

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Founded in 1967. Chartered in 1972.

PRESIDENT: Lawrence E. Gelfand, Department of History, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52243.

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CHAIRMAN, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS COMMITTEE: Wayne S. Cole, Department of History, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742

MEMBERSHIP: Anyone interested in U. S. diplomatic history is invited to become a member of SHAFR. Annual dues are \$12.50, payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Fees for students are \$6.00, for retired members are \$8.00, and institutional affiliations are \$30.00. Life memberships are \$175.00. In the case of membership by a husband-wife team dues, one of them shall be one-half that of the regular price.

MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in August. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZES: The Society administers three awards a year, all of them in honor of the late Stuart L. Bernath and all of them financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California. The details of each of these awards are given under the appropriate headings of each issue of the **Newsletter**.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors two printed works of a quarterly nature, the **Newsletter**, and **Diplomatic History**, a journal; a **Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects** is published occasionally.

Citations and Archives: A Response to British Criticisms by an American Historian

by Terry Anderson (Texas A&M University)

One must applaud recent attempts by British historians to erect a sensible system for citing and locating documents in the Public Record Office. Hopefully, Robert Frazier, Victor Rothwell, and Peter Beck will be able to accomplish their task of initiating "a system of citation facilitating academic communication between historians on both sides of the Atlantic." But I question the approach used by Rothwell and Beck, especially their criticism of my recent book, **The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947**. Rothwell criticized me in a February 1982 review in the **Times Literary Supplement** for "erecting an unnecessary barrier" between sources and readers. In the June issue of the **SHAFR Newsletter** Beck repeats the charge, infers that my citations waste the time of historians, and uses my book as the case in his article "British Government Archives: The Case for the 'Piece and File' System of Citation."

I am amazed that **The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War** has received "footnote" publicity in the United Kingdom. I suspected or at least hoped that Britishers would be interested in the interpretation, the first based on official British postwar documents—that the United Kingdom played a much more important role in the evolution of American policy toward the Soviet Union than previously thought, and that British documents support some contentions of traditional historians and also the revisionists' ideas that the Truman Administration used economic and atomic diplomacy against Moscow. Instead, and with some exceptions such as Paul Dukes, British historians seem unprovoked by these ideas, and more interested in my citations.

Thus, I feel obligated to respond to British charges, and offer a suggestion for historians of foreign affairs.

My research at the Public Record Office was conducted during 1977 and 1978. At that time officials there did not issue information sheets listing any "accepted" way of citing documents. I cited author, date, and its piece number in record group 371. A typical citation read: Minute by Sargent, 17 February 1947, FO records, R2523/34/19G. In other words, I listed the "piece" but not the "file" number that one finds by taking the piece number to an index at the PRO. I used this method for two reasons—it was the common one used by historians at that time, and it would be easier for an editor than the longer citation of piece and file.

Three years after my last research trip, in December 1981, Robert Frazier published a short article in the **SHAFR Newsletter**. He stated that some historians are using the piece method, that others are employing the piece and file system, and he advocated the latter.

I agree with Frazier, and urge all to adopt the piece and file system. This practice would facilitate the search process, especially for documents requested by mail. Furthermore, I suggest that SHAFR elect a committee or hire a historian to survey the national archives of all major countries. Working with archivists at those institutions, that person could compile a list of recommended citations which would become standard for editors, archivists, and historians. The list would be published as an article or series of articles in **Diplomatic History**. Reprints could be produced as a pamphlet and sold by the organization or at the depositories for a few dollars, eventually "overloading the coffers" of SHAFR.

With this guide, historians might end bickering over citations, and instead spend time in a more important way—discussing issues and interpretations.

TURNING THE TABLES: STATE DEPARTMENT OPINION OF DIPLOMATIC HISTORIANS DURING WORLD WAR II

by Mark A. Stoler (University of Vermont)

Assessments of American diplomats are quite commonplace in historical writing. Implicitly or explicitly, we all evaluate the work of the diplomats we study, and our subsequent judgments fill the scholarly journals and bookshelves. But a diplomat's counter-assessment of historians is another matter. Many of us do not expect to be read, let alone "rated" by our subjects, and would be quite surprised to discover summary evaluations of our work in State Department files.

At least one such evaluation does exist, and it is reproduced below for the edification and amusement of SHAFR members. As part of its postwar planning program during World War II, the State Department hired as consultants numerous experts in different aspects of international affairs. At one point, it apparently considered hiring diplomatic historians, for on August 23, 1943, Harley Notter forwarded to Leo Pasvolsky, Director of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, an assessment of a broad range of possible consultants which included a section evaluating some of our most eminent senior colleagues. The copy of that memorandum reproduced below is taken from Box 8 of the Notter files, Record Group 59, State Department General Records, National Archives, Washington, D.C.

One is tempted after reading this memorandum to make a host of sarcastic comments, but I have decided to forego that luxury and instead let each of you evaluate for yourself what such a document says about Notter and the Department as well as our colleagues. One "lesson from the past" is unavoidable, however: before your next indictment of an American diplomat, remember that he or his successors may actually read what you have written and seek appropriate revenge.

(The document cited by Professor Stoler is four pages in length. I shall try to maintain the spacing of the original. --the editor)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Division of Political Studies

August 23, 1943

Secret

SA: Mr. Pasvolsky

I think we have exhausted so far as presently possible the consideration, aside from members of the Federal Courts, of persons of distinguished competence and reputation in American diplomatic history, international organization, international law, and the American political scene.

The status of developments to date is that, of the possible special consultants to come at irregular intervals, one has been selected and four more favorably considered, as follows:

1. John W. Davis, selected
2. Charles Cheney Hyde
3. Manly O. Hudson
4. Joseph P. Chamberlain
5. Quincy Wright, with some doubt

One further man is under favorable examination:

6. Henry M. Wriston

Investigation, with the injunction that it be cautiously conducted, has begun in regard to the following:

Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford University)
Charles C. Tansill (Catholic University)
Quincy Wright (Chicago University)

**ADDITIONAL PERSONS
FOR CONSIDERATION**

In addition to the nominations already submitted to you in a joint study by various members of PS, coordinated by Mr. Rothwell, offers some additional nominees and an evaluation of some whose names have previously been suggested.

American Diplomatic History

Combining persons already mentioned to you with new nominees the list stands as follows:

Thomas A. Bailey
Samuel Flagg Bemis
Julius I. Pratt
Denna Frank Fleming
James Fred Rippy
Henry S. Commager
Edward Meade Earle

On these men my own evaluation is that Bemis, while a realist and a highly competent scholar, lacks ability to work with people, good practical judgment, and respect for the Department. Bailey, while extremely well-informed on facts and personalities of American foreign relations, and possessing great facility in writing, in coining phrases and in popularizing foreign affairs, lacks understanding of the forces operative in the modern world and conceives foreign relations wholly as something conducted between foreign offices or between various officials and their opposite numbers.

Pratt, whose name has been added, is vigorous, flexible, and well-grounded in current developments but lacks brilliance and distinction. Fleming is competent and well-informed and currently interested in Far Eastern affairs, but is quite inflexible. Rippy has a broader interest than his field of writing (Latin America) has shown so far, and he has substantial judgment. Commager, whose name appeared on the original list, has an excellent grasp of modern forces, sound judgment, and skill in writing simply and clearly. I understand, however, that his capacity to work with other men is not as great as that of some of the other nominees. Earle has excellent personal qualifications but until recently has been primarily concerned with the European scene rather than with the American. In neither of the latter cases, however, do I know the men's defects well enough to feel sure in presenting estimates.

Of all these men Bemis and Bailey are the most antagonistic to the British and to the President's policy, but for different motives—Bemis for strong nationalist reasons, and Bailey because of his suspicion of foreign entanglements and of anything identifiable as idealistic in the Wilsonian sense.

The American Political Scene

The two best qualified men are:

Arthur N. Holcombe (Harvard)
Edgar Eugene Robinson (Stanford)

Holcombe is a man of penetrating knowledge, good judgment, and wide acquaintance with government and prominent persons in public life. He is interested internationally in dependent areas. Robinson is a man of substantial and independent judgment in public affairs, has intimate knowledge both of Republican and Democratic personalities and parties and political behavior the country over, and has deep interest in, and good sense about American foreign relations. He could make a solid contribution. Further materials on these men and on John M. Gaus (Wisconsin) and John D. Hicks (California), alternate nominees, are attached.

International Law

In international law there are no new nominations but some additional evaluative material on the men already named. Mr. Edwin Dickinson appears to be particularly worthy of consideration. He is regarded as being very able, and practically on a par with Jessup when one balances their relative strengths and weaknesses. His appointment would give representation to the West. Further information on these men and on two relatively weak alternates is attached. The possible nomination of John Foster Dulles in this field would require further study. Manley O. Hudson and Charles Cheney Hyde presumably need no further comment at this time.

International Organization

In international organization Joseph P. Chamberlain seems to be outstanding although he is well advanced in years (70). (In recent months he has been very much absorbed in problems of municipal law.) The appointment of Mr. John Foster Dulles would be as much for reasons connected with the Federal Council of Churches as anything else, and presumably merits consideration from that point of view more than from the standpoint of tangible contribution to the literature on the subject. There are no other satisfactory nominations to suggest beyond the possibility of Arthur Sweetser, unless it be Frederick Sherwood Dunn. Dunn has a distinguished record and is very able. He is somewhat retiring, however, and his national reputation is not as great as that of the other men. While Clyde Eagleton is mentioned in the attached memorandum he would be more suitable for the staff and is under consideration. Payson S. Wild, although very promising and competent is not old enough or sufficiently established to justify the senior status of special consultant. General Frank R. McCoy, now President of the Foreign Policy Association, aged 69, has a keen and constructive mind on security organization and would probably merit study.

Henry M. Wriston fails to fit into any one of these fields. He rather overlaps between the American political scene and international organization, and really is just a thoughtful American interested in world affairs, with knowledge gained from general reading and university activity. While he has written a book, and therefore has the merit of having put his ideas in some systematic form, some other men in university presidencies might be regarded as stronger appointments from a political point of view.

PS:Notter:DBM

Harley Notter was a former historian who had become Chief of the Department's Division of Political Studies.--MAS

GLOSSY DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

by

Robert D. Schulzinger (University of Colorado, Boulder)

This is the fourth critique in the **Newsletter** series. (See June 1980, September 1981, and December 1981).

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: A HISTORY, Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan. Lexington, Massachusetts and Toronto, Ontario: D.C. Heath and Company, 1977.

One of the most infuriating observations in **America Revised**, Frances Fitzgerald's otherwise superb demolition of high school history textbooks, is that their physical beauty subverts their message. What student could gaze at several hundred pages of attractive layout, multicolored charts, and glossy photographs, she asks, and swallow the liberal writers' point that the American past reveals a depressing tale of violence, nativism, and betrayed hopes? I doubt that she wants to see dowdy looking textbooks, and few students gnash their teeth along with Fitzgerald at the war between package and content. She hit the bullseye, though, when she noted how modern industrial printing changed the looks of textbooks.

American Foreign Policy takes advantage of the state of the printer's art. Thomas Paterson (University of Connecticut) and his collaborators, J. Gary Clifford (Connecticut) and Kenneth J. Hagan (Naval Academy), must have reasoned that diplomatic history need not be as dull as publishers made it look. Where the competition served unappetizing black blocks of type spiced now and then with flashy writing, occasional cartoons, and smudgy photos, the people at Heath gave students a book they might want to look at. While the trim size of the book, 7½" X 9 1/16", is large by anybody's standards, the prose covers less than five inches of the width. Six hundred words is the maximum that ever appears on a

single page, but most have far fewer. The remainder of the space is filled with stunning prospective maps, sharp photos of people, places and warships (especially warships), clear chronological charts, sensible lists of participants, clever caricatures, overly clever running heads, and blessed wide white margins.

The result is a glossy survey of the people who created policy, the main events of diplomacy, and the major writings of diplomatic historians. Does it present a convincing and coherent view of American foreign relations? No, not completely, but that may not have been uppermost in the authors' minds. Besides wanting the book to look good, they hoped to elaborate anecdotes in more than a phrase or paragraph. Anyone who has lectured to the would-be secretaries of state who take diplomatic history knows that plenty of the students have been drawn to the subject by stirring war stories. Paterson et al. introduce each of the fifteen chapters with a "diplomatic crossroad." These vignettes cover such subjects as the 1782 negotiations with Britain, the sinking of the **Lusitania**, the 1931 Manchurian crisis, FDR's meeting with Churchill in Placentia Bay, and Nixon's trip to China. Too many of them, about a third, have a nautical theme, but they are all lively, lucid, and have something to do with the more compressed narrative that follows. Students seem to like them, even if some of them wonder what these illustrations illustrate. A few wish the rest of the text went into equal depth, while the same number skip over them altogether.

American Foreign Policy also pays respect to historiography, something repulsive to most undergraduates. Since analyses of the interplay between current events and historical memory sap the morale of most college students, Paterson tries the indirect approach of selecting an appropriate point from a professional historian to illuminate a point. Students probably do not know that their text provides them with the best of current writing on American foreign relations, but their professors might. Students can, if they wish, painlessly acquire bibliography even if **American Foreign Policy** does not explain why historians write as they do.

Paterson has a go at integrating the personalities of participants into their decisions. At times, notably in a section on "The Conservative Shapers of the American Empire, 1900-1914," the narrative itself connects the background, training, and outlook of diplomats and politicians to what they did in office. But readers find personality interesting for its own sake, even if they cannot follow a thread from style to action. **American Foreign Policy** feeds this healthy prurience with well-crafted captions under the pictures and cartoons. This technique undermines coherence, but that may even be the point: it is not possible to fit everything into the text. One subliminal result may be to reinforce the traditional complaints about the messiness of American foreign policy and, more seriously for the professoriat, to the sloppiness of attempts to explain it.

American Foreign Policy includes important issues outside the traditional sphere of what one clerk wrote to another. There is a discussion of the student anti-war movement of the sixties which probably struck a responsive chord a few years ago and may soon stir student blood again. Paterson does a better job than most in offering glimpses of the effects of American actions on the opinions of foreigners. He quotes where possible from non-American books and throws in a few foreign cartoons. The authors include a bit of international economics, but they know how quickly that topic glazes eyes and do not press.

Nonetheless, most of the book covers well-trod ground, explaining how the United States got involved in its wars, how it fought them, where it came out, how its citizens reflected on combat, and what difference it all made. Fitzgerald noted and then deplored the fact that the best of the school books superimposed modern interpretation onto a traditional outline. **American Foreign Policy**, among the best of the college texts, does the same thing for undergraduates. That should be acknowledged without Fitzgerald's handwringing.

The first edition had its share of factual blunders, e.g. the authors had the 1905 Portsmouth conference convene a year before it really met and a naval war buff assured me after class one day that the caption identifying the U.S.S. **Essex** got the tonnage of that vessel wrong. These are hardly capital crimes. More to the point was the lack of a paperback edition split into two volumes. Most of the enrollment in diplomatic history courses comes in the twentieth century portion. While it makes sense to insist that students know some background, it's hard to suppress their outraged howls at the price of books.

Paterson and his collaborators expound a moderate revision. Their interpretation of late 19th century imperialism, the origins of the Cold War, and the agonies of Vietnam represent middle of the road sixties anti-war liberalism. The 1977 version appeared before neo-conservative Vietnam revisionism became the basis of current foreign policy, but the authors did seem to anticipate Eisenhower's rehabilitation, vix.: "In assessing the Eisenhower-Dulles record it is tempting to balance each negative with a positive. But that attempt would be misleading." What will they say about Norman Podhoretz's **Why We Were in Vietnam?**

American Foreign Policy is good conventional history. Readers put it down without knowing how all the pieces fit together, why diplomatic historians ask the questions they do, and what the international context looked like, but they do spend some time with an attractive book. Beauty isn't everything and it's surely not the only thing, but it's better than dull.

Footnote:

(A two-volume paperback, second edition of **American Foreign Policy** will be published in 1983.--editor).

Will The Real Author of the Cold War Please Stand Up?

by Joseph M. Siracusa (University of Queensland, Australia)

In my student days in Vienna, now more than eighteen years ago, I had an opportunity to study with an astute but acerbic Austrian Professor of History who seemed never to tire of complaining of 'Americans' uniquely ethnocentric approach to historical problems. At the time, I wrote it off to sour grapes, knowing the man in question had cooled his heels for several years in an American prisoner of war camp for "Germans" somewhere in Arizona or some such place. What particularly bothered the good professor was the American-held notion that the experience of the Cold War, if not its very phraseology, was peculiar to the international experience of the United States. Fresh from the southside of Chicago and fairly apprehensive of my new surroundings, I decided, not unlike Falstaff, that discretion might well be the better part of valor and so remained silent. Many years later, from the perspective of ten years' teaching of my own country's external relations abroad I have finally come to approximate the sensitivity of my Austrian colleague.

In particular, my Vienna experience rushed into my thoughts when I recently read what the SHAFR **Newsletter** calls a "straight" essay on the Baruch Plan and the coming of the Cold War in **Diplomatic History**. In the context of explaining protracted negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding an agreement for the international control of atomic energy, the author of this otherwise unexceptional essay nominates the famed American journalist Herbert Bayard Swope (1882-1952) as the man who "may have been the first to call the 'Cold War'" by name. We are then treated to the obligatory scholarly citation and footnoting Swope's comment on the decision of President Harry Truman to fire Henry Wallace from his Cabinet in September 1946: "We are, indeed, in the midst of a Cold War. We should do nothing the enemy wants us to do."¹ There is also the counter-claim by Bernard M. Baruch (1870-1965), the U.S. representative to the newly-created United Nations Atomic Energy Commission, that he was the first to introduce Swope's phrase, Cold War, publicly in a speech to the South Carolina Legislature in April 1947.² Swope, it should be recalled, served as a principal adviser to Baruch in his capacity as American delegate to the UNAEC. For his own part, Baruch had achieved a number of "firsts" in his long, productive career. (Incidentally, Baruch's father, Simon (1840-1921), a German born physician, was reputed to be the first doctor to perform an operation for appendicitis (1888) in the United States.) Something might also have been said - but was not - about the role of journalist Walter Lippmann in popularizing the term.

So, who was the first to call the Cold War? To the best of my knowledge -- and I am prepared to stand corrected -- the phrase Cold War was coined in the early 1890s by German Social Democrat Eduard Bernstein (1850-1932), the son of a Berlin Jewish locomotive driver and the seventh of fifteen children. Complaining of the costly European arms race in the era Bernstein wrote in the **Neue Zeit** in 1893: "This continued arming, compelling the others to keep up with Germany, is itself a kind of warfare. I do not know whether this expression has been used previously, but one could say it is a cold war [ein Kalter Krieg]. There is no shooting, but there is bleeding,"³ in the sense of undermining the welfare of the peoples and the squandering of the resources needed in the work of social reform. And again in 1914, Bernstein referred to the "cabinet politics" of the Great Powers as "this silent war, this cold war."⁴ Social critics of the day made much of this kind of bloodless battle, the dry warfare of steel and gold.⁵

In any case, given the enormous resources required by the superpowers to achieve nuclear superiority or parity or whatever it is they think they are doing, it might be well to credit Mr. Bernstein not only with coining the phrase "Cold War," but giving to it its modern meaning as well. One need only compare Bernstein's definition with that of military strategist John M. Collins's recent effort to see who is closer. According to Collins, the Cold War may best be defined as "A state of international tension at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, wherein political, economics, technological, sociological, psychological, paramilitary, and military measures short of sustained armed combat are orchestrated to attain national objectives."⁶ With such clarity in high places one can develop a deep sympathy for the millions of functional illiterates who presumably populate the land.

Will anyone second my motion to give Eduard Bernstein his rightful place in our modern political lexicon? I was tempted to approach my former Austrian mentor on the matter but am frankly too embarrassed. What would he think of a student who took so long to grasp his message?

FOOTNOTES

1. Larry G. Gerber, "The Baruch Plan and the Origins of the Cold War," **Diplomatic History**, 6 (Winter 1982), p. 92, fn. 75.
2. Bernard M. Baruch, **Baruch: The Public Years** (New York, 1960), p. 388.
3. "Die internationale Bedeutung des Wahlkampfes in Deutschland," **Neue Zeit**, Jahrgang 11 (1892-93), Vol. 2, p. 294. **Neue Zeit** was the official theoretical journal of the German Social Democratic party.
4. See Roger Anthony Fletcher, "Revisionism and Empire: A Study of the Views of Eduard Bernstein, Joseph Bloch and the 'Socialistische Monatshefte' on Germany's Place in the World Community 1900-1914," University of Queensland PhD thesis, 1981, p. 314.

5. For example, H.N. Brailsford, **The War of Steel and Gold** (London, 1911), p. 308.
6. John M. Collins, **U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities, 1960-1980** (New York, 1980), p. 594.

(This office received the following response to Professor Robert H. Ferrell's letter regarding the OAH and AHA which appeared in the June 1982 **Newsletter**. We shall be happy to serve as a forum concerning this issue. —Editor)

July 13, 1982

I endorse what Professor Robert H. Ferrell said in his open letter in the June, 1982 **Newsletter**. What he said needs to be said, and I hope something will be done about this matter, especially about the ever increasing costs of attending the national meetings and the holding of them in such expensive hotels. Both the AHA and OAH seem to want to hold the same kinds of meetings put on by bankers, businessmen, and others who prefer plush hotels. Unfortunately, the people who make these decisions about the hotels and the meetings do not, I believe, need to pay their own way, and thus it might be difficult for them (although it should not be) to understand the need for more modest meetings.

It is shocking to realize that the travel budget of the American Historical Association last year was \$94,000. It is also poor judgement that so much money is spend on such an item, especially when the AHA continues to clamor for more money from its members.

I warmly compliment Professor Ferrell for bringing this matter to our attention, and I hope the leadership of both the AHA and OAH will do something about it. After all, we historians are quick to criticize the lack of leadership in public affairs. What about the last of it in our own national organizations?

Sincerely,

Vincent P. DeSantis
University of Notre Dame

MORE ON WILLIAM SEWARD'S DIPLOMACY: TWO LETTERS

(In March the **Newsletter** office received a letter from Professor Kinley Brauer of the University of Minnesota regarding a **Newsletter** abstract. Professor Brauer agreed that his letter be published and the editor took it upon himself to send a copy to Professor Norman Ferris of Middle Tennessee State University for comment. Both letters appear below. -- Editor).

March 12, 1982

Dear Professor Brinker

In his report of the 1981 SHAFR program published in the December issue of the **Newsletter**, Charles DeBenedetti presented a discussion of Norman Ferris' paper, "Lincoln and Seward in Civil War Diplomacy: Their Relationship at the Outset Reexamined." DeBenedetti summarized Ferris' interpretation and described the audience reaction. Unfortunately, I was not present at the SHAFR meeting--I was conducting research in Germany at the time.

I was disappointed to read that Ferris was not altogether convincing and that the questioners were skeptical about Ferris' evidence. That may be the consequence of attempting to challenge a standard interpretation in an oral presentation rather than in a published essay, where the evidence is explicit and verifiable. I am convinced that Ferris' argument, at least as stated by DeBenedetti, is sound.

Fortunately, those interested in the problem of Seward's "foreign war panacea" need not rely solely on Ferris' necessarily undocumented statement. Several years ago, I published an article advancing the same interpretation, supported by research in published materials and archival research in the United States, England, France, and Spain. Those interested in reflecting further on the question, with the evidence at hand, may wish to examine my article, "Seward's 'Foreign War Panacea': An Interpretation," **New York History**, LV (April 1974), 133-57.

As I argued then and continue to believe, Seward's note to Lincoln was rational, plausible, and intended both to preserve the Union and to preserve peace with Europe. If Ferris was not original in his argument, at least he may have revived once again a reconsideration of this curious episode.

Sincerely,

Kinley Brauer
University of Minnesota

May 11, 1982

Dear Professor Brinker,

Thank you for giving me an opportunity to comment on Professor Brauer's letter.

I was not entirely in agreement with Professor Charles DeBenedetti's survey of my paper of last summer, nor did I think his appraisal of the audience reaction was entirely accurate. I should have been delighted to have sent Professor Brauer a copy of my paper, including all of the documentation that was necessarily absent from my reading copy.

Still, I am pleased that Brauer asserts his agreement with a theory that I advanced in a paper presented to the 1966 annual meeting of the Southern Historical Association. That paper was submitted in 1967 to the **American Historical Review** and several other journals, but referees apparently found it, as one of them said, too much in conflict with established "authorities" for publication. My theory was at the heart of my book **Desperate Diplomacy**. In writing that volume, the manuscript of which bounced around from one publisher to another from 1973 onward until it was finally published in 1976, I did not have the benefit of Brauer's 1974 article, but I read it later, of course, and noted that Brauer, too, apparently thought that Secretary of State William Seward, early in 1861, contrary to most historical accounts, desired peace with foreign nations, not war. However, since there are many vital differences between the views advanced in Brauer's article and mine, I am happy to have this opportunity to point out what they are.

In his 1974 article Brauer advanced the thesis that Seward's "belligerent foreign policy proposals," contained in his April 1, 1861, memorandum to President Lincoln, "... were clearly intended to create a major international controversy." Seward "had nurtured the idea of promoting a foreign crisis as a means of ending the domestic crisis for several months." This was Seward's 'foreign war panacea.' But this "program for provoking a foreign crisis," Brauer goes on to declare, "was paradoxically a plan for the maintenance of peace Seward wanted to promote a foreign **crisis** but not a foreign **war**."

What evidence does Brauer provide in his lengthy article to support this thesis? He furnished very little supporting material not previously used by writers like E.D. Adams, the one exception (a notable contribution) being his use of the Spanish foreign archives. (But he apparently did not use such important primary sources as the private papers of Lord Richard Lyons, the British Minister at Washington, and the papers of Lyons's two close friends, Charles Sumner, chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, and William H. Russell, of the London **Times**. Nor does he appear to have consulted the Belgian,

French, and Russian foreign archives for the originals of reports from Washington during this period--or to have consulted the dispatches of Rudolf Schleiden, also written from Washington at this time.) The result is that Brauer accepts three ideas contained in "previous interpretations": that Seward exhibited (1) "extreme belligerence" in a (2) carefully constructed "foreign program," and that he (3) intentionally "deceived" European diplomatists with a "misleading," "disingenuous policy" just prior to writing his April 1, 1861, memorandum to Lincoln. Brauer then interprets the memorandum itself in this light.

I strongly disagree with all three statements. The "evidence" for Seward's "belligerence" is circumstantial and biased, and it is contradicted by much better evidence from more reliable sources, as well as by the surrounding context--which many historians have failed to supply. See, for example, my elucidation in **Desperate Diplomacy**, pp. 213-14, of what Brauer mistakenly, in my opinion, calls Seward's "ungracious and undiplomatic outburst" of March 25, 1861. I believe that Secretary of State Seward was never "belligerent" toward foreign nations.

On the second point, Brauer, emulating so many other historians, refers repeatedly in his article to Seward's having "thought," "believed," and "imagined" a "grand strategy," a "program," that required the appearance of "belligerence" to conduct successfully. Seward, however, never mentioned such a "program," unless one desires to warp the words of the April 1 memorandum into such a document. Hence the entire idea is merely inference and supposition, which I think is contradicted not only by existing documents but also by common sense. In my opinion, Seward was simply adapting his efforts to restore the Union to changing circumstances as they occurred, and he had no "grand strategy" beyond keeping foreign powers out of the Civil War.

In regard to Brauer's last point, I think many historians have made the mistake of accepting the version of Seward's co-called "negotiations" with the Southern Commissioners early in 1861 that was issued by those same commissioners and by Seward's political enemies in the Lincoln administration. To me that seems naive. Moreover, to say, as Brauer does, that Seward was deceptive because he "let Lyons believe incorrectly" and because he "allowed a rumor to circulate" seems to place an unreasonable burden on the man. I know of no instance in which unbiased, incontrovertible evidence shows that Seward intentionally misled **anyone** during the early months of 1861.

I realize that all this may be difficult for historians, steeped in the existing mythology about Seward's early foreign policy, to swallow. What Brauer has done is generally to have credited most of the old stories as facts, but to have placed a different interpretation on them.

What I have done is to have challenged the authenticity of the stories themselves, while arriving also at the conclusion that Seward, in 1861, desired peace not war with European powers. I concede that Brauer's approach is much less likely to provoke opposition from other historians. But I believe my interpretation is correct.

Sincerely,

Norman Ferris
Middle Tennessee State University

THE PHANTOM BOOK: THE PERILS OF PUBLICATION

by Edward M. Bennett (Washington State University)

Now you see it, now you don't. In 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977-78, and 1979, the forthcoming publication of Howard C. Payne, Raymond Callahan, and Edward M. Bennett, **As the Storm Clouds Gathered: European Perceptions of American Foreign Policy in the 1930s**, was announced. What happened to the book the authors were asked by friends, colleagues and students, and especially by their chairmen who waited to list it as an achievement in their recommendations for salary increases? What happened is both enlightening and frightening.

In 1971, Ed Bennett was asked to put together a paperback volume on Europe's response to American foreign policy in the thirties for the American Forum Series. Upon agreeing to develop the project, he received a contract from Ginn/Blaisdell Company. The Xerox Corporation then bought the Blaisdell company and cancelled all paperback promotions and contracts. Joe Huthmacher, who had initially suggested the volume to Bennett, secured the rights to the series (except for the first volume, Morgenthau, Schlesinger, and Gardner, **The Origins of the Cold War**). Another publisher undertook to bring out the series, but his backlog was so large that it seemed to the authors, now that they had completed the manuscript, that they all might be retired before their volume appeared in print. The authors secured a release from their new contract and were contacted by another publisher who had just bought a company and wanted to build an ambitious list. Unfortunately, the expansion was too rapid and, aided by a new Internal Revenue Service ruling that prohibited depreciating books being warehoused prior to sale, the publisher of the phantom book went bankrupt before examination and review copies could be distributed. Some people in the profession knew of the book and were able to secure enough copies for classroom use for one semester in 1980 after the book actually appeared (despite its 1979 publication date).

All of this would not have been so tragic if the people who examined the manuscript had not found it to be a significant contribution because the essays were based almost entirely on original sources and because the essays presented French, British and Russian expectations and analyses of American foreign policy in the thirties. The authors had established that the future allies of World War II held in common a belief that America must play an active role in resolving the developing crisis in Europe. France and Russia responded optimistically to the "new realism" being shown by Franklin D. Roosevelt and hoped that it would soon be manifested in a "special relationship" with the Americans. All of these European leaders expected America to awaken to the need for collective security and encouraged themselves in the belief that the awakening was actually taking place. How and why European statesmen deluded themselves about American policy aims, and the effect of this disillusionment, provides a stark background for the coming of the war and helps explain the limits which prior experiences placed upon wartime and postwar cooperation.

This outline of the author's decade-long experiences (1971-1981) which fluctuated by hope and despair has had a happy, if belated, ending. Richard Dean Burns, editor of the **SHAFR Guide**, learned about the phantom book when preparing the **Guide** and, with his new publishing venture, acquired copies for classroom use. Anyone interested in examining the phantom book (**As the Storm Clouds Gathered**, 175 pps., paperback, \$5.95.) for such use may obtain a copy by writing to REGINA BOOKS, P.O. Box 280, Claremont, California, 91711.

MINUTES OF THE SHAFR COUNCIL MEETING AT BOSTON, AUGUST 6, 1982

Lawrence E. Gelfand, presiding.

Council members present: Professors Gelfand, Kaplan, Offner, Taylor, Wittner.

Others attending by invitation: Professors Ambrosius, Burns, Brinker, Pugach, Wilson; Dr. Gustafson and Mr. Hemstadter.

Mr. Gelfand called the meeting to order at 7:45 a.m. in Room 310 of the Sherman Union, Boston University. Upon motion, Council Minutes of March 31, 1982 were approved.

The first item on the agenda concerned the revisions of the SHAFR agreements with ABC-Clio. Ms. Bonnie Simrell, Editor-in-Chief, in a letter to Mr. Zahniser of 9 July 1982, proposed the following changes or additions to earlier agreements:

- (1) That the seventy-three historians who had made contributions to the forthcoming **Guide to American Foreign Relations Since 1700** be asked to pay \$20.00 for their copy, rather than to receive a free copy per an earlier understanding.
- (2) That the Press receive a check at the end of August, 1982 for the full amount of all orders placed for the **Guide**.

Discussion followed on these, and other items in the proposed contract revisions. Notice was taken of the considerable amount expended by ABC—Clio in publishing the **Guide**, but the numerous delays in publication were also noted. On motion, it was decided to (1) hold ABC—Clio to the earlier commitment to provide a free copy to all contributors and (2) to write the Press a check at the end of August for 50% of **Guide** order monies, the rest to be paid immediately upon publication, and (3) to strike from the new Agreement the sentence in item 13, "Each contributing editor and contributor shall receive ten (10) unbound copies of his respective chapter." The motion passed unanimously, but with the understanding that absent Council members be polled to see if they concurred to the vote.

Professor Burns asked the Council to give some thought to establishing a Bibliography Committee to study the feasibility of issuing a supplemental volume to the **Guide**. Perhaps, Mr. Burns suggested, such a supplement might be published in five years. Mr. Gelfand indicated that this matter might be brought up again at the December meeting of the Council.

Mr. Gelfand next raised the question of future SHAFR summer meetings. Some preliminary arrangements had been made by Mr. Kaplan to hold the summer 1983 meeting at Catholic University and the Summer 1984 meeting at George Washington University. Mr. Gelfand will pursue these earlier contacts in order to get firm institutional sponsorship in writing. For summer 1985, Mr. Gelfand invited SHAFR to hold its meeting at the University of Iowa.

In discussing Mr. Gelfand's invitation, Professors Taylor and Pugach asked the Council to explore holding a future summer meeting in conjunction with the Pacific Coast Branch (PCB) of the American Historical Association. Following discussion, it was decided to explore this possibility through Professor Taylor and to consider a joint meeting with the PCB at the Council meeting in December. No action was taken on Mr. Gelfand's invitation; this item too will be considered in December.

Mr. Gelfand announced the meeting times for SHAFR activities at the forthcoming meetings of the American Historical Association in Washington, DC: Council meeting on Monday, December 27, 8:00-11:00 p.m. in the Sheraton Marshall Room; Cash bar reception,

Tuesday, December 28, 5:00-7:00 p.m., Sheraton Dover Room; and the luncheon on Wednesday, December 29, 12:15-2:00 p.m. in the Shoreham Diplomat Room. Mr. Ambrosius also announced that the proposed SHAFR session has been accepted by the Program Committee of the AHA.

Mr. Gelfand then asked the Secretary-Treasurer for his report. Mr. Zahniser first mentioned that the SHAFR office has received four hundred orders for the forthcoming **Guide**.

Following instructions from Council, Mr. Zahniser had mailed a check for \$215.00 to the Coalition to Save Our Documentary Heritage, Washington, DC, and had received a letter of thanks from the organization's treasurer. Mr. Gelfand observed that before we send further support monies we should investigate the effectiveness of the Coalition. He asked Mr. Gustafson to look into the question and to report to Council in December.

In keeping with Council's recommendation, Mr. Zahniser appointed a Finance Advisory Committee to oversee and advise him on SHAFR's endowment funds. The Committee members are Professors Hess, Varg, and Kuehl, chair. Also in keeping with Council's wishes, Mr. Kuehl and Mr. Zahniser are the authorized SHAFR officers to make deposits to and to write checks on SHAFR's money market account. Mr. Kuehl is investigating the desirability of bonding himself as well as Messrs. Zahniser, Hess, Varg, Kaplan, and Mrs. Connaughton, all of whom are involved in handling SHAFR monies. Report will be made to Council in December concerning bonding.

Mr. Zahniser reported on his contracts with Educational Materials Distributors of Detroit, Michigan. Mr. Vince Manzo, Public Relations Manager, had indicated a possible interest in distributing SHAFR's Roster and Current Research Projects booklet to a moderately wide audience. Council recommended that Mr. Zahniser continue to investigate this matter and to report to Council in December.

Last, Mr. Zahniser thanked Mr. Offner for his superb job in making local arrangement, including publication of the program.

Mr. Gelfand then brought to Council the wish of Dr. and Mrs. Bernath concerning possible alterations in the Bernath Prize Awards. Mr. Kuehl had expressed the wishes of Dr. and Mrs. Bernath in a letter of SHAFR Council members of July 22, 1982. The suggested changes were as follows:

- (1) Raise the Bernath Book Prize to \$1,000.00 (rather than \$500.00)
- (2) Raise the Bernath Lecture Prize to \$500.00 (rather than \$300.00)
- (3) Raise the Bernath Article Prize to \$300.00 (rather than \$200.00)
- (4) Provide \$250.00 in travel and hotel expenses so that the Bernath Book Prize winner can accept the award in person.
- (5) Provide \$250.00 in travel and hotel expenses to the Bernath Lecture Prize winner.

Following discussion, it was moved and seconded to accept these changes, contingent upon concurrence of the majority of Council. Mr. Gelfand indicated he would write at an early moment to Dr. and Mrs. Bernath, thanking them for their continuing generous support.

Concerning the project to establish a W. Stull Holt Fellowship, Mr. Gelfand indicated that the funding is moving along nicely and that it will be necessary in the near future to establish a committee to recommend purposes and terms of the award.

Mr. Gelfand next reported that he had written a letter to appropriate officials in the Department of State concerning possible establishment of internships for young historians. The paucity of practical experience in the Department of State among the ranks of diplomatic historians was noted. Suggestions were made about exploring internships with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee or the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. All agreed such internships should be for no less than six months. Mr. Gelfand will report to Council when he has a response to his letter from the Department of State.

Council next discussed the desirability of increasing contacts with foreign scholars whose speciality is international relations or American history. Informal contacts have been made with such scholars over a period of years. It was moved and seconded to establish a contingency fund to assist foreign scholars to participate in SHAFR summer meetings and to explore establishing further contacts with foreign scholarly associations of American studies. Following discussion, it was moved and seconded to table the motion, it being understood that the matters raised needed further consideration. The motion to table passed unanimously.

Mr. Gelfand announced that Professor Akira Iriye of the University of Chicago had been elected to membership in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Mr. Gelfand extended the Council's congratulations to Mr. Iriye on this singular honor.

Mr. Gelfand gave warm thanks to Mr. Ambrosius for the excellent SHAFR program, and to Mr. Offner for his great skill in handling local arrangements.

On motion Council adjourned.

Marvin R. Zahniser
Secretary to Council

PUBLICATIONS IN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

Dorothy V. Jones (Evanston, Illinois), **License For Empire: Colonialism by Treaty in Early America**. 1982. University of Chicago Press. \$23.00

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John Prados (Washington, D.C.), **The Soviet Estimate: U.S. Intelligence Analysis & Russian Military Strength**. 1982. The Dial Press.

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Stephen G. Rabe (University of Texas at Dallas), **The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezeula, 1919-1976**. 1982. University of Texas Press. \$25.00.

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Richard C. Lukas (Tennessee Technological University), **Bitter Legacy: Polish-American Relations in the Wake of World War II**. 1982. University Press of Kentucky. \$16.00

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Robert H. Bremner and Gary W. Reichard (Ohio State University) eds., **Reshaping America: Society and Institutions, 1945-1960**. Ohio State University Press.

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Richard H. Immerman (University of Hawaii), **The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention**. 1982. University of Texas Press. \$24.50.

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Robert W. Clawson and Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State University) eds., **The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose & Military Means**. 1982. Scholarly Resources. Cloth \$19.95, Paper \$9.95.

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Their Infinite Variety: Essays on Indiana Politicians, Volume 53 of the Indiana Historical Collections. 1981. Indiana Historical Bureau. Cloth \$24.00, Paper \$15.00. This volume includes twelve essays, four of which are by SHAFR members: Lee Scott Theisen, Charles W. Calhoun (Austin Peay State University), Michael J. Devine (Cincinnati, Ohio), and Ernest C. Bolt, Jr., (Richmond, Virginia).

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James F. Willis (Southern Arkansas University), **Prologue to Nuremberg: The Politics and Diplomacy of Punishing War Criminals of the First World War** (Contributions in Legal Studies No. 20). 1982. Greenwood Press. \$29.95.

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Joseph A. Fry (University of Nevada-Las Vegas), **Henry S. Sanford; Diplomacy and Business in 19th Century American**. 1982. University of Nevada Press.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

William O. Walker, III (Ohio Wesleyan University), **Drug Control in the Americas**. 1981. University of New Mexico Press. \$25.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

On October 22, 1983, Bard College will sponsor a History Conference. They plan to have panels on the following nine subjects, and are soliciting papers on all topics, with the hope of offering several additional sessions. Those already scheduled include:

1. New Approaches to Ancient History
2. Science and Society
3. Politics in the Weimar Republic
4. Regional American History
5. Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy
6. The Social History of the Church
7. The History of Building Structure
8. Teaching the History of Minorities
9. History of Psychiatry

Send resume with abstract for papers or panels on any aspect of history. The deadline is November 1, 1982. Write to:

Alice Stroup
Department of History
Bard College
Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504

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The National Council on Public History is pleased to announce its fifth annual conference on public history, to be held Thursday through Saturday, May 5-7, 1983, near metropolitan Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Host for the conference will be the University of Waterloo. The program, entitled "Public History in Action: An International Perspective" will include films, lectures, panel discussions, presentations and dialogues, following four general topics: 1) Imaging the Past; 2) Conserving the Past; 3) Using the Past in the Public Sector; and 4) Using the Past in the Private Sector.

The program committee especially encourages participants to offer suggestions, papers, and whole sessions in the areas here specified, but serious consideration will be given all offerors. Send proposals and requests for information to James Walker, History Department, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, Canada N2L 3G1. Telephone 519-885-1211, X2771.

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The Winston Churchill Memorial and Library in the United States located at Westminster College has recently acquired the following microfilmed records from the British Public Record Office: CAB 65: War Cabinet Minutes (14 reels plus ½ reel of the confidential annex) Minutes or conclusions of the War Cabinet, September 1939 to May 1945 and of the Cabinet, May to July 1945; PERM 3: Operational Papers (190 reels) files of the Prime Minister's office kept at the War Cabinet offices dealing with defense and operational subjects; PREM 4: Confidential papers (128 reels), Files of the Prime Minister's office kept at N. 10 Downing Street, dealing for the most part with civil and political matters; FO 371 British Foreign Office-United States Correspondence, 1938-1945 (197 reels). In addition to the microfilm collection, the Library holds books by and about Churchill and houses a permanent exhibit of Churchill memorabilia. Scholars interested in Sir Winston's life and times are cordially invited to visit the Memorial and use its resources. For further information write Mr. Warren Hollrah, Museum Manager, Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri 65251.

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The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library will hold a conference on "Leadership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization" in Abilene, Kansas, October 14-15, 1982. Conference participants will include NATO scholars as well as figures who have held important NATO positions such as former Supreme Allied Commander General Lyman L. Lemnitzer and former NATO Ambassador James Harlan Cleveland. For further information contact the Director, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas 67410

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The Gerald R. Ford Library will host a conference November 10-11 on "the President, Congress, and Foreign Policy." The conference will be sponsored by the Atlantic Council, Former Members of Congress Association, and the Ford Library. The address is: 1000 Beal Avenue, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48109.

Tadashi Aruga (Hitotsubashi University) has informed this office that the Japanese Association for American Studies has published Number One (1981) of **The Japanese Journal of American Studies**. This first issue is entitled: **United States Policy toward East Asia: 1945-1950**. and includes an article by Takeshi Igarashi (University of Tokyo), on "MacArthur's Proposal for an Early Peace with Japan and the Redirection of Occupation Policy toward Japan" and a review essay by Sadao Asada (Doshisha University), "Recent Works on the American Occupation of Japan: The State of the Art." Both are SHAFR members.

Editor Aruga provides the following information: Copies of the **Japanese Journal of American Studies**, No. 1, may be obtained from the office of the Association by paying 7 U.S. dollars per copy (this is a special offer to SHAFR members). Payment should be made by check or bank transfer. Make check payable to Tadashi Aruga, JAAS. Bank Transfer should be sent to Amerika Gakkai. Tadashi Aruga, #220-4802037, Kichijoji Branch, Mitsubishi Bank, Musashino, Tokyo. In case of transfer, other freely convertible currency (equivalent to \$7.00) is also acceptable.

The Journal will be a biannual publication. Correspondence on business and editorial matters should be addressed to the Editor, JJAS, the Japanese Association for American Studies, c/o Center for American Studies, University of Tokyo, Komaba Campus, Komaba, Meguro-ku Tokyo 153, Japan.

In April, as most of the membership knows, the Department of State named William Z. Slany The Historian, Office of the Historian. The principal assistants in the Office of the Historian are:

Acting Deputy Historian - Neal H. Peterson
Acting General Editor - John P. Glennon
Acting Adviser on Research — Nina Noring
Division Chiefs - Paul Claussen, David Mabon, Charles S. Sampson
Assistant to the Historian - Carol Becker

ANNOUNCEMENT ON DOCUMENT TRANSFER

(The Classification/Declassification Center of the Department of State (A/CDC) has prepared a brief statement summarizing the steps taken in recent months to facilitate the transfer of the 1950-1954 records from the State Department to the National Archives.)

STATUS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE RECORDS FOR 1950-54

The Department of State and the National Archives and Records Service (NARS) concluded an agreement in February 1982 providing for the systematic declassification review of the Department's records for the period 1950-1954. Under the terms of the agreement, the Department of State is providing two-thirds of the cost of funding a special team of 24 skilled archivists who will carry out a document-by-document review of the files of the Department. The teams are proceeding through the work on a geographic basis, reviewing country-by-country and region-by-region the Department's central files and the files of the related diplomatic missions abroad.

The review is governed by declassification guidelines prepared by the Department covering every country with which we had relations or dealings at the time and several functional subjects as well. These were prepared by the Department's Classification/Declassification Center in close coordination with the geographic and functional bureaus of the Department responsible for the country or subject concerned. A number of these guidelines were thoroughly tested in advance by the National Archives, under actual working conditions, to assure that they would provide a workable basis for the review.

Fundamentally, the guidelines identify as precisely as possible those categories of information pertaining to each country (or subject) the release of which would still damage our foreign policy or other security interests despite the passage of time. Typical examples would be sensitive information about persons still alive and active in government and politics in the country concerned, or information on still-sensitive topics provided in confidence by foreign diplomats or other officials. Concerning this latter point, the Department has in a few key instances discussed this question of sensitivity of older records with foreign governments in an effort to narrow as much as possible the range of foreign government information which must be withheld.

Experience with the FRUS series tells us that publication at or near the 30-year line enables the Department to release almost all foreign policy documentation -- perhaps 98% overall, a bit less in the case of a few countries or subjects. Reviewers using guidelines cannot be expected to achieve this -- 90% would be a more realistic goal, with the difference releasable only after review by a Department area expert. (This latter review would take place if an FOIA request were received for a document withheld by Archives.)

The only file completed by NARS and subsequently analyzed (Central America post files) showed a release rate of 96% which seems to bear out our expectations. Our confidence that these expectations will continue to be borne out reflects of course not only that experience but the several months of testing referred to earlier.

It is undeniably true that a page-by-page review takes time. Early returns show the reviewers working at a pace near 60 pages an hour, but this is slowed to closer to 35 by the time all the checking and recordkeeping is done. Nonetheless, this system has already brought to completion the large and historically important files on Korea. The Department of State has formally offered these records to Archives, which should result in their being opened almost immediately. During August we expect to see the completion of work on Indochina and on Central America, and we will promptly offer these for opening as well. In summary, although the job may indeed require four years to be brought fully to completion, during that time there should be a reasonably steady flow of new records being opened.

Access to files still not reviewed and opened under this procedure is available as before through FOI, and, under the terms of our agreement with NARS, should be addressed to the Department (Information and Privacy Coordinator, Room 1239, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520).

PERSONALS

James H. Hitchman (Western Washington University), read a paper, "India's Criticism of America's Foreign Policy," at the first annual Pacific Northwest Conference on Diplomatic History, Gonzaga University, Spokane, April 23, 1982.

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Ronald Schlundt (University of Maryland-European Division) will be a Fulbright Lecturer at the Japanese Foreign Service Training Institute and the University of Tokyo.

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During the winter of 1983, Bradford Perkins (University of Michigan) will serve as a Directeur d'études at the Ecole des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, Paris, conducting a seminar on recent American foreign policy.

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Robert J. McMahon, formerly of the Department of State Historical Office, has accepted a position as an Assistant Professor at the University of Florida, beginning this fall.

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Stephen G. Rabe (University of Texas at Dallas) was promoted to Associate Professor with tenure. Professor Rabe also received the AMOCO Foundation Outstanding Teaching Award that provides a cash stipend.

Albert H. Bowman (University of Tennessee-Chattanooga) will be on sabbatical leave next year to write: "Jefferson and Napoleon: Franco-American Relations, 1801-1809," and a booklet for the Bicentennial Council of the Thirteen Original States Fund on the American Revolution and Self-Determination.

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Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State) and Peter Hill (George Washington University) are members of the Gilbert Chinard Prize Committee of the Society for French Historical Studies.

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Alfred E. Eckes (U.S. International Trade Commission) has been selected by President Ronald Reagan to serve as chairman of the U.S.I.T.C. for a two year term ending in June 1984. Ecke's term as a commissioner lasts until June 1990. The International Trade Commission, formerly the Tariff Commission, administers U.S. trade laws and has broad authority to investigate all aspects of international trade.

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Two SHAFR members have received awards from the American Council of Learned Societies: John Gimbel (Humboldt State University) for research in science, technology, and reparations in postwar Germany; and William Stueck (Purdue University) for research in the diplomacy of the Korean War.

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Akira Iriye (University of Chicago) has been elected to membership in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. **Congratulations!!**

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The Herbert Hoover Presidential Library has announced the awarding of grants-in-aid to several scholars including SHAFR members Michael Dunne (University of Sussex), Richard A. Pfau (University of Miami), and Frederic A. Propos (University of California, Los Angeles).

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The Truman Library Institute announced that the 1982 Tom L. Evans Grant has been awarded to William W. Stueck, Jr. (Purdue University) and that other grants have gone to Lester H. Brune (Bradley University), Robert J. McMahon (Department of State), James I. Matray (New Mexico State University), Dennis Merrill (University of Connecticut), and Thomas A. Schwartz (Harvard University).

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The Truman Library Institute's 1982 Harry S. Truman Book Award was given to two scholars: Bruce Cumings and SHAFR's Robert M. Hathaway (Barnard College, Columbia University) for his book **Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944-1947. Congratulations.!**

K. Jack Bauer (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute) has been awarded the 1981 John Lyman Book Award for documentary editing given by the North American Society for Oceanic History. Bauer's achievement: **Naval Affairs, 1789-1860** (10 volumes, 1981) published by Scholarly Resources. **Congratulations!**

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ADDRESS CHANGES

If you move please send your new address to Dr. Marvin R. Zahniser SHAFR, Business Office, Department of History, 106 Dulles Hall, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210. This procedure should be followed if you wish to receive the SHAFR **Newsletter** and/or **Diplomatic History**.

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The SHAFR **Newsletter** will henceforth accept paid advertisements. An arrangement has been made with Scholarly Resources which allows us to accept ads for the **Newsletter** or ads for both the **Newsletter** and **Diplomatic History**. SHAFR members are encouraged to advertise their published works in the organizational publications. For information write: Advertising Department, Scholarly Resources, Inc., 104 Greenhill Avenue, Wilmington, DE 19805.

Scholarly Resources Inc., which has published **Diplomatic History** from its inception, is soliciting book-length manuscripts in the fields of American diplomatic history, modern American history, Asian Studies, and international relations. Enquiries or proposals should be sent to:

Managing editor
Scholarly Resources Inc.
104 Greenhill Avenue
Wilmington, DE 19805

SHAFR'S CALENDAR

- November 1 Deadline, materials for December **Newsletter**.
- November 1-15 Annual elections for officers of SHAFR.
- November 3-6 The 48th annual meeting of the Southern Historical Association will meet at Memphis with headquarters at the Peabody Hotel.
 Program Chairman:
 Prof. Robert W. Johannsen
 Department of History
 University of Illinois
 Urbana, Illinois 61801
- December 1 Deadline, nominations for the 1983 Bernath Memorial lectureship.
- December 27-30 The 97th annual convention of the AHA will be held in Washington, D.C. Deadline for proposals has passed.
- January 1, 1983 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
- January 15 Deadline, nominations for the 1982 Bernath article award.
- February 1 Deadline, nominations for the 1982 Bernath book prize.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for the March **Newsletter**.
- April 6-9 The 76th annual meeting of the OAH will be held in Cincinnati with the headquarters at the Stouffer's Towers and the Cincinnati Convention-Exposition Center. Deadline for proposals has passed.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June **Newsletter**.

(The 98th annual meeting of the AHA will be held in San Francisco.)

Program Chairman:

Prof. Bertram Wyatt-Brown
Case Western Reserve University
Cleveland, Ohio

(The 77th annual meeting of the OAH will be held in Los Angeles.)

Proposals should be sent to:

OAH Program Committee

University of Maryland

College Park, MD 20742

Deadline for proposals is March, 1983.

**ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED, OR SCHOLARLY PAPERS
DELIVERED BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR**

(Please limit abstracts to a total of twenty (20) lines of **Newsletter** space, or approximately two hundred (200) words. The desire to accommodate as many contributors as possible, plus the overriding problem of space, makes this restriction necessary. Double space all abstracts, and send them as you would have them appear in print. For abstracts of articles, please supply the date, the volume, the number within the volume, and the pages. It would be appreciated if abstracts were not sent until after a paper has been delivered, or an article has been printed. Also, please do not send abstracts which have appeared in **Diplomatic History**, since all SHAFR members already receive the latter publication).

NOTE

The publication in 1978 of the three-volume **Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy: Studies of the Principal Movements and Ideas**, edited by Alexander DeConde, was a major event for historians generally and for members of SHAFR in particular. Such works rarely receive an extended evaluation in professional journals. Members of SHAFR probably have read Bradford Perkin's five-page review entitled "Rating DeConde's Stable of Diplomatic Historians" in **Diplomatic History**, 3 (Fall 197), 439-442. They may have missed, however, Richard W. Leopold's twelve-page analysis entitled "Historians and American Foreign Policy: An Encyclopedic Endeavor" in the **Pacific Historical Review**, L (August 1981), 339-350 and D.C. Watt's somewhat shorter review (along with his review of John E. Findling's **Dictionary of American Diplomatic History published in 1980**) in the **Times Literary Supplement** for November 27, 1981.

William O. Walker III (Ohio Wesleyan University), "Historical Foundations of U.S.-Mexico Narcotics Diplomacy," paper read at the International Studies Association Convention, Cincinnati, March 1982. The United States has encouraged the adoption and implementation by Mexico of a strict drug control program since the days of the revolution there. Mexican leaders, from Venustiano Carranza to José López Portillo, have declared their willingness to eliminate illicit drug production and traffic. The record of accomplishment has not matched the rhetorical commitment. Explanation for the gap between intent and capability lies within the traditions of both nations. Drugs have long played an important role in Mexico's rural culture. And United States officials have consistently believed that effective control was largely a function of will on the part of Mexico. As a result, United States drug diplomacy toward Mexico, occasionally coercive in form, remained a prisoner of that dubious assumption until after the debacle of Operation Intercept in 1969. Since then the two countries have endeavored with increasing success to fashion an effective, mutually acceptable program for drug control.

"La primera ayuda económica norteamericana a España" by Angel Viñas, in **Lecturas de economía española e internacional**, Ministerio de Economía y Comercio, Madrid, 1981, 49-90.

This is a contribution to a collective work of essays on the Spanish economy both in its present condition and on past economic foreign policy making. It deals with the implementation of the first United States economic aid injection to the failing economy of the Franco regime in the period 1951-1953. So far there have been no detailed studies on the fate of the 62.5 million credit to be extended to Spain which was included in the 1951 General Appropriations Act. In this article I have analyzed credit mechanism, the obstacles both in the United States and in Spain which had to be put away for the aid to become effective, the delays introduced by United States authorities in the implementation process, and the Spanish complaints.

Emphasis has been put on the need for streamlining the already obsolete Spanish legal procedures to handle foreign aid, the distribution of the United States credit, and the nature of relations between the Spanish authorities and Eximbank.

Some theses put forward by American historians concerning the alleged critical importance of United States aid to Spain in this period have been corrected and a comparison has been established with some other aid injections received years before by the Franco regime from Argentina. It is shown that the first batch of United States aid was limited in amount and consequences and that it cannot be held responsible in any case for the modest recovery of the Spanish economy prior to the

signing of the United States-Spanish executive agreements of September 26, 1953.

The article is based on firsthand contemporary documents and on files kept in Spanish archives.

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Linda Killen (Radford University), "Self-Determination vs. Territorial Integrity: Conflict within the American Delegation at Paris over Wilsonian Policy toward the Russian Borderlands." **Nationalities Papers** (Spring 1982). Russian territorial integrity had been one of the three mainstays of Wilson's policy toward revolutionary Russia and the president took a commitment to preserving that integrity with him to the Paris Peace Conference. At the same time, Wilson was also identified with the principle of self-determination for ethnically identifiable nationalities—many of which were in the throes of breaking away from war-torn Russia. The resultant policy variance pitted Secretary of State Lansing, as spokesman for territorial integrity, against much of the American delegation, erstwhile Inquiry members and devotees of self-determination. Wilson himself took a rather schizophrenic approach. As peacemaker, aware of all the pressures that complicated the conference's task, he sanctioned the break-up of Russian territorial integrity for reasons of expedience. As president, during the conference and thereafter, he refused to grant American recognition to the resulting national states (such as Estonia).

The author believes that, while the non-recognition policy made sense so long as there was any chance for the emergence of an acceptable government in Russia proper, the persistence of such a policy in the face of Soviet survival successfully damaged relations with everybody concerned: Russia because he (President Wilson) would not recognize the Soviets; the new nation-states because he would not recognize them; the American delegation because he refused to commit himself fully to the principle of self-determination; and Lansing because he refused to openly support the secretary's stand on territorial integrity.

* * * * *

Ann Kasten Nelson (George Washington University), "The 'Top of Policy Hill': The NSC vs. The Oval Office in the Eisenhower Administration." Paper delivered at the meeting of the Organization of American Historians, April, 1982. This paper noted that at the conclusion of the Eisenhower administration there developed a critique of the national security process within the NSC that was to have lasting repercussions on the organization of national security policy. That critique, based upon a misperception of the role and purpose of the NSC, was unwittingly encouraged through the insistence of its

strongest defenders that in the Eisenhower white house the NSC was "on top of policy hill." Since much of the material now available in the Eisenhower Library emphasizes the role of the oval office, historians face the danger of completely ignoring the NSC process which often appears irrelevant. As a corrective, this paper emphasized the threefold process of making national security policy that was orchestrated with such skill by the President. Unfortunately, for reasons still unclear, the participants in the process never fully explained the nuances of this arrangement. Hence the perception of a bureaucratic NSC process completely entangling a passive President encouraged his successor to dismantle the structure and set the precedent for a process which came to be dominated by the national security adviser and his staff.

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Mark A. Stoler (University of Vermont), "Aiken, Mansfield and the Tonkin Gulf Crisis: Notes from the Congressional Leadership Meeting at the White House, August 4, 1964," **Vermont History**, 50/2 (Spring, 1982), 80-94. In his memoirs, President Johnson reproduced a series of direct quotes from this meeting as evidence that the Congressional leadership unanimously endorsed his military retaliation against North Vietnam and proposed "Tonkin Gulf" resolution. These quotes came from notes taken and later transcribed by Walter Jenkins, and now available in the Johnson Library. The two full versions of these notes reproduced with an explanatory introduction in this article reveal that Johnson quoted from them very selectively and omitted the serious Congressional questioning and dissent expressed at this meeting, especially by Senators Aiken and Mansfield. Both senators publicly supported the retaliatory military action and the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, but only because presidential actions had left them with no choice and no possibility of effective dissent in 1964.

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Charles M. Dobbs (Metropolitan State College), "Canadian and American Perceptions of the Soviet Union: 1946-1949." a paper read at the 1982 Western Social Science Association Annual Convention. In the immediate postwar years, Canadian diplomats maintained a surprising independence of thought regarding the USSR when compared with American diplomats. When American hopes for postwar cooperation with the Soviets were dashed U.S. diplomats began pressing Cold War bipolarity (and containment) on a reluctant world. Canadian perceptions were more complex. Initially Ottawa viewed the United States as being as much an obstacle to Canadian attainment of the perquisites of "middle power" status as was the USSR a threat to peace. The Canadians were frustrated by Soviet intransigence and American

arrogance especially concerning such issues as "Big Three" management of the German peace treaty, subordination of the UN to the exigencies of containment, and NATO. Despite disappointment with America's vitriolic attitude toward the USSR, Canadian diplomats did perceive the Soviet Union as a threatening adversary by 1949 and, without accepting Cold War rhetoric, moved to support most American initiatives.

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(The **Newsletter** inaugurates what we hope will become a biannual event--publication of abstracts of papers given at the foreign-policy section of the European Association for American Studies. The abstracts were forwarded by Professor Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones of the University of Edinburgh who served as workshop organizer.)

The following nine papers were offered at the European Association for American Studies foreign-policy workshop, held at the Sorbonne, Paris, March 29-April 2, 1982. The theme of the workshop was "American Opposition to European Imperialism since c.1870: Changing Concepts about Foreign Policy."

* * * * *

Góran Rystad (University of Lund, Sweden), "Ambiguous Anti-Imperialism: The Problem and its Historiography." Rystad argues that by the conclusion of the Philippine adventure, the anti-imperialists were looking backwards to a society that no longer existed, the imperialists to a future world that never developed in the way they had prophesied. Neither side was any longer capable of mobilizing public opinion in support of a program of action.

* * * * *

Serge Ricard (University of Provence, France), "Monroe Revisited: The Roosevelt Doctrine, 1901-1909." At the beginning of the twentieth century the twenty-sixth president of the United States complemented the 1823 dictum and initiated a new imperialist diplomacy in the Caribbean. The Roosevelt Corollary was a response to the changed environment of the age; it also reflected its author's dual concern for strategy and ideology.

Theodore Roosevelt's interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was an essential component of his imperialist thinking. Inasmuch as it purported to justify a different approach to foreign policy, it expressed totally new concepts. Like Monroe's pronouncement, the Roosevelt Doctrine proceeded from a distrust of Old World imperialisms, but it also challenged the European powers--notably Britain and Germany--by postulating American supremacy in the Western Hemisphere; it further implied the superiority of the United States over its neighbors, as well as a moral duty to enforce hemispheric law and order.

TR felt that his country was qualified to police the Americas, if not the globe, and to wield the civilizing influence that Europe had so far exerted. It looks today as if the Rooseveltian claim has never been repudiated.

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Jacques Portes (University of Paris, France), "The French Perception of American Anti-Imperialism, 1879-1910." Portes argues that the French were so preoccupied with "le péril américain" and "l'américanisation du monde" that they failed to appreciate the U.S. anti-imperialist thrust. This bias left them unprepared for Wilsonian diplomacy.

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Dragoljub Živojinović (University of Belgrade), "The New States From the Old Empire: The United States and the Case of Yugoslavia." The author points out that initially the American policy towards the Yugoslav unification was negative. President Wilson did not want the dissolution of Austria-Hungary for a long time, hoping to induce her to leave the war. When this proved unrealizable, he decided to support the struggle of the Austrian nationalities for freedom and independence. At the end of the war, Wilson claimed that the break-up of Austria-Hungary was imminent because of America's commitment to the nationalities. The Yugoslav and Serbia initially resented Wilson's policy, but could not change it.

The dissolution of Austria-Hungary brought new threats from Italy. As an ally and victor, Italy used the secret Pact of London to claim large stretches of Yugoslav territory along the Adriatic. Wilson decided to restrain Italy and offer his help to the Yugoslavs. His protection prevented Italy from realizing her pretensions; furthermore, the presence of the American Navy in the Adriatic prevented eventual war between Italy and Yugoslavia.

In the Italo-Yugoslav dispute Wilson saw an unambiguous conflict between excessive ambitions and the principles for which America entered the war. He acted to offer Yugoslavia protection, political and physical.

* * * * *

Thomas Schoonover (University of Bielefeld, West Germany), "Imperialism in Middle America; United States Competition with Britain, Germany, and France in Middle America, 1820s-1920s." Schoonover argues that U.S. opposition to European incursions in Latin America was motivated by a competitive spirit, and that geography was a crucial factor. Specifically, the "bottleneck" nature of Middle American transit gave it more significance than trade, investment, raw materials and so forth in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (University of Edinburgh, Scotland), "Turning the Big Cat Inside Out: U.S. Secret Agents and the British Empire in Two World Wars." Secret methods were useful to U.S. diplomats well before the establishment of the CIA in 1947, particularly when a policy change was contemplated at a moment premature for candor, and when hemispherically or racially inconsistent policy was being implemented. In World War I, U.S. secret agents propped up the British Empire while diplomats proclaimed America's faith in open diplomacy and self-determination. OSS agents undermined the Empire at the height of Anglo-American "understanding" in World War II. In the early years of the Cold War, intelligence experts once again, at the cost of considerable heartsearching, recommended support for empire as an interim bastion against Communism. The United States had supplanted the British lion at the cost of becoming feline herself.

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Allan Winkler (University of Oregon), "American Opposition to Imperialism During World War II." Resistance to the imperial order of the past remained closely tied to the nation's war aims as they were voiced on all fronts. In the end, however, the need to cooperate with the other members of the Grand Alliance, Britain in particular, tempered American goals.

* * * * *

Albert E. Kersten (Rijkscommissie voor Vaderlandse Geschiedenis and Leiden University, Netherlands), "The Dutch and the American anti-colonialist Tide, 1942-1945." Kersten analyses the reactions of the Netherlands government to the American conception of international trusteeship and independence for the European colonies after the war. During 1942 the Dutch government was extremely worried about what it conceived as America's idealistic and generalized concept of the issue. The Dutch aimed at proving that their policy in the East Indies had long been developing towards self-government. Holland's anxiety about regaining her position in the East Indies was somewhat abated by the positive responses to Queen Wilhelmina's speech of 7 December, 1942 which outlined earlier plans for the future relationship between metropolitan Holland and the colonies, and also by Roosevelt's repeated promises to that end. The Dutch were neither interested in the basic content of the American concepts, nor were they informed of the State Department's postwar plans for the colonies. American policy changed in 1945 because of security reasons, and the Dutch regarded this change as confirmation of the correctness of the pre-war policy they had continued since 1942 despite America's revolutionary ideas.

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Stephen E. Ambrose (University College, Dublin), "American Perceptions of Soviet Imperialism, 1945-1982." Soviet imperialism in Europe has been, and is, unacceptable to the United States. American leaders have spent a great deal of time, money, and energy on attempts

to eliminate, or weaken, or at least liberalize the Soviet empire. They have used as weapons various forms of embargo, propaganda, covert action, and the arms race. None have worked. The general failure of American policy in Eastern Europe has led to a frustration that increases the tension in East-West relations and therefore threatens the whole world. In 1982, as in 1945, disapproval and denunciation are the only legitimate and realistic responses to Soviet imperialism in Europe.

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NOTICE TO MEMBERS

Arrangements have been completed regarding SHAFR functions at the AHA meeting. They are as follows:

Monday, Dec. 27, 8:00 - 11:00 p.m., Council meeting:
Sheraton Marshall Room

Tuesday, Dec. 28, 5:00-7:00 p.m., cash bar reception:
Sheraton Dover Room

Wednesday, Dec. 29, 12:15 - 2:00 p.m., luncheon:
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The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition was initiated in 1972 by Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in memory of their late son. Administered by SHAFR, the purpose of the competition and the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing of a lengthy nature by young scholars in the field of U.S. diplomacy.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: the prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1982. It must be the author's first or second book. Authors are not required to be members of SHAFR, nor do they have to be professional academicians.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. William Stinchcombe, Department of History, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N. Y. 13210. The works must be received no later than February 1, 1983.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$500.00 If two (2) or more writers are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be in Cincinnati.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

- 1972 Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
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- 1973 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
- 1974 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
- 1975 Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
Stephen E. Pelz (U of Massachusetts-Amherst)
- 1976 Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
- 1977 Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
- 1978 James R. Leutze (North Carolina)
- 1979 Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston, MA)
- 1980 Michael Schaller (U of Arizona)
- 1981 Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke)
Hugh DeSantis (Dept. of State)
- 1982 David Reynolds (Cambridge U)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE FOR THE BEST SCHOLARLY ARTICLE IN U.S. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Award for scholarly articles in American foreign affairs was set up in 1976 through the kindness of the young Bernath's parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, and it is administered through selected personnel of SHAFR. The objective of the award is to identify and to reward outstanding research and writing by the younger scholars in the area of U.S. diplomatic relations

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to the author of any article upon any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1982. The article must be among the author's first five (5) which have seen publication. Membership in SHAFR or upon a college/university faculty is not a prerequisite for entering the competition. Authors must be under thirty-five (35) years of age, or within five (5) years after receiving the doctorate, at the time the article was published. Previous winners of the S.L. Bernath book award are ineligible.

PROCEDURES: Articles shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR, Five (5) copies of each article (preferably reprints) should be sent to the chairman of the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee by January 15, 1983. The Chairman of the Committee for 1982 is Sr. Rachel West, Department of History, Marian College, Indianapolis, IN 46222.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$200.00. If two (2) or more authors are considered winners, the prize will be shared. The name of the successful writer(s) will be announced, along with the name of the victor in the Bernath book prize competition, during the luncheon for members of SHAFR, to be held at the annual OAH Convention, meeting in 1983, at Cincinnati.

AWARD WINNERS

- | | |
|------|--|
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| 1978 | Michael H. Hunt (Yale) |
| 1979 | Brian L. Villa (U of Ottawa, Canada) |
| 1980 | James I. Matray (New Mexico State University)
David A. Rosenberg (U of Chicago) |
| 1981 | Douglas Little (Clark U) |
| 1982 | Fred Pollock (Cedar Knolls, N.J.) |

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL LECTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship was established in 1976 through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and is administered by a special committee of SHAFR. The Bernath Lecture is the feature at the official luncheon of the Society, held during the OAH convention in April of each year.

DESCRIPTION AND ELIGIBILITY: The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address, delivered at the annual meeting with the AHA, but is restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer is expected to concern himself/herself not specifically with his/her own research interests, but with broad issues of importance to students of American foreign relations. The award winner must be under forty-one (41) years of age.

PROCEDURES: The Bernath Lectureship Committee is now soliciting nominations for the 1984 award from members of the Society agents, publishers, or members of any established history, political science, or journalism organization. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vitae, if available, should reach the Committee no later than December 1, 1982. The Chairman of the Committee, and the person to whom nominations should be sent, is Dr. Richard E. Welch, J., Department of History, Lafayette College, Easton, PA 18042.

HONORARIUM: \$300.00 with publication of the lecture assured in the SHAFR **Newsletter**.

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- 1982 Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

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DEADLINE: All material must be in the office of the editor not later than four (4) weeks prior to the date of publication.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication.

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MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, honors, awards), announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered--or published--upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting the use of diplomatic materials in various (especially foreign) depositories, biographies and autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field of U. S. diplomacy, and even jokes (for fillers) if upon diplomatic topics. Authors of "straight" diplomatic articles should send their opuses to **Diplomatic History**. Space limitations forbid the carrying of book reviews by the **Newsletter**.

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