



The Society for Historians of American
Foreign Relations

NEWSLETTER

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SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Founded in 1967. Chartered in 1972.

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MEMBERSHIP: Anyone interested in U.S. diplomatic history is invited to become a member. Annual dues are \$5.00, payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Membership fees for retired members and for students are \$3.00 per year, while institutional affiliations are \$10.00. Life memberships are \$75.00.

MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in August. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZE: The Stuart L. Bernath Prize of \$500.00 is awarded each year at the spring meeting of the Society to that person whose first or second book in U. S. diplomatic history is adjudged the best for the previous year.

ROSTER: A complete listing of the members with addresses and their current research projects is issued in even years to all members. (A supplemental list is mailed in odd years). Editor of the **Roster & Research List** is Warren F. Kimball, Department of History, Rutgers University (Newark), Newark, New Jersey 07102.

SHAFR'S First National Meeting, August 15-16, 1975

Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

by

Jules Davids (Georgetown U)

Washington's summer heat did not deter an enthusiastic response on the part of SHAFR members and other interested participants in attending the Society's first national meeting, held at Georgetown University, August 14-15, 1975. The official registration totalled 217, but actual attendance, including students who sat in on various sessions, brought this figure close to 250. The banquet dinner and luncheons each numbered about 140 persons, and stimulating talks were presented by Townsend Hoopes, Seth Tillman, and Ronald Steel.

The representation was remarkably diverse. Although the Washington area had the largest participation at the SHAFR meeting (about 80), many persons who attended were not only from the Washington area colleges and universities but also from governmental departments and agencies. Sixteen staff members from the Historical Office of the State Department were present, as well as the State Department Director of External Research. Other organizations represented were the National Archives (5), the U.S. Naval Historical Center (5), the History and Museum Division, Hq., U.S. Marine Corps (3), the U.S. Information Agency (2), the U.S. Naval War College (2), and the Historical Division of the Army Corps of Engineers. Several persons at the conference were from other countries: Canada (3), England (2), West Germany (2), and Australia.

Within the United States, participants came from twenty-nine states. The heaviest representation was from New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland (12 each); Ohio followed closely behind (11); and other states with two to seven persons included Texas and Michigan (7 each), California and Tennessee (5 each), Wisconsin (3), and Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts and New Jersey (2 each). Among other states represented were Florida, Maine, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Vermont.

Numerous letters have been received, attesting to the success of SHAFR's first national meeting. Many laudatory comments were made concerning the local arrangements at Georgetown. The atmosphere was congenial, with a good spirit of camaraderie. All the sessions were well attended, and several elicited lively interest.

Some idea of the response to the conference may be garnered from the remarks of a few of the participants. Geoffrey S. Smith of Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, said "I had a marvelous time." Commenting on the "smoker" of the American-East Asian Relations group, Dorothy Borg wrote, "The evening was just what it should have been--relaxed and friendly with very fruitful shop talk that will surely produce significant results." She asked that thanks be extended to "the few people who worked so hard and with such amazing success to have all the mechanics go so smoothly." And Dr. Borg added, "Their efficiency and thoughtfulness, as much as anything, allowed the evening to have a special quality." Charles P. Cullop, Associate Dean of East Carolina University at Greenville, North Carolina, said, "I heard some first rate papers, and enjoyed this meeting as much as any professional meeting I have attended, perhaps more."

With this good send-off of SHAFR's first national meeting, the Society can look forward to many more rewarding annual conferences.

SHAFR's First National Meeting, or
Getting the Bugs Out in Washington

by

Thomas G. Paterson
University of Connecticut

About 225 people registered for SHAFR's first national meeting in Washington, D.C., August 15-16, 1975. Georgetown University generously hosted the conference and Professor Jules Davids toiled for months in preparation. The Program Committee, chaired by the writer, put together eight sessions, two luncheon addresses, and a dinner meeting. The reviews have been mixed. Some thought it a crashing bore; others recorded it as a grand first effort. As always, many held the truth to be somewhere between. The sticky weather was what we expected and have always regretted. Both the President and Congress were out of town, escaping as most natives do from the sweltering humid temperatures. The "Coors is Here" signs, however, cheered Easterners who have been out of reach of that beer. The Watergate complex stood awesomely not far down the Potomac, a towering reminder of our recent past. The social hour was a lively success with the Alumni House's patio and garden conducive to good friendship and conversation. The catered luncheon and dinner food was surprisingly good and the air-conditioned rooms a delight. Georgetown provided a useful guide to its manuscript collections, as well as a team of diligent students who handled a variety of chores, including the much welcomed

coffee-making in the morning. There were some conversational highlights: a former diplomat sent a representative to one session to learn how one historian was handling him; one speaker dressed in florid attire spoke excitedly without notes for an hour, or so it seemed; Career Ambassador Loy Henderson attended many sessions and at one of them denounced the "Bolsheviks."

The papers varied in quality and were delivered with myriad styles, from the sleepy to the over-dramatic. Too frequently chairmen did not hold the speakers to their instructions about allotted time, and as a result, in a majority of cases, there was little or no time for an interchange with the audience. Some presentations were quite impressive and based upon significant research. The sessions were organized around the traditional format: formal papers and critics. In some cases this format worked; in others it did not. One of the lessons SHAFR learned was that other formats should be tried in the future, particularly ones which involve the audience. Several possibilities have been suggested: small seminars with the papers distributed to all seminar participants far in advance; breakfast sessions with small groups; summaries of papers distributed beforehand with concentration in the session on answering questions; carefully-prepared "memoirs" by leading diplomats; and "round-tables." Most assuredly panelists must be held rigorously to specified time limits. Some people raised questions about a summer meeting date, preferring instead to meet as a satellite of one of the major national organizations which draw large attendances. Overall, it can be said that our first national conference was a test, an experiment. SHAFR will now work to get the bugs out, to define precisely the kind of national conference it wants in the future. The Council welcomes suggestions.

The chairmen and participants of the eight sessions helped prepare the following reports. Questions about the papers or comments should be directed to the appropriate panelists.

The first session of the conference on Friday, August 15, **The International Impact of the American Revolution**, drew about forty people. Chaired by Bradford Perkins of the University of Michigan, it heard papers by Frank Kidner (San Francisco State University) on France and by Robert Freeman Smith (University of Toledo) on Latin America. Peter Czap of Amherst College and Lawrence Kaplan of Kent State University provided comments. The Kidner and Smith papers, as well as the Czap comments, shared two common propositions: the direct impact of the American Revolution on areas they treated was not great, and even among the small number of people who looked to the United States, there was both much misunderstanding and some reluctance to follow the American model.

Kidner dealt solely with France from the time of Franklin's first visit in 1767 to the establishment of the Second Empire in 1851. He anatomized the various **Americaniste** factions, showing the differences between them and their comparatively small influence on French dev-

elopments. He warned against placing too much emphasis upon the American Constitutional Convention and the Bill of Rights as precedents for the constitution-making of the National Assembly and the Declaration of the Rights of Man respectively. By 1850, he concluded, there scarcely existed any **Americainistes**, and most Frenchmen disliked the Jacksonian America that had merged.

Smith maintained that, although some Latin Americans (notably Miranda) were influenced by the American Revolution and although for a brief period after the outbreak of the wars for independence there were frequent appeals to the American example, the independence movement was generated almost solely by the Napoleonic invasion of Spain and its impact on the Spanish imperial structure. He also pointed out that most of the leaders in the struggle for independence, from Miranda through Bolivar, did not believe that the American model was an appropriate one for Latin America, being too liberal and too devoted to individualism to suit the new area of revolt.

Czap gave a small paper of his own. Although noting the interest of a few individuals and the attention paid to American ideas by the Decembrists of 1825, he minimized the impact of the American Revolution on Russia. In Poland, he admitted some possible influence upon the constitution of 1791 and the Kosciusko revolt of 1793, but considered other factors much more important.

Kaplan noted the difficult task of weighing the impact of one set of developments upon another. He suggested that it might have been more profitable for the speakers, particularly Kidner, to explore more deeply a limited period of time around the beginning of the revolutions in France and Latin America, respectively, but also suggested that, once Kidner had decided to cover a longer period, the terminal date of 1851 was perhaps not wisely chosen.

Norman Graebner of the University of Virginia chaired Session II on **United States-German Relations in the 20th Century**, Friday morning, August 15. About 140 people attended an often lively discussion. Lloyd Ambrosius of the University of Nebraska began with a paper on "The United States and the Weimar Republic." He developed the theme that Wilson's ideas at Versailles were too imprecise to serve as the foundation for any successful policy toward Germany. Wilson was not prepared to enforce or revise the treaty provisions which applied to Germany. He was not willing to suppress Germany or admit Germany into the family of nations as an equal. Because the treaty was not satisfactory to Germany, it required either adjustments or additional enforcement. Wilson pursued neither alternative. Without any genuine foundation for a German policy emanating from the Versailles conference, the British and French governments pursued divergent policies in the years that followed, while the United States really pursued none at all. Ambrosius noted that John Foster Dulles was responsible for Article 231 in the treaty. But the controversies which arose on this article afterward were not the concern of the United States. The United States from Wilson onward never really developed a policy for Germany.

Arnold Offner's (Boston University) paper dealt with the Roosevelt years of 1933-1940 and was titled "Appeasement Revisited." He acknowledged the intense US-German trade rivalry during the 1930s, but doubted that this was any cause for war. Beyond that, Offner related FDR's efforts to come to terms with Hitler, including the abortive conference of 1938. He mentioned the positive American approach to Munich. What was wrong with American policy, as Offner (and the Europeans) saw it, was that it was concerned with economics and disengagement instead of politics and territory. Thus it never came to terms with Hitler.

Bruce Kuklick of the University of Pennsylvania challenged the use of the word "appeasement" in his paper "American Appeasement of Germany, 1941-1951." His paper was read and defended by Leo Ribuffo of George Washington University. He viewed American policies as basically pro-German, hardly curtailing German power.

Robert Dallek of U.C.L.A. could not attend. Graebner read his comments. He favored the papers of Ambrosius and Offner with little criticism; he rejected much of Kuklick's. He did not agree with Kuklick that the United States saw the need for a powerful Germany in a stable Europe. Rather, he saw a changing United States policy toward Germany in which the United States ultimately came to fear German power. In his comments Robert Ferrell of Indiana University was rather general. He made the point that the older generation of diplomatic historians, because it experienced Munich, would view the issue differently.

Friday's (August 15) luncheon speaker was Seth Tillman, Staff Associate of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Jules Davids of host Georgetown University chaired the meeting, attended by about 145 people. Tillman worked closely with Senator J. William Fulbright and spoke on "The Senate Foreign Relations Committee: The Fulbright Years." He traced Fulbright's key concepts, especially his beliefs in the primacy of domestic policy and needs, the United Nations, and détente (based upon spheres of influence). Fulbright sought to make the Foreign Relations Committee an educational institution and the peak year for that was 1966, when hearings were conducted on relations with China, Vietnam, and Western Europe (NATO). Fulbright set the tone for the Committee: probing and receptive to ideas. The Senator had a historical sense and began to analyze the origins of the Cold War. He read carefully the letters Ho and Mao wrote to Washington at the close of World War II and became convinced that the United States had lost diplomatic opportunities. The Committee began publishing its "Historical Series." Tillman admitted that there were contradictions in Fulbright: seeking democratic values abroad but denying them in his home state of Arkansas, for example. But Fulbright was a politician and had to avoid challenging his constituents on the emotionally-charged issue of civil rights in order to continue his criticism of Vietnam. At least that is how Fulbright put it. Fulbright also defended the preroga-

tives of Congress in foreign policy-making and challenged the exercise of power by the executive branch. Above all else, Tillman concluded, Senator Fulbright was a student. He was always asking: "Have you got any ideas?"

The third session on **Energy and Foreign Policy: Crises and Crunches** (August 15) was chaired by Daniel J. Reed, Assistant Archivist for Presidential Libraries, whose introduction constituted a long paper in itself. Because most of the papers were also quite long, there was no time to discuss the questions raised by critics David Finnie of the Mobil Oil Company and Carl Parrini of Northern Illinois University. About 150 people attended the meeting.

Dennis O'Brien of California State University, Sacramento, discussed an oil crisis which began in early 1919 and abated in the winter of 1920-21. Government officials and oilmen reached a consensus, and a well-organized system of support for the industry emerged, setting a pattern for the future. The catalyst for the crisis was the premature exhaustion of oil-fields in Mexico (supplying 15-20% of United States needs) at a time when consumption was rising dramatically and geologists were predicting that American production would peak by the mid-1920's and decline soon after. The paper treated the bureaucratic processes within the Governments of Great Britain and the United States, as well as within the oil companies. According to O'Brien, it was the beginning of the age of multinational oil companies and official Washington played a major role in shaping the relationship which followed.

John DeNovo, University of Wisconsin-Madison, tackled three World War II oil questions: (1) the ramifications of the enormous drain on petroleum resources; (2) the bureaucratic struggle to develop a national and international oil policy; and (3) Anglo-American relations. DeNovo concluded that early fears of shortages subsided when reappraised world reserves appeared adequate. Attempts to develop national and international policy were less successful. Industry welcomed governmental intervention in the form of tax incentives, relaxed anti-trust laws, and allocation of scarce hardware, but balked at what it considered interference in purely business decisions.

Robert Hunter, Senior Foreign Policy Advisor to Senator Edward Kennedy spoke about the crisis of 1973, which he considered a watershed in world energy relations. The catalyst was the joining of the economic goals of OPEC with the political goals of the Arab States. At the same time consumption patterns in the developed world were rising and the government of the United States seemed unaware that a problem existed. Hunter expressed surprise that OPEC did not exercise its economic power more strongly before 1973, but he stated that political conditions during the period October 16 - December 23, 1973, were right and OPEC exploited the opportunity. Hunter concluded that the United States emerged a short-term "winner" (along with the USSR,

Canada, and the OPEC nations), because of its comparative domestic production capacity and the relative international strengthening of the dollar. In any case, a "New International Economic Order" emerged.

Session IV, **The Major Powers and the United States, 1898-1910**, met Friday afternoon, August 15, and approximately seventy-five persons attended. Roger R. Trask of the University of South Florida served as chairman, substituting for David F. Trask of the State University of New York at Stony Brook, who was unable to attend.

The first paper, titled "Roosevelt, Russia, and Peacemaking, 1905," was presented by Raymond Esthus of Tulane University. In a detailed analysis of the negotiations at Portsmouth, Esthus argued that the key to understanding the final compromise settlement of the Russo-Japanese War can be found in the relationship between the chief Russian delegate, Sergei Witte, and Czar Nicholas II. Witte's views, Esthus argued, prevailed over those of the Czar; Roosevelt's role was not decisive.

Manfred Jonas of Union College presented the second paper on "The Case of Germany." Jonas described efforts by Germany to court the United States between 1899 and 1908, efforts determined essentially by European events. Paying special attention to German-United States relations during the Moroccan crisis of 1905 and the Algeciras Conference, Jonas suggested that President Roosevelt did not act in the German interest. But this rebuff at Algeciras did not end Germany's efforts to cement closer ties with the United States; these efforts terminated only after the signing of the Root-Takahira Agreement of 1908 between the United States and Japan. Japan stood as a major obstacle to the fulfillment of German ambitions in the Far East.

Samuel Wells of the University of North Carolina and Kenneth J. Hagan of the United States Naval Academy commented. Wells stressed the role of Great Britain during the period under consideration. After summarizing British concessions to the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Wells emphasized that by 1906 American leaders realized the value of cooperating with Britain rather than Germany, but at a substantial price to the former. Anglo-American relations, Wells argued, prospered mainly because of artful English leadership. Hagan noted that Esthus and Jonas essentially agreed on the reasons for the outcome of the Portsmouth Conference, but expressed his disappointment that Esthus did not go further with his analysis of United States-Japanese relations. He suggested in conclusion that it might be time to move beyond the "traditionalist" interpretation of the period.

The evening address of August 15 was delivered by Townsend Hoopes, the author of **The Limits of Intervention** and **The Devil and John Foster Dulles**. Amin Rappaport of the University of California, San Diego, and President of SHAFR, presided. Hoopes dealt with the question of current American foreign policy and adjustments after the Vietnam debacle. He surveyed the Kennedy-Johnson foreign policies

and characterized them as globalism. Noting that those presidents possessed great self-confidence, Hoopes suggested that the Cuban Missile Crisis gave a further boost which helped escalate the war in Vietnam. That confidence was broken by Vietnam. Hoopes criticized the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger foreign policy for being unwilling to accept what it cannot change: leftist governments. Visceral anti-communism is still part of American diplomacy, and there is scant regard for morality or idealism in Kissinger's balance of power gymnastics, Hoopes said. He mentioned that Solzhenitsyn was launching an out-of-date anti-Communist crusade; the Russian writer has been too long in the repressive Soviet society, Hoopes thought, to understand changes in international affairs. The task for American foreign policy in the future? To recognize the limits of American power, to admit the decline of American power, to understand that the United States cannot prevent or alleviate all anarchy, Hoopes concluded.

Session V on **The United States Response to the Fascist Menace in Latin America** (August 16) was chaired by John J. Finian of The American University. Irwin F. Gellman, Morgan State College, presented a paper entitled "The New Deal's Use of Nazism in Latin America." Gellman contended that, since public opinion in the United States would not sanction conflict outside the hemisphere, President Franklin D. Roosevelt used Latin America to influence domestic public opinion by advocating preparedness under the doctrine of hemispheric protection. He constantly and arbitrarily enlarged the boundaries of the hemisphere to encompass Iceland and Greenland. Gellman argued that this involved a substantial exaggeration of the Fascist threat to Latin America, and that in using Latin America in this manner, F.D.R. "misled" the American people.

Kenneth J. Grieb, University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh, discussed "The Fascist Mirage in Central America: Guatemalan-United States Relations and the Yankee Fear of Fascism, 1936-1944." Grieb demonstrated that the United States became hyper-sensitive to supposed indications of Fascist sympathies on the part of the Central American dictatorships during the mid-1930's. He compared Yankee hypersensitivity to the "Red Scare" of the 1950's, and noted that the United States confused similarity of method on the part of the Central American dictatorships with adherence to doctrine, and failed to perceive that the similarities merely reflected local methods within the Central American countries. He used the regime of General Jorge Ubico in Guatemala as a case study, pointing out that this pro-American regime still experienced difficulties with the United States due to the size and influence of the German community there and Yankee misinterpretation. Grieb noted that the Central American nations could not be blamed for failing to condemn Fascism at a time when isolationism prevented the United States from offering leadership and directly opposing Fascism itself.

Michael Grow of George Washington University discussed "The United States, Nazi Germany, and Corporatism in the River Plate Basin." Grow observed that the United States attempted to use the Fascist menace in southern South America as a means to oppose dynamic, authoritarian, nationalistic regimes which were hostile to Yankee investment. He argued further that the United States sought to utilize the Second World War years to place itself in economic control of southern South America by displacing German investment. He cited examples from Argentina and Paraguay.

Ambassador Willard L. Beaulac commented on the papers. Drawing upon his experience in each of the countries, he commented that he had learned much about himself from the papers. He thought Grieb's study corresponded to what he remembered about Guatemala. He welcomed the emphasis on economics in all three papers, noting that this aspect needed more study. On Gellman's reference to Roosevelt's "misleading" the American public, Ambassador Beaulac observed that President Roosevelt undoubtedly felt that he was actually "leading." Regarding Grow's references to his actions while Ambassador to Paraguay, Mr. Beaulac said it was normal for American representatives to promote American interests and to advocate democracy.

Approximately 150 people attended the Saturday morning session (VI) on **Three Cold Warriors and the Origins of the Cold War**, chaired by Milton O. Gustafson of the National Archives. C. Ben Wright of Chatham College presented a paper on George F. Kennan; Larry Bland of Gaston College on W. Averell Harriman; and T. Michael Ruddy of Kent State University, New Philadelphia Branch, on Charles Bohlen. The three diplomats came to their positions of influence from somewhat different backgrounds and perspectives, but they all had firsthand knowledge of the Soviet Union, their observations and recommendations were influential during the crucial period 1943-1947, and by 1946 they held similar views on American-Soviet relations.

Charles Burton Marshall, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, commented with considerable spirit on the three papers from his point of view as a former policy-planner in the State Department. He knew each of the three diplomats. Bohlen, he said, had wide experience, but his wisdom was limited to that experience; Kennan's influence in the Department of State, he believed, has been exaggerated; and Harriman, in his opinion, was able to change his mind on issues from day to day.

George Herring, University of Kentucky, replaced Lloyd Gardner, who was unable to attend, as a commentator. Herring thought the three speakers, who recently completed biographical dissertations on their respective diplomats, had done a solid job of research. But he noted that no one presented any significant new interpretation. The speakers, who carefully described the various events and ideas of the period, were too cautious in not providing some critical analysis of their diplomats.

Ronald Steel addressed the Saturday luncheon (August 16) on "Walter Lippmann and the National Interest." Thomas G. Paterson of the University of Connecticut presided. As the biographer of the distinguished journalist-analyst and author of three books on American foreign policy, Steel was conversant with his subject. Steel identified the key to Lippmann's thought as the need for a balance of commitments and power on behalf of the territorial integrity and democracy of the United States. Lippmann decried the imbalance he saw in the periods of isolationism and globalism. Tracing Lippmann's intellectual journey from World War I days to the recent past, Steel noted his disillusionment after Versailles, but his movement to interventionism in 1940-41. His **U.S. Foreign Policy** (1943) became his coda after the war and his break with Wilsonianism. His new "realism" stressed the use of power in the national interest. Lippmann sought to neutralize Europe in the postwar period through a recognition of spheres of influence. His criticisms of the Truman Doctrine and Kennan's "X" article stressed the "strategic monstrosity" they would produce. He advocated "disengagement" in the 1940's, a decade before Kennan did so in his Reith Lectures. Lippmann opposed American intervention in Vietnam from the beginning, arguing that Indo-China was within the Chinese sphere of influence. He became a hero of anti-war protesters, especially when he broke with President Johnson and condemned America's "bastard empire." Steel remained to answer questions after his talk, including one which received the answer that Lippmann supported the military intervention in Santo Domingo in 1965, hence remaining true to his spheres-of-influence approach.

Session VII (August 16), **An Overview of American Foreign Policy in the Late Nineteenth Century**, was chaired by Robert L. Beisner of American University. James F. Vivian (University of North Dakota) and James Chapin (University College, Rutgers University) read papers on James G. Blaine and Hamilton Fish, respectively. Richard E. Welch, Jr. (Lafayette College) and Milton Plesur (State University of New York, Buffalo) commented. Although Hamilton Fish's and James G. Blaine's careers as Secretaries of State covered only the years 1869-1877, 1881, and 1889-1892. Chapin's paper looked into the period 1895-1898, thus giving the session a study of five presidential administrations. Although the papers differed greatly in thesis and focus, both extended the current reevaluation of American foreign policy into this once-neglected period.

Vivian presented a straightforward thesis: Blaine has enjoyed an unjustifiably inflated reputation as Secretary of State. Some historians have credited Blaine with being the father of Pan Americanism and the Good Neighbor Policy or have declared him a prime architect of "new empire" economic expansionism. Other historians and some of Blaine's contemporaries have found few substantive achievements, but have discovered what they consider his vision, foresight, and innovative thinking. Vivian denied that evidence exists for any of these claims. Urging much more research on Blaine's diplomatic career, Vivian suggested but did not insist that the result will prove damaging to Blaine's ranking in American diplomatic historiography.

Chapin's more ambitious paper on "Hamilton Fish and the Lessons of the Ten Years 'War'" sought to reverse the Allan Nevins-created reputation of Fish. Chapin faulted Fish on numerous grounds, both tactical and strategic. Fish was a determined but awkward economic expansionist. Chapin concentrated on a comparison between Fish's handling of the Cuban revolution of the 1870s and Cleveland's and McKinley's response to the renewed conflict in the 1890s. He stressed continuity for American foreign policy, as well as for the Cubans and Spanish in strategy and personnel. The period of 1895-1898, then, was a replay of the 1870s with the major exception that Spain and America went to war in the latter case. Following the work of Philip Foner, Chapin urged diplomatic historians to study the Cuban rebels and their policies and goals, rather than just those of the United States.

Plesur and Welch offered accolades to both speakers, but stressed shortcomings. They criticised Vivian for giving a negative assessment of Blaine without concluding where Blaine belongs in the American diplomatic tradition. They asked, further, how Blaine's reputation could have become so inflated if his achievements were so thin. Both critics thought Chapin's continuity thesis for the 1870s-1890s was overdrawn. They suggested that a continuity in personnel (United States, Cuba, or Spain) did not necessarily determine a continuity of policy. They recommended that Chapin pay more attention to the differences between the two periods, to take account of changes between the 1870s and 1890s which explain why war erupted in the latter decade. After responses from the authors, the audience of about forty asked questions, most of which centered on the Plesur and Welch comments.

The Saturday afternoon session (VIII, August 16) on **China and the United States: The Economic Dimension, 1890s-1975** focused on the economic aspects, questions of the success or failure of American exporters, the importance of investments, the influence of dreams of a great China market on American-China policy, and the Nixon-Kissinger overtures to restore relations. Participants were Michael Hunt of Yale University, Jerry Israel of Illinois Wesleyan University, and Edward Friedman of the University of Wisconsin. Marilyn Young of the University of Michigan and Warren Cohen of Michigan State University served as critics. Paul Varg of Michigan State University presided.

Hunt presented a analysis of economic relations from 1890 to the outbreak of the second World War. Previous studies have approached the question largely from the point of view of determining whether commercial interests had a significant influence on American foreign policy. Hunt was interested in economic relations *per se*. Commercial relations never measured up to American expectations and were minor when viewed as a totality, yet two companies, Standard Oil and the British-American Tobacco Company, were successful and both played important roles in China's economic life. Hunt discussed how Chinese nationalism provided effective barriers to foreign imperialism.

Jerry Israel's paper, covering the period 1931-1949, presented by Professor Safford of Montana State University in Israel's absence, studied (1) the concern for profits on the part of American business representatives in China and (2) predictability, "the purview of those far-removed from the action in Asia." The author examined the China-American Council of Commerce and Industry in the first category. The Council was a short-lived group of prominent business interests organized during World War II. These corporate interests assumed that there had been a long-standing friendship with China which would work to their advantage. Israel, in the second half of his paper, dealt with what he called predictability. Symbolic of these lone-term efforts to establish a stable order of relations among the powers in Asia was the Commission on a Just and Durable Peace of the National Council of Churches. Israel chose John Foster Dulles as representative of this movement.

Edward Friedman, in a paper entitled "The Shadow and the Myth," argued that the United States after World War II was blinded to economic realities by its obsession with anti-communist politics, particularly by its hostility to China. Consequently it persisted in a program of costly military preparedness and overseas expenditures while its more realistic allies, like Japan, concentrated on victory in world markets. Eventually unfavorable trade balances and a shortage of foreign exchange sharply weakened the dollar and threatened economic ruination. The Chinese, wholly devoted to the importance of economics in the world power struggle, perceived early what was taking place. So did some members of Congress, but the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations adhered to the illusions which placed political goals first and slighted economic ones. The point of major importance, as Friedman saw it, was that the Chinese, unlike Americans, saw realities.

Warren Cohen and Marilyn Young offered critical comments. Both praised Hunt's paper. Israel's paper was subjected to sharp and unfavorable comment by Cohen, who thought it inadequately researched. He also questioned the importance of the China-American Council of Commerce and Industry and denied that Dulles played a significant role between 1931 and 1941. Cohen applauded Friedman's introduction of a Chinese perspective and expressed agreement with several of his findings, but questioned Friedman's emphasis on economic competition with Japan as a factor promoting a new American policy toward China.

Marilyn Young found Israel's paper very suggestive, but asked whether profit and predictability were as separate as Israel implied. For instance, were the types who belonged to the Council on Commerce and Industry so different from those who belonged to the Council on Foreign Relations? Was the mind-set of John Foster Dulles different from that of the presidents of the 400 firms who made up the Council on Commerce and Industry? She posed as the central question whether business interests differed essentially in their approach from policy-makers. She praised Friedman's paper for paying full attention to the

Chinese segment of Sino-American relations. At the same time she asked why American business should have been blinded by political prejudices and noted that Friedman had an obligation to inquire why this was so. She found the paper exciting and the lack of explanatory substance frustrating.

MINUTES

Council Meeting, August 15, 1975
Washington, D.C.

The Council of SHAFR held a brief meeting, 8:30-9:55 A.M., in the Walsh Building at Georgetown University. Those members of Council present were Dorothy Borg, Wayne Cole, Robert Divine, Joseph O'Grady, and Bradford Perkins. Armin Rappaport presided. Also present were Robert Ferrell, Warren Kuehl, Lawrence Kaplan, Frank Merli, and Jules Davids.

Jules Davids reported upon local arrangements and an anticipated registration of over 200 for the national conference.

On motion by Robert Divine, seconded by Wayne Cole, it was unanimously voted to elect Myrna Bernath as an honorary Life Member of SHAFR

Dorothy Borg gave an accounting for the **ad hoc** committee which was set up to make recommendations concerning the establishment of overseas branches of SHAFR. She stated that such action seemed premature, that more members were needed in various countries, and that SHAFR should welcome many more members from abroad before creating branches. Robert Divine moved and Bradford Perkins seconded, that the Council approve the report. The vote was unanimous.

Larry Kaplan described the steps that had been taken regarding the second national conference of SHAFR, to be held in Columbus, Ohio, in the summer of 1976. He noted that \$5,000 had been approved by the Ohio Bicentennial Committee for this meeting, and said there were plans to obtain additional funds. Frank Merli, as the new Chairman of the Program Committee, agreed to work closely with the Ohio sponsors, and a report of these plans appears on page 23 of this number of the **Newsletter**.

Wayne Cole and Armin Rappaport spoke briefly about various organizations which are attempting to improve communications between the general public and the State Department. Neither saw much role for SHAFR in these efforts, but they agreed to keep in touch with these programs.

Robert Ferrell discussed developments regarding a journal for SHAFR. He noted that campus-related proposals seemed in limbo, but that a new lead had developed through Jules Davids. Michael Glaser, speaking for Scholarly Resources, Inc., had expressed an interest in assuming the printing costs of such a publication. A committee consisting of Ferrell, Richard Leopold, and Davids, was named to explore contractual arrangements, and to plan a canvass for a suitable editor, provided an agreement can be reached with Scholarly Resources.

Information on SHAFR's plans for participation in the annual meetings (1975) of the Southern Historical and American Historical Associations, transmitted to the Council, appears elsewhere in this issue of the **Newsletter**.

A suggestion from the Historical Office of the Department of State that its staff would like to develop a closer relationship with SHAFR led to an agreement that the Historical Office be invited to designate a person to attend the Council meetings.

It was suggested that the National Office investigate the requirements for membership upon the American Council of Learned Societies.

The Council formally approved the transfer of \$200 to the Stuart L. Bernath Special Account in order to cover the awards for 1974 and to establish the fund at a solid level.

Warren Kuehl stated that Gerald and Myrna Bernath have expressed an interest in making an additional gift to SHAFR in memory of their son, Stuart, and they welcome ideas for a suitable program. After discussing alternatives, the Council agreed to offer two suggestions: (1) that a fund be created which would provide research grants-in-aid to young post-doctoral scholars in their first five years of teaching; (2) that a Stuart L. Bernath lecturer, similar to that of a Phi Beth Kappa lecturer, be designated each year to speak upon several campuses.

The joint Secretary-Treasurer was instructed to express the genuine thanks of all members of the Society to Tom Paterson and his Program Committee, to Jules Davids for his work on local arrangements for the national conference, and to the staff of the Historical Office of the Department of State for its program on August 14.

DETENTE: Meaning and Implications

Simon J. Ellison*

What is *détente*? It is not mentioned in the old textbooks on international law or on international relations. It is an old practice, although the term of reference describing it is fairly recent in diplomatic usage. The French were the first to make use of the term which is now internationalized. It was meant to be a "relaxation" in the relations between nations after unusual tension and strain in such relationships which seemed to verge on hostility. *Détente*, therefore, is an informal mutual effort on both sides to reduce such tensions and strain in their relationships wherever they had previously manifested themselves--to mark time, as it were, almost to the point of apparently accepting the status quo for the time being. It is a move which is not meant to terminate nor to remove the basic causative factors which previously brought about the difficult relationships and which could still serve to aggravate them to the point where tense and strained relationships verging on hostility could be resumed, even to the ultimate outcome.

Détente might, therefore, be characterized as a temporary expedient, a tactical policy in the relationships obtaining between nations. It in no way bears upon strategic policy changes in those relationships. Tactics may vary from time to time to suit the current interests of the nations employing them, like the moves made by the canoeist paddling through a turbulent stream. The policy strategies, however, are likely to remain the same, or may, in the dynamics affecting the community of nations, undergo change, slow and imperceptible, almost glacially.

Détente is now a popular term, much used and much abused. It is meant to describe the current relationships obtaining between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. What is often missed in the broad popular usage and interpretation of the term to describe those relationships is the diplomatic meaning which is very strictly limited. The broad popular usage of the term is undoubtedly based on wishful thinking that the basic international irritants have been permanently suppressed or removed, and unfortunately, may serve to entrap those who have blithely accepted their own carelessly--drawn meaning and ignored the meaning of the highly limited diplomatic term which describes and defines international relationships.

It should be understood that our present détente with the U.S.S.R. is not the first. We are now going through a rather tenuous and uncertain third détente with U.S.S.R. which seems to have had its inception in the early 1960's, now therefore nearly thirteen years of age. One may recognize the two previous détentes of varied duration as having occurred in 1933 in connection with the diplomatic recognition of the U.S.S.R. by the U.S.A., and again during the wartime "grand alliance" days of 1941 to 1945.

*Prof. Ellison, a recent retiree from Bayside H.S. in New York City, was for many years heavily involved in the Advanced Placement Program in the public school system of that city.

ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED, OR SCHOLARLY PAPERS
DELIVERED, BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

(Please limit abstracts to a total of fifteen (15) lines of **Newsletter** space. The overriding problem of space, plus the wish to accommodate as many contributors as possible, makes this restriction necessary. Don't send lengthy summaries to the editor with the request that he cut as he sees fit. Go over abstracts carefully before mailing. If words are omitted, or statements are vague, the editor in attempting to make needed changes may do violence to the meaning of the article or paper. Do not send abstracts until a paper has actually been delivered, or an article has actually appeared in print. For abstracts of articles, please supply the date, the volume, the number within the volume, and the pages. Double space all abstracts).

J. Albert Bailey (U of Alabama--Huntsville), "The Western Allies and Turkish Neutrality: The Casablanca Conference, 1943," **Journal of the Alabama Academy of Science**, 45, #3 (July, 1974), 212-222. The Western Allies began serious efforts to persuade Turkey to enter the war on their side at the Casablanca Conference in January, 1943. Although Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin had previously indicated interest in a general approach to Turkey, with the aim of detaching her from her position of neutrality in the war, it was the British argument at Casablanca which initiated conversations with Turkish leaders on the subject. Immediately following the Conference meetings, Churchill and his civilian and military advisors met with Turkish President, Ismet Inonu, at the town of Adana in southern Turkey. Meetings among Allied and Turkish leaders continued throughout 1943 but did not achieve the objectives set forth at Casablanca: Turkey remained neutral until the very last months of the war.

The records of the Casablanca Conference reveal that the approach to Turkey was very much a personal desire of Prime Minister Churchill. Neither the British Foreign Office nor, to a lesser extent, the British military leaders were enthusiastic about the diplomatic initiative. President Roosevelt gave general approval to Churchill's plan but little more; the American military leaders exhibited serious doubts on the subject.

Since a move to induce Turkey to enter the war involved deeper questions of diplomacy and military strategy, the divergence of the Western Allies, first apparent at Casablanca on the matter, revealed differing political and military aims. The growth of American military and diplomatic power in the latter years of the war would relegate British ambitions, including those towards Turkey, to a secondary position.

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Barton J. Bernstein (Stanford U), "Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1954: A Reinterpretation," **Political Science Quarterly**, XL (Spring, 1975) 23-69. F.D. Roosevelt recognized the wartime and postwar international-political significance of the atomic bomb, considered it a legitimate weapon for use against an enemy, allowed Great Britain to participate in the bomb project as a junior partner, acted systematically to exclude the Soviet Union from knowledge of the project, and maintained the options for later "atomic diplomacy." Roosevelt's decisions and assumptions constituted the the legacy that H.S. Truman inherited. Only a bolder man, when lacking a popular mandate and succeeding his revered chief, might have challenged this legacy. Truman had neither the political nor psychological independence nor the incentive, and his continuation of many of Roosevelt's advisers served subtly to deter him. Under Truman, the bomb did influence policy slightly before Potsdam and stiffened the president at Potsdam in dealing with the Soviets. The administration used the bomb against Japan because the weapon promised to speed the end of the war and because there was, for policy makers, no moral reason to avoid using the bomb. Policy makers generally rejected as too risky or as very marginal what critics have viewed as alternative ways of ending the war: (1) further modifying the unconditional surrender formula and guaranteeing the position of the emperor; (2) providing a warning or noncombative demonstration of the atomic bomb; (3) pursuing Japanese peace feelers (4) awaiting a Soviet declaration of war or inviting the Soviets to sign the Potsdam Declaration; (5) stepping up conventional warfare (air bombing and naval blockade). Policy makers were also deterred from reconsidering their decision because they, unlike the Franck Committee, believed that the bomb also offered a bonus: it might intimidate the Soviets and make them more tractable in the postwar period. After the war, the bomb did encourage policy makers to believe in their capacity to achieve their goals in the few months after Hiroshima and reduced any desire to make concessions. There was practice of "atomic diplomacy"--in this case implied

threats to achieve American goals. That diplomacy largely failed. In summary, Roosevelt's wartime decisions to avoid approaching the Soviets on the bomb and Truman's use of atomic diplomacy resulted in missed opportunities at improving relations, added to Soviet fears and suspicions and, thereby, contributed to the Cold War.

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James K. Libbey (Eastern Kentucky U, Richmond, Ky.), "Liberal Journals and the Moscow Trials of 1936-38." *Journalism Quarterly*, 52, #1 (Spring, 1975) 85-92, 137. Commentary in leading American liberal journals reveals that the Moscow trials tarnished the image of the Soviet Union prior to the Nazi-Soviet Pact. The Pact has been posited as the crisis among the American left that forced abandonment of the Soviet Union as a positive alternative model to capitalism. Articles in liberal periodicals demonstrated, however, a significant disenchantment with the USSR before 1939.

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Jamie W. Moore (The Citadel), "Deterrence Theory: The Concept and an Application in American Foreign Policy." Paper delivered at Peace Science Society (International--Southern Section), North Carolina State U, April, 1975. The years 1945-1963 were a paradigm testing era for national security strategy. By the advent of the 1960's, a new belief system had been developed to handle conceptually the problems posed by the intrusion of nuclear weaponry into modern warfare. The new paradigm was endorsed by all groups and was composed of three essential and commingled components: containment of Russian-communist expansion, deterrence of aggressor nations from any temptation to resort to war, and keeping credible the announced United States policy of responding to threats to the non-communist world. This belief system was drawn from a variety of sources, of which the "lessons" of the 1930's and the tradeoffs among fiscal, strategic, and political needs of the postwar era were the most important. The paradigm served as a reference point for American decision-making during the Vietnam War, and the outcome of that struggle thus has important consequences which go beyond the current foreign policy debates.

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Salvatore Prisco III (Union College, New Jersey). "The International Significance of the American Revolution." Stevens Institute of Technology Bicentennial Forum Series, Hoboken, New Jersey, May 19, 1975. This paper was an analysis of the impact of the American Revolution abroad in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. The American Revolution was not just a historical event fixed in time, but also an ongoing process which continues to have meaning in the contemporary world. Although it has been fashionable among historians to downgrade the international significance of the American Revolution for independence, the fact is that the war set the stage for national, social, and anti-colonial movements over the next two centuries. The conclusion of the "Age of Revolution" has not as yet been reached. The Bicentennial provides the nation with a timely occasion to reassess its basic values.

Thomas Schoonover (U of SW Louisiana), "Preliminary Report on Central American Commerce and Maritime Activity in Relation to the Great Power Struggle of the 19th century: A Quantitative Approach," "41st International Congress of Americanists, Mexico City, September, 1974. This paper concluded that previously scholars have largely either ignored trade and maritime activity in Central America, or have written impressionistic, subjective studies primarily focusing on British and United States roles in the 19th century. Germany's role in 19th century Central America recently has been assessed, but the impact of the other Eurp other European powers--France, Spain, Italy, Holland, and Belgium--have not been examined. The use of quantification to assess trade and maritime activity for the mid-and late 19th centuries is possible for all Central American countries with the exception of Honduras where lack of numerical data, at this point, frustrates any statistical analysis. Data for Nicaragua in the 1840's and 1850's are scarce but thereafter at least adequate. Data are sufficient or abundant for Guatemala, Costa Rica, and El Salvador for the years beginning about 1840 with the breakdown of the Central American Confederation.

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Joseph M. Siracusa, (U of Queensland, Australia), "The New Left, The Cold War, and American Diplomacy: The Case for Historiography as Intellectual History," *World Review*, 14 (March, 1975), 37-52. Nowhere in the writing of American history since the days of Charles A. Beard has historiography in the sense of "a phase of intellectual history" been more meaningful than to the radical historians of the 1960's who set out to reconstruct the history of United States diplomacy, which in any case had been and remains the general preoccupation of the profession, in the service of their cause, the societal reordering of American liberal institutions and practices. What the diplomatic literature of the New Left proved without question was the truly self-interested nature of American foreign policy--a fact that the moral superiority of the Realists had earlier prevented them from admitting. Or, as William Diebold, Jr., put it: "The United States has not really been Santa Claus." What could not be proved were the "unspoken assumptions" revisionists attributed to the motives of policy makers; and for this reason the bulk of the radical literature seemed unintelligible to those who did not, in the last analysis, speak their language or share their value system.

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Harry Stegmaier, Jr. (Frostburg State College, Frostburg, Maryland), "A Case Study of United States Business Interests in Latin America: The United States Oil Companies and Mexico, 1937 to 1941." Convention, Organization of American Historians, Boston, April 17, 1975. In March of 1938, President Lázaro Cárdenas of Mexico expropriated the properties of the United States and the British petroleum companies in his nation. This paper dealt primarily with the anti-Mexican campaign conducted by the petroleum companies, led by the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, between 1938 and 1941. A world-wide boycott of Mexican petroleum was instituted. Mexico found it impossible to obtain tankers to move its oil. Eventually, in desperation, Mexico sold its oil to the Axis powers at a substantial financial loss. In addition, the companies began a major anti-Mexican propaganda operation. Finally, in the 1940 Mexican election, the petroleum companies backed General Juan Almazán, a right-wing candidate with Nazi support. This study also dealt briefly with petroleum company influence on the State Department and showed how that governmental agency, and particularly the Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, supported the companies' position. The Mexican situation between 1937 and 1941 was an excellent example of how United States relations with Latin America could be wrecked by private United States corporations, with the support of the State Department.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Program Committee for the annual convention of the OAH, to be held in Atlanta, April, 1977, invites proposals for papers, workshops, panels, or other professional contributions to the program. Each project should be described in a two-page **resumé** which summarizes its thesis, methodology, and significance. The Committee welcomes suggestions for companion papers or commentators. In fact, it welcomes all suggestions for the enhancement of the Atlanta program.

In recent years the convention has stressed themes appropriate to the Bicentennial, overviews of historical problems, and other matters of timeliness. The Committee for the 1977 convention contemplates no special stress. It hopes to present a program composed of the best scholarship on both familiar and novel subject areas, and at the same time to give ample attention to the professional and teaching aspects of historians' activities.

Proposals may be addressed to Otis L. Graham, Jr., Department of History, U of California (Santa Barbara), Santa Barbara, California 93106, who is the chairman, or to SHAFR's representative on the Committee, Thomas G. Paterson, Department of History, U of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut 06268.

The SHA will hold its annual meeting in Washington, D.C., the second weekend in November with the Shoreham Hotel as the headquarters. SHAFR will host a reception on Thursday eve, November 13, 4:30-6:00, in one of the rooms of the Shoreham whose number will be posted upon a bulletin board near the registration area. Following the reception, car pools will be organized to provide transportation to the Chez Odette Restaurant in Georgetown where, following dinner, Raymond O'Connor (U of Miami--Florida) will speak on "The Navy and American Foreign Relations."

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The annual meeting of the AHA is scheduled for Atlanta, December 28-30. The SHAFR Council will meet at 8:15 P.M., December 26, in Room 12 Oaks of the Marriott. The Society luncheon will be at noon, December 28, at the Midnight Sun Restaurant, 235 Peachtree Street, N.E., in Peachtree Center.

Armin Rappaport will deliver his presidential address, titled "A New American Foreign Policy," and a short business session will follow. Later that same day (5:00-7:00) a reception will be held in the Tudor Room of the Hyatt Regency Hotel.

Members will soon receive details with respect to both meetings from the National Office.

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The Department of History, Simon Fraser University, British Columbia, is sponsoring a journal of diplomatic history which will be published quarterly, probably beginning in the spring of 1976. The editors propose to define "diplomatic history" in the broadest possible fashion and to publish articles on strategy and related military problems, trade and commerce, ideology, and other aspects of international relations, as well as those upon conventional diplomatic history.

Though it is hoped to avoid undue emphasis upon the history of particular areas, it is also anticipated that the foreign relations of the United States will receive considerable attention. One of the issues of the journal in 1976, for example, will be devoted to the international history of the American Revolution.

The submission of articles is invited for the specific issue upon the American Revolution, as well as those on other aspects of American foreign relations. These should be sent to the editor, Dr. Edward Ingram or Dr. Ian Mugridge, Department of History, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, B.C., V5A 1S6, Canada.

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The Council of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations decided at the OAH convention in Boston (April, 1975) to prepare a roster of those members of SHAFR who because of specialized knowledge, stemming from their research and studies, could serve as consultants regarding the foreign policies of the United States. Congressional committees often seek the views of experts, and the State Department on occasion solicits the opinions of individuals well-versed in a particular area. The Council believes it would be quite helpful if the Society could provide a roster of such qualified persons which might be circulated to interested persons and offices of the National Government.

Would those of you, therefore, who are interested and who have specialized knowledge relevant to contemporary diplomatic issues, respond with the following information to the National Office?

1. Name and address.
2. Brief biographical data, including publications. If you are listed in the 1974 or 1975 edition of **Directory of American Scholars: History**, please indicate as much, and give in a concise fashion whatever additional information you believe is necessary for the purposes of the roster.
3. Specification of the foreign policy issues upon which you feel competent to speak or write.

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The 18th annual meeting of the African Studies Association will be held October 29 to November 1 at the Sheraton Palace Hotel, San Francisco, California. The theme of this year's meeting will be "African and American Interchange," focusing upon the two-way flow of cultural and social influences between the continents. Possible topics relevant to U.S. influence upon Africa include: the role of U.S. and international corporations; the effect of the oil crisis upon Africa; the effectiveness of U.S. agricultural aid to Africa; the internationalization of the American life style; and the importance of American music. Examples of topics relevant to African influence upon the U.S. are: the development of African languages, art, music, and foods upon this continent; African influences on American aesthetics, including our moral and spiritual values, and on American literature; the effects of the developing African tourist industry; the significance of the development of African publishing houses and businesses in the U.S.; and Africa's role in the reform of international currency.

For information about registration, contact James Duffy, Executive Secretary, African Studies Association, 812 Shiffman Center, Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts 02154.

SECOND ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAFR

The second annual meeting of SHAFR is scheduled for August 13-14, 1976, at the Fawcett Center for Tomorrow on the campus of the Ohio State University in Columbus. Sessions will be sponsored jointly by SHAFR and the OSU Department of History, with the assistance of the George Gund Foundation and the Ohio American Revolution Bicentennial Advisory Commission.

“Lessons of the Past for American Diplomacy” will provide a unifying theme for the sessions. A principal purpose of the conference will be to identify and evaluate aspects of the American diplomatic experience over the past 200 years that might conceivably serve as guides to future action in the field of foreign affairs. A select group of governmental officials involved in day-to-day operations of U.S. diplomacy will join academic specialists to consider how “lessons of the past” relate to the practical problems of policy formulation and implementation in contemporary foreign affairs.

The Program Committee intends to invite both prominent scholars and distinguished guest speakers who have been, or are involved presently, in policy-oriented issues to present keynote and dinner addresses. Also, the Program Committee envisages several panels dealing with the enduring themes of American diplomacy--such as, for instance, the American Approach to Revolutions; the Realist Tradition in American Diplomacy; Critics of American Foreign Policy; Capabilities and Commitments; Domestic Constraints on American Foreign Policy: An International Perspective; and Issues for the Future.

Proposals for the latter sessions should suggest two or three scholarly papers as well as chairmen and commentators. If possible, at least one participant should be from the policy-oriented community (for example, a governmental agency, a foreign embassy, a “think-tank,” or the financial and business community).

Finally, the Program Committee invites discussion-oriented programs with six to ten speakers (each presenting brief remarks) upon a critical issue and with ample opportunity for audience involvement. Again, these sessions should relate to the “lessons-of-the-past” theme and concentrate upon geographic or thematic issues. These might include Latin American, East Asian, or Western European themes. Others might consider arms control, economic aspects or diplomacy, or the media and foreign policy.

To facilitate preparations for the 1976 conference, proposals should be sent as quickly as possible to Professor Frank Merli, Chairman of SHAFR Program Committee, 35 Norwood Avenue, Northport, New York 11768 (Telephone: 1-516-757-2474).

EDITORSHIP OF SHAFR JOURNAL

The Council hereby invites interested members to submit proposals concerning the editorship of a SHAFR journal. Separate negotiations for a publisher are under way, and thus bids for the editorship should be limited to the editorial function. The Council hopes to publish a journal at least twice a year. The main purpose of the journal is to provide a new place for the publication of articles devoted exclusively to American diplomatic history, broadly conceived.

Members wishing to submit proposals should observe the following guidelines:

1. Editorial qualifications. Each proposal should include the applicant's vita and a statement of his or her editorial goals.
2. Institutional support. The proposal should include specific statements in regard to released time for the editor; salaries for editorial and secretarial assistance (part-time secretary, editorial associate, graduate assistant, etc.); office expenses (telephone, supplies, overhead); and the editor's travel costs to scholarly meetings. A survey of established journals of comparable size indicates that in addition to the editor's released time, a minimum of \$12,000 is needed for the part-time salaries and office expenses described above.

Proposals should be submitted to Professor Robert H. Ferrell, Department of History, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana 47401, by December 1, 1975.

THE ACADEMIC EXCHANGE

(Acting solely in a service capacity, the **Newsletter** will carry notices of (a) vacancies in various fields which are of interest to U.S. diplomatic historians, and (b) the vitae of members of SHAFR who desire employment. All announcements will be anonymous, unless a user specifically states otherwise. Each notice will be assigned a number, and persons who are interested must mention that number when contacting the editorial office. That office will then supply the name and address which corresponds to that number. When contacting the editor regarding an announcement, please enclose a stamped, addressed envelope for the return. Announcements should not exceed twelve (12) lines in the **Newsletter**. Unless specifically requested to do otherwise, and then subject to the limitations of space and fairness to others, a particular notice will be carried only once a year).

#E-103 Ph. D. slated for January, 1976, in American diplomatic and modern Middle Eastern history. Laid off after three years, as assistant professor in large state college. Prefers teaching position in Northeast. Also capable as administrator, researcher, and writer. Experienced teacher, in mid-thirties, with high recommendations. Has taught survey courses in U.S. History and Western Civilization; also courses on American diplomatic, economic, and immigration history, Middle Eastern history and modern Jewish history. Reads four languages, has four published articles; dissertation being considered for publication.

PERSONALS

Dr. John L. Gaddis (Ohio U and a member of the SHAFR Council) will be visiting lecturer in the Department of Strategy at the Naval War College during the 1975-76 academic year.

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Dr. Armin Rappaport (U of California, San Diego, and President of SHAFR) has been awarded a NATO Research Fellowship to do work upon a book tentatively titled, "American Policy towards European Integration since 1945." He will be in Europe to do research upon the topic during the late summer and fall of this year.

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Joan Hoff Wilson (California State U at Sacramento) was chosen as a member of the Nominating Board of the OAH in the March elections of that organization.

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Joseph M. Siracusa (U of Queensland, Australia) was recently placed upon the Membership Committee of SHAFR with his area of representation being Australia and New Zealand. Dr. Siracusa is the first overseas member to serve on this Committee.

Dr. Vincent Davis (Director of the William A. Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the U of Kentucky) was chosen president-elect of the International Studies Association (ISA) at that body's recent annual meeting in Washington, D.C.

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Dr. E. Berkeley Tompkins, Executive Director of the National Historical Publications and Records Commission since 1973, has resigned from the National Archives and Records Service. Now serving upon the Commission of the NHPRC is Dr. Fredrick Aandahl, Acting Director of the Historical Office, Department of State. His predecessor in the Historical Office and upon the Commission was Dr. William M. Franklin, a recent retiree.

PUBLICATIONS IN U.S. DIPLOMACY BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

D. P. Crook (U of Queensland, Australia), **The North, the South, and the Powers, 1861-1865**. 1974. John Wiley & Sons. \$12.95.

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Robert A. Divine (U of Texas and Vice President of SHAFR), **Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Recent American History**. 1975. John Wiley & Sons. \$9.95. Reviewed in **History**, September, 1975.

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Robert H. Ferrell (U of Indiana), **American Diplomacy**. Third ed. 1975. W. W. Norton & Co. \$11.50.

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Wilton B. Fowler (U of Washington), **American Diplomatic History Since 1890**. 1974. AHM Publishing Corp. pb. \$2.95. In the series, Goldentree Bibliographies in American History.

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Arthur L. Funk (U of Florida), **The Politics of Torch: The Allied Landings and the Algiers Putsch, 1942**. 1974. University Press of Kansas. \$11.00. Favorably reviewed in **Journal of American History**, September, 1975.

Irwin F. Gellman (Morgan State), **Roosevelt and Batista: Good Neighbor Policy in Cuba, 1933-1945**. 1973. U of New Mexico Press. \$12.00. Reviewed favorably in **History**, April, 1974.

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Burton I. Kaufman (Kansas State U), **Efficiency and Expansion: Foreign Trade Organization in the Wilson Administration, 1913-1921**. 1974. Greenwood. \$12.50. Favorably reviewed in **Journal of American History**, September, 1975, and in **History**, March, 1975.

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Richard S. Kirkendall I, (Executive Sec'y of OAH), **The United States, 1929-1945. Years of Crisis and Change**. 1974. McGraw-Hill. Cl. \$8.95. pb. \$4.95. Favorably reviewed in **Journal of American History**, September, 1975.

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Ernest R. May's (Harvard) "**Lessons**" of the Past: **The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy**, published in 1973 by the Oxford U Press at \$6.95, clothbound, is now available from the same company in a paperback edition at \$2.95.

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Charles E. Neu (Brown), **The Troubled Encounter: The United States and Japan**. 1975. John Wiley & Sons. Cl. \$9.95; pb. \$5.95.

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Thomas G. Paterson's (U of Connecticut) **Soviet-American Confrontation; Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War** published originally as hardback for \$12.00 by Johns Hopkins in 1974, may now be secured from that firm in paperback for \$3.95.

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Stephen E. Pelz (U of Massachusetts), **Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II**. 1974. Harvard Press. \$17.50. Reviewed in **History**, November-December, 1974.

ADDITIONAL PUBLICATIONS BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

Jules A. Karlin (U of Montana), **Jospeh M. Dixon of Montana: Part I, Senator and Bull Moose Manager, 1867:1917.** 1974. U of Montana Press. \$7.95. Reviewed in **History**, May-June, 1975.

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E. Daniel and Annette Potts (Monash University, Australia), **Young America and Australian Gold: Americans and the Gold Rush of the 1850's.** 1974. U of Queensland Press, Brisbane, Australia. \$14.50-Australian currency. The first chapter, "The Official Americans: The Consuls," deals with traditional diplomatic history.

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Harold D. Langley, ed. (Catholic U), **To Utah with the Dragoons and Glimpses of Life in Arizona and California, 1858-1859.** 1974. U of Utah Press. \$8.50. Reviewed in **History**, April, 1975.

 THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE COMPETITION FOR 1976

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations announces that the 1976 competition for the Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Prize upon a book dealing with any aspect of American foreign affairs is open. The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of U.S. diplomatic relations.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1975. It must be the author's first or second book.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. Ernest R. May, Chairman, Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Prize Committee, Department of History, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02178. The works must be received not later than December 31, 1975.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$500.00. If two (2) or more works are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be April, 1976, at St. Louis, Missouri.

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| 1972 | Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth) |
| 1973 | Michael H. Hunt (Yale) |
| 1974 | Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
Stephen E. Pelz (U of Massachusetts - Amherst) |

 SHAFR ROSTER AND RESEARCH LIST

Please use this form to register your general and current research interests as well as your address. This **List** is stored upon computer tapes so that information may be quickly retrieved. In order for the system to work, though, two things are necessary from the members: (a) simple, concise, obvious titles should be used in describing projects; (b) a key word should be specified for each project. It would be quite helpful if members would send revised information to the editor whenever new data is available, since it will be much easier to keep the files up to date and avoid a rush in the fall. If a form is not available, a short memo will suffice. Changes which pertain only to addresses should be sent to the Executive Secretary, and he will pass them on to the editors of the **List** and the **Newsletter**. Unless new data is submitted, previously listed research projects will be repeated.

 Name: _____ Title: _____

Address _____

State: _____ Zip Code _____ Institutional Affiliation

(if different from address) _____

General area of research interest: _____

_____ Key word _____

Current research project(s): _____

_____ Key word(s) _____

If this is pre-doctoral work, check here _____

Mail to: Dr. W. F. Kimball, editor
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 Department of History
 Rutgers University, Newark
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THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: Nolan Fowler, Department of History, Tennessee Tech, Cookeville, Tennessee 38501.

ISSUES: The **Newsletter** is published on the 15th of March, June, and September, and on the 1st of December. All members receive the publication.

DEADLINES: All material must be in the office of the editor not later than six (6) weeks prior to the publication date.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication. Copies of the **Newsletter** which are returned because of faulty addresses will be forwarded only upon the payment of a fee of 50¢.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of all back numbers of the **Newsletter** are available and may be obtained from the editorial office upon the payment of a service charge of 35¢ per number. If the purchaser lives abroad, the charge is 50¢ per number.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, honors, awards), announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered—or published—upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, lists of accessions of diplomatic materials to libraries, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting diplomatic materials in various depositories. Because of space limitations, "straight" articles and book reviews are unacceptable.

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