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ROSTER: a complete listing of the members with addresses and their current research projects is issued in even years to all members. (A supplemental list is mailed in odd years). Editor of the **Roster & Research List** is Warren F. Kimball, Department of History, Rutgers University (Newark), Newark, New Jersey 07102.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors two printed works of a quarterly nature, the **Newsletter**, and **Diplomatic History**, a journal. All members receive these publications.

REVISIONISTS REVISED: THE CASE OF VIETNAM

Marilyn B. Young*

I want to talk to you today about a process I see going on all around me, in the face of which I often feel helpless: the rewriting of the history of the war in Vietnam for comfortable current usage. Perhaps you have noticed it too and are equally concerned; perhaps it is as invisible to you as it seems to be to many of my friends and colleagues; perhaps some of you are participating in it. For me, it is a Present Danger, and I wish there was a committee dedicated to combating it.

For the past three years I have taught freshman seminars on this war. The students, to a man or woman, declare themselves fervently against the war. "It was bad," they say. "It was wrong." Within a week it is clear that their understanding of why it was bad, what was wrong about it is terribly limited. They cannot face the possibility that American motives were not of the purest. We meant well, they argue, but our leaders didn't know enough and we got bogged down. Our intentions were of the best, they insist but "something" went wrong. Like those who joined the antiwar movement in 1969 and after, they believe the war had become unwinnable, or if winnable, the price was too great. The war, they dispassionately explain, was an error, a blunder, an American tragedy. It was, they conclude, just stupid. Simplistic analysis, suitable to eighteen-year olds, you might say. What disturbs me is that it is precisely the analysis most available to them in the press, the movies, memoirs, novels, and academic studies.

I had thought, in my innocence, that by the war's end a very different analysis had achieved widespread consensus. The work of antiwar scholars and the availability of "secret" government documents made clear what many of us had been saying since the late Fifties: In callous pursuit of a definition of national interest that did not admit to serious debate, six administrations had committed themselves to denying to the people of Indochina the right of self-determination. Tactics had varied, from relatively mild subversion to terror bombing on a scale unprecedented in the history of warfare. But **tactics** weren't the issue. The point, by 1975, was not that the U. S. could not win against a people's war; the point was, what in God's name were we doing trying?

And yet, from the war's end to the present, a very different question has held center stage. A 1975 editorial in the **Washington Post** puts it best: "For if much of the actual conduct of the Vietnam policy over the years was wrong and misguided--even tragic--it cannot be denied that some part of the purpose of that policy was right and defensible." Of course anything **can** be denied. What the **Post** editorial writer is really saying is that it cannot **afford** to be denied. What was so right and

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defensible? "To hope that the people of South Vietnam would be able to decide on their own form of government and social order."¹ Now how can the editor honestly have believed that was our hope, when four years earlier he might have read, in the government version of the **Pentagon Papers**, Secretary Dulles' definitive statement of the American objective: to see to it that the Vietminh could "only take over by internal violence."² As Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts put it, in their fascinating study of how the system worked, the consensus of six administrations was that "containment required preventing the Communists from taking full control of Vietnam."³ Nothing about choices and social order here. Without drawing breath, the editorial goes on: "The American public is entitled, indeed obligated, to explore how good impulses came to be transmuted into bad policy, but we cannot afford to cast out all remembrance of that earlier impulse. For the fundamental lesson of Vietnam surely is . . . that we are capable of error--and on a gigantic scale."⁴ In somewhat less elevated language, this is precisely the lesson my students draw from the current discussion of Vietnam and that, as Leon Trotsky said, is no accident.

I believe that the treatment of Indochina in the postwar period is a vital part of the effort to create a new ideological consensus, one that will preserve the possibility of counter-revolutionary interventions when and how they become necessary. For the fundamental institutions which gave rise to the Vietnam war have hardly changed; what has changed is the **credibility** of the imperialist ideology which justified that war. From the viewpoint of the State, that is the wound that must be healed.

We are, in press, films, memoirs, novels, and academic studies, being asked both to forget and misremember. What is it necessary to forget? That America was defeated in Vietnam by the combined force of a mass movement in America and a people's war in Indochina. Even Gelb and Betts, in what is in most ways an admirably astringent study of American policy, seem reluctant to confront the reality of what America tried to crush in Indochina. The Communists, they write, were simply more **effectively** dictatorial than the Saigon mandarins, especially because after World War II they captured much of the banner of nationalism."⁵ Sophisticated in so many other ways, the authors still talk about nationalism as if it were a game of capture the flag. The Vietnamese Communists **were** nationalists; nationalists who believed that only a thoroughgoing social revolution, which eliminated both imperialism **and** traditional patterns of social relations, could realize the goals of independence and self-determination. They were not just cleverer versions of "our" Vietnamese. We are also required to forget the incredible disparity between the forces America brought to bear against the people of Vietnam, and that which faced the U.S. military and their clients. Again, Betts and Gelb are a good illustration, especially because the bulk of their work speaks sharply against current revisionist arguments. The brutality of Communist methods of warfare, they write, "matched, if not exceeded, Saigon's." A surprising statement in view of all the statistics on the air war against both southern and

northern Vietnam conducted entirely by the U. S. and Saigon. Moreover, the authors note, Hanoi received "massive doses of aid from the Soviet Union and China." To be sure, it was "only a fraction of the aid the United States gave to France and Saigon."⁶ Despite this acknowledgement, on the next page they argue that the war could not end so long as the superpowers kept the supplies flowing. "Each side tried more force. The other side would match it."⁷ All that is served by the perpetuation of this idea of relatively evenly-matched sides is an avoidance of the reality, on the ground, of what that war was like for each side.

Why we should be rendered amnesiac is hardly a puzzle. If the efforts of mobilized citizens could affect government policy on this issue, and if people remember that fact, then it might happen again on other issues--and that is clearly not to the interest of the State. Nor is the inspiration to be drawn from the example of the successful Vietnamese resistance to American power a lesson the government wishes anyone to learn. But in addition to forgetting, we are being asked to misremember, to learn from the war precisely the wrong lessons useful not to the world at large, but only to the preservation of American power.

A general outline of the revisionist history of the war is easy to describe: the U. S., foolishly but with benevolent intent, intervened in Indochina in order to defend a legitimate South Vietnamese government against brutal aggression from its northern Communist neighbor. Somehow our good intentions got lost in the shuffle. Out of misunderstanding and excusable ignorance, we were caught defending a dubious and increasingly unattractive ally. "What started off as an act of counterintervention against a foreign intervention," Zbigniew Brzezinski explained to a reporter recently, "became a national liberation struggle, and we got bogged down in it."⁸ The language is interesting--we counter-intervened against a foreign intervention. America is apparently at home everywhere, though surrounded by foreigners.

In time, the story goes on, our tragic mistakes were realized and corrected. The record is now cleared. As President Carter explained it, in a mindboggling display of blaming the victim, we owe the Vietnamese nothing "because the destruction was mutual."⁹ Vietnam was a brutal war, the revisionist version continues, but then so are all wars. In a recent spate of movies and memoris, and implicit in Guenter Lewy's **America in Vietnam** as well, the specific evils of Vietnam are washed in the general blood of war itself. Legitimacy is sought by associating the horrors of Vietnam with those of such widely-accepted conflicts as WWII. If even WWII has its moral ambiguities--as indeed it does--then what can one expect of Vietnam? The memoirs of Phil Caputo and Michael Herr, despite their graphic descriptions of the particularities of the Vietnam war, are both more than half in love with it. War is hell, they say, but boy you should have **been** there. This is the underlying message that deposits itself, like a layer of silt, in the public consciousness. Nothing that glorious can have been all bad. Caputo goes even farther: what ultimately deprives Vietnam of meaning is that

we didn't win. Otherwise, whatever the goal, the deaths of his friends would somehow have been meaningful.

I want to spend just a little time on the Vietnam movies that are beginning to fill screens around the country. It is here, in the popular media, that consciousness is formed and the failure of critics to pay extensive attention to what is going on is deeply disturbing. The boldest offender, in terms of my thesis, is "The Deerhunter," which uses Vietnam as a backdrop for a story about the usual manly virtues. Brilliantly marketed, wildly over-praised by the critics, "The Deerhunter," presents a picture of Vietnam that would be laughable if it weren't so terribly vicious and destructive. The American heroes are literally dropped into a situation of great evil which not unnaturally corrupts some of them. The Vietnamese are presented as universally mindless brutes, merrily wasting ammunition on a Russian roulette gambling game with helpless American POWs. They commit atrocities against their own people, their cruelty knows no bounds--they are refugees from the worst propaganda movies of the Forties. Imagine, if you will, what our response would have been had the Germans made such a film shortly after V-E day. It might have been set on the Eastern front and shown subhuman Russians mistreating noble German GIs who, after many tribulations, return to Bavaria to sit in a deserted beer garden sadly singing "Deutschland Uber Alles." Such a movie would have been banned by the occupying authorities of four nations. And we would not for a moment think that undue censorship.

It is instructive to compare "Deerhunter's" success with the fate of two far more honest movies which most of you have probably never heard of, much less seen: "Go Tell the Spartans," and "Twilight's Last Gleaming." "Spartans" takes place entirely in Vietnam before 1965 ('the good old days,' according to some revisionist accounts), Vietnamese appear as real human beings, both the "mercenaries" who fight with the Americans and their adversaries. The American presence in Vietnam is a puzzle to most of the men fighting there and the movie treats every official explanation with a healthy skepticism. In "Twilight" the political message is much harsher. We were in Vietnam, the movie tells us, solely for the sake of maintaining our credibility--and the hero's stance towards this is total outrage and an insistence on full public disclosure of the documents which make it clear. But the White House, perhaps looking at the more popular Vietnam movies around, decides the public cannot bear too much reality and, for his pains the hero is tricked and destroyed. The premise might seem far-fetched, were it not part of the official explanation. As George Ball pointed out, a small nation like France could withdraw from Vietnam, but "the authority of the U. S. in world affairs depends, in considerable part, on the confidence of other nations that we can accomplish whatever we undertake."¹⁰ I am reminded of Joseph Heller's satirical novel **Good as Gold**. At times it reads almost like a straight description of official modes of thought and the academics who push them. Lieberman, editor of a small intellectual journal that might or might not be **Commentary** (perhaps it is that combined journal Woody Allen refers to as

Dissentary), declaims aloud to his friends a recent editorial he has written: "If we are willing to go to war every time our vital interests are at stake, then I say we must go to war every time our vital interests are NOT at stake, to make sure friend and foe understand we will."¹¹

Whatever you think of "Twilight's" argument, both it and "Spartans" offer the public an uncomfortable understanding of the recent past, one hard to live with, but far closer to the truth than "Deerhunter." Both were passed over by the critics; neither has been widely distributed and no one connected with them has been nominated for an award of any kind.

What are the lessons "responsible" journalists and academics wish us to learn from Vietnam? Among the more surprising is that we actually won the war, not once but twice--in 1968 and 1972. But the fruits of victory in '68 were stolen by an irresponsible press corps which persuaded a gullible public that Tet was a victory for the other side. Nevertheless, by 1972 counter-insurgency had eliminated the Viet Cong as a significant factor in the war and the North Vietnamese Easter offensive was decisively defeated. After the Christmas bombing, as Sir Robert Thompson puts it, the war was over. The U. S. had won.¹²

And then? Some revisionists argue that Congress, in its mindless cowardice, handed South Vietnam to the Communists by halting the bombing of Cambodia and placing limits on American military aid. Others explain the lost victory by referring to the sell-out in Paris in 1973, by which President Nixon agreed to allow NVA units to remain in place in the South and then failed to deliver necessary levels of support to Thieu. More broadly, we lost because of the pressures of the antiwar movement, the behavior of the liberal press, and the timidity of politicians unwilling to pay the domestic political price of victory. The analysis carries with it suggestions for solving these problems in a future crisis: suppress dissent more effectively, control the press, replace softhearted officials with tougher ones.

The net effect of the argument is clear: it renders insistence on ending the war an extraneous factor, something to be **managed** rather than responded to. War and its prosecution becomes the exclusive province of the military and those civilians whose goal is total victory. By definition, then, the U. S. cannot lose a war: the positive desire to stop fighting is understood as essentially illegitimate.

More common than claims to military victory--actual or potential--is the notion that the war was indeed unwinnable at a reasonable price. Edwin O. Reischauer has written that the "real lesson of the Vietnam war is the tremendous cost of attempting to control the destiny of a Southeast Asian country against the cross-currents of nationalism. Southeast Asia simply is not open to external control at a cost that would make this a feasible proposition for any outside power."¹³ And if it could be done cheaply? What then? By this measure, Russia's invasion and domination of Czechoslovakia is an ideal policy.

The most recent version of the proper lesson is also the most narrow and succinct. In an op-ed essay, Richard Betts, co-author of **The Irony of Vietnam**, argues that there are few things to be learned from Vietnam except this: "Never commit massive conventional forces in a civil war on

behalf of a weak government against disciplined revolutionaries with sanctuaries..”¹⁴ Obviously this leaves us with many attractive alternatives: we can commit small amounts of conventional forces on behalf of a strong government in a civil war against unruly revolutionaries. Or we can commit nuclear forces on behalf of a government whose strength, like the discipline of its adversaries, becomes irrelevant. Betts would like to see the development of a “flexible policy that exploits favorable conditions to protect interests and values but bow to conditions that preclude success.” But he specifies neither the interests nor the values at issue, beyond the necessity of “competition with the Russians and their clients.” Embedded in the approach Betts takes is the assumption that intervention on behalf of governments against revolutionaries, rather than the other way around, is automatically acceptable policy, provided only, in his words, we can “win without ignominy.” Isn’t it possible that the project **itself** is ignominious, victory or no?

For some time I had been puzzled by a curious analogy that has been drawn between Vietnam and the Spanish Civil War. Bernard Fall’s original comparison had made great sense to me. Vietnam wasn’t Munich, he wrote, in anguish shortly before his death, it was Spain, and the United States was in the position of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Bett’s op-ed essay made things clear. It is disturbing to be so consistently counter-revolutionary, especially when the governments we choose to establish and then fight for are so uniformly miserable. But there have been worthy governments, and unworthy revolutionaries—Spain for example. Hence the editor of the **Washington Monthly** argues that we “weren’t wrong to try to help the South [in Vietnam] with supplies and volunteers, any more than the American left was wrong to give such help to the Loyalists during the Spanish Civil War.”¹⁵ An odd scenario, this one, with the Green Berets playing the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, the government of the United States standing in for the CPUSA and the NLF in the role of Franco!

The revisionists must take as the starting point of their discussion the legitimacy of South Vietnam as an independent nation. All the evidence of the way in which that political entity was created in, by, and for the government of the United States, is simply ignored. Take an otherwise reasonable **NY Times** editorial attacking China’s Vietnam policy. Referring to our own hard times in Indochina, the following throw-away phrase appears: “when the U. S. tried to protect half of Vietnam against attack by the other”¹⁶ The editorial goes on to discuss China, but the author’s analysis is completely coded in this phrase. We came to the defense of half of a nation; our errors were tactical, correctable; we shall do better next time. The fear is that Vietnam has so traumatized the American public that the government can no longer resort to military force of any kind in foreign affairs. Since, according to a recent study, there have been 215 occasions since WWII when force was employed by the U. S. as an instrument of policy, the loss of this option clearly has people worried.¹⁷ Albert Wohlstetter, in a series of op-ed articles, urges on us the necessity of a sophisticated and varied arsenal which offers

the possibility of a "credible response" in emergencies. "Military force isn't always an answer," Wohlstetter tells us--which is a relief really--but "we can scarcely protect our interests, or indeed help keep peace," without a "carefully modulated and precisely limited military force."¹⁸ Wohlstetter does not discuss what our interests are, **whose** peace we are keeping, or how military force can help us. By focusing on tactics, he assumes principles.

If we are to, in a phrase gaining increasing currency, "regain our will," the bad taste left by Vietnam will have to be taken away. Not an easy, or even pleasant, job, but there are academics equal to the task. The most unambiguous effort is Guenter Lewy's **America in Vietnam**. Handsomely produced by Oxford University Press, it has all the earmarks of a solid academic book--it is dull, heavily footnoted, employs "hitherto neglected official sources," and delivers far less than the blurb promises. Lewy's objective is explicitly presentist and political. "Examined dispassionately," he wishes, "American actions in Vietnam lend no support to the accusations of criminality or of gross immorality with which America's conduct of the war is charged Today it is more urgent than ever that this be understood, for the simple reason that Vietnam continues to haunt our minds and continues to exert a powerful influence on our conception of ourselves as a nation and of our role in the world." Vietnam was traumatic, Lewy goes on, not because of what occurred there, but because of the "cobwebs of mythology" about what went on there.

Lewy is convinced that young people in America today lack national pride and self-confidence because they are under the mistaken impression that "illegal and grossly immoral conduct" on the Vietnam battlefield was "officially condoned."²⁰ He does not deny that such conduct occurred, only that it was policy. His argument rests solidly on the premise that the U.S. had a legal and moral right to be fighting in Vietnam in the first place. If you refuse his first premise, the book falls to pieces and the war, as well as the specific tactics used to prosecute it, appears as what it was in naked fact: a criminal endeavor.

Since fundamental American policy is never at issue in Lewy's book, he is free to turn his full attention to tactical aspects of the war. He makes a convincing argument against "big unit war," noting the many ways in which it proved less than productive in the Vietnam setting. Counter-insurgency and pacification should have been the main thrust of GVN and American efforts, he writes. Had the Saigon government only dealt with the "distributive conflicts in Vietnamese society in a meaningful way," it could--with appropriate American help--have won the war.²¹ Of course, had the government dealt with these conflicts in a meaningful way it would have **been** the NLF and there would have been no war at all.

Among the most distressing aspects of Lewy's book is his treatment of American military tactics. He wishes to demonstrate that, however disturbing to civilian sensibilities, nothing the military did in Vietnam was against standing international rules of war. Therefore we, as post-Vietnam Americans, have nothing to be ashamed of. The

relocation of village populations? We had a responsibility, under the rules of war, to move people from combat zones. And besides, although conditions in refugee camps were not pleasant, they were "not out of line with the local standard of living. . ." "What about the deliberate creation of refugees? Bad tactics, perhaps, but the military "really believed" that forced relocation was the "most effective way of depriving the VC of supplies and manpower--the water in which they swam." It thus falls under the heading 'imperative military reasons' as described in Art. 49 of the Geneva Convention.²²

How about napalm? Well, fire is an ancient weapon of war, and the Hague Convention only enjoins the use of arms which cause "unnecessary suffering." What this means in the normal course of war is to rule out only those weapons which cause suffering disproportionate to the military advantage gained and, although he is uneasy about it, Lewy feels napalm passes the test. About white phosphorus he is clearly unhappy--but there's no law against it yet. Moving right along, Lewy excuses crop defoliation (lack of evidence that it's a direct danger to health), CBUs (effective, besides there's no law against them), tiger cages (prisoners were only shackled between five p.m. and six a.m. and there is no "firm" evidence that organic paralysis resulted), and so on.²³

The book is almost endlessly depressing, a sad reminder that the lessons of Vietnam have not even begun to be learned. For Lewy and others who think as he does the goal of national policy, despite minor changes in language, remains what it was before Vietnam. In Brzezinski's words it is "to make the world congenial to ourselves, to prevent America from being lonely in the world. . . ." A more modest statement of imperial purpose than you might find in the Fifties or Sixties, perhaps, but its import is the same: the world must respond to the definition of **American** need. Brzezinski believes the people of the world today have "greater respect for the moral meaning of America . . . and for the President himself as the personal expression of the fundamentally spiritual message of America."²⁴

Although it is not my chosen vocabulary, I think America can indeed have moral meaning in the world, but only if more of us are ready to confront Vietnam in all its terror. I want academics to be able to call things by their proper names, even when writing about their own country. The well-documented effort to subvert self-determination in Vietnam on the part of six administrations must be remembered, analyzed, understood. Gelb and Betts go farther than most in facing Vietnam directly. What drove successive administrations to commit themselves to keeping Vietnam--or some portion of it--anti-Communist are "the institutions of the system and the values that permeate them."²⁵ Yet their final recommendations do not speak of "changing either institutions or values. They urge that future administrations reject all universal doctrines, forget about striving for consensus and devote themselves to a pragmatic treatment of each issue as it arises. Pragmatism, however, is a **method**, not a new value. One can pragmatically pursue the same old ends."²⁵

All of you are familiar with the current German reaction to that

otherwise undistinguished soap opera of horror called "The Holocaust." One can imagine similar reactions twenty years from now to a TV broadcast of the Peter Davis documentary "Hearts & Minds." What? people will ask. Did this really happen? It can't have. Or if it did-how? And why haven't our teachers told us about it? Writing on quite another issue, the poet Susan Griffin says, "There is always a time to make right/what is wrong/. There is always a time/for retribution/and that time/ is beginning." To struggle against the rewriting of the history of the war is to participate in that beginning.

NOTES

1. **Washington Post**, April 30, 1975, quoted in Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman, **After the Cataclysm: Postwar Indochina and the Reconstruction of Imperial Ideology**, pp. 8-9 (forthcoming, South End Press, Boston, 1979).
2. Quoted in Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, **The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked** (Washington, D. C., 1979), p. 63.
3. **Ibid.**, p. 3.
4. **Washington Post**, *op. cit.*
5. Gelb with Betts, p. 11.
6. **Ibid.**, p. 10.
7. **Ibid.**, p. 11.
8. Elizabeth Drew, "Profile," **New Yorker**, May 1, 1978, p. 98.
9. Quoted by Noam Chomsky, Huizinga Lecture, Leiden, December, 1977.
10. Quoted in Guenter Lewy, **America in Vietnam** (New York, 1978), p. 425.
11. Joseph Heller, **Good as Gold** (New York, 1979), p. 153.
12. Sir Robert Thompson's essay and others which reflect the military revisionist approach appears in D. D. Frizzell and W. Scott Thompson, eds., **The Lessons of the Vietnam War** (New York, 1977).
13. Quoted by Chomsky, Huizinga Lecture, *op. cit.*

14. Richard K. Betts, "From Vietnam to Yemen," **New York Times**, March 25, 1979.
15. Charles Peters, "Vietnam Veterans and Refugees Still Exist," **New York Times**, October 24, 1977, p. 29. Lewy makes the same comparison on p. 428 of **America in Vietnam**.
16. **New York Times**, February 28, 1979.
17. Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, **Force Without War: U. S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument**, (Washington, D. C., 1978).
18. Albert Wohlstetter, "The Uses of Irrelevance," **New York Times**, February , 1979.
19. Guenter Lewy, "Vietnam: New Light on the Question of American Guilt," **Commentary**, 65:2 (February, 1978), 49.
20. Lewy, **America in Vietnam**, vii.
21. **Ibid.**, p. 187. Lewy examines "big unit" warfare in chapter 2.
22. **Ibid.**, pp. 228-229.
23. Lewy discusses incendiary weapons on pp. 242-248, the health hazards of crop destruction on pp. 262-264, CBUs on pp. 266-267, and tiger cages on pp. 297-299. A convenient summary of this material can be found in his **Commentary** article.
24. Brzezinski in an interview with James Reston, "The World According to Brzezinski," **New York Times Magazine**, December 31, 1978, p. 9 ff.
25. Gelb with Betts, p. 360. Their recommendations for the future are discussed on pp. 363-369.

The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library as a Research Center for the Study of International Affairs: Opportunities and Prospects

David Haight

(Mr. Haight received the M.A. in history at Wichita State University in 1970. He has been at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library since 1971. His work there has for the most part involved the reviewing, declassifying, and further processing of President Eisenhower's papers and those of his associates.

We feel particularly fortunate in being able to offer our readers this informative article at this time in view of the coming SHAFR Summer Conference which will be held in Lawrence, Kansas, not far from Abilene. Many members of the Society who plan to attend the summer meeting will undoubtedly want "to kill two birds with one stone" by spending some extra time in research at the Eisenhower Library).

On November 17, 1966, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library at Abilene, Kansas, officially opened its doors to researchers. The first scholars to visit the Library found opportunities to study President Eisenhower's diplomacy to be quite limited because little material reflecting the formulation of policy was available at that time. Within the last few years, however, the Library staff has opened to research large quantities of manuscript material, much of which pertains to international affairs. Twelve series in Dwight D. Eisenhower's Papers as President (commonly referred to as the Ann Whitman File) have been largely opened to scholars. These papers document the President's international conferences, his communications with foreign leaders, his relationships with his Secretaries of State, and his own personal views on America's role in world affairs. The papers of Eisenhower's second Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter, are now also available to scholars and the staff is currently processing the papers of Secretary John Foster Dulles. The opening of other important collections such as the papers of C. D. Jackson, those of James C. Hagerty, and portions of the records of the White House Staff Secretary and the Files of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs has also been conducive to the Library's development as a key research center for the study of foreign affairs.

A number of factors have contributed to the Library's importance to students of international relations. First of all, President Eisenhower, by necessity and by natural inclination, devoted much of his time and energy to the conduct of foreign policy. His efforts are reflected by the high percentage of his papers which relate to this subject. Secondly, the President and his staff consciously attempted to preserve as complete a

record of the Administration as possible. As a result, certain types of information were recorded which otherwise would have been lost to history. The Library staff in turn has striven to make as much of this information available as possible by systematically reviewing the papers of the President and those of his associates, by attempting to have certain materials declassified, and by preparing detailed finding aids to the Library's holdings. Researchers have also contributed by requesting mandatory declassification reviews which have resulted in the releasing of numerous documents. Finally, the Library's acquisition of the personal papers of many of the President's Cabinet officials, White House staff members, military associates, and personal friends has provided rich documentation to supplement the President's own papers and official records.

Scholars even superficially familiar with the Eisenhower Presidency should have little trouble recalling the many international issues of the 1950s: wars in Korea and Indochina; crises in the Middle East, the Formosa Straits, and Berlin; summit conferences and good will trips; the U-2 Incident; the phrases "brinkmanship" and "massive retaliation"; and countless controversial personalities including Konrad Adenauer, Chiang Kai-shek, Fidel Castro, John Foster Dulles, Charles De Gaulle, Anthony Eden, Nikita Khrushchev, and Syngman Rhee, to name only a few.

Students of the period may not, however, be aware of the Eisenhower Administration's recordkeeping activities which resulted in the creation and preservation of the unusually diverse and rich body of documentation now housed at the Library. President Eisenhower kept a diary during various periods of his life and continued to do so during his Presidency although his diary-keeping was sporadic and confined largely to the early years of his administration. His secretary, Mrs. Ann Whitman, supplemented the President's diary with her own entries. Other White House diarists include Press Secretary James C. Hagerty whose handwritten and typescript entries encompass the year 1954 and portions of 1955 and 1956 in depth, C. D. Jackson, a psychological warfare specialist who documented his cold war activities in a personal log spanning the years 1953-64, and Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, one of the President's science advisors who published his revealing diary covering the years 1959-1961.¹

The various diaries kept by the President and his staff comprise only a small part of the historical record of these years. When Dr. Arthur Minnich was appointed Deputy Staff Secretary in 1953 his assignments included the recording of the Administration's history. In early 1954 Minnich indicated that a top priority was the committing to paper of information which would not otherwise be preserved in the records. Types of documentation which would be preserved included:

1. Extensive minutes of Cabinet meetings.
2. Summaries of legislative leaders meetings.
3. Reports and comments made at daily staff meetings which had a bearing on the President's problems and activities.

4. Background memos based on verbal accounts from staff members regarding developments affecting the President.
5. Human interest items.²

Greatly facilitating the accomplishment of these objectives was the functioning of the White House Staff Secretariat, headed by Colonel Paul T. Carroll with assistance from Minnich. This staff secretariat controlled the flow of correspondence directly to and from the President and kept an accurate record of those communications and the actions taken. The role of the Staff Secretary in the recording of history was significantly expanded in October, 1964, when General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Jr., replaced Colonel Carroll who died suddenly. General Goodpaster soon began attending and monitoring private conferences which the President frequently held in his office with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and other top advisors on national security policy. General Goodpaster or his assistant, Lieutenant Colonel John S. D. Eisenhower, took extensive notes and prepared detailed memoranda which summarized these high level discussions.

Although Secretary of State Dulles often saw the President alone without leaving any record of the private discussions,³ when he met the President along with other Cabinet officers or representatives of executive departments, Goodpaster was there to record the meetings. When Christian A. Herter succeeded Dulles as Secretary of State, Goodpaster and John Eisenhower began covering all meetings between Herter and the President, including the private ones. John Eisenhower later commented:

We never received an inkling whether Herter objected or not. Even if he did he was too much of a gentleman to indicate it. On our part we were happy because from then on our records of historic decisions would be more complete.⁴

Not only are these "memcons" a valuable source for documenting Secretary Herter's relationship with the President, they are also especially useful for illustrating military viewpoints on international affairs since the President's meetings with the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff appear to have been faithfully covered by Goodpaster or Eisenhower. In general, these documents provide a remarkably detailed record of the formulation of United States policy at the presidential level with respect to most major international problems during the years 1955-1960.

While General Goodpaster and Colonel Eisenhower monitored meetings in the White House on national security matters, Arthur Minnich took notes during Cabinet convocations and the President's meetings with Republican and bipartisan Congressional leaders. The "minutes" prepared by Minnich, actually paraphrased summaries, provided possibly the most detailed record of discussions in any recent president's cabinet. The value of the Cabinet "minutes" to historians

and political scientists is enhanced because President Eisenhower attempted to utilize the Cabinet more fully than had previous presidents. While this body devoted most of its attention to domestic issues, it frequently considered problems having international ramifications, particularly foreign trade questions. Secretaries Dulles and Herter sometimes briefed the Cabinet at length on major international crises.

The Eisenhower Administration's recordkeeping practices extended to the highly-privileged meetings of the National Security Council. Preserved for posterity is a body of memoranda which summarize virtually every NSC discussion. These detailed memoranda total approximately 5,000 pages. According to Gordon Gray, the President's Special Assistant For National Security Affairs, 1958-1961, the President gave strict orders at the beginning of his administration that no notes be kept of these NSC discussions. Despite this order, Gray's predecessor, Robert Cutler, instructed a deputy to take notes at each meeting. These notes were systematically typed and prepared as fully-paraphrased summaries. Gray wondered why the President did not say "What is this guy going?" But he apparently never questioned the practice.⁵ In July, 1959 when the deputy resigned, he turned over these voluminous notes to the President who recognized their historical value. Eisenhower told Gray to have this record continued to the end of the Administration.⁶

Although as of this writing none of these NSC summaries have yet been declassified, their existence was recently publicized by the Senate Select Committee on Foreign Intelligence which cited some of these documents in its report on attempted assassinations of foreign leaders.⁷ A finding aid which lists topics discussed at these meetings is now available to researchers and a number of mandatory review requests have been placed for some of these documents.

Not to be neglected as a record of President Eisenhower's thinking on policy matters is his official and private correspondence with foreign heads of state, Cabinet officials, White House staff members, and personal friends. Eisenhower normally restricted his public statements to bland and unrevealing generalities, but tended to "open up" in his private correspondence to such close friends as Captain Everett "Swede" Hazlett.⁸ An example of the President's candidness in his correspondence with Hazlett can be seen in a letter which he wrote during the Suez Crisis in 1956. After assessing the Middle East situation at length, Eisenhower concluded by stating:

I think that France and Britain have made a terrible mistake. Because they had such a poor case they isolated themselves from the good opinion of the world and it will take them many years to recover. France was perfectly cold blooded about the matter. She has a war on her hands in Algeria and she was anxious to get some one else fighting the Arabs on her Eastern flank. So she was ready to do anything to get England and Israel in that affair. But I think the other

two countries have hurt themselves immeasurably and this is something of a sad blow because quite naturally Britain not only has been but must be our best friend in the world.⁹

Although President Eisenhower preferred not to conduct official business by telephone, he did frequently discuss policy matters on the phone with his Secretaries of State. Both Dulles and Herter prepared records of their telephone conversations with the President and with other individuals as well. The Dulles papers contain an estimated 8,000 pages of detailed memos of telephone conversations while the Herter papers include perhaps another 4,000 pages of these memos. The Ann Whitman File also contains records of many of the President's telephone conversations with Dulles, Herter, and Under Secretaries of State, Walter Bedell Smith and Herbert C. Hoover, Jr.

After having surveyed some of the major types of documentation preserved at the Eisenhower Library it might be well to turn now to the major obstacle encountered by scholars wishing to make full use of this material, namely security classification. Executive Order 11652 which became effective in June, 1972, provided for the declassification of most government information over thirty years old and established a system under which researchers could request declassification reviews by agencies of documents between ten and thirty years old, including Eisenhower's presidential papers. This mandatory review provision of Executive Order 11652 has had a great impact on the Library's declassification programs. During fiscal years 1977-78, documents totalling 18,664 pages were submitted for mandatory review. 7,262 pages were declassified in full, 2,008 pages declassified in part, 5,558 pages exempted in full from declassification, and about 3,800 pages submitted during this period still await action from one or more agencies. While these figures may be helpful in indicating the sheer volume of paperwork involved in the mandatory review operation, they do not clearly reveal the quality of material which has been declassified. It has been the Library's experience that this system has brought about mixed results in return for a tremendous number of staff hours invested. Mandatory reviews have resulted in some significant documents and categories of documents being declassified but have also led to a number of disappointments and frustrations.

An examination of the Library's mandatory review records does suggest certain trends. For example, most correspondence and memoranda under thirty years old originated by major foreign governments has been consistently exempted from declassification although some messages from heads of African, Latin American, and a few smaller Asian countries have been opened. Material created by the National Security Council has also been a problem as the NSC has been extremely slow in responding to requests and has been generally conservative in releasing information. A fairly large number of the memoranda of Presidential conferences prepared by Andrew Goodpaster and John Eisenhower have been declassified either in full or in part, but action on these important documents has been slow and a

great many of these memos which have been submitted for review still await action by one or more agencies. Intelligence information is and will undoubtedly continue to be a difficult category as far as declassification is concerned for many years.

On the other hand, the Library has achieved a highly successful return on its submission of Cabinet "minutes" and summaries of discussions between legislative leaders and the President. While these meetings normally did not deal with issues as sensitive as those handled by the NSC, these documents do contain some frank comments on countries and issues. Particularly rich in information regarding foreign relations are the memoranda of bipartisan discussions which the President held periodically with congressional leaders from both parties.

In general, the chances of a document's being declassified may depend on a number of factors: the type of document, the agency or desk officer conducting the review, and the current relevance of the subject matter. Documents dealing with subjects on which much has already been published sometimes tend to be released. Information on Indochina, for example, is more likely to be released than a detailed memorandum outlining United States policy and courses of action in a currently sensitive area such as the Middle East.

President Carter recently signed Executive Order 12065 which supersedes E. O. 11652 and is, therefore, the latest executive pronouncement governing security classified information. Since the new order did not become effective until December 1, 1978, it is too early to determine what impact it will have on the declassification of President Eisenhower's papers. This impact should, however, be considerable because, in contrast to the thirty year rule provided by E. O. 11652, the new order specifies that most U. S. Government originated documents twenty years old or older must be reviewed for declassification. It also requires that the concerned government agencies shall formulate guidelines to be applied by archivists in the National Archives and in Presidential Libraries when reviewing the twenty year old material.

Although a comprehensive study of the diplomacy of the Eisenhower years must await the declassification of the NSC summaries, correspondence between the President and foreign heads of state, plus the opening of the Dulles papers, ample documentation is now available to support studies of numerous aspects of this period. Probably the best place to begin is with the Ann Whitman File which contains the President's diary entries, records of Cabinet meetings, his correspondence files, and memoranda of his conferences. Information concerning most issues of interest to the President may be found in this body of presidential papers.

In addition to the Whitman File, one of the most valuable sources of information on internal policy formulation is the Hagerty diary. James C. Hagerty held the President's confidence for the eight years of the Administration and was privy to much highly-restricted information on

foreign policy. Unfortunately for history, Hagerty's diary covers only the year 1954, portions of 1955 and only a few days of 1956. But for the period covered, this diary contains many candid observations, including details on the shaping of United States policy toward Indochina during the critical spring and summer of 1954, the Formosa Straits crisis of 1954-55, the debate over the Bricker Amendment, and the impact of international security controversies on foreign policy-making. The memoranda of telephone conversations contained in the papers of Christian A. Herter also provide considerable insight into internal policy development. These are particularly useful for their coverage of plans for the 1960 Summit conference, the U-2 Incident, United Nations affairs, and Congressional involvement in foreign policy.

Eisenhower served as President during a period characterized by frigid relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. He saw the need for an advisor who could provide ideas on the waging of the cold war and specialization in psychological aspects of American policy. C. D. Jackson, who dealt with these problems during his tenure on the White House staff in 1953-54 and during periodical consultations with the President afterward, recorded in his log and in his correspondence his views on the United States' relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as America's image abroad. Jackson's papers also document his involvement with Radio Free Europe, his role in planning diplomatic moves aimed at the psychological exploitation of Joseph Stalin's death, and several memoranda containing observations on John Foster Dulles' relations with the President.

An aspect of foreign policy for which literally thousands of pages are now open is that of foreign economic policy. This appears to be a wide open area for scholars who wish to steep themselves in the ramifications of debates over escape clauses and peril point provisions of reciprocal trade agreements, importation of a plethora of commodities ranging from lead and zinc to dried figs, questions of trade with the Soviet bloc, and the diplomacy of oil.

Little has been written about the President's top advisors of foreign economic policy, Joseph M. Dodge and Clarence Randall. These men served as chairmen of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, an interagency body established in 1954 for the purpose of coordinating policy in this area. Randall also chaired a presidential commission in 1953-54 which conducted a broad study of United States trade policy, and issued a report based on its findings. This report served as the basis for many of the Administration's reciprocal trade proposals made during the next few years. The records of this commission (commonly known as the Randall Commission) are for the most part open to research as are portions of the records of the chairman for the Council on Foreign Economic Policy. The formulation of overall trade policy is covered in these collections and in a number of other, including the papers of Philip Areeda, Joseph Rand, the White House Central Files, the Herter papers, and the Whitman File. The use of agricultural surpluses as instruments of foreign policy is the primary subject matter

contained in the records of Clarence Francis, while mutual security and military assistance programs are documented in the records of the President's Citizen Advisors to Study the Mutual Security Program (Fairless Committee) and the President's Committee to Study the Military Assistance Program (Draper Committee).

The impact of science on American foreign policy is a topic well represented in such collections as the Records of the President's Science Advisory Committee, the Records of the White House Office of Science and Technology, and the Ann Whitman File. The rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union in outer space is the subject of several memoranda of conferences with the President as are technical and diplomatic aspects of disarmament negotiations, including nuclear test ban talks.¹⁰

The involvement of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the formulation of United States foreign policy can be seen in several declassified memoranda of Presidential conferences with Defense Secretaries Charles E. Wilson, Neil H. McElroy, and Thomas S. Gates, Jr., and with members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly Arthur W. Radford and Nathan F. Twining. Some of these conferences dealt with strategic aspects of the Formosa Straits crisis of 1955 and 1958, Middle East problems, and the concept of "massive retaliation."¹¹ The Administration's concern over the Soviet Union's capability for launching a surprise attack on the United States is reflected in two landmark reports which are contained in the Records of the Special Assistant For National Security Affairs. One of these, the Report of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory Committee (Killian Report), has been partially declassified, with the released portions revealing a surprising amount of information on the Panel's perception of the potential Soviet threat. The other report, the Gaither Report, has been fully declassified and also addresses itself to the Soviet Union's capability to attack the United States.

Although much of the documentation of United States relations with the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and other major European powers is still classified, sufficient quantities of quality material pertaining to certain geographic areas have been opened to justify specialized research projects. Some of these areas include Africa, South and Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and certain aspects of United States policy toward Latin America.

The organizational and administrative aspects of Eisenhower's foreign policy is a promising area for researchers and it should become even more fruitful as the staff continues to process the Library's files relating to national security. President Eisenhower established the position of Special Assistant For National Security Affairs and set up a rather elaborate structure for the National Security Council. The prospects for declassification of material pertaining to the development and administration of this national security machinery appear good, based on the Library's past experiences.

The interaction between the President and Congress on foreign policy matters is another well-documented area. President Eisenhower

staunchly defended what he believed to be the constitutional powers of the Chief Executive from incursions by Congress. The most widely debated challenge to executive prerogatives during the Eisenhower years was the proposed Bricker Amendment. The President's successful defense of his treaty-making powers in this case is documented by large quantities of correspondence, memoranda, legal analyses, and telephone conversations regarding this attempted amendment. Useful source material for studies of Executive-Legislative relations in general can be found in the Legislative Meetings Series and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries Series of the Ann Whitman File.

Supplementing and in some cases filling gaps in the Library's manuscript holdings is the growing number of oral history interviews which are becoming available. Many of these contain information on international affairs during the 1950s. A few of the more prominent individuals interviewed include: George V. Allen, Dillon Anderson, Richard Bissell, Charles E. Bohlen, C. Douglas Dillon, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John S. D. Eisenhower, Milton Eisenhower, Andrew J. Goodpaster, Jr., Gordon Gray, James C. Hagerty, Loy W. Henderson, Livingston T. Merchant, Robert D. Murphy, Walter S. Robertson, Roy Richard Rubottom, Jr., and Nathan F. Twining.

Space does not permit an in-depth description of resources pertaining to numerous other topics which might be researched profitably at the Eisenhower Library such as international information activities, cultural exchange programs, international air routes cases, United Nations affairs, and immigration and refugee matters. It should be clear, however, that the Eisenhower Library is a key research center for the study of international affairs during the 1950s and that plenty of opportunities are present for scholars to conduct research at the Library now. It should also be apparent that the Library has much untapped potential and that a thorough study of the formulation of the Eisenhower administration's foreign policy awaits the declassification of a relatively small quantity of extremely high-level documentation. Only then will the Library truly reach its peak as a research center for the study of international affairs.

NOTES

¹George B. Kistiakowsky, **A Scientist at the White House**, (Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1976).

²Memorandum, "Notes on History Project", Arthur Minnich February 2, 1954, Folder: "DDE Diary-January 1954 (2)", Box 3, Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries Series, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President of the United States (hereafter referred to as Ann Whitman File).

³John S. D. Eisenhower, **Strictly Personal** (New York: Doubleday, 1974), 206.

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵Oral History interview with Gordon Gray (OH342) Eisenhower Library Oral History Project.

⁶Memorandum, Dwight D. Eisenhower to Gordon Gray, August 13, 1959, Folder: Dwight D. Eisenhower Dictation, August, 1959, Box 28, Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries Series, Ann Whitman File.

⁷**Report of United States Senate Selection Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities: Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders**, pp. 51-70, 114-116.

⁸Captain Hazlett grew up in Abilene, Kansas, with the future President and the two men developed a friendship which lasted until Hazlett's death in 1958.

⁹Letter, Dwight D. Eisenhower to "Swede" Hazlett, November 2, 1956, Folder: Hazlett, Capt. Everett, 1956-58 (1), Box 18, Name Series, Ann Whitman File.

¹⁰Robert Divine has suggested the research potential existing on the subject of disarmament and nuclear weapons with his publication of the memorandum of a Presidential conference of March 24, 1958, which dealt at length with these matters. See Robert A. Divine, "Eisenhower, Dulles and the Nuclear Test Ban Issue: Memorandum of a White House Conference, 24 March 1958", **Diplomatic History**, (Summer, 1978) II #3, 321-331. A number of other memoranda of conferences on these issues has also been declassified and are located in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries Series of the Ann Whitman File.

¹¹See, for example, a memorandum of a conference with the President, Admiral Radford, General Taylor, and General Goodpaster, May 24, 1956, Folder: Goodpaster, May 1956, Box 8, Dwight D. Eisenhower Diaries Series, Ann Whitman File. At this meeting the President presented his views of a general war in stark terms--as simply a war between the United States and the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons being used. He felt that massive retaliation would be the key to survival.

Research in the German Democratic Republic (East Germany)

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This past summer (1978) I spent ten days in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), conducting research at the Zentrales Staatsarchiv in Potsdam and Merseburg. This research note is intended to offer my experiences for others, who contemplate research in the GDR, to profit therefrom. I made my first request to use the GDR archives in 1973, but was refused permission; my second request in late 1977 met with acceptance. Entrance into the archives is thus not automatic, although the director of the Merseburg archives informed me that few, if any, U.S. scholars were being refused now. It should be noted, however, that research desks are limited in number and during peak periods a researcher may be denied access because no space is available. For more information about U.S. researchers' experiences in obtaining access to GDR archives, any interested individual should contact Professor Gordon Mork, Department of History, Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907, who has been monitoring such attempts for about two decades.

A potential foreign researcher should begin by examining the available research guides to the Potsdam branch (specializing in materials after German unification in 1870), or the Merseburg branch (containing basically materials of the Prussian government before 1871). Guides which can be profitably consulted include: Irmtraut Schmid, "Der Bestand des Auswärtigen Amtes im Deutschen Zentralarchiv Potsdam," **Archivmittellungen**, 12 (1962), 71-79, 123-32; Helmut Lötze, "Archivalische Quellen zur deutschen Aussenpolitik bis zum Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges," **Deutsche Aussenpolitik**, 2 (1957) 873-879; "République Démocratique Allemande. A) Deutsches Zentralarchiv," **Archivum**, XV (1965), 9-20; Helmut Lötze and H. St. Bratyer, **Übersicht über die Bestände des Deutschen Zentralarchivs Potsdam**, Band 1, Schriftreihe des Deutschen Zentralarchivs (Berlin, 1957); Herbert Buck, **Zur Geschichte der Produktivkräfte und Produktionsverhältnisse in Preussen 1810-1933. Spezialinventar des Bestandes Preussisches Ministerium für Handel und Gewerbe** (so far vols. 1:1, 1:2, 2 or 3; Weimar, 1966-); Harmut Harnish, "Nachlässe im Staatsarchiv Potsdam," **Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft**, XXI (1971); 1088-1092; and Gordon R. Mork, "The Archives of the German Democratic Republic," **Central European History**, II (Sept., 1969), 273-274. Indirectly relevant to U.S.-German relations (because of competition in Latin America), another guide which should be consulted is Staatliche Archivverwaltung der DDR (editor), **Übersicht über Quellen zur Geschichte Lateinamerikas in Archiven der**

Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Potsdam, 1971). Only when the researcher has located and identified, as specifically as possible, the types of materials he/she wishes to consult, is it time to write to the archive(s) one intends to visit, asking permission to conduct research there. Specify the general research topic, the length of stay planned, approximately when the intended research will begin, and, as specifically as possible, the groups or bodies of known material the person wishes to examine. A letter should also be addressed to the Minister of the Interior of the GDR containing similar information for the whole visit. The addresses are: Ministerrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, Ministerium des Innern, Staatliche Archivverwaltung, DDR-15 Potsdam, Schliessfach 42, German Democratic Republic; Zentrales Staatsarchiv, Dienststelle Merseburg, DDR-42, Merseburg, König-Heinrich-Strasse 37, German Democratic Republic; and Zentrales Staatsarchiv, Dienststelle Potsdam, DDR-15 Potsdam, Berlinerstrasse 98/101, German Democratic Republic. These letters can be mailed simultaneously, or, one could approach the Interior Ministry first and await its decision before contacting the specific archive(s). I wrote all three at once to save time. If one requests an archive to do a search or investigation to determine, for example, whether other material might exist than that which has been located, the researcher will receive a bill for this search time. Such information can also be obtained once the scholar arrives by consulting guides on the premises or by talking with the archive's staff which is professional and helpful.

When the Interior Ministry and the archive(s) have granted permission to conduct the work, such permission will, nevertheless, still be conditioned upon the applicant's obtaining a visa. Actually, once one has the letter from the Interior Ministry, obtaining the visa is simple. Instructions regarding visa matters will accompany the Interior Ministry's letter. Since each step takes some time, though, it is best to initiate the visa procedure well in advance of the desired research period. Each individual must book and pay for room and breakfast in advance. U.S. citizens can normally obtain a visa on the same day if they cross over at East Berlin by paying for lodging and board, assuming that all the other permissions--Interior Ministry letter and letters from the archive(s)--have been obtained. If the visa is obtained in advance, though, the researcher usually can receive permission to enter the GDR at almost any point by train, car, or plane (when available).

The price of lodging and breakfast in the GDR is expensive by my standards of research accommodations. My wife traveled with me as research assistant and we paid \$38 and \$39 per night for bed and breakfast in a room without a bath, and \$42 per night with a bath. Other living expenses, such as meals, drinks, travel, entertainment (movies, theater, etc), inter-city and intra-city transportation, ranged from reasonable to very reasonable.

At both archives materials are screened (which may only amount to counting pages to make sure that all materials are delivered and recovered intact). Each volume or item received must be signed for on

the inside cover. The required screening means, however, that limits are placed upon the number of volumes a researcher can request per day. If possible, given personnel limitations, the staff at both archives will attempt to allow the researcher to exceed the limit upon request. Since my research focused on the years from 1820 to about 1929, I am unable to state if later records are open to U.S. researchers. Various types of microfilm and photoreproduction services are available. I found the microfilming costs to be a little high and the photoduplication costs to be very high. The schedule of hours can best be obtained by writing the specific archive since hours change with some frequency in accordance with staff problems and other factors. The schedules should, however, be approximately the following: at Potsdam, 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, and 8 a.m. until 6:30 p.m. on Tuesday and Thursday; at Merseburg, about 8 a.m. until 6 p.m. daily. The working conditions (space, lighting, etc.) are good, and while both archives have competent staffs, I must add that some of the most friendly, helpful service given us while in Europe was offered by the staff at Merseburg. I assume that both staffs speak English (since my wife is German and I am also fluent in German we spoke no English while in East Germany). The researcher obviously needs an adequate reading knowledge of German and some basic conversational ability in order to "get around" in the country with ease.

Minutes, SHAFR Council April 11, 1979

The Council convened at 8:00 p.m. in the Rosedown Room of the Hyatt Regency in New Orleans. Present were President Paul A. Varg, Vice President David M. Pletcher, Council member Betty M. Unterberger, the Joint Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Lawrence S. Kaplan and Warren F. Kuehl, and the editor of the **Newsletter**, Nolan Fowler, with his successor, William J. Brinker. Also in attendance were Richard W. Leopold, Arthur G. Kogan, Beverly Zweiben-Slany, William Z. Slany, John P. Glennon, Theodore A. Wilson, Raymond A. Esthus, and Peter F. Cohen. The absence of a quorum requires that all actions taken at the meeting be submitted to the full Council for approval, via a mail ballot.

The ballot by mail to all members of the Council for decision upon matters discussed by the truncated Council, meeting at the AHA in San Francisco on December 27, 1978, resulted in approval of the following: Amendments to the Bernath Article Award ("The author must be under thirty-five years of age, or within five years after receiving the Ph. D. at the time of publication. The article must be among the author's first five that have seen publication."); dues rates to SHAFR for married couples ("In the case of memberships by a husband-wife team the dues of one of them shall be one-half that of the regular rate."); grant of authority to Richard D. Burns, editor-in-chief of the project for revising S. F. Bemis

and G. F. Griffin's **Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States** (1935), to negotiate a tentative contract with ABC-Clio Press of Santa Barbara, California; nominations of new members to the Editorial Board of **Diplomatic History** (Lawrence E. Gelfand, Marilyn B. Young, and William C. Stinchcombe), and choice of Warren I. Cohen as the next editor of **Diplomatic History**.

The next order of business concerned the question of whether SHAFR should continue its support of the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History (NCC) at the suggested rate of fifty cents (50¢) per member per year. Dr. Kuehl stated that Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath had given \$75.00 to this project in the name of the Society, and that the other members of SHAFR had contributed \$56.50. Sales of SHAFR's mailing list to publishers had produced the sum of \$160.00 in 1978 and \$120.00 already this year. Dr. Kuehl pointed out that if some \$260.00 were taken from this mailing list fund and added to money already earmarked, the Society could then send a check to the NCC which would meet fully the obligations to the latter for the current year. The Council gave its approval to this financial arrangement.

The Council turned its attention next to the problem of selecting a firm to handle the publication of the above-mentioned revision of the Bemis and Griffin **Guide**. A decision is mandatory in the near future because (a) several topical contributors to the project have finished their tasks, while others will do so soon, and (b) costs of publication are rising all the time. The terms of publication are quite important, Dr. Kuehl observed, because the arrangements for a subsidy are still incomplete. The NEH has provided \$45,000 thus far for the undertaking with the understanding that an additional \$5,000 will be granted if SHAFR can procure an equal amount of money from another source. President Varg is currently negotiating with the Bentley Foundation, hoping to secure this support. The ABC-Clio Press of Santa Barbara, California, and the KTO Press of Millwood, New York, are the two choices as publishers. Each is distinguished in this area of publishing, and each has submitted a proposed contract to the Council. President Varg asked Warren Kuehl to note the major differences between the two offers. He (Kuehl) indicted two significant areas of distinction. One, the ABC-Clio Press would provide up to 100 free copies of the completed work to topical and/or editorial contributors, plus provisions for discount purchases by SHAFR, whereas the KTO Press offered nothing in this area. Two, the anticipated market price of the finished work, if done by the KTO Press, would be from \$80 to \$100 per copy, while the sale price of a copy, if done by ABC-Clio, would be between \$10 and \$40, depending upon various factors. Paul Varg added that he had recently received a letter from the editor, Richard D. Burns, expressing a preference for the ABC-Clio Press because of the latter's proximity to his own base of operations, Los Angeles. Such a situation would be highly advantageous in working out the various details and problems attendant upon publication. After considering all of these--and other--factors the consensus of the Council was to accept the offer of the ABC-Clio Press to publish the revised **Guide**.

Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane and former president of SHAFR), who is chairman of the committee charged with selecting a new Executive Secretary-Treasurer of the Society, reported upon the results of the group's efforts. Six candidates and their institutions have been--or are--under consideration for the post. A strong effort will be made to complete arrangements for the position by the date of the summer meeting of SHAFR so that the transition can be completed by the end of the year.

Theodore A. Wilson (Kansas), Chairman of the Program Committee, disclosed that practically all the plans for SHAFR's summer meeting, scheduled for August 9-11 upon the campus of the University of Kansas have been made. Rooms will be available in both the university dormitories and the local Holiday Inn. A shuttle bus will transport members and other interested individuals between the lodging areas and the meeting places. The program, stated Dr. Wilson, is a diversified one. (See , p. 43 for details). There is also the possibility of a group trip to the Truman Library at Independence, Missouri.

At the Council meeting in December Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California, who have already funded three SHAFR prizes for younger diplomatic historians, all in honor of their late son, Stuart L. Bernath, indicated a willingness to finance yet another award, the beneficiaries in this case to be deserving "senior" historians in the field of U. S. diplomacy. A considerable amount of time was taken tonight in a discussion of this proposal.

Members of the Council, as well as others present, voiced their gratitude over this latest manifestation of generosity upon the part of the Bernaths, but at the same time they indicated their great concern over an imminent financial problem which faces the Society--a probable steep rise in the annual dues of the members. The ones in the Society who would be most hurt by such a rise would be that very segment of the organization which the Bernaths have helped so magnificently--the younger historians. If dues were raised to any significant degree, the Society would lose many of its younger members who are struggling to finish graduate school or to establish themselves in the profession. Additionally, promising young diplomatic historians would not join the organization if the dues were prohibitive. Funds from whatever source which would (a) help keep the dues for all at a relatively low level, or (b) would subsidize in some fashion the costs of membership to the younger historians would be quite welcome. Several suggestions were made as to how these objectives might be realized. Warren Kuehl was instructed to compile these suggestions and then to serve as a liaison between SHAFR and the Bernaths in pursuing this matter.

The need for additional funds has long been recognized as the Number One problem of the Society. So much so, that an ad hoc committee, chaired by Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana), was set up in the summer of 1977 and assigned a two-fold responsibility: (a) "to examine the kinds of projects the Society might embark upon," and (b) to decide upon the specific campaign(s) required to obtain funds for the selected

undertakings. President Varg agreed to write Ferrell and obtain from him a summary of the committee's work to date. Reports of Kuehl's deliberations with the Bernaths as well as an accounting from the Ferrell committee will be presented to the Council at the SHAFR convention in August.

Nolan Fowler explained once more (for those with short memories) that although his teaching duties at Tennessee Tech will end with the close of the current spring quarter he will continue the editorship of the **Newsletter** until the end of the year. At that time a colleague at Tech, Dr. William J. Brinker, will assume the editorial duties with Tennessee Tech maintaining its sponsorship of the publication.

Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers-Newark) who has compiled the biennial SHAFR **Roster and Research List** since the founding of the Society has asked that he be relieved of this responsibility. With Dr. Kimball's relinquishment of this post, 1979 has/will witness(ed) a complete turnover in the key positions of the Society: President and Vice President, Executive Secretary-Treasurer, editors of **Diplomatic History** and the **Newsletter**, and now the Compiler of the **R & R List**.

Warren Kuehl read two items of interest from a letter written by Akira Iriye, immediate past president of SHAFR and interim chairman of the American-East Asian study group:

The American-East Asian study group was established within SHAFR during the OAH meeting in New York City in 1978. It aims at serving as a liaison among specialists in the history of American-East Asian relations. Harvard University has made a small grant to the group, enabling it to publish a newsletter once or twice a year. The newsletter will publish news of current research activities, publications, conferences, etc. I hope very much that arrangements can be made to distribute it to all members of SHAFR who are interested.

In connection with the above, Professor C. Hosoya, the dean of diplomatic history in Japan and president of the Japan Institute of International Affairs (membership: 900), was here the other day and expressed a strong interest in establishing some sort of liaison between that society and ours. I told him that I thought this was an excellent idea. Details need to be worked out, but for now it will be good to keep this matter under advisement. At some point in the future it may even become feasible to have a joint conference of the two societies.

Samuel F. Wells and Waldo H. Heinrichs have written that they have filed suit against the State Department in order to accelerate the release of the **Foreign Service List** and the **Biographical Register**. Although the suit has not been formally processed as yet, some response has already been forthcoming from the Department as a result.

Warren Kuehl mentioned an oddity which occurred recently and asked for guidance in handling it. An individual became a life member,

paid the fee of \$125.00--then died three months later. Should the fee be returned to his widow? The members were in agreement that it should.

A special committee was set up in December of 1977 with Dr. Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern) as chairman and entrusted with the duty of exploring the problem of "the future content and format of the **Foreign Relations** series." This committee met simultaneously but separately from the Council tonight. A report upon that group's deliberations will appear in the September number of the **Newsletter**.

At the luncheon on April 3 (Hyatt Regency Ballroom, Section C) Marilyn B. Young (Michigan), the winner of the Stuart L. Bernath lectureship for 1979, delivered a paper upon the topic, "Revisionists Revised; The Case of Vietnam." ((This paper has the lead in this issue of the **Newsletter**). The winners in the three Bernath prize contests for 1979-80 were also announced. John L. Gaddis (Ohio U) will be the memorial lecturer for 1980. (Dr. Gaddis was also the winner of the Bernath book prize in 1973). The article award for 1979 went to Brian L. Villa (U of Ottawa) for his paper, "The Atomic Bomb and the Normandy Invasion," which appeared in **Perspectives in American History**, XI (1977-78), 461-502. (An abstract of the article appeared in the last issue of the **Newsletter**). The victorious work in the book contest was **The Department of State in the Middle East, 1919-1945**, by Phillip J. Baram (program manager, City of Boston, Mass.).

SHAFFR'S GOVERNING BODIES (1979)

The date following a person's name indicates the year (at the end of December, in most cases) when that individual's term expires. Members of ad hoc committees are not listed here.

COUNCIL (Elected Members)

Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut) 1979
Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa) 1980
Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers, Newark) 1980
Betty M. Unterberger (Texas A & M) 1980
Robert F. Smith (Toledo) 1981
George C. Herring (Kentucky) 1981

(Past Presidents)

Robert A. Divine (Texas) 1979
Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane) 1980
Akira Iriye (Chicago) 1981

EDITORIAL BOARD, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

Warren I Cohen (Michigan State), editor

Kinley J. Brauer (Minnesota) 1979
Paul S. Holbo (Oregon) 1979
Robert F. Smith (Toledo) 1979
Thomas D. Schoonover (S W Louisiana) 1980
Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton) 1980
Joan Hoff Wilson (Arizona State) 1980
Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa) 1981
Marilyn B. Young (Michigan) 1981
William C. Stinchcombe (Syracuse) 1981

COMMITTEES

The person listed first in each instance in the chairman/woman of that particular committee.

BERNATH ARTICLES

Arnold A. Offner (Boston U) 1979
Lester D. Langley (Georgia State U) 1980
Noel Pugach (New Mexico) 1981

BERNATH SPEAKER

Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth) 1979
Keith L. Nelson (U of California, Irvine) 1980
Jerald A. Combs (California State U, San Francisco) 1981

BERNATH BOOK

Walter F. LaFeber (Cornell) 1979
Robert Dallek (UCLA) 1980
Thomas D. Schoonover (S W Louisiana) 1981

NOMINATIONS

Paul S. Holbo (Oregon) 1979
Milton O. Gustafson (National Archives) 1980
Gary R. Hess (Bowling Green) 1981

PROGRAM

Theodore A. Wilson (Kansas)
Joan Hoff Wilson (Arizona State)
Eugene P. Trani (Nebraska)

MEMBERSHIP

Ralph E. Weber, Chairman
Department of History
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233

I. The Far East

Sadao Asada
Department of Political Science
Doshisha University
Kyoto, Japan

II. Georgia, North Carolina, and South Carolina

Mary Atwell
Department of History
Hollins College
Hollins College, Va. 24020

III. Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington

Wolfred Bauer, Associate Dean
University of Puget Sound
Tacoma, Washington 98416

IV. Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and Tennessee

Albert H. Bowman
Department of History
U of Tennessee (Chattanooga)
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

V. Delaware, Maryland, and New York

Anthony M. Brescia
Nassau Community College
Garden City, New York 11530

VI. Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia, and Alaska

Francis M. Carroll
Department of History
St. John's College
University of Manitoba
Winnipeg 19, Canada

VII. District of Columbia and Virginia

Kenneth J. Hagan
Department of History
U. S. Naval Academy
Annapolis, Maryland 21402

VIII. Illinois, Indiana, and Kentucky

George C. Herring
Department of History
University of Kentucky
Lexington, Kentucky 40506

IX. Michigan, Ohio, and West Virginia

Gary R. Hess
Department of History
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, Ohio 43403

X. New Jersey and Pennsylvania

Frank X. J. Homer
Department of History and
Political Science
University of Scranton
Scranton, Pennsylvania 18510

XI. Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island

Travis B. Jacobs
Department of History
Middlebury College
Middlebury, Vermont 05753

- XII. Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming**
 Thomas C. Kennedy
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 Laramie, Wyoming 82071
- XIII. Kansas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma**
 Stephen J. Kneeshaw
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 School of the Ozarks
 Point Lookout, Missouri 65726
- XIV. Iowa, Missouri, and Nebraska**
 Richard N. Kottman
 Department of History
 Iowa State University
 Ames, Iowa 50011
- XV. Australia**
 Joseph M. Siracusa
 Department of History
 University of Queensland
 St. Lucia, Brisbane
 Australia 4067
- XVI. Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Labrador**
 Geoffrey S. Smith
 Department of History
 Queen's University
 Kingston, Ontario
 Canada
- XVII. Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont**
 Mark A. Stoler
 Department of History
 University of Vermont
 Burlington, Vermont 05401
- XVIII. Louisiana and Texas**
 Betty M. Unterberger
 Department of History
 Texas A & M University
 College Station, Texas 77843
- XIX. Arizona, California, Hawaii, and Nevada**
 Gerald E. Wheeler, Dean
 School of Social Sciences
 San Jose State University
 San Jose, California 95192
- XX. Wisconsin, Minnesota, South Dakota, and North Dakota**
 Ralph E. Weber
 Department of History
 Marquette University
 Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233

PERSONALS

Joan Hoff Wilson (Arizona State) has a fellowship at the Woodrow Wilson International Center (Washington, D.C.) in order to do research upon a history of Richard M. Nixon's presidency.

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Norman B. Ferris (Middle Tennessee) has received an NEH grant for the year, July 1, 1979-June 30, 1980, for the purpose of writing a biography of William H. Seward.

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Ralph F. de Bedts (Old Dominion U) will retire from his present position as of June 1, 1979. Presently designated "Eminent Professor of History," he will then bear the added title of "Emeritus", compliments of the Board of Visitors, Commonwealth of Virginia.

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Kenneth Moss, most recently at the U of Minnesota, will as of September 1 become assistant professor of history at the U of Alabama (Huntsville).

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Richard C. Lukas (Tennessee Tech) was one of three instructors at his institution to receive the Outstanding Faculty Award for 1979. He is the only two-time recipient of this honor, having also won in 1975. Winners of this award receive \$1,000.00 each.

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James H. Hitchman (Western Washington) has been awarded a Fulbright lectureship to the University of Mysore, India, for 1979-80.

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Warren I. Cohen (new editor of **Diplomatic History**) has been named Director of the Asian Studies Center at his "home base," Michigan State.

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Two of the eleven scholars who will be directing a seminar, titled "America and the World," at the U of Oregon, June 16-24, are members of SHAFR: Leonard P. Liggio (Cato Institute, San Francisco) and Arthur A. Ekirch, Jr. (SUNY at Albany).

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Joan Hoff Wilson (Arizona State) was one of three historians recently appointed to the Board of Editors, **American Historical Review**, by the AHA Council.

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Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt) was the 1979 winner of the Ellen Gregg Ingalls Award for Excellence in Classroom Teaching at his school. The award carries a stipend of \$1,000.00.

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Wolfred Bauer was recently elevated to the post of Associate Dean at the University of Puget Sound, Tacoma, Washington.

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J. Donald Miller (U of Connecticut) has been appointed to the position of Assistant Professor in American Diplomatic History at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University.

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Richard C. Lukas (Tennessee Tech) will deliver, by invitation, a series of lectures upon the topic of Polish-American relations during World War II this summer at two organizations with headquarters in Warsaw--Institute of History of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Research on the Contemporary Problems of Capitalism. While in Poland Lukas will also do research at the national library upon a book which will deal with the U.S. and Poland during the Cold War.

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Anthony M. Brescia (Nassau Community College) is currently editing **The Letters and Papers of Richard Rush** for microfilm publication by Scholarly Resources, Inc. When completed, the approximately 30 reels of film will bring together from over 100 repositories documents relating to this important figure. Of interest to diplomatic historians will be much of Rush's private correspondence in which he frequently reflected on affairs of state, both as a diplomat and as a private citizen. The project is supported by the National Historical Publications and Records Commission, Research Foundation SUNY, the Earhart Foundation, and Nassau Community College.

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Nine persons make up the current board of editors of the **Pacific Historical Review**. A majority of that group are members of SHAFR: Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State), Roger V. Dingman (Southern California), Waldo H. Heinrichs (Temple), Akira Iriye (Chicago), and Noel Pugach (New Mexico).

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Jacques M. Downs (U of New England/St. Francis College) had an NEH summer stipend, June-September, 1978, for the purpose of working in the East India Record Office, London, and at the Jardine Matheson Archive, Cambridge, upon the subject of early Sino-American relations. For the months of October-November last fall he was aided by a grant from the Eleanor Roosevelt Institute to do research in the Delano Papers at the F.D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, upon the same topic. Also of great help to him in his research endeavors was a sabbatical from his institution during the first semester of the current academic year.

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Charles E. Neu (Brown) will direct one of the NEH summer seminars for college teachers at his university, June 18-August 10, upon the subject of "Organizational Dimensions of American Foreign Policy." This seminar will be devoted to the thesis that "the emergence of large-scale organizations is of central importance in Twentieth Century American foreign policy." Many different approaches have been used in treating American foreign policy over the last three-quarters of a century, but only a few scholars--and those only recently--have looked at this policy from the organizational angle. This seminar will be an attempt to expand the area of knowledge in this neglected area.

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Reinhard R. Doerries (U of Hamburg) who is well known to several members of SHAFR from the many friendships which he made while doing research in this country a few years ago reports that he has been quite busy over the last two years, doing articles and giving lectures galore. His labors, however, have been in the non-diplomatic area, covering such topics as comparative acculturation, ethnic organization, and ethnic and minority institutions and culture. In the relatively near future, though, he hopes to get back into the field of foreign relations.

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Norman B. Ferris (Middle Tennessee) has just been named to a three year term upon the Tennessee Committee for the Humanities, an affiliate of the NEH. The Committee's task is to decide which group projects shall be funded, in whole or in part, that promote public understanding and appreciation of the humanities.

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Thomas H. Hartig, head curator of history for the Ohio Historical Society (hdqrs. in Columbus) since 1976, has resigned his position to become Director of the Woodrow Wilson Birthplace Foundation, Inc., Staunton, Va.

Armin H. Rappaport (U of California, San Diego, and former president of SHAFR) spent some time last fall in Europe interviewing certain people in connection with a work he is doing upon American policy and the development of the European Coal and Steel Community. He is also utilizing the spring quarter of this year to pursue the same project in France.

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Gary R. Hess (Bowling Green) has received a grant from the Eleanor Roosevelt Institute to help with expenses while doing research at the F.D. Roosevelt Library the forepart of this year upon the subject of U.S. policy in Southeast Asia during the 1940s.

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The third volume of **The Papers of John Marshall** under the editorship of Charles T. Cullen, was recently released. Part of this work concerns Marshall's experiences as U.S. envoy to France in 1797 and the resulting XYZ affair. SHAFR member William C. Stinchcombe (Syracuse) has "annotated the diplomatic documents and supplied editorial essays on the mission to France, on Marshall's Paris Journal, and on selected correspondence between the envoys and Talleyrand. All of the envoys' dispatches are included, and all of the decoded material has been deciphered anew by Stinchcombe."

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Paul A. Varg (Michigan State and president of SHAFR) will be going upon a three weeks' group tour of Mainland China this summer under the auspices of the U.S.--China Peoples Friendship Association. President Varg has long taught courses concerning this area of the world, but this will be his initial visit there. Needless to say, he views the upcoming trip with keen anticipation

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Publications in U.S. Diplomacy by Members of SHAFR

Richard C. Allard (Naval Historical Center), **Spencer Fullerton Baird and the U. S. Fish Commission**. 1978. Arno Press. \$25.00. The work contains several chapters which deal with Baird's role as the chief American scientific witness during the hearings of the fisheries commission at Halifax in 1877, and the subsequent efforts of the Fish Commission to collect information bearing upon the Anglo-American fisheries dispute.

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Homer L. Calkin (Department of State, retired), **Women in the Department of State; Their Role in American Foreign Affairs**. 1978. U. S. Government Printing Office. \$7.25.

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John M. Carroll (Lamar U), **American Isolationism in the 1920's**. 1979. Forum Press. 14 pp. \$0.95.

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Robert Dallek (UCLA), **Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945**. 1979. Oxford U Press. \$19.95. Alternate selection of History Book Club for May, 1979. Available to members of that club for \$12.95, plus handling charges.

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Alexander De Conde's (U of California at Santa Barbara and second president of SHAFR) **This Affair of Louisiana** which was published in a hardbound edition in 1976 by C. Scribner's Sons at \$12.50 is now available in paperback from the LSU Press for \$6.95.

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Richard S. Kirkendall (Indiana and Executive Secretary of OAH), **Harry S. Truman: The Decision to Intervene**. 1979. Forum Press. 14 pp. \$0.95. In Forum series in American History.

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Walter La Feber (Cornell), **The Panama Canal; The Crisis in Historical Perspective**. 1979. Expanded edition. (The original edition, hardbound, appeared in 1978 by the Oxford U Press \$10.95). The addition, comprising 27 pp., concerns the Senatorial debates in 1977-78 over the new U.S.-Panama treaty. Oxford U Press. Pb. \$3.95.

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Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt), **The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1919-1933**. 1979. North Carolina \$22.00. Winner of the 1975 Gilbert Chinard Incentive Award.

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Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern and third president of SHAFR), "The History of United States Foreign Policy: Past, Present, and Future," pages 231-246 of **The Future of History: Essays in the Vanderbilt University Centennial Symposium**, edited by Charles F. Delzell. 1977. Vanderbilt U Press. \$13.95. In the review publication, **History**, for July, 1977, is this statement: "All the contributors are extremely good on recent historiographical trends. Their papers are wide-ranging, critical, balanced, and packed with useful information and bibliography."

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Gary May (Delaware), **China Scapegoat: The Diplomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vincent**. 1979. New Republic Books. \$15.95. The work was the winner of the Allan Nevins prize for 1975. The **Foreign Service Journal** has purchased serial rights to it, and excerpts therefrom will appear in the April and May issues of that publication.

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Keith L. Nelson and Spencer C. Olin (both at U of California, Irvine), **Why War? Ideology, Theory, and History**, 1979. U of California Press. \$10.95.

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Joseph Smith (U of Exeter, England), **Illusions of Conflict: Anglo-American Diplomacy toward Latin America, 1865-1896**. 1979. Pittsburgh. \$16.95.

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Arthur Walworth (free-lance historian), **Woodrow Wilson; American Prophet**. Third ed. 1978. W. W. Norton & Co., Cl. \$19.95; pb. \$8.95. The original work was the Pulitzer Prize winner for biography in 1959.

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Other Available Materials in U.S. Diplomatic History

A conference upon the Korean War was held in May, 1975, at the Harry S. Truman Library. The papers delivered at this gathering have been published (1977) by the Regents Press of Kansas, edited by Francis H. Heller, under the title of **The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective**, and retailed for \$13.00. The essays of four members of SHAFR--Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent), John E. Wiltz (Indiana), Alonzo L. Hamby (Ohio U), and Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)--were given high marks by the reviewer in the **Journal of American History** for March, 1979. Leopold's paper was also commended highly in **Reviews in American History**, December, 1978.

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The publishing company, Michael Glazier, Inc., of Wilmington, Delaware, recently launched a new program in audial materials titled "Voices of History." Part I of this project comprises 38 cassettes, each approximately 55 minutes in length, which cover U.S. diplomatic history from 1778 through the Nixon presidency. A cursory inspection of this Part I reveals that it is a SHAFR-dominated affair. Jules Davids (Georgetown) is the chief editor, Gary May (Delaware) is the consultant-editor, and the material for at least 27 of the 38 cassettes was prepared and narrated by members of SHAFR.

WHO LOST BAB EL MANDEB?

by

Robert L. Beisner

(It has never been the intent or wish of this humble publication to joust with our most scholarly, sister periodical, **Diplomatic History**. We find ourselves, hopeswice, in agreement with Washington Irving who described his aspirations thusly: "I seek only to blow a flute accompaniment in the national concert, and leave others to play the fiddle and the French horn." Hence upon this occasion we have no desire to compete with the "Notes and Comments" feature of **Diplomatic History**. But the following "note" by the above-esteemed member of SHAFR who is domiciled in the Department of History at American University is so informative and timely that we hope we may be forgiven this lapse from grace in carrying it. This valuable contribution to the corpus of U.S. diplomatic history appeared in the weekly "Outlook" of the **Washington Post**, March 4, 1979).

The increasingly serious armed conflict between South and North Yemen and both Saudi Arabia's and the United States' concern that

their "ally", North Yemen, might soon join Iran in the ranks of overwhelmed client states was reported in *The Washington Post* last week.

Much of the anxiety centers on the fate of Bab el Mandeb Strait, "the 15-mile-wide entrance to the Red Sea passage between the Suez Canal and the Indian Ocean," a strait over which the South Yemenites already exercise substantial control.

In the same edition of the newspaper there is a story in which readers are reassured that, recent remarks by Secretaries James Schlesinger and Harold Brown to the contrary notwithstanding, the United States has no intention at this time of sending troops to protect its oil sources or generally "stabilize" the maelstrom of Mideastern politics.

Perhaps President Carter, daily accused of irresolution and fecklessness by critics right and left, might take some consolation in learning that he would not even have to consider sending troops to the Strait of Bab el Mandeb had a previous administration shown sufficient foresight.

Letters buried in the papers of Hamilton Fish in the Library of Congress reveal what now looks like an extraordinary blunder committed 105 years ago. In the summer of 1874, George H. Boker, a minor literary light from Philadelphia and U.S. minister to Turkey, wrote Fish, U.S. Grant's Secretary of State, describing an American opportunity to gain control over this strategically-located strait. Three Frenchmen, Boker wrote, proposed to him "the ceding to the United States of all the land lying around the Cape of Babelmandeb, which they have purchased and hold by the same title by which the English possess Aiden [sic]."

"A look at the map," he continued urgently, "will show you the geographical importance of the position, 'as a coaling and a watering station for a fleet, besides enabling its owner to shut up the mouth of the Red Sea at pleasure.'" Further wondrous benefits would include control of "the entire trade of Mocha" and the possibility of opening up "a large commerce with Abyssinia."

Boker told the Frenchmen that he would send "the whole scheme" for Fish's consideration, along with relevant maps, charts, and so forth.

He admonished Fish to jump at the chance:

"For an ambitious nation, here is a wonderful opportunity to make a mark, and to command a spot of little less importance to the world than Gibraltar." Nonetheless, he feared that the 30th Secretary of State would refuse to deal and that the hated British would get the territory, "but it makes my blood boil to think that everything worth having, beyond national landmarks, is falling into the hands of that Power, while all the rest of the nations look tamely on."

Boker's petition went to a man little known for desires to make waves, let alone to expand American possessions so far away. What is also little known is that this Hudson River aristocrat owned a delicious streak of mirth. Racked by pressing crises in Cuba, besieged by clamoring office seekers, doing what he could to maintain some ambience of rectitude in a corrupt administration, Fish obviously relished the opportunity to reply to Boker. He responded on July 22, 1874:

"Yours of June 9th respecting the purchase of the Straits of Babelmandeb and the contiguous Continents, is engrossing serious attention." He then urged caution: "Before positively signing the contract, a careful examination of title will have to be made. By law, this examination can only be made by or under the direction of the Attorney General."

"I do not think that we can take any definite steps with regard to the Babelmandeb purchase," he continued, getting to the heart of the matter, "until after the completion of another purchase of great interest, and importance, of a site for an observatory on the reverse side of the Moon with the right of laying and maintaining a telegraph communication therewith from the Observatory in Washington. The proposition for a coaling station in the Coggia Comet," he added, "has met with little favor, perhaps by reason of the bashful retirement of the Comet while the Naval Engineers were sounding a passage to the proposed station. Babelmandeb, however--no matter. Very faithfully yours, HAMILTON FISH."

So much for the amusing statesman's ability to see ahead a century! His loyal minister--however unaware he might have been of the future need for Mideastern oil, of our current anxiety about Saudi security, of our fears of Soviet meddling--was instead disappointed at being unable to put the British "nose out of joint."

"I supposed," he wrote Fish on Aug. 18, "that you would poke fun at me for proposing to you the purchase of Babelmandeb," but he thought it had been his "duty to lay the matter before you in an unofficial way. How was I to know what use the Government might wish to make of the money that can be coined at a printing-press? Why not Babelmandeb among other fancies? If the late Mr. Seward was permitted to furnish U.S. with a refrigerator, why should not you provide an oven?"

Boker, too, lived in an age of military retrenchment and concluded the matter with the remark that, "on the whole, I think it wise that we with our wretched little navy . . . should have nothing to do with distant possessions. Had I been in your position, I should have decided the question of Babelmandeb just as you have done. So **exit** Babelmandeb."

As Benjamin Franklin put it: "For want of a nail the shoe is lost . . ."

ERRATUM

In the report of the Fourth Annual National Conference of SHAFR (held upon the campus of George Mason University last summer), filed by Betty M. Unterberger (Texas A & M) and carried in the December number of the **Newsletter**, the statement was made that about 30 persons attended the opening session. That figure should have been 130, rather than 30.

**ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED, OR SCHOLARLY PAPERS
DELIVERED, BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR**

(Please limit abstracts to a total of twenty (20) lines of **Newsletter** space. The overriding problem of space, plus the wish to accommodate as many contributors as possible, makes this restriction necessary. Don't send lengthy summaries to the editor with the request that he cut as he sees fit. Go over abstracts carefully before mailing. If words are omitted, or statements are vague, the editor in attempting to make needed changes may do violence to the meaning of the article or paper. Do not send abstracts until a paper has actually been delivered, or an article has actually appeared in print. For abstracts of articles, please supply the date, the volume, the number within the volume, and the pages. Double space all abstracts. Do not send abstracts of articles which have appeared in **Diplomatic History**, because all members of SHAFR receive the latter publication).

Justus D. Doenecke (New College, U of South Florida), "Beyond Polemics: A Historiographical Re-Appraisal of American Entry into World War II," **History Teacher**, XII (February, 1979), 217-251. The essay begins by discussing the debate over revisionism in the late 1940s and early 1950s, then moves to a detailed discussion of Japanese-American relations in the interwar period. The article then covers German-American relations and concludes by pointing out new areas for research. In some ways, the essay is an update of Wayne S. Cole's article, "American Entry into World War II: A Historiographical Appraisal," **Mississippi Valley Historical Review**, XLIII, 4 (March, 1957), 595-617.

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Keneth Moss (Minnesota), "Fighting for a Single Foreign Policy: State Department-Commerce Department Rivalry during the New Deal." Paper delivered at Missouri Valley History Conference, March 10, 1979. During the 1930s State Department reformers tried to bring all aspects of foreign trade policy under their department's control. While bureaucratic jealousy partly explained the reform, the major reason for this program was a recognition of the interdependence of economic and political factors. The Great Depression convinced State Department reformers that trade promotion could not be separated from foreign policy. Assistant Secretary of State Wilbur J. Carr, and his successor, George S. Messersmith, worked to destroy the Commerce Department's independence in trade promotion. By merging the foreign services of the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce with State's, Carr and Messersmith hoped to correct a split in American foreign policy which they believed had widened during the previous two decades. In engineering this consolidation, they enjoyed the support of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, thereby securing the reform's success

in 1939. However, the victory was shortlived. The Second World War diverted Roosevelt's interest and left the nation's policymaking apparatus more fragmented.

* * * * *

Joseph M. Siracusa (University of Queensland, Australia), "The Night Stalin and Churchill Divided Europe: The View from Washington." Paper read at the Ernest Bramsted Memorial Conference of the Australasian Association for European History, Brisbane, May, 1979. This paper is essentially an analysis of the response of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration to Anglo-Soviet efforts to divide the Balkans in the late stages of World War II, from the May Agreement of 1944, which was in fact never consummated, to the Churchill-Stalin Percentage Agreement of October 1944, which was not implemented. Throughout the period of the Percentage Agreement President Roosevelt emerges as a figure torn by the realities of war as perceived by the Churchills and Kennans on the one side and the higher ideals of the postwar era as perceived by the Hulls and (Breckinridge) Longs on the other side. Surrounded by officials obsessed with fears that the division of eastern Europe into spheres of influence would lead to yet another "War for Survival", faced with a fourth presidential election campaign, and knowing that there were no happy solutions to problems in the region but certain they would have to be dealt with at some time, it is not surprising to find FDR leaning first this way and then the other. Materials for this paper were drawn from various sources including the National Archives and the Public Record Office.

* * * * *

Paul A. Varg (Michigan State, and president of SHAFR), "Sino-American Relations in the 1850s." Paper delivered at Missouri Valley History Conference, March 10, 1979. A wider gulf than that which existed between Confucian China and mid-nineteenth century United States can scarcely be imagined. China, a civilization not a nation state, was a cultural unit bound together by Confucian ethics, the extended family system, and the guild. The government in Peking reigned but did not rule, could not deal with local problems, nor defend herself against western intrusion. The United States, on the other hand, stood forth as the symbol of success, a rapidly expanding economy, territorial expansion, and aggressive promotion of foreign trade. The encounter between the two in the final years of the 1850s created problems both were powerless to solve: the opium traffic, the coolie trade, and disturbances in Chinese treaty ports as seamen and vagrants stirred up brawls and not infrequently committed crimes. The helpless government in Peking could not deal with these evils, nor could the best-intentioned American ministers and consuls who on occasion tried to do so. Extraterritoriality became a shield for criminals as the Chinese were barred from arresting them, consular courts dismissed Chinese testimony as unreliable, and foreigners refused to testify against each other. The experience of Minister William B. Reed led him to observe that "his former confidence as to the benefits to be derived from opening new markets was much abated as he saw the increase [in]

the area of collision and corruption and oppression." Reed and the missionary-diplomat, Samuel Wells Williams, deplored the results of the western impact.

* * * * *

James F. Willis (Southern Arkansas University), "An Arkansan in St. Petersburg: Clifton Rodes Breckinridge, Minister to Russia, 1894-1897," **Arkansas Historical Quarterly**, XXXVIII, 1 (Spring, 1979), 3-31. Based upon research in the National Archives, Library of Congress, and the privately-held papers of Clifton R. Breckinridge, this essay argues that Breckinridge was one of the ablest American diplomats of the 1890s. Although largely limited to the role of a passive observer, he was particularly adept at analyzing American interests and policies within the context of European rivalries, often showing a considerable understanding of the historical forces at work. His most important insight was to recognize and report the beginning of a fundamental shift away from traditional friendship in American-Russian relations. He did not have a large or direct influence upon the course of American foreign affairs, but he provided much valuable information in his perceptive despatches and letters to the Department of State and Presidents Grover Cleveland and William McKinley.

Department of Definitions (Student Division)

Exhibit A ---- "Round Robin"

"A fat bird, or a peculiar bird that got pregnant"
(student under Clifford L. Egan, Houston U)

"China challenged the U. S. in ping-pong. Part of
beginning of new relations with China."
(student with Robert L. Beisner, American U)

* * * * *

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITION FOR 1980

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition was initiated in 1972 by Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in memory of their late son. Administered by SHAFR, the purpose of the competition and the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing of a lengthy nature by young scholars in the field of U.S. diplomacy.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: the prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1979. It must be the author's first or second book. Authors are not required to be members of SHAFR, nor do they have to be professional academicians.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. Walter F. LaFeber, Department of History Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853. The works must be received not later than February 1, 1980.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$500.00. If two (2) or more writers are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be April, 1980, in San Francisco.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1972 | Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth) |
| 1973 | John L. Gaddis (Ohio U) |
| 1974 | Michael H. Hunt (Yale) |
| 1975 | Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
Stephen E. Pelz (U of Massachusetts-Amherst) |
| 1976 | Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton) |
| 1977 | Roger V. Dingman (Southern California) |
| 1978 | James R. Leutze (North Carolina) |
| 1979 | Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston, MA) |

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL LECTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship was established in 1976 through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and is administered by a special committee of SHAFR. The Bernath Lecture is the feature at the official luncheon of the Society, held during the OAH convention in April of each year.

DESCRIPTION AND ELIGIBILITY: The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address, delivered at the annual meeting with the AHA, but is restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer is expected to concern himself/herself not specifically with his/her own research interests, but with broad issues of importance to students of American foreign relations. The award winner must be under forty-one (41) years of age.

PROCEDURES: The Bernath Lectureship Committee is now soliciting nominations for the 1981 award from members of the Society, agents, publishers, or members of any established history, political science, or journalism organization. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vitae, if available, should reach the Committee no later than December 1, 1979. The Chairman of the Committee, and the person to whom nominations should be sent, is Dr. Kenneth E. Shewmaker, Department of History, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755.

HONORARIUM: \$300.00 with publication of the lecture assured in the SHAFR Newsletter.

AWARD WINNERS

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1977 | Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute) |
| 1978 | David S. Patterson (Colgate) |
| 1979 | Marilyn B. Young (Michigan) |
| 1980 | John L. Gaddis (Ohio U) |

**THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE FOR THE
BEST SCHOLARLY ARTICLE IN U.S. DIPLOMATIC
HISTORY DURING 1979**

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Award for scholarly articles in American foreign affairs was set up in 1976 through the kindness of the young Bernath's parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, and it is administered through selected personnel of SHAFR. The objective of the award is to identify and to reward outstanding research and writing by the younger scholars in the area of U.S. diplomatic relations.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to the author of any article upon any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1979. The article must be among the author's first five (5) which have seen publication. Membership in SHAFR or upon a college/university faculty is not a prerequisite for entering the competition. Authors must be under thirty-five (35) years of age, or within five (5) years after receiving the doctorate, at the time the article was published. Previous winners of the S. L. Bernath book award are ineligible.

PROCEDURES: Articles shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each article (preferably reprints) should be sent to the chairman of the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee by January 15, 1980. The Chairman of that Committee for 1979 is Dr. Arnold A. Offner, Department of History, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$200.00. If two (2) or more authors are considered winners, the prize will be shared. The name of the successful writer(s) will be announced, along with the name of the victor in the Bernath book prize competition, during the luncheon for members of SHAFR, to be held at the annual OAH convention, meeting in April, 1980, at San Francisco.

AWARD WINNERS

- | | |
|------|---------------------------------------|
| 1977 | John C.A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.) |
| 1978 | Michael H. Hunt (Yale) |
| 1979 | Brian L. Villa (U of Ottawa, Canada) |

(Note: During the first three years of the competition for the articles prize the upper age limit was 40 years).

FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAFR

WHERE? University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas.

WHEN? August 9-11, 1979.

REGISTRATION? Thursday evening, August 9, and Friday morning, August 10, in the Kansas Union.

PROGRAM?

Thursday night:

Panel Upon the topic, The Teaching of American Diplomatic History.

Friday morn:

- a. United State's Post-World War I Policy towards Germany.
- b. NATO at Thirty.

Friday afternoon:

- a. Planning for the United Nations.
- b. Continental Expansion and the American Indian.

Saturday morn:

- a. Doctoral Dissertations Dealing with the Cold War.
- b. American Perceptions of the Orient.

INFORMATION? Those individuals wishing explanatory materials concerning registration, travel to and from the airport, on-campus housing, and meals should write to: William Chestnut, Coordinator of Conferences, Division of Continuing Education, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas 66045.

For those persons who prefer to stay off campus the local Holiday Inn has set aside a number of rooms for conference attendees. Call this toll-free number, 1-800-453-5555, to secure reservations, or write to the motel, at this address: Box 508, Jayhawk Station, Lawrence, Kansas 66044.

SHAFR'S CALENDAR FOR 1979

- August 1 Deadline, material for September **Newsletter** with publication one month later.
- August 9-11 SHAFR's Fifth Annual Conference at the University of Kansas.
- August 9-12 The Pacific Coast Branch of the AHA will hold its 72nd annual meeting at the University of Hawaii, Honolulu. SHAFR will have a reception at this convention.
- November 1 Deadline, material for December **Newsletter** with publication one month later.
- November 1 Deadline, additions and deletions for SHAFR's **Roster and Research List**.
- November 1-15 Annual elections for officers of SHAFR.
- November 14-17 The 45th annual meeting of the SHA will take place in Atlanta, Ga., with the Sheraton-Biltmore as headquarters. SHAFR will hold a reception at this convocation.
- December 1 Deadline, nominations for 1980 Bernath memorial lectureship.
- December 28-30 The 94th annual convention of the AHA will be held in New York City. As usual, SHAFR will have a full round of activities at this meeting. With the exception of a few individuals, the officials of SHAFR for 1980 will begin their tenure at the end of this convention.

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: Nolan Fowler, Department of History, Tennessee Tech, Cookeville, Tennessee 38501.

ISSUES: The **Newsletter** is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December. All members receive the publication.

DEADLINE: All material must be in the office of the editor not later than four (4) weeks prior to the date of publication.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication. Copies of the **Newsletter** which are returned because of faulty addresses will be forwarded only upon the payment of a fee of \$1.00.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of most back numbers of the **Newsletter** are available and may be obtained from the editorial office upon the payment of a service charge of 75¢ per number. If the purchaser lives abroad, the charge is \$1.00 per number.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, honors, awards), announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered--or published--upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting the use of diplomatic materials in various (especially foreign) depositories, biographies and autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field of U. S. diplomacy, and even jokes (for fillers) if upon diplomatic topics. Authors of "straight" diplomatic articles should send their opuses to **Diplomatic History**. Space limitations forbid the carrying of book reviews by the **Newsletter**.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

- | | |
|------|---|
| 1968 | Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford) |
| 1969 | Alexander De Conde (U of California--Santa Barbara) |
| 1970 | Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern) |
| 1971 | Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana) |
| 1972 | Norman A. Graebner (Virginia) |
| 1973 | Wayne S. Cole (Maryland) |
| 1974 | Bradford Perkins (Michigan) |
| 1975 | Armin H. Rappaport (U of California--San Diego) |
| 1976 | Robert A. Divine (Texas) |
| 1977 | Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane) |
| 1978 | Akira Iriye (Chicago) |

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