

The Society for Historians of American
Foreign Relations



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THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William Brinker, Department of History, Tennessee Tech, Cookeville, Tennessee 38501.

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: William K. Baker, Tennessee Tech.

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FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

1968	Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)
1969	Alexander De Conde (U of California--Santa Barbara)
1970	Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)
1971	Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)
1972	Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)
1973	Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)
1974	Bradford Perkins (Michigan)
1975	Armin H. Rappaport (U of California--San Diego)
1976	Robert A. Divine (Texas)
1977	Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)
1978	Akira Iriye (Chicago)
1979	Paul A. Varg (Michigan State)
1980	David M. Pletcher (Indiana)

Dealing with Defeat: Teaching The Vietnam War

by

Sandra C. Taylor with Rex Casillas

(The first part of this study was published in the December 1980 **Newsletter**. The conclusions, tables, notes, and appendix appear here. -Editor's note.)

In Conclusion:

Several observations can be made from the results of this study. At the outset, it is clear that the questionnaire demonstrates the problems of political labeling in today's context. Most of those who are self-proclaimed radicals have a clear sense of what that means. They use standard rhetoric, applying terms like "imperialism" and "immorality" to American actions. But the great majority of respondents seem to have much more ambivalence. While many didn't like the term "liberal," it is doubtful that the word "moderate" would have made them more comfortable. The problem is more than just a matter of terminology. I would venture that many of the 60% calling themselves liberals are disturbed about questions of economic policy, the role of "big" government, and are rather unhappy with the choices in the upcoming election.* The unsettling and threatening international scene has also distressed those whose views were shaped by the turbulence of the Vietnam years, when foreign policy, for all the emotion it brought forth, seemed to inspire simpler answers. Questions of national defense loom large, and the outright rejection of interventionism that marked the final years of the Vietnam era is no longer appropriate. We are no longer "doves," yet we are hesitant about becoming "hawks." Old labels such as these don't apply, because the definitions that were once associated with them are no longer useful. While the extremes still offer solutions, those caught in the middle of the political spectrum find no easy answers and are questioning the premises of the past.

Despite this confusion over labels, the data assembled here does have an unmistakably conservative cast when compared with previous polls both of the general population and of diplomatic historians. While no comprehensive attempt has been made in this paper to chart the changing course of public opinion, it is clear that the group sampled by this questionnaire was much more careful in their evaluation of the Vietnam War than was a comparable group surveyed in 1972, when feelings about the war ran much stronger than today. The number from this current survey who believe that the war was a mistake is considerably lower than the 68% who, in 1972, favored immediate withdrawal from Vietnam. (see Table 4) Although that question differs from the item on the 1980 questionnaire concerning present attitudes about the war, one can infer that the basic sentiment is the same. This conservatism can be sensed, too, in the comments evaluating the Vietnam experience. Clearly our sample demonstrates a decline of the

*This a reference to the 1980 presidential election.

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*This a reference to the 1980 presidential election.

"no more Vietnams" viewpoint so prevalent only a few years ago.

Given this conservative trend and the ambiguity over the meaning of the term "liberal," the composite identity of the liberals in our sample can be more clearly understood. Radicals of the Vietnam generation believed that you could "never trust a liberal," that they were vague, "wishy-washy," and lacking in conviction. Conservatives, on the other hand, were the enemy, but at least you knew where they stood. Today's liberals would appear equally indictable in radical terms. Our sample is perhaps typical: they are male, an educated elite, upper middle class, members of the Establishment in most respects -- probably typically WASPish in background. While they may not consider themselves, in these inflationary times, to be prosperous, they are certainly comfortable. They hold tenured positions at the major universities and colleges across the land. They may no longer command the ear of presidents, but their words are listened to by students--perhaps in fewer numbers than in the past, but certainly with more deference than a decade ago. As protest is no longer fashionable among the young, neither is radicalism among their elders. It is better to be "cool," dispassionate, detached, and perhaps a bit cynical. After all, as we have seen, the revolution didn't come. The war ended, the government survived Watergate, and it is all becoming ancient history.

Hence we back away from moral judgements about Vietnam. In an essay on historical interpretations of the war written in 1973, Gaddis Smith decried the "characteristic American arrogance" that he found in the "three versions of Vietnam" which typified then-current explanations of the war -- the official justification, the "Quagmire thesis," and the left-Revisionist argument, all of which depicted American actions as the "prime causes of international events."⁷ We now have moved beyond such narrow ethnocentricity to give more credence to the force of events in Southeast Asia and elsewhere that are beyond our control. But, in so doing, our motives arise less out of greater knowledge of these other variables than from a diminution of righteous indignation about ourselves. How much safer today to immerse oneself in "national security studies," which a recent **New York Times** article identified as the "coming thing."⁸

This brings me to my final point: the so-called "lessons of Vietnam." The war is no longer a simple black-and-white issue. More data has been coupled with less emotion. With the passage of time has come detachment and a certain degree of diffidence. Yet the search for "historical objectivity" can become an easy excuse for the avoidance of judgement. A majority of diplomatic historians still agree that the Vietnam War was a mistake, but then, it became part of the "conventional wisdom" quite a few years ago to hold that view. While we see the war in Southeast Asia as an error, there is a tendency to view it as a rather isolated phenomenon, not part of a pattern or indicative of a trend. As the Soviets return to an expansionist mode, many react by rekindling Cold War fires and supporting the need for a greater military establishment with at least as much fervor as they put into tearing the last one down. One respondent even speculated that the fact of our long

involvement in Vietnam was what kept the Russians from pursuing such adventurism in the past. What impeccable logic. Vietnam may have been wrong, but we have come a long way from a rejection of interventions out of hand. Although most of our sample respondents teach the war in the context of the Cold War and containment, it is not at all clear that they have reached the conclusion George Herring did: "Vietnam made clear the inherent unworkability of a policy of global containment."⁹ For many, it may well be that it was the particular unfortunate choice of locations and the results of a policy of gradual escalation that brought defeat, not the bankruptcy of the original notion. While many may endorse the ideas of the "Win" school identified by Gelb and Betts -- that once American prestige and credibility are committed, the United States should seek victory through total use of its technological advantages -- others appear to endorse the ambivalence of the "Reformist" school, which seeks to determine how best to avoid another such mistake, or as those authors conclude, how to extricate ourselves once such inevitable mistakes are made.¹⁰

Most of us haven't changed our minds about the war in the last decade. It may well be that most haven't thought about the war since they no longer had to, and considering the difficulty historians had even in agreeing to use the vehicle of the American Historical Association to protest the war, perhaps we didn't want to think about the war then either. While passing judgement about the war then was an act of political protest, perhaps many feel it is unnecessary to rethink that conventional wisdom until we have all the facts necessary for objectivity. Maybe we are still "waiting for the dust to settle." On the other hand, to beg the question by saying as one respondent did, that the "jury is still out," may well mean that that jury will be out forever.

Perhaps the most apt historical analogy to be drawn about teaching the Vietnam War in these post-defeat years may come from looking at the role of historians in the post-Civil War south, who were too caught up in their tragedy to pass judgement on it. If we cannot quite bring ourselves yet to protest and justify our "peculiar institutions" perhaps it is that we feel they have been attacked enough. One would hate to think that the "lessons" of Vietnam must remain for the coming generation of historians to tell to us.

NOTES

1. Indochina Curriculum Group, **The Vietnam Era: A Guide to Teaching Resources** (Cambridge, MA, 1978), p. 3.
2. William C. Griffin and John Marciano, **Teaching the Vietnam War** (Montclair, NJ, 1979).
3. Sandra C. Thompson and Clayton A. Coppin, Jr., "Texts and Teaching: A Profile of Historians of American Foreign Relations in 1972," **Newsletter** of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, IV (Sept., 1973), pp. 4-22. See table 4 for a comparison of comparable data drawn from that study.

4. Alexander Kendrick, **The Wound Within: America in the Vietnam Years, 1945-1974.** (Boston & Toronto, 1974), pp. 30-31.
5. **Public Opinion I** (March-April, 1978) pp. 12-16, as cited in George Herring, **America's Longest War** (New York, 1979), p. 267.
6. Lawrence M. Baskir and William A. Strauss, **Chance and Circumstance: The Draft, the War, and the Vietnam Generation** (New York 1978).
7. Gaddis Smith, "The United States in World Affairs since 1945," William H. Cartwright and Richard L. Watson, Jr., eds., **The Reinterpretation of American History and Culture** (Washington, D.C., 1973), pp. 548-549.
8. "A New Fashion of Toughness among the Eggheads of War," **The New York Times**, July 13, 1980, 22E.
9. Herring, **American's Longest War**, p. 270.
10. Leslie H. Gelb with Richard K. Betts, **The Irony of Vietnam** (Washington, D.C., 1979), pp. 354-369.

TABLE 1.

<u>AGE</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>	<u>CUMULATED PERCENT</u>
AGE				
25-34	9	9.0	9.0	
35-39	29	29.0	38.0	
40-44	17	17.0	55.0	
45-49	15	15.0	70.0	
50-54	12	12.0	82.0	
55-59	11	11.0	93.0	
60-64	6	6.0	99.0	
65+	1	1.0	100.0	
Total	100	100.0		

TABLE 2.

<u>POLITICAL AFFINITY</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>	<u>CUMULATED PERCENT</u>
	10	10.0	10.0	
	61	61.0	71.0	
	18	18.0	89.0	
	1	1.0	90.0	
Total	100	100.0	100.0	

TABLE 3.

<u>CONTEXTUAL FRAMEWORK</u>		<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>PERCENT</u>
Cold War/Containment	37	37.0	
New Left-Radical	16.	16.0	
Realist	22	22.0	
No Response	24	24.0	
Total	100	100.0	

TABLE 5. INFLUENTIAL BOOKS ON THE WAR

	Useful in shaping your own attitudes	Important & useful for students
Guenter Lewy, <u>America In Vietnam</u> (1978)	19	5
Frances FitzGerald <u>Fire in the Lake</u> (1972)	53	36
Philip Caputo, <u>Rumor of War</u> (1977)	16	15
George Herring, <u>America's Longest War</u> (1979)	47	39
<u>The Pentagon Papers</u>	59	26

TABLE 4. COMPARATIVE DATA FROM 1972 QUESTIONNAIRE

	NUMBER OF RESPONSES	PERCENT
Favoring immediate withdrawal (1-2)*	119	68.4
No strong response (3-5)*	38	25.8
Favored prolonged presence there (6-7)*	10	5.7
Total	167	

*Indicates number checked on 1-7 scale.

Voting Patterns

	1964		1968		1972	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Republican	17	11.5	25	13.9	33	18.9
Democratic	130	87.8	125	69.4	109	66.5
Other	1	.7	1	1.1	21	12.8

Political Persuasion and Classroom Interpretation

	Personal Interpretation of American For. Relations	Personal Political Evaluation
Radical (1-2 on scale)	15.6%	24.5%
Moderate (3-5)	69.3%	66.9%
Conservative-traditional (6-7 on scale)	15.0%	8.6%

NOTE: This data was compiled in 1972 from a sample of 187 who replied (of a total of 450 who received questionnaires, the membership of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations.)

TABLE 7.

POLITICAL VIEWS OF WAR PROTESTERS

	COUNT		ROW PCT		COL PCT		NO RESPONSE	ROW TOTAL
	PROTESTERS	DID NOT PROTEST	RADICAL	LIBERAL	MODERATELY CONSERVATIVE	VERY CONSERVATIVE		
	9	1	27	34	2	16	1	10
	23.1	1.6	69.2	55.7	5.1	26.2	2.6	16.4
	90.0	10.0	44.3	55.7	11.1	88.9	100.0	100.0
	9.0	1.0	27.0	34.0	2.0	16.0	1.0	10.0
Column TOTAL	10	10	61	61.0	18	18.0	1	10
	10.0	10.0	61.0	61.0	18.0	18.0	1.0	10.0

TABLE 6.

POLITICAL IDENTITY

AGE	Count		Row PCT		COL PCT		No Response	
	RADICAL	LIBERAL	MODERATELY CONSERVATIVE	VERY CONSERVATIVE	TOT PCT	TOT PCT		
25-34	1	7	0	0	1	1	11.1	THE VIETNAM GENERATION
	10.0	77.8	.0	.0	10.0	11.1	10.0	
	1.0	11.5	.0	.0	1.0	7.0	1.0	
35-39	6	16	4	0	3	3	20.7	THE VIETNAM GENERATION
	60.0	55.2	13.8	.0	10.3	30.0	6.0	
	6.0	26.2	22.2	.0	30.0	16.0	3.0	
40-44	2	12	3	0	0	0	11.8	THE VIETNAM GENERATION
	20.0	70.6	17.6	.0	.0	.0	2.0	
	2.0	19.7	16.7	.0	.0	12.0	3.0	
45-49	.0	9	4	0	2	2	.0	THE "OLDER" GENERATION
	.0	60.0	26.7	.0	13.3	29.0	.0	
	.0	14.8	22.2	.0	20.0	9.0	2.0	
50-54	.0	6	.3	1	2	2	.0	THE "OLDER" GENERATION
	.0	50.0	25.0	8.3	16.7	20.0	.0	
	.0	9.8	16.7	100.0	20.0	6.0	3.0	
55-59	.0	8	2	0	1	1	.0	THE "OLDER" GENERATION
	.0	72.7	18.2	.0	9.1	10.0	.0	
	.0	13.1	11.1	.0	10.0	8.0	2.0	
60-75	1	3	1	0	1	1	15.7	THE "OLDER" GENERATION
	10.0	50.0	16.7	.0	16.7	10.0	1.0	
	1.0	4.9	5.6	.0	10.0	3.0	1.0	
Column total	10	61	18	1	10	10	10.0	
	10.0	61.0	18.0	1.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	

APPENDIX

Teaching the Vietnam War: A Questionnaire

1. Sex ____ Male ____ Female.
2. Age ____ 25-34 ____ 35-39 ____ 40-44 ____
45- 49 ____ 50-54 ____ 55-59 ____ 50-64
____ 65 or older
3. Location of postgraduate education ____ New England
____ Mid-Atlantic ____ South ____ Midwest ____
West
4. Type of school you are educated at ____ private ____ public
5. Your rank ____ graduate student ____ instructor ____ assistant
professor ____ associate professor ____ professor ____ other
6. Your political viewpoint: ____ radical ____ liberal ____ moderately
conservative ____ very conservative
7. Your personal experience with the Vietnam War:
____ Vietnam veteran ____ combat ____ non-combat
____ service in another area
____ deferred or exempted from the draft
____ non eligible for the draft
____ involved in protest movements against the war.
8. Your present attitude about the Vietnam War and American
intervention:
____ a mistake from the outset--immoral, illegal, and wrong
____ a failure of proportion (escalation the error, not technical or
economic support of the South)
____ a failure due to military strategy or error
____ a failure because of political limitations on military strategy
____ a limited success
____ other (explain)

9. Has your attitude changed in the last ten years? How?

10. Do you teach about Vietnam?

_____ as part of a survey course on American History

_____ as part of a general diplomatic history course

_____ as a separate or special offering, such as _____ graduate seminar _____ undergrad seminar _____ course on American Policy in Asia _____ special topics course in history _____ special offering outside your department

_____ others:

11. Do you have an over-all contextual framework for analyzing American diplomacy into which you place the Vietnam War? If so, explain briefly:

12. Which books have been most useful to you in shaping your attitudes about the war? Which have you found most useful for students:

Yourself

Your Students

_____ Fitzgerald, **Fire in the Lake**

_____ Lewy, **American in Vietnam**

_____ Caputo, **Rumor of War**

_____ Herring, **America's Longest War**

_____ N.Y. **Times, The Pentagon Papers**

_____ Emerson, **Winners and Losers**

_____ Others:

13. Which issues about the war and its consequences are of greatest concern to your students today?

_____ the resumption of the draft

_____ war crimes and atrocities

_____ protesting government actions

_____ inflation

_____ abuse of governmental power

_____ future military interventions

_____ the role of the CIA

_____ overall perceptions of our foreign policy posture

_____ other:

14. Have you used any particular effective audio-visual materials in teaching about the war? If so, please list:
15. Have you assigned students to see any commercial films about the war? If so, which ones? _____Apocalypse Now _____
The Deerhunter _____Coming Home
_____Other
16. Have you used any of the following pedagogical techniques:
_____role playing _____simulations or war games _____ debates
_____oral reports _____book reports _____outside lecturers with
specific expertise (explain)
17. How would you characterize student response to the Vietnam War today?

William Z. Slany (Deputy Historian, Office of the Historian, Department of State) prepared this paper for presentation at the Pacific Coast Branch of the AHA. Upon request, the author has agreed to print the essay here.-- Editor's note.

HISTORY OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS SERIES

By
William Z. Slany
INTRODUCTION

I have undertaken here to talk to you as a public historian about a major public history project which faithfully and instructively reflects the growth and the sharpening anguish of the public history discipline. The focus of my presentation is the published series **Foreign Relations of the United States**, the official documentary record of American foreign policy published by the Department of State since 1861. This documentary publication is the premier diplomatic publication in the world -- more current, more comprehensive, and freer of government constraints than any other similar publication. The **Foreign Relations** series came of age as a fully scholarly publication in the late 1920's under the direction of Secretary of State Frank Kellogg, with the preparation and publication of a special sub-series of volumes recording American diplomacy during the first World War. The "World War Supplements" thrust the **Foreign Relations** into the front rank of government diplomatic history publications rivalling those of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany. Following World War II the **Foreign Relations** series grew substantially in size, scope, and scholarship and attained the status and stature as the most current, most complete, diplomatic documentary publication. It became the central printed source and guide for the serious study of post-war international affairs. Of more than 250 **Foreign Relations** volumes published since 1861, more than 150 volumes were published since 1945 and another 50 volumes are currently in preparation. The staff has grown from approximately 8 professionals in 1945 to a staff of 25 professional historians in 1980.

The **Foreign Relations** series has grown to maturity in the post-war years, but with this growth has come dangerous turmoil and threats to the integrity of the publication. The problems and prospects of the historians who labor for the Department of State in preparing the **Foreign Relations** may demonstrate to you the kinds of problems facing public historians everywhere. These historians have, since World War II, become better trained, better paid, and far more able to exercise scholarly choice and responsibility-in their work. On the other hand current political values and considerations have a far greater impact upon the preparation of the series than ever before. Furthermore, while the **Foreign Relations** staff historians function as public historians they were trained as academic historians and generally find their corner of the Department of State an uncomfortable and unwelcome laboratory

for the furtherance of the public good and the testing of new techniques of technology.

Let me undertake a brief review of the preparation and publication of the **Foreign Relations** series from the end of World War II to illustrate my theses. The immediate post-war years through the end of the Truman-Acheson period saw the wind-down of the first great era of the series--the completion of the Paris Peace Conference volumes and the annual volumes for the years preceding the outbreak of World War II. In the Dulles period the series burst into a new phase of greatly intensified professionalism, much larger staff and resources, combined with the politicizing of the series. While Dean Rusk served as Secretary of State, the new scholarly editing precepts were established in the annual **Foreign Relations** volumes, the scope of the publication was systematically broadened, the use of wider sources was fully established, and the first bulky volumes on post-war foreign policy were born. The 1970s witnessed the full professionalizing of the **Foreign Relations** staff, the wide-scale use of other agency files, and the search for a more suitable format for the series to match the changing size and content of the volumes.

THE TRUMAN-ACHESON PERIOD

The first post-war years were important for the dynamic changes in the Historical Division -- but not for the **Foreign Relations** staff or project. The eight or so historians concerned with the series busied themselves in the relatively dull task of finishing the remaining volumes of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 as well as documenting the more routine aspects of American diplomacy of the 1930s. The only notable exception to this exercise was the preparation of the unique volume - finally published in 1952 -- dealing with U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union for the Period 1933 -- 1939. In its topical format and its selection and annotation this particular **Foreign Relations** volume was a unique precursor of things to come in the series. The real dynamism of this period for the Historical Division was committed to the great series **Documents on German Foreign Policy**. This series, based upon the captured German Foreign Office documents, represented a unique inter-allied documentary project, and the application of scholarly innovation and intensity to a documentary project on an unmatched scale. This distinguished project represented the intellectual center of the Historical Office, until shouldered aside in the 1950s by the wartime conference volumes of the **Foreign Relations** series.

THE DULLES PERIOD. . .The 1950s

A new era of an engaged and "relevant" **Foreign Relations** series began during the era of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. The Historical Division struck out boldly and plunged the series into the special wartime volumes and the enlarged China volumes. These seventeen volumes, some of which were not published until the 1970s, revolutionized the concept of the series and the fundamental editing precepts. But these volumes also locked the series into an inextricable

embrace with the political directions and values of the seventh floor of the Department of State. And it was in the preparation of these special, precedent-shattering volumes that began the tension between declassification and continued secrecy which currently threatens to overwhelm the series.

The seven volumes of the **Foreign Relations** series committed to documenting President Roosevelt's meetings with allied leaders were unique in their concentration on policy-making at the very highest level. They were similar to the World War I Supplement volumes but were far more broadly conceived in the range of background papers presented and policy alternatives explored. The editors undertook to find and use every scrap of written record of the conferences -- from all agencies, from the Presidents' own papers, and from record holdings outside the government and even outside the United States. Comprehensiveness was made a major objective in a way never before pursued in the preparation of the series. Moreover, the editors introduced a higher level of editorial annotation and explication of texts and events than ever before attempted in the series. Significantly the closeness to currency of the earliest of the conference volumes -- those for Yalta and for Potsdam -- resulted in a wrenching declassification process which involved the highest officers of the Department including Secretary Dulles himself on many occasions. The clearance process also involved the President on occasion and even heads of government of other states.

The ten volumes of the China sub-series -- at least initially intended as a special sub-series -- were not methodologically different from the annual volumes. But the China volumes did differ in the scale of resources applied in the preparation process, in the thoroughness of the presentation of the record, and in the political sensitivity aroused by the volumes. A special team of historians hurriedly collected the fullest possible record on American-China policy for the 1942-1949 period which would serve as a verification of the partial documentation originally presented by Secretary Acheson in the so-called China White paper in 1950. But the preparation aroused and shocked some highlevel Department officials who managed to persuade Secretaries Dulles and Herter that the volumes ought not be published. The argument did not revolve around particular documents or portions of documents but about the project as a whole.

The special wartime conference volumes and the expanded coverage of the China volumes signalled the politicizing the **Foreign Relations** series. The decision to proceed with these volumes originated with the political leadership for political reasons. Once the two projects got underway, the Secretary of State and other high-ranking Department principals became deeply involved in the timing and mode of release of volumes and even in the details of declassification of individual documents. However, let me make it clear that no attempt was made to influence the selection of documents or the shape of the record prepared by the Department's professional historians. Particularly in the case of the wartime conference volumes, the argument over

clearance was over the continued sensitivity of certain issues and the timeliness of publication on particular dates.

While the wartime conference volumes revolutionized the editing methodology of the **Foreign Relations** series, the undertaking undermined the ongoing preparation of the annual **Foreign Relations** volumes in at least two major ways. Resources and strong leadership were diverted from the annual volumes and concentrated on the special documentary projects. Furthermore, major bodies and categories of documents which might have been printed in the annual volumes were instead presented in the special wartime volumes. The situation bred disharmony and conflict between the directors of the two documentary enterprises which prevented the Historical Division from benefitting as fully or as soon from the rich experience of the special projects.

To a certain extent the annual **Foreign Relations** volumes were preempted in part with the inauguration of the new State Department publication **American Foreign Policy: Current Documents**. This series was begun 1950-55. Thereafter the volumes were published on an annual basis until the demise of the project at the end of the 1960s. The model and precursor for the series, generally referred to as the "Current Documents" series, was the volume **A Decade of Foreign Policy. Basic Documents 1941-1949** published in 1950. **Current Documents** collated and presented previously published documents, generally from official American sources. The volumes were endorsed and in a real sense created by Secretary Dulles to meet current foreign policy needs. Dulles once told the Advisory Committee on the **Foreign Relations** series that the **Current Documents** provided a method for the early release of documents usually printed in the **Foreign Relations** series -- a series which he foresaw having an ever more difficult time in obtaining clearance when it came to documenting the "Cold War."

THE RUSK PERIOD - THE 1960s

During the 1960s, in the Secretaryship of Dean Rusk, the **Foreign Relations** series grew in scope, the staff grew in professionalism, and the leadership of the series assumed new and distinctive directions. The decade of the 1960s was the time of endings and beginnings for the Historical Division. The American participation in the project for publishing **Documents on German Foreign Policy** was ended, the wartime conferences were generally completed --if not published--and the long time leaders of both the Division and the **Foreign Relations** project retired and were replaced by tested managers with some what different points of view. Secretary Rusk decided to resume the publication of the special China volumes, which had been temporarily suspended during the last years of the Dulles-Herter period. But Secretary Rusk directed that the China volumes not be released as a special sub-series but be absorbed into the annual volume structure and only be released for a particular year when all the other annual volumes for that year had already been cleared and released. The consequence of this Rusk decision was that the China volumes for 1949 were not released until 1979--18 years after the decision and about 21 years after the work had been originally compiled.

But the clear change in the **Foreign Relations** series was seen in the annual volumes themselves. It was during the Rusk years that the annual volumes covering years of World War II were finally completed and published and the first of the massive volumes recording post-war diplomacy and foreign policy were prepared. The year 1945 was documented in 9 bulging volumes in addition to the three equally big volumes documenting the conferences in 1945 at Malta, Yalta, and Potsdam. This was the largest annual documentary project ever attempted in the name of **Foreign Relations**. The growing published record testified both to the readiness of the new **Foreign Relations** and Historical Division leadership to accept the new scale of documentary editing but also the pressure of the new professionals of the historical staff who embraced thoroughness and size as aspects of the new dogma. The size of the volumes and the documentary selections was a reflection of the exploding size of the foreign policy record -- both in the State Department and in other government agencies which, like the Defense Department, began to have a major role in most foreign policy questions. The methodological step in exploiting the expanding Department of State Records was the beginning of the use on a large scale of the special office working files or 'lot files' not incorporated into the central archives of the Department and particularly rich in the variety and intimacy of the view of policy making. The model for the post war volumes was set. They were bigger, more numerous, derived from a much wider use of Department and other agencies' files, and far more thoroughly annotated.

While the 1960s witnessed the rising quality and quantity of the annual volumes of the **Foreign Relations** series, the problem of declassification or clearance of documents in the volumes began to assume an ever larger role in the preparation of the volumes. The time involved in clearance soon exceeded the time needed to select and edit the volumes. The series began to slide more rapidly behind currency. The **Foreign Relations** series had been 15 years behind currency during Secretary Hull's administration, had slid to 17 years under Secretary Acheson, to 18 years under Dulles and Herter, and plummeted to 23 years behind currency under Secretary Rusk. Year after year the Advisory Committee on the **Foreign Relations** series -- brought into being to provide academic verification of the scholarly responsibility of the selection of documents for the series -- devoted its energies to admonishments and alarms about the steady drift from currency. It may, of course, have been the emergence of an inevitable deadlock. The bigger and better the series got, the more certain was the likelihood of delay.

The most significant aspects of the new editorial and scholarly professionalism became clear in the volumes begun in the mid and late 1960s but not released (for clearance reasons) until the early 1970s. Special topic volumes were attempted on the Paris Peace Conference of 1946, the meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers, and the problems of Germany and Austria. The editorial apparatus of individual volumes was vastly increased with the use of far more detailed and authoritative

footnotes, lists of names and participants, extensive bibliographical notes about file sources, and precise citations of particular special "lot files." Special efforts were made to mesh the documents selected in the **Foreign Relations** volumes with the authoritative printed record already available. Foreign publications and sources were exploited and light was thrown on controversial issues or documents.

The 1970s

The decade of the 1970s -- under Secretary of State Rogers, Kissinger, and Vance -- was a period of triumph and turmoil for the **Foreign Relations** series. New leadership in the Historical Office - renamed the Office of the Historian -- focused on accelerating, modernizing, and further professionalizing the work and product of the series. By the end of the decade, a series of reorganizations had concentrated virtually all of the resources of the Office of the work of preparing and declassifying the volumes of the series. The long-established responsibility for preparing historical policy studies was suspended on a regular basis although the augmented **Foreign Relations** staff still managed to turn its attentions occasionally to urgent historical research projects for the top level leadership of the State Department. The **Current Documents** publication was indefinitely suspended so that limited resources could be focused on the **Foreign Relations** series.

New technology was introduced to match the computerization of printing processes at the Government Printing Office -- the longtime publisher of the **Foreign Relations** series. The introduction of such modern equipment was unavoidable. The last **Foreign Relations** volumes to be printed in the traditional linotype method were set in galley proof in the late 1970s, and the first volumes to be printed by the new computerized phototypesetting methods were produced at the same time. Experiments and early planning began also with microform supplements to the printed volumes in the hope and expectation that it might prove possible to vastly expand the published records without further increasing the size or number of volumes in print. This technological experimentation aroused fear, anxiety, and some protest both within the Office of the Historian and in the broad academic constituency which used the volumes.

The last vestiges of the early post-war Historical Office leadership disappeared, and there was a nearly complete turnover of the professional staff. The **Foreign Relations** staff, now larger than ever before in the history of the publication, was comprised mainly of recent university graduates trained in the newer diplomatic history and international affairs disciplines. This new, younger, better-trained staff was far more tightly connected to the recent scholarly and professional values learned in graduate schools than earlier staff members. And the new generation of staff historians brought to their work on the **Foreign Relations** series the ideological commitments and concerns of the campuses and communities that had trained and nurtured them. There always had been some sort of vague "town and gown" distancing

between the professional historians of the Department and the substantive officers of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. It was a genial aloofness often tinged with respect. But in the 1970s the **Foreign Relations** historians shifted more sharply to advocacy and a vague sense of confrontation and embattlement with the rest of the Department of State. This advocacy mood manifested itself in several forms. The selections of documents for inclusion in **Foreign Relations** volumes began to emerge as a more clearly realized effort to document the failures or contradictions of American foreign policy. Particular attention was devoted to the aspects of intelligence activity and "political action" in countries around the world. There was a more relentless effort to seek out the warts on the face of American diplomacy as well as its orderly solemnities. The corollary to this tendency in collecting the published historical record was resolute opposition to tolerating any efforts of substantive Department Officers to withhold or delay clearance from an ever-widening spectrum of documentation.

The sense of advocacy also hurled the Office of the Historian into a key bureaucratic role in developing State Department policies and procedures for systematic declassification of documents. During the first 25 years after World War II access to the full record of American foreign policy was bureaucratically linked to the publication of the **Foreign Relations** series. By the 1970s the State Department and the Historical office could no longer maintain that linkage, and scholarly access was disconnected from publication. New laws like the Freedom of Information Act and new executive regulations on classification and declassification in the 1970s made large-scale declassification of documents a growing official responsibility of the State Department and all other government agencies. The Historical Office asserted its expertise in claiming a policy-making role in access policy and large-scale declassification policies. In so doing the Office brought the **Foreign Relations** series back into a key role in the Department procedures for declassification and in the Department squabbles that swirled around that program.

The new scholarship and the new advocacy made itself felt in the **Foreign Relations** of the 1970s in format and in the kind of documents included in the volumes. The traditional annual format of the series was quietly abandoned in the mid 1970s in favor of a more flexible format. In the short term the series was compiled and produced in a triennial format. The first of these volumes was published in 1979. More and more topical volumes were designed instead of the usual bilateral, linear compilations of documents. High-level confidences were assigned special attention as a focus of policy formulation. Editorial apparatuses to volumes grew larger and more complex. Introductions and editorial explanations of the objectives and assumptions of the editing of volumes were experimented with.

The changing format was facilitated by the rapidly expanding documentary base from which records were selected for publication. Although the State Department records continued to constitute the basis of the official published record, the Presidential and National

Security Council papers in the libraries of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower came to constitute the center piece of nearly all documentary projects. A small but growing number of records were drawn from the Defense Department, Treasury, Commerce, and the C.I.A. (within the State Department's records). Necessary use was made of special working files of offices, bureaus, desks, and the like.

While the **Foreign Relations** grew larger and the research for sources more intrepid, the series' problems grew. Declassification became a chief issue within the State Department but also a source of argument and delay with other agencies. Postponements or delays in clearance of particular volumes of 6 years or more became frequent. Production and completeness suffered. Some 34 volumes were published during the eight years of the Rogers-Kissinger period and only 11 in the years under Vance. By 1980 the series had slipped to nearly 29 years behind currency although compilation continued at about 23 years behind currency. The State Department continued to provide substantial resources for the project. President Nixon urged a speed up, and President Carter pledged openness, but **Foreign Relations** had collided with the documentary record of American participation in the Cold War--a record which even from the vantage point of 25 years still roiled the international affairs waters.

By the end of the decade the series was bigger, better, broader, more scholarly than ever before but increasingly a source of dissatisfaction for the Department, the staff, and the academic users.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

The current progress and perils confronting the historians involved in the official **Foreign Relations** series accurately mirror the possibilities and problems of public historians throughout the government. In recent years the training, status, and achievements of public historians have steadily increased, but so have their expectations. Government agencies like the Department of State have, in the main, responded well to the sharpened professionalism and strongly asserted values of the new public historians. The expectations and demands made by public historians upon their government are consistently far greater than can be immediately or continuously met by rank and file government officials not yet accustomed to working with contemporary historians. This strained frontier between government officials and academically-trained historians must and will be gradually converted into an effective working relationship, but not without effort and understanding on both sides.

In the case of the **Foreign Relations** series the future appears to hold some of the following developments.

In the first place the historians will no doubt change in the years to come. They will be more particularly trained as public historians rather than as academic historians regretfully pursuing "alternative careers." Trained as public historians, these new professionals will be better able to enter into the dialogue with public officials and political leaders and

more able to pursue their research and editing responsibilities with even greater facility than their predecessors.

The Office of the Historian is already one of the largest units of public historians in the government. There is evidence that the Department of State will continue to support this function which has served both the public interest and the internal needs of the Secretary of State and his principal advisors. But financial stringencies felt elsewhere in the government and the Department will also be felt by the historians. They will be obliged in the years to come to take the lead in applying the most up-to-date technology to the processing of the **Foreign Relations** series. Innovative measures will be found to apply computers and microform technology to the series to permit it to be edited, printed, and distributed more cheaply, more rapidly, and far more broadly. One can foresee the time in the future when the materials prepared by the historians of the Department will serve as the principal instrument for the study of international affairs and foreign policy not just in the United States but in most small and medium nations abroad who will not have been able to develop their own archival access or distribution.

The **Foreign Relations** series will necessarily emerge as more than a select printed documentary. The bibliographical and archival guides will soon be as important as the documents printed. Furthermore, a vast supplement of microform copies of documents, perhaps in a ratio of 10 to 1 or more to the printed documents will provide scholars in the United States and around the world the opportunity to verify the editorial work of the series and carry direct research beyond the point currently possible now only by scholars visiting the National Archives in Washington.

The tension between the needs for national security and the public's right and need to know will persist and even sharpen before some more experientially-tested middle ground is reached. In part this resolution will come hand in hand with the spread of historical services to other agencies. Historical units will eventually evolve in the White House, the National Security Council, and such major agencies as the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Treasury Department. Put another way, the development of a mature public historian component throughout the government is probably the best guarantee to the continuously effective balance in our democracy between the demands for secrecy and public disclosure.

Finally, one can foresee that the public historians cannot alone perfect the **Foreign Relations** publication beyond certain levels. Historians will come to work far more dynamically with practicing government officials in perfecting, maintaining, and preserving the record of foreign policy. The preparation of the historical record begins at the moment an event occurs -- not 20 to 30 years later. Historians will find some more useful methodology by which the actors in the historical events will be able to assist in perfecting the record -- not by censoring or dictating the structure of the history, but by supplementing the written record and assuring its completeness.

I hope that much of these developments can happen soon. I know that

they will only occur with effort and in the face of unavoidable conflicts. I am certain that an intelligent and enlightened public will not long allow its historians to fall short of the needs and responsibilities with which they are charged.

William Z. Slany
Deputy Historian
Department of State
July 1980



Student Boners

Adams-Onis Treaty: "Onis decided to sell France to the United States to avoid another raid on the indians. . . they also established the boundaries between Spain and the United States."

James I. Matray (New Mexico State U)

* * * * *

"The Yalta was a river in Europe that Roosevelt would not let McArthur cross to win the war. Although McArthur was not allowed to cross the river, the enemy crossed it many times. The reason why the United States wouldn't cross the river was because there was supposed to be some type of agreement not to cross it."

Robert Ferrell (Indiana University)

* * * * *

Question: Name the two kinds of "bomb stuff."

Answer: "Uranium and Planetarium."

Robert Ferrell (Indiana University)

Amateur Cryptographers Beware

A recent letter from the Central Intelligence Agency explained why two documents dated 1946 could not be declassified. "The troublesome information consists of specific CIA budget information and information pertaining to the exchange of intelligence with an identified foreign government. We believe that information of this nature requires protection for an extended period of time, if not in perpetuity."

Since the Panama Canal treaty of 1903 was the most significant diplomatic example of the use of the phrase, "if not in perpetuity," perhaps the CIA is saying (in code) that the records should be classified for 75 years.

Milton Gustafson (National Archives)



REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HISTORICAL DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTATION

As has been customary, the **SHAFR Newsletter** is including the 24th Annual Report of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation for your information. Although the report will appear in the AHA **Newsletter**, the committee members believe that since many SHAFR members do not belong to the AHA the report should be printed here.

On November 13-14, 1980, the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation convened in Washington for its twenty-fourth annual meeting with the officers and staff of the Department of State concerned with the compilation, release and publication of historical documentation on American foreign relations. As usual, the chief consideration of the Advisory Committee was the problems, progress and prospects of the **Foreign Relations of the United States**. During the initial, open meeting the Office of the Historian reported on its activities and plans to the Advisory Committee. The principal concerns discussed were (a) the publication schedule of the **Foreign Relations** series and (b) the problems confronted in the delivery of central services used by the Office of the Historian. Late in the afternoon the committee members had an opportunity to converse informally with staff members. The morning session on November 14 was closed because of the confidential nature of the material supplied to discuss the problems of declassification. To assist the members of the committee in preparing themselves for the session, the Office of the Historian had compiled a reading file of documents relating to its activities, containing classified and controlled information which had been made available in the Office of the Historian for examination on the morning of November 13. This session proved to be particularly useful because of the participation of the heads of the three geographic divisions of the Office of the Historian. After lunch that day, the Committee reconvened in the Office of the Historian to hear a brief report on the status of policy-related research. The Committee then met alone to evaluate the year's progress of the Office of the Historian and to discuss the nature of its annual report.

The issue above all others which dominated the thinking and discussions of the Advisory Committee throughout the sessions was the slow-down if not virtual stoppage of the **Foreign Relations** series. The last year in which a substantial number of volumes was published was 1977 when ten volumes were released. That number dropped to three in 1978 and two in 1979. Only one volume was released in 1980, volume I for 1951 dealing with national security affairs, despite the assurance given the Advisory Committee last year that seven to ten volumes would be published.

The Advisory Committee expressed its concern at the evident slowing of issuance of **Foreign Relations of the United States**. It seemed clear to

the Committee that the current delay was attributable not so much to preparation of the volumes as to the institution of the system of re-review of volumes which had already been carefully reviewed for declassification in the Department, following time-tested procedures.

The Office of the Historian had planned to publish thirty volumes of documents covering the period 1950-1954. Of these, ten volumes have already been published. The remaining twenty volumes were in various stages of the publication process. Traditionally, the Office of the Historian has managed the process by which the State Department and other concerned agencies acted to declassify the classified material selected for inclusion in the volumes. By April, 1980 this process insofar as the Department of State was concerned, was largely complete for the 1950-1954 volumes and well advanced in connection with clearance requests directed to other agencies.

The delay in the publication of twenty volumes for the 1950-1954 period is the result of a policy of re-review instituted by the Department's Classification/Declassification Center (CDC). This office was established in November, 1978 and given responsibility both for "mandatory declassification review" including FOI Cases and for "systematic declassification review." The latter is the function at issue because CDC deals with information selected for inclusion in the **Foreign Relations** series as an aspect of its central responsibility in connection with systematic review, namely drafting of guidelines for use at the National Archives. In other words, the prime role of the CDC is not to declassify documents as an aspect of systematic review but rather to draft guidelines for the use of reviewers at the National Archives. To accomplish its task of devising guidelines, the CDC reviews a sample of information made available to it by the Office of the Historian and recommends declassification action. This sample is also the gross body of information selected by the Office of the Historian that might be published in the **Foreign Relations** series. Thus, the CDC acts for the concerned geographic and substantive bureaus in declassifying materials selected for inclusion in the **Foreign Relations** series.

The CDC was directed to begin work with the records covering 1955 and after. However, on the basis of its early activities, it decided unilaterally that it was necessary to revoke the clearances for the remaining twenty unpublished volumes covering 1950-1954, some of which were already bound, nearly bound, or in advanced page-proof status, and undertake a re-review of all the documents in those twenty volumes. The reasons for this decision were: that the concerned bureaus had conducted an inadequate declassification review of information selected for the 1950-1954 volumes in **Foreign Relations** series, and that failure to withhold this information would endanger national security; and that certain other information previously deemed desensitized had become "resensitized" because of altered international circumstances and that its release would endanger national security. This re-review, scheduled for completion by November of 1980 has caused significant delay in the publication of the **Foreign Relations** series, resulted in significant extra cost to the

government, and delayed the expeditious transfer of the Department's records for 1950-1954 to the National Archives, where they would be made available to the public. Moreover, the decision appears to be inconsistent with the spirit as well as the substance of Executive Order 12065 concerning classification and declassification issued in June, 1978, which was clearly aimed at a more rapid, open, and expeditious clearance procedure.

While the Committee expressed understanding of the need to safe-guard security, it felt, after discussion of material which had been excluded on re-review, that the process produced little if any benefit in that regard. This was evident because much of the material excluded in the process of re-review was already in the public domain, and because the substantive content of the excluded material could easily be replaced - as was done - by already published material of the same content. In such circumstances, security could hardly be a relevant consideration. The chief result of the process of re-review thus seemed to be a very substantial diversion of time and money, an increase in administrative burden, and an eventual delay in publication with no perceptible benefit in end result. It is hard to believe that such a procedure is useful.

The Advisory Committee also agreed, on examination of the results of the process of re-review, that it was not likely that the process would be less costly in the future, or would have more substantial benefits. The Committee felt that, especially as the documents in question are all at least twenty years old, and will have passed through a preliminary screening by competent and conscientious officials before being offered for declassification, the presumption in favor of openness ought to be strong.

The Advisory Committee therefore urges that the Department of State re-examine and where necessary revise the process of re-review of already cleared documents, with the objectives of: maximizing prompt publication, as being relevant to that open consideration of diplomatic history which is essential to a free democracy; giving realistic consideration to questions of security in the light of a full knowledge of what has already been published elsewhere, as well as the **present** security implications; and achieving a full and accurate publication of documentation, at the earliest date feasible. The publication of the **Foreign Relations** volumes at the twenty year line during the 1960s and the subsequent opening of unpublished documents at the National Archives enabled American scholars to produce numerous works of high quality on the record of American diplomacy during World War II and the immediate postwar period. The volumes for the 1940s were thorough in documentation and there is no evidence that their publication led to any security problems. The tradition of publication of the volumes at the twenty-year line, strongly supported by Presidents Kennedy and Nixon, the intent of Executive Order 12065, and the need for access to historical documentation if the democratic process is to function effectively, all serve to reinforce the presumption for openness.

The Committee wishes to express its deep concern over the function and performance of the CDC thus far. On the basis of the information acquired during our two days in Washington, we found ourselves unable to accept the assurances given us by the Director of the CDC, that it was working satisfactorily.

Centralization of the declassification function in the CDC, as it is actually being implemented (though this need not be the case), has introduced a new organizational "layer" and created a damaging communication gap between historians in the Office of the Historian and specialists on the geographical and functional desks elsewhere in the Department. Acting as a "middleman" between them, the CDC now virtually eliminates direct communication between the staff of the Office of the Historian and the desk specialists regarding the specific grounds on which declassification decisions should be made. Direct substantive discussions between the Office of the Historian and desk specialists were a valuable feature of the earlier pre-CDC system. Such discussions facilitated an informed, multi-sided application of the "balancing" test for declassification decisions. The absence of this quality of face-to-face discussion of relevant substantive matters in the new CDC system makes it much more difficult for the staff of the Office of the Historian to present adequately the case for declassification of specific items, to become fully and reliably informed as to the desk specialists' reservations, and, therefore, to address them satisfactorily.

The Committee believes that the "layering" of procedures and the "bureaucratization" of communication between the Office of the Historian and the desks in the new CDC system gravely handicap efforts to apply the "balancing" test in a way that gives an adequate and fair opportunity to those charged with making the case for declassification.

These disadvantages and the undesirable consequences of the structure of the CDC are reinforced by the Department's decision to staff the CDC entirely with retired Foreign Service Officers. The relevance of the competence and experience of the retired FSO's for this task is not at issue. But there are several disadvantages to relying exclusively on them to operate the CDC declassification function.

The very fact that many retired FSO's were intimately involved in policies of the Cold War era of the 50's and 60's creates the possibility that they may take a quite conservative approach to applying the "balancing" test to what can and should be de-classified for the **Foreign Relations** volumes for this period.

The retired FSO's generally speaking, cannot be expected to be aware of the considerable factual information concerning important details of U.S. foreign policy during the 50's and 60's that is already in the public domain. As a result they are likely to exaggerate the sensitivity of the materials submitted for declassification by the Office of the Historian. In consequence, the CDC staff is likely to underestimate the damage to the reputation of the United States if the Department of State issues **Foreign Relations** volumes that, because of significant omissions resulting from CDC denials of the declassification

recommendations made by the Office of the Historian, give a distorted picture of U.S. foreign policy during those years.

This is, of course, not to say that the recommendations of the Office of the Historian for declassification should be accepted uncritically or that the Office of the Historian is always right. Adversarial proceedings in arriving at decisions to declassify materials for **Foreign Relations** volumes are necessary and can contribute, if structured and managed properly, to an application of the "balancing" test that is both responsible and well-informed. But centralization of the declassification process in CDC has inserted a third party of superordinate status that unbalances the adversarial process previously conducted directly between the Office of the Historian and the desks, and erodes the quality of the discussions previously conducted directly between the Office of the Historian and the desks.

The current misgivings of the Advisory Committee are by no means new. In 1978 the Committee expressed anticipatory concern about both the structure/staffing and procedures of the CDC when Professor Bernard Cohen, the Chairman, noted that ". . .the Committee will be interested to learn at its meeting next year whether this central staff meets the high expectations that created it, or whether historians will find it even more difficult to fight central-defined declassification guidelines. We believe that the Department should resist the temptation to staff the new clearance mechanism with senior or even retired Foreign Service officers, who may lack a commitment to the release of documents. . . ."

The Committee does **not** share the expectations of The Historian that necessary changes will be made to improve the staffing and procedures of the CDC. Relevant in this connection is the fact that the Director of the CDC, in his statement to the Committee, expressed unqualified satisfaction with CDC staffing, procedures, and performance. Hence, it is clear that fundamental disagreements exist between the CDC director and the Office of the Historian. The Committee is far from confident that these fundamentally divergent concepts can be easily overcome or reconciled simply as a result of giving the present system time to acquire more experience. The Committee is aware and appreciates the efforts of the Office of the Historian, and Public Affairs to seek improvements in the CDC performance. However it seemed to the Committee that the Office of the Historian had exhausted virtually all channels currently available to it for seeking redress. It should, however, also be noted that The Historian has repeatedly expressed the belief that the deficiencies of the CDC process will be corrected eventually. He has received assurances from higher authority within the State Department that the Oversight Committee and the Coordinating Committee will be activated and that meetings of these committees will offer the Office of the Historian and Public Affairs an opportunity to bring about needed changes in the new centralized declassification system that, according to The Historian, will make it "work as it was supposed to."

In view of the immense problems resulting from the policies of the

CDC, the Committee must express skepticism about the prospects for publishing the volumes covering the years through 1966 by the stated target date of 1986. The Committee believes that the twenty-year line should be reestablished and it is pleased that the Office of the Historian is devoting its resources toward that objective. Yet the present chaotic status of the volumes for 1951-1954, completed but now required to undergo extensive "re-review" leading to reclassification, appeals, and prolonged delays in publication, presents the sobering likelihood that the series will soon surpass a thirty year line.

III

The Committee has just learned that a proposal to revise the **Foreign Affairs Manual** relating to the organization of the Classification/Declassification Center is at an advanced stage of consideration. The proposed revision removes from the Office of the Historian the authority to manage the process by which it obtains declassification decisions from other agencies and governments (2 FAM 1353). The Committee is deeply concerned that it was not informed of this important matter at its recent meeting.

A change of this nature constitutes a crucial policy departure. For this reason the matter should receive the widest and most careful consideration before it is decided. The proposed FAM would replace a system that is working satisfactorily with one that may be seriously flawed. Moreover, removing an important element of editorial control from the Office of the Historian might compromise its obligation to publish an objective and non-political **Foreign Relations** series.

As stated in FAM 1351 the Office of the Historian is required to publish, "subject to necessary security consideration, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies." The Office of the Historian is further authorized to obtain and publish information from other agencies when needed to convey "a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States." Another provision, 2 FAM 1352, provides that "the editing of the record is guided by principles of historical objectivity. There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision."

The Committee believes that the proposed revision (2 FAM 1353) seriously undermines the bureaucratic credibility of the Office of the Historian. Logically, the Office of the Historian should retain responsibility for and control of each step of the production of the **Foreign Relations** volumes. This is particularly true of the clearance process, which has emerged in recent years as the most difficult and, in some respects, the most important aspect of the production of volumes. Direct management of other agency and foreign government clearance enables the Office of the Historian to research and prepare appeals as

the need evolves. Experience with the drafting of appeals has demonstrated the necessity of day-to-day involvement with clearance negotiations in order to be able to draft knowledgeably and effectively. It is essential that the Office of the Historian retain responsibility for the day-to-day management of its own product. It is the Office of the Historian, not CDC, which has a vested interest in prodding the slow and reluctant in the clearance process. Given CDC's orientation and performance to date, control of the clearance process could be used to further delay and impede publications of the volumes. Finally, the overarching argument, which ought to be governing, is that the Office of the Historian is, within the broader construct of the Bureau of Public Affairs, the only institutional advocate of a policy of openness within the Department of State. As such, it is essential for it to maintain a credible negotiating relationship with each of the agencies and foreign governments involved in the clearance process. The proposed revision would limit the involvement of the Office of the Historian in the clearance process to the appeal stage and critically diminish its credibility by creating the impression that it no longer had overall responsibility for clearance of the series. Any such diminution would effectively reduce the only voice making the case for the public's right to be informed about the foreign policy process.

The Committee regrets that the CDC in interpreting Executive Order 12065 has deleted documents involving reports on conversations with representatives of other governments on the grounds that such material includes "foreign government information." In decades of prior practice, the Office of the Historian had consulted foreign governments only when it sought to publish a document originating with those governments; memoranda of conversations with representatives of other governments were considered "American." As a result of CDC interpretation of "foreign government information" as well as of intelligence and military matters, the volumes for 1951-1954 have, in many cases, been virtually decimated. While the total percentage of documents reclassified might sound limited, it is evident that the deleted material in some cases comprises much of the essential historical record. For instance, CDC review of the 1951 volume on China and Korea resulted in deletion of eighty documents, or portions of documents, approaching approximately ten percent of the China material. The 1952-1954 volumes on Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which total 2039 pages, have been subjected to CDC deletions (based on preliminary data) estimated at 400 pages. One must keep in mind that this is a "re-review"; the Office of the Historian had previously gained clearance from the appropriate offices within the Department and with a number of other agencies. The CDC is also insisting upon extensive deletions as it initiates its reviewing of the volumes for the middle 1950s.

IV

The Committee wishes to make several recommendations to correct some of the aforementioned problems. It appears to the Committee,

after careful discussion of present procedures relating to the classification, declassification issue, and after extensive discussion in the Committee's private session, that there is a fundamental organizational difficulty in the present structure. CDC, as we understand it, was created mainly because of the problems associated with the Freedom of Information Act and the need for a central clearance procedure in that regard. It was also given a responsibility in the process of declassification of documents for publication in the **Foreign Relations of the United States** series. That function puts CDC in between the substantive officials of the Office of the Historian who must deal with documents proposed to be included in the **Foreign Relations** series, and the substantive desk or functional officials of the Department who must clear the proposed declassification. What is gained is a superficial appearance of uniformity and possibly even of efficiency. In fact, efficiency is sacrificed, since an intermediate level is interjected between those who have substantive responsibilities, and who have in the past, though with some problems, adequately discharged those responsibilities.

With no desire to prescribe administrative procedures, the Advisory Committee nevertheless suggests that all of the objectives of the present program of CDC review could be achieved in a simple, and cost-saving, way. What could be done would be to require the relevant officials of the Office of the Historian to clear documents for declassification with the relevant persons in the regional or other bureaus; so much has to be done in any case: officials of the Office of the Historian and officers in the regional or other bureaus are necessarily involved. The role of CDC would then be to: (a) exercise an overall and general supervision involving the setting of common standards in regard to declassification - but not to participate in the day-to-day administration of those standards; and (b) to resolve such disputes as might arise between the substantive officials dealing with declassification of documents. In other words, were there to be a case in which an officer of the Office of the Historian felt that a document, denied declassification by an official of (say), EUR, should really be declassified, and that the standard was being violated, there would be a reference of the matter to CDC. This would of course provide a safeguard against premature or otherwise undesirable declassification. At the same time, it would greatly simplify the present procedure, and enable CDC to function with a smaller group of special consultants, if, indeed, any such were necessary at all.

The Advisory Committee, concerned with declassification and publication of documents of historical significance, and with the stated objectives of openness of the United States Government, and equally cognizant of the need for security clearance in connection with such declassification, feels that the above procedure would respond to both sets of consideration. It should also save a considerable amount of money, which the Committee feels could be better used in other areas, as for example in strengthening the research and study aspects of the Office of the Historian.

The Committee wishes to recommend the addition to the CDC staff of three or four retired historians -- perhaps on a part-time basis -- who will be carefully selected for their scholarly reputation and balanced judgment regarding security matters. The Office of the Historian should participate in the selection of these persons.

The Committee is also deeply concerned over the likelihood that efforts to reach the twenty-year line will be accompanied by conservative declassification decisions which, in turn, will result in **Foreign Relations** volumes that contain significant gaps and a distorted record of American foreign policy in the 50's and 60's. We urge that issuance of new **Foreign Relations** volumes be delayed when, in the judgment of the senior historians in the Office of the Historian, not to do so would result in such distortions.

The Committee urges the Office of the Historian to delay publication of volumes which fail to meet the standards of the series. At the risk of extending the publication line, the Committee believes that the Office of the Historian must opt for producing only volumes which will provide a full record, rather than succumbing to pressures to rush into print with incomplete volumes.

The Committee also believes that it is essential for the Office of the Historian to appeal continually what it considers to be unjustifiable CDC decisions, even though it may be pressured to become less aggressive and to withhold historically significant documents from review when a negative outcome is almost certain. The Committee urges the Office of the Historian to press for review of all documents which are of significance in understanding the policymaking process. For the Office of the Historian to practice "prior restraint" would undermine its professional integrity.

Since some selected, important documents cannot be declassified the Committee attaches the greatest importance to the development and application by the Office of the Historian of:

- (a) a methodology for indicating in published **Foreign Relations** volumes that important sources of information on certain aspects of U.S. foreign policy were not available in developing the compilation for a given volume;
- (b) editorial practices that indicate to readers that important documents bearing on an aspect of U.S. foreign policy being discussed in a **Foreign Relations** volume have not been declassified;
- (c) appropriate ways of alerting readers to the fact that those parts of a document reproduced in **Foreign Relations** that are missing are the result of security considerations and are not omitted by the Office of the Historian because they are considered unimportant.

As volumes are published following CDC and other review, the Office of the Historian should include footnote references to documents which were denied clearance. This is essential for scholars working with the

volumes and it will facilitate Freedom of Information Act requests for further review of such documents.

In summary, the Advisory Committee believes that a critical situation has developed, one which threatens the integrity of the **Foreign Relations** series and the opening of historical documentation. The functions and policies of the CDC are the principal reasons for the failure of the Office of the Historian to produce volumes according to schedule. Accordingly, the Committee recommends:

- (1) a high level examination of the process of re-review with the objective of facilitating the publication of timely and thorough volumes;
- (2) re-establishing the practice of having the Office of the Historian work with geographic and other desk officials to gain clearance of documents;
- (3) restricting CDC to the functions of establishing general standards for declassification and of resolving disputes between the Office of the Historian and desk offices;
- (4) adding retired historians to the CDC staff.

In addition, the Committee calls upon the Office of the Historian:

- (1) to delay publication of volumes which fail to meet the standards of the series;
- (2) to appeal questionable denials of clearance;
- (3) to assure inclusion in the **Foreign Relations** volumes of appropriate notification that relevant documents have not been declassified.

In conclusion, one cannot visit with the staff at the Office of the Historian without being impressed by the dedication to the **Foreign Relations** series, the commitment to the highest standards of professional integrity, and the determination to maintain a tradition of excellence. Yet the profound staff disillusionment over the present situation and the frustration resulting from delaying publication of volumes are distressing to the Committee. It is clear that the leadership of the office must continue its efforts to force reconsideration of existing clearance procedures and policies. At the same time, the Committee recognizes that the type of changes called for in this report necessitate prompt and effective action at the highest levels in the State Department.

Respectfully submitted,

Betty Miller Unterberger
Professor of History
Texas A & M University
Chairperson, Advisory Committee
on Historical Diplomatic
Documentation

Alexander L. George
Professor of Political Science
Stanford University

Gary R. Hess
Professor of History
Bowling Green University

Seymour J. Rubin
Executive Vice President and
Executive Director
The American Society of
International Law

Enid Curtis Bok Schoettle
The Ford Foundation

Arnold H. Taylor
Professor of History
Howard University

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The project directors of **THE HISTORIANS PROJECT: AN EXAMINATION AND CRITIQUE OF THE PRINCIPAL THEMES THAT HAVE ANIMATED THE AMERICAN PUBLIC EFFORT FOR PEACE, 1930 - 1980** have requested the **Newsletter** to inform the SHAFR membership about the project. George S. Weigel, Jr., (World Without War Council of Greater Seattle) has prepared the following essay.

Since the formation of the American Peace Society in 1828, Americans have launched a bewildering variety of private, voluntary organizations whose principal purpose was advancing the prospects for a world in which international conflict was resolved through nonviolent means. These organizations have addressed different aspects of the problem, for a wide range of audiences, and with the resources of many different analytic, moral, and political perspectives.

Their common denominator is that, in different degrees, they have all failed.

Yet in a time like our own -- where there has been an explosion in the numbers of non-governmental centers at work on problems of international conflict and America's role in world affairs, and where the crucial importance of these centers as the arenas in which the themes of the foreign policy argument is shaped is more widely recognized (even when bemoaned) -- it seemed important to us in the World Without War Council to investigate the principal teachings of these organizations, to judge their adequacy, and to see if "advices and cautions" can be drawn from past efforts and applied to those at work in the field today. The National Endowment for the Humanities agreed, and we are thus six months into The Historians Project, whose aims are summarized in the subtitle above.

The principal goal of the project is to identify and critique the primary teachings of war/peace organizations over the last fifty years. To that end, we have commissioned some twenty-five essays on various aspects of the "public effort for peace," ranging from studies of the Council on Foreign Relations and the League of Nations Association, to analyses of the ideological changes in American isolationism over the period in question. Essay authors have studied the shifting worldview of mainline Protestant church organizations in the 1930s, the policy

arguments of the National Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy, and the implications of the revisionist historiography of the Cold War. An "Overview Document" will summarize the primary teachings culled from these essays; that Document, and the essays themselves, will become grist for a series of regional scholars' seminars scheduled for late Spring in New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Seattle. In addition, a "pre-seminar" will meet during the Organization of American Historians convention in Detroit in April, to critique the "Overview Document" and to discuss several of the project essays.

During the seminars, "advices and cautions" will be suggested for those at work on issues of war, peace, and America's role in the world today. These will be brought to a second round of consultations, this time with current organizational leaders, which will be held throughout the country in the Fall?

In addition to this main thrust of the project -- linking scholars and organizational leaders through an examination of the intellectual history of the American peace effort -- the project has several other ancillary goals:

- *To identify themes for Ph.D. and post-doctoral research;
- *To strengthen the relationship between organizations and scholarly archival depositories now interested in war/peace collections (such as the Hoover Institution, or the Swarthmore College Library), and to open the door to new depositories when appropriate.
- *To bring the results of the seminars and consultants to the general public through magazine and newspaper articles, and through radio and television.

SHAFR members interested in participating in the Historians Project are most welcome to do so in one (or several) of the following ways: by participating in the "pre-seminar" at the OAH meeting in April; by identifying Ph.D. and post-doctoral research themes; by identifying existing major bibliographic resources in the field; by reviewing project essays; by contributing an essay summarizing their already-completed research on a particular aspect of the American public effort for peace (the project can assume modest secretarial and duplicating costs). Those interested in participating should contact George Weigel, (with Robert Pickus the project director) at 1514 N.E. 45th Street, Seattle, WA 98105; phone 206-523-4755.



REPORT OF EXECUTIVE SECRETARY-TREASURER

December 27, 1980

During 1980 SHAFR continued to serve in many ways the needs of persons interested in American foreign relations. The steady development of **Diplomatic History** has earned it increased recognition as a major scholarly journal; its articles together with the information included in the **Newsletter** are especially important to the Society's members. Through the generous support of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald Bernath, SHAFR has been able to recognize the work of younger scholars by means of three awards named in the memory of Stuart L. Bernath. The summer conference brought 130 persons to the University of Maryland; the program, developed by the Program Committee headed by Eugene Trani, included well-planned sessions on important and timely issues. On two longstanding matters of concern, progress was evident. The updating of the Bemis guide, which SHAFR undertook as a major project three years ago, moved toward completion under the general direction of Richard Dean Burns. Perhaps the most serious issue confronting diplomatic historians has been the delay in the publication of the **Foreign Relations** series and the related changes in policy regarding declassification of documents. Through an **ad hoc** committee and by having members on the Department of State Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation and on committees of the AHA and OAH, the Society's concerns have been clearly stated, but it had become evident that SHAFR needed a means for dealing more consistently and directly with the complex questions surrounding the **Foreign Relations** and declassification issues. Accordingly, at the suggestion of President David M. Pletcher, Council recommended and the membership approved the establishment of a new standing committee--the Committee on Government Relations. It is chaired by Wayne Cole and is now beginning its work.

Membership for the year reached 912. This represented an increase of about 12% over 1979 and of nearly 75% since 1976. Beyond the work of the Membership Committee which under the leadership of Ralph Weber has been instrumental in this steady growth, **Diplomatic History** has attracted many new members. The interest in SHAFR of scholars overseas has been especially important, and in recent months, as a result of contacts made by Warren Cohen during his visits to the Chinese mainland, SHAFR has enrolled its first members in the People's Republic.

SHAFR continued to have a balanced budget, despite increased operating costs in almost all aspects of the Society's administration. The ability to provide important services while maintaining low membership fees was facilitated by the support of the institutions associated with the Society's various committees and, in particular, by that of Michigan State University, Tennessee Technological University, and Bowling Green State University.

Lastly, the Society's commitment to its younger members has received additional support from Jerry and Myrna Bernath. At the

August meeting, Council adopted a plan for establishing the "Bernath Supplementary Fund" which will provide a means for subsidizing student memberships, increasing the value of the Bernath prizes, and assisting and recognizing younger scholars in other ways. The Bernaths have just made another generous contribution in the amount of nearly \$7,800 which is designated for the Supplementary Fund. The Society is indebted to the Bernaths for their dedication and confidence.

In sum, SHAFR, through the efforts and cooperation of many persons throughout the United States and overseas, has enjoyed a successful year.

Gary R. Hess

SHAFR BUDGET -- 1980

CHECKING ACCOUNT

1979 Carryover	\$ 3,859.93	
Dues received in 1980	7,494.79	(a)
Convention Income	43.40	
Bernath Living Trust	1,900.00	
Sale of Mailing List	263.00	
Transfer from Bernath Article-Speaker Account	500.00	
Transfer from Savings	2,500.00	
	<hr/>	
Total	\$ 16,561.12	

EXPENDITURES

General Office		
Printing	\$ 602.75	
Postage	1,079.77	
Long Distance	114.12	
	<hr/>	\$ 1,796.64
Council and Committee Expenses	\$ 342.81	\$ 342.81
	<hr/>	
Conventions		
AHA (1979)	\$ 254.55	
AHA (1980)	210.00	
SHA	50.00	
AHA-PCB	75.00	
SHAFR	28.25	
OAH	63.90	
	<hr/>	\$ 681.70
<u>Diplomatic History</u>		
Payment for 4 issues for 1st 600 members	\$ 2,400.00	
Payment for issues over 600 members	1,706.00	
Contract subsidy for 1980	750.00	
Contract subsidy for 1981	750.00	
	<hr/>	\$ 5,606.00
Miscellaneous		
Bank Expenses and Deposit Box	\$ 11.00	
Donation to NCC	320.00	
Income Tax Consultant	75.00	
Adjustments in Dues	8.18	
	<hr/>	\$ 414.18
Bernath Accounts		
Book Award	\$ 500.00	
Speaker Award	300.00	
Article Award	400.00	
Transfer of Interest to Bernaths on Living Trust	1,900.00	
	<hr/>	\$ 3,100.00
Total Expenditures		\$ 11,941.33

SUMMARY

Carryover from 1979	\$ 3,859.93
Transfer from Savings	2,500.00
Income from 1980	10,201.19
	<hr/>
Total Available	\$ 16,561.12
Less Expenditures	- 11,941.33
Less Transfer to Savings	- 2,000.00
	<hr/>
Checking Balance, 12/19/80	\$ 2,619.79

ENDOWMENT AND SAVINGS ACCOUNT

(Mid-American National Bank, Bowling Green, Account 26039)

Balance, Jan. 1, 1980	\$ 4,000.00	
Interest, 1980--On Account	182.62	
Bernath Supplementary Trust	630.00	(b)
Certificate 0033493 (1st National Bank, Akron)	84.36	
Transfer/Contribution for Bernath Prizes	500.00	
Transfers to Savings from Checking	2,000.00	
	<hr/>	
	\$ 7,396.98	
Less Transfers to Checking	- 2,500.00	
	<hr/>	
Balance, 12/19/80	\$ 4,896.98	

T MARKET CERTIFICATE (State Home Savings and Loan, Bowling Green, #530026-S)

Balance, Jan. 1, 1980	\$ 1,075.00
Interest	116.79
	<hr/>
Balance, 12/19/80	\$ 1,191.79

(a) Dues total includes four life memberships (\$500.00).

(b) Total interest from Bernath Supplementary Trust in savings account is \$ 1,004.92.

BERNATH ACCOUNTS

		December
		BALANCE
	<hr/>	
Designated Bernath Account		
\$7,000 U.S. Treasury Bond, Acc't. #123726689901		\$ 374.92
Interest Paid 1980		630.00
		<hr/>
		\$ 1,004.92

Bernath Book Account

17-10524-4 Passbook Number		
First National Bank of Akron	Balance, December, 1979	† 482.35
	Interest on Bonds	\$ 600.00 1,082.35
	Awards, 1979	500.00 582.35
	Safekeeping Receipt 56357	
	Interest on Treasury Note	82.50 664.85
	Interest on Savings Acc't.	30.79 695.64
		<hr/>

Bernath Article and Speaker Account

00-47346-3 Passbook Number		
First National Bank of Akron	Balance, December, 1979	\$ 868.16
	Interest on Bonds	\$ 495.00 1,363.16
	Awards, 1979	500.00 863.16
	Interest on Savings Acc't.	41.19 904.35
		<hr/>

Bernath Trust Account

36-003654-9 Passbook Number		
BancOhio	Balance, December, 1979	\$ 27.67
	Interest on Savings Acc't.	\$ 1.41 29.08
		<hr/>

PROPOSED 1981 BUDGET

INCOME

Carryover from 1980	\$ 2,619.79	
Late Dues for 1981	2,500.00	
Dues in Nov.-Dec. for 1982	4,500.00	
Interest	1,000.00	
TOTAL	\$10,619.79	

EXPENDITURES

<u>General Office</u>		
Printing	\$ 650.00	
Postage	1,100.00	
Long Distance	125.00	
		\$ 1,875.00
<u>Administrative Expenses</u>		
Exec. Sec.-Treas. Travel	\$ 250.00	
Council & Committee	300.00	
		\$ 550.00
<u>Diplomatic History</u>		
Payments for Copies	\$ 5,000.00	
		\$ 5,000.00
Conventions	\$ 750.00	\$ 750.00
Miscellaneous Expenses	\$ 125.00	\$ 125.00
TOTAL EXPENDITURES FOR 1981		\$ 8,300.00



MINUTES OF COUNCIL MEETING

December 27, 1980

The Council met on Saturday, December 27, 1980, Room 1042, Sheraton Washington Hotel. Members present: David M. Pletcher, Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert Dallek, Raymond A. Esthus, Akira Iriye, Betty M. Unterberger, Paul A. Varg, Gary R. Hess. Also present were John Anderson, William Brinker, Thomas Buckley, Wayne Cole, Warren Cohen, Charles DeBenedetti, Milton Gustafson, Daniel Helmstadter, Phillip Johnson, Warren Kuehl, and Joseph Siracusa.

President Pletcher called the meeting to order at 8:15 p.m. The first part of the meeting was devoted to a number of reports. Milt Gustafson summarized the work of the Nominating Committee and the recent election results: Lawrence E. Gelfand, Vice President; Arnold Offner, Council (2 year term); Walter LaFeber and Sandra Taylor, Council (3 year term); Samuel Wells, Nominating Committee. Bill Brinker reported on the **Newsletter**, calling attention to the inclusion of the newsletter of the American-East Asian Relations Committee. Warren Cohen noted that the number of articles submitted to **Diplomatic History** had declined from one hundred in 1979 to eighty-four in 1980 and emphasized the need for established scholars to contribute; he also observed that the financial support of Michigan State University is assured only through March 1982. Tom Buckley reported that the Roster and Research List operations have been transferred to the University of Tulsa; the data have been put on computer tape, the List is now being printed and will be mailed in January. Chuck DeBenedetti outlined plans for the 1982 meeting at American University which will begin on Thursday evening, July 30 and conclude with a luncheon on Saturday, August 1. He urged members to submit proposals for sessions (deadline March 1) and to suggest speakers for the Friday luncheon and dinner. On behalf of the Bernath Book Committee, Bob Dallek noted that few books had been nominated and that the experience of recent years indicated that most books would be submitted within the next two months. His observations led to some discussion on means of encouraging earlier nominations; it seemed advisable for the national office to send announcements of the award to publishers twice a year, rather than once as has been customary. Reports on the **Guide to American Foreign Relations**, the Bernath Article Prize Committee, and the Bernath Lecture Prize Committee were presented by the Executive Secretary on behalf of Richard Burns, Lester Langley, and Keith Nelson respectively: the **Guide** is nearing completion, with 30 of 41 chapters at the final editing stage and publication anticipated for the Fall of 1981; few articles have been nominated and the committee encourages suggestions; about twelve nominees are under consideration for the lecture prize and the committee is still interested in receiving the names of qualified nominees.

Warren Kuehl presented an interim report of the **ad hoc** Committee on Finance, which the President appointed last Spring. (Other members are: Alexander DeConde, Sally J. Marks, Thomas Schoonover), The report focused on four areas:

(1) a recommendation that any new prizes of awards, which the Committee believed ought not to be solicited because of administrative and prize committee time and expenses, should be accepted under the following guidelines:

(A) The amount of capital available should be sufficient to make the award meritorious; an amount in excess of \$5,000 would seem to be a reasonable figure.

(B) The number of nominees for an award should be sufficient to make it meritorious; the designated area or subject should not be unduly narrow and consideration should be given to making awards every two or three years to be certain there are a sufficient number of nominees.

(C) New prizes should not impinge upon areas already covered by awards.

(D) Council should be sensitive about any restrictions related to age or sex.

(E) An amount to cover administrative costs of awards should be included in the income from prize funds.

(2) A recommendation that monies accumulated from life memberships should be invested in a high-yield bond or treasury note so that the income realized would equal the cost of each membership.

(3) A recommendation that royalties from the **Guide to American Foreign Relations** be utilized to update the **Guide** every five years, to establish an ongoing computerized retrieval system for all data in the **Guide** with new materials added regularly, and publication of bibliographical essays in **Diplomatic History** or pamphlet form; a Bibliographical Committee should be appointed as soon as possible to implement these recommendations.

(4) A recommendation that a Development Fund be established, carrying the name of a donor or person honored by the fund.

Discussion on the Financial Committee's interim report emphasized Council's concern with longterm funding of the Society's administrative expenses. Varg moved and Unterberger seconded a motion that Council: (1) accept the Committee's report; (2) adopt its recommendations regarding additional prizes and awards; (3) adopt its recommendation regarding the establishment of a Bibliographical Committee, but leave to that Committee responsibility for recommending to Council the means for utilizing royalties to update the **Guide** and bibliographical information; (4) request that the Committee give consideration to plans for a general endowment. Motion approved.

The Executive Secretary-Treasurer submitted his annual report (copy is appended to the minutes).

Moving to new business, the Council acted upon three issues related to **Diplomatic History**. First, it discussed the question of whether book reviews should be included in the journal. Warren Cohen noted that a comprehensive book review section would necessitate adding a book review editor. In general, Council preferred the alternative of review essays which would not require any expansion of the editorial staff and was also considered to be of greater interest to the Society's membership. Second, the Council approved (on a motion by Dallek, seconded by Kaplan), the following nominations for the editorial board: Russell Buhite (2 year term), Manfred Jonas, Thomas Paterson, and Betty M. Unterberger (3 year term). Third, the Council considered the renewal of the Society's contract which expires at the end of 1981, SHAFR pays about \$5.50 per individual subscription. Owing to increased costs, Scholarly Resources proposed an increase to \$8.00 per individual annual subscription. Dan Helmstadter and Phil Johnson of Scholarly Resources expressed their strong interest in continuing the journal and there was general agreement among Council members that the arrangements between SHAFR and Scholarly Resources had resulted in a high quality journal. Varg moved, Esthus seconded that Council approve renewal of the contract with Scholarly Resources for a three year period at a cost of \$8.00 per individual annual subscription. The motion was approved.

The increased cost of the journal, it was recognized, will necessitate an increase in membership dues beginning in 1982. In preliminary discussion on this matter, it was noted that the Society should draw upon the Bernath Supplementary Fund to subsidize student memberships and that Council might wish to consider establishing a "contributing" category of membership. The revised dues structure will be considered by Council at its April meeting.

Council also discussed a proposal to plan summer meetings two or three years in advance. This seemed advisable in view of the strong support for continuing the summer conferences which was evident at the Council meeting in August. Advanced planning would also facilitate making appointments to the Program Committee. There was consensus that the Executive Secretary, in consultation with the President and Vice President, should make plans for summer conferences operating on the policy of meeting two of three years in the Washington, D.C. area; meeting places and dates will be subject to final approval by Council.

Council next considered whether it should endorse the proposal that Congress enact legislation establishing a United States Academy of Peace. Discussion underscored a reluctance to take any action until more information was available.

Betty Unterberger urged that SHAFR's newly established Committee on Government Relations act quickly to express the Society's concerns over the delays in publication of the Foreign Relations volumes and the declassification policies at the Department of State. She noted that the State Department Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation will submit its report early in 1981 and that Organization

of American Historian **ad hoc** Committee on the Foreign Relations Series and Government Declassification Policies has reported to the OAH President. Wayne Cole, chairperson of the Committee on Government Relations, indicated that the Committee would meet on December 28 and that he anticipated it would act promptly. The other members of the committee are Milt Gustafson, Roger Dingman, Melvin Small, Jules Davids, and Lloyd Gardner.

Meeting adjourned at 10:45 p.m.

Gary R. Hess

* * * * *

At the luncheon meeting on December 29, about 110 persons were present to hear David Pletcher's presidential address, "Rhetoric and Results: A Pragmatic View of American Economic Expansionism, 1865-1898." Following his address, the following resolution was introduced by Warren Kuehl and approved unanimously:

The Society thanks Gerald and Myrna Bernath for their warm loyalty and the expression of continued confidence as reflected in their recent gift.

SHAFR'S CALENDAR FOR 1981

- | | |
|----------------------|--|
| April 1-4 | The 74th annual meeting of the OAH will be held in Detroit with headquarters at the Detroit Plaza. There will be the usual SHAFR activities at this meeting. |
| May 1 | Deadline: materials for June Newsletter . |
| July 30-
August 1 | SHAFR's 7th annual conference at American University in Washington, D.C. |
| August 1 | Deadline: materials for September Newsletter . |
| August 16-19 | Meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch of the AHA at the University of Oregon-Eugene. There will be a SHAFR reception. |
| November 1 | Deadline: materials for December Newsletter . |
| November 1-15 | Annual elections for officers of SHAFR. |
| November 11-14 | The 47th annual meeting of the SHA will be held in Louisville with headquarters at the Galt House |
| December 1 | Deadline: nominations for 1982 Bernath memorial lectureship. |
| December 28-30 | The 96th annual convention of the AHA will be held in Los Angeles with headquarters at the Biltmore Hotel. There will be the usual SHAFR activities at this meeting. |

**ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED, OR SCHOLARLY PAPERS
DELIVERED BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR**

(Please limit abstracts to a total of twenty (20) lines of **Newsletter** space, or approximately two hundred (200) words. The desire to accommodate as many contributors as possible, plus the overriding problem of space, makes this restriction necessary. Double space all abstracts, and send them as you would have them appear in print. For abstracts of articles, please supply the date, the volume, the number within the volume, and the pages. It would be appreciated if abstracts were not sent until after a paper has been delivered, or an article has been printed. Also, please do not send abstracts of articles which have appeared in **Diplomatic History**, since all SHAFR members already receive the latter publication).

James I. Matray (New Mexico State University), "America's Reluctant Crusade: Truman's Commitment of Combat Troops in the Korean War," **The Historian**, XLII, 3 (May 1980), 437-455. This article reassesses the Truman Administration's response to the Korean War during the short period between the North Korean attack and the commitment of American ground combat forces. It demonstrates that Truman was initially reluctant to authorize a complete commitment of military power and did not decide to defend South Korea regardless of cost until almost one week after the outbreak of hostilities. American policy prior to the attack explains Truman's unwillingness to immediately dispatch troops, since containment in Korea emphasized the building of the capacity for local self-defense. Restraint characterized American actions during the first days of the war as well, until MacArthur reported that American combat forces alone would prevent North Korean conquest of the entire peninsula. Despite a conviction that the Soviet Union now sought global domination through military means, only South Korea's inability to defend itself destroyed the Administration's confidence in the feasibility of relying on limited means for countering the threat of Soviet expansionism. Subsequently, the United States would rely on military intervention, rather than nationalism and indigenous hostility to Soviet domination, as the best method for preserving peace and stability in the Cold War world.

Mark A. Stoler (University of Vermont), "The American Perception of British Mediterranean Strategy, 1941-1943," paper delivered at the Fourth Naval History Symposium at the U.S. Naval Academy in October, 1979; to be published by the Naval Institute Press in Craig L. Symonds, ed., **New Aspects of Naval History**, in May, 1981. Throughout World War II, American military planners and their chiefs condemned Britain's Mediterranean strategy as a militarily unsound and politically inspired attempt to preserve and expand British postwar imperial interests. This paper attempts to identify the key American planners who verbalized such accusations and to explore their reasoning in depth. Viewing the Mediterranean strategy as part of a political "master

plan" by Britain to retain postwar dominance, the planners responded with a detailed definition of American wartime and postwar goals which heavily influenced their strategic recommendations and their later assessments of the Soviet Union.

"The 'Pacific-First' Alternative in American World War II Strategy," **The International History Review**, Vol. II, no. 3 (July, 1980), 432-452. This article examines the numerous threats by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, most notably during the summer of 1942, to overthrow the "Germany-first" strategy and concentrate the American war effort in the Pacific. It concludes that these threats were quite serious, and not simply bluffs designed to force British acquiescence in American strategic plans for the European theater. Furthermore, despite President Roosevelt's blunt rejection of the Pacific-first alternative in mid-1942, American military planners continued to press for a new set of strategic priorities which would give greater emphasis to the Pacific theater. These efforts led to an indirect but major modification of the Germany-first strategy.

Peter J. Beck (Kingston Polytechnic, England), "From the Geneva Protocol to the Greco-Bulgarian Dispute: the development of the Baldwin Government's policy towards the peacekeeping role of the League of Nations, 1924-1925," **British Journal of International Studies**, 6, 1 (April 1980), 52-68. Although the Baldwin Government, which saw the League not as an autonomous actor but as an instrument of policy to be utilized or not according to the circumstances, exerted a decisive influence upon the League's development as a peacekeeping body during the mid-1920s, it is difficult to isolate British influence from that deriving from other powers, which also attempted to mould the League to their own purposes. In this respect, the USA, while a League "outsider," exercised a significant influence both upon the League itself and upon the League policies of such countries as Britain. As a result, the League was forced to evolve along the traditional diplomatic lines favored by the great powers rather than along the lines of the "new diplomacy" mapped out by its founders, such as Woodrow Wilson.

"Politics and the Olympics: The Lesson of 1924," **History Today**, 30 (July 1980), 7-9. The 1924 Paris Olympics demonstrated that sport can never be isolated from political influences and that the idealism of the Olympic movement failed to match up to the reality of the Paris Games. The divisions of the post-1919 world meant that neither Germany or Russia, both still regarded politically as outcasts, were invited to participate, while extra-sporting considerations are needed to explain the hostility displayed by French spectators and contestants towards British and American participants. Although the relative success of Americans did not help, French spectators clearly identified them with a government that had not only criticized the recent French occupation of the Ruhr but had also refused to guarantee France against a future German invasion.

Professor Beck has also published "Knowledge of the Past that Helps to Shape the Future," **The Times Higher Education Supplement**, 401 (4

July 1980), 10-11 which provides a rationale for history in higher education, while also surveying course developments since 1970.

Of additional interest to SHAFR members: the Historical Association, London has published his **Careers Guide for Graduates in History**.

Norman A. Graebner, "The Mexican War: A Study in Causation," **Pacific Historical Review**, XLIX, No. 3 (August 1980), 405-426. This article poses the question of why historians disagree so sharply on the subject of Mexican War causation when that struggle occurred over a century and a quarter ago and the last important source on the question, the Polk diary, was published seventy years ago. One reason for the disagreement, the article notes, is the tendency of historians to examine war through the views of those involved and thereby ignore questions of choice or avoid approaches to war which might be more universal and thereby might create some degree of consensus. The article suggests that the choices which the United States and Mexico gave to each other in 1846 were not unlike those which confronted this country and its antagonists in most wars which the United States has fought. The author analyzes Mexico's fears and failures largely through the eyes of Charles Bankhead, the British Minister, in whom Mexican officials confided as they sought to escape the pressures exerted by the United States. He concludes that Polk, having rejected the need to withdraw or modify his demands on Mexico, embarked on a policy of escalation which led to war because he always demanded more of Mexico than that country would concede peacefully.

Wilson D. Miscamble (Canberra, Australia), "Harry S. Truman, The Berlin Blockade and the 1948 Election," **Presidential Studies Quarterly**, Vol. X, No. 3 (Summer, 1980), 306-316. This essay examines the nature of the American response to the Soviet blockade of Berlin. It moves beyond an investigation of American decisions and decision-making during the blockade to scrutinize the impact on these decisions of President Truman's concurrent participation in a difficult campaign to win the Democratic Party's presidential nomination and the subsequent contest for the presidency. While the impact of foreign policy on the election of 1948 has been studied, the impact of electoral politics on foreign policy has not. This essay fills this void. It is based upon research in the National Security Council documents in the National Archives, in the Truman papers at the Harry S. Truman Library and in other manuscript collections such as those of Robert Patterson at the Library of Congress and Senator Arthur Vandenberg at the Bentley Historical Library in Ann Arbor.

Glen St. J. Barclay (University of Queensland), "The Uses of Impotence: The Foreign Policy of the Carter Administration," **World Review**, 11: 2 (June, 1980), 55-66. President Carter attempted to apply a form of diplomacy different in principle from the traditionally Machiavellian techniques of his predecessors. He espoused domestic issues like human rights which had normally been regarded as being

outside the scope of diplomatic action. He also repudiated the concept of "linkage," according to which progress in one area of foreign policy might be influenced by the success of negotiations in another area. Foreign governments were baffled by a President who identified the prestige of the United States with goals which he was not prepared to use any form of leverage to attain. Americans themselves were confused by the extraordinary relationship involving the President, Secretary of State Vance, who apparently shared the same values as Carter but did not enjoy his confidence, and National Security Chief Brzezinski, who acted on quite different and more traditional principles but was far more trusted by Carter. The mounting crises of 1980 seemed to call for a less enigmatic and more integrated response from Washington.

Alan K. Henrikson (The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University), "The Geographical 'Mental Maps' of American Foreign Policy Makers," **International Political Science Review/Revue internationale de science politique**, vol. 1, no. 4 (1980), 495-530. Statesmen respond to the world as they perceive and imagine it--which may not be the way the world really is. In the conduct of affairs over vast geographical spaces, such as those appropriate to present-day American foreign policy, the environmental "mental maps," or cognitive frameworks, relied upon may be of critical importance. This article analyzes the mental geography of U.S. officials, in terms of both their "geographical mind," or articulated geographical concepts, and their "geographical field," or intuitively sensed spheres of activity. More specifically, it examines what are called **image-plans**, such as Zbigniew Brzezinski's notion of an "Arc of Crisis" around the Indian Ocean, and **Behavior-spaces**, such as the spatial milieu as experienced by Secretary of State Vance in the course of his diplomatic travel. By bringing to the surface the patterns inherent in both, the article is intended to heighten our understanding of geographical considerations in foreign policy.

PERSONALS

Joan Hoff Wilson (Arizona State U) was elected to the AHA Research Committee in the November 1980 polling.

Roger V. Dingman (U of Southern California) has received a fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities to work on the project. "Peace in the Pacific: Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement, 1941-1952."

Calvin L. Christman (Cedar Valley College, Dallas, Texas) is preparing **A Bibliography of Doctoral Dissertations in United States Foreign Affairs** for Scholarly Resources, Inc. This volume will list dissertations completed from 1938 to 1978, when Christmas began his annual dissertation article in the spring issue of **Diplomatic History**.

Raymond G. O'Connor (Professor Emeritus) lectured at the University of Guam during February on the general theme of "Sea Power in a Multipolar World."

Mark Stoler (University of Vermont) has been awarded a Moody Grant from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation, a Penrose Grant from the American Philosophical Society, and a summer fellowship from the University of Vermont to pursue research on Senator George D. Aiken and American foreign policy from 1941 to 1975. Professor Stoler will be a visiting professor for 1981-82 at the Naval War College, Newport, RI.

Advertisements for the **Public Historian**, the new journal of public history, list as members of their Board of Editors a group of SHAFR members, including Maurice Matloff (Dept. of the Army), Ernest May (Harvard U), Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (City University of New York), and David Trask (Dept. of State).

Randall B. Woods (University of Arkansas) has been awarded a National Endowment of the Humanities Fellowship to study Anglo-American economic and financial relations from 1943-1946. The A.C.L.S. has awarded Woods a Grant-in-Aid to examine the Keynes, Attlee, Bevin, Sinclair, and Swinton papers at Cambridge U.

Thomas H. Hartz (Director of the Woodrow Wilson Birthplace Foundation) has resigned his position to become Director of the Iowa Humanities Board.

Klaus Schwabe (formerly of the University of Frankfurt, Germany) has been awarded the professorship for modern history at the Technical University of Aachen. The Technical University has granted him a six-month sabbatical to enable him to prepare the English translation of his book, **Deutsche Revolution und Wilson-Frieden**.

Robert W. Sellen (Georgia State U) delivered a short series of lectures on "The Origins and Evolution of the Cold War," at the University of San Marcos, Lima, Peru, December 8-12. He repeated one lecture at Villareal National University, Lima, on December 17. (Professor Sellen has prepared comments on these experiences for inclusion in the June **Newsletter**.)

Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern U) retired in August 1980 as William Smith Mason Professor of American History after teaching at Harvard from 1937 to 1948 and at Northwestern since 1948. A past president of SHAFR (1970) and of the OAH (1976-77) he served on the State Department's Advisory Committee on **Foreign Relations** from 1957 to 1964 as one of the first three representatives of the AHA. He is currently chairman of the National Archives Advisory Council, Chairman of the Secretary of the Navy's Advisory Committee on Naval History, a director of the Harry S. Truman Library Institute, and a member of the Editorial Advisory Committee of **The Papers of Woodrow**

Wilson. In September, he was elected a Fellow of the Society of American Archivists.

Warren W. Tozer (Boise State U) has been named the President of the Western Conference of the Association for Asian Studies for 1980-1981.



In Memoriam

James Alport Donovan, Jr., 64, archivist of the International Communication Agency, died of cancer on October 31 in Washington. Donovan worked as a special agent for the FBI during World War II. He translated documents and interviewed German prisoners of war. In 1946 Donovan joined the State Department. While at State, he first worked to bring German students to the U.S. Between 1960 and 1972 he was staff director of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. In 1973 he became assistant director of the history project in the educational and cultural affairs bureau and remained at that post until the ICA was formed.

In 1959 he received the State Department's Meritorious Service Award.

Mr. Donovan has been a SHAFR member for several years.

PUBLICATIONS IN U.S. DIPLOMACY

James W. Cortada (Fords, NJ), ed., **Spain in the Twentieth-Century: Essays on Spanish Diplomacy, 1898-1978.** 1980. Greenwood Press. \$22.95.

Michael J. Devine (Columbus, OH), **John W. Foster: Politics and Diplomacy in the Imperial Era, 1817-1917,** 1980. Ohio University Press. \$14.95.

Norman A. Graebner (U of Virginia), **Roosevelt and the Search for a European Policy, 1937-1939.** 1980. Oxford University Press. 4.50. (This was an Inaugural lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on May 21, 1979).

Lester D. Langley (U of Georgia), **The United States and the Caribbean, 1900-1970.** 1980. Georgia University Press. \$27.50

Frank A. Ninkovich (Flushing, NY), **The Diplomacy of Ideas: U.S. Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950.** 1981. Cambridge University Press. \$24.95.

William W. Stueck, Jr., (U of Georgia), **The Road to Confrontation: American Policy toward China and Korea, 1947-1950.** 1981. University of North Carolina Press. \$20.00 Paper \$10.00.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

Paolo Coletta (U.S. Naval Academy), **A Bibliography of American Naval History**, 1981. Naval Institute Press. \$15.95.

William N. Still, Jr., (Greenville, NC), **Odyssey in Gray: A Diary of Confederate Service, 1863-1865**. 1979. Virginia State Library. **American Sea Power in the Old World: The United States Navy in European and Near Eastern Waters, 1865-1917**. 1980. Greenwood Press. \$22.95.

Ralph E. Weber (Marquette U), **American Dissent from Thomas Jefferson to Cesar Chavez: The Rhetoric of Reform and Revolution**. 1980. Krieger Publication Co. \$6.50. **The Awakening of a Sleeping Giant: Third World Leaders and National Liberation**. 1980. Krieger Publishing Co. \$6.50. **European Ideologies Since 1789: Rebels, Radicals, and Political Ferment**. 1980. Krieger Publishing Co. \$6.50.

George F. Pearce (U of West Florida), **The U.S. Navy in Pensacola: From Sailing Ships to Naval Aviation, 1825-1930**. 1980. University Presses of Florida. \$17.00.

Peter J. Beck (Kingston Polytechnic, England), **Careers Guide for Graduates in History**. 1980. The Historical Association, London. £ 5.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Warren I. Cohen, editor of **Diplomatic History**, reminds SHAFR members that he welcomes essays of an historiographic nature and that review essays on books of more than usual significance are desired also.

All essays submitted to the journal should be in triplicate. If multiple copies are not provided, manuscripts will be processed as money for copying becomes available.

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Kendrick A. Clements (U of South Carolina) is in the process of writing a sketch of Samuel Flagg Bemis for a forthcoming volume on American historians for the **Dictionary of Literary Biography**. Entries in the volumes include basic biographical data and interpretative essays on the authors' works. Clements would appreciate hearing from any of Professor Bemis' former students, friends, or colleagues who may have anecdotes, evaluations, or suggestions that he could use. He can be reached as follows:

Kendrick A. Clements, Dept. of History, U. of So. Carolina,
Columbia, So. Carolina 29208. (803) 777-2679

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Lawrence Kaplan (Kent State U and SHAFR President) announces that the Center for NATO Studies at Kent State is sponsoring a conference. "The Warsaw Pact After Twenty-five Years," on April 22 and 23, 1981. The participants are almost evenly divided between Europeans and Americans and few are strictly historians. Four major topics are scheduled: The Principal Historical-Political Relationships, The Organization, The Weapons, and The Warsaw Pact and NATO.

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CHARLES THOMSON PRIZE

The National Archives and the OAH are again co-sponsoring the Charles Thomson prize in American History. This award for an article on any aspect in American History, carries with it a cash award of \$500 and publication in **Prologue: The Journal of the National Archives**. Essays should be based, in part, on research in the National Archives and/or Presidential Libraries, and should not exceed 7500 words in length. They should be submitted to the editor of **Prologue** on or before August 1, 1981. The OAH Thomson Prize Committee will judge all entries and the winner will be notified by **Prologue's** editor. Publication of the winning essay will be in the spring of 1982 and the prize will be awarded at the annual OAH meeting.

* * * * *

The 16th annual Northern Great Plains History Conference will be held at Sioux Falls, SD, October 8-10, 1981. Interested scholars are invited to submit proposals for papers or complete sessions in all fields of history and history-related disciplines. Potential participants should submit proposals, together with short abstracts of their papers, prior to June 1, 1981, to James E. Spaulding, Department of History, University of South Dakota, Vermillion, SD, 57069.

SCHEDULE OF SHAFR ACTIVITIES AT THE OAH

- Council Meeting, Wednesday, April 1
Cadillac Room, Level 5, Detroit Plaza 8:00-11:00 p.m.
- Reception (cash bar), Thursday, April 2
Marquette Room, Level 5, Detroit Plaza 5:30-7:30 p.m.
- Luncheon, Friday, April 3
Cabot Room, Level 4, Detroit Plaza
- Burton Spivak (Bates College), winner of the
1981 Bernath Memorial Lecture Award, will
deliver the luncheon address 12:00-2:00 p.m.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL LECTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship was established in 1976 through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and is administered by a special committee of SHAFR. The Bernath Lecture is the feature at the official luncheon of the Society, held during the OAH convention in April of each year

DESCRIPTION AND ELIGIBILITY: The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address, delivered at the annual meeting with the AHA, but is restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer is expected to concern himself/herself not specifically with his/her own research interests, but with broad issues of importance to students of American foreign relations. The award winner must be under forty-one (41) years of age.

PROCEDURES: The Bernath Lectureship Committee is now soliciting nominations for the 1982 award from members of the Society, agents, publishers, or members of any established history, political science, or journalism organization. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vitae, if available, should reach the Committee no later than December 1, 1980. The Chairman of the Committee, and the person to whom nominations should be sent, is Dr. Keith L. Nelson, Department of History, University of California (Irvine), Irvine, California 92717.

HONORARIUM: \$300.00 with publication of the lecture assured in the SHAFR Newsletter.

AWARD WINNERS

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1977 | Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute) |
| 1978 | David S. Patterson (Colgate) |
| 1979 | Marilyn B. Young (Michigan) |
| 1980 | John L. Gaddis (Ohio U) |
| 1981 | Burton Spivak (Bates College) |

**THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE FOR THE
BEST SCHOLARLY ARTICLE IN U.S. DIPLOMATIC
HISTORY DURING 1979**

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Award for scholarly articles in American foreign affairs was set up in 1976 through the kindness of the young Bernath's parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, and it is administered through selected personnel of SHAFR. The objective of the award is to identify and to reward outstanding research and writing by the younger scholars in the area of U.S. diplomatic relations.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to the author of any article upon any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1979. The article must be among the author's first five (5) which have seen publication. Membership in SHAFR or upon a college/university faculty is not a prerequisite for entering the competition. Authors must be under thirty-five (35) years of age, or within five (5) years after receiving the doctorate, at the time the article was published. Previous winners of the S. L. Bernath book award are ineligible.

PROCEDURES: Articles shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each article (preferably reprints) should be sent to the chairman of the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee by January 15, 1980. The Chairman of that Committee for 1979 is Dr. Arnold A. Offner, Department of History, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$200.00. If two (2) or more authors are considered winners, the prize will be shared. The name of the successful writer(s) will be announced, along with the name of the victor in the Bernath book prize competition, during the luncheon for members of SHAFR, to be held at the annual OAH convention, meeting in April, 1980, at San Francisco.

AWARD WINNERS

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|------|--|
| 1977 | John C. A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.) |
| 1978 | Michael H. Hunt (Yale) |
| 1979 | Brian L. Villa (U of Ottawa, Canada) |
| 1980 | James I. Matray (U of Texas, Arlington)
David A. Rosenberg (U of Chicago) |

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITION FOR 1980

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition was initiated in 1972 by Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in memory of their late son. Administered by SHAFR, the purpose of the competition and the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing of a lengthy nature by young scholars in the field of U.S. diplomacy.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: the prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1979. It must be the author's first or second book. Authors are not required to be members of SHAFR, nor do they have to be professional academicians.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. Walter F. LaFeber, Department of History Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853. The works must be received not later than February 1, 1980.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$500.00. If two (2) or more writers are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be April, 1980, in San Francisco.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

1972	Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento) Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
1973	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1974	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1975	Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire) Stephen E. Pelz (U of Massachusetts-Amherst)
1976	Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
1977	Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
1978	James R. Leutze (North Carolina)
1979	Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston, MA)
1980	Michael Schaller (U of Arizona)

SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Founded in 1967. Chartered in 1972

PRESIDENT: Lawrence S. Kaplan, Department of History, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio 44240.

VICE-PRESIDENT: Lawrence E. Gelfand, Department of History, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52243.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY-TREASURER: Gary R. Hess, Department of History, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, Ohio 43403.

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CHAIRMAN, MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE: Ralph E. Weber, Department of History, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233.

CHAIRMAN, NOMINATIONS COMMITTEE: Samuel F. Wells, Jr., Woodrow Wilson Center, Smithsonian Building 442, Washington, D.C. 20560.

CHAIRMAN, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS COMMITTEE: Wayne S. Cole, Department of History, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742

MEMBERSHIP: Anyone interested in U.S. diplomatic history is invited to become a member of SHAFR. Annual dues are \$8.50, payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Fees for students, unemployed members, and retired members are \$5.00 per year, while institutional affiliations are \$30.00. Life memberships are \$125.00. The dues for institutions which wish to receive only the **Newsletter** are \$5.00 a year. In the case of memberships by a husband-wife team the dues of one of them shall be one-half that of the regular rate.

MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in August. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZES: The Society administers three awards a year, all of them in honor of the late Stuart L. Bernath and all of them financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California. The details of each of these awards are given under the appropriate headings of each issue of the **Newsletter**.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors two printed works of a quarterly nature, the **Newsletter**, and **Diplomatic History**, a journal. All members receive these publications.

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