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PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors two printed works of a quarterly nature, the Newsletter, and Diplomatic History, a journal; a Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects is published occasionally.

MISSING OR MISLEADING SOURCES:
AN OCCUPATIONAL HAZARD
Frederick Marks

One experience which etched itself indelibly on my memory occurred during a recent visit to a foreign archive. Exchanging pleasantries with another scholar from the United States and remarking that I thought I had come upon a striking gap in the records, I was astonished at my colleague's reaction. Not only did he reject the very idea of a gap, almost indignantly, he insisted that it is the job of archivists to preserve evidence rather than destroy it.

Since then, it has often crossed my mind that one of history's perennial problems, that of missing or misleading evidence, is rarely considered. This seems especially significant in the field of diplomatic history where one must deal with highly sensitive material, material which can destroy the reputation of an individual or nation. Surely, it is in this area, if any, that the problem of sources would seem to require careful scrutiny.

There has been a tendency in the past to approach research centers, whether a private collection such as the Dulles Papers at Princeton or a public repository like the National Archives, as if the files were genuinely representative. Too often, bulk can give the appearance of completeness. Yet only when one is prepared to assume that anything even potentially embarrassing to an individual or nation is not likely to appear will one avoid the snare of misjudgment. Needless to say, State Department records are screened by a board of retired foreign service officers, and only items cleared by the board will see the light of day. The same holds true for Britain's Foreign Office. Indeed, it would be surprising if any other custom were to prevail. Most international exchanges come to fruition only in an atmosphere of strict confidentiality. It is not for naught that access to government documentation lags twenty-five to thirty years behind the event, and this in the United States. Other governments such as those of China and the Soviet Union may extend the period of closure indefinitely. Naturally, when a nation or family does decide to open its archives, the historian is well-advised to approach with caution. There will inevitably be pitfalls along with opportunities and

rare is the instance when one must not strive continually to read between the lines.

Consider the diplomacy of the two Roosevelts, Theodore and Franklin, each of whom followed the rule of committing as little as possible to paper. When T.R. claimed to have given the kaiser a clear-cut ultimatum during the heat of the Venezuela Blockade Crisis of 1902, critics instinctively accused him of exaggeration. There was not a shred of evidence for it in the British, German, or American archives. Only on second glance did it become apparent that there are such obvious gaps and omissions in the record that lack of evidence is tantamount to proof positive. Lord Lansdowne requested that the State Department, in publishing its diplomatic correspondence, alter the wording to reflect more favorably on H.M.G. and Roosevelt obliged. Clearly, one must take into account all the circumstances under which a body of evidence is published. Most of the German letters, diaries, and other documents for the early period were brought out after World War I when the fatherland stood in urgent need of foreign aid. To reveal T.R.'s ultimatum in the 1920s would only have jeopardized good relations with the United States at a time when they were at a premium.¹

The first Roosevelt merits special recognition for the ingenuity with which he covered his tracks. A president who could cross Lafayette Square incognito for secret talks with the British ambassador was not above burning evidence of the kaiser's indiscretion.² Much of his diplomacy bypassed the State Department and traveled by word of mouth through hand-picked envoys, often of another nationality. Important information was more apt to be conveyed on the tennis court or astride a horse than within earshot of a secretary. Those who search Roosevelt's autobiography for a candid account of the World Cruise of the Great White Fleet are therefore riding for a fall. His strategy in the Alaskan Boundary dispute is likewise anything but an open book, and one may recall that the profession had to wait twenty years for discovery of the Taft-Katsura memorandum with Japan.

When it comes to the diplomacy of cousin Franklin, the plot thickens. The 1930s and 1940s are highly charged with emotion and their central character remains controversial. As one would expect, there are

innumerable interesting but unanswered questions so that any warning with respect to sources which applies to the earlier period must be taken at least as seriously for the New Deal. One reason why the quest for certainty has proven so engagingly inconclusive is that a great many primary sources have been lost, eliminated, or deliberately shrouded from public view. The war trials atmosphere which until recently pervaded the postwar era can hardly be expected to ensure honest reporting. In Japan, such figures as Shigenori Togo, Mamoru Shigemitsu, and Nobutaka Ike have written "pro-American" accounts of their native land, and the diplomatic silence extends to friends as well as enemies.³ Nations allied with the United States during war continue to rely on Washington for aid. Thus, when Professor Liang tapped Nationalist Chinese archives to publish his brilliant study of Stilwell in China (it achieved instant best seller status in Taiwan, going through five printings in three months), he barely scratched the surface of potential sources.⁴ Similarly, when Lord Templewood (Samuel Hoare) published a description of his experience as head of the British mission in Madrid, he portrayed Alexander Weddell, his American counterpart, as charming and blamed Weddell's difficulties with Spanish Foreign Minister Serrano Suner on the latter. All of this must be read against a background of unpublished opinion in which Hoare accused Weddell of being "completely incompetent" and prone to "gaffs."⁵ It is instructive to note that the greater the time span following Roosevelt's death, the more trenchant the criticism. Churchill wrote first, then de Gaulle, and then Eden. Each became a bit bolder, with Eden's second volume more sharply worded than the first.⁶

The period 1933-45 abounds in documentary lacunae. Working at the National Archives, researchers have grown accustomed to seeing stamps and memorandums attached to papers signifying that they have been cleared for inspection. One of the better examples of British removal of telling material is a section of the minutes of the Churchill War Cabinet.⁷ By the same token, nothing could be more commonplace than the disappearance of records outlining an exchange between Henry Morgenthau and the French treasury agents in which a means was sought to circumvent American neutrality law.⁸ If there is no transcript of a crucial Roosevelt phone call to Premier Daladier, this

is again to be expected.⁹ FDR asked the French never to divulge his position on the Brussels Conference much the way Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles told British Ambassador Lord Lindsay to burn evidence relating to American operation of a provocative naval patrol.¹⁰ We do not have the full text of Welles' talks with German leaders in 1940, only scraps; and when one tries to locate the record of an important interview between Norman Davis and Prime Minister MacDonald, one finds a note in the published documents to the effect that the minutes of the interview are inexplicably missing.¹¹ Searching for the German reaction to Roosevelt's discussion of helium sales to Berlin, one must be content with a truncated version ending in elipsis.¹²

Further complicating the work of the scholar is the fact that good-sized portions of private manuscript collections have been held in reserve. This applies to everything from drafts of books by Joseph Davies (currently on file at the Library of Congress) to Churchill's papers, which will not be available until ten years after the completion of his official biography. The papers of Leon Blum and Joseph Paul-Boncour, held respectively by the French Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques and the French Archives Nationales, contain little more than newspaper clippings and speech manuscripts for this particular period.

What makes it doubly challenging is the way papers are sometimes doctored for publication. When the Dutch minister to Japan warned of a possible descent by the Japanese on Guam, Ambassador Grew commented in his diary, "I do not think such an insane step is likely." In Ten Years, however, Grew added the word "now," making himself appear more prescient.¹³ Occasionally, deletions may change the whole tone of a memoir as in the case of the Forrester diaries and sections of the Davies diary included in Mission to Moscow. Breckinridge Long's impolitic comments on Mein Kampf have been omitted in his published diary just as important parts of a Bullitt cable were withheld from publication by the State Department.¹⁴

Most disquieting of all is to find certain parts of a manuscript collection unaccountably missing. Key letters between Roosevelt and British friend Arthur Murray were found to be absent in the Elibank Papers.

Sections in the Grew diary for August 1941 had been scissored out of the collection at Harvard, and many pages of the Long diary at the Library of Congress were nowhere in evidence (one was razed away).¹⁵

In sum, it may be said that there is ample room for scepticism in the weighing of raw data. Beyond this, the student should expect to do a good deal of digging around the controversial issues. This implies resort to a wide array of sources. Magazines and newspapers can furnish valuable clues on the lead of an investigative reporter. The diary of leader X in country A may reveal significant thought patterns of leader Y in country B. It happened, for example, that Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King was on close terms with FDR as well as the leadership of England. When, therefore, one of his diary entries for October 1940 describes the Ottawa cabinet as locked in debate over whether or not to follow Britain's lead in guaranteeing American possessions in the Far East, the logical question is what could possibly have brought Britain to such a commitment -- particularly when there is no mention of it in British records? Could this be a quid pro quo for some guarantee made by the USA? Other diary entries would seem to suggest that the answer may very well be yes.

The broader the net, the better the catch. Secondary works by foreign scholars can be a veritable gold mine as they are likely to reflect another nation's point of view and will often be informed by documents that would be difficult, if not impossible, for an outsider to obtain. The Royal Archives of King George VI may be closed to the public, but anyone who reads Wheeler-Bennett's biography of George VI will find FDR confidently assuring the king in June of 1939 that the United States will enter the next war on the first bombing of London.

Information that is missing in politically important archives may turn up in some relatively neglected spot such as a military archive. Combing through French naval records for the period 1939-1940, it becomes clear that the French naval attache in Tokyo harbored critical assumptions about U.S. support in a future war and expressed them on paper with a clarity one could not expect to find elsewhere.

Admittedly, the twin factors of time and money will

set definite limits to any major scheme of research. As documentation becomes ever more extensive, the chance for carrying out broad-based analysis on a significant topic may appear to be on the wane. Nevertheless, with judicious use of sampling techniques, one should still be able to maintain variety in the choice of sources and thus finesse the problem of partial or misleading evidence. Thoroughness and ingenuity, helpful adjuncts in any discipline, will continue to be integral to the study of diplomatic history.

NOTES

¹Frederick W. Marks III, Velvet on Iron: The Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt (Lincoln, 1979), pp. 43-48.

²Ibid., p. 52.

³Shigenori Togo, The Cause of Japan (New York, 1956); Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny: My Struggle for Peace (New York, 1958); Nobutaka Ike, trans, and ed., Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences (Stanford, 1967). Ike maintains that Japan sought "a great empire" rather than the kind of strategic and economic conditions which would have made it possible to find common ground with the West (p. xix). Shigemitsu, who make no effort to present the case for Manchukuo, was appointed foreign minister after the war.

⁴See Chin-tung Liang, General Stilwell in China, 1942-1944: The Full Story (New York, 1972). Herbert Feis, who was commissioned by the State Department to write The China Tangle, is prominent among those who have tried to write on China without Chinese sources.

⁵Templewood, Complacent Dictator (New York, 1947), pp. 5, 27, 81; Hoare to Halifax, 8 and 19 November 1940, Hoare to Cadogan, 11 November 1940, Fo 800/323, Public Record Office, Kew, England (hereafter referred to as PRO). Weddell resigned in April 1942, to be succeeded by Carleton Hayes.

⁶Eden's third volume, entitled The Reckoning, applies words like "feckless," "hysterical," and "conjurer" to FDR (pp. 433, 457). Recently, Lord Coleraine spoke quite candidly in an interview with professor Thorne;

Christopher G. Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945 (London, 1978), p. 115n. The Spanish foreign minister, it should be noted, spoke of Weddell as pleasant but lacking in diplomacy and somewhat naive ("un peu enfant"); Ramon Serrano Suner, Entre les Pyrenees et Gibraltar (Geneva, 1947), pp. 236, 238.

⁷War Cab. 267, CAB 65/9, PRO.

⁸Saint-Quentin to Bonnet, 27 September 1938, Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (France), Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 1932-1939 (Paris, 1964 --), ser. 2, XI, 588, 588n.

⁹Ibid., ser. 2, IX, 847n.

¹⁰James Leutze, "The Secret of the Roosevelt-Churchill Correspondence: September 1939 -- May 1940," Journal of Contemporary History 10 (July 1975), p. 483; Welles to Bullitt, 22 October 1937, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (1937), III, 632.

¹¹E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler, eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, ser. 2, V, 547n.4.

¹²U.S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, ser. D, I, 707; the president "does not know what he should do; he can hardly . . . (group missing)."

¹³Waldo H. Heinrichs, American Ambassador: Joseph C. Grew and the Development of the United States Diplomatic Tradition (Boston, 1966), p. 368.

¹⁴Long's comments are available in his diary at the Library of Congress, and the Bullitt letter can be found in the Robert Kelley Papers at Georgetown University.

¹⁵The pages that were missing in the Long diary were 1-112 (covering 1933-34), 245-54, 261-62, and 297-300. Page 309 had been razed away.

**THE AMERICAN 'EASTERN ESTABLISHMENT'
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS:
A CHALLENGE FOR HISTORIANS
Priscilla M. Roberts**

Part II

To a great extent the existing historiography on the 'Eastern Establishment,' or rather its overwhelming absence, mirrors aspects of the society in and for which it was written. An examination of the deficiencies in the extant writing on the 'Establishment' furnishes many insights into the social and political structure of the American intellectual and academic world. Professionally, it is perhaps sobering to ponder the degree to which what we, as historians, consider worthy of attention or of question may reflect the underlying assumptions and beliefs of the society in which we live and participate. To borrow the classic reasoning of Sherlock Holmes when the dog failed to bark in the night, in some ways the absence of serious studies of the 'Establishment' is at least as revealing and significant as their presence could be. Yet it can hardly be as enlightening. It is surely time that historians of U.S. diplomacy gave some serious consideration to the concept of the foreign policy 'Establishment.' The unfortunate historian may occasionally feel that he is chasing a unicorn, mermaid, or some other such mythical and elusive beast, though not, one trusts, red herrings or wild geese. Still, we must develop approaches and tools to tackle the subject. Indeed, it seems to demand a multiplicity of studies; the list of unresolved questions is long and varied.

When working in this area, American historians might well abandon what often seems to be a tendency to concentrate upon limited and specific periods of time and pay some attention to the issue of continuity as well as change in twentieth-century United States foreign policy. Our profession is perhaps too ready to speak of "the Harding era" or "the age of Roosevelt"; while rather more than a moment gone, ten thousand such ages span a surprisingly short period of geological time. It might be more profitable to remember, for instance, that John Foster Dulles' first appearance on the American diplomatic scene was at the Second Hague Peace Conference in 1907; that Stimson's

career in the cabinet began in 1911 and ended in 1945; that the leading New York banker Russell C. Leffingwell served as Under Secretary of the Treasury from 1917 to 1920 and was chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations during the 1950s; that as a young man McCloy was a soldier in the United States Army during World War I, and recently was a prime mover in persuading Jimmy Carter to admit the deposed Shah of Iran to the United States; that W. Averell Harriman became interested in foreign affairs during the 1920s and still from time to time makes those pronouncements on the subject expected of an elder statesman; or that Walter Lippmann, who in certain circles was for many years before his death in 1975 almost an oracle on foreign policy issues, was already a prominent journalist during the First World War. Such individuals themselves possess, or possessed, a strong sense of the element of continuity in American foreign affairs, and frequently referred to their own past experiences when making decisions on such matters. Historians should be conscious of this dimension, and should be on the alert for continuity of both ideas and personnel, and for the possible analogies between different situations. Too narrow and specific a focus may sometimes be self-defeating.

When dealing with the 'Establishment,' one should also attempt to retain a sense of perspective. Historians should bear in mind the complexity of America's political, social, and economic system, and attempt to place the 'Establishment' in relation to other groups within it. To view the 'Establishment' out of context and in vacuo could easily prove deceptive. It may well be that on close examination some attributes which one ascribes to 'Establishment' members prove to be also characteristic of other, perhaps most, Americans. Historians must attempt to differentiate between those traits which the 'Establishment' had in common with other groups or individuals, and those which were peculiar to it alone.

An open-minded, empirical, common-sense approach seems the most potentially fruitful method to adopt when studying the foreign policy 'Establishment.' The first task facing its would-be historians is, of course, to define the term. Who belongs to the 'Establishment,' and why? (Why is it, indeed, that virtually no one will admit to being a member himself, and many supposed leaders of the 'Establishment' stoutly deny

that such an entity even exists?) Are 'Establishment' members born or made, and how are they recruited? Are certain social or regional origins, membership in particular professions, organizations, or institutions, or subscription to a definite set of foreign policy attitudes the decisive criteria in qualifying one for membership? Could all be important, or on occasion none essential? Is it perhaps possible for an individual at some point in his career to belong to the 'Establishment,' but after to leave, and vice versa? How long has the foreign policy 'Establishment' existed? Can one fairly describe it as a group of men committed to a particular view of foreign affairs which amounts to a tradition? If so, how, when, and why did this tradition first arise? How was or is it transmitted, and to whom? Has it altered over time? How cohesive a group is the 'Establishment,' and how self-consciously do its members subscribe to certain foreign policy attitudes? Precisely what are their 'internationalist' views, and what differentiates these from the foreign policy beliefs of other Americans? Is the 'Establishment' simply a coterie of East Coast bankers, lawyers, businessmen, academics, and representatives of the media, all intent upon the elegant but determined pursuit of their own economic interests? Is the 'Establishment' identical with the American upper class, or is it a subdivision of that group, or neither of these? How strong are its ties to the military, the business world, or agricultural groups? Is the 'Establishment' effectively a 'military-industrial complex'? Can one regard it as a political pressure group, or a political force of any description? How many politicians or officials of the State, Treasury, and Defense Departments and other government agencies are members of the 'Establishment'? How many presidential advisers? Perhaps inevitably, the answers to these questions may sometimes be imprecise and subjective. They must, nonetheless, be asked.

To define the 'Establishment,' we first need more studies both of individuals who might be considered to belong to it, and of the institutions which seem to provide its organizational framework and underpinning. At present, facts are still often conspicuous by their absence, and the information we have frequently only too selective. We need many more detailed individual and collective profiles of American foreign

policymakers, the authors of which at least consider them in the context of the 'Establishment' and discuss whether or not they might be regarded as members of that body. Such studies should provide us with a comprehensive overview of their subjects' entire careers; only so, in many cases, can one grasp the full significance of their posture on any given issue. It is, for instance, enlightening to realize that many of those Americans who supported United States intervention against Germany during World War II had been vehemently pro-Allied in the previous World War. To often, at present, these personages make fleeting appearances in the pages of excellent works on very specific aspects of American diplomacy. To appreciate some of the more subtle nuances and implications of their attitudes and activities, more rounded portraits of these individuals are essential. Let them escape from the footnotes and win attention in their own right.

More work must also be done on banks, businesses, and law firms, the media, the Ivy League universities, the Ford, Rockefeller, Carnegie, and other major philanthropic foundations, the Brookings Institution and similar think tanks, the Council on Foreign Relations, the Foreign Policy Association, the League of Nations Association, the Committee for Economic Development, and the Trilateral Commission, and such ad hoc groups as the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies and the Committee for the Marshall Plan. (This list is not intended to be all-inclusive, but merely suggestive.) Some such studies already exist, but more are needed.²⁷ Most important, historians should scrutinize the interconnections between all these groups and institutions, and also their links with the official American foreign policy decision-making apparatus. The nuts and bolts are in many cases still missing: we need more analyses of their membership in terms of social and regional origin, education, and profession. Remembering, too, that there are lies, damn lies, and statistics, and that within most organizations some groups or individuals are more influential than others, we must also attempt to discern who, to use an Americanism, wielded the clout within these bodies. How homogeneous were their members' foreign policy views, and were there ever internal disputes within these institutions over international issues? If so, what on? Historians must then ask: If one combined the

membership of all these organizations, or all those individuals among them who conformed to a specific set of criteria, or even all those Americans of whom the latter might be true, would one have unearthed the foreign policy 'Establishment'? Was or is it perhaps possible to be a prominent New York banker or corporation lawyer, yet not to belong to the 'Establishment'? Can all the Trilateral Commission's American members be part of it? In some respects, might one's passport into the 'Establishment' be a state of mind, a commitment to certain specific 'internationalist' beliefs? In short, is the foreign policy 'Establishment' primarily a social, an institutional, an occupational, or an ideological entity? Perhaps some fusion of the various potential approaches might be most productive.

When, however tentatively, we have identified the 'Establishment,' we must attempt to define its 'internationalism' more precisely. As used by historians and others, the term can embrace an enormous variety of positions and attitudes. If possible, historians should try to single out the common denominators and distinctive features of the 'Establishment' brand of 'internationalism.' What, if any, were the basic tenets on which all, or at any rate a majority, of 'Establishment' members were and perhaps are agreed? Did they, for example, include a particular interest in European rather than Asian, African, or Latin American affairs; a readiness to countenance United States intervention in the First and Second World Wars; support for the Marshall Plan and N.A.T.O.; or a conscious determination to combat 'isolationism'? Did or does some underlying general theme link the 'Establishment's' various foreign policy beliefs into one coherent whole? To what extent did the 'Establishment' formulate its foreign policy views in response to external stimuli and particular international events and developments? Has the 'Establishment' world view changed over time? The world of the 1920s did not, for instance, closely resemble that of the 1950s. Did altered perceptions cause the 'Establishment' to modify its foreign policy tenets? If one can discern a consensus 'Establishment' view on foreign affairs, how was this reached? Who were the leaders in the process, and how were these attitudes disseminated? Did 'Establishment' members draw their conclusions independent of one another, and then associate

themselves in organizations designed to promote their shared views? Or were their beliefs formulated by particular committees, institutions, and individuals, and then handed down to the majority of those involved? Or was there, perhaps, some kind of interaction between these two possible models?

The next questions must be: What were the sources of the 'Establishment's' foreign policy beliefs? Why did its members subscribe to a particular brand of 'internationalism'? When attempting to answer these, historians should be prepared to jettison the thesis that 'internationalism' of any description is necessarily the most logical, sensible, or rational policy for the United States to pursue, and to question all the 'Establishment's' most fundamental foreign policy assumptions. It may be that some of these were so generally taken for granted that they were rarely stated explicitly. That would not, however, necessarily make them less compelling. The validity of both the revisionist and Realist theses should be tested empirically with regard to specific episodes and issues. Instances which spring immediately to mind are the 'Establishment's' attitude toward the League of Nations, French security, reparations, and war debts during the 1920s; American intervention in each World War; the Marshall Plan, N.A.T.O., and German reunification and rearmament. Other examples would not be difficult to find. One should, however, scrutinize not simply the potential economic and strategic, but also the moral, ideological, and cultural bases of 'Establishment' thought. It may be possible to correlate 'Establishment' foreign policy attitudes with social class, regional origins, ethnicity, religion, political beliefs, partisan affiliation, business interests, foreign ties of every description, personal experiences, or individual psychological characteristics. Is there, for instance, as some historians and political scientists have claimed, a relationship of some nature between 'liberalism' and 'internationalism'?²⁸ If so, does a certain kind of 'liberal' develop into a particular species of 'internationalist,' or is the connection less straightforward? Possibly domestic preoccupations affected the 'Establishment's' foreign policy opinions. There could well be some connection between 'Establishment' members' beliefs as to the role of business in relation to government, and the respective

parts which they thought public officials, private individuals, and corporate institutions should take in foreign policymaking. Various studies have already attempted to link the 'corporatist' or 'corporate liberal' outlook and the 'internationalist' views of leading American policymakers of the interwar years and the 1950s.²⁹ Such an approach might well prove fruitful when dealing with the 'Establishment.' The concept of 'status politics,' latterly perhaps in some disrepute, might be another useful tool to employ.³⁰ It is quite likely, even probable, that at times more than one of those factors mentioned played a significant role. If so, historians must attempt to assess their relative weight. Perhaps most essential of all, they must reject no hypothesis out-of-hand, but should approach their task with open minds and as few preconceptions as possible.

Lastly, and most importantly, historians must try to gauge the degree and nature of the 'Establishment's' influence upon twentieth-century United States foreign affairs. When doing so, they would be wise to bear some reservations in mind. They must avoid the twin traps of either over- or under-estimating the 'Establishment's' impact upon American diplomacy. They must consider the possibility that on many occasions whatever group they define as the 'Establishment' may not have achieved all its aims but perhaps had to accept compromise solutions. The important role of Congress in foreign policymaking should not be ignored. It would be prudent to remember that the 'Establishment' never operated in a vacuum, and that many other groups in the American polity took an interest in one or more aspects of their country's overseas activities. For reasons of their own, some of these may well have supported or opposed measures which the 'Establishment' favored. Approval for some aspects of the 'Establishment' foreign policy line need not imply that any group or individual belonged to the 'Establishment.' One should also ask whether, rather than being as homogeneous and united as many have tended to assume, the 'Establishment' might not have been internally divided over at least some issues. Historians should be sensitive to the possibility of such subtleties and complexities.

At present, any large and comprehensive study of the 'Establishment' and twentieth-century United States diplomacy is patently lacking. The subject is surely

significant and challenging enough to deserve such a survey. Inevitably, any such work must in part synthesize the findings of other historians. Although information on the 'Establishment's' attitudes and activities can already be extrapolated from many fine studies, as yet there are very few books or articles whose primary focus is the 'Establishment.' We need more detailed case studies of specific episodes and issues which take some account of the possibility that the foreign policy 'Establishment' as such existed and had some impact upon the course of American foreign affairs. Lack of records and the ever more prevalent use of that triumph of modern technology, the telephone, may sometimes hamper the would-be student of the 'Establishment.' On the whole, though, twentieth-century historians of all descriptions are faced with a mountain of private and governmental records, to which, however slow and frustrating the pace of official release and declassification, the coming years can only add. For the most part, the necessary sources to begin serious work on the 'Establishment' and foreign policy are already available.

Work in this field should attempt to pinpoint the governmental loci of 'Establishment' power and influence. At any given time, which departments, bureaus, or agencies were staffed by individuals who might be described as 'Establishment' members? Just as important, though, how much weight did their counsels carry? The case of Cordell Hull may serve as a timely reminder that the Secretary of State, for instance, was not always pre-eminent in his own sphere; a certain familiarity with the intricacies of the bureaucratic in-fighting almost endemic among American government officials is essential to the accurate appreciation of the 'Establishment's' operational effectiveness. Moreover, one must not forget that 'Establishment' members often gave unofficial and informal advice to elected and appointed officials alike, suggestions whose influence must often, however much insight one may gain from the documentary record, oral histories, and personal interviews, be judged subjectively and intuitively. Nor should historians ignore the fact that the private actions of 'Establishment' members may sometimes have had important effects upon the course of international affairs. Several excellent studies have revealed the crucial role which private American bankers, albeit

with the State Department's tacit encouragement, played in European reconstruction during the 1920s.³¹ Perhaps even more significant were the activities of leading New York bankers in raising American loans and credits for the Allies during World War I, thereby enabling the Allies to maintain their purchases of American munitions, and consequently their own war effort, until United States intervention.³² On occasion, the lobbying and propagandist efforts of such unofficial groups as the Committee to Defend America and the Committee for the Marshall Plan -- both of which worked closely with sympathetic government officials -- helped to enlist congressional and public support for courses of action which American policymakers favored. Individuals such as Stimson, McCloy, and Acheson repeatedly slipped smoothly from private life into public service and back again, and even when out of office often cooperated closely with their former colleagues for given foreign policy ends. The support of Republican 'internationalists' for Wendell L. Willkie in 1940, Thomas E. Dewey in 1944 and 1948, and Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1952, may have been private, but in the last case in particular was vital in ensuring the election of a president who was at least not hostile to the 'Establishment's' diplomatic goals. Studies of the 'Establishment's' influence must take these and similar considerations into account.

At best, counterfactual history must be a speculative business. Yet the question remains: Had whatever individuals or group one eventually defines as the 'Establishment' not subscribed to a certain set of foreign policy beliefs, might the course of twentieth-century American foreign affairs at any time have been different? If so, when, and how? In short, is it correct to say that for several decades or more the 'Establishment' and its 'internationalist' views have exercised a decided, even crucial influence upon the shaping of United States diplomacy? The task facing historians is undoubtedly formidable, and calls for a great deal of research and hard work. This particular wood contains many fascinating trees, and one must take care not to forget the broad theme of the 'Establishment' and American foreign policy while concentrating on the minutiae of detail which such endeavors certainly involve. If the job is worth doing, though -- and I suggest it is -- it may be worth doing badly, but would be better still done

well. Inevitably, the answers to the questions raised in this article, and no doubt others, must sometimes be impressionistic, imprecise, and subjective. Such difficulties, however, offer no good excuse for not attempting to supply them. Like Everest, the subject of the 'Establishment' is too big to ignore, and should therefore be tackled.

FOOTNOTES

²⁷See, e.g., Meyer Berger, The Story of the New York Times, 1851-1951 (New York, 1951); David Halberstam, The Powers That Be (New York, 1979); W. Nielsen, The Big Foundations (New York, 1972); H. R. Fosdick, The Rockefeller Foundation (New York, 1952); David Walter Eakins, "The Development of Corporate Liberal Policy Research in the United States, 1885-1965" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1966); Kim McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power: From FDR to Reagan (New York, 1982); Shoup and Minter, Imperial Brain Trust; Sklar, ed., Trilateralism; Karl Schriftgeisser, Business Comes of Age: The Story of the Committee for Economic Development and Its Impact Upon the Economic Policies of the United States (New York, 1960); idem, Business and Public Policy: The Role of the Committee for Economic Development, 1942-1967 (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1967); Walter Johnson, The Battle Against Isolation, reprint ed. (New York, 1973); Chadwin, Warhawks.

²⁸Works which make some use of this concept include, e.g., Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York, 1955); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution (New York, 1968); Arno J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (New Haven, 1959); idem, Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counter-Revolution at Versailles (New York, 1968); Kolko, Main Currents in Modern American History; Parrini, Heir to Empire; Leffler, Elusive Quest; Richard M. Abrams, "American Anticommunism and Liberal Internationalism," Reviews in American History 10 (September 1982): 454-467; and the works by Williams cited in note 22.

²⁹Among those studies to adopt such an approach are Hogan, Informal Entente; Leffler, Elusive Quest; Van Meter, "United States and European Recovery"; Robert Griffith, "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate Commonwealth," American Historical Review 87 (February

1982): 87-122. Among the many works which give some insight into the phenomenon labeled 'corporatism' or 'corporate liberalism' are those by Williams and Kolko cited in the previous note. See also Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (New York, 1963); James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900-1918 (Boston, 1968); McQuaid, Big Business and Presidential Power; idem, "Corporate Liberalism in the American Business Community, 1920-1940," Business History Review 52 (Autumn 1978): 342-368; idem et Edward Berkowitz, Creating the Welfare State: The Political Economy of Twentieth-Century Reform (New York 1980); Stuart D. Brandes, American Welfare Capitalism, 1880-1940 (Chicago, 1977); Robert D. Cuff, The War Industries Board: Business-Government Relations During World War I (Baltimore, 1973); Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy; idem, Herbert Hoover: Forgotten Progressive (Boston, 1975); Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of Monopoly (Princeton, 1968); idem, "Herbert Hoover, the Commerce Secretariat, and the Vision of an 'Associative State,' 1921-1928," Journal of American History 61 (June 1974): 116-140; idem, "The Discovery and Study of a 'Corporate Liberalism,'" Business History Review 52 (August 1978): 309-320; idem, ed., Herbert Hoover as Secretary of Commerce: Studies in New Era Thought and Practice (Iowa City, 1981).

³⁰The seminal work on 'status politics' is unquestionably Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: from Bryan to F. D. R. (New York, 1956). See also John G. Sproat, "The Best Men": Liberal Reformers in the Gilded Age (New York, 1968); Stow Persons, The Decline of American Gentility (New York, 1973); Samuel P. Hays, "The Social Analysis of American Political History, 1880-1920," Political Science Quarterly 80 (September 1965): 373-84; David P. Thelen, "Social Tensions and the Origins of Progressivism," Journal of American History 56 (September 1969): 323-341.

³¹See the works cited in note 18.

³²Kathleen Burk, "The Diplomacy of Finance: British Financial Missions to the United States 1914-1918," Historical Journal 22 (June 1979): 352-359; idem, "The Mobilization of Anglo-American Finance during World War I," in Mobilization for Total War: The Canadian, American and British Experience 1914-1918, 1939-1945,

ed. N. F. Dreisziger (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1981): 26-34; Roberta A. Dayer, "Strange Bedfellows: J. P. Morgan & Co., Whitehall and the Wilson Administration during World War I," Business History 18 (July 1976): 127-134; Roberts, "American 'Eastern Establishment' and World War I:" 247-307.

ABSTRACTS

Ninth Annual Meeting of The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, August 4-6, 1983, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.: Report by Alan K. Henrikson (The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University), Chairman, Program Committee

In 1983 the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) held its Annual Meeting in conjunction with the Conference on Peace Research in History (CPRH) and the American Military Institute (AMI) -- an unprecedented encounter. The result was not only the largest summer meeting in SHAFR's history but also, owing to the harmony achieved between peace historians and military specialists, one of the most rewarding. CPRH and AMI took as their common general theme, "The Causes, Conduct, and Consequences of War in the Twentieth Century." The SHAFR Program Committee, with the Bicentennial of the 1783 Treaty of Paris in mind, invited papers on all aspects and phases of Anglo-American relations. In addition, papers were solicited treating U.S. foreign economic policy, the nuclear arms race and arms control (including the "freeze"), the relevance of political geography to diplomatic history, and the controversial Nixon-Kissinger policy of "detente" -- curiously, in light of the current importance of the subject and the recent appearance of the principals' memoirs, the one suggested theme that no SHAFR member or other historian offered to address at the summer meeting.

Further sessions, of an experimental nature, were held dealing with "video history" and designed to encourage brief work-in-progress presentations by younger scholars, including advanced graduate students. As before, the Committee on American-East Asian Relations sponsored a symposium during the SHAFR national

meeting, and it generously hosted an evening reception for CPRH, AMI, and SHAFR as well as its own members. The U.S. Department of State Historian's Office offered a tour of the Department's Foreign Affairs Information Computer Center and Operations Center, and also a briefing on the progress of declassification.

These coordinated presentations would not have been possible without the fine cooperation of all the organizations and institutions involved, including Catholic University. As 1983 SHAFR Program Chairman, I would like warmly to thank them all, in particular CPRH Program Chairman David S. Patterson (Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State) and the other members of the SHAFR Program Committee -- William H. Becker (George Washington University), Harold D. Langley (Smithsonian Institution and Catholic University of America), Charles E. Neu (Brown University), and the previous SHAFR Program Chairman, Lloyd Ambrosius (University of Nebraska). Local arrangements at Catholic University in Washington were admirably handled by Harry Langley, a genial and invaluable ally.

The 1983 program featured fifteen sessions with presentations and commentaries. There were also three luncheon sessions with speakers. Almost all were very well attended, by historians and also by members of the Washington diplomatic, military, and intelligence communities. There was some press interest in the conference. For summaries of each event, I am indebted to the chairmen or the persons presiding. Their reports, slightly edited for brevity and uniformity and in a few cases somewhat augmented, follow.

The Historiography and Methodology of Peace Research and Military History (Chair: Warren F. Kuehl, University of Akron)

The paper by Charles DeBenedetti (University of Toledo), "Peace History: In the American Manner," reviewed the focus, scope, and methodology of peace history. Noting the existence of an extensive literature that still lacks a wider readership, he pointed out what peace historians have to offer. Edward M. Coffman (University of Wisconsin -- Madison) focused on "Recent Trends in Military History." In a review of literature, he described the movement from

battlefield operations "to military institutions, society, and thought, and how they fit in the currents of their times." He also noted a new willingness to use social scientific techniques. Jeffrey P. Kimball (Miami University) reviewed the results of his 1981 questionnaire given to diplomatic, military, and peace researchers, which sought not only hard data but also ideological information useful for doing intellectual history. In "A House Divided? Diplomatic, Military, and Peace History Approaches to the Causes of U.S. Wars," he showed in the form of graphs derived from computer analysis that clear ideological differences can be seen in the respective fields, with military historians tending toward the conservative side, diplomatic historians in the middle, and peace researchers to the left. He emphasized that methodology can be influenced by ideology, and that all historians should be more conscious of their own preconceptions.

Remarks from the floor indicated that, despite new trends in focus and breadth, the literature in both the military and peace areas is still ethnocentric, based on the American experience. There was enthusiastic agreement that the exchange between AMI and CPRH members was fruitful in broadening perspectives, and that further dialogue would be valuable.

CPRH-AMI Luncheon (Presiding: Harold D. Langley)

In a talk on the personal theme, "A Military Historian Looks at Arms Control and International Affairs," Daniel R. Beaver (University of Cincinnati, currently at the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks) spoke about the cultural and intellectual assumptions that have informed his work in history.

The Problem of Limited War (Chair: Col. Roy K. Flint, U.S. Military Academy)

In a paper treating "The Korean War, 1950-1953," John Edward Wilz (Indiana University) argued that, as a result of that conflict, American leaders came to believe that limited wars were the most likely form of war in the nuclear age. In order to be prepared, the nation needed a standing force armed with the right equipment, a doctrine designed for low-intensity conflict, and a readiness posture permitting immediate

employment. Such a policy, they discovered, would be expensive, and perhaps unpopular with the American people.

Robin Higham (Kansas State University) took a more unconventional approach in "A Limited War in a Total War: The Coming of the Graeco-German War, 1940-1941." Redefining "limited war" to include the World War II British campaign in Greece, Higham observed that the question was how far the British could go in supporting the Greeks against the Germans while preserving their strength for the life-and-death struggle yet to come. He concluded that it was a "sorry performance" on the part of the British, because their real interest was to preserve their political influence in the eastern Mediterranean. They knew that they lacked the military power to achieve their strategic ends.

A commentary was offered by Lt. Col. Don Bittner, USMC (Command and Staff College, Quantico).

Case Studies in the Evolution of Anti-War Views (Chair: Brig. Gen. Edwin H. Simmons, U.S. Marine Corps History and Museums)

Mark A. Stoler (University of Vermont), in his "National Security Without War: General Stanley Embick and the Continental Alternative in American Military Planning, 1918-1941," characterized General Embick's views as not so much anti-war as pragmatic and dissenting from the consensus in U.S. interwar strategic planning. A principal U.S. Army planner, Embick was an articulate proponent of a "continental" strategy, stressing defense of the continental United States and vital U.S. interests in the Western Hemisphere. Although the global strategy, or world view, prevailed in the full range of "Rainbow" plans, Embick's pragmatism did influence these plans and had its ultimate expression in Rainbow 1, the 1940 plan for the defense of the Western Hemisphere in the event of war with the Axis.

William C. Berman (University of Toronto), in a paper entitled "An Education of a Dove: William Fulbright and the Vietnam War," presented a rather eulogistic appreciation of Fulbright's conversion to the peace cause. In discussion, Fulbright was characterized as the "legitimater" of dissent in the Vietnam War and

the question was raised as to why there had been no such figure during the Korean War.

Commentator David F. Trask (U.S. Army Center of Military History) observed that a preoccupation of American soldiers and statesmen since World War I has been to find means of countering hegemonic Eurasian threats compromising U.S. security. The difficulty was that general warfare, in its modern destructive guise, appeared as an increasingly questionable means of countering hegemonic enterprise. As Stoler ably demonstrated, General Embick was appalled by the prospect of destructive wars in Eurasia. Embick's own solution was to build a system of Hemispheric defense. Senator Fulbright, who recognized after 1945 that nuclear war was unacceptable as a political act, even in response to Eurasian hegemonic dangers, initially propounded Wilsonian solutions to international problems. In later years, he increasingly counseled U.S. restraint on the world stage, given the necessity first for reform at home.

Sandra C. Taylor (University of Utah) commented that Stoler's well-written paper was "useful and instructive to those who would see the Army as a veritable nest of hawks, urging on a reluctant country policies and programs that would lead only to war." She identified the major theoretical issue in Stoler's paper as being whether the military should have concerned itself with larger policy issues rather than merely strategic considerations. The implication of the paper is that they should have done so.

She had more difficulty with Berman's paper because it was not a standard academic paper but instead the last chapter, or set of conclusions, of his forthcoming biography of Fulbright. She had no particular quarrel with Berman's generalizations but missed the supporting argumentation and evidence. She was intrigued by Berman's statement that Fulbright, after breaking with Johnson, later wished that he had remained on the "inside." Where, she asks, is the proper place for criticism and dissent?

Retrospective on the Cuban Missile Crisis

In tandem with this year's SHAFR President, Ernest R. May (Harvard University), Arthur L. Singer, Jr. (Alfred P. Sloan Foundation) offered a demonstration

of the experiments in "video history" which the Foundation is sponsoring. During the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, President Kennedy was advised by an executive committee of the National Security Council. Survivors of the "excom" were interviewed in groups, with video cameras running, and Mr. Singer showed a selection. The audience responded thoughtfully to questions about the potential uses of such videotapes -- first of all, as historical sources, complementing documents, autobiographies, and the like, and, secondly, as aids for classroom teaching. Mr. Singer would welcome further comments from persons who were present or, indeed, from anyone with relevant observations. His address is the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, 630 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10111.

Great Britain, Ireland, the United States, and the Coming of World War II (Chair: Warren F. Kimball, Rutgers University -- Newark)

In his paper, "American Neutrality and the Logic of British Accommodation with the Dictators, 1935--1936," Harry Dahlheimer (State University of New York -- College at Cortland) presented a gentle critique of American "appeasement," using the Italo-Ethiopian War as a case study. Frederick W. Marks's paper, "FDR's First and Foremost Commitment to Great Britain," took an almost opposite position, arguing that Franklin Roosevelt had made a firm commitment to Britain at the time of the reopening of the Burma road in the fall of 1940 and an unspoken but clear commitment even by the middle of 1939. Timothy P. Maga (University of Maryland -- Far Eastern Division), in "The United States and Irish Neutrality, 1937-1941," presented a narrative summary of John Cudahy's ambassadorship to Ireland in the late 1930s, when the ambassador's anti-interventionism seemed at odds with FDR's thinking.

Both commentators, Geoffrey S. Smith (Queen's University) and Warren Kimball, agreed that Dahlheimer and Marks could not both be correct, and took exception to Marks's conclusion that Roosevelt had made a clear, firm commitment to Britain in either Asia or Europe.

American Foreign Economic Policy in the Early Cold War: Reconsiderations (Chair: William H. Becker, George Washington University)

In his paper, "Private Power and Public Policy: United States Foreign Oil Policy Reconsidered," David S. Painter (Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State) argued that, in order to please the oil industry's many contending interests, the U.S. government sought to create an international environment in which all companies could operate with security and profit. Painter found American oil policy much influenced by general domestic political and economic conditions. There was never any question, for example, about permitting an increasing consumption of oil, nor was there much appreciation of the effect of American policy on foreign oil suppliers.

Robert M. Hathaway (History Staff, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) traced the evolution of food assistance as a political instrument in his "A Weaponry of Wheat: Food Aid and American Foreign Policy." The paper focused on aid to Yugoslavia and India, and demonstrated how Cold War perceptions influenced food support. The Truman Administration's initiatives set the stage for the far more ambitious policies of the Eisenhower years -- e.g., P.L. 480, passed in 1954, which came to be known as the Food for Peace Program.

The paper of Robert A. Pollard (The Wilson Quarterly), "Economic Security and the Origins of the Cold War," presented a new interpretation of the role of economic foreign policy in the years between 1945 and 1950. He proposed that economic measures, rather than military preparations, were the main instruments for achieving American security during this period.

Both commentators, I.M. Destler (Institute for International Economics) and Alfred E. Eckes (U.S. International Trade Commission), were complimentary about the careful research that had gone into these papers. Destler, a political scientist, thought that both Pollard and Hathaway might have concentrated more on the domestic politics of the foreign policy issues which they studied. Painter had shown the importance of domestic political considerations. Eckes, a historian, also urged greater attention to domestic factors. From the vantage of his experience as Chairman of the International Trade Commission, he raised questions about the free trade assumptions of all three papers. The international economic

environment, he observed, turned out to be much more complicated than many policy makers of the 1940s thought it would be. The authors seemed too ready to accept the faith in multilateralism that was prevalent at the end of World War II.

"Geopolitics" Re-examined: Political Geography and American Diplomatic History (Chair: Charles Vevier, University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey)

A paper by Bernard V. Burke (Portland State University), "Manifest Destiny and Containment in Early North America," argued that the traditional concept of Manifest Destiny as the preordained expansion of the American people across the continent was just one half of the expansionist rationale -- the other being a fear of containment. In countervailing fashion and with a chesslike attention to geographical and areal detail, containment was used by all sides -- Spanish, French, British, and American -- in extending territorial power defensively against the encroachment of their imperial rivals in North America.

In "Anglo-American Imperial Rivalry, 1815-1860," Kinley J. Brauer (University of Minnesota) stated, in effect, that the operations, tactics, and economic interests of the United States in North America in the early nineteenth century founded the imperial vision and development of American imperialism well before the outburst of the modern imperialist movement during the latter part of the century. Brauer cited Clay's American System, the ideology of Young America, and the South's suspicion of British abolitionism which stimulated Southern desires for tropical hegemony in the Caribbean.

"Idealism and Realism at Paris: Isaiah Bowman's Role in Redrawing Europe," a paper by a political geographer, Neil Smith (Columbia University), addressed the personal-professional dilemmas of the man who went on to become the doyen of American political geography. When the facts of the tangled geographical-boundary issues of post-World War I Europe drove against the needs of compromise and comforts of dogma, Bowman grew up rather rapidly, if also self-righteously. He survived some serious challenges to him as an expert. He was to be disappointed in not gaining the League of Nations Secretariat position.

George W. Hoffman (University of Texas) was not able to be present to give a commentary. Lawrence E. Gelfand (University of Iowa) found Burke's paper a useful reminder that the imperial rivalries of the early period of American national history were also reflections of world-wide imperial and balance-of-power policies. He strengthened Burke's case by referring to the 1789-1790 Nootka Sound crisis. This would have directly threatened American expansion if it had brought war and possible consequent cession of Spanish Florida and Louisiana to England. As a suggestion for future research, he noted that the only actual military opposition to American westward expansion turned out to have been posed by Mexico. With regard to Brauer's theme of Anglo-American rivalry, he noted the counter-reality of a string of diplomatic agreements from Rush-Bagot to Clayton-Bulwer. In assessing Smith's paper on Bowman, Gelfand observed that idealism vs. realism is an outdated analytical approach and expressed his doubt that Bowman's activities can be sufficiently understood by using that standard. Gelfand further raised questions about the extent of Bowman's influence in the Inquiry. Finally, he questioned Bowman's shift in attitude regarding the Treaty in 1944, after having so heartily favored it in 1919.

In summarizing the session as a whole, Charles Vevier urged that the consideration of geopolitics be renewed by American diplomatic historians, to say nothing of the need to reassess the entire scope of American history from that viewpoint. The time has come, he suggested, to deal with the Haushoferian shadow that has darkened the field, particularly since geopolitics, however defined, is strongly present in the current work of foreign policy makers and commentators everywhere. This neglect has contributed to the fig leaf of American innocence that has so frequently been used to excuse American expansion and imperialism. The gap in understanding goes hand in hand with certain habits of American diplomatic history, such as treating land and sea expansionism along separate dimensions. The unifying effects of technology are overlooked. As for practitioners of historical geography, he critically noted that their work had become overloaded by detailed areal and physical description, without developing itself as a unity with political geography.

SHAFR-CPRH-AMI Luncheon (Presiding: Alan K. Henrikson)

SHAFR was greatly honored to have as its featured speaker Elliot L. Richardson, whose topic was "Negotiating World Order: The Historical Case of the Law of the Sea Conference." In introducing Mr. Richardson, SHAFR Program Chairman Alan Henrikson noted the appropriateness of his appearance before the society in 1983 -- the year of the bicentennial celebration of the Treaty of Peace with Great Britain, a country in which Mr. Richardson served as U.S. Ambassador, and also the occasion of SHAFR's pioneering collaboration with CPRH and AMI, which brought to mind Mr. Richardson's own exceptional combination of civilian and military perspectives, from his high-level State and Defense Department experiences. It is his role as a leading internationalist, however, that Henrikson particularly emphasized. The multilateral context of foreign policy -- as best illustrated by the Law of the Sea Conference, at which Mr. Richardson was the U.S. representative -- is a new fact of which diplomatic historians have not yet taken sufficient account. From the early days of the League of Nations and United Nations, our profession has always been "multilaterally minded," Henrikson pointed out. But perhaps we are less so now than we have been -- and should again become.

Stressing the deficiency of "world order" achieved through "management of the politico-military balance," Ambassador Richardson observed that international power balancing is inherently "unstable." Alluding to the Nixon Administration's relations with the Soviet Union, he observed that, paradoxically, the more "brilliant" such balancing is, the more it makes the world uneasy -- for it makes people feel their safety depends on brilliant performance by particular men. "Fail-safe" or "reinsurance" policies are necessary. As in the case of the Law of the Sea, it is important to create a system of rules that remains in place "after the plenary body that has addressed it has dispersed."

He then described in detail the Law of the Sea Conference -- the "biggest," "longest-running," "most successful" multilateral conference in history. Both substantively and procedurally, the LOS Conference was innovative. During the last session, the most

difficult issue was "the decision-making process." Some further adjustment in, e.g., the Seabed Authority, might be necessary, he suggested, in order to make the new regime for the ocean more universally acceptable. Eventually, he predicted, the United States, despite the "ideological" reaction of some members of the Reagan Administration, will join in the Treaty. If it does not, the other countries might "discover they don't need the United States."

Anglo-American Relations in the Early Nineteenth Century (Chair: David M. Pletcher, Indiana University)

This session was originally entitled "The Monroe Doctrine: Reinterpretations" and included papers by Harold E. Bergquist, Jr., of Winchester, Mass., and N. N. Bolkhovitinov of the Institute of General History, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. Since Professor Bolkhovitinov was unable to be present, Program Chairman Henrikson arranged for a paper, "The Caroline Affair and Anglo-American Relations, 1837-1842," to be read by Kenneth R. Stevens (Dartmouth College). The changed emphasis necessitated revising the title of the session.

Bergquist ("The Perkins-Bemis Interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine Questioned") suggested that Dexter Perkins and Samuel Flagg Bemis unduly emphasized the defensive character of the Monroe Doctrine and undervalued evidence suggesting that it was also partly offensive, directed against Britain. He felt that Secretary of State John Quincy Adams wanted to develop a rapprochement with Russia during the early 1820s, in order to align that power with the United States and the young Latin American nations in any future anti-British conflict.

Stevens devoted the bulk of his paper to an analysis of the legal issues arising from the "Caroline" affair. In particular, he examined Daniel Webster's doctrine of self-defense justifying violent action against attack, such as the attack on the "Caroline," but only if the need for such defense were "instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation" -- conditions which did not exist in 1837. He concluded by touching on several twentieth-century invocations of the Webster doctrine.

Brief commentaries by Pletcher and Lloyd C. Gardner (Rutgers University) commended Stevens but devoted most time to Bergquist's paper. Pletcher felt the "offensive" thesis might have its points, but he called for more clarity in its development. Gardner was skeptical of its justification and utility. Bergquist then read a paraphrased translation of a commentary on his paper sent to him by Professor Bolkhovitinov. It was generally approving but offered a few criticisms.

Arms Control in Perspective (Chair: Roger R. Trask, Historical Office, U.S. Department of Defense)

Joseph B. Baratta (Boston University) presented a paper, "Grenville Clark: Advocate of Limited World Government for the Control of Atomic and Other Weapons, 1944-1946." Through a plan he authored in 1944 as well as efforts to inject arms control provisions into the UN Charter and support for the 1946 Baruch Plan, Clark sought his objectives with an awareness of "current international realities" and "practical wisdom," Baratta maintained. Thomas A. Julian (BDM Corporation) gave a paper entitled "Paul Warnke and the Nuclear Freeze Movement." Warnke, Julian argues, is representative of "liberal" arms controllers, who see the outbreak of World War I -- unintended and a blunder, resulting in disaster much vaster than its trivial causes -- as their central historical experience. Although Warnke's approach has stressed dealing with the Soviet Union on arms control "step by step," he endorsed the comprehensive nuclear "freeze" proposal. Julian argues that Warnke is not inconsistent in this -- that he sees the freeze as a way to interest public opinion in arms negotiations.

In his commentary, David MacIsaac (Air Power Research Institute) suggested that Clark was "a man whom the times overrode." The fear in the U.S. of an unknown future and the possibility of a hideous new war made it impossible for American statesmen to surrender atomic weapons, which were the means of victory. Assessing Julian's paper, MacIsaac concluded that people interested in arms control will eventually turn to persons such as Paul Warnke.

The second commentator, Roger Trask, commended Baratta on his well-documented paper, but raised questions about Clark's influence. Suggesting that Julian's

thoughtful analysis of Warnke ought to be published, he noted that his paper implied criticism of the Reagan approach to arms control. In discussion, one questioner suggested that Clark's approach to limited world government was elitist and designed to perpetuate Anglo-American dominance. Questions also were raised about the consistency of Warnke's approach.

Antebellum Naval Diplomacy (Chair: Harold D. Langley)

Two revisionist interpretations were presented at this session. In the first paper, "'Prudence and Discretion': Anglo-American Relations and the Suppression of the Slave Trade on the African Coast, 1820-1860," Judd Scott Harmon (U.S. National Park Service -- Harper's Ferry Center) traced the U.S. Navy's efforts to restrict the slave trade from the beginning of independent patrols in 1817 and establishment of the African Squadron in 1842 to the joint cruising and close cooperation with the Royal Navy after 1845. In 1862 the last American warship was withdrawn for Civil War duty; but in that same year the United States and Great Britain signed a treaty allowing the British to search suspected slavers flying the American flag. This action was a reversal of a long-held position dating back to the time of Secretary of State John Quincy Adams.

The second paper, by Robert William Love, Jr. (U.S. Naval Academy), dealt with "Anglo-American Naval Diplomacy and the Falkland Islands, 1820-1845." Love challenged previous historians' interpretations, by arguing that the 1820 claim of Daniel Jewett was probably invalid and, in addition, that American agents followed President Andrew Jackson's policies to the letter. He cited new British evidence showing that the Admiralty and not Lord Palmerston initiated London's decision to seize the islands in 1833. President Jackson never recognized this claim, nor did his successors, each of whom adopted his policy of willingness to use force to insure American maritime access to the islands.

The commentators were Richard W. Turk (Allegheny College), who concentrated on Harmon's paper, and Robert Seager II (University of Kentucky), who discussed Love's paper.

Anglo-American Financial Diplomacy During and After World War I (Chair: Melvyn P. Leffler, Vanderbilt University)

Kathleen Burk (Imperial College, London University) presented a paper entitled "Britain, America, and the Sinews of War: British War Missions to the United States, 1914-1918." This described Britain's growing dependence on American assistance and examined the efforts of Lord Northcliffe and Lord Reading to secure financial aid from the Treasury Secretary, William McAdoo. As a result of conscious efforts by U.S. Treasury officials to use American financial power for leverage against Great Britain, the British were forced to relinquish their dominant financial position to the United States.

Philip A. Grant (Pace University) discussed "The United States and the British War Debt Controversy, 1919-1923." He summed up the negotiations of Chancellor of the Exchequer Stanley Baldwin and Governor of the Bank of England Montagu Norman with the U.S. World War Foreign Debt Commission. He claimed that the debt settlement was a reasonable compromise.

Mark T. Guilderhus (Colorado State University) and Melvyn Leffler commented on the two papers. They praised Burk's paper for its illumination of a specialized topic that is often overlooked by diplomatic historians. Both noted that a better appreciation of wartime financial diplomacy could help explicate the mixed competitive and cooperative features of the Anglo-American relationship extending into the 1920s. Guilderhus and Leffler were critical of the Grant paper. They cited Grant's inadequate research in archival and manuscript materials, noted his reluctance to ask tough questions, and commented upon his inability to see connections between the debt issue and other contentious matters, including naval armaments and rivalries in the Western Pacific.

Chinese Historians and American Policy in the 1940s: A View From Two Sides, Symposium of the Committee on American-East Asian Relations (Chair: Warren I. Cohen, Michigan State University)

In the absence of Chang Chung-tung (National Taiwan University), chairman of the panel Warren Cohen read

Professor Chang's paper, entitled "Containment and China's Relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, 1947-1949." Professor Chang's paper stressed the aid the United States was giving to European countries as part of its policy of containing the Soviet Union, and also discussed at length Chinese interest in working with the Soviet Union to avert a Guomindong defeat.

The other paper was offered by Wu Jiajing (Michigan State University), who spoke on "The Marshall Mission and the Guomindong-Communist Controversy in China." Ms. Wu reviewed interpretations offered by Communist and Guomindong as well as by American writers. She offered a number of explanations for Marshall's failure, stressing his (American) partiality for the Guomindong.

The commentators -- James A. Fetzer (State University of New York -- Maritime Academy) and Robert M. Blum (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency) -- and the audience focused mainly on Wu Jiajing's paper, which was well received. The audience during this evening session averaged about seventy and swelled to eighty or ninety when free drinks and hors d'oeuvres became available.

Britain, America, and the Orient (Chair: Gary R. Hess, Bowling Green State University)

This session included papers by Roberta Allbert Dayer (State University of New York -- Buffalo), John J. Sbrega (Tidewater Community College -- Virginia Beach Campus), and Andrew J. Rotter (Saint Mary's College of California).

The Dayer paper, "Sir Charles S. Addis and the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, 1933-1938," examined the role of Addis in the working relationship between his bank and the British Foreign Office, emphasizing his actions as manager of the British Group of the China Consortium. Although this Consortium foundered in consequence of the breakdown of international cooperation during the late 1930s, Addis attempted to represent both British and Chinese interests. In a paper, "Anglo-American Rivalry for the Postwar China Market, 1941-1945," John Sbrega detailed the conflicting postwar objectives of Britain and the United States and their mutual suspicions. A lack of realism characterized the planning of both the

State Department and the Foreign Office; the indifference of President Roosevelt and the outdated imperialism of Prime Minister Churchill further aggravated their misunderstandings over China. Andrew Rotter in his paper, "Another Root of Vietnam: The United States, Great Britain, and Southeast Asia, 1945-1950," dealt with the importance of Britain in the American commitment to recognize and support the Bao Dai regime. The British were concerned about stabilizing their position in Southeast Asia -- especially in Malaya, whose exports to the United States were vital in reducing the sterling area's dollar deficits. With both London and Washington apprehensive about the ability of Southeast Asian countries to withstand communist expansion in the aftermath of communist ascendancy in China, cooperation became imperative.

In commenting, Waldo H. Heinrichs (Temple University) suggested that Dayer's paper needed clearer focus and that the Consortium effort should be placed within a broader context. With respect to Sbrega's paper, he recommended looking more thoroughly at actual British and American economic interests in China and making clearer the significance of wartime differences. He found Rotter's argument clearly stated and carefully developed. Hess, in a brief commentary, noted the extent to which all three papers dealt with the role of perceptions in policymaking. They were especially useful in understanding the ways in which British officials viewed the thinking of their American counterparts.

The Historical Study of Intelligence (Chair: Jeffrey M. Dorwart, Rutgers University -- Camden)

This session featured papers entitled "German Intelligence Operations in the U.S.: Agents and Diplomats in World War I," by Reinhard R. Doerries (Hamburg University), and "History on Trial: A Critique of the CIA and its Critics," by Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (University of Edinburgh). Doerries revealed fascinating details of German intelligence work in the United States, and drew attention to the "enigma" of why the German government, with its decided interest in American neutrality and future Wilsonian mediation, would have risked actions that were bound to erode American neutrality and force Wilson's hand. Jeffreys-Jones questioned the premises

on which the CIA was built, including the memory of inadequate prewar U.S. intelligence activity and data. He was critical of the "undue faith" placed in wartime British intelligence by Americans and also of the assumption that the U.S. needed an agency with "war-style" functions even in peacetime.

Commentary and criticism by former CIA officer and intelligence writer George C. Constantinides and the session chairman focused on the overly ambitious nature of Jeffreys-Jones's historiographical revisionism and on his confusing employment of labels to categorize various CIA historians.

Extensive discussion by the large audience in attendance stressed the imprecise use of terms such as "centralization" and "bureaucratic continuity" in the papers and comments, as well as the fact that the session seemed to skirt discussing the nature of intelligence itself in favor of criticizing those professional intelligencers who neglect the early history of intelligence in their writings. A memorable comment by Walter Pforzheimer cautioned historians who come into the Agency [CIA] with their eyes open, sit down in the executive dining room, and "hear two or three stories, true or otherwise" -- and lose perspective. Historians, he said, "tend to get themselves co-opted more than any intelligence officers."

Chairman Dorwart concluded the session with an appeal for better cooperation between professional intelligencers and historians of intelligence.

"Work in Progress" Session (Chair: Robert L. Beisner, American University)

Five doctoral candidates read well-crafted papers on a variety of subjects: by focusing on particular issues, the authors explored United States relations with Colombia and Italy in the 1920s, with East Asia in the 1930s, and with Germany and Peru in the 1950s. Michael L. Krenn, the first of three Rutgers University students, offered "Lions in the Woods: The United States Confronts Economic Nationalism in Latin America, 1917-1929." David F. Schmitz's paper concerned "'A Fine Young Revolution': The United States and a Fascist Revolution in Italy, 1917-1925." John P. Rossi delivered a paper on "The 'Federal

Project': The United States Government, RCA, and the Washington System, 1922-1933." Thomas Schwartz from Harvard had written, and reported on, "The End of Occupation, the Beginning of Alliance: John J. McCloy and Allied High Commission in West Germany, 1949-1952." And Thomas Zoumaras of the University of Connecticut delivered a paper on "Promoting Privatism in Peru: The Development Loan Fund and Overseas Home Ownership."

In part because this Saturday morning session competed with the glamorous offering on the CIA, as well as the session on the Orient, the audience proved to be small. "But the questions from this select audience were excellent," Beisner records, "and we all enjoyed ourselves." He thought that having work-in-progress sessions of this sort (though to be interspersed throughout the conference) "an excellent idea."

Minutes of the SHAFR Council Meeting
December 27, 1983
San Francisco, California, Ernest R. May presiding

In attendance were Lawrence Kaplan, Sandra Taylor, Warren Kuehl, Warren Cohen, William Brinker, Milton Gustafson, Raymond O'Connor, William Becker, and Marvin Zahniser.

Mr. May called on Mr. O'Connor to present a Resolution honoring the late Thomas A. Bailey. Mr. O'Connor, on behalf of Alexander DeConde, presented the following statement which the Council warmly supported.

The Council of the Society for Historians of American foreign relations notes with sorrow the death of the Society's first president, Thomas A. Bailey, on July 26, 1983. Among other accomplishments, he pioneered the study of the influence of public opinion on the shaping of aspects of American foreign policy in the twentieth century, and through his widely read books influenced the thinking on American history and diplomacy of thousands of students. With this resolution, the Council not only mourns the passing of a fine and good man, but also honors him as a distinguished scholar, teacher, and writer, and as one of the two or three finest American diplomatic historians of his time.

Mr. Kuehl then presented a motion, duly seconded, that the general endowment fund of SHAFR be named in honor of Professor Bailey. Discussion followed, in which it was agreed that Mr. Kuehl and Mr. DeConde will develop a statement for the use of this fund and present the statement to Council at its spring meeting in Los Angeles. Mr. Kuehl expressed hope that an ad hoc committee be appointed to raise money for the fund honoring Mr. Bailey, and anticipated that Mr. DeConde will be active in this drive. Motion passed unanimously.

Mr. May spoke to the recent report of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation. The Committee had recently written to the Secretary of State asking that the Department observe a 25 year rule on accessibility to documents, and that an exacting procedure be followed when exceptions seem needed. The Committee also asked for the development of partial documentary series on particular problems, such as NATO and Vietnam. No reply has yet been received from the Secretary's office, but one is expected soon. Mr. Kuehl asked whether any suggested time limitation on accessibility doesn't undermine SHAFR'S usual position that State Department documents should be made available at the earliest possible moment.

In the discussion that followed, the Council also considered the Draft Statement on Legislation Concerning Security Classification adopted for discussion by the Research Division of the American Historical Association. Not all were satisfied with the AHA statement. Council recommended that this Statement be printed in the SHAFR Newsletter, with a request that comments on the Statement be forwarded to Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers University, Conklin Hall, 175 University Avenue, Newark, NJ 07152). A further report on accessibility will be asked of the Government Relations Committee at the Council meeting in April.

Mr. Cohen reported that the W. Shull Holt Fund now has over \$15,000. He moved that the Fellowship Award for the coming year be \$1,500. The motion was seconded and approved. Further efforts will be made to increase the size of the Holt Fund.

Mr. Kuehl briefly discussed the terms of the proposed Graebner Award. Mr. DeBenedetti will bring in a formal statement of the terms at the SHAFR Council meeting in April.

Mr. Becker, Program Chair, indicated that the summer program will likely be held once again in cooperation with the American Military Institute and the Conference on Peace Research in History. He will suggest session themes in a forthcoming Newsletter and in a special mailing. The conference will be held on August 2, 3, and 4, at George Washington University. Peter Hill of GWU is serving as Local Arrangements Chair. Dorm room rates will be very reasonable.

Mr. Becker also noted that the American Historical Association program for 1984 will be especially important since it will recognize the 100th birthday of the AHA. If members have ideas for a suitable theme for a joint SHAFR-AHA session, Mr. Becker asked that such ideas be forwarded to him at George Washington University.

One last program note concerned the site of the SHAFR summer program in 1985. Professor S. Taylor, on behalf of Council, had explored the possibility of meeting jointly with the Pacific Coast Branch of the AHA. Mr. Zahniser was instructed to write to John A. Schutz indicating SHAFR'S wish to hold joint meetings. Mr. Schutz had indicated that the meetings will be held in the Pasadena area.

Mr. Zahniser reported for Mr. Herring concerning Diplomatic History. The journal will have a new cover beginning next issue. Certain editorial policy differences with Scholarly Resources seem on the way to being worked through. Mr. Herring will give a full report to Council in April.

Mr. Brinker, on behalf of the the Newsletter, asked that the membership consider having their forthcoming books advertised in the Newsletter. Advertising rates are very reasonable and the audience is a select one.

Mr. Zahniser next presented the Report of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer for 1983.

December 15, 1983

The dues increase, effective for 1984, promises to bring annual revenues and expenditures into a close yet reasonable relationship. Members ought to be encouraged to contribute to the general endowment fund so that gradually rising operating expenditures of a minor nature can be offset, as needed, from endowment.

Particular thanks is due to Professor Harold Langley, of Catholic University, who handled SHAFR summer conference monies with exceptional skill. Warren Kuehl and the members of the Finance Committee continue to invest our various endowment funds in an orderly and conservative way. Dr. and Mrs. Gerald Bernath have made the Society another generous gift, to a particular endowment fund, for which we are most grateful.

Carryovers from 1982

Checking Account	2,158.03	
Vanguard MM Fund	8,554.77	
	10,712.80	\$10,712.80

Receipts

Dues	11,431.98	
Bernath Living Trust	1,900.00	
Bernath Prizes and Expenses	2,240.00	
Sale of SHAFR Mailing List	590.00	
Endowments & Graebner Fund	414.50	
Misc. Refunds	1,516.60	
Net Interest	406.68	
	18,499.76	18,499.76
TOTAL FUNDS		\$29,212.56

Disbursements

Scholarly Resources	7,822.50	
Bernath Living Trust	1,900.00	
Bernath Prizes & Expenses	2,240.80	
General Operating	2,008.44	
Convention Expense	3,074.61	
Committee/Ex. Sec. Treas. Exp	128.54	
Brochures and Programs	788.00	
Contribution to NCC	500.00	
Professional Fees	145.00	
Transfer of Endowment & Graebner Funds	277.00	
Misc. Refund	12.00	
	18,896.89	\$18,896.89

Cash on Hand		
Operating	9,248.65	
Vanguard MM Fund (\$6,000 trans. into checking acct.)	1,067.02	
TOTAL	10,315.67	\$10,315.67

On motion, the Report was accepted.

Mr. Zahniser then presented the following proposed budget for FY 1984.

Our anticipated revenue sources for 1984 are as follows:

Membership dues for 750 regular members	\$12,375.00
(57) Retired members	456.00
Interest on checking account funds	450.00
Sale of Membership lists	400.00
TOTAL	\$13,681.00

Our anticipated expenditures for 1983 are as follows:

Diplomatic History (Scholarly Resources)	\$7,900.00
Operating (postage-stationery-supplies-etc)	1,900.00
Convention expenses	2,500.00
National Coordinating Committee	500.00
Tax Consultant	200.00
Secretary-Treasurer expenses	500.00
TOTAL	\$13,500.00

On motion, the budget was accepted.

Mr. Kuehl then presented the Report of the Finance Committee, which oversees Endowment and other funds for the Executive Secretary-Treasurer.

December 15, 1983

It has been another good year. The committee created to oversee SHAFR's funds supervises the Stuart L. Bernath Accounts, including the Book Award, the Speaker/Article Award, the Supplementary Fund, and the Bernath Charitable Annuity Account. It also administers the SHAFR Endowment and prize accounts for W. Stull Holt and for Norman and Laura Graebner. This makes a total of seven separate accounts.

The Endowment Fund is especially noteworthy. It includes the payments of life members plus some surplus accumulations over the past seven years. It was supplemented by gifts of \$2,648.50 plus interest. Everyone hopes the Endowment Fund will continue to grow. Additional gifts and interest left to accumulate will enable SHAFR to pursue its many projects.

SHAFR TRUST, PRIZE, AND ENDOWMENT PORTFOLIO
 December, 15, 1983. Bonds and notes are listed at face value.

Stuart L. Bernath Book Award		
Federal Notes	\$10,000.00	
Bank Account	522.04	\$10,522.04
Stuart L. Bernath Article/Speaker Award		
Federal Notes	6,000.00	
Bank Account	650.25	\$6,650.25
Stuart L. Bernath Supplementary Account		
Federal Notes	27,000.00	
Corporate Bonds	10,000.00	
Vanguard Account 11/30	1,129.59	
Bank Account	17,475.70	55,602.29
Bernath Charitable Remainder Annuity		
Corporate Bonds	20,000.00	
Bank Account	32.42	20,032.42
SHAFR Endowment		
Bank Account	7,000.00	
	1,960.44	8,960.44
Holt Fellowship		
Federal Notes	10,000.00	
Mich Telephone Bond	2,000.00	
Bank Account	3,300.96	15,300.96
Graebner Prize		
Bank Account	2,658.43	2,658.43
1982 total:	\$89,618.30	1983 total: 119,721.63

GARY HESS, WARREN KUEHL, PAUL VARG

On Motion, the Report was unanimously accepted.

Mr. Kuehl then reported that Dr. and Mrs. Bernath have recently made another generous gift in honor of their son Stuart. Interest from this gift of \$15,000, they anticipate, will be used to provide small-sum support for doctoral students in the concluding phase of writing their dissertation. Mr. Kuehl then presented a draft statement on the "Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Support Fund." Discussion followed concerning the mechanics of administering the Fund. Mr. Kuehl agreed to report on this matter at the Council meeting in April.

Mr. May reported that Council had received applications from two excellent candidates for the position of Executive Secretary-Treasurer. (Mr. Zahniser will vacate the position in June 1985). The Search Committee, Mr. May said, will make its recommendation to Council in April. Council then considered a suggestion from Robert K. Olson of Alexandria, Virginia. Mr. Olson, a retired U.S. foreign service officer, proposed that SHAFR consider producing "an annual report and evaluation on current U.S. foreign policy." After due consideration, Council thought there were several major difficulties in such a course and felt it advisable not to pursue the suggestion.

Mr. May announced that Mr. Warren K. Kuehl had been elected Vice-President of SHAFR for 1984 and that Mr. Michael Hunt and Mr. Roger Trask had been elected to three-year terms on the Council. Mr. Albert H. Bowman was elected to a term on the Nominations Committee.

On motion, the meeting was adjourned at 10:00 p.m.

Marvin R. Zahniser

SHAFR FUNCTIONS AT THE MEETINGS OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN HISTORIANS. Los Angeles, California, April 4-7, 1984

COUNCIL MEETING.

Biltmore Hotel. Wednesday, April 4, 8:00 - 11:00 p.m.
Moroccan Room, Conference Level.

RECEPTION

Biltmore Hotel. Thursday, April 5, 5:00 to 7:00 p.m.
Cordoban Room, Conference Level.

LUNCHEON

Biltmore Hotel. Friday, April 6, 12:00 noon to 2:00 p.m. Gold Room, Galeria Level. Tickets will be \$13.50 each. Please purchase tickets through pre-registration, or at the hotel registration desk. Speaker: Michael Hogan, Miami University. "Revival and Reform: America's 20th Century Search for a New International Economic Order."

ANNOUNCEMENTS

CORRECTION

Lu Minghua (Nanjing University) writes to point out an error in the June 1983 Newsletter on page 22 where the SHAFR membership is broken-down by nation. We incorrectly listed 14 members from "Rep. of China" whereas it should read 1 member from the Republic of China (Taiwan) and 13 members from the People's Republic of China.

TITLE CORRECTION

Due to a "communications-lapse" between authors and the Newsletter a title was attached mistakenly to an article in the September 1983 Newsletter by Messers Rossi, Krenn, and Schmitz. It should have appeared correctly as "New Perspectives on American Diplomatic History in the 1920's: The Frank B. Kellogg Papers" by Michael Krenn, John Rossi, and David Schmitz. (Sorry for any inconvenience -- editor)

RAPPAPORT MEMORIAL FUND

The Department of History at the University of California San Diego and Mrs. Marjorie Rappaport have decided that the most appropriate memorial to Armin would be one that highlighted the part of his career that he valued most while at UCSD, undergraduate training. Therefore, the department has established a Rappaport Memorial Fund which will endow an annual prize to the outstanding history major graduating from UCSD. Contributions may be made by check to the Rappaport Memorial Fund, Department of History, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093.

THE W. STULL HOLT MEMORIAL FELLOWSHIP IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS FOR 1984

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations is pleased to invite applications from qualified doctoral candidates whose dissertations are in the field of the history of American foreign relations. This fellowship is intended to defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Qualified applicants will have satisfactorily completed comprehensive doctoral examinations before June 1, 1984, leaving only the dissertation as the sole requirement for the doctoral degree.

Applicants should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research for which the fellowship will be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date should accompany the application and prospectus of the dissertation. In addition, two letters of appraisal, including one from the director of the applicant's dissertation, are required. Applications and supporting papers should be sent before June 1, 1984 to:

Professor Lawrence E. Gelfand
Chairman, Holt Memorial Fellowship Committee
Department of History
University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa 52242

In 1984, the Holt Fellowship carries an award with stipend of \$1500.00.

Announcement of the recipient of the Holt Memorial Fellowship for 1984 will be made at the Society's summer meeting in Washington, D. C. in August.

At the end of the fellowship year, the recipient of the fellowship will be expected to report to the Committee relating how the fellowship was used.

NEWBERRY EXHIBITION

Diplomacy will be the theme of a major exhibition of rare books and manuscripts opening the first week in May at The University of Chicago Library. SHAFR

member Dorothy V. Jones (The Newberry Library) was the researcher for the two-year project, and has written the catalogue that will accompany the exhibition. Entitled "SPLENDID ENCOUNTERS: The Thought and Conduct of Diplomacy", the catalogue explores basic themes in diplomacy and illustrates them with a wide variety of materials from the Library's Department of Special Collections. The exhibition runs through September 1984. The catalogue will be available through the library.

11TH W.S. BROWN CONFERENCE

The 11th Wilbur S. Brown Conference in History, will be held at the University of Alabama, October 26-27, 1984. Its Theme -- "War and Society Since 1945." Speakers already committed include Professors Robert H. Ferrell and George C. Herring, and Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. For more information, contact Professor Howard Jones, Department of History, University of Alabama, University, AL 35486.

4TH NATO STUDIES CONFERENCE

The Lyman L. Lemnitzer Center for NATO Studies will be holding its fourth conference on April 10-12, 1984. The theme is: NATO, the Warsaw Pact, and the Third World. SHAFR members Scott L. Bills, Thomas H. Etzold, Gary R. Hess, Alan K. Henrikson, and Lawrence S. Kaplan will present papers.

LETTER FROM WILLIAM Z. SLANY, THE HISTORIAN, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, NOVEMBER 18, 1983

Copies of the Department of State's official report on the survey of users of the Foreign Relations series which was carried out with the very real and much appreciated cooperation of SHAFR are now available. The membership list of SHAFR was used in toto as part of the mailing which the Department sent to over 1600 historians and specialists in international relations. I was most gratified by the rate of return on the questionnaire which represented almost 50 percent of those distributed. Equally pleasing was the supportiveness indicated by the respondents: almost 90 percent were frequent users; 95 percent felt that the series of American diplomatic history would suffer without the series; and 35 percent took the

opportunity to write narrative comments which were almost unanimously favorable.

The report is rather detailed and addresses a number of issues in depth. Two responses, however, were not only informative but somewhat surprising to us. More than one-third of the users of the series indicated that they were not specialists in American diplomatic history, opening perhaps some possibilities for increasing sales particularly in the overseas market. Also by almost a two to one margin, the users voted in favor of later-more-comprehensive release (more at 30 instead of less at 20 years).

Any member who wishes to have a copy of the report can receive one by contacting me.

William Z. Slany
The Historian, Office of the Historian
Department of State
Washington D. C. 20520

FULBRIGHT SCHOLARS

Among the American scholars who have received 1983-84 Fulbright awards are the following SHAFR members: Lloyd C. Gardner (Rutgers) Finland; Norman A. Graebner (Virginia) Australia; T. Michael Ruddy (St. Louis U) Finland; Michael Schaller (Arizona) China; Daniel S. Smith (Illinois-Chicago Circle) Sweden; Donald N. Clark (Trinity) Korea; and James E. Miller (Dept. of State) Italy.

FAIRBANK AWARD

Bruce Cumings (University of Washington) has been awarded the John King Fairbank Award for Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947. CONGRATULATIONS !

NCC INFORMATION

Warren Kimball, Chairman of the Government Relations Committee, has sent the following information for the enlightenment of the membership. He reminds us that SHAFR is a member of the National Coordinating Committee and asks that SHAFR members send him comments and suggestions.

Exerpts from NCC Legislative Briefing of December 20, 1983. National Historical Publications and Records Commission

During the eleventh hour of the first session of the 98th Congress, identical bills reauthorizing NHPRC's grants program passed both houses of Congress. This legislation extends NHPRC's grants program for five years with a ceiling for the appropriation of \$4 million for this year and the next and \$5 million for the following three years.

House Historian Selected - The successful passage of a House Resolution last December established the Office for the Bicentennial for the House of Representatives. On October 1 Ray Smock began his duties as Director of this office. Resisting pressure to turn the position into a political plum, Speaker Tip O'Neill stood by the conviction that a professional historian with strong qualifications be chosen. We welcome Ray to his new position and look forward to working with him.

National Endowment for the Humanities Funding - This fall the House and Senate reached a compromise on the FY'84 appropriation for NEH and agreed upon \$140 million, a \$10 million increase over the FY'83 level of \$130. The largest area of increase occurred in the Research Division where \$18.4 million was appropriated. This will aid the Endowment in launching a program called Travel to Collections and will allow the new program of Summer Seminars for Secondary Education to expand. Despite some fears, the funds for the state humanities programs were not reduced, but instead increased slightly. Congress once again showed its strong support for NEH by appropriating 20% more than President Reagan's recommendations. Representative Yates deserves a strong thank you.

Fulbright Academic Exchange Programs - The FY'84 appropriation for the Fulbright program is approximately \$93.9 million. This represents an increase over the \$86.2 million of FY'83. In October Congress passed reauthorization legislation for the U.S. Information Agency, of which Fulbright is a part, that included the establishment of a "charter" to govern the manner in which the Bureau for Educational and Cultural Affairs administers programs. The

Charter guarantees that the exchange programs remain non-political.

CIA Agrees to Partial Concession On Historical Value

On October 4 the Senate Select committee on Intelligence marked-up S.1324, a bill to exempt the CIA operational files from FOIA requests. As a result of hearings over the summer and prolonged negotiation the CIA agreed, in partial concession to historians, that files deemed exempt from the FOIA be reviewed in an ongoing process for potential declassification. Amendments to S.1324 define more specifically the type of documents that may be designated as "operational" and provide procedures and criteria for review which include "consideration of the historical value."

Freedom of Information Act - On September 12 the Senate Judiciary Committee unanimously approved S. 774, a compromise bill that represents substantial improvements over the Reagan-Hatch bill that would have seriously weakened the Act's effectiveness as a tool of open government. S. 774 broadens the scope of law enforcement records exemptions, prohibits FOIA requests by foreign nationals, gives businesses full notice and objection rights whenever requests are received for information they have submitted to government agencies, and allows agencies to charge commercial requestors for the time spent in censoring documents. Historians were successful in securing a fee waiver statement which exempts scholarly researchers from the new fees.

Warren asks that the Newsletter also reprint substantial portions of NCC's "Fact Sheet on National Archives Independence," and requests that SHAFR members write their representatives and senators urging them to support this legislation.

FACT SHEET ON NATIONAL ARCHIVES INDEPENDENCE

Issue

Passage of S. 905 and H.R. 3987, bills to restore the independence of the National Archives and Records Service (NARS) by separating it from the General Services Administration.

Background

The National Archives Act, passed in 1934, established

the National Archives as an independent agency mandated with the task of collecting the scattered records of our documentary heritage and creating a system for the orderly accumulation of such records over time. The Archivist of the United States was appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Fifteen years later, however, the National Archives was incorporated into the newly created General Services Administration. In a post-war effort to increase government efficiency the Hoover Commission recommended the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 which transferred the National Archives to the General Services Administration.

Key Points

1. The basic missions of NARS and GSA are incompatible. In 1963 Senator Mathias expressed reservations about the "concept that GSA should become the guardian of history as well as the custodian of washrooms, storerooms, and workrooms."

2. The records of the nation need protective independence from partisan political influence. GSA, which has a history as a prime agency for political appointments, has demonstrably politicized certain archival activities. One disturbing case of political pressure on the Archivist involved the issuance of a questionable deed of gift for the Vice Presidential papers of former President Nixon.

3. NARS' lack of authority over budget, program priorities and personnel management has been detrimental to the low morale of archival employees and has led to the perception both inside and outside of Government that the National Archives is poorly managed. When the U.S. Archivist cannot speak out frankly about archival issues and problems, we do not have an archival program able to operate professionally in the national interest.

4. The transfer of NARS from GSA to independent status would involve net offset and not additional administrative costs.

5. NARS' budget has suffered over the years while those of the Library of Congress and the Smithsonian have prospered in comparison. GSA has in recent years rarely sought adequate funding for NARS. GSA has

minimized NARS' budget requests to the Office of Management and Budget. GSA's principles of profit and loss are difficult to apply to the work of archivists and records managers, who deal with people and materials of intangible value in labor intensive work.

6. GSA has had eight administrators in the last twelve years. With this rapid turnover, GSA administrators have had neither the time, inclination nor background to make sound archival policy. For example, GSA's recent no growth policy at NARS' has resulted in the agencies being forced to develop their own small records centers at tremendous cost. It cost \$10.61 a cubic foot for records to be stored at federal agency offices and only \$.80 in records centers.

7. There are many precedents in the federal government for necessarily small and independent agencies such as the Securities and Exchange commission and the Federal Communications Commission.

PUBLICATIONS

Robert D. Schulzinger (University of Colorado), American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century. 1984. Oxford University Press. \$22.50. ISBN 0195033728. (\$12.95 paper ISBN 0195033736)

Bruce G. Cumings (University of Washington), Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947. 1981. Princeton. \$44.00. ISBN 0-691-09383-0. (\$16.50 paper ISBN 0-991-10113-2)

George C. Herring, ed. (University of Kentucky), The Secret Diplomacy of the Vietnam War: The Negotiating Volumes of the Pentagon Papers. 1983. U. of Texas Press. \$47.30. ISBN 0-292-77573-3.

Lloyd C. Gardner (Rutgers University), A Covenant with Power: America and World Order from Wilson to Reagan. 1984. Oxford University Press. \$22.95. ISBN 0-19-503357-4.

H. Schuyler Foster (Washington D.C.), Activism Replaces Isolationism: U.S. Public Attitudes 1940-1975. 1983. Foxhall Press. \$14.95. ISBN 0-9611128-1-6.

Wesley M. Bagby (West Virginia University), Contemporary International Problems. 1983. Nelson-Hall. \$21.95. ISBN 0-88229-774-0. (\$9.95 paper ISBN 0-88229-775-9)

Edward W. Chester (University of Texas at Arlington), United States Oil Policy and Diplomacy: A Twentieth-Century Overview. 1983. Greenwood Press. \$35.00. ISBN 0-313-23174-5.

Rhodri Jefferys-Jones (University of Edinburgh), ed., Eagle Against Empire: American Opposition to European Imperialism. 1983. Publications Universite de Provence (Aix, France), for the European Association for American Studies. 50 French francs.

Rhodri Jefferys-Jones, ed. with Bruce Collins, The Growth of Federal Power in American History, originally published by Scottish Academic Press in 1983, is now available in an American edition from Northern Illinois University Press.

CALENDAR

- April 4-7 The 77th annual meeting of the OAH will be held in Los Angeles with the headquarters at the Biltmore Hotel. (See Schedule of Activities on Page 42).
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June Newsletter
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September Newsletter.
- August The 10th annual conference of SHAFR will be held at George Washington University. Proposals are due early in the new year (1984). The Program Chairman is:
William H. Becker
Department of History
George Washington University
Washington, D.C. 20052

October 31-November 3

The 50th annual meeting of the Southern Historical Association will be held in Louisville. The Galt House will be the headquarters hotel.

November 1

Deadline, materials for the December Newsletter

November 1-15

Annual elections for officers of SHAFR.

December 1

Deadline, nominations for the 1984 Bernath Memorial lectureship.

December 27-30

The 99th annual meeting of the AHA will be held in Chicago. The headquarters hotel is yet to be announced. (The deadline for proposals has passed.)

(The 1985 OAH will meet in Minneapolis, April 17-20, deadline for proposals has passed).

**THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE FOR THE BEST
SCHOLARLY ARTICLE IN U.S. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY**

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Award for scholarly articles in American foreign affairs was set up in 1976 through the kindness of the young Bernath's parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, and it is administered through selected personnel of SHAFR. The objective of the award is to identify and to reward outstanding research and writing by the younger scholars in the area of U.S. diplomatic relations.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

Eligibility: Prize competition is open to the author of any article upon any topic in American Foreign Relations that is published during 1983. The article must be among the author's first five (V) which have seen publication. Membership in SHAFR or upon a college/university faculty is not a prerequisite for entering the competition. Authors must be under

thirty-five (35) years of age, or within within five (5) years after receiving the doctorate, at the time the article was published. Previous winners of the S.L. Bernath book award are ineligible.

Procedures: Articles shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each article (preferably reprints) should be sent to the chairman of the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee by January 15, 1984. The Chairman of the Committee for 1983 is Harry Stegmaier, Department of History, Frostburg State University, Frostburg, Maryland 21532.

Amount of Award: \$300.00. If two (2) or more authors are considered winners, the prize will be shared. The name of the successful writer(s) will be announced, along with the name of the victor in the Bernath book prize competition, during the luncheon for members of SHAFR, to be held at the annual OAH Convention, meeting in 1984, at Los Angeles.

AWARD WINNERS

1977	John C.A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)
1978	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1979	Brian L. Villa (U of Ottawa, Canada)
1980	James I. Matray (New Mexico State U) David A. Rosenberg (U of Chicago)
1981	Douglas Little (Clark U)
1982	Fred Pollock (Cedar Knolls, N.J.)
1983	Chester Pach (Texas Tech)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL LECTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship was established in 1976 through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and is administered by a special committee of SHAFR. The Bernath Lecture is the feature at the official luncheon of the Society, held during the OAH convention in April of each year.

Description and Eligibility: The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address, delivered at the annual meeting

with the AHA, but is restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer is expected to concern himself/herself not specifically with his/her own research interests, but with broad issues of importance to students of American foreign relations. The award winner must be under forty-one (41) years of age.

Procedures: The Bernath lectureship Committee is now soliciting nominations for the 1985 award from members of the Society, agents, publishers, or members of any established history, political science, or journalism organization. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vitae, if available, should reach the Committee no later than December 1, 1983. The Chairman of the Committee, and the person to whom nominations should be sent, is Harriet D. Schwar, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Honorarium: \$500.00 with publication of the lecture assured in Diplomatic History.

AWARD WINNERS

- 1977 Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
- 1978 David S. Patterson (Colgate)
- 1979 Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
- 1980 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
- 1981 Burton Spivak (Bates College)
- 1982 Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)
- 1983 Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt)
- 1984 Michael J. Hogan (Miami)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITON

The Stuart L. Bernath memorial Book Competition was initiated in 1972 by Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in memory of their late son. Administered by SHAFR, the purpose of the competiton and the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing of a lengthy nature by young scholars in the field of U.S. diplomacy.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

Eligibility: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that

is published during 1983. It must be the author's first or second book. Authors are not required to be members of SHAFR, nor do they have to be professional academicians.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. William Stinchcombe, Department of History, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y. 13210. The works must be received no later than February 1, 1984.

Amount of Award: \$1,000.00. If two (2) or more writers are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH.

Previous Winners

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1972 | Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento) |
| | Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth) |
| 1973 | John L. Gaddis (Ohio U) |
| 1974 | Michael H. Hunt (Yale) |
| 1975 | Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire) |
| | Stephen E. Pelz (U of Massachusetts-Amherst) |
| 1976 | Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton) |
| 1977 | Roger V. Dingman (Southern California) |
| 1978 | James R. Leutze (North Carolina) |
| 1979 | Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston) |
| 1980 | Michael Schaller (U of Arizona) |
| 1981 | Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke) |
| | Hugh DeSantis (Department of State) |
| 1982 | David Reynolds (Cambridge U) |
| 1983 | Richard Immerman (U of Hawaii) |



AMERICAN-EAST ASIAN RELATIONS NEWSLETTER

VOLUME IV

NUMBER 1

MARCH 1984

An Appreciation

The Committee on American-East Asian Relations and the editors of its Newsletter wish to express their deep appreciation to Professor Mordechai Rozanski. Mort played a key role in organizing and launching the A.E.A.R. Newsletter. Every issue since the first one

in June 1980 reflects the imprint of his careful and judicious hand. Its success -- and one cannot exaggerate this point -- was largely due to his tireless efforts. Mort brought to his work on the Newsletter not only an enormous capacity for hard work but also a wonderfully contagious enthusiasm, which infected all of us. Circumstances now require that he invest both in his demanding new duties as a dean at Adelphi University in New York. We wish him great success.

Another American-East Asianist, Charles (Ron) Lilley of Northern Virginia Community College, Woodbridge Campus, has assumed Mort's duties.

New Editors

The American-East Asian Relations Committee is pleased to announce the addition of Michael Barnhart, Bruce Cumings, and Takeshi Igarashi to the Editorial Board of the A.E.A.R. Newsletter. Professors Barnhart of SUNY-Stony Brook and Igarashi of Tokyo University will report on developments in American-Japanese relations and Professor Cumings of the University of Washington on those in American-Korean relations. We hardly need to add that the addition of these three fine and exceptional scholars will greatly improve our coverage of American-Japanese and -Korean relations.

PUBLICATIONS

In fulfilling a promise made in the December 1981 issue, this number of the A.E.A.R. Newsletter offers an update on published books and articles. James Fetzer compiled the following list, and, in preparing future updates, he would welcome the readers' assistance. Information about articles and books should be sent to Professor James Fetzer, State University of New York, Maritime College, Department of Humanities, Fort Schuyler, Bronx, New York, 10465.

BOOKS

General

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Cohen, Warren, ed. New Frontiers in American-East Asian Relations. Columbia University Press, 1983.

Solomon, Richard. East Asia and the Great Power Coalitions: An Analysis of Regional Developments in

1981. Rand Corporation, 1982.

Lensen, George. Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea and Manchuria. University Presses of Florida, 1982.

Myers, Ramon, ed. A U.S. Foreign Policy for Asia. Hoover Institution Press, 1982.

Asian-Americans

Irons, Peter. Justice at War: The Inside Story of the Japanese-American Internment. Oxford University Press, 1983.

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American-Chinese Relations

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Cole, Bernard. Gunboats and Marines: The United States Navy in China, 1925-1928. University of Delaware Press, 1983.

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Nishi, Toshio. Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan, 1945-1952. Hoover Press Publication #244, Hoover Institution Press, 1982.

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ARTICLES

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Spickard, Paul. "The Nisei Assume Power: The Japanese Citizens League, 1941-1942." Pacific Historical Review. May, 1983.

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Davies, Clarence. "Financing Imperialism: British and American Bankers as Vectors of Imperial Expansion in China, 1908-1920." Business History Review. Summer, 1982.

Heininger, Janet. "Private Positions versus Public Policy: Chinese Devolution and the American Experience in East Asia." Diplomatic History. Summer, 1982.

Knechtges, David and Lewis Saum. "A Chinese Memoir of the University of Missouri, 1920-1923." Missouri Historical Review. January, 1983.

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Oksenberg, Michael. "A Decade of Sino-American Relations." Foreign Affairs. Fall, 1982.

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THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

- SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.
- EDITOR: William J. Brinker, Department of History, Tennessee Tech.
- EDITORIAL ASSOCIATE: John W. Winters, Tennessee Tech.
- EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS: Scott Hickman & Renea Griffith.
- ISSUES: The Newsletter is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December. All members receive the publication.
- DEADLINES: All material must be in the office of the editor not later than four (4) weeks prior to the date of publication.
- ADDRESS CHANGES: Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication.
- BACK ISSUES: Copies of most back numbers of the Newsletter are available and may be obtained from the editorial office upon payment of a service charge of \$1.50 per number. If the purchaser lives abroad, the charge is \$2.50 per number.
- MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, honors, awards), announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered--or published--upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting the use of diplomatic materials in various (especially foreign) depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field of U.S. diplomacy, and even jokes (for fillers) if upon diplomatic topics. Authors of "straight" diplomatic articles should send their opuses to Diplomatic History. Space limitations forbid the carrying of book reviews by the Newsletter.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

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