

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

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MEMBERSHIP: Anyone interested in U. S. diplomatic history is invited to become a member of SHAFR. Annual dues are \$12.50, payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Fees for students are \$6.00, for retired members are \$8.00, and institutional affiliations are \$30.00. Life memberships are \$175.00. In the case of membership by a husband-wife team dues, one of them shall be one-half that of the regular price.

MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in August. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZES: The Society administers three awards a year, all of them in honor of the late Stuart L. Bernath and all of them financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California. The details of each of these awards are given under the appropriate headings of each issue of the **Newsletter**.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors two printed works of a quarterly nature, the **Newsletter**, and **Diplomatic History**, a journal; a **Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects** is published occasionally.

British Government Archives: The Case for the 'Piece and File' System of Citation

by Peter J. Beck (Kingston Polytechnic, England)

Robert Frazier's article in the December 1981 **Newsletter** justifiably criticizes the new **Diplomatic History Guidelines and Style Sheet** in respect to the recommendations for citing British Foreign Office records. Although individual journals specify varying methods of citation, the latest **Diplomatic History Guidelines** tend to reflect a failing more characteristic of American journals and historians than of their British counterparts. However, this assertion is not intended to cause Anglo-American academic conflict; on the contrary, my intention is to support a system of citation facilitating academic communication between historians on both sides of the Atlantic.

Only this week, that is, a few days after the receipt of the December 1981 **Newsletter**, I encountered Victor Rothwell's critique of an American writer for his employment of the original file number system in contrast to the 'piece and file' system, such as favoured by Frazier, Rothwell and myself. Thus, Rothwell of the University of Edinburgh criticizes Terry H. Anderson for utilizing the 'irritating' file number system in **The United States, Great Britain and the Cold War 1944-47** (University of Missouri Press) in the **Times Literary Supplement** review published on 26 February 1982. 'Historians who do this are erecting an unnecessary barrier between their sources and their readers . . . It is a senseless practice which ought to cease.'

The original file system offers an obstacle to prompt and effective communication, and is therefore in conflict with the basic objectives of such journals as **Diplomatic History**. As Frazier proved, the failure to operate a 'piece and file' system renders it difficult for readers to refer subsequently to the actual document. If the reader lives within reach of the Public Record Office at Kew, the problem is not too acute but time will be required to track down the piece number, which is essential for ordering archival material. Any historian's time is a precious commodity, and such searching for piece numbers is in reality time wasted. The situation is more serious for historians living in the USA, since they will find it difficult, if not impossible, to order Xerox copies or microfilm of any file cited in a **Diplomatic History** footnote. Continuing staff reductions mean that staff at the Public Record Office are unlikely to look up piece numbers in response to postal requests. Even if an American historian gets to London he will still have to waste valuable time looking up the necessary references.

The adoption of a 'piece and file' system of citation for F0371 eg. F0371/13198/2764, where 13198 is the piece number and 2764 the file number, would not only prove as concise as the **Diplomatic History Guidelines** recommendation but would also constitute a service to the historical community. In turn, the example set by **Diplomatic History** might serve as a precedent for other journals, and historians such as Terry Anderson, to follow.

RECORDS OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET: A NEGLECTED SOURCE FOR DIPLOMATIC HISTORY RESEARCH

by John W. Roberts, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

Historians of American diplomacy are increasingly aware of the value of multi-archival research. In part that means supplementing research in United States State Department records with research in other countries' foreign ministry archives. But since many United States agencies affect American foreign relations, it should also involve examining the records of federal agencies other than just the State Department.¹

In this respect, the records of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) can be helpful to diplomatic historians. As OMB is the clearinghouse for Executive Branch programs, its records afford an unusually broad perspective on policymaking.

OMB was founded in 1921 as the Bureau of the Budget. Initially part of the Treasury Department, in 1939 it was transferred to the Executive Office of the President. OMB traces its lineage back through several predecessor agencies: the Commission on Department Methods, or Keep Commission (1905-7), the President's Commission on Economy and Efficiency (1910-13), the Bureau of Efficiency (1913-33), and the Central Bureau of Planning and Statistics (1918-19). Its most important function is to review and revise budget requests from the various federal agencies and prepare the overall budget to be submitted by the White House to Congress. In addition, it prescribes management techniques to be used by federal agencies, helps coordinate the policies of individual agencies with those of other agencies and with the goals of the President, advises the President on bills before Congress, and helps the President draft legislation for submission to Congress.²

OMB is primarily concerned with administrative matters, and its records have been used in studies of public management.³ But obviously management and budget allocation impinge upon policymaking. All aspects of American diplomacy, from tariffs, defense, cultural exchange, and international credit, to the United Nations, foreign aid, the consular service, Voice of America, and intelligence gathering come under OMB purview. By examining OMB records, the student of foreign relations can gain insight into how policies are devised: how policies fit into the general presidential program, and how policies evolve in the transition from conceptualization to implementation. OMB records provide an overview not available in the records of other individual agencies or in the papers of individual policymakers.

As of March 1982, the national archives has accessioned OMB and OMB-related records for the period 1910 through 1972. The records are divided into scores of series. By and large, a series constitutes the records of a particular OMB division for one or two presidential administrations or congressional sessions. Nearly every series has a detailed finding aid. Upon identifying series of interest, researchers can inspect the pertinent finding aids and choose specific files to request.

For the purpose of this essay, OMB series have been divided into four groups: Central Office Records, Legislative Reference Records, Records Relating Primarily to Foreign Relations, and Miscellaneous Records.⁴

Central Office Records contain the office files of the OMB Directors and Assistant Directors. Included is correspondence between the Director and the heads of other agencies concerning the opinions of those other agencies on particular policies. Also included are OMB reports to the Director evaluating policies and proposed policies, summarizing the histories and goals of policies, and offering recommendations. There are policy recommendations from the Director to the President. And there is Director's Office correspondence with White House aides, Senators and Representatives, and members of the public. The records are arranged in broad subject categories.

The OMB Legislative Reference Division advises the President on bills being considered by Congress and helps write the President's legislative program. Among the Division's records are drafts of bills, revisions of drafts, copies of bills as finally presented to Congress, and OMB intraoffice comments on bills at the drafting stage. In addition, there are OMB summaries of bills, point-by-point reviews of existing and proposed legislation, and OMB recommendations to the White House on what attitude should be taken with respect to certain pieces of legislation. OMB solicited the views of all agencies that a particular law would affect, and those opinions are contained in these files. And there are Congressional committee reports, presidential messages to Congress, executive branch position papers, and White House press releases. The files are arranged by bill, and the bills are grouped by subject.

Records Relating Primarily to Foreign Relations consist for the most part of files on the State Department budget. State Department budget records are divided into four parts: annual budget estimates, supplemental and deficiency estimates, budget execution records, and general subject files. The most significant records are located in the budget estimates (which are arranged by appropriation) and the subject files. The records show the budget figures requested by the State Department and those granted by OMB, as well as State Department policy statements putting individual appropriations into context, and OMB reports analysing State Department programs from both policy and budget standpoints. There are also agendas of meetings, memoranda, correspondence, and records of conversations documenting the budget negotiations between OMB and State. Among the Budgetary Administration Records of the OMB's International Division are similar files for the Agency for International Development, the National Security Council, the Foreign Economic Administration, and other agencies.

Miscellaneous Records contain the files of certain divisions of OMB which are concerned with analyzing topics in their own special bailiwicks, such as the federal government's fiscal program, the full

budget (as opposed to just the State Department's budget), the distribution of functions among federal agencies, and wartime economic exigencies. Aspects of foreign policy can fall within a particular division's expertise. Thus, the Division of Fiscal Analysis scrutinizes the influence of the Export-Import Bank on overseas investment, the use of United States economic assistance to generate foreign currency, and the effects of Treasury and Commerce Department policies on international finance; the Estimates Division investigates foreign policy-related budget matters in general, analyzing the probable effectiveness of proposed programs and discussing alternatives; the Government Organization Branch studies the division of labor among federal agencies administering foreign aid programs, international trade acts, and other foreign policies; and the War Records Section during World War II collected reports from OMB and other agencies concerning economic conditions in other countries, fiscal operations of United States military governments, Lend Lease, and economic warfare.

OMB records do have some drawbacks. Not every file is a treasure trove. Some series are consistently more valuable than others, and even within a single series the value of individual files can fluctuate. Files on some subjects, appropriations, or laws, are so sparse or routine as to be practically worthless.

Generally speaking, the older a file is the less information it contains. This is partly because OMB became involved in policy matters only gradually and sporadically, beginning with the Franklin D. Roosevelt presidency. Moreover, the functions of OMB and the vision of its Directors were restricted prior to its reorganization in 1939.⁵

Another difficulty concerns classified records. Because OMB files sometimes contain classified documents, they must be screened before being made public. Most classified documents are withdrawn, to be reviewed later for declassification should a researcher submit a request under the Freedom of Information Act. As screening can be time-consuming, it is helpful if researchers can tell the National Archives what files they want to see in advance of their visit. Several series have been declassified on their entirety by the National Archives, but in light of budget cuts the prospects for additional series-wide reviews in the foreseeable future are not encouraging.

Despite such hindrance, OMB records should not be overlooked by diplomatic historians. They offer a rare glimpse of the goals and assumptions of policymaking, and the disagreements and compromises of policymakers.⁶

NOTES

¹For a survey of State Department, Navy Department War Department, Presidential, and other records in the National Archives pertaining to United States foreign relations, see Milton O. Gustafson, ed., **The National Archives and Foreign Relations Research** (Athens, Ohio, 1974).

²Percival Flack Brundage, **The Bureau of the Budget** (New York,

1970), pp. vii, 44-5, 49-50, 52, 61-3, 68-73, 84, 105; John P. Crecine, Mark S. Kamlet, David C. Mowery, "Presidential Management of Budgetary and Fiscal Policymaking," **Political Science Quarterly** 95 (Fall, 1980): 396-401; R. Michael McReynolds, "Records Relating to Presidential Efforts for Administrative Reform," in Frank B. Evans and Harold T. Pinkett, ed., **Research in the Administration of Public Policy** (Washington, 1975), pp. 116-19.

³McReynolds, *Ibid.*, pp. 122-23.

⁴"Records Relating Primarily to Foreign Relations," and "Miscellaneous Records" group certain series for the convenience of this essay. As OMB records are actually organized, there are no such groupings of series.

⁵Larry Berman, **The Office of Management and Budget and the Presidency, 1921-1979** (Princeton, N.J., 1979), pp. 3-19, 22-25, 28, 31-33, 37, 56-8, 66-70.

⁶In preparing this essay, the author surveyed OMB records and consulted inventories of those records compiled by members of the National Archives' Judicial and Fiscal Branch.

APPENDIX: A partial list of OMB series of interest to diplomatic historians.

1. Central Office Records

series	years
A. 21.1	1921-38
B. 39.27	1939-46
C. 47.3	1947-52
D. 52.1	1953-60
E. 61.1	1961-68

2. Legislative Reference Records

series	years
A. 21.2	1921-38
B. 39.1	1939-46
C. 47.1	1947-52
D. 53.2	1953-60
E. 61.2	1961-64
F. 65.2	1965-68
G. 69.2	1969-72

3. Records Relating Primarily to Foreign Relations

A. Budgetary Administration in the Department of State

series	years
a. 39.12	1939-52
b. 51.8	1953-61
c. 60.8	1962-69

- B. series 39.18, Records Relating to Overseas Assistance Programs Other Than Those Administered by the Department of State (1939-52).
 - C. series 41.2, Records Relating to the Office of the Foreign Observer (Eric Biddle Mission to Great Britain; 1941).
 - D. series 42.4, Records Relating to the Special Mission to Great Britain (Biddle Mission; 1942-46).
 - E. series 51.21, Budgetary Administration Records of Independent Agencies Assigned to the International Division (1953-61).
 - F. series 60.21, Budgetary Administration Records of Independent Agencies Assigned to the International Division (1961-69).
4. Miscellaneous Records
- A. series 39.3, Division of Fiscal Analysis, General Records (1939-52).
 - B. series 39.26, General Budget Correspondence.
 - C. series 39.38, Estimates Division, General Records (1939-52).
 - D. series 41.3, Division of Administrative Management: War Records Section (1941-47).
 - E. series 51.25, Office of Budget Review: Records Relating to the Preparation of the Annual Budget (1953-61).
 - F. series 52.3, Budget Review Division: Budget Methods Branch (1952-68).
 - G. series 52.5, Office of Management and Organization: Management Improvement and Research Branch (1952-60).
 - H. series 52.6, Office of Management and Organization: Government Organization Branch (1952-60).
 - I. series 52.10, Office of Budget Review, Economic Adviser Section and Fiscal Analysis Branch (1952-60).
 - J. series 52.12, Budget Review Division: Budget Preparation Branch (1952-68).
 - K. series 61.5, Office of Management and Organization: Government Organization Branch (1961-64).
 - L. series 62.10, Program Evaluation Division (1962-68).

M. series 65.5, Office of Management and Organization: Government Organization Branch (1965-68).

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Changes in State Department Filing Manuals 1948-1950

by David A. Langbart (Alexandria, Va.)

Scholars using State Department records should be aware that effective 1 January 1950, the Department of State began using a revised version of the classification scheme for its central decimal file. This new system, which remained in effect until 1963, does not match that used for the period 1910-49 in more than a superficial way. There are ten classes rather than nine. Classes 0 (Miscellaneous) and 1 (Administration of the United States Government) remain the same. Classes 2 (Extradition), 3 (Protection of Interests), and 4 (Claims) are consolidated into class 2 (Protection of Interests-Persons and Property). Class 5 (International Congresses and Conferences, Multilateral Treaties, League of Nations, United Nations) becomes class 3 (International Conferences, Congresses, Meetings, and Organizations. United Nations, Multilateral Treaties). Class 6 (Commercial Relations) is renumbered class 4. The familiar class 7 (Political Relations of States, Bilateral Treaties) becomes class 6 (International Political Relations). File numbers 710 and 713, which concern relations between American states and Central American states, are relegated to class 3. The well-known class 8 (Internal Affairs of States) becomes classes 5 (International Informational and Educational Relations. Cultural Affairs. Psychological Warfare), 7 (Internal Political and National Defense Affairs), 8 (Internal Economic, Industrial, and Social Affairs), and 9 (Other Internal Affairs. Communications, Transportation, Science). In addition, some country numbers are changed.

With this reorganization, once familiar file numbers become obsolete, an important consideration when making Freedom of Information requests for records of the 1950s and early 1960s, which have not yet been transferred to the National Archives. For example, political relations between the United States and country**, formerly 711.**, becomes 611.** (which under the old filing scheme detailed trade relations between the United States and country**); Communist and Bolshevik activities in country**, once 8**.00B turns into 7** .001; military and propaganda activities of country** in country ##, which had been 8**.202##, is now 7##.52**, and, as noted above, cultural relations, once 8**.427##, becomes class 5.

Another change scholars must contend with is the filing scheme for

the records of foreign service posts. From 1912 through 1948, the classification scheme used by overseas posts matched that used for the Department's central files. The one difference being that the post filing scheme does not incorporate country numbers. In the central file, 8**.00 concerns political conditions in country**, but in the post files, this becomes 800. If information on a country other than the one in which the post is located is filed, the name of the country usually follows (i.e. 800Japan). If one is interested in financial matters of country**, file 8**.51 is examined in the central files, but file 851 is consulted in the post records. Beginning on 1 January 1949, however, the Foreign Service began using a new system bearing no resemblance to that of the central files. The Department of State originally intended to have the revised manual for the central files match the new Foreign Service arrangement, but that did not happen. The changes in the Foreign Service classification manual are more confusing than those in that of the central files, but are basically as follows: Classes 0 (Miscellaneous) and 1 (Administration) remain the same. Parts of class 1 and classes 2 and 4 combine into class 2 (Citizenship, Immigration, Protection and Legal Services). Classes 3, 5, 7, and part of 8 join together as class 3 (Political and Governmental Affairs). Part of class 8 becomes class 4 (National Defense Affairs). Class 6 and another part of class 8 combine to form class 5 (Economic, Industrial, and Social Affairs). The remaining parts of class 8 form class 6 (Informational, Cultural, and Scientific Affairs). Under this new scheme, one consults file 350 to find material on political affairs and file 501 for information on financial matters, which are 7**.00 and 8**.10 respectively in the central files after 1949.


The result of these changes is that scholars using State Department records must learn one new classification scheme if using records dated after 1948 and two new and differing systems if using records post-dating 1949, where formerly it was necessary to learn only one basic filing manual. If researchers wish to investigate a topic cutting across these filing changes, they must learn three different and mutually exclusive filing systems which are summarized on the chart which follows.

Additional information on changes in the State Department's filing schemes can be found in Gerald K. Haines and J. Samuel Walker, **American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review** (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), pages 336-338.

Post Records 1949-63

Central File 1910-49
Post Records 1912-48

Central File 1950-63



Executive Order 12356
by Milton O. Gustafson

President Reagan recently signed an Executive Order on National Security Information, to take effect August 1, 1982. This order, which prescribes a uniform system for classifying, declassifying, and safeguarding national security information, is similar to previous

Executive Orders on this subject issued by President Truman in 1951, President Eisenhower in 1953, President Nixon in 1972, and President Carter in 1978. Congressional and media critics have described the new Executive Order as a reversal of a 30-year trend toward more openness in government, but its defenders contend that it is not very different from President Carter's order, especially in its practical effect.

In fact, it was President Nixon's Executive Order 11652 which really provided for openness in government. The intelligence and foreign affairs bureaucracy disliked that order, especially when combined with the amendments to the Freedom of Information Act effective in 1975, and it began almost immediately to work for its change. The bureaucracy succeeded when President Carter signed Executive Order 12065 in 1978; although that order appeared to provide even more openness in government by declassifying information after 20 years instead of 30 years, the numerous exceptions allowed the extension of classification beyond 30 years for almost any kind of classified information. President Reagan's order, by explicitly confirming that practice, sent a signal to the bureaucracy to classify more information and keep it classified longer.

How does the new Executive Order affect historians of American foreign relations and their ability to gain access to records transferred to the National Archives? This brief summary will analyze only four areas addressed by the new Executive Order: (1) classification categories, (2) duration of classification, (3) reclassification of information, and (4) foreign government information.

Classification Categories

The new order, like President Carter's order, establishes classification categories, but it reverses the emphasis. Carter's order stated that information could **not** be considered for classification unless it fell within one or more of the seven categories; Reagan's order states that information shall **be** considered for classification if it concerns one of ten categories. One of the new categories allows for protection of information if it concerns the "vulnerability or capabilities of systems, installations, projects, or plans relating to the national security." Almost anything could be called a plan, thus allowing it to be classified. Another new category is for information that concerns "a confidential source." For information received in foreign countries, that means that almost any non-governmental source could be considered "a confidential source" and the information provided could be classified.

Duration of Classification

Executive Order 10501 of 1953 had no provision for automatic declassification. It did provide that for material transferred according to law or Executive Order from one department or agency to another for the latter's use as part of its official files or **property** (as distinguished from transfers merely for purposes of storage), the receiving department or agency was to have declassification and downgrading authority. Since material accessioned by the National Archives (NARS)

was legally transferred as property, NARS had declassification authority. During the period that Executive Order 10501 was in effect, however, NARS chose not to use that declassification authority on records in its legal custody.

Executive Order 11652 of 1972 had separate provisions for information classified before and after the effective date of the Executive Order. For information classified after 1972 there was a General Declassification Schedule (GDS) which provided for automatic declassification after six, eight, or ten years (depending on the level of classification—Confidential, Secret, or Top Secret), but it also allowed information to be classified as an exception to the GDS. Classified information excepted from the GDS was to be automatically declassified after 30 years unless the head of the agency specified in writing that the information had to remain classified because (1) it was essential to the national security, or (2) its release would place a person in immediate jeopardy.

Information classified before 1972 was to be systematically reviewed for declassification by the Archivist of the United States when it was 30 years old in order to identify, separate, and keep protected information which an agency head could specify as requiring protection for longer than 30 years because (1) it was essential to the national security, or (2) its release would place a person in immediate jeopardy. From 1972 to 1978, the period when Executive Order 11652 was in effect, information dated before 1948 was reviewed for declassification and information requiring protection longer than 30 years was identified, separated, and protected.

Executive Order 12065 of 1978 provided for general declassification of most information after six years, but exceptions could be made for some information which did not need to be reviewed for declassification until it was 20 years old; in addition, foreign government information did not need to be reviewed for declassification until it was 30 years old. In practice, under the section 1.3 of Executive Order 12065, almost any classified information could remain classified indefinitely.

The new Executive Order eliminates automatic declassification in theory, recognizing that it had been eliminated in fact by Executive Order 12065. The result will be a massive accumulation of classified information in government files. At some point it will become necessary to undertake a costly page-by-page review of the information to see if it can be declassified, but since there is no time period specified in the Executive Order, there will be no incentive to undertake that review.

Reclassification of Information

President Carter's Executive Order specifically provided that classification could not be restored to documents already declassified and released to the public. The new Executive Order provides that information previously declassified and disclosed may be reclassified if someone determines in writing that the information requires protection and that it may be reasonably recovered.

Although the new Executive Order does not take effect until August 1, 1982, there is already evidence that agencies have begun to re-review material previously declassified and released in order to identify material that should be reclassified.

Foreign Government Information

Under each of the Executive Orders, foreign government information must retain its original classification or be assigned a United States classification in order to assure a degree of protection equivalent to that required by the foreign government which furnished the information.

President Nixon's order, however, also provided that all information had to be declassified after 30 years unless its release would (1) damage the national security, or (2) place a person in immediate jeopardy. Under the Nixon order, some agencies, like the State Department, decided that it could declassify foreign government information; other agencies, like the Defense Department, decided that it had to maintain the foreign government classification on foreign government information. The conflicting interpretations of how to handle foreign government information was resolved by President Carter's Executive Order in 1978.

Carter's order provided a simple definition of foreign government information—"information that has been provided to the United States in confidence by, or produced by the United States pursuant to a written joint arrangement requiring confidentiality with a foreign government or international organization of governments." Such information had to be reviewed for declassification after 30 years instead of 20 years; the order, however, also allowed classification to be extended for 10-year periods after 30 years. Under the Carter Executive Order, the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) issued guidelines for the review and declassification of foreign government information that, in effect, permitted the classification of such information to be continued beyond 30 years.

President Reagan's order only explicitly states what had developed in practice under the Carter order. For example, an ISOO directive had extended the definition of foreign government information to include information received with the "implied" expectation that it was to be kept in confidence; the word "implied" has been added to the text of Reagan's Executive Order. Since anyone can say that any foreign government information was received with the implicit expectation that it was to be held in confidence, the effect is that any foreign government information can remain classified as long as the foreign government wants it to be.

Foreign government information in U.S. possession constitutes Federal records over which the U.S. government should have complete control, and determinations about release should be a matter of U.S. policy. In the Reagan order, the U.S. government apparently has relinquished this authority. The consequence is that foreign government information must be withheld until the foreign government

confirms that it has released the information to its public. For many countries, that release might not take place for 50 or 75 or 100 years or more.

Impact on NARS

The Reagan order provides for the National Archives to systematically review records transferred to NARS in accordance with systematic review guidelines prepared by agencies, or by ISOO for foreign government information. These guidelines used to be guides for declassification; in effect, under the new order, they will become guides for retaining classification. The result will be that considerable quantities of diplomatic documents—more than 20% in some files—will have to be withheld for more than 30 years, and it is likely that the necessary page-by-page review in order to withdraw so much information will not be undertaken or continued during a period of budgetary restraints. Records will remain in agency custody, subject to loss and misfiling because of Freedom of Information Act requests, instead of being transferred to NARS.

The Prospects for U.S. Diplomatic History Teaching and Research in Europe

by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (University of Edinburgh)
1982 EAAS foreign-policy workshop organizer

At the foreign-policy workshop held during the European Association for American Studies biennial conference in the Sorbonne, Paris, March 29-April 2, 1982, there was a discussion of ways and means of furthering the professional interests of European students of U.S. diplomacy. This insertion in the **SHAFR Newsletter** is intended to supply the context of the discussion, and to report on the recommendations made.

The idea of a possible link between the biennial EAAS foreign-policy workshop and SHAFR had received some support before the Sorbonne meeting. Early in the summer of 1981, EAAS President Maurice Gonnaud had written “enthusiastically” of the possibility of a “consolidation of the workshop into a chapter, based in Europe, of SHAFR”. SHAFR President Lawrence F. Kaplan had welcomed the possibility of publicizing the Society at the Sorbonne workshop. In July, 1981, **SHAFR Newsletter** editor William J. Brinker said he had been wondering for a couple of years how to provide an improved international service. He added: “Should someone in Europe be willing to send me material, I will guarantee an occasional ‘European’ section in the **Newsletter**”. Bill Brinker later undertook to publish in the Abstract section of the **Newsletter**, summaries of the papers delivered at the Sorbonne, together with this particular insertion.

It should be stressed that the 1982 foreign-policy workshop participants were not in Paris because they were representative of their profession as a whole, but because of their ability to contribute to the

workshop's theme, or their desire to learn about it. The theme was "American Opposition to European Imperialism since c. 1870: Changing Concepts about Foreign Policy." They were not mandated by national associations. Furthermore, the forty or so participants turned up on a rolling basis to different sessions, some only to the academic papers, some only to the ways-and-means discussion, a few only to the workshop dinner (held at Ernest Hemingway's old haunt, The Cr merie-Restaurant Polidor). On the other hand, some of the EAAS's more experienced "politicians" were present at the ways-and-means discussion, which was attended by workshop participants from the Netherlands, Belgium, England, the United States, Yugoslavia, Ireland, Norway, Italy, West Germany, Australia, Algeria, Scotland, and, of course, France.

The first question to which the workshop addressed itself in its "ways-in-means" session was that of "an occasional 'European' section in the **Newsletter**". With one vote against, the workshop determined that such a section would serve a useful purpose. In the course of discussion, there was support for the scheme to publish abstracts of the workshop papers, and an occasional report on European resources, courses, and miscellaneous problems and activities including conferences. It was felt that advance notice of the themes of future conferences would be especially useful. The workshop considered two options: firstly, that individuals should submit items to the **Newsletter** editor, who would collate them periodically at his discretion, with no European coordination; secondly, that, without impairing the liberty of individuals to submit items on their own initiative, it should be the responsibility of one person to solicit information biennially, submitting it in the form of a report to the **Newsletter** editor. The vote in favor of the latter course was unanimous.

The workshop decided, on the nod, that a European chapter of SHAFR with a formal secretariat would be bureaucratically cumbersome, and unduly taxing on diminishing resources. It was therefore resolved that future workshop organizers might be asked to consider the biennial report to be one of **their** additional duties. S. J. S. Ickringill (New University of Ulster), EAAS Board Member, agreed to bring the matter up in the next EAAS Board meeting, and the 1982 workshop organizer undertook, further, to write to Professor Gonnaud asking him to suggest the new duty to the 1984 organizer.

Next, the workshop considered a proposal by Lewis Hanke of the University of Massachusetts. Hanke was editing a **Guide to the Study of United States History outside the U.S., 1945-1980**, 3 vols. (Kraus Publishing for American Historical Association, 1984). The significance of his enterprise for diplomatic historians was obvious, so there was keen interest in his follow-up proposal, still in its gestative stage, that the AHA sponsor a series of month-long international seminars in the United States on U.S. historical themes, for the benefit of scholars invited from the United States as well as from foreign countries. With unwavering unanimity, the workshop resolved to welcome the Hanke

proposal in the warmest terms, to request, in the case of a successful launch, that a foreign-policy seminar be considered an early priority, and to recommend that such a foreign-policy seminar be held in Europe. (Ian Bickerton [University of New South Wales, Australia] felt that the proposed AHA seminars would be better received, politically, in all parts of the globe, were they to be conducted in locations outside, as well as inside, the United States.) The workshop's expression of support for the Hanke proposal was especially notable, since a militant debate on the role of women in the EAAS had, at the EAAS's General Meeting, absorbed the time during which a group of historians had hoped to obtain a strong European endorsement.

Finally, the workshop considered microfilm. Through the International Communications Agency, the U.S. government was to make funds available annually for the microfilming of National Archives material of interest to European professional scholars and advanced students. An EAAS committee under Claude Fohlen of the Sorbonne had designated diplomatic records as one of the areas for future concentration. The Fohlen committee had just decided that the microfilm material would be lodged in the library of the John F. Kennedy-Institut für Nordamerikastudien, Free University of Berlin. In the EAAS General Meeting, assurances had been given that the microfilm would be made available by post on the most liberal and expeditious terms. At the workshop's "ways-and-means" session, a question was asked about the EAAS's purchasing policy: who would decide on which diplomatic archives to photocopy for storage in, and distribution from, Berlin? Steve Ickringill undertook to publicize (through the SHAFR and EAAS Newsletters) the name of the EAAS's academic advisor on diplomatic history microfilm purchases, as soon as the advisor was selected. Interested scholars would then be at liberty to contact the advisor and make recommendations on behalf of their students or themselves.

An open letter to members of SHAFR who are, or might have been, or might become, members of the American Historical Association and the Organization of American Historians

by Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)

A year and a half ago, in December 1981, attending the American Historical Association meeting, I had a traumatic experience gazing at what has to be one of the more garish convention hotels in Washington, that nice old hotel of pre-Second World War years that some silly architect hoked up with false pillars and hundreds of thousands of cubic yards of concrete and escalators and elevators and small rooms that look out on nothing, all monitored by credit cards and other signs of money by the busy people at the desks below. It was a stupid hotel, and a stupid meeting. An even more stupid occasion must have been the

AHA's meeting on the West Coast last December, to which I did not go. Philadelphia, the scene of the OAH meeting this spring, is an attractive place, but the prices are very unattractive — \$63 at the Franklin Plaza, \$56 at the Holiday Inn Center City, \$44 at the Penn Center Inn, after which one can have a double bed at the YMCA if one is available. The OAH is planning a meeting on the Pacific coast for a year from now. But back to my trauma in Washington — the point that came to mind forcibly during that meeting was that it was time to call a halt to this sort of thing. My first convention of the AHA was in December 1950 in Chicago, at the hotel then known as the Stevens, and I think the rooms were \$6, and I traveled from New Haven on the train for a modest price. Now one cannot find the train station, and the airline tickets are completely out of reach. All in all this situation, let us say, has gotten out of hand, or at least our hands. If one were a businessman with a billfold of credit cards, that would be something else.

It seems to me, first of all, that we cannot justify two major meetings a year, and must reduce to one, and in December because that is the time of cheap hotel rates. And we cannot justify meetings in faraway places such as California or perhaps anything beyond the traditional triangle of Chicago (sorry about that), New York, and Washington. The South, Southwest, and Far West, alas, must settle for regional meetings. If the American historians want to continue by themselves it must be the old Mississippi Valley grouping, using the secondary cities and minor hotels — national meetings are out of the question.

Secondly, I propose a combination of the present two national organizations, and an amalgamation of their journals. At the moment they have two office staffs, two journal staffs, two newsletters, two journals (both reviewing books in American history). When Tom Clark during an airline flight was thinking of a new name for the old Mississippi Valley Historical Society and thought of the Organization of American States and changed the last word, he was not creating something eternal, as Tom would be the first to relate; he did this in the mid-1960s when salaries were going up, and airline tickets were dirt cheap. Everything is now reversed. I recommend that the AHA, combining with the OAH, move to Bloomington, Indiana, to the lovely old mid-nineteenth-century house on North Bryan, and sell off its miserable row houses in Washington to the real estate speculators who would be eager to buy them.

The new journal should limit its articles to subjects of general interest, and let the special articles go to the special journals, which are now legion. And it should cut all the paraphernalia of the journals, including the listings of articles and anything else that might swell the size of the combined journal, and limit itself to four issues a year, even if that means cutting reviews.

The single new national organization should reduce its expenditures sharply, eliminating such frills as the travel budget of the American Historical Association, which last year was a shocking \$94,000. There should be no free air tickets for committee members of any sort, and the

executive secretary must stay in Bloomington unless someone offers to pay his way out. I would say, with exaggeration, that the new organization should have no telephone. And with a single review, limited to four issues, that costs would come down. My argument here is the need to bring down membership costs, which I think should be no more than \$20 and maybe \$15. The purpose would be to attract historians everywhere, especially high school teachers (years ago some 400 belonged, out of 80,000); among people attracted by the low membership costs would be the thousands of historians who have dropped memberships in recent years.

Many activities of the combined organization should be voluntary—without pay. Staffs for meetings, editors for lists of this or that, etc., etc., should be volunteers.

I am not irritated with the leadership of either national organization but feel that it is bureaucratic (three vice presidents for the American Historical Association, and shoals of committees!), benighted, uniformed, and unconcerned. It does not understand the difficulties of life on the average campus or in government offices or historical societies or presidential libraries, not to mention high school classrooms. Perhaps the editor of the **Newsletter** would entertain letters such as mine, agreeing or disagreeing, and the resultant opinions could go, with or without our compliments, to the presidents of the two national organizations. I must say that last year I wrote a four-page single space letter to Professor Bernard Bailyn of Harvard, then president of the AHA, after his solicitation, a letter that he kindly answered, but nothing more came of it. I like to think that many of you feel the way I do.

THE DOMINO THEORY AND OPPOSITION TO THE USE OF FORCE AS A BASIS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY by Paul V. Joliet (Saint Bonaventure U)

Over the past years there has been continued controversy concerning the so-called "domino theory"; however, most of the discussion has failed to focus on the essential issue involved.

It is misleading to concretize the "domino theory" by presenting it as a specific geographic problem peculiar to Southeast Asia or anywhere else. In actuality, the core element of the "domino theory" is the principle that peace is indivisible; that is, the principle that to preserve peace everywhere, the use of force to implement foreign policy objectives must be eliminated anywhere that it occurs or threatens to occur. This principle is based on the idea that ultimately there are only two choices. Either the world community will suppress the use or threat of force and will live in peace, or the world will tolerate the use or threat of force. In the latter event, with the use of force legitimized (probably in small conflagrations between relatively insignificant countries), a conflict will ultimately erupt between the great powers which will produce a new world war. Thus, the "dominoes" are not necessarily

strategic countries falling to Communism. They are incidents involving the use of force which are not suppressed by the world community, and which are therefore steps leading to a Third World War.

In part, the problem is that, as demonstrated by Congressional reaction to George C. Marshall's 1947 appeal for aid to Turkey and Greece, the people of the democracies find it difficult to grasp (and therefore support) as the basis for military action such an abstract concept as "indivisible peace" or such a paradoxical notion as the need to use force (war) to discourage (eliminate) the use of force (war). They find immediate concrete or ideological threats much more real and they are consequently much more willing to accept overseas military involvement if it is presented in these terms. Consequently, it is difficult to gain, in the name of preserving world peace, the popular support and Congressional appropriations necessary to meet force with counterforce in regions which seem remote from American security, or only marginally threatened by Communist or other forms of expansion.

An additional difficulty is that Hitler revived a subtle method of using aggressive force that had been utilized extensively during the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars of ancient Greece. This method, which might be called "indirect conquest", entails using indigenous sympathizers in foreign countries to overthrow the existing, independent, governments of those countries in order to bring them under one's control. Consequently, the problem of dealing with aggression today is doubly complex and ambiguous. It is complex and ambiguous because aggressors (defined as those willing to use force as a means of changing the international **status quo**) use the method of "indirect conquest" described above, not simply overt aggression. It is also complex and ambiguous because the puppet governments thereby created are not always obviously puppets; a fiction of independence is invariably maintained in order to confuse the issue in the public mind of the democracies. By confusingly making what is ultimately foreign aggression appear as an essentially internal affair, these ambiguities and complexities tend to undermine any argument that the democracies should intervene militarily in such situations.

Another difficulty is that most wars during the last 100 years have been waged to achieve national independence and/or unification. The contemporary belief in popular sovereignty, upon which the democracies are by definition founded, has been extended to include the idea that any specific ethnic group (nationality) has the moral right to have its own independent government if it so desires. Even if this idea is valid, there are no convincing grounds for believing that it entails an absolute moral imperative having moral precedence over preserving peace. However, the idea is a specious one for anyone who believes in Christianity or in the traditional philosophical principles of absolute morality, from which the modern idea of basic human rights is largely derived. It is not valid because if an ethnic group exercises all basic human rights in an existing political structure, there is no logical basis for the idea that it has the moral right to go to war (kill) simply to have its

own government. Nevertheless, the widespread, although illogical, acceptance of the nationalistic idea among the people of democratic countries makes it difficult to gain their support for military intervention against countries which resort to force for this reason.

An additional difficulty is that those who use force to suppress the use of force might fail to be sufficiently judicious in their actions. Although they must be prepared to do so when necessary, they must not too readily resort to or threaten force themselves, otherwise they will perpetuate the very malady which they seek to stamp out, both by succumbing to it themselves and by discrediting the use of force as a means of ensuring world peace.

A final difficulty has to do with the moral imperative to redress profound moral wrongs if it is within one's power to do so. Renouncing the use of force as an instrument of policy means reducing to the point of elimination the ability to intervene effectively in the internal affairs of other countries in order to suppress moral evils occurring in those countries, such as another holocaust or its moral equivalent. This creates a perplexing and nearly unresolvable moral dilemma. However, the dilemma may be addressed in two ways. First, it may be addressed in terms of accepting such evil as the lesser of two evils. The greater evil would be to resort to force and intervene without provocation, thereby creating an international climate conducive to chronic war; this would in the long run mean inflicting far greater suffering and evil than intervention would alleviate. Secondly, the dilemma may be addressed by considering that, historically, governments capable of inflicting such horrors as the holocaust have accepted the use of force as a legitimate instrument of policy internationally as well as domestically. Consequently, they will inevitably resort to the use or threat of force in international affairs and may be eliminated in the course of suppressing such actions. This occurred during World War II, when the Allies, in responding to Fascist aggression, used this opportunity to eliminate the Fascist systems and rescue the survivors of the holocaust and other persecuted individuals.

Similarly, during World War II, despite the difficulties entailed in such a policy, President Roosevelt repeatedly affirmed the need to preserve peace in the postwar world by forcibly discouraging the threat or use of force in international affairs. In an address following the Tehran and Cairo Conferences of 1943, for example, the President made the following points:

...If force is necessary to keep international peace, international force will be applied--for as long as it may be necessary.

For too many years we lived on pious hopes that aggressor and warlike nations would learn and understand and carry out the doctrine of purely voluntary peace. The well-intentioned but ill-fated experiments... did not work. It is my hope that we will not try them again. No--that is too weak--it is my intention to do all that I humanly can as President and Commander-in-Chief to see

to it that these tragic mistakes shall not be made again.

There have always been a cheerful group of idiots in this country who believed that there would be no more war for us if everybody in America would only return into their homes and lock their front doors behind them. Assuming that their motives were of the highest, events have shown how unwilling they were to face the facts.

The overwhelming majority of all people in the world want peace. Most of them are fighting for the attainment of peace--not just a truce, not just an armistice--but peace that is as strongly enforced and as durable as mortal man can make it. If we are willing to fight for peace now, is it not good logic that we should use force if necessary in the future to keep the peace?

I believe....[that] the great nations who are fighting so magnificently to gain peace are in complete agreement that we must be prepared to keep the peace by force.*

In sum, there seems to be only two fundamental options open to the people of the world, as long as there exist those who have no qualms about using war as an instrument of policy. One option is to tolerate the use of force as a legitimate instrument of policy by being unwilling to forcibly suppress it; this path will ultimately lead to another general war. The other option is to be willing to forcibly eliminate the use of force as an instrument of policy; this path will preserve peace and therefore the security of all countries, regardless of their particular social, economic or political systems. The difficulties surrounding the latter option are staggering, but they are not insurmountable. To assume that they are insurmountable creates a self-fulfilling prophesy and dooms the human race to world war; to assume that they are not insurmountable preserves the possibility of creating a world at peace.

"Might isn't Right, is it, Merlyn?"

"Aha! You are a cunning lad, Arthur...You are trying to make me do the thinking. But...you will have to think the rest yourself. Is might right--and if not, why not, give reasons and draw a plan. Besides, what are you going to do about it?"

"When I was a young man...there was a general idea that it was wrong to fight in wars of any sort. Quite a lot of people in those days declared that they would never fight for anything whatever."

"Perhaps they were right," said the king.

"No....Wars are a wickedness, perhaps the greatest wickedness.... They are so wicked that they must not be allowed....There is no excuse for war, none whatever, and whatever the wrong which your nation might be doing to mine--short of war--my nation would be in the wrong if it started a war so as to redress it....Wrongs have to be redressed by reason, not by force.

"I'm not suggesting that all of them can be decided...but that there are many wars in which the aggression is as plain as a pike-staff, and that in those wars at any rate it might be the duty of

decent men to fight the criminal. If you aren't sure that he is the criminal--and you must sum it up for yourself with every ounce of fairness you can muster--then go and be a pacifist by all means...[but] unless you can make the world wag better than it does at present, King, your reign will be an endless series of petty battles...in which the poor man will be the only one who dies. That is why I am asking you to think."

.....
"...Now what I have thought," said Arthur, "is this. Why can't you harness Might so that it works for Right? I know it sounds nonsense, but, I mean, you can't just say there is no such thing....There, Merlyn, that is all I can think of. I have thought as hard as I could, and I suppose I am wrong, as usual. But I did think. I can't do any better."*

*Leland Goodrich and Marie J. Carrol (eds.), DOCUMENTS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS, Vol VI, July 1943 - June 1944, (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1944), pp. 17-18.

*T. H. White, THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING, N.Y.: G. P. Putnam's, Sons, 1939, pp. 229, 237-41, 243-44.

The Mythical Yalta Myth by Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers)

When West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt recently cautioned against disturbing the European spheres of influence agreed to in 1945 at the Yalta Conference by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, he loosed passions which had been long quiet, if not forgotten. The Kremlin quickly followed, using the centenary of Franklin Roosevelt's birth as an opportunity to state that FDR had recognized legitimate Soviet interests in eastern Europe. More than anything else, the quick revival of the debate over whether or not Poland was "sold down the river" only demonstrates how little we have progressed beyond the arguments of World War II. But since that is the case, we should understand what truly happened when the Big Three met in the Crimea.

Conservative (often Republican) critics of the Yalta decisions have agreed that the Soviet Union received a sphere of influence in eastern Europe, though they condemn those decisions as immoral and stupid, the actions of a sick man who was duped by a sly and clever Stalin. Liberals (usually Democrats) condescendingly argue that FDR was a haphazard if well-intentioned foreign policy leader who flew "by the seat of his pants" and who had no long-term plan. They gently chastise

him for failing earlier on to perceive the Soviet threat and, along with most conservatives, praise the decision of Truman and his advisers to get tough with Moscow. Taking up the arguments of men like Averell Harriman and Charles Bohlen, liberals defensively claim that Roosevelt and Churchill had done the best they could by getting Stalin to promise free elections for the Poles. Thus, the argument goes, the West did not betray Poland or eastern Europe, rather the presence of the Red Army let Stalin renege on his commitments. Ironically, both conservatives and liberals treat Roosevelt as a prisoner of the Soviets; one because he was stupid, the other because he had no choice.

But Franklin Roosevelt was far from stupid. Even his bitterest enemies have portrayed him as an intelligent, or at least a shrewd and conniving politician. Why should that skill stop at water's edge? Nor did FDR ever think that he was without choices in eastern Europe. And he most surely had a long-range plan. Roosevelt believed that the origins of World War II lay in the peace settlement that followed World War I (a piece of dubious historical analysis), and he was determined to prevent that from happening again. Confrontation with the Soviet Union did not seem to be the road to peace. Faced with the reality of Soviet power, with domestic insistence that the United States prosecute the war against Japan and then come home, and with Polish intransigence on postwar frontiers, the president recognized the "special" interests of the Soviet Union while trying to preserve open communications, in ideas and trade, between East and West. He failed to foresee the kind of iron curtain that would eventually fall, but he clearly acquiesced to a Soviet military and political sphere of influence in Poland and eastern Europe.

The relationship between Poland and the Soviet Union, for that was the basic issue, had been set by the events of World War II and sketched out at the Teheran Conference in late 1943 and the Churchill-Stalin talks in Moscow in October 1944. Given a chance to occupy territory claimed by Tsarist and Soviet leaders, Stalin had insisted from the onset of war that portions of what had been eastern Poland be "returned" to the Soviet Union, with territorial compensation for Poland in eastern Germany. Stalin made that adjustment a prerequisite to Soviet-Polish agreement on other questions. Churchill and Roosevelt never offered any overall objections to the Soviet demands, suggesting only minor modifications to the boundaries proposed by Stalin. But at no time during the war was the exiled Polish government in London willing to accept such territorial changes. At the same time, the two Allied leaders consistently agreed that Stalin had every right to insist that any postwar Polish government be "friendly" to the Soviet Union, a requirement that ruled out any restoration of the London Poles to power.

The Yalta discussions about Poland did not challenge those Soviet demands. Rather, Churchill and Roosevelt sought to create the impression that any government in postwar Poland would meet the high standards of political freedom set forth in the Atlantic Charter. They hoped the inclusion of a few members of the London Polish regime would legitimize the entire government, whether it was a "new" provisional government or just a broadened version of the Soviet-

sponsored Lublin (Warsaw) group. At eight of the nine plenary meetings during the Crimea Conference, Churchill and/or Roosevelt tried to get the Soviets to grant at least cosmetic concessions, but Stalin and Molotov gave very little. All the British and Americans could achieve was a vague promise that "all democratic and anti-Nazi parties" would have a right to take part in "free and unfettered elections" in Poland. A tripartite commission was to discuss the reorganization of the Polish government, but the commission's authority was even less than that of the Allied Control Commission in Italy, which had been used so effectively to deny the Soviets any functional role. Churchill and Roosevelt recognized that implementation of the compromise they had negotiated depended upon Soviet goodwill, and the Allied leaders seem to have wishfully believed that Stalin would be lured by the opportunity for long-term cooperation instead of immediate gains. They counted on Stalin to understand their need for appearances, but both commented that the Soviets could implement the agreements as they saw fit, without formally violating them.

Of course, the historical accuracy of the Yalta "myth" is not what concerns today's policy makers and pundits. They select those slivers of the truth that buttress their own arguments about contemporary politics. But spheres of influence do exist in Europe, and how they came to be is another chapter in the long story of warrior-kings and power politics.

Warren F. Kimball teaches U.S. diplomatic history at the Newark College of Rutgers University. This piece is adapted from his **Churchill and Roosevelt: the Complete Correspondence**, to be published later this year by Princeton University Press. The argument presented in this piece is based on the Churchill-Roosevelt correspondence and on materials found in the British records, particularly the minutes of the Churchill-Stalin talks of October 1944 (TOLSTOY), and documents in the Eden (Lord Avon) papers.

SHAFR COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

SHAFR's Committee on Government Relations met in Los Angeles in December 1981 during the AHA convention and in Philadelphia in March during the OAH convention, reported to the SHAFR Council at both meetings, and its members have exchanged information about items of interest.

In 1981, the committee consisted of Wayne Cole, Chairman (University of Maryland); Jules Davids (Georgetown University); Melvin Small (Wayne State University); Milton Gustafson (National Archives); Lloyd Gardner (Rutgers University); and Roger Dingman (University of Southern California). This year Milton Gustafson is the chairman; Betty Unterberger (Texas A & M) and Ronald Spector (Center of Military History) have replaced Professor Davids and Professor Small.

The following items should be of interest to members of SHAFR:

1. **State Department Historian.** Dr. William Z. Slany has been appointed Historian of the Department of State, replacing David F. Trask, who is now the Chief Historian, Center of Military History.

2. **Classification/Declassification Center (CDC).** There is also a new Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the Classification/Declassification Center at the Department of State. Ambassador John R. Burke has replaced Clay McManaway.

3. **Coalition to Save Our Documentary Heritage.** A new coalition, consisting of more than 54 groups, has been formed in Washington to exchange information and develop a joint strategy in order to secure adequate funding for the National Archives and to work for its separation from the authority of the General Services Administration. Acting upon the recommendation of the Government Relations Committee, the SHAFR Council agreed to join the new coalition and provide a contribution similar to that given to the National Coordinating Committee (NCC).

4. **National Archives.** At the time of the AHA meeting in December, the National Archives and Records Service (NARS) was trying to cope with an unexpected 16% cut in its budget for the current fiscal year. In order to meet the new budget total, it was expected that 140 employees in the Washington area would have to be dismissed, and everyone else on the staff would be forced to take 26 days of furlough without pay. In March, Rep. Glenn English, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights, held two days of hearings on NARS. The Coalition to Save Our Documentary Heritage helped to organize very effective testimony for the March 2 hearing. On March 4, Gerald Carmen, the Administrator of GSA, announced that he planned to reduce the NARS payment to the Public Building Service for the Archives Building and the Presidential Library buildings, and the result would be "no substantial furloughs" for the NARS staff. Meanwhile, many members of the NARS staff are now unemployed or working elsewhere. From October 1980 to February 1982 the NARS staff was reduced from 2179 to 1756. There is little hope that the final NARS budget for the current year might be increased, and the outlook for FY 1983 is not very promising. In order to save money for administrative salaries, there has been a reorganization of the Office of the National Archives; diplomatic and legislative records are now combined in the custody of the Legislative and Diplomatic Branch.

5. **National Security Information.** Rep. Glenn English's Subcommittee on Government Information and Individual Rights held a hearing on March 10 regarding proposed revisions of Executive Order 12065 on the classification and declassification of national security information. Professor Anna Nelson, George Washington University, represented historians (including SHAFR) in testifying against the proposed changes. But, on April 2, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12356, only slightly changed from the draft order. Under the new Executive Order, much more information can be classified, it can remain classified indefinitely, and information previously declassified and released to the public can be reclassified. Historians can hope that

implementing directives, soon to be issued by the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), will be more liberal than the Order.

6. State Department Records, 1950-54. The State Department and the Records Declassification Division of NARS have entered into an agreement for NARS term employees to review for declassification the central files (Record Group 59) and post files (Record Group 84) of the State Department for the 1950-54 period. Many of the reviewers were on the staff of the Records Declassification Division, but lost their jobs because of the budget cuts; under the contract, the State Department will be providing most of the funding. For the purpose of the review, the files are being physically transferred to the Archives Building, but they will remain in the legal custody of the State Department until the review project is completed. For the next four years, requests for records dated in the period after 1949 must continue to be made to the Information and Privacy Coordinator of the State Department. Some of the post files (RG 84), already legally accessioned by the National Archives, have been available to researchers for some time, but those records are being re-reviewed under the new guidelines. According to the project director, "any documents previously declassified and released identified in this re-review as potentially requiring continued protection will be brought to the attention of the Department of State, along with information concerning prior release and use, for final determination by the Department as to their disposition."

7. Reclassified Records Re-declassified. Last December Stephen Green of Montpelier, Vt., received 47 pages of documents from the National Archives about Air Force photo reconnaissance of Cyprus and northern Israel in 1953. In February, Edwin A. Thompson, head of the Records Declassification Division, telephoned Green and asked to have the copies returned temporarily for record-keeping purposes. Later, Thompson returned only 36 pages to Green (with portions snipped out of seven other pages) together with an apology for misleading him. Thompson told a reporter there was nothing he could do because the Air Force instructions were so explicit. After a threatened lawsuit by the ACLU, adverse publicity in the **Washington Post** and **Newsweek**, and intervention by the head of the Information Security Oversight Office, Steven Garfinkel, the Air Force re-declassified the documents and returned them all to Green. Although the new Executive Order on national security information permits the reclassification of information the Carter Executive Order, which is in effect until August 1, 1982, specifically prohibits such practices.

8. Records Declassification. Because of general dissatisfaction with the current system of declassifying records and making them available for historical research, some historians have suggested a return to the restricted-access system in existence from 1938 to 1971. During that period, U. S. citizens could apply to the State Department for access to its records, some of which were still security classified; they had to

submit their research notes to the State Department for review, and they could not obtain copies of classified documents. It was a system that was much cheaper to operate than the current one, legitimate secrets were protected, and history could be written based on documentary research.

9. Revamped NCC. At the OAH meeting, presidents and executive secretaries of related historical associations met to discuss the possibility of establishing a national advocacy office in Washington. Such an office could mean either a replacement for the National Coordinating Committee (NCC), which is under the AHA, or result in an expanded role for a more-independent NCC.

10. Advisory Committee. The State Department's Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation met in November 1981, but as of this writing, its report has not yet been released. Arnold Taylor (Howard University), Ernest May (Harvard University), and Gaddis Smith (Yale University) were the historians on the committees; Gary Hess (Bowling Green State University) could not attend the meeting.

--Milton O. Gustafson, National Archives

COUNCIL MINUTES

Minutes of the Council meeting of Wednesday, March 31, 1982, held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, at the annual meetings of the Organization of American Historians, Lawrence E. Gelfand presiding.

In attendance were Council members L. Kaplan, W. LaFeber, A. Offner, S. Taylor, P. Varg, L. Wittner, D. Pletcher. Also in attendance were T. Wilson, W. Cole, W. Cohen, B. Unterberger, W. Brinker, M. Gustafson, T. Buckley, D. Helmstadter, J. S. Walker, W. Slany, L. Ambrosius, and M. Zahniser.

The meeting was called to order by Mr. Gelfand at 8:00 p.m.

Mr. Gelfand informed Council that Fred E. Pollock is the winner of the Bernath Article Prize and that David J. Reynolds is the winner of the Bernath Book Award Competition. An official announcement of the winners would be made at the SHAFR luncheon on Friday.

Mr. Gelfand made a brief announcement of the annual SHAFR meetings to be held at Boston University from August 5-7, and asked Mr. Ambrosius, Program Chair, to report. Mr. Ambrosius believed the program is now well set and likely to be highly interesting to the membership. On two minor program matters Council gave formal advice to Mr. Ambrosius. Mr. Offner of Boston University, Local Arrangements Chair, also reported. Mr. Offner indicated that the local arrangements are in very good order.

Mr. Zahniser brought a number of items before the Council.

1. Membership in SHAFR stands at 870, of which 92 are non U.S. members.

2. Thus far 285 orders have been received for the **Guide to American Foreign Relations since 1700**. (Over 350 orders: 5/15/82—ed.)

3. Members were asked for advice about the best use of endowment monies recently contributed by T.A. Bailey. Following discussion, it seemed best to appoint a committee to study how future endowments can be used most constructively. It is anticipated that others will also wish to give SHAFR endowment funds and the organization should therefore have a well thought out plan for use of such monies. Motion was made and seconded that Mr. Gelfand appoint a committee to study how endowment monies can be best used by SHAFR. The motion passed unanimously.

4. Mr. Zahniser asked Council's advice on how the organization can best handle its present endowment. He explained that since the early 1970's Professors Kuehl and Kaplan and later Professor Hess, have supervised the endowment monies so generously contributed by Dr. and Mrs. Bernath. The funds are now significant and need continuous and professional management. Mr. Zahniser believed that the close supervision given those funds by Mr. Kuehl and others was of such high quality that SHAFR might wish to enlist Mr. Kuehl to continue general oversight of the funds.

Following discussion, Council decided for the present to keep those funds under the general supervision of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. However, on motion Council approved unanimously that Mr. Kuehl, Mr. Hess, and Mr. Varg serve as advisers to Mr. Zahniser on the financial concerns of SHAFR, with the understanding that these advisers will have primary responsibility in managing SHAFR's endowment monies and in soliciting future endowment funds from members or interested parties. Mr. Zahniser indicated he will ask Mr. Kuehl to serve as Chairperson of the Finance Advisory Committee.

5. On motion, Council unanimously granted Mr. W. Kuehl and Mr. L. Kaplan full legal power to handle Bernath endowment monies presently managed by the Akron office of Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner and Smith Inc.

6. On motion, Council unanimously granted Mr. Zahniser and Mr. Kuehl legal authority to write checks on SHAFR's account held with Vanguard Funds (Federal Portfolio). Mr. Cole asked if the organization had considered bonding the Secretary-Treasurer or others entrusted with the Society's funds. Following discussion, it was decided to refer the matter for study and advice to the advisory committee of Professors Kuehl, Hess, and Varg.

7. Mr. Zahniser asked Council's advice on the preparation of materials advertising the Society. Should we prepare brochures, as in the past, or should we use letters that could be constantly updated through use of the word processor? Sentiment expressed indicated the brochures should be updated. Mr. Gelfand indicated he will prepare copy for a new edition of the brochure.

Mr. Gelfand then called on Mr. Patterson for a report of the Search

Committee for an editor of **Diplomatic History**. Mr. Patterson indicated the Committee had received two excellent proposals and applications, and three inquiries. Upon reflection, the Search Committee had decided to recommend Professors George C. Herring, Jr. and Robert Seager II of the University of Kentucky as Editor-in-Chief and Associate Editor of the journal. The University of Kentucky has promised generous financial support of the journal. On motion, Council unanimously approved the Search Committee's recommendation. Mr. Cohen and Mr. Herring will now begin to work out the transfer of duties in an orderly fashion.

Mr. Gelfand then asked Mr. Gustafson to report for the Committee on Government Relations. Mr. Gustafson reported that his Committee had met twice since the last Council meeting. The budget crises within government and a new proposed Executive Order governing access to government documents had been the two major items concerning the Committee.

Mr. Gustafson suggested that SHAFR join a new organization, the "Coalition to Save Our Documentary Heritage." At present the Coalition has enlisted the support of 54 organizations council concurred to the recommendation. A wide ranging discussion then ensued on the probable lamentable consequences of government's increasing tendency to restrict access to documents. Mr. Gustafson will write an explanation of the proposed Executive Order on classifying documents for the SHAFR Newsletter. Mr. W. Slany indicated the Executive Order has now been thoroughly reviewed within government and seems likely to be approved. He believed that tightening budgets and less archival staff also will have a major impact on records accessibility.

Mr. Gustafson suggested that members write letters to their congressman opposing the proposed Executive Order on the grounds (1) that the cost of running a secretive government will be enormous and (2) that unduly protecting records will make it increasingly difficult for the American people to be given a full and candid view of their history.

Mr. Gelfand then called on Mr. Walker to report for the Bernath Book Award Committee. Thirty books had been submitted to the Committee for review, some excellent and some clearly inappropriate. Mr. Walker thought Council should watch the number and type of entries over the next several years. It may be necessary in future years to define more carefully what books are eligible for entry into the prize competition.

Mr. Gelfand asked Mr. Buckley to report on the SHAFR Research Roster. Mr. Buckley stated that a new Roster will appear in December. The present Roster information has been placed on computer and is thus easily updated. Mr. Buckley asked that SHAFR members be urged to submit new information to him on their work and research interests.

Mr. Brinker next reported for the SHAFR **Newsletter**. He asked that the members and officers of the organization keep him fully informed on matters of professional interest so that the **Newsletter** can be as useful as possible.

Mr. Gelfand then asked Council's advice on whether the present and future arrangements with ABC-Clio on the **Guide** should be formalized

and signed. At present there is a memorandum on terms (1979) and some correspondence but no finished contract incorporating the most recent understandings. Following discussion it seemed best to pursue the matter with Bonnie Simrell, Editor-in-Chief of ABC-Clio.

Mr. W. Cohen presented a project to honor the memory of W. Stull Holt.

Council unanimously supported the following resolution:

The Society will be delighted to accept contributions toward the establishment of a W. Stull Holt Traveling Fellowship for Doctoral Research. Such a fellowship would be a fitting memorial to one of SHAFR's earliest and most distinguished members.

The SHAFR Council envisages a nationwide competition for the awards, the first of which may be available for the 1983-84 academic year. The memorial fund must contain a minimum of \$10,000 by 31 August 1982. The target for the fund drive is \$100,000.

Tax deductible contributions should be assigned to SHAFR and sent to:

Professor Warren I. Cohen
Department of History
Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan 48824

After 31 August funds should be sent to:

Professor Marvin Zahniser, Executive Secretary
SHAFR
Department of History
The Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio 43210

Mr. Kaplan then moved the profound thanks of the Council to Mr. Warren Cohen for his exceptionally meritorious work as editor of **Diplomatic History**. Council members, and others present, supported the motion through sustained applause.

Mr. Gelfand raised the issue of whether SHAFR should try to persuade the State Department to sponsor internships for graduate students in diplomatic history. Such training, Mr. Gelfand said, would enhance academic understanding of decision making in the Department of State. Also, should Council give thought about how best to train graduate students in American foreign relations? The hour being late, it was suggested that these important ideas be discussed in a session at one of SHAFR's summer meetings.

The meeting adjourned at 11:00 p.m.

Marvin R. Zahniser
Secretary to Council

ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED, OR SCHOLARLY PAPERS

DELIVERED BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

(Please limit abstracts to a total of twenty (20) lines of **Newsletter** space, or approximately two hundred (200) words. The desire to accommodate as many contributors as possible, plus the overriding problem of space, makes this restriction necessary. Double space all abstracts, and send them as you would have them appear in print. For abstracts of articles, please supply the date, the volume, the number within the volume, and the pages. It would be appreciated if abstracts were not sent until after a paper has been delivered, or an article has been printed. Also, please do not send abstracts which have appeared in **Diplomatic History**, since all SHAFR members already receive the latter publication).

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (University of Edinburgh), "Gladiator of the Shadows," **The Times Higher Education Supplement**, 487 (March 5, 1982), 11-12. This 4,000-word essay is about the CIA and the concept of the "imperial Presidency". It is based on memoirs, press reports, periodical literature, and Congressional documents. It offers an explanation of the rise and fall of covert operations, and outlines the controversy between the CIA's defenders and critics. The essay supplies a critique of the critics in partial explanation of the rehabilitation of the CIA since the late 1970s.

Raymond James Raymond (University of Connecticut), "The Anglo-Irish Talks 1938: A Reappraisal," paper read at the Duquesne History Forum, 15 October 1981. This paper presented a reassessment of these crucial pre-war Anglo-Irish talks which were the prelude to Ireland's diplomatic neutrality during World War II. Apart from reassessing the role of Irish Prime Minister Eamon De Valera, the paper also argued that the talks had an important American dimension that has been ignored. President Franklin D. Roosevelt took an interest in the negotiations and his representatives, Joseph Kennedy, Ambassador to Great Britain, and John Cudahy, Minister of Ireland, played important and constructive roles in moderating the Irish negotiating position and facilitating Anglo-Irish accord.

—"The United States and Terrorism in Ireland 1969-1981," paper presented as the Phi Alpha Theta initiation lecture at the University of Connecticut, 9 December 1981. This paper makes the argument that the United States needs to reassess its traditional "hands off" policy on Northern Ireland; that American strategic interests are being threatened by the Provisional I.R.A.'s developing relations with European terrorist organizations. A number of specific policy recommendations were made including a military and economic aid program for the Republic of Ireland, and stern repressive measures here in the United States against Provisional I.R.A. support groups like NORCID.

—“Eamon De Valera: Diplomatic Failure, Economic Seer?,” paper presented at the International American Committee for Irish Studies-Canadian Association for Irish Studies Conference, University of Vermont, 1 April 1982. This paper, part of a symposium on Eamon De Valera’s role in modern Irish history, suggested that De Valera consistently misread the intentions of the Roosevelt Administration during World War II and overestimated the influence of Irish-Americans on President Roosevelt’s foreign policy. Moreover, by seeking to mobilize Irish-Americans against Lend-Lease, De Valera poisoned United States-Irish relations for over a decade after the war.

Robert H. Keyserlingk (University of Ottawa), “Anschluss oder Besetzung: Der ‘Anschluss’ Oesterreichs 1938-1945 aus der Sicht der USA” (“Annexation or Occupation: The American View of the Anschluss of Austria 1938-1945”), **Zeitgeschichte (Contemporary History)**, Institut for Contemp-History, University of Vienna, Austria), 9.4. (January 1982), 126-140.

It has always been unclear whether or not the USA refused in 1938 to recognize the Anschluss of Austria, although after the war it claimed it had not, invoking to this end the principles of the Stimson Doctrine. However, this article attempts to show that the two editions of the State Department’s **Digest of International Law** (1940’s editor Green H. Hackworth, 1960’s editor Marjorie Whitman) are ambiguous still on this issue. State Department documents from the 1938-1945 period are employed, especially from the office of the State Department’s legal advisor, to indicate that it is probably untrue that the US refused **de jure** recognition of the Anschluss, and that the Stimson Doctrine played no role at all in these considerations.

Michael A. Lutzker (New York University), “Present at the Outbreak: American Witness to World War I,” **Peace and Change, A Journal of Peace Research**, VII (Winter, 1981), 59-70. A re-examination of the widely held view that World War I was greeted by popular enthusiasm, this essay draws upon unpublished letters and diaries, press interviews, and memoirs from a number of the nearly 80,000 Americans traveling in Europe during the Summer of 1914. A complex picture of public responses emerges during the month-long period between the assassination at Sarajevo and the outbreak of hostilities. At first public indignation was confined almost entirely to Austria-Hungary. European leaders invoked their alliances without pressure from below and, as the crisis became aggravated following the ultimatum to Serbia, sought by a variety of means to win popular support. Americans witnessed substantial opposition from Socialists until there were bans on antiwar demonstrations. Those in the countryside saw profound uneasiness as each nation hovered between peace and war. The capitals were considerably more war-like than the provinces; most accounts have generalized too freely from a few large cities. Only the call to mobilize produced in each country a surge of national unity. Monopolization of the channels of information appears all important in convincing the people of each nation that theirs was a defensive war.

The following abstracts are of papers delivered at the April , 1982, meeting of the Organization of American Historians in Philadelphia.

James I. Matray (New Mexico State University), "Strange Bedfellows: Truman's Commitment to Syngman Rhee." Previous writers have argued that Truman's commitment to Syngman Rhee was the product either of "inadvertence" or "design." This paper demonstrates that Rhee's triumph was actually the outgrowth of factors largely beyond the control of the United States. Rising evidence of Moscow's hostile intent coupled with serious instability south of the 38th parallel forced American occupation officials to sacrifice democratic principles in an effort to maintain law and order. Far more important, Rhee earned his victory. During World War II, he had developed friendships with a number of influential individuals who later would assist his rise to power. Rhee also was opportunistic and politically astute, using the twin issue of Soviet expansionism and trusteeship to build support. Finally, Rhee was ruthless in his quest for power, engaging in intimidation, violence, and even murder to guarantee the ultimate realization of his political ambitions. American leaders honestly attempted to prevent Rhee's political victory. In the end, outside factors and the Korean War made Truman and Rhee strange bedfellows in Korea.

Kenneth Moss (staff: House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East), "Oil and Mexican-American Relations, 1942-1943, a Crisis for the Good Neighbor Policy." From 1942 through the summer of 1945 the State Department negotiated futilely to regain participation by American oil companies in Mexico. In 1938 the Mexican government had nationalized the property of seventeen foreign oil companies. The United States accepted a negotiated compensation in late 1941 and agreed with Mexico's right to determine its petroleum laws. What the United States sought but did not obtain was a contract relationship between American companies and the national Mexican petroleum company, Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex).

Despite the pressing demands created by the world war, American policy held to the tenets of the Good Neighbor Policy of the 1930's. American policymakers worked to direct the behavior of American companies in Mexico and adhered strictly to the concept of reciprocity. In turn for official assurances against American interference in Mexico's internal affairs, the United States expected Mexico to offer acceptable terms for American participation. Regardless of the repeated failure to win agreement from Mexico, the State Department pressed the same terms through the end of the negotiations.

The State Department's adherence to the Good Neighbor Policy in Mexico demonstrates one instance where that policy survived the stress of war. Scholars have differed on the endurance of the Good Neighbor after the 1930's. Recent interpretations, like that of Irwin F. Gellman, argue that regional security replaced the commercial aims of the Good Neighbor. In the case of Mexican oil, the search for equitable treatment for American business dominated the 1930's and 1940's.

Stephen G. Rabe (University of Texas at Dallas), "The Venezuelan Oil Law of 1943: An Interpretation of the Good Neighbor Policy." During World War II, the United States mediated between Venezuela and the American oil companies and wrote a new petroleum code for Venezuela. Aside from substantially increasing Venezuela's oil revenues, the oil code of 1943 is noteworthy, for it has been interpreted as a watershed in U.S. diplomatic history. Bryce Wood has argued in his influential study of the Good Neighbor Policy that Washington's diplomacy established as a fundamental principle "that there was a national interest of the United States in its relations with Latin America, different from and superior to the private interests of any sector of business enterprise or of business enterprise as a whole." This paper debates Wood's interpretation of the oil law. It argues that the settlement that took away the oil contractual rights of the oil companies also conferred substantial new benefits upon them and expanded American economic influence in Venezuela. In short, U. S. foreign policy and American business interests in Venezuela did not conflict. The paper is based on research conducted in the United States, Great Britain, and Venezuela.

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Colgate), "Sino-Japanese Trade in the Postwar Years: Politics and Prosperity." The question of sanctioning trade between an American-occupied Japan and a Communist China became, in the late 1940s, an issue which both shaped and reflected fundamental currents of American foreign policy in Asia. Historians have identified these years as a time of growing tensions culminating in and symbolized by NSC 68. But the development of American policies toward Communist China and Sino-Japanese trade belie these assumptions. American State Department officials argued that Japanese economic recovery depended upon a "considerable volume" of trade with the mainland and judged the threat to Japan's security posed by communist contagion from China less serious than continued economic imbalance. This view received significant support from official and private Japanese interests and, surprisingly, from the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers, General Douglas MacArthur and his staff in Tokyo. American policy makers also saw Sino-Japanese trade as facilitating contacts with the Chinese Communists who, they hoped, might be encouraged to maintain a degree of independence from Moscow. Communist Chinese efforts to promote Sino-Japanese trade, moreover, gave impetus to such speculation. American military and intelligence circles vehemently opposed taking the risk but until the outbreak of the Korean War, State Department officials managed to keep these more bellicose elements under control.

Charles M. Dobbs (Metropolitan State College), "Korea: the Symbolic Commitment." By June 1949, the Truman Administration nearly had exhausted the prestige-protecting alternatives to ending ties between the United States and Korea. The final attempt encompassed the

refurbishing of a 1947 aid program; prompt passage would help the Korean economy and enable American disengagement from the peninsula.

The acrimonious China debate delayed the Korean bill until December when it coincided with extraordinary events. Chiang fled to Formosa, Acheson excluded Korea and Formosa from the American defense perimeter; Alger Hiss was convicted of perjury. To secure passage, the administration raised the rhetorical stakes and agreed to link Korean aid with continued aid to Chiang. Instead of completing disengagement, the Truman Administration found that the bill led to increased support for conservative dictators and opposition to the tide of Asian nationalism. Circumstances surrounding the act's passage thus had tremendous consequences in Eastern Asia for the next twenty-five years.

Michael Schaller (University of Arizona), "Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment in Southeast Asia." During the two years preceding the Korean War, American officials grew increasingly concerned with the clouded economic future of Occupied Japan. Although America had committed itself to a short term recovery program resembling the E.R.P., U.S. capital and raw materials could not reconnect Japan to its traditional sources of raw materials and markets in Northeast Asia or the former empire. A Japan dependent on relatively expensive dollar sources of supply, they reasoned, could never achieve self-sufficiency or long-term growth. Conversely, if raw-material hungry Japan turned towards its traditional links with now Communist controlled Northeast Asia, it might become a permanent hostage to the Soviet Union and China. Between 1948 and 1950, therefore, economic strategists in both the Army and State Departments took the lead in promoting Japan-Southeast Asian regional integration. American aid and policy, they believed, could forge regional links between primary production in Southeast Asia and export-oriented industry in Japan. This would not only alleviate the need for scarce dollars, but would enhance creation of a regional anti-Communist containment barrier as the European colonial powers departed. This vision of a U.S. sanctioned Co-Prosperity Sphere underlay many of the decisions made regarding Japan and Southeast Asia immediately before June 1950.

LAST MINUTE NEWS

The Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, announces a conference October 14 and 15, 1982 on "Leadership in NATO: Past and Present." Among those participating will be General Lemintzer, Ambassador Cleveland, and SHAFR's Lawrence Kaplan.

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Richard Dean Burns, editor

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
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SHAFR'S CALENDAR

- July 23-24, 1982 The 4th annual convention of SHEAR (Society for Historians of the Early American Republic) will meet at Memphis State University.
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September **Newsletter**.
- August 5-7 The 8th annual conference of SHAFR will be held at Boston University.
- August 18-21 The 75th meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association will be held at Mills College, Oakland, California.
- November 1 Deadline, materials for December **Newsletter**.
- November 1-15 Annual elections for officers of SHAFR.
- November 3-6 The 48th annual meeting of the Southern Historical Association will meet at Memphis with headquarters at the Peabody Hotel.
Program Chairman:
Prof. Robert W. Johannsen
Department of History
University of Illinois
Urbana, Illinois 61801
- December 1 Deadline, nominations for the 1983 Bernath Memorial lectureship.
- December 27-30 The 97th annual convention of the AHA will be held in Washington, D.C. Deadline for proposals has passed.
- January 1, 1983 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
- January 15 Deadline, nominations for the 1982 Bernath article award.
- February 1 Deadline, nominations for the 1982 Bernath book prize.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for the March **Newsletter**.
- April 6-9 The 76th annual meeting of the OAH will be held in Cincinnati with the headquarters at the Stouffer's Towers and the Cincinnati Convention-Exposition Center. Deadline for proposals has passed.

May 1

Deadline, materials for the June **Newsletter**.

(The 98th annual meeting of the AHA will be held in San Francisco.)

Program Chairman:

Prof. Bertram Wyatt-Brown

Case Western Reserve University

Cleveland, Ohio

(The 77th annual meeting of the OAH will be held in Los Angeles.)

Proposals should be sent to:

OAH Program Committee

University of Maryland

College Park, MD 20742

Deadline for proposals is March, 1983.

PUBLICATIONS IN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

Lester D. Langley (University of Georgia), **The United States and the Caribbean in the Twentieth Century**. 1982. University of Georgia Press. (Revised Edition). \$22; paperback, \$10.

Burton I. Kaufman (Kansas State University), **Trade and Aid: Eisenhower's Foreign Economic Policy, 1953-1961**. 1982. John Hopkins University Press. \$25.

Robert L. Messer (University of Illinois), **The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War**. 1982. University of North Carolina Press. \$19.95.

Robert F. Smith (University of Toledo), **United States and the Latin American Sphere of Influence**. Vol. 1, **Era of Caribbean Interventions, 1898-1930**; Vol. 2, **Era of Good Neighbors, Cold Warriors, and Hairshirts, 1930-1980**. 1981. Kreiger Publishing Co.

Ralph B. Levering (Earlham College), **The Cold War, 1945-1972**. 1982. Harlan Davidson, Inc. Paperback, \$5.95.

Michael Schaller (University of Arizona), **The U. S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945**. 1979. Columbia University Press. Paperback edition, 1982, \$10.

Russell D. Buhite (University of Oklahoma), **Soviet-American Relations in Asia, 1945-1954**. 1981. University of Oklahoma Press. \$14.95.

Frederick W. Marks (Forest Hills, N.Y.), **Velvet on Iron: the Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt**. 1982. University of Nebraska. Paperback edition, \$5.95.

David Reynolds (Cambridge University), **The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-1941: A Study in Competitive Co-Operation**. 1982. University of North Carolina Press. \$28.

Richard A. Melanson, ed. (Kenyon College), **Neither Cold War nor Detente? Soviet-American Relations in the 1980s**. 1982. University of Virginia Press. Includes an essay by John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University). \$14.95; paperback \$4.95.

Jules Davids, ed. (Georgetown University), **The Sino-Japanese War to the Russo-Japanese War 1894-1905**, series 3 of **American Diplomatic and Public Papers: The United States and China**. 1982. 14 vols. Scholarly Resources. \$795.

Gregg Herken (Yale University), **The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950**. 1982. Vintage Book. Paperback, \$7.95.

Waldo Heinrichs (Temple University) and Hugh De Santis, "The Evolution of a Dinosaur: The Department of State and American Foreign Policy," in **The Times Survey of the Foreign Ministries of the World**, Zara Steiner, general editor. Meckler Publishing. \$87.50 for set.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Martin V. Melosi (Texas A & M) **Garbage in the Cities: Refuse, Reform and the Environment, 1880-1980**. 1982. Texas A & M University Press. \$21.50.

John E. Wiltz (Indiana University); second edition by Nancy C. Cridland, **Books in American History. A Basic List for High Schools and Junior Colleges**. 1981. Indiana University Press, Midland Books no. 266. 1981. \$12.95, paper \$5.95.

CORRECTION

Corrections and an apology to Sally Marks, who is at Rhode Island College, not Falls Church, Va.: the correct title of her book is **Innocent Abroad: Belgium at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919**; the book was published by the University of North Carolina Press in 1981, not 1980; and it was awarded the George Louis Beer Prize in international history by the AHA in 1981. (Professor Marks, do we have this correct finally?)

PERSONALS

Martin V. Melosi (Texas A & M) has been named a Fellow to the National Humanities Center, North Carolina, for 1982-1983. He will complete a book entitled "Energy and Environment in Industrial America, 1830-1980."

Michael Ebner (Lake Forest College) as president of the Illinois Council for the Promotion of History has arranged a series of conferences in Illinois.

Kenneth B. Moss is now a staff associate with the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East (which is part of the House Foreign Affairs Committee).

Robert Schulzinger (U of Colorado) is currently an International Affairs Fellow on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Peter J. Beck (Kingston Polytechnic, England) has been awarded a Nuffield Foundation research grant for his study of the role of Antarctica in international politics 1900-41. The award enabled him to visit Australian and New Zealand archives at the close of 1981; French, Norwegian, and USA archives will be used in 1982.

Raymond James Raymond (University of Connecticut) received a faculty research fellowship from the University of Connecticut for summer 1982 to complete research for a book "America, Ireland and the Cold War 1945-1955." He has also received an Andrew Mellon Visiting Faculty Fellowship in History at Yale University where he will work under Professor John Morton Blum during the 1982-83 academic year. In January 1982 Dr. Raymond lectured at the University of Sibiu, Romania, on topics in U. S. foreign relations under Fulbright program auspices.

Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State) presented the eighth Walter Schnackenberg Memorial lecture at Pacific Lutheran on 15 March. Cohen plans his fourth "annual" trip to China in late September and reports that he has been invited to give lectures in Japan in October and at a conference in Taipei in December.

Mordechai Rozanski (Pacific Lutheran) will become Associate Dean at the Center for International Studies at Adelphi University.

George C. Herring (Kentucky) presented two papers at the Tennessee Consortium for Asian Studies held at Tennessee Tech on April 23-24.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

A quick reading of the AHA **Newsletter** of February 1982 reveals that SHAFR members are well represented on AHA committees for 1982. They are:

Sam Wells (Woodrow Wilson Center)	--- Professional Division
Joan Hoff-Wilson (OAH-Indiana)	--- Research Division
Walter LaFeber (Cornell)	--- Research Division
Betty Unterberger (Texas A & M)	--- Nominating Committee
Norman Graebner (Virginia)	--- Harmsworth Professorship
Alexander DeConde (California, Santa Barbara)	--- George Louis Beer Prize
Maurice Matloff (Kensington, MD)	--- First Books Program
Gary Hess (Bowling Green)	--- Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation
Ernest May (Harvard)	--- Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

* * * * *

Hofstra University will sponsor an "Interdisciplinary Conference in Anticipation of the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of Harry S. Truman" on April 14, 15, and 16, 1983. The conference committee welcomes papers dealing with the life, career, and Presidency of Harry S. Truman from scholars in the various and relevant disciplines. For information write:

Natalie Datlof & Alexej Ugrinsky
University Center for Cultural & Intercultural Studies
Hofstra University
Hempstead, NY 11550

* * * * *

The OAH has approved the creation of a book prize award in the name of Richard W. Leopold. The prize will be for the best book written by a historian connected with federal, state or municipal government in the areas of foreign policy, military affairs broadly construed, the historical activities of the federal government or biography. The amount of the prize will be determined by the total endowment available. SHAFR members who might wish to contribute can send checks made out to the OAH - Leopold Fund to the Organization of American Historians, 112 North Bryan Street, Bloomington, IN 47401.

* * * * *

On 31 March 1982, the Council of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) voted unanimously in support of the following resolution:

The Society will be delighted to accept contributions toward the establishment of a W. Stull Holt Traveling Fellowship for Doctoral Research. Such a fellowship would be a fitting memorial to one of SHAFR's earliest and most distinguished members.

The SHAFR Council envisages a nationwide competition for the awards, the first of which may be available for the 1983-84 academic year. The memorial fund must contain a minimum of \$10,000 by 31 August 1982. The target for the fund drive is \$100,000.

Tax-deductible contributions should be assigned to SHAFR and sent to:

Professor Warren I. Cohen
Department of History
Michigan State University
East Lansing, Michigan 48824

After 31 August send checks to:

Professor Marvin Zahniser, Executive Secretary
SHAFR
Department of History
Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio 43210

THE 1982 GILBERT CHINARD PRIZES

The Gilbert Chinard awards are made jointly by the Institut Francais de Washington and the Society for French Historical Studies for distinguished scholarly books or manuscripts in the history of Franco-American relations by Canadian or American authors. Historical studies in any area or period are acceptable, including critical editions of significant source materials. The Gilbert Chinard Prize of \$750. is awarded annually for a book or manuscript in page-proof, the Incentive Award of \$250. for an unpublished book-length manuscript, generally by a younger scholar. The Institut Francais de Washington funds the Prize; a committee of the Society for French Historical Studies determines the winners.

Deadline for the 1982 award is December 1, and five copies of each entrant should be sent to:

Professor John McV. Haight Jr.
Chairman, Chinard Prize Committee
Department of History, Maginnes No. 9
Lehigh University
Bethlehem, PA 18015

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The MacArthur Memorial, the MacArthur Memorial Foundation, and Old Dominion University will sponsor the fifth in a series of symposia on the occupation of Japan, "The Occupation of Japan: The International Context," October 21-22, 1982 in Norfolk, Virginia. Nine papers will be presented on the Allied Council, the British Commonwealth and the occupation, the role of Japan in the U.S.-Asian security policy, and the peace treaty. The program and additional details will be mailed by June 1982. Anyone who is interested in attending the symposium but who is not on the MacArthur Memorial's mailing list is invited to write to the Secretary, MacArthur Memorial, MacArthur Square, Norfolk, Virginia 23510.

HISTORICAL SERIES

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has published its executive session transcripts for 1959, in Volume XI of its "Historical Series." The Berlin Crisis dominated other issues that year.

The 1959 volume also covers the transition of leadership in the State Department from John Foster Dulles to Christian Herter, and in the Foreign Relations Committee from Theodore Green to J. William Fulbright. Testimony released in this volume includes CIA Director Allen Dulles speaking on Cuba, Tibet, and Iraq; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Nathan Twining on Quemoy and Matsu; Averell Harriman on conditions in the Soviet Union; and Paul Nitze on the emerging nations of Africa. Other hearings deal with the controversial nomination of Clare Booth Luce to be Ambassador to Brazil, first sponsored by and then opposed by Senator Wayne Morse. The volume concludes with a briefing on the situation in Laos and an investigation into corruption in the United States aid program to South Vietnam.

New procedures adopted by the Department of State considerably slowed declassification of the 1959 transcripts and resulted in more deletions than in any previous volume in the series. However, after negotiations the Foreign Relations Committee was able to reduce significantly the number of the deletions that the Department of State had requested. The Committee agreed to remove certain material that might be considered offensive to United States allies or reveal methods of gathering intelligence, but insisted upon inclusion of all testimony relating to broad policy-making matters. The new arrangements reached as a result of these negotiations for the 1959 volume should facilitate future declassification, and the Committee expects to publish its 1960 transcripts later this year.

The Committee makes a limited number of copies of the "Historical Series" available at no charge. Researchers interested in obtaining the 1959 volume and other volumes still in stock should contact the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, United States Senate, Washington, D. C., 20510.

As announced at the Philadelphia OAH:
THE BERNATH WINNERS

The Bernath Book Prize winner:

Dr. David J. Reynolds (Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge University). **The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance, 1937-1941: A Study in Competitive Co-operation** (London: Europa Publications, 1981 and University of North Carolina Press, 1982).

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The Bernath Article Prize winner:

Mr. Fred E. Pollock (Cedar Knolls, NJ), "Roosevelt, the Ogdensburg Agreement, and the British Fleet: All Done With Mirrors," **Diplomatic History**, Vol. 5, No. 3, Summer 1981.

* * * * *

The Bernath Lecturer for the OAH meeting in 1983 is Dr. Melvyn P. Leffler, Associate Professor of History at Vanderbilt University.

**THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK
COMPETITION FOR 1982**

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition was initiated in 1972 by Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in memory of their late son. Administered by SHAFR, the purpose of the competition and the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing of a lengthy nature by young scholars in the field of U.S. diplomacy.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: the prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1982. It must be the author's first or second book. Authors are not required to be members of SHAFR, nor do they have to be professional academicians.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. William Stinchcombe, Department of History, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N. Y. 13210. The works must be received no later than February 1, 1983.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$500.00 If two (2) or more writers are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be in Cincinnati.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

- 1972 Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
- 1973 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
- 1974 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
- 1975 Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
Stephen E. Petz (U of Massachusetts-Amherst)
- 1976 Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
- 1977 Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
- 1978 James R. Leutz (North Carolina)
- 1979 Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston, MA)
- 1980 Michael Schaller (U of Arizona)
- 1981 Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke)
Hugh DeSantis (Dept. of State)
- 1982 David Reynolds (Cambridge U)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE FOR THE BEST SCHOLARLY ARTICLE IN U.S. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Award for scholarly articles in American foreign affairs was set up in 1976 through the kindness of the young Bernath's parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, and it is administered through selected personnel of SHAFR. The objective of the award is to identify and to reward outstanding research and writing by the younger scholars in the area of U.S. diplomatic relations

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to the author of any article upon any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1982. The article must be among the author's first five (5) which have seen publication. Membership in SHAFR or upon a college/university faculty is not a prerequisite for entering the competition. Authors must be under thirty-five (35) years of age, or within five (5) years after receiving the doctorate, at the time the article was published. Previous winners of the S.L. Bernath book award are ineligible.

PROCEDURES: Articles shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR, Five (5) copies of each article (preferably reprints) should be sent to the chairman of the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee by January 15, 1983. The Chairman of the Committee for 1982 is Sr. Rachel West, Department of History, Marian College, Indianapolis, IN 46222.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$200.00. If two (2) or more authors are considered winners, the prize will be shared. The name of the successful writer(s) will be announced, along with the name of the victor in the Bernath book prize competition, during the luncheon for members of SHAFR, to be held at the annual OAH Convention, meeting in 1983, at Cincinnati.

AWARD WINNERS

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|------|--|
| 1977 | John C. A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.) |
| 1978 | Michael H. Hunt (Yale) |
| 1979 | Brian L. Villa (U of Ottawa, Canada) |
| 1980 | James I. Matray (New Mexico State University)
David A. Rosenberg (U of Chicago) |
| 1981 | Douglas Little (Clark U) |
| 1982 | Fred Pollack (Cedar Knolls, N.J.) |

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL LECTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship was established in 1976 through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and is administered by a special committee of SHAFR. The Bernath Lecture is the feature at the official luncheon of the Society, held during the OAH convention in April of each year.

DESCRIPTION AND ELIGIBILITY: The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address, delivered at the annual meeting with the AHA, but is restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer is expected to concern himself/herself not specifically with his/her own research interests, but with broad issues of importance to students of American foreign relations. The award winner must be under forty-one (41) years of age.

PROCEDURES: The Bernath Lectureship Committee is now soliciting nominations for the 1984 award from members of the Society agents, publishers, or members of any established history, political science, or journalism organization. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vitae, if available, should reach the Committee no later than December 1, 1982. The Chairman of the Committee, and the person to whom nominations should be sent, is Dr. Richard E. Welch, J., Department of History, Lafayette College, Easton, PA 18042.

HONORARIUM: \$300.00 with publication of the lecture assured in the SHAFR **Newsletter**.

AWARD WINNERS

- 1977 Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
- 1978 David S. Patterson (Colgate)
- 1979 Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
- 1980 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
- 1981 Burton Spivak (Bates College)
- 1982 Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William Brinker, Department of History, Tennessee Tech, Cookeville, Tennessee 38501

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: Jeanette Keith Denning, Tennessee Tech.

ISSUES: The **Newsletter** is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December. All members receive the publication.

DEADLINE: All material must be in the office of the editor not later than four (4) weeks prior to the date of publication.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of most back numbers of the **Newsletter** are available and may be obtained from the editorial office upon the payment of a service charge of 75¢ per number. If the purchaser lives abroad, the charge is \$1.00 per number.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, honors, awards), announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered--or published--upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting the use of diplomatic materials in various (especially foreign) depositories, biographies and autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field of U. S. diplomacy, and even jokes (for fillers) if upon diplomatic topics. Authors of "straight" diplomatic articles should send their opuses to **Diplomatic History**. Space limitations forbid the carrying of book reviews by the **Newsletter**.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

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|------|---|
| 1968 | Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford) |
| 1969 | Alexander De Conde (U of California--Santa Barbara) |
| 1970 | Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern) |
| 1971 | Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana) |
| 1972 | Norman A. Graebner (Virginia) |
| 1973 | Wayne S. Cole (Maryland) |
| 1974 | Bradford Perkins (Michigan) |
| 1975 | Armin H. Rappaport (U of California--San Diego) |
| 1976 | Robert A. Divine (Texas) |
| 1977 | Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane) |
| 1978 | Akira Iriye (Chicago) |
| 1979 | Paul A. Varg (Michigan State) |
| 1980 | David M. Pletcher (Indiana) |
| 1981 | Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State) |

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