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Page

- 1 Empire by Invitation: The United States and
Western Europe by Geir Lundestad
- 21 Making Fulbright Chairman: Or How the
"Johnson Treatment" Nearly Backfired by
Donald Ritchie
- 28 Researching American Foreign Relations Abroad:
Manila by Roger Dingman
- 32 The Present Danger of Thought Control by
Thomas Paterson
- 42 Minutes of the SHAFR Council Meeting
- 50 Calendar
- 52 Publications
- 53 Personals
- 56 Announcements
- 64 Bernath Awards

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EMPIRE BY INVITATION?

THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE, 1945-1952

by

Geir Lundestad (University of Tromsø, Norway)

(This is a revised version of a paper presented at the conference "Reconstruction and the Restoration of Democracy: U.S.-European Relations 1945-1952." Salzburg, April 16-17, 1983.)

"Traditionalist" historians have generally stressed the expansion of the Soviet Union after the Second World War. The Soviet Union did expand. It insisted on exercising near absolute control over Eastern Europe. It dominated North Korea; it strengthened its position in Mongolia and later in Vietnam. The communists did win a momentous victory in China, but that was a victory won with little assistance from Moscow. As Mao Tse-tung himself said in 1958, with only slight exaggeration, "The Chinese revolution won victory by acting contrary to Stalin's will."¹ The communist victory was also to prove a rather temporary blessing for the Soviets.

So, there was Soviet expansion after the war. But this paper argues two things. First, it will support the "revisionist" argument that the American was really much more striking than the Soviet expansion. Only the United States became a global power in the years we are dealing with here. While America's influence could be felt in most corners of the world, with only a few exceptions the Soviet Union counted for little outside its border areas. The American expansion went so deep and affected so many different parts of the world that it can be said to have resulted in an American empire.

Second, and here I differ from the revisionists, if we choose to call this an empire, it was to a large extent an empire by invitation. Unlike the Soviet Union, which frequently had to rely on force, the United States was generally encouraged to take a more active interest in the outside world. The American influence often went deeper than the Soviet exactly because Washington's forms of control were more in accordance with the will of the local populations than were Moscow's. Not only that, but under this American empire many of the countries that invited the United

States in were also able to do considerably better, at least in long-term material terms, than was the United States itself.

The United States came out of the Second World War as by far the strongest power on earth. In constant 1958 prices the American gross national product had grown from 209.4 billion in 1939 to 355.2 in 1945. That constituted approximately half of the world's goods and services. Steel production jumped from 53 million tons in 1939 to 80 million in 1945. Production in agriculture increased at a similar pace. With 6 percent of the world's population, the United States had 46 percent of the world's electric power, 48 per cent of its radios, 54 percent of its telephones, and its businesses owned or controlled 59 percent of the world's total oil reserves. American automobile production was eight times that of France, Britain, and Germany combined. "Only" 400,000 Americans had lost their lives because of the war.

The population of the Soviet Union had been set at 194 million in 1940. At the end of the war it numbered around 170 million. In 1945 the Soviet Union produced 10.6 million tons of steel, only half of what it produced in 1941. The Soviet Union built 65,000 cars compared to seven million in the United States. In 1945 agricultural production was only half of what it had been in 1940, not a very good year, if there ever are good years in Soviet agriculture.

On the military side, only the United States had the atomic bomb. In 1944--at its highest--aircraft production reached 95,000. The U.S. had a vast lead not only on the Soviet Union, but American production even surpassed that of Germany and Japan combined. The American army was by far the biggest and most efficient in the world. In one field only could the Soviet Union compare with the United States. They both had roughly 12 million men under arms.²

Britain was about to lose its Great Power status entirely, to some extent because of the costs of victory. War damage amounted to roughly £3 billion. Overseas assets of more than another £1 billion had been sold or lost and the income from foreign investment halved. In 1945 Britain was spending abroad more than £2000 million and was earning only about £350 million. The balance had to be acquired

primarily from one source, the United States; Britain had a brilliant war record, but little else.³

Thus, in 1945 the United States had completed a triumphant war; its technological revolution had really taken off; its rivals were exhausted economically; and it seemed that the U.S. would more or less control world markets.

A similar description would fit, as Paul Kennedy has argued, also Britain after the triumphs of the Napoleonic wars.⁴ Yet, in some ways the Pax Americana after 1945 was more pronounced than the Pax Britannica of the 19th century. While Britain had pulled away from the European Congress system of the post-Napoleonic period, the United States was apparently able to set up a world system of its own.

Many motives can be found for the American expansion after the Second World War. Most traditionalists have referred to America's and Western Europe's needs for security and protection of democracy; most revisionists have instead pointed to America's capitalism with its requirements for exports, imports, and investments. Post-revisionists have been more eclectic in their approaches and have thrown in an assortment of additional factors ranging from bureaucratic politics in the U.S. to the seemingly natural fact that the U.S., as any other Great Power in history, was bound to expand more or less regardless of its political or economic system. The debate on this point very much resembles the debate on the origins of British imperialism in the 19th century.⁵

The revisionist view of the United States thrusting itself into the affairs of other countries can be supported by examples from many parts of the world. Yet, the basic pattern was a different one. The rule was that the United States was invited in, sometimes by the declining old powers, sometimes by the governments of the countries concerned. Outside of Europe, leaders in Iran, in Saudi Arabia, in Egypt, in India, in Australia and New Zealand were all looking to the United States. Their motives might vary; the need for economic assistance; a desire to employ America as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, to Britain, or to some other power; or admiration for what the United States stood for. Briefly and for

more tactical reasons even communists such as Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse-Tung encouraged Washington to play a more active role in their countries' affairs.⁶

In this paper, the focus is on western Europe. The Europeans even more strongly than most others attempted to influence the Americans in the direction of taking greater, not lesser, interest in their affairs.

Britain offers the best example in this respect. Although London underestimated Britain's fall from Great Power status, the Attlee, as the Churchill, government clearly favored both financial assistance from America and a strong U.S. military presence in Europe. In line with this Whitehall expressed disappointment when Lend-Lease was abruptly curtailed; hoped for a credit substantially larger than the \$3.75 billion it received; wished to continue war time cooperation in atomic energy and the existence of at least some of the combined Anglo-American boards, particularly the Combined Chiefs of Staff; wanted the United States to carry a larger share of the expenses in the German Bizonie. Robert Hathaway has shown that many forms of military and intelligence cooperation actually did continue between the United States and Britain after the war. The British would have preferred such cooperation to have been undertaken openly, but that was deemed politically impossible in Washington.⁷

With regard to the desire for economic assistance, the situation was much the same in most European countries. There was a desperate need for economic assistance, and there was really only one major source, the United States. In the period from July 1945 through June 1947 Western Europe in fact on a yearly average received a larger amount of assistance than it did through the Marshall Plan. And then the more than 3 billion dollars which the Western Europeans received in humanitarian aid from the United States is not taken into account. Britain's share alone was 4.4 billion dollars. France received 1.9 billion, Italy 330 million and the Be-Ne-Lux countries 430 million. In this period Eastern Europe only got 546 million dollars. The Eastern Europeans tried to get much more, but their main stumbling block was Washington's unwillingness to grant such assistance to countries dominated by the Soviet Union.⁸

The Europeans also played an important role in shaping the Marshall Plan. The crucial person here was British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. Although Washington was skeptical of working through the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) and of having the Soviets participate, Washington left much of the initiative for the follow up to Marshall's Harvard speech on June 5, 1947, to the British and the French. In the ensuing British-French-Soviet conference in Paris Bevin dominated the scene. The Russian attempt to substitute a bilateral approach for the multilateral one favored by Washington was rejected. The ECE was to be bypassed. The Russians were to be left out. After less than a week the meeting broke down in disagreement. The British Foreign Secretary received unexpectedly firm support from his French counterpart Georges Bidault, considering the complicated domestic scene in Paris.⁹

Under the Marshall Plan the Europeans first requested 28 billion dollars from the United States. This was far more than Washington was willing to give. The Truman Administration cut this down to 17 billion and Congress in turn appropriated approximately 14 billion. Only Moscow's opposition prevented Finland, Czechoslovakia, Poland and even other Eastern European countries from taking part. Washington's own attitude blocked Spanish participation. So, at least on the economic side there can be no doubt that the Europeans were most interested in involving the United States closely in Europe's affairs.¹⁰

The same was true in most European countries even on the military side. After the ending of the London meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1947, Bevin presented his thoughts on military cooperation to Secretary of State Marshall. The British wanted to set up an arrangement for regional military cooperation in Western Europe. It was also obvious that they wanted to commit the Americans as closely as possible to this arrangement.¹¹

Bevin and the British were not the only ones who tried to involve the United States quite closely in the defense problems of Western Europe. At this early stage Belgian Prime and Foreign Minister Paul-Henri Spaak even went so far as to argue that any defense arrangements which did not include the United States

were without practical value. The Dutch favored the same line.¹²

The United States did not take any clear-cut position on these European urgings of closer involvement. Washington would undoubtedly be sympathetic to any European defense effort, but how far it would go in supporting it was to be determined at a later stage. Differences could be found within the Truman Administration and there was always the question of how Congress and public opinion would react to increasing the U.S. commitment to Europe even before the European Recovery Program had been passed by Congress.¹³

Nevertheless, the British, with general support from the Be-Ne-Lux countries, pressed on. On January 27 Bevin argued that "The treaties that are being proposed cannot be fully effective nor be relied upon when a crisis arises unless there is assurance of American support for the defense of Western Europe. The plain truth is that Western Europe cannot yet stand on its own feet with out assurance of support."¹⁴

On February 6 the pressure was further stepped up. The State Department was informed of Bevin's opinion that a vicious circle was being created. The United States would not define its position as to participation before an arrangement had been worked out in Western Europe. The British in turn argued that an arrangement could not be worked out at all without American participation since the Western Europeans would then see little point in such plans.¹⁵

The French were somewhat divided between an Atlantic and European approach to defense, but under either model it was absolutely essential that the American contribution be stepped up.

The French never tired of pressing their need for immediate military assistance from the United States. On March 4 "Atlanticist" Foreign Minister Bidault asked the Americans "to strengthen in the political field, and as soon as possible in the military one, the collaboration between the old and the new worlds, both so jointly responsible for the preservation of the only valuable civilization."¹⁶

The European pressure on the United States was building up. This perspective of Europe pulling upon the United States, instead of the other way around, should not be taken too far. Washington could not be, and was not, forced into anything against its will. Important groups in the American capital favored a strong military role in Western Europe. The point is that at least the Europeans clearly speeded up the clarification process on the American side.

Finally, on March 12 Washington informed London that "We are prepared to proceed at once in the joint discussions on the establishment of an Atlantic security system."¹⁷ The coup in Czechoslovakia, Soviet pressure upon Finland, General Clay's famous warning of March 5 about Soviet intentions in Germany, the uneasy situation in Italy, and, perhaps most important, the rumors that the Soviets might come to propose a pact on the Soviet-Finnish model even with Norway constituted the international background to this change of position in Washington.¹⁸

Despite the change in policy in Washington and despite the substantial results reached in the so-called Pentagon negotiations between the United States, Canada, and Britain in March,¹⁹ differences remained between Washington and several of the European capitals.

On March 17 Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg concluded the Brussels Treaty which established the Western Union. On the American side, while National Security Council (NSC) documents 9 of April 13 and 9/1 of April 23 on the position of the United States with respect to support for the Western Union and a North Atlantic military arrangement had stressed the objective of a defense agreement for the whole North Atlantic area, NSC 9/2 of May 11 put the accent on inducing additional European countries to join the Western Union. There were many reasons for this partial reversal on the American side to an earlier position. Within the State Department Policy Planning chief George Kennan and Counselor Charles Bohlen favored the so-called "dumbbell" concept where the United States and Canada cooperated closely on one side of the Atlantic and the Europeans on the other. Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Arthur Vandenberg also wanted to emphasize the responsibility of the

Europeans to defend themselves. The military were somewhat ambiguous on integrating the U.S. too closely with Western Europe.²⁰

In the end, as we know, the United States agreed to take part in a North Atlantic defense organization on an equal basis with the Western Europeans and the Canadians. Those in Washington who had long favored this solution won out. The key person and in many ways the main architect of NATO was the Director of the Office of European Affairs John Hickerson.

In this context of who pressed upon whom, it was important that the pressure of Britain and Canada for full American participation had to undermine the position of those in Washington who favored looser arrangements. The French and now even the Belgians had come to stress the need for maximum military coordination with and assistance from the United States. The treaty question could then wait. In September they too fell into line when they realized that a treaty could be concluded rather quickly and that arms and military coordination would depend on their assent to the treaty.²¹

Although the differences between the United States and the Europeans kept being narrowed, they never disappeared entirely in the negotiations leading up to NATO. Washington continued to insist that the Europeans do as much as possible to defend themselves. The Europeans on the other hand wanted to make the American guarantees for assistance in case of an attack as automatic as possible. All through February 1949 the State Department kept mediating between the Europeans, with the French probably being the most insistent now, and Congress which disliked anything that smacked of automatic involvement. In the end Article 5 of the treaty simply declared that in case of an attack each of the parties will take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."²²

It is true that Norway, Denmark, and Iceland would have preferred their military ties with the Atlantic pact to have been more limited than they actually became. But they represented a minority of countries on this question. On the other extreme, Spain, Greece, and Turkey wanted to join NATO, but

were not permitted to. And the sum of requests for military assistance from practically all the Western European countries, far surpassed what the United States could deliver in the foreseeable future.²³

In fact, the pressure for closer American involvement in European military affairs did not end with the setting up of NATO. Thus, at the first session of the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in September 1949 the question of NATO's further organization was discussed. A Defense Committee, a Military Com~~mittee~~mittee, and a Standing Group composed of one representative each of the the United States, Britain, and France were established. Five Regional Planning Groups were also created. Crucial in this context, from practically all the European nations there was pressure to have the United States as a member of their particular group. This was the case within the Western Europe group consisting of the Brussels treaty countries, as well as within the Northern Europe group of Denmark, Norway, and Britain. The result was that the United States became a full member of the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group and the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group and only a "consulting member" of the other three. As the report of the Council states with regard to the Northern, Western, and Southern European groups, "The United States had been requested and has agreed to participate actively in the defense planning as appropriate."²⁴

This set-up was to a large extent continued after the out break of the Korean war, but the definition of what was the "appropriate" degree of involvement was certainly changed. Again, pressure from the European side was not important in the sense that it forced Washington to do anything against its will, but in that it helped shape developments in Washington.

Now the Europeans worked hard to establish an integrated force in Europe commanded by an American. The Europeans were also unanimous in their preference for General Eisenhower, who was then appointed. Four additional U.S. divisions were sent to Europe and American military assistance to Europe greatly increased. The Korean war had made it necessary to tie the United States even more closely to Europe.

The Europeans in return had to agree to German rearmament, which, particularly to the French, was a difficult concession. They also agreed to increase their forces and defense budgets considerably. But here we come to one of the elements that has continued to trouble the alliance: once the Americans had increased their commitment to NATO, this provided little inducement for the Europeans to do their part. The American objective of increasing Europe's own defense effort therefore met only with partial success.²⁵

Thus, the pressure from European governments was undoubtedly in the direction of more, not less American attention to Europe. The question should be raised about the extent to which the governments represented their peoples on this point.

It is difficult to give one clear answer. The situation varied from country to country and polls are not available for all of them, and entirely satisfactory polls from almost none of them. The comments made here must therefore be rather tentative. In dictatorships such as Spain and Portugal, in civil war-plagued Greece, and in Turkey as well it was difficult to talk about public opinion. The growing American support to all of these countries, from 1950-51 including Spain,²⁶ clearly showed that Washington was not afraid of cooperating with undemocratic forces. Increasingly anti-communism counted more than democratic sympathies, although a combination of both was naturally to be preferred. In Western Europe, different from so many other parts of the world, Washington could have both at the same time.

To start off with Britain, the Attlee government received the support of strong majorities for its America policies. In January 1946 70 percent thought Britain should accept a loan from America. 17 percent said no. In April 1948 63 percent favored the government's attitude toward the U.S. while 19 percent disapproved of it. In July 1947 22 percent had stated that the United States wanted to dominate the world, but this declined to 14 percent in July 1948 and to 4 percent in August 1950. (The corresponding percentages for the Soviet Union were 78, 70 and 63.) It is a different matter that the British, not surprisingly, did not want the United States to run British affairs and that strong minorities disliked

certain aspects of America's foreign policy. The basic feeling was that the two countries should act together, but that Britain remain independent.²⁷

The picture was more ambiguous in France, although there too the sympathy for the United States prevailed. In July 1945 the United States was only favored 45 to 41 percent over the Soviet Union in reply to the question of what country would have the greatest influence after the war. Yet, the U.S. was picked by 47 percent as against 23 percent for the Soviet Union when it came to whom they would prefer to see in this influential position. The doubt as to who would dominate lingered on until the spring of 1947, but there was less doubt about popular preferences. Majorities supported the American loan of 1946, French participation in the Marshall Plan, and the joining of the Atlantic pact, although the number of uncommitted/uninformed persons was frequently quite high.²⁸

In Germany much criticism could be found of various aspects of the occupation, but at least in the American zone the sympathy for the United States was much stronger than for the other occupying powers. In October 1947 63 percent trusted the U.S. to treat Germany fairly, 45 percent placed such trust in Britain, 4 percent in France, and 0 percent in the Soviet Union. The support for the Marshall Plan was pronounced and the same was true for the creation of a government for the three Western zones. The German population sustained America's actions, but the United States did not pursue the policies it did primarily for the sake of public opinion. the relationship is best expressed by the editors of the OMGUS Survey, "The existence of a population that was receptive to reorientation . . . enhanced the Allies' opportunity to help shape German history."²⁹

In comparative polls from August 1947 and February 1948, no country showed such skepticism toward the United States as did Norway. In February 23 percent thought the U.S. would go to war to achieve its goals and not only to defend itself against attack. (37 percent responded that the Soviet Union would do so.) This was higher than in France (20 percent), Holland (16), Italy (16), Sweden (13), Canada (13), Brazil (9) and the United States itself (5) and reflected a definite feeling of distance to

both of the Great Powers.³⁰ Yet, only two months later 61 percent thought Norway should join a Western bloc (the U.S. role in this bloc was not clear), 2 percent favored an Eastern bloc, while 37 percent thought Norway ought to remain uncommitted. A majority also sustained the decision to join NATO, at least after it had been made by the Gerhardsen Labor government.³¹

So, little indicates that the European political leaders did not receive the support of their peoples when they brought their countries into closer economic, political, and military cooperation with the United States.

Lend-Lease, the many different loans, the Marshall Plan and NATO certainly gave the United States important instruments with which to influence developments in Western Europe. Political events did develop in a direction favorable to Washington, i.e. a strengthening of the political center, particularly moderate conservatism. Thus, many Western European countries started out in 1945 with broad coalitions that included significant communist representation. By 1947 the communists were out everywhere. The socialist parties were also declining. Elections in Italy in 1948, in Britain in 1950-51, in France in 1951, and in West Germany in 1953 all showed conservative trends. The 1950s came to be dominated by this trend, in America as in Western Europe.³²

The American influence certainly contributed to this conservatism, but it was not a decisive factor. The wider international setting in general and many different local factors were more important than American attitude. The effects of what was probably the most significant lever, the Marshall Plan, can be used to illustrate this argument.

First, Marshall aid, beneficial as it undoubtedly was, was far from crucial for Europe's recovery. As Charles Maier has shown, for the major European economies it probably contributed 10 to 20 percent of capital formation in 1948-49, and less than 10 percent in 1950-51. "U.S. aid served, in a sense, like the lubricant in an engine--not the fuel--allowing a machine to run that would otherwise buckle and bind."³³ (One can of course debate endlessly the importance of the lubricant or whether 10 percent is

much or little.)

Second, the United States was really, in Hadley Arkes's phrase, "The Imperfect Interventionist". The counterpart funds, which represented the strongest instrument, generally amounted to little in the way of changing disagreeable policies. Britain and Norway, for example, used the funds almost exclusively for debt retirement, thereby severely circumscribing any American influence.³⁴

In France, where more than half of the funds were used for productive investment purposes, the leverage was greater. Thus, in November 1948 Marshall and Prime Minister Henri Queuille agreed on some basic measures to correct the situation: a "purge of Communists, economic rehabilitation, the fiscal reform, a balanced budget, etc." Through a system of monthly releases the Americans hoped to make sure that the French would live up to their promises. Yet, Washington could not go very far in exerting direct pressure if it wanted to strengthen the moderate forces. The fact that American representatives kept complaining all through 1948 and 1949 about the nature of French financial policies also indicated that the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and the State Department were not really able to convince the French to the extent hoped for.³⁵

Third, the few local studies that have been made of the effects of the Marshall Plan, those for Norway and Ireland, seem to demonstrate that in those two countries little American pressure could be found in the direction of deflation and the cutting of social expenditures. This would then be contrary to what many revisionists have argued. Occasionally the United States even favored policies that were more appreciated by the parties of the left than by those of the right.

Thus, the Marshall Plan definitely strengthened long-term governmental planning. In the case of Ireland Raymond James Raymond has argued that it "provided the catalyst for the development of economic planning which revolutionized the Irish economy and revitalized Irish society."³⁶ The Truman Administration may have disliked such planning in the United States, but in Western Europe it wanted to make sure that the U.S. would not have to foot any more

European bills at the end of the four-year period. This was far from the only example of the United States supporting left of center policies.³⁷ Neither was it the only example of Washington trying to limit its role in European affairs. On the economic side, it pushed for the establishment of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (1948) and the European Payments Union (1950). It supported the European Coal and Steel Community (1950-52) and later the European Economic Community (1957-1958). These organizations would band the Europeans more closely together and thereby tend to limit the American role. On the military side, as we have seen, the Truman Administration stressed again and again that the more the Europeans could do on their own, the better. That was one main reason why the Americans wanted to maintain and strengthen the Western Union at the same time as the Atlantic security system was established and why especially the Eisenhower Administration strongly backed the aborted European Defense Community (1950-54).³⁸

In the past other imperial powers had favored similar limitations. The British system of indirect rule could be seen as one possible, although far from identical, parallel. But Washington too would agree only to go so far. Thus, again to use the Marshall Plan as an illustration, Marshall had underlined that the role of the United States would consist of "friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and later support of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so." Yet, as the negotiations in Paris in the fall of 1947 and spring of 1948 showed, if the Europeans did not move along the right tracks, then Washington would intervene. The Europeans asked for too much and gave too little in return for the money. Some sort of compromise had to be worked out. The American influence far exceeded "friendly aid", although Washington did not really either "run the show" as Under Secretary Will Clayton had stressed it ought to.³⁹

Finally, it could be asked what the United States gained from its empire. Again, this is much too comprehensive and complicated a question to solve here. In the way of some tentative remarks, it is far from clear that it gained anything at all, at least not in material terms. In fact, it can be argued that the "colonies" benefited more than the mother country.

Empires apparently get shorter and shorter lives. The Roman lasted around 500 years, the British roughly three hundred, and the American empire, should we say, around thirty years. In the 1970s several developments took place which, it can be argued, have resulted in the collapse of the American empire. The military strength of the Soviet Union came to rival that of the United States and now at last the Soviets too played a role in the distant corners of the world. The war in Vietnam ended in defeat and withdrawal. On the Asian mainland the American alliance system broke down; in Europe Washington's influence was declining. Parts of the Bretton Woods system collapsed. Everywhere the United States was discovering that all kinds of local forces were no longer that amenable to American advice, if they ever had been.

So there was no longer an American empire. Was that because no more invitations were issued? That was only part of the explanation. In fact many European governments still wanted both to increase the American military presence and to stimulate American economic investments. But at the same time another phenomenon, which had always existed, was growing stronger: the Europeans preferred more assistance with fewer strings attached. Once the United States had become involved in a country, the benefits of the American presence were taken for granted by many. Then the cries of American interference would become more pronounced. As Michael Howard has argued with regard to recent American-European military differences, a significant element behind these is "the degree to which we Europeans have abandoned the primary responsibility for our defense to the United States; have come to take the deterrence provided by others for granted; and now assume that the dangers against which we once demanded reassurance only now exist in the fevered imagination of our protectors."⁴⁰

However, the end of the American empire was explained primarily by the decline in America's power. The developments in the economic field could be most easily quantified, although the figures that follow should be seen more as illustrating trends than as measuring exact percentages. The British slipped from having had approximately half of the world's manufacturing production around 1850 to 32 percent in 1870 and only 15 percent in 1910.⁴¹ The American decline has been similarly marked. From having

produced nearly half of the world's gross national product in 1945,⁴² the United States was down to 35 percent in 1969;⁴² now the percentage is around 25.

In its period of imperial greatness, America's economic growth slipped behind that of almost every major Western power. In 1950 Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, and Japan had economies corresponding to respectively 6, 11, 11, 6, and 7 percent of the U.S. gross national product. In 1975 these percentages had increased to 10, 16, 19, 9, and 23. Only that old imperial power, Britain, had slower growth than the United States. (The British GNP constituted 14 percent of the U.S. GNP in 1950; in 1975 this had fallen to 12.⁴³)

Several reasons can be found for this decline on the part of the United States. The one of greatest importance here is the expense involved in maintaining the American empire. Thus, defense swallowed enormous resources, resources which in other countries could be used for more productive purposes. American yearly defense expenditures vastly outran those of other countries even on a per capita basis. According to one estimate, for the 1950-76 period those expenditures came to an average of 355 dollars in the United States, while in France, Germany, and Japan they only amounted to respectively 112, 87, and 12 dollars. (The estimated figure for the Soviet Union was 159 dollars.) Even at the low point of the 1970s the United States devoted 28 percent of its research and development money to defense compared to West Germany's 7 and Japan's 4 percent.⁴⁴

The American experience resembled that of the British. Empire certainly had its advantages, but it could not be had on the cheap. And is not the Soviet Union experiencing the same thing? China left the fold long ago. The time is over when the Eastern European countries could be exploited to Soviet economic advantage. Now they are being subsidized in many ways. Castro's victory in Cuba has also proved rather costly in economic terms.

Thus, American expansion was one of the most striking phenomena of the post-war period; this expansion created an American empire equal in scope to any the world had seen before. Yet, this was to a large extent an empire by invitation and it probably

turned out that many of those who issued the invitations prospered more under the new order than did the United States itself. But, of course, everything can not be measured in material terms.

NOTES

¹Stuart Schram, ed., Mao Tse-Tung Unrehearsed. Talks and Letters: 1956-71. Penguin Books, 1974, pp. 96-103. The quotation is from page 102.

²The figures in the preceding paragraphs have been taken from U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1970. Washington, D.C., 1975, pp. 228, 464; Thomas G. Paterson, Soviet-American Confrontation. Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War. Baltimore, 1973, pp. 11-12; Thomas G. Paterson, On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War. New York, 1979, pp. 15-16, 72, 84, 152; Adam B. Ulam, The Rivals: America and Russia Since World War II. New York, 1971, pp. 4-6.

³Peter Calvocoressi, The British Experience 1945-75. Pelican Books, 1979, pp. 10-13.

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⁹Lundestad, The American Non-Policy Towards Eastern Europe, pp. 402-04.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 397-408.

¹¹Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1948:3, Gallman to Secretary of State, December 22, 1947, pp. 1-2; Lundestad, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, pp. 171-72.

¹²FRUS, 1948:3, Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State, January 19, 1948, pp. 6-7.

¹³Lundestad, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, pp. 172-75; Escott Reid, Time of Fear and Hope. The Making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947-1949. Toronto, 1977, pp. 40-42.

¹⁴FRUS, 1948:3, British Ambassador (Inverchapel) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett), January 27, 1948, pp. 14-16. The quotation is from p. 14.

¹⁵FRUS, 1948:3, Inverchapel to Lovett, February 6, 1948, pp. 19-20.

¹⁶Georgette Elgey, La république des illusions, 1945-1951. Paris, 1965, p. 382; see also FRUS, 1948:3, Editorial Note, p. 38.

¹⁷FRUS, 1948:3, Secretary of State to the British Ambassador, March 12, p. 48.

¹⁸Lundestad, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, pp. 176-82.

¹⁹A good summary of the Pentagon negotiations is found in Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, "The Pentagon Negotiations March 1948: The Launching of the North Atlantic Treaty," International Affairs, 1983, 3, pp. 351-63.

²⁰Lundestad, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, pp. 182-91.

²¹Reid, Time of Fear and Hope, pp. 53-54, 113-25.

²²The treaty text is found for instance in FRUS, 1949:4, pp. 281-85; for a good short account of the role of the State Department in this part of the NATO negotiations, see Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. New York, 1969, pp. 280-81.

²³Lundestad, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, pp. 195-97, 310-11.

²⁴FRUS, 1949:4, Report of the Working Group on Organization, to the North Atlantic Council, p. 329-37; Lawrence Kaplan, "An Unequal Triad: The United States, Western Union and NATO," Paper presented at the conference "European and Atlantic Defense 1947-1953," Oslo, August 7-11, 1983, pp. 27-33.

²⁵A good account of the transformation of NATO after the outbreak of the Korean war is still Osgood, NATO--The Entangling Alliance; for Western European views on the questions mentioned, see pp. 64-98; see also FRUS, 1950:3, pp. 130-32, 273-78, 293-302, 590-601.

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²⁷George H. Gallup, ed., The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls, Great Britain 1937-1975. Volume One: 1937-1964. New York, 1977, pp. 125, 161-62, 174, 179, 226, 239, 241-42, 269.

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²⁹Anna J. Merritt and Richard L. Merrit, eds., Public Opinion in Occupied Germany. Urbana, 1970, pp. 9-29, 43-58, 180-81. The quotation is from p. 51.

³⁰Bjørn Alstad, ed., Norske meninger, I. Norge, nordmenn og verden. (Norwegian Opinions, I. Norway, Norwegians and the World). Oslo, 1969, pp. 89-90.

³¹Alstad, Norske meninger, I, pp. 90-91, 93-95.

³²For a brief summary of political trends in Western Europe, see Derek W. Urwin, Western Europe Since 1945: A Short Political History. London, 1981, pp. 80-84, 154-64. 217-45.

³³Charles S. Maier, "The Two Postwar Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe", The American Historical Review, 1981: 2, pp. 341-43. The quotation is from p. 342.

³⁴Arkes, Bureaucracy, The Marshall Plan, and the National Interest, pp. 273-300; Lundestad, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, pp. 151-54.

³⁵FRUS, 1948:3, Memorandum of Conversation Marshall-Queuille, November 18, 1948, p. 681; Lundestad, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, pp. 153-54.

³⁶Raymond James Raymond, "The Reinterpretation of the Marshall Plan: Ireland--A Case Study, 1947-1953." Mimeographed, University of Connecticut, pp. 21. The quotation is from page 17; Lundestad, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, pp. 132-66.

³⁷Lundestad, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, pp. 156-61.

³⁸A good summing-up of the American attitude to European integration is found in Armin Rappaport, "The United States and European Integration: The First Phase," Diplomatic History, Spring 1981, pp. 121-49.

³⁹Lundestad, America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, pp. 89-94, 132-56.

⁴⁰Michael Howard, "Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1982/83, pp. 309-24. The quotation is from p. 319.

⁴¹Kennedy, "A Historian of Imperial Decline Looks at America," p. 6.

⁴²John Pinder, "Europe in the World Economy 1920-1970" in Carlo M. Cipolla, ed., The Fontana Economic History of Europe. Contemporary Economies-I. Fontana Books, 1976, p. 343.

⁴³U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1978. Washington, D.C., 1978, p. 908.

⁴⁴Lance Davis and Robert Huttenback, "Aspects of Late Nineteenth-Century Imperialism," Paper presented at the meeting of the Organization of American Historians, New Orleans, April 11-14, 1979, Table III-1; Kennedy, "A Historian of Imperial Decline Looks at America," p. 6.

**MAKING FULBRIGHT CHAIRMAN: OR HOW THE
"JOHNSON TREATMENT" NEARLY BACKFIRED**

by

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When Senator J. William Fulbright broke with the Johnson administration over its interventions in the Dominican Republic and Vietnam, a wounded Lyndon Johnson complained to visitors: "Why, I made that man chairman!"¹ Although exaggerated and egocentric, there was some truth to Johnson's claim that he had precipitated one of the most unorthodox transfers of power in the Senate's history and had given Fulbright at least a headstart on his long career as committee chairman. The story of how Lyndon Johnson engineered the resignation of Theodore Green from the chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, long a Capitol Hill legend, has now been documented in the release of executive session transcripts and oral histories with key players in the drama.² It is the tale of a gentle conspiracy among the Senate staff, the press, and the majority leader to ease an old man out of office, a conspiracy that succeeded in spite of Johnson's wily strategies and heavyhanded tactics.

In almost a parody of the seniority system, Theodore Francis Green became chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee in January 1957, ten months short of his ninetieth birthday. In many respects the Rhode Island Democrat carried his age well. A physical fitness enthusiast, he hiked, swam, wrestled, lifted

weights, and made the rounds of Washington receptions with a vigor that younger men admired. He could still be a tough and persistent questioner of witnesses. A staunch liberal, he sympathized with Third World aspirations, advocated United Nations membership for the People's Republic of China, and was otherwise unafraid to buck the prevailing sentiments and conventional wisdom of American foreign policy. In the still club-like atmosphere of the Senate he was well liked as a dignified, congenial, and good-humored fellow.³ But for all that, Senator Green was simply too old when the mantle of chairman finally fell upon him.

Green's passion for picayune detail rankled other committee members and drove the staff to distraction. It became increasingly difficult to focus his attention on substantive issues rather than whether to use "that" or "which" in a memorandum on the subject. He once ground a meeting to a halt by arguing in favor of the word "refuger" rather than "refugee," for one who sought refuge. "I suppose linguistically he had a point," committee staff member Pat Holt commented, "but it was the kind of thing that would just drive other members of the committee absolutely through the ceiling."⁴ Green's failing hearing and eyesight also caused considerable consternation. When the chairman left his office, his personal staff would call to alert the committee staff to watch out that he found the right room. In hearings, Senator Green could no longer see clearly enough to distinguish between committee members to call upon them. He instructed Darrell St. Claire, the chief clerk, to prepare a talley sheet with a heavy line drawn between Democrats and Republicans, and would then call each one according to seniority. This arrangement worked so long as members did not change seats. "Senator Wiley?" Green once called on the shadowy figure to his right. "My name is Senator Symington," an icy voice responded.⁵

These idiosyncrasies could have been overlooked had Green been able to handle committee bills on the Senate floor. Instead he began to "mumble-stumble" through his speeches and had difficulty responding to questions about amendments. During one debate on an amendment to a foreign aid bill, Green turned to Carl Marcy, the committee's chief of staff, and asked, "Well, what do we do?" "That's up to you," Marcy

responded. "If you oppose the amendment, it will be defeated and if you support it, it will probably pass." "But I don't know what to do," Green admitted. Marcy suggested that the senator call the absence of a quorum, and use the break in the proceedings to consult with other senators. No one, however, felt comfortable instructing the chairman how he should vote. Finally, Marcy acted on his own. The amendment went down to defeat.⁶

Carl Marcy, a former State Department official who had served on the committee staff since 1950, and as staff director since 1955, found himself acting as de facto chairman. Washington reporters sensed the shift in authority. At the end of each closed-door committee session they would dutifully file into the committee room for a briefing from the chairman. After a few questions they would thank the chairman and leave. Once Green had departed, the reporters would return to ask Marcy to straighten out the account. Troubled over this situation, Marcy talked with Carroll Kilpatrick of the Washington Post and other reporters who covered the committee. "You fellows are absolutely wonderful," he said. "You treat Senator Green just beautifully all the time, but he's not with it." Green's confusion, he suggested, was turning the staff director into chairman of the committee. Kilpatrick passed this information along to a friend on the Providence Journal, which on January 29, 1959, published a respectful but firm editorial: "Green Should Relinquish His Chairmanship." "Reports from Washington increasingly suggest that Senator Green no longer has the physical capacity, the mental vigor or the depth of insight to discharge his duties as the national interest demands," the Journal observed, recommending that he could perform "a final and unique service" by stepping down as chairman. From all accounts, Senator Green was terribly hurt by the accusation of physical and mental incompetence, coming from the major newspaper in his home state.⁷

At this point, Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson entered the picture. A few months earlier, Johnson had been pleased to accommodate Green by reducing his committee assignments, when the senator underwent cataract surgery. Now, after the Democrats had won a landslide victory in the congressional elections of 1958, swelling their ranks in the Senate and improving their chances of victory in the upcoming

presidential elections, Johnson was more than happy to see the elderly gentleman step aside in favor of a man whose foreign policy expertise he deeply admired, J. William Fulbright of Arkansas. On the morning of January 29, Green called Johnson to his office to discuss the editorial and the question of whether he should resign. Johnson expressed his outrage that the paper would criticize the fine work Green was doing, especially with the heavy burden the chairman was carrying. A man of Green's distinguished stature and record should not be subjected to such abuse. He deserved some respite. Johnson's chief lieutenant, Senate Democratic Secretary Bobby Baker, apparently approached Green later in the day with similar sentiments.⁸ By that afternoon, Green had come to the same conclusion: he did not deserve such attack and he was stepping down. At 4:40 p.m., while Johnson was presiding over the Aeronautics and Space Committee, he received a note from Green asking him to stop by his office on his way home. "Needless to say, I don't go home that early," Johnson later told reporters. "I just left the chair and went to see him immediately, and we spent, oh, I guess an hour, again reviewing these matters." Green expressed his intention to retire as chairman but to retain his membership and seniority on the committee. While Johnson protested profusely, he accepted the decision.⁹

Johnson did not want it to appear that either newspaper or the Democratic leadership had pressured Green out. It had, after all, been Theodore Green who nominated Johnson for floor leader at the Democratic caucus in 1953, and he did not want to appear ungrateful. The chairman's resignation had to go before the public as a purely voluntary act. Johnson called Carl Marcy. "I want every member of the Foreign Relations Committee present tomorrow morning," he ordered, explaining that the chairman was resigning.¹⁰ At 11:00 a.m. on January 30 sixteen of the seventeen members of the committee gathered in their Capitol committee room, joined by the majority leader. Senator Green read a letter addressed to Johnson, asking to be relieved as chairman, and then turned the meeting over to him. It was unprecedented for a majority leader to preside over a committee of which he was not a member, but Johnson was not a man bound by precedents.

"There are very few days in the life of a leader

that are pleasant ones," he began. "I need not tell you that yesterday and today are two of the saddest days I have had." Johnson explained how he had told Green he was making a mistake in resigning; how there was no criticism of his actions coming from either the leadership or the committee members; and how he had urged him to continue his post. But, having heard the senator out, "I thought I had no choice other than to accept his decision, because I am not the one who wants to insist that he carry a burden he does not feel he should carry When I walked out of his office, I realized that I had just finished a meeting with one of the greatest men I had ever known." Johnson said he was powerless to make the chairman change his mind. He wanted the members of the committee to know the background of the story before it was released to the public.

Then he called for any expressions the members wished to make. Following Johnson's lead, they went around the table, according to seniority, praising the chairman and regretting his action. Senator George Aiken moved that the committee request the chairman to reconsider his decision. Seconded by Senator Fulbright, ranking Democrat and heir-apparent, Aiken's resolution carried by a unanimous show of hands. Senator Green responded with a genial resignation speech. "I thank you gentlemen from my heart for your expressions of confidence and friendship," he concluded, "but I certainly cannot take any action reversing my letter."

Johnson did not know when to stop. "The members of the committee said what I said, only more eloquently than I, and they have repeated what I said yesterday afternoon--more touchingly, I think," he told Green. "They voted unanimously to ask you to continue."

The Chairman: Who did?

Senator Johnson: This committee.

The Chairman: I didn't know that they had.

Senator Johnson: Just a few minutes ago. They now ask unanimously for you to reconsider.

The Chairman: Is that what you were doing?

Senator Johnson: You remember what I told you.

The Chairman: I certainly would not be brash enough to turn it down if it were put to the meeting here. I appreciate it highly, and I know I ought to give it

serious consideration. It didn't occur to me that it would be this way.¹¹

Senator Green's unexpected deviation from the script caused the majority leader some apprehension. He called for a short recess to allow the chairman to retire to an adjoining room and think over the situation. "Go with him," Johnson whispered to Carl Marcy. "Don't let him change his mind!" As the chairman and the chief of staff departed, Johnson turned to the committee members: "Gentlemen, if you will close that door, I think I ought to say this to the committee--." (Here the official transcript indicates only that "there was an extended discussion off the record.") Those present recall that Johnson changed the tone of his voice. Senator Green was sick and tired, he explained. He, Johnson, had been informed that if Green were not relieved of his duties he might not be with us for very long. It would be a great thing for this old man if the committee accepted his resignation.¹²

In the back room, Green agonized with Marcy and Eddie Higgins, his administrative assistant. Higgins begged him not to let the committee talk him out of resigning. Marcy reminded him that he had submitted his resignation and ought to stick to it. He referred to other men, like Konrad Adenauer, who had retired at appropriate times, and suggested that Senator Green could set an example for the rest of the Senate. "you will be more honored in sticking with this decision than if you change your mind now," Marcy counseled. Senator Green returned to the committee room and announced: "I am deeply touched by it all, but I still feel that it is my duty to my country, to the committee, and to myself, to stick by my decision." As one staff member recalled, "everybody present breathed a sigh of relief."¹³

Johnson resumed his role as master of ceremonies, producing a prepared statement for the press. "In the whole history of the Senate there have been few careers as distinguished as that of Senator Green," he read. "His love of his country is so great that he has decided to resign the chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee, an action which I personally advised against." And he added, "You can say the committee agreed to that."¹⁴

The resignation of Chairman Green had been a play in one act, written and directed by Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson. Unfortunately, the principal character had missed his cue. Johnson had been almost too clever in arranging the meeting, piling the compliments on too thick, and confusing Senator Green with his intentions. The celebrated "Johnson Treatment" nearly backfired, but in the end it produced its desired results: the elevation of a highly skilled and articulate foreign policy spokesman for the Democrats in the Senate, a man whom Senator Johnson liked to refer to as "my Secretary of State." Thus it hurt all the more when Fulbright, the man Lyndon Johnson felt he had made chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, turned against him.

FOOTNOTES

¹Tristram Coffin, Senator Fulbright (New York, 1966), 256-7.

²See the Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Volume XI, 86th Congress, 1st sess., 1959 (Washington, 1982). The oral histories are part of a series conducted with retired members of the Senate staff by the Senate Historical Office; copies of the transcripts are deposited in the Manuscript Division at the Library of Congress and the Legislative Records Division of the National Archives.

³Erwin L. Levine, Theodore Francis Green, The Washington Years, 1937-1960 (Providence, 1971), 114-47.

⁴Pat Holt: Chief of Staff, Foreign Relations Committee, Oral History Interviews, 128-9. Holt was a member of the committee staff from 1950 to 1973, and chief of staff from 1973 to 1977.

⁵Darrell St. Claire: Assistant Secretary of the Senate, Oral History Interviews, 143-4. St. Claire was chief clerk of the Foreign Relations Committee from 1958 to 1966.

⁶Carl Marcy: Chief of Staff, Foreign Relations Committee, Oral History Interviews, 97. Marcy served on the staff from 1950 to 1973, chief of staff for the last eighteen of those years.

⁷Marcy Oral History, 97-8. Providence Journal, 29 January 1959.

⁸Holt Oral History, 131-2.

⁹Providence Journal, 31 January 1959.

¹⁰Marcy Oral History, 98.

¹¹Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), Volume XI, 133-47.

¹²Ibid.; 148; Holt Oral History, 133.

¹³Ibid.; Marcy Oral History, 98-9. The committee appointed Green "Chairman Emeritus."

¹⁴Historical Series, Volume XI, 149-50. The entire text of Johnson's press conference following the session was published in the Providence Journal, 31 January 1959.

RESEARCHING AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS ABROAD: MANILA, PHILIPPINES

by

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Manila is at once a treasury of memories, an unexploited archival opportunity, and a challenge to the historian of American diplomacy. As the capital of a onetime American colony, it presents the visitor with many reminders of forty-eight years of "benevolent assimilation." Filipino nationalism may have transformed the shoreline highway from Dewey to Roxas Boulevard, but the ambience of the bygone colonial era lingers in the Army-Navy Club, the American Embassy, the Manila Hotel, and several Yankee colonial mansions. In a morning's walk one can easily see Douglas MacArthur's restored penthouse atop the Manila Hotel; reconstructed portions of the Intramuros destroyed by American bombing in 1945; Fort Santiago, site of the American military command headquarters; and Arlegui, now the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but originally the home of the American-established University of the Philippines. A short taxi ride brings one to the University of Santo Tomas, where Americans were interned during the Pacific War. Two hours' bus journey will get one to Clark Air Force Base, where Japanese bombers surprised Americans in December 1941 and where contemporary opponents of the American military presence have demonstrated. A two hour boat trip takes one to Corregidor, perhaps the most moving of all of the remnants of the American presence in the Philippines.

Manila's archival riches are of three sorts. The first is to be found at the American Historical Collection, which is housed within the American Embassy. Its curator is Lewis Gleeck, Jr., a retired

consul general Manila who has written three books on the American occupation of the Philippines. If contacted ahead of time, c/o Bulletin of the American Historical Collection, Box 1495, Metro Manila, he can guide one through the collection of rare books, magazines, and newspapers from the colonial era as well as the papers of its creator, Yankee businessman E.A. Perkins. Because of his long residence in Manila, Mr. Gleeck is also an extremely valuable source of information about Filipino diplomats and journalists whom one can contact for interviews.

Because the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Malacanan Palace archives are not currently open to researchers, collections of Philippine presidents' papers constitute the second significant source in Manila for the historian of American foreign relations. They can be found in three different locations. The National Library, only a short walk from the American Embassy, is the first site. Its collection runs from revolutionary President Emilio Aguinaldo through Commonwealth Chief Executive Manuel Quezon to post-independence presidents Manuel Roxas (1946-1948) and Carlos P. Garcia (1957-1961). Finding aids exist for each, and all have been arranged according to a common system. The Quezon and Garcia manuscripts are the most extensive, and they contain files which trace negotiations with Washington from early independence efforts through summit visits during the Eisenhower era. "Special case" files offer most to American diplomatic historians because they contain correspondence with important Philippine diplomats and politicians, most notably longtime Minister for Foreign Affairs Carlos P. Romulo. General access to these collections can be obtained by writing to either Dr. Serafin Quiason, Director of the National Library, or Ms. Carolina Afan, Head of its Asian and Filipiniana Division, Box 4118, T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, Metro Manila. Use of the "special case" files in the Garcia collection requires permission from Attorney Fernando Campos, 41 Bohol Avenue, Quezon City, Metro Manila.

Two other presidential collections are housed in private libraries. The Jose P. Laurel Memorial Library, only a few blocks distant from the National Library, contain the papers of the wartime president of the Japanese-sponsored republic. They are arranged by series, of which those dealing with the Japanese

occupation, the collaboration issue, and negotiations on Philippine-American economic relations that culminated in the Laurel-Langley accord of 1954 are of the greatest utility for historians of American foreign relations. Major portions of this collection have been microfilmed. A copy of the excellent guide to it, as well as details concerning access, substance, and casts of obtaining copies of material in the collection can be obtained by writing the curator, Mrs. Fe Angela Manansala-Verzosa, Jose P. Laurel Library, Roxas Boulevard at Pedro Gil Street, Metro Manila.

One must take a cab or bus to reach to papers of Elpidio Quirino, second president of the third republic (1948-1953), which are housed at the Ayala Museum. Three sets of materials within them are of especial value to the American diplomatic historian. The first is Quirino's official correspondence with the ministry of foreign affairs. The second is a small but fascinating collection of documents from the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, which enables one to see how the president got daily information about the communist threat at home and abroad. The third group consists of "special correspondence" files with Quirino's principal diplomatic aides, United Nations Ambassador Carlos P. Romulo and Ambassador J.M. "Mike" Elizalde in Washington. When used with Quirino's trip files for his 1949 and 1951 missions to the United States, these documents afford unique insights into the inner workings of Philippine-American diplomacy. For permission to use the Quirino papers, one should contact Rev. Gabriel Casal, OSB, Director, Ayala Museum, Box 259, Makati Commercial Center, Metro Manila.

The third major set of materials of interest to the historian of American foreign relations is to be found within the archives of the University of the Philippines. The papers of former university presidents are particularly rich because they often served as diplomats, presidential advisors, or foreign policy commentators in the press. The papers of Guillermo Guevara document his membership on the Philippine delegation to Washington in 1915-1916, on the Japanese peace settlement committee of 1950-1952, and on the Philippine delegation to the Geneva conference of 1954. Salvador P. Lopez, longtime

representative to the United Nations, ambassador to France and the United States, and undersecretary of foreign affairs, donated a collection especially notable for its extensive, well-indexed correspondence with major American and Filipino political and diplomatic leaders. The papers of Federico Mangahas, private secretary to president Elpidio Quirino and later an editor and newspaper columnist, include indexed correspondence as well as personal diaries for 1945-49 and 1953-1978. While Carlos P. Romulo has given but a portion of his papers to the university archive, it includes personal correspondence with Philippine presidents that presents his views on relations with Washington and on American diplomacy in the Pacific more generally. The Vincente G. Sinco papers document the 1945 United Nations Conference, the reparations and war damage claims issues, the Japanese peace settlement of 1951, the commission for revision of Philippine-American trade laws, and the Manila SEATO Conference of 1954. The archives staff have prepared unpublished finding aids for all of these collections, save the Romulo materials. For access to the collections and further information about their contents, one should write Ms. Aida Sarmiento, Head, Archives Division, University of the Philippines Library, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila.

The greatest challenge to the historian who visits Manila in order to use these materials is not access, which is readily granted upon prior explanation of one's purpose, but rather distance and time. Manila is a sprawling metropolis, with streets clogged by thousands of jeepny taxis and busses. The National Library, the Ayala Museum, and the University of the Philippines, while not physically distant by American standards, are remote in time. In addition, communication between them is often made difficult by the city's overloaded telephone system. Consequently the visiting researcher cannot hope to visit all three, or even any two, in a single day. Indeed, one would do well to plan to shift one's lodgings according to the probable site of research. The heart of the city contains many good hotels, several of which give significant discounts; these must be arranged, prior to arrival, through the Philippine Government Tourist offices in the United States. The Swiss Inn, 1394 General Luna, Ermita, Metro Manila, offers good food and air-conditioned rooms at modest

prices in a quiet, pleasant part of the city. On the University of the Philippines campus, one can stay at the Philippine Commission for Economic Development Hostel, Pook Diego Silan, University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, Metro Manila, which is within walking distance of the university library.

Although they are physically remote for most historians of American foreign relations, Philippine archival materials are neither inaccessible nor unimportant. I obtained Xerox copies of pertinent files even before going to Manila, and once there, I found archivists unusually eager to photocopy and mail documents that I had selected. What is there is not simply an exotic appendage to the usual sources American diplomatic historians draw upon. Given the current closure of significant portions of Department of State files well beyond the thirty year limit, these Philippine sources in some cases provide documentation where none other is available. Beyond that, Philippine materials add an Asian, yet English language, perspective on American policy in the entire Pacific region. No historian concerned with United States relations with East and Southeast Asia can afford to overlook what Manila's archives have to offer.

THE PRESENT DANGER OF THOUGHT CONTROL:

**Are we to leave to government censor
the definition of what is "meaningful"?**

by Thomas G. Paterson

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The historian's access to government documents and information is being blocked today by questionable interpretations of the law, by restrictive guidelines and directives that keep documents locked up for longer periods of time, and by unsympathetic bureaucrats whose commitment to secrecy is excessive. Diplomatic historians particularly face problems that do not stem so much from inadequate budgets or insufficient staffing at the National Archives or Department of State, although such deficiencies are conspicuous and disturbing, but rather from definitions of national security that are alarmingly

sweeping. The issue is what is being declassified to satisfy the historian's need for thorough documentation and the people's right to know. And the fundamental question is this: What kind of history will we be getting if the current policies of restriction continue?

The special problem of the declassification of diplomatic documents is part of a general trend in recent years toward what we must unabashedly call "thought control." I am not talking about the burning of books, but the prevention of books. Information is being controlled and managed as never before. Sweeping definitions of national security elevate secrecy to new levels. The Freedom of Information Act is under attack. Government officials apparently see historical information as a threat to the nation, rather than as a vital component of a functioning democracy in which the people must be informed and their government held accountable. In studying this subject, I found myself descending into a dark cavern of executive orders, legislative acts, executive directives, proposed amendments, letters of explanation, secret guidelines, and court rulings. I am sure I do not understand all of it, and I am assured by archivists and historians in the government that they have not mastered the rules either. But the procedural cloudiness should not obscure the critical question: What kind of history will emerge from our government's current policies?

The pattern of thought control is coherent and defined--there can be no mistaking it. Take several recent examples. The first occurred in early 1983 when the National Security Agency (NSA) ordered the George C. Marshall Library in Virginia to remove letters from the private papers of William F. Friedman. These letters heretofore had been open to researchers; indeed, James Bamford's book on the National Security Agency, titled The Puzzle Palace, cited these letters. NSA representatives must not have found Bamford's study friendly enough, for they moved into the Marshall Library, rubber-stamped the letters "Secret," and insisted that they be placed in the library's vault. In other words, federal agencies have the authority to classify private papers in private libraries if the documents are claimed to be sensitive under the rubric of national security. President Ronald Reagan's 1982 executive order permits agencies

to reclassify materials which have already been released to scholars. The problem we face in the future, then, is not simply one of hurrying the declassification process, but of preventing reclassification. Which collections will these federal censors move into next? (The American Historical Association has recently become a co-plaintiff in a suit that seeks to deny NSA's authority to close opened materials and to restrain NSA from further efforts to block public access to such information.)

A second case study of thought control springs from the United States Information Agency, which has been known to select speakers for its overseas programs on the basis of their allegiance to Reagan Administration policies. Professor Richard O. Curry of the University of Connecticut, whose specialty is nineteenth-century American history, hired by the USIA to lecture in Australia, was told by American officials that if he spoke out against Reagan policies he might never receive another Fulbright award (see Curry's articles in recent issues of the OAH Newsletter). Professor John Seiler of Dutchess County Community College, New York, scheduled to undertake a lecture tour of six African nations, was told his trip was canceled because his views on South Africa did not accord with current United States policy. The USIA has also compiled, and perhaps now abandoned, a blacklist of eighty-four people to be denied participation in its overseas speakers' program. Included on the celebrated list were Stanley Kutler, Walter Cronkite, John Kenneth Galbraith, James Fallows, and McGeorge Bundy. Are our cultural and academic exchange programs becoming nothing more than instruments of national propaganda?

A third example of thought control: the government has revitalized the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 to bar foreign speakers from the United States. Recent cases include Nicaragua's Interior Minister Tomas Borge and El Salvador's Constituent Assembly President Robert D'Aubuisson. They were denied visas on the grounds that their presence here would be "prejudicial to the public interest." Professor John Coatsworth, who had arranged for Borge's appearance at the University of Chicago, remarked that the "First Amendment means nothing at all if it does not permit American citizens to listen to views their government

disapproves of." A Washington Post editorial of December 1983 asked: "Can no official see the absurdity of demanding, under threat of arms, that the Sandinistas open up Nicaraguan society while the American government in limited but crucial respects closes its own?"

Still another example is the "gag rule" the Reagan Administration announced in National Security Decision Directive 84 (March 1983). This directive requires over 100,000 government officials with access to classified materials to sign a lifetime secrecy pledge. They are required to submit their speeches, articles, and books prior to delivery or publication--again, for their lifetimes. The government has been unable to demonstrate that enough classified information has been leaked in the last several years to warrant such a sweeping order. Former Undersecretary of State George Ball, whose memoirs would have had to be submitted to the censors had the directive been in place when he held office in the 1960s, called it "an appalling document." If this directive goes into effect--the Congress has temporarily delayed it and the President has said he is suspending controversial portions of the order until a compromise can be struck with Congress--the officials of one administration could censor the writings of their predecessors. Certain documents should, arguably, be kept secret: diplomatic codes, weapons designs, and perhaps the names of overseas intelligence officers. But the danger is a lifetime, government-imposed silence, a direct challenge to the writing of respectable history. If the directive becomes the rule, it might mean that historians would be impeded in their conduct of oral histories. And even if the rule is not rigorously enforced, the fear and intimidation it necessarily inspires will produce self-censorship. Memoirs would be even less useful and candid than they already are. Is a modern-day George F. Kennan to be muzzled for life?

Yet another case study of thought control can be seen in the recent trend toward classifying at high levels documents generated by officials today. From 1981 to 1982, for example, the number of documents classified "Top Secret" increased 45 percent. In 1980 President Jimmy Carter introduced a new category for very sensitive documents called "Royal." Steven Garfinkel of the Information Security Oversight Office

(ISOO) does not think any documents were stamped in this manner. But, of course, had they been, being so sensitive, they might never have been shown to him.

A sixth example of thought control involves the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). In 1975 or so the FBI began destroying documents in an apparent attempt to render the Freedom of Information Act (see below) ineffective. Substantial FBI holdings were destroyed before a January 1980 court order stopped the destruction and instructed the agency to provide the court with plans and schedules for files retention. Judge Harold Greene of the Federal District Court in Washington, D.C., declared that "perhaps more than those of any other agency" the documents of the FBI "constitute a significant repository of the record of the recent history of this nation. . . . The lessons of history can hardly be learned if the historical record is allowed to vanish." The FBI appealed this injunction. Historical associations lined up to support the court order. In mid-1980 Judge Greene denied the FBI's motion to dissolve the injunction. The FBI persisted. In the fall 1983 a U.S. Court of Appeals rejected the FBI appeal. So Judge Greene's order stands: the National Archives and Records Service and the FBI must initiate plans for archivist to inspect and evaluate FBI records before the agency is permitted to destroy anything. Scholars who know the history of the FBI cannot feel confident that the agency will give its full cooperation, court order or not.

Let us turn next to the status of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Passed in 1966 to "empower individuals to hold government accountable," the FOIA has served scholars well. Although the FOIA exempts from declassification those documents, which, if released, might endanger the national security, company trade secrets, or private individuals, many recent books in diplomatic history have utilized the act. But the scholar's use of the FOIA is now threatened in a variety of ways. Long delays--sometimes two to three years--set back research, and often what is released is heavily sanitized. Moreover, the government has tightened its rules on fee waivers. The act is generous on fee waivers; that is, fees should be waived if the release of the materials is "in the public interest." Fees, which can include both search-time and photoduplication

costs, can run very high. My own research on Cuban-American relations from the 1950s to the present is now encumbered by fees of well over a thousand dollars. The Department of Commerce will not even begin to search for relevant documents on the sugar trade until I first pay \$450; the FBI, on the other hand, has reduced its large fees by half for documents on Cuban-American topics.

A January 1983 Justice Department memorandum on fee waivers causes us to suspect that the imposition of hefty fees, as well as the denial of waivers, is a way of discouraging FOIA requests and thereby our historical research. This memorandum interprets "public interest" this way: "No matter how interesting or vital the subject matter of a request, the public is benefited only if the information released meaningfully contributes to the public development or understanding of the subjects. . . ." Are we to leave to government censors the definition of what is "meaningful?" Scholars shudder at the thought.

Besides long delays, heavy deletions, and prohibitive fees, there is another threat to the FOIA. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in early 1983 asked Congress to exempt the agency's records from the act. A host of voices, including those of historians and historical societies, cried foul. So a compromise bill has been worked out by Senator David Durenberger and CIA Director William Casey, and it now rests in Congress. Only "operational" files are to be exempted from the FOIA, and the CIA has agreed to review such files at least once every ten years. A selective declassification review program will be undertaken as well. This bill is a serious obstacle to historical research: it permits the CIA to determine what to release or what to review; the CIA will be tempted to define "operational" broadly so as to deny scholars documents; the ten-year interval for review is much too long; and there is no cutoff date--say twenty to twenty-five years--for the review or declassification of CIA records. William Casey has said that "historians would have to trust us. . . ." Since the CIA is openly hostile to the Freedom of Information Act and has even refused to cooperate with the Office of the Historian of the Department of State, he must be kidding. Perhaps Congress will stop this bill.

Finally, the terrible state of the declassification process in the State Department and the fate of the invaluable, red-bound Foreign Relations of the United States series deserve our attention. Both are bogged down in the environment of thought control. President Reagan's Executive Order 12356 (April 1982) has further served to bolt the door against scholarship. This order abandoned the systematic declassification process established by previous orders (set by Richard Nixon at thirty years and by Jimmy Carter at twenty years). One provision of Reagan's order permits the reclassification of material. It continues to exempt from declassification materials considered information from a foreign government (such as a memorandum of conversation with a foreign diplomat). As Garfinkel of the ISOO has proudly claimed, the government is now "managing" information well. Current policy follows the guideline that, when in doubt, classify at the highest level; when in doubt, do not declassify. The battle between secrecy and openness has been vigorous; openness appears to have lost. In fiscal year 1982, the State Department granted in full only 52 percent of the requests for declassification under the mandatory review procedures that apply to documents that have been deposited with the National Archives and Records Service, including the presidential libraries. The figure for the CIA was 28 percent; for the National Security Council (NSC) 48 percent; and for the Department of Defense 77 percent. The number of pages reviewed for declassification in 1982 for all agencies was 78 percent less than in 1980, and 38 percent less than in 1981. The issue, of course, is not quantity, but quality--what are we getting for documents and what kind of history is going to be written from such an incomplete record?

The Classification/Declassification Center (CDC) of the Department of State works under Executive Order 12356. Created in 1979 and staffed by some 150 former Foreign Service Officers, the CDC follows country-by-country guidelines which are in themselves classified. The CDC is a major obstacle to good scholarship in diplomatic history. Documents for the 1950s have been released very slowly; documents for 1955-60 will not be opened to research for a long time. Worse still, the CDC is engaged in reclassification. Some Foreign Service Post records stored at the federal depository in Suitland, Maryland, for example, have been called

back for rereview by the State Department classifiers. These materials had been open to scholars. There is a huge backlog in the joint National Archives/Department of State declassification project. State Department lawyers are extremely cautious about releasing documents which contain controversial topics. Large deletions and long delays await any scholar who seeks the declassification of a specific document. And there are the ridiculous cases. For my research on Cuban-United States relations for example, I applied for the declassification of many documents held at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. After a two- to four-year wait, some documents I have received show a four-letter word to have been deleted. It required no detective skills whatsoever to determine that the letters were "C-u-b-a." Who in the bureaucracy spent so much time doing that sort of useless work?

The Foreign Relations series has suffered under the stricter declassification rules, and apparently the Office of the Historian has suspended work on volumes covering the early 1960s. Now we stand at about thirty years. There have been shortages of staff, but as the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation has stated in its 1983 report: "The revised declassification procedures have been largely responsible for that delay. ..." the CDC has pulled back volumes ready for the presses to rereview them. Volumes prepared at least five years ago have not yet been printed. Some of the volumes being published are disappointing because they are incomplete. Take the Indo-China volume for 1952-54 (published in 1982). Its list of sources does not include the CIA. And the preface and introduction do not tell us if CIA files were researched or if the CIA, as has happened in the past, denied State Department requests for relevant materials. Moreover, the preface reads: "The publication of Foreign Relations of the United States constitutes the official record of foreign policy of the United States. The volumes in this series included, subject to necessary security considerations, all documents needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions of the United States. ..." This surely claims too much. The wording--"official," "all," and "comprehensive"--suggest thoroughness, when in fact the volume appears incomplete.

The American Republics volume for 1952-54 (compiled in 1974-77 but not published until 1983) is a real disappointment. Even though the 1954 intervention in Guatemala was a CIA operation, as excellent recent books have explained, the CIA denied the editors of the Foreign Relations series permission to publish documents on the covert role of the agency. The volume covering Iran and the CIA-engineered coup of 1953 has been held up because of similar declassification snarls. And what about the volumes which cover Saudi Arabia? Will they also be gutted because many documents which mention the royal family will remain classified? Will we have more cases like the 1950 volume on Korea, which includes no minutes of National Security Council meetings, because NSC would not permit the Office of the Historian to print them? The series is in danger of taking on the character of an official White Paper, losing its reputation as a respected scholarly tool.

The message of this disconcerting story is that in so many ways our history is being managed for us. The piecemeal, document-by-document, incomplete declassification of document permits the State Department, the CIA, and other agencies to control our writing of history, to manage the questions we ask, to set the terms of historical inquiry and research. For example, we would not be carefully discussing the question of lost opportunities for negotiations with Mao Zedong's China in 1949, and we would not have several excellent recent books on Sino-American relations in the 1940s, had the Foreign Relations volume, published in 1977, not printed Zhou Enlai's demarche. What if the Office of the Historian had lost the debate and the document had not been published? As it was, the volume was held up for some time before the go-ahead decision was made. What kind of history will we be getting in the future if similar cases arise? Not only does this management of information--this thought control--determine in part what questions we can answer, it also leaves the field to the memoirists--self-serving, incomplete, and suspect. How long must we rely on the autobiographies of Richard M. Nixon and Henry A. Kissinger for the history of 1970s diplomacy?

What can we do? It would help if we had a different President. It would help if we constantly alerted our elected representatives in Washington to

the many cases of thought control. It would help if we kept ourselves informed by reading the reports of Page Putnam Miller's National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History, housed at the American Historical Association office in Washington. It would help if we supported organizations like the fund for Open Information and Accountability (FOIA, Inc.) in New York. It would help if we encouraged the various committees of the AHA, Organization of American Historians, and the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations to continue their good work to change declassification rules. It would help if government authorities could agree to insert the words "or for historical research" after "in the public interest" to improve the historian's chances of obtaining FOIA fee waivers.

Professor Anna K. Nelson of George Washington University, who has for years thoughtfully spoken to these questions, has suggested, with others, that we as historians should concentrate on the long run--on preparing a statutory law governing declassification of national security materials after twenty, twenty-five, or, like Australia and Britain, thirty years. The AHA Council at its December 27, 1983, meeting passed a resolution with a recommendation to amend the Federal Records Act to provide for "basic criteria for all forms of security classification systems in all agencies of the United States Government," including a twenty-year rule. Until we abandon the current system of item-by-item review, we cannot write the history of the recent past with much confidence. Until we achieve a statutory basis for declassification we remain at the mercy of leaks of "public disclosures" and individual Presidents who can issue their obstructionist executive orders when they please. It produces little but frustration to challenge the technical language of the latest order, guideline, or directive. We must look beyond this administration and lay the groundwork for a permanent system that Congress will approve and that Presidents will leave alone. Otherwise, the present danger of thought control will flourish, all the while snuffing out the writing of thorough and respected history.

MINUTES OF SHAFR COUNCIL MEETING
August 2, 1984
Held in the Marvin Center of
George Washington University

Warren I. Cohen, presiding

Present were Council members Warren Kuehl, Charles DeBenedetti, Roger Trask, Michael Hunt, Lawrence Kaplan, and Marvin Zahniser. Also present were William Brinker, William Becker, Sandra Taylor, Gary Hess, George Herring, Robert Seager, Daniel Helmstadter, Page Putnam Miller, and Frederick Marks.

Mr. Cohen called the meeting to order at 8:00 a.m.

The first item of business concerned terms of eligibility for the Bernath Book Prize. At present the terms read that:

"It must be the author's first or second book."

After discussion, Council recommended that the sentence read:

"It must be the author's first or second monograph." Textbooks and edited books of readings are not to be counted in determining an author's eligibility for the Prize.

Mr. Kuehl then presented an operational guideline for awarding the Bernath Dissertation fund, which read as follows.

A committee of three persons, named by the president each year shall review applications and nominate persons to receive awards. The names shall be presented to Council at its December meeting for its review and approval. The committee shall be guided in the number of awards by (a) the quality of the applicants, (b) funds available any given year, and (c) the rule that awards are to provide small-sum support for doctoral students in the concluding phase of writing their dissertation. The person designated to chair the committee will solicit applications, which must be submitted no later than November 15. The first committee is charged with preparing an

application form which will provide information about Stuart L. Bernath and his scholarly and personal interests, and request data related to the stage of work, need, and the use to which the funds will be applied. A letter from the dissertation director shall also be required which certifies that the information on the application is correct. Each committee is authorized, at its discretion, to designate subject-areas or topics to which it will give special consideration.

On motion the statement was approved unanimously.

Mr. Cohen then called on Ms. Page Putnam Miller to review recent work of the National Coordinating Committee. She discussed the extensive work and strategy necessary to get a bill before Congress to place the National Archives outside the supervision of the General Services Administration. She also discussed particular concerns of historians for proposed regulations governing the administration of the Freedom of Information Act. Ms. Miller suggested that SHAFR might wish to work closely with the appropriate AHA and OAH committees which are addressing matters of documents accessibility. Following her presentation, Council voted unanimously to raise SHAFR's annual support for the NCC from \$500 to \$750, effective in 1985.

Mr. DeBenedetti then presented the terms of award and methods of selection for the Norman and Laura Graebner Prize. The statement reads as follows:

The Norman and Laura Graebner Prize is to be awarded every other year at the annual summer meeting of SHAFR to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements in the fields of scholarship, teaching, and government or community service have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

The committee shall consist of three persons named by the president of SHAFR with the approval of Council. As long as possible, effort should be made in naming the

committee to have at least one of the members be a former student of Norman Graebner.

Any member of SHAFR or the OAH, AHA, or SHA may make nominations and accompany their suggestions with a statement on the candidate's background. These shall be in the hands of the chairperson by April 1 of the year of the award. The award will first be made in 1986.

A senior historian is interpreted to include persons who have attained the age of 60.

A hand-lettered scroll (10x12 inches) is to accompany the monetary prize.

Following discussion Council unanimously approved the terms as stated.

Mr. Zahniser next addressed the question whether SHAFR should take out liability insurance for its officers, staff and the corporation itself. When this question was raised at the last Council meeting Mr. Zahniser had been instructed to determine whether the AHA and OAH carried liability insurance. Both organizations responded that they carry a one million dollar liability policy. Reservations were once again expressed about the need for SHAFR to carry such coverage. It was suggested that Mr. Zahniser seek legal advice, explore rates from various companies, and report back to SHAFR at a later time.

Discussion next centered on plans to update the Guide to American Foreign Relations Since 1700. ABC Clío is anxious to update this prize-winning volume. Mr. Kuehl, in reporting on plans, asked Council to approve a three-part motion:

- 1) that SHAFR sponsor a separate updated volume for 1986-87, and a complete revision to be published in 1992;
- 2) that Kinley Brauer be designated as associate editor of the project;
- 3) that SHAFR authorize editor R.D. Burns to seek funding support for this project from the National Endowment for the Humanities.

Following discussion, and with the understanding that part three of the motion did not authorize anyone to promise matching funds on behalf of SHAFR, the motion was passed unanimously.

The Thomas A. Bailey Endowment Fund, it was decided by Council, is to be used for the following purposes:

- a) general operating expenses to maintain dues at the lowest possible level;
- b) special projects of SHAFR. All special projects utilizing such funds are to carry the designation: "This was funded [in part where applicable] from income from the Thomas A. Bailey Endowment Fund."

Next Mr. Kuehl asked and received Council's permission to request SHAFR members to assign royalties from their books to the SHAFR endowment fund.

Roger Dingman, program chair for 1985, reported on plans to hold the SHAFR summer program at Stanford University June 26-28, 1985 in conjunction with the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association. Ronald Spector and Richard Immerman have been asked to join the Committee. Possible themes for the Conference were suggested, as well as the deadlines that will have to be observed when holding a program so early in the summer. Appropriate information will be conveyed to the membership at the earliest possible date.

No invitation has yet been received for the SHAFR summer conference in 1986. Mr. Cohen asked all those present to begin making inquiries among colleagues about possible invitations and to convey possibilities to him at an early moment.

A brief discussion was held concerning establishing a State Department internship program for younger historians. With the approval of Council, Mr. Cohen indicated that he will ask Mr. Gelfand, who first suggested such a program, to assume continuing responsibility for trying to get a decision from the Department on pending proposals.

Diplomatic History, Mr. Herring reported, now has a reasonable backlog of publishable articles, but the

journal is still able to offer relatively rapid publication. He also mentioned that University of Kentucky's commitments to support the journal extend only through June 1985. Mr. Herring and Mr. Seager have not yet decided whether to ask University officials for an extension of commitments.

Mr. Zahniser's term as Executive Secretary will end on 1 June of 1985. The search committee (E. May, L. Kaplan, W. Kuehl) reported that two exceptional candidates had indicated an interest in the position. After careful considerations, the committee decided to recommend Mr. William Kammen, professor of history and department chairperson at North Texas State University to succeed Zahniser. Following discussion, Council unanimously supported the Committee's recommendations.

Mr. Brinker reported that all goes well with the Newsletter, and Council expressed its satisfaction with his excellent work as editor.

William Becker, program chairman for 1984, gave a brief report on the program and local arrangements for the conference then being held at George Washington University. By acclamation Council commended Mr. Becker and Mr. Peter Hill, Local Arrangements Chairman, for their splendid work in arranging so useful and interesting a conference.

Mr. Cohen announced that the winner of the W. Stull Holt Memorial Fellowship competition is Lou Gomolak of the University of Texas. Mr. Gomolak, a student of Robert Devine and Abraham Marcus, is writing his dissertation on Lyndon Johnson and the Middle East.

Mr. Zahniser next presented the proposed contract from Scholarly Resources for publishing Diplomatic History for 1985 and 1986. The cost will increase \$1.00 per year, or 25 cents an issue. After discussion of this change, and one or two other items, Council authorized Mr. Zahniser to sign the License Agreement on behalf of SHAFR.

Mr. Zahniser reported that membership in SHAFR has climbed to 975, thanks mainly to the good efforts of Mr. Ralph Weber and SHAFR's membership committee. The operating budget is in reasonably good shape because of the membership dues increase. He also presented the need to find a funding source to support SHAFR

memberships for scholars living in countries where U.S. currency is not available.

Michael Hunt and Roger Trask were welcomed as new members to Council.

Mr. Kuehl presented the following resolution for approval:

Dexter Perkins, noted teacher, author, and lecturer, died on May 12, 1984. Students of American foreign relations have long appreciated the products of his scholarship, most notably his authoritative and interpretative studies of the Monroe Doctrine. Dr. Perkins was also one of the pioneer teachers in the field of diplomatic history. SHAFR therefore acknowledges with gratitude the many significant contributions of Dexter Perkins to the field of American foreign relations.

This resolution was passed unanimously by Council.

Mr. Cohen appointed Mr. Kuehl to represent SHAFR when he attends the International Congress of Historical Societies at Stuttgart, August 25-September 1, 1985.

The meeting was adjourned at 9:30 a.m.

Marvin R. Zahniser
Secretary to Council

SHAFR — A GENEALOGICAL INQUIRY
2nd Request

Dear Members of SHAFR:

I write to ask your assistance in an interesting and important project that, I believe, will further strengthen the identity of our organization, help us to recognize some of our intellectual debts and interrelationships, and provide important family "data" for the SHAFR archives at Georgetown. This project will help us to clarify our intellectual "roots" and "branches." The end product, will include a moderate component of oral history (especially involving the more advanced members of our guild),

career reflections and informative anecdotes, and construction of a SHAFR family tree, as inclusive as possible.

I would appreciate your taking the time to complete the adjacent information sheet, which will help provide the data base necessary to initiate the project, and mailing it to me at your earliest convenience. I shall also be writing selected members of SHAFR for information. I take this opportunity to thank you for your interest and support.

Most cordially,

Geoff Smith
Queen's University

Mail to: Professor G.S. Smith
History Department
Queen's University
Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6

Name: _____

Present Position _____

Address: _____

Year Ph.D. Secured: _____

Mentor: _____

University: _____

Would Contribute Information/Assistance

to Project _____ Yes _____ No

Individuals You Feel Should be Contacted

SHA FR RECRUITERS

Some of the unsung heroes of SHA FR are the regional membership chairs. Under the direction of Ralph Weber (Marquette University), the following members deserve recognition for their efforts on behalf of SHA FR.

Prof. Sadao Asada (Doshisha).	Region I	Far East
Prof. Mary Atwell (Hollins College)	II	Georgia, North Carolina, & South Carolina
Prof. Wolfred Bauer (Puget Sound)	III	Idaho, Montana, Oregon, & Washington
Prof. Albert Bowman (Tennessee-Chattanooga)	IV	Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, & Tennessee
Prof. Anthony M Brescia (Nassau Community College)	V	New York
Prof. Francis Carroll (Manitoba)	VI	Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia, & Alaska
Dr. Milton Gustafson (National Archives)	VII	District of Columbia
Prof. Richard Millett	VIII	Illinois, Indiana, & Kentucky
Prof. William D. Walker (Ohio Wesleyan)	IX	Michigan, Ohio, & West Virginia
Prof. Frank X.J. Homer (Scranton)	X	New Jersey & Pennsylvania
Prof. Travis Beal Jacobs (Middlebury)	XI	Connecticut, Massachusetts, & Rhode Island
Prof. Thomas Kennedy (Wyoming)	XII	Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, & Wyoming
Prof. Steven Kneeshaw (School of the Ozarks)	XIII	Kansas, Arkansas, & Oklahoma

Prof. Richard Kottman (Iowa State)	XIV Iowa, Missouri, & Nebraska
Prof. Joseph M. Siracusa (Queensland)	XV Australia
Prof. Geoffrey Smith (Queens)	XVI Ontario, Quebec, Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Labrador, & Prince Edward Island
Prof. Mark Stoler (Vermont)	XVII Maine, New Hampshire, & Vermont
Prof. Betty M. Unterberger (Texas A & M)	XVIII Louisiana & Texas
Prof. Roger Dingman (Southern California)	XIX Arizona, California, Hawaii, & Nevada
Prof. Jack R. Dukes (Carroll College)	XX Wisconsin, Minnesota, South Dakota, & North Dakota
Prof. Mitchell Kerr (Towson State)	XXI Maryland & Delaware
Mr. Larry Bland (Lexington, Va)	XXIII Virginia

CALENDAR

October 31-November 3

The 50th annual meeting of the Southern Historical Association will be held in Louisville. The Galt House will be the headquarters hotel.

November 1

Deadline, materials for the December Newsletter

November 1-15

Annual elections for officers of SHAFR.

- November 15 Deadline, nominations for Bernath Dissertation Support Awards (Send to Geoffrey Smith, History Department, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6 Canada)
- December 1 Deadline, nominations for the 1985 Bernath Memorial lectureship.
- December 27-30 The 99th annual meeting of the AHA will be held in Chicago. The headquarters hotel is the Hyatt Regency Hotel. (The deadline for proposals has passed.)
- January 1, 1985 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
- January 15 Deadline, nominations for the 1984 Bernath article award.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for the March Newsletter.
- February 1 Deadline, nominations for the 1984 Bernath book award.
- April 18-21 The 78th annual meeting of the OAH will be held in Minneapolis with the headquarters at the Hyatt Regency and Holiday Inn Hotels.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June Newsletter
- June 26-28 The 11th annual conference of SHAFR will be held at Stanford University. Program chair is Roger Dingman (USC). See detailed announcement on page 62. Note that the deadline for proposals is December 27, 1984.
- (The 79th OAH annual meeting will be held at the New York Statler, April 9-12, 1986.

Program Chair: Kenneth T. Jackson, Columbia University, 610 Fayerweather Hall, New York, New York 10027.

Deadline is March 1, 1985.)

PUBLICATIONS

Robert Dallek (UCLA), Ronald Reagan: The Politics of Symbolism. Harvard University Press. \$16.50.

Charles DeBenedetti (University of Toledo), The Peace Reform in American History. Indiana University Press. New in paper. \$7.95.

Howard Jones (University of Alabama), The Course of American Diplomacy: From the Revolution to the Present. Franklin Watts. 1984. 05423-3.

Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers-Newark), Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence. 3 volumes. Princeton University Press. 1984. \$125.00 prior to December 31, 1984, \$150.00 thereafter. ISBN 05649-8.

Ronald L. Hatzenbuehler, (Idaho State University) and Robert L. Ivie, Congress Declares War: Rhetoric, Leadership, and Partisanship in the Early Republic. Kent State University Press. \$19.50.

Frederick H. Schapsmeier (University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh) and Edward L. Schapsmeier, Dirksen of Illinois: Senatorial Statesman. University of Illinois Press. 1984. \$19.95. ISBN 0-252-01100-7.

Russell F. Weigley (Temple University), History of the United States Army. Indiana University Press. Now in paperback.

Lawrence S. Wittner (SUNY at Albany), Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1933-1983. Temple University Press. 1984. Cloth ISBN 0-87722-346-7 \$34.95t; paper ISBN 0-87722-342-4 \$9.95t.

Robert Ferrell (Indiana University), Truman: A Centenary Remembrance. Viking. ISBN 0-670-36196-8 \$25.00.

Joan Hoff Wilson (Indiana University & OAH) and Marjorie Lightman eds., Without Precedent: The Life and Career of Eleanor Roosevelt. Indiana University Press. 1984. \$17.50.

Richard Dean Burns (California State College, Los Angeles) ed., Harry S. Truman: A Bibliography of His Times and Presidency. Scholarly Resources. 1984. \$50.00. ISBN 0-8420-2219-8.

Robert Dallek (UCLA), The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs. Mentor. 0-451-62296-0 \$4.50.

Donald R. Whitnah (University of Northern Iowa) ed., Government Agencies. Greenwood. 1983. ISBN 0-313-22017-4 \$49.95.

Of the 112 essays covering departments, bureaus, agencies and commissions, at least 20 deal in significant manner with foreign relations. Several SHAFR members contributed to the book.

Terry Anderson (Texas A & M University) and Charles R. Bond, Jr., eds., A Flying Tiger's Diary. Texas A & M University Press. 1984. \$15.95.

Justus D. Doenecke (University of South Florida), When the Wicked Rise: American Opinion Makers and the Manchurian Crisis of 1931-1933. Bucknell University Press. 1984. ISBN-0-8387-5048-6 \$24.50.

PERSONALS

The following SHAFR members have received support for their research from the American a Council of Learned Societies: Robert Dallek (UCLA), Howard Jones (University of Alabama), and Melvin P. Leffler (Vanderbilt).

SHAFR members Paul S. Holbo (University of Oregon), Sandra C. Taylor (University of Utah), and Noel H. Pugach (University of New Mexico) have been nominated for various offices in the Pacific Coast Branch of the AHA. Good Luck!

Charles S. Maier (Harvard) is among the scholars who have recently been awarded John Simon Guggenheim

Fellowships.

Beveridge Grants for further research in American History have been awarded to SHAFR members Louis S. Gomolak (University of Texas, Austin), Timothy P. Maga (University of Maryland-Asian Division), Stephen G. Rabe (University of Texas, Dallas), Andrew J. Rotter (St. Mary's College), and Nancy B. Tucker (Colgate University).

Richard Kirkendall (Iowa State University) and Robert Ferrell (Indiana University) were among the speakers at the May 8, 1984 100-year commemoration of Harry S. Truman's birth. The seminar was held at the Smithsonian.

Mark Stoler (University of Vermont) has been promoted to Full Professor and has received the Alumni Outstanding Faculty Award. Also taking into consideration his Fulbright selection this has been a good year indeed.

George C. Constantinides (Potomac, Maryland) was awarded the 1984 National Intelligence Study Center Award for the outstanding book on intelligence published in 1983. Constantinides' book is: Intelligence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliography. Congratulations !!!

Ronald Schlundt (University of Maryland-European Division) delivered a series of lectures sponsored by the U.S. Information Service and the German-American Institute during 1983-84. On October 19, he spoke at the America House in Hanover on "The Meaning of President Reagan's Election in Modern American Politics." He delivered the lecture "John F. Kennedy: His Historical Significance after Twenty Years" in German at the Stuttgart America House on November 17 and in English at the Nuremberg German-American Institute on February 7, 1984. He completed the series on May 22 with a lecture at Heidelberg on "The Role of Minorities in the 1984 Presidential Election."

Serge Ricard (University of Provence) has successfully defended his thesis: "Theodore Roosevelt et la justification de l'imperialisme" at the University of Provence, Aix-Marseille I. His advisor was Professor Jean-Pierre Martin.

Terry Anderson (Texas A & M University) has been promoted to associate professor.

Priscilla M. Roberts (Smithsonian) has accepted a Lectureship at the University of Hong Kong to begin this fall.

Howard Jones (University of Alabama) has received a Summer Stipend from the National Endowment for the Humanities, and a Fellowship from the American Council of Learned Societies--both to work on a project entitled: "The Amistad Mutiny: Republicanism on Trial."

Sally J. Marks (Rhode Island College) has won the Phi Alpha Theta Award for Second and Subsequent Books, 1983, for Innocent Abroad: Belgium at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Congratulations to Prof. Marks!!!

Clayton R. Koppes (Oberlin College) has been awarded the Dexter Prize for his book, JPL and the American Space Program. The prize was awarded by the Society for the History of Technology for a book published in the past three years. Koppes' book, published in 1982 by Yale University Press, traces the history of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California. Congratulations to Prof. Koppes!!!

Peter Buckingham (Southwest Texas State) has accepted a tenure track appointment at East Texas State at Commerce beginning fall of 1984.

Akira Iriye (University of Chicago) was one of the speakers at the SECOND ANNUAL FULBRIGHT INSTITUTE SYMPOSIUM--"Japan and the United States: Competition and Cooperation," held on March 29-30 at the University of Arkansas.

AHA election results show two SHAFR members elected to offices: Richard S. Kirkendall (Iowa State University as Vice-President, Professional Division and John L. Gaddis (Ohio University) a seat on the Nominating Committee.

Glenn A. May (University of Oregon) has received the Louis Knott Koontz Memorial Award for 1984 from the Pacific Coast Branch of the AHA. The Koontz Award is presented annually for "the most deserving article" published in the Pacific Historical Review. May's

essay, "Why the United States Won the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902," appeared in the November 1983 issue of the Review.

Ronald Spector (U.S. Army Center) has accepted a position at the University of Alabama.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

1985 SECOLAS CONFERENCE

The Southeast Conference on Latin American Studies will be held in Orlando, Florida on March 28-30 hosted by Rollins College and the University of Central Florida. The conference theme is "Continuity and Change in Latin America." Proposals for panels, individual papers and commentators in all disciplines are invited. Please contact Professor Tom Leonard, History Department, University of North Florida, Jacksonville, Florida 32216.

ATTENTION! HISTORIANS OF RECENT AMERICAN HISTORY

The OAH Committee on Access to Documents and Open Information is eager to hear from historians who have requested and/or received information under FOIA or the Mandatory Review process since 1982.

In the last few years, committees of Congress have asked historians to give testimony on various issues relating to FOIA and the declassification of documents. In order to accurately represent the interests of historians we need to know more about your personal experiences with FOIA and the Mandatory Review process.

*How long did it take for you to receive your documents?

*Did you request documents more than 30 years old? 20 years old?

*Was your request denied?

*If you requested documents during previous presidential administrations do you think the

situation is now worse? better?

*Do you have a "horror story" to share? a "success" story?

Please share your experiences by writing the OAH Committee on access, c/o Organization of American Historians, 112 North Bryan Street, Bloomington, Indiana, 47401

SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1789-1848)

Call for sessions and/or papers for annual conference, July 26-27, 1985, at Gunston Hall, Virginia. Proposals for Virginia and Upper South sessions especially solicited; all others welcome. Submit proposals (three pages maximum) in triplicate, plus brief vitae, by October 31, 1984, to SHEAR Program 1985, William H. Pease, Department of History, University of Maine, Orono, ME 04469. For membership information contact James H. Broussard, Department of History, Lebanon Valley College, Annville, PA 17003

OAH CALL FOR PAPERS

The program committee for the 1986 New York annual meeting of the OAH invites proposals. These should include a two-page synopsis that summarizes the thesis, methodology, and significance of each paper and one vitae for each participant. Materials should be sent in duplicate. The program chair is Kenneth T. Jackson, Columbia University, 610 Fayerweather Hall, New York, New York 10027. Deadline for submissions is March 1, 1985.

The National Council on Public History will meet jointly with the OAH (described above). The NCPH invites proposals to be sent to Deborah S. Gardner, The Institute for Research in History, 432 Park Avenue South, New York, New York 10016. Deadline for submissions is March 1, 1985.

1984 GILBERT CHINARD PRIZES

The Gilbert Chinard awards are made jointly by the Institut Francais de Washington and the Society for

French Historical Studies for distinguished scholarly books or manuscripts in the history of Franco-American relations by Canadian or American authors published during 1984. Historical studies in any area or period are acceptable, including critical editions of significant source materials. The Gilbert Chinard Prize of \$750 is awarded annually for a book or manuscript in page-proof, and the Incentive Award of \$250 is for an unpublished book-length manuscript, generally by a younger scholar. Deadline for the 1984 award is December 1, and five copies of each entrant should be sent to:

Professor John McV. Haight Jr., Chairman, Chinard Prize Committee, Department of History, Maginnes #9, Lehigh University, Bethlehem, PA 18015

The winners will be announced in the spring of 1985.

FROM THE AHA PERSPECTIVES

During the first weekend in May the ACLS/IREX and Soviet Academy of Sciences commissions on the humanities and social sciences met in New York. The negotiations are expected to result in a sixth protocol governing exchanges in the humanities and social sciences between the two bodies over the next two years. Under the current fifth protocol a delegation of distinguished historians, both Americanists and Russian specialists, met in Kiev the week of June 10 for a colloquium on the two topics: Diplomatic Recognition 1933 and its background; and U.S.-Russian relations before and during World War I. Ambassador George Kennan, who was special assistant to the first American ambassador in 1934, as well as a distinguished scholar on both subjects, headed the delegation.

FREE NEW BOOKS

Every few months the US Government Printing Offices publishes New Books, a list of all new Government books, magazines, manuals, reports, and analyses added to inventory. It is available free-of-charge. To be placed on the mailing list write to: New Books, U.S. Government Printing Office, Stop:MK, Washington, DC 20401.

MARTIN F. HERZ MEMORIAL PRIZE

The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University is launching a manuscript competition in honor of the late Director of Studies, Martin Herz. They hope to receive original unpublished case studies of the operations of a country's diplomacy, in keeping with the tradition established by the series of publications edited by Ambassador Herz.

The winning monograph will be published by the Institute and the author will receive the Martin F. Herz Memorial Prize of one thousand dollars.

For further information contact: The Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057; telephone 202/625-3784.

CALL FOR PAPERS - AMERICAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION

Martha Banta, Program Committee Chair for the Tenth Biennial American Studies Association to be held October 31-November 3, 1985, in San Diego, California is accepting proposals. Particular attention is to be given to certain themes. Among those themes most likely of interest to SHAFR members are: (1) "American Ethnicity and Gender Identities: e.g. immigration and emigration, bi-lingualism; gender and racial entrapments" (2) "Cross-Cultural Relations/International Perspectives: e.g. refugees; technology and trade; comparative New World histories" and (3) "Geographies and Ideologies: e.g. landscape studies; game-scapes; cultural imperialism; cultural ecology."

For further information contact Professor Banta, Department of English, 2225 Rolfe Hall, University of California at Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90024.

Deadline for proposals is January 15, 1985.

REPORT FROM EUROPEAN ASSOCIATION FOR AMERICAN STUDIES (E.A.A.S.)

Serge Ricard (University of Provence) recently chaired the foreign-policy workshop at the 1984 biennial

conference of the E.A.A.S. held in Rome, Italy, April 16-19, 1984. Ricard sends the following report:

The workshop welcomed about 20 participants, of which eight were contributors. The following papers were read or summarized:

Hélène Christol (University of Provence): "The Dialectics of Dual Allegiance: Fascism and the Italian-American Community in the 1920s."

Zofia Libiszowska (University of Lodz): "Polish-Americans and Wilson's Polish Policy on the Eve of World War I."

Serge Ricard (Provence): "World War One and the Gospel of Undiluted Americanism."

Göran Rystad (University of Lund): "Congress and the Ethnic Lobbies: The Case of the Arms Embargo on Turkey."

Neil L. Shumsky (Virginia Polytechnic) "Migration, Return Migration and Foreign Policy."

Lubomir Zyblikiewicz (University of Cracow): "The U.S. Foreign Policies and the Poles in the West (1941-1949)."

Two invitees made presentations based on works in progress:

Noah Lucas (University of Sheffield): "Jewish Social Change and New Modes of Expression, 1914-1984."

James E. Miller (Historical Office, Department of State): "The Impact of the Italian-American Community on U.S. Foreign Policy in the 1940s."

Discussion was given priority over paper delivery. In all cases the comments came from the audience. Although attendance was relatively low, interest and motivation were high. Each of the three sessions saw the same number of faithful participants, notably Charlotte Erikson (Cambridge), Claude Fohlen (Université Europeenne-Université of Paris I), Guenter Moltmann (Hamburg), Robert Rougé (Rennes II), Harry C. Allen (East Anglia). Their stimulating comments and queries contributed in no small way to the success of the workshop.

Eleven of the participants met for dinner downtown on the Wednesday night in what turned out to be a fourth session. . .This informal off-conference get-together resulted in a most pleasant blend of conviviality and scholarship.

Official as well as personal contacts by the two previous workshop chairmen and myself have been made between the EAAS foreign policy workshop scholars and SHAFR. The Rome meeting should no doubt strengthen our relationship with SHAFR.

Although most of the papers and presentations deserve to be praised for their quality, originality and enlightening character, I would single out H el ene Christol's as perhaps the most worth of publication in the 1984 proceedings of the E.A.A.S., and I warmly recommend it to your attention. I trust you will, like me, find it quite pertinent to the theme of the conference.

Most unfortunately, Professor Dragoljub  ivojinovi  (Belgrad) was unable to attend the conference, having failed to obtain adequate funding for his trip and stay. Professor  ivojinovi , as you know is one of the foremost specialists of Italian-Yugoslav-American relations. I cannot help thinking, in view of the 1986 Budapest conference, that Professor  ivojinovi  would be ideally suited to the task of chairing the next foreign-policy workshop. His background, his work, and his contacts with Western and Eastern European, as well as American, scholars would prove invaluable assets, particularly in Budapest. I have reasons to believe Professor  ivojinovi  would like to apply for the chairmanship of the next workshop. I shall leave it up to him to do so formally and to propose an appropriate workshop topic for 1986.

I should perhaps mention that there is a strong possibility the Universit  de Provence might publish the 1984 workshop proceedings under my editorship. I am planning to submit to my University Press, in late June, a project for a small volume tentatively entitled Hyphenated Diplomacy: European Immigration and U.S. Foreign Policy since 1914. As with the proceedings of the 1982 workshop, the Groupe de Recherche et e'Etudes Nord-Am ricaines (GRENA) would sponsor the publication and subsidize it partially. Please let me know if the state of EAAS' post-conference finances is likely to allow for a repetition of the 1982-1983 EAAS-GRENA joint publishing efforts.

SHAFR CALL FOR PAPERS

SHAFR will meet from June 26-28, 1985 at Stanford University. The Council has named Roger Dingman (chair), Richard Immerman, Ronald Spector, and Sandra Taylor as program committee.

While the committee welcomes proposals for papers and sessions on all topics, it would like to emphasize themes which seem particularly appropriate to the site and date of the 1985 meeting. Those themes include: America and the Pacific world (including all aspects of relations with nations bordering the Pacific as well as European states with territorial or other interests in the region); the United States and Latin America (particularly economic and military relations); American atomic diplomacy (including arms control, deployment of nuclear weapons abroad, and the use of nuclear threats); and the teaching of diplomatic history.

The committee would like to schedule one or more sessions devoted to "work in progress." It is particularly interested in proposals from advanced Ph.D. candidates on their work.

Prospective participants in the 1985 meeting should send proposals, consisting of a one-page abstract of the proposed paper plus a brief curriculum vitae to:

Roger Dingman
Department of History
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California 90089-0034
Tel: Area 213 743-7463

All proposals must be received NO LATER THAN December 27, 1984.

NEWS FROM THE NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE PROMOTION OF HISTORY

August 13, 1984

On June 21 the Senate by voice vote gave unanimous consent to S. 905, a bill to restore independence to the National Archives by separating it from the General Services Administration. Then on August 2, the House followed suit by approving by

voice vote H.R. 3987, a parallel bill. The key supporters in the Senate, without whom this victory would not have been possible, were Eagleton (D-MO), Mathias (R-MD), and Hatfield (R-OR). In the House, Representatives Brooks (D-TX) and Horton (R-NY), the ranking members of the Government Operations Committee engineered the successful passage. Those speaking in favor of the bill on the House floor included Brooks (D-TX), Horton (R-NY), Conable (R-NY), and Clinger (R-PA). Only Kindness (R-OH), who introduced restrictive amendments that were defeated, spoke against the bill.

Two more important steps must now be taken before this legislation can become law -- a Conference Committee needs to reconcile the two versions of the bill and the President must sign the compromise bill. When Congress returns from the August recess, the Speaker of the House and the Majority Leader of the Senate will appoint a Conference Committee. The staffs of the key sponsors of this legislation have already been at work and have made significant progress toward reaching agreeable compromise language. The passage of the Conference Committee Report by the House and the Senate is usually perfunctory. Since the Administration gave indications several months ago of their willingness to support the Senate bill a Presidential veto seems most unlikely.

1st volume of History of Congress and the Vietnam War

(Donald Ritchie, Associate Historian at the Senate Historical Office sends the following.)

In 1953 Senators Barry Goldwater and John F. Kennedy joined forces on the Senate floor to amend President Eisenhower's military aid bill for Indochina. Senator Goldwater introduced the amendment halting any aid to Indochina until the French announced a target date for complete independence for the region. The only way to "prevent many of our boys from ending up in in the jungles of southeastern Asia," Senator Goldwater warned, was to "ask France. . . to grant independence and the right of freedom to these people who have fought so long for their independence and freedom." Senator Kennedy modified the amendment to remove any appearance of an ultimatum to France, but stressed his belief that "the war can never be successful unless large numbers of the people of Viet-Nam are won over

from their sullen neutrality and open hostility to it and fully support its successful conclusion." Even the Kennedy version, however was considered too drastic by the Senate, which defeated the Goldwater-Kennedy amendment by a vote of 17 to 64, with Senate Democratic Leader Lyndon Johnson voting against it.

This glimpse into how the leaders of the 1960s were forming their positions on Vietnam during the 1950s is provided in the first of a four-volume history published by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part I, 1945-1961 (Senate Committee Print 98-185 Pr 1) was prepared for the committee by Dr. William Conrad Gibbons of the Congressional Research Service. In the course of his research, Dr. Gibbons had access to files of the Foreign Relations Committee, incorporated material from the published historical series of executive session transcripts of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations committees, and conducted interviews with many of the participants. The Foreign Relations Committee commissioned this study, as Chairman Charles Percy notes, because "the Congress of the United States shares with the executive the responsibility for decisions that led to our involvement in the Vietnam war and for approving the personnel and funds it required. Only by examining those decisions can we gain from this bitter experience the full understanding needed to act more wisely in the future."

Copies of Part 1 can be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for \$8.50. Subsequent volumes are being declassified and will be published shortly.

**THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE FOR THE BEST
SCHOLARLY ARTICLE IN U.S. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY**

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Award for scholarly articles in American foreign affairs was set up in 1976 through the kindness of the young Bernath's parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, and it is administered through selected personnel of SHAFR. The objective of the award is to

identify and to reward outstanding research and writing by the younger scholars in the area of U.S. diplomatic relations.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

Eligibility: Prize competition is open to the author of any article upon any topic in American Foreign Relations that is published during 1984. The author must be under forty-five (45) years of age, or within ten (10) years after receiving the Ph.D. at the time of the article's publication. Previous winners of the S.L. Bernath book award are ineligible.

Procedures: Articles shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each article (preferably reprints) should be sent to the chairman of the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee by January 15, 1985. The Chairman of the Committee for 1984 is Michael Hogan, Department of History, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio 45056.

Amount of Award: \$300.00. If two (2) or more authors are considered winners, the prize will be shared. The name of the successful writer(s) will be announced, along with the name of the victor in the Bernath book prize competition, during the luncheon for members of SHAFR, to be held at the annual OAH Convention, meeting in 1985, at Minneapolis.

AWARD WINNERS

1977	John C.A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)
1978	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1979	Brian L. Villa (U of Ottawa, Canada)
1980	James I. Matray (New Mexico State U) David A. Rosenberg (U of Chicago)
1981	Douglas Little (Clark U)
1982	Fred Pollock (Cedar Knolls, N.J.)
1983	Chester Pach (Texas Tech)

**THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL LECTURE
IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY**

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship was established in 1976 through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and is administered by a special committee of SHAFR. The Bernath Lecture is the feature at the official luncheon of the Society, held during the OAH convention in April of each year.

Description and Eligibility: The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address, delivered at the annual meeting with the AHA, but is restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer is expected to concern himself/herself not specifically with his/her own research interests, but with broad issues of importance to students of American foreign relations. The award winner must be under forty-one (41) years of age.

Procedures: The Bernath lectureship Committee is now soliciting nominatins for the 1986 award from members of the Society, agents, publishers, or members of any established history, political science, or journalism organization. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vitae, if available, should reach the Committee no later than December 1, 1984. The Chairman of the Committee, and the person to whom nominations should be sent, is Stephen A. Schuker, Department of History, Brandeis University, Waltham, Massachusetts 02254.

Honorarium: \$500.00 with publication of the lecture assured in Diplomatic History.

AWARD WINNERS

1977	Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
1978	David S. Patterson (Colgate)
1979	Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
1980	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1981	Burton Spivak (Bates College)
1982	Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)
1983	Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt)
1984	Michael J. Hogan (Miami)
1985	Michael Schaller (Arizona)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITION

The Stuart L. Bernath memorial Book Competition was initiated in 1972 by Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in memory of their late son. Administered by SHAFR, the purpose of the competition and the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing of a lengthy nature by young scholars in the field of U.S. diplomacy.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

Eligibility: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1984. It must be the author's first or second book. Authors are not required to be members of SHAFR, nor do they have to be professional academicians.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Melvyn P. Leffler, Department of History, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee 37235. The works must be received no later than February 1, 1985.

Amount of Award: \$1,000.00. If two (2) or more writers are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH.

Previous Winners

1972	Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
	Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
1973	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1974	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1975	Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
	Stephen E. Pelz (U of Massachusetts-Amherst)
1976	Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
1977	Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
1978	James R. Leutze (North Carolina)
1979	Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston)
1980	Michael Schaller (U of Arizona)

1981 Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke)
Hugh DeSantis (Department of State)
1982 David Reynolds (Cambridge U)
1983 Richard Immerman (U of Hawaii)

STUDENT BONERS

From Guy R. Swanson (University of Alabama)

WW II peace talks--Ho Chi Minh goes to Paris to try to gain independence (for Vietnam)--Truman refused to see him.

Atlantic Charter, 1941--Rossevelt and Churchill met and discussed policies of self-determination, etc. Two major ideas came out: 1) racism--there is no way that any "non-white" could defeat the West. 2) the development of the third world--150 countries had emerged.

From Robert Ferrell (Indiana University)

Manchuria was Japan's leader.

The Washington Conference of 1921-22 was held to try to overcome hemispheric problems. The major accomplishment to come from this was the Versailles Treaty.

Lusitania. A ship that was bombed in the Cuban crisis.

From the editor (Tennessee Tech)

". . .after World War II came to an end the British government put a Monarch in grease and supported that monarch with money and soldiers."

SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Founded in 1967. Chartered in 1972.

PRESIDENT: Warren I. Cohen, Department of History, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 38824.

VICE PRESIDENT: Warren F. Kuehl, Department of History, University of Akron, Akron, Ohio 44325.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY-TREASURER: Marvin R. Zahniser, Department of History, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210.

CHAIRMAN, PROGRAM COMMITTEE: Roger Dingman, Department of History, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, California 90089.

CHAIRMAN, MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE: Ralph E. Weber, Department of History, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233.

CHAIRMAN, NOMINATIONS COMMITTEE: Ronald L. Steel, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1300 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10028.

CHAIRMAN, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS COMMITTEE: Warren F. Kimball, Department of History, Rutgers University at Newark, Newark, New Jersey 07102.

MEMBERSHIP: Anyone interested in U.S. diplomatic history is invited to become a member of SHAFR. Annual dues are \$16.50, payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Fees for students are \$6.00, for retired members are \$8.00, and institutional affiliations are \$30.00. Life memberships are \$250.00. In the case of membership by a husband-wife team, dues for one of them shall be one-half of the regular price.

MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in August. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZES: The Society administers three awards a year, all of them in honor of the late Stuart L. Bernath and all of them financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California. The details of each of these awards are given under the appropriate headings of each issue of the Newsletter.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors two printed works of a quarterly nature, the Newsletter, and Diplomatic History, a journal; a Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects is published occasionally.

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