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Almost forty years after the military coup d’état that ousted the democratically elected government of Salvador Allende, historians are still striving for a thorough and nuanced understanding of U.S.–Chilean relations between 1970 and 1973. Not surprisingly, many students of the period have focused on the more dramatic aspects of the story, namely, the role of the Central Intelligence Agency and Department of State in trying to prevent Allende’s election via the covert actions known as Track I and Track II, and the complicity of the CIA in the Pinochet regime. Unfortunately, this emphasis has come at the expense of a thorough examination of U.S. foreign policy during the three years of Allende’s presidency. The often-overlooked Nixon tapes, which cover approximately 85 percent of Allende’s tenure in office, are one source that can help refocus the debate on U.S. policy during these years, particularly as it concerns the Nixon administration’s response to the Allende government’s expropriation policy.2

The tapes indicate that U.S. policy after Allende’s election closely followed the guidelines established by National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 93 of November 9, 1970, and they corroborate several findings from the Church Committee Report of 1975. Following Allende’s election, NSDM 93 dictated that while the U.S. government’s “public posture” towards the Allende government should “be correct and cool,” Washington could apply economic pressure on Santiago by discouraging U.S. private investment in Chile and curtailing both bilateral and multilateral economic assistance. Furthermore, NSDM 93 called for collaboration between the United States and other friendly governments in Latin America “to coordinate efforts to oppose Chilean moves which may be contrary to our mutual interests.”3 The tapes also corroborate one contention of the Church Committee’s investigation of U.S. covert action in Chile, that “[e]conomic pressure exerted by the United States formed an important part of the mix” of measures designed to pressure the Allende government into abandoning its policy of nationalization without adequate compensation. The tapes also bear out the committee’s observation that U.S. policy towards Chile was largely reactive.4 Consequently, the pivotal moment in U.S.–Chilean relations during the Allende era, and the one that ultimately convinced the Nixon administration to reject any accommodation with Allende, was the Chilean government’s decision to nationalize the remaining assets of the major American copper companies operating in Chile—the Anaconda Copper Company, the Kennecott Copper Corporation, and the Cerro Corporation—on July 16, 1971.

The Nixon tapes also offer fascinating insights into the nature and execution of U.S. foreign policy concerning Chile. For example, the tapes prove, as Henry Kissinger argued in his memoirs, White House Years and Years of Upheaval, that Nixon delegated much of the responsibility for formulating and implementing U.S. policy concerning expropriation, both in Chile and throughout the Third World, to his brash but capable Treasury secretary, John Connally.5 The tapes also demonstrate that Nixon evinced a strong personal desire to apply economic pressure on the government of Chile in various ways—by taking a tough line on expropriation, for example, and by refusing to renegotiate Chilean loans at the January 1972 meeting of the so-called Paris Club.6 The tapes shed additional light on the rift that developed between Foggy Bottom and the White House and Treasury Department after the State Department failed to fall into line with the president’s directives on the U.S. government’s response to nationalization of American business assets and Chilean debt renegotiation. Finally, the tapes offer tantalizing hints that the U.S. intelligence community played an active role in assisting the administration with its policy of blocking Chilean loan renegotiation.7

Nixon’s taping system in the Oval Office had been in operation less than two weeks when Kissinger raised the possibility of having the U.S.S. Enterprise call at Valparaiso, Chile. Although Allende had been in office only four months, relations between the Chilean and U.S. governments were already abysmal. Following his inauguration, Allende had requested constitutional authority to nationalize the American copper companies in Chile. By the time of Nixon and Kissinger’s conversation about the Enterprise visit, the Chilean Senate had already passed a constitutional amendment authorizing nationalization.8 Nixon’s curt dismissal of Allende’s offer to show U.S. sailors “authentic democracy” as having been issued only for the “worst, damn propaganda purposes” was therefore probably prompted by his frustration at the course of events in Chile.9

The news was no better two months later, when Allende’s Popular Unity bloc won a solid victory in the Chilean municipal elections, securing 49.5 percent of the total vote. In one of the earliest conversations recorded in the president’s hideaway office in the Executive Office Building,
Nixon and Kissinger surveyed the damage and ruminated on future developments. Although Allende had come to power legally, Kissinger opined that he would follow the “German strategy” of gradually eliminating dissent in order to create a “fascist” state. Kissinger then excoriated the State Department, which had doggedly supported the Christian Democrats at the expense of the conservative candidate (former president Jorge Alessandri), even though in Kissinger’s mind the only thing that distinguished Allende from his predecessor, Eduardo Frei, was that the latter was a “Catholic,” i.e., a Christian Democrat. Kissinger also poured scorn on the Chilean Christian Democrats, who had recently opted for a policy of “communitarian socialism” and “constructive opposition” to Allende’s government that included support for the nationalization of Chile’s major industries.

The Nixon administration’s ire continued to rise throughout the spring and summer of 1971 as it became clear that Allende would nationalize the remaining assets of the U.S. copper companies in Chile. The government of Eduardo Frei had inaugurated a process of negotiated nationalization of foreign-owned copper assets whereby the Chilean government would purchase a 51 percent share in the properties owned by the American copper companies in 1969 with the option of acquiring the remaining 49 percent starting in 1973. Frei’s policies had the unintended consequence of hamstringing his successor, Allende, because the program of negotiated nationalization was funded largely by foreign loans that left Chile with a crippling debt burden in the world.

Once in office, Allende moved quickly to prepare for wholesale nationalization. The lower house of the Chilean Congress followed the Senate by voting in favor of nationalization in April 1971, and on May 23, 1971, the Chilean government began initial nationalization by seizing operational control of a Kennecott subsidiary, the El Teniente Mining Company.

On the evening of June 10, 1971, President Nixon met with Connelly, Chief of Staff H.R. “Bob” Haldeman, Chief Domestic Policy Advisor John Ehrlichman, Secretary of State William Rogers, and Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs Peter Flanigan aboard the presidential yacht Sequoia. Direct sources concerning this meeting remain redacted nearly four decades later, but from what can be gleaned from the surreptitiously recorded meetings made later that week it appears that there was a policy disagreement between Connelly and Rogers over the U.S. response to expropriation, with the situation in Chile front and center.

The following morning, Nixon described the Sequoia meeting to Kissinger. “[Connally’s] argument is that, for example . . . we have $500 million worth of contracts with Guyana on bauxite and so forth,” Kissinger explained. “They’re ready to expropriate if Chile gets away with it,” and “if we go down the line of slapping the wrists of people that kick us in the ass, [then] we’re going to get more and more of it. [Connally is] afraid of the virus.” Administration officials used such medical terminology repeatedly in the taped conversations, as they sought to quarantine and disinfect the “virus” of Chilean nationalization.

Nixon sharply opposed establishing closer ties to the Chilean military. “I haven’t seen the military in Chile do anything for us,” Nixon stated in the same meeting. “I’m inclined not to help them militarily.” Kissinger replied that the United States had already promised $5 million of military aid but could certainly “prevent their pyramiding it into twenty.” He then added that “the funny thing is that they have twisted your instruction to keep contact with the military into a relationship where we do more for the Chilean military than for any other military in Latin America.” Nixon concluded the discussion of Chile by reiterating that “on all future actions toward Chile I prefer a harder line.” Kissinger agreed, adding that he believed Allende was “heading for a one-party government as fast as he effectively can.” “He’s getting control of the press,” he continued. “He’s isolating the military . . . He’s already taken over the police.” Kissinger predicted that there would “never be another free election in Chile.”

Later that day, Nixon met with Kissinger and Connelly in the Oval Office to discuss standardizing a response to expropriation. Connelly argued in favor of economic retaliation against countries that targeted American interests. “The only thing, the only pry we have on ‘em, the only lever we have on ‘em, it seems to me, is at least if we could shut off their credit, or shut off the markets for the commodities they produce, or something,” the Treasury secretary opined. “But we have to be in a position to impose some economic sanctions on ‘em. Now, you can’t impose military sanctions, but we can impose financial or economic sanctions.” Later in the conversation Nixon agreed, telling Kissinger that “the problem, really, in all these loans, Henry, is that . . . pretext or no pretext, he doesn’t need ‘em . . . Second, it’s just the fact that if you start doing it, it’s going to encourage others to do likewise.” He added, “And I think John’s point is that some place along, maybe we ought to find a place to kick somebody in the ass.” Connelly recommended to the president that “once you get this studied [you should issue] a statement of policy—a White Paper, so to speak—in which [you] instruct all the government that as a matter of policy, this government will not vote for, nor favor, any loan to any country that has expropriated American interests unless that country is furnishing good and sufficient evidence that satisfactory payment has been made.”

After the provisional nationalization of El Teniente in May, the Chilean Congress unanimously approved a measure granting the Allende government the right to nationalize the remaining American companies fully on July 11, 1971. A U.S. briefing paper composed immediately after expropriation began stated that the U.S. position was to maintain “the normal form of diplomatic relations” and seek “quietly to maximize the constraints on Chilean action against U.S. economic interests.” Both privately and publicly the Nixon administration sought to use its economic “lever” on the Chilenos.

On September 28, 1971, the Allende government raised the stakes by applying $774 million in retroactive excess profits taxes on the American copper companies, which left Anaconda and Kennecott owing $378 million to the Chile government even after their properties had been nationalized (the Cerro Corporation would, however, receive $16 million in compensation). The Allende government rationalized its decision on the grounds that over four decades the copper companies had reaped profits of approximately $4 billion from their operations in Chile. Nixon and Connelly were unimpressed, however, and decided to take off the proverbial gloves.

Connelly derided Allende’s actions as a “farce” and told Nixon that the Chilean president had “thrown down the gauntlet to us.” Nixon vowed that the administration would “play it very tough” and said that he had “decided we’re going to give Allende the hook.” Connelly egged on the president, admonishing him to take tough action against the “enemy.”
Freedom and Free Markets: The Histories of Globalization and Human Rights

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When Nixon promised to make an example of Allende, Haldeman chimed in with the claim that strong action “would earn a bit with the right-wing in this country.”

After Connally left, Nixon solicited Kissinger’s opinion. “I would go to a confrontation with him,” said Kissinger, “the quicker the better . . . Maybe not in a brutal way, but in a clear way.” Kissinger also agreed to work with the Treasury secretary in order “to figure out the confrontation.” Shortly thereafter, Kissinger warned Orlando Letelier, the Chilean ambassador to the United States, that “certain consequences” would follow if the Chileans refused to be “reasonable” on the matter of compensation for the copper companies.

A few weeks later, Nixon connected the expropriation issue with his contempt for multinational organizations such as the United Nations (“a total pain in the ass for us”) that never, in his opinion, gave the United States credit for the money it provided in international aid. Nixon also expressed his support for an amendment proposed by Senator Russell Long that would mandate that all U.S. aid to nations that expropriated American assets be cancelled. Summarizing the foreign policy situation, the president emphasized the need for the United States to watch its own interests. “Whether it’s with Chile on their expropriation, or whether it’s a vote like this [on Taiwan’s expulsion from the United Nations], where we ask a lot of these goddamn stinkin’ Africans . . . to come with us, we’ve got to find ways where the United States can, frankly, throw its weight around in an effective way.” Connally shared Nixon’s instincts regarding the political utility of a punitive program and advised the president to find “some real enemies,” since, in the wake of détente with the Soviets and the opening to the People’s Republic of China, “Communism ought not to be your battle.”

In keeping with the strategy of coordinating a policy response to Allende’s election with regional powers as prescribed by NSDM 93, Nixon had a private (and very candid) meeting with Brazilian President Emilio Médici in the Oval Office on December 9, 1971. Lt. General Vernon Walters, the former U.S. military attaché to Brazil, served as interpreter and wrote the memorandum of conversation (memcon). Ironically, it was Walters’ earlier refusal to serve as Nixon’s personal scribe that persuaded the president to have a taping system installed. The substance of Walters’ memcon, which was not declassified and released until July 2009, was corroborated by the audio recording of the meeting, which was released only in February 2010. The Nixon-Médici meeting is significant because Nixon promised to support Brazilian efforts to sponsor a Chilean military coup against Allende and agreed to set up a secret “backchannel” between the Brazilians and Kissinger to handle sensitive issues—a channel that would bypass the State Department.

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Nixon told his Brazilian counterpart, “there may be matters like this [Chile], which will arise that I would prefer not to handle through . . . diplomatic channels . . . There also may be matters where the president may want to get a message to me . . . without going through [the State Department].” Nixon noted that the White House used such backchannels with “very few people” and suggested that Médici could send messages through Kissinger and Walters. He also assuaged Médici’s concerns by noting that the records of such a channel would be kept in a “special file.” To synchronize U.S. and Brazilian policy towards Chile, Nixon recommended “cutting off even more than we have,” including “private business contacts with Chile.” He explained that “for example [on the debt question] if at a critical time they’re looking for money, we gotta hit ‘em . . . We could really screw him [Allende] to hell.”

In January 1972, Nixon discussed with staff and cabinet members the Chilean debt renegotiation that would take place at the next meeting of the Paris Club. The deliberations caught by the taping system show a split between the State Department and the Treasury Department, with Nixon backing Connally’s tough stance on expropriation and debt renegotiation. Connally first broached the subject on January 17: “[Sidney] Weintraub at State” has already told the Chilean ambassador that we’re not only going to Paris, but we’re gonna . . . renegotiate, before we ever get there. Nixon responded angrily, “The son of a bitch is not supposed to do that, because I’ve issued an order through Kissinger!” Getting back to the theme of American economic strength they had discussed months earlier, Nixon stated, “Our major stroke in international affairs is economics . . . We can’t send men, now, anymore. I mean, as we well know, I hate fighting these damned wars and things . . . [T]he major thing we can do is squeeze them economically. And, believe me, that can have one hell of an effect.”

The next day, Nixon met with Ehrlichman and Director of the Office of Management and Budget George P. Shultz. Again, the president detailed his decision on the Chilean loan renegotiations and reaffirmed Connally’s authority to head the delegation to the Paris Club meeting. “As I told Connally yesterday,” Nixon confided to Shultz, “I may be wrong about Allende, but my policy with regard to any country that expropriates American enterprises is to do unto them as they do unto us, and that you’ve got to play a tough line. We’re not going to renegotiate any goddamn loans, we’re not gonna help him at all . . . particularly when he’s in trouble now.” Nixon was also furious at the State Department and told his visitors that he had just sent a memo that Connally would be in charge of the renegotiation. “Now that [Allende] is elected,” Nixon added, “and he is expropriating, and he is taking an anti-American attitude in foreign policy, to hell with him at this point on renegotiating loans! It’s such an easy way to take him on. I’m not taking him on personally; not taking him on rhetoric; we just drag our feet at the negotiation.”

In February 1972, Nixon stressed to Connally that Allende and his government “brought this on themselves; they’re ruining the Chilean economy with their expropriation and everything else. Now, for us to step in and rescue it, means that we are subsidizing, basically, the communization of Chile.” Believing that U.S. military intervention was no longer a viable alternative, Connally advised the president in February 1972 to “just hold [Allende’s] feet to the fire and he’ll be in trouble.” Nixon and Connally reckoned that the United States had the luxury of waiting on events in Chile for a variety of reasons. For one thing, Allende’s policies were clearly alienating large segments of the Chilean population,
as evidenced by the results of two recent by-elections to the Chilean Congress and Senate, both won by opponents of Allende's government.29 There may be more to the U.S. government’s handling of the Chilean debt renegotiation at the Paris Club than is readily apparent. One 1974 case study on U.S.–Chilean relations based on interviews with high-level officials, congressional testimony, and contemporaneous news articles contended that the CIA was involved behind the scenes in the renegotiation of Chile’s debt and was actually represented on the U.S. delegation negotiating the issue.30 Items in the Nixon tapes that were redacted for “intelligence” reasons either precede or follow four out of five separate conversations dealing with Chilean expropriation, the Paris Club, or Allende between January and February 1972. Since the Paris Club was then discussing the Chilean debt renegotiation, it is not a stretch to hypothesize that there was a covert angle to the negotiations.31 Unfortunately, discerning the exact nature of the intelligence community’s role in the renegotiation of Chile’s debt is simply not possible using currently declassified sources.

The specter of U.S. complicity in the plot to thwart Allende’s election in 1970 seemed to hang over some of the taped conversations, especially those relating to the former U.S. ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry. Although Nixon had been an enthusiastic supporter of covert operations since his days as Eisenhower’s vice president, the tapes reveal that he was deeply concerned about the possibility of U.S. covert action in Chile being disclosed in the lead-up to his reelection campaign in 1972 and therefore wanted something done about Korry.

Nixon always laid some of the blame for Allende’s election on Korry, who (in Nixon’s opinion) had allowed his “liberal Democrat” biases to color his judgment in favor of Allende’s Christian Democratic predecessor, Frei.32 Quietly handling Korry was, however, another matter. As the tapes repeatedly demonstrate, Korry’s journalistic credentials, Democratic background, and friendships with prominent right-wing critics of the administration such as William F. Buckley, Jr., were a source of deep concern in the Nixon White House. Therefore, despite the fact that Korry was a holdover from the Kennedy-Johnson administrations, Nixon and Kissinger tried to find him another ambassadorial position. Essentially they were trying to buy his silence because he had “a hell of a lot of information on what we did down there.”33 The exact nature of “what we did down there” was spelled out months later during a telephone conversation with Press Secretary Ron Ziegler, when Nixon confirmed that Korry had been instructed “to do anything short of a Dominican-type [intervention]” to forestall Allende’s election. As far as Nixon was concerned, Korry’s greatest sin was that “he just failed, the son of a bitch . . . He should have kept Allende from getting in.”34

What can we conclude, then, from the material contained in the tapes? For one thing, although Nixon articulated little interest in cultivating closer ties with the Chilean military in order to remove Allende, his words do not conform to the facts. Between 1970 and 1973, total U.S. military assistance to Chile increased from $800,000 to $15 million (the highest figure since 1963).35 That said, neither Nixon nor Kissinger had confidence in the CIA. For example, both men expressed bemusement at the charges by the Chilean government that the CIA had participated in the June 8, 1971, assassination of Edmundo Pérez Zujovic, a right-wing interior minister in the Frei government. Upon being informed by Kissinger that “the sons of bitches [Allende's government] are blaming us for it,” Nixon expressed astonishment, since Zujovic would have been a natural ally of the United States. Kissinger reasoned that the CIA was simply “too incompetent” to pull off such an operation, reminding the president that the last time the agency had attempted such an operation, “it took three attempts,” and the victim “lived for three weeks afterwards”36.

Nixon and Kissinger also saw parallels between Allende’s actions following his 1970 election and those of Adolf Hitler during the early years of the Third Reich. Kissinger’s oft-repeated warnings that Allende intended the 1970 presidential election to be the last democratic election ever held in Chile are simply not credible, however, in light of the fact that municipal and parliamentary elections (the latter of which was a major setback for Allende’s bloc) took place in 1971 and 1973 without any attempt on the part of the government to interfere with the results.

There is also ample evidence in the tapes that Nixon and others considered Allende’s Chile to be working in concert with Cuba and radical elements within the Soviet government to spread Communist subversion in the Americas. Finally, the failure of the CIA to prevent Allende’s election, or its supposed incompetence in dispatching troublesome foreign leaders, did not prevent Nixon from expressing his enthusiastic support for “dirty tricks” operations to Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms. If anything, Nixon wanted the CIA to be better at “screwing up” other nations.37

One of the most important facts about the tapes is that they corroborate Kissinger’s contention that Nixon entrusted the formulation of U.S. policy regarding Chile after 1970 to John Connally (Nixon’s “Wallie Mitty image of himself,” as Kissinger mordantly observed).38 Connally, the consummate politician and a popular governor of Texas from 1963 to 1969, realized the political value of maintaining a hard line toward Chile in the run-up to the 1972 election, not because Allende was promoting Communism, but because the Chilean government was violating the rights of American businesses.39 The tapes show that Connally shared Nixon’s opinion regarding the unfeasibility of military intervention to oppose expropriation and believed the U.S. government should instead use its economic influence in venues such as the World Bank and the Paris Club.

Connally’s hard line on Chile also echoed much of the policy advice the Treasury secretary gave Nixon on how to deal with the Europeans over the decline of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, which was taking place at the same time that the administration was seeking to deal with Chilean nationalization.40 Under Connally’s prodding, the Treasury Department outlined what it called a policy of “presumption” that immediately cut off U.S. aid to countries that expropriated American assets.41 Although the State Department opposed Treasury’s hard-line position, Connally could declare victory on October 8, 1971, when the Nixon administration declared in NSDM 136 that the United States would “suspend new bilateral economic benefits to the expropriating country [with the exception of humanitarian assistance] unless and until it is determined that the country is taking reasonable steps to provide compensation or that there are major factors which require continuance of all or part of these benefits.”42

It is interesting that the strategic significance of Chilean copper in and of itself was not the decisive factor behind U.S. government policy. Although Chile provided less than 4 percent of the U.S.’ total imports of copper, it boasted 21 percent of the
world’s proven reserves, much of which went to U.S. allies like Western Europe and Japan. Rather, what troubled Nixon and Connally was the example set by Allende. What would happen, Connally mused, if other nations in the region, such as Guyana and Jamaica (which dominated global production of bauxite), decided to follow suit? Consequently, the administration actually adopted a position toward the Chilean government that was harsher than the one the American copper company executives suggested. The intensity of the Nixon administration’s hostility to Allende therefore becomes comprehensible only if it is placed within the wider global perspective of American dependence on imported strategic raw materials.

The Nixon tapes should not be considered as the definitive record of U.S. policy toward Chile between 1970 and 1973. The taping system was not even in operation during the 1970 Chilean presidential election or the military coup d’etat of September 11, 1973. Nor should this article’s findings be construed as an attempt to mitigate U.S. complicity in conspiring to undermine a democratically elected government. The fact that Nixon was so worried about the possibility of Korry speaking out about U.S. covert action and support for a military coup in 1970, not to mention Nixon’s candid admission to DCI Helms that more should have been done to thwart Allende’s election, is proof enough that Allende’s democratic credentials carried little weight in Washington. Rather, in concert with the documentary record, the tapes offer scholar’s a window into the Nixon administration’s response to Allende once his policy of expropriation was a reality rather than a nightmare. We hope that the easy availability of the transcripts and online audio will enable scholars to reach their own conclusions as the debate over the U.S. role in the overthrow of Salvador Allende continues.

Richard A. Moss is a co-editor at nixon tapes.org. Anand Toprani is a Ph.D. candidate at Georgetown University.

Notes:
1. The views presented in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. government or our employers. This article utilizes only a portion of the tape materials on Chile, which are available as more complete transcripts with digital audio at www.nixon tapes.org. Although we have reviewed each conversation multiple times, readers are encouraged to consult the audio and come to their own conclusions. The authors wish to thank Mark Hove, Douglas Kraft, Luke Nichter, David Painter, and Lubna Qureshi for their helpful, constructive feedback.
2. As of this writing most of the tapes dating from February to July 1973 have yet to be declassified by the National Archives. Allende was in office 1,042 days, from his inauguration on November 4, 1970, to his death on September 11, 1973. Nixon’s taping system started in the Oval Office on February 16, 1971, and ran for 883 days, ending on July 18, 1973. Allende was in office that entire time. One recent study that has utilized some of the Nixon tapes on Chile is Lubna Zakia Qureshi’s Nixon, Kissinger, and Allende: U.S. Involvement in the 1973 Coup (Lanham, MD, 2008). The authors wish to thank Dr. Qureshi for providing draft transcripts of several conversations. Digital audio and transcripts for all of the conversations cited in this article, in addition to a number of other conversations relating to U.S. policy towards Chile, can be found at http://nixon tapes.org/chile.html.
5. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, 1982), 385-389.
11. Sigmund, Overthrow of Allende, 33, 36-37, 80-83.
12. U.S. Senate, Covert Action, 35. Prior to Allende’s inauguration, U.S. direct investment in Chile totaled approximately $700 million.
13. “Copper Reform Bill is Approved in Chile,” New York Times (April 9, 1971), 6; Juan de Onis, “Chile Takes Over Copper Company,” New York Times (May 24, 1971), 11. The U.S. government was also obligated to pay as much as $310 million through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to American companies operating in Chile in the event that Allende nationalized all of their assets. “Options for the U.S. in the Event of Expropriation of U.S. Business Interests by Chile,” enclosed with Crimmins to Kissinger, “Chile,” December 19, 1970, DNSA.
It is impossible to positively identify the target referred to by Nixon and Kissinger based on the content of the conversation, although the person in question may have been the former commander-in-chief of the Chilean military, General René Schneider. Schneider died three days after a botched kidnapping attempt by right-wing elements of the Chilean military on 22 October 1970. The botched kidnapping was the third attempt by two different groups within the Chilean military, both of which were in contact with the CIA. See “Hinchey Report: CIA Activities in Chile” (September 18, 2000), U.S. Department of State Freedom of Information Act website: http://foia.state.gov/Reports/HincheyReport.asp#15; and Peter Kornbluh, The Pinchot FILE: The Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability (New York, 2004), 22–35.


38. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston, 1979), 951-952; idem, Years of Upheaval, 385–387. In comparison to other administration figures like Kissinger, the larger-than-life Texas governor has been largely ignored by historians. In fact, between 1971 and 1973, Nixon relied on Connally’s counsel in virtually all major policy debates and privately expressed his hope of grooming Connally as his successor in 1976. See Jules Witcover, Very Strange Bedfellows (New York, 2007); James Reston, The Lone Star (New York, 1998); John Connally with Mickey Herskowitz, In History’s Shadow (New York, 1993).


43. Juan de Onis, “Copper is the Color of Allende’s Mandate,” New York Times
44. The administration’s tougher stand was apparent in a meeting between Kissinger and two Anaconda executives on August 17, 1971. Whereas the Anaconda executives supported renewing international economic assistance for Chile so long as Allende promised compensation, Kissinger replied that the administration’s position was to oppose normalization of relations with Chile under any circumstances on the grounds that it was impossible to “buy Allende off” and that foreign assistance might simply result in “speeding up the process of establishing a communist regime in Chile” without ensuring Allende’s long-term compliance. See Memcon, “Chile,” August 17, 1971, DNSA.

45. This argument complements the superb work of Kenneth Rodman in Sanctity versus Sovereignty: The United States and the Nationalization of Natural Resource Investments (New York, 1988).

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**SHAFR Programs at the**

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**SHAFR Luncheon**

Saturday, March 19,

11:30 am-1:00 pm

At the luncheon,

**Barbara Keys**

University of Melbourne

will deliver the

2011 Stuart L. Bernath Lecture

SHAFR will also announce the winners of the 2011 Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize, Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize, Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize, Robert Ferrell Book Prize, and Arthur S. Link-Warren Kuehl Prize for Documentary Editing.

Tickets for the luncheon must be purchased in advance from the OAH. Details will appear in OAH registration materials.

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**SHAFR will also co-sponsor four sessions at the 2011 OAH:**

Looking Beyond the Cold War: Re-conceiving the Post-1945 Era in International and Transnational History

Evaluating the Alliance for Progress Fifty Years On

Disputed Internationalisms and Debates over the U.S. Role in the World During the Progressive Era

Between War and Peace: New Narratives of U.S. Militarization in the Twentieth Century

Check the forthcoming OAH Conference Program for details on times and locations of these four sessions.
A Roundtable Discussion of Dennis Merrill’s Negotiating Paradise: U.S. Tourism and Empire in Twentieth-Century Latin America

Mariola Espinosa, Alan McPherson, Jeffrey Taffet, and Dennis Merrill

Does the Imperial Power Negotiate?

A Review of Dennis Merrill’s Negotiating Paradise: U.S. Tourism and Empire in Twentieth-Century Latin America

Mariola Espinosa

In Negotiating Paradise, Dennis Merrill argues that U.S. tourism in Latin America constituted a form of U.S. cultural and economic imperialism, an expression of the soft power of the northern colossus. The U.S. tourists who flocked to Mexico, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, he contends, should be understood to be agents of empire, subtly exerting power over the economies, cultures, and governments of the places they visited. The book is an intriguing and much-needed account of the evolution of mass tourism in the region over the course of the twentieth century, from its beginnings in wild road trips to Mexico during Prohibition to Cold-War-era vacations managed by the Puerto Rican tourist industry, which produced carefully crafted images of beaches and luxury hotels designed to reflect capitalist progress. That people who cross borders merely for recreational purposes can nevertheless influence international relations is a point that thus far had been largely neglected in the study of U.S.–Latin American relations, and Merrill makes it convincingly.

U.S. tourism in Mexico began with escapist forays to the bars and casinos of rowdy border towns like Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez. Both towns grew with U.S. investment into places where American men could live out their fantasies of Wild West adventures, drinking and gambling just a short distance from home. However, tourism was soon redirected by the Mexican government to the country’s interior and focused on cultural attractions that highlighted a new, post-revolutionary national image, one in which a glorious past featuring both indigenous and Spanish heritages led to a unified mestizo present and a modern, progressive future. As more and more U.S. visitors took home memories of the wonders and civilized refinements that Mexico had to offer, tourism increasingly provided a space of mutual understanding. That tourism had become an arena where differences between the two nations could be resolved is exemplified by FDR’s plan for a trip (which he never took) to Mexico. His itinerary included not only a meeting with Mexican president Lázaro Cárdenas to discuss a resolution of U.S. oil company claims after the nationalization of the industry, but also a stop at the resort town of Acapulco and a visit to the celebrated silversmiths of Taxco.

Cuba’s experiences with U.S. tourism were very different from Mexico’s, but if anything they were more consequential. Visits to the U.S. tourist enclave in Havana, where it was easy to believe that every American wish was a Cuban command, blinded U.S. politicians and policymakers to the reality of dissatisfaction and unrest on the island. And after Castro succeeded in taking control of the Cuban government, tourism helped forestall an immediate rupture of U.S.–Cuban relations. The shared interests of U.S. hoteliers and Cuban tourism industry workers in reaching a mutually acceptable compromise led to a brief interlude during which some negotiation was possible.

After this window of opportunity in Cuba closed, the tourist industry in Puerto Rico became the showcase for the benefits of close ties to the United States during the Cold War. Pairing the gleaming modern hotels and clean white beaches of the Condado with the renovated colonial architecture and restored blue cobblestone streets of Old San Juan, Puerto Rico’s tourist zones promised a harmonious future to which all Latin American countries could aspire.

As these examples make clear, tourism can tell us much about the United States’ relationships with Latin America. But did U.S. tourists really constitute a mechanism by which the power of the United States over the region was exerted and strengthened? Was tourism a reliable tool of empire? On this larger question, the book is less persuasive. In fact, given the events described above, one could reasonably conclude the exact opposite: that tourism frequently subverted notions of national superiority among U.S. travelers, typically delegitimized U.S. domination among the peoples of host countries, and so undermined rather than reinforced U.S. empire in the region.

But this conclusion overlooks the differences across the three countries. While Merrill treats them as similarly situated, all incorporated into the U.S. empire, Mexico, Cuba, and Puerto Rico in fact were on very different terms with the United States. Puerto Rico was then and remains today a U.S. colony, and despite lingering nationalist sentiments, since the
beginning of the tourist boom in 1960 the indirect rule established a decade earlier by the Estado Libre Asociado has been seriously challenged only by those who favor statehood and an even tighter association with the metropole. Cuba too was a U.S. colony under indirect rule, but U.S. domination was never accepted and legitimated there as it was in Puerto Rico. Merrill justifies treating Mexico as a colony of the United States by reference to the U.S. seizure of the northern half of the country in the Mexican-American War (5), but by this logic France would have been a colony of Germany after the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in the Franco-Prussian War. Political leaders in Mexico, unlike those in Central America, the Caribbean, and arguably at times other parts of Latin America, did not effectively serve at the pleasure of the U.S. government. The course of politics in Mexico was instead set by domestic considerations. Nor did U.S. investments in Mexico dominate the Mexican economy. They remained subject to Mexican policy—sometimes dramatically so, to the dismay of their owners. Despite the shadow of its northern neighbor, Mexico cannot plausibly be considered a U.S. colony at all. These differences mean that the three cases actually offered the opportunity to examine more closely the role of tourism within empire through a study of contrasts. As Merrill documents, the Mexican government enjoyed the latitude to clamp down on border-town excesses, build a mostly domestically owned tourism infrastructure, and redirect tourists to the cultural attractions of the Mexican interior. Tourism proved to be an effective means for both defining a new national identity and gaining sufficient goodwill in the United States to overcome the international tensions that resulted from Mexican expropriations of U.S. holdings in land and oil. That U.S. tourism in these ways served the interests of Mexico City far better than those of Washington is easier to understand when Mexico is recognized as beyond the U.S. empire rather than within it.

In contrast, Cuba had no such flexibility to turn tourism to the national benefit. Political and economic domination by the United States dictated that the tourist industry in Cuba would be built with U.S. capital and run so that benefits would accrue almost exclusively to these private interests. Naturally there was no crackdown on vice, no insistence on hiring and treating local workers fairly, no reorienting tourism to showcase local culture: U.S. interests and U.S. tastes ruled. That large segments of Cuban society had resented the United States’ overwhelming influence over the island since the U.S. intervention in the struggle for freedom from Spain only ensured that these circumstances were added to the litany of grievances that fueled the Cuban Revolution. In rejecting U.S. colonialism, the revolution ended up rejecting U.S. tourism as well.

As a U.S. colony, Puerto Rico had no choice but to serve as the U.S. model for Latin America. But the very fact that U.S. colonialism in Puerto Rico was effectively uncontested meant that some allowances to local concerns and local culture could be made without risk to the imperial project. It is the complete absence of sovereignty that allows the illusion of negotiation to be maintained.

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Mariola Espinosa is Assistant Professor in the History of Medicine and of History at the Yale University School of Medicine.


Alan McPherson

As scholars of international relations and of U.S. power we have probably all wondered during our travels how power relations play themselves out in the interactions between ourselves and our hosts: hotel staff; cab drivers, fellow museum attendees, and government officials. As tourists, we may have asked, Are we imposing our values and ways of life on hosts? Do they resent or resist them? Does our government have any role to play? Are national identities even affected by strolls through museums and visits to the beach?

Dennis Merrill took on the challenging task of addressing these questions in a sustained fashion. The result is one of the more compelling U.S. international histories of recent years.

Merrill’s topic is the history of U.S. mass tourism in Latin America. He focuses on three paradigmatic periods: Mexico at the time of its revolution in the 1920s and 1930s, Cuba before and after its transformation in the 1950s and 1960s, and Puerto Rico during the time of the Alliance for Progress. Since H-Diplo recently published a comprehensive roundtable on this book (http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/Roundtable-XI-26.pdf), I will refrain from repeating the details of Merrill’s case studies here. Essentially, the Mexican government, emboldened by its revolutionary identity, set firm terms for the expansion of U.S. tourism. The Cuban governments of Fulgencio Batista and Fidel Castro pursued opposite strategies—the former embracing tourism and selling the country’s soul in exchange for lucrative contracts for cronies, the latter interpreting tourism as another form of imperialism to be exploited and later rejected. Puerto Rico, meanwhile, played a less ideological but more pragmatic game, crafting public-private partnerships and keeping the mafia out of the casinos. (I read the book while in the Caribbean myself and discussed it with a Puerto Rican historian, who begged to differ.)

The book uses a multitude of methods and theories appropriate to its cultural inquiry, including “bottom up” social history focused on ordinary tourists, jargon-free cultural theory, and feminist
readings of travel literature. Merrill deftly intertwines various concepts and historiographies without getting bogged down in any particular one and without allowing the narrative thread to unravel. Among the most remarkable aspects of the book are the wealth of sources Merrill uses from Mexican and Puerto Rican archives and the attention he pays to the agency he pays to the agency of Mexicans, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans. Merrill also repeatedly reminds the reader of contrasts between the case studies, reiterating his point about the complexities of tourism as a focus of international exchange. In fact, Latin American agency gives the book its narrative arc. The U.S. government, which generally kept its hands off tourism to Latin America, plays a secondary role. Much of the initiative also came from the tourism industry—airlines, hotel chains, promoters, and others who stood to make money by attracting gringos south of the border.

The most effective argument of the book is that tourists and the tourism industry acted as “a form of international soft power” (xiii). The author significantly alters the definition of the term as used by Joseph Nye and others to one that embraces not only government uses of persuasive means but also extra-state ones. Merrill is most convincing when arguing that tourism had an impact on international relations. He never overstretches. On Mexico, for instance, he writes that U.S. tourists, through their consumption and their interest in the art and archeology of their southern neighbor, helped bring about “the modest U.S.—Mexican rapprochement” of the 1930s (62). In Cuba, on the other hand, the degenerate behavior of tourists “aroused deep sentiment toward the Batista regime and dependence on the United States” (135), and the lingering, gendered image of a passive, pleasure-seeking island played a part in paralyzing U.S. responses once Castro took power. Through these examples, Merrill is able to claim that tourists “heightened international awareness at home, invented identities for others and themselves, helped forge and dissolve strategic alliances, contributed to the coming of revolutions, and participated in international development” (25).

Yet negotiation is a process in which two or more parties advance differing proposals and arrive at an agreed-upon compromise. There are almost no instances of real agreement in the book. Service workers deliberately offered slow service; Mexican governments decreed quotas for local employment and banned casinos; Diego Rivera made fun of tourists with his paintings; Castro nationalized hotels; Puerto Rican community organizers mobilized against slum removals and the governor opposed the expropriation of Vieques island. There are many other examples of resentment, contention, and pushback. But these are not negotiation. Yet negotiation is a process in which two or more parties advance differing proposals and arrive at an agreed-upon compromise.

Perhaps the most enjoyable feature of Dennis Merrill’s intriguing study, Negotiating Paradise: U.S. Tourism and Empire in Twentieth-Century Latin America, is that readers will be able to locate themselves within the narrative. There remains no such thing as a typical tourist, and part of the contemporary tourist experience is recognizing that one’s fellow travelers bring an array of ideologies, intentions, and expectations to their vacationing. The tourist, a kind of voyeur by definition, observes and judges not only their hosts, but also how other tourists respond to local societies. While hosts construct theatrical representations of their own societies to commodify or simplify their history and culture, tourists also live on a stage, and I suspect that many international travelers return home feeling that, while the people in the country they visited live in dignified and meaningful ways, other tourists they encountered act like a bunch of ninpies.

Merrill emphasizes throughout his text that on this stage, the more important judging occurs as locals assess and respond to tourist behavior. While locals make value judgments about tourist ideologies, they also engage in the more significant process of determining how to manipulate tourists to advance their own economic, cultural, or political interests. This process can occur at a local level as a cab driver determines how to interact with a fare, or at a national level as a tourist agency debates how to market its beaches, cities, and historic sites. Merrill illustrates the complexity of the tourist experience with three very different case studies: postrevolutionary Mexico, Cuba before and after its revolution, and Puerto Rico from the 1950s to the 1970s. In each case, locals developed unique mechanisms to promote their tourist industries and constructed idealized campaigns to suggest what their countries could offer. Mexico leaned towards the promotion of antiquity, Cuba towards sin, and Puerto Rico towards the beach. In
all cases the destinations promoted some variant of exoticism, and all had to cater to the material expectations of visitors, overwhelmingly from the United States. In each of the three countries tourism had an important impact on the process of state formation. In Mexico, tourism provided an opportunity to connect pre-Colombian and European pasts to advance the mestizo ideal. In Cuba, tourism operated as a symbol of the corruption of the Batista government for Fidel Castro, and in Puerto Rico it became a way to signal modernization efforts.

In other hands, the fine research at the heart of this book and the clear writing that explores these narratives might have led to an argument simply about the limits of power. That is, tourists travel to other countries searching for proverbial “other,” and host societies, in providing an experience, are able to manipulate the meaning of that experience and at the same time make money. Merrill takes this approach, but he does more. He attempts to insert his research into a conversation about empire and soft power and the narrative of twentieth-century U.S.–Latin American relations.

For Merrill, empire is messy business. Early in the introduction, he approvingly cites Charles S. Maier’s relatively clear definition of empire as a function of conquest, either formally or informally, and operative through continued dominance of subject peoples. Merrill, following Maier, goes on to explain that within empires, the colonized masses face tyrannical economic and political conditions generally backed by some form (or forms) of military or biological categorization designed to enrich and reinforce the power of elites. Merrill categorizes tourism as a component of U.S. empire in Latin America throughout his text, it rarely fits this neat description. There is no conquest, no subject people, and no tyranny. The cultural and biological categorizations, rather than weakening the colonized areas, create a template for constructing an escapist tourist destination. To be sure, locals serve the interests of the tourists and often act as colonized peoples, but they are exploiting tourists as much as they are being exploited by them. Empire ends up becoming more of a synonym for world-systems, or perhaps some form of dependency analysis in which capital serves to create and reinforce cultural and political inequalities while creating wealth for local and imperial elites.

Because there is no hegemonic intervenerist state in Merrill’s study, his focus on empire seems a bit disconnected from the narrative at times. It also muddies up his effort to connect tourism to soft power. The idea of soft power, using non-economic and non-military means to achieve foreign policy goals, is a consistent theme in the text. But is soft power a meaningful concept without a state organizing that power? Certainly many tourists from the United States exerted cultural power over Latin American society, but the U.S. government was not involved in the process of making this happen. Latin America might have become more globalized and capitalistic, but is it possible to speak of exercising soft power without a conscious state effort?

To be clear, these concerns are more definitional than anything else. But, because Merrill’s strong work in telling such a rich and nuanced story raises questions about the fundamental nature of the shared U.S.–Latin American narrative, the text could have led to a more critical analysis of the historiography and its key themes. That is, there is no question that Merrill is saying something important about U.S.– Latin American relations, but the problem may be in his trying to fit his conclusions into extant constructs. This issue persists as Merrill tries to connect the nuts and bolts of his story to the history of U.S.–Latin American relations. Sometimes it works, and sometimes it does not. Among the most successful sections is Merrill’s discussion of Fidel Castro’s stay at the relatively new Havana Hilton after he marched into the Cuban capital in January 1959. Not only did Fidel Castro indicate throughout 1959 that he hoped tourists would continue to come to Cuba, but early on he arranged a one-million-dollar loan for Conrad Hilton’s fashionable hotel from the Banco Nacional de Cuba. The loan allowed hotel operations to continue at a moment when tourists were scarce. Even as the political relationship between the United States government and Havana rapidly deteriorated, hotel executives imagined, with Cuban exhortations, that they could revive an industry deeply wounded by travelers’ fears about the revolution. In this fascinating story, Merrill convincingly demonstrates that Castro’s openness to a relationship with the United States lasted far longer than other scholars have suggested. Here, the history of tourism necessitates a reimagining of how the critically important year of 1959 played out in U.S.–Cuban relations.

Other sections are less successful. In the discussion of the relationship between Puerto Rican development and the Alliance for Progress, for example, Merrill overstates the idea that the island’s development programs provided a conscious model for Kennedy’s aid program. References to Puerto Rico are scant in briefing memos for Kennedy during the formulation of the program, and it is not completely clear from the text how policymakers are supposed to have connected modernization theory to tourism and how this related to their plans for the rest of the hemisphere.

Merrill also seems to have missed an opportunity to zero in on Teodoro Moscoso’s unsuccessful tenure as the initial coordinator of the Alliance for Progress. It would have been useful to assess what ideas Moscoso brought to the aid program from his experience in Puerto Rican tourism, and to see if any of these ideas limited his effectiveness throughout his service to Kennedy. Merrill admits that connecting the dots between policy action and the tourist experience can be difficult, and that instead tourism both encouraged and reflected political and economic narratives. Here there are opportunities to explore what happened when policymakers became tourists. An extended trip through Latin America that George Kennan, then heading the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff, took in 1950 demonstrates that travel could impact the ideas of key government officials. Kennan hated the entire trip, which took him to Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Peru, and Panama. He thought Mexico City was “menacing” and Rio de Janeiro “repulsive,” and he felt that the obligation to pay diplomatic calls on heads of state was “painful and slightly displeasurable.” On his return, he penned an extensive report damning the region as “a hopeless background for the conduct of human life.” While this memo did not lead to a grand policy review, it did reflect the ways in which many U.S. policymakers understood the region and how those understandings evolved from their first-hand experiences there. Similarly, exploring the travels of policymakers outside government is telling. For example, Robert Alexander, the great Rutgers University scholar of Latin American societies and history, traveled extensively in the region and compulsively interviewed not only politicians, but people such as taxi drivers, maids, and waiters.
His books, based in part on his travels, were essential reading for a generation of scholars, and also influenced Kennedy, whom he advised in 1960 as a member of the Task Force on Latin America that helped construct the foundations of the Alliance for Progress.

In many ways, the question of how travelers in Latin America changed Mexico, Cuba, and Puerto Rico forms the core of Merrill’s analysis, and he seems to want to analyze how tourism shaped the fabric of empire. But it bears emphasizing that empire also exists in the core. To explore the full dimension of the empire, more engagement with culture and politics in the United States might have been instructive. It is not clear what kinds of ideas about Latin America tourists brought home with them and how these ideas may have altered their political ideologies. Tourism industry officials in Mexico, Cuba, and Puerto Rico wanted visitors to come to a greater appreciation of their societies. That the marketing of these countries may have been deceptive and theatrical is only part of the point. Were tourists manipulated by the splendor into developing more positive ideas about Latin America? Did ideas in the United States about the region and its people change?

Merrill quotes both presidents Roosevelt and Eisenhower as encouraging international travel as a way of expanding perspectives and undermining isolationism. Roosevelt argued pointedly that through travel “we get a bigger perspective and a lot of knowledge” (22). There is no doubt that Merrill’s text helps explain what tourists might have seen and learned from their trips, but what they did with that knowledge in the months and years after their return remains unclear. This is a crucial point, because Merrill’s argument is premised on the idea that cultural understandings form the backbone of empire.

There is obviously no handy answer to the question of what tourists brought back. In his wonderfully creative 1992 text, The United States and Latin America: Myths and Stereotypes of Civilization and Nature, Fredrick Pike argues that throughout U.S. history most visions of Latin American culture and society were negative, and they mirrored ideas about Native Americans and Africans. Because Latin America was primitive and wild, colonization was not only acceptable, but necessary. But Pike also argues that at times, usually as the pace of modernization became alienating in the United States, the primitive and wild became attractive.

Rather than rejecting Latin America as the other, Americans embraced it as a way to find authentic meaning in an increasingly market-driven society. In this context it is valuable to understand, as Merrill clearly does, that tourists selected destinations for a variety of reasons and, to return to my initial point, interacted with local societies in complex ways laden with all kinds of hidden meanings. While tourists from the United States may have wanted to have a real “native” experience, they also may have wanted air-conditioning. The liminal spaces that emerged—a Sanborn’s in Mexico City, a floor show in a Havana casino, or the whitewashed streets of Old San Juan—demonstrate the understanding and complicity of locals in serving a tourist mentality.

To be sure, this is an excellent book and an important contribution to the literature on U.S.–Latin American relations. Merrill writes clearly and thoughtfully, and his research is quite impressive. Further, he is forthright in suggesting that his book is not intended to be a comprehensive study of the history of tourism in Latin America, and that the issues he raises about empire and the complex ways that power operates within that empire could never be solved within one volume. The intriguing question for scholars of U.S.–Latin American relations, or of the history of U.S. foreign relations more generally, is what to do with such a book. Certainly there is no surprise in the idea that both policymakers and ordinary citizens in the United States imagined and, as Merrill argues, experienced a cartoonized version of Latin America, and that this led to suppositions about how empire should function. But it is extraordinarily important to note that Latin Americans, both elite and not, were complicit in the construction of at least a part of the cultural and theatrical edifice of empire. Merrill is right to explore the complex symbolic ways in which empires operate, and right to point the field toward incorporating this insight into the historiography in a meaningful way.

To end on a lighter note, I do worry that having read this text might make my next vacation in Latin America less enjoyable. I worry if I will be able to engage in an escapist fantasy without overintellectualizing it—and in the process ruin that fantasy.

Jeffrey Taffet is Associate Professor of History in the Department of Humanities at the United States Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point.

Notes:
1. Merrill does a fine job of explaining that Moscoso had been among the architects of Puerto Rican modernization, which provides, not incidentally, the best evidence that the Kennedy administration hoped to incorporate something learned from Puerto Rico into the formulation of the Alliance for Progress.

Author’s Response

Dennis Merrill

I’m gratified that my work has generated such a wide-ranging discussion. I thank Mariola Espinosa, Alan McPherson, and Jeffrey Taffet for their thought-provoking reviews and Mitch Lerner and the Passport staff for arranging this exchange.

In Negotiating Paradise, I began with Charles S. Maier’s emphasis on political and military domination as a basis for understanding empire. I wanted to make it clear that inter-American relations have never taken place on a level playing field. To make sense of tourism, however, I emphasized what Maier calls the “informal” components of imperial power, especially “soft” powers such as consumer privilege and the power to make cultural meanings. Using these concepts, I portrayed the U.S. hemispheric empire in humanistic as well as structural terms, as an empire shaped by many minds, many hearts, and many hands. To fathom its immensity, I gave up all hope of paradigmatic consistency and freely mixed theoretical frameworks. Out of my academic blender emerged a study of tourism framed within a history of the “everyday life of empire.”

It is apparent from the reviews that some historians embrace blending and others are more cautious. I thank Alan McPherson for his warm endorsement of multi-archival comparative international history. His remarks pay homage to the adage that the whole is greater than...
the sum of its parts. Jeffrey Taffet, while appreciative of my research, takes issue with some of the parts, especially the theme of empire, the U.S. cultural and political context, the role of the hegemonic state, and the connections drawn between travel and foreign policy. Mariola Espinosa welcomes my work as an important contribution to the study of U.S.—Latin American relations and has no problem mixing tourism and international relations but is wary of stirring empire into the pot.

One challenge inherent to mixing historicities and methods is that definitions are likely to become contested. Readers of Negotiating Paradise will find that I agree with Espinosa’s astute observation that differences in political status across the three countries produced different kinds of visitor-host relations. She and I also share the view that Mexicans exercised considerable control over their travel industry during the interwar period, whereas Cold War-era Cubans did not. But while she asserts that the development of the Mexican travel industry can be best understood as a product of Mexico’s domestic politics, I place tourism and Mexico’s political maneuvering in the context of U.S. imperialism. She asserts that the agency exhibited by Mexican hosts weakened or evidenced weakness in U.S. influence over Mexico. I am not completely averse to that conclusion, but I pose the possibility that by conceding limited powers to Mexican tourism the United States also strengthened its hegemony. The bottom line is that she equates empire with hard and fast colonization, and I define empire more broadly to include long-enduring soft powers.

Given eastern France’s ethnic, linguistic, and historical labyrinth, I will dodge the Alsace-Lorraine comparison except to note that unlike France and Germany, the United States and Mexico never engaged as equals or even near equals. A half century after the United States annexed northern Mexico, U.S. capital spearheaded Mexico’s modernization. Mexico’s “great rebellion” recast but did not erase the bonds of informal empire. In his aptly titled book Empire and Revolution (2002), John Mason Hart has shown how post-revolutionary political economy—forged from the interwar era to the age of conditioned loans and NAFTA—transformed Mexico’s subordinate role in the U.S.—led global economy from a supplier of raw materials to supplier of consumer goods, machine parts, and cheap labor.5

Puerto Rico stands as the single case in which visitor-host relations took place within a formal, colonial context. It would be unconscionable to downplay the extent to which Commonwealth status has denied Puerto Ricans full self-determination. Yet island politicians, service workers, publicists, and artists still managed to carve out a modicum of negotiating space. They did so via economic planning and the production of cultural texts. The commonwealth government hired advertising agents, massaged travel writers, and publicized the island’s powdery beaches, lavish hotels, and colonial-era plazas. Unlike Cold War Cuba, Puerto Rico kept a cap on gambling and prostitution (although that cap was not always airtight, as McPherson correctly suggests).

Jeffrey Taffet prefers the language of “world systems” and “dependency” to sum up U.S. tourism in Latin America. The stage was and is worldwide. In 2008, more than 900 million planetary citizens took leisure trips that extended beyond their own national borders.4 But the nature of travel and the production and reception of culture are shaped but not entirely determined by the world economic system. While some tourists boast fistfuls of dollars, others travel on the cheap. Some thrive strictly on consumer fantasies; others immerse themselves in cultural, educational, and aesthetic experiences. The term “dependency,” moreover, implies that hosts lack agency to contain the asymmetrical tourist presence. Taffet’s definition apparently allows for that agency, but he overdoes it a bit when he writes that locals exploit “tourists as much as they are being exploited by them.” World systems and the cultural turn each use a specialized, elevated vocabulary that on occasion still falls short of precision. I therefore opted to depict this history in a way that made sense to me and seemed most accessible to readers; hence the theme of empire.

Some of the confusion over empire’s meanings may arise from the contemporary world context. Empires are in no small measure about power and borders: the power to impose, expand, redefine, and sometimes obliterate boundaries. During the nineteenth-century heyday of European imperialism, empires developed within bounded geographic spaces organized by powerful industrial states. Those empires dissipated throughout the twentieth century in the wake of world wars, decolonization, and the emergence of ever-denser networks of information, mobile capital, trade, and migratory labor.6 By the end of the century, U.S. global hegemony was as fluid as it was systematic. Those deemed dependent in one decade might become influential players in the next. Western Europe and Japan evolved from postwar indigents to late-century competitors. Hu Jintao’s China and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s Brazil stand as examples of postcolonial upward mobility. The avalanche of debt that has buried so many contemporary U.S. consumers, along with the nation’s lopsided balance of payments, suggests that soft power itself can erode.

Taffet’s critique, however, extends beyond semantics. One of his overarching points is that “there is no hegemonic interventionist state in Merrill’s study.” The comment is off the mark. U.S. political and military intervention in Latin America is a recurring theme throughout the book. Negotiating Paradise probes the establishment and institutionalization of the Puerto Rican protectorate; U.S. military intervention in revolutionary Mexico and Ambassador Dwight Morrow’s subsequent efforts to smooth animosities; FDR’s inconsistent Good Neighbor Policy—neighborly toward Mexico but bullying toward many others; the creation of the Bretton Woods system; the overthrow of social democracy in Guatemala; Washington’s unconditional love and military aid for numerous Caribbean and Central American dictators; the Eisenhower administration’s plots against Fidel Castro; John F. Kennedy’s application of modernization theory in the Alliance for Progress; and five decades of economic war against Cuban socialism. The state also figures prominently as a promoter of international travel through subsidies to shipping companies and airlines, the Export-Import Bank, the Marshall Plan, and the promotional activities of ambassadors and presidents.

That said, I subordinate policy studies to the history of non-state players for the simple reason that ordinary tourists and the organized travel industry initiated most visitor-host relationships. And compared to state-to-state relations, which have been covered well by others, non-state-player relationships are little understood and generally underemphasized in histories of the Americas. I am admittedly at odds with those who assume that soft power comes into play only when it is coordinated by the state. Emily Rosenberg’s Spreading the American Dream (1980) remains indispensable reading because it demonstrates
the critical role played by private interests and liberal, market-oriented ideologies in the outward expansion of U.S. influence from the 1890s through 1945. The interventionist state certainly played more than a bit-part, but it was non-state actors who fueled the mass production, mass production engine. One telling legacy is that by the early twenty-first century, Americans constituted roughly six percent of the world’s population but consumed approximately forty percent of the world’s resources. While government facilitated this grotesque inequality, it did not cause it. In another forum on my book, one reviewer aptly cited Pogo’s dictum: “We have met the enemy and he is us.”

As for the U.S. cultural and political setting, Negotiating Paradise visits the barrios of Los Angeles; the heavily touristed missions of southern California and Santa Fe, New Mexico; the Jim Crow South; and the nation’s vast patriarchal landscape from the passage of the nineteenth amendment to the age of I Love Lucy. Perhaps these visits are all too brief, but the book’s focus is cultural negotiation and blending rather than cultural export. Like many recent works on empire, it downplays binaries such as “core and periphery,” “metropole and colony,” “domestic and foreign,” and emphasizes the empire’s transnational cultural pluralism.8 While many U.S. citizens greeted interwar Mexican immigrants with a venomous bigotry, Yankees wandering across rural Mexico often idealized the manners and morals of pre-modern campesinos. Visitors to Cold War Cuba commonly adhered to the dictates of domestic containment on the mainland but delighted in Latin sensuality ninety miles east of Key West. Conscious of these dynamics, hosts joined in the meaning-making process. Fidel Castro sought to extinguish Cuba’s eroticized image altogether. The Mexican Tourist Association manipulated northern imaginaries of Latina beauty by adopting the dignified, dark-skinned indigena as its national travel icon, at once a symbol of the country’s ancient Indian past and its modern, multicultural future.

Tourists did indeed contribute to the revision of dominant cultural discourses. Few did so where Cuba was concerned, and for that reason tourist behavior and U.S. foreign policy appear heavily aligned there. In 1920s Mexico, however, a more subtle synchronization of touristic and diplomatic worlds took shape. Artists and poets, student groups and scholars, and countless middle-class vagabonds discovered a Mexico in post-revolutionary renaissance—awash in politicized mural art, the rediscovery of pre-Columbian cities, and the elevation of indigenous cultures. My book details how they publicized their knowledge through published travel memoirs, letters to newspapers, picture postcards and correspondence, and even the art, jewelry, and pottery they carted north. By doing so, they sparked a grass-roots U.S.–Mexican rapprochement more than a decade before FDR enunciated his Good Neighbor Policy.

In Puerto Rico, not all vacationers bought the Commonwealth’s public relations hype. Leonard Bernstein’s Westside Story, with its choreographed street gangs, provides just one example of how distorted stereotypes of Puerto Ricans persisted into and beyond the 1950s. By the mid-1960s, Puerto Rico nonetheless ranked as the Caribbean’s leading tourist destination. When Arthur Schlesinger Jr. lauded the island’s “peaceful democratic revolution” and cited Operation Bootstrap as an “important source of ideas behind the Alliance [for Progress],” he did so within a cultural context that increasingly identified Puerto Rico as an oasis of swank hotels and elegant restaurants and a shopping nirvana.9

Alan McPherson makes a strong case that hosts actually contested visitor prerogatives. But I will stand by my characterization of a series of prolonged negotiations designed to contain tourist power. The process might include contestation and would undoubtedly leave both parties less than fully satisfied at times. Such is the nature of negotiations the world over. But agreements were numerous. While consumers and service workers struck deals on taxi fares and restaurant tips, the U.S. and Mexican governments joined forces to lay down the Pan American Highway and the Carnegie Foundation contracted with officials in Mexico City to excavate the renowned Mayan/Toltec city of Chichén Itzá. In revolutionary Cuba, Fidel Castro bowed to industry and labor interests and allowed a partial re-opening of Havana’s gambling casinos. And unionized hotel maids in San Juan, Puerto Rico spurned pretensions to feminine deference, organized strikes, and negotiated the highest wages and benefits in the tourist-drenched Caribbean.

I sympathize with Jeffrey Taffet’s call for stronger links between tourism and foreign policymaking. Following George F. Kennan along the gringo trail might firm up the argument. Then again, Kennan was not the first grumpy Anglo to label Mexico City “menacing.” His mid-century travel notes in fact echoed views commonly held by U.S. tourists during the interwar years and suggest that even foreign policy realists can be creatures of mass culture. My main subjects therefore are the less renowned travelers—ironically, those whom elitists like Kennan commonly held in contempt—whose cultural perceptions shaped the discourse. Exactly how does one connect perceptions (touristic or otherwise) and policymaking? In the name of speculative restraint and interpretive reach, I chose to explore the interplay between culture and diplomacy rather than to argue that one caused the other.

What to do with a book such as Negotiating Paradise? The everyday history of empire complicates as well as humanizes the imperial past. It beckons us to listen to multiple voices and confront new perspectives. It permits us to expand upon event-driven history and to more deeply contemplate what Fernand Braudel termed the longue durée. The interwar era, the Cold War, détente, and the post-Cold War era remain helpful devices for analyzing international trends. But the daily life of the empire, whether it is examined by way of tourism or other seemingly mundane activities, historicizes those diplomatic turning points. Events considered novel in one era acquire precedence. The cultural distance between the age of dollar diplomacy and Camelot’s alliance for capitalism collapses. Comparisons of seminal revolutions become more facile. The twentieth century acquires intellectual coherence as an age of empire, resistance, and negotiation.

Finally, through the prism of its everyday life, the reality of empire comes more clearly into focus. William Appleman Williams wrote three decades ago of “empire as a way of life.”10 Williams concentrated his analysis on ideology, social and economic structures, and U.S. political and military power. Today we possess the analytical tools to expand our understanding of how the American way of life and the path of empire have always been connected. The history of U.S. tourism links the pious rhetoric of empire to personal acts of insensitivity, global finance and trade to individual consumption, the national security ethos to the privilege of safe travel, and the limits of U.S. power to touristic
social consciousness and host agency. It teaches that while empire and globalization are long-term processes, they unfold on a day-to-day basis. Their trajectories are not determined solely by large, impersonal bureaucracies, the invented laws of market economics, or presidents and their White House staffs. They are in fact human enterprises that engage us all.

Dennis Merrill is Professor of History at the University of Missouri in Kansas City.

Notes
A Roundtable Discussion of the 60th Anniversary of the Korean War

James I. Matray, Brian Clancy, and William Stueck

Korea: Lessons and Legacies of a Memorable War

James I. Matray

On 25 June 2010, we commemorated the sixtieth anniversary of the beginning of the conventional phase of the Korean War, when Communist forces staged a massive military offensive southward across the 38th parallel to reunite the nation. At first blush, this event would seem to provide few lessons or legacies still relevant twenty years after the Soviet-American contest for global hegemony ceased to define international politics. Today the United States is struggling to find a plan of action to eliminate the use of terror as a political weapon and to unite the world behind the implementation of that strategy.

However, understanding the origins, course, and consequences of the Korean War in fact can provide meaningful guidance for world leaders in pursuit of international peace and stability in at least two important ways. First, Korea’s war demonstrates the primacy of nationalism and local circumstances as the forces that decide events in human history. Second, the conflict confirms how flawed leaders can act on erroneous assumptions and dubious expectations to make decisions that result in unwanted and often disastrous outcomes. President Harry S. Truman proved both points when he publicly declared on 27 June 1950 that “communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.” This same profound detachment from reality afflicted his counterparts in Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and Seoul, and left Korea divided and in ruins.

That Truman exaggerated the threat North Korea’s invasion posed to the United States certainly is not surprising, given how he had justified U.S. policies to contain Soviet expansion after 1947. In his speech requesting aid for Greece and Turkey in March of that year, he had committed the United States rhetorically to defending nations everywhere against Communist expansion. Simultaneously and for the next three years, however, the president contradictorily insisted on reducing defense spending. Significantly, he refused in April 1950 to approve National Security Council Paper 68, which called for a huge expansion of U.S. military power. Chinese military intervention in the Korean War finally motivated Congress to authorize increases in the defense budget from $13.5 billion in 1950 to $60.4 billion for fiscal 1952, providing the means necessary to achieve Truman’s earlier stated ends. One of the war’s important legacies was the U.S. government’s adoption of a mobilization strategy of perpetual military preparedness, enormous military expenditures, and budget deficits. This pattern would not have taken hold in the absence of the mistaken beliefs about nationalism that caused Truman to think he was liberating North Korea and not provoking China’s entry into the war. To be sure, domestic political pressure for complete victory virtually eliminated halting at the 38th parallel as an option. But the fact remains that the humiliating U.S. military retreat and the bloody, frustrating stalemate that followed would combine to create a toxic political environment in the United States. Truman’s escalation of the war destroyed any hope of ever restoring a bipartisan foreign policy and assured instead the triumph of McCarthyism.

Lessons learned in the 1930s dominated the thinking of Truman and his advisors and led them to conclude wrongly that Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was behaving like Hitler and had ordered North Korea to attack as a first step in his global plan for expansionist aggression. Consequently, the vast increase in U.S. defense spending was not entirely for Korea. A significant portion of it financed a larger deployment of U.S. forces in Western Europe and an increase in military assistance to the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The United States also started to lobby for the rearmament of West Germany and finally realized that goal in 1955. Similarly, the Truman administration sharply increased military assistance to Indochina, the Philippines, and the exiled Guomindang regime on Taiwan. But revolutionary unrest persisted, persuading U.S. leaders that only the direct application of military power could counter what they now perceived as a dire Soviet threat menacing the entire world.

A regrettable legacy of the Korean War was that the United States thereafter practiced a policy of global intervention, relying largely on military means to maintain the status quo. U.S. support for assorted odious regimes around the world resulted in the needless waste of the nation’s blood and treasure, especially in Vietnam.

The Korean conflict convinced American leaders that communism was a monolithic global movement under the direct control of the Kremlin, and that belief moved U.S. policy in misguided directions for many years. A long-hidden legacy of the conflict was that it had a divisive rather than a unifying impact on this Communist alliance; Communist sources have revealed that the relationships among the Soviet Union, China, and North Korea were complex, fractious, and suspicious. Stalin, who had opposed an invasion until April 1950, was definitely peeved at Kim Il Sung for misleading him into thinking that the North’s forces would triumph before Washington had time to intervene. Kim, for his part, never forgot how Stalin stalled on approving Chinese intervention and, before Mao Zedong acted to save the Kim regime, was even prepared to allow U.S. forces to conquer North Korea. Wartime Sino-Soviet friction grew steadily as Stalin limited support for the Chinese war effort and delayed an armistice. Oblivious to these divisions, Truman invited confrontation with Beijing when at the start of the Korean War he sent the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait, preventing impending Communist reunification. He then gained passage in February 1951 of a UN resolution condemning China as an aggressor in Korea. Truman’s policies in the Korean War would poison Soviet-American relations for over two decades.
Creation of an alliance system to block further Communist expansion in East Asia became the primary goal of U.S. policy after the start of the Korean War. North Korea’s attack ended division in Washington about Japan’s future; the Pentagon agreed to an early restoration of sovereignty and the State Department reciprocated by agreeing to Japanese rearmament. The Japanese Peace Treaty, signed in September 1951, resulted in independence the following spring. Simultaneously, Japan signed a separate bilateral security treaty with the United States that allowed U.S. troops to stay in Japan indefinitely. Reacting to fears of a revived Japan, the United States sought the parallel goal of Communist containment in negotiating security agreements with a series of nations in East Asia. In August 1951, it signed a mutual defense pact with the Philippines pledging protection from aggression, although, in contrast to the NATO agreement, the pact did not specify that protection would be automatic. The next month, the United States signed a similar agreement with Australia and New Zealand known as the ANZUS Treaty. In 1954, the U.S.–South Korea Mutual Security Treaty and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization came into effect, and the U.S.–Republic of China (Taiwan) Mutual Defense Pact followed in 1955. Envisioning this enormous postwar projection of U.S. political and military power into the Pacific would be difficult absent the Korean War.

Many early writers defined the legacy of the Korean War as a victory for collective security, but in fact U.S. control over decision-making severely strained relations with its allies. Nor was the war a model for effectively waging limited war in a nuclear age, since the United States was prepared to use atomic weapons from the outset, and air bombardment laid waste to North Korea. These two misconceptions distract attention from perhaps the most important lesson of the Korean War: that military power has limited utility in resolving political disputes. Similarly, references to the “forgotten war” obscure what is the most significant legacy of Korea: that after three years of ghastly conflict, this tragic country was still divided. Foreign powers had not only partitioned the peninsula in 1945, but also intervened militarily twice during 1950 to prevent its reunification. More than two million Koreans died in the process, and the survivors on both sides of the demilitarized zone lived under brutal dictatorships for over three decades after the war ended. Recent naval incidents in disputed waters off Korea’s west coast are jarring reminders that an armistice in July 1953 did not end the war. Wiser leaders, conscious of the determinative power of nationalism and their own imperfections, would have placed a higher priority on helping meet the needs and desires of Koreans after World War II. Doing so would have brought about a positive outcome worthy of welcome remembrance—just as a focus on the nearshore front and rights would have created a better situation in those nations today.

James I. Matray is Professor of History at California State University, Chico.

Approaches to the Korean War for New Teachers

Brian Clancy

As a teacher with a personal connection to the “Land of the Morning Calm,” I am pleased to be participating in a roundtable commemorating the sixtieth anniversary of the Korean War, and I hope it will attract a rich cross-section of educators and students seeking to better understand the conflict. Before I entered graduate school, I taught in Korea (Koreans rarely use the term South Korea) for two years. I ate, slept, worked, and played among gracious hosts in Seoul and Uijong-Bu. While there, I took advantage of opportunities to discuss the war with Koreans, western diplomats, American soldiers, and Commonwealth veterans who were touring old battlefields. Today, as a member of the SHAFR Teaching Committee, I would like to share a few lessons I drew from the experience, as well as a few teaching tools I have used to explain the war to my own students.

My sojourn in Korea convinced me that some local history was an essential backdrop to unpacking the Cold War conflict for students. Indeed, the Hermit Kingdom was not as hermetic as I had been led to believe! Situated precariously between the Chinese and the Japanese peoples, the Koreans have known foreign influences for most of their existence. So when the country was, in effect, partitioned at the 38th parallel, somewhere among the panic-stricken populace there was a sense of déjà-vu. One friend told me how her mother frantically tried to escape from Pyong Yang by train before access to the new South was closed. When the train broke down in the night, the exodus continued on foot for the young and old; some of her family were left behind and were not seen again. In a culture that values the extended family and its ancestry, the coming of war, both cold and hot, marked not only the beginning of a painful separation, but rape, pillage, starvation, and widespread destruction—and this on the heels of the brutal Japanese occupation.

Touring Korean War battlefields helped me develop an appreciation for the international nature of the conflict. Today, in the southern port city of Pusan, the coalition flags snap over the manicured lawns of the United Nations Cemetery—an homage to the ghost of Woodrow Wilson. In the spring of 1996, I saw the flags personified when I toured the Kapyong Valley battlefields with a jovial group of returning Commonwealth veterans. At one stop, a Canadian vet held up a faded personal photo of Hill 667. Squinting at the forested feature in the bright sunlight, we could see nothing but the silhouette to suggest it was the same barren muddy hill in the picture. The vet marveled at how Korea had prospered: the large highways, modern rail system, and the high tech industries that characterize Seoul today were in stark contrast to the mud huts and starving rural peasants he had seen during the war. Later, I sat at the back of a bus full of elderly New Zealand vets and listened to them sing old songs and recite dirty poems. I asked a few what they wanted future generations to remember about the conflict. They all expressed their frustration with being part of a “forgotten war” and wanted others to understand they had come to Korea in 1950 to stop aggression.

Amid the profusion of perspectives on the war, where is a new teacher to begin? James Matray’s historiographical essay “The Korean War” is an excellent starting point and, as his insight into the debates is enriched by a useful bibliography, an ideal gateway for educators at all levels. To understand Korea before the Cold War, teachers can do no better than consult Bruce Cumings’ The Origins of the Korean War (two volumes). For students I would recommend his shorter Korea’s Civil War and the Roots of U.S. Intervention. Cumings understands the Korean people and reminds us all that “civil wars do not start: they come.”

Teaching the Korean War often requires unpacking some of the major combat operations to understand the eventual stalemate. William Stueck’s The Korean War: An International History covers both the fighting and
the diplomacy. Teachers looking for a traditional military history from a United Nations perspective should add Max Hastings’ *The Korean War* to their toolbox. Those looking for a reliable online source for extensive Korean War material—including pictures for power point presentations—should make the Truman Presidential Library website their first stop. To bring the war to life for students at all levels, teachers should consider enriching their lectures with clips from the PBS documentary *Truman.* Throughout my stay in Korea, the tense military standoff was always just below the surface of everyday life. My local hiking trail had pre-dug defensive positions that faced north. Monthly air raid drills and posters warning commuters to report saboteurs were part of the rhythm of life. The recent sinking of a South Korean warship is just the latest page in a long chapter of violent cross-border incursions. Visitors can see this ongoing psychological Cold War up close on a USO tour of the United Nations Joint Security Area at Pan Mun Jom (no South Korean civilians allowed). Here propaganda is a 24/7 business: visitors are surrounded by extensive tank ditches and minefields, and the northern hillside is covered with signs and equipped with the largest sound system in the world, both blaring encouragement to southerners to flee across “The Bridge of No Return” to a better life. Each side tries to maintain a taller flagpole than the other side. Across a nearby river, a façade of empty cities lights up at night to suggest a prosperity that does not exist in the Stalinist hell that is North Korea.

Pan Mun Jom should remind us that the Korean War always has one foot in the present. Teachers can return to Stueck’s *The Korean War: An International History* to learn about the lengthy, propaganda-strewn negotiations that eventually settled major combat operations in 1953. The University of Wisconsin Digital Collections’ *Korean War* volumes of the FRUS series are an excellent resource of primary documents to drive assignments. The Demilitarized Zone symbolizes more than just a stalemated war. During the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson and his advisors often based their hardline Vietnam diplomacy on the American negotiating experience at Pan Mun Jom. By 1965, the Ghost of Korea had joined Munich and the “loss” of China in the pantheon of diplomatic blunders. As the Korean War turns sixty, it continues to resonate for teachers, students and policymakers alike.

Unique among American wars, that unresolved civil war has produced continuing nuclear tensions and violent flare-ups on the peninsula that will keep us connected to the conflict.

Brian Clancy is a doctoral student in the Department of History at the University of Western Ontario.

**Notes**

4. These volumes may be consulted at <http://digicol.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/>.

**The Sixtieth Anniversary of the Korean War**

William Stueck

Anniversaries of wars invite reflection, but since wars are often complex in nature and ambiguous in legacy the question of what exactly to reflect on can be difficult to resolve. When it comes to Korea, for example, we could dwell upon the following facts:

- It was a hideously destructive conflict, especially for the Korean people, some three million of whom died.
- It was made possible by the division of the peninsula into two hostile parts, the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the South and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the North, and the United States played a pivotal role in that development.
- From the start of its occupation of half the peninsula in September 1945, the United States supported repressive right-wing groups people for the most part by recent collaborators with the Japanese.
- U.S. intervention in June 1950 prevented the reunification of a country that had been one for many centuries but remains dangerously divided to this day.
- A fair portion of the war’s destruction was produced by American carpet-bombing of North Korea, which became increasingly indiscriminate from November 1950 onward.
- The war taught lessons to American leaders that helped produce the disastrous commitment to South Vietnam during the following decade.

Certainly these unpleasant truths deserve more than passing attention, and I am confident that other commentators in this forum will give them their due. But since I am on balance a glass-half-full kind of guy, I choose to dwell on a couple of positives: first, that once the armistice was concluded on July 27, 1953, the shooting never resumed on a large scale, and second, that the ROK, which the United States saved through its intervention, has developed into a stable, vibrant, and democratic entity that has earned the respect and admiration of the rest of the world.

In mid-October 1950, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace returned to Washington from Wake Island, where as a member of President Harry S. Truman’s entourage he had met with General Douglas MacArthur to receive a report on Korea. MacArthur had captivated his audience with assurances that the war was all but won and that U.S. troops could begin to be reassigned from the theater by the end of the year. When Pace reported this to Secretary of Defense George Marshall in the Pentagon, he received an astounding reply. “Pace, that’s troublesome,” the much decorated architect of U.S. military strategy in World War II said. “To precipitate an end to the war would not permit us to have a full understanding of the problems we face ahead of us.” Even the North Korean attack on South Korea of the past June had not taught the American people that they had erred in the aftermath of World War II in pressuring their government to demobilize the armed forces rapidly.

The Chinese, of course, would soon have much to say about when the war ended. Their intervention temporarily reversed the military situation on the peninsula, and even when it...
shifted in the spring of 1951 back in favor of United Nations forces, the United States declined to make another effort to unify the peninsula by military means. As armistice talks began in July, and despite the fact that the general U.S. military buildup had advanced well beyond the stage of the previous fall, Marshall and others again expressed concern that an early end to the fighting would produce a repeat of the post-World War II experience.

As things turned out, the war lasted another two years and the U.S. military buildup continued apace, although never on a scale large enough to satisfy the Pentagon brass. By July 1953 the enemy was anxious to end the fighting in Korea, even at the expense of making an embarrassing concession on the prisoner-of-war issue. The United States earlier had won a concession for a defensible armistice line rather than restoration of the 38th parallel. Once the armistice was signed, the United States quickly signed a security treaty with the ROK. Over the remainder of the decade, the United States provided more military and economic aid to South Korea than to any other country in the world. While Washington greatly reduced the size of American forces stationed on the peninsula, two full army divisions remained there in forward positions, and they were backed up by considerable air power. A strong foundation had been established for the maintenance, over the long haul, of a tense peace in Korea.

That foundation was essential for economic development, which began on a large scale during the 1960s and had reached a level by the 1980s that enabled the ROK to compete effectively to host the 1988 Olympics. Economic development, in turn, brought the rise of a self-confident urban middle class, which in 1987 agitated effectively for democratization of the political system. The process was not always pretty, and the United States sometimes fumbled opportunities to nudge the system forward at a more rapid pace, but the ultimate result was far better and came far sooner than it would have had the ROK been allowed to collapse in the face of Soviet tanks and artillery during the summer of 1950.

The fact that things have worked out so much better for people in the ROK than for those in the DPRK suggests that we should acknowledge more than just the obvious flaws in the course of the U.S. occupation of Korea from 1945 to 1948 and during the early floundering of the ROK under the leadership of Syngman Rhee. During the occupation, for instance, the United States instituted reforms that greatly expanded the educational opportunities for Korean children, girls and boys alike, worked to integrate over a million ethnic Koreans who migrated to South Korea from Manchuria, North Korea, and Japan, and commenced a land redistribution program to reverse the prevailing system of absentee ownership and tenant farming. That program was expanded, if not fully implemented, by the Rhee government on the eve of the DPRK attack. Land reform created a foundation for both political stability and economic development over the longer term.

Yet the United States failed to make adequate efforts to communicate to the Soviet Union its commitment to secure the ROK from outside attack, and that failure was critical in leading to the Korean War as we know it. The United States has made many small mistakes in Korea since the armistice was signed, but that one big mistake has never been repeated. In their reflections on the past, Americans should take some satisfaction from that achievement as well as from the success of the ROK.

William Stueck is Professor and Distinguished Research Professor of History at the University of Georgia.
Report of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, January 1-December 31, 2009

August 8, 2010

By public law and by its own tradition, the Historical Advisory Committee of the Department of State embraces two principal responsibilities. One is to oversee the preparation and timely publication of the Foreign Relations of the United States series. The other is to facilitate public access to records that are 25 years or older from the date of issue.

The first of these responsibilities is mandated by the Foreign Relations Statute of 1991, which calls for a “thorough, accurate, and reliable” documentary record of United States foreign policy. That statute grew out of the intense public controversy triggered by the appearance of two particular Foreign Relations volumes: one, published in 1983, covered the events surrounding U.S. intervention in Guatemala in 1954; the other, published in 1989, covered U.S. intervention in Iran in 1953. In each case, those volumes omitted documentation that would have shed light on U.S. covert activities. Such documentation either was not made available to HO researchers or it was not cleared for publication. Consequently, knowledgeable scholars rightly criticized the two volumes—and the series—for falling short of the standard of accuracy and thoroughness, dealing a serious blow to its credibility and stature.

Over the nearly two decades that have passed since the Foreign Relations Statute of 1991 became law, the Office of the Historian has sought with good faith to compile volumes as true to the historical record—and as “thorough, reliable, and accurate”—as possible. Our committee applauds that effort. It is very pleased, moreover, with the palpable improvement in the series that has characterized the volumes compiled and published since that landmark statute. By the same token, we appreciate that the standard of thoroughness, accuracy, and reliability remains an exceedingly complex one for the Office of the Historian to meet in view of the profusion of important government documents pertaining to foreign relations for the decades of the 1960s, 1970s, and after and in view of the parallel requirement that volumes be published no later than 30 years after the events they document. The office has struggled to meet these complementary obligations, finding much greater success in achieving the quality objective than in achieving the timeliness objective.

The committee’s second statutory obligation is to monitor and advise on the declassification and opening of the Department of State’s records, which in large measure involves the Department’s implementation of the operative Executive Order governing the classification and declassification of government records. E.O. 12958, issued in 1995, and later amended by E.O. 13292 of 2003, mandated the declassification of records over 25 years old—unless valid and significant reasons could be specified for not releasing them. Those orders were supplanted, in December 2009, by a new Executive Order (E.O. 13526), whose implementation and implications fall outside the current reporting period.

Declassification Issues and the Transfer of Department of State Records to the National Archives

During 2009, the committee continued to monitor progress of the State Department’s declassification efforts as well as the transfer of the Department’s records—electronic as well as paper—to the National Archives and Records Administration. We also discussed issues relating to delays in opening these records to the public; and received quarterly reports on the processing and opening of State Department records at NARA, including the central files. We are pleased to report that the Department’s Systematic Review Program achieved its core annual goal of completing the declassification review of 25-year old records.

In addition, the committee engaged in extensive discussion with National Archives personnel relating to its National Declassification Initiative and the expected launching of the National Declassification Center. The Historical Advisory Committee strongly supports the National Declassification Center, which should contribute significantly to the creation of a more rational and streamlined approach to the declassification and availability of governmental records pertaining to foreign affairs.

In an effort to bring our concerns about the ways in which the current declassification system affects the timely production of Foreign Relations volumes, we also met with the Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB) and with the Director of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO). We also received several briefings about early drafts of President Obama’s new executive order on the classification and declassification of government records, an order that was not formally issued until December.

Publications of the Foreign Relations Series

During 2009, the Office of the Historian published just three volumes in the Foreign Relations of the United States series, the fewest number of volumes to appear in some years. Those were:

2. 1969-1976, Vol. E-3, Documents on
The Challenge of the 30-Year Rule

A combination of factors served to impede progress in reaching the 30-year line throughout 2008 and 2009. The most serious of those appears to have been the internal turmoil, staff turnover, and managerial disruption that plagued the Office of the Historian during those years. Our committee had become sufficiently concerned about staff turnover and low office morale that we called attention to those matters in our 2007 annual report. Those concerns also led, in December 2008, to the public resignation of the committee’s past chair and one of its members. Subsequent investigations of the Office of the Historian by a three-person panel appointed by the Secretary of State and then by the Department’s Inspector General contributed to a significant slowdown in the compilation, review, and publication of Foreign Relations volumes. Our committee did not prepare its traditional annual report for 2008 because of the sudden loss of its chair and because the uncertainties that plagued the office made an accurate appraisal of developments and future prospects exceedingly difficult.

For much of 2009, more than half of the managerial positions in the Office of the Historian remained vacant, including the Office Director, the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, and all three front line supervisory positions devoted to preparation and review of Foreign Relations manuscripts. The important position of Joint CIA-State Department Historian also remained vacant at the end of 2009, despite the temporary occupancy of the position during part of the year.

Although the situation has now been partially rectified, it bears emphasizing that there is still no permanent Office Director, a General Editor was only named in June 2010, and all three of the “division chiefs” who supervise and provide the initial review of Foreign Relations manuscripts remain relatively new to their positions and thus inevitably somewhat inexperienced. The Historical Advisory Committee is cautiously optimistic that the staffing and managerial problems will soon be stabilized, allowing for greater productivity in the near future. It is also cautiously optimistic that the alarming level of turnover among staff historians that greatly concerned it in the past will give way to a more stable staff that over time will acquire the seasoning and experience that characterizes the most accomplished documentary editing teams. Further, we are heartened to note that staff morale appears to have improved measurably from mid-2009 to the present.

Staff departures in 2008-09 also led to a major backlog in the in-house reviewing of Foreign Relations manuscripts. In the past, the General Editor provided a second review of each volume before it could be sent forward into the declassification process. With the departure of the General Editor in 2008, the vulnerability of a system dependent on one experienced editor to review all manuscripts became evident. The department of each of the division chiefs, who traditionally provide the initial manuscript review, exacerbated the bottleneck problem. A backlog of manuscripts needing a first and/or second review mounted through the course of 2009. The Historical Advisory Committee has explored with the Office of the Historian alternatives to an editorial review system overly reliant on a single individual and we have reason to believe that a system may soon be installed that will encourage the development of a larger number of experienced reviewers, thereby reducing the bottleneck problem.

Intelligence Issues and Other-Agency Coordination and Cooperation

External factors also impeded the Office of the Historian from making progress in moving toward the 30-year line this past year. One derives from the sensitivity surrounding the official publication of intelligence-related documentation. The 1991 law, and a subsequent memorandum of understanding between the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency, greatly facilitated research in intelligence files and the incorporation of intelligence documentation in Foreign Relations volumes. An interagency committee, known as the “High-
Level Panel,” was established in the late 1990s to provide guidelines for the publication in the Foreign Relations series of documentation relating to covert actions and other sensitive intelligence activities that had a major impact on U.S. foreign policy. The success of that innovation can be gleaned from the fact that 44 covert intelligence activities have now been acknowledged, with the Foreign Relations series serving as the primary venue for publishing documentation on the role of intelligence activities in U.S. foreign relations. No fewer than 31 different volumes, either published or currently in declassification review, are expected to contain relevant documentation on those 44 covert intelligence activities. That crucial, and extremely positive, step toward openness has, however, created substantial delays in the declassification and publication process. The Office of the Historian estimates that any volume with a High-Level Panel issue will spend at least one more year in the declassification pipeline than a volume which does not contain an intelligence issue which requires consideration, the drafting of guidelines, and clearance by that inter-agency panel. Appealing negative decisions about documents deemed essential to a thorough and reliable record is a necessary, but time-consuming, process.

Finally, the inability of certain agencies to meet the 120-day deadline, set by statute, for reviewing documents chosen for inclusion in Foreign Relations volumes has been a major frustration for the committee and for the Office of the Historian. To illustrate the problem, four volumes have been delayed simply because the Department of Justice and the FBI have failed to meet their statutory obligation to review documents in a timely manner—even though, in each case, only a small number of documents needed to be reviewed. The record of the Department of Energy has also fallen short of statutory requirements, slowing down the production of other volumes. In the past, Department of Defense and CIA reviewers also contributed to these declassification delays. The performance of both agencies over the past year has, however, shown marked improvement.

Conclusion

Although external impediments to the attainment of the 30-year line in the publication of Foreign Relations volumes are both significant and troubling, the Historical Advisory Committee is just as concerned with internal problems and performance. After all, a 30-year line in the compilation and internal review of volumes must be recognized as an essential first step in the positive movement toward a 30-year line in the publication of the volumes. Yet the office is not yet close to achieving a 30-year line in the compilation of Foreign Relations manuscripts, no less a 30-year line in the review and revision of those manuscripts. Twenty-six volumes are being prepared for the Carter administration (1977-1980). All would have to be completed, reviewed, revised, and entered into the declassification process by the end of December 2010 for the 30-year line in the compilation of Foreign Relations manuscripts to be met. Regrettably, that will not occur. By the end of 2009, in fact, only one of the projected 26 volumes for the Carter years had attained the status of being fully compiled, reviewed, revised, and entered into the declassification process. Research for the next two quadrennia—covering the Reagan administration (1981-1988)—had, by the end of 2009, not yet even begun. And the records of the Reagan administration contain approximately 8.5 million pages of classified material, a more than threefold increase over the number of classified pages for the Nixon administration, further complicating the challenge. In view of those realities, the Historical Advisory Committee continues to be deeply concerned by what appears to be a growing distance between the statutory obligation to reach a 30-year line in the publication of Foreign Relations volumes and the actual length of time it has been taking to compile, review, revise, declassify, and publish those volumes. Too many volumes are now being published closer to 40 years from the events they document than 30 years. A few examples can illustrate the wider point: the volume covering SALT I, for 1969-1972, remains unpublished, despite the fact that the first portion of that volume covers events that occurred 41 years ago. The same is the case for volumes on National Security Policy; the Energy Crisis; Western Europe and NATO; Chile; the Arab-Israeli dispute, Japan, and others. All remain unpublished; yet the early portions of each of those volumes document events that occurred fully 41 years ago. Our committee finds such a significant divergence from the law requiring the publication of Foreign Relations volumes at a 30-year deadline to be both alarming and unacceptable.

We look forward to working with the Office of the Historian in an effort to devise a workable plan to meet the 30-year line as quickly as feasible, without sacrificing the high quality that is a cherished hallmark of the series. We continue to believe that an essential benchmark on that road must be first to attain a 30-year compilation line -- a goal that, we believe, should be attainable within the next three-five years, given current resources.

A very positive development, on the resources front, occurred in late-2009 when the Department of State awarded the Office of the Historian 11 new full-time positions for historian-editors while formally ending the contract-historian program. We are hopeful that this new staffing level will allow for additional resources to be devoted to the production of Foreign Relations volumes. The new positions should also contribute to the staffing stability that we believe is essential to achieve and maintain the high level of productivity demanded by the statutory requirements under which the office operates.

Other positive developments during the past year include the close cooperation between the Historical Advisory Committee and the Office of the Historian in strategic planning for the Reagan administration volumes. Several members of the committee participated in the work of two office working groups: one focused on achieving the appropriate balance between print and electronic volumes; the other devoted effort to the preparation of a draft plan for the appropriate number of geographic and thematic volumes for the Reagan presidency. The committee endorses the office’s preliminary commitment...
to produce 54 total volumes for Reagan’s two presidential terms as an excellent working plan. We also note, and enthusiastically endorse, the launching, in March 2009, of the office’s new website: www.history.state.gov. That website, and the broader digital history initiative of which it forms a key part, will allow for sophisticated on-line searches of Foreign Relations volumes, something that we believe should be a major boon to researchers.

In closing, the committee applauds the positive initiatives and developments of the past year. Nonetheless, it remains pessimistic about the ability of the Office of the Historian to reach a 30-year line in the publication of FRUS volumes by 2018, as the office has previously asserted it could. That would mean the compilation, review, revision, declassification, and publication of all volumes for the Carter and Reagan years, in addition to the 26 still-unpublished volumes for the Nixon-Ford years within the next nine years—a total of some 106 volumes in 9 years. In our collective judgment, that is a noble aspiration—but not a realistic one.

Robert J. McMahon
Chair, Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

Committee Members:
Carol Anderson
Laura Belmonte
Richard Immerman
Trudy Peterson
Katherine Sibley
Peter Spiro
Thomas Zeiler

2010 SHAFR
Summer Institute
Madison, Wisconsin
June 18-23, 2010

From left to right: Jeff Engel, Joe Renouard, Ben Coates, Benjamin Brandenburg, John Vurpillat (teaching assistant), Frédéric Heurtebize, Amy Offner, Jessica Chapman, Kaeten Mistry, Jaideep Prabhu, Rob Rakove, Tom Westerman, Mark Lawrence, Eli Plopper, Claudia Castiglioni, and Candace Sobers.

SHAFR would like to thank the University of Texas, Texas A&M University, Texas A&M University’s Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, the University of Wisconsin, and Co-Directors Mark Lawrence and Jeffrey Engel for their efforts on behalf of the 2010 SHAFR Summer Institute.
History in Action: Teaching Diplomatic History to Diplomats

Melissa Jane Taylor and Alexander R. Wieland

For more than three years, the Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State has been providing diplomatic history modules for each new class of Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) that is trained through the Foreign Service Institute (FSI). Our main goal in teaching history to FSOs-in-training, many of whom already possess advanced degrees in international relations, political science, and other related disciplines, is not to impart a set body of knowledge but to prepare them to deal with the practical situations they will face during their diplomatic careers. To that end we have designed interactive historical scenarios that highlight common foreign policy dilemmas and thereby underline the importance of history as a guide to policymakers. Each of us has created a role-playing exercise in which the students are asked to put themselves in the shoes of historical actors. In the first exercise, the students are cast as consular officers assigned the task of constructing appropriate diplomatic responses to the immigration crisis of the 1930s; in the second, students are Washington-based Department of State bureau officials charged with formulating a U.S. response to the events of the 1956 Suez Crisis.

Immigration Crisis, Vienna 1938: The Implications of Policy for Consular Officials

Over the past year, Melissa Jane Taylor designed and taught a course in which FSOs are placed in Vienna during the summer of 1938, shortly after Austria’s annexation to Germany. Her personal scholarly research focuses on immigration from Vienna during the late 1930s and lent itself well to developing an interactive module on immigration history to those who might eventually be asked to implement U.S. immigration policy.

In preparation for the class, the students are asked to read two briefings that Taylor prepared: one describing the situation facing Viennese Jews in the immediate aftermath of the March 1938 annexation of Austria and a second describing the restrictionist U.S. immigration policy of that period. In addition, the students are given two Department of State documents from that time that further outline how immigration policy was to be implemented by consular officials. At the beginning of the module, the students are placed into small groups. Each group is given an immigrant visa application to evaluate and must determine whether a visa would be granted or rejected and on what grounds. Taylor utilizes six different immigration cases for each class. The students will eventually learn the actual outcome of three of those, which are real cases drawn from her research; the other three are invented, keeping in mind historical accuracies. The class is divided into twelve groups, and two groups work on each case. The students are also told that each case must be evaluated based upon what they know about Vienna in 1938 and not on what they know about the subsequent deportation of the Jews or the Holocaust and its atrocities.

Visa applicants range from a middle-aged Jewish confectioner with a wife and nine children to an elderly Jewish widow who wishes to join her children in the United States. Applications include as many different types of people as possible (single, married, widowed; students, professionals, laborers, intellectuals, retirees; political dissidents and Jews) with varying strengths and weaknesses in the supporting documentation necessary for the issuance of visas. After the students have had sufficient time to discuss and evaluate their cases, each group is asked to present its case to the class and explain its decision. The situation replicates as much as possible that of a consular officer in the late 1930s: there is some but not a lot of time in which to make a decision; in some instances there are questions that are not answered in the documentation; and there is a fixed quota of applications that can be approved in a given month. It is clear in each class that the students are struck and challenged by the constraints upon them; consular documentation from the period makes it clear that U.S. consuls felt the same way.

The beauty of this exercise is that there are no right or wrong answers. A strong case can be made to accept or deny each applicant. The first time this module was taught, all but one immigrant visa received contradictory responses, and in subsequent iterations this trend has continued. Some groups are very restrictionist in their implementation, which is appropriate for 1938; some make an effort to find valid reasons for granting a visa to an individual or family. The divided responses generate a wealth of discussion and resonate with the students, who acknowledge that either answer could be accepted as valid within the constraints of policy. Moreover, the differing outcomes underline the degree of autonomy consular officials possessed in the late 1930s when adjudicating visa applications.

After the exercise is complete and there has been plenty of time for discussion, the students are challenged to consider the case of John Wiley, American consul general in Vienna from July 1937 to July 1938. Wiley witnessed the annexation of Austria and the wave of virulent anti-Semitism that ensued, and he had to deal with the masses of individuals, primarily Austrian Jews, who flooded the American consulate in a desperate attempt to secure an American immigration visa. Wiley was deeply affected by the plight of the Jews, as his actions indicate, and he encouraged the
must devise and present concrete recommendations for how the Eisenhower administration should respond to the actions of its British and French allies. In contrast to the immigration case exercise, the FSOs are asked to consider the situation from the perspective of policymakers at the Department of State in Washington, rather than that of officials “on the ground.” Prior to the session, the class is divided into seven “State Department bureau” groups, each with a specific portfolio for which they are responsible. Two of the groups represent the European Affairs bureau, one concerned with U.S. relations with the Western Alliance, the other with U.S.–Soviet relations. Two Near Eastern affairs bureau groups are charged with representing the viewpoints of U.S. relations with Egypt and Israel, respectively. The final three bureau groups are responsible for analyzing the situation from the perspective of U.S.–United Nations relations, international public opinion, and international economic affairs. Each group, regardless of bureau or portfolio, is assigned the same task: to make specific recommendations for U.S. policy vis-à-vis the British and French invasion while (ideally) maintaining the institutional perspective and interests of the group’s individual portfolio. The groups are then asked to present their recommendations orally in a mock briefing session with an individual playing the role of Acting Secretary of State Herbert Hoover, Jr., who at the time was in charge of State in place of the hospitalized John Foster Dulles. The purpose of separating the students into individual groups with distinct perspectives is to give them a sense of the bureaucratic rivalries that can exist within a policymaking body and the extent to which foreign policy recommendations can become divided because of the tendency of different groups to view the portfolios under their purview as the “most important” consideration for U.S. policy. While it is obviously unrealistic to expect students to be fully steeped in the institutional perspectives of their respective bureaus in a single session, particularly as the details of the Suez Crisis itself are often largely unfamiliar to them, efforts are made in this exercise to replicate the divisions these perspectives would have inculcated. The FSOs are given a series of documents to read in preparation for the exercise. All students are given a short general chronology of the events of the Suez Crisis up to November 5, and the minutes of the National Security Council meeting of November 1, 1956, drawn from the Foreign Relations of the United States volume on the crisis, both of which are designed to provide context and setting for the students. The FSOs are also given one- to three-page “briefing papers” specific to their portfolio, which were drafted by Wieland. The papers are shaped to reflect what U.S. policymakers would likely have known on the morning of November 5, 1956, rather than the subsequent historiography. In this way students are less likely to be influenced by the “correct” historical course of action ultimately adopted by the Eisenhower administration or by details that would have been largely unknown to the Americans at the time—e.g., the secret Anglo-French-Israeli Protocol of Sèvres. Each bureau group is assigned a different briefing paper tailored to focus on the implications of the Anglo-French landings for that group’s portfolio: relations with the Western Alliance, U.S.–Egyptian relations, etc. The students are encouraged to read only their group’s briefing paper in order to limit the amount of information available to them and to push them to shape their policy recommendations according to the relatively narrow emphasis of the group’s portfolio.

During the class session, the students first meet with the other members of their bureau group in order to formulate their recommendations. The majority of the period, however, is devoted to a mock briefing of “Acting Secretary of State Hoover.” After each group has had the opportunity to present its recommendations, Hoover asks the students numerous follow-up questions, often forcing them to justify their positions or to consider factors they may have overlooked. In the majority of cases, the groups have tended to present recommendations mirroring the decisions ultimately taken by the Eisenhower administration: apply pressure (publicly or privately) upon London and Paris to halt their operations, avoid any action that could be interpreted as hypocritical by the international community in light of Washington’s criticism of the Soviets’ concurrent intervention in Hungary, minimize alienation of Gamal Abdel Nasser, etc. The questioning by Hoover, however, has tended to push the students to consider alternatives to these options, thereby emphasizing the idea that the decisions taken were neither foreordained nor immediately
obvious to those making them and forcing the bureau groups to defend their individual portfolios. Wouldn’t censure of Britain and France lead to fractures in the Western Alliance? If Nasser has already accepted weapons from the communist bloc, why should the United States worry about whether he stays in power? What is the Soviet capacity to follow through on its threats to use its military might to bring the British and French to heel? Is the Kremlin’s threat credible? The session wraps up with a brief summation in which Wieland explores the course of action the Eisenhower administration adopted to bring the crisis to a close and examines some of the consequences, both positive and negative, these decisions had for the United States.

This historical role-playing exercise accomplishes a number of objectives. As with the immigration exercise, students are given the opportunity to deal with the type of high-pressure crisis situation they may encounter in the course of their diplomatic careers, when they may be forced to make concrete policy recommendations or decisions without the benefit of unlimited time or information. At the same time, the FSOS are presented with a number of conceptual dilemmas ranging from the political (what do policymakers do when confronted with allies who pursue actions contrary to U.S. foreign policy objectives?) to the practical (what role does institutional rivalry play in shaping foreign policy decisions?) in order to give them the experience of developing courses of action for the United States to take.

These exercises are only a couple of examples of the types of history-based sessions used by Department of State historians in their diplomatic history program for new FSOS. In addition to role-playing, the program also incorporates more traditional lecture-and-discussion sessions. Again, to make them more useful to the student-practitioners, these sessions have tended to be more thematic than strictly chronological. Examples from the course have included sessions on ideological debates in U.S. foreign policymaking during the era of the early republic, the history of the impact of public opinion and the media on U.S. foreign policymaking, the changing role that the use of force has played in the history of U.S. foreign relations, the history of foreign economic relations, and the historical growth of environmental concerns as a factor in international diplomacy. The overall objective of these sessions, and indeed of the diplomatic history program as a whole, is to reinforce a sense of historical consciousness among the new FSOS: to give them a sense that history is relevant to the work they do, that many of the problems they will face as foreign policy practitioners are not entirely new, that their forerunners were sometimes compelled to make difficult decisions, and that these decisions did not always produce unqualified success for U.S. policy.

While these exercises were created specifically for FSOS, they could undoubtedly be implemented in undergraduate and graduate classrooms as well. All students enjoy the feeling of being on the front lines of history that role-playing brings. By giving them the opportunity to play an active role in historical scenarios, we can make history both more relevant and more accessible.

Melissa Jane Taylor and Alexander R. Wieland research and compile volumes in the Foreign Relations of the United States series in the Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State.

Note:
1. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Office of the Historian, the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. government.

In the Next Issue of Passport

William Appleman Williams the Novelist?

Debating Matthew Connelly’s “SHAFR in the World”

A Roundtable on Michaela Hoenicke-Moore’s Know Your Enemy

And much more!
A Cold War Update for a High School Teacher

Ronald Eisenman

Recently, I experienced the best in professional development for high school history teachers. I attended a week-long seminar entitled “U.S. and the Cold War” in Washington D.C., co-sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History. Alongside 24 teachers from across the country, I studied with two of the country’s most eminent scholars, Melvyn P. Leffler of the University of Virginia and Christian Ostermann, director of the Center’s History and Public Policy Program and the Cold War International History Project. Dr. Leffler provided a framework for understanding the Cold War, while other leading scholars and writers such as Michael Dobbs, Thomas Blanton, and Marc Selverstone led discussions on specific questions. These historians gave us an in-depth look at the latest research on the Cold War while preparing us to take what we learned back to our classrooms. Together, we crafted primary-source activities and shared teaching strategies that will make the Cold War real for our students.

For teachers, the opportunity to immerse ourselves in one topic with the world’s leading scholars is invaluable. This seminar’s content was both broad in scope and expansive in detail. Prior to meeting in Washington D.C., we were given homework assignments: reading books, analyzing primary documents, and sharing Cold War lesson plans online with colleagues across the nation whom I would soon meet in person. Upon reading Melvyn Leffler’s For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War, I understood the high quality of the program I was about to attend. In his book, Leffler examines the complex interplay of fear, ideological constructs, national interests, and historical memory that gave the Cold War its animus and enabled it to persist for fifty years despite occasional realizations by policy makers that continuing it defied rationality. The book, as well as Leffler’s lectures, addressed the characters of both Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan that led them finally to end the Cold War peacefully, which was by no means inevitable. In preparation for the seminar, we also read Odd Arne Westad’s The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Time to understand the centrality of the third world to developments of the Cold War. In addition, we read journalist Michael Dobbs’ One Minute to Midnight, which examined the unfolding of the Cuban Missile Crisis from the perspective of all parties involved.

Upon arriving in Washington D.C., I was excited to spend six days around so many knowledgeable and talented people who share my interests. Staying in a hotel only blocks away from the White House, I met my colleagues at a welcome dinner. Among this group of teachers from literally the four corners of the U.S., conversations were intense. The next morning we encountered heavy security as we went to class at the Ronald Reagan Building. It turned out that President Obama and Secretary Clinton were making an unannounced visit that morning to address a trade mission from China.

In his first lecture, Leffler laid out the critical inquiries for the seminar: What is the Cold War? Why did it begin? Why did it escalate? Why did it become global? Why did it end? How did it end peacefully? The questions seemed basic, but the answers were nuanced and complex. Over the next six days, we traced the development of the Cold War using a chronological outline. Along the way, we listened to lectures, analyzed primary documents from the time period, created document activities for our students, gave presentations on successful lesson plans, and watched Errol Morris’ documentary The Fog of War. Many of the ideas developed throughout the class would be the subject of informal discussions with colleagues at the coffee table or at meals.

A recurring theme in the course was the meaning of the containment doctrine and how U.S. policy makers applied it for 50 years. Leffler made the case that containment was not just a principle to stop the expansion of communism but was tied to the objective of defeating communism. According to Leffler, the U.S. was not worried as much about Soviet military activities as communism’s ideological appeal to other countries. He stressed that this was a battle of capitalism and liberal democracy against communism. The only way to lose that battle would be to tolerate continued poor economic conditions in Europe, which could lead to the political success of budding socialist and communist parties in European countries and eventual linkage of those nations with the Soviet Union.

Fearing this scenario, the U.S. pursued three main objectives throughout the Cold War. First, it committed to building up the industrial core of Europe and northeast Asia and keeping countries in those regions allied with the U.S. A revived Germany and Japan would provide capitalism and democracy a decisive advantage against the Soviet Union. The U.S. and its allies would have access to its resources and people. This eventually created a security dilemma for the U.S. since a strengthened Germany and Japan would fuel Soviet fears and lead to more conflict. On the other hand, if Germany and Japan were allowed to whither, communist parties throughout Western Europe and the world would continue to proliferate and weaken U.S. authority in the world.

Second, the U.S. resolved to shore up vulnerabilities in the Third World, since economic success of the West and its allies required access to trade with their regional trading partners. During the seminar, we traced U.S. covert as well as military interventions in key regions around the world which had this objective in mind. At a time when great proliferation of national independence movements
and conflicts were occurring, the prospects for U.S.-Soviet conflicts in those countries increased. In addition, conflicts intensified since the U.S. was not always successful in this arena. Yet, U.S. policymakers frequently argued that such “test case” efforts were necessary because U.S. credibility was at stake and failure to intervene would cause more dominoes to fall.

Third, the U.S. needed to build up its military dramatically even during peacetime. The containment policy required strong deterrence. War would not break out unless by accident or miscalculation, which unfortunately was not out of the realm of possibility. Because of the global nature of U.S. interests, nuclear build-up would be a more economical alternative than a build-up of conventional forces which would be far more costly.

Even though most teachers can remember the Cold War firsthand, it has only been in the past 15 years that Western historians have had access to materials from former Communist bloc countries and China. These resources provide invaluable insight into the dynamics of the Cold War as seen through the eyes of the “other” side.

The new information about the Cold War is startling. As Michael Dobbs, the author of One Minute to Midnight, explained to us, on October 27, 1962, known as “Black Saturday,” the U.S. and Soviet Union were closer to the brink of nuclear war than was realized at the time. Even after both President Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev committed themselves to resolving the conflict peacefully, factors outside their control almost pushed both leaders to nuclear catastrophe. As President Kennedy so colorfully opined, “There’s always some son of a bitch who doesn’t get the message.” Historians now know that had President Kennedy followed the advice of his advisors and launched a preemptive attack on Soviet missiles in Cuba, Soviet nuclear missiles could have reached New York City. Moreover, a sizable number of tactical nuclear weapons, each one the equivalent of the bombs used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would have been shot at the U.S. base in Guantanamo Bay and at any invading U.S. forces.

The new documents also provide insight into the depth of the Soviet-Sino split and the beginnings of détente. By the early 1960s, relations between the Soviet Union and China were tense due to divergent national interests and personality conflicts between their leaders, Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedung. As early as 1963, the CIA understood not only that the communist world was not monolithic under the control of the Soviet Union, but also that China would seek to expand its influence in underdeveloped areas at Soviet expense. Kennedy responded by trying to compete with the Soviet Union rather than accommodate it. It was not until Nixon’s presidency in the late 1960s that U.S. policymakers recognized the Sino-Soviet split created opportunities to lessen Cold War tensions. The Sino-Soviet split eventually resulted in a series of border clashes between the two communist neighbors. The depth of the split became apparent when Soviet officials approached the U.S. to gauge its reaction if the Soviets were to launch a preemptive attack on Chinese nuclear sites.

The Sino-Soviet split eventually proved partially responsible for providing the conditions for the U.S.-China rapprochement and for the beginning of détente with the Soviet Union. Leffler skillfully made the case that policy makers accomplished détente because they recognized the openings for it despite the existence of significant obstacles. The Vietnam War was a major drain on U.S. resources and its reputation around the world. The U.S. was experiencing a decline in its relative power around the world. Yet, it was able to bolster its power because of the Sino-Soviet split. Nixon and other U.S. policymakers also recognized that the ideological appeal of communism in the Third World was declining. The Soviet economic model was beginning to slow down, while free markets were showing success in Asia. It was under these conditions that the U.S. sought to decrease tensions with the Soviet Union, which eventually led to agreements to reduce nuclear arms and bolster economic ties between the nations. Nixon believed that the Soviets would be motivated to work with the U.S. because of their economic difficulties. At the same time, the benefits to the U.S. would be significant. The risk of nuclear war would be lowered, the Soviets would be induced to cease their expansion into the Third World, and the Vietnam War would finally end, thus ending the source of the U.S. power drain.

Inspired by the seminar, I have recently examined the documents on the Korean War that are available online in the virtual archive of the Cold War International History Project. The documents portray North Korean leader Kim Il Sung as the prime instigator of the Korean War. Leffler made the case that Kim sought to attack the South for indigenous Korean reasons related to its history and colonial past. It was not part of an international communist plot to take over the world. Kim Il Sung initially sought permission to attack South Korea on September 3, 1949. The Soviets at that time counseled patience despite Kim’s assurances that an invasion would be over within two to three months. The Soviets reasoned that a protracted conflict in Korea could be used by the U.S. to threaten Soviet interests and may provoke the U.S. to “interfere in Korean affairs.” Even China opposed the idea of an attack because it was involved in its own military activities. Over the next nine months, Kim proved persistent and eventually acquired necessary war supplies and the green light for the invasion from Stalin. Kim also met with Chinese officials. A month before the outbreak of the war, Mao informed the North Korean ambassador that North Korea should not worry about a possible U.S. intervention in the event of war since the U.S. would not concern itself with such a small territory. This would prove to be a major miscalculation.

The communications among North Korea, China, and the Soviet Union during this time period are fascinating. Prior to the outbreak of war in June 1950, North Korea initially sought approval and military supplies primarily from the Soviet Union. As war approached, the North Koreans began to work more closely with the Chinese, while assuring the Soviets that they had provided all the weapons the North Koreans needed. Once war broke out, the Soviets agreed to the placement of nine Chinese volunteer divisions on the border in case U.S. forces crossed the 38th parallel. While providing military assistance to the North Koreans, the Soviets also encouraged the Chinese to become more involved, especially when it became apparent that the North Koreans would not achieve a quick victory. After the U.S. landing at Incheon, Kim II Sung, knowing that his military position was in jeopardy, requested direct Soviet military assistance if attacked. Instead, the Soviets requested that Chinese volunteers be sent without prior notice to North Korea. At first, China resisted this proposal, partially out of fear of a widened conflict involving the U.S., China, and Soviet Union. After a series of communications between the three communist countries, Mao eventually agreed to send the divisions. Historians have recently learned that this step
took great personal courage for Mao since he was in the minority among Chinese leaders in supporting it. Once the Soviets persuaded the Chinese to join this war, they backed away from daily operations by telling the North Koreans to make concrete strategic arrangements with the Chinese. This policy enabled China to distance itself from any failures while avoiding a direct confrontation with the U.S.

The documents also reveal that once the Korean War was initiated, Cold War interests took over and prolonged it. Correspondence between Stalin and Mao show that they were motivated to delay the armistice talks so that the Chinese military could gain valuable combat experience and damage the prestige of Truman and the American military. It is clear that although the Soviet Union was not a party to the war or the peace talks, it played a major role behind the scenes. Moscow supplied the weapons, assisted in the strategic formulations, and dictated the pace and direction of the armistice talks.

Perhaps most significantly, this seminar showed me and my fellow teachers that examination of new primary sources offers us, as historians, a richer and more complex understanding of the fears and motivations behind Soviet decision-making. One of the great lessons of the Cold War, according to Leffler, is the need to empathize with your opponent so that you can understand his actions. Fear may lead one nation to miss the signals for peace despite its being in the interest of both parties. Obviously, understanding may not lead to agreement, but understanding does lead to better decision-making. One of the tragedies of the Cold War was its enormous social and economic costs. During the decades-long conflict, overwhelming fear on both sides caused each side to misinterpret one another’s actions and miss opportunities to de-escalate the conflict.

The U.S. and the Cold War seminar was an ideal professional development opportunity for teachers. It was a great opportunity to recharge our intellectual batteries and learn from the nation’s best scholars. I look forward to sharing my new knowledge and enthusiasm for the subject with my students. One of my goals is to use many of the primary source document activities that were created this summer in my classroom. My students will utilize the Cold War International History Project’s website, http://www.cwihp.org, for original research. This remarkable archive contains the most recently released documents from all sides of the Cold War.

The seminar also let me and the other teachers share techniques and ideas that will enrich my classroom. Equally important, we laid the foundation for future collaboration. And I am excited to share all that I have learned with my colleagues at Rutland High School and other Vermont educators. For more information on this and other seminars, please visit the Gilder-Lehrman website: http://www.gilderlehrman.org/.

Ronald Eisenman teaches U.S. History and Anthropology at Rutland High School in Vermont. He is also a member of the board of Vermont Alliance for Social Studies.

SHAFR Needs Faculty Teaching Partners

SHAFR is currently working with secondary teachers to create lesson plans for a series of topics in the history of American foreign relations. The project leaders hope to develop a list of SHAFR members who would be willing to serve as Faculty Partners on the project. Your role as a Faculty Partner would be to be available via email to a secondary teacher who is completing one of the lesson plans. Our hope is that having this partnership will encourage more teachers to write lesson plans for the project.

For example, if you were to volunteer to be a Faculty Partner for early American diplomacy, a teacher might send you a note about a couple of primary sources for the Louisiana Purchase and ask your thoughts about using them in the classroom. The Project will match SHAFR Faculty Partners with the teachers writing the lesson plans only when there are specific questions that need SHAFR expertise.

Please consider participating in this effort, which will be a valuable service to our teachers.

If you are interested, simply send a note to John Tully, SHAFR Director of Secondary Education, at tullyj@ccsu.edu. indicating which areas and/or lesson plans you would be willing to be available for should questions arise.

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An Introduction to the Department of State Central Foreign Policy File, 1973-1976

David A. Langbart

The first of the Department of State's central files available online can now be accessed on the National Archives website through the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) portal at http://aad.archives.gov/aad/ under the heading 'Diplomatic Records.' These records, covering the period from 1973 through 1976, are the first fruit of changes made to the central files during the 1970s. Their new form and format present challenges for the researcher. In some ways they make research easier; since many documents can be accessed remotely, but significant contextual documentation for the online records exists only in hardcopy at the National Archives. Navigating the records may be initially confusing, and fully exploiting them requires an understanding of their content and organization. Still, they present new opportunities for research.

The online records are part of the department's Central Foreign Policy File (CFPF), which underwent radical changes between 1973 and 1975. The department replaced the familiar paper files with a hybrid recordkeeping system consisting of electronic and microfilm records. In doing so, the department became the first agency to preserve a large volume of electronic textual records. To assist researchers, this essay will explain the changes and provide information about the content, structure, and use of the records. Disbursement, storage of records, the department began to phase out its paper-based holdings in 1973 and created a new central recordkeeping system, then called the Automated Data System (ADS).

ADS consisted of an electronic index, computer-output microfilm of many telegrams, manually created microfilm of hardcopy documents, and paper files of oversized documents. The department indexed the records in a database that initially constituted the main "automated" portion of the recordkeeping system. For the manually created microfilm, staff keyed data elements such as date, subjects, and document number into the database along with reel and frame numbers to create an index of the microfilmed documents. The same types of information were captured automatically and manually verified for the computer-output microfilm. To locate records, users queried the system to create a virtual subject file of document citations and then retrieved the relevant documents. During the 1990s, data from the database on all records was merged with the preserved electronic telegrams into the State Archiving System (SAS), and it is that data that is being transferred to the National Archives.

The preservation of telegrams in the new system began in July 1973. While initially computer-output microfilm served as the preservation medium for the telegrams, many were saved in electronic form as well. Within a few years the electronic versions of the telegrams became part of the formal recordkeeping system. The microfilmed version of the telegrams is preserved in hardcopy on the D-Reel ('D' for digital) microfilm. The electronic and microfilmed telegrams overlap significantly; declassification efforts have focused on the electronic versions. Some telegrams were not preserved electronically or on the D-Reel microfilm. They might be found among the hardcopy records described next. Telegrams with the special handling caption "NODIS" ('No Distribution') appear among the electronic records and are preserved on a separate set of microfilm.

In January 1974, the department began microfilming paper documents (airgrams, memoranda, reports, correspondence, diplomatic notes, aides mémoire, etc.), destroying the originals afterwards. This microfilm is referred to as the P-Reel ('P' for paper) microfilm. (Documents created on paper dating through December 1973 are found in the legacy paper-based filing system.) Hardcopy documents too large for filming, usually enclosures to incoming airgrams, were separately preserved in their original format.

Filing System

To categorize records for use in automated retrieval, the department developed the TAGS/Terms System, which is still in use. TAGS stands for Traffic Analysis by Geography and Subject. There are Geo-political and Subject TAGS. The department requires that each document be labeled with appropriate TAGS, including at least one Subject TAGS. Supplementing the TAGS, indexers use specific words or phrases ('Terms') to assist in refining document searches. Subject and Subject TAGS are arranged in nine subject fields ('Administration,' 'Business Services,' 'Consular Affairs,' 'Economic Affairs,' 'Military and Defense Affairs,' 'Operations,' 'Political Affairs,' 'Social Affairs,' and 'Technology and Science'). These are further divided into specific subject categories, each designated by four-letter abbreviations. For example, the subject category "EFIN" indicates "Financial and Monetary Affairs," which is part of the subject field "Economic Affairs," and the subject category "PHUM" indicates "Human Rights," which is part of the subject field "Political Affairs." The Geo-political TAGS are two-letter codes representing regions and countries. For example, 'XA'
stands for Africa and “XM” for Latin America. Each country also has its own code: "KE" for Kenya, for example, and "CL" for Chile. Region and country codes are used separately.

To deal with the myriad of organizations, the department established a list of titles or acronyms approved for use in indexing documents. Many are commonly-used acronyms ("AFL-CIO" for the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations), but the department also created artificial designators to distinguish between organizations with the same initials: "IWC-1" (International Whaling Commission) and "IWC-2" (International Wheat Council).

The TAGS/Terms System is not static. The department adds, deletes, and revises TAGS and Terms as necessary. For example, from 1974 to 1985 human rights was considered a social issue and its Subject TAGS was "SHUM." In 1985, the issue was redefined as a political issue and the Subject TAGS was changed to "PHUM." Recently, the department established the Subject TAGS "EINT" to cover records on "Economic and Commercial Internet." The TAGS handbooks issued periodically by the department contain a description of all the TAGS and explain the TAGS/Terms system. The handbooks for the period of the accessioned records are part of the online finding aids to the digital records in AAD.

Appraisal of Records

The telegraphic communications exchanged by the department and Foreign Service Posts include a significant volume of documents that do not warrant preservation in the National Archives. To eliminate those telegrams, NARA, working with the department, carried out an archival appraisal of the telegrams using the Subject TAGS to determine the value of the records and segregate the permanent from the temporary. The resulting schedule designates as permanent all telegrams labeled with Subject TAGS from the subject fields "Economic Affairs," "Military and Defense Affairs," "Political Affairs," "Social Affairs," and "Technology and Science," as well as telegrams labeled with selected Subject TAGS from the "Administration," "Business Services," "Consular Affairs," and "Operations" subject fields. In addition, all records on the P-Reel microfilm and the N-Reel microfilm are designated as permanent, as are all Oversize Enclosures and all Top Secret Telegrams. Appendix I lists the permanent Subject TAGS for the 1973-1976 period.

The appraisal designates as temporary those Subject TAGS in the "Administration," "Business Services," "Consular Affairs," and "Operations" subject fields that do not warrant retention. Telegrams bearing only temporary Subject TAGS are approved for destruction, do not appear among the records on AAD, and are not represented by withdrawal cards. The retention of an individual document is determined by the Subject TAGS with the longest retention. A telegram with every one permanent Subject TAGS is retained. Appendix II lists the temporary Subject TAGS for the 1973-1976 period.

The Records

To facilitate transfer to the National Archives, the records constituting the CFPF since 1973 are split into the following sub-series:

1. Electronic telegrams designated as permanent
2. D-Reel Microfilm
3. Electronic Index to the P-Reel Microfilm
4. P-Reel Microfilm (beginning 1974)
5. N-Reel Microfilm (beginning 1975)
6. Oversize Enclosures
7. Top Secret telegrams

Each sub-series is described below. As of May 2010, the National Archives has accessioned the records through 1976. Periodically, the department will transfer an annual increment of the records, and the declassified electronic records will be posted online.

Telegrams ("cables"), the primary means of communication between the Department and Foreign Service Posts, were transmitted electronically, and varied in length from a sentence or two to elaborate reports. The typical declassified telegram online in AAD consists of two parts: the Message Text, consisting of the telegram as originally transmitted (see figure 1) and the Message Attributes, consisting of metadata about the message (see figure 2). The attributes consist of 67 fields including "draft date," "document number," "film number," "from," "original classification," "subject," "TAGS," and "to." Telegrams that are withdrawn are represented by withdrawal notices, consisting of a Message Attributes page with a limited amount of information including "draft date," "document number," "from," "to," "subject," "TAGS," concepts ("Terms"), and "film number" (see figure 3). Some permanent telegrams from the 1973-75 period were initially not available in AAD. The full complement of declassified permanent telegrams did not become available online until September 2010.

As telegrams accumulated, the department periodically created computer-output microfilm, the D-Reels, of those messages. These telegrams are arranged in the order in which they were sent and received, not by subject or point of origin. Documents of interest on the film can be located only by using the automated index. The microfilm is preserved by the National Archives as a backup to the electronic records. It is not systematically reviewed for declassification and is not available for research.

The department was a pioneer in the use of a database system to preserve large complicated text files. As the department migrated the electronic data to new hardware and software platforms, some data loss occurred, despite efforts to protect and recover each telegram. Typically, the damage resulted in telegrams containing a phrase such as "ERROR READING TEXT," "EXPAND ERROR ENCOUNTERED," or "TELEGRAM TEXT FOR THIS MRN IS UNAVAILABLE" instead of the content of the telegram in the Message Text field (see figure 4). In some cases, the telegram may contain nothing in the text field. In those telegrams without text, the "locator" field may contain a phrase such as "ADS TEXT NOT CONVERTED" or "ADS TEXT UNRETRIEVABLE" and may indicate if the text was captured on microfilm (see figure 5). The number of lost messages appears to be relatively small, except as follows:

1. Most message texts from December 1-15, 1975
2. Most message texts from March 18-31, 1976
3. Many message texts from April 1-2, 1976
4. Most message texts from May 25-31, 1976
5. About 92% of the message texts from June 1976
6. Most message texts from July 1, 1976

Some lost message texts may appear on the D-Reel microfilm or on the P-Reel microfilm (described next). If the Message Attributes portion of a telegram, as found in AAD, has a number in the "film number" field, the telegram text should be included on the specified microfilm (see figure 6). If the film number begins with D73, D74, D75, D76, N73, N76, P74, P75, or P76, contact NARA's
Archives II reference unit for further information. To request access to documents with film numbers beginning with D77, N77, or P77 or higher, researchers must submit a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the Department of State. Be sure to specify the film number when contacting either agency.

To preserve non-telegraphic documents such as airgrams, memoranda, reports, correspondence, and diplomatic notes in the new system, the department microfilmed and then destroyed the original documents. Documents on the P-Reel microfilm are arranged in the order in which they were received and filmed by the records management office, not by subject or point of origin.

Records on the P-Reel microfilm are indexed in the electronic P-Reel indexes. Documents of interest can be located only by using that index, which provides citations to the microfilm records. Citations to telegrams that are on the P-Reels and the N-Reels are not in the P-Reel index, but they are in the telegram file. Declassified P-Reel index citations consist of a Message Attributes page which includes metadata about the related document (see figure 7). The attributes consist of the same 67 fields found in the telegram attributes. Index citations that are withdrawn are represented by withdrawal notices that consist of a Message Attributes page with a limited amount of information including "draft date," "document number," "from," "to," "TAGS," and "film number" (see figure 8). The citation found in the film number field indicates the film location of the particular document of interest. The P-Reel citation number consists of three parts: prefix, roll number, frame number. A citation that reads "P750010-502" indicates that the document was microfilmed (not necessarily written) in 1975 (P75), is on roll 10 from that year (0010) and begins at frame 502 (-502). Because different offices retained documents for varying lengths of time, the P-Reels frequently contain documents dated earlier than the year of filming. For example, P76 reels consist primarily of documents created in 1976 but may also include documents created in preceding years. Documents are transferred to NARA and declassified based on the year of filming, so documents from 1974-1976 may appear on microfilm that has not yet been transferred. The documents to which P-Reel index citations refer are not available online.

Telegrams bearing the special handling caption NODIS ("No Distribution") may be found in two places: preserved electronically as part of the main electronic telegram file and more completely on the N-Reel ("N" for NODIS) microfilm beginning in 1975.

The Oversize Enclosures generally consist of large reports and publications sent to the Department by Foreign Service posts under cover of an airgram. While filed separately, the oversize records are indexed in the P-Reel indexes.

During migration of the records from an earlier platform to the current recordkeeping system, telegrams classified at the Top Secret level were printed out for preservation purposes and the electronic versions were deleted. Those records now exist only in hardcopy form.

Declassification

Before researchers can use them, the records undergo review to identify security classified and otherwise restricted information. Documents and citations including such information are withdrawn and replaced by withdrawal notices that serve as placeholders. The withdrawal notices for the electronic records are found in separate sub-series of records while those for paper files are interfiled with the records. To accommodate the withdrawal cards, the electronic records presently in NARA consist of the following subseries:

1. Electronic Telegrams, 1973
2. Electronic Telegrams Withdrawal Cards, 1973
3. Electronic Telegrams, 1974
4. Electronic Telegrams Withdrawal Cards, 1974
5. P-Reel Index, 1974
6. P-Reel Index Withdrawal Cards, 1974
7. Electronic Telegrams, 1975
8. Electronic Telegrams Withdrawal Cards, 1975
9. P-Reel Index, 1975
10. P-Reel Index Withdrawal Cards, 1975
11. Electronic Telegrams, 1976
12. Electronic Telegrams Withdrawal Cards, 1976
13. P-Reel Index, 1976
14. P-Reel Index Withdrawal Cards, 1976

P-Reel index entries and withdrawal cards refer to the index citations only and not necessarily to the document on microfilm to which a citation refers. The documents themselves may or may not be declassified and released.

To facilitate declassification and researcher use of the documents found on the P-Reel and N-Reel microfilm, the department created non-record paper reference copies. Classified or otherwise restricted documents have been removed from the files and replaced with withdrawal notices. Researchers will use the declassified paper copies; the microfilm is being retained as the archival record. This may seem an odd way of handling the preservation and declassification of the records; the system is the result of changes in the handling of the declassification and release of records since 1973.

P-Reel printouts from 1974-1976 and Oversize Enclosures from 1974-1975 are declassified and open for use. "P76" documents require screening for otherwise restricted information before release to researchers; screening will take place as researchers request the records. Declassification processing of the N-Reel microfilm printouts, the Top Secret telegrams, and the 1976 Oversize Enclosures is not complete; as of May 2010, the records are not open to researchers. P-Reels and N-Reels with prefixes of P77 and higher remain in the custody of the department.

For more information on availability of P-Reel documents, the N-Reels, the Oversize Enclosures, and the Top Secret telegrams, contact the Archives II reference section. To request access to P-Reel and N-Reels documents with prefixes of P77 and higher, researchers must submit an FOIA request to the Department of State. All requests should include the microfilm roll and frame numbers of specific documents.

Using the Records

While the online availability of the declassified electronic records makes them easy to use and enables scholars to begin researching and identifying documents of interest before visiting the National Archives, they still need to use the other records in the CFPF. The microfilm and paper records include documentation important in its own right. The electronic records can be searched in numerous ways. Researchers can establish their own search parameters using any combination of the fields in the Message Attributes portion of each telegram or P-Reel index entry. For example, researchers can use the standard Subject, Country, and Organization TAGS and query the system using the "TAGS" field. Another approach would be to use the "Draft Date," "From," and "To"...
fields to locate citations to hardcopy documents and all telegrams sent to and from a given post for a given period. Using the "Document Number" field, researchers can locate specific documents such as telegrams or airgrams referenced in reports and memoranda. Other searches can be conducted using the "Subject" line.

In addition, for those documents available online, the entire text of the electronic telegrams can be searched for key words, phrases, or names. Full text search capability does not apply to the hardcopy records on the P-Reel microfilm, the N-Reel microfilm, the Top Secret telegrams, and the Oversize Enclosures.

In order to locate all documents of interest, users must search each of the electronic files separately. AAD allows the search of only one of the files in the series at a time.

Initial AAD search results appear on the "Display Partial Records" page (see figure 9). Designated search fields will display with the data that is stored in them in the raw data record as will other field(s) with the term(s) or phrase(s) used in free-text search. The Message Text field is a default search field for the telegram files and always appears unless removed from the search page. Only a part of the text will appear. To view the entire text, and all the Message Attributes for a listed item, click on the icon in the "View Record" column in the appropriate row. The full record is in a PDF format, so users will need Adobe Acrobat Reader in order to view the document.

Researchers cannot download the full set of retrieved records. They can download or print each record separately. Copies of released files are also available on removable media on a cost-recovery basis. For information, please contact the Electronic and Special Media Services Division (NWME) reference staff.

It is important to remember that only some records from the central foreign policy file for the 1973-1976 period are available through AAD. The following records are not accessible online but will be available for use at the National Archives when declassified and released to the public:

1. Reference copies of the documents referred to in the P-Reel indexes
2. Oversize ("Bulky") Enclosures
3. Declassified Top Secret telegrams
4. Reference copies of NODIS telegrams printed from the N-Reel microfilm
5. Telegrams and P-Reel index entries that contain security classified information or are otherwise restricted from public use.

Citing the Records

Proper citation of the records is critical. The NARA publication Citing Records in the National Archives of the United States (General Information Leaflet Number 17) provides general information on the citing of records. NARA recommends that records retrieved via online research using the AAD cite the series title "Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973-1976" and the record group title "Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State" with a note in brackets containing the date on which the records were retrieved from AAD. Individual telegrams reviewed online should be cited by their Document Numbers as found in the Message Attributes as well as other pertinent information such as the date. For example, "1974BONN00753" indicates the 753rd telegram received from the U.S. embassy in Bonn in 1974, while a telegram with the citation "1975STATE095768" is the 95768th telegram sent from the Department of State in 1975. Using this number, researchers will be able to retrieve all available sections of multi-section telegrams and all available versions of retransmitted telegrams. Documents from the microfilm (P-Reel and N-Reel printouts and telegrams retrieved from the D-Reels) should include the Document Number and other identifying information such as from, to, and type of document (letter, memorandum, report) and the Film Number. The Film Number indicates the type of microfilm, the year it was produced, the roll number, and the frame number of the first page of the document (e.g., P740001-1234). Citations for the paper Oversize Enclosures and Top Secret telegrams should indicate the sub-series of records and a combination of from, to, type of document, and document number.

Requesting Classified and Otherwise Restricted Records

To request access to records that are withdrawn from the files, researchers must file a FOIA request. Requests for withdrawn records should be directed to NARA's Special Access and FOIA Staff. For more information about submitting a FOIA request, see the NARA FOIA Reference Guide at http://www.archives.gov/foia/foia-guide.html. Be sure to include the document number, document date, and the "to" and "from" citation for each document in your request.

For More Information

More information is available from the National Archives. General questions should be addressed to the Archives II reference section (NWCT2R) at The National Archives at College Park, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, MD 20740-6001, by telephone at 301-837-3510 or by email at archives2reference@nara.gov. Technical questions about the electronic records should be addressed to the Reference Services Staff, Electronic and Special Media Records Services Division, via email to cer@nara.gov, or by telephone at 301-837-0470.

David A. Langbart is an archivist in the Textual Archives Services Division at the National Archives and Records Administration.

Note:

1. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author. The author appreciates the assistance of Anne L. Foster and Steven D. Tilley.
## Appendix I: Permanent Subject TAGS, 1973-1976

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TAGS</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administration</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>ACLM</td>
<td>Claims Against the U.S. Government</td>
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<td>Committees</td>
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<tr>
<td>AEMR</td>
<td>Emergency Planning and Evacuation</td>
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<td>AGAO</td>
<td>General Accounting Office</td>
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<td>AINF</td>
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<td>AINR</td>
<td>INR Program Administration</td>
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<td>ALTR</td>
<td>Newsletter</td>
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<td>AMGT</td>
<td>Management Operations</td>
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<td>AODE</td>
<td>Employees Abroad</td>
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<td>AORG</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<td>ASEC</td>
<td>Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASIG</td>
<td>Inspector General Activities</td>
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<td>Agribusiness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BBAK</td>
<td>Background on Firms, Products, and Individuals</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Engineering and Construction Services</td>
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<td>BEXP</td>
<td>Trade Expansion and Promotion</td>
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<tr>
<td>BPRO</td>
<td>Business Proposals and Inquiries</td>
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<td>BTIO</td>
<td>Trade and Investment</td>
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<td>Travel by U.S. and Foreign Businessmen</td>
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<td>Deaths and Estates</td>
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<td>E***</td>
<td>All Subject TAGS in the “E” field are permanent. See the online handbooks for details.</td>
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<td>Military Vessel and Flight Clearance and Visits</td>
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<td>OCON</td>
<td>Conferences and Meetings</td>
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<td>OGEN</td>
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<td>U.S. Congressional Travel</td>
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<td>OVIP</td>
<td>Visits and Travel of Prominent Individuals and Leaders</td>
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<td>T***</td>
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Appendix II: Temporary Subject TAGS, 1973-1976

Records on matters covered by the Subject TAGS designated as temporary may be preserved among the department’s decentralized files that are designated as permanent.

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<thead>
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<td>ABLD</td>
<td>Buildings</td>
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<td>Budget Services and Financial Systems</td>
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<td>Departmental Communications</td>
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<td>Financial Services</td>
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<td>AFSP</td>
<td>Post Administration</td>
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<td>Library Services</td>
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<td>Personnel</td>
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<td>Commissary and Recreation</td>
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<td>AREG</td>
<td>Regulations and Directives</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Overseas Schools</td>
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<td>Transportation</td>
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<td>AWRD</td>
<td>Awards</td>
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<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<th></th>
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<td><strong>Administration</strong></td>
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Passport January 2011
Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 91  SANJO 04526 201138Z

43

ACTION SS-23

INFO: OCT-01 ISO-06 SJS-40 R26W

102449

O 201818Z SEP 76
FM ANAMBASSY SAN JOSE
TO SECBASE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5110

SECRET SANJOSE 4526

EXDIS

FOR ARA-LUERS FROM SIHLAUDEMAN

E.O. 11652 XGDS-2
TAGS: PINR, PINS, PINT, AR, CL, UV
SUBJECT: OPERATION CONDOR

REF: STATE 231654

UNLESS THERE IS SOME COMPLICATION I AM UNAWARE OF, THERE
WOULD SEEM TO BE NO REASON TO WAIT MY RETURN. YOU CAN SIMPLY
INSTRUCT THE AMBASSADORS TO TAKE NO FURTHER ACTION.
NOTING THAT THERE HAVE BEEN NO REPORTS IN SOME WEEKS
INDICATING AN INTENTION TO ACTIVATE THE CONDOR SCHEME. TODMAN

SECRET

NNN

Figure 1: Declassified Telegram - Message Text
Figure 2: Declassified Telegram – Message Attributes
Illustration 5

Message Attributes

Automatic Declassification: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MEETING AGENDA, TEXT
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 20 JAN 1975
Declassification Date: 01 JAN 1960
Declassification Note:
Disposition: Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date: n/a
Disposition Author: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: n/a
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1875NATOB00245
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 90
Drifter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: CORE5
Film Number: D75021-0189
From: NATO BRUSSELS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
1Secure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975hwextt19750137/azaatbogk.tel
Line Count: 4
Locator: TEXT ON MICROFILM, ADS TEXT UNRETRIEVABLE
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 1
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 75 USNATO 7/05
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: MorefiRH
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 16 SEP 2003
Review Event:
Review Exceptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <16 Sep 2003 by MorefiRH>; APPROVED <17 Sep 2003 by MorefiRH>
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Graefeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifiers:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: N/A
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: NATO SCIENCE: SCIENCE COMMITTEE MEETING AT NATO, FEBRUARY 5-7, 1975
Tags: TGEN, NATO
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Graefeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Figure 5: Message Attributes for a Telegram without text indicating that the message is on film
Figure 6: Message Attributes for a Telegram without text showing the film reference number
Illustration 7

Message Attributes

Margaret P. Graefed Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006

Figure 7: Declassified P-Reel Index Citation – Message Attributes
Illustration 8

Message Attributes

Figure 8: Classified P-Reel Index Citation – Message Attributes
### Illustration 9

**Display Partial Records**

File unit: **Electronic Telegrams, 1/1/1975 - 12/31/1975**

In the Series: Central Foreign Policy Files, created 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1976, documenting the period 7/1/1973 - 12/31/1974.

You searched for: Draft Date = 04/15/1975

You found 832 partial records out of 2,310,427 total records in this file.

*If your search or query has returned more than 1,000 partial records the sort option cannot be used. If the width of any column displayed in the partial records is greater than 80 characters, there is no option to sort the partial records by the column.*

To view the cables you will need **Adobe Acrobat Reader**. Once you have the Reader, you can view any of the cables.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>View Record</th>
<th>Draft Date</th>
<th>Document Number</th>
<th>Film Number</th>
<th>From</th>
<th>Subject</th>
<th>TAGS</th>
<th>To</th>
<th>Message Text</th>
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<td>D750131-0016</td>
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<td>D750131-0787</td>
<td>STATE</td>
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<td>COMERFACIS</td>
<td>GAAP</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 9: Display Partial Records Screen**
SHAFR Council Minutes
Thursday, June 25, 2010
8:30 am -12:45 pm
The Pyle Center Room 313
University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI

Present: Frank Costigliola, Jeffrey Engel, Catherine Forslund, Peter Hahn, Richard Immerman, Mitch Lerner, Erin Mahan, Bill McAlister, Ken Ogood, Andrew Preston, Jaideep Prabhud, Andrew Rotter (presiding), Chapin Rydingsward, Bob Schulzinger, Thomas Schwartz, Naoko Shibusawa, Annessa Stagner, John Tully, Jennifer Walton, and Marilyn Young

Business Items

(1) Announcements

Rotter called the meeting to order at 8:30 am and thanked everyone for attending. Rotter informed Council that, along with Elaine Tyler May, president of the OAH, he had recently contacted David Ferriero, Archivist of the United States, about SHAFR’s concern with the increasingly slow rate of declassification at NARA. Ferriero informed Rotter that a committee had been formed and a special forum organized with the aim of addressing such concerns. It was noted that Anna Nelson was in attendance at the forum, held on June 24 in Washington DC, and plans to submit a report to Rotter.

Discussion ensued on the current status of SHAFR’s Committee on Historical Documentation (Chester Pach, David Herschler, and Fred Logevall). Immerman suggested that Council consider appointing Susan Weetman, recently appointed general editor of FRUS, to the Committee with the aim of encouraging a cooperative relationship between SHAFR and the Office of the Historian. It was noted that Weetman is not a historian and that the HAC was not consulted in her appointment. Mahan noted that Edward Keefer would be an excellent addition to the Committee. After further discussion, Council approved a motion to expand the Committee and to clarify and update its mandate in light of recent events. Lerner recommended, and Council supported, asking the Committee to prepare a progress report for discussion at the next Council meeting.

Young informed Council that mild concern had arisen regarding the large number of announcements scheduled for the Saturday luncheon. After a brief discussion, Council advised issuing expressions of gratitude and the memorial moment at the Friday luncheon. The presentation of awards and prizes will remain at the Saturday luncheon.

(2) Report on motions passed by e-mail since last meeting

Hahn reported that since its last meeting, Council had passed by e-mail a motion tentatively to approve the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on Electoral Reform.

(3) Election reforms

Rotter asked Council to discuss the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee on Electoral Reform revised and tentatively approved at the January Council meeting and, subsequently, by e-mail. During discussion, Stagner suggested that for the sake of clarity, Council revise the language in recommendation #5 stating that “the desiderata . . . include requirements such as requiring that a graduate student member of the Council hold ABD status for at least one year prior to his/her expected graduation.” It was noted that this suggestion was intended to prevent instances in which a member of Council (elected on the graduate student slate) earns her/his PhD either prior to or during the term in question. Young and Ogood expressed the opinion that recently minted PhD’s would retain the ability to represent the interests of the graduate student wing of the SHAFR body. After further discussion, Council approved a friendly amendment to the recommendations on electoral reform, stating: “a graduate student member of the Council must have one year remaining in his/her graduate program.” Recommendation # 5 will need to be revised accordingly.

The discussion shifted to the issue of reconsidering the decision made in January to expand Council membership by one with the additional slot reserved for an international candidate. Lerner restated his opposition to this policy. It was noted that SHAFR’s non-U.S. members constitute approximately 20% of the Society and thus an additional seat designated as international would grant this group a level of representation (33%) disproportionate to its actual size. It was also expressed that the creation of an international seat would reduce the rate of access currently allotted to non-national groupings and would restrict the formulation of election pairings by the NC, while possibly stigmatizing prospective international candidates and/or the SHAFR electorate. Schwartz was persuaded by these concerns and suggested that Council – as an alternative to creating an international seat – devise a mandate to encourage the NC to consider international candidates as well as candidates from teaching institutions. Young expressed support for the suggested alternative and advised Council against assigning the NC with an overly restrictive mandate. In support of Council’s original decision, Immerman noted that the proposed international seat was not intended to empower an underrepresented interest group but to advance SHAFR’s desire to internationalize its organizational structure as well as the scholarly output and consciousness of the SHAFR body. While there was wide support for SHAFR’s commitment to internationalize, opposition was expressed concerning the formalization of this commitment via the creation of an international Council seat. After further discussion concerning potential alternatives to the proposed international seat as well as the proper relationship between SHAFR officers and the SHAFR Nominating Committee, Council passed three amendments altering the electoral reform recommendations.

As a result, recommendations #4, #10, and #16 will now read:

4) In each case the calls for nominations/self-nominations and solicitations shall be juxtaposed with desiderata developed by the NC. These desiderata can include record of publication and teaching, history of active service to SHAFR, commitment to SHAFR’s mission, etc. In particular, Council draws the NC’s attention to the importance of ensuring representation from international members, members at teaching institutions, etc.

10) The number of elected members of the Council shall expand by one with the goal of ensuring wide representation of the SHAFR membership.
16) SHAFR officers should not sit in on NC meetings. They may nominate but should make no further contact with Nominating Committee.

Hahn directed Council’s attention to Section 5(i) of the proposed bylaw revisions. He asked Council to address whether the paragraph in question was redundant. A consensus emerged in favor of retaining Section 5(i) as currently drafted. Council discussed briefly the merits of outsourcing future administration of SHAFR elections and Young indicated her desire to revisit this issue at the next Council meeting in January. Costigliola introduced a motion authorizing Hahn to prepare a draft of the revised bylaws and to eliminate language therein inconsistent with the above amendments. The motion passed unanimously. Hahn explained that the bylaws revisions will be submitted to the SHAFR electorate in 2010. If ratified, the revisions will take effect during the 2011 election cycle.

(4) Publication contract issues

a) 2009 report from publisher

Hahn distributed copies of Wiley-Blackwell’s publisher’s report for 2009 and provided Council a thorough briefing on the report.

b) Wiley Society Discount Partner Program

Hahn informed Council that SHAFR has the opportunity to participate in the Wiley-Blackwell Society Partner Discount Program – a free service that would provide SHAFR Members with a 25% discount on Wiley-Blackwell books. Hahn stated that the only apparent drawback of the Discount Program was that members availing themselves to it would be subject to future email solicitation from Wiley-Blackwell. During discussion, a consensus emerged favoring SHAFR’s participation in the Discount Program. Council authorized Hahn to take the necessary steps toward this end.

c) Appointment of new Contract Committee

Rotter reported that Randall Woods had agreed to chair the new Contract Committee. Rotter also appointed to the committee Richard Immerman, Marilyn Young, Mitch Lerner, Frank Costigliola, Tom Zeiler, Jeff Engel, and Bob Schulzinger.

(5) AHA Prize Stipulations

Rotter asked Council to discuss an issue recently brought to his attention concerning the current award stipulations of the AHA-administered Louis Beer Prize as well as two additional AHA prizes pertaining to European history. All three of these awards are reserved for U.S. citizens/permanent residents and concern was voiced that such terms were out of step with the current state of the field and contrary to the interests of the global community of scholarship and scholarly organizations striving to internationalize. When asked by a SHAFR member about the prospect of altering the terms in question with the aim of accommodating international applicants, the AHA expressed sympathy with the concerned party but indicated that due to legal barriers it was unlikely that the terms of the prizes would be altered. Council agreed that the exclusive terms of the award(s) were less than ideal and that legal categories rooted in immigration law do not reflect upon the quality of one’s scholarship. It was noted that the distinction between permanent residency and H1-visa status was very thin. During discussion, Council reaffirmed SHAFR’s desire to facilitate scholarship and scholarly dialogue and community across national boundaries, but was divided as to whether these sentiments ought to be expressed through formal opposition to the AHA prize stipulations. Several Council members expressed support for a mild resolution urging the AHA to “make a good faith effort” to contact the heirs of the original donors for the purpose of altering the terms of the awards. An amendment urging the AHA to “review the issue in interest of internationalizing the field” was also suggested. Immerman cautioned that the proposed resolutions would in essence be asking the AHA to incur potentially significant legal fees to change the terms of AHA-administered prizes. Preston noted that the practice of restricting awards based on the nationality of the applicant was not uncommon. The Pulitzer Prize and Booker Prize were cited as examples. After further discussion, Council passed a motion directing Rotter to draft a resolution on the above subject for discussion and amendment by Council.

(6) Motion on membership dues

Schwartz asked Council to consider reducing membership rates to $25 for retired members. Current SHAFR membership rates are $50 for regular members and $20 for student members. Schulzinger informed Council that memberships dues have remained flat for nearly five years and that SHAFR’s current dues are well below the industry standard. It was also noted that membership dues would become an important component of future contract negotiations. Immerman expressed the belief that retaining the current student discount should take precedent over discounts for retired members. Council was reminded that SHAFR currently offers a reduced rate ($20) for unwaged members. The unwaged rate is available to members for two consecutive years. After further discussion a motion offering reduced membership rates for retired members failed to pass.

(7) SHAFR presence at OAH meetings

Hahn reported that Rotter asked him to pose to Council the fundamental question of whether SHAFR should continue to seek a presence at the OAH annual meetings and, if so, what steps it might take to bolster its presence. Hahn reminded Council that SHAFR’s recent sponsorship of graduate student breakfasts and foreign attendees receptions at the recent OAH meetings had been discontinued in light of per person costs and that SHAFR’s 2010 OAH graduate student outreach initiative, which involved offering free drinks to graduate students at SHAFR’s OAH reception, failed to generate significant interest. Hahn reported that 70 people typically attend SHAFR’s AHA luncheon while approximately 35 attend the OAH luncheon. It was also noted that several SHAFR members at the 2010 OAH conference did not attend the Bernath Lecture. Discussion ensued. Council considered increasing publicity for SHAFR’s OAH reception and the possibility of sponsoring an off-site luncheon similar to its annual AHA luncheon. Immerman noted that the Bernath Lecture was a significant event and that SHAFR members present at the OAH should make an effort to attend. Costigliola stressed the importance of securing an appropriate venue for the Bernath Lecture. He noted that while restaurants offer certain benefits relative to on-site venues (specifically in terms of meal pricing) they are often not the most ideal space for an academic lecture. After further discussion, Council approved a motion to discontinue SHAFR’s OAH reception and to subsidize an on-site Bernath Lecture luncheon. Council also agreed to move the presentation of the Link-Kuehl Prize to the OAH luncheon.

(8) Motion to approve SHAFR.ORG Mission Statement

Council passed a motion unanimously approving the proposed SHAFR.ORG Mission Statement:
“SHAFR.org is the website of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). As such it provides SHAFR members with information that supports their teaching, research, and other professional endeavors, including their participation in the work of the organization. SHAFR.org also seeks to extend the Society’s mission of promoting the ‘study, advancement, and dissemination of a knowledge of American foreign relations’ to a wider community. To that end, it offers informed commentary and analysis on contemporary foreign relations issues from a historical perspective and provides an online forum for scholars, practitioners, teachers, and the general public to discuss issues related to foreign relations.”

(9) Motion to pay travel to SHAFR conference of program committee chairs

At Rotter’s request, Council discussed providing program committee chairs with travel funds to attend the annual SHAFR conference. It was noted that the work of the program chairs is considerable and that their presence at the meeting should be made a priority. After further discussion, a consensus emerged that SHAFR should provide transportation funds for program committee chairs to attend the SHAFR meetings, in cases where financial support is not available from the home institution, on the same terms as travel for Council members. A motion so directing passed unanimously.

Rotter asked Council to address the issue of providing travel funds for additional committee chairs and/or committee members to attend their SHAFR committee meeting held during the annual SHAFR Conference. Council was reminded that SHAFR has in place a three-year program to fund overseas travel of persons attending the SHAFR meetings, including international committee members with committee obligations at the annual SHAFR conference. Lerner noted that the overall functionality of SHAFR’s Teaching Committee is not contingent upon its members’ presence at the June committee meeting. After further discussion, a consensus emerged against approving additional travel support for SHAFR committee members and in favor of allowing a president to make ad hoc allocations as in recent years.

Reports

(10) Berks Conference exchange idea

Rotter informed Council of a recent effort to secure a SHAFR-sponsored panel at the Berks Conference of Women Historians. Kelly Shannon recently submitted a Berks panel proposal on the topic of “Women’s Rights, the Nation State, and Foreign Relations in the 20th century.” SHAFR has agreed to sponsor the panel in the interest of cultivating a cooperative relationship with the Berks Conference. Rotter reported that the Berks program chairs have expressed interest in the initiative and was encouraged by the prospect of future collaboration.

(11) Teaching Committee

Lerner summarized the work of the Teaching Committee. Every year the Committee organizes one or more SHAFR panel(s) on teaching and foreign relations, solicits teaching articles for publication in Passport, and maintains the ever-expanding syllabi page on shafr.org. The Committee is also currently developing an historical documents page on shafr.org, which is scheduled to go live in the coming months.

(12) Director of Secondary Education

John Tully circulated a report on his work as Director of Secondary Education. Tully informed Council that his mandate is to solicit, edit, and post 15-20 secondary lesson plans on shafr.org. Tully is currently working with five teachers on ten of the lesson plans in the first stage. Some of the initial drafts are in good shape with revisions scheduled to be completed over the summer. He noted that some contributors have been late in submitting drafts but expressed confidence that when the lesson plans are completed they will be top rate and will attract additional interest in SHAFR and web traffic to the SHAFR website. Tully expressed his desire to manage the project through its completion even if the final set of lesson plans extend beyond his three-year term.

Tully welcomed questions and comments. Forslund suggested that Tully target college and university professors as well as AP teachers as potential collaborators. Along these lines, Osgood noted the potential benefits in pairing professors and secondary educators on a shared lesson plan with the former providing guidance and oversight to the latter. The prospect of Tully obtaining a TAH grant was also discussed. Tully indicated that TAH grants are administered through local school districts and that he would look into the possibility of collaborating with interested parties at that level. Lerner urged Tully to utilize the resources of the Teaching Committee and to submit a quarterly report on his progress. Tully agreed and thanked Council for its helpful suggestions.

(13) 2011 SHAFR Summer Institute

Rotter reported that Carol Anderson and Thomas Zeiler will be hosting the 2011 Summer Institute at Emory University and that Ambassador Princeton Lyman has agreed to participate.

Engel reported that the 2010 Summer Institute had been successful and thanked Richard Immerman, Susan Ferber, and William Inboden for their valuable participation. Engel spoke of the logistical and financial benefits of holding the Summer Institute either at the same locale as the annual conference or at the home-institution of one of its organizers. He also suggested that when the locale of the Annual Meeting and the Summer Institute overlap those responsible for securing lodging for the former also do so for the latter.

(14) Diplomatic History

Schulzinger submitted the DH semi-annual report both in writing and orally. The journal is in excellent shape. While article submissions have risen considerably, the journal’s acceptance rate has continued to decline. Due to the significant backlog of book reviews, DH has convinced Wiley-Blackwell to publish a number of book reviews online prior to their appearance in the physical journal. Schulzinger also noted that the staff at Wiley-Blackwell have been exceptionally cooperative and pleasant to work with.

(15) FRUS

Rotter introduced Bill McAlister of the State Department Historian’s Office. McAlister was in attendance to voice his concerns regarding the
future status of FRUS, specifically as it relates to the increasing number and types of documents coming under review. He explained that given the proliferation of new countries and government agencies during recent past decades and the general broadening of historical topics, the documentary record would continue to grow at an unprecedented rate. As a result, McAlister anticipated that it would become increasingly difficult for the HO to fulfill its congressional mandate. The unique problems posed by “digitally born” records and digital finding aids designed by technicians unaware of the needs and concerns of researchers were discussed at length. McAlister was convinced of the need for an institutional response aimed at establishing a dialogue with those responsible for designing the digital findings aids. He urged Council to bring these concerns to the attention of the AHA, the SAA and the OAH and to consider passing a resolution calling for a commission to address the above issues. During discussion, it was suggested that SHAFR utilize the expanded Committee on Historical Documents to look into these issues. Mahan noted that if Council were to pursue these matters further, Tom Powers as well as the National Security Archive would be potential collaborators. It was also noted that McAllister has written an article on the above issues, which will appear in Passport’s August issue.

(16) 2010 annual meeting

Walton reported on the 2010 annual meeting both orally and in writing. She noted that 2010 meeting was on track to break previous SHAFR attendance records for a non-DC conference year. She also noted that a significant number of attendees were arriving from outside the United States. Walton drew attention to the Wisconsin Veterans Museum, which will be hosting the Saturday reception. As reception co-sponsors, both the Museum and the Center for World Affairs and the Global Economy have provided generous financial support.

Council passed a resolution thanking Walton and the 2010 Program Committee (Naoka Shibusawa [co-chair], Anne Foster [co-chair], Kristen Hoganson, Dirk Bonker, Jason Colby, Carol Anderson, Salim Yaqub, and Amy Greenberg) for their hard and dedicated work in organizing the 2010 conference.

(17) 2011 annual meeting

The 2011 annual meeting will be held at the Hilton Marks Center in Alexandria, VA. Hahn reported on the conclusion of negotiations with a hotel broker which Council had approved in January. The hotel broker had surveyed the Washington market and provided SHAFR with a list of eight venue options. After narrowing the list of potential venues to three, Hahn, with Rotter’s authorization, hired Sarah Wilson to survey each of the sites and to report on her findings. Wilson indicated that all three sites were adequate but that one, the Hilton Marks Center, had certain advantages, including its location. Hahn explained that the by using the broker, SHAFR gained significant financial savings. The broker’s fees will be paid entirely by the hotel. SHAFR will also gain Hilton HHonors points that will be used to offset costs otherwise paid by SHAFR.

(18) 2012 annual meeting

The 2012 annual meeting will be held in Hartford and Storrs, Connecticut. Costigliola noted that Michael Hogan has offered $15,000 on behalf of the 2012 venue.

(19) Dissertation Completion Fellowships

On behalf of the selection committee, Hahn reported that the dissertation completion fellowships would be awarded to Hajimu Masuda and Sudina Paungpetch.

(20) Oxford University Press USA Dissertation Prize

Laderman reported that the Oxford University Press USA Dissertation Prize would be awarded to Paul Chamberlain with an honorable mention going to Mairi S. MacDonald.

(21) Norman and Laura Graebner Prize

On behalf of the selection committee, Hahn reported that the Norman and Laura Graebner Prize for Lifetime Achievement would be awarded to Michael Hogan.

Other Business

(22) National History Center

Young reported that the National History Center has requested that SHAFR become a $5,000 co-sponsor of a series of seminars at Wilson Center in Washington, DC. It was noted that in June 2008, the NHC had requested that SHAFR support financially the Congressional Briefings Project – a now dormant project intended to provide historical context and perspective on current issues for policy makers and members of their staff. After a brief discussion, Council directed Young to request further information on the proposed seminars. Interest was expressed in the proposed budget and the potential for SHAFR to nominate speakers and to post seminar-generated webcasts on shafr.org.

(23) Resolution

Council unanimously passed a resolution thanking the Executive Director for his valuable service.

(23) Adjournment

Rotter concluded the meeting by thanking everyone for attending. The meeting adjourned at 12:30 pm.

Respectfully submitted,

Peter L. Hahn
Executive Director
PLH/cr

Passport January 2011
1. Personal and Professional Notes

Kristin Ahlberg won the Society for History in the Federal Government's George Pendleton Prize for *Transplanting the Great Society: Lyndon Johnson and Food for Peace* (University of Missouri Press).

Francis M. Carroll (National University of Manitoba, Emeritus), has been appointed the Burns Library Visiting Scholar in Irish Studies at Boston College for the autumn term 2010.

Brian Etheridge has become associate professor of history and director of the Helen P. Denit Honors Program at the University of Baltimore.

Jason Parker (Texas A&M) won the 2010 Truman Scholar's Award from the Harry S. Truman Library Institute.

2. Research Notes

**New Volume of Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee**

The U.S. Senate Historical Offices announces the release of the latest volume of *Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series)*, with more than 1,000 pages of previously classified testimony and transcripts from closed hearings in 1968. The Vietnam War is a major focus of these closed hearings, with great attention given to a re-examination of the Gulf of Tonkin incident. The declassified hearings provide new insights into the Foreign Relation Committee members' skepticism about the Vietnam War and concern about the limited legislative role in U.S. foreign policy. Among other topics discussed in the hearings are the Senate's approval of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, North Korea's capture of the *Pueblo*, and the Soviet Union's invasion of Czechoslovakia. This volume was prepared for publication by Senate Historian Donald A. Ritchie. A limited number of free copies are available from the committee by mail at: Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, D.C. 20510. The complete volume is available online at the committee's Web site, [www.foreign.senate.gov](http://www.foreign.senate.gov).

For more information, visit the web page at [www.foreign.senate.gov](http://www.foreign.senate.gov).

**National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book**

*The Iraq War, Part I: The U.S. Prepares for Conflict, 2001*

*Declassified Documents Show Bush Administration Diverting Attention and Resources to Iraq Less than Two Months after Launch of Afghanistan War; U.S. Sets "Decapitation of Government" as Early Goal of Combat*

Following instructions from President George W. Bush to develop an updated war plan for Iraq, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld ordered CENTCOM Commander Gen. Tommy Franks in November 2001 to initiate planning for the "decapitation" of the Iraqi government and the empowerment of a "Provisional Government" to take its place.

Talking points for the Rumsfeld-Franks meeting on November 27, 2001, released through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), confirm that policy makers were already looking for ways to justify invading Iraq - as indicated by Rumsfeld's first point, "Focus on WMD." This document shows that Pentagon policy makers cited early U.S. experience in Afghanistan to justify planning for Iraq's post-invasion governance in order to achieve their strategic objectives: "Unlike in Afghanistan, important to have ideas in advance about who would rule afterwards."

Rumsfeld's notes were prepared in close consultation with senior DOD officials Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith. Among other insights, the materials posted by the National Security Archive shed light on the intense focus on Iraq by high-level Bush administration officials long before the attacks of 9/11, and Washington's
confidence in perception management as a successful strategy for overcoming public and allied resistance to its plans.

This compilation further shows:

* The preliminary strategy Rumsfeld imparted to Franks while directing him to develop a new war plan for Iraq.
* Secretary of State Powell's awareness, three days into a new administration, that Iraq "regime change" would be a principal focus of the Bush presidency.
* Administration determination to exploit the perceived propaganda value of intercepted aluminum tubes - falsely identified as nuclear related - before completion of even a preliminary determination of their end use.
* The difficulty of winning European support for attacking Iraq (except that of British Prime Minister Tony Blair) without real evidence that Baghdad was implicated in 9/11.
* The State Department's analytical unit observing that a decision by Tony Blair to join a U.S. war on Iraq "could bring a radicalization of British Muslims, the great majority of whom opposed the September 11 attacks but are increasingly restive about what they see as an anti-Islamic campaign."
* Pentagon interest in the perception of an Iraq invasion as a "just war" and State Department insights into the improbability of that outcome.

Rumsfeld's instructions to Franks included the establishment and funding of a provisional government as a significant element of U.S. invasion strategy. In the end the Pentagon changed course and instead ruled post-invasion Iraq directly, first through the short-lived Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance and then through Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority.

In addition to an analytical essay and the documents, this EBB includes two research aids - a detailed timeline and an illuminating collection of quotations from key individuals and government documents.

For more information contact:
Joyce Battle
202-994-7000
http://www.nsarchive.org

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National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book
The Iraq War, Part II: Was There Even a Decision?

U.S. and British Documents Give No Indication that Alternatives were Seriously Considered

Contrary to statements by President George W. Bush or Prime Minister Tony Blair, declassified records from both governments posted on the Web reflect an early and focused push to prepare war plans and enlist allies regardless of conflicting intelligence about Iraq's threat and the evident difficulties in garnering global support.

Perhaps most revealing about this posting on the National Security Archive's Web site is what is missing--any indication whatsoever from the declassified record to date that top Bush administration officials seriously considered an alternative to war. In contrast there is an extensive record of efforts to energize military planning, revise existing contingency plans, and create a new, streamlined war plan.

Among other findings from the documents, the posting's editors conclude that the Bush administration sought to avoid the emergence of opposition to its actions by means of secrecy and deception, holding the war plan as a "compartmented concept," restricting information even from allies like the United Kingdom, and pretending that no war plans were being reviewed by the president. President Bush and his senior advisers were so intent on pursuing their project for war, the documents show, that they refused to be deterred by early and repeated refusals of cooperation from regional allies like Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt; or from traditional allies such as France and Germany.

Bush administration disdain for a diplomatic solution to the issue of Iraq's potential for developing weapons of mass destruction is further evidenced, the editors conclude, in early resistance to a multilateral solution through the United Nations (UN), in a preference to substitute direct U.S. control for a UN monitoring regime, and in the difficulty encountered by both America's closest ally, the United Kingdom, as well as the U.S. State Department, in inducing President Bush to agree to try a UN initiative.

For more information contact;
John Prados
(202)-994-7000
http://www/nsarchive.org
For nearly a year before the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the British government of Prime Minister Tony Blair collaborated closely with the George W. Bush administration to produce a far starker picture of the threat from Saddam Hussein and his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) than was justified by intelligence at the time, according to British and American government documents posted by the National Security Archive.

With the aim of strengthening the political case for going to war, both governments regularly coordinated their assessments, the records show, occasionally downplaying and even eliminating points of disagreement over the available intelligence. The new materials, acquired largely through the U.K. Freedom of Information Act and often featuring less redacted versions of previously released records, also reveal that the Blair administration, far earlier than has been appreciated until now, utilized public relations specialists to help craft the formal intelligence "white papers" about Iraq's WMD program.

At one point, even though intelligence officials were skeptical, the British went so far as to incorporate in their white paper allegations about Saddam's nuclear ambitions because they had been made publicly by President Bush and Vice President Cheney.

The documents also show that:

* From early 2002 both governments were seeking regime change, but Prime Minister Blair and his officials were very conscious of the need to make a case for war, based on claims about Iraqi WMDs.

* From March 2002--the very beginning of the process--the U.S. and U.K. administrations were concerned to achieve consistency in their claims about Iraqi weapons, often at the cost of accuracy. In the spring of 2002 the two countries began to produce in parallel the white papers on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction that they published that fall. At least two drafts of the respective white papers were exchanged from either side in order to avoid providing grist for "opponents of action."

* Officials working on the parallel papers took part in a number of secure video conferences to avoid inconsistencies between the documents. Both sides accelerated the drafting of their white papers in September 2002 as part of a coordinated propaganda effort.

* Officials re-drafting the U.K.'s white paper or "dossier" in September 2002 were told to ensure that it "complemented" rather than contradicted claims in the U.S. document. A draft of the U.K. dossier was brought to Washington by intelligence chief John Scarlett for U.S. input.

* In addition, U.K. officials examined the draft U.S. white paper closely and sought to match its claims. The U.S. paper has been described by one of its authors as intended "to strengthen the case of going to war with the American public."

* The U.K. white paper was amended to incorporate a number of claims about Saddam's alleged nuclear ambitions that intelligence officials found questionable but were included because President Bush and Vice President Cheney made public reference to them, for example the allegation that Iraq could obtain a nuclear weapon within a brief one- or two-year timeframe.

* In addition, the U.K. dossier was heavily influenced by Blair advisers and public relations experts, including Alastair Campbell, Blair's director of communications. Its drafters were also willing to change it to fit in with public statements from British government advisers, whether or not those statements were true.

For more information, contact:
John Prados
202-994-7000
http://www.nsarchive.org

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Pakistani tribal areas where Osama bin Laden found refuge were momentarily open to the Pakistani Army when "the tribes were overawed by U.S. firepower" after 9/11, but quickly again became "no-go areas" where the Taliban could reorganize and plan their resurgence in Afghanistan, according to previously secret U.S. documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive and posted at www.nsarchive.org.

According to U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald E. Neumann, the 2005 Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan was a direct product of the "four years that the Taliban has had to reorganize and think about..."
their approach in a sanctuary beyond the reach of either government." This had exponentially increased casualties as the Taliban adopted insurgency tactics successful in Iraq, including suicide bombings and the use of IEDs. Ambassador Neumann warned Washington that if the sanctuary in Pakistan was not addressed it would "lead to the re-emergence of the same strategic threat to the United States that prompted our OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] intervention" in 2001.

As current U.S. strategy increasingly pursues policies to reconcile or "flip" the Taliban, the document collection released reveals Washington's refusal to negotiate with Taliban leadership directly after 9/11. On September 13, 2001, U.S. Ambassador Wendy Chamberlin "bluntly" told Pakistani President Musharraf that there was "absolutely no inclination in Washington to enter into a dialogue with the Taliban. The time for dialogue was finished as of September 11." Pakistan, as the Taliban's primary sponsor, disagreed. Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Chief Mahmoud told the ambassador "not to act in anger. Real victory will come in negotiations... If the Taliban are eliminated... Afghanistan will revert to warlordism."

The new materials also illustrate the importance of the bilateral alliance to leaders in both Islamabad and Washington. One cable described seven demands delivered to Pakistani Intelligence (ISI) Director Mahmoud by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage two days after the attack, while another reported Pakistani President Musharraf's acceptance of those requests "without conditions" the next day. However, the documents also reveal fundamental disagreements and distrust. While Pakistan denied that it was a safe haven for anti-American forces, a State Department Issue Paper for the Vice President claimed "some Taliban leaders operate with relative impunity in some Pakistani cities, and may still enjoy support from the lower echelons of Pakistan's ISI."

For more information, contact:
Barbara Elias
202-994-7000
belias@gwu.edu
http://www.nsarchive.org

National Security Archive's Southern Cone Project Release on Nixon and Uruguay

Documents posted by the National Security Archive on the 40th anniversary of the death of U.S. advisor Dan Mitrione in Uruguay show the Nixon administration recommended a "threat to kill [detained insurgent] Sendic and other key [leftist insurgent] MLN prisoners if Mitrione is killed." The secret cable from U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, made public for the first time, instructed U.S. Ambassador Charles Adair: "If this has not been considered, you should raise it with the Government of Uruguay at once."

The message to the Uruguayan government, received by the U.S. Embassy at 11:30 am on August 9, 1970, was an attempt to deter Tupamaro insurgents from killing Mitrione at noon on that day. A few minutes later, Ambassador Adair reported back, in another newly-released cable, that "a threat was made to these prisoners that members of the 'Escuadrón de la Muerte' [death squad] would take action against the prisoners' relatives if Mitrione were killed."

Dan Mitrione, Director of the U.S. AID Office of Public Safety (OPS) in Uruguay and the main American advisor to the Uruguayan police at the time, had been held for ten days by MLN-Tupamaro insurgents demanding the release of some 150 guerrilla prisoners held by the Uruguayan government. Mitrione was found dead the morning of August 10, 1970, killed by the Tupamaros after their demands were not met.

For more information, contact:
Carlos Osorio
cosorio@gwu.edu
202-994-7061
or
Clara Aldrighi
clara.aldrighi@gmail.com
http://www.nsarchive.org

National Security Archive collection
How Do You Solve A Problem Like Korea?

Four decades ago, in response to North Korean military provocations, the U.S. developed contingency plans that included selected use of tactical nuclear weapons against Pyongyang's military facilities and the possibility of full-scale war, according to recently declassified documents. Astonishingly, casualty estimates ranged from a low of 100 or so civilian deaths up to "several thousand."

Newly-elected President Richard Nixon and his key advisors, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger,
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and JCS Chairman Earle Wheeler, considered a menu of possible military actions against North Korea, from carefully targeted attacks on North Korean military facilities, to a plan codenamed FREEDOM DROP for limited nuclear strikes (with surprisingly limited casualty expectations), to all-out war using nuclear weapons. The Pentagon drew up these plans as the result of North Korea's downing of a U.S. reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan in April 1969 -- just one in a long set of military provocations by Pyongyang that continues to the present.

Yet, in another pattern that would be repeated in the years since then, Nixon and his advisors were forced to heed the Pentagon's warnings that anything short of massive attacks on North Korea's military power would risk igniting a wider conflagration on the peninsula, leaving diplomacy, with all its frustrations, as the remaining option, coupled with the deterrent posed by U.S. conventional and nuclear forces.

The National Security Archive obtained the documents posted through multiple Freedom of Information (FOIA) requests to the U.S. government. They are part of a major new collection consisting of almost 1,700 documents, *The United States and the Two Koreas, 1969-2000*.

For more information contact:
Robert A. Wampler, Ph.D.
wampler@gwu.edu
http://www.nsarchive.org

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**North Korea International Documentation Project Collection**

*The Rise and Fall of the Detente on the Korean Peninsula: 1970-1974*


For more information, contact:
James Person
North Korea International Documentation Project
Woodrow Wilson Center
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
1300 Pennsylvania Ave.,
N.W. Washington, D.C. 20004-3027
nkidp@wilsoncenter.org

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**U.S. National Strategy Documents Collection**

The National Defense University Library has released its U.S. National Strategy Documents collection, a comprehensive collection of official U.S. Government strategy documents. The collection can be accessed online at: https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/ cdm4/search_strategy.php, and includes: National Security Strategies dating from the Reagan Administration to the present day; Military and Defense Strategies; Quadrennial Defense Review reports; and strategies focusing on terrorism, homeland security, cyber security, and weapons of mass destruction. All of these strategy documents are brought together in one location, enhanced by a full-text search feature to facilitate in-depth research.

For more information:
https://digitalndulibrary.ndu.edu/index.php

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**Baptism By Fire: CIA Analysis of the Korean War**

The CIA's Electronic Reading Room has released a new collection on the Korean War, which includes more than 1,300 documents consisting of national estimates, intelligence memoranda, daily updates, and summaries of foreign media concerning developments on the Korean Peninsula in 1947 - 1954. The release of this collection makes available to the public the largest collection of Agency documents released on this issue. The release of these documents is in conjunction with the conference, "New Documents and New Histories: Twenty-First Century Perspectives on the Korean War," co-hosted by the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and the

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**Lyndon Johnson Daily Diary now on the Web**

The Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and Museum has posted digital images of President Johnson's Daily Diary, 1963-1969, on their web site. While the President’s Daily Diary is the centerpiece, the web site also includes the Daily Diary from Johnson's years as Vice President, 1961-1963, and the last two years he served as the Democratic Majority Leader in the Senate, 1959-1960. Johnson's secretaries maintained the Daily Diary and included information about travel, meetings, social events, and telephone calls, as well as anecdotal information about the President's activities during the day. It includes over 14,000 pages and is fully searchable. The Daily Diary is posted at: http://www.lbjlibrary.org/collections/daily-diary.html.

The President’s Daily Diary is a rich resource that provides context for many of the documents and recordings of telephone conversations included in the Library’s collections. It also gives scholars insights into President Johnson's character, lifestyle, decision-making processes, sense of humor, and relationships with his friends and family, advisers, and staff.

In addition to noting Johnson's appointments and telephone calls, his secretaries frequently recorded details of events that happened outside of the Oval Office, during the President’s travels, or late at night when few staff were present. For example, Marie Fehmer (“mf”), one of the secretaries who compiled the Diary, took notes on the conversation at the June 23, 1967 luncheon during the summit meeting between President Johnson and Soviet Chairman Alexei Kosygin by listening at the door. The Diary for the day reads: "At 2:15p, the door to the luncheon room was closed—and mf could hear no more. MW [Marvin Watson] closed the door, with the feeling that the Russians might be getting nervous seeing mf taking close notes." But as the Diary observes, Fehmer didn't give up: "2:25p – from the back stairs, mf took notes on the conversation..." and her notes of the luncheon discussion and other events that day continue on through several more pages of the Diary.

For more information, contact:
Claudia Anderson
2313 Red River Street
Austin, Texas 78705
claudia.anderson@nara.gov
(512) 721-0164

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**NDU’s Conflict Records Research Center records from Iraq**

The National Defense University's new Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) invites scholars to conduct research in their holdings. The CRRC makes digital copies of captured records from Saddam Hussein's Iraq and al Qaeda available to scholars. It currently houses over 900 records (30,000 pages), and the number of documents in the center grows almost daily.

For further information and basic instructions on how to go about researching at the center, visit the CRRC’s webpage at: www.ndu.edu/inss/index.cfm?type=section&secid=101&pageid=4.

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3. **Announcements:**

**CFP: 2011 International Graduate Student Conference on the Cold War**

*April 14-16, 2011 University of California at Santa Barbara*

The Center for Cold War Studies (CCWS) of the University of California at Santa Barbara, the George Washington University Cold War Group (GWCW), and the LSE IDEAS Cold War Studies Programme of the London School of Economics and Political Science (CWSP) are pleased to announce their 2011 International Graduate Student Conference on the Cold War, to take place at the University of California at Santa Barbara on April 14-16, 2011.

The conference is an excellent opportunity for graduate students to present papers and receive critical feedback from peers and experts in the field. We encourage submissions by graduate students working on any aspect of the Cold War, broadly defined. Of particular interest are papers that employ newly available primary sources or non-traditional methodologies.
To be considered, each prospective participant should submit a two-page proposal and a brief academic c.v. (in Word or .pdf format) to Salim Yaqub at syaqub@history.ucsb.edu by January 28, 2011. Notification of acceptance will occur by February 21. Successful applicants will be expected to email their papers (no longer than 25 pages) by March 21. The author of the strongest paper will have an opportunity to publish his or her article in the *Journal of Cold War History*. For further information, contact Salim Yaqub at the aforementioned email address.

The conference sessions will be chaired by prominent faculty members from UCSB, GWU, LSE, and elsewhere. The organizers will cover accommodation costs of admitted student participants for the duration of the conference, but students will need to cover the costs of their travel to UCSB.

In 2003, UCSB and GW first joined their separate spring conferences, and two years later LSE became a co-sponsor. The three cold war centers now hold a jointly sponsored conference each year, alternating among the three campuses. For more information on our three programs, please visit the respective Web sites:

http://www.history.ucsb.edu/projects/ccws for CCWS  
http://www.ieres.org for GWCW  
http://www2.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/programmes/coldWarStudiesProgramme for CWSP

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**CFP: The 2011 TSA Annual Conference**  
**July 11-14, 2011, Dundee University**

The Chairman of the TSA, Prof. Alan Dobson (University of Dundee) would like to extend an invitation to the 2011 Transatlantic Studies Association 10th Anniversary Conference.

Our outstanding 2011 plenary guests are Warren Kimball (Rutgers University), who will lead a multi-disciplinary roundtable, *Transatlantic Relations and the Second World War*, featuring scholars Gavin Bailey, Andrew Buchanan and Thomas Mills presenting new perspectives on the Transatlantic wartime relationship, and Plenary Lecturer Will Kaufman, University of Central Lancashire, who will speak about *Ghost Lighting the Transatlantic Stage: Explorations in Comparative Dramaturgy*. There will also be a roundtable on the contemporary Anglo-American special relationship, "Seventy Years On," co-chaired by Alan Dobson and Steve Marsh.

Panel proposals and individual papers are welcome for any of the general panels listed below. One should submit a 300-word abstract of proposal and brief CV to the listed panel leaders or to Alan Dobson by April 30, 2011.

1. **Literature and Culture**: Constance Post, cjpost@iastate.edu and Louise Walsh, walsh.lou@gmail.com
2. **Planning and the Environment**: Tony Jackson, a.a.jackson@dundee.ac.uk and Deepak Gopinath, d.gopinath@dundee.ac.uk
3. **Economics**: Fiona Venn, vennf@essex.ac.uk, Jeff Engel, jengel@bushschool.tamu.edu, and Joe McKinney, joe_mckinney@baylor.edu
4. **History, Security Studies and IR**: Alan Dobson, a.p.dobson@dundee.ac.uk and David Ryan, david.ryan@ucc.ie

Sub-panels for History include:

(i) **NATO**: Ellen Hallams, EHallams.jscsc@defenceacademy.mod.uk and Luca Ratti, ratti@uniroma3.it
(ii) **Obama and Transatlantic Relations -- A Midterm Assessment**: David Haglund, david.haglund@queensu.ca
(iii) **Diplomats at War: The American Experience**: Simon Rofe, jsimonrofe@le.ac.uk and Andrew Stewart, ASStewart.jscsc@defenceacademy.mod.uk
(iv) **The Periphery Is the Centre: Transatlantic Engagement in International Crises Since the Cold War**: Annick Cizel, annick.cizel@univ-paris3.fr; David Ryan, davyd.ryan@ucc.ie
(v) **Anglo-American Relations**: Steve Marsh, marshsi@cardiff.ac.uk
(vi) **Transatlantic Relations, Diplomacy, Statecraft and Culture in the Second World War**: Gavin Bailey, g.j.bailey@dundee.ac.uk; and Thomas Mills, T.Mills@brunel.ac.uk. Proposals for this sub-panel will be considered for a possible future special edition of the *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*.
(vii) **European and American Intellectuals: Questions of War and Peace**: Michaela Hoenicke-Moore, michaela-hoenicke-moore@uiowa.edu, and Priscilla Roberts, proberts@hkucc.hku.hk
5. **Transatlantic Memories and Public Memorials**: Michael Cullinane, M.Cullinane@ucc.ie
6. Transatlantic Relations and Energy: Fiona Venn, vennf@essex.ac.uk

For more information, contact:
Alan Dobson
TSA chair
a.p.dobson@dundee.ac.uk

CFP: 126th annual meeting of the American Historical Association
January 5–8, 2012, Chicago, IL

The 126th annual meeting of the American Historical Association will be held January 5–8, 2012, in Chicago. The Program Committee welcomes proposals from all members (academic and nonacademic) of the Association, from affiliated societies, from historians working outside the United States, and from scholars in related disciplines. The theme for the meeting is “Communities and Networks.” While seeking proposals for sessions that explore facets of this broad topic, we also welcome submissions on the histories of all places and time periods, on many different topics, and on the uses of varied sources and methods. We also invite members to employ and to analyze diverse strategies for representing the past, including fiction, poetry, film, music, and art.

Furthermore, we wish to provide opportunities to examine new forms of digital research and publication. We welcome, therefore, proposals on technology pertinent to historical archiving, research, teaching, and technology demonstrations, which will be part of a historical technology fair to be held at the meeting venue. We thus hope to link the proceedings at the annual meeting to the current development of the information highway and its relevance to historical research and teaching.

We invite proposals for sessions in five different formats: formal sessions (paper presentations plus comment), sessions devoted to precirculated papers, thematic workshops, roundtable discussions, and practicums. Individuals or small groups may also propose the presentation of posters as part of a poster session, to be held on Saturday afternoon, in which historians will share their research through visual materials. Finally, members may propose “experimental” panels using forms of presentation not covered by these standard session types. Please consider which session format best suits your intellectual goals, and will best foster lively interaction among presenters and between presenters and the audience. To assure substantial time for interaction between speakers and audience, all panels, regardless of format, are limited to a maximum of five participants serving as speakers or commentators.

Please consult the “Annual Meeting Guidelines” (online at www.historians.org/annual/guidelines.cfm) when preparing your proposal. Note that the Association encourages the representation of the full diversity of its membership in the annual meeting. Successful sessions will reflect to the extent possible institutional and career stage diversity as well as gender and ethnic diversity. Proposers of panels that do not include gender and ethnic diversity may be asked to revise and resubmit.

Proposals may only be submitted electronically. Full instructions for doing so can be found on the “Instructions for Submitting Proposals” page at www.historians.org/annual/proposalFAQ.cfm. With the exception of foreign scholars and scholars from other disciplines, all persons appearing on the program must be members of the AHA. Proposals must be submitted in their completed form (that is, with full information concerning all participants and their presentations) by midnight, Eastern Standard Time, on February 15, 2011. Proposals cannot be submitted after the deadline has passed; the system will be closed to submissions and will not accept them.

Questions about the content of proposals should be directed to the Program Committee co-chairs Jacob Soll and Jennifer Siegel. Questions about policies and modes of presentation should be directed to Robert Townsend, AHA’s assistant director for research. Questions about the electronic submissions process may be e-mailed to the American Historical Association with “2012 Annual Meeting” in the subject line.

CFP: Center for Cryptologic History Conference
Cryptology in War and Peace: Crisis Points in History
October 6–7, 2011, Johns Hopkins University, Laurel, Maryland

The National Security Agency’s Center for Cryptologic History sponsors the Cryptologic History Symposium every two years. The next one will be held October 6–7, 2011. Historians from the Center, the Intelligence Community, the defense establishment, and the military services, as well as distinguished scholars from American and foreign academic institutions, veterans of the profession, and the interested public will all gather for two days of reflection and debate on topics from the cryptologic past.

The theme for the upcoming conference will be: “Cryptology in War and Peace: Crisis Points in History.”
This topical approach is especially relevant as the year 2011 is an important anniversary marking the start of many seminal events in our nation’s military history. The events that can be commemorated are many. Such historical episodes include the 1861 outbreak of the fratricidal Civil War between North and South, 1941 saw a surprise attack wrench America into the Second World War. The year 1951 began with the fall of Seoul to Chinese Communist forces with United Nations troops retreating in the Korean War. In 1961, the United States began a commitment of advisory troops in Southeast Asia that would eventually escalate into the Vietnam War; that year also marked the height of the Cold War as epitomized by the physical division of Berlin. Twenty years later, a nascent democratic movement was suppressed by a declaration of martial law in Poland; bipolar confrontation would markedly resurge for much of the 1980s. In 1991, the United States intervened in the Persian Gulf to reverse Saddam Hussein’s aggression, all while the Soviet Union suffered through the throes of its final collapse. And in 2001, the nation came under siege by radical terrorism.

Participants will delve into the roles of signals intelligence and information assurance, and not just as these capabilities supported military operations. More cogently, observers will examine how these factors affected and shaped military tactics, operations, strategy, planning, and command and control throughout history. The role of cryptology in preventing conflict and supporting peaceful pursuits will also be examined. The panels will include presentations in a range of technological, operational, organizational, counterintelligence, policy, and international themes.

Past symposia have featured scholarship that sets out new ways to consider cryptologic heritage, and this one will be no exception. The mix of practitioners, scholars, and the public precipitates a lively debate that promotes an enhanced appreciation for the context of past events. Researchers on traditional and technological cryptologic topics, those whose work in any aspect touches upon the historical aspects of cryptology as defined in its broadest sense, as well as foreign scholars working in this field are especially encouraged to participate.

The Symposium will be held at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory’s Kossiakoff Center, in Laurel, Maryland, a location close to the Baltimore and Washington, D.C., areas. As has been the case with previous symposia, the conference will provide unparalleled opportunities for interaction with leading historians and distinguished experts. So please make plans to join us for either one or both days of this intellectually stimulating conference.

Interested persons are invited to submit proposals for a potential presentation or even for a full panel. While the topics can relate to this year’s theme, all serious work on any aspect of cryptologic history will be considered. Proposals should include an abstract for each paper and/or a statement of session purpose for each panel, as well as biographical sketches for each presenter.

For more information or to submit proposals, contact:
Dr. Kent Sieg
301-688-2336
kgsieg@nsa.gov

CFP: 2012 Organization of American Historians Conference
Frontiers of Capitalism and Democracy
April 19-22, 2012, Milwaukee, Wisconsin

The 2012 OAH/NCPH Annual Meeting will be held in Milwaukee from April 19-22, 2012, with the theme: “Frontiers of Capitalism and Democracy.”

For the OAH/NCPH Meeting in Milwaukee, we welcome panels that address the role of the evolving market system, class relations, and migrations over the long chronological sweep of American history, or that explore the frontiers of social imagination and/or territorial encounters that have altered understandings of other peoples and traditions. While we invite sessions on all aspects of U.S. history, we are especially eager to see those that stimulate reflection on tensions and/or interchanges between capitalism and democracy at “frontier” moments in the past.

The Program Committee is keen to encourage a wide variety of forms of conversation. Please feel free to submit such nontraditional proposals as poster sessions; roundtables that hone in on significant debates in subfields; discussions around a single artifact or text; serial panels organized around a thematic thread that will run through the conference; working groups that tackle a common professional issue or challenge (see guidelines on the NCPH Web site, www.ncph.org); or workshops that develop professional skills in the documentation or interpretation of history. Teaching sessions are also welcome, particularly those involving the audience as active participants or those that reflect collaborative partnerships and/or conversations among teachers, public historians, research scholars, and history educators at all levels and in varied settings.

We seek a program that includes the full diversity of the OAH and NCPH membership, so wherever possible
proposals should include presenters of both sexes, members of racial and ethnic minorities, and historians who practice their craft in a variety of venues, including community colleges and pre-collegiate classrooms, consulting firms, museums, historical societies, and the National Park Service. We prefer to receive proposals for complete sessions, but will consider individual papers as well.

All proposals must include the following information:

- a complete mailing address, e-mail address, phone number, and affiliation for each participant; and
- an abstract of no more than 500 words for the session as a whole; and
- a prospectus of no more than 250 words for each presentation; and
- a vita of no more than 500 words for each participant.

Proposals should be submitted electronically to the OAH Proposal System found at the OAH webpage at: http://www.oah.org/. Complete session proposals most often include a chair, participants, and, if applicable, one or two commentators (chairs may double as commentators, and commentators may be omitted in order for the audience to serve in that role). Session membership should be limited by the need to include substantial time for audience questions and comments. All participants are required to register for the Annual Meeting.

The deadline for proposals is February 1, 2011.

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**CFP: International Security/Internal Safety Conference**

*April 1-2, 2011, Mississippi State University*

The History Department at Mississippi State University is hosting the fifth regional IS/IS (International Security/Internal Safety) Conference on April 1-2, 2011. We invite graduate students and faculty to submit paper proposals on topics that focus on military history, diplomatic history, political history, international relations, international security, and internal safety.

Prominent historians, such as Professor Robert Citino, will be featured on the program. Prizes will be given to the top graduate student papers presented at the conference. In addition, we hope to provide one night’s free lodging for out-of-town graduate students who travel to MSU in order to present their research.

Submissions of individual paper and panel proposals will be considered.

Please submit a 250-word proposal and a one-page cv or a panel proposal electronically to Mary Kathryn Barbier, Ph.D. at mkb99@history.msstate.edu by January 30, 2011.

For more information, contact:
Mary Kathryn Barbier, Ph.D.
Mississippi State University
Box H
Mississippi State, MS 39762
(662) 325-3604
mkb99@history.msstate.edu

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**CFP: The Question of Rights**

*September 15-16, 2011, San Francisco State University conference*

San Francisco State University will host a conference on September 15-16, 2011 exploring the question and place of rights in history, politics, and society.

Rights, both individual and collective, have long been a theme in American society, often seen in conflict with state power. We welcome papers on assertions of rights by insurgent groups, resistance to rights claims, and governmental efforts to suppress or promote rights, in areas including but not limited to: civil liberties; disability rights; labor and economic rights; feminism and antiracism; immigration; environmental justice; access to healthcare; the prison industrial complex; sexual orientation; the stateless; and human rights.

Our goal is to bring together a wide variety of people from a range of academic, activist, legal, and community spaces to examine the place of rights within both the context of American society (as situated within a broader global political community). To that end, we welcome participation from historians, both senior and junior scholars, graduate students, community advocates, archivists, and lawyers. We invite proposals for panels or roundtables. Though we prefer complete panels, we will consider individual papers. We also welcome workshops with pre-circulated papers, or sessions in which panelists assess the state of debate on a topic. All submissions will be peer reviewed by our program committee.
The deadline for submission of panels, consisting of an abstract of 1,000 words for panel and workshop proposals and a one-page CV for each participant, is March 15, 2011. Send your proposals to Christopher Waldrep, Department of History, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, California 94132 or via email to cwaldrep@sfsu.edu.

For more information, contact:
Christopher Waldrep
Department of History
San Francisco State University
1600 Holloway Avenue
San Francisco, California 94132
925-370-2909
cwaldrep@sfsu.edu

Cold War History Resources Available from the Organization of American Historians

The October 2010 issue of the OAH Magazine of History focuses on teaching Cold War history. It includes articles by consulting editor Jeremi Suri, Donna Alvah, Mitchell Lerner, Marc Selverstone, and Jeff Woods as well as teaching strategies by John DeRose, Paul Frazier, the late David Ghere, and Magazine editor Carl Weinberg. Weinberg’s study of the 1954 film, “The Salt of the Earth,” and Ghere’s simulation exercise based on the Yalta conference are also featured online. Visit http://www.oah.org/pubs/magazine/v24n4/ for a complete table of contents, selected articles, film clips, classroom handouts, and primary documents.

In addition, through the OAH Distinguished Lectureship Program, numerous historians, including Suri, can shed new light on the Cold War for college and public audiences. Learn more about participating speakers at http://lectures.oah.org.

For more information, contact:
Annette Windhorn
Lectureship Program Coordinator
Organization of American Historians
112 N. Bryan Avenue
Bloomington, IN 47408
812-855-7311

Boren Fellowships for Foreign Language Study

Applications for the 2011-2012 National Security Education Program's David L. Boren Scholarships for undergraduate students and Fellowships for graduate students are now available at www.borenawards.org. Boren Awards provide unique funding opportunities for U.S. students to study in Africa, Asia, Central & Eastern Europe, Eurasia, Latin America, and the Middle East, where they can add important international and language components to their educations.

Boren Scholarships provide up to $20,000 for an academic year's study abroad. Boren Fellowships provide up to $30,000 for language study and international research. The application deadline for the Boren Fellowship is February 1, and the deadline for the Boren Scholarship is February 10.

For more information, contact:
Susan Gundersen
Boren Scholarships & Fellowships
Institute of International Education
1-800-618-NSEP
boren@iie.org

Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Fellowships and Travel Grants

The Dole Institute of Politics is pleased to announce two funding opportunities for researchers at the graduate and post-graduate levels.

The Dole Institute is now accepting applications for the 2011-2012 Research Fellowship. Graduate students and post-doctoral scholars are eligible to apply for this $2,500 award, which will support substantial contributions to the study of Congress, politics, or policy issues. The Institute is also awarding travel grants intended to defray costs associated with research related travel. This program will offer reimbursements of up to $750 to students, post-doctoral researchers, and independent scholars.

The Research Fellow and Travel Grant recipients will have full access to Senator Bob Dole's extensive
collections, which include materials from his 36-year career in the House and Senate and provide extensive documentation on specific legislative issues.

In order to receive full consideration, proposals should demonstrate how the applicant’s research will be furthered through on-site use of the Dole Archive. See the full announcement at http://www.doleinstitute.org/archives/grants.shtml for application requirements.

Research Fellowship applications must be received in whole by the Dole Institute by February 1, 2011. The recipient will be expected to be in continuous residence at the Dole Institute for 1-3 weeks, between June 1, 2011 and August 31, 2012. Award notification letters will be mailed by April 1, 2011.

Applications for travel grants will be reviewed on a rolling basis. There is no deadline to apply and applications will be accepted until funds are exhausted. Applicants can expect a decision regarding their application within 2-4 weeks.

For more information, contact:
Morgan R. Davis
Senior Archivist
Dole Institute of Politics
University of Kansas
785-864-1405
mrd@ku.edu
http://www.doleinstitute.org/archives/grants.shtml

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**Eisenhower Foundation Travel Grants**

The Eisenhower Presidential Library Abilene Travel Grants Program assists scholars researching primary sources in such fields as history, government, economics, communications, and international affairs so they may provide informed leadership in our national life. The grants program is funded and administered by the Eisenhower Foundation in Abilene, Kansas.

Travel grant application forms can be found at the Library webpage at: http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/index.html.

Grants are awarded to individual researchers on a competitive basis to cover a portion of expenses while in Abilene, Kansas using the presidential library. The size of the grant (not to exceed $1,000) is dependent upon the distance traveled and duration of stay in Abilene. Grants are not retroactive and travel must occur within one year of award.

Applications must be received no later than February 28 for Spring reviews, and September 30 for Fall reviews. Applicants should provide the following materials to:

- A letter from the Eisenhower Library providing information on the availability of relevant materials in the Library’s archives. Please address inquiries to Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, 200 S.E. 4th, Abilene, KS 67410 and request permission to use the holdings of the Library. An archivist at the Library will respond with a letter detailing collections that are pertinent to your research topic.
- A curriculum vitae including academic experience and a list of any publications.
- A detailed summary (not to exceed five pages) of the subject and scope of your research. Funding priority will be given to well-developed proposals that will rely significantly on the resources in the Eisenhower Library.
- Tentative timetable for visiting Abilene (including duration of stay in Abilene) and for completing the project.
- A ten-fifteen page writing sample.
- A proposed budget. For information on lodging, food, and travel costs please visit the Abilene Tourism and Convention Bureau website at http://www.abilenekansas.org.
- Information as to any other grant received or being pursued for the project.
- Two or three supporting letters from academic advisors or professional colleagues.
- Intended publication or other use of the product of your research.

A selection panel will review application packages. All applicants will be informed in writing of the selection panel's decision approximately six weeks after the application deadline. Once a grantee has firm travel plans, the grantee will be issued two checks. One check in the amount of half the award will be mailed to the
grantee immediately prior to the research trip to the Library, while the second will be held by the Library for presentation upon arrival. 

If grantee’s research results in a thesis, dissertation, book, or article, a copy of the final product must be submitted to the Eisenhower Library for its holdings.

All materials should be submitted to:
Abilene Travel Grants Program
Eisenhower Foundation
P.O. Box 295
200 S.E. 4th Street
Abilene, KS 67410

Hoover Library Travel Grant

The purpose of the Herbert Hoover Travel Grant Award is to fund travel to the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library in West Branch, Iowa. The Herbert Hoover Presidential Library Association is a nonprofit support group for the Hoover Presidential Library-Museum and Hoover National Historic Site in West Branch. The Association has funded a travel grant program for thirty years, awarding over $460,000 in grants.

Current graduate students, post-doctoral scholars, and independent researchers are eligible to apply. An applicant should contact the archival staff to determine if Library holdings are pertinent to the applicant’s research. Finding aids for library’s major holdings are available online at www.hoover.nara.gov

All funds awarded shall be expended for travel and research expenses related to the use of the holdings of the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library. In recent years, awards have ranged from $500 to $1,500 per applicant. The Association will consider requests for extended research at the library. An independent committee of distinguished scholars from Iowa colleges and universities evaluates the research proposals.

Requirements

1. Completed application form, available at the Library web page
2. Research proposal, up to 1200 words
3. Bibliography page
4. Curriculum vitae
5. Three letters of reference sent directly from writers who are familiar with your work

All materials must be received by March 1, 2011 (postmark date).

For more information, contact:
Delene McConnaha,
Academic Programs Manager
P.O. Box 696
West Branch, IA 52358
800-828-0475
info@hooverassociation.org

Call for Manuscripts: US, Asia, and the World, 1620-1914

Education About Asia (EAA) is the peer-reviewed teaching journal of the Association for Asian Studies. Our readers include undergraduate instructors as well as high school and middle school teachers. Our articles are intended to provide educators, who are often not specialists, with basic understanding of Asia-related content. Qualified referees evaluate all manuscripts submitted for consideration. A plurality of our readers teaches some form of world history, but some of our secondary school teachers are also responsible for U.S. History.

We are in the process of developing a special section entitled "U.S., Asia, and the World, 1620-1914" for the fall 2011 issue. For this special section, we invite authors to submit manuscripts that encompass a wide range of US-Asia topics that focus upon interactions and significant events, drawing from a wide range of areas of study including the arts, diplomacy and politics, economics, military history, and society and culture. We are looking for manuscripts concerning all areas of Asia. We seek manuscripts both from historians of Asia and scholars and teachers with expertise on the United States and other parts of the world. We are especially interested in manuscripts that address U.S.-Asia interactions that proved to have global impact. We are most interested in manuscripts that are useful for introductory survey-level courses at both the secondary and undergraduate
levels. Please consult the EAA guidelines, available on the Web site, before submitting a manuscript. Pay particular attention to feature and teaching resources manuscript word-count ranges. Prospective authors are also encouraged to share possible manuscript ideas with Lucien Ellington via email. The deadline for initial submission of manuscripts is May 10, 2011.

For more information, contact:
Lucien Ellington
Editor, Education About Asia
l-ellington@comcast.net
http://www.asian-studies.org/

New Book Series: War and Society in the Midwest

Ingo Trauschweizer and David Ulbrich are pleased to announce a new book series on "War and Society in the Midwest" to be published by Ohio University Press. We believe that this new series will offer an important forum for rising and established scholars and for engagement of professional and general audiences.

This series provides publishing opportunities for scholars studying war and society in the Midwest, defined as the Old Northwest Territory and the upper Mississippi River basin (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Iowa).

The scope of “war and society” is also broadly conceived, including military history of conflicts in or involving the Midwest; studies of peace movements and pacifist attitudes in or involving the Midwest; examinations of midwesterners fighting in wars or returning from wars; and studies of institutional, political, social, cultural, economic, or environmental factors unique to the Midwest that affect wars and conflicts. Outstanding and timely monographs, surveys, anthologies, or edited primary sources can be considered.

For more information, visit the web page at: http://www.ohioswallow.com/series/War+and+Society+in+the+Midwest

4. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines:

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize recognizes and encourages excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The prize of $1,000 is awarded annually.

Eligibility: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the PhD whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or of any other established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

Procedures: Nominations, in the form of a letter and the nominee’s c.v., should be sent to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter should discuss evidence of the nominee’s excellence in teaching and research.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH). The winner of the prize will deliver a lecture during the SHAFR luncheon at the next year’s OAH annual meeting. The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to a SHAFR presidential address and should address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer’s specific research interests. The lecturer is awarded $1,000 plus up to $500 in travel expenses to the OAH, and his or her lecture is published in Diplomatic History.

To be considered for the 2011 award, nominations must be received by February 28, 2011. Nominations should be sent to: Professor James Goode, Dept. of History, DI-134 Mackinac Hall, Grand Valley State University, Allendale, MI 49401, (goodej@gvsu.edu).

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. The prize of $1,000 is awarded annually to the author of a distinguished article appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations.
Eligibility: The author must be under forty-one years of age or within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of the article’s acceptance for publication. The article must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award or the Myrna F. Bernath Book Award are ineligible.

Procedures: All articles appearing in Diplomatic History will be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations may be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

To nominate an article published in 2010, send three copies of the article and a letter of nomination to Professor Erez Manela, Department of History, 1730 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, (manela@fas.harvard.edu). Deadline for nominations is February 1, 2011.

The Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize

The Betty M. Unterberger Prize is intended to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by graduate students in the field of diplomatic history. The Prize of $1,000 is awarded biannually (in odd years) to the author of a dissertation, completed during the previous two calendar years, on any topic in United States foreign relations history. The Prize is announced at the annual SHAFR conference.

The Prize was established in 2004 to honor Betty Miller Unterberger, a founder of SHAFR and long-time professor of diplomatic history at Texas A&M University.

Procedures: A dissertation may be submitted for consideration by the author or by the author’s advisor. Three copies of the dissertation should be submitted, along with a cover letter explaining why the dissertation deserves consideration.

To be considered for the 2011 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by February 28, 2011. Submit materials to David Painter, Georgetown University, Department of History, Box 571035, ICC 600, Washington, DC 20057-1035.

SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship

SHAFR invites applications for its dissertation completion fellowship. SHAFR will make two, year-long awards, in the amount of $20,000 each, to support the writing and completion of the doctoral dissertation in the academic year 2011-12. These highly competitive fellowships will support the most promising doctoral candidates in the final phase of completing their dissertations. SHAFR membership is required.

Applicants should be candidates for the PhD in a humanities or social science doctoral program (most likely history), must have been admitted to candidacy, and must be at the writing stage, with all substantial research completed by the time of the award. Applicants should be working on a topic in the field of U.S. foreign relations history or international history, broadly defined, and must be current members of SHAFR. Because successful applicants are expected to finish writing the dissertation during the tenure of the fellowship, they should not engage in teaching opportunities or extensive paid work, except at the discretion of the Fellowship Committee. At the termination of the award period, recipients must provide a one page (250-word) report to the SHAFR Council on the use of the fellowship, to be considered for publication in Passport, the society newsletter. The submission packet should include:

- A one page application letter describing the project’s significance
- The applicant’s status
- Other support received or applied for and the prospects for completion within the year
- A three page (750-word) statement of the research
- A curriculum vitae
- A letter of recommendation from the primary doctoral advisor.

Applications should be sent by electronic mail to dissertation-fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line should clearly indicate “Last Name: SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship.”

The annual deadline for submissions is April 1. Fellowship awards will be decided by around May 1 and will be announced formally during the SHAFR annual meeting in June, with expenditure to be administered during the subsequent academic year.
5. Letters to the Editor

October 6, 2010
Dear Professor Hahn,

I write to inform you of how the Samuel Bemis grant awarded to me by SHAFR has helped forward my progress on my dissertation.

The grant helped defray the costs of an exploratory research trip to Honolulu, where I discovered a wealth of archival material on Hawai’i statehood and its aftermath. The Hawai’i state archives has numerous relevant collections, including the papers of all the major groups and political figures involved in the statehood campaign. The University of Hawai’i also has a wide range of sources that go beyond statehood to show more broadly how Hawai’i was portrayed to mainland Americans during the mid-twentieth century. Some of those relevant collections include the records of the Dole Pineapple Company, the Hawaii Visitors Bureau, and of the university itself.

As important, the Bemis award has provided me with financial support during my initial research phase here in Chicago. For the past several months I have been engaged in reviewing secondary literature on Hawai’i statehood as well as analyzing some 11,000 pages of congressional material from the 1940s and 1950s on the statehood question. Through this research I have begun to trace how debates on Hawai’i statehood evolved from a narrow focus on how statehood would transform Hawai’i to how it would transform the United States as a whole. The issue of Hawai’i statehood in many ways became a key vehicle for debating wider questions of American race relations, national identity, and the role of the U.S. in the world. The sheer volume of congressional material on Hawai’i statehood speaks to its cultural and political significance in postwar American society.

This legislative history background will serve me well when I begin my major archival research in Honolulu this coming December. The Bemis award has been instrumental in helping me to prepare for such an undertaking.

Thank you again for your generous support.

Sincerely,
Sarah Miller-Davenport
University of Chicago

September 14, 2010
To the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations:

I am writing to express my appreciation for the 2010 Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant. The grant defrayed the cost of traveling to nine archives, allowing me to study the activities and ideas of multiple groups involved in Cold War anti-poverty programs.

My dissertation asks how ideas about capitalist development evolved through the experience of implementing Cold War anti-poverty programs, and how ideas circulated between the United States and Latin America. Focusing the Latin American research on Colombia, I examine the ideas of competing groups that fought over social policy in both countries: peasants, urban working classes, government officials, capitalists, international financial institutions, academic researchers, and private consultants. The project is a social history of economic thought, in which Cold War reform projects and the social conflicts surrounding them provide the context for studying ideas.

I focus on three Colombian programs that generated vigorous international intervention and domestic social conflict: the creation of Colombia’s first regional development corporation in the 1950s, the construction of Latin America’s largest public housing project during the 1960s, and the transformation of the Colombian economics profession during the 1960s and 1970s. I then follow a number of participants in these projects, including Albert O. Hirschman, David Lilienthal, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, and members of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, back to the United States. There, beginning in the late 1960s, they founded community development corporations, organized business school exchanges, and argued for new forms of corporate investment and public administration.

Between January and July 2010, I traveled to nine archives in the United States. I used government documents
at the Eisenhower and Kennedy Libraries, as well as the National Archives in College Park. These collections contained materials on diplomatic relations with Colombia, Point IV housing missions to Colombia, the transformation of economics education in Colombian universities, housing and macroeconomic policy under the Alliance for Progress, and a campaign by the United States Information Agency and the Advertising Council to project a populist image of US capitalism in Colombia. They also contained information about the creation of the first community development corporation in the United States, the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation, which involved veterans of Colombian anti-poverty programs.

I visited three university archives to read the papers of economists who worked in Colombia. At Duke University, I used the papers of Lauchlin Currie, an architect of New Deal macroeconomic policy who spent the second half of his life in Colombia working as a presidential advisor, urban planner, and academic economist. Currie was a vociferous critic of public housing and land reform policies under the Alliance for Progress, and played an important role in transforming the practice of economics at the Universidad Nacional and the Universidad de los Andes. At Columbia University, I read the papers of George Kalmanoff, who ran a private economic consulting firm with Albert O. Hirschman in Bogotá during the mid-1950s and went on to study strategies of foreign investment in Latin America. Finally, I studied the training and development of Colombian economist Antonio J. Posada in the archives of the University of Wisconsin. Posada received his PhD in Wisconsin’s agricultural economics department in 1952 and subsequently worked with the Wisconsin Land Tenure Center, a university-based institute funded by USAID to study Latin American land reform under the Alliance for Progress. He became the first dean of the economics department at Colombia’s Universidad del Valle and worked for many years with the Cauca Valley Corporation (CVC), Colombia’s first regional development corporation.

Finally, I studied the activities of multilateral institutions, foundations, and consulting companies in anti-poverty programs. First, I used the archives of the United Nations to study the work of the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL, after its Spanish title). CEPAL opened a regional office in Bogotá in 1958, trained Colombian economists in development planning, and wrote the country’s ten-year economic plan adopted under the Alliance for Progress. Second, the Rockefeller Foundation and Nelson Rockefeller were deeply involved in several programs. At the Rockefeller Archives Center, I found materials on the funding and development of economics research and education at the Universidad de los Andes and Universidad del Valle, as well as the creation of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Restoration Corporation. Third, I went to Princeton to use the papers of the Development and Resources Corporation, a consulting company founded by David Lilienthal in 1954. Lilienthal and D&R got their start working with the CVC in Colombia. During the late 1960s, they became involved in US urban redevelopment projects, including the creation of the Bedford-Stuyvesant Redevelopment Corporation and the redesign of energy and land use policy in the New York metropolitan area.

The Bemis grant allowed me to travel extensively in the United States. As my first dissertation research grant, it also strengthened my subsequent funding applications. In August 2010, I began a year of research in Colombia, supported jointly by the SSRC’s International Dissertation Research Fellowship and the Inter-American Foundation’s Grassroots Development Fellowship. I sincerely appreciate the research opportunities that SHAFR’s support has opened for me.

Sincerely,

Amy C. Offner
Columbia University

6. Recent Publications of Interest

Autio-Sarasmo, Sari and Katalin Miklossy, eds. Reassessing Cold War Europe (Routledge, 2010).


Calder, Kent E. Pacific Alliance: Reviving U.S.-Japan Relations (Yale, 2010).


Cullather, Nick. The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle against Poverty in Asia (Harvard, 2010).

Cummings, Bruce. Dominion from Sea to Sea: Pacific Ascendancy and American Power (Yale, 2010).


Doyle, Robert. C. The Enemy in our Hands: America's Treatment of Prisoners of War from the Revolution to the War on Terror (University Press of Kentucky, 2010).

Edwards, Paul M. Historical Dictionary of the Korean War (Scarecrow, 2010).


Folly, Martin and Niall Palmer. Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy from World War I through World War II (Scarecrow, 2010).


Glenn, Nakano Evelyn. Forced to Care: Coercion and Caregiving in America (Harvard, 2010).

Green, James N. We Cannot Remain Silent: Opposition to the Brazilian Military Dictatorship in the United States (Duke, 2010).


Greenberg, Karen. The Least Worst Place: Guantanamo's First 100 Days (Oxford, 2010).


Hornblum, Allen M. The Invisible Harry Gold: The Man who Gave the Soviets the Atom Bomb (Yale, 2010).


Jones, Toby Craig. Desert Kingdom: How Oil and Water Forged Modern Saudi Arabia (Harvard, 2010).

Lansford, Tom. The A to Z of U.S. Diplomacy since the Cold War (Scarecrow, 2010).

Loveman, Brian. No Higher Law: American Foreign Policy and the Western Hemisphere (North Carolina, 2010).


Moyar, Mark. A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq (Yale University Press, 2010).


Patel, Kiran Klaus and Christoff Mauch. The United States and Germany during the Twentieth Century (Cambridge, 2010).


Sarantakes, Nicholas Evan. Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War (Cambridge, 2010).
Springer, Paul J. *America's Captives: Treatment of POWs from the Revolutionary War to the War on Terror* (Kansas, 2010).
The Last Word

Richard Hume Werking

At the annual conference this past June in Madison, the SHAFR Teaching Committee presented its sixth program in as many years: “Using Digitized Documents in Teaching: The University of Wisconsin’s Foreign Relations of the United States Series.” The presentations at that program will appear in the next issue of Passport.

Under the leadership first of Mark Gilderhus, Texas Christian University, and currently that of Mark Stoler, University of Vermont, the Teaching Committee has made good progress in its efforts to promote and facilitate the teaching of the history of U.S. foreign relations. It seeks to do so through such means as creating and sponsoring conference programs, assisting the publication of teaching-related articles in Passport, and developing and maintaining on the SHAFR website an array of the most useful resources for SHAFR members and others to draw upon for their teaching. Our group was established as a task force by SHAFR President Stoler in 2004 and subsequently converted by Council to a committee in 2005. Several aspects of its ongoing work may be found on the SHAFR website (www.shafr.org) under “Teaching” and then “Higher Education” including the following:

Documents Project. A documents subcommittee has been identifying and arranging for the digitization of a number of documents that we consider among the most useful for teaching the history of American foreign relations. Those few posted on the “Teaching” portion of the SHAFR website (www.shafr.org) so far include the usual suspects (George Washington’s “farewell address” in 1796, Woodrow Wilson’s war message in April 1917, George Kennan’s “Sources of Soviet Conduct” in 1947, etc.) as well as a facsimile of the document probably handled most frequently by the American public – a dollar bill. More are on the way.

Although simply the digitizing and posting of the documents will be useful for teachers, the committee believes that a significant enhancement will be short introductions and brief bibliographies accompanying the documents. Members of the committee have provided these for some of the documents, but in addition we invite all members of SHAFR, and even non-members as well, to submit their own suggestions for introductions and bibliographies – even for documents which already have them. In this manner we can learn more from one another about not only which documents we use, but to some extent why we want our students to confront them, whether within or beyond the classroom. Hence the committee encourages those of you who would like either to suggest additional documents or to submit introductions and bibliographies for documents already posted to contact Matt Loayza, Minnesota State University, Mankato (matt.loayza@mnsu.edu) who will be heading the documents subcommittee beginning in January 2011.

Syllabi & Assignments Initiative. The number of contributions to the Syllabi Initiative on the SHAFR website has grown to 49. Containing syllabi for both graduate and undergraduate courses, the list is further organized by time periods covered. All SHAFR members and other teachers of our subject are cordially invited to add their contributions, especially (though not only) if they feature additional readings, viewings, pedagogical approaches, or other material that will usefully complement what is already there. Moreover the committee is planning to enlarge the scope to include digitizing and posting assignments from teachers as well. This new Syllabus & Assignments Initiative will allow SHAFR members to share the intellectual structure of their courses and their reading lists, as well as practical tips for classroom management. A subcommittee headed by Nicole Phelps, University of Vermont (nphelps@uvm.edu) will be updating and expanding this portion of the website in 2011, and it will also be inviting contributors to update their syllabi if they would like to do so.

Director of Secondary Education. Another relatively recent initiative, approved by the SHAFR Council in 2008, established the position of Director of Secondary Education and subsequently allied it with the Teaching Committee. The incumbent of this position, John Tully of Central Connecticut State University, is in the process of soliciting, editing, and posting on the website 15-20 lesson plans for secondary school teachers. SHAFR members interested in contributing lesson plans or suggestions to this undertaking are invited to contact him at tullyj@mail.ccsu.edu.

Teaching-Related Articles in Passport. During the past few years, these have become much more frequent, thanks to the efforts of editor Mitch Lerner. Not including articles in this December issue, and also not counting “Last Word” pieces, sixteen such articles have been published since December 2004 and are available on the website.

SHAFR Survey of Teaching. Several years ago our committee conducted this survey among the SHAFR membership (and one or two non-members), receiving 154 responses that provided information about 323 courses. Both a detailed description of the survey results and an article in Passport analyzing those results are available on the website. Among the findings that especially interested me was the one which showed that at least 79% of the identified courses required student research in materials beyond those specified by the professor, with three-quarters of these requiring research in primary sources.

Last Word of a Last Word. Suggestions to the SHAFR Teaching Committee are always welcome. I hope you will share yours with any member of the Teaching Committee; our names and affiliations are on the SHAFR website.

Richard Hume Werking is professor of history and professor of library science at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD.
SAVE THE DATE!

2011 Annual SHAFR Conference
June 23-25, 2011
Alexandria, Virginia

For more SHAFR information, visit us on the web at www.shafr.org