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Thoughts From SHAFR President
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It’s gratifying to address SHAFR as a new year gets underway, because the fresh start provides an opportunity to look back as much as forward. Before combining a pep talk with a little bragging on this organization of ours, I wish to thank some people who have made SHAFR, at least for me (and really, for all of us) the perfect home for our research, teaching, and service interests. No need to name names, since doing so risks overlooking somebody. Nonetheless, I am grateful every time I write something and need it proofed, have a research or teaching question, or attend a conference and catch up with buddies. We should give thanks to friends, former presidents, and editorial staff because they have left us such a wonderful organization that is full of interesting people doing interesting things, and one that is solvent as well! They have also left a wonderful legacy for our students, who will inherit SHAFR and make it even better than it is today.

Regardless of my resolve not to single out anyone, I must focus on two people who deserve a special nod, because without them, this organization simply would not function. First, Peter Hahn. Every officer of SHAFR—and, I imagine, any member who has had a reimbursement, by-law, or scheduling issue—knows how essential Peter is to the organization. As the long-standing executive director, he is the pivot on which all else turns. Other associations have such people, but what makes Peter different is his attention to detail; he serves as our institutional memory, in-house informal legal expert, and supervisor of all ways and means. Peter’s profound concern that SHAFR be a well-run and transparent organization that meets the high standards set for it over the past forty-plus years is clearly evident at Council meetings. And his innate sense of fairness ensures that every member has a voice and a role in SHAFR. We are lucky to have Peter as our steady leader at the helm, and I hope he remains there for years to come.

Second, many of us know—but many of you might not realize—that Jennifer Walton, SHAFR’s Conference Coordinator, makes our annual meeting happen. It is as simple as that. Without her, the conference would undoubtedly be plagued with all manner of snafus and everything from rooms to meals to excursions would certainly be more expensive. Jennifer is under the gun every year to bring off the conference, and she does it with such competence that we tend to assume that she simply snaps her fingers! Above all, she labors with such good cheer (even when I come up with wild ideas for future venues that put her on the verge of a nervous breakdown) and can-do spirit! Jennifer is our go-to person and it is our great fortune that she is our guiding hand on all conference matters. Now, on to Havana!

We get very hot and bothered in our organization when we discuss our identity. Defining who we are, what we should be, and how we should show we are who we are or who we need to be—in short, seeking to prove we are heading in the right (or wrong) direction—has used up reams of paper in our journal, Diplomatic History, here in Passport, and in surveys and collections. Hell, I can’t stop myself, as this very article shows, but one of the many perks of being president of SHAFR (beyond the limo) is a chance to sound off, even on topics that have been beaten to death.

We seem to have a lot of explaining to do as historians of American foreign relations (see, even I shied away from the term “diplomatic historian”). SHAFR panelists constantly begin their papers and commentaries with the identity issue. (“Yeah, many of you are steeped in the traditions of diplomatic history, but not me. I’m linking with the advance guard of historians in other areas, while you are out of touch with current trends.”) In 2008, I wrote a state-of-the field essay for the Journal of American History. Early drafts began with a description of how over the course of a scholarly lifetime diplomatic historians move from self-flagellation to self-defense to defiant expressions of the avant garde. But shockingly, the journal’s manuscript reviewers instructed me to snap out of it, get over the persecution complex, and talk about how effective our subfield is at explaining the past. Funny how six anonymous reviewers who were not diplomatic historians urged me to trumpet that we study the state, that we’ve adjusted over the decades to the new forces of transnationalism and cultural studies, and that we understand the universally-recognized importance of power. I thought they might even use the “É” word (Exceptional) but I think that’s what they were telling me all along!

We’re good, very good. We’re interesting, far-ranging in our research, methodologically in tune, and above all, doing what we like to do. The worry and prodding are not going to stop, principally because we are such a vibrant and well-run, financially healthy, transparent, and, at heart, deeply scholarly organization whose members care about their research and their teaching mission. We want to embrace anyone—whatever their identity—who is attracted to the study of U.S. foreign relations and international history.

But you know what? We’ve tried to do that all along (or at least since I joined SHAFR in the early 1990s), even in the supposed dark ages of traditionalism when we were accused of writing only about elites in striped pants. Check out the mission statement of the journal, readily available on the SHAFR website: “Diplomatic History is the only journal devoted to U.S. international history and foreign relations, broadly defined, including grand strategy, diplomacy, and issues involving gender, culture, ethnicity, and ideology. It examines U.S. relations in a global and comparative context, and its broad focus appeals to a number of disciplines, including political science, international economics, American history, national security studies, and Latin American, Asian,
African, and European studies.” Does that sound like a journal that, despite debate about its name (and we all believe it could be improved, but we must admit that it’s got cache), wishes to shut out all comers? A publication out of touch with reality?

And we have a quite simple mission that has undergirded our breadth, depth, and trendiness. Read the statement about who we are, first enunciated forty years ago, on the SHAFR website: “The purpose of the corporation is: The maintenance of a Society of Historians for the study, advancement and dissemination of a knowledge of American Foreign Relations and the doing of all acts incidental to the accomplishment thereof.” Can you think of another such simple (almost bare) statement that is more wide-ranging, if not welcoming?

We can always do more. That’s what I have in mind. I haven’t met one member of SHAFR who is content with the status quo. We may need to internationalize our scholarship and our membership more, recruit more women and minorities, and reach into less-traditional areas (archives, government agencies, NGOs) for input. We worry (justifiably) about the job market, but so does everyone. We get anxious when another diplomatic history line closes but it’s hard to imagine a department, or a university, without an expert historian in American foreign relations. Sure, I’ve quipped along with others that the field of history hates us, but the students love us. The first part is not (entirely!) true, but the second certainly is. So we adjust, adapt, and change, sometimes even mobilizing to explain who we are, all in an effort to prove our worth and maintain a presence in our institutions. What we should really be doing more! Consider Passport reading. Mitch Lerner made Passport into an open forum for discussion of everything foreign relations, and Andy Johns has fully embraced that tradition. We are lucky to have both of them as our guides! There are many voices in SHAFR who rejoice at how good we are, but we should continue to strive to get even better. That we constantly engage in self-examination is no sign of weakness; on the contrary, it shows our maturity, stability, and innovative spirit. We should each focus on what most interests us, and then produce valuable, insightful history. We should care about the quality of what we write rather than obsessing about how others look at us and where we fit in. We fit, in fact, everywhere in the field of history. That is our true identity: the all-purpose subfield of U.S. and global history. I’m proud of that!

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A Roundtable Discussion of Nick Cullather’s The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Hunger in Asia

Erez Manela, Amy Sayward, David Ekbladh, Meredith Oyen, and Nick Cullather

Roundtable on Nick Cullather, The Hungry World
Erez Manela

Ot long ago, AHA president Linda Kerber famously declared that now “we are all historians of human rights.”1 Well, I am not sure about that. But increasingly it does seem that we are all, at least those of us involved with the study of the United States in the world, historians of development. The history of postwar development and modernization programs has been one of the fastest growing, most exciting fields of inquiry among international historians of late. It fits neatly with, and indeed has had an important role in propelling, the rapidly expanding interest of international historians in U.S. relations with the global south, in the role of non-state actors (including various UN bodies and philanthropic organizations such as the Rockefeller and Ford foundations), and in the history of an interrelated complex of global problems such as poverty, hunger, disease, and population that, until quite recently, were rarely broached by members of our guild.2

Given the great vitality of this field of inquiry at present it is easy to forget how recent much of this interest is. It began with an interest in the ideologies of development, primarily modernization theory, with Michael Latham’s pioneering work, Modernization as Ideology.3 Other studies on the ideology of development, again principally from the U.S. perspective, followed from Nils Gilman, David Engerman, David Ekkbladh, and others, with Odd Arne Westad’s recent work expanding the frame to look also at the Soviet pursuit of development abroad and, indeed, reframing the Cold War as a superpower battle for the global south.4 The literature now includes detailed investigations of modernization as a policy and practice and also encompasses the role of international organizations, with Matthew Connelly’s recent exposé of the history of global population control seamlessly weaving ideology and practice, state and non-state actors into a rich, compelling narrative.5 The field, barely in existence a decade ago, has now become mature enough to require historiographical reviews and even synthetic texts, with Latham again leading the way.6

Into this vibrant conversation comes Nick Cullather’s fascinating account of the United States’ war on poverty in Asia. This book has been eagerly anticipated by those who have followed the articles that Cullather published in the course of his work on this project, and it does not disappoint. It is sophisticated and nuanced in its analysis, prodigiously researched, and provides a richly detailed, densely packed narrative. It builds on the insights of previous authors on the history of U.S. development aid but also pushes the cutting edge quite a way forward. It deserves to be—and no doubt will be—universally read and assigned by anyone interested in U.S. foreign relations, the Cold War, and twentieth-century international history.

While other scholars have recently looked at U.S. food aid policy in the 1960s, Cullather paints on a much larger canvas. His book is of the myth-busting variety, and the myth he takes aim at is that of the green revolution. The mythical narrative goes something like this. Countries of the global south (with India as exhibit A) had suffered famine since time immemorial, and the condition was growing progressively worse in the twentieth century as Third World populations “exploded.” But a Malthusian disaster was averted due to the ingenuity of scientists headed by agronomist Norman Borlaug (one of only six people, Wikipedia tells us, to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the Presidential Medal of Freedom, and the Congressional Gold Medal, not to mention the Padma Vibhushan, India’s second highest civilian honor). Borlaug and his collaborators, having worked for decades to perfect high-yield seed varieties (HYVs) for staples such as wheat and rice, finally managed, as a result of yet another Indian famine in 1966, to break through peasant inertia and bureaucratic resistance and bring about the adoption of their seeds in south Asia, transforming India overnight from a famine-prone, nutritionally deficient, grain-importing country to one of agricultural abundance, or at least self-sufficiency. The myth of the green revolution—a term coined in 1968 by USAID director William Gaud—not only lionized Borlaug and his collaborators but also became a holy grail for the international development community, cited as an inspirational model, if not as a specific blueprint, for latter-day modernizers from Bill Gates to Bono.

Bill and Bono may have to find another narrative to hang on to, as Cullather takes the green revolution story apart piece by piece. For the U.S. scientists and especially for their supporters in and out of government, he tells us, HYVs were not so much about fighting hunger as about winning hearts and minds in the Third World, helping usher in the “demographic transition” that would slow the growth of poor populations, and helping emerging states better control farmers by making them dependant on external inputs of seeds, fertilizer, machinery, and logistics. For officials in the “developing world”—a term that itself betrays the hegemonic nature of the development narrative that Cullather sets out to question—the new techniques promised more yields that could be siphoned out.
of the countryside to feed the cities and support industrial development. And finally, the much advertised success of the green revolution was in fact very partial and came at a steep price. The HYV rice IR-8, for example, succumbed to leaf rust in Sri Lanka, and even where yields did increase the benefits were often unevenly distributed, sowing conflict in villages and trouble for modernizing elites.

The book, though not long, is densely packed, ranging widely across time, space, and theme. The story covers much of the twentieth century, takes us from the United States to Mexico to much of Asia, and deals with the scientific and intellectual underpinnings of development as well as the unfolding of programs on the ground. Not least, the book highlights the importance of hitherto obscure characters in the history of development. We learn a lot about Borlaug and his collaborators, of course, and the usual suspects of modernization history—Walt Rostow, Max Millikan, et al.—get their due. But there is also Wilbur O. Atwater, who at the turn of the twentieth century discovered and popularized the concept of the calorie, standardizing the measurement of the nutritional value of different foodstuffs and thus revolutionizing the thinking about global food supply as well as about individual nutrition. We learn about Albert Mayer, New Deal civil engineer and urban planner-cum-community-development impresario, whose work in India in the 1950s Cullather covers in some detail; and about Wolf Ladejinsky, who was instrumental in affecting land reform in U.S.-occupied Japan and later advocated similar measures elsewhere to modernize rural societies in the global south. They are all compelling actors in the drama of U.S. postwar efforts in international development, and they deserve a place of honor alongside Rostow et al. in any future accounting of this history. Moreover, Cullather, though apparently using only English-language sources (it is not easy to say with certainty, given Harvard University Press’s regrettable decision to omit a full bibliography), deserves praise for fleshing out the role of South Asian actors and institutions in this story, showing them as full participants in the drama with a complex diversity of positions and roles.

The book covers not only the story of the development and implementation of HYVs but also explores other experiments in international development, in India and elsewhere, including community development, land reform, and dam building. This breadth is illuminating but also creates some narrative difficulties. The story of the development of HYVs, for example, whose beginnings in Mexico in the early 1940s are brilliantly recounted in Chapter 2, is not picked up again until Chapter 7, with the food crisis in India in the mid-1960s. And the book’s scope also raises some questions that are not fully answered.

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**CONGRATULATIONS!**

**The following colleagues were elected in the 2011 SHAFR election:**

**President:**

**THOMAS ZEILER**

**Vice President:**

**MARK PHILIP BRADLEY**

**Council:**

**CAROL C. CHIN**

**MARY L. DUDZIAK**

**SARAH B. SNYDER**

**Graduate Student Representative:**

**CHRIS DIETRICH**

**Nominating Committee:**

**MICHAEL ALLEN**

The membership ratified the referenda on revisions of Article II, Section 5(a) and Article II, Section 5(d) of the SHAFR By-Laws.
or incompatible ones? Chapter 4 in particular, which focuses on U.S. dam-building projects in Afghanistan's Helmand Valley, is fascinating but feels rather unrelated to the rest of the book, except in a very general way.

Cullather's argument is subtle and complex. While certainly critical of U.S. development projects, he eschews simple genealogies that plot straight lines to postwar development from earlier U.S. (or other) imperial projects or racial hierarchies. Rather, he is careful to note that many of the postwar reformers, to the extent that they expressed their thoughts in such sweeping terms, earnestly sought to break away from imperial and/or supremacist models. He also avoids the simplistic but oft-repeated argument that development efforts inevitably faltered because they were based on sweeping, universalist theories and failed to take into account local circumstance and knowledge. In fact, Cullather shows that this critique was already common in development circles in the 1950s and explicitly theorized by figures such as Mayer, who was an advocate of cultural pluralism and sought to immerse himself in local contexts. Indeed, experts involved in international development often took every opportunity to express their disdain for abstract theorizing and to celebrate practical solutions that came from experience in the field; theirs was the sort of attitude popularized by the 1959 bestseller The Ugly American, whose eponymous hero was a practical-minded engineer who eschewed theory and rhetoric in favor of a hands-on, problem-solving approach.

Of course, even if most of Cullather's protagonists are cleared of the charges of imperialism, racism, or universalism, their records are far from unblemished. The story, again to Cullather's credit, is complex, but if there is one recurring critique it is that development impresarios in the Age of High Modernism put too much faith in the ability of "experts" to devise "win-win" technocratic solutions that would marginalize political struggle and differences. The green revolutionaries did not ignore politics altogether; on the contrary, they became quite adept at locating political opportunities and pressure points in Washington, New Delhi, and elsewhere to advance their agenda. But they defined the central issue as a technocratic rather than political one. Hunger was a problem of the ratio of food supply to population, isolated from broader contexts such as social hierarchies that excluded some groups from the right to proper nutrition or property regimes and government policies that favored cash crops over food or city over country. For the green revolutionaries, politics were an obstacle, regrettable if unavoidable, on the road to technocratic solutions to the problem of hunger.

The analysis is compelling, but even as one is impressed with Cullather's reasoning one can hear the developmentalist rejoinder—this argument, after all, is hardly a new one in those circles. In global health circles, for example, it is often expressed as a conflict between the vertical and the horizontal approaches to health problems. The vertical approach, following the lead of scientific medicine since at least the advent of germ theory (though its roots are more ancient), views disease as a discrete problem caused by identifiable pathogens and assumes that the goal of public health campaigns is to separate pathogen and human—i.e., to disrupt transmission. This approach gave rise to the well-known eradication campaigns of the postwar period, from malaria to polio to, most famously, smallpox. The counter-argument, the horizontal or social medicine approach, is similar to Cullather's critique. Disease, it contends, is a complex phenomenon with myriad social causes, and any project to eradicate a specific pathogen that ignores the broader contexts (hunger, poverty, social exclusion, lack of healthcare infrastructure, etc.) will fail even if it succeeds in disrupting transmission, since it would simply leave the disadvantaged vulnerable to other diseases and indignities.

A typical verticalist retort is to concede that the horizontalists are right in principle; in the end, all social ills are connected and, ideally, one should seek to eradicate not just one disease but all of them, along with hunger, poverty, and (in the favored example of one convinced verticalist I know) traffic accidents. But, they add, if we were to wait to tackle any single social problem until we could tackle all of them we would be left paralyzed by our own inadequacy or mired in utopian schemes. One can almost hear the green revolutionaries retort to Cullather's charge: yes, we isolated the problem, and yes, our success was only partial, and yes, there were unintended consequences. But had we not done it that way we would either have done nothing at all, or we would have tried to do much more, with perhaps a greater measure of coercion and even greater unintended consequences.

Though Cullather does not put it in these terms, the developmentalist gamut he presents can be broadly divided into two overlapping but distinct schools, the technocratic and the social reformist, with the plant scientists and dam builders in the first school and the community developers and land reformers in the second. The first school is based on the search for techno-scientific solutions, apolitical and, at least in principle, universally scalable. The second approach, on the other hand, focuses on socio-political rather than technical solutions, attempting to change social, legal, and economic structures that undergird poverty and hunger. But while Cullather's focus on the green revolution means that his primary criticism is directed at the technocrats, the story he tells appears to suggest that, at different times and places, all of the above approaches were tried and all failed to meet expectations, whether because of contradictions in the theory itself, gaps between theory and implementation, or both.

Cullather's book, then, seems to follow the script of much of the recent work on the history of development, that of history as cautionary tale. It is a venerable tradition and an important one, but sometimes I wonder whether it is all we historians can offer. It might be insufficient, especially if we aspire to have the history we write shape the present and the future—as Cullather clearly does. If all history can be is a cautionary tale, if all historians can do is detail the inadequacies of the past, what constructive lessons can we impart to present and future policymakers? One endorsement on the book's jacket copy suggests that reading it should bring us to rethink international development entirely, to start over with a clean slate. But if historians cannot pronounce anything in the past a success, even a partial one; if the message of history is that everything already tried has failed, policymakers will ask, What is the way forward? It may well be that we should be content to remain critics, keeping a studied distance from the halls of power. But if so we must recognize the result: namely, the abandonment of the arena of policy influence to economists. Now there is a real vision of doom.

Whatever the policy implications, Cullather's book and others like it have made invaluable contributions to our understanding of postwar U.S. and international history. They have focused on the consequence of regions that have until recently stood on the far margins of the narrative. They have brought to
light the significance of institutions and actors—global philanthropies, international organizations, expert networks—that have been, by and large, similarly neglected. And they have fleshed out in scintillating detail stories that until recently we have been unable to view except through the foggy lens of myth-making or the distorting mirror of partisan polemics. But there is much more to do. Not least, we need to globalize the story of international development, to date told largely from the perspectives of U.S.-based actors, fleshing out the roles of the Soviet Union, China, and various European states, among others. The recent surge of dissertations and books on topics related to the history of international development shows that much, indeed, is already being done. If nothing else, this work should give Bill and Bono pause.

Erez Manela is Professor of History at Harvard University.

Notes:
1. Linda K. Kerber, “We Are All Historians of Human Rights,” Perspectives 44/7 (October 2006).

An Intellectual History of Development
Amy L. Sayward

Those of us who read Nick Cullather’s recent articles in the American Historical Review (“The Foreign Policy of the Calorie”), Diplomatic History (“Miracles of Modernization”), and the Journal of American History (“Damning Afghanistan”) have been eagerly awaiting the book that would bring all of these ideas together between one set of covers.1

The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia does not disappoint. In this volume we have a sweeping intellectual history of Americans’ ideas of development grounded in a set of representative examples from U.S. efforts to “develop” Asia during the Cold War. Cullather is not alone in his endeavor to understand the theories that lay behind U.S. development efforts abroad in the twentieth century. In just the past year we have seen the publication of Michael Latham’s The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the Cold War to the Present and David Ekbładh’s The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an American World Order.2 This recent outpouring bespeaks the urgency that international historians are attching to developing a holistic understanding of this set of theories that had so many specific, local impacts around the globe after the Second World War. Cullather certainly moves us toward that goal.

From the beginning, Cullather is engaged in the enterprise of intellectual history. He defines development as “a new type of international politics . . . where the demands of nations for security and prestige connect with the most personal of needs, for health, work, and food” (ix), and he vividly illustrates how American leaders’ fears and their need to understand what had happened in the wake of Mao’s successful revolution helped to define development efforts for the next twenty years. At the center of these efforts was food. Americans believed food and agriculture to be their particular areas of expertise, and they defined hunger and poverty as a threat to international stability in the Cold War rather than simply a “given” in human society. To combat that threat, U.S. policymakers—in collaboration with Asian leaders and a large body of transnational experts from a variety of agencies, foundations, and non-governmental organizations—sought to create development showcases that could serve as universal templates for bringing modernity to the peasantry of Asia and winning their Cold War allegiances. These development bureaucrats focused on achieving a balance between population and food supplies, on modifying the psychology of the peasant, and on building modern nation-states in which new, indigenous governments could project their power into and onto rural areas through agricultural development.

The power of the idea of development derived in part from the ways in which it reinforced American ideas of mission and exceptionalism and from the ways that it addressed Americans’ desire to play a positive role in the world. It led commentators to further the myths of the “green revolution” (despite its failures) and the universally applicable development model as part of their historical memory. The model of Cold War development experts in the world. It led commentators to further the myths of the “green revolution” (despite its failures) and the universally applicable development model as part of their historical memory. These myths persist: Cullather identifies vestigial remnants of them in the Obama administration’s recent actions and intonations about the solutions to problems in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because of the tenacity of the idea of development, he is very careful to debunk the myths associated with it in order to reclaim the historical reality of the contested, messy, and conflicted story of agricultural development efforts in Asia. Indeed, he illustrates the complete failure of Cold War development experts “to settle on a single, consensus model of rural development” (5). They disagreed about the appropriate model, the ultimate goal, and the appropriate means of measuring the success of agricultural development. But if Cullather eschews the triumphal story of the green revolution’s success, he also avoids the pessimistic narrative that urges the abandonment of development.
development efforts. Instead, he says that the development policymakers and workers “went to Asia seeking adventure and a chance to fulfill their generation’s responsibility to confront poverty. . . . They brought running water, new knowledge, and sometimes prosperity, but they also supervised the disruption or displacement of thousands of people” (6).

Like other scholars, Cullather introduces the reader to the “long history” of development, which was launched well before President Truman announced his Point Four program and the United Nations created its specialized agencies to promote economic development. The Hungry World begins with Wilbur Atwater’s 1896 calorimeter, which reduced food to universally measurable calories and made food supplies subject to scientific planning by governments. U.S. Food Administrator Herbert Hoover appeared to be putting Atwater’s ideas into practice during World War I; moreover, the future President embedded in the American consciousness the idea that its international security was tied to its ability to manage the global food supply in a rational way. The new Rockefeller Foundation, which had played a supporting role in Belgian relief, made similar linkages, as did the League of Nations and FDR: the League of Nations issued international nutritional reports; Roosevelt made “freedom from want” a war aim and convened the first meeting of the Food and Agriculture Organization; and the Rockefeller Foundation sought to use science to transform Mexican agriculture during World War II, with the aim of creating a model that could be implemented throughout what came to be called the Third World.

At the center of Cullather’s chapter on the Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP) is the central dilemma of agricultural development: “how, or even if, improved agriculture translated into an improved society” (57). While MAP’s original goal was to raise farmers’ incomes and living standards, the solution offered by the Rockefeller Foundation and Norman Borlaug—improved agricultural efficiency through high-yield crop varieties and disease control—seemed to be responding to a problem that did not exist, as the Mexican government had chosen to import cheap food from the United States in order to focus on export-oriented agriculture. By the end of the project, the foundation’s enunciated goal had been transformed into national agricultural self-sufficiency, which favored commercial producers and did not further the original goal of increasing the standard of living for farmers. However, in light of the Cold War and growing concerns about the race between food and population growth, the painful trade-offs involved in the Mexican model were conveniently forgotten, and MAP became “a reassuring template to guide [American] actions in Asia” (69).

By defining Asia’s problem as hunger, which “could be relieved through organization and applied research” (70), American policymakers regained a sense that they had an answer to the Cold War dilemma posed by a Maoist China in the 1940s—agricultural development. Point Four addressed this discrete problem, and the leaders of the newly independent nations of Asia accepted development as the path toward modernity. But which developmental path would lead to modernity? Was it the community development model championed by the Ford Foundation and Albert Mayer in India, which sought to improve the components of village life through external, expert interventions that would in turn lead to voluntary participation by the newly motivated peasants? By 1957, the Indian model seemed to be failing, but these community development ideas were later resurrected in South Vietnam’s strategic hamlet projects, a CIA project in the Philippines, and the Peace Corps. Was the land reform model the road to development? Under U.S. agricultural attaché Woll Ladejinsky, the land reform program in Japan seemed to present a compelling case, but elsewhere in Asia, land reform ran up against entrenched interests. Ultimately, the goals of rural development were defined as yields, resources, and revenues rather than “the renovation of the peasant [and] the enhancement of the status, health, productivity, and allegiance of villagers and tenants,” which had been the focus of both the rural development and land reform strategies (106).

Much more impressive in their visual impact were the multipurpose, TVA-style dams of the 1950s, which Cullather sees as symbols of the “heroic age of development.” These dams, which had a strong hold on the imaginations of the world’s leaders and development technocrats, fit with national development plans as well as key state-building themes, including “the legitimacy of rules, the reach of central authority, the tending of borders and populations, and the training of elites” (113). Afghanistan was certainly a state in need of building in the postwar period, so it is not surprising that it garnered its own TVA equivalent, the Helmand and Arghandab Valley Authority (HAVA), complete with a suburban-style planned community (Lashkar Gah) ninety miles outside of Kandahar, meant to house and settle the area’s nomadic Pashtuns. Cold War and development imperatives (especially Khrushchev’s 1955 economic offensive) overruled early and persistent concerns about the dam’s viability and its usefulness to the area’s development, but ultimately the development efforts collapsed under their own weight. While other dam projects did not fail as spectacularly as the HAVA, none met their initial expectations, and all raised new questions and problems not initially imagined. Nonetheless, dams continued to hold their own in the development imagination.

Technology—a rhetorical argument in the form of an object—was certainly at the center of the damming efforts of the HAVA, but it also took center stage with the International Rice Research Institute’s IR-8 dwarf rice, which similarly made the demarcation between modernity and tradition visible in the landscape. Development advocates believed that the sight of such technology in action would help peasants develop their own faith in development. The technocrats of Ferdinand Marcos’ Philippines and those fighting for the hearts and minds of the South Vietnamese both hoped that IR-8’s dark green shoots would help peasants see “the redemptive power of science and economic growth” (161). Instead of serving as an alternative to Communist development, IR-8 became the centerpiece of the newly consolidated Vietnam’s rural reconstruction program.

India occupied center stage in the development thinking and planning of the 1960s, as both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations defined poverty as a strategic threat and sought to showcase India’s development as a distinctly Western and democratic alternative to the Soviet model. As in Mexico, they focused on India’s “hunger” as the problem that needed international aid to solve. Cullather casts the U.S. decision to focus on hunger as a narrative strategy, because much like Mexico’s exports under MAP, India’s agricultural exports (especially jute) were booming in the 1950s and providing much of the currency for the country’s industrialization as well as its food imports from Southeast Asia (in addition to Public
that accompanied development in memories of the political struggles (consciously or not) burying the year as “a necessary moment of wave of wheat” (232) that inundated the definition of development. The “tidal Cullather presents a history full of saving millions of lives from famine, the mythic tale of dwarf wheat global leadership. But in place of opportunity to exercise America’s ultimately to turn famine into an broader consortium of donors, and burden of international aid with a Minister Indira Gandhi, to share the India’s economy from new Prime the goals that their civilian leadership to gain greater liberalization of of Jawaharlal Nehru’s strategy of industrial development, jute exports and food imports helped to free India of the agricultural vestiges of British mercantile policy. For supporters of agricultural self-sufficiency, increased wheat cultivation (using new dwarf varieties) could free India from the specter of famine. The Chinese attacks along India’s northern frontier in October 1962 were a severe blow to supporters of Nehruvian industrialization and its third five-year plan. The death knell for industrialization came in 1964, with Nehru’s death and the ascension of Lal Bahadur Shastri. Shastri declared a food crisis, which by definition required increased budget allocations for agriculture. It also meant economic liberalization, fewer resources for industrialization, a retreat from nonalignment, and the abandonment of even the appearance of a redistributive agenda in the countryside. According to Cullather, these changes seemed to dissolve much of the sense of national unity and mission that had united the country since independence.

The Shastri government’s agricultural reform project (which focused on prices, credit, fertilizer, and contraceptives) shared its top-down effort to renovate socially and psychologically the countryside with IR-8 and HAVA promoters. Following the 1965 war with Pakistan, Shastri used his increased political power to further his agricultural reforms. In turn, the Johnson administration used the 1966–67 Indian famine (which was defined by American statistics rather than actual deaths) and its short-sighted policy as leveraging to gain greater liberalization of India’s economy from new Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, to share the burden of international aid with a broader consortium of donors, and ultimately to turn famine into an opportunity to exercise America’s global leadership. But in place of the mythic tale of dwarf wheat saving millions of lives from famine, Cullather presents a history full of nutritional, economic, and political trade-offs that fits well with his definition of development. The “tidal wave of wheat” (232) that inundated India in 1968 highlighted those trade-offs. And while development planners frantically sought to define the year as “a necessary moment of culmination” (233), they were also (consciously or not) burying the memories of the political struggles that accompanied development in Asia. As wheat flooded onto the continent’s markets, clashes between social classes, the dislocation of small farmers, and the political costs of backing development (exemplified by the ouster of Ayub Khan in Pakistan) emerged as major problems. By the mid-1970s, other analysts (most notably Amartya Sen) had begun efforts to redefine the causes of famine from Malthusian races between food and population to social breakdowns and gender inequality that deprived people of access to food supplies.

Reading The Hungry World, I was struck by a sense of déjà vu. During the Fall 2010 semester, Dr. Conrad C. Crane, director of the U.S. Army Military History Institute at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, visited Middle Tennessee State University and presented the counter-insurgency strategy that he had worked to develop with General David Petraeus in 2006 as part of crafting a new Army and Marine Corps manual on irregular warfare to direct military efforts in Iraq. As he discussed the nature of irregular warfare, he talked about how “the war” varied from place to place in the same region and from time to time even in the same place. He constructed a tremendously complex model that struck the historians in the audience as the closest representation of the historical experience of warfare we had seen. In fact, it was so complex that the conclusion that the military thinkers drafting the manual came to was that they had to teach American soldiers how to think—not what to think. Only if they could critically and appropriately respond to the fluid situation in front of them could U.S. military forces hope to accomplish the goals that their civilian leadership had set for them.

Similarly, Cullather introduces us to an incredibly complex picture of the vast social, economic, and political changes that swept the world in the wake of World War II. He challenges us to think more critically and creatively about the “bold new experiment in mankind’s relationship to each other and to the land” that was simplistically labeled “development” both at the time and in many histories written since (x). He is unwilling to have us abandon the goal of improving the lives of the world’s people, but neither is he willing to believe for a second that such a goal can be accomplished without understanding the local context and history of an area or the trade-offs that are involved in the international politics of development. There are no universal models, no one-size-fits-all, and that is the moral of Cullather’s story.

Notes:

Let them Eat Development: A Review of Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia

David Ekbładh

Modernity and the development that is its handmaiden need to be fed, literally. Characteristic of the impersonal relationships that are said to define modern interactions is the food supply. In the high-tech, industrial society brought by modernity, people tend to be insulated from the sources of their sustenance. Sustaining sprawling populations demands a highly productive agricultural sector. Indeed, the theorists and policymakers who pushed development programs understood that the transformation they sought was predicated on supplying their societies with abundant food. This meant changing the countryside. One can think of all the resources (particularly publicity) modernizing states have expended on such efforts. The Soviet Union’s collectivization agriculture and “Virgin Lands” schemes or the
plans of the Marxist regime in Ethiopia—just to name a pair—made the transformation of rural life a sine qua non of a new society. This sort of transformation of food production in the service of a developmental vision was hardly exclusive to the political left. It characterized most of the big, bold modernization projects of the era; including many U.S. sponsored modernization programs in the Cold War.

Nick Cullather has enhanced some of the most incisive of his articles that have graced the Journal of American History, the American Historical Review, and Diplomatic History in recent years to explain how American-led attempts to make food more accessible were a means to further U.S. strategy in the Cold War. He shows how the mission of offering more calories to people became a technical question to be solved by the generous application of the blessings of science and technology—dams, “miracle rice,” and expert knowledge. For American planners, abundant food would clear the way for modern, high-tech, industrial societies. More immediately, full stomachs would lessen the appeal of those offering another vision of the future—communists.

By making the realities of food production a question of yield subject to technical answers, thorny social and political issues such as land tenure could be avoided. By enhancing the food supply experts hoped to synthesize a “social catalyst” that they could control (240). However, as Cullather notes, too often this concoction slipped from their grasp, loosing unpredicted and unintended consequences.

One quick aside: for many scholars, agriculture is often equated with plant cropping. However, scholars might turn their gaze on another critical part of the food supply—animals. Husbandry and fisheries and their modernization are also important and contentious parts of development programs. International bodies have a tradition of focus on this issue. Take one prominent NGO, Heifer International, which has long seen the provision of livestock and the improvement of herds as a means to lift people into a more prosperous life. Of course, this effort impacts people’s (and animals’) lives in dramatic ways and has profound economic and ecological impacts.

The Hungry World ranges widely, as it must. By its nature food production was linked to or dependent on many other nodes of the development process. A chapter on Afghanistan pulls the narrative back to explore some of the supports necessary to the transformation of agriculture—large-scale irrigation programs often centered on multipurpose dams. Cullather explores attempts, centered on Helmand Province, to install the dams that would provide the water that was to remake the countryside. Here, as in so many other places, the law of unintended consequences struck. The dams brought salination to the soil and sedimentation to the rivers. Ecological problems fed instability that eventually brought down the Afghan government that had sponsored the programs. Attempts to utilize IR-8, the much-heralded “miracle rice,” as a strategic asset in Vietnam also ran into hard realities. The rice had emerged from the Ford Foundation-funded International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines, and the Americans were hoping that it would be a magic bullet in their attempts to pacify the countryside in South Vietnam. As it turned out, the shot went wide of the mark, as fighting made the pacification benchmarks of increased rice production hard to achieve. Attempts to use the rice as an olive branch by offering its bounty to North Vietnam also ran into the hard reality of unintended consequences. Rice cultivation does not respect political and ideological boundaries. Not long after IR-8 was introduced in the South, it had found its way to paddies in the North.

The book’s center of gravity, like many development efforts Cullather describes, lies in India. By exploring the relationship between American advocates of agricultural reform and their Indian counterparts, Cullather reveals how food is yoked to the application of power in both international and local politics. Amartya Sen has established that famine is a political event, but Cullather explains just how political it can get with the case of the food shortage in India’s state of Bihar in 1966. The possibility of famine produced an opportunity for Lyndon Johnson to pose as India’s savior and reap desperately needed good publicity in the midst of the Vietnam War. It was also useful in Delhi, where the ruling Congress Party used the crisis to cow political rivals in the state (228-29).

On the subcontinent and elsewhere in Asia the Americans were able to establish fully both their modified crops and the new techniques needed to grow them. By the late 1960s they could declare a “green revolution” of rising crop yields. But here again the unforgiving law of unintended consequences intervened. Bursting granaries often highlighted social and political inequalities. More food stoked fears of out-of-control population growth and explosive urban expansion. Many regimes in Asia that put great faith in the promise of the “green revolution” were beset by civil unrest and political instability in the years that followed.

During the 1960s and 1970s the “green revolution” itself became one more in a long line of unanticipated problems that undercut many accepted assumptions behind modernization. In this Cullather has not just challenged the standard story that the “green revolution” was an unfettered success but has offered a prescient reminder that such far-reaching yet intimate transformations of societies will necessarily touch cultural and political nerves, leading to unexpected reactions.

Cullather does not succumb to simple condemnation of this strain of developmentalism. He makes the astute point that “hunger—along with terrorism, migration, climate, and narcotics—belong to an ever-larger category of international issues for which a search for technical fixes serves as a substitute for serious engagement” (270). In a world where buzzwords such as “sustainability,” “ownership,” and “entrepreneurship” are slung around casually as answers to numerous complicated and nagging development problems, this is a jiger of sense that many development and policy communities would do well to imbibe.

While the book cannot claim to exhaust utterly the subject matter it engages (it is doubtful that any single book could), Cullather has produced an excellent, original work that not only extends the scholarly pale on modernization and development but also extends the realm of international history. Nevertheless,
with its focus on the Cold War the book brushes up against a conceptual boundary of inquiry on the topic. Cullather reinforces much recent work that sees development as one of the primary means that all sides used to wage the struggle. However, the need to modify food production to bring it in line with the needs of a modern society and international economy was a battle being waged long before containment became a strategic doctrine, and many groups and governments continue this slog long after the fall of the Soviet Empire.

Good swaths of the transnational progressive movement were invested in transforming rural life and, by so doing, enhancing the supply of food. One example is the work of a nineteenth-century German agricultural reformer, Fredrich Wilhelm Raffesien, which was carried to the United States to aid in efforts to contain rural troubles and the radicalism that could spring from them. Finding these ideas useful at home, American and international activists grappling with China’s food problems and recurrent famines brought them to Asia.

This is not to imply that Cullather is not aware of such activity or does not explore the “prehistory” of agricultural development before the Cold War. Quite the contrary. One of the strengths of the book is his exegesis on the rise of the calorie to international influence; another is his discussion of the strands of agricultural development that came together in Mexico in the 1940s and would serve as a basis for the “green revolution.” He steps away from a focus on governments to see the vital importance of nonstate actors, particularly agriculturalists and foundations. He notes the tremendous impact of the Rockefeller Foundation in these prewar years, which preceded the Ford Foundation’s enormous investments during the Cold War.

Still, the complicated history and awkward present of development efforts should call into question the primacy of the Cold War in understanding the evolution of development, along with other powerful global trends. Undoubtedly the cold warriors honed the use of development as part of a grand strategy to contain the appeal of communism. But the urge to reform societies with many of the means deployed in the middle decades of the twentieth century predates the Cold War. While particular approaches and ideas have waxed or waned and strategic imperatives have come and gone, the use of development by activists and policymakers as a means to implement their visions has never entirely ebbed.

Today, when policy entrepreneurs like Jeff Sachs urge greater investments in development with shiny promises of follow-on technological breakthroughs that will liberate poor nations from their “poverty traps,” they stir the echoes of Cold War-era promises. But rock-star economist Sachs and fellow advocate and actual rock star Bono are not just heirs to Cold War ideas. They are part of a longer tradition of developmentalism. Sachs takes particular delight in presenting development as the product of apolitical technical fixes, an idea that undoubtedly makes him popular among donors and governments. One particular component of his efforts, the Millennium Village, bears more than a passing resemblance to the “community development” that Cullather discusses and that entranced many people during the Cold War. However, it also has much in common with rural reform in the progressive era. Talk of a new “green revolution” for Africa and beyond speak to the appeal of a process that Cullather shows is poorly understood. Dams dropped down in Afghanistan in the 1950s and 1960s by an earlier generation of American and international aid workers remain a hinge for development efforts and a strategic asset that NATO forces struggle to protect today. These projects remind us that development has deep roots and will continue to serve the looming needs of military strategy, humanitarian urges, governmental legitimacy, and other imperatives that lie well beyond the strictures of the Cold War.

Many actors, particularly nonstate groups, were invested in developmentalism before the Cold War and remained passionate afterwards. The continued use of the calorie as a means to developmental ends reminds us that the Cold War crafted itself onto longer trends in development, not vice versa. In fact, depending on the question being asked and the perspective taken, the Cold War begins to shrink. It becomes a moment of intense focus for particular variants of development. But it is one moment. Even within the historical confines of the conflict, development ideas were bent and sometimes broken by pressures that were not the specific products of that geopolitical struggle.

Considerable work is brewing that reframes our understanding of the emergence of developmental ideas that ruled the day in the Cold War and continue to echo down to the present. The reform activities by American colonial officials in the Philippines and the actions of nongovernmental actors deepen our appreciation of the historical depth of the spectrum of ideas that fed post-World War II modernization efforts. From important angles, rather than being the font of globe-straddling development ideas, the Cold War can appear to be a passing rationale for the longer urge to development that characterizes modern life.

Of course none of this devalues the fresh and remarkable analysis Cullather has presented on the subject. The Hungry World is a worthy culmination of over a decade of work and a timely reminder of the perils of one of the more powerful forces on the world scene.

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Notes:
4. For a recent statement of Sachs’ vision see Jeffery Sachs, Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet (New York, 2008)

Review of Nick Cullather, The Hungry World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia

Meredith Oyen

Like many middle-class American children in the 1980s, I first discovered hunger through Michael Jackson. The charity single “We Are the World”—itself only one of many
such efforts—opened many young eyes to famine in Africa and to the notion that Americans might be able to do something to prevent it. As Nick Cullather ably shows in his new book, long before the “me generation” realized that children went to bed hungry in Ethiopia (and that we should therefore eat all our broccoli), the United States government was actively engaged in waging war on hunger in Asia.

In The Hungry World, Cullather aims to dissect the roots and spectacular growth of the so-called “green revolution”—the effort to end hunger through agricultural innovation and high-yield rice and wheat crops—and in the process, he unpacks a far more complicated history of the international politics of development work. By taking a long view of the evolution of development policies, Cullather is able to explain the differences between the mythology surrounding the work and the reality of its limited achievements. He also establishes how U.S. officials, scientists and philanthropists came to see hunger and world poverty not simply as humanitarian concerns but as actual threats to the peace and stability of the international system. This fear eventually became engulfed in Cold War diplomacy, helping that conflict reach into areas of human experience that would seem far removed from its central antagonisms.

Cullather’s story is deeply embedded in the idea of American exceptionalism. From his starting point with the discovery of the calorie as a unit of measuring human food needs to his closing musings about the Obama administration’s promotion of a second green revolution, he addresses themes of hunger, rural poverty, and poor agricultural yields as problems the United States was uniquely equipped to solve. Between President Truman’s announcement of Point Four and the late 1960s, the United States made an all-out effort to solve these problems, with the focus on the potentially volatile population of rural Asia. Cullather explains that the United States pursued three simultaneous goals in Asia: ending hunger by addressing the output and distribution problems that resulted from a perception that the population had outstripped the food supply; transforming the mindset of peasants to make them fit more easily into an American, democratic model of rural life; and building and improving nations by helping them establish better control over their own resources. Throughout this effort, the international network of reformers engaged in the work operated under the assumption that American-style models and technologies held solutions for the problems of malnourished or impoverished peasants, if only the latter could be trained to understand them. Having firmly established that one of his aims was to correct the mistaken notion—wherever it might occur—that development work began only in the 1940s, Cullather starts off with a foray into the science of food production and the resulting understanding of how diets differ by country, which in turn leads to the “discovery” of a “world food problem.” Citing Malthusian-style concerns about food scarcity and a growing population, he finds the roots of the green revolution in Asia in rhetoric from the interwar period, where “the imperative of balance, centrality of Asia, and the solutions offered by intensified grain production and birth control” had already come together to create an agenda for future foreign aid endeavors (25). From there, Cullather examines the Mexican Agricultural Program (MAP) and its role as a model for helping Asia. As it turns out, the program also became an object lesson on the dangers of getting too tied to “models” for development work without regard for their applicability to other times and places or even their legitimacy within the environment for which they were originally created. MAP developed new strains of wheat designed to be hardy enough to survive any encounter in Asia, but the program was also an attempt to recreate New Deal policies abroad. The mismatch between programs and problems becomes a recurring theme in the book, as aid officials repeatedly attempted to come up with a universal solution to local problems, then discovered again and again that transferring technology from Tennessee to Mexico to Central Asia was not a recipe for instant success.

The next two chapters show aid officials still pushing to transfer domestic American programs abroad. The first chapter centers on community development and land reform projects, and the second on a Tennessee Valley Authority-type dam project in Afghanistan. The projects described in the first chapter tried to recast village life by reforming how peasants related to one another; the dam project endeavored to define national boundaries by helping a nation assert control over its resources. The discussion of American efforts to build a dam as a way of building a nation in Afghanistan is of particular interest, given present-day efforts at nation-building in that country, although it raises concerns that once again, more idealism and energy are going into the project than careful consideration. The faith in the transferability of any of these ideas from the United States to other locations was rooted at least in part in the idea that “development fit social problems into a novel concept of time, asserting that all nations followed a common historical path and that those in the lead had a moral duty to aid those who followed” (75). Each recipient of U.S. aid could be at a different place along the timeline of development, and it was up to the United States to use its expertise to find ways to speed up modernization.

Subsequent chapters address Food for Peace wheat shipments to India and the development and spread of “miracle” dwarf rice in the Philippines and South Vietnam. Both projects offer Cullather plentiful opportunities to address how the politics of the Cold War served to shift conceptions of containment in South Asia from armaments to agricultural projects. In each case, American aid provided a model for development that did not require communist revolution, in direct contrast to the examples provided by the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. In these instances public perception of the work was of the utmost importance, as “U.S. officials considered their ability to display the fruits of modernity to be a powerful weapon against communism” (161). The struggle between simply doing good work
and getting visible credit for it is also evident in the following chapters as the book addresses the difficult tradeoff in India between the politics of famine and the nation’s effort to develop industry and become a self-sufficient producer of wheat. Given the focus on India in the book, it would be useful to see a stronger comparison between British imperial policies and U.S. development programs; the idea of both being colonial undertakings of a sort is evident enough, but aside from a reference to how the British had once defined famine in India, Cullather does not compare the two efforts. The contrast between them could be defined more explicitly.

Finally, The Hungry World discusses the backlash against the green revolution efforts, arguing that “the domestic consensus behind development had always rested on a jury-rigged alliance of self-interest, strategic anxiety, and faith in the unique capacity of the United States to engineer progress” (253). As that faith gave way under the strain of the Vietnam War and a weakened domestic economy, support for the international development program eroded. Increasing skepticism that the green revolution had actually revolutionized anything of real importance—or at the very least, had made a strong impact on hunger in Asia—fed that gnawing doubt and led to greater efforts to achieve the much-talked-about goal of delivering development goals and political or diplomatic objectives. Racing quickly through another forty years of effort, the book ends with a caution about trying once again to end hunger in Africa through increased agricultural productivity, a project Cullather believes no more likely to succeed than earlier efforts in Asia.

This book is meticulously researched, drawing upon records from individual participants, nongovernmental organizations, and government bureaus and agencies. Cullather’s experience researching both colonialism in the U.S. relationship with the Philippines and U.S. intelligence work serves him well, as he offers a clear sense of how deeply these development programs were intended to reach. In addition to describing U.S. international engagement, Cullather also does an admirable job of keeping track of domestic political developments and addressing the connections between public support and foreign aid. His conclusions are consistently thought-provoking, in part because of the specter of current policy and in part because the economic and agricultural development work he describes is not often a part of traditional histories of the Cold War in Asia.

Beyond the impressively detailed account of both the personalities and projects engaged in the development effort, one of the book’s greatest strengths is Cullather’s focus on the contrasts between image and outcome. By placing the whole of the development project into the prism of Cold War battles for credibility and the effort to “win hearts and minds” across Asia, he reminds us that the Cold War in Asia was as much centered on psychological campaigns as it was on military ones. The perception of India as a line of containment after the “fall” of China is particularly striking in this regard, given the tumultuous nature of the relationship between Nehru’s government and U.S. administrations. The novelty of placing development and foreign aid at the centerpiece of the discussion of foreign relations forces the reader to rethink U.S.–Indian relations during these years. Although it is understandable that the book should focus on the agricultural science projects developed in India and Southeast Asia, East Asia receives short shrift in the overall discussion of U.S. development projects, aside from a short discussion of how land reform was embraced as a democratic (and not just potentially socialist) policy goal.

Similarly, some discussion of the big picture of development work beyond the agricultural programs and as it evolved over the course of various administrations would be useful in framing the discussion for an audience uninitiated in this history. Some readers will also be left wanting to know even more about how the actions and achievements of these green revolutionaries were utilized in U.S. information work in South Asia and elsewhere. The efforts of the United States Agency for International Development come through clearly, but the book mentions the United States Information Agency only twice and is thus less clear on the extent to which that agency championed the success of the wheat program in India, the “miracle” rice in Southeast Asia, or the commitment to the Helmand dam to audiences outside these countries.

These omissions notwithstanding, this exciting study offers some cautions and lessons for current lawmakers, historians of foreign relations, and (of course) international pop stars. Referencing the new impetus for development led by Bill Gates and Bono, Cullather suggests with a degree of exasperation that interested people and organizations are in danger of repeating the missteps of the past, especially in the oft-repeated refrain that feeding the hungry should be divorced from politics. He writes that “hunger—a long with terrorism, migration, climate, and narcotics—belongs to an ever-larger category of international issues for which a search for technical fixes services as a substitute for serious engagement” (270). Better understanding of past “solutions” to these problems—no matter how incomplete—can complicate and enlarge our understanding of American diplomatic history as well as promote a more reality-based approach to public policy that moves beyond short-term scientific solutions and charity songs.

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Author’s Response

Nick Cullather

Passport readers may recall that in April 2011, a legend of nation-building in Afghanistan came crashing down when 60 Minutes revealed that Greg Mortenson was a fraud. Before he became a famous philanthropist Mortenson had been a mountaineer. His mega-bestseller Three Cups of Tea described how, after a failed attempt to climb K2, he had stumbled into the Pakistani village of Korphe and been nursed back to health by warlike but caring tribespeople. To fulfill a promise to the villagers, he returned to the United States and raised money for a school for girls. His efforts bore fruit, and his one-man foundation, the Central Asia Institute (CAI), soon built dozens of schools in the Taliban-ridden valleys of Afghanistan and Pakistan with funds raised by American schoolchildren. 60 Minutes charged that the K2 story was fabricated, the schools were either nonexistent or empty, and that Mortenson used CAI as his “personal ATM.”

It was the second such exposure in less than a year. In December another documentary triggered investigations of the microfinance establishment, an assortment of private lenders and charities who provide small loans—often only a few hundred dollars each—to destitute and mainly female entrepreneurs. In Bangladesh and India, microfinance had been hailed as a breakthrough, releasing the business talent of half the population.
Its inventor, Mohammad Yunus, won a Nobel Peace Prize for stimulating “economic and social development from below.” Inquiries, however, have shown that microfinance banks charged ruinous interest rates and paid lavish salaries to bank officers. Yunus now stands accused in his home country of being little more than a loan shark.2

These cases came to mind when I read Meredith Oyen’s reference to Michael Jackson’s simple appeal, Amy Sayward’s description of Conrad Crane’s warning that field commanders had to be taught “how to think,” and Erez Manela’s insightful comparison of verticalist and horizontalist tendencies in developmentalist thought. As each of the commentators observes, progress depends on how you tell the story. Development closes the divide between simple ambition and complex realities by filling it with fables. To mobilize donors and constituencies in many countries at once and to sustain that effort for years or even decades, modernizers need a compelling narrative. A good story links verticalist and horizontalist impulses, explaining why a single solution in one place can be a universal answer to larger problems. It reconciles seemingly conflicting strategic and humanitarian goals through a unifying idea. Schools would prevent terrorism, Mortenson explained, since literate girls would grow up to be educated mothers who would never allow their sons to take up arms. Micro-loans attacked poverty, the “root cause” of terrorism, according to Yunus. Bankers and free markets would “put poverty in the museums.”3 They weren’t trolling for idealists or the gullible. Shrewd players—such as General Petraeus and Warren Buffett—bought these claims.

Manela is right. It does little good for historians to debunk these myths. They tend to debunk themselves. Even if they don’t collapse as spectacularly as Mortenson’s, they decompose once the ambitions and assumptions sustaining them go away. When researching The Hungry World I was initially surprised to find that development practitioners were so aware of the fables they were spinning or that were being spun about them. Plant breeders joked about the “miracle rice fairy tale” and land reformers acknowledged that their work relied on a fragile “reform mystique.” It had to be so; as Barbara Ward explained, “these are days for poetry, not statistics.”4

What I try to do in The Hungry World is explain why certain poetics had such powerful appeal at particular moments, how a story could unite Lyndon Johnson, Indira Gandhi, Pope Paul VI, and a flock of agencies and experts behind a sweeping plan of action that would transform half a continent. I carefully avoided conclusions about success or failure, since those judgments can have meaning only within a narrative of progress, either a leftover parable from the development decades or a story I might invent myself. My unwillingness to reach a hand into history and pull out a winning strategy disappoints most audiences I speak to, and in their disappointment I feel the temptation that must have snared Greg Mortenson. History can hold lessons, I believe, but not in the form of models from the past that can be repeated in the future. The chief lesson is to keep a critical eye on the story of development, and to be aware that it is just a story.

I am deeply grateful to all the commentators for their thoughtful observations and to the editors of Passport.

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Notes:
The final score is in: United States 13, Russia 6. But no, it’s not the final score in the Cold War as calculated through some sophisticated political science model. It is in fact the final score in the recent Rugby World Cup match between the two former Cold War enemies. Because the Rugby World Cup is taking place in New Zealand, millions of English supporters are suffering very early starts to their day at the time of writing to enjoy the television coverage. Then again, we’re not bad at the game (World Champions in 2003, runners-up in 2007): In contrast, the United States is ranked seventeenth, one place below the former Soviet republic of Georgia, but four places above Russia. To counter the lowly status of both teams, the media tried to build the game up with references to “superpower struggles” and “Cold War rivalries” (not to mention the 1972 Olympic basketball final, Fischer-Spassky, and 1980’s “Miracle on Ice”), but the match was ultimately of limited consequence, the historical analogies useless.

Yet those Cold War references recall a time when the United States had drive and a clear sense of purpose. In the ideological heat of the Cold War, the American way—liberal democratic capitalism—mattered, and ultimately prevailed. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the intensity faded. There was a sense in the 1990s that perhaps the United States didn’t need a foreign policy, or that it was so powerful that it could afford to disconnect from the rest of the world. If there was a lack of leadership, it was by choice. The events of September 2001 temporarily restored the purpose and drive of the United States in the world, but a decade on that drive seems to have diminished. Global leadership on the part of the United States is seemingly no longer available.

Trying to get hold of a general “British view” of America and its place in the world is almost impossible, and having accepted the invitation to comment informally on the British perspective, I should note that my comments are somewhat impressionistic. One thing that is clear is that we view the United States more favourably now than we did when the previous president was in office. Nevertheless, there does seem to be a general sense here among the media and those who are interested in such things that the United States is somehow adrift, uncertain and in need of direction. In international terms, this perception translates into a lack of leadership. From a British perspective, the lack of leadership can be seen most clearly in three areas: international affairs in the Middle East, the global economy, and in the sphere of domestic politics.

With respect to the Middle East and the Arab Spring, the United States has seemed surprisingly peripheral, having only marginal influence in the events unfolding in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and Syria. Even where there has been direct intervention, as in Libya, the United States has not been the dominant partner, appearing simply as one nation among many. In part, the cautious attitude appears to reflect a tension in American policy between traditional ideals of democracy and freedom on the one hand, and national security imperatives that fear Islamic fundamentalism on the other. The feeling is that America stands for democracy only as long as the right people win. This tension (which has led to accusations of hypocrisy) is of course nothing new, but it has seemed particularly pronounced as the Obama administration has played a waiting game. Admittedly, compared to the previous one, this administration has offered just what many British people want to see: a more deliberative, modest, and less gung-ho approach from a country that works closely with its allies in a genuine, collaborative internationalism. But when that approach is combined with other concerns, then it begins to look more like a lack of leadership.

The main issue here is the ongoing global economic crisis. While the Arab Spring is largely confined to the Middle East, we are very much gripped in the UK by the economic stagnation that has affected much of the globe since 2008. As the United States still has the world’s largest economy in an increasingly globalised world, it is no surprise that we continue to look to America for leadership in this area; the Depression-era idea that when America sneezes Europe catches a cold is even truer today than it was then. Yet the American economy shows little sign of sustained recovery. Weak economic growth statistics and stubbornly nine percent unemployment hardly represent a stirring example. The most striking symbol of American economic difficulty came with the downgrading of America’s credit rating, which led to criticism from China and comments about
America’s relative decline. The International Monetary Fund recently announced that the global economy has entered a “dangerous new phase,” yet the United States is not stepping up to lead us out of it, while it remains the nation most likely to do so.

Part of the reason for the lack of economic leadership is the political discord within the United States, a topic that currently gets more British media coverage than it deserves—not because the issues don’t matter, but because of the focus on fringe candidates and personality issues rather than matters of substance and policy. While ideological divisions within the United States are clearly exaggerated by current political leaders and by the tone of the debate, the lack of consensus and subsequent political gridlock has commentators here enthralled. A small part of this obsession is like rubbernecking at a car crash, but there is a considerable sense of genuine surprise here that Tea Party candidates are quite so close to power. Candidates like Michele Bachmann and Christine O’Donnell may be extreme examples, but they are farther to the political right than almost anyone we have here, even with a Conservative-led coalition government.

The best example of this domestic discord in 2011 was the debate over America’s debt ceiling, which was headline news in the United Kingdom. Bismarck’s remark that “politics is the art of the possible” appeared to be forgotten in a game of political brinkmanship that saw ideological stubbornness on both sides, though mostly from House Republicans. The fact is that these supposedly domestic issues can affect us overseas: the economic implications of the debate and subsequent downgrading are still playing out. More broadly though, the debates in the United States reflect a lack of a Western consensus on how to move forward. The absence of a consensus is reflected in the split personality of Britain’s own governmental coalition; it can also be seen in the way Europe is struggling to deal with its own debt crisis. It appears there is no clear answer as to the way ahead.

Perhaps the bigger question is this: why do we still look to America for leadership? Part of the answer is that we are drifting along with the United States, and there are no better options. As a result, though we (and especially those on the political left) sometimes resent American power, we continue to look to the United States for leadership. Militarily, we (the United Kingdom, but also

Europe more broadly) lack the hard power capabilities of the United States. Economically, the global system requires a strong America. Even in the arena of domestic politics, our politicians still look to the United States for examples in spheres as diverse as policing, higher education, and even health care. What happens in and to the United States often ends up affecting us too.

Another part of the answer is that it’s the way we see the world, and it’s how it’s presented to us. The British media views global affairs through the lens of American leadership. The domestic and foreign affairs of the United States dominate the world news sections of the British press; its economic and military issues frequently dominate the main news pages too. The Guardian is particularly obsessed with the politics, personality and will-she-won’t-she-run flirtations of Sarah Palin. But with ideas about the American Century deeply ingrained, the deep political, economic and cultural ties between our two nations, and of course the nebulous (and highly contested) concept of the special relationship, our natural inclination when seeking advice and support is still to look across the Atlantic rather than across the Channel.

It’s not clear how long this situation might last. Thomas Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum’s recent book That Used to Be Us2 suggests that American power is in decline, and its solutions for a return to form are not entirely encouraging or convincing given America’s domestic political turmoil.

The rise of nations like India, Brazil, and especially China has led to suggestions—see, for example, the writings of historian provocateur Niall Ferguson—that the United States is on the wane and we are moving toward a multipolar world. Yet for all the suggestions of relative decline, and despite the limited suggestions for ways forward, for now, “it still is you.” The United States is not the world’s last best hope, but it is still seen as the best bet for strong leadership at the moment. And—for better or worse—we’re waiting.

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Notes:
1. “We” in this context means “England,” as Wales and Scotland have their own teams, and there is a united Ireland team. “World Champions” in this context refers to the 93 countries that play the game—some 92 more than are represented in the NFL, whose champions are also “World Champions.” While I apologise to those who have no interest in sport, I was struck at the last SHAFR meeting by the fact that not only are numerous SHAFRites clearly obsessed by various sports, a number are writing or have already written ten books about them.
2. Thomas Friedman and Michael Mandelbaum, That Used to Be Us: How America Fell Behind In the World It Invented and How We Can Come Back (New York, 2011).
An Introduction to the Central Files of the Department of State, 1789-1976

David A. Langbart

The central file of the Department of State, part of Record Group 59: General Records of the Department of State, is the primary source for documentation on U.S. foreign policy and events in various countries. The National Archives has accessioned the central file only through 1976. Locating documentation on specific countries and regions in the various iterations of the Department of State's central file can be confusing because of changes in the filing systems over the years. The following is an overview of those systems that explains how to locate the primary files relating to specific countries and regions for the period from 1789 to 1976. It is not comprehensive and is intended only to provide a starting point for research. It does not deal with the decentralized files (“Lot Files”) or the records of foreign service posts.

While there are variations over time, in general the central files consist of communications between the Department of State and American diplomatic and consular posts (despatches, instructions, telegrams, and airgrams), internal departmental documentation, communications with other government agencies and private organizations and the public, communications with diplomatic and consular officials from other countries in the United States, and related materials.

I. 1789-1906: Book Period

For the period between 1789 and 1906, the central files are arranged by series under three main headings: (1) Diplomatic correspondence, (2) Consular correspondence, and (3) Miscellaneous correspondence. For many of the records there are registers and other finding aids. There are also several small series that may be of interest to researchers. For example, there is a series consisting of the despatches from Special Agents of the Department of State. For the most part, all of these records are now bound into volumes.

Because of the arrangement of the records during this period, finding documentation relating to a specific country can be time consuming. While most of the despatches and instructions exchanged between the Department of State and its diplomatic and consular posts in a specific country and the diplomatic and consular representatives of that country in the United States relate to that country, that is not always true. It is likely that the American diplomats in various countries reported on events in third countries from the perspective of their host government.

A. Diplomatic correspondence

Diplomatic Instructions: communications from the Department of State to American diplomatic officers overseas. Arranged by name of the country to which an American diplomat was accredited and thereunder chronologically.

Diplomatic Despatches: communications from American diplomats overseas to the Department of State. (After the advent of the telegraph, this series includes telegrams.) Arranged by the name of the country to which an American diplomat was accredited and thereunder chronologically. If an American diplomat was accredited to more than one country, the despatches from several countries may be bound together.

Notes to Foreign Missions in the United States: communications from the Department of State to foreign diplomatic officers in the United States. Arranged chronologically.

B. Consular correspondence

Consular Instructions: communications from the Department of State to American consular officers overseas. Arranged chronologically without regard to post except for those from the period 1835-74, which are arranged by geographic area and thereunder chronologically.

Consular Despatches: communications from American consuls overseas to the Department of State. (This series includes telegrams.) Arranged by name of the city in which the consulate was located and thereunder chronologically.

Notes to Foreign Consuls in the United States: communications from foreign consular officers in the United States to the Department of State. Arranged chronologically.

C. Miscellaneous correspondence

Domestic Letters: communications sent by the Department of State to persons other than U.S. and foreign diplomatic and consular officers. Arranged chronologically.

Miscellaneous Letters: communications received by the Department of State from persons other than U.S. and foreign diplomatic and consular officers. Arranged chronologically. With the exception of the Consular Instructions, all of the records noted above are available on various National Archives microfilm publications. Researchers must use the microfilm, rather than the original documents, when that alternative is available.
II. 1906-1910: Numerical File

In 1906, the Department adopted a new filing system in which the different types of records from the Book Period were brought together in numbered case files. In the four years this system was in effect, the Department opened 25,982 sequentially numbered files. There is no relationship between cases in proximity to each other.

To locate files relating to specific countries, see the information below on the 1910-49 Central Decimal File and then consult the Numerical File “Putpur Lists” that have been arranged according to the decimal filing system adopted in 1910 (Inventory 15, Entry 190). The lists were rearranged by the Department of State to enhance its own use of the records.

A separate Minor File includes generally routine correspondence. This much smaller series is arranged alphabetically.

All the Numerical and Minor Files are available on National Archives Microfilm Publication M862. To identify the roll of film for the desired file, researchers should see the additional information about that publication on line or ask the reference staff.

III. 1910-1963: Central Decimal File

In 1910, the Department instituted the Central Decimal File, in which documents are filed according to a pre-determined decimal classification system. There were two different decimal files. The first version was in effect from 1910 through 1949; the second was operative between 1950 and January 1963. Generally, the decimal files are divided into larger categories and thereunder by region or country. As a result, researchers use a smaller number of files spanning a greater number of subjects.

III A. 1910-1949: Central Decimal File (first version)

The files are broken into the following segments: 1910-29, 1930-39, 1940-44, and 1945-49. In general, the records are divided into nine broad subject classes: Class 0 (General, Miscellaneous), Class 1 (Administration), Class 2 (Extradition), Class 3 (Protection of Interests), Class 4 (Claims), Class 5 (International Congresses and Conferences/Multilateral Treaties), Class 6 (Commerce), Class 7 (Political Relations of States), and Class 8 (Internal Affairs of States). In general, country numbers (which can cover a region, a country, a colony, or another geographic entity) are used in conjunction with class and subject numbers to form the file numbers under which documents are filed. The filing manuals issued by the Department of State include listings of country numbers, and the National Archives has compiled a comprehensive list showing the changes over time. These are available in the Archives II Research Room.

The following is a simplified breakdown of the primary country-specific file categories, demonstrating how the country numbers are used. The file manuals prepared by the Department of State provide a detailed breakdown of all file categories and also explain other file categories that contain records on specific countries. For example, File 701.## contains documentation on the diplomatic service of country ** in country ##. Records relating to individual countries can be found in Class 5, too, but that class is not arranged using the country numbers. Researchers generally find the records in classes 6, 7, and 8 the most useful for foreign policy research, but other files are of value, too.

Once researchers know the file numbers in which they are interested, they must use the box listings for each segment of the Central Decimal File to identify the exact boxes holding the records of interest. The lists are available in the Archives II Research Room. Many of the 7**,## and 8** files for the years 1910-44 are available on National Archives microfilm publications.

2**##: General files relating to extradition. The lower number always precedes the decimal point. 2## [name]: Individual extradition cases. The number preceding the decimal point is the country from which extradition is sought and the number following the decimal point is the country demanding the extradition.

3**##: Protection in country ** of the private and national interests of country ##. 4**##: General files relating to claims matters. The lower number always precedes the decimal point. 4## [name]: Individual claims cases. The number preceding the decimal point is the country against which the claim is made and the number following the decimal point is the country making the claim.

6**##: Trade between two countries. The number before the decimal point is the importing country, while the number after the decimal point is the exporting country.

7**##: Political relations of states. The lower country number always precedes the decimal point.

8**[subject number]: Internal affairs of country **. (Includes file categories for political affairs, military affairs, naval affairs, social matters, economic matters, industrial matters, communications and transportation, navigation, and scientific affairs.)

III B. 1950-1963: Central Decimal File (second version)

These files are broken into the following segments: 1950-54, 1955-59, and 1960-63 (use of the Decimal File ended in January 1963). In general, the records are divided into ten broad subject classes: Class 0 (Miscellaneous), Class 1 (Administration), Class 2 (Protection of Interests), Class 3 (International Conferences, Congresses, Meetings and Organizations/Multilateral Treaties), Class 4 (International Trade and Commerce), Class 5 (International Informational and Educational Relations), Class 6 (International Political Relations), Class 7 (Internal Political and National Defense Affairs), Class 8 (Internal Economic, Industrial, and Social Affairs), and Class 9 (Communications, Transportation, Science). In most cases, country numbers (which can cover a region, a country, a colony, or another geographic entity) are used in conjunction with class and subject numbers to form the file numbers under which documents are filed. The filing manuals issued by the Department of State include listings of country numbers, and the National Archives has compiled a comprehensive list showing the changes over time (also available in the Archives II Research Room).

The following is a simplified breakdown of the primary country-specific file categories, demonstrating how the country numbers are used. The file manuals prepared by the Department of State provide a detailed breakdown of all file categories and also explain other file categories that contain records on specific countries. For example, File 602.**## contains documentation on the consular service of country ** in country ##. Records relating to individual countries can be found in Class 3, too, but that class is not arranged using the country numbers. Researchers generally find the records in classes 5, 6, and 7 the most useful for foreign policy research, but again, other files may also be of...
value.

Once researchers have determined the file numbers they want, they must use the box listings for each segment of the Central Decimal File to identify the exact boxes of interest. The lists are available from the Archives II Research Room.

2**.##: Protection in country ** of interest of nationals of country ##.

4**.##: Trade between two countries. The number before the decimal point is the importing country, while the number after the decimal point is the exporting country.

5**.##: Cultural and informational activities of country ** in country ##.

6**.##: Political relations of states.

The lower country number always precedes the decimal point.

7**.[subject number]: Internal political and national defense affairs of country **.

8**.[subject number]: Internal economic, industrial, and social affairs of country **.

9**.[subject number]: Internal communications, transportation, and scientific affairs of country **.

IV. 1963-1973: Central Foreign Policy File (Subject-Numeric File)

The records are broken into the following segments: February–December 1963, 1964-1966, 1967-1969, and 1970-1973. The files are arranged according to a prearranged subject-numeric filing system. While the records are arranged in eight broad categories (Administration, Consular, Culture and Information, Economic, Political and Defense, Science, and Social), the files themselves are filed under the fifty-six primary subjects into which the broad categories are divided. The following list includes the non-administrative primary subjects into which the broad categories are divided.

Consular
CON Consular Affairs (General)
PPT Passports & Citizenship
PS Protective Services
V Visas

Culture and Information
CUL Culture
EDU Education
EDX Educational & Cultural Exchange
INF Information
MP Motion Pictures
PPB Press and Publications
RAD Radio
TV Television

Economic
AGR Agriculture
AID AID

AV Aviation (Civil)
E Economic Affairs (General)
ECIN Economic Integration
FN Finance
FSE Fuels & Energy
FT Foreign Trade
INCO Industries & Commodities
IT Inland Transportation
LAB Labor & Manpower
OS Ocean Shipping
PET Petroleum
PO Postal Affairs
STR Strategic Trade Control
TEL Telecommunications
TP Trade Promotion
& Assistance
TR Transportation (General)

Political and Defense
CSM Communism
DEF Defense
INT Intelligence
POL Political Affairs & Relations

Science
AE Atomic Energy
SCI Science & Technology
SP Space & Astronautics

Social
HLTH Health & Medical Care
REF Refugees and Migration
SOC Social Conditions

The primary subject files are further divided by country or region using an assigned abbreviation. The filing manuals issued by the Department of State include a list of country names and abbreviations. Because it is possible to have files relating to a specific country under all of these primary subjects, researchers use a larger number of files on more narrowly focused subjects. The records on each country are further divided by subject according to a pre-determined numerical file designation that is placed between the primary subject abbreviation and the country or area abbreviation. For example, the file number POL 15-1 SWE is for documents about political affairs and relations (POL) of Sweden (SWE) and specifically about the Swedish prime minister (15-1). Researchers generally find the files in the Economic and Political and Defense categories the most useful for foreign policy research.

Again, researchers must use the box listings for each segment of the Central Foreign Policy File, located in the Archives II Research Room, to identify the boxes holding the files of interest.

V. 1973-1976: State Archiving System

On July 1, 1973, the department began phasing in a new filing system. Records were no longer arranged by subject. Documents were indexed using an automated tool, with most telegrams stored electronically and hard-copy documents (beginning January 1, 1974) stored on microfilm. More information about the records can be found in the FAQs available on-line through the National Archives’ Access to Archival Databases (AAD) website <http://aad.archives.gov/aad/> under “Diplomatic Records” or in David A. Langbart, “An Introduction to the Department of State Central Foreign Policy File, 1973-1976,” Passport, vol. 41, no. 3, January 2011, pp. 34-47.

Researchers may gain access to the declassified telegrams and declassified index information about the microfilmed documents, as well as withdrawal notices for classified records, on the AAD website. The electronic records can be searched in many ways to locate documents of interest. Paper copies of the declassified documents from the microfilm are available for use at the National Archives.

Central file records dated after 1976 remain in the custody of the Department of State. Researchers must file a Freedom of Information Act request directly with the department to request access to records in their custody.

For more information, please contact the National Archives and Records Administration:

Archives II Reference Section
(NWCT2R)
Room 2600
The National Archives at College Park
8601 Adelphi Road
College Park, MD 20740-6001
E-mail: archives2reference@nara.gov

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Musings on Anniversaries: 1941, 1991

David Mayers

This year (2011) marks the anniversaries of two momentous events in the history of twentieth-century international relations. The Soviet-German war of 1941-45 began seven decades ago, and twenty years ago the USSR ceased to exist as a superpower and dissolved into its constituent national republics.

1941 and After

The Third Reich launched vast military operations (BARBAROSSA) against the USSR on 22 June 1941. These inflicted devastation upon Soviet cities and countryside that has few rivals in the annals of warfare. German armies and partners—Finnish, Hungarian, Italian, Romanian—were on a crusade, as Adolph Hitler conceived it, to eradicate communism and secure for future generations of Third Reich colonists that Lebensraum improperly occupied by “noxious microbes,” of whom Russians and Jews were most conspicuous. Tender feelings in this context should not be squandered on the three million-plus Red Army POWs destined to perish in German camps or the annihilation of two million Soviet Jews. Between twenty-five and twenty-seven million Soviet civilians and soldiers were killed during 1941-45, a scale of fatality which dwarfed that suffered by all European/North American belligerents combined.

Despite Joseph Stalin’s ineptitude in June 1941, Red forces blunted the German attack, itself burdened by overextension and wanton cruelty that forfeited the initial goodwill felt by hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and Balts (even some Russians) for their Wehrmacht “liberators.” Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus surrendered his Sixth Army at Stalingrad on 2 February 1943. Months later (July-August) the tank battle at Kursk confirmed the irreversibility of waning German strength and anticipated the immensity of Soviet triumph, which before running its final course caused seventy-five percent of all casualties suffered by Germany with commensurate damage to Axis artillery, warplanes, and logistics. A top-level U.S. strategic survey observed in summer 1943 that “Russia occupies a dominant position and is the decisive factor looking toward the defeat of the Axis in Europe.” According to later estimates, when Anglo-U.S. armies stormed ashore in Normandy on 6 June 1944, 60 German divisions were stationed in France and the Low Countries. At this same time 199 German divisions, augmented by 50 satellite divisions, were committed to the eastern front. Less than a year later the Third Reich lay in ruin and under Allied occupation, an outcome to which the Red Army had massively contributed from 1941 onward.

1991 and Before

Few celebrations in Allied cities after German surrender rivaled for intensity of feeling that held in Moscow on 9 May 1945. More than 1.5 million people descended upon Red Square, which was festooned with patriotic bunting and displayed German trophies. Muscovites that evening were treated to a spectacular fireworks display.

This euphoria, needless to elaborate, did not last. The war’s cumulative sorrows were beyond the balms offered by party or state to console. Bombastic speeches, military parades, cannonades, and newsreel depictions of Politburo grandees atop Lenin’s mausoleum created excitement in 1945. But these could not restore to health the millions of people maimed or forever missing nor recompense the destitute and homeless.

The enthusiasm of U.S. and Soviet soldiers who met on the Elbe river in late April 1945, and the optimism of conferees from fifty countries who met (April-June) in San Francisco to ratify a constitution for the United Nations, also proved ephemeral. A different and flintier sort of international system was dawning, heralded in 1946 by Stalin’s “two worlds” speech (9 February), George Kennan’s “long telegram” (22 February), and Winston Churchill’s “iron curtain” warning (5 March).

London, Berlin, Tokyo, and Paris were no longer the cockpits of power. The emergent Washington-Moscow order swept all else to the margins. It was not intended as a peace system, nor a justice system, most assuredly not a mercy system.

The new order took root in the shambles of that international regime devised at Paris in 1919, just as it had supplanted the 1815 Vienna arrangement (with subsequent amendments) that had survived for a century. The postwar order would be defined by bipolarity, self-regulation, distinctive spheres of influence, and rival ideologies that buttressed political legitimacy in the respective blocs while fostering social-intellectual conformity.

These properties until 1991 allowed for a basic stability. Within it the major antagonists never came to direct blows, preferring instead that relative safety derived from proxy combat. Washington’s and Moscow’s monitoring, moreover, of the diplomatic-military equilibrium prevented its dissolution by ongoing threats: competition in the periphery (i.e., the “Third World”), propaganda struggle, arms races. The resultant proximate peace was, as with any political system, imperfect from the standpoint of idealists or people living in vulnerable zones (Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia).

Yet this order, however riddled with alarms (the 1962 missile crisis, for example) and brutality, proved more resilient than the one born in 1919 and in certain respects was preferable to that of post-1991, with its peculiar scourges: rampant ethnic strife, religious fanaticisms, failed states, shadowy terrorists, protracted neocolonial wars (Afghanistan, Iraq). The great powers spun a set of rules in the post-1945 era by which
they usually abided. Lesser states occupied reasonably defined niches in diplomatic-economic blocs. Even the weakest--allowing for exceptions like Cuba or South Vietnam--were left with room for maneuver to play the main rivals against each other, reaping benefits from both, per the nonaligned movement’s stratagem. Overall, the post-World War Two order was not without virtues: predictability, continuity, keeping a lid on tribalism (not least in the Balkans).

American diplomacy was disconcerted in 1991 by the shadows of peace that gathered with the collapse of Soviet power (foreshadowed by the 1989 breaching of the Berlin Wall, expunging of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and disintegration of the Warsaw Pact). The verities of international life had faded along with bipolarity and the vocation of containment.

Official Washington reacted to fast-paced change with a declaration of intent, first announced by George H. W. Bush, then elaborated upon by Bill Clinton: the United States would henceforth assume the role of benevolent hegemon, dispensing favors and justice according to the dictates of realism, based on conventional security and economic desiderata. Multilateralism would be the preferred vehicle of action. Unilateralism as a last resort was not eschewed. This formula, never so baldly stated as above, was grandly christened the new world order. It came a cropper on the events of 11 September 2001. The hoped for peace dividend, so plausibly large and promising in 1991, then disappeared (or is frittered away more accurate?) into Afghanistan and Iraq.

How will people regard 9/11 on its seventieth anniversary? Perhaps they will see it as a moment of grief portending hardship but eventual triumph, comparable in ways to the Soviet experience of June 1941. Or will 9/11 be regarded as something conceptually closer to the USSR of 1991, a once-mighty power brought low by overextension. The words of Edward Gibbon, applicable to his Roman imperium and the recently imploded Soviet Union, might one day--unless we muster prudence and self-control--be applied to our stretched American empire: “The decline was the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate greatness . . . The causes of destruction multiplied with the extent of conquest.”

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SHAFR and the AHA: 
A Personal Essay

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes

I am the American Historical Association. Yep, that’s right, I am the man. I have been a leader of sorts in the AHA, chairing one of its committees. I am part of the great and vague “they” that SHAFR members refer to when disparaging that organization. It is possible that I might be part of the problem, but I hope instead to be part of the solution—at least as far as SHAFR is concerned. Allow me to explain.

First, SHAFR is quite healthy vis-à-vis the AHA and the other major umbrella organization in our profession, the Organization of American Historians. This happy situation has as much do with SHAFR’s strengths as the AHA’s weaknesses. Most of SHAFR’s strengths are well known to its members. Thanks to the generosity of the Bernath family, the organization is exceptionally well funded. The main publication of SHAFR, Diplomatic History, enjoys a sterling reputation. Since its founding, it has had a series of good editors, and under their management it became the main title in its field. That success, combined with the economic model of academic publishing and the steady leadership of SHAFR, has made the journal a moneymaker for our organization.

SHAFR members are also doing well. The classes we teach at both the undergraduate and graduate level draw students—a fact that is difficult for our departmental colleagues to ignore even if they try (and they do). “Globalization” is a major trend in academic studies these days, but we have been “globalized” for a very, very long time. Foreign scholars publish in Diplomatic History and attend SHAFR meetings regularly. Most SHAFR members have gone beyond the State Department files in Record Group 59 in the course of their research, and even if work in U.S. archives predominates, work in foreign archives has been going on since the time of Samuel Flagg Bemis. SHAFR has even held its annual meeting outside the United States. How many other scholarly organizations can make that claim?

The strengths of our organization become all the more apparent when our members attend the meetings of other scholarly groups. The high caliber of SHAFR meetings is not a constant in our profession.

Some of SHAFR’s strengths are less obvious. Because we study diplomats and bureaucracies, many of us have absorbed the professional traits of our subjects to a certain degree. SHAFR meetings are gatherings of scholars who exchange ideas and debate topics in a professional manner that is far more infrequent than it should be in the history business. The leadership of SHAFR is also far more competent than that of most other scholarly societies. That competence, which has contributed to the financial strength of our organization, derives from our study of bureaucracies and our knowledge of how large organizations work. It is not surprising that so many diplomatic historians end up becoming departmental chairs and deans.

The AHA, on the other hand, has numerous problems. Most of these issues stem from the fact that the organization has outlived its original purpose and context. In the AHA’s first three decades of existence, when its meetings drew between 400 and 600 people (the same as current SHAFR conferences), an umbrella organization of historians doing all time periods and topics made a lot of sense. Today: not so much.

The historical profession now is far more specialized than it was a century ago. The simple fact of the matter is that a scholar in any field of history can have a successful career without ever publishing in the American Historical Review or presenting at an AHA meeting. The same is true for the Journal of American History and the OAH. There are too many other publishing venues available that cater to specific, well-defined scholarly communities. Diplomatic History and SHAFR are perfect examples of this phenomenon.

This development is not all that surprising. While there is a lot of talk in departmental conference rooms about learning from all fields, the simple truth is that all of us only have twenty-four hours in a day, and our first priority is keeping up with developments in our own historiographies and doing all the tasks associated with being a professor (grading papers, developing lecture notes, meeting with students, and attending numerous committee meetings). Reading journals that hardly ever address our own research and/or teaching interests is never a high priority. That is the case for everyone, be they a diplomatic historian of the United States or a social historian of medieval Germany.

It is true that there is a good deal of hostility towards diplomatic history among our colleagues, and that attitude is certainly manifested at AHA meetings. To argue otherwise would be just plain silly. The question, though, is whether this bias is the real problem. I would argue not. Instead, I believe an out-of-date mission is a far more relevant explanation of the lack of opportunities for diplomatic historians within the AHA.

If I am right, then we have a problem. Despite its weaknesses relative to SHAFR, the AHA—and to a much lesser extent, the OAH—is the flagship organization of our profession. This is the second point that I want to make here: diplomatic historians must recognize that it is in their individual interests and the institutional interests of SHAFR for them to engage with the AHA more closely. If they have any doubts on this matter, they should remember that hiring decisions, promotions, and graduate admissions that affect our collective and individual futures are in the hands of historians from other fields. For diplomatic history to thrive, it is crucial that we dialogue with the major umbrella organizations, no matter how weak they are. In fact, their weaknesses give us opportunities.

There are three ways in which diplomatic historians should
engage with the AHA. The first is to submit panel proposals for the annual meetings. It is far easier to get proposals accepted at this conference than one might think. Both the AHA and the OAH suffer from what I like to call the “why bother” factor. Since most scholarly communities of historians have their own organizations, which they feel are more receptive to their interests than the large umbrella organizations that are attempting to cover a vast assortment of topics and issues, many academics see little value in engaging with these big organizations. The result is an acceptance rate that fluctuates between 45 and 80 percent, depending on the year in question. The less desirable the city in which the conference is located, the higher the acceptance rate. Let me give you a personal example: I am 3 for 6 with AHA panels and 1 for 1 with OAH panels.

A second way in which to interact with the AHA—and probably the most important—is to volunteer to serve on one of its committees. All of these groups subtly steer the AHA in one direction or another. The book prize committees are important because the prizes are distinctions that distinguish important studies that are new and important in their forms of analysis and interpretation. As a result, they exert influence both on the relative prestige and on direction that scholarship takes in various fields. Accordingly, who serves on these committees is almost as important as who receives the honors. The opportunity to have that type of influence is the main reason I volunteered to be a judge on one of these committees. I served for three years and was the chair in my last year.

I took three important lessons away from that experience. First, I saw the “why bother” factor at work in the submission process. The AHA awards the prize we supervised once every two years. The committee received only 24 nominations the first year and 31 the second year. That number is really not very large, considering that all books have a two-year window of eligibility. How many SHAFR books are published in two years? A lot, I imagine. Second, I learned that despite popular perceptions about the AHA selection process, all the judges made an honest effort to evaluate the submissions on their own merits. I saw little bias among the five judges with whom I worked. Finally—and this is no small thing—there is impressive quality out there in the field of diplomatic history. All the finalists in both prize cycles dealt with topics that were relevant to SHAFR, and one of these books won another major award.

The conference program committee is also of exceptional importance. Again, the main issue the committee faces is the “why bother” factor. However, the individuals who serve on this body determine which panels will be accepted or rejected. These decisions have a broader and more enduring impact on the historiography of various sub-fields than those of book prize committees. If SHAFR members do not volunteer, SHAFR panels are less likely to be chosen. As a result, a good portion of the bias problem—against diplomatic history or any other field—is self-inflicted.

The third way in which diplomatic historians can interface with the major umbrella organizations is to submit articles for publication to their journals. The American Historical Review, like the AHA, has long outlived its original purpose and usefulness. In the 1910s, when the AHA was the same size as SHAFR is today, the AHR made sense. Today is a different story. The AHR (and the Journal of American History) probably would not make a list of the 10 most important journals for most diplomatic historians or a similar list that historians of the U.S. Civil War or Tokugawa Japan might put together. (I will admit that there is no reason for a historian of Japan to be reading the JAH at all, but my overall point should be clear.)

So, if the AHR is so irrelevant—and it is—why should anyone bother to submit articles to it for possible publication? The answer is simple: prestige. Prestige for the individual scholar and prestige for the field. I would consider the regular appearance of between three and four diplomatic history-oriented articles per year in either the AHR or the JAH to be a professional victory. This development can come to pass, but only if diplomatic historians ignore the voice that says “why bother” and submit to these journals on a regular basis.

There are good reasons for individual scholars to ignore this recommendation. The cold, hard truth of the matter is that most of the submissions to these journals will result in a rejection. The thing to remember, though, is that there is no chance of publication if there are no submissions. I have tried to follow this approach, submitting a number of articles to both publications. For the most part, I was fortunate to get rejected quickly. I then took my work to periodicals with editors who gave my work honest consideration. I will admit that it can be very discouraging when an author invests months of work in the revise-and-resubmit process and gets strung along by an editor who submits it to multiple reviewers before getting one negative evaluation that brings about a rejection. Such behavior is the worst type of academic snobbery. I have heard enough horror stories to know that this behavior happens, but the more diplomatic historians the journal staffs see, the less viable this approach becomes. The institutional strength of SHAFR can and should be a remedy for this bias. SHAFR’s leadership needs to hold the editors of these major umbrella publications accountable when evidence of bias becomes clear. We will have accountability only if diplomatic historians submit their work to these periodicals on a frequent basis.

Then, too, sometimes lightning does strike. Again, let me draw upon a personal experience. I submitted an article to the English Historical Review, the journal the AHA used as a model for the AHR. When the editor of another journal who did research in the same field expressed an interest in publishing my work, it was only the advice of a friend that kept me from terminating the submission with the EHR. I figured that the EHR would give it no real consideration. My assumption was a form of the “why bother” factor. Since I knew the odds were against me, I figured I should accept the offer, but my friend convinced me to wait until I heard back from the journal. To my surprise, the article was accepted. Not only was it accepted, it was accepted without revisions. Since then that article has done many good things for me professionally. Sometimes historians need to take a calculated gamble and ignore the voice that says “why bother.”

I think SHAFR can be part of the solution, and it can be because diplomatic history in general and SHAFR in particular are strong and vibrant. While the AHA cannot make such claims, it is still important for diplomatic historians to engage with our colleagues in this organization. In short, a rising tide raises all boats.

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes is Associate Professor of Strategy and Policy at the U.S. Naval War College.
Does Culture Matter?
The Emotions, the Senses, and Other New Approaches to the History of U.S. Foreign/International Relations

Call for Applications


Designed for advanced graduate students or early career college teachers interested in exploring the cultural approach, broadly defined, to the history of U.S. foreign/international relations, this program will invite participants to enhance their own training and preferences for new ways of thinking about the field, or to entertain such ways of thinking for the first time.

The Institute will feature wide-ranging conversation about assigned readings and participants will have an opportunity to present their work to their peers in the summer. Our hope is to nudge participants toward fresh ways of thinking about standard topics or toward new topics altogether, now or in the future. Sessions will also help prepare participants for the job market and offer hints about publication in scholarly journals and with academic presses.

The Institute co-directors are Frank Costigliola of the University of Connecticut and Andrew Rotter of Colgate University. Costigliola has recently finished a book on emotions, World War II, and the origins of the Cold War; Rotter is at work on a project concerning the American and British empires and the five senses. Both historians have in the past explored the influence on U.S. foreign relations of gender, race, religion, language, and other factors that could be understood as being shaped by culture. Several leading historians have tentatively agreed to speak at Institute sessions. The program will also include free time for research and at least one off-campus excursion. Each participant will be reimbursed for travel, be provided free accommodation in air-conditioned University of Connecticut housing, and receive an honorarium of $500.

The Institute schedule is designed to enable participants to remain in Connecticut for the 2012 SHAFR conference, to be held in Hartford and Storrs on June 28-30. The deadline for applications is February 1, 2012. Applicants should submit a curriculum vitae along with a one-page (single spaced) letter describing how participation in the Institute would benefit their scholarship and career, to Rachel Traficanti at rachel.traficanti@uconn.edu. Send questions to Rachel, Frank Costigliola (frank.costigliola@uconn.edu), or Andrew Rotter (arotter@colgate.edu). Preference for admission to the Institute will be given to members of SHAFR.

Business Items

1) Announcements

Young called the meeting to order at 8:00 A.M. and thanked everyone for attending. Young reported that Richard Herrmann had recently stepped down as the Director of the Mershon Center at Ohio State University. In response, Council unanimously passed a resolution thanking Herrmann for his longstanding support of SHAFR and Passport. Council also expressed appreciation to Chapin Rydingsward, who will resign as assistant executive director of SHAFR on June 30 after three and a half years of service.

Matray addressed Council in his capacity as SHAFR's Endowment Liaison, a position established in 2002. He explained that he would be stepping down from this position in 2012 at the conclusion of his second five-year term. Young stipulated that Council would continue to discuss the status of the position in the coming months. Council thanked Matray for his 10 years of service as Endowment Liaison.

2) Recap of motions passed by e-mail since January meeting

Hahn reported that Council, since its last meeting in January, approved two motions by e-mail ballots. It authorized the Director to contract with a vendor to administer SHAFR's elections beginning in 2011 and it approved the succession of the editorship of Passport from Mitch Lerner to Andrew Johns, effective January 1, 2012. Hahn reported that he had signed a contract with Vote Now to administer SHAFR's 2011 election, and that Lerner would stay on at Passport as Consulting Editor in 2012.

3) Diplomatic History Contract Committee report

Young declared that Council would sit in Executive Session to discuss the Diplomatic History contract. After a long and thorough discussion, Council unanimously passed a motion directing Woods, as chair of the Contract Committee, to move forward with the ongoing negotiations.

4) Motions from the Ways & Means Committee

Renewal of stipend to National History Center

Rotter reported that SHAFR had recently received a request by the National History Center (NHC) to increase its sponsorship of the Wilson Center seminar series from $5,000 to $10,000. The Ways & Means Committee requested Council's guidance on this issue. During discussion, it was noted that several SHAFR members have participated in the seminar series. Council also expressed interest in receiving a budget for the seminar series. After further discussion, Council unanimously passed a resolution renewing SHAFR's $5,000 sponsorship of the Wilson Center seminar series for one year with the stipulation that it would consider increasing this amount at the January meeting.

Compensation of Web Editor

In support of the recommendations of the Ways & Means Committee, Council approved unanimously a motion to provide a $3,000 annual stipend to SHAFR's Web Editor and a $2,000 budget for the Web Editor to hire a student assistant. Council also recommended that the Web Editor submit a status report annually, detailing the overall direction and accomplishments of shafr.org.

Travel policies

Rotter directed Council's attention to SHAFR's travel reimbursement policies, which extend varying levels of support to Council Members, Program Committee chairs, and members of the Membership Committee. The Ways & Means Committee encouraged Council to devise a more uniform travel policy and to remind travellers of the expectation that they will first seek university funds for travel. During discussion a consensus emerged in support of eliminating the per diem reimbursements to members of Council (except for graduate student members); affirming non-eligibility of travel expenses except coach airfare (or its equivalent in mileage); and including reimbursement of hotel expenses for up to 4 nights at SHAFR meetings in June and 2-3 nights at AHA meetings (3 in cases where the member is also presenting a paper scheduled to necessitate the third night stay). Council unanimously passed a motion to approve these terms, directing that the new terms will take effect immediately.
Investment management

Rotter reported on the changing corporate status of the firm that currently manages SHAFR's investment portfolio. He reported that the Ways & Means Committee recommends authorizing the Executive Director to explore the possibility of shifting the management of SHAFR's portfolio. Hahn noted that SHAFR's CPA indicated that fee expenses might be reduced by adopting a different management structure. After discussion, a consensus emerged in support of the Committee's recommendation to have the Executive Director investigate the possibilities of reform.

5) Editorial succession of Diplomatic History

Young directed attention to a motion, approved by Council at the January 2009 meeting, to have the SHAFR President in 2012 appoint a committee to consider applications for the editorship of Diplomatic History, for a term beginning in August 2013. Young urged Council to revisit this amendment in light of the fact that the Diplomatic History Editor is expected to assume the presidency in 2012. Council passed a resolution by a vote of 5 yes, 3 no, and 2 abstentions, to set aside the 2009 motion. After extensive discussion, Council passed a resolution, by a vote of 7 yes, 1 no, and 2 abstentions to extend the appointment of the current DH editors to August 2014 and to direct the SHAFR President in 2013 to appoint a committee to consider applications for the editorship, for a term beginning in August 2014.

6) Historical Documentation Committee

Pach addressed Council on behalf of SHAFR's Historical Documentation Committee (HDC) and reaffirmed the Committee's recommendation to have the SHAFR representative on the Historical Advisory Committee (HAC) serve as chair of the HDC. Pach also directed attention to the bi-annual Reports on Operations of the National Declassification Center. The last such report was issued in September and is available at www.archives.gov/declassification/. He also noted that the next report would be available in July and recommended that Council withhold its judgment until then. During discussion, several Council members emphasized that the HDC ought to be reformed so as to function more effectively as SHAFR's public voice on matters of declassification and a channel of relevant information to the membership. It was also suggested that the Committee include representatives from NARA, potentially including an historian employed in the Presidential Archives system. After further discussion, Young explained that she would devise a set of proposals in the coming weeks concerning the future status of the HDC and would solicit Council's suggestions via email.

7) Renaming CGIUS as the SHAFR Global Scholars Grant (SGSG)

Zeiler recalled the motion passed by Council at the previous meeting to allocate, beginning in 2012, $10,000 annually for 3 years on a trial basis to the Membership Committee to initiate the proposed CGIUS. After a brief discussion, Zeiler moved (Belmonte seconded) to rename the CGIUS as the SHAFR Global Scholars Grant (SGSG). The resolution passed unanimously.

8) Selection of hosts for Summer Institute in 2013 and after

Rotter reported that the current funding cycle supporting the SHAFR's Summer Institute program would end in 2012. He suggested that Council define its position on the future status of the Institute. During discussion, it was noted that each Summer Institute costs SHAFR approximately $45,000. After further discussion, Rotter moved (Mahan seconded) to extend funding for the SHAFR Summer Institute through 2013. The motion passed unanimously. Young indicated that she will charge the SI Oversight Committee to solicit bids to host the 2013 Summer Institute.

9) Possible initiatives with C-Span

Lerner introduced Luke Nichter, executive producer of C-SPAN's American History TV series. Nichter thanked Council for the invitation. He explained that American History is a new program, broadcasting 48 hours weekly on CSPAN III. Each episode is archived and streams online at http://www.c-span.org/History/. Nichter detailed American History TV's planned coverage of the 2011 SHAFR meeting and highlighted proposals for future collaboration, each proposal involving the participation of SHAFR members in interview-style TV programming.

Nichter indicated that he would like to improve C-SPAN's coverage of future SHAFR conferences by maintaining dialogue between SHAFR and C-SPAN throughout the year and welcomed the Council's advice with regard to future programming and other areas of potential collaboration.

On behalf of SHAFR's recently appointed C-SPAN task force (Mitch Lerner, Erin Mahan, Laura Belmonte, Marc Selverstone, and Brad Simpson), Lerner offered the following suggestions for strengthening C-SPAN's SHAFR-related programming:

1) Increase television coverage of SHAFR conference panels, with potential focus on teaching-related panels.
2) Increase programs that place contemporary events in their historical context.
3) Work with filmmakers to get documentaries and feature films germane to foreign relations screened and have an accompanying scholarly discussion following them.
4) Televide coverage of significant SHAFR events, such as the presidential address and the plenaries at the annual conference.

During discussion, Council expressed general support for seeking further collaboration with C-SPAN. Young thanked Nichter for coming and requested that Lerner continue to act as a conduit between SHAFR and C-SPAN.
10) Call for proposals to host the 2014 SHAFR Conference

Zeiler reported that SHAFR will issue in Passport a call for proposals to host the 2014 SHAFR Conference. It was noted that the call would specifically target SHAFR members interested in hosting the conference at their home institutions and encourage proposals for all locations, including those west of the Mississippi and abroad. Zeiler noted for the record that the University of South Carolina has expressed interest in hosting.

11) Potential sponsorship of an encyclopedia on U.S. foreign relations (Peter Hahn)

Hahn reported on a recent offer from the Encyclopedia Society to have SHAFR sponsor an encyclopedia on U.S. foreign relations. After examining the terms of the proposal, Council directed Hahn to decline the offer.

Reports

12) Passport

Lerner reported that Passport was in good financial standing. He estimated that in 2011 the publication would cost SHAFR approximately $5,300. Lerner was also happy to report that Passport received a $4,600 grant from the Mershon Center at Ohio State University, doubling the amount granted the previous year. He cautioned, however, that this source of funding is not guaranteed in future years. Lerner concluded by announcing that he would be stepping down as the Editor of Passport and that Andrew Johns would replace him. Council enthusiastically passed the resolution thanking Lerner for his years of service as Passport editor.

13) Diplomatic History

Zeiler reported that Diplomatic History is flourishing. He highlighted the rising quality of article submissions along side the journal’s declining acceptance rate, which now stands at approximately 15%. It was additionally noted that the journal will institute an internal review to determine the degree of gender disparity in article and book review publications.

14) Teaching Committee

Stoler addressed Council on behalf of the SHAFR Teaching Committee (Brian Clancy, Humberto Loayza, Nicole Phelps, Marc J. Selverstone, Phyllis L. Soybel, Matthew Masur, Molly Wood, Terry Hamblin, John Tully [ex officio], Mitch Lerner [ex officio]). After highlighting the 2011 Roundtable panel, organized by the Committee, on “Using Anniversaries to Teach Broader Ideas in U.S. Diplomatic History,” Stoler detailed the status of the Teaching Committee’s syllabi and online documents project. Stoler also reported that John Tully, SHAFR’s Director of Secondary Education and ex-officio member of the Teaching Committee, had submitted a proposal to the Teaching American History Grant Program, but that unfortunately the Department of Education had instituted a freeze on new grants this year. Stoler concluded by announcing that he would be stepping down at the conclusion of his current term. Council passed a resolution thanking Stoler for his work.

15) 2011 SHAFR Conference

Goedde reported that in response to its broad outreach, the 2011 Program Committee received an impressive number of proposals including 96 for full panels and 48 for single papers. The Committee rejected 27 full panel and 39 single paper proposals. She noted that several of the rejected single paper proposals were excellent, but that they simply could not be configured within a panel. She suggested that next year, the “Panelists seeking panelists” page on shafr.org should be advertised more prominently. It was also reported that the committee had introduced new metrics to the online registration survey. The preliminary analysis of this data indicates that tenured professors constitute the largest group in terms of career status, followed by graduate students and non-tenured professors, and that the proportion of first time participants increased this year. It was additionally noted that female applicants constituted 30% of the total applicant pool, but only 21% of the participant pool. Simpson indicated that the Committee intended to study the source of this disparity and report back.

Walton reported that 397 individuals had pre-registered for the conference, including 44 international registrants. She noted a decline in room rates and overall Conference expenses relative to previous SHAFR meetings held in the Washington, D.C. area and credited this decline in part to contractual details negotiated by SHAFR’s venue broker. It was noted that SHAFR was subsidizing the Saturday evening clambake and that tickets were still available.

Council unanimously passed a resolution thanking Walton and the 2011 Program Committee (Dirk Bonker, Jason Colby, Petra Goedde [Co-chair], Amy Greenberg, Sheyda Jahanbani, Mark Lawrence, Nicole Phelps, Brad Simpson [Co-chair], Salim Yaqub) for their work in organizing the 2011 conference.

16) 2012 SHAFR Conference

Zeiler report that the 2012 SHAFR Conference would meet in June at the Hartford Marriott in Hartford, Connecticut. He noted that the Local Arrangements Committee was up and running and that David Engerman and Kristin Hoganson would co-chair the 2012 Program Committee. Zeiler was happy to say that both Thomas Paterson and Michael Hogan will participate in a roundtable panel on the 20th anniversary of Examining the History of American Foreign Relations and that John Gaddis will lecture at the conference.
17) 2013 SHAFR Conference

Young indicated that she would explore the various venue options available in the Washington, D.C. area for the SHAFR Conference in 2013. Decisions on the 2013 meeting were postponed until after the present conference so that assessments could be made of the present venue and the new system of negotiating via a broker. Young asked to discuss the tradition of holding the annual meeting in the DC metro area every other year. During discussion, Belmonte noted that the research conducted by the SHAFR body was becoming less and less bound to Washington-based archives and suggested broadening the venue rotation by returning to Washington every third year. Hahn noted that venues near DC-area Metro lines were prohibitively costly and that University venues in the metropolitan area had also become more costly than in the past. It was suggested that Council make an effort to determine where the majority of SHAFR members stand on this issue. After further discussion, Young urged Council continue to evaluate the issue with the aim of either accepting or rejecting the biannual DC-area venue in principle for future years.

18) 2011 Summer Institute

Zeiler reported that the 2011 Summer Institute, “Freedom and Free Markets: The Histories of Globalization and Human Rights,” was a great success and that virtually all participants reported developing greater intellectual insight during their time there.

19) 2012 Summer Institute

Rotter reported that he and Costigliola would be co-chairing the 2012 Summer Institute in Connecticut. The Institute will be organized around the theme “Does Culture Matter?: The Emotions, the Senses, and Other New Approaches to the History of US Foreign Relations.” It will be held during the week immediately preceding the 2012 annual meeting and several guest lecture candidates are currently under consideration.

20) Dissertation Completion Fellowship Committee

On behalf of the selection committee, Hahn reported that the dissertation completion fellowships would be awarded to Victor V. Nemchenok, of the University of Virginia, for a dissertation entitled “A Dialogue of Power: Development, Global Civil Society, and the Third World Challenge to the International Order, 1970-1988” and Shanon Fitzpatrick, of the University of California at Irvine, for a dissertation entitled “Pulp Empire: Macfadden Publications’ Global Circulations.”

21) Betty Unterberger Dissertation Prize Committee

Painter reported the Betty Unterberger Dissertation Prize will be awarded jointly to Thomas C. Field, Jr., who will be joining the Global Studies Department at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, for his dissertation, “Conflict on High: The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1961-1964” (London School of Economics and Political Science, 2010); and Julia F. Irwin, Department of History, University of South Florida, for her dissertation, “Humanitarian Occupations: Foreign Relief and Assistance in the Formation of American International Identities, 1898-1928” (Yale University, 2009).

22) SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowships

Jonathan Winkler reported that SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowships Committee (Chris Jespersen, Megan Threkeld, and Jonathan Winkler [chair]) received 39 applications (up from 31 last year). The committee selected two applicants for the 2011-12 fellowships: Victor V. Nemchenok of the University of Virginia, whose dissertation is entitled “A Dialogue of Power: Development, Global Civil Society, and the Third World Challenge to the International Order, 1970-1988,” and Shanon Fitzpatrick of the University of California at Irvine, whose dissertation is entitled “Pulp Empire: Macfadden Publications’ Global Circulations.” The committee recommended that future committees confirm the membership status of all applicants before making decisions. The committee further recommended that future committees revise the call for applications to invite “a statement of the research no more than three pages in length” and to specify if such proposals should be single- or double-spaced. The committee felt confident that the quality of the applications is high and the reputation of the award is strong. The fellowship has helped attract bright scholars to membership in SHAFR, and is promoting innovative, outstanding scholarship in the history of U.S. foreign relations and international history.

23) Concluding matters

Young introduced Anna Nelson, who wanted to voice concern over the changing leadership and policies at NARA. Nelson drew attention to the corporate language employed in a recent NARA statement unveiling its new “Executive leadership,” including a new “Chief Operating Officer” and “Chief Human Capital Officer” whose responsibilities were defined in terms of “customer-driven goals” and in pursuit of a “transformed organization.” Nelson expressed concern that such language, coupled with the new leadership’s neglect of processing records as well as the recent retirement of several experienced NARA staffers, boded ill for the future health of historical research at NARA. It was noted that NARA recently expanded its range of activities to include organizing public exhibits of historical artifacts. After discussion, Young indicated that Council would study the implications of these developments and take action accordingly in coming months.
Noting the internet’s rising role (blogs and other online sites) as a vehicle for public education and action on issues of declassification, Belmonte suggested that SHAFR’s Web Editor, if additional assistance were made available, might be willing to enter this territory. It was also suggested that following the current Diplomatic History contract negotiations, SHAFR could approach the publisher for help and advice in these matters.

Belmonte also introduced a preliminary proposal, developed in consultation with Tom Schwartz, to have SHAFR sponsor one or more internships in areas related to the field of diplomatic history and foreign relations, in such places as the State Department Office of the Historian, presidential libraries, the National Security Archives, and the Cold War International History Project. It was suggested that if pursued such outreach would enable SHAFR more effectively to engage the interface between public history and education, government archives and evolving archival policies, and the academic study of the history of U.S. foreign relations. Council directed Belmonte to follow up on her initial suggestion and continue to explore possible ways for SHAFR to support professional development within the sphere of public history and records.

Young concluded the meeting by thanking everyone for attending. The meeting adjourned at 1:15 PM.

Respectfully submitted,
Peter L. Hahn
Executive Director

PLH/cr
1. Personal and Professional Notes

Frank Costigliola (Connecticut) has been selected to edit the diaries of George F. Kennan.

Nick Cullather (Indiana) received the Ellis W. Hawley Prize from the Organization of American Historians for his book, The Hungry World: America's Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia (Harvard, 2010).

Masuda Hajimu has accepted the position of Assistant Professor of History at National University of Singapore.

Allan R. Millett has been appointed as University Research Professor at the University of New Orleans.

2. Research Notes

Call for Papers: St Antony’s International Review

Following the successful publication of wholly themed issues between 2005 and 2010, forthcoming issues of the St Antony’s International Review (STAIR) will also include a General Section. STAIR therefore invites authors to submit original research manuscripts on topics of contemporary relevance in international affairs. Submissions from the fields of political science and international relations, philosophy, and international history will all be considered. Articles may take either a theoretical or policy-oriented approach. We caution, however, that STAIR has a broad readership and therefore prizes accessibility of language and content.

STAIR is the only peer-reviewed journal of international affairs at the University of Oxford. Set up by graduate students of St Antony’s College in 2005, the Review has carved out a distinctive niche as a cross-disciplinary outlet for research on the most pressing contemporary global issues, providing a forum in which emerging scholars can publish their work alongside established academics and policymakers. Distinguished past contributors include John Baylis, Valerie J. Bunce, Robert O. Keohane, James N. Rosenau, and Alfred Stepan.

Please note that STAIR will continue to devote at least half of each issue to a special theme of contemporary significance. Authors should therefore refer to the themed Calls for Papers available at www.stair-journal.org to determine whether their particular areas of interest are covered by upcoming special issues. All articles that do not fit with the upcoming special themes listed here should be submitted to the General Section.

STAIR will review manuscripts that contain original, previously unpublished material of up to 6,000 words (including footnotes with complete bibliographic information). Authors are asked to include a word count and an abstract of no more than 300 words. Submissions are sent to external reviewers for comment. Decisions can generally be expected within three months. For further information on manuscript preparation, referencing, and diction, please refer to the “Notes for Contributors” available at www.stair-journal.org.

Please send submissions to stair@sant.ox.ac.uk.

Call for Applications: Smith Richardson Foundation International Security and Foreign Policy Program

The Smith Richardson Foundation’s International Security and Foreign Policy Program is pleased to announce its annual grant competition to support junior faculty research on American foreign policy, international relations, international security, military policy, and diplomatic and military history. The Foundation will award at least three research grants of $60,000 each to support tenure-track junior faculty engaged in the research and writing of a scholarly book on an issue or topic of interest to the policy community.

These grants are intended to buy-out up to one year of teaching time and to underwrite research costs (including research assistance and travel). Each grant will be paid directly to, and should be administered by, the academic institution at which the junior faculty member works. Projects in military and diplomatic history are especially encouraged. Group or collaborative projects will not be considered.

Procedure: An applicant must submit a research proposal, a maximum of ten pages, that includes the following five sections:

• a one-page executive summary;
• a brief description of the policy issue or the problem that the proposed book will examine;
• a description of the background and body of knowledge on the issue to be addressed by the book;
• a description of the personnel and methods (e.g., research questions, research strategy, analytical approach, tentative organization of the book, etc.); and
• a brief explanation of the implications of the prospective findings of the research for the policy community.

The applicant should also include a curriculum vitae, a detailed budget explaining how the grant would be used, and a work timetable with a start date. A template for a junior faculty proposal is available at the Foundation’s website.

Proposal Evaluation Criteria: Proposals will be evaluated based on the following criteria: the relevance of potential analysis and findings to current and future foreign and security policy issues; the potential of the project to innovate the field and to contribute to academic or policy literature on the chosen topic; the degree to which research questions and analytical methods are well defined; the degree to which the project will develop valuable new data or information through field work, archival work, or other methods; and the applicant’s publication record.

Eligibility: An applicant must have a Ph.D., preferably in Political Science, Public Policy, Policy Analysis, International Political Economy, or History. He or she also must hold a position as a full-time tenure-track faculty member of a college or university in the United States. An applicant should explain how he or she meets all of these requirements in a cover letter to the proposal.

Deadline: The Foundation must receive all Junior Faculty Research Grant proposals postmarked by June 15, 2012. Applicants will be notified of the Foundation’s decision by October 31, 2012.

Please e-mail your proposal to juniorfaculty@srf.org as a single document, ideally in PDF or Microsoft Word .doc/.docx format, or mail an unstapled hard copy to:

Junior Faculty Research / International Program
Smith Richardson Foundation
60 Jesup Road
Westport, CT 06880

Case Studies of the Cold War: A Course for Teachers and Lecturers in Europe

The Parallel History Project, together with the University of Utrecht and the Harry S. Truman Library would like to draw your attention to a unique course on the Cold War for teachers and lecturers in Europe that will take place in Utrecht from 18-22 April 2012. In this course recently declassified archival material will be used to create a series of lessons/seminars on the Cold War at either secondary or university level through cooperation between university lecturers and teachers.

Experts from all over the world have been invited to share the latest insights into Cold War research. Among the speakers will be PHP coordinator Professor Dr. Vojtech Mastny (Washington), Professor Dr. Leopoldo Nuti (Rome), Professor Dr. Jussi Hanhimaeki (Geneva), Professor Dr. Beatrice de Graaf (Leiden), and Dr. Mike Divine (US).

The course is heavily subsidized by the Truman Library, which means that the conference fee for the full course from Wednesday till Sunday is 275 Euro, and from Thursday morning until Saturday evening 195 Euro, including all meals. Until 16 September secondary school teachers from outside the Netherlands may be able to get the whole course reimbursed, including travel and accommodation, since it is approved by the Comenius/Grundtvig database of the European Commission, under the number NL-2012-251-001. See http://ec.europa.eu/education/trainingdatabase/index.cfm?fuseaction=DisplayCourse&cid=30479

There are still places available, and we have decided to arrange the number of seminars in accordance with the number of participants, so as to give as many people as possible a chance to attend. There may be additional funding available for PhD students and trainee teachers upon request.

Please see http://www.euroclio.eu/new/index.php/news-mainmenu-730/conferences-and-events--announcement-calls-and-reports/2647-cold-war-conference and the attachments for further information, or contact Laurien Crump: L.C.Crump@uu.nl

Call for Papers: “Diasporas and the Left”

Left History: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Historical Inquiry and Debate, is currently inviting original article submissions for our special issue entitled, “Diasporas and the Left.” This issue will explore the relationship between diasporic communities from all geopolitical spheres (including but limited to the Americas, the Caribbean, Africa, Europe, the Asia Pacific, and Oceania) and political and social movements of the Left in any time period. Possible topics include independence movements, freedom fighters, resistance to slavery, the organization of workers of color, racial conflict in unions, post-colonial organization, Leftist interpretations of diaspora, international organizing, civil rights movements, Black Power, Brown Power, and cultural movements.

Submissions should be no more than 35 pages in length (double spaced) and should follow the Chicago Manual of Style guidelines. Please see our website for more specific style regulations at http://www.lefthistory.ca. We will be accepting submissions for this special issue until March 1, 2012. The issue will be published in Fall/Winter 2012. Please send complete submissions to: lefthist@yorku.ca. We will also be happy to answer any questions that may arise.
Rethinking Diplomacy

For the 2012-13 theme, the Institute for Historical Studies at The University of Texas at Austin envisions a fundamental and substantive re-thinking of scholarly approaches to diplomacy as a worldwide, multi-disciplinary, historical practice.

Applicants should state unambiguously how they take a new and creative position vis-à-vis the individuals, communities, and states that have frequently defined the historical study of diplomacy.

We are particularly interested in exploring the meaning and practice of diplomacy in pre-modern times and non-Western societies and in a wide range of questions.
- How have different societies defined diplomacy?
- What were the underlying concepts of diplomatic engagement?
- In what ways was the practice of diplomacy gendered?
- What was the process by which one became a diplomat?
- Was statecraft clearly distinguished from actual diplomatic dealing or were the two synonymous?
- How have individuals and organizations conceived and practiced diplomacy in non-conventional sites and spaces?

This IHS project is part of a broader cross-campus initiative on “Rethinking Diplomacy” that also includes the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law, the Department of Government, the Center for European Studies, and British Studies. Together, the IHS and the campus-wide initiative aims to interrogate, stretch, and ultimately re-shape the ways the relations between societies and their representatives are conceptualized.

For further information on the IHS, the theme, the programming, and applications for residential fellowships for 2012-13, see the IHS website: http://www.utexas.edu/cola/insts/historicalstudies/

2012-2013 Fellowship in Naval or Marine Corps History

The United States Naval Academy Department of History invites applications for the Class of 1957 Fellowship in naval or marine corps history for the 2012-13 academic year. Applications will be considered for any period or aspect of naval or marine corps history. The successful applicant will be a recipient of the PhD within the past five years or an ABD researching the dissertation. The Fellow will conduct research, participate in the History Department's scholarly activities related to naval history, deliver an address on his research, and teach one class on naval history. In addition to the use of Nimitz Library and the Museum, the Fellow will receive health insurance, office space, and competitive compensation. Send a cover letter, curriculum vita, writing sample, transcript, and three letters of recommendation to Professor Robert Love at love@usna.edu. Deadline for applications is March 1, 2012.

3. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines

Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations. The prize of $2,500 is awarded annually to an author for his or her first book on any aspect of the history of American foreign relations.

Eligibility: The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works that represent social science disciplines other than history are not eligible.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contributions to scholarship. Winning books should have exceptional interpretative and analytical qualities. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should display careful organization and distinguished writing. Five copies of each book must be submitted with a letter of nomination.

The award will be announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the selection committee. The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition which meets the standards of excellence established for the prize.

To nominate a book published in 2012 for the 2013 prize, send five copies of the book and a letter of nomination to Professor Mark Lawrence, University of Texas, Department of History, Mailcode B7000, Austin, TX 78712. Books may be sent at any time during 2012, but must arrive by December 1, 2012.
Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize recognizes and encourages excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The prize of $1000 is awarded annually.

Eligibility: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the PhD whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or of any other established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

Procedures: Nominations, in the form of a letter and the nominee's c.v., should be sent to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter should discuss evidence of the nominee's excellence in teaching and research. The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH). The winner of the prize will deliver a lecture during the SHAFR luncheon at the next year’s OAH annual meeting. The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to a SHAFR presidential address and should address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer’s specific research interests. The lecturer is awarded $1,000 plus up to $500 in travel expenses to the OAH, and his or her lecture is published in Diplomatic History.

To be considered for the 2012 award, nominations must be received by February 28, 2012. Nominations should be sent to Professor Robert Dean, Eastern Washington University, 200 Patterson Hall, Cheney, WA 99004-2496 (email: rdean@ewu.edu).

Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. The prize of $1,000 is awarded annually to the author of a distinguished article appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations.

Eligibility: The author must be under forty-one years of age or within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of the article’s acceptance for publication. The article must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award or the Myrna F. Bernath Book Award are ineligible.

Procedures: All articles appearing in Diplomatic History will be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations may be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR. The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. To nominate an article published in 2011 for the 2012 prize, send three copies of the article and a letter of nomination to Professor William Stueck, Department of History, University of Georgia, 232 LeConte Hall, Athens, GA 30602-1602 (email: wstueck@uga.edu). Deadline for nominations is February 1, 2012.

Norman and Laura Graebner Award

The Graebner Award is a lifetime achievement award intended to recognize a senior historian of United States foreign relations who has significantly contributed to the development of the field, through scholarship, teaching, and/or service, over his or her career. The award of $2,000 is awarded biannually. The Graebner Award was established by the former students of Norman A. Graebner, professor of diplomatic history at the University of Illinois and the University of Virginia, to honor Norman and his wife Laura for their years of devotion to teaching and research in the field.

Eligibility: The Graebner prize will be awarded to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic or international affairs. The recipient’s career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Procedures: Letters of nomination, submitted in triplicate, should (a) provide a brief biography of the nominee, including educational background, academic or other positions held, and awards and honors received; (b) list the nominee's major scholarly works and discuss the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs; (c) describe the candidate's career, note any teaching honors and awards, and comment on the candidate's classroom skills; and (d) detail the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices and discussing particular activities. Self-nominations are accepted.

Graebner awards are announced at SHAFR’s annual meeting. The next deadline for nominations is March 1, 2012. Submit materials to Guenter Bischof, University of New Orleans, Department of History, Liberal Arts Building Rm. 135, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA 70148 (e-mail: gjbischo@uno.edu).

Arthur S. Link-Warren F. Kuehl Prize for Documentary Editing

The Link-Kuehl Prize is awarded for outstanding collections of primary source materials in the fields of international or diplomatic history, especially those distinguished by the inclusion of commentary designed to interpret the documents.
and set them within their historical context. Published works as well as electronic collections and audio-visual compilations are eligible. The prize is not limited to works on American foreign policy, but is open to works on the history of international, multi-archival, and/or American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy.

The award of $1,000 is presented biannually (odd years) to the best work published during the preceding two calendar years. The award is announced at the SHAFR luncheon during the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

Procedures: Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. Send three copies of the book or other work with letter of nomination to Professor Cary Fraser, Department of African and African-American Studies, The Pennsylvania State University, 133 Willard Building, University Park, PA 16802 (e-mail: cff2@psu.edu). To be considered for the 2013 prize, nominations must be received by January 15, 2013.

SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship

SHAFR invites applications for its dissertation completion fellowship. SHAFR will make two, year-long awards, in the amount of $20,000 each, to support the writing and completion of the doctoral dissertation in the academic year 2011-12. These highly competitive fellowships will support the most promising doctoral candidates in the final phase of completing their dissertations. SHAFR membership is required.

Applicants should be candidates for the PhD in a humanities or social science doctoral program (most likely history), must have been admitted to candidacy, and must be at the writing stage, with all substantial research completed by the time of the award. Applicants should be working on a topic in the field of U.S. foreign relations history or international history, broadly defined, and must be current members of SHAFR. Because successful applicants are expected to finish writing the dissertation during the tenure of the fellowship, they should not engage in teaching opportunities or extensive paid work, except at the discretion of the Fellowship Committee. At the termination of the award period, recipients must provide a one page (250-word) report to the SHAFR Council on the use of the fellowship, to be considered for publication in Passport, the society newsletter.

The submission packet should include:

- A one page application letter describing the project’s significance, the applicant’s status, other support received or applied for and the prospects for completion within the year
- A three page (750 word) statement of the research
- A curriculum vitae
- A letter of recommendation from the primary doctoral advisor.

Applications should be sent by electronic mail to dissertation-fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line should clearly indicate “Last Name: SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship.

The annual deadline for submissions is April 1. Fellowship awards will be decided by around May 1 and will be announced formally during the SHAFR annual meeting in June, with expenditure to be administered during the subsequent academic year.

Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant

The Bernath Dissertation Grant of up to $4,000 is intended to help graduate students defray expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Holt, Gelfand-Rappaport, and Bemis grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please complete the application at SHAFR.org. The annual deadline for applications is October 1. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in Passport.

W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship

The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship of up to $4,000 is intended to defray the costs of travel necessary to conduct research on a significant dissertation project. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Stuart L. Bernath, Gelfand-Rappaport, and Bemis grants.)
Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

**Procedures:** Self-nominations are expected. Please complete the application at SHAFR.org. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org. The **subject line of the email** should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.

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**Lawrence Gelfand – Armin Rappaport Dissertation Fellowship**

SHAFR established this fellowship to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*.

The Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship of up to $4,000 is intended to defray the costs of dissertation research travel. The fellowship is awarded annually at SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Stuart L. Bernath, Holt, and Bemis grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

**Procedures:** Self-nominations are expected. Please complete the application at SHAFR.org. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org. The **subject line of the email** should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.

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**Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grants**

The Samuel F. Bemis Research Grants are intended to promote dissertation research by graduate students. A limited number of grants of varying amounts (generally, up to $2,000) will be awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Stuart L. Bernath, Holt, and Gelfand-Rappaport grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

**Procedures:** Self-nominations are expected. Please complete the application at SHAFR.org. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org. The **subject line of the email** should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.

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**Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship**

The Michael J. Hogan Foreign language Fellowship was established to honor Michael J. Hogan, long-time editor of *Diplomatic History*.

The Hogan Fellowship of up to $4,000 is intended to promote research in foreign language sources by graduate students. The fellowship is intended to defray the costs of studying foreign languages needed for research. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. Applicants must be graduate students researching some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

**Procedures:** Self-nominations are expected. Please complete the application at SHAFR.org. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to hogan-fellowships@shafr.org. The **subject line of the email** should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*. 
William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants

The William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants are intended to promote scholarly research by untenured college and university faculty and others who are within six years of the Ph.D. and who are working as professional historians. Grants are limited to scholars working on the first research monograph. A limited number of grants of varying amounts (generally, up to $2,000) will be awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please complete the application at SHAFR.org. The annual deadline for applications is October 1. Submit materials to williams-fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in Passport.

Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship

The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship was established by the Bernath family to promote scholarship in U.S. foreign relations history by women.

The Myrna Bernath Fellowship of up to $5,000 is intended to defray the costs of scholarly research by women. It is awarded biannually (in odd years) and announced at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Applications are welcomed from women at U.S. universities as well as women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and those within five years of completion of their PhDs. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Self-nominations are expected. Please complete the application at SHAFR.org. The biannual deadline for applications is October 1 of even years. Submit materials to myrnabernath-committee@shafr.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in Passport.

4. Recent Publications of Interest


Cooper, Andrew Scott. The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East (Simon and Schuster, 2011).


Friedberg, Aaron L. *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia* (W.W. Norton, 2011).


Hahn, Peter L. *Missions Accomplished?: The United States and Iraq since World War I* (Oxford, 2011).


Harmer, Tanya. *Allende’s Chile and the Inter-American Cold War* (North Carolina, 2011).

Harvey, Frank P. *Explaining the Iraq War: Counterfactual Theory, Logic and Evidence* (Cambridge, MA, 2011).


Jacobs, Matthew F. *Imagining the Middle East: The Building of an American Foreign Policy, 1918-1967* (North Carolina, 2011).


Kramer, Lloyd S. *Nationalism in Europe and America: Power, Cultures, and Identities since 1775* (North Carolina, 2011).


Robertson, Charles L. *When Roosevelt Planned to Govern France* (Massachusetts, 2011).


To the Editor of Passport:

The Passport roundtable on the so-called Long Crisis in Diplomatic History seems much ado about nothing. (Though it obviously prompted me to respond.) Professor Matthew Connelly’s challenges are hardly new or particularly imaginative. A fatal flaw in his argument is the curious sociological assumption that an association of thinking people has a nature and “mind” that allows generalizations about the learned purpose of its members. We are, thankfully, individuals.

While I bridle at the casual dismissals of the work of political (and diplomatic) historians that has characterized all too much of academe’s recent past, I do not dismiss the importance of well-researched narrow and “parochial” studies. The mosaic of history that we study requires that small stones of knowledge be added to the picture until, voila!, some historians can speculate on the broader meaning. I do not expect myself or my colleagues in our discipline (or sub-sub discipline, as Prof. Connelly would have it) either to create or join some sort of “global community of historians,” and to homogenize all our thoughts and writings. I reject the implication (unintended I am sure) that my fifty-year focus on the foreign policy of Franklin Roosevelt along with Anglo-American relations is somehow insufficiently “global.” (Yes, I have no language research skills beyond English – the current international “lingua franca.” So what?)

Anders Stephanson, an historian at Columbia University, put it succinctly: It is, in point of fact, one the great ironies of “the provinciality” issue that the US profession has more or less forgotten about US power: the provincial aspect of the US profession is not that it is US but that it isn’t US enough. It is hard to find a department of history in the United States that features a strong presence in the following three fields: (i) US foreign relations; (ii) US military history and (iii) US economic history. It is ridiculous. It is ridiculous in a global context.

Bob MacMahon has deftly pilloried Connelly's objections. But no need for anger since the accusations are empty. The reality is that diplomatic historians, U.S. and otherwise, are deeply concerned with all the very political issues of war and peace, including the socio-cultural and global factors. We (US diplomatic historians) have been committed to multi-archival research since Max Savelle and Samuel Bemis. It may be that, at this moment, the only people who care about the politics of war and peace are the students and general public who buy books. That works for me.

As for a new label for SHAFR, a rose by any other name . . . . . A waste of time and money. Someday when the American empire has run its course SHAFR can change its name. But why bother?

Warren F. Kimball
Rbt. Treat Professor of History (Emeritus)
Rutgers University

Dear Graduate Fellowship Committee of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations:

With the $2,000 Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant, I was able to travel to Montevideo, Uruguay, from April 24 to May 30, 2011, for my project, provisionally titled, “Pan-American feminism and the Rise of International Women’s Rights, 1920-1948.” My dissertation explores Pan-American feminism from the 1920s to the 1940s, revealing how a network of activists and organizations from throughout the Western Hemisphere worked in coordinated campaigns to move “women’s rights” beyond the domestic realm and into that of international law. Drawing on archival research in the United States, Uruguay, Cuba, and Chile, my work looks closely at various perspectives on Pan-American feminism, as well as at the crucial organizational and conceptual roles it played in constructing the principles of international human rights.

The funds from the grant paid for my plane ticket to and from Montevideo, Uruguay, as well as for my transportation to and from the archives for the five weeks I was there. Most of my research there centered on the archives of Paulina Luisi, Uruguayan feminist and a key player in the network of activists I’m studying. Her archives are housed at three different institutions: the Biblioteca Nacional, the Archivo General de la Nación, and the Facultad de las Humanidades y Ciencias de Educación. This last repository of papers was one I only discovered existed once I was in Montevideo. It was an extremely well-organized archive, with every document accounted for in a ledger, and it contained a number of Luisi’s conference and radio speeches that do not exist elsewhere. These sources, as well as the rich correspondence I found between Luisi and other Pan-American feminists in her other archives, opened up surprising perspectives and points of communication which will contribute indispensably to my project. The research that the Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Grant allowed me to do was invaluable. Thank you so much for making this trip possible.

Sincerely,
Katherine M. Marino
Ph.D. Candidate
History Department
Stanford University
kmarino@stanford.edu
August 26, 2011

Earlier this year, I received the Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship in support of my dissertation, “Reagan’s Gun-Toting Nuns: Catholicism and U.S.-Central American Relations.” The Bernath Fellowship allowed me to conduct research trips in both the U.S. and Central America. Building on my discoveries at the Carter and Reagan presidential libraries and the papers of several Catholic members of Congress, I applied the Bernath Fellowship to better understand Catholics’ efforts to oppose and promote U.S. intervention in Central America. During a follow-up visit to the archives of the Maryknoll Sisters in Ossining, New York, I viewed recently opened files on the religious community’s efforts to change U.S. policy. To understand the opposing point of view - how conservative Catholics worked with the Reagan administration to promote U.S. intervention in the region- I examined the papers of Paul Weyrich at the University of Wyoming, Laramie. I then compared how both groups of activists framed the debate regarding U.S. policy with the State Department’s efforts to package Reagan’s foreign policy during a visit to the National Archives.

On several trips to El Salvador, I spoke to people about the relationship between their religious faith and political views during the civil war as well as the involvement of priests, nuns, and catechists in the civil war. At the Universidad Centroamerica and the Museo de la Palabra y la Imagen, I gained access to materials not available in the U.S., including a recently discovered collection of a progressive newspaper from San Salvador.

I want to sincerely thank SHAFR, as the Bernath Fellowship allowed me to complete my research. I am now well-positioned to begin writing my dissertation.

Theresa Keeley
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of History
Northwestern University

July 15, 2011

I would like to express my appreciation to the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations for supporting my dissertation, “Whispering Gallery: War and Society during the Korean Conflict and the Global Social Construction of the Cold War, 1945-1953,” with a Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grant of $2,000 in the spring of 2010, and a SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship of $20,000 during the 2010-2011 academic year.

I am writing to describe my use of these funds. First, I used the Bemis Grant to defray costs of airfare (Ithaca, NY, to London), lodging, and food expenses during my research trip to London in June of 2010. At the National Archives in Kew—formerly known as the Public Record Office—I examined and digitally photographed roughly 5,300 pages of documents, in total, from various record groups, such as the Foreign Office, Prime Minister’s Office, Cabinet Office, Colonial and Commonwealth Offices, and Ministry of Home Security.

These documents proved invaluable for my research because they revealed British officials’ observations concerning the situations in China and Korea during the Korean War period, which were quite different from those from Washington, and the ways in which they tried to influence American officials on these topics. Also, I have greatly benefited from reading British diplomats’ numerous reports and observations from Korea, China, Singapore, India, Egypt, Eastern Europe, and, of course, the United States to explore domestic politics and popular attitudes in these societies.

Then, the SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship provided me precious time to fully devote myself to working on my project, which is based on extensive research at thirty-five archives and libraries in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Britain, and the United States, and which traces global social construction of the Cold War during the Korean War period through synthesizing social and diplomatic history, as well as local and global history.

Thanks to the SHAFR Dissertation Fellowship, the 2010-11 year was the most fruitful period since I came to Cornell. During this period, I have completed writing all of my chapter drafts, developed portions of my dissertation into journal articles for the Journal of Contemporary History and the Journal of Cold War Studies, given eleven presentations and talks at various venues, including SHAHR, AAS, and NYCAS, as well as number of colloquia and an international conference in China, and managed to find an Assistant Professor position in the Department of History at National University of Singapore.

Overall, the Bemis Research Grant and SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship tremendously helped me to make progress on my dissertation, and in my academic career as a whole. Now, I am working on completing and polishing my dissertation for submission before moving to Singapore in December of 2011. I could not have done all of this without such generous support from SHAHR. As such, I would like to thank SHAHR for providing these awards.

Sincerely,
Masuda Hajimu
Ph.D. Candidate
Cornell University
The Last Word: Signs of the Apocalypse

Andrew L. Johns

One of my favorite parts of Sports Illustrated every week is the regular feature, “This Week’s Sign that the Apocalypse is Upon Us.” For those of you who don’t read SI, these anecdotes highlight the absurd, perplexing, and ludicrous aspects of the sporting world—such as when Boston Pizza, a Canadian chain, spent approximately $20,000 to rebrand its stores temporarily as Vancouver Pizza during the 2011 Stanley Cup finals (natch, since the Canucks were playing the Bruins) by hanging banners over its signs and putting stickers on its delivery boxes. Given the proclivity of owners, athletes, and fans in professional, collegiate, and even high school sports toward ridiculousness, there is never a lack of material.

I’m sure that some readers of Passport (Ken, Jason, Brian… I’m thinking of you) have submitted my appointment as editor for consideration by SI as proof that the end is nigh. I imagine that I feel a bit like Carl Yastrzemski did on opening day 1961, when the Red Sox rookie took over left field at Fenway from the legendary Ted Williams: excited, a little nervous, and keenly aware of the high expectations that accompany the inherited position. During his eight-year tenure as editor, Mitch Lerner transformed Passport from a simple organizational newsletter into a must-read source of thought-provoking reviews, articles, and commentary on U.S. foreign relations. Like Barry Sanders, Jim Brown, and Ken Dryden, Mitch leaves Passport at the top of his game; like Williams, Mitch hit a home run with his final issue. His absence at the helm will certainly be felt. All of us in SHAFR owe him a debt of gratitude and our sincere thanks for his efforts.

I look forward to the challenge of editing Passport and building on the tradition established by Mitch and his predecessor, Bill Brinker. Fortunately, I know that my task will be made immeasurably easier by the membership of SHAFR. In fact, in soliciting reviews and articles over the past several months, I have already discovered an incredible passion and support for Passport and a universal willingness to contribute essays that makes me enthusiastic about the future of both the publication and our field.

Going forward, I hope to keep Passport focused on addressing the key questions and challenges facing SHAFR. We will continue publishing roundtables on recently-released books of interest to our readers, perhaps the most popular and engaging feature that Mitch began during his tenure. I also want to do more in terms of exploring new and more focused historiographies, moving beyond the traditional and broad (although still relevant) questions such as responsibility for the Cold War or the Vietnam conflict. I have already solicited essays on recent scholarship on human rights, public diplomacy, modernization, and the nexus of foreign policy and domestic politics, and plan to do much more in this vein. In addition, Passport will, in partnership with the Office of the Historian, begin publishing reviews and roundtables on new volumes in the FRUS series and will continue to solicit commentary from both U.S. and international scholars on the current state of U.S. foreign relations, research-related issues, the state of the field, and SHAFR’s place within the broader historical community. We will also begin a new feature, “Dispatches,” which will include letters to the editor, reports from SHAFR grant recipients, and feedback from our readers. I hope that SHAFR’s membership will take advantage of this opportunity to interact with and respond directly to the content in Passport. Please send comments for “Dispatches” (in Word, WordPerfect, or PDF format) to shafr.passport.editor@gmail.com.

By every measurable and anecdotal metric, SHAFR is doing extremely well. But like the sporting world—not to mention the history about which we teach, research, and write—we have our own “marches of folly.” We devote so much time talking and debating about who we are (or should be), where we fit in the profession (or should fit), what we call ourselves (or should call), and what we do (or should do) that it occasionally seems like SHAFR is (or should be) on the verge of either extinction or irrelevance. From my perspective, nothing could be further from the truth. We do what we do exceptionally well, as Tom Zeiler points out in his presidential message at the beginning of this issue. But in the nearly twenty years that I have been involved with SHAFR, it has always bothered me that we seem to exhibit a collective inferiority complex when it comes to our scholarship, methodologies, and the perception of the organization—from both internal and external sources.

Part of the problem as I see it is the almost pathological desire to stay on the cutting edge (or bleeding edge, which my grandfather the physician suggests is actually even more recent and relevant) of scholarly trends at the expense of more traditional approaches…and the implicit, and occasionally explicit, criticism that comes from failing to do so. If this sounds familiar, it should. Mitch Lerner talked about the problems associated with this phenomenon in his valedictory “Last Word” column last September, and I could not agree more strongly. That is not to say that we should not explore new ideas, new sources, or new methodologies. Some of the best books I have read over the past decade resulted from scholars pushing the envelope regarding who and what constitute the history of U.S. foreign relations, broadly conceived. This is, without a doubt, an “era of innovation” for SHAFR.

Yet as Bob McMahon pointed out in a 2005 article in the Journal of Policy History, diplomatic history (or the history of foreign relations…or international history…or transnational history…depending on one’s perception and definition of what we do) is, “intrinsically, a Janus-faced field, one that looks both outward and inward for the wellsprings of America’s behavior in the global arena.” We should not allow ourselves to ignore certain topics or approaches simply because they may not be fashionable. Indeed, studying the “American-ness” of U.S. foreign relations should be a central concern to SHAFR. After all, as KC Johnson has written, if we do not explore these questions, who will? Failure to do so would most assuredly be a sign of the apocalypse.

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