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MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the society is held in the summer. The society also meets with the AHA in January.

PRIZES: The Society administers four awards that honor the late Stuart L. Bernath and two honoring the late Myrna L. Bernath; these are financed thorough the generosity of the late Dr. Gerald J. Bernath. Awards also honor Laura and Norman Graebner, the late W. Stull Holt, the late Warren Kuehl, the late Armin Rappaport, Robert Ferrell, Lawrence Gelfand, and Arthur Link. Details of each of these awards are to be found in the June and December *Newsletters*.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly newsletter and a journal, *Diplomatic History*.

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GWU-WWC FACULTY FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM IN ASIAN POLICY STUDIES

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RESEARCH NOTE: "A PROGRAM FOR COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME, 16 MARCH 1960"

by
David J. Ulbrich
TEMPLE

The end of the Cold War precipitated the release of many previously classified documents. This in turn has allowed historians to determine with a greater degree of certainty what actually took place during the Cold War. For example, full declassification of "A Program for Covert Action Against the Castro Regime, 16 March 1960" occurred in 9 April 1998 under the auspices of the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board.¹

The "Program for Covert Action" provides a window into an inner circle of the Eisenhower Administration. Although he admitted later in 1965 to directing the Central Intelligence Agency to train an armed force of Cuban exiles in March 1960, Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to acknowledge any discussion of operational or tactical plans during his presidency. He did not wish to be associated with the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs (Playa Girón) in April 1961.² Before 1998, evidence about Eisenhower's role in the programming stages for covert operations in Cuba remained unclear. Historians have nonetheless gleaned much of the content of the "Program for Covert

¹"A Program for Covert Action Against the Castro Regime, 16 March 1960," Folder "CIA Policy re Cuba (17 March 1960)," White House Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, Box 4, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas (hereafter EL). For other archival materials on the Bay of Pigs, see "Records Relating to the Paramilitary Invasions of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, April 1960," 5 Boxes, Record Group 263 National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NA).

²Earl Mazo, "Ike Speaks Out: Bay of Pigs was all JFK's," *Newsday*, 10 September 1965, 50; see also Folder "May [2]," "Principle Files," Post-Presidential Papers, 1965, Box 38, EL. Stephen E. Ambrose, with Richard H. Immerman, *Ike's Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment* (Doubleday, 1981; Mississippi Press, 1999), 315.

Action” through their use of earlier redactions and other primary sources.

This research note briefly recounts the historical context of the “Program for Covert Action.” Next, the fully declassified text appears in total. This research note then traces the declassification process over time. Almost twenty secondary sources cite this document’s various incarnations. Lastly, this research note makes some observations about this document’s significance in light of Eisenhower’s efforts to distance himself from what would become the Bay of Pigs invasion.

In the months after Fidel Castro seized power in Cuba in January 1959, Eisenhower and his advisors assessed his regime to be a threat to American interests in the region. They attempted to apply lessons learned in Guatemala in 1954 to the situation in Cuba.³ The president feared that Latin American nations might fall like dominos if Castro exported his revolution. The spread of communism threatened economic stability and political harmony would be lost. U.S.-Cuban relations soured commensurately.⁴ By

³See Richard H. Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (U of Texas Press, 1982); Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States*, (Princeton, 1991); Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA’s Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*, Introduction by Nick Cullather and Afterword by Piero Gleijeses (Stanford U Press, 1999).

⁴For examples, see Edward Gonzalez, “The United States and Castro: Breaking the Deadlock,” *Foreign Affairs* 50 (July 1972): 722-30; Peter Wyden, *The Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story* (Simon and Schuster, 1979); Ambrose with Immerman, *Ike’s Spies*; Richard E. Welch, Jr., *The Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961* (U of North Carolina Press, 1985); John Prados, *Presidents’ Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War II* (Morrow, 1986), Stephen Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism* (U of North Carolina Press, 1988); Thomas G. Paterson, *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution* (Oxford, 1994); Louis A. Pérez, *Cuba and the United States: Ties of Singular Intimacy*, 2nd ed. (U of Georgia Press, 1997). See also memoranda and minutes from 1959 and 1960 in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960*, vol. VI Cuba (GPO, 1991), 541-543, 740-746, 750-751, 760-765, (hereafter *FRUS, 1958-1960, VI, Cuba*).

early 1960, Eisenhower went so far as to call Castro a “mad man,”⁵ and a “little Hitler.”⁶

Consideration of covert activities directed against the Castro regime began in earnest many weeks before the “Program for Covert Action” appeared in document form. In January 1960, the secretive “5412 Group” took up the task of reviewing and approving possible CIA covert operations to get Castro out of Cuba.⁷ The 5412 Group had been created by National Security Council policy directive NSC 5412/2 in December 1955.⁸ Although authorization for covert operations ultimately came from the president, the 5412 Group acted as a buffer between President Eisenhower and his National Security Council, the latter of which did not deal with covert operations. Shrouded in secrecy, the 5412 Group allowed Eisenhower to maintain plausible deniability regarding his direct involvement in covert operations. Its membership included the undersecretary of state, the deputy secretary of defense, the special assistant for national security affairs, the director of central intelligence, and

⁵FRUS, 1958-1960, VI, *Cuba*, 764; see also James M. Keagle, “The Eisenhower Administration, Castro, and Cuba, 1959-1961,” in *Dwight D. Eisenhower*, ed. Joann P. Krieg, (Greenwood, 1987), 212.

⁶Notations in Eisenhower’s personal calendar, 5-6 July 1960, Ann C. Whitman Diary, July, 1960 (2) File, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Ann Whitman File, Box 11, EL, cited in Steven F. Grover, “U.S.-Cuban Relations, 1953-1958: A Test of Eisenhower Revisionism,” in *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment*, ed. Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose (Louisiana State Press, 1995), 243.

⁷Anna K. Nelson, “The Importance of Foreign Policy Process: Eisenhower and the National Security Council,” in *Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment*, ed. Gunter Bischof and Stephen E. Ambrose, (Louisiana State U Press, 1995), 113; Prados, *The Presidents’ Secret Wars*, 175-176; Ambrose with Immerman; *Ike’s Spies*, 307-310.

⁸For more information, see Folder “NSC 5412 — Covert Operations,” NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Records of the White Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Box 10, EL; Folders “President’s Papers 1955 (1)” and “President’s Papers 1955 (7),” Special Assistant’s Series, Presidential Subseries, Records of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Box 2, EL; Folder “Pending Material 1957 (4),” Special Assistant’s Series, Presidential Subseries, Records of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Box 3, EL.

“designated representatives” from the Departments of State and Defense.⁹

After much work within the CIA, Director of Central Intelligence Allen W. Dulles presented a draft of “A Program for Covert Action Against the Castro Regime, 16 March 1960” to the 5412 Group.

[The fully declassified text follows in its entirety.]

16 March 1960

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

1. *Objective:* The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention. Essentially the method of accomplishing this will be to induce, support, and so far as possible direct action, both inside and outside of CUBA, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative. Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond control of the U.S. before the covert action program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U. S. to act in a crisis.

2. *Summary Outline:* This program contemplates four major courses of action:

a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located outside

⁹William Leary, ed., *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (U of Alabama Press, 1984), 63; Wayne G. Jackson, *Allen Welch Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence: 26 February 1953 - 29 November 1961*, vol. III, *Covert Activities*, 115-118, 161-162, (1973 [partially declassified in 1994]), Accession Number NN3-263-94-011, NA; Wyden, *The Bay of Pigs*, 24; Ambrose with Immerman, *Ike's Spies*, 240-241.

of Cuba. It is hoped that within one month a political entity can be formed in the shape of a council or junta, through the merger of three acceptable opposition groups with which the Central Intelligence Agency is already in contact. The council will be encouraged to adopt as its slogan "Restore the Revolution", to develop a political position consistent with that slogan, and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive political alternative to Castro. This vocal opposition will: serve as a magnet for the loyalties of the Cubans; in actuality conduct and direct various opposition activities; and provide cover for other compartmented CIA controlled operations. (Tab A)

b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means for mass communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition. The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island. The target date for its completion is two months. This will be supplemented by broadcasting from U.S. commercial facilities paid for by private Cuban groups and by the clandestine distribution of written material inside the country. (Tab B)

c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be responsible to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition. Such a network must have effective communication and be selectively manned to minimize the risk of penetration. An effective organization can probably be created within 60 days. Its role will be to provide hard intelligence, to arrange for the illegal infiltration and exfiltration of individuals, to assist in the internal distribution of illegal propaganda, and to plan and organize for the defection of key individuals and groups as directed.

d. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert military operation on the island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained with military instructors. In a

second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U.S. so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country.

3. *Leadership*: It is important to avoid distracting and divisive rivalry among the outstanding Cuban opposition leaders for the senior role in the opposition. Accordingly, every effort will be made to have an eminent, non-ambitious, politically uncontentious chairman selected. The emergence of a successor to Castro should follow careful assessment of the various personalities active in the opposition to identify the one who can attract, control, and lead the several forces. As the possibility of an overthrow of Castro becomes more imminent, the senior leader must be selected, U.S. support focused upon him, and his build up undertaken.

4. *Cover*: All actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behalf of the opposition council will, of course, be explained as activities of that entity (insofar as the actions become publicly known at all). The CIA will, however, have to have direct contacts with a certain number of Cubans and, to protect these, will make use of a carefully screened group of U.S. businessmen with a stated interest in Cuban affairs and desire to support the opposition. They will act as a funding mechanism and channel for guidance and support to the directorate of the opposition under controlled conditions. CIA personnel will be documented as representatives of this group. In order to strengthen the cover it is hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources to support the opposition. \$100,000 has already been pledged from U.S. sources. At an appropriate time a bond issue will be floated by the council (as an obligation on a future Cuban government) to raise an additional \$2,000,000.

5. *Budget*: It is anticipated that approximately \$4,400,000 of CIA funds will be required for the above program. On the assumption that it will not reach its culmination earlier than 6 to 8 months from now, the estimated requirements for FY-1960 funds is \$900,000 with the balance of \$3,500,000 required in FY-1961. The distribution of costs between fiscal years could, of course, be greatly altered by policy decisions or unforeseen contingencies which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations. (Tab C)

6. *Recommendations*: That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized to undertake the above outlined program and to withdraw the funds required for this purpose as set forth in paragraph 5. from the Agency's Reserve for contingencies.

Tab A

THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION

1. The CIA is already in close touch with three reputable opposition groups (the Montecristi, Autentico Party and the National Democratic Front). These all meet the fundamental criteria conditional to acceptance, i.e. they are for the revolution as originally conceived--many being former 26th of July members--and are not identified with either Batista or Trujillo. They are anti-Castro because of his failure to live up to the 26th of July platform and his apparent willingness to sell out to Communist domination and possible ultimate enslavement. These groups, therefore, fit perfectly the planned opposition slogan of "Restore the Revolution".

2. An opposition Council or Junta will be formed within 30 days from representatives of these groups augmented possibly by representatives of other groups. It is probably premature to have a fixed platform for the Council but the Caracas Manifesto of 20 July 1958 contains a number of exploitable points. Two of the CIA group leaders were signers of the Manifesto. The following points are suggested as a few possibilities:

a. The Castro regime is the new dictatorship of Cuba subject to strong Sino-Soviet influence.

b. Cuba is entitled to an honest, democratic government based on free elections. There is no hope of this as long as Castro throttles the rights of legitimate political parties and the freedom of expression.

c. A realistic agrarian reform program providing for individual ownership of the land must be put into effect.

d. Individual freedoms must be restored and collectivism in commerce and education must be eliminated

e. Sino-Soviet influence in the affairs of Cuba must be eliminated. A special research group of Cubans with American support is planned to refine and expand these planks and to produce propaganda materials based on the above platform for use by and on behalf of the opposition Council.

Tab B

PROPAGANDA

1. Articulation and transmission of opposition views has already begun. Private opposition broadcasts (i.e. purchase of commercial time by private individuals) have occurred in Miami (medium-wave) and arrangements have been made with Station WRUL for additional broadcasts from Massachusetts (short wave) and Florida (broadcast band). Presidents Betancourt and Ydigoras have also agreed to the use of commercial stations for short wave broadcasts from Caracas and Guatemala City. CIA has furnished support to these efforts through encouragement, negotiating help and providing some broadcast material.

2. As the major voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at least one "gray" U.S.-controlled station. This will probably be on Swan Island and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial power. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these will be transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience and as the operation progresses, it may be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region. Such an additional facility might be installed on a U.S. base in the

Bahamas or temporary use might be made of a shipborne station if it is desired to avoid "gray" broadcasting from Florida.

3. Newspapers are also being supported and further support is planned for the future. *Avance*, a leading Cuban daily (Zayas' paper), has been confiscated as has *El Mundo*, another Cuban daily. *Diario de la Marina*, one of the hemisphere's outstanding conservative dailies published in Havana, is having difficulty and may have to close soon. Arrangements have already been made to print *Avance* weekly in the U.S. for introduction into Cuba clandestinely and mailing throughout the hemisphere on a regular basis. As other leading newspapers are expropriated, publication of "exile" editions will be considered.

4. Inside Cuba, a CIA-controlled action group is producing and distributing anti-Castro and anti-Communist publications regularly. CIA is in contact with groups outside Cuba who will be assisted in producing similar materials for clandestine introduction into Cuba.

5. Two prominent Cubans are on lecture tours in Latin America. They will be followed by others of equal calibre. The mission of these men will be to gain hemisphere support for the opposition to Castro. Controlled Western Hemisphere assets (press, radio, television) will support this mission as will selected American journalists who will be briefed prior to Latin American travel.

Tab C

Financial Annex

<u>I. Political Action</u>	FY-1960	FY-1961
Support of Opposition Elements and other Group Activities	150,000	800,000
<u>II. Propaganda</u>		
Radio Operations and Programming (including establishment of trans- mitters	400,000	700,000
Press and Publications	100,000	500,000

III. Paramilitary

In-Exfiltration Maritime and Air Support Material and Training	200,000	1,300,000
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IV. <u>Intelligence Collection</u>	50,000	200,000
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Totals	900,000	3,500,000
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*These figures are based on the assumption that major action will not occur until FY-1961. If by reason of policy decisions or other contingencies over which the Agency cannot exercise control, the action program should be accelerated, additional funds will be required.

[End of documents]

After endorsing it, the 5412 Group sent it on to Eisenhower for approval. An unsigned, undated memorandum accompanying the "Program for Covert Action" stated that, "This document is our basic policy paper. It was approved by the president at a meeting in the White House on 17 March 1960."¹⁰ The minutes for this meeting depict a supportive president. Following his *modus operandi*, Eisenhower allowed discussion and debate among his advisors and asked questions as he saw fit. He emphasized that any CIA or American involvement in ousting Castro should remain indirect and untraceable. Operation PLUTO was born.¹¹

¹⁰Unsigned and undated document, Folder "CIA Policy re Cuba (17 March 1960)," White Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, Box 4, EL.

¹¹For meeting minutes, see *FRUS, 1958-1960*, VI, *Cuba*, 861-863; for one sentence which has since been declassified, see "Memorandum of a Conference with the President," 17 March 1960, Folder "Intelligence Matters (14)," Records of the White House Staff Secretary, Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 15, EL. Jackson, *Allen Welsh Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence*, 116-119; Ambrose with Immerman, *Ike's Spies*, 307-310; Prados, *The Presidents' Secret Wars*, 175-179; Piero Gleijeses, "Ships in the Night: The CIA, the White

Later in 1960, PLUTO evolved into Operation TRINIDAD, an operation that called for anti-Castro forces to invade Cuba near the city of Trinidad and then carry on a guerilla war in the Escambray Mountains. When these objectives became impractical, Operation ZAPATA replaced TRINIDAD in March 1961. ZAPATA called for the invasion at the Bay of Pigs that occurred one month later on 17 April.¹²

The "Program for Covert Action" has surfaced in several redacted forms over the last few decades. Researchers often made requests for declassification because of some historical incident or political influence. Likewise, historical incidents or political influences certainly affected decisions to deny or limit the release of information in those requests. Thus, tracking the various redactions reveals as much about the declassification process as it does about American foreign relations.¹³

Historians cite sanitized segments of the "Program for Covert Action" in the "Taylor Committee Report and Memorandum for Record of Paramilitary Study Group Meetings."¹⁴ In the

House and the Bay of Pigs," *Journal of Latin American Studies* 27 (February 1995): 2-13; Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 24-25.

¹²Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala*, 194; Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 89, 99-102; Richard M. Bissell, Jr., et al., *Reflections of a Cold Warrior: From Yalta to the Bay of Pigs* (Yale U Press, 1996), 156, 170, 190; James G. Blight and Peter Kornbluh, eds., *Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Reexamined* (Lynne Rienner, 1998), 38-58.

¹³For a general discussion of "declassification analysis," see Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963* (Princeton U Press, 1999), 403;

<<http://www.polisci.ucla.edu/faculty/trachtenberg/>> (26 August 2002).

¹⁴Memorandum No. 1, "Narrative of the Anti-Castro Cuban Operation Zapata," 13 June 1961, cited in *Operation Zapata: The 'Ultrasensitive' Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs*, with an Introduction by Luis Aguilar (Frederick, MD: UPA, 1981), 3-4. A partially declassified version of the Taylor Committee's report can be found in *FRUS, 1961-1963*, vol. X, *Cuba, 1961-1962* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997), 675-700; document selection and declassification review for this *FRUS* volume was completed in 1996. Excerpts of the Taylor Committee's report which were declassified in 2000 are also available

immediate aftermath of the botched Bay of Pigs operation in April 1961, then-President John F. Kennedy appointed U.S. Army General Maxwell Taylor to preside over a board of inquiry. His so-called "Taylor Committee" investigated Operation ZAPATA in May and June of 1961. Many people vital in both planning and operational stages offered testimony, most of which was classified. One of the Taylor Committee's memoranda contained an overview of the "Program for Covert Action." Historians have teased some basic tenets out of this document, but Eisenhower's involvement remains unclear.¹⁵

Other historians make reference to President Eisenhower's own *Waging Peace* as evidence about his role in covert activities directed against the Castro regime. Eisenhower's memoir briefly mentions the meeting on 17 March 1960 in which the CIA "was ordered to organize the training of Cuban exiles, mainly in Guatemala, against a possible future day when they might return to their homeland." He clearly feared that Cuba was becoming a communist satellite, an outcome "that the United States could not tolerate."¹⁶ Specific plans, however, do not appear in *Waging Peace*. Because Eisenhower neither cited nor mentioned the "Program for Covert Action," historians have used his memoir primarily to gauge his temperament in March 1960.¹⁷

on the National Security Archive's website at
<<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB29/index.html>> (3 August 2002).

¹⁵For references, see Immerman, *CIA In Guatemala*, 188-197; Richard E. Welch, Jr., *The Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961* (U of North Carolina, 1985), 48-49; Trumbull Huggins, *The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs* (W.W. Norton, 1987), 49-51; Jackson, *Allen Welch Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence*, 118; Rabe, *Eisenhower and Latin America*, 127-130.

¹⁶Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace, 1956-1961* (Doubleday, 1965), 520-525, 533-4, 630-631.

¹⁷For references, see Ambrose with Immerman, *Ike's Spies*, 309-313; Welch, *The Response to Revolution*, 48-49; Huggins, *The Perfect Failure*, 49-51; Loretta Sharon Wyatt, "Reform, Yes; Communism, No! Eisenhower's Policy on Latin American Revolutions," in *Dwight D. Eisenhower*, ed. Joann P. Krieg (Greenwood, 1987), 229-230.

The most frequently cited version of the "Program for Covert Action" can be found, albeit in sanitized form, in the records of the "Church Committee."¹⁸ Chaired by Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) during 1975 and 1976, this U.S. Senate Select Committee investigated the CIA for plotting assassinations and performing other covert operations. Increased awareness of the CIA's clandestine activities had alarmed Congress and the American people. Moreover, the Watergate scandal and the Vietnam debacle had offered scant reassurance that the United States government was trustworthy or dependable. Documents in the *Congressional Record* have allowed historians to determine many elements of the Operations PLUTO, TRINIDAD, and ZAPATA. Likewise, attitudes of individuals and groups also show through in the transcripts and other evidence. Still, specific details of the "Program for Covert Action" in the Church Committee's records remain excised.¹⁹

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 (FRUS), Volume VI, *Cuba* contains a redaction of the "Program for Covert Action." Document selection for this volume occurred during 1985 and 1986, and the finished product appeared in print in 1991.²⁰ This much-sanitized and fragmented redaction leaves the reader with an incomplete understanding of the document's significance. It mentions four "courses of action" to be taken against the Castro

¹⁸United States Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligent Activities, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, 94th Congress, 1st Session (GPO, 1975), 92-93, 114-116, 126-127.

¹⁹For references, see Ray S. Cline, *Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA* (Acropolis Books, 1976), 284; Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 24-31; Ambrose with Immerman, *Ike's Spies*, 309; Prados, *The Presidents' Secret Wars*, 175-180; John Ranelagh, *The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA*, rev. ed. (Simon and Schuster, 1987), 337, 353-363; Huggins, *The Perfect Failure*, 49-51; Keagle, "The Eisenhower Administration, Castro, and Cuba," 210-211; Christopher Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from Washington to Bush* (Harper Collins, 1995), 250-253; Bissell, *Reflections of a Cold Warrior*, 152-157.

²⁰*FRUS, 1958-1960, VI, Cuba*, iv, 850-851. See also Geoffrey Warner, "Eisenhower and Castro: US-Cuban Relations, 1958-1960," *International Affairs* 75 (October 1999): 803-817.

regime and the authorization for the CIA to perform those courses of action. But, because much information in the Tabs A, B, and C remains sanitized in this version, historians can make only cursory observations about the "Program for Covert Action."²¹

Other secondary sources refer to various redactions of the "Program for Covert Action" held by the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library in Abilene, Kansas. The Eisenhower Library received its copy of the document from CIA Archives in December 1974.²² Researchers have since filed mandatory review requests for the declassification of this document because they realized its potential value.

According to the mandatory review process outlined in Executive Order 11652 in 1972 and subsequent executive orders, government agencies of origin must review classified documents. In the case of the CIA, only its own authorized personnel may perform such reviews because requested documents may contain sensitive material. Gaining access to classified materials becomes further complicated because the Freedom of Information Act of 1966 (FOIA) and its amendments do not necessarily apply to presidential paper collections created prior to 20 January 1981, a date set by the Presidential Records Act of 1978 to coincide with the beginning of the Reagan presidency. The previous Presidential Libraries Act of 1955 covers the vast majority of materials at the Eisenhower Library.²³

²¹For references, see Andrew, *For the President's Eyes Only*, 250-253; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, *"One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964* (W.W. Norton, 1997), 43-44; John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford U Press, 1997), 179-185.

²²Letter of transmittal, Robert S. Young to John E. Wickman, 24 December 1974, Folder "CIA Policy re Cuba (17 March 1960)," White Office, Office of the Staff Secretary, International Series, Box 4, EL.

²³Email correspondence between author and David Haight on 9 January 2002 and 19 June 2002; email messages in author's possession. For more information regarding FOIA, see <http://www.archives.gov/research_room/foia_reading_room/foia_reading_room.html> (5 August 2002); and for more information regarding access to Presidential records, see

Access to the particular copy of the "Program for Covert Action" held at the Eisenhower Library could not be obtained through the FOIA review process. Researchers filed mandatory review requests for the "Program for Covert Action" in 1977 and again in 1979. The CIA denied both requests in full in 1979 and 1981, respectively. Another researcher submitted another request for the document in 1984. Responding in 1986, the CIA permitted the release of portions of the document that had already been declassified under E.O. 12965. In 1988 and later in 1995, the CIA approved declassification of more portions of the "Program for Covert Action."²⁴ Even when successful in the mandatory review process, however, researchers only received a sanitized version of the document.²⁵ Although the exact reasons for mandatory review requests have not been ascertained, the furor over the Iran-Contra Affair in the late 1980s doubtlessly sparked attempts by researchers to break down classification barriers.

Independent of other efforts, the National Security Archive submitted a FOIA request in 1996 directly to the CIA for "The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation," otherwise known as the "Kirkpatrick Report" to acknowledge CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick as its author. This report contains the "Program for Covert Action" in an appendix. The Kirkpatrick Report represents the "holy grail" among documents on the Bay of Pigs operation. Two years later in 1998, the CIA released this important report to the National Security Archive. It should be

<http://www.archives.gov/presidential_libraries/presidential_records/presidential_records.html> (5 August 2002).

²⁴Email correspondence between author and Haight on 11 June 2002 and 19 June 2002; email messages in author's possession.

²⁵For references, see Prados, *President's Secret Wars*, 178, 429; Fursenko and Naftali, *One Hell of a Gamble*, 43-44; Thomas G. Paterson, "The Limits of Hegemony: The United States and the Cuban Revolution," Occasional Paper (Latin American Studies Consortium of New England), 5. Gleijeses also mentions a "heavily sanitized" version of the "Program for Covert Action" found in the National Security Files, Box 61A, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

noted that Tab A, Paragraph 2, Sections b, c, d, and e, and several proper names in Tab B Paragraph 1 in the "Program for Covert Action" remain excised in the Kirkpatrick Report as it appears in the *Bay of Pigs Declassified*.²⁶

Scholars founded the National Security Archive in 1985. Receiving no government support, this entity sustains itself with grants from private sources and revenues from publications. The National Security Archive has attempted to open classified materials for the public and has then served as a non-governmental repository for those materials. Many documents are available in print or on line. Its systematic use of the FOIA helped to spur the declassification process.²⁷

All of the sources cited above, nevertheless, do contain excised sections. They do not reveal the extent of Eisenhower's interest in overthrowing Castro. Nor do they indicate the specificity of the "program" prepared with his knowledge and authorization. The story would become clearer by 1998.

In 1991, Oliver Stone's film *JFK* served as the "final catalyst," albeit an unintended catalyst, for the eventual release of thousands government documents such as the "Program for Covert Action." Stone's film, though more fiction than history, aroused suspicions about conspiracies surrounding President John F. Kennedy's assassination in 1963. As a result, a bipartisan Congress passed the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (hereafter JFK Act) to open the classified records and calm the public's anxieties. This act, according to diplomatic historian Anna

²⁶Peter Kornbluh, ed., *The Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report on the Invasion of Cuba* (The New Press, 1998), 1-17, 103-109. Partially sanitized excerpts from the "Program for Covert Action" also appear as an appendix in Blight and Kornbluh, *Politics of Illusion*, 205-208. See also Michael Warner, "Lessons Unlearned: The CIA's Internal Probe of the Bay of Pigs Affair.," *Studies in Intelligence* 42 (Winter 1998-1999) <<http://www.odci.gov/csi/studies/winter98-99/art08.html>> (1 February 2002).

²⁷ <<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/>> (26 July 2002).

K. Nelson, also helped “crack open the doors to the inner sanctums of the CIA, FBI, and other intelligence agencies.”²⁸

To hold government agencies accountable, the JFK Act established the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board (KARRB) to be composed of several scholars in April 1994. This independent review board worked over the next four years “to re-examine for release the records that the agencies still regarded as too sensitive to open to the public” and “to help restore government credibility.”²⁹ The KARRB received “extraordinary powers of oversight” to release previously classified documents such as the “Program for Covert Action.” Only a sitting president could overturn its decisions. The KARRB expanded its scope of archival inquiry as widely as possible by opening all documents relevant to the assassination that could “enrich the historical record.” As of September 1998, the KARRB voted to release 29,420 documents including the “Program for Covert Action.” Government agencies often released the requested documents in question independently on the assumption that the KARRB would vote to do so; these so-called “consent releases” allowed for declassification of another 33,176 documents. In all, the KARRB’s drew from almost forty Record Groups and six Presidential Libraries.³⁰ Not all these thousands

²⁸Anna K. Nelson, “The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board,” in *A Culture of Secrecy: The Government Versus the Peoples’ Right to Know*, ed. Athan G. Theoharis (U Press of Kansas, 1998), 213-217, 229. For the text of the JFK Act, see *Final Report of the Assassination Records Review Board* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1998), 183-195; and also: <http://www.archives.gov/research_room/jfk/assassination_records_review_board/arb_report.html> (14 June 2002).

²⁹Nelson, “The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board,” 213; and *Final Report of the Assassination Records Review Board*, 1-2. The Honorable John R. Tunheim chaired the KARRB, and Henry F. Graff, Kermit L. Hall, and William L. Joyce also served Nelson. The KARRB’s papers can be found in “President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection,” Record Group 541, NA; and <http://www.archives.gov/research_room/jfk/assassination_records_review_board.html> (14 June 2002).

³⁰*Final Report of the Assassination Records Review Board*, xxvi, 34, 41-56, 91-96, 203-204. Phone conversation between author and Anna K. Nelson, 17 January 2002; notes from conversation in author’s possession.

of documents were completely declassified, however. Nelson and other historians lament the fact that a "culture of secrecy" prevails in so many government agencies.³¹

In conclusion, Eisenhower denied responsibility in 1965 for what would become the failed invasion at the Bay of Pigs. He argued instead that his role in 1960 included only formulating a preliminary "program" rather than constructing any operational or tactical "plans" to oust Castro. Although perhaps correct in a rigidly defined sense, Eisenhower's statements did not tell the whole story. The "Program for Covert Action" included no tactical matters such as the number of support aircraft or the size of an invasion force.³² Yet, it did mention specific people, groups, places, contingencies, timetables, budgets, and recommendations. Eisenhower's disavowal of his involvement in "programming" but not "planning" thus seems to be semantic and evasive.³³ The "Program of Covert Action" also bears witness to commercial, security, and ideological considerations as well as belligerent and paranoid mindsets that affected the Eisenhower Administration to one degree or another.

³¹Nelson, "The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board," 211; Zachary Karabell and Timothy Naftali, "Research Note: The Perils and Promise of CIA Documents," *Diplomatic History* 18 (Fall 1994): 615-26; J. Kenneth McDonald, "Research Note: Commentary on 'History Declassified,'" *Diplomatic History* 18 (Fall 1994): 627-634; James X. Dempsey, "The CIA and Secrecy," in *A Culture of Secrecy: The Government Versus the Peoples' Right to Know*: ed. Athan G. Theoharis, (U Press of Kansas, 1998), pp. 37-59.

³²Wyden, *Bay of Pigs*, 24-25. Additional material can be found in oral history interviews with Gordon Gray; see "Gordon Gray," OH 342, interview conducted by Maclyn Burg, EL, June 25, 1975; and Gordon Gray, OH 73, interview conducted by staff, Columbia Oral History Project, December 7, 1966, January 23, 1967, January 27, 1967, February 7, 1967, March 7, 1967, May 23, 1967, July 9, 1967 and November 30, 1967, also held by EL. For more specific operational and tactical plans drawn up in early 1961, see various memoranda and meeting minutes in *FRUS, 1961-1963, X, Cuba, 1961-1962*, ix-x, 10-17, 21-24, 36-40.

³³For a similar indictment based on much less information than is currently available, see John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (Oxford U Press, 1982), 157-159.

The full declassification "Program for Covert Action" provides a more accurate representation of President Eisenhower's interest in covert operations in Cuba. Herein lies this document's historical value. The evolution of its redactions serves as a case study of the declassification process and adds to the understanding of the historiography of Eisenhower's foreign policy.

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WAS NORTH DAKOTA THE MOST ISOLATIONIST STATE DURING THE EARLY COLD WAR PERIOD?

by

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- the author]

In the rare studies dealing with American post-World War II isolationism, the state of North Dakota always holds a special place, as it has acquired the reputation of having been "the nation's

most isolationist state during the postwar decade.”¹ To a large extent, this reputation can be ascribed to the attitude of some of its prominent Republican members on Capitol Hill. Hence, Senator William Langer, who sat between 1941 and 1959, voted against the United Nations Charter and denigrated the European Recovery Program, while his colleague Milton Young, in the upper house from 1945 to 1981, was one of only 13 senators who opposed the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949.² The situation was no different in the House of Representatives: William Lemke, who sat between 1933 and 1950, depicted the internationalists in 1947 as “the betrayers of our Nation,”³ and Usher Burdick, in the lower house between 1949 and 1959, particularly attracted attention for his vehement criticism of the United Nations Organization and his advocacy of an American withdrawal from this international body.⁴

¹Ted Galen Carpenter, “The Dissenters: American Isolationists and Foreign Policy, 1945-1954” (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1980), 22. See also Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), 146.

²Eleanora W. Schoenebaum, ed., *Political Profiles: The Truman Years* (New York: Facts On File, Inc., 1978), 298, 623. Regarding the Marshall Plan, for instance, Langer contended in March 1948: “I am against the Marshall Plan as I believe there are many people in our own country who are in desperate need of help. I have no objection to sending food and clothing overseas but when it comes to billions of dollars, I think that our people should come first” (William Langer to A. B. Rorman, March 5, 1948, William Langer Papers, Box 218, Folder 5, Chester Fritz Library, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota). Interestingly enough, the same Langer, who still continued to denounce foreign aid in the 1950’s, was the only member of the upper house to vote against SEATO in 1954 (“The Question of Curtailing U.S. Foreign Aid,” *Congressional Digest* (November 1956), William Langer Papers, Box 564, Folder 13; Doenecke, 241).

³Congressional Record, July 24, 1947, A4089.

⁴“Petition to Withdraw from the United Nations,” June 14, 1955, Usher Burdick Papers, Box 29, Folder 6, Chester Fritz Library, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota; Usher Burdick to Martha S. Selkirk, June 27, 1955, Usher Burdick Papers, Box 29, Folder 4. Incidentally, Burdick, who held in high regard George Washington’s Farewell Address, categorically refused the “isolationist” label during the Truman-Eisenhower years, as his words of 1953 make clear: “I am not an isolationist. I believe in friendship and in helping those who cannot help themselves. But I believe in protecting our own rights and freedoms, and our resources in men and goods, first! (Usher Burdick to R. E. Swendseid, May 5, 1955,

This brief essay, which is based above all on an examination of the extensive manuscript collections of these politicians at the University of North Dakota (Grand Forks), essentially seeks to determine if this Middle Western state, that historian Selig Adler has characterized as “a living fossil surviving into the second half of the twentieth century with foreign policy attitudes suitable to the early years of the century,”⁵ was truly as “isolationist” during the Truman-Eisenhower era as its reputation would have it. Although such a reputation appears well-deserved in some respects, as illustrated by the attitude of the small North Dakotan delegation in Congress⁶ on many key issues of this period (United Nations, British loan of 1946, Truman Doctrine, Marshall Plan, NATO, Korean conflict, Great Debate of 1950-51, Bricker Amendment, SEATO, Eisenhower Doctrine, etc.), we intend to demonstrate, among other things, that the internationalist sentiment was far from being absent in the Sioux State during the postwar era.

But what is meant by the notion of “isolationism” during these years? Although the term has never been easy to define,⁷ much

Usher Burdick Papers, Box 7, Folder 11; Usher Burdick to Joseph A. Prachar, February 25, 1953, Usher Burdick Papers, Box 30, Folder 13).

⁵Robert P. Wilkins, “The Non-Ethnic Roots of North Dakota Isolationism,” *Nebraska History*, Vol. XLIV (September 1963): 221.

⁶For instance, in addition to Congressmen Lemke and Burdick, the Middle Western state sent only two other members to the House of Representatives during the Truman years: Republicans Charles Robertson (1945-49) and Fred Aandahl (1951-53) [Schoenebaum, ed., 646].

⁷Said for instance historian Justus Doenecke: “Defining *isolationism* has long been a problem.” Scholars of isolationism find it a loaded term and one possessing such emotional connotations that dispassionate analysis is indeed difficult. Wayne S. Cole defines isolationists as people who opposed intervention in European wars and who believed in America’s unimpaired freedom of action. They often differed from pacifists “in being strident nationalists and in endorsing strong military preparations.” Some isolationists, Cole noted, welcomed certain forms of imperialism and were not averse to military action in Latin America or Asia. Another historian, Manfred Jonas, finds two strands dominant in American isolationism: “unilateralism in foreign affairs and the avoidance of war.” In discussing the former point, Jonas notes that the isolationists ever sought to maximize the

like the concept of “internationalism,”⁸ it must be noted that most scholars have tended to equate isolationism “with opposition to *certain* types of commitments in *particular* areas of the world.”⁹ For his part, historian John Findling has essentially defined isolationism as “a term used to indicate a policy of abstaining from an active role in international affairs.”¹⁰

To explain the isolationist attitude of several North Dakota politicians during the early cold war period, we must consider some factors. Thus, historian Robert Wilkins has suggested that Lemke, Langer and Burdick, in beginning their public careers in state politics before World War I, were for a long time exposed to the “isolationist mind” of the North Dakota citizens who, for instance, tended to oppose U.S. participation in the two world wars.¹¹

options open to the country. “At no time did isolationists seek literally to ‘isolate’ the United States from either the world’s culture or its commerce.” [Justus D. Doenecke, *Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1979), 11-12].

⁸Said Doenecke on this concept: “If the word *isolationist* is slippery and misleading, the term *internationalist* is equally so. Unlike the word *isolationist*, the word *internationalist* usually bears a positive connotation. To be an internationalist is to adhere to a far-sighted ‘large policy’ designed to punish ‘aggression’ and to ‘preserve’ the ‘world community.’ If used in the purest sense, a genuine internationalist seeks a global community of interest so great that all nations — including the United States — would sacrifice sovereignty in order to preserve it. Common usage of the term, however, denotes a belief that the United States and the rest of the world — and, in particular, Western Europe — are interdependent.” (*Ibid.*, 12)

⁹Carpenter, 1.

¹⁰John Findling, *Dictionary of American Diplomatic History* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 265.

¹¹Robert P. Wilkins, “The Nonpartisan League and Upper Midwest Isolationism,” *Agricultural History*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 2 (April 1965):109; Elwyn B. Robinson, *History of North Dakota* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1966), 353, 420, 423.

Moreover, these politicians, mostly conservative on domestic issues,¹² were products, to a large extent, of their Middle Western environment — an environment that included a myriad of people who endorsed the traditional principles of non-entanglement. In fact, it seems hard to deny that the Middle West, a region that historian Ray Allen Billington has depicted as being, in 1945, “more conservative than the rest of the nation,”¹³ was fertile soil for the isolationist tradition.¹⁴ Accordingly, still in the late 1940s, America’s “heartland” “continued to account for the bulk of isolationist membership.”¹⁵ An examination of the papers of Langer, Lemke, Young and Burdick reveals that North Dakota, a part of that region, was not devoid of isolationist contingents during the early cold war. During the debate over the British loan, for instance, Milton Young affirmed that “practically all of the mail

¹²In the early years of the Truman period, Milton Young, for example, voted against the retention of price controls and backed the Taft-Hartley Act, as well as the anti-Communist legislation (Schoenebaum, ed., 623). Nevertheless, it must be noted that William Langer lined up with the Democrats on most domestic issues during the Truman era (*Ibid.*, 298).

¹³Ray Allen Billington, “The Origins of Middle Western Isolationism,” *Political Science Quarterly*, 60 (1945):64.

¹⁴Scholar William Carleton has contended that it was during the First World War that the term “isolationist” really began to be applied to this region since “the majority for war was less in the Middle West than in any other section of the country” [William G. Carleton, “isolationism and the Middle West,” *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 33 (December 1946):380]. Various factors may explain this phenomenon, as Ted Carpenter has suggested: “The region’s geographic insularity coupled with its relative lack of dependence on foreign commerce allegedly created intense support for a noninterventionist foreign policy. Other writers note the presence of large numbers of ethnic groups, especially Germans, who embraced isolationism in order to avoid situations that might provoke war between their adopted country and their former homeland. Another view sees the Midwestern preference for non-entanglement rooted in long-standing agrarian and populist hostility toward Eastern finance capitalists and their European allies. Still other scholars stressed that isolationism has been primarily Republican party dogma and is closely related to ruralism and domestic conservatism” (Carpenter, 2-3).

¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 18. For instance, in addition to William Langer and Milton Young, quite a few NATO opponents in the Senate came from the Middle West: among others, Forrest Donnell (Missouri), Kenneth Wherry (Nebraska), William Jenner (Indiana) and Robert Taft (Ohio) [*Congressional Record*, July 21, 1949, 9916].

which has reached me on this subject from the people in North Dakota has been in opposition to the loan."¹⁶ Incidentally, the same Young received this unequivocal comment from a constituent from Lisbon (a small town southwest of Fargo) during the 1947 debate over the Greek-Turkish Aid Program: "I am still [an] [i]solationist. We can't 'police' the whole world."¹⁷

With the Korean war and the ensuing Great Debate, isolationist pressures from North Dakotans clearly intensified. An examination of Langer's papers in December 1950 and January 1951, for instance, shows that citizens from Fargo, Kenmare (a small town northwest of Minot) and Turtle Lake (a small town southeast of Minot) opposed U.S. participation in the Korean conflict.¹⁸

Regarding the resolution passed by the North Dakota Senate in January 1951, which called "upon Congress and the President to withdraw our troops from Korea,"¹⁹ a citizen from Washburn (a small town north of Bismarck) even went so far as to affirm that "I would say from the conversation of the man on the street that 98% of the people in North Dakota want and DEMAND that our troupes (*sic*) be withdrawn from Korea."²⁰ Naturally, the North Dakotan

¹⁶Milton Young to E. J. Pravda, February 4, 1946, Milton Young Papers, Box 1, Folder 17, Chester Fritz Library, University of North Dakota, Grand Forks, North Dakota.

¹⁷Mark Stanley to Milton Young, April 3, 1947, Milton Young Papers, Box 17, Folder 28.

¹⁸Mrs. J. C. Vantine to William Langer, December 13, 1950, William Langer Papers, Box 477, Folder 16; Mrs. Leslie J. Brooks to William Langer, January 4, 1951, William Langer Papers, Box 477, Folder 16; Paul E. Nelson to William Langer, January 15, 1951, William Langer Papers, Box 477, Folder 16. Scholar Michael Sponberg, however, has noted that support for the Korean war among individuals came mainly from large cities (especially Fargo and Grand Forks) while opposition was voiced by small town citizens and farmers writing poorly constructed letters [Michael R. Sponberg, "North Dakota and the Korean War, 1950-1951: A Study in Public Opinion" (M.A. thesis, University of North Dakota, 1969), vii, 38].

¹⁹"Senate Resolution No. 1," January 2, 1951, Usher Burdick Papers, Box 7, Folder 15.

²⁰R. R. Robinson to Milton Young, William Langer, Usher Burdick and Fred Aandahl, January 16, 1951, William Langer Papers, Box 477, Folder 19.

sympathy towards the isolationist creed did not come to an end during the Eisenhower years. Suffice it to say that a poll, in early 1956, showed the state overwhelmingly opposed to foreign aid.²¹

To understand the persistence of the isolationist sentiment in North Dakota during the Truman-Eisenhower years is not an easy matter. In fact, as mentioned (see note 14), several explanations of isolationism exist. Was this sentiment linked primarily to the “conservative leanings of the state,”²² a state “which normally [voted] about 75 percent Republican?”²³ Or to its geographical remoteness²⁴ and the fact that North Dakota “has historically been dominated by outside interests?”²⁵ Was it rather related to the

²¹Wilkins, “The Non-Ethnic Roots,” 218.

²²Robinson, 472.

²³*Congressional Record*, June 25, 1945, 6649. Between 1889 and 1960, for instance, members of the Grand Old Party held the governorship for fifty-eight of the seventy-two years. Furthermore, the North Dakota presidential vote during the postwar years reveals a strong preference for Republican candidates Thomas Dewey (1948), Dwight Eisenhower (1952, 1956) and Richard Nixon (1960) [Timothy L. Gall, ed., *Worldmark Encyclopedia of the States* (New York: Gale Research, Inc., 1995), 464].

²⁴Said historian Glenn Smith: “That North Dakota is remote from most of the United States requires only a cursory knowledge of American geography. Hundreds of miles separate the state from the chief centers of commerce, finance, industry, population, and culture. Most important, perhaps, is the fact that North Dakota is remote from the centers of political decision, not only in the United States, but in the entire western world” [Glenn H. Smith, *Langer of North Dakota: A Study of Isolationism, 1940-1959* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1979), 212].

²⁵David B. Danbom, “North Dakota: The Most Midwestern State,” in James H. Madison, ed., *Hearland: Comparative Histories of the Midwestern States* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), p. 111. Historian David Danbom has argued that such a “colonial status,” a significant component of North Dakota’s sense of isolation, had a strong economic dimension: “North Dakota depended on outside capital to finance its agriculture and commerce, on railroads owned by outsiders to export its raw agricultural products and import manufactured goods, on outside consumers to buy North Dakota wheat and beef, and on outside manufacturers and workers to produce essential goods” [David B. Danbom, “A Part of the Nation and Apart from the Nation: North Dakota Politics Since 1945,” in Richard Lowitt, ed., *Politics in the Postwar American West* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995), 176].

German and Norwegian presence?²⁶ Was isolationism connected to “the North Dakota fondness for the conspiracy theory?”²⁷ Or was it the result of the so-called weak communist presence in the state?²⁸ It is difficult to furnish a clear-cut response. A review of the papers of the North Dakota politicians, however, leads to four main observations. First, the North Dakotan preference for non-entanglement in foreign policy emanated from various sections of the state, including the main cities of the east (Fargo and Grand Forks) as well as the small towns of the west (Kenmare, Turtle Lake, Washburn, etc.). Second, isolationist constituents with German names did not seem to abound in the correspondence of North Dakota members of Congress, an observation which suggests, as scholar Robert Wilkins has affirmed,²⁹ the inadequacy of the ethnic interpretation of North Dakotan isolationism. Third, many isolationists in North Dakota were women, a state of fact that was especially obvious during the Korean war. Such a reality was hardly surprising since several Midwestern women’s organizations (American Mothers of Minnesota, Catholic Mothers and Daughters

²⁶A fifth of North Dakotans were of German stock in 1945 (Robinson, 430). Their emotional ties to their former homeland, which went to war with the United States twice in less than a quarter of a century, tended to be strong. It must also be noted that the Midwestern state had the heaviest concentration of Russian-Germans and, for Samuel Lubell, this state of affairs was not trivial since “they have been a major factor in keeping [North Dakota] the most isolationist state in the Union” [Samuel Lubell, “Who Votes Isolationist and Why,” *Harper’s Magazine*, Vol. 202, No. 1211 (April 1951):33]. One reason which permits us to comprehend the suspicion of outsiders and the isolationist bent among these Germans from Russia certainly lies in the fact that they came precisely from an isolated and peripheral place in Europe (Danbom, “North Dakota,” 118-119). As for the Norwegians, David Danbom has explained their isolationist propensity in these terms: “their attitudes toward European conflicts reflected the neutrality of Norway and the antimilitarism of their ancestors, many of whom came to America to escape conscription” (Danbom, “A Part of the Nation,” 177).

²⁷Robert P. Wilkins and Wynona H. Wilkins, *North Dakota: A Bicentennial History* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1977), 153. Scholars Robert and Wynona Wilkins have essentially defined this theory as “the tendency to view with suspicion the East, bankers, and other businessmen who, over the years, had ‘exploited’ the state” (*Ibid.*).

²⁸Doenecke, 213.

²⁹Wilkins, “The Non-Ethnic Roots,” 205.

of America, United Mothers of Cleveland, Mothers of Sons Forum of Cincinnati, etc.) had opposed the U.S. ratification of the United Nations Charter a few years earlier.³⁰ Fourth, although some scholars have minimized the “rural interpretation” of American isolationism,³¹ ruralism appears to have been a key component in North Dakotan isolationism. Indeed, in this farm state, which was hit particularly hard during the Great Depression,³² the need for young and physically healthy men was particularly great. Consequently, the participation of young men in foreign ventures could potentially threaten the economy; an “economy” already weakened in the 1950s by a decline in farm prosperity.³³ Indubitably, this last element explains the “isolationist upsurge” at the time of the Korean war and the fact that “reaction to [this conflict] was violent in North Dakota.”³⁴ This testimony of January 1951 offered by a citizen from Kenmare is particularly evocative: “I would like to know, just how we are going to carry on farm operations, with all our boys drafted[.] Burke County [in the northwestern section of the state] is small in population[;] therefore we feel a great loss of help. We are farming 800 acres,

³⁰*Congressional Record*, July 23, 1945, 7952.

³¹Doenecke, 22.

³²“North and South Dakota suffered perhaps more seriously than any other states during the depression. A series of droughts in the middle 1930’s compounded already severe economic hardship. In 1936, the two states had higher proportions of their population on relief than any other states in the Union,” wrote scholar Michael Rogin [Michael Paul Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Specter* (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1971), 125]. According to historian David Danbom, these elements brought North Dakota “close to destruction as a viable entity” (Danbom, “North Dakota,” 115).

³³Smith, 180.

³⁴Wilkins, “The Non-Ethnic Roots,” 215. In addition to the North Dakota Legislature’s approval of a resolution calling for the evacuation of U.S. troops from Korea, it is interesting to note that Governor Norman Brunsdale, during the same years, wanted Army recruiters to withdraw from the state (Smith, 195).

with only one man to do this.... Why should we defend Korea?"³⁵ Needless to say, universal military training (UMT) was not popular in this largely agricultural state: a poll conducted during the Korean war, for instance, disclosed that almost 60% of the North Dakotans interviewed opposed UMT.³⁶

Although the isolationist sentiment remained strong in North Dakota during the Truman-Eisenhower years, internationalism also attracted cohorts of supporters in the state. Interestingly enough, the electoral defeat of prominent North Dakota Senator Gerald Nye in 1944 was largely ascribable to his isolationist stance on foreign policy.³⁷ Far from being negligible during the postwar years, the internationalist sentiment certainly contributed to molding the attitude of some members of the North Dakotan delegation on Capitol Hill. Thus, Senator Milton Young, regarded as "most internationalist in outlook of all North Dakota politicians,"³⁸ was

³⁵Mrs. Leslie J. Brooks to William Langer, January 4, 1951, William Langer Papers, Box 477, Folder 16. Naturally, such sentiments were not confined to North Dakota. Indeed, in nearby Nebraska, another farm state, a citizen from Sidney (a small town southeast of Scottsbluff) expressed similar concerns at approximately the same moment: "In regard to foreign policy, I am wondering why most of the burden of supplying troops for Korea has fallen on the U.S.[.] I think we are rushing into this business a little too fast. Especially when we start sending boys 18 & 19 years old over to Korea after just a very short period of training. I am wondering what will happen to our farms if all of the boys are taken off of them. Who will be left to do the work? Most of the fathers are too old to do all of this work by themselves" (Marian Sherwood to Kenneth S. Wherry, January 22, 1951, Kenneth Wherry Papers, Box 13, Nebraska State Historical Society, Lincoln, Nebraska).

³⁶"Public Opinion Poll - Results of Senator Langer's recent questionnaire —, 1951-1952," William Langer Papers, Box 477, Folder 20. Interestingly, another poll taken in 1948 by Milton Young had revealed a similar percentage of opponents in North Dakota to universal military training (*Grand Forks Herald*, March 25, 1948, Milton Young Papers, Box 284, Folder 1). According to historian Glenn Smith, such an opposition to UMT in North Dakota was easily understandable: "In an agrarian economy, young, healthy males are an asset. By the time they are 18 years of age, their help on the farm is considerable. Yet, under military conscription, they become subject to the draft at the time when their potential as farm help is greatest" (Smith, 220).

³⁷Robinson, 438-440.

³⁸Wilkins, "The Nonpartisan League," 106.

favorable in 1947 to aid for Greece and Turkey; as he confessed in March: "I was once a pretty good isolationist and would still be one if I thought it were possible for us to live safely on this side of the ocean. It seems utterly impossible now with the atomic bomb, aviation improvements, and all other new methods of warfare. It seems to me now that we will never be safe unless we have some assurance that the gangsters in other parts of the world are not in a position to easily start war."³⁹ Furthermore, the Republican senator, who stated during the same year that "our future depends almost entirely on the success of the United Nations,"⁴⁰ also voted for the Marshall Plan in 1948.⁴¹ But Young was not the only North Dakotan to support some of Truman's internationalist measures at the time of the 80th Congress: his Republican colleague Charles Robertson (1945-1949) of the lower house, for instance, praised the Greek-Turkish Aid Program.⁴²

More broadly, various foreign policy issues exemplify the strength of the internationalist sentiment among the North Dakotan population. During the Truman years, for example, issues such as the United Nations, the European Recovery Program and NATO clearly showed the "internationalist propensity" of numerous ordinary citizens.

³⁹Milton Young to E. J. Pravda, March 25, 1947, Milton Young Papers, Box 17, Folder 28. A few weeks later, Young was more explicit concerning the need to support Truman: "If Greece and Turkey collapse, it will mean the domination of all of the Mediterranean, which is the key to the Middle East, by Russia, and this domination would spread to all countries of Europe....If we refuse to go along with the President, it would, for all practical purposes, neutralize any influence our government could have in Europe, and this would be the most disastrous effect of all. Stalin could say our people are not behind the President" (Milton Young to M. E. Owens, April 19, 1947, Milton Young Papers, Box 17, Folder 29).

⁴⁰Milton Young to Alfred S. Dale, Jr., April 29, 1947, Milton Young Papers, Box 17, Folder 28.

⁴¹Schoenebaum, ed., 623.

⁴²*Congressional Record*, May 9, 1947, 4962.

Regarding the United Nations, it is interesting to note that many North Dakotans viewed favorably American adherence to the organization in 1945. An examination of Langer's papers even reveals that a clear majority of citizens favored adoption of the Charter. Historian Glenn Smith, in fact, found that more than 90% of those who wrote to the Republican senator supported the U.N. Charter.⁴³ For instance, between the beginning of April and the end of July 1945, Langer received pro-U.N. letters from the Knights of Columbus Club of Napoleon (a small town southeast of Bismarck), some Fargo citizens, the Presbyterian Churches of North Dakota and a delegation of Driscoll's (a small town east of Bismarck) citizens.⁴⁴ With his negative vote on the U.N. Charter, Langer consequently appeared as not truly representative of the views of his constituents. Interestingly enough, a review of Usher Burdick's correspondence shows that North Dakotan support for the United Nations, although difficult to quantify, seems to have continued into the Eisenhower years.⁴⁵

The debates over the Marshall Plan and NATO also demonstrate a certain commitment to internationalism in North Dakota. Thus, a poll taken in the state in early 1948 indicated significant support for the European Recovery Program among townspeople and farmers.⁴⁶ Thus, to the question "Do you favor the Marshall

⁴³Smith, 99.

⁴⁴John Mitzel to William Langer, April 14, 1945, William Langer Papers, Box 146, Folder 4; Bert E. Johnson to William Langer, July 23, 1945, William Langer Papers, Box 146, Folder 4; W. H. Northrop to William Langer, July 23, 1945, William Langer Papers, Box 146, Folder 4; Robert Carey to William Langer, July 23, 1945, William Langer Papers, Box 146, Folder 4; Petition from Driscoll's citizens to William Langer, July 23, 1945, William Langer Papers, Box 146, Folder 4.

⁴⁵Mrs. E. D. Michel to Usher Burdick, February 18, 1953, Usher Burdick Papers, Box 30, Folder 13.

⁴⁶Wilkins, "The Nonpartisan League," 106. This state of affairs may help to understand Robert Wilkins' affirmation to the effect that it was "unjustified to assume that rural people were more 'isolationist' than other North Dakotans" [Nels Lillehaugen, "Survey of American Policy in the Cold War, 1945-1950, as Reflected by the North Dakota Press" (Ph.D.

[P]lan?, no less than 3,367 North Dakotans out of 5,000 answered in the affirmative."⁴⁷ Concerning the North Atlantic Pact, it must be noted that Milton Young's correspondence contains many pro-NATO letters during the year 1949, such as this one from a Fargo citizen who manifestly did not appreciate the senator's conservative position:

Isolationism today is as out of date as removing thyroid to cure goiter. Most of our [i]solationists claim to be the champions of free enterprise, champions of democracy. The record of history shows that by their causing us to desert the [League] after World War I, and thus causing the break down (*sic*) of world cooperation..., it threw the world into a general break down (*sic*) of world trade which caused the national depressions which caused the necessity of state controls and the necessary regimentation and general drift toward totalitarianism.⁴⁸

Exasperated by Young's opposition to the North Atlantic Pact, another Fargo constituent even contended: "I do not believe that isolationism dominates the people of North Dakota at the present time."⁴⁹ Langer's correspondence also includes pro-NATO testimonies, which casts doubt on Robert Wilkins' assertion that, in the summer of 1949, "fortified by letters and petitions from North Dakota, not a single one of which favored the treaty, Langer launched an attack on NATO."⁵⁰ For instance, a citizen from Jamestown (a city between Bismarck and Fargo) vehemently

dissertation, University of Idaho, 1971), 267].

⁴⁷"Results of Young Poll Listed," *Grand Forks Herald*, March 25, 1948, Milton Young Papers, Box 284, Folder 1.

⁴⁸A. Gordon More to Senators William Langer and Milton R. Young, July 14, 1949, Milton Young Papers, Box 23, Folder 1.

⁴⁹Walter L. Stockwell to Milton Young, July 19, 1949, Milton Young Papers, Box 23, Folder 1.

⁵⁰Robert P. Wilkins, "Senator William Langer and National Priorities: An Agrarian Radical's View of American Foreign Policy, 1945-1952," *North Dakota Quarterly*, 2 (autumn 1974):46.

objected to Langer's stance in mid-July, saying "I believe you are making a mistake in opposing the [Atlantic] [p]act."⁵¹

In the same vein, the internationalist sentiment was far from being absent from the North Dakota press. In his doctoral dissertation dealing with the period 1945-1950, Nels Lillehaugen has affirmed "that weekly and daily newspapers in North Dakota not only faithfully reported but intelligently analyzed developments of the Cold War, which resulted in an editorial shift from pre-war isolationism to one of awareness of international responsibility."⁵² In fact, with the exception of *The Leader* (a weekly published at Bismarck and considered as the political organ of Senator Langer)⁵³ and, for a time, the *Valley City Times-Record* (from a little town located 70 miles west of Fargo), almost all of North Dakotan editors repudiated isolationism in the incipient cold war context and advocated a dynamic role for the American nation in curbing the Soviet threat.⁵⁴ Thus, newspapers such as the *Grand Forks Herald* — whose editor had widely traveled and read —⁵⁵ and the *Fargo Forum*, generally considered as the two most influential newspapers in North Dakota,⁵⁶ tended to denounce William Langer's dissenting vote on the United Nations Charter and supported George Marshall's historic speech at Harvard in 1947.⁵⁷

⁵¹R. J. Holmes to William Langer, July 16, 1949, William Langer Papers, Box 265, Folder 3.

⁵²Lillehaugen, xi.

⁵³*Ibid.*, 9.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, xiv.

⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 3.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 2-3.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 44-46; 177-179. Concerning both issues, however, the *Fargo Forum* expressed some reservations (*ibid.*, 45, 180). The newspaper, for instance, underscored that there were some aspects in the United Nations Charter "which could be questionable in value" (*ibid.*, 45).

For their part, newspapers such as the *Bismarck Tribune* and the *Minot Daily News* approved Truman's request for aid to Greece and Turkey as well as the North Atlantic Pact.⁵⁸

Interestingly enough, during the Korean episode, highly criticized in North Dakota by politicians and inhabitants alike, the press was generally supportive of Truman's foreign policy. For instance, even during the December 1950 debacle, following the Chinese counter-offensive of November, no less than twelve newspapers — five dailies and seven weeklies — “pledged their continued support to the commitment to halt communist aggression.”⁵⁹ Among these newspapers, incidentally, were the *Fargo Forum*, the *Jamestown Sun* and the *Dickinson Press* (from a small town west of Bismarck).⁶⁰ Obviously, the construction of major air and missile bases in Grand Forks and Minot during the second part of the fifties, in inevitably creating many jobs for North Dakotans and most likely making their state particularly vulnerable in the nuclear age, certainly contributed to further stimulate the internationalist sentiment in North Dakota.⁶¹

Having completed this portrait of the internationalist sentiment in North Dakota, some questions immediately come to mind. If the internationalist sentiment was not insignificant in North Dakota during the Truman-Eisenhower years, why did the population vote as it did? Why, for instance, was a politician such as William Langer, described as “North Dakota's most controversial figure,”⁶²

⁵⁸*Ibid.*, 149, 156; 236, 241-242, 244.

⁵⁹Sponberg, 62.

⁶⁰*Ibid.*, 62-63.

⁶¹Danbom, “North Dakota,” 119.

⁶²Lillehaugen, 8.

reelected again and again with generally passive campaigns⁶³ when his isolationist colleagues Henrik Shipstead (Minnesota) and Forrest Donnell (Missouri) were defeated in 1946 and 1950 respectively? To the last question, Nels Lillehaugen has underlined that Langer's backing from the people remained unshaken "because of his courage in the depression years as Governor, as well as his easy ability to communicate with the 'home folks'."⁶⁴ As for politicians such as Usher Burdick and Milton Young, they both consistently introduced several measures on behalf of North Dakota farmers⁶⁵ and we must certainly consider, in the end, the possibility that these members of Congress were primarily judged not by their positions on foreign policy but by their support of farm aid, aid to veterans, federal programs to develop natural resources, etc..

However that may be, it seems fair to affirm that the North Dakotan delegation on Capitol Hill, at least with regards to its views on foreign policy during the Truman-Eisenhower era, was not always representative of its constituents. Consequently, we tend to believe that the allegation characterizing North Dakota as "the nation's most isolationist state during the postwar decade" may appear somewhat exaggerated.

⁶³Langer, incidentally, won reelection in the upper house in 1946, captured all North Dakota counties but three six years later, and won every county in 1958 [Justus D. Doenecke, "William Langer," in John Garraty and Mark Carnes, eds., *American National Biography*, Vol. 13 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 152].

⁶⁴Lillehaugen, 270.

⁶⁵*Congressional Record*, July 20, 1949, 9852; July 24, 1951, A4610; Schoenebaum, ed., 623-624.

SOME THOUGHTS ON *SPECIAL PROVIDENCE*

by

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There is a good deal to admire in Walter Russell Mead's new treatment of the history of American foreign policy entitled *Special Providence*. Mead provides a provocative analytical alternative to the tired realism versus idealism dichotomy that has often been employed to explain U.S. foreign policy. He also makes it clear that isolationism is a largely sterile concept in terms of understanding the American response to international affairs. The book provides the useful reminder that globalization is not just a post-world war development. Mead impressively demonstrates that the relationship of the United States to the international economy has been important to the U.S. for over two centuries.

The core of Mead's analysis is his contention that over the course of American history the interaction of four schools of thought has been responsible for a large successful foreign policy. Each of the schools features a distinctive set of ideas and values which dictates how the United States should behave in international affairs. The content of policy, Mead contends, is a function of the waxing and waning of influence exercised by each school as well as by the ability or inability of each school to find common cause with the others. The four schools are labeled Hamiltonian, Wilsonian, Jeffersonian, and Jacksonian.

The Hamiltonian way is described as emphasizing the U.S. "need to be integrated into the global economy on favorable terms." This need produced a Hamiltonian emphasis on freedom of the seas, maintaining an open door for trade and investment, and, in the nineteenth century, forging amicable relations with Britain and its empire. A protectionist tariff policy was also embraced until World War II. Hamiltonians, Mead asserts, also promoted a strong national government that would provide sufficient military power

and exercise regulatory power, particularly in the area of finance. The Hamiltonian way has not sought to advance transcendent values and achieve, thereby, the moral reform of a quarrelsome and greedy world. The Hamiltonian school, instead, has pursued the economic and strategic interest of the U.S. with great vigor.

Mead's depiction of the Hamiltonian school needs to be strengthened by more emphasis on the tensions and contradictions present within the Hamiltonian point of view. For example, Mead fails to stress that, in the early history of the country, pursuing freedom of the seas and amicable relations with Great Britain were not compatible goals. In the context of European wars, from 1793 to 1812, the United States sought to implement its broad view of neutral rights on the high seas. This effort ran head long into Britain's effort to use its naval power to restrict neutrals' contact with Britain's enemies. The collision of these two endeavors created major problems in Anglo-American relations. Advancing America's freedom on the seas while achieving friendly relations with Great Britain was a difficult, if not impossible, task. Hamilton recognized this and knew that, at times, a choice had to be made between these competing goals. In the Jay Treaty, he opted for better relations with Britain at the cost of backing down on freedom of the seas. The Hamiltonian school often confronted this type of choice. Mead's treatment of this school would be enriched by more emphasis on these types of dilemmas.

Mead's analysis of the Hamiltonian perspective also contains some curious contentions and bothersome omissions. Mead contends that the period 1860-1929 was "the zenith of Hamiltonian power in the United States." He also contends that strong, centralized authority provided by central banks and regulatory power exercised by a powerful national government were developments embraced by Hamiltonians. For a good deal of the period 1860-1929, the United States did not have anything resembling a central bank and "laissez-faire" reigned supreme in relation to the regulatory power of government. How, then, can this period be "the zenith of Hamiltonian power in the United States?" Mead also depicts

Hamiltonians as advocates of protective tariffs until around World War 11. During or after World War 11, it is not entirely clear, the Hamiltonians converted to free trade and the abolition of protectionism. By the 1990s, Mead argues, the Hamiltonians were in the vanguard of those advocating a world without trade restrictions. How this important conversion came to pass is never really explained. It should be.

Mead's analysis of the Wilsonian point of view stresses the school's emphasis on the advancement of the principles of democratic government and the protection of human rights. While advancing these principles, Wilsonians insist "that the United States has the right and the duty to change the rest of the world's behavior, and that the United States can and should concern itself not only with way other countries conduct their international affairs, but with their domestic policies as well." Mead traces this Wilsonian urge to the American missionary movement of the nineteenth century. The missionary impulse sought to go forth in the world and make it a better place. Wilsonians, in government carried on this work in foreign policy.

Mead astutely stresses the point that Wilsonian projects represent more than the work of dreamy-eyed and impractical idealists. Wilsonian endeavors have a practical side. Advancing American principles, in effect, pays handsome dividends. Simply put, if people around the world embrace American values, then the United States will be able to advance its foreign policy goals in a congenial environment.

Unfortunately, Mead fails to emphasize sufficiently how this practical side of Wilsonianism has meshed nicely with the Hamiltonian perspective. He does note that there are complementary points between the schools. (See pp. 167-168.) Mead stresses, however, the points of antagonism between the two perspectives. He argues, for example, that the foreign policy debates of the 1990s were basically a struggle between the Hamiltonian and Wilsonian points of view. This emphasis on

antagonism neglects very important instances of the two schools working together effectively. For example, the United States rationale for cold war policies was often an effective amalgam of Hamiltonian and Wilsonian considerations. Also, more than antagonism between the two schools exists in the contemporary world. The achievement of Wilsonian ends, such as democratic government that promotes the rule of law can provide the software in societies that is essential to the creation of the kind of integrated global economy desired by the Hamiltonians.

Mead also cannot make up his mind where Wilsonians stand on the use of violence. On one hand, he cites the prevention of war as part of the "grand strategy" of the Wilsonian school. It is only in the 1990s in the Balkans, Mead contends, that Wilsonians have "discovered a hitherto unsuspected taste for blood." However, he also cites examples in the book of Wilsonians, tramping off to war or inviting the use of violence in international affairs. If Mead is unwilling to tell us which is the real Wilsonianism, then he needs to expend more ink in explaining the Wilsonian bifurcation regarding war.

Reservations aside, Mead has crafted a credible description of the Hamiltonian and Wilsonian schools of thought. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for his description of the Jacksonian tradition. This part of his analysis remains very much a work in progress.

Mead's depiction of a Jacksonian school begins by asking what accounts for the frequent use of heavy handed violence in American foreign policy. A Jacksonian tradition, he argues, armed with a virulent nationalism and an exaggerated sense of honor, has made a major contribution to this propensity for violence. This point of view, while slow to anger and slow to mobilize, is capable of ferocity once aroused. The Jacksonian way operates on instinct and emotion more often than intellect and reason. According to Mead, "those who like to cast American foreign policy as an unhealthy mix of ignorance, isolationism, and irresponsible trigger-happy cowboy diplomacy are often thinking of the Jacksonian tradition." Mead's

analysis of the Jacksonian persuasion, despite his occasional protests to the contrary, is essentially a trip through the land of the Yahoos.

Mead's treatment of this school of thought suffers, first of all, from a lack of clarity. It is never very clear whether Jacksonianism is only a popular sentiment forced upon a reluctant foreign policy elite or is also a point of view warmly embraced by a foreign policy elite. Mead's failure to demonstrate the sustained presence of the Jacksonian perspective in the policy of any foreign policy leader contributes significantly to this lack of clarity.

Mead also posits the existence of a Jacksonian folk community from which the Jacksonian tradition has grown. Originating during the colonial era in the backcountry Scotch-Irish population, the Jacksonian folk community, Mead contends, has spread throughout the country. Mead's analysis here is superficial and in need of much greater explanation. He proceeds frequently to cite values that he deems Jacksonian values stemming from a Jacksonian folk community. It is something of a mystery why Mead thinks the reader should accept such alleged connections when it is often easy to assign the origin of the cited values to other, equally credible sources.

In assigning certain characteristics to the Jacksonian persuasion, Mead also undermines his own analysis. Mead cites concerns about reputation as an important issue to Jacksonians. Jacksonians give great weight to preserving American prestige in the world. It is surprising, to say the least, that this concern should be noted as a Jacksonian characteristic. (Mead does not emphasize it in connection with the other three schools.) It is difficult to think of an American foreign policy leader since 1945 who has not embraced considerations of prestige as a crucial foreign policy matter. Should we conclude, then, that all of these leaders were, in some significant way, Jacksonians? If so, I anxiously await the demonstration that people such as Henry Kissinger and McGeorge and William Bundy, all self-proclaimed defenders of American prestige, possessed major Jacksonian credentials. In addition, Mead contends that Jacksonian

military doctrine asserts that the enemy's will is a legitimate target in war. Just about every belligerent in every twentieth century war has adopted this idea. How, then, can this position be cited as a distinguishing characteristic of a Jacksonian school of thought? Finally, Mead argues that Jacksonians "have always supported loose monetary policy." If he means by this the expansion of the money supply by such means as the issuance of bank notes, then Mead is clearly mistaken. Jackson, himself, disliked banks in general and found particularly repugnant their practice of issuing notes which, he felt, corrupted the money supply. Jackson and other Jacksonians like him personified the hard money position in the first half of the nineteenth century.

In contrast to his chapter on the Jacksonians, Mead's analysis of the Jeffersonian tradition is a major contribution. Jeffersonians, Mead argues, "have historically been skeptical about Hamiltonian and Wilsonian policies." Hamiltonians and Wilsonians, the Jeffersonian tradition holds, are inclined to involve the United States in dangerous adventures in behalf of questionable interests. These adventures often carry the unnecessary risk of war the cost of which jeopardizes liberty at home. Jeffersonians define American interest narrowly and cautiously. The Jeffersonian tradition has been the brake on American foreign policy.

Caution, Mead stresses, is the watchword of Jeffersonians, not noninvolvement. The Jeffersonian school accepts the notion that the United States must be an alert participant in international affairs. This tradition also eschews doctrinaire attachments which resist yielding to altered circumstances. For example, the Jeffersonian view was able to leave behind the intense suspicion of Great Britain, which characterized it before 1812, and to move, after 1820, to the support of accommodation with Britain which avoided war with that power and which, in fact, enlisted the British navy as America's Atlantic protector.

The central dilemma for the Jeffersonian school, Mead argues, has been separating healthy caution from irresponsible neglect. Healthy

caution can avoid misguided adventures and dangerous situations. But ill-conceived caution can cause problems to fester to the point of disaster. Put another way, the Jeffersonian tradition might save us from future Vietnams. However, as Mead points out, Jeffersonians, in the 1930s, were slow to see Germany as a threat.

The beauty of Mead's treatment of the Jeffersonian school is that it allows us to throw the idea of American isolationism into the garbage can, a place it richly deserves. The Jeffersonian tradition, as Mead describes it, makes more sense of American policy and politics than does a supposed inclination to withdraw from foreign affairs. Mead has given us a framework of analysis that can yield riches far beyond those provided by the internationalist v. isolationism or idealist v. realist dichotomies. The Jeffersonian school as the monitor of the Hamiltonian and Wilsonian schools holds the promise of being a key way of understanding American foreign policy. If, in future editions, Mead manages to bring greater analytical clarity to the idea of a Jacksonian school, then we will really have something special.

NEW EVIDENCE ON THE 1979-1989 WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

by

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What was behind the Soviet decision in December 1979 to invade Afghanistan? And why did Mikhail Gorbachev pull out Soviet troops 10 years later? What was the role of the U.S. covert assistance program, in particular the Stinger missiles? What role did US and Soviet intelligence play?

These were among the questions behind a major international conference organized in April by the Wilson Center's COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT (CWIHP) in cooperation with the Center's ASIA PROGRAM and KENNAN INSTITUTE, George Washington University's Cold War Group, and the National Security Archive. Designed as a "critical oral history" conference, the discussions centered on newly released and translated U.S., Russian, Bulgarian, German, Czech, and Hungarian documents on the war. Conference participants included former Soviet officials and National Security Council (NSC), State Department, and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officials from the Carter, Bush, and Reagan administrations, as well as scholarly experts from around the world. It was made possible by funding from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and other donors.

Russian documents reveal how one-sided reporting from Afghanistan severely limited Soviet policy options between March of 1979, when an uprising in Herat and calls for Soviet intervention first surfaced during discussions in Moscow, and autumn of that year. Russian scholar Svetlana Savranskaya argued that the Soviet leaders' almost exclusive reliance on alarmist KGB assessments of a quickly deteriorating situation in Afghanistan in the fall of 1979 — at the expense of more cautious military intelligence and diplomatic channels — constituted a critical factor in the decision to intervene.

That year, Soviet concerns mounted over the possibility of a possible U.S. intervention in Iran following the ouster of the pro-Western Shah. Moscow, moreover, feared that the United States sought a substitute foothold in Afghanistan and worried about maintaining credibility with communist world allies. Soviet leaders were genuinely concerned that Afghan strongman Hafizullah Amin was either a U.S. agent or prepared to sell out to the United States. At the meeting, former U.S. Charge d'Affaires J. Bruce Amstutz as well as other participants forcefully debunked the myth of any Agency links to Amin. Amstutz, who met Amin five times in the fall of 1979, remembered not detecting any hint in his conversations

with Amin to suggest that the Afghan leader wanted to ally with the United States.

U.S. relations with successive communist regimes in Afghanistan had been volatile since the 1978 communist coup. The KGB record remains garbled on a key event in the downward spiral in the U.S.-Afghan relationship prior to the invasion, the still-mysterious February 1979 abduction of U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs. The materials, provided to CWIHP by defected KGB archivist Vasiliy Mitrokhin, suggest that the Amin regime, against the advice of the U.S. Embassy, had authorized the storming of the hotel where the ambassador was held by three terrorists associated with a radical Islamic group. It remains unclear why the KGB recommended the execution of the only terrorist who survived the storming of the hotel prior to his interrogation by U.S. embassy personnel.

Dubs, a proponent of a wait-and-see policy toward Kabul, favored the resumption of Afghan officer training in the United States, which had been suspended after the communist take-over, eager as other State Department officials to avoid forcing Kabul to rely solely on the USSR. But by early 1979 relations between the two countries were rapidly declining. Following a meeting with Amin in early 1979, Carter Administration NSC official Thomas P. Thornton recounted providing a negative assessment of the regime that influenced the U.S. to suspend its assistance program to Afghanistan, a decision reinforced by the "Dubs Affair."

In mid-1979, the Carter administration began to provide non-lethal aid to the Afghan resistance movement. The Reagan administration would inherit an active program of covert military aid to the Mujahadeen that had begun in December 1979 (though some suggest that a U.S.-funded arms pipeline was in place as early as August 1979 — an assertion repudiated by some of the CIA officials present). Over the next two years, under the leadership of CIA Director William Casey, aid developed into a sophisticated coalition effort to train the Mujahadeen resistance fighters, provide them with Czech and East German arms, and fund the whole operation.

In 1980, the government of Saudi Arabia decided to share the costs of this operation equally with the United States. In its full range of activities, the coalition included the intelligence services of the United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, and China. At the height of the covert assistance program in 1986-87, the coalition was injecting some 60,000 tons of weapons, ammunition, and communications equipment per year into the Afghan war, according to the former CIA station chief in Pakistan, Milton Bearden.

Nevertheless, Elie D. Krakowski, former special assistant to U.S. assistant secretary of defense for international security policy during the Reagan administration, argued that U.S. aid and overall strategy toward Afghanistan was left wanting, largely due to the fact that Afghanistan policy derived largely from U.S. relationships with Pakistan and Iran. This, in turn, resulted in allowing the Pakistani ally broad leeway, channeling U.S. aid to radical and, to a lesser extent, moderate Islamic resistance groups. Confronted with allegations that one third of the Stinger missiles alone were kept by the Pakistan intelligence service, CIA officials, by contrast, asserted that oversight over the aid program was tighter and more discriminate than publicly perceived.

London-based Norwegian scholar Odd Arne Westad pointed out that Russian documents reveal how quickly the Soviet leadership grew disenchanted with the intervention in Afghanistan. A narrow circle of leaders had made the decision to intervene, with KGB chief Andropov and Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov playing critical roles. According to Anatoly S. Chernyaev, former member of the Central Committee's International Department and later a key foreign policy adviser to Mikhail Gorbachev, many like him learned of the invasion from the radio. Criticism of the decision was more widespread than often assumed. Not surprisingly, internal discussion of settlement proposals began as early as spring 1980. The proposals bore remarkable similarities to those introduced by the United Nations in 1986.

By the time Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the war in Afghanistan was largely stalemated. The Soviet forces were mainly tied up in cities and in defending airfields and bases, leaving only roughly 15 percent of their troops for operations. According to Lester Grau, a U.S. Army specialist on the war, the Afghan conflict had become “a war of logistics.” Grau also emphasized the heavy toll disease took on the Soviet troops; almost 60 percent of them were hospitalized at some point during the war. Some advocates of the U.S. covert aid program, such as Congressman Charles Wilson (D-TX), contend that the U.S.-backed aid program drove the Soviets out of Afghanistan and credit the courageous decision to introduce the shoulder-held Stinger missiles as the basic turning point. Introduced in 1986, this missile was highly effective against Soviet helicopters.

Chernyaev argued that Gorbachev had decided to withdraw from Afghanistan soon after taking power in 1985. The Reagan administration’s active program of aid and assistance, in coordination with its coalition partners, played a role in shaping Moscow’s decision to end the war and withdraw. But Chernayev pointed to the loss of public support within the Soviet Union — as reflected in demonstrations by the mothers of soldiers, negative press reports on the campaign, and the high number of desertions — as the paramount impetus for the Gorbachev’s decision to withdraw.

Gorbachev could not pursue his campaign of reform unless he ended the war in Afghanistan and sharply reduced the arms race. Even then it took the new Soviet leader four years to gain approval from the other members of the Politburo and the leadership of the army and the KGB to withdraw. Eager not to mirror the perceptions stemming from the U.S. pullout from Vietnam a decade earlier and intent on preserving a “neutral” and friendly regime in Afghanistan, Moscow leaders, particularly Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, sought “Afghanization” without “losing the war” by stabilizing and propping up the last communist regime of Nadjibullah. With the

toppling of the last communist regime in 1992, that strategy had failed.

Besides those mentioned above, former officials and policymakers among the conference participants included former RAND analyst Alexander Alexiev, Charles Cogan, Ambassador Raymond L. Garthoff, former Kabul University professor M. Hassan Kakar, Ambassador Dennis Kux, Ambassador William Green Miller, former Carter NSC staffer Jerrold Schecter, Bush Sr. Special Afghanistan Envoy Peter Tomsen, and former Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Nicholas A. Veliotis. The COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT will publish the documents gathered for the conference in its next *Bulletin* and on its website at <http://cwihp.si.edu>.

CORRECTION

The e-mail messages exchanged by Larry Berman and Jeffrey Kimball, which were reproduced in the March 2002 issue of the *SHAFR Newsletter* (vol. 33, no. 1, pp. 37-39), were mis-dated. Berman's message originally preceded Kimball's and should have been dated January 9, 2002. The original date of Kimball's reply was January 10, 2002.

- the editor

LETTERS

9 July 2002

In his piece in the June 2002 Newsletter, Binoy Kampmark ascribes to me the view that “the Cold War was the brave and essential response of free men to communist aggression.” This was not my view — as the sentence in the *Foreign Affairs* article from which these words were extracted makes clear. That sentence reads in full: “The orthodox American view, as originally set forth by the American government and as reaffirmed until recently by most American scholars, has been that the Cold War was the brave and essential response of free men to communist aggression.”

Mr. Kampmark mistakes my account of “the orthodox American view” for my personal view. The rest of my article argues that “the orthodox American view,” and also the orthodox revisionist view, were simplistic and quite inadequate to an understanding of the Cold War. My conclusion: “Each side believed with passion that future international stability depended on its own conception of world order. Each side, in pursuing its own clearly indicated and deeply cherished principles, was only confirming the fear of the other that it was bent on aggression.... Each side felt compelled to adopt policies which the other could not but regard as a threat to the principles of the peace. Each then felt compelled to undertake defensive measures.... So the machinery of suspicion and countersuspicion, action and counter-action, was set in motion.”

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr

* * * * *

July 1, 2002

Richard Hill refers to Harvey Asher and to me in a footnote intended to support his claim that unspecified historians (the implication is all) have “agreed since World War II that Hitler’s declaration of war was the reason why the United States entered the European War...” Two sentences later he refers to it as a *casus*

belli. In fact, Asher's article assigns no cause to America's declaration of war but speculates only about the reasons for Hitler's. For my part, I have never regarded Hitler's speech of December 11 or the formal declaration of the German *chargé-d'affaires* delivered at the State Department the following day as more than the occasion for a declaration of war. I know of no serious historian who has ever considered them the actual *casus belli*. Their elevation to that status was not, as Hill would have us believe, "a concoction invented by historians in 1945" or at any other time, but is his own concoction which is shaped suspiciously like a strawman.

Manfred Jonas

OBITUARY

Longtime SHAFR member F. Kevin Simon passed away suddenly April 21 at the very young age of 49. Kevin was a graduate of Michigan State University where he studied U.S. diplomatic history with Paul Varg. He received an M.A. degree from the University of Kentucky in 1977, writing a thesis on the 1945 Dixie Mission to China, and a diploma in advanced historical studies from Trinity College, Cambridge. He joined the faculty at Sayre School, Lexington, Kentucky, in 1984, and remained there for the rest of his career except for brief stints at Stratford Hall in Virginia and as director of programs at the FDR Library. A splendid teacher, he won numerous teaching awards and was a frequent participant in summer programs for secondary school teachers. He also created and ran until his death the annual David A. Sayre History Symposium, which brought to Sayre School distinguished historians in a day-long seminar with secondary school teachers. Many of the symposia focused on diplomatic history topics, and a number of SHAFR members participated in the symposium. Kevin had a special interest in creating closer bonds between history teachers at all levels, and he took great pride in the Sayre Symposium. A

warm and outgoing person with a devotion to history and a true passion for teaching, Kevin will be greatly missed by his legion of former students and his many friends and colleagues across the country.

George C. Herring

SHAFR COUNCIL MINUTES

University of Georgia, Executive Conference Room

June 22, 2002 - 7:30-9 am

Robert Beisner presiding

Members Present: Ken Osgood, Steve Rabe, Jim Matray, Bill Burr, Dennis Merrill, Peter Hahn Bob Beisner, Lloyd Ambrosius, Malcolm Crystal, Bill Walker, Chester Pach, Bob McMahon, Hope Harrison, Bob Schulzinger, Tom Zeiler, Mark Lawrence, William Brinker

1. Stephen Rabe, reporting for the Holt Fellowship Committee, announced this year's winners. Awards of \$1,000 each went to: Erez Manela (Yale) and Daniel Michael (George Washington).
2. Lloyd Ambrosius announced that George Herring (Kentucky) was awarded the Graebner Award at the 2002 annual SHAFR meeting.
3. Bob Beisner discussed the current situation of the SHAFR guide. The guide progresses on schedule. A brief discussion followed regarding price, mechanics of distribution of the volumes, and the process of supplementary updating.
4. Malcolm Crystal from Blackwell Publishers stated that membership has held steady. A small increase in institutional members countered a small decrease in individual members. Crystal described Blackwell's variable pricing scheme for

institutional members, some of which would be involved in consortia to purchase *Diplomatic History*.

5. Bob Schulzinger discussed the experience of the first full year of publishing *Diplomatic History* at Colorado. He proposed that Council approve the publishing of a fifth issue of *DH* each year. The extra issue would, in the beginning, be devoted to some innovations. Discussion followed and members were supportive of the proposal. Some noted the special value of historiographical essays. A motion to approve the fifth issue passed unanimously.

6. Beisner opened discussion regarding the SHAFR Endowment. Discussion followed concerning the purpose and need for a Finance Committee. A committee will report back at the January, 2003 meeting.

7. Peter Hahn reminded members that dues would increase to \$40.00 for regular members and \$20.00 for students.

8. William Walker reported on the 2002 meeting, its various (minor) problems connected with the program. He noted that there were fewer proposals approved than in the past. In the discussion which followed it was noted that perhaps too few senior members were delivering papers at the meeting.

9. Hope Harrison from George Washington, the site of the 2003 meeting (June 6-8) reported for Peter Hill (Local Arrangements). She discussed the early planning that has occurred. David Schmitz will be the Program Chair. Discussion followed relative to timing of the annual meetings. No dates seem ideal to both those teaching on semesters and those on quarters.

10. No firm dates or place are confirmed for the 2004 conference.

11. Council expressed their thanks for the smooth working conference in Athens to William Walker and Bill Stueck.

PERSONALS

Kinley Brauer has retired from the University of Minnesota and has been appointed Visiting Professor of History at Duke. He is also chairing the George Louis Beer Prize Committee for the AHA.

Francis M. Carroll (St. John's College: Winnipeg) has been awarded the 2001 J.W. Dafoe Book Prize for his book, *A Good and Wise Measure: The Search for the Canadian-American Boundary, 1783-1842*. The prize is for the best book on Canada and international affairs.

Joseph M. Henning (Saint Vincent College) has been awarded a Fulbright Scholar grant to lecture at Tohoku University, Japan, during the 2002-3 academic year. Henning will teach in the Graduate School of Arts and Letters and the Graduate School of law.

Klaus Larres (Queen's Belfast) has been selected as the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Library of Congress for the academic year 2002-3. He will work on a project tentatively entitled "The United States and the Unity of Europe: a comparative analysis of American policymaking and European integration in the post-1945 era and the post-Cold War years."

Klaus Schwabe (emeritus - U. of Technology, Aachen), has been awarded the Chaire Glaverbal of the University of Louvain-la-Neuve/Belgium for 2002, to teach a course on the American involvement in European integration.

CALENDAR

2002

- November 1 Deadline, materials for Dec. *Newsletter*.
November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.

2003

- November 15 Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.
January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main St., Malden MA 02148.
January 2-5 117th annual meeting of the AHA in Chicago. Deadline has passed.
January 15 Deadline for the Bernath Article Award.
February 1 Deadline for the Bernath Book Award, deadline for March *Newsletter*, and deadline for Ferrell Book Prize.
February 15 Deadline for the Bernath lecture prize.
March 1 Deadline for Graebner Prize nominations.
April 3-6 The 96th meeting of the OAH will take place at Memphis at the Cook Convention Center.
April 15 Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
June 6-8 SHAFR's 29th annual conference will meet at George Washington University. Hope Harrison will be local arrangements chair.
August 1 Deadline, materials for the Sept. *Newsletter*.

Sites for future AHA meetings are: Washington, January 8-11, 2004; Seattle, January 6-9, 2005; Philadelphia, January 5-8, 2006.

The 2004 OAH Meeting will be in Boston, March 25-28 at the Marriott Copley Place.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Symposium to Honor Arnie Offner

On Friday, 15 November 2002, the University of Connecticut Foreign Policy Seminar will hold a special symposium to discuss Arnold Offner's new book on Harry Truman, *Another Such Victory*. Professor Offner will discuss his book and Professors Carolyn Eisenberg, Bob McMahon, and Bill Stueck will offer comments. Professor Emeritus Tom Paterson will moderate the discussion, in which audience participation will be welcome. The symposium will begin at 4:30 p.m. in the Dodd Center on the UConn campus. For further information and dinner reservations, contact: Frank Costigliola at 860-486-4356, costig@uconnvm.uconn.edu

**Peacekeeping and Intelligence:
Lessons for the Future?**

NISA/ NDC Conference, November 15-16, 2002
Netherlands National Defense College, near Delft
and The Hague, the Netherlands

The dramatic events in the former Yugoslavia during the last decade of the previous century clearly indicate that the process of planning and executing international military peacekeeping operations can only be carried out successfully when supported by adequate and timely intelligence. With this conference, the Netherlands Intelligence Studies Association and the Netherlands Defense College wish to contribute to the ongoing discussions on Intelligence and Peacekeeping. For further details and registration: www.nisa-intelligence.nl

PUBLICATIONS

David Anderson (Indianapolis), *The Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War*. Columbia, 2002. ISBN 0-2331-11492-3, \$45.00.

Mark Philip Bradley (Wisconsin-Milwaukee), *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950*. North Carolina, 2000. Cloth: ISBN 0-80878-2549-2, \$39.95; paper: ISBN 0-8078-4861-1, \$19.95

Saki Dockrill (King's College, London), *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World?* Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2002. ISBN 0-333-73236-7, £31.50.

Lawrence S. Kaplan (emeritus - Kent State), *Alexander Hamilton: Ambivalent Anglophile*. Scholarly Resources, 2002. Cloth: ISBN 0-8420-2877-3, \$65; paper: ISBN 0-8420-2878-1, \$19.95.

Noam Kochavi (Hebrew University), *A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy during the Kennedy Years*. Praeger, 2002. ISBN 0-275-97216-x, \$67.95.

Klaus Larres & Ann Lane (Queen's U., Belfast & King's College, London), *The Cold War: The Essential Readings*. Blackwell, 2001. New in paper: ISBN 0-631-20706-6, \$29.95.

Doug Little (Clark), *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945*. North Carolina, 2002. ISBN 0-8078-2737-1, \$34.95.

Marlene J. Mayo (Maryland), J. Thomas Rimer, and H. Eleanor Kerkham, eds., *War, Occupation and Creativity: Japan and East Asia, 1920-1960*. U. of Hawaii, 2001. Cloth: ISBN 0-8248-3022-9, \$60.00; paper: ISBN 0-8248-2433-4, \$29.95.

James I. Matray (California, Chico) ed., *Encyclopedia of U.S.-East Asian Relations*, Two volumes. Greenwood, 2002. ISBN 0-313-30557-9, \$175.00.

Cathal Nolan (Boston U), *The Greenwood Encyclopedia of International Relations*, Four Volumes. Greenwood, 2002. ISBN 0-313-30743-1, \$475.00.

Melvin Small (Wayne State), *Antiwarriors: The Vietnam War and the Battle for America's Hearts and Minds*. Scholarly Resources, 2002. Cloth: ISBN 0-8420-2895-1, \$65; paper: ISBN 0-8420-2896-x, \$19.95.

John A. Thompson (Cambridge), *Woodrow Wilson*. Longman, 2001. ISBN 0-582-24737-3, \$15.99.

Marilyn Young (NYU) and Robert Buzzanco (Houston) eds., *A Companion to the Vietnam War*. Blackwell, 2002. ISBN 0-631-21013-x, \$99.95.

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

Complete details regarding SHAFR awards, prizes, and funds are found in the June and December issues of the *Newsletter*, abbreviated information in the March and September issues. Changes and updates are presented here in italics.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976, respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath, in memory of their son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

DESCRIPTION: This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of the history of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination and should be sent to: *Katherine Sibley, Department of History, St. Josephs U., 5600 City Ave., Philadelphia PA 19131-1395*. Books may be sent at any time during 2002, but should not arrive later than February 1, 2003.

Recent Winners: Gregory Mitrovich and Joseph Henning

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

DESCRIPTION: The Bernath Lecture Prize seeks to recognize and encourage excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The winner of the 2002 competition will deliver a lecture at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH. The lecture is to be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address and is to address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. The nominating letter requires evidence of excellence in teaching and research and must reach the Committee no later than 15 February 2003. The Chairperson of the Committee is: *William Walker, Dept. of History, Florida International U., University Park, Miami FL 33199*.

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to any article or essay appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations that is published during 2002. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or, if more than 40 years of age, must be within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of acceptance for publication. Nominations shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR by January 15, 2003. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted to the chairperson of the committee: *Walter Hixson, Dept. of History, U. of Akron, 201 Olin Hall, Akron OH 44325-1902*.

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

This grant has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. Applications, in triplicate, should be sent to: *Terry Anderson, History, Texas A&M, College Station TX 77843*. The deadline for application is November 1, 2002.

Georgetown Travel Grants

The Bernath Dissertation Grant committee also administers grants to be funded from the SHAFR Georgetown fund to support travel for research in the Washington area. The amounts are determined by the committee.

The Myrna F. Bernath Book Award

A prize award of \$2,500.00 to be offered every two years (apply in odd-numbered years) for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Books published in 2002 and 2003 will be considered in 2003. Submission deadline is November 15, 2003. Five copies of each book (or page proofs) must accompany a letter of application. Contact: *Catherine Forslund, Dept. of History, Rockford College, 5050 E. State Street, Rockford IL 61108-2393*.

Most recent winners: Cecilia Lynch (Cornell) and Jessica Gienow-Hecht (LSU)

The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship Award

An award of \$2500 (apply in even-numbered years), to research the study of foreign relations among women scholars. The grants are intended for women at U.S. universities as well as for women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and newly finished Ph.D's. The subject-matter *should be historically based* and concern American foreign relations or aspects of international history, as broadly conceived. Work on purely domestic topics will not be considered. Applications should include a letter of intent and three copies of a detailed research proposal of no more than 2000 words. Send applications to: *Catherine Forslund, Dept. of History, Rockford College, 5050 E. State Street, Rockford IL 61108-2393*. Submission deadline is November 15, 2002.

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

This fellowship is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Applications and supporting papers should be sent before April 15, 2003 to: *Anne Foster, St. Anselm College, Box 1648, 100 St. Anselm Drive, Manchester NH 03102-1310.*

Most recent winner: Mary Montgomery (Maryland)

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history. The deadline for nominations is March 1, 2004. Current chairman: *Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Department of History, University of Nebraska, Lincoln NE 68588-0327.* Phone: 403-472-2414, Fax: 402-47208839, E-mail: lambrosius@unl.edu

Most recent winner: Robert Divine (Texas, Austin)

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture." Deadline for submissions is February 1, 2003. Current Chairperson: *Mary Ann Heiss, History, Kent State University, Kent OH 44242-0001.*

*Most recent winners: Frances Early
Fred Logevall*

**ARTHUR LINK PRIZE
FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING**

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. Current Chairperson: *Milton Gustafson, 2796 Shawn Ct., Ft. Washington MD 20744-2566.*

Most recent winner: Warren Kimball

THE LAWRENCE GELFAND - ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office. Contact: *Peter Hahn, SHAFR Executive Secretary-Treasurer; Department of History, Ohio State U., 106 Dulles Hall, Columbus OH 43210-1361.*

ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This is competition for a book, published in 2002, which is a history of American Foreign Relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author. The deadline for submission of books is February 1, 2003. Current chairperson: *Kinley Brauer, 884 Fearington Post, Pittsboro, NC 27312-8503.*

Recent Winner: Mark Gallicchio (Villanova)

NATIONAL HISTORY DAY AWARD

SHAFR has established an award to recognize students who participate in the National History Day (NHD) program in the area of United States diplomatic history. The purpose of the award is to recognize research, writing, and relations to encourage a better understanding of peaceful interactions between nations. The award may be given in any of the NHD categories. For information contact: *Cathy Gorn, Executive Director, National History Day, 0119 Cecil Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742*