THE FORTRESS WAR:
EFFECT OF UNION FORTIFICATIONS IN THE WESTERN THEATER
OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR

by

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Für meine Hirten
Cricket und Nico
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ABSTRACT

Civil War historiography generally overlooks Union occupation forts or interprets them as forward bases of supply. What is missed when these structures are not explored in their wider context? This dissertation determines that the Union Army and African Americans constructed more than 300 forts in some 130 cities and towns in the Western Theater, where the majority of Southerners free and enslaved resided. Further, this study examines the impacts of these fortified positions, particularly upon adjacent slave societies.

Initially epicenters of environmental destruction and incubators of human and animal contagions, these forts became major portals for slave escapes. Subsequently, fortified areas enabled many escapees to reinvent themselves as contract laborers and commercial entrepreneurs. Further, by the end of the war, many fortified areas had evolved into generally stable city-states in which Federal soldiers, freed persons, and white citizens achieved tacit levels of coexistence. Posited here is that Union forts resembled Josef Schumpeter’s economic premise of “creative destruction,” a paradigm in which innovations continually dismantle outdated social and economic constructs. In short, Union forts were innovations. Traditionally depicted as arbitrarily destructive, Union garrisons were more commonly engineering operations, many of which successfully reallocated major commercial, industrial, transportation centers from Confederate to Federal use. Much of this stability and social transformation reverted to local white control when the U.S. War Department abandoned over 90 percent of these forts by the end of 1865.
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<td>CWH</td>
<td><em>Civil War History</em></td>
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<td>JNH</td>
<td><em>Journal of Negro History</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>JSH</td>
<td><em>Journal of Southern History</em></td>
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<td>LOC</td>
<td>Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.</td>
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<td>MARBL</td>
<td>Emory University Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library, Atlanta, GA</td>
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<td>NARA</td>
<td>National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.</td>
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<td>OR</td>
<td><em>Official Records of the War of the Rebellion</em></td>
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<td>SRNBA</td>
<td>Stones River National Battlefield Archives, Murfreesboro, TN</td>
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<td>THQ</td>
<td><em>Tennessee Historical Quarterly</em></td>
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<td>WCA</td>
<td>Williamson County Archives, Franklin, TN</td>
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<td>WMUA</td>
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INTRODUCTION

In his 2005 study of the Eastern Theater earthworks in the American Civil War, Earl J. Hess observed, “the topic of fortifications is one of the more important yet to be explored by historians.”¹ Ten years onward, with few exceptions, the subject remains largely overlooked. When addressed, defensive structures are almost exclusively examined through the prism of military engagements. What do we miss when we do not consider Civil War fortifications within their larger context?

Counterbalancing Hess’s focus on campaign trenches in the East, this dissertation explores Union occupation fortresses west of the Appalachians. The region of choice stems from the growing perception among historians that the Western Theater was militarily more decisive than the relative deadlock that transpired in and around Virginia. In addition, it was in the fixed Union fortified areas where the Federal soldier, Southern citizen, and enslaved African American operated closer to one another and for longer periods of time than any other place.² As a consequence, fortified occupation areas were among the most potent Civil War arenas for what Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter famously called “creative destruction,” or the semi-nihilistic means by which new innovations continually dismantled old social and economic constructs.³

In the Schumpeter model, creations primarily mean technological inventions, breakthroughs in production efficiency, and entrepreneurial investment of capital. Destruction befalls jobs and industries rendered obsolete by these innovations. Especially vulnerable to
destruction, Schumpeter contended, were modes of production that were most resistant to innovation. Fundamentally, creative destruction describes how economies exist in a perpetual state of flux, where capital shifts from outdated institutions to more efficient and profitable means of production. The concept is relevant to the American Civil War, and any other international conflict, because it facilitates examination of military innovations through the lens of socioeconomic cause and effect. Mehrdad Vahabi offers a compelling notion in regards to military events and the Schumpeter model by stating, “wars are public affairs led by political entrepreneurs.”

This dissertation asserts that Union occupation forts were innovations of considerable significance in the course of the war. From the formation of the United States up to and including much of 1862, the U.S. War Department built and designed fortresses almost exclusively for the purposes of repelling foreign invasion and subjugating Native Americans. From late 1862 onward, their main purpose was to subdue U.S. citizens. Widespread application of these forts produced multiple unforeseen consequences, the most significant of which was the rapid acceleration of slave escapes. Drawn by the growing presence of Union forts, enslaved African Americans increasingly engaged in massive entrepreneurial risk. Detaching themselves from rigid and antiquated labor systems, tens of thousands ventured toward Union forts and the possibility owning their own labor. By the end of 1864, these two innovative processes built progressively upon each other and did much to destroy Confederate control of its own infrastructure. In the language of Schumpeterian economics, by the end of the war the U.S. Army and escaped slaves had conducted, heavily through the means of fortification, a sweeping “reallocation of resources.”
Forts were certainly not afterthoughts for the warring parties. In the *Official Records of the War of the Rebellion*, the word “fortifications” appears more than 3,100 times and “garrisons” over 6,100 times. In comparison, there are fewer than 2,000 references to the term “muskets.” Commonly referred to as defenses, they were more of an offensive armament for the Union, and they were not applied sparingly (see APPENDIX A). Stephen V. Ash calculates at least one hundred Confederate towns and cities underwent fortified Federal occupation. Overall, the Union erected more than four forts for every one built by Confederates, and most of the latter structures were destroyed or overrun during the course of the war.7

My personal interest in forts began in childhood, either through the natural human tendency to find large objects worthy of attention or from television shows and films that habitually depicted such structures as adventurous places. Regardless the reason, on the odd occasion I was able to visit real ones over the years, I explored them without a trace of fear, probably because I had the good fortune of not being born in a war zone. They were worthy of a side trip but hardly objects of concern. In my world, Civil War forts were benign curiosities.

Such placidity was not the case for those who built them or lived in their shadows. Personal memoirs, soldier letters and civilian diaries, twentieth-century ex-slave narratives and current-day excavations reveal fortifications as objects of endemic power. Such accounts can read hyperbolic, until they bring forth the details of what “fort” meant. To the beholders, a fortification stood as a sprawling network with no obvious boundary, only a nefarious event horizon with varying layers of checkpoints, picket lines, and rotating scouting parties. Engineering manuals, including Dennis H. Mahan’s seminal *Complete Treatise on Field Fortification*, featured strict algebraic formulas and precise geometric templates on how to construct works properly, but they also contained maxims mandating that defenses had to layer
ever outward. Fortifying meant building out more than up. Forts did not loom over towns as much as enveloped them.

In contrast, today’s preserved Civil War “forts” are nearly the antithesis of their original state. Even sites with steady tourist traffic are otherwise motionless and unpopulated. They emit no noises other than birdsongs and breezes. No spikes line their outer trenches nor does jagged abatis ring their perimeters. There is no pervasive smell of animal dung, human sinks, or burning campfires. Civil War forts today, carpeted with green grasses and canopied by trees, appear inviting, submissive, and tranquil.

Predominantly, the faintly visible walls that remain simply represent the nucleus of what was a much larger fort system. In medieval English this centerpiece was the *keep* or main bastion, the highest and most defensible location of any given area, and a position of last resort. Ideally a bastion would never receive a shot in anger, for it stood far behind a series of increasingly lethal obstacles. Stocked with sentinels and bristling with artillery, its second line of defense was usually a dry moat embedded with jutting wood spikes. Beyond these were long rows of tangled trees with sharpened branches jutting outward – the barbed wire of their time. Almost invariably, the fort then absorbed nearby farm houses, barns, even academies and mansions, which the garrisons either usurped or demolished depending on what seemed most practical. Around these were multiple regimental camp sites, teeming horse corrals and mule parks, long commissary buildings and barracks, humble headquarters and hospital tents. Nearby, usually on high ground, smaller forts hosted their own artillery and rings of defense. Then came the stark open ground, sometimes square miles of it, clear cut, pimpled with tree stumps and pockmarked with rifle pits. The larger complexes had blacksmith shops and bakeries, signaling towers, sawmills, and slaughterhouses. These impromptu metropolises seeped into the adjacent
village, town, or city, where officers and enlisted availed themselves to choice office buildings, churches, warehouses, and homes.

The truncated “forts” visited today are often misinterpreted as having marginal impact on the war, because their diminutive size misleads the witness. In reality, the fact that these innermost structures rarely saw combat attests to the considerable reach and effectiveness of the composites that surrounded them.

When reading of such complexes, it becomes readily apparent why Union officers frequently had a difficult time reporting when forts were “complete.” What also emerges is the myriad of ways people described them. They were referred to as infections, monstrous warts, and carbuncles. Some called them hives or nests. In many ways, occupied populations considered them to be living, impulsive organisms. Indeed fortresses could behave as such. At any hour, these massed campgrounds, packed liveries, and nauseating latrines could exhale clouds of smoke, dust, and methane into the eyes and nostrils. Their sporadic cannon shots and shrieking shells stung the ear drums. As they grew, forts developed voracious appetites for lumber, livestock, grains, trees, even buildings. Residents spoke of the land being consumed by them. Of the many garrisons surrounding his hometown of Helena, Arkansas in late 1862, minister William Barksdale lamented, “Everywhere they are devouring and laying waste the labor of man’s land.”

At the same time, Union soldiers talked and wrote about their works in generally positive terms, using words like “impregnable” and “impenetrable.” They bragged of finding choice camping spots and marveled at the lush beauty of the surrounding southern landscape. Not a few attempted to recreate their civilian lives while in garrison, including domesticating their tents and quarters with makeshift carpeting and subtle trimmings, fraternizing with townspeople, and
replicating their old jobs whenever possible. Some fort systems became known more for their social events and engineering projects than for their skirmishing.

This soldierly pride (if not fondness) for fort life may seem surprising, since the dominant narrative comes from the eastern experience, where Federals often condemned their own defenses as superfluous. The difference is understandable considering the contrasting objectives and topographies of the two theaters. Trying to penetrate northern Virginia with the Appalachians to their west, the Atlantic to their east, and multiple rivers blocking their advance, the apply-named Army of the Potomac had more than enough water and walls between themselves and their opposition. Theirs was the task similar to that of the Allies in Western Europe, attempting to secure bridges and cut through hedgerows. In contrast, Western Theater Federals faced something akin to the War in the Pacific, with its oceanic expanse and select locations of prime real estate. While it is true that Lincoln gave his eastern generals the seemingly impossible mission of pursuing Robert E. Lee yet still defending the District of Columbia, he also asked his western commanders to drive all the way into the Deep South while still protecting the Midwest plus Missouri, Kentucky, and all the Confederate territory they managed to take along the way. It was for this great task remaining before them that these men took increased devotion to the cause of fortification.

Thus we are presented with two rather different interpretations, one that viewed Union forts in the West as destabilizing and devastating, and the other suggesting these same structures mitigated acts of retribution and offered stability in an otherwise chaotic environment. As a consequence, these two positions symbolize a prevalent, ongoing dialectic within Civil War historiography – the debate over how transformative the conflict actually was.
Many Civil War histories in the wake of the Vietnam era emphasize the lethality and unpredictability of wars. Among the better known examples is James McPherson’s 1988 *Battle Cry of Freedom*, with its central theme of unexpected escalations, including the emergence of attacks upon civilians. Taking that theme further, the 1993 Pulitzer-winning volume *The Destructive War* by Charles Royster advances an old notion that the American conflict was exceptionally destructive. Royster goes so far as to title the final chapter “The Anomalous War.” His position is that Civil War combatants both foreign-born and domestic rarely agreed on what the Founding Fathers may have wanted, but many embraced the use of violent revolution in the pursuit of ideals. According to Royster, sincere, single-minded zeal overtook reason in the minds of volunteers North and South, to the point where many believed, “The fathers’ example taught the virtue of service through bloodshed.”

Around that time, a slow groundswell formed, partially around Michael Fellman’s 1989 *Inside War*. These works argued that it was not famous idealists but stealth opportunists who operated seemingly without limits, traumatizing whole landscapes with acts of random terror and highly irregular warfare. Twenty years later came the even more provocative Daniel E. Sutherland’s *A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerillas in the American Civil War* (2009). The overriding message from Fellman, Sutherland, and others involves the great dangers to civilians beyond the main armies. The war came to them, with unnerving stealth and in unpredictable patterns, at the hands of individuals committed to few principles beyond individual gain and personal vendettas.

Adding to these themes of utter destruction were perspectives from the civilian side. For Drew Gilpin Faust, it was the impossibility of family reunion rather than national reunion that caused an incalculable harm. In her widely-read *This Republic of Suffering* (2008), Faust makes a
persuasive case that death in the antebellum era was an intimate event, and far off battles robbed communities of that intimacy. As she points out, people often died young, but they commonly died at home. The death of loved ones far away and the wartime prevalence of unmarked graves left hundreds of thousands of families without a sense of closure.  

More recent scholarship is starting to challenge these horror shows. Call it a counter-exceptionalist movement, influenced by the growing consensus that the Civil War was but one of multiple, interconnected, international events in the nineteenth century. These works caution against the use of body counts and claims of devastation that infer the war was somehow unlike any other. A leading voice is that of Mark Neely, Jr., who reminds us that perpetrators and victims alike tended to magnify the events beyond the material evidence, as both sought to maximize effect to serve their respective narratives.

Looking at the popular yardstick of total casualties, Nicholas Marshall suggests in his 2014 article, “The Great Exaggeration: Death and the Civil War,” that many historians are either consciously or subconsciously selective in their use of statistics. The most common practice is to present the combined number of military deaths in the war rather than divide them into their less monumental shares for each side. Even more evocative is the liberal use of the adjective “bloody” when describing these numbers, even though it is well known that the supermajority of military, citizen, and enslaved deaths were from disease.

In examining the Confederacy county by county, Paul S. Paskoff finds that nearly half of the counties in the South experienced virtually no military engagement, foraging, occupation, or even troop movements. Most fortunate were the sections without railroads. As such, nearly all of Florida and Texas went untouched.
What of the war’s signature effect, the ending of legal slavery in the United States? Gregory P. Downs contends that both the war and Reconstruction were apparently not nearly long enough or sufficiently nihilistic to dislodge engrained customs of abject racism. The theme of a ruined South, he finds, came predominantly from white well-to-do Southerners after the war. Their motive was to halt Reconstruction. To that end, many presented themselves as victims who were already devastated by the actions of Union soldiers, and anything beyond that would be beating a dead gray horse.21 Even more dismissive are Stephen V. Ash, Edward L. Ayers, Scott Nesbit, among others, who calculate that of the four million humans in bondage in 1860, not more than 10 percent reached freedom by 1865. Ash also hypothesizes, with evidence, that most of the land and the majority of the enslaved did not even see a blue uniform during the whole of the war.22

These divergent works have one similarity: they rarely if ever mention Union fortifications in the Western Theater. Though far from exhaustive, the research within this dissertation coincides with nearly all the above findings to an extent. The war was extremely destructive, and yet the damage was limited to certain locations. Emancipations occurred in large numbers during the war, yet only a fraction of the enslaved escaped. How could these apparent contradictions coexist? Overall, conclusions within this paper closely echo the discoveries of Ayers, Nesbit, and Paskoff. The question is not a matter of how much; the question is a matter of where. This was not a total war, yet it was. It was intensely localized, and the locations of greatest change were often in and around Union forts of occupation.

Consider a population whose reactions to the war are simultaneously difficult yet possible to ascertain. The dearth of wartime writing from the enslaved leaves an extremely small sample. Yet the documentation of individual and familial actions presents a compelling pattern. County
tax records, digitized newspapers, recent studies of contraband camps, soldier letters, United States Colored Troops muster rolls and pay slips, and other sources often involve areas of fortified occupation. While apparently few who escaped or were brought into Federal strongholds believed the transition would be easy, many saw these fortress networks to be their best chance to break away from the perpetuity of familial enslavement. For those slaves taken by the Union military, and for the greater number who left bondage by their own initiative, many of them, likely a majority, reached emancipation by entering a fortified area. Once more, African Americans helped build, maintain, and guard these fortresses.

This dissertation begins with a chapter on the wartime increase of Union western fortification and the acceleration of slave self-emancipation, transformations that were inexorably linked. The creation of occupation forts represented a major shift – an innovation – in the U.S. War Department’s military strategy. After gaining and losing large amounts of Confederate territory, with some locations held and lost several times, the U.S. Army opted to build multiple fort systems in an attempt to solidify areas deemed militarily critical. The vast majority of these sites were centers of commerce, industry, and transportation. Significantly, many were urban and suburban slave societies located within some of the most agriculturally productive areas of the South. The growing numbers of forts embedding in these slavery-rich areas created an emergent incentive for slaves to reinvent themselves as laborers for the Federal military, in spite of most Union officials and officers diligently opposed to such propositions.

Chapter Two investigates how military losses from prolific contagnions helped produce a shift in Federal attitudes towards the use of contraband labor. Not coincidentally, losses from disease and demand for contraband labor were often highest in fortified areas. In an inversion of Schumpeter’s maxim, when it came to disease, destruction preceded creation. Concerning the
destruction, the combined weight of townspeople plus incoming garrisons, escapees, and refugees overpopulated occupation zones. Resulting stresses upon local food supplies, severe contamination of water sources, and lack of adequate shelter often transformed these places into incubators and distributors of disease. Fatality rates slowly declined when forts progressively reduced episodes of disruptive combat, work crews rebuilt and fortified supply lines, and private aid societies provided supplemental food, medicines, and clothing. In the interim, Federal policy went from resisting to endorsing emancipated labor for the Union war effort. However, the military proved less than creative when considering freed person labor in general. For the remainder of the conflict, the War Department underutilized the large contraband populations located within occupied areas. Federal officers and officials predominantly employed or recruited young adult males, while the majority of escapees were females, teens, and children – the very demographics that supplied northeastern manufacturers with much of their cheap labor. In the increasingly industrialized and urbanized landscapes of Union fortified sites, the undervaluing of female and youth labor, not to mention the overlooking of skill sets present among older contrabands, indicated an enduring inability among Federal leadership to reinvent perceptions of race. This behavioral stagnation did not prevent multitudes of contraband women, children, and aged from inventing their own employment in and around Union forts, especially in the industries of cooking, baking, foraging, laundry, and seamstress work.\(^{23}\)

Chapter Three looks upon environmental transformations, including effects upon animal life, communal ties with nature, and sound pollution. As with emancipation and contagion, changes to the environment were substantial yet concentrated. Primary areas of alteration were not the countryside but urban and suburban sites of occupation. While wanton destruction did take place, the primary objective of occupation garrisons appeared to be large-scale source
reallocate. While affected citizens frequently decried deforestation, foraging, home and building confiscations, and other operations as intentionally cruel and excessive, many Union officers and men depicted the end result – the creation of large operational forts with clear lines of fire – as inherently constructive. Many Federals showed particular justification turning livestock into food, homes into headquarters, forests into abatis, and fences into fuel when the dispossessed were perceived to be or confirmed to be Confederate sympathizers. While few citizen-soldiers overlooked the hardships involved in garrison duty, many viewed occupation – fort construction especially - as an exercise in engineering. Destruction involved the dismantling of civilian hegemony far more than the ending of civilian life.

Chapter Four explores the eventual use of forttressed areas as instruments in nation building. Both the Militia Act of 1862 and the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863 explicitly called for the use of able-bodied freedmen in the construction and garrisoning of forts and other defenses. Also examined are the uses of oaths, attempts to shift economies from slave to wage labor, and efforts to create Southern civilian loyalty by having occupied populations become dependent on Northern private and public goods and services. Eventually, occupation did make gains in “politically cleansing” areas of ardent secessionists, reducing and even eliminating de jure and de facto slavery, and fostering a degree of pragmatic unionism among white citizenry. These changes did not occur on a regional or county level. At most, the Federal government, its armed forces, African American freed persons, and private relief agencies were able to create a series of liberalized “city-states,” located almost exclusively in heavily fortified zones. Regardless of their limited space, these secured commercial, industrial, and transportation hubs represented some of the most substantive and stable creations of the Union war effort. Further,
fortressed cities and towns destroyed much of the Confederacy’s political and military effectiveness.

The dissertation concludes with a synopsis of how and why the creative destruction of these city-states did not endure. Before the war ended, Federal officials attempted to remove women, children, and aged contraband from the urban and suburban fortress areas and into experimental wage-labor plantations. Most of these plantations were beyond the protection of large fort systems, consequently making them vulnerable to guerilla raids and Confederate cavalry. Further, managers of such sites were primarily lightly-vetted white Southern property owners who submitted to an oath of allegiance or Northern civilians venturing into cash crop production. In most cases, these experiments failed to develop into wage-based businesses. Effectively reversing entrepreneurial efforts of former slaves to reinvent their labor status within the relative protection of fortified city-states, these rural operations devolved instead into tenancy farming and sharecropping endeavors.

Soon after April 1865, the U.S. War Department rapidly decommissioned fortified garrisons, erasing the Federal-commanded city-states in the process. Fortified areas thereafter became political and economic power vacuums, into which the partially destroyed hegemony of the former ruling white elite reestablished itself. Federal abandonment of the city-states, probably more than the short-sighted creation of wage plantations, played a significant role in the re-subjugation of African Americans, especially women, the very young, and the aged. The failure of the War Department and the Lincoln Administration ultimately rested in their inability to define the war beyond an attempt to defeat domestic military insurgency. To suggest that an entire region of the United States could be altered to the extent that it would surrender coerced, race-based tenancy labor for a wage-based, mobile workforce is to believe that the whole of that
region had been creatively destroyed during the course of the war. As it attempts to establish, this
dissertation asserts that the only Confederate areas that underwent creative destruction to any
substantive extent were the scores of fortified cities and towns under continuous Federal
occupation.
CHAPTER ONE:

THE BLUE KEEP - EMERGENCE OF A NEW WESTERN STRATEGY

“The destruction of the rebel armies and the gradual occupation of the country by fortifying and garrisoning its chief strategic and commercial points are the only conclusion to the war.”

Montgomery C. Meigs, November 18, 1862

Execution of the American Civil War was, in a word, haphazard. If there was any consensus among its actors when the conflict began, it was their prevailing belief that the fighting would play itself out within a matter of months. When the crisis escalated beyond all but the most cynical prognoses, these same optimists found themselves experimenting in paradoxical ways. Appeasers became aggressors, moderates radicalized, the obedient shifted towards defiance. The war was a performance of the unforeseen.

Among the most striking anomalies were the escalation of slave escapes and the equally dramatic spread of Federal occupation west of the Appalachians. Piecemeal in the beginning, both escapes and fortification climbed rapidly in late 1862 and early 1863. Posited here is that these phenomena were not coincidental; they were in fact interdependent.

In the antebellum era, few slaves attempted escape, and even fewer succeeded. With little to no money, and with few opportunities to contact potential sympathizers and supporters, persons of color traveling on their own were also readily suspected and easily detected. One of
the chief obstacles was the lack of secure transit points. Despite its reputation then and now, the Underground Railroad rescued fewer than those who rescued themselves. On average, perhaps as few as one thousand individuals managed to escape slavery per annum, or about one quarter of one percent of all enslaved Americans.4

This rate would most certainly change with the coming of the war. As the conflict intensified, Union forces established forward operating bases, especially in the expansive Western Theater. In turn, some enslaved viewed such strongholds as conspicuous and promising portals for a successful escape, a probability of finding food and shelter, and the possibility of work. It must be made clear that “gaining freedom” is not an ideal description of these ventures, because such phrasing evokes that there was a general certainty of outcome. A more accurate view would be to call most escapes a calculated risk, and an extremely high risk at that.

Case in point, Federal officials initially viewed such immigration as detrimental to their war aims and illegal under U.S. law, but a small percentage of key officers began to take selective advantage of the labor that some of the inbound provided, especially in the building and maintaining of forward positions. In late 1862, U.S. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant established the first contraband camp in the Western Theater at Grand Junction, Tennessee, near the star fort built adjacent to the rail crossroads.5 Soon after, he began to employ physically able freedmen as cooks, nurses, teamsters, earthwork builders.6

The consequent strengthening of such fortifications attracted even more contrabands. Simultaneously, the man-hours required to maintain these sites soon motivated Union officers to acquire more “able-bodied” slaves, to the point where Union foraging began to include the collecting of humans. This was in no way a smooth progression. Words and actions from soldiers and enslaved alike suggest that they initially viewed each other in utilitarian terms.
occupied Nashville, Samuel Boyd of the 84th Indiana encountered a male slave riding a mule and leading another. The rider stated that his master had threatened him with a beating. As Boyd recalled, “So,” said he, “I thought I would come in the night and see massa Johnson (the Governor) about it. I thought these two mules would be better than a whipping, and maybe massa Johnson will want some hauling done.” Many Union officers and slaves eventually recognized the emerging condition as beneficial to their own objectives. However, few had any reason to believe there would soon be a growing and codified union of forts and freedmen.

The Geopolitical Context

Militarily, much of the conflict’s first ten months involved building up numbers more than battling the opposition. While rhetoric and volunteering grew in volume, pitched battles were uncommon. Respective governmental expenses may have skyrocketed, but casualty rates grew slowly. The miniscule U.S. Navy could cast little more than a threadbare net in the capacious waters of the Atlantic and Caribbean. Slave escapes were rare. Kentucky declared neutrality early on. After the shrill and fury of Manassas abated, many still felt it plausible that somehow the issue of secession could be resolved before long. That was certainly the disposition of the Lincoln administration.

In hopes of minimizing material damage and appealing to what he believed to be a large but latent majority of Unionists in the South, Lincoln briefly mandated a cautious approach toward citizens and property in the Western Theater. Most West Point graduates supported this attitude, including Lincoln’s commander of the Army of the Ohio. A political conservative and a strict adherent to military discipline, Don Carlos Buell also had multiple connections to slavery and enjoyed close ties with influential white southerners. A prime example of the conciliatory
position among military professional soldiers (an attitude that was not always shared by the less patient volunteer enlisted) was Buell’s “Roasting-ears Orders,” officially known as General Orders 13a. Issued in late February 1862, while the Army of the Ohio was in the process of taking an almost undefended Nashville, Buell ordered his men to respect the homes, property, and privacy of any and all peaceable citizens regardless of their sentiments toward secession. Exceptions were only allowed through the official consent and direction of commanding officers. The major general not only wished to keep in step with administrative desires, he also wanted Southern civil institutions to retain their local authority. Entering Murfreesboro, soldiers were informed that any man in uniform found stealing or damaging civilian property would be remanded to civil authorities and placed under their jurisprudence. The policy would apply to any area into which Buell’s predominantly volunteer army advanced.9

Concerning human property, the blue influx did produce black migrations, but these were mostly southward under the direction and coercion of owners. Many Kentucky masters sent their chattel beyond Nashville in hopes of retaining them as long as possible. Numerous Tennesseans followed suit. The enslaved Precilla Gray of Thompson’s Station, Tennessee recalled, “the master sent a hundred of us down in Georgia to keep the Yankees from getting us, and we camped out during the whole three years.”10 The McGavocks of nearby Carnton Plantation did the same with their forty some enslaved, shipping them to large family estates in Mississippi and Louisiana. Other owners did likewise, transferring their chattel to the quieter areas of the Confederacy.11 Upon entering Grand Junction, Tennessee in September 1862, a colonel in the 2nd Illinois Cavalry noted how its plantation society had “but few inhabitants left there.”12

At the time, the risk of loss was actually minimal. The Confiscation Act had been in place six months when Buell’s and U.S. Grant’s men had advanced deep into Middle Tennessee and
down the Mississippi Valley, but the law was rarely enforced. Part of its minimal application came from its tight parameters. The Act only applied to slaves that U.S. civil courts found to be in direct service to the Richmond government. The number of such individuals thus employed (let alone officially determined to be so) was relatively low, a small percentage of adult males. Otherwise, the overriding policy was *laissez faire*. A soldier in the 58th Indiana said as much as his regiment marched toward an unanticipated engagement near a church called Shiloh:

The roadsides were lined with negroes in their best attire, eagerly watching the “Yankees” pass. The large plantations on either side of the road were uninjured by the troops that had gone before us. We found nearly all the people, white and black, at home. This was especially the case at Franklin, through which we passed on the morning of [March] the 31st.  

Other encounters varied little, except for the particulars. When the 21st Ohio first entered Athens, Alabama in April 1862, not long after the costly shock at Pittsburg Landing, one of the officers recalled, “Slaves came to us bringing information of the enemy far south of our lines, and expecting protection and freedom, to be greatly disappointed.” In the summer of 1862 near Tuscumbia, Alabama, a male slave informed a Federal colonel that he and several others were ready and willing to follow the colonel’s army and serve them as needed. Upon hearing this, the officer calmly informed him that he and his fellow slaves would be shot if they did not return to their master immediately. While not all African Americans seeking escape faced such immediate threats to life and limb, the risks involved were still too high and promising destinations too few, especially when both armies tended to greet them with hostility. The possibility of entire families
making an escape was nigh impossible. According to the hopes and policies of the Lincoln cabinet, Southern citizens and the Confederate armed forces were still separable entities. The moderate-led administration continued down the path of appealing to white civilians and fighting the butternut combatants.\textsuperscript{15}

It is worthy to note that the above towns of Franklin, Athens, and Tuscumbia had no Union forts when these events transpired. This would change dramatically a year later, when all three railroad towns became fortified and garrisoned, largely through African American labor. But in June 1862, there seemed to be marginal incentive for Federals to create Western bastions, nor for the enslaved to risk joining fluid armies.

After fourteen months of fighting, while the Army of the Potomac managed to advance a total of only 75 miles towards Richmond, their associates to the west appeared to be bowling over whole states. After Leonidas Polk’s ill-conceived invasion of neutral Kentucky in September 1861, the Bluegrass State eventually morphed into a moderately obliging Union throughway. Victories in early 1862 at Forts Henry and Donelson, Pea Ridge, and even Shiloh (spun as a Union win) helped secure major cities like Memphis and Nashville. By April the Union Army and Navy had captured New Orleans, by far the largest city in the Confederacy, with minimal casualties. Although susceptible to guerrilla attacks, most of the critical rails, rivers, and roads of Arkansas, Missouri, and Tennessee were in Union hands. Some Federal regiments that had been in service for a few months old had already reached the outskirts of the Deep South in places like Corinth, Decatur, the Memphis & Charleston Railroad, and Tuscumbia. The situation looked so dire to Jefferson Davis that in the spring of 1862 he went before the Confederate Congress and pleaded for a conscription of all able-bodied white males of military age, the first of its kind enforced in American history (and a year before Lincoln asked
the U.S. Congress for a similar law). Few of Davis’s constituents felt as surprised and disillusioned as adult white females, who suddenly had to surrender family members with little recourse. This may have been especially demoralizing in the Western Theater where Federal armies and freshwater navies were quickly overtaking scores of southern communities.16

It was enough for the world to take notice. With his own designs on Mexico, Napoleon III had little incentive to insert France into the bloody American conflict, nor recognize a potential rival in his southerly region of desire. The otherwise eager critics of the Lincoln administration, the London *Times*, admitted by mid-May that “advantages gained in the West by the Federal Government, have been such as it is impossible to overrate.” Even more shocking was the apparent ease with which the Union armed forces captured the Crescent City. How could the Confederacy relinquish its primary international metropolis, what the *Times* called “the real capital of the Southern Confederacy,” a fair question considering Britain’s mills connected to the South via New Orleans, Charleston, and the Caribbean far more than through the comparatively diminutive and inland Richmond. Citing Shiloh as an exception, the Tory paper also expressed wonderment at the speed with which Baton Rouge, Corinth, Huntsville, and Memphis capitulated. As for “the great State of Tennessee,” the *Times* informed its readers that it “may be looked upon as lost to the Confederate Republic.”17

Yet, as a central point easily forgotten, this was a war over the future of U.S. hemispheric expansion.18 Federal victory was not yet assured, but its increasing likelihood created a serious paradox for the very young Republican Party. Reunification meant a possible return of a powerful southern Democratic caucus to the House and Senate, and a possible return to a southward emphasis based on slave labor.19 With U.S. westward enlargement proceeding even while the Civil War was still in motion (read Indian Wars, wartime gold rushes in Idaho,
Montana, and Wyoming, designs on the northwest Pacific Rim, East Asian trade), the Republican-held Congress began to stake monumental claims. After decades of trying, new allies such as old free-soil Whigs and Radical Republicans et al passed the far-reaching Homestead Act in May, with the stipulation that acreages would only go to those who had “never borne arms against the United States Government or given aid and comfort to its enemies.” Although eventually devastating to innumerable Native Americans and an unintentional beacon to the corrupt, on paper the decree could have been (and was) interpreted as a potential emancipation of the urban proletariat and the end of serfdom for millions of rural whites and blacks alike. July 1st brought a Pacific Railway Act, with a northern industrial terminus no less. Twenty-four hours later came passage of the Morrill Act, gifting millions of acres of government land to educate the male masses in the applied sciences. In this war of blue against gray, these laws in their time looked to many as if written in bold strokes of socialist red. It was enough to inspire the perpetually impatient Karl Marx and his more optimistic associate Frederick Engels to publicly declare, “the revolutionary waging of war, is at hand” [italics in original].

Still, whatever was in store for Confederate President Jefferson Davis and other political and socioeconomic elites, their options were manifold and potentially comfortable. Prominent members of southern society generally possessed the capital, credit, and connections to adjust to changing conditions better than most, certainly more so than the enslaved. In 1862 very few secessionist communities were under entrenched Federal occupation, and per Federal policy, even fewer endured serious damage. In contrast, as Leslie Schwalm reminds us, enslaved communities were under armed occupation long before the war began. If anything, the sectional crisis intensified their suppression. Patrols, deportations to areas further south, threats, and misinformation only intensified with the war’s escalation. As in the antebellum years, the system
of slavery continually strove to keep chattel imbalanced, impoverished, and isolated. This strategy was most successful in rural areas, where the vast majority of humans lived in the South. Even for those who had come into contact with Union troops, there seemed to be little indication that their personal condition could be altered anytime soon.²⁴

What did become evident to many African Americans in these contested areas was that the Confederate military and town governments were actively seeking the able-bodied among them to build and maintain small fortifications. In places like Port Hudson and Vicksburg, Decatur and Stevenson, Island No. 10 and Clarksville, they saw firsthand (and constructed with their own hands) structures that would grow in size and number as the war progressed. Those directly involved could see the strength and weaknesses of such positions, which ones had access to good roads and clean water, and how much labor was required to keep them in fighting trim. It was because of their building experience and intimate knowledge they possessed of immediate areas that many marginalized individuals could consider themselves desirable assets to the warring parties. For the thousands pulled into construction, they and their families were discovering possible sources of empowerment and potential portals for escape.²⁵

Several thousand families were doing just that where northern bases were taking root, including at St. Louis and Rolla, Missouri, southern Illinois’s “Little Egypt” town of Cairo, and Dover’s Fort Donelson. As of June 1862, Federals were just repossessing Corinth and Memphis, but fortified occupation had not yet become a major component of Federal military strategy in the Western Theater. That was about to change, though mostly on paper and in vivid imaginations.²⁶
The Emergence of “Different Principles”

A fair indication of impatience is when a moderate begins to sound like Thomas Paine. Such was the case on July 9, 1862 when conservative Republican Senator William Fessenden of Maine scolded his fellow members of the U.S. Senate for the continued careful treatment of callous planters. The war had become deadly and expensive. A wholly new direction was necessary, he demanded, one that required taking possession of southern property, “not from any feeling of emancipation, not from any of that sort of peculiar sentiment…but from the absolute necessity of the case, from the common sense of the thing.”

Lincoln and his cabinet were assuredly moving in a similar direction. William Seward and Gideon Welles were evidently the first to hear that impatience was to become policy when their chief executive approached them in the second week of July. Almost immediately, his secretaries of State and the Navy voiced their firm support. As Welles would later write, “we wanted the army to strike more vigorous blows.”

Much of the subsequent focus upon the ensuing the Emancipation Proclamation involved (and still involves) the emancipation aspect, even if that aspect was fundamentally about an immediate need for manpower. Consequently, disproportionate attention has been placed on one bill then under consideration, a measure that would become on July 17, 1862, the much-celebrated Second Confiscation Act. Unfortunately that law tends to overshadow another law signed on the same day, an amendment to a rarely-used emergency provision that had been on the books since the eighteenth century. What Fessenden was referring to, indeed what Lincoln, Seward, and Welles viewed as a critical new direction, was the Militia Act. Based on a seventy year-old law that allowed the temporary federalization of state militias, the 1862 revision enabled African Americans to become paid employees of the U.S. military. Often overlooked is the task
for which these individuals were to perform in exchange for their freedom, plus the freedom of their families and all of their following generations. They were to be hired “for the purpose of constructing intrenchments [sic], or performing camp service or any other labor, or any military or naval service for which they may be found competent.” Union forts were slowly gaining a labor force.

It had taken some time for the government to appreciate the ability of fortifications to hold critical cities and transportation routes. On July 30th New Hampshire Governor Nathaniel Berry, one of Lincoln’s most diligent supporters, urged that the strategy be pressed. In a brief, pointed letter endorsed by five other signatories, Berry directly questioned the continued use of “reading, thinking, intelligent, patriotic young men…wasting their strength and energy in daily and nightly watchings of Rebel estates and other property.” Part Thomas Paine and part Frederick Engels, the letter specifically appealed to Lincoln’s Whig disdain for the protection of aristocracy. It also recommended using the vast, untapped source of “strong and willing hands” for “digging trenches, piling fortifications, and the like.” It was time, the devout Free-soiler Berry reasoned, to apply secessionists’ property against them.

Berry and his associates were not alone in their sentiments, as a growing number were beginning to see a purpose to holding onto Confederate strongpoints and using capable laborers other than Union soldiers to secure these critical areas. Around this same time, Lincoln’s own Interior Secretary John P. Usher sent him an undated message with the bold title “What we want is a Plan,” and Usher began with an underlined “My plan is this.” He called not for repeated attacks against armies but an aggressive acquisition of key positions, namely Vicksburg. Recommending an aggressive campaign of gun boats and a land force of no fewer than 60,000 men, (very close to what accomplished this task a year later), the otherwise unctuous Usher told
Lincoln to fortify and garrison the city and then, “fortify and garrison, such other points upon the Mississippi, as commands its navigation.”

Just three months prior, the Army of the Potomac reached the outskirts of the Confederate capital, only to be pushed back by fresh counterattacks in July. During this reversal, it was becoming evident that Southern generals were at their strongest and most efficient when served by slave-built defensive works. Later that same July, Lincoln penned an initial draft of his proclamation, one much longer and more vehement than the September version. Lincoln would see it again when Salmon Chase returned the July iteration to him on the eve of January 1, 1863, Emancipation Day. The original version read, “A despotic tyranny…holds in actual slavery, nearly one half the entire population, of which half nearly whole is friendly to the troops and arms of the Union; but is yet compelled to furnish, by labors in the field and in the shop, upon fortifications, and in trenches, indispensable support to the rebellion.” In other words, the new Militia Act recognized that the Confederate use of extensive defensive works could be just as effective for Union forces.

Still, fortification and confiscation were primarily words on paper. It would take something stronger than written edicts from Lincoln to convince the U.S. War Department to pursue a policy of labor-intensive fortification. As it turned out, the motivation to adopt such a strategy was already in motion.

**Bragg’s Great Push Northward**

Gen. Braxton Bragg’s grand Confederate counteroffensive of summer and fall 1862 lasted twice as long and travelled twice as far as Robert E. Lee’s immortalized 1863 Gettysburg Campaign. By sheer numbers and ground covered, Bragg’s campaign also dwarfed John Bell Hood’s
desperate 1864 foray into Tennessee. Yet Bragg’s massive northward drive barely registers in popular memory, possibly because of the commander’s enduring legacy of irascible ineptitude. Details of Bragg’s Kentucky Campaign are beyond the scope of this study. The purpose here is to highlight the enormous loss of territory that the Union army suffered as a result, and how this loss moved the U.S. War Department towards the strategy of incremental invasion via fortification.

In August 1862, under the commands of generals Bragg and Edmund Kirby Smith, two great columns totaling more than 50,000 men moved from the Deep South, through unionist Cumberland Plateau, and deep into Kentucky. Overall, the operation reached from the shores of the Gulf of Mexico to the banks of the Ohio River. Bragg’s early successes were such that he deemed the undertaking, “the most extraordinary campaign in military history.” Just to get his men to their starting point at Chattanooga, Bragg was able to transport his huge contingent more than 750 miles over a meandering rail network in just two weeks, bypassing Union armies along the way. Some of his men began the journey as far south as Mobile Bay. It was and would remain the largest and longest rail shipment of troops the Confederacy ever achieved.

On August 14, 1862, Brigadier Kirby Smith and his force entered Kentucky with little fanfare (much to their surprise) against almost no resistance (to the terror of millions of northerners). In quick succession, Smith’s men took the state capital and advanced towards Louisville. Soon after, the Army of Northern Virginia began its campaigns of Second Manassas and Sharpsburg. Further west along the Mississippi, smaller and more agile armies simultaneously prodded into the interiors of Mississippi and Tennessee when opportunities arose. It all seemed so promising to the otherwise irritable Bragg that he told his commanders that a rendezvous within the state of Ohio was within the realm of possibility.
In hindsight, we know that Bragg’s mighty offensive effectively ended after an indecisive engagement at Perryville on October 8. What is less observed is the massive territorial inversion that Bragg caused. In September, Federals had to abandon all of their gains in north Alabama. They also lost much of Middle Tennessee. Bragg even headquartered in Murfreesboro, a city within a day’s march to Nashville. November losses in the midterm elections, though overblown by the opposition, were nonetheless unsettling for the Lincoln administration. The shocking loss of his primary forward supply base at Holly Springs, Mississippi sent U.S. Grant reeling back to Memphis. Among those who had suffered the worst setbacks were the enslaved who had escaped into Federal camps over the preceding year. Their lot was to either move with the retreating bluecoats, fall off, or fall back to their familiar and enslaving owners.\(^{37}\)

Thus began a period of limbo for many communities caught between. Nannie Haskins remembered her area of Clarksville, Tennessee being taken and retaken. Confederates enjoyed greater success there, in part because of their aptly-named Fort Defiance nearby. The unoccupied town of Franklin, wedged between Nashville and Murfreesboro, changed hands at least ten times. For many other locations less protected, they would live in what Stephen Ash calls the “no-man’s land.” One of the few Union holdouts in the Deep South was the critical rail junction town of Corinth. Just as Bragg’s men were heading toward Perryville, another Confederate army under Earl Van Dorn launched a series of fierce assaults, which the occupying Federals successfully withstood after two days of bitter engagement. A major reason for the successful resistance stemmed from the Union’s heavily-manned, well-armed, and extensively fortified position.\(^{38}\)

Though less than stellar in his own performance during the contest, Major General William Rosecrans received both praise and promotion from the Lincoln administration. For his
efforts, Rosecrans earned command of a reorganized force in the critical supply base of Nashville, newly christened as the Army of the Cumberland. Dismissed from the post was the overly-cautious Don Carlos Buell. Though Rosecrans was often accused of moving too cautiously as well, his philosophy on how to wage war in his Department suddenly gained great favor from members of Congress, families of servicemen, the administration, and somewhat known to him, not a small number of enslaved persons seeking a way out. Rosecrans knew by training and experience (he had spent five years supervising fortification of the Rhode Island coast) what the enslaved knew by construction and observation (in places like Corinth). Forts could creatively destruct the Confederacy Western Theater by working as offensive weapons.\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{The Blue Keep and the Above Ground Railroad}

Several historians recognize the fundamental shift in western strategy that occurred over the winter of 1862-1863. Their basic paradigm can be described as “moving from conserving to conquering.” Stephen V. Ash uses “from conciliation and conservatism to coercion and revolution.” In their analysis of occupation in northern Alabama, George C. Bradley and Richard Dahlen describe a pattern of “\textit{Conciliation to Conquest}.”\textsuperscript{40} I take the position that the transition was not that different from emerging practices evident among the military and the enslaved - the ultimate goal was not emancipation – the objective for the administration, the army, and the enslaved was to find greater immediate security by way of labor. This short term plan was most certainly on the Congressional books since summer 1862. The impending Proclamation definitely endorsed the expansion of existing policy, containing a passage not present in the September statement. The iconic January 1 version is most famous for its declaration that the enslaved in places still in rebellion “shall be then, thenceforward and forever free.” Often missed
is the later sentence on Lincoln’s incentive for making such a policy change. “I further declare and make known, that such persons of suitable condition, will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.” What the historiography generally dilutes is the significance of that particular line, easily missed for many reasons, but worthy of mention because of this: fortification was a critical nexus, if not the primary nexus, where the strategies of slaves, soldiers, and the administration ultimately intersected.

A few examples are worth mentioning. Formed in July 1862, the small contraband camp at Helena, Arkansas grew to nearly 6,000 persons by January 1863. Also by January 1863, Helena was one of the most fortified Union strongholds along the Mississippi. Federals overtook the Confederate-and-slave-built Fort Defiance in Clarksville, Tennessee on Christmas 1862 and renamed it Fort Bruce. Largely through African American labor, Federals strengthened and enlarged the works. At nearby Nashville, contrabands labor played a central role in making and maintaining its daunting structures of Fort Negley, Fort Morton, Blockhouse Casino, multiple other bastions, plus miles of outlying trenches.

Southeast of Nashville, the enslaved also made possible the sprawling complex of Fortress Rosecrans outside Murfreesboro, producing the largest earthen fortification in North America. Maj. Gen. Samuel Curtis said the same at Jefferson Barracks in St. Louis March 9, 1863, where African Americans arrived by river and road. In June 1863, contrabands built nearly all of Fort Nelson, the central citadel to Camp Nelson in Kentucky, where officials would eventually certify the legal freedom of more than 13,000 individuals.

As Dr. Samuel Boyd of the 84th Indiana observed during the building of several forts just northeast of Franklin, Tennessee:
The exact status of the slavery question, and its relation to our army, is the most perplexing of all others…all that an outside observer can learn is that obtained by watching the movement of the colored population. The first remarkable fact observed is that the tracks of slaves all point to our camp, and that they are very numerous. Three car loads of the “peculiar institution” to Nashville this week.

And a gayer set of “festive cusses” seldom travel the road. They do not seem to clearly realize their new relation. They all insist, however, that they are free.\textsuperscript{46}

There are reasons for the marginalization of such structures when investigating their possible relationship to the emancipation story. When slaves approached Union armies, white witnesses almost invariably described the event as a border crossing. In January 1863, Colonel Cyrus Bussey in Helena asked his superiors what he should do with “a great many Negro men, women and children coming into our lines.”\textsuperscript{47} That April, D.H. Clifton with the 121\textsuperscript{st} Ohio at Franklin, Tennessee told his hometown newspaper, “Contrabands are coming into our lines daily. I should judge there were 500 or 600 at this place who have come since our arrival.”\textsuperscript{48} Later that same year a soldier at Clarksville wrote to his brother, “About ten get through the lines per day.”\textsuperscript{49}

Use of the word “line” masked what was actually taking place. All three of the above movements were not border crossings but expeditions into fortified towns. As several researchers of the emancipation experience have found, slaves did occasionally join passing armies, but many soon learned that blue columns in motion were either retreating from or seeking Confederates. When runaways entered Union areas on their own volition, they predominantly
moved towards established fortified occupation sites. Union forts were comparatively stable, static, deterrents to combat, and havens from guerrillas. Moreover, fortresses contained opportunities for food, shelter, and employment – blacksmith shops, infirmaries, the laundries, liveries, and kitchens.50

Edward L. Ayers and Scott Nesbit confirm this pattern in their study of when and where emancipation occurred most frequently. Battlefields, not surprisingly, were unattractive. As for the preferred locus, Ayers and Nesbit find, “zones of relatively long-lasting Union control in the seceded South, by contrast… left very different marks on slavery. The institution had all but fallen apart in these places. African Americans living in the occupied South crowded into garrisoned cities and towns, leaving behind them a landscape nearly devoid of coerced labor.”51

Joseph Danielson draws a similar conclusion in his examination of northern Alabama. Federals occupied the area for several months in 1862, but their tenuous position apparently attracted few runaways. When the Union army returned a year later and intensified fortifications of the Tennessee Valley, the influx became much larger. In their study of Union-occupied Chattanooga, Gilbert Govan and James Livingood note the natural attraction of secured supply bases, which tended to increase as the war worsened.52

A June 11, 1863 piece in the Nashville Daily Union attested to the “migration via fortification” phenomenon, including the growing trend for extended families to escape together:

Passing along Church Street about one o’clock yesterday we met a large number of ‘contrabands,’ representing both sexes and all ages, from the infant at the breast to the decrepit old man. A gentleman asked, “When did you come in?”

“Yistiddy!” responded a stout wench, with a child in her arms. We learn that they
were from Williamson County, and the vicinity of Franklin. Hundreds of them are daily deserting the service of their owners, who, as a general thing, do not take steps to recover them.\(^{53}\)

This last example depicts just how radically transformed the situation had become in two years, starting with the Fugitive Slave Law firmly in place, to the sporadically applied First and Second Confiscation Acts, to the point where familial migration had almost become a normal occurrence. One may think of the poignant question posed by Steven Hahn in his 2009 overview *The Political Worlds of Slavery and Freedom*, to wit the title of his second chapter, “Did We Miss the Greatest Slave Rebellion in Modern History?” The short answer would be yes, but if we take into account that perhaps only 10 percent of the enslaved reached emancipation by 1862, it could be said that most slaves missed it as well.\(^{54}\) Did Hahn miss something as well? When detailing the scope and patterns of this mass exodus, Hahn does not mention wartime fortifications or even zones of occupation as avenues for self-emancipation.

Another question to consider, along with where slaves tended to gravitate, is where those fort systems were located. The short answer is - predominantly within slave societies - the Mississippi Valley, the Tennessee Valley, Chattanooga and Atlanta, and along major rail lines. In the rich-soil corridor that graced the central meridian of Middle Tennessee, Col. Emerson Opdycke at Franklin remarked, “the rebs have not come; but the darkies are coming in, faster than I can dispose of them, as I cannot get rations for them, but they are coming, in such numbers, as to seriously annoy the commissary department. Those I cannot subsist, shall be passed on to Nashville, where there is a contraband camp.”\(^{55}\) Where slavery flourished, Union fortifications rapidly grew.
Hence, political, social, and economic power in the South depended very heavily upon geographic positioning. The Confederacy may have covered some 750,000 square miles, but the choicest soil for cash crop production constituted a mere fraction of that expanse. Moreover, the South’s select few transportation arteries contracted these positions of potential wealth even further. As Walter Johnson articulates in *River of Dark Dreams* (2013), as does Richard Dunn in *Sugar and Slaves* (1972), the most dominant investors and planters were those who managed to attain the most fecund fields adjacent the most navigable ports, rivers, rails, and turnpikes. For latecomers and the less fortunate, the remaining acres were less arable and more remote. In effect, the Union Army fundamentally replicated the planter strategy, by conquering and controlling the most desirable, productive points upon a vast and marginal landscape.

It must be added that escapees, though not ignorant, were not clairvoyant. Many could not sense if Union forces or Washington decrees were crushing the system to which the enslaved were coercively bound. African Americans streamed into Corinth having never heard of the Emancipation Proclamation. Militarily, it was not so much the string of Union victories achieved largely by whites that inspired escape, but the string of Union forts and repaired rail lines constructed largely by blacks that provided a self-evident new option. Many did have a sense when food, shelter, and familial security could be found in places more powerful than the old master. An officer from Indiana stationed at Nashville observed one such incident in March 1863. “I saw said master a few days ago at our headquarters. He was complaining grievously of his losses. Some of his eighty slaves had run off. The rebels had taken some of them, and now the Union men were using eight of his best on the fortifications of Nashville.” Even for those who did not escape, the fort option enabled them to negotiate for better conditions. Under the daunting weight of ramparts and batteries, an already feigned illusion had been broken, and the
planter’s omniscient self-assurance suddenly did not have the same credibility. To the Indiana officer, the planter continued to lament: “What was worst of all, those left at home would work only as they pleased and when they pleased. He said that before the war he could whip them and beat them to make them work, but now if he whipped them they would leave him.”

Concerning owners, the “servant” walkout could come suddenly, as it did for wealthy planter and entrepreneur J.H. Bills on June 1, 1863. For months the Union army occupied his corner of southwest Tennessee near the town of Bolivar. “Early this morning my man Jerry and Hannah his wife, their children Vira, Billy, Martha, Louis, Simon and Mary with Vira’s three children, Jerry, Hattie, and also Victoria and child and Angelina and child all off by railroad. There appears to be a general stampede.” Day after day he wrote “the stampede continues.” Though many of his slaves still stayed, Bills admitted he felt his days as “master” were numbered. “I have no confidence when all our authority is gone.” Bills and his ilk were also well aware they were losing mountains of capital. Dr. Henry West of the 125th Ohio conservatively estimated that each runaway cost an owner an average of $500, leading him to conclude that these emigration were “sapping the very foundation of the Rebels’ last hope.” He had a point. At the time of West’s writing, the contraband camp at Helena, Arkansas alone represented at least $3 million in human capital.

Many enslaved began to develop a growing sense of self-worth, especially concerning their ability to assist the Federals. “I remember when the Yankees came to this town,” recalled a teenage slave. “My old boss hit me that morning and he didn’t know the Yankees were in town, and when he found it out he come back beggin’ me to stay with him and said he was sorry.” The young slave would eventually leave and join the Union army and serve in the fortresses of Nashville.
There was another major incentive for escape. As Stephen Ash, Earl J. Hess and others have noted, much of the rural area surrounding these Union cells soon backfilled with white guerillas, many of whom were not connected nor loyal to any particular entity but themselves. This resulting danger, as much as it vexed armed and organized Federal soldiers, functioned as an omnipresent terror to unarmed and dispersed African Americans.\(^{65}\)

Fleeing was one thing. Surviving thereafter was another. Again, fortressed areas were rife with customers and jobs, and ones that tended to pay better than the previous employer. African American women were conspicuously industrious at Corinth for example, cooking and laundering for Union soldiers as well as contracting their labor to locals.\(^{66}\) At Franklin Dr. Samuel Boyd noted:

> Every officer in camp has many colored helps as the regulations will allow, who seem to be entirely satisfied with their new field of labor. A larger number of ex slaves are at work on the fortifications and at other labor in our army. Hard by our camp is a deserted farm house which now swarms with slaves of all shades of color, sizes, ages, and sexes. I am told that an order was recently promulgated here that none but able-bodied should be admitted into the lines. Yet still they come, both great and small.\(^{67}\)

Another surgeon made a similar observation: “It is astonishing to see the contrabands coming in,” wrote Dr. Henry West of the 98\(^{th}\) Ohio, “drove after drove.”\(^{68}\) Also stationed with Drs. Boyd and West, one soldier mentioned a more direct way of introducing the enslaved to labor opportunities, though in a manner somewhat reminiscent of the institution against which
they were rebelling: “The digging has been mainly done by our soldiers. When the 125th Ohio occupied the town, they daily confiscated niggers under the Proclamation and escorted them to the trenches.”

A soldier from the 85th Indiana recalled frequent interaction between his comrades and local slaves, noting: “One of the peculiar features of our camp life there was the great number of contrabands — all sexes and colors. We had no difficulty in securing servants. The old conditions of slavery were breaking up and a new order of things developing.”

But there were still obstacles innumerable, not the least of which was that Federal soldiers, free whites, and the Lincoln presidency would continue to view enslaved African Americans as the anonymous “them.” But for all three groups their newfound mobility, coerced as well as self-actualized, brought them into closer contact with one another than ever before. These interconnections at the very least pushed individuals and institutions to question long-held theories. The results would cover the spectrum, from empathy to antipathy, but at the very least there was an uptick in contact. The following from Franklin may well illustrate how that range of perception can be expressed, even over the course of one reflective letter home.

While the fort was building, it occurred to Colonel [Oliver] Payne that the "contraband of war" might be useful in this work, so he ordered Lieutenant [John] Raidaie to take a detail of men, and go forth and bring in such of the bondmen as he could find that were able to do the work required. So the lieutenant sallied forth in the direction of Roper's Knob, and he was rewarded by finding large numbers of the aforesaid "contraband," as the slave owners of Kentucky had sent their slaves into Tennessee, to keep them as far away as possible from the Union
lines… These slaves we kept in camp until the fort was completed…But it was
wonderful with what alacrity these poor ignorant colored people performed the
work required of them. They seemed to realize that they were working for
themselves.\textsuperscript{71}

Indeed, there were de facto revolutions in motion. A critical mass within the U.S.
military, the administration, and the enslaved had had enough. They were going to keep, by way
of fortification and other means, what they had previously and repeatedly lost. For the Union
soldiers, consisting predominantly of citizens who wanted to return to their civilian status sooner
rather than later, the practice of overtaking then giving back bridges, rail lines, rivers, and cities -
was over. For Lincoln and his associates, every runaway meant a potential laborer. For the
enslaved escaping, some survived long enough and moved far enough to hope that they and their
children were no longer going to be someone’s inherited chattel, collateral, or payment of debt.
In reality these ideals would meet innumerable hardships and setbacks. In time the revolutions
would prove largely ephemeral. For the moment, these shifts would also prove lethal. This first
step of working in close quarters with one another would kill a great many of them.
CHAPTER TWO:

CONTAGION – THE SCOURGE OF OVERPOPULATION

“We are assured, on good authority, that an unfortunate creature was walking about the streets yesterday, with well-developed smallpox on his face and body. The attention of two physicians was directed to him, who pronounced the case a decided one.”

*Nashville Daily Union*, January 12, 1863

It is widely known that illnesses killed twice as many Civil War soldiers than did combat. Also generally understood is that diseases cannot discern whether their targets are civilian or military. Strangely, these two axioms rarely appear together. In areas of fortified occupation, the enslaved, citizens, and soldiers interacted most often and longest, which consequently produced considerable amounts of contagion. Effects of illness upon these areas merit exploration, including areas west of the Appalachians. According to William L. Barney, Union soldiers serving in the Western Theater were 43 percent more likely to die from disease than those stationed in the Eastern Theater.

Specifically this chapter examines contagion’s *destructive creation* - the inverse of Schumpeter’s model – whereby damage preceded innovation. In this case, destruction involved widespread disease in fortified zones. The creative effects were developments of mutual empathy.
and conditional support between Northern occupiers and Southern citizens, and the Federal expansion of African American labor in the Union war effort.  

The extent to which disease initially afflicted fortressed areas is difficult to overstate. In early January 1863, there were nineteen military hospitals in occupied Nashville caring for soldiers, citizens, and contrabands. By February 1863 the number of hospitals rose to twenty three. A month later, the total reached twenty four. Each building had been a civic center of one kind or another until confiscated and altered. Places like Broadway Hotel, Hynes High School, the Masonic Hall, and the Methodist Church became numbered infirmaries. The Female School near the Nashville and Chattanooga Depot became Hospital Number 12. Planters Hotel on the corner of Deaderick and Summer was known as Hospital 17 or more commonly “the Officers Hospital.” All facilities resided within the arc of bastions, blockhouses, and trenches than surrounded the second most fortified city in North America.

Federal officials established these heavily-defended hospital sites ostensibly to alleviate combat areas of their worst medical cases. The strategy was to try and spare the lives of the severely afflicted as well as mitigate outbreaks continually sprouting in the outer garrisons. The process instead injected multiple biohazards into densely populated areas. “Our men sickened and were sent to the general hospital at Nashville,” wrote Ohioan George Lewis, “where very many died, and many were discharged as unfit for further military duty.” Isaac Royse of the 115th Illinois added, “many were sent to the general hospitals in Nashville. From these places very many were carried to their long home in the soldiers’ cemetery.” A wary John King of the 92nd Illinois simply refused to be shipped north. “To go to Nashville to a hospital where soldiers were being carried to their graves by the dozens and scores daily was no pleasant thought to me.” Part of the scare came from the knowledge that civilians there were also dying in numbers.
The city’s deadly reputation even reached the pages of the New York Times, which reported, “Nearly all its churches and public buildings, such as High Schools, University, Medical College, Gun factory, are devoted to use of the sick and wounded. There are 24 hospitals here, containing each an average of 200 patients.” Some structures became so contaminated that they were eventually abandoned.

All Union-held fort metropolises possessed multiple military hospitals, including Louisville, Memphis, and St. Louis. Beyond these centers, smaller occupied towns contained several infirmaries each, from confiscated academy buildings to regimental hospital tents. Altogether, Union garrisons in the Western Theater were among the most prolific incubators and distributors of disease. Much like what happened in the training camps of 1861 and early 1862, an influx of a mostly rural population crowded into these impromptu cities incited several severe outbreaks.

The pathogenic problem involved what Matthew Smallman-Raynor and Andrew Cliff call the “war-disease association.” Expanding on Friedrich Prinzing’s pioneering 1916 work Epidemics Resulting from Wars, Smallman-Raynor and Cliff trace the effects of invasion and overcrowding, breakdowns in healthcare infrastructures, compromised sanitation, reduced nutrition, and refugee flight. Within this volatile framework, they notice a consistent group of pestilences – especially cholera, dysentery, smallpox, typhoid, and typhus – diseases that flourished in urbanizing areas. Ensuing “war pestilences” naturally made no distinction between military and civilian bodies as they spread. The reality of impartial infections is not so readily apparent in twentieth-century scholarship on Civil War medicine. Their primary focus on campaigns, surgery, and soldiers give the unintended impression that contagions struck the
military almost exclusively. One likely cause is the imbalance of sources; medical information is far more abundant on white Union servicemen than on any other demographic.\textsuperscript{15}

Kathryn Shively Meier’s illuminating 2013 volume on the 1862 Shenandoah Valley reveals how armies were essentially walking biohazards. For example, she exaggerates only marginally when stating that these roving thousands could abruptly transform bountiful landscapes into “sprawling latrines” and “transitory urban slums.”\textsuperscript{16} Shively Meier and others also recognize that mobile troops were generally much healthier than those set in place. As the Federal soldier George Lewis said, “I think that every old soldier will agree with me that the march, while more fatiguing, is more healthful than the camp.”\textsuperscript{17}

Living in fortified areas involved large amounts of human and animal pollutants, susceptibility to shortages, and dangerously confined spaces. Together the Union and Confederate war departments produced or procured around 1.5 billion bullets of all types during the course of the war, yet a single person with tuberculosis could expectorate four billion tuberculosis bacilli in a single day. TB alone managed to kill four times as many soldiers as the Battle of Shiloh plus untold numbers of contrabands and citizens. Like other “war diseases,” it preyed most upon the fatigued and undernourished in areas of concentrated population.\textsuperscript{18}

\textbf{Fort Granger – A Case Study in Biological Destruction}

On April 26, 1863, in the farming community of Mount Morris in northwest Illinois, A.Q. Allen penned a letter to his nephew John Leek of the 92\textsuperscript{nd} Illinois stationed at Fort Granger in Franklin, Tennessee. Along with news from home, the note contained a prophetic warning: “John, this war is an awful thing and I fear many more valuable lives will be lost. You are exposed to many dangers.”\textsuperscript{19}
It is unknown whether that letter ever reached Corporal Leek, but while the note was in transit its addressee suddenly came down with flu-like symptoms. When those symptoms intensified, doctors sent him to the regimental hospital, a large canvas tent containing coughing patients, attentive insects, and an open view of five adjacent regimental campgrounds and their latrines. Leek’s decline was so rapid that it merited a visit from one of his hometown comrades, Pvt. Charles Falkner, who felt rather ill himself. But what Falkner saw immediately prompted him to inform their community, “John Leek is very sick with lung fever.” Ten days later, Falkner wrote home again. “I will tell you one thing will be pretty hard for Mrs. Leek to hear, Poor John is no more. He died last night after a long spell of sickness. It was the typhoid fever.”

As a civilian, Leek was a tall, industrious carpenter. As a soldier on garrison duty, he gradually weakened from exposure to illness and the elements. What finished him off was something he could not see. Yet unbeknownst to him, typhoid’s carrier had a faint taste – the disease entered the body through food and water contaminated by another victim’s fecal matter. It also had a feel, spreading inside the body as it did, producing joint and abdominal pain, lethargy, sleeplessness, and increasingly excruciating headaches. It had smells – putrid vomit and liquid diarrhea. Last came sound, mostly through deliria and death rattles.
Fig. 1.1 - Samuel Boyd Map of April 10, 1863 Franklin, Tennessee. Shown are the arrangement of encampments and fortifications compacted into less than two square miles. Fort Granger is the largest fort, situated at the intersection of the river and railroad. Boyd Family Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.
The intent here is not to be superfluous. The main point is that Leek was indeed leaking. He body was effusing sweat, half-digested food, and most dangerously his contaminated feces. He was also emanating a multitude of warning signs that compelled his superiors to move him from one group of people to another. Unlike a bullet to a major organ or artery, sickness killed more slowly, turning each victim into a potential vessel. Had he stabilized, Leek would have likely been sent to the confiscated college building downtown which had become the garrison’s main hospital. If his symptoms worsened there, he would have been sent to Nashville. Ironically had he caught smallpox – among the deadliest diseases in human history – he would have likely survived.

So feared was the lethal breath of smallpox that in many cases, the learned reaction was swift quarantine and immediate treatment. This chapter begins with an anecdote from occupied Nashville that typifies the alacrity that the pox demanded. Eighteen miles to the south, where Leek and many others were dying left and right from typhoid, a single case of smallpox in the 115th Illinois prompted doctors to isolate the man in his own tent a half mile from camp. Given a single caretaker, the victim recovered. Other diseases did not elicit similar preventative measures. On the contrary, it was standard practice to erect hospital tents adjacent to their respective regiments.  

Dangerous to themselves in bivouac, soldiers also interacted frequently with the surrounding populations. For occupiers as well as the occupied, their collective volume abruptly overtaxed local sustenance, necessitating widespread foraging, and trade of foodstuffs. Such transfers of food and water, not to mention the potential carriers, exacerbated an already dangerous situation. English-born Alfred Willett of the 113th Ohio wrote of one such transaction:
Camp Frankling [sic] Feb the 23, 1863

I whent a peace from our picket post to a farmers and got some corn bread I waited till they baked it it was not very good but we eat it that his a bout all they have to eat they cantgit much flower they will trade most any think for Coffee and sugar thy cant git any groceryes I whentup to the same place this mornig and got some Corn bread and biscuits and pickles for the boys they was a frade to go they did not have much to say to me I took a seet and waited till they baked it but I kep my gun Close by me and loaded so I was not much a fraid of them.24

Unbeknownst to Pvt. Willett and his wary hosts, the microbes they were exchanging were as potentially lethal as any firearm within reach. Willet would live to see the end of the war, but over fifty of his comrades would not even survive their four-month stay in the fortifications of Franklin. Twenty-one perished on site and thirty died after being transported to the hospitals at Nashville. All died from disease, primarily typhoid. Along with Willett’s 113th Ohio, there were eleven more infantry regiments, three cavalry regiment, and two artillery batteries in the immediate area.25

One of those sister regiments was the 115th Illinois. In their ranks was one Zeboim Patten. An art teacher in civilian life, Patten may have painted a darker image than he realized when he explained how often soldiers and civilians handled the same food and kitchenware. En route to a picket line, he bought milk from one household, mixed it with rice from his regiment, and “[d]id our cooking at a negro house close by.” The practice was common within the regiment. By that time, many of their cooks, laborers, laundresses, and nurses were African Americans from near and far.26
The first groups to occupy Franklin were the lead companies of the 125th Ohio, who entered the town February 12th by wading across a frigid Harpeth River. Reflecting upon that cold night and the difficult months that followed, Capt. Charles Clark concluded “the losses by death, discharge, and transfer…occasioned by that cold bath in the Harpeth and the hard service for some weeks thereafter, probably exceeded the losses [for the 125th Ohio] in any single battle except that of Chickamauga.” Encamped immediately to his north and just east of the main bastion near a contraband camp was the 124th Ohio. A member of that regiment would later recall, “Not any one of the hard fought battles of our campaigns so depleted our ranks as our stay at Franklin.”

Unfortunately for all involved, the Union legions were bringing with them an unforeseen “third army” - lethal contagions incubating inside the bodies of their rank and file. Among the many carriers were Corporal Leek’s 92nd Illinois. Four months before his death, Leek and his fellow volunteers were waylaid in a crowded Camp Baird in Kentucky, where contagions flourished among the tightly quartered men. “I have usual health,” he assured a family member, “but there is a great many sick in camp.” Transferring to Franklin, as the 92nd stopped just south of Nashville, John sent news that severe illnesses persisted among the troops. “There is a good many sick,” he reported, though he believed he was not one of them.

Close behind them were the 115th Illinois, journeying from Louisville to Nashville via crowded steamboats. Many died in transit. In support were the 40th Ohio, who’s surgeon observed, “Up to the time of leaving Eastern Kentucky in February, 1863, our losses were: from resignation on account of ill health, fourteen; discharged for disability, fifty-one; died from disease, eighty-three; casualties, three; making a total loss of one hundred and fifty-one, nine-tenths of this loss being in the first four months after leaving Camp Chase.”
As other regiments filed in soon after, their watery baptism came in the form of torrential winter rainstorms. On his first day at Franklin, Lt. Col. Carter Van Vleck of the 78th Illinois wrote, “we now have 146 reported sick and unable for duty who came with us…” Four days later, the math was getting worse. “The health of the regiment is bad. We have 300 sick out of the 8 companies left us. I am about the only officer that is quite well.” In support six miles away near Brentwood was the 19th Michigan, but its surgeon Dr. John Bennitt feared the regiment was a fighting force only in name.31

These are the darkest hours that I have seen since I have been in the army. Bad rainy muddy weather. 160 men on sick list one day - isolated from the rest of the army – liable to be attacked by rebel guerillas and taken prisoner or killed in our utterly demoralized condition…There are about 130 sick men in general hospital and 40 or 50 on detached service – these with the 216 here make up what there is of our regiment, which came out of Michigan six months ago with 950 men.32

Faced with such heavy losses in manpower, and committed to hold onto Middle Tennessee, Federal officials determined the best course of action was to send in more regiments, all of which contained ailing men in their ranks. One such reinforcement was the 85th Indiana. Entering Franklin on March 2, 1863, the regiment had already suffered sixty fatalities in six months, and they had not yet seen combat.33

As William Rosecrans’s army began to construct their complex of bastions, redans, trenches and rifle pits on the opposite side of the Harpeth, they could have conceivably quarantined themselves from Franklin proper. However, almost no troops stationed at Union fort
systems were able to isolate themselves during their wartime service, even in their initial weeks of construction. In short order, these multiplying Union strongholds also became unwilling to curtail their presence and involvement in local affairs. At Franklin as it would be elsewhere, in order to achieve the objectives of creating and maintaining a large fortified base camp in enemy territory, the Fort Granger garrison became heavily dependent thereafter upon two critical resources – African American labor and the town itself.34

“We are quartered in a tavern here in Franklin,” wrote Albert Slack on February 20th. For several weeks he assured his family that shelter was not an issue; they were simply taking it where it was available. By March, he wrote as if he was beginning to feel at home. “We are still quartered in the old tavern. Our company occupies two rooms – a fireplace in one and a stove in the other. We live pretty comfortable at the present.” Despite the snug living space, or because of it, Slack and his companions struggled to stay healthy. During the stay, Slack’s tavern mate Pvt. Andrew M. Clark died from what doctors reported to be “congestion of the brain.” Another member of the regiment had already perished in town from the airborne disease of tuberculosis, as did another from pneumonia. Two more from the 121st would die in the immediate area before the end of the month as scores more fell ill.35

Since its arrival in February 12, the 125th Ohio also bivouacked in town. There they stayed for a month, primarily in houses. To assuage loved ones back home about living amongst so many ardent Confederates, the troops reported, “We have plenty of clothing, provisions, &c., with which to make soldiering, as far as possible, agreeable.” Within a week of the encouraging imagery, four in the regiment succumbed to disease.36

Nearby, other officers and enlisted began to occupy other businesses and government buildings, including the newspaper office on the northwest corner of the main square and the
county courthouse across the street. Two blocks to the east, troops took up residence in the three-story Masonic Lodge, and several men (including Slack, who was beginning to suffer from acute diarrhea) took over operation of the train depot along the east edge of town. Day and night, pickets filtered through the streets on their way to their posts towards the south and west, bringing with them a variety of illnesses.\(^{37}\)

Table 2.1  Local Union Deaths from Three Primary Diseases

Franklin, Tennessee, Spring 1863

Symptomatic of the destruction that occurred when garrisons initially formed, the Federal occupation of Franklin, Tennessee in early 1863 created bursts of contagions. These outbreaks usually subsided when fortifications became operational. The ensuing prevention of open warfare and the stabilization of infrastructure did much to improve local access to food, wood fuel, medical supplies, and adequate shelter.\(^{38}\)
The civilian toll is difficult to determine, especially concerning the African American population. Evidence indicates that typhoid deaths among military personnel reached its apogee during the first weeks of occupation, while residential losses from typhoid-like symptoms continued in the weeks and months that followed. It is also during this transitional period that use of local food, fuel, and water sources were at their most intense and least regulated. Such was the case on Carter Hill just south of town, where Union soldiers established a reserve picket line; regiments manned the location day and night in 24-hour shifts. One of the few wells on this defensive rise stood in the yard of Margaretha and Johann Lotz. After untold numbers of soldiers had availed themselves to the well, the Lotz toddlers Julius and Julian, a boy and a girl, also drank from it. They both died soon after with symptoms indicative of typhoid fever.\textsuperscript{39}

![Table 2.2](chart.png)

Open warfare began around Franklin in February 1862. Occupation began in 1863 and continued almost continuously until September 1865. While the garrison’s initial presence likely precipitated a spike in local deaths, the following period of relatively stability saw civilian death rates return to prewar levels.\textsuperscript{40}
Contagions were also common among Franklin’s compact roads and row houses. No fewer than four drugstores and as many doctor offices lined Main Street in 1860. But the area’s quick streams and cool springs generally spared its people from mosquito-borne malaria and Yellow Fever. In the late 1850s, the town of Franklin averaged a relatively low fourteen formal burials plus an unknown number of enslaved internments per year. But in 1862, as the region became a combat zone, the civilian funereal rate nearly doubled, almost exclusively due to disease. In 1863 during the Union fortification period, fatalities increased even further, despite the fact the local population was around half its prewar level. Making matters worse, many of the local medical professionals had left to serve in the war. Of the fifty-eight individuals listed as doctors in Williamson County’s 1860 Census, roughly 40 percent of them left to serve in the Confederate Army in 1861. Most were still in the military in 1863. Of even greater importance, breakdowns of infrastructure, a tightening blockade, and inflationary effects greatly compromised access to food, clothing, and medicines, especially for the poor.

The question of how best to survive would not have been particularly clear. The number of incoming soldiers and runaways grew, and with them came increasingly voracious demands on nearby provisions and labor. With this influx of humans also came the increase of sickness. For one planter on Lewisburg Pike just south of town, it almost seemed as if the world was coming to an end, or at least his world was. He could only watch as foraging parties repeatedly gleaned his plantation for supplies and livestock, as his once deferential human property walked away by ones and twos, and as his wife and daughter continually battled one debilitating ailment after another. In time, he became painfully sick himself. On April 13, 1863, he opened his diary and confessed to himself, “My health is very bad – I will certainly go crazy.”
The fortifying of Franklin in early 1863 transformed the town of 1,000 to a city containing well over 11,000 persons in just 100 days. For a brief period, occupied Franklin had a population density twice that of Brooklyn, New York.

**The Process of Overpopulation**

Prolonged overcrowding became a central problem. Marching armies moved in and then moved on, but fortressing armies tended to dig deep, build up, and take over – with swelling numbers of contrabands looking for work and protection. Time and again, the result was abrupt and often severe overpopulation. In 1860 Helena, Arkansas had slightly over 1,500 resident free and slave. In July 1862 several thousand Federal soldiers plus contrabands entered the river town and established occupation. Corinth, Mississippi contained 1,500 people at the start of the war. From November 1862 to November 1863, the average number of Union soldiers in the immediate area varied between 10,000 and 15,000.\(^4^4\) By February 1863 Helena had been transformed into a fortress network, with 6,000 contrabands alone.\(^4^5\) The following month, Murfreesboro resident John Spence exaggerated only slightly when he described his home city possessing “suburbs of about forty five thousand inhabitants, generally of a blue cast and smartly touched with Black.”\(^4^6\) In Chattanooga, Union forces were able to withstand a Confederate siege in late 1863, thanks in no small part the chain of Federal forts that had been built across northern Mississippi and Alabama. Armed with these supply routes and a defense in depth, Federals held onto the city through the rest of the war and beyond. Chattanooga’s prewar total of 2,000 inhabitants became by 1865 a garrison of 3,000 Federal soldiers, plus 3,000 whites and 2,600 African Americans in town, and another 3,500 African Americans across the river.\(^4^7\)
Unhealthy habits among volunteers intensified the crisis. A veteran of the 40th Ohio remembered in 1863, “there were errors in cooking, in location of camps, a want of proper policing of camps, and many other mistakes that the same officers and men would not have made a year later.”

Sometimes the men had no choice; some locations were too valuable to leave, regardless what microbes lingered. Taken in late spring 1862 and meanly fortified thereafter, the vital rail junction town of Corinth, Mississippi suffered from a dire lack of clean ground water. Laden with iron and more lively elements, its lack of purity worsened with the growing number of human and animal burials conducted around the breastworks. Soldiers knew well enough to inter dead things away from the living, but after the costly yet successful defense of the town in October, Confederates persistently threatened the location. As a result, members of the 2nd and 7th Iowa infantry regiments lived for a time with their fallen comrades, the latter buried shallow near their tents.

Famous is the Union capture of invaluable Vicksburg on July 4, 1863. Less known is the Union refortification and occupation of the city that endured for the remainder of the war. An Iowa soldier named Daniel Parvin rightly felt fortunate when his regiment stayed relatively healthy throughout much of 1862. When his regiment entered the forts of Vicksburg in the summer of 1863, they quickly fell ill in large numbers. In simple, abject frustration, Parvin wrote, “This is a very sickly place.” Officer Edward J. Wood of the 48th Indiana experienced similar troubles when his men garrisoned Vicksburg in late 1863, with diarrhea and malaria being especially lethal to his regiment.

In fortified Clarksville, Knoxville, and Chattanooga, Tennessee, smallpox was the primary killer. The arrival and departure of troops spread it outward, and the steady stream of
incoming escapees continued to supply the disease with new victims and carriers. William Wiley of the 77th Illinois feared his stay at Fort Pickering in Memphis because, “while there the measles broke out in the camp and nearly all who had not had them were taken down and but very few ever got over them….they were sent to the convalescent camp at old Fort Pickering where they had to lay on the damp ground and nearly everyone took a relap [sic] and died.” In Middle Tennessee, after outbreaks of typhoid slowly abated in May 1863, the summer brought insect-borne illnesses including lice-transmitted typhus. When Joseph Whitney mailed his winter army coat from Tennessee to his wife in Illinois, he also sent a note of caution: “When you open the box, you must be careful about the body lice, for there are still some hanging around about camp.”

As Whitney’s spouse discovered, there was little chance of containing biological dangers at the source. Hence the need to redefine “fort,” because the small pieces we see today are but the archaeological pieces of what had once been living, active organisms, and ones with unique appetites. To exist, these entities built or usurped bakeries, depots, roadways, and homes. As with the men at Franklin who dwelled in taverns and newspaper offices, other posts took over mill factories, shops, and warehouses. Fort Anderson tightly surrounded the county courthouse in Paducah, Kentucky. Homes in Natchez, Mississippi became barracks for officers and enlisted. In Chattanooga, the Catholic and Episcopal churches became ammunition dumps, the Methodists saw their house become a prison, and one of the Presbyterian churches served as a hospital.

When fortress walls weren’t overshadowing these public and private spaces, the bastions simply swallowed them whole. One of the strongest positions at Corinth was name “Fort College Hill” because of the female college that stood upon the rise. Fort Byington at Knoxville encompassed the buildings of East Knoxville University. William Shepherd felt Fort Pickering
of Memphis was the working definition of an arsenal, because it contained mounds of ammunition, plus paymasters (of which he was one), a harness shop, offices, warehouses, and a tremendous amount of paper to keep the business running. One soldier referred to Corinth as simply “a walled city,” because it was. In October 1862, when Brigadier General Grenville Dodge arrived to take command of the place, he was somewhat taken aback by the sheer amount construction taking place, along with its army-run carpentry shops, slaughterhouse, stockyards, and warehouses. Sadly for all involved, this breakneck development often exacerbated the contagion issue. In Middle Tennessee, Joseph Whitney spoke for many when he wrote home, “We are getting lots of sickness now, the weather is so warm and we have had to work so hard fortifying.”

Still, the emphasis here is fundamentally about disease and its effect on survivors in occupied areas. While our assessments of the war are frequently conducted via broad categorizations (enslaved and free, Union and Confederate, occupied and unoccupied) the actions of individuals reveal considerable creativity in the face of destruction. Again using Franklin and its numerous forts as a case study, it is possible to see nuance and negotiated relationships that are not easily apparent at the macrocosmic level.

Take for example the relatively affluent and prominent Dr. J.S. Park who lived and worked downtown. In the spring of 1863, when the fortifications, population, and rapidly climbing rates of disease transformed his tiny city almost daily, Dr. Park and his family learned they were to be deported southward as punishment for supporting the Confederacy. In response, Dr. Park wrote to Gen. Granger pleading the commander to let his family stay: “The state of health of my wife who has been seriously sick for more than eight weeks, and now unable to sit up an hour at a time, will not admit of compliance in so short a time.” Granger permitted the
reprieve, but Mary Ann Parks would die anyway three months later. The cause of death was reportedly “inflammation of the stomach,” more than likely gastritis, often the result of severe digestive infection and endemic emotional distress. At 39 years of age, Mrs. Park lived far longer than several of her occupiers but decades less than her life expectancy. For the white upper class, those who survived the tumultuous years of childhood could expect to see 60 and beyond.⁶¹

Within sight of her house, at the division hospital in the Female College building, 31 year-old James Damon from Ohio lost his fight with typhoid on March 26, 1863; his wife and three children would learn of his fate soon after. Weeks later, an almost equally sick James Magie of the 78th Illinois wrote a despondent letter to his wife, informing her, “a man died in the same tent I slept in last night.” The deceased was Pvt. George W. Hedrick, age 32, from Adams County, Illinois, not far from where the Magies lived.⁶² A despondent Alfred Willett from Ohio found time to write home and tell his family how many friends he was losing. “John Simpson did not go with us. He is sick most of the time. We have lost several of our boys since we have been here. William Carr is dead. He died in Nashville about ten days ago. We buried one of our boys last Sunday.”⁶³

Mourners reacted in a myriad of ways. Some became despondent; Joseph Whitney seemed to take every fatality in his regiment with a heavy heart. Others became defiant; secessionist Dr. Park placed his wife’s obituary in the camp newspaper of the 14th Michigan, tacitly blaming their occupation for his wife’s death. Many eventually chose detachment; diarist August Yenner of the 121st Ohio was almost matter-of-fact with his entries: “Saturday, May 2. Very warm. Home from picket. Andrew & I went to river to wash & swim. Another comrade gone. Andrew Huth [to] whom we paid our last respects.”⁶⁴
White Flags – The Creation of Occupier/Occupied Empathy

For whites in the path of this construction, many became caretakers, often involuntarily. Homes within or adjacent any Union fort were subject to partial or total use as hospitals. Domiciles-turned-infirmaries included Dr. Daniel Cliffe’s house in Franklin with its critically sick patients Captain Albert Yeomans and Private George French of the 125th Ohio. Their second lieutenant Seabury Smith, prostrate with fever, tried to recuperate at the residence of carriage maker Perkins Preist.65

As dangerous as the mixing of ill and well often was, several soldiers recalled the arrangement as amicable. A correspondent serving in the 125th Ohio informed the Chardon, Ohio Jeffersonian Democrat noted, “the citizens were very kind to our sick…oft times taking them to their houses, and giving them as much care and attention as they could have done to a relative.” Despite such demonstrations of hospitality, the soldier admitted, “the mass of the people are open enemies of our Government.”66 A member of the 115th Illinois in Tennessee came down with severe abdominal pain, and when a dose of morphine from his own surgeon had little effect, he stopped by the house of an avid Confederate, yet he admitted “the woman though secesh was very kind and made me some pepper tea which relieved me very much.”67 Farm boy Benjamin Baker marveled at the hospitality he received at Winchester, Tennessee in the summer of 1863. “I have gotten acquainted with several families. The people are sociable and intelligent and very obliging to the soldiers…I have gotten acquainted with a Mr. and Mrs. Merritt here who are very kind to me.”68

Ironically when these intrusions came in small numbers, especially when the callers were among the infirm, several prominent townspeople found it empowering, or more accurately re-empowering. In the case of Dr. Cliffe, he had initially served as a surgeon in the Confederate
Army. By early 1863 the doctor had become a vocal defender of the Union. His wife was even more outspoken in defense of their Federal occupiers. By acting as caretakers, the Cliffes and others like them reasserted their position as members of the southern Brahmin. For upper-echelon whites who publicly refused to cooperate during occupation, Union officials often dispossessed and deported them entirely, including Dr. Cliffe’s wealthy neighbor Sallie Hines McNutt. In contrast her fellow elites William Campbell, Frank Hardeman, Samuel Henderson, A.R. Pinkston, and the increasingly ubiquitous Cliffe staged a pro-union rally in August 1863. Their chosen venue was the county courthouse, situated three blocks east from the McNutt home and four blocks west of the main Federal fort. After speeches from prominent individuals such as Tennessee Military Governor Andrew Johnson, the aforementioned community leaders presented a series of written resolutions pledging unwavering support for the Union. Not coincidentally, all five members were slave owners, and three of the five were medical doctors.69

Power sharing aside, a subtler yet more pervasive creation emerged. The rise of widespread sickness often placed largely secessionist white populations on an even plane with their stricken occupiers. Though disease rates would eventually decline as fortress networks began to stabilize, the deadly interim convinced many to become pragmatic and occasionally obliging. Some even became empathetic. An otherwise virulent secessionist, young Nannie Haskins of Clarksville wrote in July 1863, “There is a federal hospital near here; for two or three days we have been hearing the groans of one poor fellow; he seems to suffer so much, I heard that he had been wounded somehow. Now I hear him again. I feel for him. If I could relieve him of pain most cheerfully I would do it. I feel that when they are sick or wounded they are no longer enemies.”70 In many cases, particularly in situations where personal connections were established (even terse ones), varying degrees of empathy began to form.
Serving as medical care centers and prisoner-of-war transfer hubs, fortress networks often enabled enemies to interact in secure settings. While visiting ailing friends at his division hospital a mile from his main fort, Sergeant James K. Magie of the 78th Illinois spent time with an individual who was clearly in a worse place than he was. Among nearly one hundred Union sick and injured, he saw “some of the wounded rebels that we took a week or two ago. I talked with one young man who had his arm shot off close to the shoulder. 71

There were of course a large number of citizens who privately vented their loathing of occupation. Some even metaphorically referred to Union fort garrisons as a pestilence, many not realizing that the acute overpopulation and transmission of pathogens made the label literally true. Yet when citizens and soldiers looked for the root causes of their physical miseries, they did not blame each other, they blamed the weather. Living before the breakthroughs of Lister and Pasteur, many echoed the conclusions of Union officer Carter Van Vleck. “The cause of the trouble is that it rains all the time and keeps cold and the men have to sleep on the ground without straw. It is enough to kill Indians!” Others believed it was the types of food they were ingesting (rather than the contaminated contents). George Lewis thought that ground water mixed with limestone was the chief culprit.72 Generally, the shared hardships of contagion encouraged whites to cautiously coexist.

**Black Death and Black Labor**

This move toward empathy slowed considerably when it approached the color line. Racial boundaries stubbornly persisted, and “breakthroughs” were primarily achieved on personal levels and even then by degrees. In more than one regard, the enslaved looked and sounded utterly foreign to white northerners, and vice versa. Many of the enlisted believed they
had far more in common with white townspeople, as well as with their comrades from different
countries, than with contrabands. One likely reason, among others, was the way in which
runaways differed from those who had stayed behind.

Trekking long distances with few if any resources or safe havens, over rugged terrain and
exposed to the elements, escapees generally weakened and frequently endured injuries en route.
In Helena, Arkansas, a teacher witnessed several incoming escapees infested with insects and
suffering from open sores. At Corinth, some of the more philanthropic soldiers gave incoming
contrabands what was available – worn-out tents and uniforms taken from the deceased. Some
arriving children were completely naked.

If sources of healthcare were tenuous for whites, they nearly disappeared for displaced
African Americans. Left behind were the owners who had a vested interest in keeping
investments alive. Also left behind were the materiel for home remedies, primarily garden plants
and herbs. Sources of clothing, food, and shelter became scarce beyond the first few miles.
Escape and migration could and did separate caretakers from other family members. At greatest
risk of illness and injury were the very old (of which there were few), and the very young (of
which there were many). Interruptions to firewood and food supplies were detrimental to
immune systems already compromised by malnutrition, rudimentary shelters, and hard physical
labor. As a result, many escapees faced a potentially lethal dilemma – attempt to endure
independently or find a crowded, fortified Union encampment for protection and employment.

In late March 1863, Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas inspected the substantial Union
defenses at Cairo, Illinois. There he discovered a contraband enclave of some 1,500 individuals
who were dying by the hundreds from measles, pneumonia, and smallpox. The Western
Sanitary Commission found similar crises among nearly all Federal strongholds along the
Mississippi Valley. Fortifications successfully repulsed guerillas, but they subjected resident contrabands to illness and exposure. Circumstances had become so dire that the Western Sanitary Commission feared as many as half the people in the encampments would perish, “doomed to die in the process of freeing the rest.” In late 1863, a Commission official at Natchez, Mississippi reported, “there was not one house that I visited where death had not visited its portals. The number of deaths in families numbered from one to eleven. Seventy-five had died in a single day.” From 1863 to 1865, approximately one quarter of African Americans in camps and forts along the Mississippi Valley succumbed to disease and exposure.

A correspondent to the New York Times was so affected by what he had seen at Helena, he believed the word “freedom” itself needed redefining:

There it simply means freedom to starve, rot, die, and the sooner the better. Since I reached that place the average daily mortality among the contrabands has been from ten to twenty. Nobody takes any further interest in them than to kick them out of the way whenever they get in it, and to curse them upon all occasions as a source of the most serious demoralization of the army. Their condition is not a single remove above that of brutes -- a more degraded, helpless class of people exists nowhere on the Continent. If our philanthropy is to end in taking them away from their masters, we had better, in mercy to them, decree that as fast as emancipated they shall be shot.

Life could be just as brutal elsewhere. In January 1864, near Fortress Rosecrans in Murfreesboro, Tennessee, civilian John Spence observed, “The Yankees have large numbers
living in camp, women and children. Great numbers of them dying every week. The small pox is still breaking out among them.” Almost simultaneously in Nashville, the Daily Union actually considered it good news that “only” 357 individuals, most of whom were African Americans, were then interned at the city’s smallpox hospital. Many of the cooks and nurses working there were African American as well. It is unknown how many became ill or died in the line of work, but a great many perished nearby while constructing the trenches, bastions, and forts that ringed the city. In protecting the most critical Union supply base in the west, an estimated 600 to 800 lost their lives. Later that year, contraband immigration into occupied Chattanooga rose precipitously, and a smallpox epidemic struck the camps soon after.

Sometimes the enslaved came to the disease, and sometimes it came to them. In March 1863, after being exposed to Federal patrols from the Union fortifications at Bolivar, Tennessee, twenty-six people owned by planter J.H. Bills contracted measles.

Consistently, officers and men were willing to leave most of the enslaved where they were. Much like slave owners, the army deemed healthy young men to be the most valuable, especially the strong and those with specialized skill sets. Unlike owners, who generally viewed African Americans as potentially lucrative long-term investments, Federals overwhelmingly sought more immediate gains. Not infrequently, the inclination was to also view laborers as disposable. In fortresses along the Mississippi, one method of dealing with sick as well as deceased contrabands was to transport both across the river.

There are instances when entire families perished. Jim Downs cites a case that represented such catastrophic loss. In late 1864, just as a frigid winter emerged, escaped slave Joseph Miller and his family managed to reach the heavily fortified Camp Nelson in Kentucky. There Miller joined the USCT with the understanding that his family would also receive food
and shelter. Weeks later the fort commander retracted the offer and drove out the entire contraband camp into a cold rain. Sent by forced march out into the countryside, with no food or safe destination, the family slowly succumbed. Within 24 hours Miller’s ailing seven year-old son died of exposure. Within three weeks Miller’s wife Isabella died as did another son. In two more weeks his remaining son and daughter also perished. Soon after, Joseph Miller himself died.88

Federal officials even deemed the corpses of Isabella and her children as less valuable than John’s. In 1862, faced with the unforeseen losses of human life, the U.S. Congress inaugurated the creation of national cemeteries. The assumption was that the Union war effort would eventually need ten such cemeteries. In six years’ time, there were seventy-three. Congress forbade the inclusion of Confederate soldiers. They also excluded all contrabands except for those who joined the USCT. As for the noncombat freed persons who died in or near the contraband camps, many of whom built and labored in the adjacent fortresses, there would be no ground officially set aside for gravesites, no established Federal funding for burial or headstones, and almost no records kept of their passing. These dead were to become the utterly unknown.89

Even when the Union army attempted to separate themselves from the enslaved, the enslaved were still gravitating toward them, in the drive to reinvent and detach themselves away from the antiquated owner-slave system. “It is astonishing to see the contrabands coming in – drove after drove,” wrote one surgeon garrisoned in Middle Tennessee, “there are not less than five hundred runaway slaves in Gen. Granger’s corps.” While professing support for this large demographic shift, the doctor apparently overlooked how such an infusion could place civilians and soldiers at risk. In the very same letter, the doctor reported that his regiment had a sizeable
sick list, including cases of acute diarrhea, chronic diarrhea, bronchitis, intermittent fevers, measles, mumps, skin disease, and throat infections.\textsuperscript{90} African Americans became aware of the risks and decided to challenge the rigid practice of slavery despite the lethal dangers.

These events – the large amounts of incoming contrabands, the escalating use of forts, and the increasing numbers of garrison illnesses and deaths – were each in their own way an unforeseen impetus for radical innovation. Together, they bought forth a major reallocation of labor - a growing call for increased use of African Americans in and around fortifications, especially in light of growing white military losses to disease.

Although heavily fortressed Kentucky, Missouri and Tennessee were exempt from the Emancipation Proclamation and its promotion of African American labor at military installations, Union officers in exempted areas still borrowed or confiscated slaves to work as cooks, nurses, and washers in the hospitals. For ill soldiers in private homes and public buildings, nurses were frequently the house “servants.”\textsuperscript{91} In fortressed regions still in rebellion, the Proclamation augmented the authority of officers and escapees alike to create and fill jobs that planters previously forbade.

Few articulated this new, pragmatic approach with greater clarity (and less tact) than Iowa Governor Samuel J. Kirkwood. While visiting his constituents serving in fortified forward positions, he balked at the sight of Iowans in uniform digging, hauling, chopping, and toting. Why should white soldiers be driving mule wagons, he fumed, when such lowly positions “could just as well be filled with niggers.”\textsuperscript{92} Among those within the growing consensus was Cyrus F. Boyd of the 15\textsuperscript{th} Iowa. Positioned near Bolivar, Tennessee, Boyd wrote home saying, “Contrabands are building forts around here and felling trees across the road to keep the enemy’s cavalry from surprising us. A good many soldiers and people are bitterly opposed to having
‘niggers’ take any part in the War. I am not one of those kind of people. If a culled [sic] man will
dig trenches and chop lumber and even fight the enemy he is just the fellow we want and the
sooner we recognize this the quicker the war will end.”

Of course only a percentage of the destitute and displaced were actually strong enough to
perform such difficult work. For the masses, their primarily goal involved survival. In the spring
of 1863, Maria R. Mann (niece of the famed education reformer Horace Mann) worked in
fortified Helena, Arkansas serving the thousands crowded into its contraband camps. At those
locations, she believed, nearly half of the inmates had died in a month’s time. Likely her estimate
was high, but she had cause to fear for the living. Mann came to a conclusion similar to that of
many Union officers and northern politicians. African American elderly, women, and children
were dying, supposedly, because they had left their “natural state” of rural enslavement.

Part of this mindset came from widely-read antebellum treatises, many of them written by
the southern medical community, detailing perceived physiological and psychological
differences of the races. This view anticipated the imperial philosophy of “scientific racism” of
the late nineteenth century and its attempts to classify the various races as specific stages of
human development.

For most Union soldiers who perished, regardless of race, the end usually occurred inside
a large tent or urban building, in other words a public space. Quite often, it happened within or
near fortifications, where most hospital beds and supply bases were located. For the whites in
blue, two out of three fatalities were from disease; for African Americans in the service, it was
fourteen out of fifteen, and most often in garrisons. Yet the availability of African American
labor continued to grow as larger numbers escaped plantation systems and urban owners.
The Northern use of Southern labor certainly had precedence. Historically, it has been the rule rather than the exception for warring parties to augment their numbers with “outsiders.” Such was the case for the Aztecs, Athenians, the Manchu, the Mongols, and so on. During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, around one out of five soldiers in the French military were not French. The British Imperial Navy relied on impressments for more than a century. In nearly every military contest in which it has participated, the United States armed forces has relied to varying degrees on the assistance and service of Native Americans.97

Depending how long conflicts lasted, participating governments tended to follow a basic progressive sequence. First was official avoidance (on assumptions of a short war and the supposed inferiority or unreliability of outsiders). Next came employment of scouts, camp laborers, and the like, followed by the reluctant arming of a select portion. The last stage of the creative destruction process involved overdependence. If and when a war lasted long enough to reach that point, the long-marginalized outsider then had the potential to demand inclusion or autonomy in exchange for their continued service.98

When for example the Roman Empire overextended, its military became increasingly reliant on non-citizen auxilia, literally “the help.” It is fair to say that the Union and the Confederacy faced a similar situation, but one side was able and willing to negotiate with the help more than the other. Still, Washington’s terms only applied to a small percentage and did not offer de jure citizenship. Further, the families of the African American auxilia were as yet not part of the discussion, and there were few indications that they soon would be. Already an easy target for more than just contagions, the majority of the four million were to remain lesser beings in the eyes of the law, and the easiest targets in a land of sickness. Regardless, escapees embodied Schumpeter’s definition of creative entrepreneurs and innovators, recognizing
considerable risk and yet introducing fundamental changes to the means of production. Among other endeavors, African Americans became increasingly involved in the alteration of the natural environment in and around urban occupied areas. In many instances, the construction of Federal forts involved transforming civilian secessionist towns into Union military cities. Much of the workforce during that process comprised of the self-emancipated.
CHAPTER THREE:

DECONSTRUCTION -
ALTERATIONS TO THE WESTERN THEATER LANDSCAPE

“The 96th Regiment cut down about 15 acres of heavy timber yesterday, mostly beech nut. It was the prettiest grove I ever saw. The man that owned it was a rebel colonel. His wife offered our colonel five thousand dollars if we let it stand, but no, it was military necessity.”¹

Pvt. Joseph Whitney, May 7, 1863,
Franklin, Tennessee

One of the most efficacious and fundamental ways Union fortifications contested secessionist slave societies was through radical transformation of urban and suburban environments. Though vilified and demonized by secessionist families at the time, and later canonized as gospel in the narratives of the Lost Cause, Civil War alterations to the landscape were not nearly as devastating as what was then occurring in Paraguay, Taiping, and the Great Plains and Rockies of North America. Yet on the personal level, as it was with disease, damage to hearth and homestead could be traumatizing. For Union occupation forces, dismantling was essentially part of their plan. In their creative destruction, they were going after select targets, not the entire countryside. Ultimately the primary goal was not to destroy these critical locations but to use them.
Writing to his mother, Benjamin Baker of the 25th Illinois Infantry tried to explain the military occupation of Murfreesboro, Tennessee in terms relatable to her world in Coles County, Illinois. “Suppose a busy army of 20,000 should camp on Mr. Moore’s farm. In the morning there would not be a chick or pig or cow on the farm. The potatoes and onions and all eatables in the house would be gone. The fences would all be burned. If they stayed a week in the neighborhood the whole community would be a common, utterly devastated – no pen, let alone mine, can describe the horrors of civil war.”

Private Baker’s March 1863 description of garrison life may have been inelegant, but he well synopsized how a corps could aggressively consume animal and plant life when it remained in place. He was also rather profound with his use of the medieval English term “common” to describe what happened when the men burned fences. These rail and lumber border markers clearly identified personal property and the prevailing social order. By removing these fences, soldiers not only created campfires, they simultaneously claimed territory and demoted the local elite to a lower tier. More than destruction, the strategy involved reuse. Just as the Federals and escaped slaves began to use freed labor against former masters, they altered secessionist-owned flora, fauna, and buildings to suit their own needs.

Recent scholarship highlights this transfer. Lisa Brady’s *War Upon the Land* (2012) presents a similar material transfer, although Brady emphasizes the rural countryside more than urban fortified areas. Specifically, Brady considers the Union army’s consumption of agriculture as an attempt to return it to a state of chaotic wilderness, thereby physically and emotionally undermining the order and authority of the planter class. Megan Kate Nelson’s *Ruin Nation* (2012) is more convincing, as she sees the war as an industrialization of nature (making corduroy roads and heating tent cities with acres of timber, for example). Nelson adds that the tangible
damage to humans and landscapes largely disappeared within a relatively short period of time, leaving descendants to either forget or inflate just how much damage actually occurred. Both historians cultivate the convincing premise stemming from Kelby Ouchley’s *Flora and Fauna of the Civil War* (2010) and its recognition of nature’s central position in daily life. Advancing the premise that nature played a central role in a largely agrarian and rural America in the mid-nineteenth century is the 2015 anthology *The Blue, the Gray, and the Green: Toward an Environmental History of the Civil War*, which includes chapters from Brady and Nelson among others.³

In a way, these scholars and others like them are the academic descendants of the ecological movement with its Alfred Crosbys and Jared Diamonds. Their collective forbearers include the late nineteenth century, Kentucky-born, Vassar and Leipzig-educated Ellen Churchill Semple, who studied the many interconnections between the American Civil War and nature. A pioneer in the discipline of human geography, Semple concluded that individuals were overall more affixed to their topographical boundaries than to their political ones. Ultimately, she observed, people are first and foremost organisms, and they try to survive by shaping and reacting to their host ecosystems.⁴

Largely, this chapter works from Semple’s human location and adaptation premise, Nelson’s industrialization theme, and the growing recognition that events such as Sherman’s March through Georgia achieved much of its shock and awe through speed and a show of power rather than actual damage to personal property. As Steven Woodworth finds, “The destructiveness of Sherman’s march through Georgia became legendary, but to a significant extent it was nothing more than legend.” Whereas much infrastructure was laid prostrate, mostly
through arson, comparatively few homes, farms, and plantations were irreparably damaged, and few civilians appeared to have perished.\(^5\)

Posited here is that the most intense and enduring expressions of creative environmental destruction occurred primarily in fortified and occupied areas. With the possible exception of the Shenandoah Valley, it was in and around the immediate areas of Western Theater forts where ecosystems and human structures experienced the most extensive alterations. In other words, wartime environmental transformations, more often than not, were localized.

**Creative Destruction in Urban Landscapes**

A poignant example of how fortification produced considerable local change but left surrounding vistas less modified comes from the very men who garrisoned the Middle Tennessee corridor of forts in early 1863. Passing southward through Nashville, a city under occupation for nearly a year, soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland found the capital exceedingly unpleasant to the senses. The war had mutated the vibrant center of commerce and higher education into an odiferous, crowded, military base of cheerless earthworks, careworn edifices, and morbid hospitals. Especially for the rural boys, it all had the feel of a dark satanic mill. During his brief stay, John Leek grunted, “Mother this is a forsaken looking country. It don’t look like it was worth fighting for. The country is stripped of everything but the hills.”\(^6\) J.E. Brant’s 85\(^{th}\) Indiana regimental band pulled into town playing “Dixie,” to which he commented, “We took our Stand in Dixie sure enough…Nashville at that time showed the rough usage of war and the beautiful country about the city was being desolated.” An Indiana officer described the city as a vast ruin.\(^7\)

These men were witnesses to a massive industrial restructuring. At Nashville and elsewhere, U.S. Army Engineers, the enlisted, and African Americans labored to change slave
societies designed to serve the propertied classes into wage labor societies designed to serve the Federal war effort. Lt. Col. Carter Van Vleck essentially recognized this creative destruction in Nashville when he informed his wife, “The war has made its mark around here. There is not a fence anywhere to be seen, and many of the magnificent residences have been abandoned, and all the shade trees cut down, and the houses either left in charge of the negroes or taken possession of by soldiers.” Again, Van Vleck’s observations attested that most alterations were taking place in urban and suburban locations. When his 78th Illinois marched southward into the countryside, his tone changed considerably, as had the scenery around him. Leaving behind the fortifying city, he told his wife, “The country is one of the most beautiful in the world.”

When Van Vleck and company moved south, they extended the creative destruction process into other populated locations. Union divisions and the formerly enslaved eventually created a 300-mile chain of forts and blockhouses that stretched from Louisville to Chattanooga and beyond. At the same time, Federals became enamored with the vistas beyond fortified areas. In 1862, many of these lands had already seen hundreds of military engagements large and small, but the forces that fought those campaigns were generally on the move. In late 1862 and 1863, the U.S. volunteer army returned to the regions from which it retracted during Bragg’s grand Kentucky offensive. In this venture, conducted during the onset of spring, many of the regiments had the sense that they were stumbling not upon hallowed ground but upon paradise itself.

On the road leading south of Nashville, Van Vleck stopped to take in the scene, which he believed:

is as pretty as anything I have ever seen or ever expect to see anywhere. There are many of the finest residences surrounded by a succession of hills and valleys,
beautiful groves and small clearings…Was it not for that fearful curse, which is indicated by the long row of dirt huts that is half hid behind every mansion, I should feel quite anxious spend my declining days here, in this beautiful valley, in case I survive my term of service in the army.\textsuperscript{10}

Accompanying Van Vleck plus thousands of infantrymen and draft animals were members of the First Michigan Engineers. The unit was tasked to rebuild bridges along the Nashville and Decatur Railroad, the most direct rail line connecting Kentucky to Alabama. To expedite the operation, engineers brought with them the required building materials, including long trunks of oak trees hacked out of the Nashville area, some of which were estimated to be two centuries old.\textsuperscript{11} Some of those trunks would trestle the very bridge leading into Franklin, Tennessee that stood next to a steep knoll locally known as Figuers’ Bluff. This was the hill from which a menacing Fort Granger would soon rise, but at the time, it seemed an idyllic and peaceful place. Again, Van Vleck could not help but marvel at what he was seeing. “There is a long avenue of cedars that form a dense shade extending from the top of the hill to near the bottom, parallel with the precipice. It is really a pretty place.”\textsuperscript{12} Even then, Van Vleck spoke of his surroundings as if he was Josef Schumpeter’s very definition of an innovating entrepreneur, declaring, “I think I could be satisfied to live here always, if I had the money to improve it as it ought to be.”\textsuperscript{13}

Time and again, foraging and scouting parties, advancing pioneer battalions, and pickets who ventured beyond the fortressed towns spoke of beauty rather than destruction. On his way to Chattanooga, Elihu Wadsworth passed through a landscape that had already suffered through the
Stones River and Tullahoma campaigns, yet he wrote to his brother, “[m]uch of the way the scenery is grand and picturesque.”

Part of the allure stemmed from the region’s otherworldliness. The vast majority of the regiments that would build and occupy these citadels had never been so far south. In the span of four months, men of the 125th Ohio went from being civilians living and working along the shores of Lake Erie to soldiers fortifying and garrisoning railroad towns in Kentucky and Tennessee. For many men in the 96th Illinois, the South seemed like a different country altogether, especially for the two enlistees born in Norway, its eighteen native Scots, its eighty-three English, some ninety Germans, and the one hundred members born in Ireland. Even with unusually persistent rains and late frosts, the region’s March felt like their native May. The plant life alone, with its seemingly exotic blooms, inspired the men to press the blossoms and send them home. One shrub in particular fascinated Charles Falkner from northern Illinois, who told his wife, “I am going to put some cotton seed in this letter and I want you to plant some and see what it will come to.”

Scot Butler, whose father recently founded a college in Indiana that would bear the family name, waxed poetic from atop a hill along the Harpeth River. The hill itself had been recently stripped of all its trees save one, and capped with a blockhouse that could hold sixty men. But the views beyond were evidently breathtaking. “From here we command one of the most beautiful landscape views I ever beheld. This is called the ‘Garden Spot’ of America,” Butler contended. “Away off to the north stretches a valley of unrivaled beauty. Alternate patches of meadow and woodland, its dashing streams, shining through the mist of morning like threads of silver, and the hills, ranged on each side, clothed with towering trees and stand like eternal sentinels over this scene of seeming quiet beauty and content.”
The less effusive Albert Slack thought of Franklin, “[t]his is about as nice a town for a county town as I have been in in the south.” Strolling into the countryside with an eye to the farmland, he added, “This is as beautiful country as I ever saw. It is a nice soil. The sun shines bright and warm as May in Ohio.” A native of Vermont, erstwhile school teacher Charles Partridge admired the town foremost:

On the south bank of the river was clustered the pleasant village of Franklin. From the village, roads or pikes led in various directions, and from the height on which the camp was located a fair view of the open fields beyond the village could be had. Near the camp were a few large houses, mostly of brick. There were heavy bodies of timber in all directions, but generally at quite a distance from the camp.

Such glowing accounts were common, and they provided a baseline for what was about to happen. Despite the scores of raids and skirmishes the landscape endured in 1862, it had apparently recovered well by the start of 1863 – farms still functioned, groves and tree lines remained intact, and fencerows reemerged. It was at that point where the horrific Battle of Stones River, straddling the old and new year, served as presage. Soon after the contest, the Union Army and African American laborers staked out a position along the river that was to become the largest inland fort in the war. Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans and his eponymous fortress near Murfreesboro embodied the new war emerging in the expansive Western Theater. After two years of territorial gains and losses, the creative destruction process of fortification would be the
strategy for the remainder of the war, overtaking key locations, building formidable bases upon them, and driving forward.

Near recently fortified Bolivar, Tennessee, slave owner J.H. Bills found the creation of Union occupation so destructive that he referred to the Federal army as “debris.” As Dr. Henry West 98th Ohio knew well, the title was not inaccurate. “An army even passing through a county is a perfect devastation,” he admitted, “no matter how friendly.”

One of the most conspicuous examples of reallocated sources involved deforestation, and it happened in stages. For those companies unable to find lodging in towns, the process began with carving out camping spaces. For the groups it benefitted, the procedure seemed almost pleasant. For James K. Magie of the 78th Illinois, his newly constructed surroundings were quite serene, as “the 78th has been camped at this place since the 12th of February. We are located in a beautiful forest of heavy timber, and have the advantage of good water, and the pleasure of splendid scenery.” Dr. West of the 98th Ohio described a similar reaction when his regiment carved out a clearing next to a Tennessee town. “Our last move was into a perfect wilderness – full of trees, undergrowth, and bramble bushes. The boys went to work on good earnest and with a good will, and in a short time we had a very fine camp.” Highlighting was he saw as the ultimate purpose of such an operation, West said of his men, “they are going around clearing for Uncle Sam.”

As Megan Kate Nelson finds, for secessionist civilians who lived through this transformation, such clear-cutting felt utterly destabilizing. Seeing these staples of beauty and commerce become massive weapons pointed directly against them proved more than many could endure. Isaac Royse of the 115th Illinois described the refashioning of one forested bluff into a menacing fort:
It was made of strong earth embankments surrounded by a ditch about twenty feet deep and twenty to thirty feet wide. Outside of that stakes were driven in the ground a foot or so apart covering several rods in width all pointing outward at an angle of about 45 degrees with the outer ends made quite sharp. Outside of these the tops of oak and hickory trees were placed close together the limbs trimmed and points sharpened and these also pointing outward. These tree tops and limbs were made fast to the ground by means of stakes driven in across and beside them thus making an assault on the fort no easy matter.23

Royse wrote of earth, hickory, oak, trees, limbs, nouns that evoke images of tranquility, shade, shelter. His adjectives were not as inviting – surrounded, driven, sharpened. Symbolic of what was happening, the term for the felled and sharpened trees that Royse described was *abatis*, a word derived from Old French meaning to cut or slaughter. With its menacing effect upon serene, forested hills, the end result appeared to many locals as wanton mutilation. In reality, the impact was by design. This was not indiscriminant ravaging; it was deliberate engineering.

Historians continue to debate the influence of longtime West Point Engineering professor Dennis Hart Mahan on the course of the war, but his impact on the Western Theater appears concrete. Mahan’s litany of published works, including *A Complete Treatise on Fortification*, served as standard texts in the Military Academy, and his most adherent pupils were the chief operating architects in the Western Theater. Capt. Orlando M. Poe, one of his top graduates in 1856, constructed the mass of forts and batteries that held Knoxville, Tennessee from late 1863 onward.24 Capt. William Emory Merrill, first in his West Point class of 1859 and an assistant
professor under Mahan, designed most of the forts that peppered Middle Tennessee.²⁵ Stephen Ambrose asserts that “Mahan was the only instructor at West Point who decisively shaped [Henry] Halleck’s thinking.”²⁶ Regardless of Ambrose’s possible overstatement, Halleck’s many antebellum writings frequently emphasized fortifications as essential to the defense of soldiers in the field and the nation as a whole.²⁷ When the war came, Halleck, Merrill, Poe, and other Mahan adherents employed hallmark Mahan principles – use available materials and pragmatic methods of construction, employ civilian labor when practical, and foremost, use nature as a weapon. As Isaac Royse’s account attests, the soldiers first admired the hills and trees, and then the men reshaped that landscape and wielded it against its former owners.²⁸

Initial alterations focused primarily on the human-made, including barns, sheds, and homes. The tool of choice was often fire. The primary incentive was the perpetual need for firewood. Due to a cold, wet, elongated spring in 1863, and the manifold increase in human population, local supplies dwindled rapidly. As Lt. Col. Van Vleck reported on March 4, “Last night it was quite cold and froze solid. This forenoon it remained cold and snowed nearly all the time.”²⁹ The subsequent need for kindling and fuel sent men looking for the driest materials possible, and they had a penchant for fences. W.A. Boyd and his men of the 84th Indiana exemplified standard procedure when they sifted southward on the road to Columbia, found plank and rail fencing, and harvested miles of it.³⁰

As winter lingered, civilians contributed to this creative destruction. Sgt. James Magie of the 78th Illinois observed:

All of the rebels are engaged in cutting down their fruit trees for firewood, and in many cases the owners are destroying their fences and outhouses for the same
purpose. It is awful to see the devastation of this war. The soldiers will pull of the weather boards for fuel when they are satisfied the owner is a rebel. There is plenty of timber or green wood hereabouts, but the soldiers would rather have dry wood, and it makes no difference whether it is some nicely painted ornamental piece around a rich man’s door yard, or fence rails around a pig pen – it is all the same.\textsuperscript{31}

When Helen Harlow traveled from Ohio to tend to her ill husband at the Franklin garrison, she marveled at “the sad, sad desolation and destruction that stares us in the face everywhere the war has gone. Fences, gardens, shrubbery, and every kind of ornament and improvement exhibit the track of the desolating scourge the rebels have so ingloriously brought upon themselves.”\textsuperscript{32}

Fundamentally, these attacks on the aesthetic were direct assaults on Confederate or suspected Confederate property. Forests were next. By late March, the process was well underway, with tens of thousands of troops barricading themselves in choice combinations of high ground and adjacent towns. Van Vleck took part in some moonlight lumberjacking. “A heavy detail was made from our regiment, at night, to fell timber on two points east of camp. We worked hard all night thinking that it would add to our security, and when morning came we had made clear the two hills, of the giant monarchs of the forest.”\textsuperscript{33} The 96\textsuperscript{th} Illinois entered Brentwood and proceeded to hack down trees and carve out rifle pits. Back in Franklin, a soldier in the 113\textsuperscript{th} Ohio wrote: “This place is being strongly fortified, and for that purpose heavy details for fatigue duty are being daily made. The pioneers are busy making and hauling fascines and gabions which are placed in the walls of the works in course of construction.”\textsuperscript{34}
Fig. 3.1. Gabions and Fascines

Material reuse in action. A pair of gabions bookend a stack of fascines in Virginia; the open area around them indicates the clear cutting that accompanied their fabrication.

Garrisons also created security for themselves, nearby unionists, and escaping slaves through frequent patrolling, regimental drilling, and marching in and around forts. Living on a small hill on the southeast edge of town, within sight of Fort Granger, secessionist Sallie McNutt felt a deep sense of personal and physical invasion when Union soldiers began to camp in her yard: “Within 10 feet of my window was an immense tent, occupied by 8 men…the officers were encamped in Judge Perkins’ yard, in front of the remains of a fine house, that a Yankee soldier had burned a few months before. It was very evident that the whole plan had been arranged to make it [the occupation] as torturing and destructive as possible.”35
As traumatic and invasive as this moment likely was for her, along with many other privations and damages her homestead endured, McNutt and her family lost much because they had much to lose. They would still survive the war and articulate their displeasures in writings, monuments, memory, and the resilient status of wealthy whites in a post-slave society. Viewed in a wider context, the American Civil War may be considered exceptional in that it was personally traumatic for so many but generally restrained towards the Southern citizenry as a whole. There would be no direct equivalent to a region-wide scorched-earth policy, nothing approaching an Armenian genocide or the continuing losses of land and people for Native Americans.

In his 2011 article, “A Census-Based Count of the Civil War Dead,” J. David Hacker substantiates this relative restraint against citizen populations. Notably, Hacker finds one lone demographic that experienced almost no difference in death rates between the antebellum period and the war years - southern white women between ages 10 and 44. In areas under Union occupation, the main objectives involved reallocation of labor and property and the destruction of secessionist civilian authority, not the physical destruction of secessionist civilians themselves.36

Acts of retribution against property did increase when guerilla activities and Confederate attacks persisted. Using our case study of the Fort Granger system, an attack by Confederate Gen. Earl Van Dorn and some 1,500 to 2,000 effectives on April 10, 1863 reached the town center and threatened the main fort. A successful standoff led garrison commander U.S. Gen. Gordon Granger to expand the deforestation and dismantling around his fort from several hundred yards to more than a mile and a half.37 Officers deemed a brick mill below the fortress as a potential defensive position for an attacking force. As a result, Union engineers blew it up. A
week later, two hundred soldiers paid a visit to one of the most resistant secessionist families in the community. Armed with wagon teams and an immense metal cable, the men proceeded to hook the cable atop soaring canopy trees and pulled them down upon the family’s barns, sheds, and dwellings, though they spared the family mansion. When the matron demanded to know why this was being done to her home, Union officer was heard to have said “to get rid of obstructions, the trees might hide the Rebels when they came in.”

Such demolition embodied Schumpeter’s model of creative destruction. The arrival of a new paradigm, in this case a large Union fort, resulted in the demolition of a preexisting order, specifically property belonging to prominent Confederate families.

A soldier in an Illinois battery recalled being detailed “to go south of town to cut away some fruit trees and tear down or burn some houses that were standing in the range of the guns.” Yenner and his fellow infantrymen were surprised to see themselves being pulled away from digging entrenchments, which had become their normal routine, to chopping down trees all day. By the end of the week, they were doing both, plus lighting the occasional fire: “April 25, 1863. Warm in Dixieland to burn brush and cut down rebel forests, and build forts of wood & stone and dig rifle pits.”
Fig. 3.2 Section of Samuel Boyd Map of Fortified Franklin, Tennessee. Encamped immediately to the south of Boyd’s 84th Indiana were Zeboim Patten and his 115th Illinois Regiment. On April 21, 1863, Patten described what transpired here - “We were put on a new point which they have commenced to fortify, where the house and out buildings were burned yesterday.”41 Boyd Family Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.
The extent to which this culling affected pro-Confederate civilians is difficult to calculate, but an incident near Franklin well illustrates one woman’s sense of loss. A few hours after midnight in mid-May 1863, the 1st Illinois Light Artillery, 78th and 96th Illinois Infantry, and 125th Ohio Infantry rose to wage battle against heavy woods on Carter Hill to the south of town. Joseph Whitney of the 96th felt ambivalent as his regiment “cut down about 15 acres of heavy timber yesterday, mostly beech nut. It was the prettiest grove I ever saw. The man that owned it was a rebel colonel (likely former Confederate officer Moscow Carter). His wife (likely America Carter) offered our colonel five thousand dollars if we let it stand, but no, it was military necessity.”

An accompanying officer spoke not only of that specific stand of trees but also of virtually every grove within sight of the Union fort, declaring “The beautiful grove is a thing of the past.” As one Ohio soldier told his hometown paper of his regiment’s work in the South, “We have made our mark here, with the axe and the spade, that the work of years could not efface.”

At Murfreesboro in late April 1863, slave owner John Spence admitted sensations of vulnerability from the aggressive clear-cutting. “We can now see for miles in some direction from town. Ready, Bell, Murfree and Carney’s farm houses are entirely destroyed and portions of numbers of others.” So abrupt was the transformation that Spence wondered if the townspeople would soon lose their sense of place. “Things are so changed that in the course of time it will be a hard matter to trace out the original landmarks,” he wrote, “a wilderness of timber has disappeared and in its place a large prairie waste.”
Fig. 3.3 Deforestation around Fort Sanders at Knoxville, Tennessee - March 1864. Seated is Union Col. Orlando Poe with Brig. Gen. Orville Babcock, the two chief architects of fort construction at Knoxville.

Thus emerged the Schumpeterian model, whereby competition and change created losers and winners, the latter usually including the authors and adopters of change. In early 1864, Samuel Boyd of the 84th Indiana found solace in the effect his men had upon the landscape of Cleveland, Tennessee, writing, “Our brigade is still at work felling trees and fortifying the hills adjoining our camp. When our soldiers cut down all of the trees and burn all the brush in the Confederacy, it is generally believed that the rebels will be more easily found; consequently we can then make brief work of conquering a peace.”

Pvt. Thomas Odell offered a slightly contrasting view. Coming from a small farming and manufacturing community himself in Illinois, he expressed a degree of unease when describing fort life in Middle Tennessee:
I look around me – I see the green grass, I see the peeling brook, the pure living water gushing forth from the earth. I look where the farmer sowed his wheat last fall, and where from those noble trees he gathered so much delicious fruit – and…it is checkered over with soldier tents, mules, wagons, artillery – the fence is gone - the orchard is cut down – and in some cases, the houses have been torn to the ground…when I lift my eyes I see soldiers, teams, darkies moving in every direction.45

Again, these were areas where change came mostly through occupation more than battles. As one veteran recalled hours before the 1864 Battle of Franklin, the fortified areas of Middle Tennessee looked as if a war had already taken place there, as indeed it had. He was in fact part of the garrison stationed in the area during the previous year. Upon his return, he realized that he had helped engineer a major alteration of the town’s landscape. The pending “battlefield” looked as if it had already been scythed down, “all fences and trees had disappeared under the rude hand of war. The ground over which the Confederates charged was open, unobstructed, undulating plain.”46 Many of the fences, trees, crops, and buildings that had previously stood upon that plain had gone into constructing and maintaining six nearby forts and bastions, plus many more defensive positions created in the region.

The Sound of Power

Another deliberate creation of the fortification system involved the overt production of noise, much of it harsher than the everyday din of a gradually industrializing landscape. Some of it was random and acute, like rifle shots. Much of it was pervasive, such as soldiers, contrabands,
wagons, caissons, and animals milling about in cityscapes. For civilians under occupation (especially for the ruling classes) the emerging atmosphere sounded alien, insistent, intrusive, and it perpetually reminded them that they no longer controlled the volume and tempo of social composition.

One of few specialists on sound in the Civil War, Mark M. Smith hypothesizes the relative dearth of secondary material stems from print-centric research by scholars living within an increasingly visual society. He assesses that nineteenth-century Americans were far more attuned to their “soundscapes,” or what R. Murray Schafer refers to as collective “keynote sounds,” the familiar acoustic ambiances of everyday life. Intrusive sounds were of considerable importance to slave societies impregnated with Union fort systems, because it was they who lived in some of the most intensely and extensively affected soundscapes of the war.

The antebellum South was of course not a silent place, particularly in commercial, industrial, and transportation centers – places that the Union army became keen to occupy. Even plantations that Northern troops found so strange and alluring were hardly the placid ideals of moonlight and magnolias like the fictional Tara. A more accurate representation would have been something like Carnton, the Franklin plantation of John and Carrie McGavock. Today it is a house museum bedecked in period furnishings and void of human residence. Enveloped in manicured landscapes and adjacent to a historic park, its current ambience is so serene and idyllic that many couples have their weddings on the grounds. But in its prewar years it was not unlike most other working plantations - a functioning factory designed to create surplus. At Carnton the industries were livestock, cereals, and lumber, each with their own resonations. There were mooing cattle and rooting hogs to be bred, fed, sold, or slaughtered. Teams of livestock and humans worked fields of corn and wheat. Next to the main road, a steam-powered
grist and saw mill ground and ripped away at raw materials under the tutelage of two enslaved engineers. All operations were managed from the headquarters of the big house and maintained by nearly forty fulltime chattel laborers. Adding to the hum and punctuations of production, trains of the Nashville & Decatur Railroad ran past the plantation’s west side eight times a day, with steam whistles screeching before each crossroad. Typical were such features for an economy that ran on hard labor and bulk transportation.

But when Federal garrisons fortified and occupied such areas, the overt noises they created were designed to overwhelm the old order. The tactic often worked. Stephen Handel finds that prolonged exposure to invasive sounds tends to induce resignation and even submissiveness, particularly if such noises are so overpowering that they fatigue the intended audience. Evidently such was the subjugating effect in many occupied areas when Union fortifications stamped their authority with repetitious din and randompercussions. As Smith puts it, garrisons could be garish to the point where “sound itself became part of psychological warfare on the Southern home front.”

The building of forts and deforestation made their own stark racket. In his description of a grove hunt conducted on the property of a suspected Confederate officer, Charles Partridge of the 96th Illinois recalled the event in almost orchestral terms. “Then began the work of destruction, 300 axemen raining heavy blows upon these beautiful trees…It was a musical chorus at the sharp blows and heavy axes rained their rapid blows upon the doomed forest. In ten minutes there was a crash, then another and another …the sound of falling timber was almost continuous.”

Part of the overbearing force of large forts came from omnipresence - the concert did not cease. Regiments assigned to picket positions operated on 24-hour shifts, with a third of the unit
on the line and at the ready, a third at rest, and a third making camp, tending to equipment, and cooking meals. General Gordon Granger habitually sent relief regiments to their posts at 3 a.m., marching them through occupied towns en route to the perimeter to ensure maximum manpower at daylight, much to the consternation of soldiers and townspeople alike. Under the cover of darkness, the opposition occasionally tested the strength of defensive lines, prompting calls to arms and exchanges of gunfire. Pvt. August Yenner wrote of a frustratingly typical late night encounter, “about 2 at night, the enemy came inside three of our picket posts, and quickly we formed into ranks of war on hearing some dozen shots & long roll. I did not sleep a wink.”

Neither did civilians within range of the noise. Horse-mounted scouting parties numbering in the hundreds frequently deployed at night to be in position when the sun rose. At all hours, sentries posted at checkpoints demanded others to stop and give countersigns. Blaring bugles and rattling drums roused sleeping infantry at or before sunrise.

Whole mornings usually involved the appropriately-named “drill.” The basic aim was to forge flesh-and-blood individuals into rank and file amalgamations. Officers trained the men nearly every day, frequently several times a day, and to many it felt incessant. “We are called up sometime between 3 and 5 o’clock every morning, drill until 6 ½ o’clock, and about every third day have to start immediately after breakfast foraging or to work on fortifications, but if we are lucky enough to escape both these we commence drill again at 9 o’clock and continue until 12. From to 2 till 3 I have to hear the recitations of officers and again drill from 3 till 4:40, have dress parade at 5…”

Wheeling, countermarching, accelerations to the double-quick, and firing by ranks, these assemblies frequently involved a thousand men and more. As for dress parades, officers usually conducted them in large open fields near occupied towns, with an ensemble sometimes
numbering ten thousand men and more, plus hundreds of mounts and draft animals. “Aside from the fatigue, heat, etc.,” recalled a soldier of one such exercise, “it was an occasion well worthy [of] attention to see a large army drawn up in line, or marching by column of company with flags and banners displayed, music discoursing pleasing airs at the head of each regiment, and long lines of cavalry and batteries of artillery, and to anyone but a soldier, who sees such almost daily, is a grand thing.”

Extremely rare was the day without the rattle of musketry. Aside from frequent skirmishing, Union infantry used ample supply systems and available time to hone their shooting skills. In the spring of 1863, Henry Royse and his companions in the 115th Illinois just outside Franklin practiced shooting at targets from 150 yards. “After some days practice the companies were moved back to 200 yards distance then to 250 yards and then to 300 yards. In this way the skill of the men was tested at the various distances. Some of the best shots hit the target three or four times out of five even at the longer distance.” What Royse did not mention was the sheer volume this entailed. One modest-sized company could include at least fifty riflemen. Shooting five rounds each meant 250 detonations for each company each session. One regiment could easily expend 2,000 rounds in a day. In a week, a brigade-sized garrison (of which there were many) might require over ten thousand cartridges for practice alone.

Adding to the noise were the rare executions by firing squad, the odd warning shots, and sporadic skirmishes along picket lines. Far more frequent were shootings of lame horses and mules, plus multi-gun salutes during military burials. Sgt. James Magie of the 78th Illinois witnessed the interment of a comrade who had been mortally wounded in a firefight. As was the emerging custom at his post, the funeral and burial took place in the city cemetery, quite near the town square. More than the visual elements, it was the sounds of the ceremony that Magie found
to be most profound. “There was a quite imposing funeral procession yesterday – a lieutenant in the 4th Regular US Cavalry,” Magie wrote to his wife. Along with the rifle honor guard firing in unison into the daytime sky, a brass band played a series of dirges. Federal posts applied these echoing rituals to establish solidarity among the men and to warn residents not to challenge the garrison’s resolve.59

One of the most frequent and intense expressions of a garrison’s power came from its booming artillery. Audible from a dozen miles and more, volleys at closer ranges could feel like punches to the chest. In flight, the most menacing shells were of the rifled variety. The lead collars and grooved casings designed to catch the barrel grooves produced a piercing screech which ceased only after impact. Spherical shots, when spinning, had the eerie ability to sound like buzz saws cutting into thick lumber. Shells from large Parrot siege guns – common entities in defensive structures – produced a deep hum, described by one witness as something “between a buzz and a groan.” Two years into the war the U.S. artillery arm was relatively well supplied allowing for extensive usage, and officers seemed willing to shoot off ordnance for nearly any occasion.60

Gunnery practice typically took place once a week, with the shooting of live rounds at distant targets. This included stationary guns within fortifications and mobile artillery sent short distances from the main works. Such maneuvers tested not only a crew’s accuracy and efficiency but also the reliability of fuses and detonators. On artillerist marveled at the effect of 24 lb. shells fired into the countryside: “They proved to be of excellent quality; not one failed to explode that was fired.” Local populations could feel and hear such deadly exercises on a regular basis, with no practical means of stopping them from happening.61
At times the crews used powder charges to issue celebratory blasts. In April 1863, Federal artillery fired salutes from the battlements at Corinth to mark the first anniversary of the Battle of Shiloh. Guns from Fort Pickering rang in the Fourth of July of 1863 with a series of volleys, repeating the ceremony three days later when the garrison received word that Vicksburg had been captured. For the multitude of redans and forts positioned along major rivers, especially for those far away from the fighting, it was common to fire salutes to passing steamers carrying high-ranking officers and dignitaries.62

During national holidays, even the most reticent Federal citadels rattled windows and nerves to declare ownership of patriotic anniversaries. Such was the case with George Washington’s birthday. Union garrisons made it a practice from 1863 onward to fire thunderous battery salutes. At Nashville, pro-secessionist Rachel Carter Craighead remembered nearly falling out of bed from the blast of Union cannons as they shouted homage to Washington.63 At Fort Brown in Brownsville, Texas, Union celebrations for the Fourth of July included a six-gun battery salute followed by military a parade through the city, regimental games of baseball, grand picnics, and a fair amount of loud toasts and speeches.64 One year later, festivities at Chattanooga included copious amounts of fireworks.65 Not unexpectedly, such rest days occasionally produced drunk soldiers medicating themselves. Revelry, brawls, and late-night howls were common in some units.66

Perhaps no sound impacted the Southern white psyche more than African American voices expressing a growing sense of autonomy. For generations, when it came to people of color, slave-society whites were accustomed to seeing slaves in volume but hearing little volume from them. In turn, the enslaved well knew that while owners were in earshot, quietude was a prerequisite for personal survival. “Servants” also knew to respond quickly to audible cues.
While enslaved in Arkansas, Katie Rowe remembered, “Anybody miss just one lick with the hoe, or one step in the line, or one clap of that bell, or one toot of the horn, and he is going to be free and talking to the devil long before he ever sees a pair of blue britches.” But by the war’s midpoint, Union occupation inverted the choral order. Freed persons began to experiment with public expression while secessionist voices turned quiet. As one member of the 113th Ohio wrote home from Franklin in mid-1863, such demonstrations were becoming increasingly overt. “The contrabands at our camp had an old-fashioned dance,” he told his family, “and we acted the part of admiring spectators.” At Clarksville near Fort Bruce, pro-Confederate Nannie Haskins wrote in her diary, “The Negroes and Yankees are having a big picnic today – they have been passing here in great droves together. It makes me sick at heart.” It was even too much for some white Federals. As one soldier near Franklin wrote home one night, “There has been an old nigger trying to make music on an institution that he made out of goose quills ever since I have been writing, and a lot of screeching black devils around him making such a noise that I could hardly write. If he does not soon stop I will go out and knock him in the head.”

Few voices had greater freedom and leverage than those in uniform, so long as their officers allowed. In fact, black enlisted and white officers alike soon learned that one of the most intimidating weapons they possessed involved the noise and motion of their own rank and file. At Memphis, after their review just south of Fort Pickering, the men of the 77th returned to their camp in emphatic style. “As we marched through the streets of the city,” remembered one of its members, “the boys made a noise and clatter as unearthly and unintelligible as was ever heard at the tower of Babel. Some would sing and some would crow, some would cackle and some would squeal. Altogether the concert was neither musical nor entertaining. No doubt the citizens of Memphis thought the regiment was either drunk or crazy.” For several days in the fall of 1863,
the wealthy secessionist Rachel Craighead recalled feeling powerless against the waves of African American regiments marching through her affluent Nashville neighborhood. “The hateful niggers,” she wrote, “have been parading and cheering, with guns, fully equipped for fighting.”

When the 49th and 55th USCT transferred from the forts of Corinth to the major base of Memphis, they did not slip quietly into the city. Instead they announced their arrival with strident speech, stomping feet, and grinding wheels. One of their regimental officers thoroughly enjoyed the pained reactions he witnessed among the white citizenry at “what they had never before seen and had never expected to see – their own former slaves powerfully and lawfully armed for their overthrow, and led and commanded by those whom they considered their invaders.” At Natchez in late January 1864, USCT soldiers roared in triumph when they were ordered to dismantle the infamous slave pens just east of town. Many relished the noisy work and regaled with loud voices as they tore down the structures and transported the lumber to Fort McPherson.

Conversely, occupation also meant quieting or silencing those who previously used sound as the primary voice of their social authority. Numerous are the accounts of pro-Confederate civilians, especially of women, expressing audible forms of resistance. In Mothers of Invention, Drew Gilpin Faust’s influential examination of women in the slave South, she finds that elite white females under occupation fashioned a belief that their feminine wiles enabled them to “manage” their occupiers. One of their most consistent examples includes performing melodies for garrison officers, with repertoires laden with secessionist songs. But it must be recognized that these resistors conducted such acts almost exclusively within private parlors. Such demonstrations were quiet and isolated compared to the daily public spectacles of massed
volleys and brass bands. A few members of the 124th Ohio called upon one well-known songstress who obliged to a private recital, serenading them with “Bonnie Blue Flag” and other neo patria pieces. The clearly unwelcomed visitors found such defiance humorous. “These rebel war songs and others might have been heard floating out on the soft evening air, near the old locust grove,” observed one of the officers, “and not one of the brave men that did duty there thought any the less of the pert and plucky rebel girl. We laughed at her wit and the raillery that she heaped on us, calling us invaders.”76 To be certain, the Union men were invading personal domain when calling on this particular young person’s home, just as their thundering artillery, marching feet, and the voices of thousands of armed men invaded spaces both public and private.

Then there were the familiar antebellum sounds that Federal garrisons redefined. For free citizens, train whistles previously meant travel and trade. Under occupation they signaled incoming troops, wounded, refugees, and contrabands. Changed too were the meaning of bells large and small, at least the ones not yet melted into Confederate artillery tubes. Before, they called servants to churches, chambers, and fields. Under occupation, bells served the wishes of provosts. A previously influential Presbyterian pastor in Union-occupied Chattanooga bitterly recalled his own silencing on Christmas Eve 1863. “Our church was still used as a hospital and no bell rang out on the air telling us of God, His house, His worship. There was no Sunday school. There was no day school. The churches were all closed, the pastors, except myself, were gone.”77

As overwhelming as the din of massive battles and marching armies could sound to a subjected community, the noise usually came and went within days if not hours. In contrast, the audible presence of a fortified garrison could dominate an area for months and years. As the
Chattanooga pastor attested, fort life redefined his city’s soundscape, to the point where its many garrisons created a dominant Federal environment and muted his class’s public authority.

**Forts as Urban Slaughterhouses**

If there was one form of environmental alteration that was widespread and enduring, it was the creation of industrial-scale ranching and meat packing. The ensuing destruction included much local wealth in animal husbandry. Initially farm livestock was a primary military objective for federal garrisons, as their removal did far more than deforestation and sound projection to weaken opposition and feed the Union occupation.

Civilians, regardless of their political convictions, found the confiscation of mules and horses to be the most damaging on several levels. Mules, often 15 percent to 25 percent more expensive than horses, were the tractors for poor farmers and wealthy planters alike. In many cases, horses were as close to family cars - and family pets - as the nineteenth-century household would get. Also, unlike the less approachable hogs and cattle, horses had names. One example among multitudes, in September 1864 the John D. Roberts family of Tennessee saw their mules Beck, Fannie, Jack, and Pete taken away to the cauldron of the Army of the Cumberland. Joining them were horses Charley, Rachel, Roda, and Sarah. Unless these horses were placed in the service of some general staff, who tended to care for mounts with greater diligence, it is probable that these creatures did not survive the war. Their death would have been most likely if they were used to haul artillery; the life expectancy for battery animals was less than eight months.78

Sometimes the Union Army employed the Confiscation Acts rather liberally. In 1864, the 14th Michigan at Fort Granger took a mule, a steer, two cows, and thirty-nine hogs from African American farmer Matt Beach.79 Destroying trees and fields took considerable time with little return, but garrisons gained much when they went after livestock. Tennessee was an especially
meaty place. In the South only Texas bred more horses, and the Volunteer State stood first in production of hogs and mules. Williamson County, for example, was well-known for its abundance of livestock – nearly 20 percent of its total wealth was in farm animals alone. In the growing network of fort systems, human appetites for meat and horsepower rapidly accelerated. The collateral effect devoured much of this living resource.\(^8^0\)

For animal owners, and for the domesticated animals themselves, the proliferation of forts in 1863 and 1864 generated intense and widespread confiscation. Construction and maintenance of fortifications required considerable amounts of literal horse power, as did the processes of bridge, rail, and road repair, not to mention the ongoing practice of deforestation. The solidifying procession of blockhouses, redans, and fortresses also formed a bulwark behind which Union foraging parties could scavenge with near impunity and venture outward with acceptable risk. Most vulnerable were families and animals situated near Union bases. Near Brentwood, Tennessee, Nancy Crockett’s horses and hogs disappeared into the fortifications of Nashville. Her neighbor Thomas H. Oden also lost a mule, two horses and “fifty large timber trees” to the colossus of Nashville. Jane Morton and neighbor Parke Street of Nolensville saw their horses, mules, and hogs also taken to the sprawling Fortress Rosecrans at Murfreesboro. The garrison at Brentwood took nearly all of Sarah and William Pate’s horses, hogs, and sheep. Mary T. Bostick of Triune received several foraging visits from the soldiers stationed in the mile-long trench works near her home. She lost her mules and sheep in the process.\(^8^1\)

While in service, just like their fellow mammalian drivers, cavalry and draft animals died from disease and exhaustion far more than from combat. Gene Armistead’s study of Civil War horses and mules illustrates how equine contagions were common, especially skin and respiratory infections, hoof rot, and tetanus, the last of which was 100 percent fatal. These
maladies spread quickly for the same reasons – exhaustion, overwork, lack of adequate provisions, and confinement in tight spaces. Stationed on the abatis-ring and blockhouse-crowned prominence of Roper’s Knob high above the fort complex at Franklin, August Yenner looked down upon one of two overcrowded mule parks amongst the many batteries and campsites. To him, the restless mass looked like “a small machine” in constant motion.\(^8^2\) Military historian Gervase Phillips finds that one of the reasons Maj. Gen. Rosecrans always seemed in dire need of mounts for his Middle Tennessee operations was that his own men were grossly negligent in the care of their steeds. The problem was so rampant, finds Phillips, in 1863 Quartermaster General M.C. Meigs informed Rosecrans that in his cavalry regiments “have killed ten times as many horses for us as for the Rebels.”\(^8^3\)

In many ways the life of a combat animal, as short as it often was, resembled the life of the low paid enlisted or the unpaid enslaved. Subjected to mass confinement, treated impersonally by handlers, and thrust into moments of terror, the sentient knew suffering. During the Civil War as a whole, somewhere between 1.2 million and 1.5 million horses and mules perished in military service, with an average lifespan of less than a year. Under such conditions the fight-or-flight instinct commonly leaned toward the former – many of the animals became endemically hostile, for theirs was a violent life.\(^8^4\)

Charging defenses, forts in particular, were deadly experiences for mammals, horses in particular, considering they made such large and easy targets. When Confederate Gen. Earl van Dorn’s cavalry assaulted Franklin in 1863, Joseph Whitney of the 96\(^{th}\) Illinois witnessed something that bordered the unreal. Either by purposeful diversion or mistake, some thirty to forty riderless horses from the Confederate side came barreling through the streets and towards Fort Granger. Close behind them were the 28\(^{th}\) Mississippi Cavalry. To stem the tide, Gen.
Ganger himself issued the command to open fire. Later he reported, “Our siege guns and light batteries opened upon them with murderous effect, literally strewing the ground with men and horses.” William A. Boyd of the 84th Indiana added that the mounts lay among the carnage like discarded trash. “As soon as we crossed the river about a half mile from camp we saw several dead and wounded horses. A half mile further we saw many more dead horses and two of the 40th [Ohio] and eleven dead rebels [and] two officers.”

During Confederate Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest’s attack against Fort Granger on June 4th and 5th, again involving thousands of equines, results were very much the same. From the parapets of Granger, S.K. Fletcher watched through a spyglass as Confederate cavalry and horse-drawn artillery launched an assault from the cotton gin along Columbia Pike. “They ran our cavalry in, and the our cavalry ran them back again, and made several charges, our big guns lighting a shell in among them…they finally drove our infantry and cavalry through town and across the river. They threw solid shot down the street, breaking some of our horses’ legs.”

In addition to combat and disease, animals also faced hunger – theirs and others. In the case of human wants, fowl and other fauna had the enormously unenviable position of being a convenient solution to the problem. Civilians and soldiers alike wrote of daily foraging exploits that bought or confiscated innumerable chickens, turkeys, hogs and sheep. At the same time the livestock themselves, living in an ecosystem overrun and overpopulated, struggled to find food. Francis McAdams of the 33rd Indiana well summarized the situation at Franklin when writing in his diary about his favorite in army life – the dinner bell, “That reminds me we get plenty to eat here but forage for the animals is scarce.”

Though the garrison at Franklin effectively controlled an area of around ten square miles, this was nowhere near enough space to sustain over ten thousand people and at least as many
domesticated cattle, horses, and mules, each consuming eight times the amount of food per day as a person. Charles Falkner said of the increasingly stripped countryside, “there is nothing in this state for an army to live on. There is but one chicken in the state and the one rooster that is on a Union man’s farm. We can hear him crow every morning. The fences are all tore down and there is not any kind of feed in the state, no more than there is out on the unfenced prairie.” As early as March 1863, the Federals at Franklin realized that foraging alone could not sustain their need for mounts and protein.

Fortunately for the U.S. War Department, as it stripped the fields of Middle Tennessee, it was successfully conquering “virgin” lands out west, by way of Federal soldiers in forts no less. Armed with these new grazing zones to their west, and the booming meat and rail industries further east, the Quartermaster Department filled military requisitions for hides, mounts, and rations. William Cronon’s seminal Nature’s Metropolis well illustrates this fusion of the rural and urban spheres, where both areas effectively became mass factories in nineteenth-century America. By 1863, these industrial plants of meat and grain successfully fueled the Union army’s human requirements, and decimated large swaths of the environment in the process.

One incident in particular demonstrated the potential effects of this unprecedented mass production. In July 1863, during the fierce heat of midsummer, a correspondent for the Nashville Daily Union investigated the shipment of 100 cattle from the stockyards of Chicago. Either the beef contractor or the rail line loaded the steers so tightly onto so few cars that the animals could not lie down for the duration for their 500-mile journey. Watered once along the way but given no feed, many somehow survived, only to be unloaded onto a scythed landscape in Middle Tennessee. There the reporter witnessed “they are turned into a dry, barren lot, at Mr. Rozell’s, where not a mouthful of food or water can he had, and nothing is given them. Some of them are
soon killed, and so relieved of their wretchedness...But others remain there for three weeks with literally nothing to eat or drink, showing all the while signs of the most acute suffering and distress. And is all this on the score of humanity?\textsuperscript{90}

Looking upon Fortress Rosecrans at Murfreesboro, resident John Spence witnessed the slaughtering process. In March 1863:

\begin{quote}
the army were receiving large droves of beef cattle... They were generally kept in lots in and about town. It took about fifty or sixty every day to supply the demand of the army and hospitals. They would drive out that number shoot them down. When butchered, it generally covered over a half acre ground, the entrils [sic], heads and feet, left lying there – so in the course of time several acres was covered in this way, and it began to get warm weather. The smell became very offensive.\textsuperscript{91}
\end{quote}

Susan Fletcher of occupied Little Rock, Arkansas witnessed a similar scene unfold on her large farm. When the adjacent garrison required a fresh supply of meat, Fletcher wrote, “I saw my hillside pasture red with the blood of slain cattle.”\textsuperscript{92}

Bought or confiscated, and shipped in unprecedented quantities, equines eventually became short-term, disposable tools. When the mounts died, they proved challenging to discard entirely. As a result, their flesh tended to accumulate quickly. In 1863, Spence observed of Murfreesboro, “Large numbers of horses died and were lying round in the neighborhood… numbers [of] horses were shot, such as were very poor, diseased, and worn out.”\textsuperscript{93} In 1864 near Fort Pickering, a single neighborhood contained the carcasses of more than 150 horses. A detail
from the 49th USCT buried the rotting bodies in haste, aided by a ration of whisky to dull the experience. On a steamer traveling from Clarksville’s Fort Bruce, Lt. Elihu Wadsworth discovered how his fellow soldiers upstream at Nashville evidently dealt with their surplus - they dumped carcasses into the river. His journey along the Cumberland was rather uneventful, aside from the sight and smell of horses and mules floating lifeless in the water. Those that washed up along the riverbank, he observed, became gathering points for buzzards. This waste was not the result of some cataclysmic battle, rather it was nearly an everyday occurrence. On another voyage to the capital months later, Wadsworth saw even more horses and mules in varying states of decay and contortion drifting downstream. The rise and fall of the river had deposited a great many of them high up along the banks. Some had become lodged on the trees like so many macabre ornaments, hanging from limbs some fifteen feet above the ground.

An Evolving Stability

The Southern landscape was not so much erased as rewritten, especially by Union forts. Situated on points of high ground, sometimes covering several square miles, fortresses were created to undermine existing structures of public authority. Federal bastions were the Union army’s and government’s version of the county courthouse, the Masonic lodge, the town church, the planter mansion. They also functioned as management centers for a large and self-sustaining factory system with a well-armed command structure. These were meant to be overbearing and overpowering, and they were. Creation of this network took time of course, and it generally migrated from west to east.
In autumn 1862 Union citadels stood in Rolla, Missouri and Memphis, Tennessee, as well as Baton Rouge, Louisiana and Corinth, Mississippi. By the following summer, Federals and freedmen had fortified Nashville, Murfreesboro, and Vicksburg. In 1864, construction extended into eastern Kentucky, eastern Tennessee, and north Georgia.96

In describing his own fortifications at Franklin, Tennessee, one officer could have been talking about the Western Theater as a whole by the last winter of the war:

…each of the forts protects all the others so that this will be one of the most impregnable places in the world when completed and armed, which will not be long hence, as the whole force are at work with all their might. We still are told
that there is danger of an attack here, if so, the sooner the rebels come the better for us.97

The birth state of Jefferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln exemplified how these island chains linked strongly together - to the benefit of Mr. Lincoln. By late 1863, eleven forts protected Louisville and its immediate surroundings. From there the strongholds extending eastward were Frankfort, Lexington, Paris, Fort Nelson, Crab Orchard, London, Camp Burnside, and Cumberland Gap, a distance of over 400 miles.98

For the spaces in between, Federal soldiers and civilian African Americans constructed blockhouses, bridge stockades, turnpikes, and rail lines. Connecting all of these was a communication system of telegraph lines and signal stations that outdistanced and outperformed the Confederacy’s by wide margins. Enjoying a visit to her husband in the 113th Ohio near Roper’s Knob at Franklin, Helen Harlow marveled at how his division’s flag station communicated speedily with distant hilltops. Touring the site with little fear of attack, she peered through the platform’s telescope and saw “the flag, men, and objects at the first telegraphic station, a distance of nine miles, as rapidly, and distinctly as with the naked eye only a few hundred yards off.”99 These two intercommunicating stations, Harlow noted, were but a small part of an information line that reached sixty miles.100

For the legendary Army of the Potomac stuck in Virginia, many within their ranks, and observers from without, concluded that their defenses seemed to get in their own way. In contrast, the emergent tone in the Western Theater, from top commanders to lowly privates, was one of confidence and pride in what they and contrabands were building. In April 1863, Joseph Whitney 96th Illinois beamed when describing his sense of place and authority in Middle
Tennessee. Concerning the once-menacing Confederates, “We are watching them as a cat would watch a mouse. We are well fortified and can stand a pretty hard brush. We have five batteries and 13 siege guns.” Of Nashville’s Fort Negley in July 1863, Adam Himmel of the 85th Illinois wrote, “This is a beautiful and skilful work indeed. Most impressive to him were the ‘awful looking creatures’ in the guise of massive siege guns. In fact the area had become so stabilized that he joked about the transfer. “Stormed the works of Fort Negley. Drove the 10th Illinois out of the inner works of the fortifications. Glorious victory. None of the 85th lost on this stack, Nashville’s ours.” Albert Marshall of the 33rd Illinois described why he had great confidence in Union defenses at Pilot Knob, Missouri. Monitored by Fort Davidson just to its west and Fort Curtis a mile to the south, in tandem they were strong enough in 1863 for Marshall to say “indications are that no rebel force will ever trouble this vicinity again.” More often than not, they were correct.

![Fort Curtis outside Helena, Arkansas.](library-of-congress-material)
Federals had concrete reasons to think they could hold onto places that secessionists could not. At Fort Donelson, Nashville, Memphis, and other locales initially fortified by Confederate and slave labor, Union troops and escapees were able to enlarge and improve the works many times over. While it is true that the North had far greater capacity in manpower, engineering, industry, and transportation than the South, the coinciding economic expenditures alone could have destroyed the Union war effort from within, as it nearly did. The Federal national debt rose by 4,200 percent in four years, by far the largest percentage increase to date. Yet contrary to Lost Cause arguments, Union fortifications grew largely from the raw and finished materials the South provided. A typical example comes from Daniel Parvin of the 11th Iowa in November 1863. His regiment was then engaged in strengthening fortifications in and around captured Vicksburg. Its defensive abilities had reached the point where Parvin believed 10,000 troops could hold the place indefinitely. This could have been considered an optimistic view considering 23,000 Confederates were unable to hold that vital river city. Yet by that time in the war, the transfer of enslaved, livestock, grains, rails, rivers, trees, and cities like Vicksburg from Confederate to Union use had reached enough velocity and volume to make such assertions very plausible.  

Even log blockhouses and stockades along strategic rail lines could induce a stalwart disposition among well-trained and well-armed troops. Iowa Brig. Gen. Grenville Dodge sincerely believed that a company of some eighty men within an earth and log blockhouse could defend itself against a regiment ten times its size. When his comrades began to fortify Brashear City in the Louisiana after the capture of Vicksburg, one Union soldier dubbed the position “absolutely impregnable.” He went so far as to privately chastise his officers for not fortifying the delta fast enough. “Had the fort been built in time it would have saved our
Government the deep mortification it suffered last June when the Confederates came in and captured the city and a large amount of Government stores."\textsuperscript{106}

Though fort life in the West was not without its miseries, officers and enlisted frequently expressed considerable faith in the use of fortress networks. The most common expression was a feeling of empowerment one felt when positioned on high ground, armed with considerable firepower, and ringed with several layers of obstacles and outer lines, known in military parlance as "defense in depth."\textsuperscript{107}

To stop there would be to give the impression that Federals within these fortresses were hungry for conquest, and some certainly were. But the prevailing sentiment among them was a desire to see the war to the end and return home. Like the great majority of military personnel in the war, nearly all the Union men in the western garrisons were and had always planned to be civilians. Even for those who were professional soldiers before the war, the greater incentive to join the service was to become acquainted and trained in the fast-growing profession of engineering.\textsuperscript{108}

It was not destruction the men were admiring. It was by and large what they had engineered. Once a fortress and its functions had been established, a series of events typically transpired thereafter. When positioned close to another complex, their rail lines and river routes became increasingly resistant to attacks. Stockpiled materials, ready blueprints, and waiting labor pools were able to repair burned bridges within days. Secured bases enabled cavalry parties to chase away river raiders in quick order. Tenuous supply lines became more dependable, and with them the provisions to create better fed, equipped, and reinforced positions. Disease rates among soldiers fell (yet continued to prey upon contrabands).\textsuperscript{109}
In Middle Tennessee a soldier spoke of the estimable particulars. “Soldiers are not idle here. Today, I was engaged in turn-piking our street, between our tents.” Nearby several former journalists overtook the town paper’s press and started offering a weekly to the encampment and the folks back home. A writer in civilian life, C.W. Hildreth of the 2nd Iowa did the same with the local press in Corinth, Mississippi. At Blue Springs, Tennessee, an officer attested:

Our camp is nicely improved and still the work goes on from day to day. The streets are well graded and ditched. Pine trees, twelve or fifteen feet high are set out in rows on each side of the streets, which adds much to the cheerful appearance of the camp…nearly all of the little shelters…have correspondingly little fire places in them.

At Roper’s Knob in Franklin, a Hoosier wrote with pleasure how he and many like him had reused the refuse of occupation to create a home for themselves. “I have my tent fixed splendidly,” he said, “Along table on one side, with my desk on the end. A number one bed on the other side. A good floor nailed down and carpeted with coffee sacks – who could have a better house? I would rather live in it than in any parlor.” Union soldiers of the 66th Illinois built a Masonic Hall inside one of the outlying forts at Corinth. Stationed at Natchez in September 1863, James Newton of the 14th Wisconsin spoke of a near ideal setting along the Mississippi. “There is an old woman and her daughter who live right across the road,” he told his family. “They cook rations for us. We buy vegetables now and then and on the whole we manage to live pretty well. It really begins to feel like home.”
Not surprisingly, ready access to fresh food and medical services proved critical to the health and morale to soldiers and civilians alike. By late May 1863 the 78th Illinois near Nashville started their own bakery, dispensing fresh bread to themselves and all buyers. African American labor provided much needed cooking and laundry services to whites inside and outside of forts. Reliable transport began to connect Union strongholds with quartermaster corps, wholesalers, donations from the U.S. Sanitary Commission, the Western Sanitary Commission and other private entities including the Catholic Church. As Carter Van Vleck reassured his family, “The Sisters of Charity [are] what few Union ladies are everywhere found. The soldiers and the multitudes of negroes furnish nurses enough for the hospitals of good quality.”

In October 1863, the 27th Indiana transferred from the Eastern to the Western Theater. These veterans of Antietam, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg eventually garrisoned a fort in Tullahoma, Tennessee, and found the experience bizarre yet strangely familiar. Aside from seeing African Americans in Federal uniform for the first time, Edmund Brown from Company C remarked “[t]he general aspect of things was not so different from Indiana. Neither were the people all disloyal…while the signs of war were evident on every hand, the country had not been laid waste as it had been where we had mostly served.” Concerning victuals, Brown echoed experiences of other troops who were stationed in towns that had been fortified for some time, observing, “Fresh meat and vegetables were as cheap in Tullahoma as they have been in the average Northern town since the war.” Again, the slow yet evident shift from full-fledged foraging to a rebirth of town markets struck Brown as something reminiscent of home. With a sense of relief, he observed, “[n]o soldier with any money at all would forage sweet potatoes; he could buy them for less than he considered it worth to dig them.”
In the midst of war zones, a great many occupiers saw their creatively destructive work produce one impressive, encompassing outcome. They were making functioning cities. A journalist rightly compared Corinth’s main defenses with its outer camps and earthworks as a city surrounded by incorporated towns. In May 1863, Maj. William Broaddus tried to describe the enormity of his garrison to his son in Ohio. “We are encamped on a hill, and the country around is somewhat broken, and the camps are stretched as far as the eye can reach, and at night it looks very pretty. Looks like a large city illuminated when the camp fires are lighted.”

Fig. 3.6 The 84th Indiana at Murfreesboro, Tennessee. Their camp is in a typical rectangular formation resembling a city block, including internal streets. Note the amount of deforestation, which was so extensive that soldiers cut down even more to give themselves shade and fresh scents. Samuel Boyd captioned this photo in pencil: “The cedar trees in front of tents were cut in the woods nearby and stuck in holes in line with the tents.” Boyd Family Papers, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.
However appealing these locales were becoming for their military occupants, to secessionist in their long shadows these bastions were directly contributing to their own sense of being overpowered. The teenage Adelicia McEwen, returning with her father after a brief trip northward, lamented the enormity of the growing Union encampment and the military features sprouting upon it, “the whole east side of the river up to the fort was covered with tents and army wagons, the guns were polished so brilliantly that they flashed the sun’s rays.” In contrast, African Americans, white unionists, and Federal soldiers viewed such places as safe havens, though the stark vistas could still produce melancholy even among supporters. Pvt. August Yenner admitted that when seen from below, such structures could take on “the dire savage looks of war, with fort and magazine and instruments of death.”

These walls of earth and dying trees, the stripped hills, the austere throats of bristling artillery could and did have similar effects on many soldiers. Between standing in ranks through the predawn hours, long shifts of working on defenses, and patrolling the area, many occupiers were reaching their tolerance threshold. As Dr. Bennitt observed after just seven weeks of encampment at the fortifications near Franklin, “There is much Nostalgia among the men now, many are trying to get discharged…We are getting out of patience with the manner in which war is being played here, and are anxious to see the enemy, and punish them for the troubles they have brought upon our once happy land.” Col. Emerson Opdycke wrote his wife expressing similar frustrations with staying behind ever-growing works: “April 7th 1863. I am not much in favor of impregnable works in the field; to get to a battle we must leave them, celerity is what we need. If we fail of successful action until after harvest, another year here will be inevitable.”
Yet there emerged growing evidence of progress, even tangible signs of measured civility. Perhaps not surprisingly, the men in these stabilizing places began to create domestic spheres within fortified areas. In Nashville, Soldiers’ Bible classes transpired every Sunday morning at the Second Presbyterian Church on College Street, ironically near the new brothel district where a commercial sex industry flourished. At Natchez, one of the most stable and least damaged of towns under occupation, Fort McPherson officers occupied some of the oldest and wealthiest homes, subsequently sparing most of them from harm. One mansion, the city’s oldest known Greek Revival residence ominously named “The Burn,” did not succumb to arson, nor did the vast majority of the town’s dwellings.

Moreover, these occupied towns became bases upon which African Americans and private benevolent societies began to construct spheres of personal sovereignty. As Cheri LaFlamme Szcodronski observes of the Western Theater contraband camps, “Although established out of military necessity,” these havens near Union forts “provided an environment where refugees could begin to explore the meaning of citizenship.” Cities within cities, many such contraband systems eventually sprouted schools, places of worship, and small businesses. Federal infrastructure and military presence, built and maintained largely through African American labor, became the sites of measurable progress toward liberation and self-determination.

Rather than rendering utter devastation upon the natural landscape, Union fort systems created a relatively stable locations civilian-military infrastructure. Repurposed urban and suburban landscapes helped establish formidable fortified towns and cities from the Border States southward along much the Mississippi, Cumberland, and Tennessee River Valleys, as well
much of the Nashville & Decatur rail line. These increasingly secured transportation routes, along with mass production and large-scale transportation of livestock, provided fortified areas with increasingly predictable and adequate supplies of food, teams, and mounts. Over time, the overbearing size and sound of these garrisons marginalized local opposition and solidified bases of civilian support. They also conspicuously harbored large numbers of individuals who had detached themselves from slave labor and reallocated much of that labor into fort systems.

Incremental, experimental, Federal fortifications eventually became one of the most stable, if not the most stable, military creation within the first three years of the war. Garrison troops, cooperative citizens, and African American laborers were able to alter local physical landscapes in key commercial and transportation centers in favor of the Union and at the expense of the Confederacy. As events would demonstrate, attempts to create equally stable political and economic landscapes proved just as feasible, albeit almost exclusively within these fortressed areas. Attempts to extend political and economic landscapes favorable to the Federal government and the wage-labor system outside of these fortified areas proved far more elusive and fragile.
CHAPTER FOUR:

INVESTMENT-
NATION-BUILDING IN FORTIFIED ZONES

“Every step and every movement of the multitude, even in what are termed enlightened ages, are made with equal blindness to the future; and nations stumble upon establishments, which are indeed the result of human action, but not the execution of any human design.”

Adam Ferguson, *Essay on the History of Civil Society*, 1767

“The war looks to me more complicated than it did a year ago…”

Joseph Whitney, 96th Illinois at Fort Granger, 1863

Principally unspectacular, Union forts rarely captured widespread public attention beyond their immediate surroundings. Their presence in the mindset of postwar generations was even less. Currently some are almost pitied for having seen “no action,” as if the structure had somehow failed to be important because it created a degree of regional stability. Yet it was the dominating, nearly unassailable fortresses that offered platforms upon which the Federal government and African Americans tried to reinvent themselves, only to find themselves wandering somewhere between the old order and a new birth of freedom.
In his 2007 piece *The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction*, Mark Neely, Jr. occasionally plays the role of contrarian to the “utter desolation” themes in some Civil War histories, and his general premise reads valid. Much of the conflict’s inherent shock to those who lived and died in it, he proposes, was its wanton neglect of discernable patterns. One of Neely’s more compelling observations is that our current position, with its vantage of knowing the war’s immediate and eventual outcomes, dulls our ability to empathize with their chaotic world. To at least approach a better understanding of what it was like for individuals and their competing governments, he invites us to admit to ourselves “we simply do not know what the grand strategies of the Civil War were,” largely because the war’s actors great and small struggled to find one themselves. For spheres public and private, one of the most frequent casualties in the Civil War was any long term plan.\(^\text{128}\)

One example of the conflict’s anti-teleological tendencies was Abraham Lincoln’s December 1862 Annual Address to Congress and its recommendations for a new nation state. With the Emancipation Proclamation a month away from going into effect, the President feared that particular war measure would last only as long as the war itself. If and when peace reappeared, the Proclamation might be struck down as unconstitutional - not an unthinkable prospect considering Roger B. Taney was still Chief Justice on a conservative Supreme Court. In an attempt to prevent the reestablishment of the old pro-slavery order, Lincoln proposed to Congress three Constitutional amendments. If they were to be passed and ratified, they would have been the first changes to the law of the land in sixty years. The first was to grant Federal assistance to any state that would abolish its slavery by the year 1900. The second – a tempering of his Proclamation – would maintain the freedom of those slaves who were emancipated during
the war, with reimbursement of their value to their former masters. The last was to allow the use of Federal revenues to pay free persons of color to leave the United States.\footnote{129}

From this Annual Message, upon which Lincoln and several of his cabinet members committed copious amounts of time and effort, Lincoln hagiographers have cherry-picked its most eloquent phrases. Favored among them: “In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free – honorable alike in what we give, and what we preserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best hope of earth.”\footnote{130}

The message’s finer details indicated something more complicated and perhaps less noble. Freedom for most slaves, under his proposed plan, would arrive by the start of the twentieth century, possibly. If things went according to that plan, there could be sizeable transfers of national capital into the hands of a few thousand slave owners. As for Lincoln looking to assure “freedom to the free,” the ideal would involve freeing the Union of its African and African-European descendants. Understandably, he made no mention of possible citizenship for the enslaved and emancipated. The only chance of that happening, his Annual Message clearly stated, was for those interested in such recognition to emigrate to Haiti or Liberia.\footnote{131}

In a few years there would be three ratified Amendments, and the fact that they would have almost no resemblance to the President’s 1862 recommendations said much about the state of affairs in the winter if 1862-63. The President, reflective of his human nature, could not see the future nor read the minds of the people. He could only express aspirations and offer plans for a future he and others were aiming to establish. In this regard, his narrative was very much along the lines of others then transpiring in the halls of commerce and governance in North America and elsewhere, where the concepts of \textit{Staat} and \textit{Volk} were still very much in their formative stages. Even in the antebellum years, the relationship between the U.S. government and its
residents was far from clear. No less an authority than U.S. Attorney General Edward Bates admitted as much when he confessed in 1862, “eighty years of practical enjoyment of citizenship . . . have not sufficed to teach us either the exact meaning of the word, or the constituent elements of the thing we prize so highly.”

At that very moment, the two small yet growing movements of Federal fortification and slave self-emancipation would alter assumptions of citizenship so quickly and radically that the word “revolutionary” arguably applied. Six months after Lincoln’s formal message, the U.S. War Department began transferring a handful of black militia at the state level into the Federal Army proper, almost exclusively as fort garrisons. Within nine months recruitment of African Americans became a major objective for the War Department, and nearly every fortified position from Helena to Elk River turned into an active recruiting center. In a year there were 50,000 men of color, born free and born enslaved, in Federal uniform and tasked with manning fortified areas and protecting the hundreds of thousands of contrabands therein. After a little more than two years, somewhere around 400,000 former enslaved were connected to a Federal labor or military program, and nearly half of those individuals were in the heavily fortified Mississippi Valley alone.

African American involvement in the Union war effort had gone from an interference to an imperative in less than two years. Consequently the chance for black citizenship went from inconceivable to a developing question in nearly the same span of time. It was one thing for a political figure to proclaim millions of men, women, and children thenceforward and forever free, but to reactively destruct “the dogmas of the quiet past” required a black civilis and a white Staat to act in concert, and that formal relationship did not yet exist. Primarily in militarily secured areas, that relationship would take its first public steps.
Loyalty Oaths and Political Cleansing

If there was one issue in fortified zones that Federal officers had to address first, it was the privileged status of slave owners. The extremely conciliatory tone in Lincoln’s Annual Message, for those who would learn of it, gave the impression that the Old Union was still the paradigm most likely to long endure. Hours before the Emancipation Proclamation became an official (and possibly pro tempore) government policy, the politically neutral and highly prosperous slave owner J.H. Bills crafted a hopeful passage among his otherwise pessimistic diary entries. Living near the Union fortifications at Bolivar, Tennessee, he wrote, “it is now near seven months that the town has been in garrison of Federal troops, and everything appears [in] desolation. Every day seems to give us hard troubles…May Heaven deliver us from another such [year] as the past. We want peace, which would give us property.” In an effort to establish a degree of peace within fort areas, provost marshals applied an increasingly aggressive requirement of loyalty oaths.¹³⁴

Few observers were under the impression that civilian oaths were guarantors of cooperation. Union officers generally understood that the Confederate government and its military officer class were littered with those who had recently sworn to uphold the U.S. Constitution. So too, escapees wryly recalled their previous expressions of “unending loyalty” to masters they had recently left. Even the most passionate public defenders of racial separation knew that many within their own houses, including themselves, frequently crossed the color barrier. Latecomers to that fact, many northern soldiers learned of the wholesale hypocrisy when they marched ever southward. Samuel Boyd with the 84th Indiana recalled seeing “but few white faces,” in rural Tennessee, “but every shade of black from the deepest dye down to the lightest
possible tinge stood in groups before every house we passed, seeming to enjoy the joke most bountifully.\textsuperscript{135}

As varied as skin color but much harder to determine, a person’s political stripes could change at any given time, especially during a crisis. A trooper in the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Michigan Cavalry admitted that one of the easiest parts of his job involved spotting uniformed enemy combatants. In contrast, civilians within his fortified area were an unnerving enigma:

It became necessary to study the people. There were the loyal, the professedly loyal, the conservative southerner and the bitter secessionist, and as our mission was against armed foes only, it often became a very difficult task to discriminate between the loyal and the professedly loyal; but all were watched alike and our dealings with them made as agreeable as possible under the circumstances.\textsuperscript{136}

In recognition of the tenuous situation, on March 8, 1863, Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans issued General Orders No. 43 from his headquarters along Stones River at Murfreesboro. Unlike the transient nature of mobile campaigning, the construction of semi-permanent strongholds enabled military officials to exercise greater control over local citizenry. In Rosecrans’s case, he required that any person found uncooperative with his occupational forces would “hold themselves in readiness to go south of our lines within ten days from the date of notice.” Passes were required to enter or leave Union lines, and any individual entering a zone of occupation from the south would be considered a spy. In addition, every citizen regardless of loyalty would be required to sign an oath assuring they would, in Rosecrans’ words, “abide by behave
themselves as peaceable citizens, may remain at home, following their usual avocations, subject
to military orders and regulations.”

In issuing this order, Rosecrans essentially adopted a preexisting method of social
control. Battles were deadly games of chance, but his was a proven formula. He threatened to
send people “south” if they did not behave, required passes for all forms of travel, treated the
unsolicited and undocumented as fair game, and demanded overt and perpetual deference, all
under the watchful eyes of patrols, scouts, and the looming and well-armed big house. Rosecrans
asked secessionists within his areas of occupation to choose between accepting U.S. citizenship
and accepting the status of a slave.

Rosecrans’s order also contained a thinly veiled incentive – publicly accept citizenship
and perks await. Potential benefits included but were not limited to increased personal security,
greater access to food and fuel, ability to travel, and the chance to keep property up to and
including human chattel. Life could be good for local whites (or at least markedly better), and the
local Union fortress could provide.

Whole communities took up the offer. Cita Cook notes how Natchez, Mississippi, the
slave society of slave societies, largely accepted the proposal and subsequently saw little
skirmishing and suffered minimal material damage. As local elites and Federal officers worked
in tandem to keep their respective spheres of authority, the most extensive damage appeared to
have been the removal of two houses during the construction of Fort McPherson on the north
side of town. Most other mansions remained upright and intact, including several inside the fort
itself. The countryside did not fare as well. The slave-rich region lost a considerable amount of
its food, horses, and cotton to Federal foragers, but some of that materiel made its way to the
cooperative civilians of Natchez.
Through the process of creative destruction, Federal officers were creating a series of market and material incentives in an effort to dismantle possible loyalties to the Confederacy. This entrepreneurial endeavor would have been predictably futile in areas of tenuous Union control, but in securely fortified cities and towns Federals essentially possessed captive audiences. In rural environs, although subject to random foraging, residents could survive through barter, fishing, hunting, gathering, and their own farms and gardens. Urban residents were more dependent on cash and credit-based economies, and Union officials played to that dependency.

Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger at his eponymous fort in Franklin made it a point to publicly award privileges to confirmed Unionists. Soldiers brought loads of firewood to loyalist homes, allowed them to come and go as they pleased and buy food and supplies from the quartermaster at reduced prices. In times of danger, families were even granted passage into forts.\(^{140}\) Faced with such enticements, neutrals and secessionists often chose pragmatism over principles. Near Fortress Rosecrans twenty miles east of Franklin, John Spence said of his fellow citizens, “Many would avail themselves of the said oath, which was against the will. Others would still hold out against it, but all did more or less make some friend among the common soldier.”\(^{141}\)

There were also occasions when Union soldiers and Unionist civilians felt an unforeseen sense of power in the particulars, as was the case with passes and the sense of belonging they provided. Stationed at Fort Brown in Texas, Iowa soldier Benjamin McIntyre initially viewed written passes as a nuisance. Over time however, he began to view them as tangible, invaluable symbols of citizenship, “a pass is a great thing and we must see and feel it.”\(^{142}\) Not only did it give him greater sense of security when encountering people he had never met, it also signified who had joined the same endeavor he had years ago and more than a thousand miles away.\(^{143}\)
Indeed, not until the Civil War did the U.S. State Department widely issue or demand passports for international travel, and would not do so again until the First World War. The old realm of arbitrary privilege had given way, at least for the time being, to a republic insisting upon universally reviewable documentation that only the professedly loyal could obtain.\textsuperscript{144}

Another pleasant surprise among pro-Unionists (and an opportunity for those who were beginning to doubt their initial confidence in the Confederacy) were public displays of Federal affection. As Joseph Whitney said of the once secessionist hotbed of Franklin, Tennessee, “The town…is pretty well cleared of rebel sympathizers. All that would not take the Oath of Allegiance had to leave. Now we are having pretty good times.”\textsuperscript{145} Not four months after that a crowd of hundreds gathered at the county courthouse for public rally. In attendance were the anti-secessionist editor and national speaker William “Parson” Brownlow, Military Governor Andrew Johnson, and perhaps more importantly, a number of prominent local slave owners fawning over the Federal officials and the newfound burst of southern white Unionism.\textsuperscript{146}

In fortified areas, Federals also enjoyed holding a near monopoly on incoming information. The dying press in the South struggled with ink, paper, and printer shortages, not to mention a quickly disappearing telegraphy system largely dependent on northern and foreign-made equipment. Unable to receive much more than rumors and the odd smuggled letter from Confederate-held areas, holdouts had to read from Union-friendly local papers such as the Nashville \textit{Daily Union} and the Chattanooga \textit{Gazette} along with faraway clarions like the pro-administration \textit{New York Times} (which could reach most Western Theater forts in less than 48 hours). Articles spoke of local arrests for sabotage and espionage, whole communities lining up to take the oath (largely exaggerated), war-weary secessionists (often plausible), and names of families being sent south (frequently accurate). They also spoke of Union rallies in formerly
Confederate-controlled communities like Huntsville and Vicksburg, including guided tours of defensive works.  

In contrast, civilians on the grey side of the spectrum frequently found the experience to be all-consuming. Union officials (not unlike wary slave owners) commonly required repeated expressions of obedience. In the occupied corridor just south of the forts at Nashville, Alexander N.B. Brooks claimed he took an oath on four different occasions, and even then the assessors stated “From the whole testimony, we are not satisfied that he was loyal.” Living ten miles south of Brooks, Mrs. Martha Royce insisted she was a loyalist, but that did not prevent her from banishment, because her spouse was serving with Nathan Bedford Forrest at the time. Not long after her removal, Federal troops and contrabands dismantled the Royce home and used the lumber to build barracks inside their forts.

Regardless, many deportations verged on being relatively benign, often because the targeted were people of some wealth and connections. Unlike enslaved who risked life and limb to escape, the departing privileged had many options, sometimes comfortable ones. For Elizabeth Shields of Natchez, expulsion meant packing up her five children and moving them to the family plantation in Louisiana. Union soldiers escorted the Sallie McNutt family out of Franklin all the way to Confederate lines, which at that point was a total of two miles. Taking temporary refuge at the Harrison House, a large plantation home a quarter mile further south, the McNutts eventually made their way to family members in Virginia. They returned to Franklin in 1866 without a loss. The fortress commander in Brownsville, Texas became so impatient with those who refused to take the oath that he had several deported to Mexico, which involved a trek of one to three miles, depending on where in the Brownsville area the perpetrators lived.
Some Confederate sympathizers viewed the oath movement much like they perceived the Emancipation Proclamation, as an extralegal show of weakness rather than a declaration from moral and material high ground. Young and rebellious Nannie Haskins said of the Federals at nearby Fort Bruce in Clarksville, “Everything they do shows more plainly that we are finally to be triumphant.” Her father nonetheless signed a parole of honor, telling his son and daughter that it was for the best; they would be a burden on the Confederacy if sent south.\(^{151}\)

In contrast, others considered such coercion as nothing short of barbarity. Vehement secessionist Rachel Carter Craighead living inside the ring of Union defenses at Nashville confided in her diary that “to take the oath is killing me. I am so troubled to think of my swearing to such a lie as I would have to tell, but it can’t be helped.”\(^{152}\) She equated the oath to the Spanish Inquisition, perhaps because she felt she would lose everything if she did not cooperate. Soon after penning the above statement, however, she proceeded to write about how much she was struggling to properly press her silk petticoat.\(^{153}\)

Then there were persons like J.H. Bills outside of Bolivar, who viewed the Union as the better bet on maintaining his cache of over one hundred humans. Watching his neighbors and other prominent individuals file into town to take the oath of allegiance, Bills interpreted such a public showing of compliance as “an indication of peace.” With Tennessee exempt from the Proclamation, and no pro-Confederate behavior on his part to make him subject to the Confiscation Acts, Bills was certainly not alone among planters in wishing for a speedy termination to hostilities. He had seen enough runaways (and he was unaware his chattel was about to leave him as well), that any further delay would put his own investment at risk.\(^{154}\)

It was even possible for a few to remain in an occupied area yet reject taking the oath altogether. Stationed at Fort Pillow, Capt. Francis Moore of the 2\textsuperscript{nd} Illinois Cavalry encountered
one hardliner, an exceptionally large female with a beau serving in butternut. Rather than betray her love by taking the oath, the towering figure said she would rather fight Moore hand-to-hand. The trooper decided to drop the issue on the grounds that “it was contrary to my principles to fight with any lady who had a fist as big as my head.”

Large hearts and hands aside, whites who refused offers of renewed U.S. citizenship faced potentially life-threatening consequences. Occupiers could and did apply microcosmic Anaconda Plans upon any home or neighborhood they so desired. Pvt. William Herron of the 85th Indiana marveled at the near-immediate effect. “The misery and suffering of the rebels can hardly be imagined. They have no firewood, and in two weeks more will have nothing to eat.” He witnessed families chopping down their own fruit trees, gutting outbuildings, and scavenging what few fences remained for fuel.

Garrison commanders generally designed such hardships, as with the benefits of cooperation, as public exhibitions for the masses riding the political fence. The emerging message was this - federal forts and adjacent towns were interdependent. As these communities were vital to the survival of the garrisons, the forts had become critical to the security and survival of the community. To regain the fruits of citizenship, the shortest path was through open cooperation.

Yet with this proposition, the U.S. military and its government encountered a growing mass that were already cooperating, to the point where military and political success virtually required their continued support. The Union certainly was not alone in this growing concern. As Chandra Manning observes, several federations evolving in the mid-nineteenth century found themselves increasingly bidding “for the loyalties of individuals previously deemed beneath notice.” In North America as elsewhere, calls for immediate assistance eventually and
unexpectedly prompted requests for safeguards, liberties, and even citizenship. As time would attest, Federal reciprocity depended primarily on gender, followed by age, then race, and finally class. Consequently, in the immediate concerns of military operations, females, the very young and old, minorities, and the unskilled remained in the realm of afterthought. Young, able-bodied males in contrast progressively became a sought commodity.

United States Colored Troops

Overall the occupation-by-fortification approach created a paradox for the U.S. government. Among noncombatants in occupied areas, secessionists generally steered clear of Union occupiers, while African Americans flowed toward them in ever-increasing numbers. Whenever garrisons felt as if the slave influx had stabilized, more contrabands flooded in.158 Though it is likely that only around 10 percent of the four million enslaved Americans ever reached liberation during the war, from the standpoint of whites and blacks at the time, the rate was nothing short of explosive. In spite of the great attention heaped upon the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law, personal liberty laws, sales of Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and ballooning abolitionist society memberships, the total number of successful prewar escapes likely did not exceed 1,000 per year. In contrast, with an estimated 400,000 wartime emancipations, by mid-1863 the rate was closer to 1,000 every two or three days.159

At Memphis, Maj. Gen. Stephen Hurlbut knew that even with the Emancipation Proclamation he had no direct authority over this growing host. Their movement posed “no difficulty when troops are in the field in their limited camps,” the general admitted, “but when the lines enclose a vast space of country, or fence in, as here, a great city, this incursion of ungoverned persons, without employment and subject to no discipline, becomes vitally
serious.” He was correct. The Proclamation only recommended the use of adult, able-bodied males within the armed forces. For the great remaining masses, the edict vaguely suggested that they refrain from violence and seek “reasonable wages.” Thus, many escapees quite naturally sought wages from the largest employer on the continent.

Understandably, Hurlbut began to fear that winning the war potentially meant losing all known forms of social order. In late March 1863 he wrote directly to his commander-in-chief expressing several dire concerns, including the perception that Tennessee had become “wholly deprived of all the machinery by which civil government operates.” Memphis itself was nearing a breaking point. The sheer weight of refugees, mostly impoverished women and children, and those immediately outside his jurisdiction were becoming so destitute that he believed “I see nothing before them but disease and death.” No police force existed save for the already overtaxed army. Courts had ceased operating. Continuous foraging and guerilla warfare steadily and widely reduced farms to wilderness. As for the region’s peculiar institution, “it is impossible for anyone to say whether the state of slavery exists or not.” Congress had to act, Hurlbut warned, for crises were transcending mere military necessity. “The evil is pressing, the necessity for prompt action paramount.” From his vantage, the valleys of the Cumberland, Mississippi, and Tennessee verged on the anarchic.

Hurlbut’s angst paradoxically stemmed from Federal military successes and the self-liberation of thousands of enslaved people. By the summer of 1863 the new strategy of establishing fortified corridors - and the rate of slave escapes – both began to accelerate, especially after the fall of Vicksburg. Yet this expanding use of fortressed occupation and the rise of contraband immigration also became increasingly unsustainable for the U.S. War Department. Vanquishing enemy combatants, pacifying citizens, and tending to tens of
thousands on the verge of starvation proved beyond Federal military capacity. Combat they could manage, but as Hurlbut attested, his officers and men were not equipped or trained for nation-building. That responsibility, including the administering of national loyalty oaths, technically belonged to the State Department. If Congress would not act on the rising tide of contrabands (and they generally did not), the Army would be forced to experiment as best they could.

With the luxury of hindsight, it can be said that the Federal military came far closer to a national solution than did their directors in office. Yet both groups made a fundamental error in their planning. They assumed the overriding question was a political one.

Stationed at Murfreesboro, 21 year-old Benjamin Baker of the 25th Illinois made a compelling observation. The lauded (and lampooned) Emancipation Proclamation meant little to the slave unless she or he reached a secure Union area, and even then the Proclamation became *legis ex post facto* for the individual.164 The word “freedom” itself seemed unsuitable, according to a white Union soldier at Corinth. He viewed the incoming contraband as worse off than those who were said to have followed Moses, as the majority of escapees had almost nothing with them; in fact “they hardly escaped with their lives.”165 Another soldier recalled shooting a hog and removing its entrails, and then watching a contraband summarily grab the innards and then disappear into a camp shelter.166 Lethargic legislation was not going to stabilize their immediate crises.

What many northern soldiers could not recognize was that the seemingly most destitute and disheveled contrabands were among the most entrepreneurial. Surviving off of entrails and sporadic rations, constructing shelters from discarded tents and lumber, venturing alone or in small groups into heavily-armed and menacing forts, or inventing their own employment after
reaching such places embodied risk and experimentation. \(^{167}\) Escapees left owners not to avoid work but to exercise greater ownership of their own labor. Many risked lethal dangers and an unknowable future to enter into the capitalist system as their own employee. \(^{168}\)

One remarkable letter from a soldier in Memphis demonstrated how observers could recognize entrepreneurial behavior within an individual yet still view a race as property rather than persons. Writing to his father from his office inside Fort Pickering, William Shepherd of the 1st Illinois Light Infantry reported:

> About the “Light Colored Contraband” I really don’t know what to say. You seem to know more about the shipping of Negroes north than I do. Memphis is not the place, however. All such business is done at Cairo, I guess, as several boatloads have been shipped from this place to Cairo. There is not a contraband darkey girl in the city that is good for anything. Generally every one are field hands and know nothing about the duties of a servant girl. Our little colored boy up to camp, twelve years old, is worth a dozen such girls as we have for our messing the office, and we think we have done well...Of course it would be bad policy for me to steal one away. Is there any one in our place that has a contraband? \(^{169}\)

The plan did have some drawbacks, as Shepherd admitted. Much like colonization, it was a prohibitively expensive plan to implement, even on a personal level. “It would cost a great deal to ship one to you,” he informed the potential employer, “and as I am not to start for Kenosha immediately, I could not bring one.”\(^{170}\) To return home with hired help was not an isolated dream by any means. One Northern soldier in Middle Tennessee actually saw it happening in his sleep.
In his diary he wrote, “I slept so well and dreamt of home and wife and mother with several Negroes.”\textsuperscript{171} Serving in the fortifications at Helena, Arkansas, Charles Musser of the 29\textsuperscript{th} Iowa told his father “I expect [I] will be so lazy when I get home…[I will] have to import Some darkies. They are a very good Substitute for work hands.”\textsuperscript{172}

Such were piecemeal visions of the larger strategy, to have escapees shipped to areas where cheap labor was in high demand. In the camps and forts at Cairo, Illinois, the contraband population fluctuated between 2,000 and 6,000, mostly from Tennessee. Seen for what they essentially were, displaced persons, their status simply became amplified. Some were shipped as far away as Minnesota.\textsuperscript{173}

Such stubborn problems of distant displacement, bewildered commanders, starving contrabands, widespread disease, and dreams of cheap labor are uncomfortable counters to the triumphant emancipation narrative. Even less inviting is the way these hardships can be falsely interpreted as evidence in favor of the “better off in slavery” mythology that remained so tenacious within white mindsets. There is a redemptive quality to thinking as Vitor Izecksohn does in \textit{Slavery and War: Race, Citizenship, and State Building in the United States and Brazil, 1861-1870} (2014). Therein he argues that the “army occupation in the South brought irreversible transformations to the status of African Americans that were fast and permanent.”\textsuperscript{174} Certainly the Emancipation Proclamation has its dedicated admirers. In their article on nineteenth-century nation-state creation in North America and France, Stephen Sawyer and William J. Novak go so far as to dub Lincoln’s edict as “one of the first acts of the modern American liberal state.”\textsuperscript{175} But this dissertation takes the position that neither occupation nor a proclamation was a great leap forward.\textsuperscript{176} Instead, the argument here is that by themselves they were essentially iterations trying to grind out a modicum of forward progress. In tandem however, and strengthened by the
gradual inclusion of African American labor, they proved to be enormously successful in acquiring the nation’s great middle ground. Neither a return to slave societies nor total abolition was feasible in 1863. War Democrats and radical Republicans were going to remain in opposition to each other. The humanity of enslaved women, let alone enslaved males, was still an exceedingly divisive issue among loyalists. But the use of forts in the Western Theater provided a means by which even the most ardent enemies within the Union could act anew, even if many did not wish to think anew.

The use of African Americans in garrison roles proved palatable for conservatives like Brig. Gen. Steven Burbridge. A Kentuckian and slave owner, Burbridge warned that his class in the Bluegrass State would refuse cooperation of any kind, even at a bounty of $300 per slave, if the administration insisted on placing African Americans in combat roles. It was acceptable for him and his fellow conservatives, even preferable according to many, to place freedmen in the “lesser” positions of guarding rail lines and manning bastions. The Union needed more white men in the assumed critical positions of front line engagement.177

For many African Americans, these posts were far from menial. It was in the shadow of Union fortresses, with their batteries, bayonets, and provosts, where the enslaved first saw their masters lose hegemony. Far from mere symbols of Federal power, forts were the means to freedmen power. While on picket at Gallatin, Tennessee, Joseph Wilson of the 14th USCT basked in the fulfillment of encountering former slave owners who did not have proper documentation. The poetic role reversal of taking planters to Northern authorities was the very definition of freedom to him.178
Much has been written on those very same military authorities resisting black service, especially concerning their archetype Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman. In his view, it was unlikely the people of color could make good soldiers, but their ability to labor was a proven entity, as was his overriding need for such workers. As late as his push through Georgia, Sherman insisted, “I believe that negroes better serve the Army as teamsters, pioneers, and servants, and have no objection to the surplus, if any, being enlisted as soldiers, but I must have labor and large quantities of it.” What should be taken into account was Sherman’s belief that the best places for African Americans to gradually “experiment in the art of the soldier” was to
garrison fortified areas. His top choices were “Memphis, Vicksburg, Natchez, Nashville, and Chattanooga.”

The standard modern storyline on conservatives such as Sherman is that they finally found revelation by witnessing black regiments act with aplomb in combat – the triumphant narrative of racial dignity via trial-by-fire. In reality, shifts in white attitudes including Sherman’s were much slower, piecemeal, and pragmatic. The stage upon which this less dramatic scenario played out was usually in a garrison. Indeed the Emancipation Proclamation said nothing of combat roles, only garrison and guard work, yet it was this long mutual exposure rather than the flash of battle that brought the greatest change in perceptions. Assistant Secretary of War Charles Dana noted that close proximity and prolonged service were the factors that caused the greatest erosion of resistance.

Sometimes the shift towards humanism came by way of a simple change in wardrobe. For some Northern soldiers, their first close contact with enslaved were when the latter came to them as escapees, clothed in tatters and wracked with disease. This condition often solidified racial attitudes. Yet when able-bodied African American males joined the USCT, their transformation in appearance led many to question their initial perceptions. Stationed at Nashville in late 1863, Elihu Wadsworth saw thousands of contraband around him, but he told his brother that the growing number of USCT recruits gave a different impression. “It would do you good to see those ragged men come in and put on a suit of U.S. cloth. When they learn they are free men they stand up their full height.” Col. Robert Cowden of the 59th USCT summed up the transformation in less elegant terms, but he did reflect how sudden the new impression could take hold; “Yesterday a filthy repulsive ‘nigger,’ today a neatly-attired man.”
Most often white soldiers expressed a measure of respect, even gratitude, when they saw arduous labor that bettered their own fortified area. Benjamin McIntyre at Fort Brown in Brownsville, Texas provided an insight to what could be achieved through a black regiment:

At this place forts and fortifications were to be made requiring the labor of hundreds of men for months. Streets were to be swept and cleaned daily and this is the work of a very disagreeable character and for one I thank the originators of the Corps d’Afrique for taking from us such labor as belong to menials. Today their whole force is at work and hour after hour through the long hours under the heat of a scorching sun they labor and bring their works of labor to perfection. They are a fine looking set of men – all fair specimen of their native Africa.\textsuperscript{184}

 Civilians too first encountered black soldiers not on the battlefield but in their occupied towns. In October 1863, the Nashville Daily Press reported “Our citizens saw, for the first time, a regiment of colored troops marching through the streets of Nashville.” Even for white Unionists, this vision could be discomforting, but it was among the first concrete indications that African Americans preferred to serve the Union more readily than their former masters.\textsuperscript{185}

Many young African American men saw their relationships changing as well, not just in their separation from a former owner, but also in their quantifiable connection with the Federal government. A teenage slave of the Carothers east of Franklin ran away during the first years of the war. Joining the USCT and eventually fighting in the Battle of Nashville, he returned on furlough to pay an amicable visit to Ms. Carothers. Though glad to see him, she reportedly asked
why he felt the need to fight her, to which he responded, “No’m, I ain’t fighting you, I’m fighting to be free.”

Many white males in the Union army began to view African American soldiers as their own ticket to freedom, to get the war over with and return home. Some expressed hope that African Americans could find liberty, but nearly all were more interested in their own liberation back to civilian life. For one white soldier witnessing the formation of the 55th USCT at fortified Corinth, he stated confidently that the best thing about these black soldiers was that they were not copperheads.

Speaking of those still at home, their newfound incentive to support African American recruitment involved the recent unpleasantness of the national draft. Passed in March 1863, its implementation began that summer, and with it came a sudden surge of northern governors and young white males of military age suddenly pushing for greater black participation. When the Lincoln administration mentioned that African Americans could be counted towards volunteer quotas, Col. R.D. Mussey in Middle Tennessee reported “I had received numerous letters from loyal Kentuckians praying for the formation of colored regiments in their state.”

To that end, the War Department moved faster than their commander in chief. Stanton had already installed West Point graduate Lorenzo Thomas as the de facto director of recruitment in the Mississippi Valley. Discovering no consistent policy from post to post, Thomas decided to make one, with an emphasis on forming infantry and artillery units. In the autumn of 1863, Stanton placed George L. Stearns, one of the main architects of the 54th and 55th Massachusetts Regiments, at the head of affairs for USCT formation in the Army of the Cumberland.

The ensuing buildup of recruitment centers revealed the Above Ground Railroad, with its stations at rail and river strongholds anchored by Union forts. Fair representatives of this
widespread flight are the 288 USCT recruits known to have been born in Williamson County, Tennessee (see APPENDIX B). Five of the men were mustered in at their county seat of Franklin and its complex of Fort Granger. Twenty-three were inducted at Fort Pickering in Memphis. Thirty entered into the service at Fortress Rosecrans. No fewer than eighty five made their mark at Nashville. From Helena, Arkansas to Knoxville, Tennessee, with the exception of the few who made it to northern states, all entered employment in the United States government through forts. Strongholds in the Mississippi Valley alone inducted more than 78,000 men, or approximately 40 percent of all who served in the USCT. 190

The Impact of Public Works

In the last two years of the war, some of the most stable areas in the South usually shared two overriding characteristics – moderately garrisoned Union fortress systems and a resulting Federal/freedmen/citizen interdependence. In need of several thousand copies of his loyalty oath form, Capt. Francis Moore of the 2nd Illinois Cavalry ventured out of Fort Pillow in search of a printer. He soon came upon the office of a rather secessionist paper, and the proprietor refused to honor the request. After Moore threatened him with irons and a guard, the erstwhile Confederate “worked like a little pro until midnight.” After the job was completed, much to the printer’s surprise, Moore paid him. From that point after, Moore found him to be “the most pleased man and the best friend I had in town.” 191 From the personal to the pragmatic, business relations frequently transcended social, political and even racial boundaries. Merchants and traders in all forms congregated around places like Fort Pillow in West Tennessee and Fort Harker near Stevenson, Alabama, turning them into quasi commercial districts. From bartering apples to peddling shoes, commerce was king within the courts of occupation. 192 Nothing of course
compared to the lure of profits from cotton, prices of which had more than doubled in Liverpool and had risen fivefold domestically since the start of the war. In 1863 as was the case in 1860, the centers of trade were Memphis, Helena, and New Orleans. The situation presented many with new opportunities for upward economic mobility. Taking the oath enabled the “middling folk” to trade with Union officials, and to usurp the positions of deported, exiled, or jailed elite secessionists.

The work of Alan Taylor speaks loudly in such cases. As Taylor aptly shows in his studies of North American colonization, the War of 1812, and other creatively destructive ventures, alleged “borderlands” were places of synthesis more than separation, of cautious interdependence more than virulent separation, even in times of war. Likewise, the secured areas around Union occupation forts go far in dispelling the “total war” theme that occasionally resurfaces in Civil War studies. The once influential *Embattled Courage* by Gerald Linderman in 1987 contends that “by 1864 the Civil War had expanded beyond the battlefield to encompass a warfare of terror directed primarily against the civilian population of the Confederacy.” Carter Malkasian’s 2002 *A History of Modern Wars of Attrition* describes the Union strategy in the Deep South as “pursuing total aims directly through brutally devastating an enemy’s military resources or attempting to annihilate enemy manpower.”

The total war argument appears valid when reading about the initial waves of destruction, but it rarely takes into account what was created in its stead. For example, a member of the 33rd Indiana Infantry offered a stark assessment of a town he once considered beautiful:

Franklin is war worn. The shattered glass in her churches and school houses, her lonely streets and the closed shutters of her store houses, the battered doors and
ruined machinery of her manufactories, and above all that deathlike, breathless silence, that absence of all sound, that can be felt nowhere but at the desolate hearthstone, here reigns supreme.¹⁹⁹

At first glance, this passage can seem even more shocking considering it was written more than a year before the horrific Battle of Franklin, but it does not show the considerable reengineering that occurred in the interim. In the case of this small town, the massive garrison of ten thousand men eventually downsized to one thousand, roughly equal to the local population. The ensuing easing of tensions allowed for a reconstruction of trade. Proto-capitalism sprouted in the form of sutlers expanding their business to civilians. Loyalist shopkeepers tested the waters next, offering dry goods and dentistry, seed and precious livestock to starving markets, while risking local boycotts and violent retaliations. Whatever citizens would not buy, the soldiers would.²⁰⁰

What often boosted the economies to new levels were the things the U.S. military was made to do—engineering. Rail and road repair, barracks construction, material purchases, and river spans were almost exclusively for military purposes, but the effect upon adjacent populations sometimes resembled a kind of nineteenth-century New Deal. Federal work projects took over where local economies had collapsed. Supported by new taxes and unprecedented governmental involvement, infrastructure improvements also benefited from the assistance of private entities such as the Western Sanitary Commission, church organizations, East Tennessee Relief Association (founded in Knoxville), the Christian Commission, and entrepreneurs.²⁰¹ In Murfreesboro, pro-Confederate John C. Spence admitted the Federal occupation had its material advantages. “There is very good order kept about the streeds [sic]. Guards about the corners.
Soldiers generally kept close to their quarters, not allowed to visit about citizens houses and they were wont to do the last year…the order suits well all around.” At Fort Brown in June 1864, Benjamin McIntyre wrote, “Our military authorities seem doing at Uncle Sam’s expense for the place what the inhabitants cannot do for themselves.” With considerable help from African Americans, the garrison evidently painted and whitewashed churches, cleaned sidewalks, improved roads, and provided rations and shelters for loyalists in need. They also formed a Temperance Society, installed a telegraph service, and built a rail spur.

With most shops closed in war-ravaged Chattanooga, the population relied heavily on boxes and barrels stamped “U.S.” for their everyday provisions. They also relied on the protection of Federal offensive positions that buffered the city, including Battery Coolidge, Fort Cameron, Fort Crutchfield, Fort Jones, Redoubt Carpenter, Fort Sherman, and others. Able to conduct public works in this safe zone, the army and freedmen built new bridges, constructed and repaired roads, fabricated an iron-rolling mill and operated a grist mill. Federals and African Americans also established a fire department and made a reservoir for city water, both of which Chattanooga did not have before the war. Officers in confiscated homes bought want ads in the reborn Gazette asking for a different kind of union. One sought a housekeeper, though the requirements included youth (not older than thirty), being single (widows welcome), and preferably a woman of “personal attraction.” Another simply wanted to share his new domicile with any female unionist who desired to become a “helpmate.”

Stability also meant bringing wives and family in from the North, and family outings were an increasing possibility. Within a year of the “Battle above the Clouds,” Lookout Mountain became a popular picnic site, as did the hilltops near the fortified city of Huntsville, Alabama. At that hotspot, loyalists and Federals enjoyed fish fries, dances, high tea and town
dinners “for the elders.” The 59th Indiana, among other regiments, brought their wives down for weeks on end. At Natchez, Brig. Gen. Walter Gresham enjoyed the company of his wife at Natchez for two whole months.

Freed persons also used fortified areas of their own construction to establish and maintain marriages, because many were not confident that bonds created in slavery were valid in emancipation. Corp. Austin Andrew of the 12th Illinois at Corinth recalled seeing nearly forty weddings on a single Sunday. In March of 1864, Elihu Wadsworth helped organize twenty-three weddings complete with certificates for the brides. Some of the couples, he noted, had been together for a decade.\(^\text{207}\)

Though short of granting or considering citizenship for African Americans, Federal officials and freed persons themselves became more adamant about using what was immediately available. By late 1863 and into 1864, consumption and destruction continued, but the evolving trend was one of symbolic and concrete reuse and the attempt of freed persons to reallocate and reinvent themselves. Such was the case at the mansion of Douglas Walworth, adjutant general to William T. Martin in the CSA. Walworth’s loss of social leverage became publicly apparent when Federals and contrabands converted his Natchez estate, called Elmo, into a freedman’s school.\(^\text{208}\) In 1864 Huntsville, the same innovation occurred with a white church.\(^\text{209}\) USCT soldiers as well as family members built a schoolhouse next to their camp at Memphis, and proceeded to learn composition and reading from a regimental chaplain and his spouse. By 1865 the former slave society of Natchez, Mississippi contained eleven African American schools with more than one thousand pupils.\(^\text{210}\)

Unionists and freed persons were not the only ones who could benefit from the safety of fortresses, especially the wealthy “trapped” inside the larger cities. Two weeks after the bloody
Battle of Nashville, the pro-Confederate Craigheads dined on eggs, duck, two turkeys, and chicken. To stem the tide of contagion and repair damaged infrastructure after a siege and battle, U.S. Grant ordered weeks of continuous cleanup of Knoxville. An editor in 1863 occupied Little Rock, Arkansas marveled at the pace of revitalization within the city. “The streets are filled with a restless, quick-motioned business people,” he observed. “Every store and storehouse is full, drays and wagons crowd the streets; two theaters are in full blast, and all is bustle and business.”

Of all the acts of creative destruction, arguably the most subtle yet impactful was the introduction of Federal legal tender. Barely a year old when it first arrived in occupied areas, the U.S. Treasury note often made a negative first impression, as civilians friendly to Richmond often considered greenbacks as yet another form of invasion. One Federal soldier in Middle Tennessee recalled going to a farm house to purchase a turkey. When he offered greenbacks in exchange, the matriarch reportedly said, in so many words, that it was unworthy to be used as a bathroom tissue. Harsh feelings may have endured, but many civilians warmed up to greenbacks by the summer of 1863 when the Confederate dollar began to rapidly decline.

While sweethearts in grey were going long periods without grey-backs, Union soldiers – especially those quartered in fortresses along river and rail hubs – frequently sent and received cash and checks from family and quartermasters. At that time the U.S. Treasury Department authorized, through yet another task carried out by the military, the issuance of “goods, wares, and merchandise” to local markets in areas under stable Federal occupation. Situated between the fortresses of Nashville and Murfreesboro, and further protected by local forts and earthworks, the residents of Williamson County were allotted $40,000 worth of commodities, and their allowance was among the more modest. Between December 1863 and October 1864, Arkansas
received nearly $2 million worth of consumer goods for purchase, all of which was distributed to
the fortified positions of Devall’s Bluff, Fayetteville, Fort Smith, Helena, Little Rock, and Pine
Bluff. 215 To solidify cooperation among citizens, local persons who had taken the oath of
allegiance were hired to monitor the program. 216

The Federal government also provided consumers, primarily blue bellies with green
notes. Along the secessionist countryside leading to the Union earthworks at Triune, a column of
regiments were ambushed, with snacks. Said one soldier:

Quite a traffic in leathery pies and buttermilk has sprung up along the road.
Almost every house you pass on the route is an improvised refreshment saloon,
and there are numerous stands by the roadside where sweaty infantrymen, train
guards and wagon men may be cajoled to pat with their “infant greenbacks.” 217

Rather than taking a wary stance, the volunteer felt as if his scrip had suddenly become a
means to an end, adding, “This love of United States paper money I hail as an encouraging sign
of a strong, growing Union sentiment in Middle Tennessee.” 218 In Memphis in July 1863, an
observer happy noted, “The stores, markets, hotels, theaters, etc. are liberally patronized by the
Union troops, who spend a good deal of good money in the city.” 219 In many fort towns, the
greater fear among soldiers was not the threat of a Confederate attack but the possibility of
getting gouged at the local market on payday. “Greenbacks seem very plenty today,” wrote a
member of the Fort Brown garrisons in 1864, “and every article of Merchandise seems to have
advanced five hundred percent.” 220
What federal garrisons and African American laborers created in these fort towns were operational city-states. In the incremental, experimental effort to “save the Union,” the U.S. War Department eventually created forts in areas deemed militarily critical. Almost invariably, these positions were in fact commercial sites and transportation hubs. As such, they possessed components necessary to function as market economies, but they could not do so if operated only by the Federal military, or the indigenous (largely secessionist) white citizenry, or the recently self-liberated.

Through the unlikely concert of these three disparate groups, and proximities to similarly positioned and populated fort towns, sustainable city-states emerged. Armed and consistently garrisoned bastions, batteries, checkpoints increasingly prevented the occurrence of destabilizing battles, raids, and skirmishes. In turn the daily needs of large garrisons provided a ready consumer base for local merchants, farmers, and laborers both skilled and unskilled.

The issuance of loyalty oaths (effectively commercial contracts), federally and commercially supplied finished products and foodstuffs, in creation of public works projects, and the introduction of a relatively stable and standard currency further stabilized these emerging city-states. Notably many of these sites emerged and functioned several hundred miles into the interior of a steadily deterioration and decentralizing nation-state.

The cumulative effect of these urban and suburban sites, based at least in principle on wage-labor capitalism, could have replaced the old order of that struggling nation-state, a planter-directed society based heavily on slave-labor capitalism. Unfortunately, the U.S. military spent the remainder of the war not in augmenting the wage-labor system emerging in those fortified city-states. Instead, the strategy became one of reintroducing freed persons back into a rural planation-based system managed by marginally-vetted white directors. The result would be
the otherwise evolving city-states suffering losses of much-needed African American laborers, and the condemnation of these laborers into an antiquated and rigid iteration of rural slavery based on tenancy and sharecropping, with coinciding restrictions on economic and physical mobility arbitrarily based on age, gender, and race.
“When Genl. [William] Benton heard of the surrender of the reb army and fleet, he mounted his horse, rode out to where the boys were at work on the fort, rose up among them and said, ‘Boys, the war is over, throw down your spades and let the fort go to H_ll. We don’t want it.’”

Charles Musser, 29th Iowa Infantry
Fort Stoddert, Alabama, May 7, 1865

In a counterintuitive move, the U.S. War Department began to disassemble their fortified positions soon after the sites became stable. In addition, seeking to keep only able-bodied males, the Federal government and its military aimed to dispense with the rest – the great majority of contrabands - by placing them on nearby “secured” farmlands. These actions largely dissolved functioning city-states and returned freed persons to the plantation labor system.

Regression for the Liberated

These policy reversals stemmed partly from a belief that “inactivity” among contrabands fostered, in the words of Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas, “idleness, sickness, and disease.”
In turn, Thomas issued a Western Theater directive from occupied Vicksburg in August 1863. By the authority of Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, all able-bodied male escapees within Union-held areas were to apply for military service. To reduce the tide of women, children, and the elderly, Thomas instructed all relatives of escaped men “to remain on the plantations or elsewhere where they have heretofore been in a state of fortitude, provided such place be under the control of the National troops.” Non-military contrabands already within fortified areas were to accept employment in these collective farms, some of which were protected by stockades and blockhouses.

Through the ominously-titled Subsistence Department, Thomas installed multiple sites along much of the lower Mississippi Valley. Other commanding officers followed suit. Thomas and Brig. Gen. Grenville Dodge established similar systems around Corinth, as did Maj. Gen. Stephen Hurlbut in western Tennessee. Colonel M. Larue Harrison set up over a dozen such places in Arkansas by end of 1864. In February 1865, the Democrat-leaning St. Louis paper *Missouri Republican* praised Federal efforts to keep refugee children out of the city and on distant Missouri farms “to earn their own living,” adding, “Nothing is more injurious to children than to supply all their wants, without their making an effort for themselves.” Across the state, agrarian compounds dotted the landscape from Fort Scott in western Missouri to Fort Davidson along the state’s eastern border.

The creation of African American wage labor in the agrarian sector could have presumably pleased many on the political spectrum, from hardline conservatives to radical socialists, but the fundamental goal among its authors was to rid fortified areas of a supposed surplus of contrabands. One of the chief problems with its implementation was the inherent vulnerability of rural sites, the very environments that so many contrabands risked their lives to
escape. Even with an armed Union presence, African Americans suffered mightily when re-injected into the hinterland, primarily from raiding parties. On August 1, 1864, Brig. Gen. Napoleon Bonaparte Buford, his hundreds of cavalry troopers, and his USCT battery failed to stop an estimated 800 irregulars from kidnapping hundreds of black and white laborers from confiscated plantations forty miles northeast of Little Rock, Arkansas. “They did not attack either of my two forts on the plantations,” Buford informed his superiors, “but [the raiders] have taken off the people and movables from two-thirds of the places.”10 Time and again, other experiments and their inhabitants suffered similar fates, particularly along the Mississippi Valley.

Historian Ronald Davis calculates that at Natchez, it was unsafe for anyone associated with the Union garrison to live more than two miles away from the city’s defenses.11 By the summer of 1864 for example, thirty-seven free-labor plantations operated within a day’s march of the river town and Fort McPherson, and all of them were susceptible to guerilla raids. Some suffered multiple strikes over the course of a few weeks.12 In the Natchez region, plantation manager Thomas Knox recalled, “Nearly every day I heard of a fresh raid on our neighborhood, though, after the first half-dozen visits, I could not learn that the guerillas carried away anything, for the simple reason there was nothing left to steal. Some of the negroes remained at home, while others fled to the military posts for protection.”13 Knox attempted to make his two leased plantations work, until mounted raiders took more than a score of the farms’ horses and mules, kidnapped nineteen laborers, and murdered one of his managers.14

Some officers, including West Mississippi Military District Commander Major Gen. E.R.S. Canby, pleaded for abandonment of the leased planation system altogether. In its place Canby recommended creation self-guarded colonies. Federally supplied and armed,
interconnected into defensive enclaves, these positions were to employ the proven paradigm of fortified zones.15 In a December 1864 letter to Stanton, Canby championed the formation of an “active, enterprising, and arms bearing population, and the establishment of a system of military colonies capable of protecting themselves against anything except organized invasion.” The colonists should be put into military organizations, armed and equipped at the expense of the United States, and mustered into its service for the special duty of preserving the plantations from raids and approaches from the districts under the control of the rebels.”16 The proposal was not implemented, despite the paradigm’s success elsewhere.

Another setback for freed people involved an endemic infrequency of payment.17 In November 1863, when the American Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission asked Maj. Gen. George Stearns how African American laborers and soldiers were paid in Nashville, Stearns answered directly, “They have never been paid. Such examples are everywhere.”18 According to Stearns, the primary problem was the Federal government’s inability “to decide whether the Negro or his master should be paid.” Even with guaranteed monthly stipends to USCT enlisted, Stearns warned that families of the servicemen had no way of reliably receiving any income themselves, regardless of their employment status.19 For African Americans working on fortifications, the financial plight appeared very much the same; by April 1863, forts, blockhouses, and miles of trench works grew by the week in Nashville, but pay did not. Of nearly $86,000 owed to labors, less than $14,000 had been received.20 In December 1863, Secretary Stanton sent Brig. Gen. James S. Wadsworth westward to monitor the progress of contraband labor, where the inspector subsequently discovered conditions similar to involuntary servitude. Wadsworth expressed fears of an emerging type of serfdom, yet he still entertained hopes that the free marketing of said labor would someday “make the people of the South homogenous with those of the North.”21
Notably, Wadsworth did not specify whether his definition of “people” included all southerners or just landowning whites.

In late 1863, James Yeatman of the Western Sanitary Commission inspected contraband camps along the Mississippi, including several near Fort Grant at Vicksburg, Fort Curtis in Helena, and the three large camps near Fort Pickering at Memphis (Camp Fiske, Camp Shiloh, and President’s Island).22 He determined that most critical long term need involved proper payment:

Make them realize that they are freemen; and to make them do this they must be treated as such and paid as such…if they are employed as blacksmiths and carpenters, they must be paid as such. A man worth thirty, forty, fifty, or seventy-five dollars per month, should not be forced to give his labor for less, or be hired out at seven dollars per month. They should be permitted to seek their own occupation.23

With few exceptions, plantation managers were in charge of payment, punishment, equipment, and local stores. By Federal contract, at least half of monthly wages were deferred until year’s end, theoretically to ensure that laborers fulfilled their year-long contracts.24 On March 11, 1864, Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas issued General Order No. 9 from Union occupied Vicksburg. The announcement stipulated that plantation work would be conducted through one-year contracts. However, idleness would be considered a crime. Wages were $10 per month for an adult male, $7 for females, $5 for teenagers, minus expenses and reprimands for any deemed infraction, including “feigned” illness, arriving late to any assigned task,
breakage or loss of tools, etc.\textsuperscript{25} The work and hours were arduous, with a minimum requirement of ten hours labor per day during most of the year, and nine hours per day in winter.\textsuperscript{26}

Almost invariably the experiment failed, in no small part from African Americans resisting the arbitrary authority of overseers and managers who assumed that the prewar labor-relationship of owner and owned was still a valid and acceptable mode of production. Yet for thousands of escapees who had experienced at least a degree entrepreneurial opportunity within fortified city-states from which they were so recently removed, many simply focused on their own labor needs. Previously successful in their flight to Union forts, and the survival of their stay therein, many freed persons remained committed intent to enter the capitalist system as their own employee, as an innovation of the self.\textsuperscript{27}

Perhaps the greatest challenge to freed peoples was the continuous threat of displacement. Having functioned for so long without pay or civil liberties, the enslaved survived instead through immediate support networks, particularly familial ties. Yet Federal mandates that funneled adult males into uniform and their kinship into remote locales tended to perpetuate one of the most traumatic and unsettling events for the enslaved, that of separation. Unlike most white and free black servicemen north or south, most contrabands had no home to which they could return, not to mention their continuing lack of income, low rates of literacy, and undefined citizenship. In turn, family members could be and often were shipped hundreds of miles away. For example, women and children from the Chattanooga area were sent as far away as the Mississippi Valley to work on plantations run by whites deemed loyal to the Union.\textsuperscript{28}

As Federal occupation spread and solidified, so did this displacement of “less useful” women, children, elderly, and disabled. Late in the war, an unforeseen phenomenon only added to this rejection and relocation. In January 1865, Union Provost Marshal for Northwest Missouri
John Tyler described the emerging willingness among slave holders to rid themselves of their undesirable property as well. “[B]eing found rather unprofitable, and expensive,” Tyler reported, owners were increasingly “hauling them within a convenient distance of some military post, and then set them out with orders to never return home – telling them they are free.”

While Union fortification and occupation certainly did not invent the marginalization of races, genders, classes and age groups, it clearly illustrated the continuing sociopolitical valuation of adult males over the majority of the population. In effect, as the war progressed, Union fortified zones became dumping grounds of the economically unwanted. Stationed in occupied Chattanooga in 1865, a former slave from Missouri wrote to Edwin Stanton explaining the miserable effect of such practices, stating:

the Colored Men of these 44th and 16th and 18th [USCT Infantry Regiments] there
Wives is Scatered abut over the world without pertioction and Sufference
condishtion and there Husband is here and have not seen there Faimlys for 2 years
and more.³⁰

Later that year, fellow soldier Calvin Holly stationed at Vicksburg voiced similar concerns to the Freedmen’s Bureau, forecasting the return of the old order. He wrote of women and children “being knocked down for saying they are free, while a great many are being worked just as the ust [sic] to be when Slaves, without any compensation,” and this within a designated secure area of Union occupation. If freed peoples could not be fully protected by the U.S. military or the return of family members in the service, argued Holly, then at the very least the federal government could guarantee the right for the vulnerable to carry their own weapons.
With considerable foresight, Private Holly predicted the lack of such protections would result in loss of African American life and a return to the “farms.”

This counterreformation of the plantation did not necessarily condemn all escapees to a continued state of virtual slavery. Many resisted a return to the countryside, opting instead to remain in fortified urban areas or move out of the slave south altogether. John Rodrigue makes the compelling argument at the Louisiana delta sugar industry, with its technology-driven and time-sensitive production needs, enabled freed persons to exercise considerable leverage in negotiating payment for their skills. Yet by comparison, as Rodrigue observes, workers in less industrialized grain, tobacco, and cotton agricultural operations did not possess such leverage and thus were thus subjected to a tenancy work environment similar to slavery. For this latter group, the U.S. War Department fundamentally failed to maintain their reallocate labor within the protected city-states. In the end, Edwin Stanton and his institution reversed the process of creative destruction that had actually helped them win a military victory, and it may have helped them win a more relevant political and economic victory once the fighting had ceased. Ultimately, the end result was a return of the rigid, counter-innovation labor process that failed to optimize the innovative potential of the working class.

It is fair to note that this regressive process of placing escapees back into plantation systems, which occurred during the war, ran directly counter to Abraham Lincoln’s own long-held view of natural economic progression in its relation to labor. Once more, this reversal of the creative destruction process transpired primarily in the Western Theater, involving the region from which Lincoln had lived most of his life yet had not visited once during the whole of the war. As his biographer Gabor Boritt has aptly documented, Lincoln viewed enslavement as more an artificial interruption of economic progress than as a problem of racial injustice. On many
instances in public and private, Lincoln described the natural life-cycle of the laborer as working for someone in youth, working for oneself in adulthood, and employing others in later age. On a macroeconomic level, even during his presidency, Lincoln exercised Whig principles of using governmental credit and capital to assist market innovation and growth, as exemplified by the wartime passage and signing of the Legal Tender Act, the Land Grant Act, the Homestead Act, and the Pacific Railway Act, yet the inherent flaw of returning urbanizing and specializing labor to the confines of an outdated production model did not incur his interference.

**Evacuating the City-States**

Unfortunately for fortress-area African Americans who managed to elude exportation back into the countryside, and for the relatively stable and protected city-states altogether, the War Department ultimately opted to dismantle fortified sites faster than they were created. The resulting evacuations created power vacuums into which the old guard of white property owners quickly reentered. Some relinquishments transpired well before the end of military fighting. When Federal troops started to pull out of northern Mississippi in January 1864, military and civilian Confederates quickly filled the void. As one person put it, “we can bring our niggers back now, the d____d Yankees have left Corinth.” That April at Fort Pillow, hardened Confederates made clear that clannish terror was already in motion. After overrunning the fortifications, soldiers under Nathan Bedford Forrest killed or mortally wounded more than 270 Union soldiers, many of them African Americans who had already surrendered. The loss constituted roughly 50 percent of the Federal garrison. Fear of similar collapses spread elsewhere and almost always crossed racial lines. Along the Rio Grande, Unionist African Americans, Hispanics, and whites became so dependent on Fort Brown’s protection that when
the Federal army evacuated it in July 1864, hundreds of families went with the army or left for Mexico or New Orleans.  

Yet the wartime loss of entrenched garrisons was rare. From 1863 to 1865, the Union lost or abandoned very few forts, by far the most conspicuous being Fort Pillow. Otherwise, the Federal “defense in depth” was so well established that whole bases like Pillow could be lost and yet the solidity of occupation endured. In late September 1864, Nathan Bedford Forrest and his troopers overran fortifications near Athens, Alabama but were unable to advance beyond stronger works at nearby Huntsville. Confederates reoccupied an abandoned Corinth in the fall of 1864, enabling John Bell Hood and 30,000 men to launch one last grand Confederate offensive into Tennessee, yet a series of Union defenses steadily ate away their numbers. Actions against black and white Union garrisons at Decatur, Alabama and Pulaski, Tennessee slowed Hood’s advance. A massive and bloody reduction at Franklin, authored in part by Union artillery shelling Hood’s legions from the safety of Fort Granger, weakened the last large mobile Confederate army even further. When Hood’s men eventually reached the ramparts of Nashville, the bastioned city appeared so daunting that the “Gallant Hood” could only sit and stare as the icy rains of December pelted his exhausted army. The ensuing two-day Battle of Nashville, an overwhelming Union assault inspired in part by the deeds of several USCT regiments, signaled the end of the last major southern assault of the war. The city-states like Nashville stood firmly, but only as long as the forts remained.

In time, the Federal army erased their own defenses much faster than the Southern military could dream of doing, and the effect reached far beyond African American safety. In his 2010 study The Black Experience in the Civil War South, Stephen V. Ash states that as the war neared its end, “Blue-clad armies continued to invade and occupy sections of the Confederacy,
but they did not do so for the sake of territorial conquest per se…As late as May 1865 only a small portion of Confederate territory was actually under Union control.” The statement is generally accurate in a literal sense. Lincoln repeatedly reminded his field commanders that his objective was to defeat Confederate armies rather than take Richmond and other prizes. Yet as Pvt. Holly and his comrades knew, the war in the Western Theater did revolve around territorial conquest. Although much of that massive expanse eluded Union occupation, what Federals did control by 1865 was of utmost economic, political, and topographical significance. Virtually all of the Mississippi, Cumberland, and Tennessee River valleys, every major railway and state capital save Tallahassee, and the primary slave belts. In nearly every single case, the conquest and control came through fortification, and the loss of that control also came from evacuation.  

Concerning the war’s actual endpoint, nearly every scholarly assessment is much like Gregory P. Downs’s assertion in After Appomattox (2015), that the conflict did not cease with an hour-long meeting in a residential parlor. Instead the war ended much in the same way it began (around forts no less). Sporadic fighting and old scores surfaced amongst periods of deep unease. Though no one could confidently foresee the future, the signs were not promising.  

In the case of the Chattanooga city-state, Gilbert E. Govan and James W. Livingood rightly described the arriving peace as “chaotic.” Northern soldier-civilians, with their impending return home, often lightened their load by announcing fire sales. There were public auctions of rations, clothes, livestock, buildings, and mills. Locals with credit lines and currencies snatched quick deals as the Federals prepped for departure. At Natchez a Freedmen’s Bureau official anticipated the city’s adjacent Fort McPherson would continue operations for some time. Such would not be the case. In January 1865 the garrison numbered around 6,000 officers and men. By October 1866 the total number was down to 68. As late as June 1865, Union fortifications
inspector Z.B. Tower gave recommendations on maintenance and military forces required to keep established defenses in operation, under the assumption that places like “Huntsville will doubtless be permanently occupied,” and it would not be. As the Andrew Johnson administration later wrestled with an experimental Reconstruction policy that revolved around the questions of “how much” and “for how long,” the lion’s share of their civilian army had already left nearly every stronghold behind, and with them the fragile city-states that required considerable force and funding for their operation.\textsuperscript{45}

![Union Fort Sites by January 1, 1862](image-url)
Fig. 5.2  Union Fort Sites by January 1, 1864
Fig. 5.3  Union Fort Sites by January 1, 1866
Was this a total war or was it measured response? S.K. Fletcher of the 33rd Indiana presents a compelling clue why stories of end-of-war decimation had some measure of truth. When his division deployed from Franklin, Tennessee to other forts further east and south, his small brigade remained behind to maintain Fort Granger and its surroundings. Touring the mostly vacated area, Fletcher became awestruck by the leveling rendered at just one campsite:

We found bake ovens, beds, etc., in abundance. The old camps were a sight worth seeing. There were beds and houses of all description, chairs, stools, boxes, lumber without end. One would have no idea that so much lumber could be gathered up from the old houses and fences within the limits the soldiers are permitted to rove. It will take a whole army of negroes one season to pull the stakes out of the ground after this war, before it can be cultivated. Just to look over the old camps, you would think there wasn’t a forked limb left on any tree within many miles.  

This residual effect led some to depict Union garrisons as authors of obliteration. Closer to the truth may be the “measured response” camp. As one soldier said of the occupied area, “Quite a number of rebels’ families have been sent south to their friends, but nobody has been hung, shot or otherwise damaged physically.” What Fletcher described was an evacuated city, built and maintained by disparate groups who barely understood each other, except to acknowledge to each other if not themselves that that collaboration usually resulted in the prevention of property loss.
In the long view, Union-fortified towns may have reaped more benefits than losses. Franklin, Tennessee, a town that had seen three years of occupation and a massive battle late in the war, saw its local paper resume its freedom of press in the summer of 1865 while an infantry regiment from Illinois was still in garrison at Fort Granger. One conspicuous change to the paper was its motto. Located just beneath the banner, the prewar motto read, “Liberty and Union, Now and Forever, One and Inseparable.” After the war it said, “Be it our Weekly Task to Note the passing Tidings of the Times.” Among those tidings were advertisements from doctors who had served in the Confederacy announcing they were back in business. Also quickly resuming operations were the Chancery Court, grocery stores, law offices, bridle and saddle shops, livestock dealers, boot and shoe stores, pharmacies, and an agent for Aetna Insurance. The Joseph Frankland Clothing Store, whose proprietor began the war in butternut and galvanized to blue in 1862, already stocked the latest dresses and suits from New York. Competing for column space was the announcement of the coming circus, due in town on October 9.\(^{48}\)

Another indicator of “business as usual” involved the emergence of Freedmen contracts, whose vague wordings likely made white southern compliance dubious at best. Just two miles south of the rapidly reviving Franklin, for example, freedman Billy Miller signed over his fourteen-year-old daughter Mary to plantation owner Carrie McGavock for the entire year of 1866. In exchange for Mary’s dutiful services, Billy was promised a paltry $50. This would be one of over four hundred labor contracts in Williamson County negotiated through the Freedmen’s Bureau, and just one of many thousands across the South. Many of these were written in towns with still-operating garrisons. Unfortunately the renters and employers lived mostly in the countryside, beyond the reach and monitoring of the few white and black Federal officials and soldiers that remained.\(^{49}\)
Even as infrastructures improved, largely in favor of the former owners-turned-landlords, resistance movements and race wars loomed. At the forefront, the old guard announced their demands in print, in newspapers and publishing houses abruptly returning to their control. From the *Memphis Argus* and reprinted elsewhere came a scathing condemnation:

If it be considered indispensably necessary to continue garrisons in Tennessee…in the name of justice, in the name of humanity, and particularly of white humanity - we ask that, at least, as many white soldiers best left upon us as negroes [Argus italics]…it is unsafe for white people to move about at all in the night; and even in the daytime they are often subjected to contumely and insult at the hands of the freed people, and the colored soldiers.\(^{50}\)

When the soldiers eventually left, the hegemonic fortress model remained in place. With the reduction of Federal forts, the role of the “big house” shifted back to the prewar structures of courthouses, banks, and plantation mansions. As blue garrisons exited, the legions of pale butternut returned. One’s skin color, if light enough, served as a valid pass to move in any public space. Public deference to the returning authorities served as an acceptable oath of allegiance. Along with the emergence of terror groups, often based in former occupation sites where African American liberation had most progressed, a series of mass riots erupted. Notably, these deadly clashes also tended to occur in former garrison towns, such as Memphis and New Orleans in 1866, as well as Franklin, Tennessee in 1867 and nearby Pulaski in the same year.\(^{51}\) Could a continued large-scale Federal occupation have mitigated or prevented such events? The answer is effectively unknowable. Further, it may be more valid to ask if social justice was a major priority
for either government in the Civil War. At the time, “civil rights” and “nation states” were still elusive, evolving, and highly contentious concepts. What can be confirmed is the continued policy of incremental invasion through extensive use of fortifications.

The Enduring Strategy of Federal Fortification

In 1863 military fortifications were successful enough that the Federal government decided to invest in fortresses heavily – for the time being and for a vast future also. Few events demonstrated this intent more forcefully than the sprouting of additional fortresses across the Territories and along the Pacific Rim. Worthy of attention is a bill that the U.S. Congress passed on February 20, 1863. That particular law was “An Act making appropriations for the construction, preservation, and repairs of certain fortifications and other works of defence [sic] for the year ending thirtieth June, eighteen hundred and sixty four.” It allocated $100,000 to improve Fort Montgomery on New York’s Lake Champlain, $200,000 going toward New Hampshire’s Fort Constitution, an equal amount to modernize Fort Delaware, support for coastal defenses in New Jersey and Washington, D.C., plus an additional $700,000 for five separate forts in Maine. With the U.S. Navy and scores of merchant ships operating in the Pacific, Congress also appropriated funds for works in Oregon, Washington, and California, including a sum of $100,000 to fortify Alcatraz Island. Congress appropriated an additional $700,000 for “field works and field operations,” this for a nation already teeming with bastions. By the end of the war, Key West alone had 13,500 men and 400 artillery pieces.52

While coastal forts and the U.S. Navy looked into the seas and oceans for new frontiers, the U.S. War Department redoubled efforts to finish off what the Spanish monarchy had started. Through the use of fortified posts, cavalry units led the ongoing conquest and destruction of
Native Americans. Many Union veterans of Fort Grant, Fort McPherson, and Fort Negley would transfer further west to places like Fort Laramie, Fort Leavenworth, and Fort Union. Lt. Col. George Grummond, former provost at Fort Granger, and his eventual wife, Unionist Fannie Courtney of Franklin, moved to Fort Kearny in the Wyoming Territory in 1866. For them, the stay was brief. That December while on patrol outside the defenses, Grummond and eighty of his associates were summarily overrun and killed by Arapaho, Cheyenne, and Lakota. Unlike the rapidly recovering planter class, Native Americans’ centuries-long struggle for indigenous survival actually did have the earmarks of total war.\footnote{53}

So too, into the former slave states, the War Department and its government decided to post more than a quarter million Federal troops on permanent assignment. During the course of the war, Congressional members recognized a growing need for such permanent strongholds, and authorized their construction in 1862. Legislators anticipated the nation would need ten or twelve. They eventually built seventy three. The War Department initially installed national cemeteries in Northern states and the District of Columbia, but by late 1863 they expanded the operation southward. By 1866, most Federal military cemeteries resided in the defeated Confederacy. Many of these depositories became better known for nearby battles or sieges, regardless whether the majority of the interred were victims of disease. Most cemeteries were former sites of fortified Union occupation. Further, these plots were an overt expression of ownership, an eternal claim to the land itself and a permanent insertion into public memory.\footnote{54}

The largest of these would be Vicksburg with more than 17,000 Union bodies, a place that the Union occupied from July 1863 to 1866. Overall 75 percent of the interred were unknowns, including a staggering 98 percent of African American troops.\footnote{55} Second largest was Nashville National Cemetery. Maj. Gen. George Thomas situated it just north of the city, its
15,000 headboards standing astride the rail line from Louisville. Reportedly Thomas wanted every citizen entering Nashville from the north to see the price the Union paid to hold onto the city.\textsuperscript{56} Next largest in the Western Theater was Memphis with a multitude of deceased from Helena. The long list also included Baton Rouge, Corinth, Murfreesboro – all of them fort towns.\textsuperscript{57} Initially bordered by picket fences, these gravesites eventually received protective walls of stacked stone and headquarters manned by veterans. To replace teetering headboards of painted lumber, the War Department installed bone-white marble headstones standing at attention in long, precise rows.

Perhaps understandably, Federal officials forbade admission of Confederate dead. Less explicable was their exclusion of countless contraband civilians who died building and maintaining these same fortress towns. At Chattanooga an unknown number of African Americans who perished under Union employment were buried in long, unmarked trenches, outside the confines of the formal War Department burial grounds. At Helena, teacher Maria Mann said she witnessed similar ad hoc disposals, including burial of deceased African Americans into the same trenches as deceased draft animals.\textsuperscript{58}

Notably, in response to continued threats from terror groups, innumerable problems from the contract system, the collapse of the Freedmen’s Bureau, and pressing needs for employment and belonging, many surviving families of the self-emancipated formed their own fortress systems. These self-supporting communities included Africana near Fort Bruce at Clarksville, “Cemetery” adjacent Fortress Rosecrans at Murfreesboro, and Mt. Olivet among the earthworks at Nashville.\textsuperscript{59} Stephen Ash aptly describes these and similar social strongholds as “a fallback position,” where the formerly enslaved “withdrew behind the battlements of the impregnable black fortress.”\textsuperscript{60} The analogy is not hyperbolic, as these areas proved to be among the most
secure and semi-autonomous for a targeted demographic. Hundreds of such enclaves had
discernable headquarters and keeps, hospitals and sutlers, boundaries and scouts. The
communities were quite possibly the last of the city-states born from a failing war.

Is it possible that we still do not understand the American Civil War, let alone its internal
components, because we try to contain it within a fabricated paradigm of nation? Certainly the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries were less the age of nation-states than the folly of considering
them the path to ius naturale. Perhaps the emblematic word here is folly, which is a type of
defensive fortification developed in the nineteenth century. Formed primarily for military
objectives, and built on water, they were neither designed for nor conducive to habitation.

Was the Union victorious? Yes, if the measure involves destruction of armies. A clear
answer is less apparent if the question involves the creation of socioeconomic innovation, which
occurred so briefly yet measurably in the city-states of Union fortified towns. Two perspectives,
one written by a British Member of Parliament and the other from an Illinois veteran of the Civil
War, synopsize the complicated concept of “winning.” Perhaps the most accurate definition of
the social strata that emerged during the wars of the nineteenth century came from Charles
Masterman’s The Condition of England (1909). Masterman categorized the few who stood at the
apex of industrial production as “conquerors.” Beneath them were a layer of generally
cooperative professionals or “suburbans,” who he contended had physically and emotionally
detached themselves from the inner workings of mass production. Supporting this superstructure
was “the multitude,” or the urban working class. Beneath them, Masterman defined a bottom
group he profoundly titled “prisoners.” These were the laborers so thoroughly marginalized that
they were condemned to operate in a near-permanent state of abject economic poverty. 61
Reflecting upon this condemned assembly, Masterman described a condition that could have applied to a postwar freed person in Memphis as accurately as it applied to a mill hand in Manchester. “In every city there is the unlimited supply of disorganised women’s and children’s labour, which sees before it no alternative but of a quick or of a prolonged decay.”62 In detailing why such individuals struggled so mightily, he stated, “They are compelled to work overtime. They endure accident and disease. They are fined and cheated in innumerable ways,” and chief among the hardships were starvation-level wages.63 Masterman went on to argue that to transfer these individuals into an agrarian economy would create little more than a change of scenery, with no real change in opportunity. To do so would be to turn them into “a peasantry…lacking ownership of cottage or tiniest plot of ground… in the cheerless toil of the agricultural labourer upon scant weekly wages.”64

In the same year as the publication of Conditions of England, an aging Union veteran named J.T. King left his home in Illinois to visit the various sites of his Civil War service, which included Fort Granger in Franklin, Tennessee. His division helped create the structure in the spring of 1863, with the assistance of many self-liberated African Americans. “It was a beautiful fortification,” he recalled, “with trenches sixteen feet deep, and with firing trenches or rifle pits…we felled the timber for a distance of three miles from the fort and drawing the trees with sharpened branches pointed outward to within a quarter mile.”65

Reaching his destination by rail, and walking to the top of the eighty-foot rise where the dominant fort once stood, King was taken aback by what he found. “The old fort stands neglected, a labyrinth of brush vines and timber growing on the parapet and from the sides of the trenches.” He could still trace out the main embankments, the thirty-some embrasures from where the cannon muzzles peered, and the location of the magazine that held thousands of
rounds of ammunition. To him, it was far from an instrument of devastation. To the contrary, King described the fort as a symbol of order in an otherwise chaotic war, yet he recognized it could have unleashed itself upon the surrounding secessionist population if its officers so desired. “Our artillery had a clear sweep of the country for several miles in every direction, and we could at any time have made kindling wood of Franklin in a very few minutes.” But, King concluded, “there seemed however to be a tacit understanding between our commander, General Granger, and the citizens of Franklin, that if the Confederates would not use the buildings for shelter that we would spare the town.”

King felt forlorn that this artifact of Union occupation had been abandoned, but he felt that his work, and the laborers of many other men, women, children, and draft animals had not been in vain. The Federal fortress network helped keep him and his Union alive. “I spent many weary hours shoveling earth there,” he said, “but feel that I have been repaid in full.”

In his letter home about this visit to old Fort Granger, King closed the note with a melancholic realization. He still lived in a nation where what a person inherited could outweigh what a person achieved. On his way back to the train station at the foot of the hill, he came upon a local who introduced himself as a colonel. Wondering if the man was a veteran of the Civil War like himself, King kindly asked him how he came about such an impressive rank. The man answered, “I never was in no war suh, just a natural born Colonel suh.”
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APPENDICES
# APPENDIX A:

## WESTERN THEATER UNION OCCUPATION SITES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Built</th>
<th>Principle Fortification</th>
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<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>Athens</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Fort Henderson</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Bridgeport</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Redoubts Harker and Mitchel</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Decatur</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>Fort No. 1, Fort No. 2</td>
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<td>Elkmont</td>
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<td>Suphur Trestle Fort</td>
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<td>Huntsville</td>
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<td>Mobile</td>
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<td>Barnesville</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>Fort Barnesville</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Girardeau</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>Four primary forts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrisonville</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Fort Harrisonville</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Island No. 10</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>unnamed fort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lexington</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>unnamed fort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jefferson City</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>Fort Jefferson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Madrid</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>unnamed fort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot Knob</td>
<td>1861-1862</td>
<td>Fort Hovey/Curtis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot Knob</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Fort Davidson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Fort/Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rolla</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>Fort Wyman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palmyra</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>South River Fort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Patterson</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>Fort Benton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peruque</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>Fort Peruque</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springfield</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>Five primary forts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Charles</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>Fort Bunker</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Joseph</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>Fort Smith</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Louis</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>Ten primary forts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Oklahoma Territory</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Gibson</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Fort Gibson/Blunt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tennessee</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivar</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>unnamed fortifications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brentwood</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Stockade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buck Lodge</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Fort Mitchel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carthage</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Battery Knob</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chattanooga</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Twelve primary forts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarksville</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>Fort Bruce</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cleveland</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Two redoubts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clifton</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>Stockade Hill</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collierville</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Fort Collierville</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Fort Mizner</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumberland Gap</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>multiple batteries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dover</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>Fort Donelson</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elk River (near Decherd)</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Elk River Fort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Heiman</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>Fort Heiman</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Pillow</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>Fort Pillow</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Fort Granger</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallatin</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Fort Thomas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germantown</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Fort Germantown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Junction</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Fort McDowell</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kingston Springs</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>unnamed fort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnsonville</td>
<td>1864</td>
<td>Redoubts A and B</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knoxville</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Eight primary forts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lafayette Station</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>unnamed fort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LaGrange</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>LaGrange Post</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loudon</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Fort Ammen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lynnville</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>unnamed fort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McMinnville</td>
<td>1864</td>
<td>Six primary forts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memphis</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>Fortress Pickering</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitchellville</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>Fort Smith</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>unnamed fort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murfreesboro</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Fortress Rosecrans</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nashville</td>
<td>1862-1863</td>
<td>Six primary forts</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pikeville</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>unnamed fort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pocahontas</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>Big Hill Pond Fortification</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pulaski</td>
<td>1864</td>
<td>Fort Lilly</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelbyville</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>unnamed fort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Springfield</td>
<td>1863-1864</td>
<td>Springfield Post</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strawberry Plains</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Redoubt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sullivan's Branch</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Redoubt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triune</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Multiple forts and trench works</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tullahoma</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>unnamed fort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waverly</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Fort Hill</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Whiteside</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>Four blockhouses</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Winchester</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>unnamed fort</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td></td>
<td>** Built before the Civil War**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brownsville</td>
<td>1864</td>
<td>Fort Brown</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Fort captured from Confederate military.*
APPENDIX B:

MOST COMMON ENLISTMENT SITES OF USCT SOLDIERS BORN IN

WILLIAMSON COUNTY, TENNESSEE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mustering Location</th>
<th>Enlistees</th>
<th>Principle Rail Line</th>
<th>Principle Fortification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nashville, TN</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>Four major rail lines</td>
<td>Six primary forts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murfreesboro, TN</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Nashville &amp; Chattanooga</td>
<td>Fortress Rosecrans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memphis, TN</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Three major rail lines</td>
<td>Fort Pickering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbia, TN</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Nashville &amp; Decatur</td>
<td>Fort Mizner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elk River, TN</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Nashville &amp; Chattanooga</td>
<td>Elk River Fort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gallatin, TN</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Louisville &amp; Nashville</td>
<td>Fort Thomas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stevenson, AL</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Mem. &amp; Char. - Nash. &amp; Chatt.</td>
<td>Fort Harker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chattanooga, TN</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Nash &amp; Chatt - E. Tenn. &amp; Georgia</td>
<td>Twelve primary forts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus, KY</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Mobile &amp; Ohio</td>
<td>Fort Halleck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicksburg, MS</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Southern R.R. of Mississippi</td>
<td>Fort Grant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corinth, MS</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Mobile &amp; Ohio + Mem. &amp; Char.</td>
<td>Seven primary forts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franklin, TN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nashville &amp; Decatur</td>
<td>Fort Granger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helena, AR</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Memphis &amp; Little Rock*</td>
<td>Fort Curtis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarksville, TN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Edgefield &amp; Kentucky</td>
<td>Fort Bruce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knoxville, TN</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>East Tennessee &amp; Virginia</td>
<td>Fort Sanders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paducah, KY</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>New Orleans &amp; Ohio</td>
<td>Fort Anderson</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Columbus, OH</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Central Ohio R.R.</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fort Smith, AR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>Fort Smith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodrich Landing, LA</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>none</td>
<td>unnamed fortifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shelbyville, TN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nashville &amp; Chattanooga</td>
<td>unnamed fortifications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sullivan's Branch, TN</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Nashville &amp; Northwestern</td>
<td>redoubt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTES

NOTES TO INTRODUCTION:


2 One of the vanguards bringing greater consideration for the Western Theater is Thomas Connelly, especially his *Army of the Heartland* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1967). Among the more poignant points Connelly makes is that the famous Army of the Potomac only managed to take one part of one state during the whole of the war, whereas the less-celebrated Army of the Cumberland, Army of the Mississippi, and Army of Ohio overtook every Confederate state save Virginia and Florida. Connelly also notes that river directions in the West enabled collisions between the warring parties. In the East, the series of wide rivers winding across their respective paths limited their engagements to a few (now iconic) choke points. See also Earl J. Hess, *The Civil War in the West: Victory and Defeat from the Appalachians to the Mississippi* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); Daniel E. Sutherland, *A Savage Conflict: The Decisive Role of Guerillas in the American Civil War* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009).

3 Josef A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (London: Routledge, 2003), first published in 1942 and first published in English in 1843. Several works attribute the first use of “creative destruction” as an economics concept to Schumpeter’s contemporary Werner Sombart, although Sombart did not define the phrase in detail. Hugo and Eric Reinert offer an ever deeper history, contending that the concept originated in Indian philosophy and that Friedrich Nietzsche (who influenced Sombart) was the individual most responsible for introducing the concept, if not the phrase, into Western thought academic discourse; see Hugo S. Reinert and Eric

4 Schumpeter, 81-86.


6 Schumpeter, 178.

7 Ash estimate of Union occupied locations in Stephen V. Ash, *When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 77. Estimate of four major Union forts built for every one Confederate major fort is based largely on the ratio that existed in Tennessee and was similar in other regions. The ratio was certainly much higher in favor of the Union in Kentucky by comparison, whereas the ratio along the Gulf of Mexico likely neared parity. See Samuel D. Smith, Benjamin C. Nance, and Fred M. Prouty, *A Survey of Civil War Era Military Sites in Tennessee* (Nashville: Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, 2003), 123-141.

8 Dennis Hart Mahan, *Complete Treatise on Field Fortification, with the General Outlines of the Principles Regulating the Arrangement, the Attack, and the Defense of Permanent Works* (New York: Wiley and Long, 1836).


10 Mahan, 17, 20-26, 64-75, 129-130.

11 Mahan, 215-218.

13 Among many soldiers who used the word “impregnable” to describe their forts were Lt. Col Carter Van Vleck of the 78th Illinois for the Union defenses at Franklin, Tennessee on April 26, 1863, from Teresa K. Lehr and Philip L Gerber, eds., *Emerging Leader, the Letters of Carter Van Vleck to His Wife Patty, 1862-1864* (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse, 2012), 97, and Albert O. Marshall of the 33rd Illinois for the forts at Brashear City, Louisiana, from Robert G. Schulz, ed., *Army Life from a Soldier Journal: Incidents, Sketches and Record of a Union Soldier’s Army Life, In Camp and Field, 1861-1865* (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2009), 190-191. Among those who used the word “impenetrable” was Pvt. J.T. King of an Illinois unit also at Franklin, from “Private King Visits Old Battlefield,” *Alton (Illinois) Evening Telegraph*, Aug. 7, 1909, p. 2.


17 Recent works that place the American Civil War in a more global context include Andre M. Fleche, *The Revolution of 1861: The American Civil War in the Age of Nationalist Conflict* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012); David T. Gleeson and Simon Lewis, eds., *The Civil War as Global Conflict: Transnational Meanings of the American Civil War* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2014); Mischa Honeck, *We Are the Revolutionists: German-Speaking Immigrants and American Abolitionists after 1848* (Athens: University of


21 Gregory P. Downs, *After Appomattox: Military Occupation and the Ends of War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015). A kindred spirit in his call for greater attention to the role of Union military occupation, Downs also draws support from the likes of Eric Foner for his emphasis on Reconstruction. Yet he arguably contributes most to the debate by highlighting the tightly interwoven civic barriers that firmly institutionalized public exclusion of African Americans. Far more than the periodic episodes of voting, it was the courts at all levels, financial institutions, hegemonic police systems, and every strata of public office that even exceeded the Klan in their cohesive and arbitrary use of terror. Reconstruction largely failed, Downs infers, not because postwar African Americans struggled to find jobs; it failed because the prewar establishment was not forced to abdicate theirs.

22 For an assessment on how much of the Confederacy that the Union military actually controlled and how many enslaved were emancipated by 1865, see Stephen V. Ash, *The Black Experience in the Civil War South* (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 4-7, 63. For a more detailed examination of when and where slaves found liberation,


NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE: THE BLUE KEEP – EMERGENCE OF A NEW WESTERN STRATEGY


3 For estimates of slave escapes and attempts per year during the antebellum era, Eric Foner labels them “guesses” at best and cites a range of 1,000 to 5,000, Eric Foner, *Gateway to Freedom: The Hidden History of America’s Fugitive Slaves* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 4. With somewhat more calculation, J. Blaine Hudson, estimates the same range, with 3,000 to 3,500 escapes per year from 1830 to 1860, J. Blaine Hudson, *Fugitive Slaves and the Underground Railroad in the Kentucky Borderland* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2006), 161-163.


6 Szcodronski, 113.

7 Samuel Boyd quoting the unnamed male slave in February 25, 1863 *True Republican* (Centreville, Indiana), saved in the Samuel Boyd Scrapbook, Boyd Family Papers, Bancroft Library Archives, University of California at Berkeley.


9 On the Lincoln administration’s early conservative approach to Southern white private property, see George C. Bradley and Richard L. Dahlen, *From Conciliation to Conquest: The Sack of Athens and the Court-Martial of Colonel John B. Turchin* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2006), 9-17; James McPherson, *Battle Cry of Freedom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 352-355. Bradley and Dahlen suggest that conciliatory positions were not in the North American tradition of “frontier” warfare. Engagements such as Metacom’s War, the French and Indian War, the American Revolution, and the War of 1812 with the sacking of York, Washington, and First Nation villages exemplify a very contrary convention, whereby civilians were among the first targets and most common military targets. They do however contend that by 1860, the officer corps of the professional U.S. military were trained to consider reprisals against civilians as deplorable and destabilizing. See Bradley and Dahlen, 72-79. On Maj. Gen. Buell and his support of a cautious military approach, see Bradley and Dahlen, 71-72, 79-81; Joseph W. Danielson, *War’s Desolating Scourge: The Union’s Occupation of North Alabama* (Lawrence: University of
Joseph W. Danielson posits that secessionist civilian resistance, at least in northern Alabama, remained high throughout occupation, as locals vested hope in religious convictions and military counterattacks to remove Federal forces. This does seem to be the case at the outset of federal occupation in the spring of 1862, but evidence indicates that it faded with the fortification of the area in 1863. Joseph W. Danielson, *War’s Desolating Scourge: The Union’s Occupation of North Alabama* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2012), 35-37.

10 Precilla Gray quoted in Rick Warwick, compiler, *Williamson County: The Civil War as Seen through the Female Experience* (Franklin, TN: Williamson County Heritage Society, 2008), 95.


17 James F. McMillan sees the situation in Mexico less about French national pride and more about struggling French markets and investors on the global stage. Envisioning a supposedly secure Mexico under Maximilian would enable greater security for overseas open trade. In effect, McMillan argues France was looking for an open door to the Americas, in James F. McMillan, Napoleon III (London: Routledge, 2013), 150-151. Robert W. Young contends that Napoleon was consciously toying with Confederate diplomats to use possible interference as a bargaining tool with the Washington government. The key to French success in Mexico, Young finds, rested on using their non-interference in the American Civil War in exchange for United States non-interference in Mexico, in Robert W. Young, Senator James Murray Mason: Defender of the Old South (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1998), 170-172. May 16 1862 London Times article quoted in “Bearing of the Western Victories on the Campaign; Northern Triumph Conceded,” New York Times, June 1, 1862.

18 The prototypical example of pre-Civil War sectionalism over the West is rightfully “Bleeding Kansas” and the fate of free- versus slave-soil territories. See Jonathon Halperin Earle and Diane Mutti Burke, eds., Bleeding Kansas, Bleeding Missouri: The Long Civil War on the Border (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2013); Nicole Etcheson, Bleeding Kansas: Contested Liberty in the Civil War Era (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004); and Kristen Tegtmeier Oertel, Bleeding Borders: Race, Gender, and Violence in Pre-Civil War Kansas (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2009).

Another source of sectionalism over Western territories involved the routing of a transatlantic railroad. Since the 1840s, southern actors increasingly called for a terminus near the Gulf of Mexico, eventually producing the Gadsden Purchase of 1853-1854. In contrast, northern actors called for a terminus at or near Omaha, Nebraska, with moderate stances coming from the likes of Stephen Douglas positing a terminus at St. Louis. For details of this rail sectionalism, see David H. Bain, Empire Express: Building the First Transcontinental Railroad (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), chapters 3 and 4; Walter R. Borneman, Iron Horses: America’s Race to Bring the Railroad

nineteenth-century federal land legislation being more imperial than philanthropic, a position with which this
dissertation generally agrees, see William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1972), 18-56.

21 For the language of the Homestead Act of 1862, see Thomas C. Mackey, ed., *A Documentary History of the Civil
War Era, Vol. 1, Legislative Achievements* (Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 2012), 63-66. Concerning the
long-debated contest over a Homestead law, the relatively radical nature of giving free federal land to citizens was
as much a Whig-Democrat, West-East, working class-wealthy divide as it was a Southern Democrat point of
opposition. Still, the fact that the Republican Party and its Whig and Liberal Republic elements adopted a pro-
Homestead position was largely a manifestation of their growing opposition of the expansion of slavery into
Western territories. See Michael A. Morrison, *Slavery and the American West: The Eclipse of Manifest Destiny and
the Coming of the Civil War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997); William Nester, *The Age of
Adam Tuchinsky’s deft treatment of the land reform question at midcentury and its complicated implications,
including its appeal to aggressive speculators as well as radical left idealists. For the purposes of this dissertation,
however, the more immediate interest is in Tuchinsky’s description of the Southern Democratic opposition that
successfully blocked legislation up until the Civil War. For the emergence of land grant legislation at the state and
federal levels, including factions of support and opposition, see Adam Tuchinsky, *Horace Greeley’s New-York
and C.F. Cross, *Justin Smith Morrill: Father of the Land-Grant Colleges* (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State
University, 1999).

22 Synopsis of Amnesty text in Henry S. Commager, ed., *The Civil War Archive: The History of the Civil War in

Leslie A. Schwalm, “Between Slavery and Freedom: African American Women and Occupation in the Slave South,” in *Occupied Women: Gender, Military Occupation, and the American Civil War*, LeAnn Whites and Alecia P. Long, eds., (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2009), 137. Lisa C. Tolbert counters the universalized image of the American enslaved person, noting how those who lived in cities and especially smaller towns had a relatively high degree of individual mobility (via errands) and economic opportunity (by renting themselves out on their available spare time). Though living within the parameters of a small town, many were nonetheless had greater access to more information and varied social connections than those in more remote areas; Tolbert, *Constructing Townscapes: Space and Society in Antebellum Tennessee* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 196-200. For descriptions of how slave owners would use misinformation among other tactics against their enslaved in an attempt to prevent their escape, see Ira Berlin, ed., *Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation, 1861-1867, Ser. 2 Book 1* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 38-39.


30 Nathaniel S. Berry, et al to Abraham Lincoln, July 30, 1862, Series 1, General Correspondence, 1833-1916, Abraham Lincoln Papers, LOC.

31 John P. Usher to Abraham Lincoln, [May-September] 1862, Series 1, General Correspondence, 1833-1916, Abraham Lincoln Papers, LOC.

32 Famous for its rant against McClellan and the harsh, underlined rebuke “you must act,” Lincoln’s April 9, 1862 telegram to George B. McClellan also articulates Lincoln’s growing recognition of how quickly Confederate defensive works were being made, and how effective they could be in stopping nearly any feasible size of assault; see, Abraham Lincoln to George B. McClellan, April 9, 1862, Military Affairs, Abraham Lincoln Papers, LOC. Early draft of the Emancipation Proclamation to from Salmon P. Chase, Memorandum on Emancipation, December 30-31, 1862, Abraham Lincoln Papers, LOC.


35 Bragg’s record rail transport achievement noted in McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 516.

36 Bragg believing he could reach the Ohio River in McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 518.

37 Berlin et al, Slaves No More, 48-49.


41 For the transformation of the Proclamation from first draft to final signature, see: Benjamin Thomas, *Abraham Lincoln: A Biography* (New York: The Modern Library, 1968), 333-364. For an articulate debunking of the popular notion that the war served some abolitionist ideal, see James Oakes, *Scorpion’s Sting: Antislavery and the Coming of the Civil War* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2014).


43 Nannie E. Haskins diary, February 16, 1863, Mf 1261, TSLA.


46 Samuel S. Boyd Civil War scrapbook, Boyd Family Papers, 1781-1933, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.


49 Elihu Wadsworth to brother Charles Wadsworth, December 2, 1863, Civil War Correspondence of the Wadsworth Brothers, 1861-1865, Mf 1995, TSLA.


53 *Nashville Daily Union*, June 11, 1863, p. 3.


59 Indiana officer was Samuel S. Boyd of 84th Indiana, from Samuel S. Boyd Civil War scrapbook, correspondence of March 4, 1863, Boyd Family Papers, 1781-1933, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.

60 Ibid.

61 J.H. Bills Diary, June 1, 1863, Mf 1, Reel 2, TSLA.

62 Ibid.

63 Henry West, “Patriotic Letter from Dr. West,” *Belmont Chronicle* (St. Clairsville, OH), April 9, 1863, p. 2. Number of African Americans at Helena, Arkansas contraband camps and description of adjacent fortifications from


67 Samuel S. Boyd Civil War scrapbook, correspondence of April 4, 1863, Boyd Family Papers, 1781-1933, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.

68 Henry West, “Patriotic Letter from Dr. West,” *Belmont Chronicle* (St. Clairsville, OH), April 9, 1863, p. 2.

69 Indiana soldier quoted from J.E. Brant, *History of the Eighty-Fifth [Indiana Volunteer Infantry Regiment]: Its Organization, Campaigns, and Battles* (Bloomington, IN: Cravens Bros., 1902), 44. Reporter/soldier from the 125th Ohio quoted in “Army Correspondence,” *The Daily Cleveland Herald*, May 02, 1863.

70 Indiana soldier quoted from Brant, 44. Reporter/soldier from the 125th Ohio quoted in “Army Correspondence,” *The Daily Cleveland Herald*, May 2, 1863.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO: CONTAGION – THE SCOURGE OF OVERPOPULATION

1 “Small Pox,” Nashville Daily Union, January 12, 1863, p. 3.

2 William L. Barney, The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 100. Though emphasizing the first year of the war, George Worthington Adams also notes that Union soldiers in the Western Theater were much more likely to succumb to disease than their Eastern Theater comrades, in Adams, Doctors in Blue: The Medical History of the Union Army in the Civil War (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1952), 15, 224-226.


4 Nashville Daily Union, January 9, 1863, p. 1; Nashville Daily Union, February 7, 1863, p. 1; Nashville Daily Union, March 25, 1863, p. 1

5 Ibid.


8 Claire E. Swedburg, ed., Three Years with the 92nd Illinois: The Civil War Diary of John M. King (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 1999), 71-72.
9 New York Times, June 18, 1863, p. 5;

10 Peter Maslowski, Treason Made Odious: Military Occupation and Wartime Reconstruction in Nashville, 1861-1865 (Millwood, IL: 1978), 100-112.


14 James Henretta observes a very similar war-disease association in pre-Revolution, British-occupied New England, where large garrisons of Redcoats contaminated several towns, in some cases as much as fifty percent of the population, “as soldiers and militiamen carried the contagion out from their crowded barracks and camps;” Henretta quoted in Michael D. Coe, The Line of Forts: Historical Archaeology on the Colonial Frontier of Massachusetts (Lebanon, NH: University Press of New England, 2006), 125. The pattern continued into the twenty-first century


17 Lewis, *The Campaigns of the 124th Regiment*, 24. Andrew McIlwaine Bell details how malaria and yellow fever were exceptions to the rule of “camp diseases.” Unlike diseases that thrived in tight spaces, malaria and yellow fever prospered in coastal tidewaters and the tropics. The Union corner on quinine and other preventive measures, cites Bell, enabled Federals to lose just half the number of soldiers than the Confederacy, but those numbers were still around 10,000 and 20,000 respectively. For our purposes, these were obstacles in the field more than the fort. But Bell well defends two growing trends in the scholarship, namely the perspectives that disease and environment are historical factors, and often significant ones. See Andrew McIlwaine Bell, *Mosquito Soldiers: Malaria, Yellow Fever, and the Course of the American Civil War* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2010). For other studies on malaria and yellow fever in the Civil War, see Stewart M. Brooks, *Civil War Medicine* (Springfield, IL:


21 Charles S. Falkner of 92nd Illinois to his brother, May 22, 1863, quoted in Rick Warwick, *Williamson County: The Civil War Years Revealed through Letters*, 75.

22 In the outstanding social history *This Republic of Suffering*, the venerable Drew Gilpin Faust unveils the vivid pain and loss felt by civilians separated from beloved soldiers in the latter’s final hours. Many in nineteenth-century American society saw it as a supreme obligation that the war presented them from meeting. On one level the book is brilliantly titled, for “republic” connotes the existence of duly sworn representatives. On another level it is unfortunate, as it can be inferred to mean a unified and unifying experience. If anything, Faust is suggesting the opposite. When looking at the enormous losses in the American Civil War (although modest in comparison to several other civil wars, say, the Taiping Rebellion), it is easy to forget that each these could be traumatic and potentially devastating to a small unseen few.


25 Willet’s survival of the war and mustering out in 1865 recorded in Francis Marion McAdams, *Every-day Soldier Life: Or a History of the One Hundred and Thirteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry* (Columbus, OH: Charles M. Cott, 1884), 181. Causes and deaths of the 113th Ohio Regiment between February 12 and June 4, 1863 from Francis Marion McAdams, *Every-day Soldier Life: Or a History of the One Hundred and Thirteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry* (Columbus, OH: Charles M. Cott, 1884), 184-255, 362-363; Ohio Roster Commission, *Official Roster of the Soldiers of the State of Ohio in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1866, Vol. 8* (Cincinnati: Ohio Valley Press, 1886), 77-102; NARA, *U.S. Register of Deaths of Volunteers*, Record Group 94, Box 41, pp. 19, 90; Box 42, pp. 7, 29; Box 43, pp. 21, 81; Box 44, p. 127; Box 45, pp. 70, 136; Box 46, p. 51; Box 47, p. 70;


29 Letters from John Leek to his mother Emily Leek, Jan. 9, 1863, and March 1, 1863. In her pension application, John Leek’s widowed mother Emily A. Leek included several of John’s original letters as evidence that he was indeed her son; available at Fold3 - http://www.fold3.com/image/256971372/.


33 Frank J. Welcher and Larry G. Ligget, *Coburn’s Brigade: 85th Indiana, 33rd Indiana, 19th Michigan, and 22nd Wisconsin in the Western Civil War* (Carmel, IN: Guild Press, 1999), 50. For inclement weather in Franklin in the spring of 1863, see Albert Slack letter to family, February 20, 1863, from Emory University Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library (MARBL), Albert L. Slack Correspondence, 1862-1865, Manuscript Collection No. 459.


36 “125th Regiment – Federal Knapsack,” Western Reserve Chronicle (Warren, OH), March 25, 1863, p. 3.

Confirming account of 125th Ohio quartered from February 12 into March reported in “From the 125th Regiment,” Jeffersonian Democrat (Chardon, OH), April 3, 1863, p. 2.


40 White civilian death rates in Franklin, Tennessee calculated from Dr. Samuel Henderson Diary, WCA; Old City Cemetery, Books 1 and 2, WCA; Rest Haven Cemetery, Books 1 and 2, WCA; Thompson, J.T., and Robert Z. Carlisle II, “The Lotz Family: Survivors of the Battle of Franklin,” WCA.

MSS Z-Z 115 Box 1; and Lisa C. Tolbert, *Constructing Townscapes: Space and Society and Antebellum Tennessee* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999). Known formal burials within a two-mile radius of Franklin from *Directory, Williamson County, Tennessee Burials, Vols. 1-3* (Franklin, TN: Williamson County Historical Society, 1973); Old City Cemetery, Books 1 and 2, and Rest Haven Cemetery, Books 1 and 2, Williamson County Archives (WCA), Franklin, TN; Dr. Samuel Henderson Diary, WCA. Downtown Franklin doctor offices and pharmacy suppliers derived from obituaries in *Western Weekly Review* (Franklin, TN), 1857-1861, mf, WCA. Illnesses common to area derived from the *Western Weekly Review* (Franklin, TN), 1857-1861, WCA; and Dr. Samuel Henderson Diary, WCA.


43 Diary of Dr. Samuel Henderson, April 13, 1863, WCA.


Beach, 21.


61 Dr. J.S. Park May 11, 1863 letter to Gen. Gordon Granger, in Rick Warwick, compiler, *Williamson County: The Civil War years Revealed through Letters, Diaries, and Memoirs* (Franklin, TN: Williamson County Heritage Foundation, 2006), 301. Mary Ann Carden Park’s death catalogued in Rest Haven Cemetery Burials, Book 1, WCA. Description of her death in *The Sentinel* (Franklin, TN), August 22, 1863, p. 2


64 Mary Ann Carden Park’s obituary in *The Sentinel* (Franklin, TN), August 22, 1863, p. 2. August L. Yenner (1837-1924) Diary, May 2, 1863, United States Civil War Collection, Western Michigan University Archives and Regional History Collections (WMUA), Kalamazoo, MI.


66 “From the 125th Regiment,” *The Jeffersonian Democrat* (Chardon, Ohio), April 3, 1863, p. 2.

67 Member of the 115th Illinois quoted in Rick Warwick, compiler, *Williamson County: The Civil War years Revealed through Letters, Diaries, and Memoirs* (Franklin, TN: Williamson County Heritage Foundation, 2006), 85.


70 Nannie E. Haskins diary, July 24, 1863, Mf 1261, TSLA.


80 Humphreys, *Marrow of Tragedy*, 73-74.


83 *Nashville Daily Union*, January 14, 1864, p. 3.


85 Jim Downs, *Sick from Freedom*, 5; Humphreys, *Marrow of Tragedy*, 73.

86 J.H. Bills Diary, March 12, 1863, Mf 1, Reel 2, TSLA.


90 “Patriotic Letter from Dr. West,” *Belmont Chronicle* (St. Clairsville, OH), April 9, 1863, p. 2.


95 Berlin et al, *Slaves No More*, 45. An insightful work on how “scientific racism” developed and was applied to the growing cities of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is Samuel K. Roberts, Jr., *Infectious Fear: Politics, Disease, and the Health Effects of Segregation* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009). Though Roberts examines several cities in transition, he primarily uses Baltimore as a case study. There, Roberts finds, whites interpreted the many tuberculosis cases among recently urbanizing African Americans as proof of an unclean culture better adapted to the countryside. Roberts rightly concludes that the epidemic were a result of tight living
spaces located in tenements with little natural light, poor diet, poor sanitation, and lack of fresh water or fresh air. Several of these variables were prevalent in contraband camps.

96 Adams, 225.


NOTES TO CHAPTER 3: DECONSTRUCTION - ALTERATIONS TO THE WESTERN THEATER LANDSCAPE


9 Carter Van Vleck letter February 13, 1863 quoted in Lehr and Gerber, 68.


13 Ibid.

14 Elihu Wadsworth to brother Charles Wadsworth, April 28, 1864, Civil War Correspondence of the Wadsworth Brothers, 1861-1865, Mf 1995, TSLA.


Albert Slack letter to family, March 1, 1863, from Emory University Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library (MARBL), Albert L. Slack Correspondence, 1862-1865, Manuscript Collection No. 459.


Henry West, “Patriotic Letter from Dr. West,” *Belmont Chronicle* (St. Clairsville, OH), April 9, 1863, p. 2.


“Patriotic Letter from Dr. West,” *Belmont Chronicle* (St. Clairsville, OH), April 9, 1863, p. 2.

Ibid.


27 For Halleck’s prewar views on the importance of fortification, see Henry W. Halleck, *Elements of Military Art and Science* (1846).


29 Carter Van Vleck letter of March 4, 1863 in Lehr Gerber, 78.

30 Diary of W.A. Boyd, March 10, 1863, Boyd Family Papers, Bancroft Library, UC Berkeley, BANC MSS Z-Z 115 Box 1.


33 Carter Van Vleck quoted in Raymond, 77.


35 Area fortifications described in “Test Excavations on Roper’s Knob: A Fortified Union Signal Station in Franklin, Tennessee,” Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation, Division of Archeology, Report of


40 August L. Yenner (1837-1924) Diary, April 18 and 25, 1863, United States Civil War Collection, Western Michigan University Archives and Regional History Collections (WMUA), Kalamazoo, MI.


44 Samuel S. Boyd Civil War scrapbook, correspondence of February 18, 1864, Boyd Family Papers, 1781-1933, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.

45 Odell quoted in Raymond, 82.


47 Mark M. Smith, “Of Bells, Booms, Sounds, and Silences: Listening to the Civil War South,” in *The War was You and Me: Civilians in the Civil War*, Joan E. Cahn, ed., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 9-12; Mark M. Smith, *The Smell of Battle, the Taste of Siege: A Sensory History of the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015); 6, 30, 139-140. Although Smith’s research of American Civil War sensory experience is pioneering in many ways, his emphasis is primarily on the Eastern Theater and examining the effects of military campaigning. Minimal is his coverage of the Western Theater and areas of extended military occupation, locations where arguably civilian wartime sensory impacts were at their most profound and enduring.

48 Information on number of slaves at Carnton in 1860 from Williamson County Slave Schedule, WCA. Information on Carnton grist and saw mill from *Western Weekly Review* (Franklin, Tennessee), August 13, 1857; ibid, September 15, 1857. On the soundscapes of antebellum plantations, Mark M. Smith contends that they were largely examples of “social quietude and tranquility.” My contention is that such perceptions are generally formed on the basis of contemporary plantations which no longer operate and have no permanent residents.

49 Details of John McGavock’s relationship with the railroad in *Tennessee & Alabama RR vs. John McGavock*, (April 1867), WCA. Additional details of the Nashville-Decatur in *Executive Documents Printed by Order of The House of Representatives During the Second Session of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1866-67* (Washington, D.C.:
239


52 Partridge, 118-119.

53 Accounts of Gordon Granger preferring very early operations noted in *Ninety-Second Illinois Volunteers* (Freeport, IL: Journal Steam Publishing, 1875), 79.

54 Yenner quoted in August L. Yenner Diary, Feb. 23, 1863, United States Civil War Collection, Western Michigan University Archives and Regional History Collections (WMUA), Kalamazoo, MI.

55 Example of sentries calling out for countersigns from Rachel Carter Craighead Diaries, April 26, 1862, Reel 1, Mf 661, TSLA.

56 Carter Van Vleck letter of February 27, 1863 in Lehr and Gerber, 76.

57 Raymond, 79.


Nashville garrison salute to Washington depicted in Rachel Carter Craighead Diaries, February 22, 1863, Reel 1, Mf 661, TSLA.


For an example of inebriated soldiers on national holidays, see Timothy B. Smith, *Corinth 1862: Siege, Battle, Occupation* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2012), 284-285.

Interview of Katie Rowe, age 88, Tulsa, Oklahoma, WPA Slave Narrative Project, Oklahoma Narratives, Volume 13, p. 276.

McAdams, *Every-day Soldier Life*, 27.

Nannie E. Haskins diary, July 4, 1864, Mf 1261, TSLA.


W.H. Bentley, *History of the 77th Illinois Infantry* (Peoria, IL: Edward Hink, 1883), 106

Rachel Carter Craighead Diaries, October 3, 1863, Reel 1, Mf 661, TSLA.

Account of USCT soldiers celebrating the dismantling of slave pens in Natchez from the *Milwaukee Daily Sentinel*, February 17, 1864.


Presbyterian minister quoted in Govan and Livingood, 24.

Animals reported as confiscated from Williamson County, Tennessee listed in NARA, Southern Claims Commission, M1407: Matt Beach, Claim Numbers 16372 and 16567; John D. Roberts Claim Number 1659 filed by Thomas H. Roberts. Life expectancy for artillery teams in Gervase Phillips, “Writing Horses into American Civil War History,” *War in History* 20 (2): 168.

Animals reported as confiscated from Matt Beach listed in NARA, Southern Claims Commission, M1407: Matt Beach, Claim Numbers 16372 and 16567.


Animals reported as confiscated from Williamson County, Tennessee listed in NARA, Southern Claims Commission, M1407: Nancy Crockett, Claim Number 5848; Thomas H. Oden, Claim Number 6322; Jane Morton, Claim Number 6327; Parke Street, Claim Number 1274; Sarah and William Pate, Claim Number 11462; Mary T. Bostick, Claim Number 12219.
August L. Yenner (1837-1924) Diary, May 22, 23, 1863, United States Civil War Collection, Western Michigan University Archives and Regional History Collections (WMUA), Kalamazoo, MI.


93 Ibid.


95 Elihu Wadsworth to brother Charles Wadsworth, December 2, 1863 and April 8, 1864, Civil War Correspondence of the Wadsworth Brothers, 1861-1865, Mf 1995, TSLA.


97 Carter Van Vleck quoted in Lehr and Gerber, 97.


100 Ibid.

102 Adam J. Himmel letter to brother George Himmel, July 23, 1863, Adam J. Himmel Civil War Letters, 1861-1865, Mf 1980, TSLA.


106 Schulz, 191.


Snetsinger, 82.

Timothy B. Smith, *Corinth 1862*, 283.

Samuel S. Boyd Civil War scrapbook, correspondence of April 8, 1864, Boyd Family Papers, 1781-1933, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.

S.K. Fletcher quoted in Merrill, 211-212.

Timothy B. Smith, *Corinth 1862*, 282.


Soldier from the 27th Indiana quoted in Edmund Randolph Brown, *The Twenty-Seventh Indiana Volunteer Infantry in the War of the Rebellion, 1861 to 1865* (Monticello, IN:1899), 448.

Ibid.

Timothy B. Smith, *Corinth 1862*, 281.

Broaddus quoted in Raymond, 82.

Adelicia McEwen quoted in Rick Warwick, compiler, *Williamson County: The Civil War as Seen Through the Female Experience* (Franklin, TN: Williamson County Heritage Foundation, 2008), 15. August L. Yenner (1837-1924) Diary, May 22, 1863, United States Civil War Collection, Western Michigan University Archives and Regional History Collections (WMUA), Kalamazoo, MI.


NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR: INVESTMENT – NATION-BUILDING IN FORTIFIED ZONES


131 Holzer and Gabbard, 219-221.


134 J.H. Bills Diary, December 31, 1862, Mf 1, Reel 2, TSLA.


This dissertation works more along the lines of Michael Durey’s view of the loyalty oath in Civil War Ireland, where most civilians fluctuated around the center of the rebel-loyalist spectrum and consequently allowed themselves to sign oaths when they felt under duress to do so, regardless the political position of the authority imposing the oath, Michael Durey, “Loyalty in the Age of Conspiracy: The Oath-filled Civil War in Ireland, 1795-

136 Marshall B. Thatcher, A Hundred Battles to the West, St. Louis to Atlanta, 1861-1865: The 2nd Michigan Cavalry (Detroit: Marshall Thatcher, 1884), 123.

137 Rosecrans’s order for the deportation of those who refused to take the loyalty oath from OR, Ser. 1, Vol. 23 Pt. 2, p.121.


139 Cook, 122-123.


141 John C. Spence, A Diary of the Civil War (Murfreesboro, TN: Rutherford County Historical Society, 1993), 80.


143 Ibid.


Southern Claims Commission, Alexander N.B. Brooks of Williamson County, Tennessee, Case No. 11754, image available at Fold3.com/image/27/619119/

Moses Royce postwar letter seeking recompense for lost house transcribed in http://battleoffranklin.wordpress.com/category/fort-granger/ (accessed February 2, 2012). Royce family life in exile described in Rick Warwick, compiler, *Williamson County: The Civil War as Seen through the Female Experience* (Franklin, TN: William County Heritage Society, 2008), 102-117. The *Fayetteville* (North Carolina) *Observer*, May 4, 1863, p. 3, may have been mentioning the Royce family when describing the exportation of three families from Franklin. The timing was the same, although the family name given was Rice. There was no family by that name living in Franklin or Williamson County at that time.

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151 Nannie E. Haskins diary, May 17, 1863 and May 30, 1863, Mf 1261, TSLA.

152 Rachel Carter Craighead Diaries, April 21-22, 1863, Reel 1, Mf 661, TSLA.

153 Ibid.

154 J.H. Bills Diary, December 12, 1862, Mf 1, Reel 2, TSLA.


156 Frank J. Welcher and Larry G. Ligget, *Coburn’s Brigade: 85th Indiana, 33rd Indiana, 19th Michigan, and 22nd Wisconsin in the Western Civil War* (Carmel, IN: Guild Press, 1999), 100 - 106.


158 For examples of Union soldiers surprised by the influx of contraband into their fortified areas, see J.K.M., “From the 78th Regiment,” *Macomb (Illinois) Journal*, April 10, 1863, from a letter written on March 23, 1863 at Franklin, Tennessee. Also at Franklin, see “From the 125th” *Western Reserve Chronicle* (Warren, Ohio) March 4, 1863, p. 1.

In some cases, soldiers began to expect the influx of African Americans to increase as the war progressed. For such an example, see Elihu Wadsworth to brother Charles Wadsworth, December 2, 1863 at Fort Bruce in Clarksville, Tennessee, Civil War Correspondence of the Wadsworth Brothers, 1861-1865, Mf 1995, TSLA.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Federal soldier quoted in Timothy B. Smith, Corinth 1862: Siege, Battle, Occupation (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2012), 290.

Federal soldier quoted in ibid.
For an overview of the Schumpeter model of creative destruction and its relationship to entrepreneurial behavior, see Josef A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (London: Routledge, 2003), 130-134.

For examples of former slaves actively resisting plantation lessees and overseers, see Ronald L.F. Davis, “The Black Experience in Natchez, 1720, 1880,” 151-158;


Ibid, 240.

August L. Yenner (1837-1924) Diary, March 13, 1863, United States Civil War Collection, Western Michigan University Archives and Regional History Collections (WMUA), Kalamazoo, MI.


Gregory Downs, for one, presents the skeptical position that the American Civil War made only incremental change for the status of African Americas in the public sphere, a perspective with which this dissertation generally agrees. My analysis differs from Downs in that I find considerable localized change for African Americans who were able to reach and construct areas of Union occupation and fortification. For Down’s position, see Gregory Downs, *After Appomattox: Military Occupation and the Ends of War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015).


Concerning African American labor, the final January 1, 1863 Emancipation Proclamation specifically read, “such persons of suitable condition, will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.”


186 Former slave quoted in Rick Warwick, compiler, *Williamson County: The Civil War as Seen through the Female Experience* (Franklin, TN: William County Heritage Society, 2008), 64.


194 Leigh, 59-62; David G. Surdam, Northern Naval Superiority and the Economics of the American Civil War (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), 184-185.

195 Ibid, 62.


201 Govan and Livingood, 36.


206 Govan and Livingood, 34.


214 Albert Slack letter to family, February 20, 1863, from Emory University Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library (MARBL), Albert L. Slack Correspondence, 1862-1865, Manuscript Collection No. 459.


218 Ibid.


NOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE: RETICENCE – THE ERASURE OF UNION OCCUPATION FORTS


4 Ibid.


Ibid.


15 Ibid, p. 150.


17 Gerteis, 130.


19 Ibid.


23 Ibid, 16.


27 For examples of former slaves actively resisting plantation lessees and overseers, see Davis, “The Black Experience in Natchez,” p. 151-158;


34 Ibid, 122-124.


41 Stephen V. Ash, The Black Experience in the Civil War South (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2010), 5.


43 Among many recent works that also merit attention concerning the Civil War continuing long after 1865, Heather Cox Richardson offers a compelling piece that defines “reconciliation” as largely a middle class concept at the
beginning of the twentieth century, with the impoverished and wealthy remaining at odds in terms of region, race, and class, in *West From Appomattox: The Reconstruction of America After the Civil War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). For an intriguing view that the “end of the war” is measured too often in terms of levels of violence via military and paramilitary action, see William A. Blair, “Finding the Ending of America’s Civil War,” *American Historical Review* 120:5 (December 2015): 1753-1766.


50 *Western Weekly Review* (Franklin, TN), September 30, 1865, p. 2.


54 Notably, Garry Wills in his lauded *Lincoln at Gettysburg* presents all national cemeteries as part of a national movement to make cemeteries into parklands where the living can peacefully commune with the dead. This may apply to Gettysburg National Cemetery, with its semi-circle design and placement in a northern battlefield. Yet even its near complete exclusion of Confederate bodies suggests that the intent of such places was not as peaceful as Wills presents. Garry Wills, *Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words that Remade America* (New York: Touchstone, 1992), 66-70, 73-74. Transfer of Union bodies from Columbia, Tennessee to Murfreesboro, Tennessee in “Removal of Dead – Thirteen Hundred Dead Bodies Sent to Murfreesboro,” *Nashville Union and Dispatch*. November 22, 1867 p. 3.


62 Ibid, 159.

63 Ibid, 159, 163.


66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.
NOTES TO APPENDICES