Inside...

A Roundtable on Craig and Logevall’s *America’s Cold War*
The Creation of the Bureau of African Affairs
Vice President Nixon and the Bureau of African Affairs

...and much more!
Passport
The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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The SHAFR Council has proposed revisions of the society’s electoral procedures. To study the issue, President Frank Costigliola in 2009 appointed an Ad Hoc Committee on Electoral Reform including Richard Immerman (chair), Catherine Forslund, Arnold Offner, Meredith Oyen, Tom Schwartz, and Kathryn Statler. The Ad Hoc Committee investigated SHAFR’s election procedures, interviewed former officers and former Nominating Committee members, and explored electoral procedures in other historical organizations. The Ad Hoc Committee presented its findings and recommendations to Council in January 2010. Council discussed the matter at length at its January and June 2010 meetings and, at the latter gathering in Madison, unanimously approved a number of proposed reforms.

Several of the reforms approved by Council require amendments to the Society’s official By-Laws. According to the By-Laws, amendments must be approved by a majority vote of Council and a concurring majority vote of members participating in a mail ballot. Accordingly, Council directed that the proposed By-Laws amendments should be submitted to the membership for approval or disapproval during the 2010 election cycle. If approved in 2010, the amendments would take effect in the 2011 election.

The 2010 Referendum Ballot will present individually the proposed amendments to the By-Laws that Council approved. Members will be invited to vote YES or NO on each provision. The proposed reforms are enumerated below. (Bold font indicates changes; new words are underlined.)

1) Article II, Section 5(a) shall be amended to allow SHAFR annual elections to be held by mail or electronic means. If this measure gains majority approval, Article II, Section 5(a) shall read:

Elections shall be held annually by mail or electronic ballot. The candidate for each office who receives the highest number of votes is elected. When more than two nominees are slated for a particular office, a run-off election will be held between the candidates with the two highest vote totals.

2) Article II, Section 5(e) shall be amended to advance the date for mailing the election ballot from September 15 to August 15. If this measure gains majority approval, Article II, Section 5(e) shall read:

The Chair of the Nominating Committee shall certify the names to be placed on the ballot to the Executive Director by August 15. The Executive Director shall mail the completed election ballot to the membership not later than August 15 for return by October 31. The election results, certified by the Nominating Committee, shall be announced as expeditiously as possible.

3) Article II, Section 5 shall be expanded to include several new provisions regarding the nominations process, restrictions, and authority. If these measures gain majority approval, Article II, Section 5 shall include the following sub-sections:

- **(f)** If a SHAFR member is nominated and placed on the ballot, but fails to win election, he or she shall wait one year before being nominated again for the same or a different office.

- **(g)** Following the expiration of their tenure, Council members must wait three years before seeking nomination again.

- **(h)** The president and vice president shall not submit nominations while holding office. SHAFR officers should not sit in on Nominating Committee meetings or have contact with Nominating Committee members regarding nominees.

- **(i)** The authority for administering the election rests with the Nominating Committee. In addition to soliciting nominations and constructing the ballot, the Nominating Committee shall acquire from the candidates statements and biographical data; enforce all election guidelines; respond to all questions; work with the SHAFR Business Office to circulate the ballot, reminders, and other notifications; receive from the webmaster the electronic results; and transmit the results to the SHAFR Business Office. The Nominating Committee shall refer all disputes to the Council.

- **(j)** SHAFR endows the Nominating Committee with full responsibility and authority for constructing the ballot and both the nominating and election process.

4) Article III, Section 1 shall be amended to limit the president and vice president to one term in office. If this measure gains majority approval, Article III, Section 1 shall read:

The President shall supervise the work of all committees, formulate policies for presentation to the Council, and execute its decisions. He or she shall appoint the members of the Program Committee and of special committees, commissions, and boards. He or she shall sign all documents requiring official certification. The President shall be ex officio a member of the Council and shall preside at all Membership and Council meetings at which he or she is present. A retiring President shall retain membership on the Council for three years after the expiration of his or her term of Office as President. The president and vice president shall be limited to one term in office.

5) Article IV, Section 1 shall be amended to increase the number of elected Council members by one. If this measure is approved by the membership in 2010, the 2011 ballot will be constructed so that one of the three Council races will be for a two year (2012-2013) term of office. Given that our current two graduate student members were elected to terms ending in 2011 and 2012, such a staggered start of the new seat will result in a consistent number of Council members rotating on and off of Council in future years. If this measure gains majority approval, Article IV, Section 1 shall read:

The Council of the Society shall consist of (a) those officers or former officers of the Society who, in accordance with Article III of the By-Laws, serve ex officio as members of the Council; (b) seven (seven) members (three year terms) elected by the members of the Society and (c) two graduate student members (three year terms) elected by the members of the Society. In the event of a vacancy on the Council caused by death or resignation, the vacancy shall be filled at the next annual election.

The referendum on the above amendments to the By-Laws will be mailed in late summer 2010 to all members.

The final draft of the Ad Hoc Committee’s report, as approved by Council in June 2010, will be posted through the end of 2010 at www.shafr.org/about/governance/.

The full text of the SHAFR By-Laws are posted on-line at http://www.shafr.org/about/governance/by-laws/.
On his 2004 album, the rapper Mos Def recorded a song titled “Champion’s Requiem.” The first verse describes the fantasy of a passionate basketball spectator-turned-participant:

I stepped on the court from no league, just home team
I jumped out the stands and I snatched the rock
With the final seconds—one to land—on the clock
Mos posted up to throw up the game-winning shot
I put it through the net and let the world’s jaw drop
Then fled the arena before they called cops
Tell the players and the coach I wasn’t tryin’ to blow spot
But the way they was ballin’ made it difficult to watch.

Although this song was written more than fifty years after the inauguration of Dwight Eisenhower, it describes the way that many historians, including me, conceived of the role that Richard Nixon played in the overall development of Eisenhower’s Africa policy and, specifically, in the creation of the Bureau of African Affairs. Of particular import is the notion that Nixon spurred the creation of the African Bureau upon his return from the Continent in early 1957. In his official report on the trip, Nixon recommended that the State Department create a separate bureau. Although the 1958 NEA and transformed it into a distinct unit very clear:

The justification for the creation of this new Bureau includes three basic reasons: (1) the increasing world significance of political, economic, and social developments in Africa, (2) the importance of Africa to the United States, and (3) the growing need to counter unfriendly influences which are showing increasing interest in Africa.

The push toward greater autonomy for staff dealing with African issues also reverberated across the Atlantic as America increased its presence on the continent: “[In FY fiscal year] 1956, two posts (Tunis and Rabat) were raised to the status of diplomatic missions. In FY 1957, one additional post (Accra) was raised from consular to diplomatic status and four new posts were established (Abidjian, Yaounde, Kampala, and Mogadiscio).”

Yet the growth of American posts in Africa did not necessarily represent an increase in respect for, or warm feelings toward Africa’s indigenous peoples. Like Nixon, many of the individuals in the State Department took a dim view of Africans and the very idea of African independence. For example, many of the participants in a 1950 meeting in Madagascar of American officials and members of the State Department voiced the typical elite outrage regarding the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya and expressed sympathy for the white settlers.

This attitude prevailed even though at this point no one considered Communism to be a major threat on the continent. In many ways, the most pressing concern for the thought process behind the new bureau, congressional testimony by State Department officials made the reasons for the development of a
Eisenhower administration officials was figuring out effective ways to explain U.S. diplomacy to colonial officials and settlers rather than to the “natives.” Of course, this view was not unanimous. Some American officials argued against a “Europe-first” approach to African affairs, while some suggested a timetable for African independence.7

Over the course of the decade, however, members of the Office of African Affairs and the larger NEA sensed the changing mood on the continent, recognized the creeping potential of Communism and acknowledged the need to dialogue with the “natives.” Again, congressional testimony demonstrates this shift. “It is our government’s policy to encourage and assist the states of this area in the orderly development toward self-government or independence and to help establish positive programs in the newly independent states of Africa which will assist them to remain strong and free of unfriendly outside interferences,” one official wrote.8 The report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which supported the legislation necessary for the creation of the African Bureau, went even further:

The raw materials of Africa are vital to the American industrial machine. . . . Africa is important to us militarily. We have bases in Libya and Morocco as well as military installations in Ethiopia. These are vital links in the chain of defense of the Free World. The Communists and other unfriendly elements are courting the emerging nations of Africa. . . . These unfriendly influences pose a serious danger to the United States, for if the Communists are successful, a large portion of the world’s area and the world’s resources would be lost to the Free World; untold millions would come under the Communist yoke. These competing claims for the African mind demand immediate attention. . . . Under the existing departmental organization there are occasions when the more urgent—but in the long run not necessarily more important—problems of the Near East and South Asian area demand and receive prompt consideration to the detriment of African problems which are deferred. This bill will go far to correct that situation.9

Moreover, increased activism and pressures from Africans and African Americans for a change in the global status quo motivated officials in

Foggy Bottom to expand their field of vision, if not their world view.

**Black Activism and the Growing Importance of Africa**

Activism by blacks on both sides of the Atlantic was key in the evolution of the African Bureau. In 1949, Olu Awani, a Nigerian student enrolled at the University of California, caused a minor sensation when he was arrested in Flagstaff, Arizona, for objecting to a restaurant’s refusal to serve him a meal. The fallout was such that the governor alerted the State Department, while groups like the Arizona Council of Churches and the Arizona Council for Civic Unity felt compelled to write letters of apology to the British government for the mistreatment of a British subject.10 A year later, Horace Mann Bond, president of historically black Lincoln University, contacted the State Department seeking funds to establish an Institute of African Studies on his campus.11 In 1953, the NAACP insisted that the State Department officially recognize a pending visit by Kwame Nkrumah as a matter of “national interest.” An NEA staffer wrote a memorandum seeking guidance regarding the NAACP’s request and conceded that “[the Office of African Affairs] has been under increasing pressure in recent months from various quarters, including certain American Negroes in positions of some influence, to strengthen our ties with the Gold Coast.”12 A number of State Department officials began to revisit the significance of Africa in the department as these events dovetailed with others, like the pointed African responses to the American school desegregation crises, the Emmett Till lynching, and African American agitation regarding human rights at home and abroad.13

In addition, State Department documents indicate that the Afro-Asian Conference of 1955 (also known as the “Bandung Conference” for the city in which it was held) was among the most provocative manifestations of global activism in this period. The conference was the idea of a small group of South and East Asian leaders who decided in December 1954 that representatives of new or emerging nations (or nationalist movements) in Africa and Asia should meet to discuss an alternative to the Cold War. When they announced that the conference would take place in April 1955 and that President Sukarno of Indonesia would serve as host, Eisenhower administration officials grew deeply concerned. They were worried about the impact it would have on what they considered to be the larger issue of Soviet containment. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, CIA Director Allen Dulles, and twelve other officials met in January 1955 and debated the viability of undermining the Bandung conference. One of their great fears was that it would become “an excellent forum to broadcast Communist ideology to a naíve audience in the guise of anti-colonialism.” At the conclusion of the meeting, Secretary Dulles summed up the general position that the administration would take, at least initially.

The Secretary said that Egypt is the key to the success or failure of the Conference, but that the price of wrecking the Afro-Asian Conference by using our influence in Egypt might be extremely high. He then elaborated the U.S. position on the subject as follows: if, without using strong-arm methods we can prevent the Conference from taking place we would welcome this outcome; but we are not prepared openly to oppose it or to threaten lest such a posture elicit an unwanted counter reaction. . . . If the Arab bloc decides to attend the Conference, their decision will tip the balance, and many other states such as Thailand and Japan will want to attend. Should this occur, the U.S. should establish as many contacts as possible with the friendly countries attending . . . in an effort to propose courses of action which would embarrass Communist China and minimize the danger that the Conference might lead to the formation of an Asian-African bloc which could ultimately weaken relations between non-Communist Asia and the United States.14

Because a copy of the meeting notes was forwarded to NEA, it appears that the Office of African Affairs was not represented at the meeting.15 If that is the case, its absence would be another indication of the way in which most high-ranking Eisenhower officials placed African matters on the bureaucratic periphery.

The Bandung Conference “represented a potential paradigm shift in international relations,” and its planning and staging forced the State Department to change tactics with respect to Asian and African self-determination.16 In 1956, NEA approved an interim reorganization of the Office of African Affairs that
took effect on September 10 of that year. By January 1957, the State Department had submitted its FY 1958 budget, which included an entirely separate budget for Africa.17

The incidence of black and brown activism at home and abroad over this five- to six-year period showed many members of the State Department that the institution needed to change with a changing world and indicates that the agitation of peoples of color had an earlier and deeper catalyzing effect on the State Department than Nixon’s post-trip report. Travel to Africa did play a role in prompting the changes in the State Department, but the impetus for change came from travel by other government personnel, and they took their trips years before Nixon’s sojourn to the continent. Nixon’s credibility with respect to Africa manifested itself only after his trip to the continent in early 1957. He seemed to know or care little about Africa before that. According to at least one scholar, in the transitional days between the first and second Eisenhower administrations Nixon was hunting around for something to do. Apparently, a trip to Africa fit the bill.

Going to That Undiscovered Country

First-hand contact with the continent during the first half of the 1950s led a number of State officials to reconsider the Europe-first approach to African matters. Reports like the one filed in 1951 by E. H. Bourgerie, who was director of the Office of African Affairs at the time, noted the racial tensions and rising nationalism in Anglophone Africa.19 Although these accounts probably fell on deaf ears in the upper echelons of the department, they gradually gained traction over time. In the summer of 1956, George V. Allen, assistant secretary of state for NEA, informed Secretary of State Dulles that:

[a]s a result of my recent visit to Africa, I recommend certain organizational changes in NEA to take into account the increased and constantly growing importance of that Continent. As you know, a good many suggestions from members of Congress, businessmen, and racial and religious groups have supported the idea of an Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. This would involve a larger reorganization of the Department than is presently required. . . . Meanwhile it seems to me that the following action could be taken promptly, without undue organizational problems.20

Allen laid out the initial steps for creating the African Bureau and buttressed discussions about reorganizing African Affairs that had taken place earlier that year.21 Within three months of Allen’s memo to Foster Dulles, the department created the position of deputy assistant secretary for African affairs and divided the Office of African Affairs into two: an Office of Northern African Affairs and an Office of Southern African Affairs.22

Actors within the State Department rationalized this transition thusly:

The Department of State has been concerned that the profound developments occurring on the Continent of Africa require more recognition and coverage in the conduct of our foreign relations with African countries. The organizational structure within the Department must be realigned to provide an independent echelon to conduct our international relations with the peoples of Africa equal to that of other great geographic areas.23

Clearly, the increasing importance that NEA staffers acceded U.S.–Africa relations had galvanized the entire department.

Show Me the Money!

The evolution of State’s organizational structure was even more visible through the federal budget process. In spring 1956, Loy Henderson, deputy undersecretary of state for administration, asked State Department officers to cobble together their budgets for 1957 and 1958.24 During this process, NEA staff members carved out a budget specifically for the prospective African Bureau, and in October 1956, they wrote to the director about the need for legislation to create an assistant secretary position for the new bureau. “Such legislation should be introduced early in the next Congressional session and before we appear before the House Appropriations Committee in late January or February on our 1958 budget,” they advised.25 The FY 1958 budget “included the request for funds to establish an independent bureau,” and in its report to Congress the House Committee on Appropriations “recommended necessary funds for the establishment of the Bureau of African Affairs.”26

In the 1950s, Congress criticized the State Department for overspending its budget.27 But the department, which was slowly recovering from the McCarthy attacks and the Alger Hiss debacle, was ready to grow.28 It also wanted Congress to understand that its budgets were simply guidance in an uncertain world; depending on the challenges of a particular year, expenditures could far exceed earlier projections.29 One way to deal with this issue was to break up NEA and create another bureau, with a separate assistant secretary, analytical and diplomatic personnel, and operational staff.30

Although optimism about the reformulation of NEA was palpable, staffers were aware of the financial crisis facing the State Department. Members of Congress and the Bureau of the Budget complained openly about State’s large expenditures and repeated requests for additional funds. State pared down its budget requests, but William Rountree, Allen’s successor as assistant secretary of state for NEA, continued to press for additional staff. He contacted Loy Henderson in the hopes that he would lobby for a restoration of thirteen positions that the future bureau, now referred to as the “AF,” would need. “These positions will allow a minimum staff on economic and political activities in the bureau and will provide for the needed increases in the field especially in communications where workload has increased during the past 12 months as much as 50% in some posts,” Rountree wrote.31 Members of Congress would note the costs of the proposed departmental changes as they moved the legislation forward:

Following the creation of the self-contained area of African Affairs within the office of the Assistant Secretary of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs last August, 39 positions were transferred from the latter office to the new Area. Also, pursuant
to appropriations granted by Congress, 22 new positions were established; 20 of these have now been filled. The fiscal year 1959 appropriation request proposes raising the number of authorized positions in Washington to 70. . . . The 1959 appropriation request raises the number of U.S. nationals employed in the field from an existing 224 . . . to 296. . . . Local employees will be raised from 250 to 300.52

In August 1958, when the Office of African Affairs had finally become a reality, the NEA's Charles Manning confirmed the costliness of the departmental expansion as he documented the reassignment of personnel in an eighteen-page memorandum in which he meticulously recorded each employee's name, date of birth, title, prior position, and salary.53

Through the Halls of Power

A thorough examination of the history of the enabling legislation further supports the notion that the creation of the African Bureau was an iterative process prodded by many factors rather than a spontaneous impulse fostered by a single elected official. Public Law 85-524 established the African Bureau after a brief incubation period and a fifteen-month voyage through Congress. The winter of 1956 had witnessed some consternation in Foggy Bottom for the leadership of the proposed African Bureau. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported favorably on the bill on April 9 and the entire Senate passed it three days later. Although the House Committee on Foreign Affairs received the bill on April 15, it languished for a while as the chamber considered a foreign aid bill.35

State Department officials like Charles Manning, Loy Henderson, and Joseph Palmer testified before the Foreign Affairs Committee, lobbied individual members of Congress, and met with congressional clerks to help expedite the legislative process.36 Palmer, who would later become the first U.S. ambassador to Nigeria, went to Capitol Hill to nudge the bill forward by testifying before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations.37 Loy Henderson told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that “the African continent is changing rapidly and the tempo is difficult to determine. Our future interests in Africa are bound to increase and the long-term attitude of the population of Africa is of very real significance in our general world position.”38 It is worth noting that at this juncture the Eisenhower administration was increasingly concerned about the “attitude” of Africans towards America; Henderson's comments came a year after Aurtherine Lucy's aborted attempt to desegregate the University of Alabama and a few months before Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus' showdown with the Little Rock Nine. A month later, Henderson met with Representative John J. Rooney, Republican from New York, and “reminded him that his Committee in its Report . . . last spring had included “necessary funds for . . . the establishment of the Bureau of African Affairs.” Henderson went on to say that “our need for strengthening our activities in the Department with regard to Africa is so great that we contemplated setting up a semiautonomous area for African Affairs . . . for the time being.” Representative Rooney apparently replied “that it seemed to him that such a procedure was logical and that he could perceive no objection to it.”39 As the House sat on the enabling legislation, NEA—despite its confidence that the bill would finally become law40—employed its fall-back position and instituted a provisional reorganization that created a “semi-autonomous” African Affairs unit within NEA.41 NEA officials also volunteered to “pare down the 1958 budget estimate”42 and reached out to Washington insiders for help. Even one of President Eisenhower’s most trusted aides was asked to provide some insight regarding the bill. Clarence Randall, chair of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, wrote to Sherman Adams, and Adams replied that he had: made a check on the Bureau of African Affairs proposal mentioned in your April 16 memo to me. It is in good shape. The foreign aid bill is in the way at the moment. . . . As soon as the foreign aid bill clears the House, I think the way is clear for this bill. . . . Committee judgment has been that to attempt this bill before the foreign aid bill would be a tactical blunder.43

A few weeks later, another staff member received a tip about Representative Frances Bolton, a Republican from Ohio. “Mrs. Bolton is an important member of the Committee and is highly respected. She might be an important instrument . . . in getting the proposed bill adopted.”44

On May 28, 1958, the Foreign Affairs Committee reported favorably on the bill after a unanimous vote. Bolton introduced the enabling legislation on June 25, and, perhaps because of her insistence on the urgency of the bill, the House held a roll call vote on the following day. Although 224 members voted in favor of passage—with 145 nays and 61 abstentions—the bill lacked the requisite two-thirds majority. However, it passed on July 10, and the president signed it into law eight days later.45 Once Congress passed the enabling legislation, the exodus of personnel from NEA to the African Bureau began.46 These transferred staff members served as the foundation of the new bureau; they would oversee the nearly two dozen new employees whose job positions were part of the FY 1958 budget.47 Finally, on August 20, 1958, President Eisenhower brought the process to a conclusion by nominating Joseph Satterthwaite to become the first assistant secretary in charge of the African Bureau.48

Conclusion

Based on Nixon’s status within the administration, it is easy to infer a connection between his 1957 Africa trip and the birth of the African Bureau a year later. However, the archival record clearly indicates that the vice president played no direct role in the formation of the State Department’s African Bureau. Many factors contributed to the myth that he was responsible for the bureau. First, as Representative Bolton noted in her remarks on the floor of the House as she presented the enabling legislation, Nixon openly declared the need for a stand-alone organization for Africa within the
State Department in his April 5, 1957, report to the president regarding his trip to the continent. But State Department records indicate that Nixon’s declaration came ten months after George Allen made a similar statement to Foster Dulles and almost a year after the creation of a separate budget for the AF. Second, as Nixon burnished his status as an Africa “expert,” he probably enhanced his image as the prime advocate for African affairs within the administration by denigrating the State Department. According to a number of scholars, Nixon harbored a “lifelong” distrust of the State Department, which he referred to as the “Confusion Castle.” Perhaps he truly believed that he was thinking with greater clarity and sense of purpose about Africa than anyone in Foggy Bottom. Third, Nixon was clearly a forceful and very vocal presence in policy meetings regarding Africa that were attended by administration officials who, with a few exceptions, had never traveled to Africa. His first-hand experience as a direct observer on the continent gave him a privileged status, and his advocacy for increased focus on Africa led most in the executive branch—and, later, most scholars—to conclude that he was the driving force behind all of the changes that the administration made with respect to Africa.

It should be noted that Nixon’s advocacy of a greater focus on African affairs did not stem from a belief in racial equality. On the contrary, he used his privileged status to reinforce the assumptions and prejudices of the predominantly white bureaucratic corps regarding blacks. At a 1960 NSC meeting he stated that “[s]ome of the peoples of Africa have been out of the trees for only about fifty years,” and meeting notes indicate that no one challenged him. In fact, in the same meeting the administration’s director of the Bureau of the Budget, Maurice Stans, said that “while claiming any expertise . . . he had formed the impression that many Africans still belonged in the trees.” It is interesting that Stans had traveled to Africa at least a decade before Nixon yet deferred to the vice president as an “expert.”

The notion that Nixon bore sole or primary responsibility for the African Bureau is closer to Mos Def’s “Champion’s Requiem” than it is to demonstrable fact. It is a story about a reluctant hero who saves the day just as his favorite team is facing potential defeat. Nixon saw himself as saving the Eisenhower administration from overlooking a potentially dangerous battleground in emerging Africa. Although the real story of the birth of the African Bureau is less heroic, it remains fascinating because of the subleties it reveals in the behavior of Washington bureaucracies.

First, a close review of the document trail confirms that American leaders do not simply act out of reasoned principles but from self-interest, blurred perceptions, and misunderstandings. The State Department’s effort to create the African Bureau was prompted in part by a desire to enhance its reputation and increase its size during the early Cold War. The struggles of oppressed peoples in America and other parts of the world did play a part in the transformation of the Office of African Affairs into the African Bureau, even if many State Department officials misread these events as Communist-inspired or as fodder for Communist expansion. And as other scholars have noted, the presence of Adam Clayton Powell and Carl Rowan at the Bandung Conference led officials in the State Department to take African matters more seriously and to realize that they could develop a proactive approach to Africa if they had enough personnel dedicated to that mission.

Second, the real story of the AF’s creation shows that no government is monolithic. Granted, the language in the House Foreign Relations Committee’s report on the enabling legislation sounded much like the administration’s guiding papers on decolonization generally and on diplomacy toward sub-Saharan Africa in particular. Nevertheless, the meticulous strategizing, planning, and lobbying for the new bureau suggest that the desire to create it was not shared by everyone in the State Department, let alone the Eisenhower administration. It also highlights the independent role that Congress played in Cold War diplomacy.

Third, this story reveals that even minor historical change often occurs at the confluence of forces across the political spectrum rather than at the hands of a single person. Despite the general consensus within the corridors of the federal government about the need to wage a Cold War or the inferior status of blacks, members of the legislative and executive branches disagreed on how best to achieve Cold War aims when dealing with Africa. Outside the halls of power, individuals and organizers wondered about America’s commitment to its ideals, while others wondered whether allegiance to either camp in the Cold War was a viable path to global development. Even though they were not acting in concert, the efforts of all of these groups influenced the evolution of the State Department.

In sum, the assumption that Richard Nixon spurred the creation of the African Bureau appears to be without merit. The basic perception that Nixon had of the “home team” playing the African Cold War game poorly is contradicted by the reality that members of the State Department saw the world in much the same way as the vice president and were trying to play the game to the best of their abilities. Although Nixon cast a shadow over U.S.–Africa relations during the second Eisenhower administration, he was not instrumental in creating the African Bureau and was only one of many who shaped the administration’s Africa diplomacy. If the prize in this particular game was taking Africa more seriously within the policymaking world, the founders of the African Bureau did not need Nixon to make a “game-winning move.” Indeed, in this case Nixon was not even playing ball on the same court as the staffs at NEA.

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Notes:
2. George White, Jr., Holding the Line: Race, Racism, and American Foreign Policy Toward Africa, 1953-1961 (Lanham, MD, 2005), 20 (referring to Gray’s comments in the April 17, 1960 memorandum of the 440th meeting of the National Security Council).
4. Memorandum from Palmer to Henderson, transmitting “Principal Witness Statements of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Before the House Foreign Relations Committee On House Bill S. 1832 to Authorize An Additional Assistant Secretary of State,” July 26, 1957, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, p. 2, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.

7. See, for example, letter from Theodore Achilles to Joseph Satterthwaite, September 4, 1953, and response from Satterthwaite, October 10, 1953; General Records of the Department of State, Minutes and Notes of the Secretary’s Staff Meetings, 1952-1961, RG 59, NACP; John Haynes, Jr., memorandum excerpting the conversation between Foster Dulles and Ambassador Makins in which they expressed a negative reaction to Mason Sears’ report on Trusteeship in East Africa, February 11, 1955, Executive Secretariat Conference Files and Briefing Books 1949-76, The Secretary’s and Undersecretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, 1953-64, RG 59, NACP.

8. Memorandum from Palmer to Henderson, transmitting “Principal Witness States of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration Before the House Foreign Relations Committee On House Bill S. 1832 to Authorize An Additional Assistant Secretary of State,” July 26, 1957, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, p. 3, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.

9. Report of the House Foreign Relations Committee On House Bill S. 1832 to Authorize An Additional Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, p.4, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.

10. Letter from Governor Dan Garvey to Raymond Hare, Acting Assistant Secretary, April 12, 1950, General Records of the Office of African Affairs, 1950-1956, Correspondence Files of the Office of Southern Affairs, 1956-1957, RG 59, NACP.


14. “Memorandum of Conversation, January 7th: Subject Afro-Asian Conference,” January 14, 1955, Executive Secretariat Conference Files and Briefing Books, 1949-76, the Secretary’s and Undersecretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, 1953-64, RG 59, NACP. 15. Ibid.


24. Secretary Staff Meeting Notes, March 27, 1956, paragraph entitled “Estimate for FY 58 Budget,” General Records of the Department of State, Minutes and Notes of the Secretary’s Staff Meetings, 1952-1961, RG 59, NACP.

25. Memorandum from Ryan through Berry to Rountree re: Enabling Legislation for the Position of Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, October 25, 1956, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.


27. Secretary Staff Meeting Notes, May 17, 1956, paragraph 2, entitled “Administration of the Department,” General Records of the Department of State, Minutes and Notes of the Secretary’s Staff Meetings, 1952-1961, RG 59, NACP.

28. See generally Morten Bach and Korkaihe Hale, “‘What He Is Speaks So Loud That I Can’t Hear What He is Saying’” R.W. Scott McLeod and the Long Shadow of Joe McCarthy,” The Historian 72, no. 1 (Spring 2010): 67-95. 29. Ibid.; see also Secretary Staff Meeting Notes, August 9, 1956, General Records of the Department of State, Minutes and
Notes of the Secretary’s Staff Meetings, 1952-1961, Entry 1609, RG 59, NACP.
30. See, e.g., memorandum to Rountree from Rountree to Palmer, April 3, 1958, and memorandum from Manning to Palmer, May 2, 1958, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.
32. Undated, “Committee Action,” pp. 5-6, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.
33. “Mass Transfer Request,” August 20, 1958, memorandum from Manning to Stuart, Bureau of African Affairs Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-1959, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.
34. Memorandum from Ryan through Berry to Rountree, November 14, 1956, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.
35. See, e.g., memorandum to Manning from Rountree, November 14, 1956, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.
36. See, e.g., memorandum from Manning to Palmer, April 3, 1958, and memorandum from LaMont to Palmer, May 2, 1958, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.
37. “An Excerpt from the Testimony of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Before the House Subcommittee on Appropriations, Wednesday, January 29, 1959,” Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.
38. Memorandum from Palmer to Henderson re: Principal Witness Statement for Presentation to the House Foreign Relations Committee on the Authorization of an Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,” July 26, 1957, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, p. 4, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.
39. Loy Henderson Memorandum of Conversation with Congressman Rooney, August 12, 1957, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.
40. “Status Report – Bureau of African Affairs,” from Ryan to Rountree, June 27, 1957, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.
41. Henderson memorandum of conversation with Congressman Rooney, August 12, 1957, Record Group 59, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.
42. Memorandum from Rountree to Henderson re: “Allocation of Fiscal Year 1958 Funds for the Bureau of African Affairs,” August 8, 1957, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.
43. Memorandum for Clarence Randall from Sherman Adams, April 24, 1958, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.
44. Memorandum from George D. LaMont to Joseph Palmer re: “Assistant Secretaryship for AF,” May 2, 1958, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.
46. “Mass Transfer Request” memorandum from Manning to Stuart, August 20, 1958, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, pp. 1-18, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.
47. “Chronology – Development of African Affairs Organization,” Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-1959, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.
48. Department of State Press Release no. 579, August 20, 1958, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.
49. “Remarks for Mrs. Bolton in Presenting S. 1832,” June 25, 1958, Bureau of African Affairs, Staff Papers on Country Posts, 1956-9, Correspondence Files, RG 59, NACP.
52. See, for example, Richard Immerman, Empire for Liberty: A History of American Imperialism from Benjamin Franklin to Paul Wolfowitz (Princeton, 2010).
53. White, Holding the Line, 29-33 (regarding NSC 162/2 and NSC 5719/1).
54. See, for example, David J. Robert, Congress and the Cold War (New York, 2006).
Historians are facing an increase of unprecedented proportions in the number of records, as well as significant changes in the types of records, which together comprise the fundamental building blocks of our craft. An explosion in documentation and subjects is already under way and will expand rapidly as historians increasingly address issues beyond the 1960s. Moreover, documents created, stored, and accessed in digital formats are altering the evidentiary base of the profession, and changes in historiography have vastly expanded the types of issues that historians study. Additionally, interpretative approaches will no doubt continue to multiply. This combination of expanding documentation, the ‘digital turn,’ and historiographical diversification raises practical, methodological, and epistemological questions of fundamental interest to all historians.

One key factor in this explosion is an increase in the size and number of the organizations we study. Notwithstanding trends within the profession over the last generation, the nation-state remains a basic unit of analysis for historians, and since 1960, the number of nations has nearly doubled. Another indicator of the expanding scope of transnational intercourse is the enormous increase in international governmental organizations and international non-governmental organizations. In the last fifty years the number of IGOs and INGOs has grown by approximately 1000 percent. The United Nations Yearbook, a good general indicator of the quantity of interaction on major issues of international import, has doubled in length (even as its print size was reduced) over the last half-century. The U.S. Department of State and other foreign ministries have greatly expanded in size, scope, and complexity. The organizational charts in figures 1-6 graphically illustrate the increased number of issues necessitating sustained international negotiation, a number also reflected in the proliferation of bureaus, offices, envoys, and special assistants. Another aspect of this expansive trend is the increased involvement of ostensibly domestic actors overseas. For example, the number of federal agencies represented at medium-sized and large U.S. embassies has increased substantially over the last half-century. This trend is not limited to the U.S. government; the Diplomatic List compiled by the State Department indicates that the size of staffs assigned to embassies in Washington has also increased significantly in recent decades.

As would be expected given such massive expansion, the amount of documentation generated by government entities has skyrocketed in recent decades. A 2007 Atlantic article by Graeme Wood outlines the general parameters of government document production. Since 1980 the number of pages declassified has varied from approximately 20 million to 200 million per year. The number of documents classified has ranged between 2 million and 20 million per year over the last three decades. The graph accompanying the Wood article illustrates the overall trends in arresting fashion. A few other examples from the U.S. government provide a sense of the scope involved. In order to fulfill its annual declassification obligation for retired documents scheduled to be transferred to the National Archives, the Department of State must review a minimum of 60,000 pages per week. The National Archives now has available online millions of documents, including over 1.2 million State Department records (mostly cables) dating from the three-and-a-half-year span between mid-1973 and December 1976. The Department of State alone, a relatively small executive branch agency, currently produces over one million cables and over two billion emails per year.

This explosion of documentation is not limited to the U.S. government or American institutions. An increasing number of governments, international organizations, multinational corporations, private voluntary organizations, and individuals has generated a corresponding increase in documentation. Moreover, standards and approaches to records retention vary widely, and many organizations have no legal requirements to preserve key records at all.

Historiographical changes have had an impact on diplomatic/international/transnational history as much as any other specialty within the profession. Readers of Passport are sufficiently familiar with this transformation to obviate the necessity of going into detail here. It is not only specialist journals such as Diplomatic History, The International History Review, and International Organization that reflect this expansion of the gaze of diplomatic history; national flagship publications such as the American Historical Review, Revue d’histoire moderne.
Growth of Department of State Bureaucracy

1961
38 Boxes

Source: Department of State

2009
54 Boxes

Source: Department of State
Growth in the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations

Chart 1. Organization Structure: Itamaraty 1961

1961
37 Boxes


SECRETARIA DE ESTADO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES segundo o Anexo II do Dec. 5.979, de 6 de dezembro de 2006

2009
155 Boxes

Source: Brazilian Ministry of External Relations
An increasingly voluminous segment of the archives is being populated by “born digital” records—documents that have existed for their entire lifecycle in digital form. These records pose special challenges.

Be difficult to trace interventions as a document is initiated and brought forward through the policymaking process. It is also possible to enter a document retroactively and delete or add comments (or even amend the text). Do procedures exist to protect the integrity of the “creation narrative” of a document? How do we assess electronic marginalia?

Where and to whom was a document sent? As we have all learned from email, electronic documents may be sent inadvertently to unintended recipients and may not be sent to the intended recipients, and we are not always sure if communications are received. Do electronic recordkeeping systems address such transmission issues?

Can we be sure the recipient(s) read the document? In the world of electronic communications, “received” does not necessarily mean “read.” The same is true for traditional paper records as well, but we have all had the experience of returning to our desks after some time away to discover an inordinate number of messages populating the inbox. The sheer quantity of messages discussed in this article suggests an increased likelihood that the decision-makers we study will, either inadvertently or intentionally, delete before reading. How can we know?

Can we be sure that the recipient responded and that the sender received and read the recipient’s response? These issues outlined in the three paragraphs above may recur once messages move from the inbox to the outbox. Will there be reliable ways to trace the path of a document?

When someone makes a decision, will the approval be preserved in a “copy of record”? Again, the ubiquity and ease of amending of electronic records, especially multi-authored documents as well as records housed on shared systems, can make it difficult to determine the final version of a document. How will we know which is the “real” one?

Which records are retained permanently? Practices vary widely within governments, to say nothing of non-government actors. Some federal government agencies are putting in place communications systems that facilitate use, but the capacity to identify and retain records of permanent value remains to be demonstrated.

What sort of advantages and disadvantages do electronic finding aids present for researchers? On the one hand, it is possible (depending on how robust the search program is) to perform research by date, sender, recipient, topic, name, and place. However, many electronic systems incorporate as a central feature some sort of categorization scheme (in the case of State Department records now available on line from the National Archives website it is the TAGS system). This procedure depends on someone determining at the time the document is created under which identifiers a record will be cataloged. What happens to a document that is misclassified and ends up in one of the many categories scheduled for automatic deletion before records are retired to the archives? How are researchers to find documents when the categorization scheme changes over time, deleting some identifiers and adding others?

Will electronic documents be available on a stable platform, and how do researchers cite them? Will archival hosts provide sufficient support for e-records in regularized formats, and are there standardized, recognized citation guidelines that will remain coherent over time?

A fourth type of digital document is the non-textual record and what
we might call the “semi-textual” record. These records may be in a variety of formats, including satellite images, data streams, and telemetry; videotapes and videoconferences (used routinely by the military); PowerPoint presentations (for which the accompanying notes may or may not be saved); mobile telephone communications; mobile digital communications (from devices such as the BlackBerry); and social media services (such as blogs, Twitter, YouTube, RSS feeds, Facebook, tagging, folksonomies, photo sharing services like Flickr, and podcasts).25 How these kinds of records should be categorized, sorted, retained, and evaluated for permanent preservation is an open question. Without a doubt, the quantity of this traffic is enormous, and many of the questions posed concerning “born digital” documents apply to these semi-textual and non-textual communications as well.

The documentary “Big Bang,” when combined with the rise of records in electronic form and especially the “born digital” phenomenon, presents a daunting picture for all historians. Those dedicated to transnational, comparative research agendas face particular challenges. Because their objects of study necessarily include countries, organizations and increasingly globalized issues, they must deal with a substantially larger subject base, and they are also asking more questions of the past. The evidentiary base for international historians is exploding exponentially as well. So what do we do?

The profession should deliberate upon certain questions. Most central, given the “born digital” revolution now underway, is the question, “What is a document?” This is the historian’s version of the “tree-falling-in-the-forest” question: if we cannot tell with sufficient certitude who contributed to the creation of a document, who received and read it, whether it was acted upon, or even which is the “final version” of it, does it truly constitute a “record”?26

In addition, the question of how to find the important documents—of separating the wheat from the chaff—may be an even more challenging issue in the future. A dependence on electronic searching in the absence of traditional subject-based finding aids will likely lead to idiosyncratic research results. No doubt some electronic records will have been printed out at some point and may have the kind of handwritten marginalia that can be crucial to historians’ assessment and interpretation. The official record will be retired to the archives in digital form, but may also exist in paper versions saved in various files. Locating those paper versions, however, is likely to be a hit-or-miss proposition, depending on which files a researcher utilizes.

Historians should reach out to the people we depend upon for preservation of the building blocks of our profession. It is in our own interest, to be sure, but we also have a responsibility as stewards for society at large to ensure that the creation, retention, and description functions upon which we depend are executed with comprehensive, systematic thoroughness and according to the highest professional standards.

How is the historical record altered when the creators of documents become increasingly responsible for categorizing, organizing, retaining, and making judgments about preserving those documents? Moreover, historians may have largely come to grips with the objectivity question, but how does one write any sort of persuasive history from an increasingly small percentage of the total evidentiary base? Debates about the “noble dream” rarely address the question of whether it is possible to consult the totality of documentation, especially in the many forms that researchers now face. How are we to train graduate students for a future in which it is literally not feasible for one person to read all the extant records, even for a circumscribed, (i.e. dissertation-sized) topic?

To address such issues historians should reach out to the people we depend upon for preservation of the building blocks of our profession. It is in our own interest, to be sure, but we also have a responsibility as stewards for society at large to ensure that the creation, retention, and description functions upon which we depend are executed with comprehensive, systematic thoroughness and according to the highest professional standards. First and foremost, historians should enhance their contacts with archivists. Archival expert Trudy Huskamp Peterson27 has pointed out that archivists and records management officials (whether in government or non-government positions) perform two key gatekeeper functions, both of which have a fundamental impact on historians. They hold the power to decide what to keep and what to throw away; we cannot research records that do not exist. They also have the power to tell the rest of us what they saved; it makes little difference whether something has been kept if we do not know to ask for it or if it cannot be located. Archivists have certainly been thinking about many aspects of the issues outlined in this article, especially the implications of the digital revolution and the creation of liaisons with the “content management” communities.28 Yet a joint committee of historians and archivists that played a key role in several important initiatives between the 1970s and 1990s has disbanded.29 The issues discussed in this article suggest it is time to reconstitute a cooperative relationship. Second, historians should explore avenues to engage with the bureaus responsible for records management within agencies—especially governmental agencies. Chief information officers, information resource management officials, information management systems staff, and those holding similar titles are crucial to the process of keeping track of records that are retired from active files but have yet to be archived. Those officials also play a significant role in categorizing document collections, determining which are destroyed and which are retained. Historians should understand more clearly how such decisions are made and should question the process when it appears key issues or collections may be at stake.

Finally, historians should interface in more significant ways with the information technology specialists who design modern, sophisticated communications systems. Their inclination to create the most “user-friendly” systems—a laudable goal—does not necessarily take into account the requirements for institutional memory and the longer-term, comprehensively organized recall essential to analytical historical inquiry. Asking careful questions about current systems and practices.
is a useful first step that may lead to recommendations about how to improve standards, processes, and procedures in subsequent designs.

When I started my career as a historian, I simply showed up at an archive, asked what they had for me to see, and accepted what I was given. I had no idea how many documents existed that I did not see, what had never been transferred to the archives in the first place, and what had been destroyed. From my current vantage point, which includes access to a variety of still-classified records, I have surveyed in some small measure the “pre-archival” universe. I now have a better sense of how documents are created, shared, sent, received, saved, lost, found, destroyed, recorded, and transferred. There are many steps before any government record that survives comes into the possession of the archives. The process is no doubt similar for non-governmental entities. Given the totality and the changing nature of documents that have already begun to appear in archives, and given the certainty of massive increases in number and type of records in the future, sorting out the many issues raised in this article is a task of great complexity. Historians would do well to utilize their analytical skills to assess and address the situation sooner rather than later.

Notes:
1. The interpretations in this article are the author’s and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government or Department of State. I wish to thank Office of the Historian interns Raviv Murciano-Goroff and Forrest Barnum, who helped with research and produced graphic representations of data; participants in the session I presented on this topic at the December 2009 Culture and International History Conference IV; and my co-presenters and participants at the session on electronic documents at the January 2010 American Historical Association Annual Meeting. I also benefited from discussions with colleagues at the Office of the Historian.
2. The UN had 99 members in 1960 and as of 2010 had 192, an increase of 94 percent. Not included in those figures are as of 2010 had 192, an increase of 94 percent. Not included in those figures are participants at the session on electronic documents at the January 2010 American Historical Association Annual Meeting. I also benefited from discussions with colleagues at the Office of the Historian.
3. The figures cited here are necessarily approximate, owing to definitional difficulties outlined by the editors of the Yearbook of International Organizations, accessed at http://www.uia.be/node/163541. There were fewer than 1000 international intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations in 1960; the number is now approximately 12,500. See the Yearbook of International Organizations, 43rd ed. (2006/2007), vol. 5, especially pages 33-37.
4. There were 827 pages in the 1960 UN Yearbook; the 2005 UN Yearbook, the most recent available in printed form, has 1716 pages.
6. Perennials include attachments from various arms of the Department of Defense, customs officials, agricultural development specialists, representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency, and sometimes officers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Treasury Department. More recent additions include, inter alia, personnel from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of Energy, the Department of Commerce, and the Peace Corps.
9. Wood assumes an average of ten pages per document, but the actual number of pages cannot be estimated with a high degree of confidence.
10. Communications with staff of the Department of State Office of Information Programs and Services.
13. See the World Wide Diplomatic Archives Index (http://history.state.gov/countries/archives) for a list of over 140 government websites that feature some reference to foreign policy archival holdings and/or documentation. An instructive example is the relatively young and sparsely populated nation of Fiji, which holds nearly a million documents in its government archives (see their Ministry of Information website at http://www.info.gov.fj/archives_admin.html).
14. For example, the number of international meetings, the growth of participation in international meetings, the increase of membership in international organizations, the size of secretariats, and the number of publications produced by international organizations have all increased substantially since 1960. See Yearbook of International Organizations, op.cit., especially pages 124-33, 144-6, 275-6.
15. The International Council on Archives has developed or is developing standards and best practices guidelines in several key areas, but widespread implementation has yet to occur. See http://www.ica.org/en/standards.
20. One recognized solution to this problem is to exercise “version control,” which tracks any amendments made to
a document, but how often this measure is implemented in practice is difficult to assess.

21. Of course, the issue of receipt is a concern with traditional paper documentation as well, though the simple presence of a document in a file suggests that it was at least perused sufficiently by someone to determine it should be kept. The “read receipt” function on email is intended to address this issue, but it is not foolproof, since recipients can ignore the request to confirm receipt.

22. http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/item/2009/1012/comm/fulton_smart.html. With email, for example, the systems typically will automatically save messages, but only if they are transferred to a file. Messages that reside only in the inbox are usually not retained.

23. The NARA website briefly describes TAGS: “Each document is indexed by at least twelve specific information fields, containing characters which vary in structure from free-text to controlled alphanumerics. Subject classification is controlled by an agency-wide thesaurus system, TAGS (Traffic Analysis by Geography and Subject), in existence since 1973. Other fields include an 80-character free-text description, document date, type and number of pages, issuing bureau, and classification level. Codes are also included for geographical region, organization, and subject.” Accessed at (http://www.archives.gov/preservation/technical/imaging-storage-appendix.html#fourteen).

24. This dilemma is, of course, not unique to electronic documents, but the issue of “filing” can be all the more problematic when no system exists beyond text searches, which may not convey meanings or connections between topics. Authors who have produced indexes for their own books are aware of the limitations of software in discerning conceptual relationships.

25. See, for example, the graphic below, found on the front page and many other pages of the Department of State website (http://www.state.gov/), which invites viewers to utilize multiple portals to communicate with the Department.

26. Note that archivists are considering such issues and in certain instances are drawing conclusions that some historians may find disturbing. Consider, for example, this reassessment of the definition of records in the abstract of a paper published in The American Archivist: “The meaning or meanings of ‘record,’ and the relationship of records to other concepts such as ‘evidence’ and ‘information,’ are continuing subjects of debate. This paper examines statements about the nature of the record made by writers and practitioners within the archives and records management community, and it identifies some of the ways in which understandings and emphases vary. After reviewing different attitudes to definition and the perception of meaning, it discusses the challenges of defining records in terms of evidence or information, and suggests that archivists and records managers may prefer to consider evidence and information as two of the many affordances that records provide to their users. It concludes by exploring the concept of representation and proposing an alternative characterization of records as persistent representations of activities.” See Geoffrey Yeo, “ Concepts of Record (I): Evidence, Information, and Persistent Representations.” The American Archivist 70 (Spring-Summer 2007): 32-69.

27. Conversation with author. Formerly Acting Archivist of the United States, Peterson is an international archival consultant, AHA Council member, and member of the State Department’s Historical Advisory Committee. See http://www.trudy.peterson.com/.


29. Established in 1971 to foster interaction and cooperation on mutual interests, the Joint Committee on Historians and Archivists of the American Historical Association, the Organization of American Historians, and the Society of American Archivists submitted guidelines for the resolution of disputes between archivists and historians, advocated successfully for the creation of an independent National Archives and Records Administration, and issued a report about the professional preparation of historians and archivists.
Digital History

Stephanie R. Hurter

Digital history has become a hot topic in the history world. Debate continues over whether it is a field or a method (or both), but historians continue to express excitement about its innovative possibilities, including text-mining, in-depth searching, and world-wide access to ever-increasing stores of historical sources. This burgeoning digital landscape is a brave new world for historians. However, rather than allow the technological world to control the presentation of history on the web, many innovative historians have actually shaped it. William Thomas of the University of Nebraska offers a definition of digital history that provides insight into the discipline’s proactive approach toward digital media. “[D]o digital history,” he writes, “is to create a framework, an ontology, through the technology for people to experience, read, and follow an argument about a historical problem.” Digital history is thus both a theoretical framework and a practical application, and it provides historians with a better toolset for their trade.

The historians in the Office of the Historian at the Department of State are mandated by congressional statute to publish the documentary record of U.S. foreign policy in the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series. In order to continue to do so most effectively, the office dedicated substantial resources in 2006 to developing a digital history initiative. Recognizing that it could save taxpayer funds, develop a more effective publishing framework, and expand its audience by harnessing the power of the Web, the office began moving to a more systematic e-publishing system. Fortunately, the historians in the office who had expertise in digital media realized that if history is to be truly democratic and available on the Web, the technology behind it must be developed by technologically adept historians. These historians contributed to building our Web presence by utilizing history-specific toolsets and methods for making history accessible online.

The Office of the Historian first wanted to make FRUS consistently and fully available online. The old website provided access to select FRUS volumes and important historical articles but had very limited usability. Some volumes appeared in pure HTML format, with easy-to-read text. Others appeared as PDFs, which had to be downloaded and then read from a desktop or printed out. When we began interviewing commercial database companies to see if they could standardize our FRUS publications, we quickly realized that traditional relational database models would not meet our needs. We looked at designing our own relational database in-house, but the idiosyncratic nature of our FRUS documents rendered the structured type of data required for the relational databases unworkable.

As we debated the question of how to digitize and publish FRUS online, we developed three basic goals to guide our selection of technology. We wanted it to be open, flexible, and archival. Openness was a primary concern for us because we believe that collaboration and peer review have the power to sharpen historical thinking. We also needed a platform that would be able to deal with large segments of unstructured text, would enable in-depth searching abilities, and would not clutter historical documents with technical markup that would be out of date in five to ten years. We decided to pursue nonproprietary software created by the open-source community because having software open to large communities of programmers enhances products and provides greater opportunities for content-specific enhancement. In selecting this technology we thus considered not only its immediate benefits to us, but also the long-term contribution it could make to the knowledge of the open source/historical community.

We also recognized the need for a new viewing format for our FRUS documents. We were committed to eventually making all four hundred and fifty-odd FRUS volumes from our back catalog, along with all future volumes, available in pure text (searchable) form as well as PDFs. After extensive research, we concluded that by using a “native XML database” we could create a system that would digitize our extensive catalogue, smartly index our files, and understand their complex structure so that we could search them quickly and precisely. (The product that drives our website is an open source called “eXist”; see http://exist-db.org.)

The end product is a website, history.state.gov, that currently hosts nearly fifty thousand FRUS documents, all of which can be viewed, searched, compared, and downloaded quickly. Even more important, the platform utilized to achieve these results is open source and is thus available to other historical institutions. We hope that as more historians become aware of our resources they will build upon our foundation and make eXist even stronger and more historian-friendly.

As digital historians, we also recognized that historians contextualize. Creating a website that contextualized FRUS documents satisfied some of the requirements of our second goal—flexibility. For purposes of contextualization, documents within a relational database field are separated from significant metadata elements, which are included in other fields that must then be programatically connected to their associated document fields. By using a native XML database, we determined that we could annotate a document directly, store the metadata in the document, and allow the database to do the interconnecting for us. Within each of the FRUS volumes, the database uses our annotations to create lists of people, abbreviations of important government organizations and countries, and other pertinent data from the documents. When
readers view a document on our website, they are not faced merely with a digital page of text. Through the power of semantically smart databases, they see a document surrounded with critical information that contextualizes the foreign policy environment from which the document emerged.

We also hoped that enhancing the flexibility of our database would encourage students, specialists, and general readers alike to analyze and compare documents using their own methods and that this process would lead to creative and unique conclusions. Thomas summarizes this unique strength of digital history when he says that “digital history scholarship . . . encourages readers to investigate and form interpretive associations of their own. That might be the defining characteristic of the genre.” Our database gives readers access to large amounts of content in a medium that allows for cross-linking, in-depth searching, and cross-comparison—tools that are not available to the historical researcher relying on static documents.

The third goal of our digital mission—to make our digital materials archivable—was a concern for us when we began publishing electronic-only FRUS volumes in 2005. At that time our website was part of a larger Department of State content management system (CMS). The actual FRUS documents were coded in HTML and then entered into the CMS. This system had its shortcomings. For example, some of our earliest coded documents had their footnotes hard-coded to appear blue. Because our digital age is more focused on design, each one of these documents now needed a face-lift. Fixing this problem required nothing more than staff time, but we feared that at some point in the future our documents would become so programmatically outdated that they would no longer display in newer technologies. The need for a database that would not require every document to be modified to conform to changing technology standards led us to adopt XML, which has become the new lingua-franca of the digital world. From the many flavors of XML, we chose the Text Encoding Initiative’s schema, TEI (http://tei-c.org). It is a standard form, but it allows technological innovation and advancement without confining its users to proprietary or creator-specific guidelines. Ensuring continued access and preservation of historical documents remains a clear concern for digital historians. XML provided the solution to this concern.

History.state.gov represents one history publishing program—albeit one of the largest and most prestigious in the world—that has harnessed and shaped the power of technology to meet the needs of the discipline. We invite everyone to visit our new website at http://history.state.gov and to provide feedback through email at history@state.gov. Digital history, for us, provides the best framework for providing open, flexible, and archivable materials for our users, but we represent one voice among many, and we look forward to participating in the developing conversation as historians continue to come up with new ideas about how best to think about and utilize the digital medium.

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C.W. Wolff

Editor’s note: This article first appeared in the University of New Hampshire Magazine, Winter 2010, and is republished here verbatim with the generous permission of the editors.

James Blight and Janet Lang first met Robert McNamara in 1984 in Big Sky, Mont., at a conference on nuclear weapons.

“The conference was a boondoggle,” recalls Blight, who rarely minces words. A new fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Blight was the most junior scholar in the room, and he was disturbed at the direction of the discussion. He raised his hand and said, “I hear all this discussion about targeting and equipment and all this. One thing is missing. In a crisis, it’s people who are deciding when to push that button. The psychology of how those people feel in that crisis is not going to change with equipment.”

His point was politely acknowledged, and conversation quickly returned to tonnage, deterrence and kill-potential. After all, many of the scholars present had helped write the 1983 best-seller Living with Nuclear Weapons.

“Our mutual admiration for McNamara was not one of them. Neither was McNamara.”

The former U.S. Secretary of Defense and architect of the Vietnam War sought out Blight and Lang during the next break. “McNamara leads us down a corridor and pushes us into a stairwell,” says Lang. “And he says to Jim, ‘That’s exactly the right point. You are absolutely on target. You pursue that.’”

That pursuit would lead Blight and Lang, working closely with McNamara, to create a radical new way to examine pivotal events of the last 50 years, including the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Vietnam War and the Iran-Iraq War. One of their colleagues would call it “a genuinely novel invention in historical methodology.” Blight and Lang would call it critical oral history.

Lang and Blight are sitting in a coffee shop not far from their home in Milton, Mass. Big fans of The Boss, they are wearing identical black Bruce Springsteen concert tour T-shirts. They are equally engaging, intense and lanky, although Blight, at 6 feet, 3 inches, towers over Lang and usually everyone else in the room.

In a nod to their respective heights, Lang has adopted a lowercase “j” for her first name ever since they team-taught psychology and referred to themselves as “Big J” and “Little j.”

Their joint four-hour lecture on the Cuban Missile Crisis, the book they co-wrote, and the future of nuclear war, earn them widespread admiration and are the focus of this article. “This,” says Lang, “is the most mundane thing I’ve ever written, is my best work. It is critical oral history work from its inception, fitting it in around her own career in epidemiology. A colleague praises her “intense practicality and energy,” but cancer has greatly compromised that energy. “I need a lot of naps,” she admits. She finally gave up her career because of the profound fatigue, but she continues her partnership with Blight: “I can do a little when I feel good, and I never have to worry about leaving anyone in the lurch because Jim always picks up the slack.”

“They are the most interesting people I’ve ever met,” says David Welch, CIGI Chair of Global Security at the Balsillie School of International Affairs. They are also adventurous. After many years at Brown University—and after Lang finished a rigorous 23 weeks of chemotherapy in Boston—they packed their bags and moved to Canada this January to join Welch at the Balsillie School in Waterloo, Ontario, Canada.

Blight’s only interest in studying the past is to understand what went wrong and how to avoid it in the future. It’s a mission he shared with McNamara, who died last summer at age 93. Both acutely believed a nuclear holocaust is a frighteningly real possibility.

In fact, Blight’s fear that President Ronald Reagan might push the button was the reason he began taking security studies classes at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government in the early 1980s. At the time, he was a fellow in Harvard’s history of science department and Lang was studying for her doctorate in epidemiology.

Blight chose to focus on the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, even though most historians believed there was nothing new to learn. But Blight thought perhaps the right questions had not yet been asked of the right people in the right way.

“We want to know what it was like to be in that situation...What were they afraid of, and what is that like? These questions are rock-bottom for us,” says Lang.

“Most historians don’t think about this stuff very much because they are into the narrative,” says Blight. But he was a student of William James, a 19th-century psychologist and philosopher who believed that “...
the recesses of feeling... are the only places in the world in which we catch real fact in the making, and directly perceive how events happen, and how work is actually done.”

The challenge was how to get at those feelings, especially decades after the fact. “Jim had this idea of setting up constructive conflict between former decision-makers, documents and scholars. It was a totally brilliant idea,” says Welch.

The first critical oral history conference in 1987 brought together aging members of President Kennedy’s inner circle, including McNamara, to discuss those tense October days 25 years earlier when the world came dangerously close to nuclear war in a face-off over Soviet missiles in Cuba. “It was fascinating,” recalls Welch. The group learned how frightened—or unfrighted, in some cases—the Kennedy administration had been. “We also realized we needed to know what the other side was feeling.”

So over the next 15 years, Blight and Lang organized five more missile-crisis conferences in Havana, Moscow and Antigua. They also organized two critical oral history conferences on the Bay of Pigs invasion, five on the collapse of U.S.-Soviet detente, six on the Vietnam War and, most recently, two on U.S.-Iran relations.

Critical oral history is a simple but ambitious concept. Carefully selected key decision-makers from all sides of a historical crisis—or as Blight likes to say, “a royal international screw-up”—are invited to a conference. Also at the table are scholars who have deeply studied the crisis, and stacks of documents, often recently declassified. The scholars and documents serve as checks, balances and jogs for memories that may be faulty, incomplete or self-serving.

For several days, people talk about what they felt, as well as what they thought; what they knew and didn’t know. No scripts. No prepared papers to read. “It’s like throwing highly combustible chemicals into a test tube. It often generates self-sustaining chain reactions,” says James Hershberg of Georgetown University.

Participants talk at meetings, at lunch, late into the night over drinks. At times, the conversation can resemble the television program “Crossfire” on a bad night. People get mad and walk out, they yell at each other. But at other times, there are moving revelations that shatter what a scholar or policymaker believed to be true. A “cross between oral history and group therapy” is how Pulitzer-winning author Frances Fitzgerald described the critical oral history gestalt.

“Jim and Janet ask core questions about human motivation and interactions that scholars too often ignore, avoid or don’t have the capacity to even assess... questions so fundamental and challenging that they require a kind of intellectual growth by all of us,” says Thomas Blanton, director of the National Security Archive at George Washington University. The approach creates what Blanton calls a “a rich stew that is a whole different level of scholarship” than the normal fare at history conferences.

One of the most startling revelations to come from this “stew” was at a 1992 conference in Havana, when, almost incidentally, a former Soviet general noted that in Cuba in 1962 there were tactical nuclear weapons, as well as nuclear warheads, ready to be used if the United States had attacked.

McNamara “started pulling at his headphones, yelling that something was wrong with the translation,” recalls Blight. The best U.S. intelligence in 1962 had suggested the missiles in Cuba lacked warheads; the presence of tactical nuclear weapons hadn’t even occurred to Americans. McNamara had just had his worst fears confirmed: nuclear war had barely been avoided. A shaken McNamara concluded: “We’re damned lucky to be here.”

At an earlier critical oral history conference in Moscow in 1989, McNamara made what Lang calls the “empathy leap.” The Cubans explained how the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion convinced them the United States was bent on conquering their island. While denying that was ever the plan, McNamara conceded: “If I was in your shoes, I would have believed the same thing.” The head of the Cuban delegation was amazed. McNamara would go on to conclude that empathy with the enemy is the single most crucial element needed to prevent nuclear war.

Critical oral history is beginning to catch on. Blanton notes that Eastern European organizations are especially interested, where topics have included the 1968 Prague Spring, the liberal reforms in Czechoslovakia that were put down by Soviet forces; the 1989 fall of the Berlin Wall; and the rise of the trade union Solidarity in Poland. Even some traditional academic conferences are beginning to include at least one critical oral history session. Blight calls this “critical oral history lite.”

The method has its limitations. “Not everyone has the wherewithal to pursue something like a crazy person for five or six years until you finally get to Hanoi or Havana,” says Blight. The politics can be overwhelming; the logistics daunting; the cost prohibitive. (Blight once flew to Hanoi for breakfast and lunch when a serious, but delicate, issue arose.)

Politically, timing often is crucial. A planned conference in Havana in 1996 was postponed for six years when the Cubans shut down some Cuban-Americans from Miami who entered their air space. Conversely, Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev and his national security advisor were thrilled to host a conference in Moscow on the missile crisis.

And there’s the challenge of getting the right people to agree to attend. “That’s why McNamara was crucial,” says Lang. “He was willing to let us use him as ‘bait.’” Without McNamara, Fidel Castro probably would not have been at the table, nor would have the Vietnam project happened.

It took courage, Lang says, for McNamara to participate in the conferences as well as agree to be the subject of the 2004 Academy Award-winning documentary “The Fog of War.” (Blight and Lang supported a nervous McNamara during the filming and then wrote the accompanying book and study guide.)

Not everyone is willing to participate in critical oral history. They note that Henry Kissinger, for instance, attended one conference and said, “Never again.”

For the current Iran project, Blight and Lang have enlisted as “bait” Thomas Pickering, a career ambassador with wide name recognition, and Bruce Riedel, who spent 29 years on the CIA Middle East desk and most recently has focused on Afghanistan and Pakistan.

“Each project is a novel unto itself and each person is a whole courtship,” says Hershberg. “Jim and Janet do a careful job at bringing together a diverse, carefully chosen group for each project.” He credits their “blithe American over-optimism” as well as their understanding that no one likes to leave the writing of history to the enemy.

There was one particularly thorny conference, a lead-up to a larger one in Havana. McNamara called a late-night meeting to pound on the table and declare he would not be going to Havana. Lang chose to use the language of statistics, which she shared with McNamara: “Let’s say it’s a zero probability you’re going to Cuba. But maybe there’s an upper
“Low double digits.” Everyone left the room convinced the Havana conference was off. But Lang knew they would be going. And they did.

During an 11-day trip to Tehran in 2008, Blight and Lang noticed a license plate with two upside-down hearts—Farsi for “55.” They use that number now as a personal shorthand to remind themselves, as Lang says, “to keep it human and don’t be surprised when things are turned upside down.”

The Iran project has already been turned upside down a couple of times. First, Blight and Lang changed the focus after realizing how emotionally powerful the Iran-Iraq War continued to be in Iran, and how it was a source of much anti-U.S. feeling, specifically because of the Iranian belief, now confirmed, that the United States provided logistical support for the Iraqis’ use of chemical weapons. More recently, the project suffered a setback because of deteriorating U.S.-Iran relations. “This work never happens easily, never quickly,” sighs Lang. But she’s smiling.

C.W. Wolff is a freelance writer who lives in Kittery, Maine.

SHAFR at AHA 2011
Boston, MA

Reception (cash bar)

Friday, January 7, 2011, 5:30-7:30 pm

Luncheon

Saturday, January 8, 2011, 11:45 am - 1:15 pm

Turner Fisheries Restaurant, 10 Huntington Avenue

Keynote Speaker: Lloyd C. Gardner, Professor Emeritus, Rutgers University

SHAFR will also co-sponsor three sessions:

Friday, January 7, 2011: 9:30 am-11:30 am:
U.S. Global Power and Transnational Perceptions of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, from the 1967 War to the Camp David Accord

Friday, January 7, 2011: 2:30 pm-4:30 pm:
The American Century: Assessing the Crucial Decade, 1965–74

Sunday, January 9, 2011: 11:00 am-1:00 pm:
Open Secrets: The Foreign Relations of the United States Series, Democracy’s “Need to Know,” and National Security
During the early years of the Iraq War, George W. Bush drew attention to the ways in which American presidents try to “sell” war to the public. The “Mission Accomplished” banner in 2003 and the misleading linkages of Saddam Hussein to the 9/11 terrorist attacks awoke many Americans to the techniques used by the White House to put the country on a war footing. Yet Bush was simply following in the footsteps of his predecessors, as the essays in this standout volume reveal in illuminating detail.

This impressive collection assembles original contributions from some of the most preeminent American diplomatic historians working today. It also features the last written reflections of the late Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist David Halberstam, whose early work covering the war in Vietnam made him an enemy of presidents Kennedy and Johnson.

Written in a lively and accessible style, Selling War in a Media Age is a fascinating, thought-provoking, must-read volume that reveals the often brutal ways that the goal of influencing public opinion has shaped how American presidents have approached the most momentous duty of their office: waging war.

ISBN 978-0-8130-3466-9 | Hardcover $44.95

FEATURED CONTRIBUTIONS FROM:

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Andrew L. Johns · Robert J. McMahon · Kenneth Osgood · Chester Pach
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The Alan B. Larkin Series on the American Presidency is hosted by the Larkin Symposium at Florida Atlantic University
A Rountable Discussion of Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall’s, America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity

Stephen J. Whitfield, Andrew J. Falk, Julian E. Zelizer, Kyle Longley, Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall

Publication dates matter. Had this estimable work appeared at the height of the Western triumph over the Soviet Union, Craig and Logevall might not have been quite so emphatic in describing as a lost era the half-century that could be said to have begun in 1949. The authors claim the policy of containment succeeded that year and locked the geopolitical system into place. Alternatively, if America’s Cold War had been published immediately after 1963, the year to which they date the beginning of more or less normal diplomatic relations among the chief contenders for global power, the irrationality of the belief that the USSR posed an unrelenting and dangerous threat to the United States might not have been so evident.

If someone happened to read the conclusion of this book first, the severity of Craig and Logevall’s criticism of American foreign policy would not be so apparent. The conclusion is a model of balance and concision, an impressive and elegant weighing of the pluses and minuses of the Cold War. However, in the preceding chapters the authors focus on America’s exaggeration of Soviet might, the militarization that distorted the polity and agendas of the two major political parties, and the constant prospect of miscalculation and miscommunication that might ignite Armageddon. They detail how badly the United States exercised the influence with which history entrusted it and how it wasted opportunities to dispel alarmist attitudes about the international grasp of Communism, to scale down the awesome cost of defense, and, most important, to avoid the terrible loss of life in Vietnam, if not in Korea. There is a natural tendency to wonder how the Western triumph between 1989 and 1991 came to be so decisive when the conflict between East and West was supposed to be a long twilight struggle. And although the authors do not recount in detail the advantages that the United States in particular enjoyed over the USSR, America’s Cold War suggests that in retrospect the implosion of Soviet power seems somehow pre-ordained (or at least over-determined).

But in the postwar decades and almost certainly through the 1970s and the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the Kremlin projected the sort of force that was rightly assumed to be in collision with Western interests. Until then, American statesmen had to reckon with the capacity of the Soviets to complicate relations with the Third World (in nations as close as Cuba and as important as Egypt). During a period when the American economy seemed mired in stagflation, burdened by wildly imbalanced budgets, and challenged by a dynamic Japan, the American advantage in ICBMs, Craig and Logevall note, was narrowing from a 4:1 ratio to a 2:1 ratio. What that shrinking gap portended was debatable. For much of the epoch that this book covers, the American economy—for all its massive scale—could have been described as sclerotic. The U.S. manufacturing and industrial base was shrinking in favor of consumerist indulgence, and the American public education system was failing to produce the scientists, engineers and linguists that were needed in a contest that was being very, very carefully scored. Only the two-decade span after the fall of the Berlin Wall has given scholars like Craig and Logevall the detachment to locate the surplus energy and the excessive and unnecessary resources that the victorious superpower invested to ensure the defeat of Communism. America’s Cold War enjoys the benefit of having heard the Fat Lady sing.

To take note of that perspective is not intended as criticism. Craig (who is a political scientist) and Logevall (who is a historian) have seized the opportunity that hindsight provides to present a compelling case for the continuous distortion and misjudgment that marked so much of the nation’s diplomacy. Their thesis is strengthened by a measured and judicious tone that is considerate of counter-argument. “As long as the Cold War continued,” Craig and Logevall insist, “the political culture in Washington would reward toughness . . . and penalize equanimity and self-confidence, pretty much irrespective of what the Soviet Union was actually doing” (291). The temptation to ridicule the flakiest warnings of Soviet (or at least sinister) penetration must have been considerable. “Bob, they’re after me,” the first secretary of defense, James Forrestal, told Robert Lovett, who would become the fourth, in 1949; and two months later the mentally ill Forrestal plunged to his death from the sixteenth floor of the Bethesda Naval Hospital in a ghastly and symbolic episode of paranoia. But only once, I believe, do the authors use the word “paranoia”—on page 256, when they are describing the embattled attitude of President Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, toward their American bureaucratic and liberal adversaries (not toward the Soviets).

How much of the almost compulsive tendency of policymakers to overestimate the menace that Communism posed was due to duplicity and how much can be chalked up to delusion? That question...
is irresistible but unanswerable, and this book does not even pose it. Instead it attributes alarmism to structural and institutional factors, especially the reach of the military-industrial complex, what Allen Ginsberg in “Howl” (1956) called Moloch. America’s Cold War does not consider psychobiographical sources of anxiety and offers no diagnoses of derangement. The book does nevertheless highlight how consistently the leadership of both parties misread the intentions and capacities of the other side, to the detriment of the planet; and I mean no disparagement of the achievement of this volume in wishing the authors had cut the policymakers a little slack. American leaders should indeed have listened to George F. Kennan and James B. Conant, both of whom predicted that Soviet Communism would collapse, a victim of inherent weaknesses in the system. Presidents from Truman through the first Bush nevertheless preferred to err on the side of caution in discharging the duty of protecting and preserving Western interests. Neither Democrats nor Republicans nor conservatives nor liberals (and especially liberals afraid of the toxin of McCarthyism that might be injected into the body politic) wanted to be caught making a mistake that could cut the policymakers a little slack. America’s Cold War, which was the struggle for something as impalpable and elusive as credibility. Statesmen did not dare to permit the United States to lose face, even if the adverse consequences they projected ranged from unlikely to remote, and even if the nation’s steadiest friends did not object to, say, a negotiated withdrawal from the catastrophe in Vietnam. This book is best in showing the disjunction between the vainglorious pursuit of credibility and the actual mainland security that the United States enjoyed during the half-century of the Cold War. A nation that felt compelled to throw its weight around, even when no strategic interests were at stake, was repudiating the 1821 promise of John Quincy Adams that America would not go “in search of monsters to destroy” (14). The invasion of Iraq in 2003 is the most obvious example of such behavior, but America’s Cold War cites a precedent in Chile, which Kissinger once dismissed as “a dagger pointed to the heart of Antarctica” (281). Salvador Allende was freely elected in 1970, and he was not even a Communist (or, for that matter, interested in making weapons of mass destruction). Within three years the United States had destabilized and sabotaged his regime anyway. For the next two decades, the people of Chile were forced to submit to a brutal dictatorship. Yet there was no change in the security of the American homeland.

One reason the United States and its allies triumphed half a century or so after the formulation of the containment doctrine is that foreign policy did not confine itself to keeping Communism outside the continental limits. Ever since 1941 (the year Craig and Loegvall begin their account), when Henry R. Luce proclaimed in a Life editorial the emergence of “the American century,” the United States has imagined that the end of isolationism also entailed the projection of positive values to the world. The promise of America, Luce and many others believed, consisted of prosperity and freedom. The United States was more than a nation; it was also an idea, or an ideal, whose radiance was a novelty in human experience. Affluence was self-explanatory; freedom (partly defined as release from feudal guilds and ancestral hierarchies and statist intrusiveness) was associated not only with political choice but with the chance to escape from destitution and misery. These values beckoned to millions of foreigners. The ideological combination of economic well-being and political liberty long preceded the Cold War, of course; at the very end of Volume I of Democracy in America, Tocqueville was already contrasting the servitude that the Russian regime demanded with the democratic and commercial impulses that Jacksonian America was unleashing.

Surely the Cold War ended when it did because the Soviets could not show the superiority of a command economy; they were even importing wheat from India. Nor could the USSR compete effectively for hearts and minds. Russian culture, with the partial exception of the ballet and classical music that stemmed from the Czarist period, could barely survive beyond the heartland. Nothing coming out of the Soviet Union could compete with the allure of liberation—whether expressed in jazz or in rock ‘n’ roll or in Abstract Expressionism, whether seemingly fulfilled in the freedom from want that could be inferred from dozens upon dozens of Hollywood films. The USSR stretched over a dozen time zones, but it was straight-jacketed when it came to keeping pace with the essentials of the modern world. To stop the spread of samizdat, for example, photocopy machines were sequestered under lock and key. In

The United States was more than a nation; it was also an idea, or an ideal, whose radiance was a novelty in human experience. Affluence was self-explanatory; freedom (partly defined as release from feudal guilds and ancestral hierarchies and statist intrusiveness) was associated not only with political choice but with the chance to escape from destitution and misery. These values beckoned to millions of foreigners.
Bernath Book Prize:
Marc Selverstone (Miller Center of Public Affairs, University of Virginia)
Constructing the Monolith: The United States, Great Britain, and International Communism, 1945-1950

Despite the huge array of writing on the Cold War and its birth, Marc Selverstone succeeds in identifying an issue of tremendous intrinsic importance that has never been touched, namely the origins of the notion that communism represented a monolithic political-ideological movement centrally controlled from Moscow. Selverstone then educates us on this matter in an engaging fashion, combining the best of the new international history with traditional approaches to examining American foreign policy, to produce a highly original study. He starts with the foundations of the monolith as intellectual construct, recognizes the subtle and changing nature of the construct, and follows through to its expression in foreign policy; while also examining the nature of 20th Century communism in its many strands. Selverstone traces stages of development in both the U.S. and Great Britain, showing the similarities and nuances in the formulations made in both countries. For additional insight he compares both visions with images developing in what became the Federal Republic of Germany. This defining stance drew on roots from World War II and transmogrified Nazism to Red Fascism, with lasting implications, both domestically and abroad. Selverstone’s analysis shows how the sophisticated recommendations of certain observers of the communist scene for “wedge” strategies could not find expression in Western policy. He then contrasts the monolithic vision with actual behavior, including both European and Asian communism, demonstrating the differences among national communisms and the limited extent of Moscow’s real dominance, with Yugoslavia as the boundary case. Selverstone finally brings his study full circle by demonstrating how Western visions impeded the conduct of an effective policy vis a vis the communist dissenter Yugoslavia. This book is a far-reaching, deeply researched study that combines close comparative analysis and subtle, yet compelling arguments. Marc Selverstone’s Constructing the Monolith meets the most exacting standards of diplomatic history and fully merits the recognition of this award of the 2009 Bernath Book Prize.

Bernath Book Prize (Honorable Mention):
Michaela Hoenicke Moore (University of North Carolina)
Know Your Enemy: The American Debate on Nazism, 1933-1945

This book is an intellectually ambitious, widely researched, and eloquently written examination of a significant issue. Michaela Moore has carved out a project of great scope which she executes with flair, writing with clarity and precision. Moore constructs an account that is at once a political history and a diplomatic one, utilizing an enormous array of material, including even the cultural elements of literature, psychoanalysis, and contemporary social thought. She is particularly successful in showing how public opinion helped shape official views. The broad scope of Moore's narrative and her sustained effort to recover how the “other image” was elaborated, was affected by the views of various U.S. government departments, changed over time, and expressed itself in U.S. planning for postwar Germany, is very impressive. Know Your Enemy demonstrates that divisions over the “other image” within the Roosevelt administration at once made it difficult to develop a consensus on policy and in the end served to assist in the postwar transition of Germany from enemy to ally. Moore also pays careful attention to elements of detail, as in her analysis of how African-American views of Nazism differed from those of whites. She shows quite clearly that the debate over the “other image” led Americans to reassess their own standards for a better world. Michaela’s insight that the ultimate failure to derive a “politically coherent” consensus was actually an aid significantly illuminates our understanding of the immediate postwar period. Moore’s book Know Your Enemy meets the most exacting standards of diplomatic history and is very deserving of this Bernath Honorable Mention.
Bernath Lecture Prize:
Barbara Keys (University of Melbourne)

The committee agreed that the monograph that established Professor Keys’ reputation as an important younger scholar--namely Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s, published by Harvard University Press in 2006--was a model of original and important international history. This study, grounded in multilingual and multiarchival research, showed the importance of sport in forging international community among divergent and competing nation-states. We also found it to be exceedingly well written. We were impressed by the range Prof. Keys has shown since publication of that book, as she has now migrated into analysis of global human rights issues, including a forthcoming article in Diplomatic History. Quite productive for a “junior” scholar, Keys counts several other articles, book chapters, and a book-manuscript in development on the United States and the international politics of torture in the 1970s. It should come as no surprise that Barbara is, by all accounts, a popular and effective teacher and mentor in her work at Melbourne. On the basis of the important work she has done, and moreover on the intellectual growth she has shown in her early career, the Bernath Committee unanimously selected Barbara Keys as the winner of this year’s Lecture Prize.

Robert Ferrell Book Prize:
Mary E. Sarotte (University of Southern California)
1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe

This impressive work of international history is based upon extensive and wide-ranging research in at least six different countries. Mary Elise Sarotte supplements that archival research with revealing oral history interviews, which she conducted herself, with key participants in the United States and Europe. The book provides us with a vivid, compelling, and original analysis of the making of post-Cold War Europe. Sarotte offers rich insights into the motives and methods of such leading figures as Kohl, Bush, Baker, Gorbachev, and Mitterand. Although she devotes ample and needed attention to the options that they faced and the decisions they ultimately reached, the author also makes clear that these leaders were often responding to the actions of individuals and groups at the street level that they could not control. The narrative is lively and fast-paced, and the book is written in clear, engaging prose. 1989: The Struggle to Create Post-Cold War Europe stands as a major scholarly achievement: an original and imaginative account of a defining moment in recent international history.

Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize:
Ryan Irwin (Ohio State University)

The Selection Committee for the Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize is very pleased to announce that the 2010 recipient is Ryan Irwin, an advanced doctoral candidate at the Ohio State University, for his article, “A Wind of Change? White Redoubt and the Postcolonial Moment, 1960-1963” that appeared in Diplomatic History this past fall. Examining the moment between 1960 and 1963, this well-written and thoroughly-researched article traces how apartheid emerged as an international issue, why momentum for change stalled at the United Nations, and how the South African government worked to reposition the conversation. The judges were uniformly impressed with the compelling, layered, and subtle framing of Irwin’s argument and are convinced that “A Wind of Change” will make a significant contribution to the historiography.
Oxford University Press USA Dissertation Prize in International History:
Paul Chamberlin
Department of History, The Ohio State University, Advisor: Peter Hahn

Paul Chamberlin’s dissertation, Preparing for Dawn: The United States and the Global Politics of Palestinian Resistance, 1967-1975, was completed in the Department of History at The Ohio State University in 2009 under the direction of Professor Peter Hahn. In his study, Chamberlin demonstrates not only how the Palestinian movement drew on Arab nationalism, as has been widely appreciated and understood, but also how it sought global legitimacy by associating itself with Third World internationalism. Preparing for Dawn was both challenging and provocative, and the research that informed it was deep and impressive. Chamberlin made impressive use of a wide array of sources, including Arabic- and French-language documents and U.S. archival material, and it demonstrated a thorough command of the secondary literature. The dissertation framed a well-known topic in a new light and handled historical/political subjects often regarded as controversial in a quite dispassionate manner. It is our pleasure to award the inaugural Oxford University Press USA Dissertation Prize in International History to Paul Chamberlin.


SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowships:
Sudina Paungpetch (Texas A&M)
Hajima Masuda (Cornell University)

William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants:
Heather Dichter (University of Toronto), $3,000
Heather Stur (University of Southern Mississippi), $2,000

Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grants:
Caitlyn Casey, $2,000
Sara Miller Davenport, $2,000
Philip Dow, $2,000
Maurice LaBelle, $2,000
Hajima Masuda, $2,000
Brian McNeil, $2,000
Louie Milojevik, $2,000
Michael Neagle, $2,000
Victor Nemchenok, $2,000
Amy Offner, $2,000
Joy Schulz, $2,000
Annessa C. Stagner, $2,000
Tom Westerman, $2,000
Tal Zalmanovich, $2,000
At a time when historians in our field debate the very terminology we use to describe what we do—international relations? transnationalism? What is it?—Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall have not shied away from traditional terms like “diplomatic” and “foreign policy.” This important new synthesis includes many of the familiar participants in the Cold War—from Truman and Stalin to Gorbachev and Bush—in many of the expected settings: Berlin, Korea, Suez, Cuba, Vietnam, and Reykjavik. But while the authors’ scope is grand, their argument is tight. As international histories and cultural perspectives have pulled the dominant Cold War narrative hither and yon, Craig and Logevall seek to recalibrate our understanding of the Cold War by re-centering the United States in the narrative and, in particular, by reasserting the influence of elite American policymakers.

That said, the authors are sensitive to some of these recent trends in the literature. What international histories do well is to make use of foreign archives and insert non-American perspectives into the grand narrative of the Cold War. What is lost, Craig and Logevall complain, is an accurate view of who wields power. The international approach “runs the risk of assigning greater agency to these other actors than they deserve” because the United States “was always supreme.” (5).

What is needed, they believe, is an appreciation for the “intermestic” dimension. In their view “international problems and crises are often transformed by Washington officials into matters of domestic politics” that ultimately transform American foreign relations (240). America’s Cold War moves beyond the debates over the origins and end of the Cold War and asks why the Cold War lasted so long. The answer lies not so much in the superpower leaders’ missed opportunities for peace as it does in the American domestic political environment. Craig and Logevall conclude that elites—from zealous anticommunists to unscrupulous defense industries—seized on real and exaggerated international crises to exploit the worst fears and anxieties of Americans, thereby perpetuating the Cold War. From 1945 to 1991, policymakers engaged in two contests: an international struggle against communism and a domestic fight between pragmatic realists and irrational ideologues.

This book is a celebration of the realists’ approach. The authors view George Kennan’s initial containment policy as the prudent response to Stalinist expansion after 1945. Yet after the “twin shocks” of 1949—the advent of the Soviet atomic bomb and the “fall” of China to Mao Zedong’s communists—ideologues, political opportunists, and other self-interested fear-mongers warped reasonable containment to a sorrowful extent. Although containment remained intact from the late 1940s to the early 1990s, readers will be reminded of how international events sent sporadic tremors through the domestic political scene and altered American foreign policy. The first instance of such an effect occurred in 1950, when Paul Nitze authored NSC-68, but his would not be the last reevaluation of containment.

Kennan is a recurring character in the book. The authors portray him as the wise and sympathetic prophet who, though silenced in 1950, reappears at periodic congressional hearings and in his chronic memoirs to wag a disapproving finger at the country for misreading Soviet intentions or for misapplying his containment policy to places like Vietnam. A somber figure akin to the narrator in Thornton Wilder’s Our Town, Kennan shares his observations about the world and reminds Americans of their better past. Like Kennan, Nitze is a static man in the drama, but he remains a confirmed hardliner until the 1980s.

The authors have a healthy appreciation for those who recant and move toward realism. In the mid-1950s, Eisenhower eventually recognized the futility of nuclear...
war, the dangers of McCarthy, and the needless excesses of the military industrial complex. After the president diverged from Dulles and his rhetoric of brinkmanship and rollback, he moved cautiously toward rapprochement with Khrushchev. Kennedy, despite his campaign demagoguery about the “missile gap” and his recklessness at the Bay of Pigs, began to demonstrate similar restraint. Likewise, Reagan’s realistic assessment of nuclear weaponry sobered him; in the mid-1980s he overcame years of his own speechifying and the attitudes of hardliners within his administration to view Gorbachev as a sincere reformer. The symmetry of these cases reinforces the authors’ depiction of a long-term institutional contest over foreign policy and of the malleability of presidential opinion.

By contrast, those who move in the opposite direction are pathetic figures. Harry Truman “scared the hell out of the country” before handing over the kingdom’s keys to rabid anti-communists. Later, Hubert Humphrey transformed himself from an experienced voice of caution in the early years of the Vietnam conflict to a candidate who chained himself to Johnson’s policies. Political expediency spurred each man. More generally, the authors indicate that crusading Wilsonianism, especially in the age of nuclear weapons, portends nothing but trouble and tragedy.

Ultimately Craig and Logevall conclude that, while successful, the United States paid a high price for victory. They tally up the balance sheet and find a half-century of loss—the loss of populations killed in wars, a poisonous political environment that silenced debate and threatened liberties, an economy ravaged by unnecessary weapons systems, and a world that inherited the scourge of nuclear proliferation. Readers will find it hard to disagree with their well-reasoned verdict.

Just as the “lessons” of appeasement were applied repeatedly during the Cold War, the authors suggest how many “lessons” of the Cold War have been applied to the war on terror. They imply that the singular shock of 9/11 convinced lawmakers to meet an ideological threat by increasing military spending, by scaring voters to gain political advantage, by sacrificing democratic principles in the name of national security, and by projecting American military force to the other side of the globe.

Though Craig and Logevall are “consciously bucking the historiographical trend toward international history” (4), it would be too easy to conclude that they dismiss the role played by international actors in the conduct and character of the Cold War. When discussing the Korean War, for example, the authors do a splendid job of presenting recent scholarship relating to the diverse views of Stalin, Mao, Kim II Sung, Syngman Rhee, and Chiang Kai-shek, before describing Americans’ (mis)perceptions. Their sophisticated argument is that actors on the international stage often drove American policy and that the Korean War was one case that confirmed Nitze’s theories in NSC-68. Later, the Cuban Revolution sparked a series of consequential events: covert operations, the Missile Crisis, and development programs such as the Alliance for Progress and the Peace Corps. In one sense it could be argued that Fidel Castro drove events, but American policymakers responded in diverse and significant ways. When Lyndon Johnson “chose” war in Vietnam, he did so because he feared the nation’s international credibility with his own political standing at home. Similarly, the authors make it clear that Mikhail Gorbachev, not Ronald Reagan, was the driving force behind the dramatic and peaceful end to the Cold War. Reagan reacted by meeting Gorbachev halfway.

If I have any quibble with this otherwise excellent book, it would be that the authors who tout the “intermestic” end up absorbing the “inter” more than the “mestic,” despite their conviction that “for much of the Cold War the domestic variables predominated over the foreign ones” (6). Here the domestic scene is primarily a political site populated by policymakers, defense contractors, a few media elites, and an indefinite number of voters. Americans appear in shades of anticomununism: pragmatic realists or zealous ideologues—there are few other options. Readers of much of the recent historiography in our field may be left wondering how it is that the United States appears to be a monolithic entity devoid of dissent or competing motivations. Alas, *America’s Cold War* is not all Americans’ Cold War.

How might we look at the same subject differently? A deeper exploration of the domestic political scene would reveal the significant activities of influential Americans inside and outside the beltway who helped translate, complicate, and transform the American foreign policy of the period. Consideration of the cultural dimension is not necessarily anecdotal; many historians see it as essential to understanding America’s Cold War. Put another way: the cultural is political.

In his famous 1941 “American Century” article in *Life* magazine, Henry Luce urged Americans to recognize their global position when he declared that “American jazz, Hollywood movies, American slang, American machines and patented products, are in fact the only things that every community in the world, from Zanzibar to Hamburg, recognizes in common.” After the war, atomic scientists galvanized the antinuclear movement that pressured Eisenhower and Kennedy to support a moratorium on testing. Civil rights leaders used worldwide anticolonialism and the rhetoric of democracy to transform Washington’s public information campaigns and goodwill missions.

Did gender discourses, so prominent in the political culture of the 1960s, help Johnson communicate to others why his and America’s credibility was on the line in VI “more than the cultural is political.” Put another way: the cultural is political.

Craig and Logevall look at the “twin shocks” of the Soviet bomb and the “fall of China,” there was certainly a third “shock” in 1948-1950: the discovery of domestic spies, a subject they discuss only briefly. International events surely affected domestic politics and foreign policy, but the sudden realization that the global threat had reached the United States led Americans to redefine the very idea of national identity: who and what could be considered subversive and un-American. NSC-68 emphasized the ideological nature of the threat and called for programs to mobilize “mass opinion” in support of American values. Nitze characterized communists as irrational, “fanatical,” and “perverted”; therefore, American containment policy included a cultural weapon designed to define its opposite: Americanism.

Craig and Logevall tell us that “film, literature, and journalism veered toward the uncritical and banal” in the 1950s. Are these the same forms of soft power that won the Cold War by the 1980s? A deeper investigation of the domestic political scene would reveal that culture industries responded to international events...
and helped steer American foreign policy away from the idealized and sanitized visions of America that were preferred by the zealots and ideologues. For example, afterHUAC investigated Hollywood and encouraged blacklisting, many dissidents took their views to the new television industry and to stages and screens in the packed theaters of Europe. Recognizing the popularity of the work presented to European audiences by dissident American talent, the Eisenhower administration appropriated it and exported it as part of the state-sponsored cultural exchanges of the 1950s. So while the Soviets jammed the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, jazz and rock-and-roll infiltrated the Iron Curtain and promoted youth rebellion, especially because musicians didn’t play the State Department’s tune. Did Kennan, who is quoted extensively throughout, have any more influence after 1950 than these figures had? Policymakers mattered, as Craig and Logevall prove beyond a doubt, but readers may be left wondering if other forces on the domestic scene played roles in its formation and transformation.

Realists may have offered the more prudent path in strategic policy, but hard-line anticommunists, as reckless and strident as they may have been, inadvertently opened the door to the cultural exports that helped win the Cold War. Their insistence on viewing the superpower contest in ideological terms put a premium on the cultural productions and consumerism that defined the character of each society. With relatively little discussion of cultural issues, decisions, policies, and programs, readers may be surprised to learn that Logevall agree that “the Soviet collapse was less about U.S. government policies, less about the trillions of dollars spent on nuclear weapons, and more about what is nowadays called soft power—music, movies, consumer goods” and other forms of culture (355). Culture helps explain how the Cold War ended and why it took so long to do so.

The undergraduates entering history classes this fall were born after the Cold War ended. For those who want to make sense of that long and complicated history, this book is essential reading. I find its approach sound and its conclusions convincing. Although it cannot be the definitive source on the Cold War, it is impressive, comprehensive, and authoritative. Privileging elite American policymakers as it does, the book provides a sturdy skeleton for readers to begin the process of understanding the broad sweep of America’s Cold War experience. International histories using foreign archives to emphasize the roles played by non–U.S. actors add sinew and flesh to the narrative. And cultural perspectives—especially those that examine the non-state actors and the underlying mentalities of participants—surely provide the soul and character for a thriving body of knowledge on the history of the Cold War.

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**America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity**

Julian E. Zelizer

In their new book, *America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity*, Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall offer a provocative interpretation of the Cold War. The two argue that a significant number of the nation’s Cold War policies resulted not from rational evaluations of overseas threats but from domestic political pressure. Starting with President Truman’s adoption of a more aggressive posture toward the Soviet Union following World War II, the authors recount a series of pivotal moments when U.S. policymakers moved to militarize American political culture, build an extensive defense establishment, and authorize military interventions based on what was taking place in Washington rather than Moscow or Peking. Their work does not offer a mono-causal analysis; rather, it emphasizes the multiple factors that bore down on policymakers throughout these decades. However, it does place great weight on domestic politics.

*America’s Cold War* thus contributes to an important historiographical development that has been taking place in recent years. There has been growing interest in attempting to marry two subfields that have unfortunately drifted apart since the 1970s—diplomatic history and political history. I myself have attempted to join this enterprise with my new book, *Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security—From World War II to the War on Terrorism*, which complements many of the findings in this work.

As the diplomatic historian Robert McMahon wrote in his outstanding essay on diplomatic history and policy history in 2005, it was unfortunate that both of these subfields, which were marginalized during the social and cultural history revolution of the 1970s and 1980s, moved along separate paths. They did so at a time when each was stigmatized within the mainstream of the profession, and they continued to do so in recent years even as a younger generation of scholars began to revitalize the subfields. McMahon wrote that “[o]ne might expect, under the circumstances, strong bonds to be forged and fruitful cross-fertilization to develop between these two fields. Instead, a rather puzzling, if artificial, division has kept them separated. Diplomatic historians, so eager of late to expand the boundaries of their field to encompass some of the preoccupations of social and cultural history, have shown little inclination to explore the more obvious common turf on which they and their colleagues in policy history stand. Plainly, the older, more established field of historical scholarship has not rushed to embrace the newer field. Yet neither have policy historians shown much inclination to enter into a sustained dialogue, or explore shared interests, with specialists in foreign policy.”

In *America’s Cold War*, Craig and Logevall add that while the recent turn toward international history has offered some hugely important gains, there is a risk that the new scholarship might turn too far away from the home front and miss the very pertinent political pressures that weigh upon leaders when they are crafting foreign policy. “Our argument, in brief: for much of the Cold War the domestic variables predominated over the foreign ones. Not completely, of course, and not equally at all times.” They believe domestic politics profoundly shaped every aspect of the Cold War. Its length, its intensity, the way in which it unfolded, and the particular approach the U.S. government adopted toward it. The authors emphasize two domestic influences upon policy: partisan and electoral politics and what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex. They argue that regardless of the actual strength of the United States, “alarmism and militarism” dominated foreign policy, and they claim that politicians had a strong interest in perpetuating arguments about insecurity—even during the 1980s, when the Soviet Union was literally disintegrating.

The authors provide a synthesis of the Cold War, with politics interjected at key moments. Their main interest is to point to instances when domestic factors motivated politicians to accept the militarization of American political culture and the exercise of military muscle overseas.
Public diplomacy is the art of cultivating public opinion to achieve foreign policy objectives. A vital tool in contemporary statecraft, public diplomacy is also one of the most poorly understood elements of a nation’s “soft power.”

The United States and Public Diplomacy adds historical perspective to the ongoing global conversation about public diplomacy and its proper role in foreign affairs. It highlights the fact that the United States has not only been an important sponsor of public diplomacy, it also has been a frequent target of public diplomacy initiatives sponsored by others. Many of the essays in this collection look beyond Washington to explore the ways in which foreign states, non-governmental organizations, and private citizens have used public diplomacy to influence the government and people of the United States.

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For instance, they argue that between 1945 and 1947, Truman shifted away from perceiving Joseph Stalin as a pragmatic tyrant to seeing him as someone who was hell-bent on territorial expansion. In addition to providing new perspectives about Stalin and international turmoil, they document Truman's concerns about Republican attacks on the weakness of his foreign policies and about politically dangerous scandals involving Communist espionage and show how both were central to his policy decisions. They recount how several events, including a radio address by the maverick columnist Drew Pearson about a Soviet spy network within the United States, led Truman to worry about being seen as weak by voters. After the president announced the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and provided assistance to anti-communist forces in Greece, the administration quickly learned that some of its political calculations were on target. Craig and Logevall point to Clark Clifford's memo from November 1947, in which he wrote that there was “considerable political advantage to the administration in its battle with the Kremlin.”

In terms of irrational policymaking, the political environment only deteriorated, the book argues, after China fell to a communist revolution in 1949. This crisis raised the stakes in the party battles over anticomunism and triggered the creation of a massive national security state—and a militarized political culture—that would be difficult to dismantle. The institutions of the state took on a life of their own and diminished the opportunities for politicians to turn back.

Building on Logevall's classic work on America's entrance into Vietnam, the authors challenge the sense of inevitability that has characterized so much of the scholarship on the Cold War. They take issue with the line of historiography that has claimed that the growth of the national security state was a rational and necessary response to Soviet expansionism and aggression as well as the historiographical tradition that argues that the U.S. buildup was an effort to establish U.S. hegemony abroad. They push a third interpretation. Their book stresses the domestic politics of insecurity that led policymakers to overreact to perceived dangers. In their story, there are key turning points where policymakers could easily have taken a different path but were prevented from doing so by political fears. “Understanding this overreaction requires understanding the changing nature of domestic politics in Cold War America. The overreaction created a permanent national security state which would then have a power of its own, with its deep reach into congressional districts and financial interests.”

The authors move readers through a series of other critical moments in the Cold War. Some presidents, like Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Ronald Reagan, were swept up at the beginning of their terms into the partisan rhetoric of the era and promoted dangerous and aggressive policies toward communism but gradually moved away from those positions as they realized the dangers incurred. Other presidents made tremendously costly mistakes by acting in response to their most hysterical political fears, as Lyndon Johnson did with Vietnam. They also show how other presidents, including Jimmy Carter, could not contain their political opposition when they faced an onslaught of attacks. Even when Carter shifted to the right and adopted the rhetoric of his rightwing opponents, he was unable to forestall their electoral gains.

Like all books that break new ground, America's Cold War contains passages in which the authors could have pushed harder. At some points in the book, their analysis follows a similar pattern: they interject a few paragraphs about political considerations within a broader narrative about the Cold War that recounts geo-political dynamics. The book would have been stronger if the authors expanded and further developed the sections dealing with politics. In doing so they might have provided a more complex expansive account of “domestic politics” that connected these moments in foreign policymaking with other struggles taking place in the domestic sphere.

In addition, the book could have done more to examine how foreign policy influenced domestic politics rather than just vice versa. Both of the major parties were shaped and reshaped by foreign policy debates. National security, and the politics of insecurity, would impact how the parties positioned themselves in elections and dealt with domestic policies. These connections would have enhanced the narrative and provided a more textured and dynamic picture of the period.

But these are just a few suggestions to improve a very stimulating book. Craig and Logevall have provided an extraordinarily interesting work and one that will help advance an important conversation that has begun to take place within the profession and reconnect two subfields which have a lot in common but have spent too much time apart.

Julian E. Zelizer is Professor of History and Public Affairs at Princeton University.

Note:

Review of Campbell Craig and Frederik Logevall’s America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity
Kyle Longley

Reading Campbell Craig and Frederik Logevall’s America’s Cold War: The Politics of Insecurity transported me back to the early 1990s, when I was preparing for qualifying exams for George Herring. Of course, his reading list included Stephen Ambrose’s Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy since 1938 and the sixth edition of Walter LaFeber’s America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1990. I remember the similarities between the two, including the way they were organized and the particular people and events they covered. Craig and Logevall’s book makes it clear that, twenty years later, there are continuities in the Cold War narrative that remain remarkably unchanged.

The main way in which this book differs from previous works by historians such as Robert McMahon, John Gaddis, and Melvyn Leffler is the authors’ emphasis on the importance of domestic politics. Of course, scholars such as LaFeber argue that economic factors helped cause the Cold War and often drove American foreign policy. Others stress domestic considerations, but Craig and Logevall persuasively argue that “for much of the Cold War, the domestic variables predominated over the foreign ones,” although “not completely,” they acknowledge, “and not equally at all times” (6).

In great detail, the authors incorporate domestic factors into the Cold War narrative. They underscore that in the past, some historians placed emphasis on “internal sources of foreign policy, but not on partisan wrangling, election-year maneuvering, interest-group pandering, or other proximate political concerns” (10). They explain that some problems arise because historians of American foreign relations often bury themselves in the archives of the foreign policy establishment, whose documents...
“give few clues that foreign policy choices could be affected by base political motivations” (10).

To the authors, the transformation of external threats into a cornerstone of domestic politics was part of a fundamental evolution in the Cold War. They focus on a group of “politicians and operators in Washington who exploited America’s Cold War” and whose “fundamental interest lay in denying that the United States was secure, no matter what was happening overseas. Talking up the threat, perpetuating the politics of insecurity, became the mission” (11). Ultimately, the authors clearly contradict the former Speaker of the House, Thomas “Tip” O’Neill, who liked to say that “all politics is local.” In the Cold War, foreign threats and the ways in which politicians exploited them assumed a central place in the political landscape.

No section of the book better develops the authors’ argument than the one on President Dwight Eisenhower’s farewell address. The former general, who the authors acknowledge helped continue the build-up of the military-industrial complex, warned that “in the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes.” He added that the growth of the complex and escalation of the Cold War threatened the very nature of American democracy, including free enterprise and individual liberty (194).

Craig and Logevall persuasively contend that in this speech Eisenhower recognized that the military-industrial complex had evolved since 1941 to the point where it had become dangerous. They note that it included “the military establishment, the arms industry, and the congressional backers of these two institutions,” that it was “a vested interest largely outside the perimeter of democratic control,” and that it was “arguably the single greatest factor in post-1941 economic life of the United States” (7-8). As a result, “its tentacles reached into almost every congressional district in the country and distorted electoral politics to a tremendous degree. The preservation of the military-industrial establishment became a kind of national addiction, from which American society could recover only after going through the most severe withdrawal” (8). The pervasiveness of the complex meant that “a great many powerful people in American society had an unspoken (and often unconscious) need for the Cold War to continue” (8). This point is particularly powerful.

I enjoyed reading the book. Stressing the importance of domestic factors is a welcome change from the usual emphasis in the historiography. The authors also include some discussion of theoretical approaches, such as those of Kenneth Waltz, and make the book more appealing by including historiographical discussions without devolving into a long list of the names of the historians.

Like any good survey, the narrative opens up new avenues for research. The authors argue that their ideas revolve around “how and why” questions that require “immersion in American sources and knowledge of American institutions, political culture, and social structures” (6). They have examined many of these questions at many levels, but there are others that offer opportunities to develop some of the complexities and nuances of America’s political culture during the Cold War.

For example, in seeking to place Washington at the center of their focus, the authors sometimes miss domestic considerations that would actually strengthen their main thesis. They virtually ignore efforts in the early Cold War to create security in the Western Hemisphere, where the United States had focused for more than 150 years. Domestic groups—mainly the large economic interests invested throughout Latin America—persuaded Washington to promote security and encourage open markets and favorable business environments in the region (the authors briefly acknowledge such efforts in Guatemala in 1954). Pressure was exerted on behalf of other regions by similar interest groups; in the Middle East, American oil companies and colorful characters such as Armand Hammer helped shape perceptions and, ultimately, U.S. policy. Here, the New Left argument about the impact of economic factors in U.S. foreign policy remains as relevant as ever. These groups also served as the original proponents of the military industrial complex (during the banana wars, for example), often driving U.S. policy to intervene to protect American interests long before the Cold War.

However, other internal factors also shaped policy, and other domestic groups played a significant role in the political process, such as the Americans for Democratic Action, the American Friends of Vietnam, the AFL-CIO, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, and the China Lobby. These organizations, along with many others, including American lobbyists in the employ of Nicaragua, Saudi Arabia, the Philippines, and the Dominican Republic, pushed and prodded people in the White House, Congress, and the State Department to promote their agendas. While there is some acknowledgment of their significance, more discussion of the influence of these groups and their tactics and successes would have further strengthened the book’s core argument.

The authors also miss a great opportunity to develop some emerging fields in social, cultural, and political history more fully. Some historians of American foreign relations reflexively scoff at the emphasis on gender and race, arguing that our field should avoid following politically correct trends. However, there are significant contributions that these and other cultural considerations could make to an understanding of the complexity and nuances of the powerful domestic forces acting on U.S. policymakers in the Cold War.

Gender analysis—principally, a consideration of the importance of social constructions of masculinity—could have helped explain how long-term domestic considerations affected U.S. foreign policy makers. There are two important levels of analysis in this area. A number of historians have provided remarkable insights into the predispositions and mindsets of elite foreign policymakers. Among them are Robert Dean in his fine work, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy (2003), and K.A. Courdleone in Manhood and American Political Culture in the Cold War (2004). Both of these books offer important ideas about how to understand concepts, such as how John Kennedy’s image of himself as a man shaped his responses in Cuba and Vietnam. Studies of Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and George W. Bush show how the idea of masculinity shaped by everyday elements of American life (work forms, popular culture, legends) can help to explain how and why the presidents, their advisors, and other American policymakers acted as they did.

Other levels of gender analysis explore how social constructions of masculinity shaped Cold War culture. For example, gender played a significant role in the creation and...
it remains an important component of it that the authors have not fully developed. Other cultural factors such as religion and popular culture would open up additional avenues for investigation; such factors have an impact on elections, polls, and everyday political debates and play an important role in shaping American institutions, political culture, and social structures.

In addition, the authors also could have developed a more complex analysis of the regional factors that clearly shaped the foreign policy debates of the Cold War. Relying on the idea of a monolithic American political culture ignores realities that deserve explicit discussion. There are many examples of regionalism affecting foreign policy debates, examples that would have further underscored the authors’ ideas about domestic considerations. For example, Vietnam proved a complex issue even within the South, where the majority of citizens strongly supported the war effort. J. William Fulbright (D-AR), Albert Gore, Sr. (D-TN), and John Sherman Cooper (R-KY) all broke with strong advocates of the war from the region, including John Stennis (D-MS). This conflict between border-state senators and senators from the Deep South, which had its origins in the political culture of the region, had an impact on the direction of the war. Providing some background about the long-term development of the South as related not only to this issue but to many others (including masculinity, violence, and race relations) would have enabled the authors to shed more light upon the influence of domestic concerns on foreign policy ones.

Underscoring regionalism could also have strengthened the authors’ discussion of the military-industrial complex. The presence of so many military bases in the South helps explain why the South and its leaders became such strong supporters of the Cold War. Similarly, the Mountain West and West had large numbers of military bases and industries strongly tied to the defense complex. Although many people in these areas viewed themselves as independent, anti-tax conservatives (the grassroots supporters of the Reagan revolution), they backed huge government expenditures for defense and often ignored the hypocrisy of their positions. They formed the backbone of the strident pro-Cold War constituency, represented in the West by people like Barry Goldwater, Henry Jackson, William Knowland, Pat McCarran, Ezra Taft Benson, and, “of course” Ronald Reagan.

Highlighting why the South and the West provided the strongest support for the military-industrial complex could further illuminate how complex issues developed on the domestic level.

In conclusion, Craig and Logevall have written a Cold War history that succinctly and persuasively argues for the importance of the domestic context for understanding why the United States acted as it did during the long conflict. I have highlighted some areas where I think that the focus on domestic political culture could have been further developed, but these critiques do not detract from the fact that this book is a good survey of one of the most important periods in American and global history, albeit one increasingly being relegated to the periphery by scholars in the fields of history and political science. Craig and Logevall do a good job of reminding everyone of their centrality.

Kyle Longley is Snell Family Dean’s Distinguished professor of history at Arizona State University.

Authors’ Response

Campbell Craig and Frederik Logevall

We should first like to thank Mitch Lerner at Passport for his organization of this roundtable and his cheerful expertise in shepherding it through to publication. We also express our gratitude to the four reviewers for writing such clear and reasonable critiques of our book. One occasionally comes across a review that seems to be more about the intellectual agenda of the reviewer than the book under scrutiny. Such was not the case here.

As all four reviewers note, our book is concerned primarily with American decisions and American actions. This is not the only path we might have chosen, of course, and in choosing it we understood that we were going against the dominant trend in the scholarship, which is to study the Cold War as international history. We need no persuading that the international history approach can have tremendous utility, but as we argue in the book it has limitations of its own. Moreover, in view of the America-centric questions at the heart of our study—why did the United States follow the course it did after World War II? How were the major U.S. policy decisions pertaining to the Cold War reached?—it was not the optimal approach for us. Even so, we believe all students of
postwar world affairs can profit from reading our analysis. After all, the predominant power of the United States over the past seventy years or so has given American leaders a tremendous say over what happens in the world, for good and for ill. This is not to say that U.S. officials determined everything, obviously, or that the United States was at any point after 1941 omnipotent—as even a cursory look at America’s Cold War makes clear. It is, however, to maintain that the United States at all times had preponderant power in the international system, a fact that has profound importance in historical terms.

The four reviewers appear to accept this fundamental claim, and we are pleased to see numerous other areas of interpretive agreement between them and us. In the spirit of debate, we will focus mostly here on a few points of disagreement or difference. Andrew Falk’s elegant and perceptive essay, in describing our book as a “celebration of the realist” approach, Whitfield argues, is that we would empathize with American political culture and by political order in the United States is underdeveloped. To this charge we plead guilty, but with an explanation. Fundamentally, our book is about America’s foreign policies across the fifty-year period from Pearl Harbor to the collapse of the USSR. We insist that the domestic political context in the United States shaped these policies much more than many Cold War historians have allowed, but we crafted our argument, for the purposes of clarity and brevity, to stipulate how a few general aspects of American domestic politics contributed to a host of specific foreign policies, rather than the other way around. We could certainly have explained in greater detail how military contractors, lobbyists, pork-barrel politicians, and defense intellectuals actually operated in Washington, but this would have forced us either to expand the book’s size radically or to reduce our coverage of foreign policymaking. We chose instead to posit a few central features of the American political scene and highlight particularly salient examples of their influence on foreign policy. Zelizer’s own study, it should be noted, does examine U.S. political culture more exhaustively than does our book, which is why we would also concur with his judgment that the two volumes complement one another well.

Stephen Whitfield’s major criticism of America’s Cold War is that we adopt what he sees as a hindsight-dependent and deterministic view of Soviet weakness. We argue that American policymakers consistently over-hyped the Kremlin’s power and intentions even though they knew that the United States was supreme, while a less hindsight-bound approach, Whitfield argues, would empathize with American leaders facing real demonstrations of Soviet power, as at the outset of the Korean War, for example, or during the USSR’s major nuclear buildup in the 1970s.

It is an oft-stated argument in the literature on the superpower confrontation, and Whitfield makes it well. In response may be offered the philosophical rejoinder: why should historians renounce the benefits of hindsight? We know more now, and should say so. More to the point, though, it is a matter of historical record that senior American officials perceived the imbalance between the United States and the USSR at pivotal moments throughout the Cold War. They knew from an early stage that the American strategic arsenal surpassed that of the Soviet Union in all but one category—the number of men under arms—and that its economic strength was far superior. Privately, they acknowledged that the Soviet Union did not want war. In 1959–60, senior administration officials including Dwight Eisenhower knew that there was in fact no “Missile Gap”—or, rather, that the gap that existed favored the United States and the West. Early in the Cuban Missile Crisis, Robert McNamara asked seriously why it really mattered whether the Soviets had missiles in Cuba, given the American installations encircling the USSR. And Ronald Reagan, in his days on the Committee on the Present Danger, candidly pointed out America’s vast technological advantages over the Soviet Union, perhaps not realizing how implausible this observation was to the CPD’s cause. This is not to mention the numerous intelligence reports flowing into the White House throughout the Cold War identifying the USSR’s deep structural problems, reports that eventually led to the creation of “Team B,” the post-sterilization of the politics of insecurity, in the late 1970s.

Moreover, to reiterate the point, if other American officials were not so sanguine and seemed genuinely to worry about Soviet superiority, it was often because the domestic political culture in the United States pushed them in this direction. U.S. leaders who wanted campaign contributions, endorsements from leading defense “experts,” appointments to high cabinet positions, and insulation from the charge of being “soft on communism” had good reason to assume the worst about the USSR and to obsess constantly about the prospect of American inferiority. To argue, on the other hand, that the United States was in a dominant position in every measurable sense
was just bad politics during most of the post-1945 era. We do not mean to suggest that this culture was deterministic—the above examples show it was not. But threat perception is never an exact science. It is shaped by interests, and in the United States those interests have tended (and tend still) to reward alarmism and militarism. In nations that have long experience with the hazards of overreaction, threats tend to be perceived quite differently. In the United States for much of the Cold War, that is to say, politicians had the luxury of playing politics with foreign policy, with often baneful effects.

We would be remiss in failing to note Whitfield’s powerful conclusion, in which he highlights the trenchant critique of the emerging Cold War strategy offered by Walter Lippmann in 1947. Whitfield is right to underscore the columnist’s remarkable contribution (in historical terms, certainly) to the foreign policy debate that year, and we also agree that Lippmann’s “conception of the of the proper role of the United States in world affairs hovers over America’s Cold War.” Though we examine Lippmann’s 1947 critique as well as Kennan’s response to it, we don’t analyze it in depth; here as elsewhere in the book, we ran into the old problem: so much to say, so little space. Certainly, Lippmann deserves a more prominent place in the historiography of the Cold War than he has thus far received.

Finally, a few words about Kyle Longley’s generous and intelligent review, in which he laments our inattention to the issues of race and gender. We admire the work done in recent years to reexamine traditional historical questions (and new ones) through the lens of not only race and gender but also culture (as emphasized by Falk in his essay), ideology, religion, class, and language. We assign this literature in our classes and cite some of it in the book. At the same time, Longley is certainly correct that race and gender could have loomed much larger in our study than they did. In the end, though, the historian of decision-making must choose among causal factors. To merely list X number of causes and say that they all played a role will not do. When accounting for the development and execution of major U.S. Cold War policies (as opposed to the larger phenomenon of foreign relations), we believe it is difficult to show how conceptions of gender and race had a consistent and decisive effect upon decision-making. Consider one of Longley’s examples, John F. Kennedy as president. How does one square the macho swagger of the Kennedy White House with JFK’s fundamental cautiousness on major foreign policy issues? In the crises over Berlin and Cuba, for example, Kennedy worked strenuously to avoid war; on Vietnam he was no gung-ho warrior but a committed skeptic, unconvinced from an early point that a lasting military solution was possible. A gendered analysis seems to have little explanatory power here as far as policymaking is concerned.

Longley might (or might not) concede this particular example and still insist that domestic politics—so important in our analysis—cannot be separated from gender or race or culture or ideology. This would be a fair point, one that could open up an interesting and productive historiographical debate. For our side, a possible opening salvo in such a debate would be that all those factors end up being filtered through domestic politics. That is to say, to the extent they found expression and influenced policy during the Cold War, it was in large measure through domestic political discourse and partisan strategizing.

In writing America’s Cold War and articulating our “Politics of Insecurity” theme, we have sought to cast a new light on American national security decision-making in the post-1941 era and to make a case for the importance of the intermestic. U.S. policy in the Cold War, we maintain, was never merely a reaction to communist power or a crusade concocted solely by domestic interests and imperatives. It was always a combination of the two. We thank the contributors to this Passport forum for taking this argument seriously and on its own terms, and we look forward to the important and exciting work that remains to be done on the subject.

Campbell Craig is Professor of International Relations at the University of Southampton.

Frederik Logevall is John S. Knight Professor of International Studies and Professor of History at Cornell University.
1. Personal and Professional Notes

Bob Brigham (Vassar College) has been nominated for the American Historical Association Council, Teaching Division.

Paul Chamberlin has accepted the position of assistant professor of history at the University of Kentucky.

Chris Dietrich (Texas) has won a Beveridge Grant from the American Historical Association for research in Mexico City.

Jeffrey Engel has become the Verlin and Howard Kruse ’52 Founders Professor at the Scowcroft Institute for International Affairs at Texas A&M University. He was also named one of History News Network’s “Top Young Historians.”

Michael Hogan has become the 18th President of the University of Illinois.

Ryan Irwin has become Associate Director of International Security Studies at Yale University.

Kyle Longley (Arizona State University) has been selected president elect for the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association.

John McNay has been promoted to the rank of full professor at the University of Cincinnati’s Raymond Walters College. He has also been elected vice president of UC’s chapter of the AAUP.

Kenneth Osgood (Florida Atlantic) will be the Stanley Kaplan Visiting Professor of American Foreign Policy at Williams College for 2010-11.

Marc Selverstone has become Assistant Director for Presidential Studies at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia.

2. Research Notes

Historic Eastern European Dissident Journal Published Online

A rare complete series of the historic dissident journal Problems of Eastern Europe has achieved its first-ever online publication as part of the new Russian-language web pages of the National Security Archive, also featuring hundreds of digitized facsimiles of declassified Soviet-era documents on topics such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet war in Afghanistan, Mikhail Gorbachev and the end of the Cold War, and dissident movements in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Introduced on the Archive site by long-time editors Larisa and Frantisek Silnicky, Problems of Eastern Europe published throughout the 1980s a wide range of Soviet, Eastern European, and ultimately even Western reformist thinking, in order to make connections between those various publics and overcome the information barriers that especially hindered the development of dissident and oppositionist ideas. The new Russian-language Web pages, compiled and edited by the Archive’s director of Russia Programs, Svetlana Savranskaya, together with technical editor Rinat Bikineyev, also include the most sought-after primary sources in Russian from the Archive’s extensive collections, ranging from the diary of top Gorbachev aide and long-time Central Committee official Anatoly Chernyaev, to the scholarly collection compiled by the late Sergo Mikoyan based on his father Anastas Mikoyan’s experience as a leading Soviet Politburo member, to the specialized collections developed by Archive staff on such topics as the Soviet side of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet invasion and occupation and withdrawal from Afghanistan, and the surveillance and repression of dissidents such as the Moscow Helsinki Group. The site also features a new “document of the month,” the original “sovershennom sekretno” (top secret) transcript of the Soviet Politburo discussion 30 years ago of the Afghanistan war.

English-language publications of the Archive’s Russia and Eurasia Programs include more than two dozen Electronic Briefing Books of key U.S. and Soviet documents (in translation) covering major Cold War topics and events.

For more information, visit the web page at: www.nsarchive.org/rus.
The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, 1990

Fifth Installment of Former Top Soviet Adviser's Journal Available in English for First Time

The National Security Archive has now published its fifth installment of the diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, the man behind some of the most momentous transformations in Soviet foreign policy at the end of the 1980s in his role as Mikhail Gorbachev's chief foreign policy aide.

In addition to his contributions to Perestroika and new thinking, Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev was and remains a strong proponent of openness and transparency, providing his diaries and notes to historians trying to understand the end of the Cold War. This section of the diary, covering 1990—a tragic year, according to Chernyaev—is published in English for the first time.

For more information, contact:
Svetlana Savranskaya
202-994-7000
http://www.nsarchive.org

Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library's Digital Library

The Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library has launched a major program to digitize and post to the web some of its most important materials. The first digitization project was the "National Security Adviser. Memoranda of Presidential Conversations, 1973-1977," the Library's most popular and most used textual collection. Each folder of the Memoranda of Conversations (or "Memcons") contains the White House's transcript-like records and handwritten source notes from over 1,000 presidential meetings on foreign relations and national security matters, January 1973 - January 1977. In addition to Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, participants include foreign heads of state and diplomats, U.S. intelligence and national security officials, U.S. diplomats, members of Congress, Cabinet members, visiting delegations, and others. Discussion topics are myriad. The bulk of the Memcons are now declassified and open for research. The online collection will be updated as new material is released.

Other completed digitization projects include President Ford's Daily Diary, National Security Council Meeting Minutes, selected documents related to the Vladivostok arms control summit (1974), and the diary of Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns.


For more information please contact the Ford Library at ford.library@nara.gov, or (734) 205-0555.

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Secret U.S. Overture to Iran in 1999 Broke Down Over Terrorism Allegations

A highly confidential U.S. overture to Iran in summer 1999 foundered because the intelligence community and FBI believed members of Iran's Revolutionary Guards (IRGC) had a role in the infamous Khobar Towers bombing of June 1996, and because U.S. officials overestimated the Iranian president's ability to manage the sensitive matter of U.S. relations within Iran's power structure, according to newly declassified documents.

The new documents, including President Bill Clinton's message to Iranian President Mohammad Khatami and Tehran's response, highlight the complexities facing recent U.S. policy-makers in their approaches to the Islamic Republic, particularly the challenge of balancing closer ties to Tehran with concerns over allegations of past support for terrorist groups. Those concerns led the Clinton administration -- notwithstanding the president's personal interest in a rapprochement with Tehran -- to order updated contingency plans for military strikes against Iranian targets.

For more information, contact:
Malcolm Byrne
202-994-7000
mbyrne@gwu.edu
http://www.nsarchive.org
New CWIHP Document Collection from Dutch Archives

CWIHP is pleased to announce the publication of e-Dossier #21, "A Mass Psychotic Movement Washing over the Country Like a Wave": Explaining Dutch Reservations about NATO’s 1979 Dual-Track Decision, by University of Amsterdam Professor Ruud van Dijk. Drawing upon newly declassified documents from Dutch archives, Professor Ruud van Dijk traces the evolution of Dutch policy and international diplomacy leading up to the December 12, 1979 dual track decision on the modernization of Theater Nuclear Forces (TNF) in Europe. Pressure from the United States and NATO allies to accept TNF modernization, as well as strong Dutch domestic opposition to modernization, placed the Dutch government in a challenging position. The 16 documents about interactions between Dutch leaders and their alliance peers that form the basis for this e-Dossier provide unique insights not only into Dutch politics, but also into the dynamics of alliance politics and the important role that public opinion within a single country can play in international affairs.

For more information or to download the dossier: http://www.wilsoncenter.org

The Washington/Camp David Summit 1990

The Washington Summit in 1990 between Presidents George H.W. Bush and Mikhail S. Gorbachev brought dramatic realization on the American side of the severe domestic political pressures facing the Soviet leader, produced an agreement in principle on trade but no breakthrough on Germany, and only slow progress towards the arms race in reverse that Gorbachev had offered, according to previously secret Soviet and U.S. documents posted by the National Security Archive.

The largely symbolic achievements of the Washington summit memorialized in the documents contrast with subsequent published accounts claiming that the summit was a crucial turning point for German unification. The documents suggest other (non-American) points were more important, such as the March 1990 elections in East Germany, and the July 1990 meeting between Gorbachev and West German chancellor Helmut Kohl, in which Kohl offered significant financial aid and support for the Soviet troops in East Germany during a multi-year withdrawal process.

For more information, contact:
Svetlana Savranskaya or Thomas Blanton
202/994-7000
nsarchiv@gwu.edu

3. Announcements:

CFP: Cryptology in War and Peace: Crisis Points in History
October 6-7, 2011, Laurel, MD

The National Security Agency’s Center for Cryptologic History sponsors the Cryptologic History Symposium every two years. The next one will be held October 6-7, 2011 in Maryland. Historians from the Center, the Intelligence Community, the defense establishment, and the military services, as well as distinguished scholars from American and foreign academic institutions, veterans of the profession, and the interested public will all gather for two days of reflection and debate on topics from the cryptologic past.

The theme for the upcoming conference will be: “Cryptology in War and Peace: Crisis Points in History.” This topical approach is especially relevant as the year 2011 is an important anniversary marking the start of many seminal events in our nation’s military history. Such historical episodes include the 1861 outbreak of the fratricidal Civil War between North and South. Nineteen forty-one saw a surprise attack wrench America into the Second World War. The year 1951 began with the recent fall of Seoul to Chinese Communist forces with United Nations troops retreating in the Korean War. In 1961, the United States began a commitment of advisory troops in Southeast Asia that would eventually escalate into the Vietnam War; that year also marked the height of the Cold War as epitomized by the physical division of Berlin. Twenty years later, a nascent democratic movement was suppressed by a declaration of martial law in Poland; bipolar confrontation would markedly resurge for much of the 1980s. In 1991, the United States intervened in the Persian Gulf to reverse Saddam Hussein’s aggression, all while the Soviet Union suffered through the throes of its final collapse. And in 2001, the nation came under siege by radical terrorism.

Participants will delve into the roles of signals intelligence and information assurance, and not just as these capabilities supported military operations. More cogently, observers will examine how these factors affected and shaped military tactics, operations, strategy, planning, and command and control throughout history. The role of cryptology in preventing conflict and supporting peaceful pursuits will also be examined. The panels will include presentations in a range of technological, operational, organizational, counterintelligence, policy, and international themes.

Past symposia have featured scholarship that set out new ways to consider cryptologic history, and this one will be no exception. The mix of practitioners, scholars, and the public precipitates a lively debate that will
promote an enhanced appreciation for the context of past events. Researchers on traditional and technological cryptologic topics, those whose work in any aspect touches upon the historical aspects of cryptology as defined in its broadest sense, as well as foreign scholars working in this field, are especially encouraged to participate.

The Symposium will be held at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory’s Kossiakoff Center, in Laurel, Maryland, a location central to the Baltimore and Washington, D.C., areas. As has been the case with previous symposia, the conference will provide unparalleled opportunities for interaction with leading historians and distinguished experts. Please make plans to join us for either one or both days of this intellectually stimulating conference.

Interested persons are invited to submit proposals for a potential presentation or even for a full panel. While the topics can relate to this year’s theme, all serious work on any aspect of cryptologic history will be considered. Proposals should include an abstract for each paper and/or a statement of session purpose for each panel, as well as biographical sketches for each presenter. To submit proposals or for more information on this conference, contact Dr. Kent Sieg, the Center’s Symposium Executive Director, at 301-688-2336 or via email at kgsieg@nsa.gov.

For more information:

Dr. Kent Sieg
Symposium Executive Director
Center for Cryptologic History
301-688-2336
kgsieg@nsa.gov
http://www.nsa.gov

Institute for Advanced Study Fellowship
2011-2012, Princeton, NJ

Each year, the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, NJ, invites approximately twenty scholars to be in residence for the full academic year to pursue their own research. The School welcomes applications in economics, political science, law, psychology, sociology, and anthropology. It encourages social scientific work with an historical and humanistic bent and also entertains applications in history, philosophy, literary criticism, literature and linguistics. Applicants must have a Ph.D. at time of application. Each year there is a general thematic focus that provides common ground for roughly half the scholars; for 2011-2012 the focus will be “Moralities,” under the direction of Professor Didier Fassin. The application deadline is November 1, 2010. Applications must be submitted through the Institute’s online application system, which can be found, along with more information about the theme, at www.sss.ias.edu/applications.

For more information:

Donne Petito
donne@ias.edu
http://sss.ias.edu/applications

John Carter Brown Library Fellowships
2011-2012, Providence, RI

The John Carter Brown Library will award approximately thirty Research Fellowships for the year June 1, 2011 - June 30, 2012. Sponsorship of research at the John Carter Brown Library is reserved exclusively for scholars whose work is centered on the colonial history of the Americas, North and South, including all aspects of the European, African, and Native American involvement.

Short-Term Fellowships: Regular John Carter Brown Library Fellowships are available for periods of two to four months and carry a stipend of $2,100 per month. These Fellowships are open to Americans and foreign nationals who are engaged in pre- or post-doctoral, or independent, research. Graduate students must have passed their preliminary or general examinations at the time of application.

Long-Term Fellowships: The Library will also receive applications for Long-Term Fellowships, several of which are funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH), an independent agency of the U.S. Federal government, by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, and by The Reed Foundation which has endowed the InterAmericas Fellowship supporting research on the history of the British West Indies and the Caribbean Basin. The R. David Parsons Fellowship supports the study of the history of exploration and discovery.

Long-Term Fellowships are for five to ten months (with a stipend of $4,200 per month). Applicants for NEH Long-Term Fellowships must be American citizens or have been resident in the United States for the three years
immediately preceding the application deadline. Graduate students are not eligible for Long-Term Fellowships. Recipients of all Fellowships are expected to relocate to Providence and to be in continuous residence at the John Carter Brown Library in Rhode Island for the entire term of the award.

For more information:
www.jcbl.org

New CWIHP Working Paper

CWIHP is pleased to announce the publication of the latest addition to the CWIHP Working Papers Series, Working Paper #61, *Arming Nonalignment: Yugoslavia's Relations with Burma and the Cold War in Asia (1950-1955)* by Jovan Cavoski. Using recently declassified documents from Yugoslav, Chinese, Indian, and U.S. archives, Cavoski examines the hitherto unexplored political, military, and economic partnership between Yugoslavia and Burma during early Cold War years. This relationship not only affected both countries' views on the nonaligned movement, but it also radically influenced the internal situation in Burma and its political and social development. While, according to Cavoski, Yugoslavia viewed Burma as a window into Asia through which new ties with India, China, and Indonesia could be forged, for Burma this new partnership brought political and military benefits that helped solidify its position on the world stage. The scale of Yugoslav-Burmese military cooperation, Cavoski points out, strengthened Burma's response to internal rebellion and foreign interference. This relationship, in many ways, influenced the way China, India, the U.S., and the USSR viewed the role of Burma and Yugoslavia in world affairs. At the same time, it also became a pattern around which stronger bonds between nonaligned countries were ultimately shaped.

For more information:

CFP: Civil War History

*Civil War History*, the leading scholarly journal devoted to the American Civil War era, is welcoming manuscript submissions. Nearing its sixtieth year of publication, the journal is expanding its coverage to more deeply explore the antebellum and Reconstruction eras. While Civil War History will continue to publish military and political history, as well as reviews of recently published books, the editors are also seeking pioneering scholarship that investigates the cultural, social, and comparative history of the period before, during, and after the War. Manuscripts that take a transnational and/or comparative approach, as well as those that examine the interrelationship between war and society, are especially encouraged.

Manuscript inquiries and submissions should be addressed to Lesley J. Gordon, Editor, Civil War History, Department of History, University of Akron, OH 44325-1902; civilwarhistory@uakron.edu. Queries concerning book reviews should be sent to: Caroline Janney, cjanney@purdue.edu

For more information, visit the journal’s website at:
http://upress.kent.edu/journals/index.htm

CFP: Transnational Dimensions of Cold War Anticommunism: Actions, Networks, Transfers
*October 31 - November 1, 2011, University of Fribourg*

Against the background of potential nuclear devastation and the confrontation between two ideologies and world powers, an unrestrained psychological war was fought by the two camps using modern means of communication (radio, cinema, covert action, etc). In the West, the Cold War was marked by widespread and intense forms of anti-communism. Generally this was antitotalitarian in nature and dramatic in tone. In response to the USSR and its Communist Party acolytes gaining power, and in reaction to important historical events (Czech Coup, Berlin Blockade, the purges, Korean War, Cuban Crisis, decolonization, Vietnam War, etc), various forms of anti-communist struggle, discourse, and representation arose. While some anti-communist endeavors built on earlier initiatives, others took on new forms, such as the large-scale institutionalization of clandestine operations by the United States after 1947-48. Although anti-communist partisans have spoken of the struggle against communism in terms of a "crusade" (implying the idea of collective action and a sanctified mission) in retaliation to a threat globally orchestrated from Moscow, critics have accused the U.S. of illegal intervention around the world, either militarily or subversively via the CIA. In recent years there has also been growing interest in the importance and impact of propaganda and public diplomacy conducted in particular by the U.S. and its allies.
When it comes to assessing these developments, the key question of the “transnationality” of anti-communism has rarely been raised. This conference looks to explore this field in breadth and depth through the following questions:

- To what extent was “anti-communism” actually planned, coordinated, and structured at the transnational level?
- What kinds of interactions and interdependencies can be observed in the different types of organized anti-communism on the transatlantic and European levels?
- What were some of the dynamics in the transfer of practices, ideas and methods?
- What types of networks were created in the struggle against the “red peril”?
- In comparison to the interwar period, to what extent were these developments new, or merely a continuation of previous activities?
- What were the motivations and goals of these individuals and groups?
- How did covert and overt activities link up, and how did their interests sometimes clash?

The conference will examine the transnational dimensions of Cold War anti-communism by bringing together perspectives on the various connections, involvements, exchanges, relationships and transfers between societies. This will look in detail at the notion of Western anti-communist “solidarity” and help to disclose the limits, failures and shifting phases of this solidarity across the public and private spheres (“state-private networks”). Since the dominant narrative of Cold War anti-communism is U.S.-centric, reflecting the greater resources and leadership role of that nation, it is the aim to build a more complex picture of this phenomenon by looking at European initiatives operating separately from (or aligned with) U.S. interests.

In order to explore these issues, the conference aims to bring together an international group of historians together with scholars from other disciplines such as sociology, political science, literature, and film studies. Paper proposals can adopt a comparative or single country approach as long as a transnational perspective is present in the analysis. The conference will be divided into three broad research areas: the “political” area (actions), the “social” area (networks), and the “cultural” area (transfers, representations, receptions, political cultures).

The organisers will cover accommodation costs in Fribourg during the conference. If possible, funding will be available for covering travel costs. Since the University of Fribourg is a bilingual university (French and German), the participants are kindly invited to present their paper in one of the two languages. However, papers in English are also welcome, as far as a substantial abstract in German and/or French is available for the audience.

Paper proposals should consist of a title and an abstract of max 4,000 characters, together with a brief CV. Please send proposals to Luc van Dongen (luc.vandongen@unifr.ch) by September 1, 2010.

Unpublished William Appleman Williams Novel Released

The text of a previously unpublished novel written by historian William Appleman Williams is now available on the OSU Libraries Special Collections website.

Titled Ninety Days Inside the Empire, the novel, penned by Williams in the 1980s, touches upon several themes that were important to the author’s life and work. Set in Corpus Christi, Texas, Williams’s book tells the story of racial strife and civil rights mobilization through the eyes of military servicemen following the close of World War II. Williams, a veteran of the United States Navy, served as a line officer during WWII. Following the close of hostilities, Williams was stationed in Corpus Christi where he joined the N.A.A.C.P. and participated in local civil rights activities.

The web version of Ninety Days Inside the Empire spans 125 pages over fourteen chapters. The text is enhanced by a number of illustrations and is introduced by Dr. Kerry Ahearn, chair of the Oregon State University English department.

For more information, contact:
Clifford Mead
Head of Special Collections
Valley Library 121
Oregon State University
Corvallis, OR 97331
541-737-2083
cliff.mead@orst.edu
Call for Entries: SHFG Thomas Jefferson Prize

The Society for History in the Federal Government (SHFG) seeks entries for its 2011 Thomas Jefferson Prize for documentary histories published in 2009 or 2010. The prize recognizes the editor(s) of a single volume or one or more volumes in a project that contributes significantly to the understanding of the history of the federal government. It will be awarded at the SHFG annual meeting in College Park, Maryland in March 2011. See www.shfg.org for a list of past winners and general requirements for all SHFG prizes.

In addition to the general requirements, entries for the 2011 Jefferson Prize will be judged on the editorial methodology employed, including accuracy of transcription, relevance and usefulness of annotation, selection and arrangement of documents, and indexing. Electronic documentary editions will also be evaluated for solid technological capabilities and performance, high quality of design, and innovative strategies or techniques.

A copy of each entry with a letter briefly stating its qualifications and merits should be sent to each of the Jefferson Committee members by November 15, 2010:

1. Richa Wilson, US Forest Service Intermountain Region, 324 25th Street, Ogden, UT 84401
2. Annette Amerman, Marine Corps History Division, 3078 Upshur Avenue, Quantico, VA 22134
3. Fred Stielow, 1235 Boucher Ave., Annapolis, MD 21403

The SHFG, founded in 1979, is a nonprofit professional organization that promotes the study and broad understanding of the history of the United States Government. It also serves as the voice of the Federal historical community. The Thomas Jefferson Prize commemorates the third president of the United States and the author of the Declaration of Independence. Jefferson was a firm believer in the study of history and the preservation of historical records.

4. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines:

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations. The prize of $2,500 is awarded annually to an author for his or her first book on any aspect of the history of American foreign relations.

Eligibility: The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works that represent social science disciplines other than history are not eligible.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contributions to scholarship. Winning books should have exceptional interpretative and analytical qualities. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should display careful organization and distinguished writing. Five copies of each book must be submitted with a letter of nomination.

The award will be announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the selection committee. The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition which meets the standards of excellence established for the prize.

To nominate a book published in 2010, send five copies of the book and a letter of nomination to Professor Katie Sibley, History Department, Saint Joseph’s University, 5600 City Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19131. Books may be sent at any time during 2010, but must arrive by December 1, 2010.

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize recognizes and encourages excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The prize of $1000 is awarded annually.

Eligibility: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the PhD whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or of any other established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.
Procedures: Nominations, in the form of a letter and the nominee’s C.V., should be sent to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter should discuss evidence of the nominee’s excellence in teaching and research.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH). The winner of the prize will deliver a lecture during the SHAFR luncheon at the next year’s OAH annual meeting. The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to a SHAFR presidential address and should address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer’s specific research interests. The lecturer is awarded $1,000 plus up to $500 in travel expenses to the OAH, and his or her lecture is published in Diplomatic History.

To be considered for the 2011 award, nominations must be received by February 28, 2011. Nominations should be sent to Professor James Goode, Dept. of History, D1-134 Mackinac Hall, Grand Valley State University, Allendale, MI 49401 (email: goodej@gvsu.edu).

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. The prize of $1,000 is awarded annually to the author of a distinguished article appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations.

Eligibility: The author must be under forty-one years of age or within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of the article’s acceptance for publication. The article must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award or the Myrna F. Bernath Book Award are ineligible.

Procedures: All articles appearing in Diplomatic History will be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations may be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

To nominate an article published in 2010, send three copies of the article and a letter of nomination to Professor Erez Manela, Department of History, 1730 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 (e-mail: manela@fas.harvard.edu). Deadline for nominations is February 1, 2011.

Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize

This prize is designed to reward distinguished scholarship in the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined. The prize of $2,500 is awarded annually. The Ferrell Prize was established to honor Robert H. Ferrell, professor of diplomatic history at Indiana University from 1961 to 1990, by his former students.

Eligibility: The Ferrell Prize recognizes any book beyond the first monograph by the author. To be considered, a book must deal with the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of SHAFR. Three copies of the book must be submitted.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

To nominate a book published in 2010, send five copies of the book and a letter of nomination to Professor Wilson Miscamble, History Department, 219 O'Shaughnessy Hall, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556. Books may be sent at any time during 2010, but must arrive by December 15, 2010.

Arthur S. Link-Warren F. Kuehl Prize For Documentary Editing

The Link-Kuehl Prize is awarded for outstanding collections of primary source materials in the fields of international or diplomatic history, especially those distinguished by the inclusion of commentary designed to interpret the documents and set them within their historical context. Published works as well as electronic collections and audio-visual compilations are eligible. The prize is not limited to works on American foreign policy, but is open to works on the history of international, multi-archival, and/or American foreign relations,
The award of $1,000 is presented biannually (odd years) to the best work published during the preceding two calendar years. The award is announced at the SHAFR luncheon during the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

Procedures: Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. Send three copies of the book or other work with letter of nomination to Jeffrey P. Kimball, Miami University, Department of History, Rm 254 Upham Hall, Miami University, Oxford, OH 45056 (e-mail: jpkimball@muohio.edu). To be considered for the 2011 prize, nominations must be received by February 1, 2011.

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant

The Bernath Dissertation Grant of up to $4,000 is intended to help graduate students defray expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Holt, Gelfand-Rappaport, and Bemis grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SHAFR web page at www.shafr.org. To be considered for the 2011 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by 1 October 2010. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in Passport.

The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship

The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship of up to $4,000 is intended to defray the costs of travel necessary to conduct research on a significant dissertation project. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Stuart L. Bernath, Gelfand-Rappaport, and Bemis grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SHAFR web page at www.shafr.org. To be considered for the 2011 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by October 1, 2010. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in Passport.

The Lawrence Gelfand – Armin Rappaport Dissertation Fellowship

SHAFR established this fellowship to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president, and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of Diplomatic History. The Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship of up to $4,000 is intended to defray the costs of dissertation research travel. The fellowship is awarded annually at SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Stuart L. Bernath, Holt, and Bemis grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SHAFR web page at www.shafr.org. To be considered for the 2011 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by October 1, 2010. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.
Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grants

The Samuel F. Bemis Research Grants are intended to promote dissertation research by graduate students. A limited number of grants of varying amounts (generally, up to $2,000) will be awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Stuart L. Bernath, Holt, and Gelfand-Rappaport grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SHAFR web page at www.shafr.org. To be considered for the 2011 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by October 1, 2010. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in Passport.

The Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship

The Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship was established to honor Michael J. Hogan, long-time editor of Diplomatic History. The Hogan Fellowship of up to $4,000 is intended to promote research in foreign language sources by graduate students. The fellowship is intended to defray the costs of studying foreign languages needed for research. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Applicants must be graduate students researching some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SHAFR web page at www.shafr.org. To be considered for the 2011 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by October 1, 2010. Submit materials to hogan-fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in Passport.

William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants

The William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants are intended to promote scholarly research by untenured college and university faculty and others who are within six years of the Ph.D. and who are working as professional historians. Grants are limited to scholars working on the first research monograph. A limited number of grants of varying amounts (generally, up to $2,000) will be awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SHAFR web page at www.shafr.org. To be considered for the 2011 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by October 1, 2010. Submit materials to williams-fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in Passport.

The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship

The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship was established by the Bernath family to promote scholarship in U.S. foreign relations history by women. The Myrna Bernath Fellowship of up to $5,000 is intended to defray the costs of scholarly research by women. It is awarded biannually (in odd years) and announced at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.
Applications are welcomed from women at U.S. universities as well as women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and those within five years of completion of their PhDs. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SHAFR web page at www.shafr.org. To be considered for the 2011 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by October 1, 2010. Submit materials to myrnabernath-committee@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in Passport.

5. Recent Publications of Interest

Atkinson, Chad. Dangerous Democracies and Partying Prime Ministers: Domestic Political Contexts and Foreign Policies (Lexington, 2009).

Belmonte, Laura A. Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War (Pennsylvania, 2010).

Clapp, Jennifer. Toxic Exports: The Transfer of Hazardous Wastes from Rich Countries to Poor Countries (Cornell, 2010).

Dolhinow, Rebecca. A Jumble of Needs: Women’s Activism and Neoliberalism in the Colonias of the Southwest (Minnesota, 2010).


Finney, Patrick. Remembering the Road to World War Two: International History, National Identity, Collective Memory (Routledge, 2010).

Folly, Martin. Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy from World War I through World War II (Historical Dictionaries of Diplomacy and Foreign Relations) (Scarecrow, 2010).

Foster, Anne L. Projections of Power: The United States and Europe in Colonial Southeast Asia, 1919-1941 (Duke, 2010).

Flavell, Julie. When London was Capital of America (Yale, 2010).


Henn, Martin. Under the Color of Law: The Bush Administration Subversion of U.S. Constitutional Law in the War on Terror. (Lexington, 2010).


Jablonsky, David. War by Land, Sea, and Air: Dwight Eisenhower and the Concept of Unified Command (Yale, 2010).


Laub, Thomas J. *After the Fall: German Policy in Occupied France, 1940-1944* (Oxford, 2010).


Maddock, Shane J. *Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to Present* (North Carolina, 2010).


Mee, Huan. *A Diplomatic Woman* (BiblioLife, 2010).

Millet, Allan R. *The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from the North* (Kansas, 2010).

Morris, Benny. *One State, Two States: Resolving the Israel/Palestine Conflict* (Yale, 2010).


Seymour, Charles. *The Diplomatic Background of the War, 1870-1914* (Yale, 2010).

Shaw, Tony and Denise J. Youngblood, *Cinematic Cold War: The American and Soviet Struggle for Hearts and Minds* (Kansas, 2010).


Wiarda, Howard J. *Think Tanks and Foreign Policy: The Foreign Policy Research Institute and Presidential Politics* (Lexington, 2010).
In Memoriam: Norman Graebner

Norman Arthur Graebner, a towering figure in the field of U.S. foreign relations, passed away on May 10, 2010, at the age of 94 after suffering a stroke. He was Randolph P. Compton Professor of History and Public Affairs, Emeritus, at the University of Virginia, where he was the recipient in 1986 of the Thomas Jefferson Award, the University’s highest honor. During 1972, Graebner served as president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. After receiving his B.A. at Milwaukee State Teachers College (MSTC) in 1939, he earned an M.A. in 1940 at the University of Oklahoma and a doctorate in history at the University of Chicago in December 1949, where he studied under Avery Craven.

Graebner was born in Kingman, Kansas, on October 19, 1915, the son of Rudolph William and Helen Brauer Graebner. His father, like four of his five brothers, was a Lutheran clergyman, and became the minister of a church in Coffeyville, Kansas, in 1917. Norman described his boyhood years in A Twentieth-Century Odyssey: Memoir of a Life in Academe as “altogether happy, secure, and often self-contained.” To his delight, he was able to develop an early passion for horse riding, but his German ancestry made him the target of wartime discrimination, leaving an indelible impression about how Americans could “absorb the hatreds and irrationalities that official propaganda was intended to generate.”

In 1926, Graebner’s father accepted a new ministerial position in Milwaukee, where Norman played baseball as a shortstop and became an avid reader. Three years at a ministerial prep school convinced him that he had no interest in joining the family business, but his graduation from public high school in 1933 left him one of the Great Depression’s unemployed. Graebner learned typing, shorthand, and bookkeeping at a vocational school and discovered he had talents as a dancer and player of contract bridge and ping-pong. Meanwhile, he had secured a clerical job with an insurance company, but left it for MSTC in the fall of 1936.

Graebner’s extraordinary academic career began in the fall of 1939 when he met fellow student Laura Baum after he began graduate studies in history at the University of Oklahoma. Two years later, they married, but by then, Laura had taught Norman how to take notes and study. His markedly improved performance persuaded Graebner to seek a doctorate despite his father’s initial objections. With M.A. in hand, he started his program in the fall of 1940 at OU, while Laura taught high school in her home state of Nebraska. Unable to secure a college teaching position for the 1941-42 academic year, a disappointed Graebner taught high school in Beggs, Oklahoma. Oklahoma College for Women (OCW) hired him the next year, an event that “revolutionized my life and outlook.”

A heavy load teaching new courses at OCW almost overwhelmed Graebner, who relied on Laura to type class notes. She provided similar assistance during his summer doctoral studies at OU. Meanwhile, a stint acting in a college play helped hone Graebner’s teaching skills. Then, in the spring of 1943, he received an anticipated draft notice. Hoping to attend Officer Candidate School (OCS), he insisted on joining the U.S. Army, but all OCSs closed before he could enroll. His clerical abilities brought duty assignments across the United States over the next year, as Laura accompanied him and found work at each destination. In the fall of 1944, his commander, impressed with Graebner’s credentials, secured his selection for OCS. His graduation followed in March 1945.

Lieutenant Graebner was among the officers who would lead the U.S. forces that occupied postwar Japan. His memoir provides stunning insights about the attitudes of the Japanese that he met after arriving in late September 1945. For him, it imbedded the belief that “negotiation often achieves more than dictation.” That Graebner was an exceptional man soon became clear. In January 1946, he acted on orders to establish the first school for U.S. soldiers in Japan. That spring, Graebner, in his spare time, began formal instruction of Japanese teachers in Yokohama on the meaning, history, structure, and application of democracy.

Recollections in Graebner’s autobiography about his six months introducing Japanese teachers to democracy have tremendous value for scholars. These experiences also had a huge impact in shaping his ideas and assumptions about international relations. Graebner took advantage of the GI Bill to resume his pursuit of a doctorate in the fall of 1947 after teaching at OCW, as did Laura, during the prior academic year. Thomas Bailey almost recruited him to Stanford University, but Graebner instead chose the University of Chicago. During the summer of 1948, Norman and Laura conducted exhaustive research at the National Archives and the Library of Congress on the Mexican War. His finished dissertation received final approval after Kate Turabian corrected it for style.

Two summers conducting research with Laura in Washington, DC, and at a dozen state, local, and university libraries led to completion of a revised manuscript published in 1955 as Empire on the Pacific: A Study in American Continental Expansion. Its main thesis held that acquisition of ports on the West Coast motivated James K. Polk’s policies leading to the Mexican War, rather than “a concern for land or agrarian interests.” As he finished this seminal work, U.S. policy in East Asia was creating growing concern for Graebner, who saw its obsession with communism as misguided because it ignored the primacy of nationalism in deciding world affairs. For him, non-recognition of China’s new government was unrealistic. He considered McCarthyism appalling. Graebner perceived the identical flawed logic guiding the Eisenhower administration and, in 1956, he sharply criticized its foreign policy in The New Isolationism.

Recalling the first four decades of Graebner’s life has importance because it helps explain his deep respect and affection for the life of an academic. Having traveled a difficult road, he fully appreciated his good fortune in securing a permanent faculty position at Iowa State College in 1948. By 1956, Graebner, now an established scholar, joined the History Department at the University of Illinois, where he adopted American diplomatic history as his area of specialization. His subsequent writings would provide the foundation for the Realist School in interpreting U.S. foreign relations.

Graebner credited Hans J. Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations (1948) with introducing him to the concept of realism as a yardstick for evaluating a nation’s behavior in world affairs. The writings of George F. Kennan and Walter Lippman also influenced his thinking. Diplomacy emphasized accommodation and compromise, Morgenthau explained, to advance and protect fundamental interests, while seeking to avoid war.
Graebner’s realist framework of analysis led to the conclusion that “any negotiation that failed the test of mutual advantage was no diplomacy at all, and assured only ultimate disaster.” His multiyear project applying the realist paradigm in assessing the history of U.S. foreign relations led to publication in 1964 of his most important work, Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings in the Intellectual Tradition of American Foreign Policy.

Thereafter, Graebner published many articles in scholarly journals assessing a variety of issues and events in U.S. diplomatic history from a realist perspective. He also edited several anthologies and collections of primary sources with commentaries, as well as writing textbooks on U.S. history. Graebner published in two volumes his realist appraisal of the U.S. diplomacy from Benjamin Franklin to Ronald Reagan in 1984 and 1985, relying heavily on primary, rather than secondary sources. In a 1987 Diplomatic History article, Jerald R. Combs recognized Graebner’s paternity in conceiving the Realist School. But he also made the critical distinction between the “soft realism” that Graebner espoused and the “hard realism” that others advocated, calling for greater U.S. power and toughness confronting its adversaries abroad. Graebner fully agreed.

Norman was proud of his scholarly contributions, but would want to be remembered most for his success as an effective teacher who both informed and inspired. That he reached this life’s goal would be a gross understatement. Undergraduates wanted to learn history from Graebner because they simply loved attending his classes, supporting his doubts “that students could learn more from a class discussion than from a well-organized and deeply-researched lecture.” At the University of Illinois, enrollments steadily rose to 500 in his course on American diplomatic history. The student radio station soon began broadcasting his lectures, reaching an estimated regular listening audience of 75,000.

In October 1966, the University of Virginia’s History Department invited Graebner to accept appointment as the first Edward R. Stettinius Chair in Modern American History. It took months for him to decide, not only because of his sense of loyalty, but also because Illinois continued to match UVA’s incentives. Years later, Graebner told me that he finally agreed to leave Urbana after concluding that Virginia’s commitment to recruit him exceeded Illinois desire to keep him. Joining the faculty in the fall of 1967, he soon became a legend. In the spring of 1972, I was one of 640 students who awaited his arrival on the first day of class in a room with 500 seats. Graebner secured another room and taught the overflow at a different hour. I doubt that he asked for any release time.

Graebner’s legacy will live on in the long list of graduate students who earned doctoral degrees under his direction. “Other than expressing my own views generously,” he later recalled, “I directed students lightly in the preparation of their dissertations . . .” While his style as a mentor was not ideal for all graduate students, it served my needs and those of many others perfectly, not least because he was generous with his time. I remember well sitting in Norman’s living room in Charlottesville and discussing my dissertation when suddenly his comments revealed to me the main thesis that my research identified and substantiated. Moreover, Graebner trained his students to be direct, clear, and concise writers. As for me, his advice led to avoidance of passive voice like the plague, not starting sentences with articles, and regularly using good quotations.

I have long remembered Graebner’s advice being an excellent teacher. This was because Norman was an exemplary role model. His emphasis on preparation and technique was obvious, whether in a large survey or in a seminar. “It was the eye contact—and the student reaction—that unleashed the energy and confidence that kept the presentation moving easily, almost effortlessly,” Graebner later observed. Just as important, however, was his commitment to creating “a high level of decorum” in the classroom. Graebner understood the connection between effective learning and maintaining formality in a teaching environment.

Graebner’s glowing review of a book that the department chair at New Mexico State University had written on the Vietnam War secured him the first permanent job. In the fall of 1982, I invited Mr. Graebner—my form of address until about 1990—to initiate the Charles Duval Outstanding Guest Lecture in History series. Laura accompanied Norman to Las Cruces, typically devoting much attention to finding out what was new with my wife and two youngsters. The Graebners loved the Mexican food and Southwestern terrain. As for his lecture, Norman presented a critique of early Reagan Administration foreign policy. If there was a “window of vulnerability,” he asked at one point, why were there no Soviet missiles landing at that moment on American cities?

In May 1986, Graebner retired from teaching. “Mr. Graebner is U.S. diplomatic history,” a Student Council report stated succinctly at the time. “Unanimously praised by all his students, ‘Stormin Norman’ Graebner is a captivating and exciting lecturer.” Thereafter, Graebner remained incredibly active as a teacher and scholar. He accepted four one-term teaching assignments at Beloit College, the Virginia Military Institute, the College of William and Mary, and Marshall University. For the 1994-1995 academic year, he served as distinguished visiting professor at the National War College. During the fall term of 1998, Graebner was a Fulbright lecturer at the University of Heidelberg.

During his career, Graebner received many honors and awards. In 1988, SHAHR inaugurated a lifetime achievement award in the name of Norman and Laura that “recognizes a senior historian of United States foreign relations who has significantly contributed to the development of the field . . .” Graebner was a Harold Vyvyan Harmsworth Professor of American History at Oxford University and a Thomas Jefferson Visiting Scholar at Downing College, Cambridge. He received honorary degrees from several universities. Graebner twice served as a Fulbright lecturer in Australia and taught as a visiting professor at Stanford University, Pennsylvania State University, and the U.S. Military Academy.

Laura passed away in 1997, succumbing to a respiratory problem she had suffered for years. Norman would remarry, tying the knot with long-time friend Jane Shannon, widow of former UVA dean and noted historian David Shannon. To the end of his life, Graebner added to his list of publications that included, as author, coauthor, or editor, more than thirty books and some 130 articles, essays, and book chapters. He was lead author, with Richard Dan Burns and Joseph M. Stracusa, of America and the Cold War, 1941-1991: A Realist Interpretation (2010). “What mattered to me,” he reminds readers with this book, “was not the country’s economic or military primacy, but its capacity to maintain an easy and reassuring coexistence with the rest of the world.” Cambridge University Press also had accepted his manuscript titled The Slow Death of Versailles, prepared with Edward Bennett, for publication in 2011.

Norman A. Graebner “lived the scholar’s life with qualities of intellectual rigor, human kindness and collegiality that few can equal,” UVA President John T. Casteen III eulogized. “His kindness, lust for life, and fundamental decency have inspired and empowered two long generations of . . . students and faculty members and of his colleagues everywhere . . . In an age when the term ‘gentleman and scholar’ may be used loosely we was the real thing.” Norman is survived by his wife, Mary Moon Graebner, a son, the Reverend Norman Brooks Graebner of Willsborough, NC, a daughter, Emily Graebner Tillotson of Rapid City, SD, and three grandchildren.

James I. Matray
California State University, Chico
His many friends and colleagues are saddened to announce the premature passing of Dr. Peter Andrew Kraemer on April 7, 2010. Dr. Kraemer, a historian with the U.S. Department of State, was both a gifted scholar and a cherished friend. Dr. Kraemer completed his Ph.D. in History and American Studies at Indiana University in 2004, where he wrote a dissertation entitled, “Germany is Whose Problem?: American Philanthropy and the German Question, 1944-1964.” At the end of that summer, he joined the Office of the Historian. Over the course of his five and a half years at the State Department, he produced volumes in the Foreign Relations of the United States series, the official documentary history of U.S. foreign policy, and worked on volumes on South Asia, Eastern Europe, and national security policy. In addition to his FRUS work, he took part in multiple endeavors to advance the overall mission of the Department, including regularly lecturing in the Foreign Service Institute’s A-100 orientation course for Foreign Service Officers, making a video appearance on the Department’s DipNote blog, where he spoke about the rise and fall of the Berlin Wall, and participating in an on-the-ground lessons learned project in Iraq, conducting oral history interviews on the nature of civil-military cooperation.

Dr. Kraemer was an active member of the larger historical profession. He was a gifted educator, teaching a graduate course on the political, social, and cultural techniques that create historical narratives at The George Washington University, and challenging the ways his students thought about and utilized history in their academic careers. In years past, he taught History and American Studies at Indiana University and Indiana University-}

Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin; served as an editorial assistant at the Journal of American History; and worked as an oral historian at Indiana University’s Oral History Research Center and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum. He was also an active participant in a number of professional organizations, including the American Historical Association, the Organization of American Historians, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and the Society for History in the Federal Government.

Dr. Kraemer’s extensive professional accomplishments are matched only by the mark that he left through his personal connections with those around him. Peter was an exceptionally generous friend whose wit and sense of humor greatly enriched the lives of those who were fortunate enough to know him. He will be forever remembered for his ability to turn even the most mundane of occurrences into the most hilarious of encounters, his cooking, his crazy sock collection, his love of German techno-music and all things orange, and the unending love and loyalty he gave to his family and friends. The world has lost a good man, a generous soul, a stunning intellect, and a dear friend. He will be forever missed. For condolences and information on memorial services and donations, please contact Keri Lewis at 603-591-1019 or Forrest Barnum at 202-663-1123.

Keri Lewis, Ph.D.
Analyst
National Security Council
The White House
For me, the professional highlight of summer is the annual SHAFR Conference, and the June 2010 meeting at the University of Wisconsin in Madison was no exception to this general rule. The conference on the south shore of Lake Mendota provided evidence of a society that is reaching new heights in professional excellence.

The Program Committee (co-chaired by Anne Foster and Naoko Shibusawa) did fabulous work in assembling a top-tier program. They arranged 75 panels that represented a wide range of topics, methodologies, and chronological eras. The sessions I attended made clear that presenters and commentators had carefully prepared to share their scholarship and insights with their colleagues and peers. The plenary session and the two luncheon keynote lectures provided stimulating and cogent perspectives. It was downright inspirational to notice how diverse and broad-ranging the research in our field has become, and it was wonderful that the Program Committee captured it so well.

The overall atmosphere at the conference was quite positive and gratifying. With more than 410 registrations, we shattered our previous attendance record for a non-Washington venue—and indeed the crowded corridors and busy book exhibit created something of a buzz, as if a few veyezula horns were being sounded down the corridor. The opening and closing receptions were festive and classy: many thanks to the Wisconsin Veterans Museum and to the University of Wisconsin’s Center for World Affairs and the Global Economy for co-sponsoring the Saturday evening gathering, and to the Museum for hosting it. Local arrangements coordinator Jeremi Suri steered us well when he booked the Pyle Center, with its sweeping view of Lake Mendota. Our new conference coordinator, Jennifer Walton, and her small army of student volunteers from Wisconsin and elsewhere admirably ensured a smooth operation from beginning to end. The ice cream cart at each afternoon break was a nice touch! And, about the crowd that congregated around the television monitor in the lobby on Saturday afternoon to watch the U.S.-Ghana World Cup soccer match: how interesting that so many SHAFR members took an interest in the history of international sport and committed an afternoon to primary research!

Beyond the purview of attendees, SHAFR also accomplished some important business at the 2010 conference. The Teaching Committee, the Membership Committee, and the Diplomatic History editorial board held meetings to address their areas of responsibility. Suffice it to say that many members contributed their time and expertise to keep the Society moving forward on all fronts.

The Executive Council also met in a marathon session to attend to several major items of business. The Council approved several reforms to the society’s bylaws governing the annual election procedures. These proposed changes, explained on page 4 of this issue of Passport, will be subject to the approval of the membership in a referendum this year and, if ratified, will take effect in 2011. The most visible proposed reforms are the addition of one elected member to Council, a change that would increase it from 13 to 14 members, and the adoption of provisions enabling a shift from mailed, paper ballots to electronic ballots in the annual elections of officers.

I am already looking forward to the next SHAFR summer conference, on June 23-25, 2011 at the Hilton Mark Center in Alexandria, Virginia. We have negotiated affordable rates at this modern, high-rise hotel, which is adjacent to a 43-acre botanical preserve, close to Old Town Alexandria, and only 4.5 miles from Reagan National Airport. The 2011 Program Committee, to be co-chaired by Petra Goedde and Brad Simpson, will soon issue a Call for Papers. I encourage you to take up the call, prepare your best work, and join us for a grand time in Alexandria.

Peter L. Hahn is Executive Director of SHAFR and Chair of the Department of History at The Ohio State University.
SAVE THE DATE!

2011 Annual SHAFR Conference
June 23-25, 2011
Alexandria, Virginia

For more SHAFR information, visit us on the web at www.shafr.org