

The Society for Historians of American
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SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

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MEMBERSHIP: Anyone interested in U. S. diplomatic history is invited to become a member of SHAFR. Annual dues are \$12.50, payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Fees for students are \$6.00, for retired members are \$8.00, and institutional affiliations are \$30.00. Life memberships are \$175.00. The dues for institutions which wish to receive only the **Newsletter** are \$5.00 a year. In the case of membership by a husband-wife team dues, one of them shall be one-half that of the regular price.

MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in August. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZES: The Society administers three awards a year, all of them in honor of the late Stuart L. Bernath and all of them financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California. The details of each of these awards are given under the appropriate headings of each issue of the **Newsletter**.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors two printed works of a quarterly nature, the **Newsletter**, and **Diplomatic History**, a journal. All members receive these publications.

This critique of Alexander DeConde's text, **A History of American Foreign Policy** by Richard Welch, is the second in the **Newsletter** series. The first critique was Warren F. Kimball's treatment of Thomas A. Bailey's text in the June 1980 **SHAFR Newsletter**. Reactions to Professor Welch's comments will be most happily received (and aired).

-- the editor --

DECONDE REDISCOVERED

by

Richard E. Welch Jr., Lafayette College

The long-standing question of whether to forswear or adopt the textbook is for a teacher of American foreign policy a secondary question. The initial concern is course possession. At the first two institutions where I taught, the instructor of U. S. diplomatic history was the department chairperson. Both used **Bailey** and neither individual planned to relinquish course or text. When I joined the faculty of Lafayette College "foreign policy" was adjudged the possession of the Political Science department, and arguments in behalf of its identification with the discipline and department of History had to await acquisition of the modest power base known as tenure. By the mid-Sixties I had gained permission of the Curriculum Committee to offer a one-semester course in the History of American Foreign Policy and by the early Seventies--when I was a member of said committee--permission to offer a two-semester course, breaking at the year 1900.

When offering diplomatic history in a condensed one-semester format, I used at different times the short and excellent texts of Wayne Cole and Robert Ferrell, in conjunction with a variety of Reserve Desk readings. With the possession of a two-semester course, however, I decided--in 1971--that if America was coming apart, Welch should at least have the courage to discard the crutch of the textbook. It was a time when paperback series on diplomatic problems, turning points, and crises were in abundance and when moral standards were low in the campus industry of xerox reproduction of material current, relevant, and cost-free. Six paperbacks were assigned for purchase in the first semester, seven in the second, and students informed in lordly fashion that for those who felt the need, several textbooks had been placed on Library Reserve, including the recently published second edition of Alexander DeConde's **A History of American Foreign Policy**. Students who craved to know what had happened between the problem paperback on the Monroe Doctrine and the xerox handout on Polk's Oregon Diplomacy had the instructor's permission to "consult one of the textbooks."

Two years ago, the instructor of diplomatic history at Lafayette College returned to the textbook. The decision was neither a victory for the Moral Majority nor a symbol of the browning of America.

Inspirations were more personal and commercial than national and political. On the commercial front, there was the fact that the costcutting anxieties of publishers were generating a series of messages from the campus bookstore manager that various paperbacks were now "out of stock" or "out of print." Probably more important, however, was the realization that the course lectures had over the years become increasingly thematic, even idiosyncratic. As I had become more interested in the comparative influence of ideas and special interests in the shaping of American foreign policy, the lectures for History 61-62 had taken the form of a running dialogue wherein the instructor took issue--to his perpetual advantage--with the theories of various schools, orthodox, revisionist, post-revisionist. After reading a final exam where the student expressed an admirable knowledge of the conflicting emphases of the Realists and the Wisconsin School but insisted that James Blaine was host to the Washington Conference of 1921, I decided that it was time to consider revising the lectures modestly and the assigned reading more radically. At least one of the textbooks should come out of the closet of the Reserve Desk.

This decision required in turn the skimming of several texts and a reasonably careful reading of three. Textbook prices had jumped perceptibly, and if this was to be a required purchase, it must be seen by the Lafayette student as worth the potential sacrifice of an extra party week-end.

The fact that in 1978 Charles Scribner's Sons had seen fit to issue a new edition of DeConde in two paperback volumes was not irrelevant to my selection, but it was ancillary to a conviction that for a two-semester, upper-level course in the history of American Foreign Policy, DeConde offered the best balance of chronological narrative and policy analysis. The experience of the past two years has convinced me that I made a good decision.

It is difficult to talk about "balance" without sounding like the blurb of a dust jacket, but with each rereading I am increasingly persuaded that herein lies the chief strength of DeConde's **A History of American Foreign Policy**. It is not the textbook with the liveliest prose style nor the textbook with the most pronounced judgmental or thematic unity. It is a text with an excellent "balance" of chronology, geography, detail, and interpretation.

DeConde offers a necessary correction to the chronological bias of some historians and most students who would emphasize the post-World War II period of American diplomatic history and view the previous 170 years as but a prelude to the errors and ambitions of American globalism. DeConde gives as much attention to the diplomacy of George Washington as to that of Harry Truman, a necessary balance for those who would understand the expansionist ambitions as well as the traditions of United States diplomacy. In similar fashion, Manifest Destiny is analyzed within the context of the fears and hubris of the 1840s and not as a premonitory foreshadowing of the market ambitions of the 1890s or the diplomatic objectives of NSC-68.

A similar balance is observed in geographical coverage. Volume I

necessarily emphasizes Anglo-American relations and power relationships in Europe and the opportunities they afforded United States expansion in North America. Volume II gives increasing attention to events in Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. Its comparative neglect of Africa is more the fault of American diplomacy than its historian.

Perhaps a more difficult balance is that achieved between the detailed description of diplomatic events and the analysis of broad policy. On occasion, one wishes that DeConde would expand his comments on the general objectives of American foreign policy in successive time frames, and further analyze their implicit and explicit ambiguities, but one's admiration for his selection of narrative detail remains constant.

Admiration for his refusal to take a dogmatic position respecting the comparative influence of corporate capitalism, an elitist bureaucracy, public opinion, pressure groups, ethnic divisions, and ideological sympathies on the evolution of American foreign policy is obviously dependent on one's own convictions respecting the existing of a single over-arching pattern of explanation. Refusal to accept a single interpretation of foreign policy motivation may be judged a cop-out. I consider it an additional example of objectivity and balance.

I have found that some students are impatient with DeConde's insistence on the complexity of American diplomatic objectives and their inspiration. His emphasis on the central role of power in international relations is hedged by his convictions respecting the importance of partisan divisions and domestic pressures and the sporadic influence of humanitarian goals and moral crusades. His recognition of the influence of economic factors and depiction of successive examples of U.S. economic imperialism is matched by a conviction that foreign policy is more often a product of international power politics than the class divisions of a capitalist political economy. While some students find here an invitation to individual meditation and class debate, lazier ones wish he would make up their mind.

DeConde's refusal to enroll unreservedly in any single school of historical interpretation is purposeful, and there is always the danger in an effort to be judicious and dispassionate that one will also be bland and boring. DeConde avoids that danger with rare exceptions. He is not averse to offering critical judgments, though he often offers them in the collective third person. These judgments make clear that DeConde is much closer to the realist than the idealist position and denies that economic diplomacy is a synonym for foreign policy. In his attention to the correlation of means and ends as in his emphasis on national security and the distinction between core interests and peripheral concerns, DeConde's opinions bear similarity to those of the late Walter Lippmann. He is more concerned, however, with the historical roots of foreign policy themes and concepts and less censorious of moralism and the rhetoric of mission. Like Lippmann, however, DeConde is prepared to attribute the failures of American foreign policy makers to erroneous assessment of the national interest rather than conspiracy, duplicity, or class status.

In insufficient support of these generalizations, I would offer the examples of DeConde's judgments respecting the Mexican-American War and Franklin Roosevelt's Japanese diplomacy.

DeConde sees Polk's Mexican diplomacy as a combination of continentalist ambition and sincere if exaggerated security fears respecting British ambitions in Texas and California. Polk's tactics were those of intrigue and sabre rattling, but there were justifiable grievances on both sides and Polk was neither a tool of the Slavocracy nor a Manifest Destiny ideologue. On the "flimsy pretext of unpaid claims and a rebuffed diplomat," Polk was prepared to ask Congress for a declaration of war before he received word of the clash at the Rio Grande, but he would have preferred to gain his territorial ambitions by means of diplomatic bluff and coercion, and his greed for territorial acquisition was fundamentally rooted in a concern for the future growth and security of the American Republic.

Nearly a century later, Franklin Roosevelt sought the surrender of Japan without war. Roosevelt did not seek to provoke the Japanese to attack the United State in order to enter the war against Hitler "by the back door." He wanted peace in the Pacific, but peace on his own terms. Those terms required Japanese acceptance of Chinese territorial integrity and the principles of the Open Door. Not only did Roosevelt see "the problem of China as pivotal in the relations with Japan," but he was increasingly concerned to display a united front with Chiang Kai-shek and with Britain. Hoping that a policy of escalating economic sanctions would persuade the Japanese to break free of the Tripartite Pact and forego their hegemonic ambitions in China and Southeast Asia, he displayed little knowledge of the security interests and psychology of the Japanese and a growing determination to promote American principles and interests in Asia. His diplomacy failed to match goals and means, but it was essentially the product of his decision that the success of Japanese militarism posed a threat to the national interest of the United States as well as the rhetoric of the Open Door doctrine. By August, 1941, it was clear that neither side would yield, and Roosevelt's rejection of Konoye's proposal for leadership conference and the decision to recognize Chiang's objections to a **modus vivendi** explain the initiation of the Japanese-American War, not its causation. "No available evidence shows that (Roosevelt)...maneuvered the Japanese into attacking, but he did leave the initiative for war in their hands so that they would be seen as the aggressors."

One need not argue with these judgments to recognize that if they are balanced, they are not bland. At Lafayette College they have provided the opportunity for class discussions that deserve the catalogue adjective, "lively."

The instructor of diplomatic history at Lafayette now demands the purchase of a textbook and the textbook is DeConde. With David Long's new edition of Bartlett's Documents, the Merli & Wilson collection of biographical essays (**Makers of American Diplomacy**), and a half-dozen Library Reserve selections, it provides a sufficient and satisfactory reading list. Or, at the very least, a foundation and correction for the

lectures, which tend to become more personal and dogmatic with each passing year.

INNOCENTS ABROAD: HOW TO LOOK AT CHINA

by

**John Allphin Moore, Jr., (California State
U — Pomona) and John Edwin Murphy**

In the late 13th century, Europe marveled at the tales of traveler Marco Polo, who revealed to his world the dazzling riches and advanced technology of the Mongol-ruled land of Cathay. Europe listened enthralled and then sent forth its merchants and missionaries. China nevertheless continued to remain remote from the West, both physically and culturally.

Marco Polo was but one of the better known tourists to delight the Christian world with engrossing reports of the East. In the twentieth century, America repeated the earlier exercise. She sent forth her missionaries and merchants to seek a common link between the world's largest nation and the world's richest. The early twentieth century travelers sought markets for our goods and converts for our religion, believing that both were available in abundance. As a result China came to assume a special place in the American mind. It was as though our nation had become special protector of the world's largest nation against its predators, particularly Japan. But following the Second World War and the defeat of Japan, the paternalistic experience soured as civil war continued to wrack China and as Americans sensed new and ominous dangers in the world. Mao's victory in 1949 not only seemed a repudiation of American friendship but resulted in China's "falling" -it was said- to the hostile camp in a bi-polar cold war that was to characterize the middle decades of this century.

In speculating about the recent improvement in relations between this country and the People's Republic of China, Americans often reflect upon how the Chinese have dramatically changed their minds about America--from an implacable, brain-controlled hatred to an apparently genuine friendliness. How, we wonder, could a whole people change so quickly and so completely? The speculation, of course, neglects the equally fascinating question of how and why Americans have changed their minds about China.

Indeed, Americans have viewed the world's most populous country in a number of different ways. From 1949 to 1971, China was an evil and dangerous place for America. After Richard Nixon's visit, however, our **bete jaune** rather abruptly became a pacific, friendly giant. Reporters as different as journalist Joseph Alsop and liberal economist John Kenneth Galbraith returned impressed, and at the decade's end, Robert Wesson of the conservative Hoover Institution summed up the metamorphosis in an article entitled "China: Suddenly It's Spring."

II

In part, the changing attitude of Americans appeared to be a response to an explosive new genre of literature - the China travel diary - provided

by Americans from all walks of life, including journalism, politics, academia, and the arts, among others.

The first post-Nixon barrage of travel books left readers with a sense of euphoria about this rediscovered giant. We were told that China was characterized by a new relaxed mood, brought on by a Maoist-inspired self confidence. Indeed, the spirit of the Chinese people was, we read, higher than ever. And no wonder: China's agrarian working class, over 80% of the population, lived under greatly improved social and economic conditions, with more consumer goods than in the past and increased agricultural output; meantime illiteracy had been erased, equality among the sexes achieved, and excellent cuisine made available to all. There was, in addition, a growing pride in craftsmanship. Virtually all observers found a "new" China of excitement, friendliness, and unified commitment. All this was due in large part to Mao's government, which, from the point of view of the Chinese (according to geologist J. Tuzo Wilson) was probably the best government that country had had in centuries.

By the late 1970's there was, as may have been expected, reaction to this euphoria. Critics such as Simon Leys and David Finkelstein probed what they described as the darker side of Maoist experimentation. They underscored the economic backwardness of the PRC, the persisting poverty, particularly in the countryside, and hinted at an ominous unemployment problem. In addition, these observers found fault in China's denial of freedoms taken for granted in the West, in her repression of dissent, and in an aesthetic callousness that led the Maoist state to replace priceless ancient architecture with heavy artless monuments to the current regime.

Recently, more balanced reports have attempted to weigh evidence with greater care. Ross Terrill, Paul Varg, Orville Schell, and Arthur Miller have offered praise where they found it due while maintaining a healthy skepticism.

These essayists share in common having been American tourists to the PRC. They went to China to look and to be told. What they saw and how they saw it are important. What they tell us, and how we respond to their reports, affects America's views of China as well as America's views of her place in the world. While this may seem less important than the future configuration of power relations among nations, in fact, Americans' perceptions--of themselves in the world and of as important a country as China--may prove crucial in influencing the role to be played by America in the international community.

Thus we should approach with caution and seriousness the task of placing an American perception on China. We are advised and humbled by Arthur Miller, who said "only a fool knows China quickly." In his excellent book, **Chinese Encounters**, the playwright approvingly quotes a long time American resident of China: "The visitor who stays a month writes a book, the one who stays three months does an article, and those who move in for years never write anything."

How then should we look at China? We could measure her against her own history. That is, are the Chinese better or worse off than at times in their past? But Americans for the most part are limited in making such appraisals by linguistic deficiencies and cultural separation. Should we then measure the country against the Mao-promised utopia? Or against the rule of the Gang of Four? Or what? Of course, American travelers understandably tend to make judgments in terms of their own country. We view China through our own eyes and preconceptions, and there are peculiarly American traits that affect that view.

To clarify the American predicament in looking at China it might be useful to consider four of the most common items to be highlighted by American travelers: the Great Wall, the burial site of Shi Huangdi (China's first emperor), the Summer Palace outside Beijing, and the Cultural Revolution.

Linked together by Shi Huangdi in the third century B. C., the Great Wall is perhaps the world's greatest public work. As a practical matter, aside from the labor of untold tens of thousands, it was and is superfluous. As a symbol, it indicates inwardness, protectiveness, isolation, and an extraordinary desire and ability to do what is necessary to keep out the intruder. Yet China's future seems to rest on two alien, Western influences. The first of course is Marxism, however modified. The second is technology and industrialization.

The more than 7000 lifesize terracotta figures found in 1974 guarding Shi Huangdi's tomb near Xian have been declared the most amazing archeological find of the twentieth century. This is as grandiose and imperial a gesture as the world has ever encountered. To witness these life-like figures, column after column, buried upright for over two thousand years, is a truly awesome experience. Here again the duality of China's evolution is brought home: an artistic and logistical enterprise of staggering proportions is simultaneously the result of egocentrism or personality cultism carried to its most extreme. The Summer Palace dates from the 12th century but was embellished in its present form by the Manchu Emperors. By standing high on a manmade hill overlooking the Palace and realizing that one's point of view comes from the earth removed to create the Kungming Lake below, the incredulous visitor cannot help but wonder who the men and women were who performed the necessary labor--without the benefit of machinery. Did they volunteer? Were they paid more than a subsistence? Did they labor out of a religious or communal or imperial passion? Did they speculate on the relationship between the physical costs and the sensual benefits of their efforts?

Another item commonly noted by travelers to China is the Cultural Revolution. By all accounts it was an exceptionally radical attempt at total cultural and economic homogenization. Its goal was to obliterate differences between those of the city and those of the country, scholars and illiterates, specialists and the inexpert. It is not without some irony that we in the West should notice how closely the Cultural Revolution adhered to a belief in the infinite malleability of human nature - a belief accepted by much of modern Western social science.

As we reflect on these four Chinese enterprises we are wise to think for a moment of our own history, so as to gain our bearings as we evaluate the encounter of such divergent cultures. A fantasy, one might say, of Karl Marx was the triumph of machines and medicine, resulting in the liberation of the body from alienated labor, perhaps even from death itself. Such liberation would be manifested in the harmony of technology, the individual and society. The good fortune among many good fortunes of America was the avoidance — or nearly so — of the feudal state. The reasons for this are many; the most obvious is that the republic was born on the threshold of the industrial revolution. No less obvious is the fact that the animating principles of the American regime were rooted in a concept of natural rights — the notion that the individual precedes society and that a tension always exists between individuals and the government. Slavery died in America in part at least because of two elements of the Marxist fantasy — machinery and a notion of equality. The horrors of American slavery and its subsequent results notwithstanding, there seems little in America that can be compared to nearly a billion people bent to the earth and the grand projects we have above described. One is forced to consider what China would be like if the passion and resources these projects consumed had been directed to a more egalitarian relief of the human estate. Arthur Miller's ultimate question of China is whether the Maoist revolution, which indeed introduced such egalitarianism, can simultaneously tolerate and even encourage individual expression and other signs and symbols of liberty as well. How one answers from an American perspective depends in part on how one distinguishes between the lasting and the ephemeral in America.

IV

In China, foreign travelers frequently visit calligraphy classes, there to view the outstanding students of the school. In America we might expect such a class to contain young people studying computers or physics. For the Chinese student, stylized calligraphy is a beautiful and rewarding art form. Learning it forges a link with a rich culture of the past. But it does not provide training for modernization. Does the Chinese youth learn calligraphy rather than, let us say modern physics, because this is one of the subjects best taught in China, or because there is no real choice for the outstanding student between calligraphy and physics? American students, likewise perhaps lacking choice, study to live in a technological society.

The dilemma and apparent ambivalence of the Chinese regarding modernization may of course be explained by a lack of capital, or by the serious logistical problems of transferring an enormous agrarian population into an urban and technological setting. But part of the ambivalence may also have to do with something else. A traditional,

indeed feudal, society has brought coherence, longevity and a certain aesthetic harmony to Chinese culture. The alternative — an urban, technological society — has brought the United States power and wealth, but also problems. Long ago, as Americans measure time, Alexis de Tocqueville anticipated the day when most Americans would acquire “sufficient education and fortune to satisfy their own wants.” When that happened, he predicted, individuals would owe nothing to anyone, expect nothing from anyone; “they acquire the habit of always considering themselves as standing alone, and they are apt to imagine that their whole destiny is in their own hands.” Thus the American, continued Tocqueville, would forget his ancestors, hide his descendents and separate his contemporaries from himself, being confined “entirely within the solitude of his own heart.”

It is arguable whether such rootlessness exists on a large scale today in America, but it is an alleged flaw in our society noted by critics from Tocqueville's time to our own.

When Arthur Miller engaged his Chinese hosts in a discussion about the meaning of life, he encountered mystification and a hint of irritation, and then was told, matter of factly, that the meaning of life was to work to improve one's country. John Kennedy's inaugural address notwithstanding, Americans appear to view the question in much more individual terms. The glory of China may rest on the commitment of the individual to the whole, and the glory of America may rest on the commitment to the individual, which creates the rewards of free inquiry but, as Tocqueville saw, the detriments of selfishness and the anxiety of rootlessness.

The question is not how or when China will become like America, but whether China, with the glorious baggage of her past and the Mao injunction for perpetual revolution, can accept the motives and methods of the twentieth century. While we continue to look at China, she may well benefit by looking carefully at America.

FURTHER READING

Since the opening of China to Americans in the early 1970's there have been numerous published reports of travelers returning from there. The following bibliography in no way exhausts the material available but includes several of the writings referred to in the foregoing essay.

Allen, Steve. **Explaining China**. New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1980.

The entertainer reports, in diary form, on his third trip to the PRC.

*Alsop, Joseph. Bi-weekly columns in the Los Angeles **Times**, December 1, 1972 — January 17, 1973. These syndicated columns by one of the Cold War's strongest supporters influenced the change in attitudes on China by Americans. Alsop, a long time critic of China,

seemed mesmerized by the Chinese. Virtually all of the positive themes regarding the Chinese government and people appear in these essays.

Cleveland, Harlan. **China Diary**. Washington, D. C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1976. Aspen director Cleveland visited China in October, 1975. He was impressed, finding that everyone worked, that the status of women was significantly raised, that agricultural production was up and that China was organized for the future.

Dedman, Emmett. **China Journal**. Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973. Dedman accompanied a group from the American Society of Newspaper Editors. He found moderates now fashionable in that country, China backward but changing rapidly, agricultural production high, industrialization low, and people friendly.

*Finkelstein, David. "A Reporter at Large (China)." **The New Yorker**, September 10, 1979. This is a devastating critique of post Maoist China. Finkelstein, who avoided the typical tourist's route and took a boat trip up the Yangtze, reports numerous faults of the Chinese state and questions the euphoria of earlier visitor's reports.

*Galbraith, John Kenneth. **A China Passage**. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1973. Written in diary form, this is a witty, positive little book by a popular economist and sometime diplomat.

Kraft, Joseph. **The Chinese Difference**. New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972. The title has a double meaning: it refers to the difference in international politics caused by the Nixon visit to Beijing as well as to the different China today as contrasted to the past. Kraft traveled to China with President Nixon in 1972 and then stayed on for an extended visit. He is journalistically analytical in speaking of the "Chinese Miracle" and the "New Maoist Man."

*Leys, Simon. **Chinese Shadows**. New York: Viking, Penguin, 1977. Leys is a pseudonym for the Belgian Pierre Ryckmans. Although not an American, Leys' biting criticism has had some influence on American thinking. He condemns thought control in China, the disrespect shown for ancient art and architecture, and maintains that the current regime disallows real friendships developing between foreigners and Chinese.

*MacLaine, Shirley. **You Can Get There From Here**. New York: Norton, 1975. This upbeat book and the public appearances by actress MacLaine helped create a positive image of China in the United States.

*Miller, Arthur and Inge Morath. **Chinese Encounters**. New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1979. This is one of the most thoughtful and penetrating analyses of modern China by an American traveler. The book is enhanced by sensitive photography.

Reston, James. **New York Times**, July 28, and August 4, 1971. These are

positive reports that speak of the youthful activity and personal friendliness of the Chinese.

Salisbury, Charlotte Y. **China Diary**. New York: Waller and Co., 1973. Another diary which, while noting the conformity and lack of certain freedoms in China, speaks of the spirit of the people, the clean streets and the medical care for all, characteristics of China that could well improve our country.

Salisbury, Harrison E. **To Peking — And Beyond: A Report on the New Asia**. New York: Quadrangle, 1973. Sprightly written by a prize winning journalist, this book emphasizes the complexity of China while noting the well worn theme of its “newness,” and lauding the spirit of the people.

*Schell, Orville. **In the People’s Republic**. New York: Random House, 1977; and “**Watch Out for the Foreign Guests**”; **China Encounters the West**. New York: Pantheon Books, 1980. Schell has worked in a factory and in the countryside and has interviewed Chinese in the more inaccessible recesses of urban areas. He offers useful insights and some concern at the impact of western ideas on Chinese culture.

Topping, Audrey. **Dawn Wakes in the East**. New York: Harper and Row, 1973. Topping’s 1971 trip was her third to China. The book is sensitively written and contains beautiful photographs.

*Terrill, Ross. **800,000,000; The Real China**. New York: Dell, 1972; “China Enters the 1980’s,” **Foreign Affairs**, 58 (Spring 1980), 920-35; “Peking: Waiting to be Westernized,” **The Atlantic**, August, 1980, pp. 8-16. Terrill, an Australian teaching and living in the United States, has made several trips to China and has reported extensively on his travels. These are balanced, careful assessments of conditions in China and relations with the West.

*Tuchman, Barbara W. **Notes From China**. New York: Collier Books, 1972. Historian Tuchman is hard on aspects of Chinese life — relations between the sexes, conformity in dress and thought, China policy toward Israel — but otherwise echoes other early positive reports, writing of the “new” person, the sense of purpose, economic security and the well being of the people.

*Varg, Paul A. “Sino-American Relations Past and Present,” **Diplomatic History**, IV (Spring 1980), 101-111. A historian who has studied early 20th century American policy in China, Varg, following his visit, carefully assessed both China’s weaknesses and strengths.

Wesson, Robert, “China: Suddenly It’s Spring.” Los Angeles **Times**, September 5, 1978, Part II, p. 7. The title speaks for itself.

*Wilson, J. Tuzo. **Unglazed China**. New York: Saturday Review Press, 1973. Wilson, a geologist, had visited in 1958 and returned in 1971. This positive report concluded that, at least from the point of view of the Chinese, Mao’s government had been the best in a long time, bringing to the country a sense of national pride, an end to poverty, and a condition of equality among the people.

REMARKS FOR THE BICENTENNIAL LECTURE SERIES,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE MAY 1, 1981:
WOODROW WILSON AND THE COORDINATION OF
FORCE AND DIPLOMACY

by

David F. Trask, Office of the Historian

Let me begin with a generalization that I will treat hereafter as a given. The coordination of force and diplomacy, I would argue, is at the center of all international statecraft, its abiding **Leitmotiv**. Clausewitz, the German military philosopher, perhaps stated the nature of this relationship in its most cogent form. Designs for the application of force, which he called strategy, must be the handmaidens of larger political objectives or aims, which he called policy. The most critical aspect of international behavior is the process of deciding how to use the various elements of national power--political, economic, psychological, and military--in seeking a favorable outcome of diplomacy.*

So far I am largely reiterating generally accepted theory, but let me extend the point a bit further into somewhat less well-understood territory. Geoffrey Blainey, an Australian who has written about the causes of war, has commented on the relationship between policy and strategy as follows: "A government's short-term aims and its assessment of its ability to implement them are always in some kind of harmony." Blainey continues: "This harmony is hardly surprising; a nation's policies and its perceptions of its own power are products of the same minds." The question at issue is not **whether** statesmen concern themselves with the relations between force and diplomacy. They do so **ipso facto**. The question is how effectively they deal with those relations.

Americans still do not always accept this intimate connection--this "harmony," as Blainey puts it. We have a tendency to think that it is possible to ignore the relationship between force and diplomacy. Recently I read a transcript of an interview with one of the oldest living foreign service officers, Cornelius Engert, whose active duty began in 1913 and ended in 1946--neatly encompassing the great international war that took place in two phases between 1914 and 1945. The interviewer, John Harter, asked Engert's opinion of how well the United States coordinated force and diplomacy at the time of the First World War. Engert was of the opinion that the United States performed this task poorly or not at all. This outcome, he continued, occurred because "our military wasn't interested in diplomacy, and our diplomacy wasn't interested in the military." Germany, he noted, worked differently. "The Germans always combined military power with the aims of diplomacy, because they realized, from the word go, that without power, diplomacy was of no use."

Engert was correct--as far as he went--but he didn't go far enough. On

the eve of the First World War the dogma in the United States was that the military establishment should leave policy to the civilians and that the civilians should leave warfare to the military. Hence neither the Department of State nor the War and Navy Departments were geared institutionally to concentrate on the coordination of force and diplomacy. What Engert failed to grasp was that the responsibility for activity of this nature--the coordination of force and diplomacy--rests preeminently with the President. He is, of course, not simply the chief executive. He is also the commander-in-chief. Lower levels of executive responsibility in the American government, may or may not participate in the coordination of force and diplomacy. As of 1914 they weren't very much involved. We have to remember that active American involvement in world affairs was still a novelty. Across the nineteenth century after the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, and most particularly after the American Civil War, the United States enjoyed a remarkable margin of safety in the world. We encountered serious threats from abroad only rarely, and were able to concentrate almost entirely on domestic development. The prospect of military episodes seemed so remote that we were able to allow the armed forces to sink to low levels in numbers and competence. When problems arose, as they did on occasion, Presidents frequently handled them by themselves. During the short war with Spain in 1898, for example, President William McKinley made exceptionally sound decisions as he coordinated America's war aims and military operations, but he performed this important task with little help from the military and with even less from the Department of State. The Secretary of State at the time, John Sherman of Ohio, had become senile. He was replaced only after the beginning of the war.

What would happen, however, if the free security of the latter nineteenth century dissipated, especially as the United States became more and more involved in world politics? This was the situation that materialized rather suddenly during the early twentieth century--but most importantly in 1914, at the onset of the First World War.

Americans, unlike Europeans and peoples elsewhere in the world, have never fully appreciated the importance of the conflict that broke out in 1914. The First World War was the preeminent event of the twentieth century. It transformed everything. It established the agenda of world politics for the remainder of the century to date. This fact, gospel elsewhere in the world, is still not fully accepted in the United States because of our preoccupation with the Second World War, which seemed to most Americans to have affected their lives more than the earlier struggle.

A young British woman, with the interesting name of Vera Brittain (can we refer to her as true Brit?) captured the importance of the war during its earliest months in a war diary quoted in her remarkable book **Testament of Youth**. You may have seen a dramatization of this work on PBS recently. The book itself is about the transformation wrought by the war in both personal and international life. Vera Brittain wrote: "It seems very hard that we should be the generation to suffer the war,

though I suppose it is very splendid too, and is making us better and wiser and deeper men and women than our ancestors ever were or our descendants ever will be. It seems to me that the War will make a big division of 'before' and 'after' in the history of the world, almost if not quite as big as the 'B.C.' and 'A.D.' division made by the birth of Christ." Here was a remarkably accurate prophetic vision.

Let me also quote the aforementioned F.S.O., Cornelius Engert, thinking back to the moment before the Great War. When John Harter asked him about his thoughts on the question of peace and war as he entered the American Foreign Service in 1913, Engert responded: "I wasn't then thinking of war--on the contrary--when I was an undergraduate we were only thinking of peace--that was the great difference so far as the attitude of America was concerned. We weren't interested in war--we had no intention of entering any war." What happened thereafter? I quote Engert again, "... since World War I, we have become war-minded, because, for the first time in our history, we were in danger of being defeated, in both world wars . . . We took life much more seriously after the First World War, and the tragic and distressing thing to most of us who were old enough to realize what was happening was that we didn't seem to pay the slightest attention between the two World Wars to the fact that another one was inevitable."

I have now made two observations--the first about the importance of coordinating force and diplomacy and the second about the extraordinary impact of the First World War. Let me now move on to the question of Woodrow Wilson, and his statecraft during the great transformation of 1914-1918. How did he cope with this unprecedented crisis, particularly with the task of coordinating force and diplomacy? If, as I argue, the unavoidable essence of statecraft is this very task, we must concentrate on this question if we wish to be in a position to evaluate the work of Woodrow Wilson.

Contrary to a pervasive, lingering myth, Wilson was thoroughly cognizant, long before his Presidency, of the intimate relationship between the use of military force and the conduct of diplomacy. He was fully aware of military power and fully prepared to make use of it. Let me quote a statement of his uttered in 1911. "There is nothing noble or admirable in war itself. But there is something very noble and very admirable occasionally in the causes in which war is undertaken." . . . There are times in the history of nations when they must take up the crude instruments of bloodshed in order to vindicate spiritual conceptions. For liberty is a spiritual conception, and when men take up arms to set other men free, there is something sacred and holy in the warfare. I will not cry 'peace' so long as there is sin and wrong in the world." Was Wilson thinking of the Civil War?

Now obviously we are dealing with a man of the highest principle, with an exponent of the highest idealism. What has been obscured is that we are also dealing with a man capable of the highest realism--with a leader who abhorred the use of violence but who was prepared, if necessary, to make use of it. Wilson saw no inconsistency between political idealism and political realism. Let me quote him on this question, a comment

made long before he became President: "America was born in the world to do mankind service, and no man is a true American in whom the desire to do mankind service does not take precedence over the desire to serve himself. If I believed that the might of America was a threat to any free man in the world, I would wish America to be weak, but I believe that the might of America is the might of righteous purpose and of a sincere love for the freedom of mankind." It does not take much imagination to descry in this comment the ancient doctrine of the "just war," not really a surprising belief for the Calvinist Wilson to espouse. Of course, Wilson recognized that war was an ultimate expedient, to be adopted only after the failure of all other methods. In speaking of the League of Nations after the First World War, Wilson noted: "Armed force is in the background of this program (for a league of nations), but it is in the background, and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall. But that is the last resort, because this (league) is intended as a constitution of peace, not as a league of war."

Wilson, then, expressed himself clearly on his views of the use of force in relation to prime political aims. He was fully prepared to exercise power to achieve political ends. The real test, however, is in his performance. Did he suit the action to the word? The answer is a resounding **yes**. Woodrow Wilson had recourse to the employment of military force in the service of high policy far more than any other President. He ordered no less than six armed interventions during his eight years in the White House. At his behest American forces twice intervened in Mexico and twice more in Hispaniola. The most important intervention, of course, was in April, 1917, when the United States declared war on Germany, but we should not ignore the armed intervention in Russia during 1918 at no less than three points—Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostok. For a man who was in spirit a pacifist or near pacifist, Wilson was extraordinarily active in drawing the sword. Why historians persist in ignoring this circumstance is a story in itself, but it must be left to another occasion.

There remains the task of summarizing the actions of President Wilson as he took the decisions that led eventually to the American intervention of April, 1917, and the consequences of that action. Here we have a fascinating case study in the coordination of force and diplomacy, that inescapable first responsibility of statecraft. We can legitimately concentrate on the behavior of the President as against that of other American leaders because Wilson held the task remarkably close. He had one important coadjutor, Edward M. House of Texas, who undertook special missions on occasion, but Wilson was the primal architect. He acted on his own because he knew what he wanted and because he lacked full confidence in the leadership of the national security agencies at the time--the Departments of State, War, and Navy. Aside from the question of trust, the agencies in question were simply not prepared intellectually and structurally to undertake effective coordination of force and diplomacy. Arrangements within agencies and between agencies were either nonexistent or inadequate. Wilson, like Lincoln and McKinley before him, had to act largely on his own if

only because there was no alternative means of discharging an inescapable responsibility.

Let me now sketch briefly the general course of the President's coordination of force and diplomacy during the First World War.

When the War began in 1914, Wilson's first instinct was to follow the traditional course sanctioned by a hundred years of free security--a policy of strict neutrality.

Very soon, however, Wilson recognized that neutrality would not suffice in the transformed condition of things. Much sooner than most of his countrymen, he grasped the overweening significance of the struggle, that it constituted a world-historical discontinuity of great moment for all mankind. Furthermore, he realized that its prolongation would work against both the national interests and the ethical aspirations of the American people.

Wilson then broke sharply and completely from tradition. He rapidly developed a scheme to accomplish nothing less than mediation of the great struggle in Europe. The United States would remain neutral but work as an honest broker with the contending coalitions to reach a peace settlement. Hoping to arrange mediation, Wilson sent Colonel House to Europe early in 1915 and again early in 1916, in search of a political basis for mediation.

Meanwhile, the President developed a set of peace objectives to be accomplished through the process of mediation. Here was the real innovation. He started with the assumption that peace rather than war was in the national interest and that continuing warfare would pose plenary dangers for the future. He struggled for a design that would prove desirable not only for the belligerents but also for the United States and indeed all mankind.

Wilson's peace plan was well developed at a very early date, at least in general outline, surely by 1916, although thereafter the President on occasion clarified details. The plan was aimed at two goals:

--It would include a territorial settlement designed to minimize occasions for future wars, largely by applying the principle of self-determination to boundary settlements. By this device the peacemakers would bind up the wounds of war and eventually heal them.

--It would provide a set of international institutions intended to preserve peace indefinitely on an equitable basis. These institutions, collected in a league of nations, would pursue two major purposes:

--The league would keep the peace through the workings of a collective security agreement.

--The league would sponsor gradual international reform to serve the interests of dissatisfied nations and peoples who at the time were alienated from the status quo. Wilson had in mind especially peoples living in colonial bondage.

What came of Wilson's scheme to make a peace along lines of his own devising through mediation? House's missions to Europe in 1915 and 1916 produced nothing. After the election of 1916, which returned Wilson to the White House, he made a third and final attempt to arrange mediation.

This enterprise culminated in Wilson's magnificent "peace without victory" speech on January 22, 1917, but it failed to accomplish its purpose.

What caused this failure? However noble his aspirations, Wilson probably should never have attempted to mediate. Mediation is possible only when both sides are prepared to accept given gains or losses, large or small as the case may be, in the interest of making peace. Such was not the case in 1917. Quite the contrary: By January 1917 the European struggle of 1914 had become fully recognizable as a quasi-global conflict bordering on total war. Each side had become irrevocably committed to peace with victory. Germany gave its answer to Wilson just eight days after his peace without victory speech, resuming unrestricted submarine warfare against belligerent and neutral noncombatant commerce on the high seas. This **demarche** obscured the fact that the Allies were no more willing than the Central Powers to accept a moderate peace settlement. Wilson was faced with the fact that both belligerent coalitions were unwilling to accept mediation, even if Germany had behaved far more egregiously than the Allies.

After January 31, 1917, Wilson faced an insoluble dilemma. He was forced to choose between highly unpalatable options. He could simply abandon efforts to influence the peace settlement, leaving the future of the world to others. Or he could enter the war, seeking by the sword to place himself in the position of achieving what he had failed to accomplish through mediation--the position of **arbiter mundi**--referee of the world settlement after the war.

After long hesitation, Wilson decided upon the second option. Much as he abhorred war, he saw intervention as the only means by which he could hope to accomplish his political ends. Other means had failed to produce results.

The submarine controversy provided a means of deciding two important questions. On which side should the United States enter? When should the United States enter? Disputation over neutral rights was not the reason why the United States entered the First World War, although that disputation decided that the United States would go to war with Germany in April, 1917.

To repeat, the reason why the United States went to war was to place Woodrow Wilson in the position of being able, if necessary, to dictate the peace settlement along lines of his own choosing, not only to the Central Powers but to the Allies as well.

In short, Wilson's decision was to employ armed force in the service of truly grandiose political aims, surely unprecedented in the national experience. He would make himself not only the prophet but the architect of a transformed world order, one that had become essential because of the profound instability--correctly deemed dangerous to the national interest of the United States--let loose in the world by the guns of August, 1914.

We have, then, a powerful example indeed of how one American President conducted the task of coordinating force and diplomacy as part of the ultimate political act--the decision for war or peace. We can

understand what went on only if we ask how the leader dealt with the coordination of force and diplomacy.

Let me now summarize rapidly the outcome of Wilson's grand design--his Olympian project.

The United States entered the war without striking bargains with the Allies comparable to the large number of secret treaties that had been negotiated within the contending coalitions in earlier years. Wilson had two excellent reasons for avoiding such engagements.

--An effort to make an acceptable deal in 1917 might have been disruptive, interfering with effective prosecution of the war during a great emergency.

--It would be easier to force an outcome acceptable to the United States later on. As time passed both the Allies and the Central Powers would become almost completely exhausted, whereas the United States would be approaching the peak of its power at war's end.

During 1918, as the Allies became almost completely dependent upon the American reinforcement, Wilson unilaterally announced the details of his plan for peace. These terms came out in the form of the Fourteen Points and several other statements of war aims. The eventual total amounted to twenty-seven points. Wilson acted independently, without consulting the Allies either before or after he made his pronouncements of war aims. He felt himself moving toward the position of being able to dictate both to the German and the Allies. Why should he dicker? Here was toughmindedness indeed, even if in the service of the highest idealism.

At first things went well. By November, 1918, Germany and its allies were forced to give up. Just before the surrender, in October, Colonel House was sent to Europe. There he forced the Allies to agree to negotiate a postwar peace settlement on the basis of the Fourteen Points and associated pronouncements. Here was one of the great diplomatic achievements in American history. The United States held all the cards; Wilson played them very well indeed.

Victory bent the Central Powers to Wilson's will; it also bent the Allies to his will.

The next step was to ensure that the commitment of 1918 was built into the peace treaties of 1919. As the peacemakers conferred in Paris, Wilson proved equal to the occasion. He forced an unwilling group of nations--especially France, Italy, and Japan--to accept an essentially Wilsonian peace. Of course it wasn't a perfect rendition of the Wilsonian program, but it was close. Far too much has been written about those aspects of the peace treaties that did not measure up fully to Wilsonian standards and far too little about the extent to which Wilson achieved his ends.

Wilson's grand design eventually came a cropper, but not because of international opposition. The Treaty of Versailles went down because Wilson's own countrymen and countrywomen failed to lend sufficient support at a critical moment of national decision. I cannot treat the question of why Woodrow Wilson--triumphant abroad--met defeat at home. I can only observe that it is not enough to coordinate force and diplomacy in a masterly manner--and surely Wilson was a master,

deserving the accolade "American Bismarck." Successful participation in world politics must reflect not only the general international situations; it must comport with domestic political realities. Wilson did not get out in front of the rest of the world. Other nations, after all, tried to carry on his program, even without American assistance. The Wilsonian dream died not in Europe but in America.

The story of Woodrow Wilson and the First World War lends authority to certain general principles.

--One is that the essence of successful international statecraft is the intelligent coordination of force and diplomacy.

--Another is that an international statesman must not move too far beyond the tolerance of his own people.

Wilson was triumphant in his understanding of the uses of force in the service of political ends. His tragedy stemmed from his failure to maintain sufficient domestic political support for his international program.

*The author wishes to acknowledge the research of Frederick S. Calhoun, whose forthcoming dissertation at the University of Chicago, provisionally entitled "Uses of Force in Wilsonian Diplomacy," promises to be a pathbreaking study. Mr. Calhoun drew my attention to certain statements of Woodrow Wilson concerning the use of force and also to the frequency of Wilson's decisions for armed intervention compared with other Presidents. The author also wishes to acknowledge the assistance of John Harter, who conducted the interview with Cornelius Van H. Engert quoted in this text.

Student Boners

"Hiroshima was the emperor of Japan." — Miriam J. Haron (Pace University).

"Manifest Destiny gave the United States the 'God-Forsaken' right to control all the land westward to the Atlantic Ocean." — Indiana University

"John Adams had a charming wife, Dolly Madison." — Indiana University.

MINUTES: COUNCIL MEETING July 31, 1981

The Council met on Friday, July 31, at the American University. Members present: Lawrence Kaplan, Lawrence Gelfand, George Herring, Akira Iriye, Arnold Offner, David Pletcher, Robert Freeman Smith, Sandra Taylor, Gary Hess. Also Present: William Brinker, Richard Burns, Warren Cohen, Wayne Cole, Charles De Benedetti, Warren Kuehl, Frederick Marks, Forrest Pogue, William Slany, Betty Unterberger.

President Kaplan called the meeting to order at 7:35 a.m. He announced that William Stinchcombe will replace Tom Schoonover on the Bernath Book Committee and that Alan Henrickson and Peter Hill will replace Eugene Trani and Robert Beisner on the Program Committee. Charles De Benedetti and Lloyd Ambrosius will continue on that committee with Ambrosius taking over as Chairperson.

Hess reported on the plans to meet at Boston University in 1982, but noted that a problem has arisen with respect to meeting room fees which in previous years have never been paid by SHAFR. It was moved by Gelfand, seconded by Smith, that the officers should seek a waiver of the meeting room fees; in the event that satisfactory arrangements cannot be worked out with Boston University, the officers should seek an alternative meeting place in the Boston area. Motion passed.

Wayne Cole reported that the Committee on Government Relations had voted not to recommend SHAFR endorsement of a proposal by Clearwater Publishing Company to publish selected State Department documents not published in the **Foreign Relations** volumes; it was believed that the Society ought not to endorse commercial projects. The Committee also recommended adoption of a resolution that the Society express concern to the Bureau of Public Affairs at the Department of State that a professional historian be selected to succeed David Trask as The Historian, Office of the Historian, and that professional societies be represented in the selection process. Taylor moved, Smith seconded, endorsement of the resolution; the motion was approved.

Richard Burns reported on the progress of the **Guide**. Copyediting is nearly complete and the volumes are scheduled to appear in early 1982. A major problem is the escalating printing costs. The Clio Press has recommended a survey of SHAFR members to determine interest in the **Guide**. It was tentatively agreed that such a survey, which might include an option to order copies at a reduced rate, would be undertaken in the fall. The need to update the **Guide** was again discussed, and it was agreed that the Bibliographical Committee established by Council in December 1980, should be instituted by the end of this year.

Charles De Benedetti reported on the work of the Program Committee in planning for the conference as well as in endeavoring to secure representation on the AHA and OAH programs.

Hess noted that the Asia Foundation has provided the Society with a

\$1,000 grant which is to be used to enroll members residing in the People's Republic of China.

Warren Kuehl submitted the report of the **ad hoc** Committee on Finance. Council, on a motion by Taylor seconded by Gelfand, received the report and endorsed its recommendations. The Committee's report is appended to the minutes.

Moving to new business, the Council discussed the difficult situation confronting **Diplomatic History** as a result of budget reductions at Michigan State. Warren Cohen observed that the University's support of the journal has been reduced by 50% and that in April, it appeared the entire subsidy would be eliminated. While he was prepared to do the best he could with reduced support in the coming year, Cohen recommended that the Society should plan to replace him by June 1982. It was agreed that the Society should provide a \$1,000 allocation to assist the journal in 1981-82 (a motion to that effect was introduced by Gelfand, seconded by Smith, and passed), and that the Society should begin the search for a new editor who could take over effective June 1982. The President was authorized to appoint a search committee.

The Council discussed the appointment of a new Executive Secretary-Treasurer to assume responsibilities of that office by January 1982. Smith moved, Pletcher seconded, that the President appoint a search committee and that the position be brought to the attention of the membership within the next few weeks.

Betty Unterberger commented on the budget situation at the National Archives and the danger that restoration of NHPRC funding will be at the expense of the Archives, thus further reducing the declassification staff in particular. She urged that individuals contact members of the appropriate Senate and House Committees. Council members expressed a strong sense of support for such efforts.

Meeting adjourned at 9:45 a.m.

Gary Hess

Appendix: Report of the Committee on Finance

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

The *ad hoc* Committee on Finance appointed by David Pletcher consisting of Alexander DeConde, Sally J. Marks, Thomas D. Schoonover, with Warren Kuehl as chairperson, has explored long-range needs of SHAFR as instructed by Council December 27, 1980, and recommends the adoption of this report to provide general guidelines for the creation of an endowment fund. The committee sees this report as a supplement to its Interim Report dated December 10, 1980. That recommended guidelines for additional prizes and awards, suggested a program for the investment of income from the **Guide to American Foreign Relations**, and outlined the need for a Development Fund to generate monies for future SHAFR scholarly projects that would advance scholarship in diplomatic history. The Interim Report also listed some areas for possible new prizes and awards as suggestions to possible donors.

The Committee on Finance now recommends the creation of a

General Endowment/Investment Fund. Its sole purpose shall be to generate income for the operating expenses of SHAFR so that dues can be maintained at the lowest possible level. It shall receive monies received from life members, bequests, gifts, assignments of royalties, supplemental monies contributed annually by members in excess of regular dues, income from life insurance policies which designate SHAFR as beneficiary, and any other income Council may assign to it. It is recommended that the annual dues statement contain a check-off line which allows members to contribute an "additional tax-deductible gift for the Endowment/Investment Fund."

Guidelines for the Endowment/Investment Fund

1. Income from the Endowment/Investment Fund shall be left to accumulate in those years in which dues and other income are sufficient for operating expenses and be drawn upon only when a deficit occurs.
2. Only income shall be drawn from the Fund with the principle remaining intact.
3. Council shall, from time to time, establish a maximum amount which can be drawn from the Fund annually for operating purposes. It may also designate certain areas to which monies may or may not be applied.
4. Any gift or bequest in excess of \$1,000, either in one amount or cumulative, shall be identified by the name of the donor. Where not specified by a donor, Council shall have the authority to determine where the income is to be applied.
5. The Secretary-Treasurer shall, each December, designate three members of SHAFR as an advisory finance board, said members to serve after approval by Council. They shall advise the Secretary-Treasurer on investments and procedures, shall review annual financial statements, and formulate recommendations on financial matters assigned them by Council.
6. These guidelines and any changes in them, once adopted, must be submitted to the full membership for approval.

Gordon H. Warren (Central Washington University) reports the similarity in the wording of Samuel F. Bemis's oft-quoted remark on the fur seal, and a remark made by Charles Sumner when speaking on the floor of the Senate for the Alaskan treaty.

Bemis: "Amphibious is the fur seal, ubiquitous and carnivorous, uniparous, gregarious and withal polygamous."

Sumner: "The seal, amphibious, polygamous, and intelligent as the beaver, has always supplied the largest multitude of furs to the Russian Company."

Warren muses, ". . . Bemis may have been influenced at least unconsciously by Sumner's remark."

SHAFR'S CALENDAR

- November 1 Deadline: materials for December **Newsletter**
- November 1 -15 Annual elections for officers of SHAFR.
- November 11-14 The 47th annual meeting of the SHA will be held in Louisville with headquarters at the Galt House.
- December 1 Deadline: materials for 1982 Bernath memorial lectureship.
- December 28-30 The 96th annual convention of the AHA will be held in Los Angeles with headquarters at the Bonaventure Hotel. There will be the usual SHAFR activities at this meeting.
- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
- January 15 Deadline, nominations for 1982 Bernath article award.
- February 1 Deadline, nominations for the 1982 Bernath book prize.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for the March **Newsletter**.
- March 31-
April 3 The 75th annual meeting of the OAH will be held in Philadelphia with the headquarters at the Franklin Plaza Hotel.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June **Newsletter**.

PERSONALS

Armin Rappaport (University of California, San Diego) will spend the Spring Quarter of 1982 as a visiting professor at the Ecole Normale Superieure in Paris.

Eduard Mark has accepted a position with the Department of the Air Force's historical program.

Raymond James Raymond, Visiting Assistant Professor of History, University of Southwestern Louisiana, has resigned to become Assistant Professor of History, University of Connecticut.

Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., has been nominated by President Ronald Reagan for a nine-year appointment to the U.S. International Trade Commission (formerly the Tariff Commission). The ITC is an independent agency with a number of trade-related responsibilities,

ranging from providing independent, expert advice to Congress and the Executive to conducting quasi-judicial hearings on unfair trade practices.

David L. Anderson (formerly at California Polytechnic State U., at San Luis Obispo) has joined the Department of History and Political Science, Indiana Central University, Indianapolis.

Robert Dallek (University of California, Los Angeles) has been awarded a Rockefeller Foundation Humanities Fellowship for 1981 for work on "The American style of foreign policy: mass culture and foreign affairs, 1896-1979."

Joan Hoff Wilson has become the Executive Secretary of the Organization of American Historians and Professor of History at Indiana University.

Gary R. Hess (Executive Secretary-Treasurer, SHAFR) has become Acting Dean of Arts and Sciences, Bowling Green State University.

David Trask has become Chief Historian, U.S. Army Center of Military History.

William Z. Slany has become Acting Historian, U.S. State Department.

Thomas Schoonover (University of Southwestern Louisiana) will be a Fulbright Senior Lecturer during 1981-82 at the University of Bielefeld, West Germany, lecturing in American Foreign Policy. His address will be: Fakultät fuer Geschichtswissenschaft, Universitaet Bielefeld, Postfach 8640, 4800 Bielefeld 1, West Germany.

Gerald K. Haines (Diplomatic Branch, National Archives) will be on leave during the 1981-82 academic year in order to serve as Visiting Associate Professor at the University of Texas-San Antonio.

Michael L. Baron (research associate, East Asian Institute, Columbia University) has been named a Mellon Post-Doctoral Fellow by the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council. He will spend the 1981-82 academic year as Visiting Scholar at Peking University, where he will study Chinese, conduct research on Chinese foreign policy, and present a series of lectures on American foreign policy.

Howard Jones (University of Alabama) has received a grant from the Eleanor Roosevelt Institute which will enable him to research in the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library on his topic: "Security Through Expansion: The Truman Doctrine and American Intervention in Greece, 1943-1949."

Bernard Reiner (Fairleigh Dickinson University-Rutherford) has received a summer fellowship from the NEH to study the impact of aging on American History and literature. He will be on sabbatical leave in the Fall of 1981.

AND LAST, BUT BY NO MEANS LEAST

William C. Widenor (University of Illinois) was awarded the Frederick Jackson Turner Prize at the 1981 OAH convention in Detroit. Widenor's **Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy** (University of California Press) was judged the best first book in American History. CONGRATULATIONS!

PUBLICATIONS IN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

David R. Mets (Troy State University, Florida Region), **NATO: Alliance for Peace**. 1981. Julian Messner. \$10.74.

Gordon H. Warren (Central Washington University), **Fountain of Discontent: The Trent Affair and Freedom of the Seas**. 1981. Northeastern University Press. \$18.95.

Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana University), ed., **The Eisenhower Diaries**. 1981. Norton. \$19.95.

Kenneth Paul Jones (University of Tennessee-Martin) ed., **U.S. Diplomats in Europe, 1919-1941**. 1981. ABC-CLIO. A compilation of essays including SHAFR members Michael J. Hogan, John M. Carroll, Ronald E. Swerczek, J. B. Donnelly, Kenneth Moss, Thomas R. Maddux, and Alex DeConde who provides the Foreword. \$35.00.

James J. Lorence (University of Wisconsin Center — Wausau), **Organized Business and the Myth of the China Market: the American Asiatic Association, 1898-1937**. 1981. American Philosophical Society. \$10.00.

David J. Alvarez (Saint Mary's College of California), **Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey, 1943-1946**. 1980. Institute for Balkan Studies.

Robert A. Divine, (University of Texas), **Eisenhower and the Cold War**. 1981. Oxford University Press. \$14.95 cloth, \$3.95 paper.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Wesley M. Bagby (West Virginia University), **Contemporary American Economic and Political Problems**. 1981. Nelson-Hall. Cloth \$19.95, paper \$9.95.

David F. Long (University of New Hampshire), **Ready to Hazard: A Biography of Commodore William Bainbridge, 1774-1833**. 1981. UMI Monographs. \$26.75.

EUROPEAN MEETING

At the European Association for American Studies 1982 biennial conference in La Sorbonne, Paris (March 30-April 2), there will be a foreign-policy workshop. The workshop will extend over three halfdays,

and will be based on six discussion papers. The theme of the workshop will be "American Opposition to European Imperialism Since c. 1870: Changing Concepts on Foreign Policy." There will also be a discussion of the possibility of developing links between this biennial foreign-policy workshop and SHAFR. Inquiries about the workshop should be directed to its chairman, Dr. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, Department of History, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9JY, Scotland, U.K. General information about the EAAS conference, and about accomodation in the Latin Quarter, may be obtained from the Committee for the Organization of the 1982 Conference, 22 avenue Reille — 75014 Paris, France, tel.: 589.29.32.

USMA HISTORY SYMPOSIUM, APRIL 21-23, 1982

The United States Military Academy will sponsor a history symposium entitled "The Theory and Practice of American National Security, 1945-1960 at West Point, New York, April 21-23, 1981. Historians and Political Scientists will present papers on political, strategic, economic, and other aspects of American national security policy during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. For further information contact: Colonel Paul L. Miles, Jr., Department of History, USMA, West Point, New York, 10996.

Several scholars have agreed to present their research findings at the conference. SHAFR members David A. Rosenberg (University of Chicago), Martin J. Sherwin (Tufts University), Lloyd Gardner (Rutgers University), and Gary W. Reichard (Ohio State University) will be among the participants.

SOUTHWESTERN HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

The Southwestern Historical Association will meet in conjunction with the SSSA convention in San Antonio, Texas, 17-20 March 1982. Proposals for papers or entire sessions should be sent to the following coordinators:

Prof. Virginia Bernhard for U.S. topics
Dept. of History
University of St. Thomas
Houston, Texas 77006

Prof. C. Fehrenbach for European and Asian
Tarleton State University
Stephenville, Texas 76402

Prof. Don Coerver for Latin America and African
Dept. of History
Texas Christian University
Ft. Worth, Texas 76129

Warren Cohen, editor of **Diplomatic History**, has asked that the following Guidelines and Style Sheet be made available to SHAFR members. Professor Cohen requests that contributors submit materials which conform to these standards.

SUGGESTED GUIDELINES FOR DIPLOMATIC HISTORY ARTICLES

1. Double space all text and footnotes
2. Editor and publisher follow A Manual of Style, 12th ed. (Chicago, 1969) and Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary
3. Omit subheadings or subtitles within article
4. Use American spellings except in quotes
5. Except within quotes dates are to be in European style--14 May 1946
6. Italics:
 - (a) Frequently used foreign words and phrases are not italicized. For example: bona fide, caveat, de facto, laissez faire, quid pro quo, realpolitik, sine qua non, vis-à-vis.
 - (b) Isolated words and phrases in a foreign language may be set in italics if they are likely to be unfamiliar to the reader.
 - (c) Avoid italicizing for the purpose of emphasis unless absolutely necessary.
7. Quotes:
 - (a) Words used in an ironic sense may be enclosed in quotes but only as a last resort when the irony might otherwise be lost.
 - (b) Quotes longer than eight lines should be set in block style with the quotation marks deleted.
8. Capitalization (general):
 - (a) lower case administration, congressional, congressman, communism, fascism
 - (b) lower case president, shah, king, senator, undersecretary of state unless followed by proper name. Only titles preceding names are capitalized. For example: Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, but Sumner Welles, undersecretary of state.
 - (c) capitalize Communist, Fascist, Labour but lower case party, i.e. Communist party, Democratic party
 - (d) For further reference see Manual of Style, pp. 147-94.

9. Footnotes:

- (a) The spelling of all names and places appearing in the footnotes should be consistent with that in the text.
- (b) Check that all footnotes have been numbered consecutively throughout article and that no notes have been deleted or the same footnote number repeated twice.
- (c) Once full names are given in an initial citation it is not necessary to repeat first names unless two persons have the same last name.
- (d) Dates in the footnotes also should be in the European style.

DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

Footnote Style for Frequently Cited Documents

Department of State - Periodicals

¹U.S., Department of State Bulletin 40 (11 May 1947): 991-94.

²Winston Churchill to Franklin D. Roosevelt, 6 December 1944, U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948 4 (Washington, 1974): 834-35 (hereafter cited as FRUS, followed by appropriate year).

Shortened References:

³Bulletin 40 (11 May 1947): 995-98.

⁴Churchill to Roosevelt, 2 January 1945, FRUS, 1948, 4:842-43.

Department of State - Reports

⁵U.S., Department of State, Trade Expansion Act of 1962, Commercial Policy Series, no. 196, pp. 21-25.

⁶U.S., Department of State, A Plan for the Establishment in Hawaii of a Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange between East and West, 86th Cong., 2d sess., 1960, p. 28.

Shortened References:

⁷Trade Expansion Act of 1962, pp. 26-28.

⁸Cultural and Technical Interchange between East and West, pp. 104-9.

Department of State - National Archives

⁹Wallace Murray (chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs) to Thomas Burke (chief, Division of International Communications), Washington, 17 April 1939, RG 59, 711.8227/14, Decimal Files, Department of State, National Archives (hereafter cited as DSNA).

¹⁰William Bullitt, U.S. ambassador at Paris, to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Paris, 29 August 1939, RG 59, 882.20/489, DSNA.

Shortened References:

¹¹Murray to Burke, Washington, 1 May 1939, RG 59, 711.8227/14, DSNA.

¹²Bullitt to Hull, Paris, 30 August 1939, RG 59, 882.20/489, DSNA.

Dissertation

¹³Ronald D. Landa, "The Triumph and Tragedy of American Containment: When the Lines of the Cold War Were Drawn in Europe" (Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1971), pp. 217.31.

Shortened Reference:

¹⁴Landa, "Triumph and Tragedy," pp. 232-39.

Papers and Proceedings

¹⁵Lincoln Evans to David Dubinsky, 19 January 1949, Papers of William Green, Convention File, Box 12, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison (hereafter cited as Green Papers).

¹⁶Samuel Perkins, "Insurrection in St. Domingo," Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society 22 (April 1886): 169-70.

Shortened References:

¹⁷Evans to Dubinsky, 23 January 1949, Convention File, Box 12, Green Papers.

¹⁸Proceedings 22 (April 1886): 171-75.

Public Record Office

¹⁹Foreign Office, Draft White Paper, "British Air Service," 21 November 1945, F.O. 371, W15465/24/802, Foreign Office Correspondence, 1945, Public Record Office, London (hereafter cited as PRO).

²⁰Foreign Office memorandum, 25 April 1945, F.O. 371, W5713/24/802, PRO.

²¹Lord Halifax to Foreign Office, 10 July 1945, F.O. 371, W9537/52/802, PRO.

United States Congressional Documents

²²U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st sess., 1941, 87, pt. 9:9505-21.

²³U.S., Congress, Senate, Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, Joint Hearings on the Military Situation in the Far East, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951, pt. 3:2202-3.

²⁴U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Soviet Space Programs, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 1962, p. 301.

²⁵U.S., Constitution, Amend. 14, sec. 1.

²⁶U.S., Statutes at Large, vol. 65.

Shortened References:

²⁷Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st sess., 1941, 87, pt. 9:9522-23.

²⁸Military Situation in the Far East, 82d Cong., 1st sess., 1951, pt. 3:2204-10.

²⁹Soviet Space Programs, 87th Cong., 2d sess., 1962, p. 305.

NOTE: For further recommended forms of citation, including public documents of Great Britain, see A Manual of Style, pp.337-70, 389-97.

REQUEST FOR BRAVE RETHINKING

(This is a copy of a letter which has been sent to the Presidents of the American Historical Association and the Organizations of American Historians.)

All of us enjoy the benefits offered by the American Historical Association and the Organization of American Historians. They have a long and honorable history. The time has now come to ask serious questions about the future of the associations and how they may best serve the profession.

Can they survive the contemporary scene? These are the realities — inflation, ever higher costs of publishing, the decline of the real income of scholars, the ever increasing costs of travel and hotel rooms. Does the ever tighter budgets of colleges and universities and the nationwide move to drastically cut travel budgets indicate that the time has come to take a fresh look and to give careful thought to ways that will assure the future of our professional organizations?

The annual report of the American Historical Association informs us that travel alone added up to a cost of \$94,000. Other expense items have mounted in the same manner. The high cost is clearly not a result of squandering resources. We have simply gone on in the same old way without being bold enough to ask how long can the associations survive without a fundamental reexamination of their programs.

This is a question of survival and not of simply reducing membership fees. Memberships are already as high as fifty dollars a year. The cost of attending meetings at luxury hotels with prices geared to business representatives with expense accounts is clearly out of keeping with the modest living styles of professors futilely seeking to match declining real income against higher grocery bills, higher mortgage payments, and severely high prices for the books they must have.

We do not have the answers but we are deeply concerned about the future. The time has clearly come for a brave rethinking of our professional associations.

Questions will occur to many of us and they should be examined. Should we rely more on regional meetings held on campuses where costs more nearly fit our pocketbooks? Should we give thought to a more limited journal? Should the two major historical associations merge? Should we recognize that in recent years a network of affiliated organizations devoted to particular areas of historical inquiry have now reached a stage where they serve the needs of special interest groups better than does the more conglomerate society which we have known? Is the role of the American Historical Association today more properly akin to that of a holding company that speaks with one voice for the disparate interests that have emerged?

Time is running out and procrastination is no longer a viable strategy. Of all professional people historians best understand the inevitability of change. Can we apply this before the crisis is upon us?

We believe that the time has come for the establishment of a planning committee of the two major organizations.

Sincerely,
Robert Ferrell
Indiana University
Gary Hess
Bowling Green State University
Lawrence Kaplan
Kent State University
Sandra Taylor
University of Utah
Betty M. Unterberger
Texas A&M University
Paul A. Varg
Michigan State University

ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED, OR SCHOLARLY PAPERS DELIVERED BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

(Please limit abstracts to a total of twenty (20) lines of **Newsletter** space, or approximately two hundred (200) words. The desire to accommodate as many contributors as possible, plus the overriding problem of space, makes this restriction necessary. Double space all abstracts, and send them as you would have them appear in print. For abstracts of articles, please supply the date, the volume, the number within the volume, and the pages. It would be appreciated if abstracts were not sent until after a paper has been delivered, or an article has been printed. Also, please do not send abstracts of articles which have appeared in **Diplomatic History**, since all SHAFR members already receive the latter publication).

In the first paper of the session on "Regionalism: A Comparative Look", at the SHAFR summer meeting, Mark Gilderhus argued that Woodrow Wilson, despite his administration's interventions in Mexico and elsewhere, preferred a long run multi-lateral Pan-Americanism. This presentation, printed in full in the Fall, 1980 issue of **Diplomatic History**, concluded that not many Latin Americans shared Wilson's vision and viewed his proposals with mistrust. Gerald Haines in "Ideological Myopia: The United States and the Japanese Monroe Doctrine, 1931-1941" argued that Americans were unwilling during the Franklin Roosevelt administration to accept Japanese explanations for a Monroe Doctrine of their own in East Asia. Professor Haines found many similarities between the American Monroe Doctrine and the Japanese versions. Paul Abrahams discussed "Post War Planning for Regional Stability: Eastern Europe, 1940-1945" in the last paper. An East European federation, with Poland at its core, became a recurring theme in Department of State proposals for postwar Eastern Europe.

But Poland's growing opposition to Russia forced Roosevelt to shelve the federation in favor of Big Power cooperation. In his comments Lawrence Gelfand found all three papers of interest and suggested that further study of regionalism was in order.

Tom Buckley

John M. Carroll (Lamar University), "Owen D. Young: The Diplomacy of an Enlightened Businessman." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, December 19, 1980. The paper focuses on the attempt of Owen D. Young to help resolve the reparations and war debt problems that stemmed from World War I. Young served as an independent financial expert on both the Dawes (1924) and Young (1929) committees. As an expert, Young attempted to apply liberal internationalist economic principles to the problem of inter-government political debts. He believed that the reparations and war debts should be reduced and eventually commercialized to help ameliorate persistent tensions resulting from the war. To do this, he advocated a voluntary cooperative effort between government and business, a method which he had seen work effectively as an executive with General Electric and the Radio Corporation of America. At the Paris reparations conference of 1924, Young was largely responsible for the formulation of the Dawes Plan, a temporary settlement, which reduced Germany's yearly reparation payments and put the German economy on a sound basis. In 1929, Young was chairman of a second reparations inquiry which further reduced German payments, set a definite reparations debt and established the Bank For International Settlements. Young hoped that the establishment of the BIS would pave the way for the early commercialization and elimination of both reparations and war debts. The Great Depression, however, caused the collapse of the Young Plan by 1933. The author argues that Young has not received adequate recognition for his efforts to ameliorate the economic and political problems resulting from World War I.

J. Dane Hartgrove (Diplomatic Branch, National Archives), "The American Approach to Work on the Joint Soviet-American Documentary Collection **The United States and Russia: The Beginning of Relations, 1765-1815**," a paper delivered at the annual convention of the American Historical Association, December 1980. An appraisal of American work on the joint collection by one of its editors, the presentation included a brief history of the project from its inception in the mid-1970's through the simultaneous release of Russian- and English-language editions in September 1980. Observations as to how the American performance might have been improved centered upon the areas of organization and methods of operation. Major shortcomings included the lack of firm, formal commitments among participating U.S. institutions, as well as failure to designate a chief U.S. spokesman and a chief editor during the early stages of the project. U.S. institutions contemplating joint scholarly projects with their Soviet counterparts should study the history of this endeavor in order to avoid similar mistakes.

Armin Rappaport (University of California, San Diego), "The United States and the Schuman Plan, 1950." This paper, which was delivered at the American Historical Association in December 1980, deals with the position of the United States towards the movement for European integration which led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community, the first fruit of the movement. The thesis is that the Congress and the State Department had opposing views of the proper role for the United States. Congress favored pushing the Europeans to integrate more rapidly by tying Marshall Plan aid to the pace of integration while the State Department refused to attach any conditions to the aid. The department feared that pushing the Europeans or, for that matter, indicating a preference for one kind of integration over another would appear as though the United States were interfering in European internal affairs. Rappaport concluded his paper with the idea that the State Department position which triumphed actually slowed the pace of integration.

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "John Leighton Stuart, American Missionaries and the Chinese Revolution," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, Washington, D.C., December 1980. The usual portrait of American missionaries in China closely identifies them with the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek. This has been true as well of the image historians have created of America's Ambassador to China, John Leighton Stuart, who came to diplomacy only after many years as a missionary educator. But just as the missionary community in the 1940s realized that the Generalissimo would neither Christianize nor modernize China, Stuart recognized that Chiang could not prevent a Communist takeover. Since Stuart's primary concern was to maintain an American presence in China regardless of political milieu, he proved willing to promote first a Nationalist-Communist Coalition government, then a Li Tsung-jen presidency and, when even this hope dissipated, a compromise with the Chinese Communists. As Nanking teetered on the brink of "liberation," Stuart rejected State Department orders to return to the United States, arguing instead that he should meet with incoming officials. Later he engaged in talks with CCP representative Huang Hua and welcomed an invitation to visit Peking sent by Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai. Far from being inflexible on the issue of Chiang Kai-shek's leadership, Stuart repeatedly fought his superiors in Washington to keep American options open.

Mark Stoler (University of Vermont), "Isolationism and American Strategy and Policy During World War II," paper delivered at the American Historical Association meeting, December, 1980. Examining the strategic and political ideas enunciated by Lieutenant-General Stanley D. Embick from 1930 through 1945, this paper concludes that isolationist concepts exerted a powerful impact on American military thinking during as well as before World War II. While Pearl Harbor clearly forced a modification of some of these concepts, they nevertheless re-emerged between 1942 and 1945 to play an important role in both American strategy and the military definition of postwar

national and defense policy. Key components of this wartime isolationist thinking included intense distrust of Britain, a new and dominant American role in the Pacific, non-involvement in Europe and acquiescence in Russian territorial demands, and a post-war Soviet-American understanding at the expense of Britain. While these ideas were challenged by some Army planners as early as 1943, they were fully accepted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff until the summer of 1945.

Richard C. Lukas (Tennessee Tech), "Polish Americans and the Polish Question, 1941-1947," paper delivered at the annual meeting of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences, May 24, 1980; and "The Polish American Congress and the Polish Question," paper read at the annual meeting of the Polish American Historical Association, December 29, 1980. Both papers analyze the reactions of Polish American organizations, especially the Polish American Congress, to American policies toward Poland during the war and early postwar years. Most Polish Americans deplored the way Roosevelt and Truman handled the Polish question and tried unsuccessfully to bring about a change in United States policy toward Poland. But the direction of American policy had been determined for some time, much of it before the Polish American Congress came into existence. Notwithstanding presidential rhetoric on the subject, at no time did Roosevelt indicate to the Soviet Union that Poland was an issue of vital concern to the United States. Postwar efforts to influence matters in Warsaw came too late to be effective and only aroused suspicion in the Kremlin. As the spokesman for most Americans of Polish descent, the Polish American Congress kept the issue very much alive in American politics and contributed during the early postwar years to the shift in public opinion from friendship with the Soviet Union to the growing anti-communism of the Cold War era.

Joseph M. Siracusa (University of Queensland, Australia), ——"Disarmament Diplomacy: The U.S. Arms Control and "Disarmament Agency and the SALT Process," a paper read at Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Institute of Politics, December 1980. This paper suggests that the problems besetting arms control today hark back to an earlier period of the Cold War. Then as now American policymakers debated Soviet intentions, the nature of linkage, and the difficulties in arriving at estimates of the percentage of the Soviet GNP devoted to nuclear arms. Then as now American policymakers were concerned with preserving the nation's retaliatory or second-strike capability. The conclusion is a pessimistic one: in the future Americans may look forward to a quickening arms race, increased military budgets, and alas, less "security."

Raymond James Raymond (University of Southwestern Louisiana), "The Reinterpretation of the Marshall Plan: Ireland a Case Study of 1947-1953," paper delivered at the 1981 Missouri Valley History Conference. This paper examines the three existing interpretations of the Marshall Plan, the "Traditionalist," "Revisionist," and "Postrevisionist," against a detailed case study of the impact of the ERP on the Republic of Ireland. Although the value of goods and services

supplied to Ireland was a mere \$146 million, Ireland is an exceptionally valuable case study. The economic recovery of Britain was essential to American interests. Ireland, although politically independent, was an important component of the British economy. As such, American aid to Ireland was part of the United States subsidy to the Sterling Area and, therefore, offers valuable insights into the operation of the Marshall Plan as a whole.

The paper is merely a preliminary statement of work in progress, but thus far it produces no evidence whatever to substantiate a revisionist interpretation of the Marshall Plan. While the paper does corroborate some elements of the orthodox interpretation, it argues that both traditionalists and New Left revisionists do not fully comprehend what happened during the implementation of the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan had a profound but unpredictable effect on European economic development. In the case of Ireland, it provided the catalyst for the development of economic planning which revolutionized the Irish economy and revitalized Irish society. If we wish to reinterpret the Marshall Plan we must focus our attention on those volatile and unpredictable forces unleashed during the program's implementation.

Raymond James Raymond (University of Connecticut), "Irish Economic Planning and Policy Control 1933-1958," in James H. Soltow (ed.) **Essays in Economic and Business History** (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1981), pp. 73-83. This essay argues that the Marshall Plan was a vital catalyst in the evolution of Irish development planning. World War II helped coordinate the various units of economic activity, revamped existing political machinery, extended the area of government control, and fostered objective forecasting. Irish involvement in the Marshall Plan developed administrative techniques and opened the country to new developmental ideas that helped alter prevailing hostile attitudes towards Keynesian economics. By 1958, the stage had been set for the economic planning that would transform the Irish economy and revitalize Irish society. United States foreign aid played the decisive role in bringing this about.

Tom Schoonover (University of Southwestern Louisiana), "Misconstrued Mission: Expansion and Black Colonization in Mexico and Central America during the Civil War," **Pacific Historical Review**, 49 (November 1980), 607-620. This article examines Mexican and Central American materials to help explain the failure of black colonization projects. The evidence leads one to the conclusion that U.S. domestic affairs have been overemphasized to explain the failure. The internal history of Central America and Mexico, their concern for their economic development and political and cultural independence and their views of their relations with the United States contributed significantly to the failure of the black colonization schemes.

T. Michael Ruddy (Saint Louis University) delivered a paper, "The State Department and Western Union, 1948-49," at the American Historical Association, 30 December 1980.

When Great Britain proposed what ultimately became the North Atlantic Treaty in 1948, a divergence of opinions arose among Foreign Service officers within the State Department as to the advisability or even necessity of this alliance. John Hickerson and Theodore Achilles, Western Europeanists by training and experience, were its most avid proponents. They believed that the Soviet threat was real and that from the alliance's military commitment would flow European economic, political, and social cooperation. George Kennan and Charles Bohlen, the department Soviet experts, had a different perspective. The Soviet Union was still a threat, but it was on the defensive in 1948, they contended. Furthermore, Stalinist Russia was not bent on world domination. Consequently they were more cautious in their endorsement of the NAT. Kennan in particular questioned its military emphasis, arguing that military aspects should flow from other forms of cooperation. Both Soviet experts initially favored other means of reassuring Western Europe. The end result of this debate was an uneasy consensus within the department. Hickerson's and Achille's position prevailed. Despite their reservations, Kennan and Bohlen acquiesced, particularly because the Western Europeans had become so convinced that the alliance was essential to their security. Even if the Soviet threat was not imminent, the Western Europeans believed it was.

Robert D. Schulzinger (University of Colorado), "The Reaction of Falling Expectations: Diplomatic History Today," paper read at the OAH Meeting, Detroit, April 2, 1981.

The 1960's were a time of great excitement for diplomatic history. The work of William Appleman Williams broke new ground and encouraged younger historians to look at the structure of American foreign policy and the roots of American expansion. The work of Williams and the other revisionists also created a new, healthy skepticism about the motives, behavior and statements of the directors of American foreign affairs. This critical disbelief in the authority of the powers that be grew with the public disenchantment with the war in Vietnam. It resulted in many works of diplomatic history which can be called "exposes" of government bumbling.

Still, the revisionists did not succeed in creating a new paradigm for diplomatic historians to follow. By the end of the 1970's some of them complained that their discipline lacked the glitter of the new social history. Others continued to practice diplomatic history the same way their predecessors, trained by the Rankeans, had done. Yet the general quality of this work rose, principally because diplomatic historians began looking to a wide range of recently opened government documents. While many diplomatic historians of the seventies abandoned the hope that their work would be based upon powerful new theories and methods, they continued to look critically at the past conduct of American foreign relations. They produced an impressive array of studies which dealt with the structure of American foreign

policy, the role of the public, and the importance of technological and economic change. They also used the newly available documents to write critically about the bilateral relations between the United States and other regions of the world.

Their output continued throughout the seventies, but their nervousness about being outshone by the new social history did not abate. They worried that diplomatic history was not what it used to be. It was. And that was the good news and the bad news.

Frederick H. Schapsmeier (University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh) and Edward L. Schapsmeier (Illinois State University-Normal), "Senator Everett M. Dirksen and American Foreign Policy: A Controvertible Odyssey from Isolationism to Cold War Interventionism." Presented at the Organization of American Historians Meeting, April 3, 1981, Detroit.

Everett Dirksen of Illinois was elected to the House in 1933. Influenced by the insularity of his midwestern constituency, a negative reaction to World War I (he had to prove his loyalty as a hyphenated American), and Old Guard isolationism, he was a staunch supporter of the Neutrality Act of 1935. The Pearl Harbor attack in 1941 caused a dramatic **volte-face**. Like Vanderberg in the Senate, he became an ardent internationalist. Elected to the Senate in 1950, he subsequently became a Cold War Warrior and Vietnam Hawk. These views evolved from his experiences of guilt (the Munich syndrome), fear of Communist expansion, bi-partisan support of presidents during wartime, and the acceptance of the principle of self-determination. His old-fashioned patriotism rejected anti-war demonstrations and revolution. His views on foreign policy were strongly influenced by President Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower. As Minority Leader, he in turn worked very closely with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Association with President Nixon was minimal due to Dirksen's death in 1969.

Jamie W. Moore (the Citadel) "The Coastal Defense Mission and the Business of National Security 1865-1914, a paper delivered at the Southwestern Social Science Association, 1981.

The central question investigated is this: Given the nature of American society between 1865-1914, what elements within the military establishment defined the army's sense of mission and what circumstances allowed advocates of particular policies to influence the political process successfully? The unstated assumption is that national policies reflect the articulation and shaping powers of organizational sub-groups. The fortifications-oriented U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the West Point alumni and friends, and civilian militarists were the important backers of the policy of coastal fortifications. Engineer-based warnings carried the experts' opinions of the dangers America faced. Comparisons of military strength, historical analogies, worst case scenarios, and traditional defense arguments were used to establish the relative inferiority of the United States to any or all of the greater and some of the lesser powers in categories of the experts' choosing. The favorite lessons of history

included the effective resistance of Fort Sumter, the bombardment of Alexandria by a British fleet in 1882, and the French experience in the Franco-Prussian War. Lumped together, these "proved" that an enemy could prepare in secret and strike suddenly from the sea, that defense systems in place would repel attacks, and that a poorly maintained defense system invited disaster. This argument, which could never be disproved, was, in sum, a statement that in the new industrial world America had to fear being caught at some unknown future point without sufficient lead time to prepare for encounters which could not be anticipated exactly.

Richard H. Immerman (Princeton), "Guatemala as Cold War History," **Political Science Quarterly**, 95, 4 (Winter 1980-81), 629-53.

This article examines the antecedents, sequence, and consequences of America's decisive role in the overthrow of Guatemala's Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. Tracing the development of policy-makers' perceptions of the Communist threat in Guatemala and the decision to intervene, it places the intervention within the broad context of cold war diplomacy, rather than treating it as an example of the inordinate influence of economic interests (in this case the United Fruit Company) or a relatively minor incident in the history of the CIA. The White House, State Department, and CIA exaggerated Communist strength in Guatemala, and the ease with which the operation succeeded led to a misplaced confidence in America's coup producing capacity. The misperceptions and overconfidence contributed substantially to the ill-conceived project at the Bay of Pigs.

Manfred Jonas, "Mutualism in the Relations between the United States and the Early Weimar Republic" appeared in **Germany and America: Essays on Problems of International Relations and Immigration**, Hans Trefousse, ed., New York, 1980. This volume appeared as No. 21 in the **Brooklyn College Studies on Society in Change**. (Lloyd Ambrosius, Justus Doenecke, Reinhard Doerries, and Klaus Schwabe -- SHAFR member all, contributed essays to this volume.) The general theme of Jonas' essay is that mutual interest, clearly recognized by both parties, was the key determinant of relations between the United States and Germany in the early 20s. That mutuality proved stronger than German resentment of the wartime role of the United States and of Wilson's much misunderstood actions at Versailles. And on the American side, it survived such shocks as Rapallo and the election of Hindenburg.

PRIZES AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

NOTICE FROM THOMAS BUCKLEY, editor., ROSTER AND RESEARCH GUIDE

In preparing the December, 1980 edition of the **Roster and Research Guide** it became apparent that many of the entries are outdated. The entire guide has been put into the computer so that it is relatively easy to update. The editor would like to publish a supplement in December of 1981 of all new entries since December 1980 and all updated ones. A full edition will, of course, come out again in December of 1982. Would all members please look at their entry and please note any errors, delete completed works, and send their current information to the editor? It would greatly increase the value of the guide. Please send by December 1, 1981 to Thomas Buckley, Department of History, University of Tulsa, Tulsa, Oklahoma, 74104.

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NOTICE FROM WARREN KUEHL — Formation of new society

A Society for the Study of Internationalism has been formed which seeks to bring together scholars from diverse disciplines who study varied aspects of international relations, historical and contemporary. It will issue a periodic newsletter and a roster listing research in progress. Dues are \$5.00 for three years. Write Warren F. Kuehl, Department of History, The University of Akron, Akron, Ohio 44325

PRESERVATION OF PEACE MATERIALS

Readers of the **SHAFR Newsletter** are well aware of the role of peace and non-interventionist groups in the history of American foreign relations. A number of members of SHAFR have written effectively on the subject. What follows is an appeal to you to take some modest actions that can make possible similar scholarship on a recent period of American history.

During the past fifteen years or more, various peace, anti-interventionist, and kindred organizations have been active on the national scene and in many localities. At a recent seminar in Seattle sponsored by the World Without War Council, we became aware that the records of many of these groups are not being preserved. In many instances, the organizations have ceased to exist or are of an ephemeral nature; as the groups fade away, so do their records. In other cases, the officers and members are unaware that scholars can make good use of their materials and that there are archives, libraries, etc., that will collect, organize, and preserve these items for historical purposes. In a few instances, perhaps, the organizers are suspicious of the uses to

which the materials might be put, and need to be educated to the fact that reasonable protections, such as restricting access for a few years (but not too long!) can be arranged.

At future regional seminars in its continuing Historians Project, the World Without War Council will raise the issue of preservation of peace materials and depositories for their safekeeping. We recommend that those of you who participate in these seminars strongly support such undertakings. Perhaps you will have further ideas as to what should be done.

Our additional plea here is to you as scholars to contact peace and anti-interventionist workers of your acquaintance to advise them to preserve all their records — including correspondence, posters, broadsides, newspapers, membership lists, financial records, etc. — and to have a local or regional repository take possession of them. You should also urge university and college librarians, archivists, curators of historical societies, and like persons to seek out such materials and add them to their collections. There are, of course, several well-known collections of peace materials. Other libraries and societies might also be suitable and logical collection places. We are impartial as to repositories but we are convinced that the task of collection should be taken up as soon as possible, lest valuable materials be lost or simply discarded.

Wilton Fowler, University of Washington
Paul S. Holbo, University of Oregon
Sandra Taylor, University of Utah

NATIONAL REGISTRY FOR THE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HISTORY

The Association for the Bibliography of History, in conjunction with the Department of History and the Lauinger Library at Georgetown University, has organized the National Registry for the Bibliography of History. The registry will collect, record, and disseminate information about bibliographic projects in all fields of history, unpublished or in progress, in the United States and Canada. The center will maintain a file of reported projects, and from time to time as appropriate, will publish lists of work in progress and completed.

For further information, and for a form upon which a bibliographic project may be reported, write to the director of the Registry, Thomas T. Helde, Department of History, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057.

THE 1981 GILBERT CHINARD PRIZES

The Gilbert Chinard awards are made jointly by the Institut Francais de Washington and the Society for French Historical Studies for distinguished scholarly books or manuscripts in the history of Franco-American relations by Canadian or American authors. Historical studies in any area or period are acceptable, including critical editions of significant source materials. The Gilbert Chinard Prize \$1,000 is awarded annually for a book or manuscript, generally by a younger scholar. The Institut Francais de Washington funds the awards; a committee of the Society for French Historical Studies determines the winners.

Deadline for the 1981 award is December 1, and five copies of each entrant should be sent to:

Professor John McV. Haight Jr.
Chairman, Chinard Prize Committee
Dept. of History, Maginnes #9
Lehigh University
Bethlehem, Pa. 18015

The winners will be announced at the annual conference of the Society for French Historical Studies in March 1982.

The winner of the Chinard Prize for 1980 was James H. Hutson for his **John Adams and The Diplomacy of the American Revolution**, University Press of Kentucky, 1980, and the Incentive Award was given to Robert R. Crout, for his manuscript - **The Diplomacy of Trade: The Influence of Commercial Considerations On French Involvement In the Anglo American War of Independence, 1775-78.**

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITION FOR 1981

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition was initiated in 1972 by Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in memory of their late son. Administered by SHAFR, the purpose of the competition and the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing of a lengthy nature by young scholars in the field of U.S. diplomacy.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: the prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1981. It must be the author's first or second book. Authors are not required to be members of SHAFR, nor do they have to be professional academicians.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. William Stinchcombe, Department of History, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N. Y. 13210. The works must be received not later than February 1, 1982.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$500.00 If two (2) or more writers are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be in Philadelphia.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1972 | Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth) |
| 1973 | John L. Gaddis (Ohio U) |
| 1974 | Michael H. Hunt (Yale) |
| 1975 | Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
Stephen E. Petz (U of Massachusetts-Amherst) |
| 1976 | Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton) |
| 1977 | Roger V. Dingman (Southern California) |
| 1978 | James R. Leutz (North Carolina) |
| 1979 | Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston, MA) |
| 1980 | Michael Schaller (U of Arizona) |
| 1981 | Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke)
Hugh DeSantis (Dept. of State) |

**THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE FOR THE
BEST SCHOLARLY ARTICLE IN U.S. DIPLOMATIC
HISTORY DURING 1981**

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Award for scholarly articles in American foreign affairs was set up in 1976 through the kindness of the young Bernath's parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, and it is administered through selected personnel of SHAFR. The objective of the award is to identify and to reward outstanding research and writing by the younger scholars in the area of U.S. diplomatic relations

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to the author of any article upon any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1981. The article must be among the author's first five (5) which have seen publication. Membership in SHAFR or upon a college/university faculty is not a prerequisite for entering the competition. Authors must be under thirty-five (35) years of age, or within five (5) years after receiving the doctorate, at the time the article was published. Previous winners of the S.L. Bernath book award are ineligible.

PROCEDURES: Articles shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR, Five (5) copies of each article (preferably reprints) should be sent to the chairman of the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee by January 15, 1982. The Chairman of the Committee for 1981 is Dr. Noel Pugach, Department of History, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$200.00. If two (2) or more authors are considered winners, the prize will be shared. The name of the successful writer(s) will be announced, along with the name of the victor in the Bernath book prize competition, during the luncheon for members of SHAFR, to be held at the annual OAH Convention, meeting in 1982, at Philadelphia.

AWARD WINNERS

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1977 | John C. A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.) |
| 1978 | Michael H. Hunt (Yale) |
| 1979 | Brian L. Villa (U of Ottawa, Canada) |
| 1980 | James I. Matray (New Mexico State University)
David A. Rosenberg (U of Chicago) |
| 1981 | Douglas Little (Clark U) |

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL LECTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship was established in 1976 through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and is administered by a special committee of SHAFR. The Bernath Lecture is the feature at the official luncheon of the Society, held during the OAH convention in April of each year.

DESCRIPTION AND ELIGIBILITY: The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address, delivered at the annual meeting with the AHA, but is restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer is expected to concern himself/herself not specifically with his/her own research interests, but with broad issues of importance to students of American foreign relations. The award winner must be under forty-one (41) years of age.

PROCEDURES: The Bernath Lectureship Committee is now soliciting nominations for the 1982 award from members of the Society agents, publishers, or members of any established history, political science, or journalism organization. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vitae, if available, should reach the Committee no later than December 1, 1981. The Chairman of the Committee, and the person to whom nominations should be sent, is Dr. Jerald A. Combs, Department of History, California State University, San Francisco, CA 94132.

HONORARIUM: \$300.00 with publication of the lecture assured in the **SHAFR Newsletter**.

AWARD WINNERS

- 1977 Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
- 1978 David S. Patterson (Colgate)
- 1979 Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
- 1980 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
- 1981 Burton Spivak (Bates College)



This fourth issue of the **AEAR Newsletter** continues our effort to provide significant information on teaching, research and publications in American-East Asian Relations. We have divided this task into 5 areas of focus and editorial responsibility. These are: 1) **Publications, Gary May**, Delaware; 2) **Courses in AEAR, Bradford Lee**, Harvard; 3) **Dissertations, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker**, Colgate; and 5) **Papers and Conferences, Michael Schaller**, Arizona.

To date, we have provided information on courses, dissertations, and grants (**SHAFR Newsletter**, Vol. XI, No. 2, June 1980), — on papers and conferences (**SHAFR Newsletter**, Vol. XI, No. 4, December 1980), and on research in progress (**SHAFR Newsletter**, Vol. XII, No. 2, June 1981). This issue focuses on publications.

We plan to update each of these 5 areas of focus in the coming year and to add several new related topics. We welcome current information about articles, books, dissertations, papers and conferences, and research. We also welcome comments and any suggestions about future directions. Please write to **Mordechai Rozanski, Office of International Education, Pacific Lutheran University, Tacoma, Washington 98447**.

PUBLICATIONS

The following list of published articles and books was compiled by **Gary May** and covers the period from 1978 to 1980. The list is arranged alphabetically by author. If any article or book was inadvertently omitted, please send a note giving its author and title to M. Rozanski at the address above.

Articles

Best, Gary D. "Ideas Without Capital: James H. Wilson and East Asia." **Pacific Historical Review** (August 1980).

Brune, Lester H. "Considerations of Force in Cordell Hull's Diplomacy, July 26 to November 26, 1941." **Diplomatic History** (Summer 1978).

Buhite, Russell D. "'Major Interests': American Policy Toward China, Taiwan, and Korea, 1945-1950." **Pacific Historical Review** (August 1978).

_____. "Missed Opportunities?: The United States and the Chinese Communists, 1949." **Mid-America** (October 1979).

Doenecke, Justus. "Beyond Polemics: A Historiographical ReAppraisal of American Entry into World War II." **History Teacher** (February 1979).

Downs, Jacques. "The Mercantile Origins of American China Policy, 1784-1844." **American Studies** (December 1980).

Goldstein, Jonathan. "Resources on Early Sino-American Relations in Philadelphia's Stephen Girard Collection and the Historical Society of Pennsylvania." **Journal of the Society for Ch'ing Dynasty Studies** (June 1980).

_____. "The Decorative Arts of the Old China Trade: Their Influence in America to 1846." **American Studies** (December 1980).

Hess, Gary R. "The First American Commitment in Indochina: The Acceptance of the 'Bao Dai Solution' 1950." **Diplomatic History** (Summer 1978).

Hunt, Michael H. "Resistance and Collaboration in the American Empire, 1898-1903: An Overview." **Pacific Historical Review** (November 1979).

_____. "The Forgotten Occupation: Peking, 1900-1901." **Pacific Historical Review** (November 1979).

Iriye, Akira. "Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural Relations." **Diplomatic History** (Spring 1979).

Krog, Carl. "American Journals of Opinion and the Fall of Vietnam, 1954." **Asian Affairs** (May/June 1979).

LaFeber, Walter. "'Ah, If We Had Studied It More Carefully': The Fortunes of American Diplomatic History." **Prologue: The Journal of the National Archives** (Summer 1979).

Levine, Steven I. "A New Look at American Mediation in the Chinese Civil War: The Marshall Mission and Manchuria." **Diplomatic History** (Fall 1979).

MacKinnon, Stephen R. "Researching Agnes Smedley in China." **The China Quarterly** (March 1979).

Matray, James I. "Truman's Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea." **The Journal of American History** (September 1979).

May, Glenn A. "Filipino Resistance to American Occupation: Batangas, 1899-1902." **Pacific Historical Review** (November 1979).

Metallo, Michael V. "American Missionaries, Sun Yat-sen, and the Chinese Revolution." **Pacific Historical Review** (May 1978).

Moore, Ray A. "Reflections on the Occupation of Japan." **Journal of Asian Studies** (August 1979)

Ninkovich,, Frank. "Cultural Relations and American China Policy, 1942-1945." **Pacific Historical Review**, (August 1980).

Owen, Norman G. "Winding Down the War in Albay, 1900-1903." **Pacific Historical Review** (November 1979).

Patterson, Wayne. "Sugar-Coated Diplomacy: Horace Allen and Korean Immigration to Hawaii, 1902-1905." **Diplomatic History** (Winter 1979).

Pelz, Stephen E. " 'When Do I Have Time to Think?': John F. Kennedy, Roger Hilsman, and the Laotian Crisis of 1962." **Diplomatic History** (Spring 1979).

_____ and Roger Hilsman. "When is a Document Not a Document--and Other Thoughts." **Diplomatic History** (Summer 1979).

Petillo, Carol M. "Douglas MacArthur and Manuel Quezon: A Note on an Imperial Bond." **Pacific Historical Review** (February 1979).

Pugach, Noel M. "Anglo-American Aircraft Competition and the China Arms Embargo, 1919-1921." **Diplomatic History** (Fall 1978).

Rubinstein, Murray. "The Northeastern Connection: American Board Missionaries and the Formation of American Opinion Toward China, 1830-1860." **American Studies** (December 1980).

Schonberger, Howard. "American Labor's Cold War in Japan." **Diplomatic History** (Summer 1979).

Taylor, Sandra C. "The Sisterhood of Salvation and the Sunrise Kingdom: Congregational Women Missionaries in Meiji Japan," **Pacific Historical Review** (February 1979).

Tredgold, Donald W. "The United States and East Asia: A Theme With Variations." **Pacific Historical Review** (February 1980).

Wells, Samuel F. "Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat." **International Security** (Fall 1979).

Books

Borg, Dorothy and Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., eds. **Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-1950**. New York: Columbia University Press, 1980.

Chern, Kenneth. **Dilemma In China: American's Policy Debate, 1945**. New York: Archon Books, 1980.

Cohen, Warren I. **Dean Rusk**. Totowa, N.J.: Roman and Littlefield, 1980.

_____. **The Chinese Connection: Roger S. Green, Thomas W. Lamont, George E. Sokolsky and American-East Asian Relations**. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979.

Dallek, Robert. **Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 1932-1945**. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979. Paperback edition available, January 1981.

Dayer, Roberta A. **Bankers and Diplomats in China, 1917-1925: The Anglo-American Relationship.** London: Cass and Company, 1980.

Doenecke, Justus D. **The Diplomacy of Frustration: The Manchurian Crisis of 1931-1933 as Revealed in the Papers of Stanley K. Hornbeck.** Palo Alto: Hoover Institution Press, 1980.

Emmerson, John K. **The Japanese Thread: A Life in the U.S. Foreign Service.** New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1979.

Etzold, Thomas H. **Aspects of Sino-American Relations Since 1784.** New York: Franklin Watts-New Viewpoints, 1978.

Fairbank, John King. **The United States and China: Fourth Edition.** Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

Gelb, Leslie H., with Richard K. Betts. **The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked.** Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1979.

Goldstein, Jonathan. **Philadelphia and the China Trade.** Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State Press, 1981.

Iriye, Akira. **Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War.** Harvard University Press, 1981.

_____, James Morley, N.B. Thayer. **Disparity and Congruence in the National Interests of Japan and the United States.** Occasional Paper #6, The Wilson Center, May, 1980.

Johnson, Robert E. **The Far China Station: The U.S. Navy in Asiatic Waters, 1800-1890.** Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1979.

Kalicki, J.H. **The Pattern of Sino-American Crises: Political-Military Interactions in the 1950s.** New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Kim, Hong N. **Scholars' Guide to Washington, D.C. for East Asian Studies.** Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1979.

Kissinger, Henry, **White House Years.** Boston: Little, Brown, 1979.

Langley, Michael. **Inchon Landing: MacArthur's Last Triumph.** New York: Times' Books, 1979.

Lewy, Guenther. **American in Vietnam.** New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Louis, Victor. **The Coming Decline of the Chinese Empire.** New York: Times' Books, 1979.

Manchester, William. **American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur. 1880-1964.** Boston: Little, Brown, 1978.

May, Gary. **China Scapegoat: The Diplomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vincent.** Washington, D.C.: New Republic Books, 1979.

Nagai, Yonosuke and Akira Iriye. **The Origins of the Cold War in Asia.** New York: Columbia University Press, 1979.

- Nahm, Andrew C., ed. **The United States and Korea**. Kalamazoo, Michigan: Western Michigan University Press, 1979.
- Perry, John Curtis. **Beneath the Eagle's Wings: Americans in Occupied Japan**. New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1980.
- Poole, Peter A. **Eight Presidents and IndoChina**. New York: Krieger, 1979.
- Powers, Thomas. **The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA**. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979.
- Pugach, Noel H. **Paul S. Reinsch: Open Door Diplomat in Action**. New York: KTO Press, 1980.
- Rozanski, Mordechai. **A Descriptive Guide and General Index to the Department of State Papers Relating to the Internal Affairs of China, 1910-1929**. Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1979.
- Schaller, Michael. **The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945**. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979.
- _____. **The United States and China in the Twentieth Century**. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
- Shaplen, Robert. **A Turning Wheel: The Long Revolutions of Asia**. New York: Random House, 1979.
- Shawcross, William. **Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia**. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979.
- Smith, Richard J. **Mercenaries and Mandarins: The Ever Victorious Army in Nineteenth Century China**. New York: KTO Press, 1978.
- Terrill, Ross, ed. **The China Difference**. New York: Harper and Row, 1979.
- _____. **Mao**. New York: Harper and Row, 1979.
- Vogel, Ezra T. **Japan As Number 1**. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979.

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

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ADDRESS CHANGES: Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication. Copies of the **Newsletter** which are returned because of faulty addresses will be forwarded only upon the payment of a fee of \$1.00.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of most back numbers of the **Newsletter** are available and may be obtained from the editorial office upon the payment of a service charge of 75¢ per number. If the purchaser lives abroad, the charge is \$1.00 per number.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, honors, awards), announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered--or published--upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting the use of diplomatic materials in various (especially foreign) depositories, biographies and autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field of U. S. diplomacy, and even jokes (for fillers) if upon diplomatic topics. Authors of "straight" diplomatic articles should send their opuses to **Diplomatic History**. Space limitations forbid the carrying of book reviews by the **Newsletter**.

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