

Passport

The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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Michael Kort on Barton Bernstein and the Bomb
Jeffrey Kimball and Larry Berman Debate "The Decent Interval"
Tom Blanton Ponders the End of History?
Lisle Rose's Tenure Battle
Research Notes from the Ford Library
...and much more

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The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Editorial Office:

Mershon Center for the Study of International Security and Public Policy
1501 Neil Ave.
Columbus, OH 43201
passport@osu.edu
614-292-1681
614-292-2407 (fax)

Executive Director

Peter Hahn, The Ohio State University

Editor

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Cover photo: A dense column of smoke rises more than 60,000 feet into the air over the Japanese port of Nagasaki, the result of an atomic bomb, the second ever used in warfare, dropped on the industrial center from a U.S. B-29 Superfortress. Courtesy National Archives and Records Administration

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Casualty Projections for the Invasion of Japan, Phantom Estimates, and the Math of Barton Bernstein

By Michael Kort

Over the past thirty years, Barton Bernstein has been a prominent participant in scholarly discussion about the bombing of Hiroshima and the surrender of Japan. He is widely recognized as a leading authority on various aspects of that subject, including the question of how many U.S. casualties Harry Truman and his advisors expected would result from the invasion of Japan planned to begin in the fall of 1945.¹ He played an important role, as a defender of low-end casualty estimates, in the 1994-95 debate over the script of the ill-fated *Enola Gay* exhibit that the Smithsonian Institution had planned to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima. His long list of articles examining the bombing of Hiroshima is clearly the product of extensive archival work. He seems to have examined every important document in English related to the main debates about the atomic bombing of Japan, and he has chastised other historians, including those whose conclusions seem to concur with his, for being less than thorough in their research on the casualties issue.² It therefore seems reasonable to apply Bernstein's standards to his own work on that same subject.

First we must go over some familiar ground regarding terminology, in particular the terms "casualties" and "battle casualties." At times some historians seem to use them interchangeably, causing serious confusion. "Casualties" is obviously an umbrella term that includes battle and non-battle casualties; thus it always exceeds battle casualties alone, often by a large number. As will be demonstrated below, Bernstein has mangled this distinction when dealing

with comments made by Admiral William D. Leahy, at the time President Truman's chief of staff, at the crucial White House meeting of June 18, 1945, where Truman and several of his top advisors reviewed Operation Olympic, the plan to invade Kyushu, Japan's southernmost home island. In addition, Bernstein has substituted his own suppositions about what George C. Marshall said at the meeting, using words like "apparently," "probably," and "strongly suggests" for what is missing in the documented historical record to create a casualty estimate that in fact does not exist.

Bernstein has always given a range for the casualties U.S. leaders expected in an invasion of Japan, while maintaining that the numbers were much lower than those Truman later quoted and those many historians, who usually support Truman's decision to use the bomb, have used. For example, in his 1986 article "A Postwar Myth: 500,000 U.S. Lives Saved," Bernstein states that military planners placed expected losses "at 46,000 and sometimes as low as about 20,000 lives."³ In the 1990s he tried to become more precise, at least with regard to what Marshall said and Leahy implied at the meeting of June 18, 1945. In addition, in an article published in 1999, Bernstein tries to reconcile their estimates from that day to the point where Marshall and Leahy "were only mildly disagreeing—63,000 versus 66,500—U.S. casualties." The insignificance of this difference, Bernstein adds, may explain why four participants in the meeting—Leahy, Secretary of War Henry Stimson, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, and Assistant

Secretary of War John McCloy—did not mention any disagreement on casualty estimates in their diaries.⁴

Bernstein uses a lot of qualifiers in writing about this subject, which is not a bad idea given the problems involved, but it seems fair to say he concludes that as of June 18, 1945, Marshall believed that the invasion of Kyushu would entail 63,000 U.S. battle casualties. For example, in an article published in 1998 Bernstein writes that "General George Marshall, the army chief of staff, had apparently told the 18 June 1945 White House meeting, including Truman, that American casualties would not exceed 63,000 among the 190,000 U.S. combat troops in the forthcoming operation on southern Kyushu."⁵ In 1999 Bernstein asserts that the "63,000 estimate . . . strongly suggests that Marshall was thinking in terms of somewhat under 100,000 battle casualties for Olympic, and possibly no more than 63,000 *total battle* casualties in that American operation," and on the same page he refers to "Marshall's own stated estimate of 63,000 ground-force casualties."⁶ In another 1999 article he reaffirms that "General Marshall stated (in Leahy's paraphrased summary) that Olympic 'will not cost us in casualties more than 63,000 of the 190,000 combatant troop estimated as necessary for the operation."⁷

The problem with all of this is that nowhere in the minutes of the June 18 meeting is it recorded that Marshall said these things. That is not because the secretary who took the minutes was shy about taking down numbers. On the contrary, the June 18 minutes record that Marshall cited combat casualties for the

battles of Leyte, Luzon, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, the last of which was not yet over. He provided statistics on American and Japanese soldiers killed in General MacArthur's operations between March 1944 and May 1945. He said that the first thirty days of the Kyushu invasion would not result in more casualties than did Luzon (31,000), but that comment, coming in the sanguinary wake of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, was unlikely to provide Truman with much comfort, since the battle for Kyushu was expected to last much longer than thirty days. Marshall also mentioned the size of the U.S. force that would invade Kyushu—766,700—and the number of Japanese troops expected to defend the island—350,000. These numbers are all clearly and precisely recorded in the minutes, as are the statistics on air casualties (2 percent per mission; about 30 percent per month) provided by General Ira Eaker.⁸ But where is Bernstein's 63,000? Given the reason the meeting was called in the first place and what was at stake, is it possible that if Marshall had mentioned such a critical number the meeting's official secretary, JCS secretary Brigadier General A. J. McFarland, would not have made absolutely sure it was recorded? Would an army general, who surely would have understood its importance, leave out such a statement by, of all people, General George C. Marshall? Such assumptions are so unlikely they can be ruled out. Since the 63,000 casualty estimate is not recorded in the detailed minutes of the meeting, which occupy more than seven single-spaced pages for a meeting that lasted about an hour, historians must decide which document is more reliable: the carefully prepared and reviewed official minutes of the June 18 meeting taken on the spot, none of the drafts of which mentions the 63,000 figure, or Leahy's haphazardly organized diary entry written down some time later in the day.

Marshall was clearly reluctant to give a specific casualty figure at this meeting. His first comment about casualties was, "Our experience in the Pacific War is so diverse as to

casualties that it is considered wrong to give any estimate in numbers."⁹ Given this reluctance and the lack of any recorded references to the 63,000 number outside Leahy's diary, it would be reasonable to conclude that the evidence decisively favors the minutes.¹⁰ Bernstein, who insists that other historians writing about this subject provide archival evidence to back up their arguments, should do the same to support his own claims.¹¹ Leahy's hearsay diary entry does not come close to meeting his standard, since it *disagrees* with the official minutes of the June 18 meeting and is not verified by any other contemporary document. It cannot in any way establish that Marshall used the figure 63,000 that afternoon. It seems fair to say that Bernstein, who demands "unalloyed" evidence from others, has created his estimate through alchemy by transmuted Leahy's nighttime diary entry into an afternoon statement by Marshall at the June 18 meeting.

Indeed, the documentary record of the June 18 meeting suggests casualty estimates several times higher than 63,000. The minutes record that Marshall made his presentation and included the reference to 31,000 casualties in the first thirty days. Then Leahy, who opposed the invasion and, as a Navy man, favored a strategy of blockade (the Navy's job) and bombardment (the job of the Army Air Force), commented that if the president wanted to know how many casualties there would be on Kyushu he should look at Okinawa, where, he said, the casualty rate was 35 percent. Next, Admiral King suggested that casualties on Kyushu would fall somewhere between the losses suffered on Luzon and Okinawa. Finally, Marshall said that the assault force for Kyushu would comprise 766,700 troops. Here we have a link in black and white—evidence Bernstein would call "archival"—that we do not have to create with supposition or speculation: Leahy says the expected casualty rate is likely to be 35 percent of the assault force, and then Marshall gives the size of that force as 766,700. Marshall does *not* use the

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
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contact:

Christopher Jespersen
Program Chair
Dept. of History
North Georgia College &
State University
Dahlonega, GA 30597
tcjespersen@ngcsu.edu
(706) 864-1903

Mark Lawrence
Local Arrangements Chair
Dept. of History
University of Texas-Austin
Austin, TX 78712
(512)-475-7267
malawrence@mail.utexas.edu

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number 190,000, as Bernstein claims he did. The next number, in the following sentence, is the expected number of Japanese defenders, 350,000.¹² As many commentators have pointed out, some quick math gives a total well in excess of 250,000 casualties, and this only for Olympic, the first half of a two-stage invasion (the other, Coronet, would be launched on March 1, 1946, against Tokyo). It is eminently reasonable to assume that every person at the meeting made this straightforward mental calculation.

Then comes a twist. Having first created a casualty estimate for George Marshall through speculation, Bernstein then tries to reconcile conflicting remarks by Marshall and Leahy actually recorded in the June 18 minutes. His does this by maintaining that when Leahy made his 35 percent statement in the June 18 meeting, he had in mind the 190,000 combat troops he mentions in his diary. And 35 percent of 190,000 is 66,500. This last number, which thus far has appeared only in Bernstein's suppositions as opposed to the archival documents he demands of others, is most convenient since, Bernstein notes, it is rather close to 63,000, leaving Marshall and Leahy nearly in agreement ("only mildly disagreeing") and explaining, Bernstein says, why no diary kept by a meeting participant pointed out a disagreement on this point. By implication, this calculation, made decades after the fact by an historian who was not there, proves that Leahy suggested, and Marshall concurred with, a casualty estimate that detailed minutes taken on the spot by a brigadier general charged with keeping an accurate record did not record. Meanwhile, two military historians, Thomas Allen and Norman Polmar, are criticized for "entirely omitting Marshall's estimate"—which appears nowhere in the minutes—from their discussion of the meeting. It is hard to blame them for this alleged oversight. There is, in fact, absolutely no documentary basis for Bernstein's claim in "Truman and the A-Bomb" that Leahy "probably" was using 190,000 as the

base number for his 35 percent casualty rate suggestion.¹³

In addition, Leahy, the source of the number in question, is unclear about when he heard it. His diary for June 18 simply states, "General Marshall is of the opinion that such an effort will not cost us in casualties more than 63,000 of the 190,000 combatant troops estimated as necessary for the operation." What is interesting about the statement is that it is written in the *present* tense. So are a number of other entries for June 18, all concerned with Leahy's or someone else's view about the invasion, surrender, or occupation of Japan, *but none fixed in time*—that is, clearly noted as having actually taken place on June 18. ("The Army seems determined to occupy and govern Japan," "I am unable to see any justification from a national defense point of view for a prolonged occupation," "It is my opinion at the present time that a surrender of Japan can be arranged," and, of course, "General Marshall is of the opinion . . .") These entries differ from every entry that, in contrast, is clearly a statement of fact regarding an event that took place that day. Those entries are all written in the *past* tense. Thus "Eisenhower arrived," he "made a very well prepared address" ("not delivered with particular skill"); after the address "we proceeded to the Statler Hotel," and "the President conferred with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of War . . ." Indeed, there is a clear reference to what General Marshall *did* say at the June 18 meeting, and it, like the other statements of events that occurred that day, also is in the past tense. ("General Marshall and Admiral King both strongly advocated an invasion of Kyushu.") In addition, two of the present tense opinion entries—the reference to the army's intent to occupy and govern Japan and Leahy's opposition to a long occupation—deal with a subject that we know was *not* mentioned at the June 18 meeting.¹⁴

In short, a careful reading of Leahy's entries for June 18 reveals that there is no reason to think the reference to Marshall's "opinion" about casualties

refers to estimates made that day or at the meeting in question. Given the context and lack of supporting evidence in the minutes, that is a far more reasonable conclusion than an assumption that Marshall used the 63,000 number at the June 18 meeting but somehow that vitally important statistic was overlooked by those responsible for keeping a record of the proceedings. As with the June 18 minutes themselves (see below), Bernstein overlooks or ignores Leahy's language in order to reach a conclusion that the language simply does not support.

The problem is that Bernstein puts words in Leahy's mouth, as he does with Marshall. As far as we know from the minutes, indisputably the most reliable source for the event, Leahy did *not* say 66,500 casualties at the June 18 meeting, *nor* did he correct Marshall when the latter, immediately after Leahy mentioned the 35 percent figure for Okinawa casualties, said 766,700 troops would invade Kyushu. It also strains the imagination to think that Leahy would have made his comment about percentage if his estimate (66,500) was so close to Marshall's (63,000). After all, 3500 casualties in this context is hardly a major difference.

While accepting without corroboration Leahy's diary numbers regarding Marshall's alleged estimates, Bernstein argues that Leahy got his percentage wrong. As far as I am aware, he did this for the first time in 1986 in "A Postwar Myth," where he claimed the correct casualty rate on Okinawa was 29 percent. Later he also corrected Allan and Polmar, who in their 1995 article "Invasion Most Costly" and in their book *Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb* also correct Leahy, saying the actual percentage of casualties suffered on Okinawa by U.S. forces was 39 percent.¹⁵ Yet it turns out that the percentage figures suggested by Leahy on the one hand and Allen and Polmar on the other were both correct, and Bernstein's wrong.

How is this possible? For that

matter, how can two numbers, 35 and 39 percent, be correct, and only Bernstein's 29 percent (or, as he later wrote, 26 percent) be wrong? In "Reconsidering 'Invasion Most Costly,'" Bernstein makes a series of calculations and suppositions based on an assortment of casualty and troop numbers. There seem to be two goals here: to establish that both Leahy and Allen/Polmar are incorrect and to have Marshall (63,000 casualties) and Leahy (66,500 casualties) agree with each other. Bernstein accomplishes this by putting Leahy's diary statement through a filter of "interpretation" within an "understanding of the context." He correctly points out that the number of U.S. troops on Okinawa varied during the course of the

battle, which is not a surprise, since this is true of any such battle. He writes incorrectly (see below) that "U.S. troops on Okinawa numbered about 154,000 in April 1945," which he calculates, using the ground force *battle* casualty number of 39,420, would yield a rate of 26 percent "or even a few points lower."¹⁶ The actual math is close enough, but the numbers used are wrong and so, therefore, are the results.

The minutes make it clear that Leahy did *not* say "battle casualties"; he said "casualties." The minutes have Leahy using the word three times. By definition "casualties" means total casualties.¹⁷ And what were the ground force *total* casualties, battle and non-battle, on Okinawa? For these answers

we can turn to one of Bernstein's sources in "Reconsidering 'Invasion Most Costly.'" *Okinawa: The Last Battle* is an official study produced shortly after the war by the United States Army. The authors of the study report "a total of 183,000 troops was made available for the assault phases of the operation." Given that its source is the United States Army, this figure is authoritative and therefore must be the one used to calculate the casualty percentage figures. (The breakdown is as follows: 183,000 total ground force troops, of which 154,000 were in seven combat divisions.) The 183,000 figure is also the one I have found most commonly cited in reliable secondary works as the assault force for Okinawa. The next task is to determine



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
Professor Carole Fink, in conjunction with the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University, is establishing a network of historians of European International Relations in the twentieth century. Titled the Mershon Network of International Historians (MNIH), it will include a website that will serve as an electronic bulletin board for posting current information. Its primary purpose will be to promote collaborative work among scholars on specific subjects in international history, such as panels, conferences, and volumes as well as joint research projects. Other goals include posting archival information, announcing meetings and publications, and disseminating news of graduate and postgraduate study programs. There is also a plan for the future: to post each year an original essay for discussion. The success of this project will largely depend on its participants, who will help to create links among a community of scholars without an organizational base.

Membership will require no fee, and privacy will be assured. The electronic bulletin board will be run and monitored by the directors of the MNIH from The Ohio State University. In addition, all announcements, postings and information will be placed on the website by the directors.

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the total battle and non-battle casualties suffered by the ground forces. Navy casualties should not be included; the issue under discussion at the June 18 meeting was the assault force—that is, the ground force that was going ashore. Thus, from the total battle casualties of 49,151 suffered by all U.S. forces in the battle of Okinawa, one must first subtract the navy total of 9,731 dead and wounded. That leaves 39,420 army and marine battle casualties. The army (15,613) and marine (10,598) non-battle casualties add up to 26,211, for a total casualty figure of 65,631. Divide 65,631 by 183,000, the number of troops the U.S. Army reports was in the assault force, and the answer is 35.8 percent, almost exactly Leahy's figure.¹⁸ It should not be surprising that Leahy came that close, even though the battle for Okinawa was not over. As D. M. Giangreco points out, Leahy and the other participants in the June 18 meeting knew the 34,000 casualty figure read by Marshall was too low, and Leahy clearly did not limit himself to battle casualties. In fact, Giangreco even provides the total casualties for Okinawa and points out that this explains how Leahy got his 35 percent.¹⁹

But what about Allen and Polmar's 39 percent figure? First of all, they used the wrong numbers to get it. It is possible that they encountered the 39 percent figure in an authoritative source, took the battle casualty figure for the army and marines—39,420—and made the numbers work by postulating about 100,000 assault troops, an incorrect figure.²⁰ Still, 39 percent is a valid figure, for as Giangreco notes, an alternate method for calculating non-battle casualties used by the government pushed the total on Okinawa to 33,096, giving a total casualty figure of 72,516. Divide 72,516 by 183,000; the answer is 39.6 percent. As Douglas J. MacEachin points out, these revised figures became available about a month after the June 18 meeting.²¹

In one of his recent articles ("Reconsidering 'Invasion Most Costly'"), Bernstein minimizes the

importance of non-battle casualties, insisting that "aside from neuropsychiatric casualties" they were "frequently comparatively minor, as indicated by the fact that under one-third of one percent (.003) of nonbattle casualties died on Luzon" compared to a quarter of battle casualties there and in the southern Philippines. Therefore, mixing battle and nonbattle casualties "can be more distorting than illuminating."²² That depends on how widely one focuses the lens and where one shines the spotlight. It turns out that 28 percent of all U.S. World War II military deaths, more than 115,000 soldiers, were non-battle casualties, a grim reality that indisputably puts into perspective and certainly illuminates the importance of those casualties. To be sure, some military statistics do not include non-battle wounded (as opposed to non-battle dead), but some do. A key issue for military leaders was the extent to which an injury affected a unit's effectiveness.²³ An official army study that deals with Luzon, *Triumph in the Philippines*, points out the large number of non-battle losses on Luzon and observes that "an infantryman who was hospitalized for pneumonia contracted in the mountains of northern Luzon was as much a loss as an infantryman who was hospitalized with a wound inflicted from a Japanese bullet. Combat fatigue casualties, permanent or temporary, fit into the same category."²⁴ In short, to military planners responsible for keeping units at full strength, non-battle casualties mattered a great deal: that is why Leahy included them when he reported the 35 percent casualty rate.

Bernstein's later articles, especially "The Alarming Japanese Buildup on Southern Kyushu," are packed with statistics about casualties and troop deployments, as well as an assortment of computations, none of which do anything to correct the fundamental errors he made regarding Leahy's percentage statement at the June 18 meeting or add any validity to his effort to have Marshall utter the number 63,000 at that meeting. One issue he raises is the precise deployment of Japanese troops

on Kyushu as of late July 1945. Bernstein points out that many of the troops were in the north, not in the south where the United States was planning to come ashore.²⁵ He seems to think these mid-summer deployments had military significance, but the American military commanders whose job it was to evaluate the situation and prepare for the expected battle in the fall did not. On July 29, 1945, General MacArthur's intelligence staff, noting the rising numbers of Japanese troops on Kyushu, concluded, "The assumption that enemy strength will remain divided in North and South (Kyushu) compartments is no longer tenable." The staff added, "The trend of reinforcements from North to South (Kyushu) is unmistakable." Making matters still worse, the Japanese were massing exactly where the Americans were planning to attack and unless something were done "enemy forces in Southern Kyushu may be still further augmented until our planned local superiority is overcome."²⁶ Nor in the impending battle were Japanese forces going to be limited to the soldiers already on Kyushu. On August 1 MacArthur's intelligence staff reported that:

the Japanese have ample reserves in rear areas . . . it is probable that 3 divisions or division-equivalents will be available in NORTHERN KYUSHU on x-day for reinforcement purposes. Moreover, higher headquarters indicated that a sufficient number of divisions are in western HONSHU, in KOREA, and in western SHIKOKU to enable the enemy to reinforce the KYUSHU garrison on a scale of its own choosing, without unduly jeopardizing local security or long range strategic requirements for the defense of HONSHU

Movement of enemy reserves to NORTHERN KYUSHU will present no insurmountable obstacles . . . the enemy still will possess a sufficient supply of small craft to move, over an extended period of time and taking advantage of darkness and periods of low visibility, almost any desired number of troops across the narrow waters separating the

northern tip of KYUSHU from its northern, western, and eastern neighbors.²⁷

Events on the ground confirmed these assessments. On August 2, Ultra intercepts of Japanese military radio transmissions placed the Japanese 206th division on northern Kyushu; two days later Ultra found that division had redeployed to the south. It was joined there a few days later by the 303rd division, which had just arrived on the island with the 216th division, which went to central Kyushu.²⁸ Regardless of what the Americans did, the Japanese were successfully moving their troops from north to south on Kyushu and at the same time moving additional divisions to the island.

It is worth noting that applying Bernstein's analysis of Japanese troop deployment to the disposition of American troops on July 29, three months before the planned invasion, would lead to absurd conclusions about how many troops the United States would be able to land on southern Kyushu on X-day. After all, American troops were hundreds of miles farther away from southern Kyushu than the Japanese troops on the northern part of the island. Bernstein also tends to minimize the military importance of the Japanese buildup, which reached 900,000 troops on Kyushu by August, pointing out that many Japanese troops were "hastily raised, ill-equipped and ill-trained."²⁹ This is to a certain extent true, but it is far less significant than Bernstein implies. For example, the Japanese situation on Iwo Jima was hardly ideal in June of 1944 when General Tadamichi Kuribayashi arrived to take command. In July, after reviewing his forces, he told an aide that he had "no soldiers, just poor recruits who don't know anything. The officers are either fools or superannuated scarecrows. We cannot fight the Americans with them."³⁰ But six months later, reinforced and worked into shape despite long, tenuous supply lines and daunting obstacles, the Japanese troops on Iwo Jima fought a battle that sent a collective shudder through the American military. Japanese

soldiers on Okinawa, outnumbered, outgunned, and cut off from reinforcements, fought no less effectively. As for the situation on Kyushu in July 1945, the Japanese still had three months to prepare for an American invasion and were working intensively to do just that. Meanwhile, American forces assigned to the second stage of the projected invasion of Japan's home islands were far from ready; in fact, given the tight schedule, many of the troops being redeployed from Europe for Coronet would have landed on the beaches of Honshu without proper amphibious training.³¹

In summary, Bernstein's assessments about what Marshall estimated and Leahy calculated are based on invalid assumptions and faulty math. His assertions about what Marshall said at the June 18 meeting are contradicted by the only reliable archival evidence available. He has misread Leahy's diary. Because he has used the wrong numbers, he has been wrong about Leahy's percentage statement since 1986 and also wrong about Allen and Polmar (even though they did indeed err in citing the number of U.S. troops on Okinawa) since 1999. This review of the casualty estimates Marshall and Leahy used may not settle the ongoing debate about how many casualties Truman and his advisors were expecting, but it certainly further weakens the already tottering argument for low numbers.

Michael Kort is a Professor of Social Science at Boston University.

Notes:

1. The book that increasingly is being recognized as the standard work on the bombing of Hiroshima and Japan's surrender is Richard B. Frank, *Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire*, (New York, 1999). Two other recent excellent overviews are Robert P. Newman, *Truman and the Hiroshima Cult* (East Lansing, MI, 1995) and Robert James Maddox, *Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years*

Later (Columbia, MO, 1995). The most comprehensive study of casualty projections for the expected invasion of Japan is D. M. Giangreco, "Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasion of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications," *The Journal of Military History*, 61 (July 1997), 521-81.

2. See Barton Bernstein, "Reconsidering 'Invasion Most Costly': Popular-History Scholarship, Publishing Standards, and the claim of High U.S. Casualty Estimates to Help Legitimize the Atomic Bombings,"

Peace and Change 24 (April 1999), 220-48. For a critique of a like-minded historian (Rufus Miles), see Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth: 500,000 U.S. Lives Saved," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (June/July 1986), 40, n. 2. Bernstein's criticism of Miles' "for arguing substantially on the basis of inference" is ironic in light of his own argument made some years later regarding Marshall's casualty estimates at the June 18, 1945 White House meeting (see below). See also Bernstein, "Truman and the A-Bomb: Targeting Noncombatants, Using the Bomb, and Defending the 'Decision'," *Journal of Military History* 62 (July 1998), 552, n. 10.

3. Bernstein, "A Postwar Myth," 38.

4. Bernstein, "Reconsidering 'Invasion Most Costly'," 229-30.

5. Bernstein, "Truman and the A-Bomb," 551.

6. Bernstein, "Reconsidering 'Invasion Most Costly'," 229.

7. Bernstein, "The Alarming Japanese Buildup on Southern Kyushu, Growing U.S. Fears, and Counterfactual Analysis: Would the Planned November 1945 Invasion of Southern Kyushu Have Occurred?" *Pacific Historical Review* 99 (November 1999), 573. Bernstein made the 63,000 number a heated point of contention during the 1994-95 debate over the Smithsonian Institution's Enola Gay exhibit. At a meeting in November 1994 of representatives of the Organization of American Historians and the Smithsonian staff, Bernstein strongly criticized the section of a revised version of the exhibit script, which went through several revisions during the long controversy, dealing with Leahy's June 18 comments. He insisted that, based on Leahy's diary entry for that day, 63,000 was what Truman's chief of staff had meant when he spoke of casualties at the meeting. That contention stunned Martin Harwit, director of the Smithsonian's National Air and Space Museum, as it contradicted an assessment Bernstein himself had made in 1986, when he had written that

at the June 18 meeting Leahy “suggested that total casualties might run as high as 230,000.” See Martin Harwit, *An Exhibit Denied: Lobbying and the History of the Enola Gay* (New York, 1996), 380-82, 345-46, and Bernstein, “Reconsidering ‘Invasion Most Costly,’” 242, n.15. For Bernstein’s 1986 estimate see “A Postwar Myth: 500,000 U.S. Lives Saved,” 40.

8. “Minutes of Meeting held at the White House on Monday, 18 June 1945 at 1530,” Dennis Merrill, ed., *Documentary History of the Truman Presidency, Volume 1: The Decision to Drop the Bomb on Japan* (University Publications of America, 1995), 2,4,5. (Hereafter “Minutes of Meeting . . . 18 June.” Pages cited are from the minutes themselves.) Along with the final official version, the Merrill collection also includes two drafts of the minutes.

9. “Minutes of Meeting . . . 18 June,” 2. Elsewhere Marshall commented that he did not believe the JCS should make estimates “which can at best be only speculative.” See D. M. Giangreco, “A Score of Bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas: President Truman and Casualty Estimates for the Invasion of Japan,” *Pacific Historical Review* 72 (February 2002), 119, n. 73. See also Frank, *Downfall*, 144-45.

10. “Minutes of Meeting . . . 18 June,” 1-8. Marshall’s numbers are on pages 2 and 4. Leahy’s percentage statement (see below) is on page 4.

11. For example, Bernstein criticizes D. M. Giangreco for not providing “unalloyed 1945 archival evidence” about the influence of an August 1944 calculation, known as the Saipan ratio, for estimating potential U.S. casualties, Bernstein, Letter to the Editor, *The Journal of Military History* 63 (January 1999), 249.

12. “Minutes of Meeting . . . 18 June,” 2-4.

13. Bernstein, “Reconsidering Invasion Most Costly,” 229-30; idem, “Truman and the A-Bomb,” 551, n. 7.

14. William D. Leahy, *The Leahy Diaries*, June 18, 1945, <http://www.historians.org/archive/hiroshima/180645.html>. The comment on Marshall’s opinion follows a discussion of the June 18 meeting and is in turn followed by a one-sentence reference to Truman’s decision to approve the invasion. That in turn is followed by the opinion statements about the occupation and surrender of Japan (four sentences). Leahy then returns to the events of the day, all recorded in the past tense.

15. Bernstein, “A Postwar Myth,” 40; idem, “Reconsidering Invasion Most Costly,”

229. See also Thomas B. Allen and Norman Polmar, “Invasion Most Costly,” *Proceedings*, U.S. Naval Institute (August 1995), 56; and idem, *Code Name Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb* (New York, 1995), 211.

16. Bernstein, “Reconsidering ‘Invasion Most Costly,’” 228-29. Here is where Bernstein runs into trouble with his terminology. In the paragraph on Leahy (line 28 of page 229) he writes, “So, Leahy should have said about 26 percent, or even a few points lower.” In the preceding paragraph he refers to Leahy’s statement about the “casualty rate for U.S. ground forces in the Okinawa campaign.” In note 17 (on page 243), where he provides the numbers that produced his 26 percent, Bernstein speaks about “battle casualties.” The problem is that Leahy and Bernstein (“casualties” versus “battle casualties”) are not referring to the same thing. See also Bernstein, “The Alarming Japanese Buildup on Southern Kyushu,” 571-72, n.15. Here Bernstein refers to the “U.S. ground force battle-casualty rate” on Okinawa, which, of course, is not the same thing as the total casualty rate. The ground force battle casualty rate, “even using the unduly low figure of 154,000 for the total number of troops,” is placed at “slightly under 26 percent.” None of this has any relevance to Leahy’s estimate, as neither number—the battle casualty rate or the 154,000 figure—should be used if one is calculating the total casualty rate suffered by U.S. ground forces on Okinawa, which is what Leahy was doing (see the next paragraph in the text.) At the same time, by lumping ground forces with naval forces and counting only battle casualties, Bernstein reduces the casualty rate “overall for Okinawa” to “slightly under 10 percent.” Similar accounting for the “entire operation” at Iwo Jima yields “slightly over 10 percent.” The point of these calculations is unclear, since these figures are artificially low because of the inclusion of naval forces and therefore lack any relevance whatsoever for understanding what might have happened to American ground forces in the Kyushu operation.

17. See Giangreco, “Casualty Projections,” 556, where he points out that Leahy “used the total number of casualties to formulate the 35 percent figure.”

18. Roy E. Appleman et al., *Okinawa: The Last Battle* (Washington, DC, 1948), 26, 36, 473. Appleman adds that the “garrison force” on Okinawa eventually reached 270,000. For a secondary source that uses the 183,000 figure (and the 154,000 figure

for combat divisions) see George Feifer, *Tennozan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb* (New York, 1992), 146. For a Japanese commentator who correctly cites the 183,000 figure, see Takashi Itokazu, “The Battle of Okinawa,” www.okinawatimes.co.jp/summit/english/2000/20000722_6.html, accessed 4/1/2003.

19. Giangreco, “President Truman and Casualty Estimates,” 124. See also idem, “Casualty Projections,” 539. It seems surprising that Bernstein, who apparently went over Giangreco’s article with a fine-tooth comb, ignored statistics that were right in front of him and clearly demonstrated that Leahy’s 35 percent figure was correct. In fact, in “The Alarming Buildup on Southern Kyushu” (page 596, n. 55), Bernstein points out that Allen and Polmar “misread the nonbattle casualties as battle casualties.”

20. Allen and Polmar, *Code-Name Downfall*, 211.

21. Giangreco, “President Truman and Casualty Estimates,” 124; idem, “Casualty Projections,” 539. The report that raised the casualty percentage to 39 percent was dated 11 July 1945. See Douglas J. MacEachin, *The Final Months of the War With Japan: Signals Intelligence, U.S. Invasion Planning, and the A-Bomb* (Washington, DC, 1998), 14, n. 31. Also see Frank, *Downfall*, 71. Frank gives the figure 72,358 for the final Okinawa total. He adds that this approximated the total of 76,000 Japanese trained defenders, “an extremely ominous indicator amid preparations for an invasion of Japan.”

22. Bernstein, “Reconsidering ‘Invasion Most Costly,’” 230-31.

23. See Giangreco, “Casualty Projections,” 539-40, footnotes 66 and 67.

24. Robert Ross Smith, *Triumph in the Philippines* (Washington, DC, 1963), 652-53.

25. Bernstein, “The Alarming Japanese Buildup on Kyushu,” 570-71, 577-78, n.30, 599. See also idem, “Truman and the A-Bomb,” 551, 553.

26. G-2 GHQ, AFPAC, “Amendment No. 1 to G-2 Estimates of the Enemy Situation with Respect to Kyushu (Dated 25 April 1945),” 29 July 1945, *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Vol 1*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 418.

27. “G-2 Estimate of the Enemy Situation with respect to OPERATION OLYMPIC (Southern Kyushu),” 1 August 1945, Record Group 165, Box 1843, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

28. MacEachin, 20, 23 (n. 52).

29. Bernstein, "The Alarming Japanese Buildup on Southern Kyushu," 577-78, n.30. See also idem, "Reconsidering 'Invasion Most Costly,'" 247, n.32.
30. Quoted in Richard F. Newcomb, *Iwo Jima* (New York, 1965), 12. The actual source for this statement was one of the general's aides, Major Yoshikata Horie. He arrived on Iwo Jima in July and later was sent to the island of Chichi Jima, about 140 miles to the north, where he was responsible for the control of arms and supply

traffic to Iwo Jima. Horie closely monitored the battle for Iwo Jima until the last radio report from General Kuribayashi's radioman on March 23. He survived the war and became the chief chronicler of what happened on Iwo Jima from the Japanese perspective.
31. Robert M. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Combat Troops* (Washington DC, 1948), 647.

Additional Warnings About the Tenure Process: Some Thoughts in Response to Robert David Johnson

By Lisle Rose

Robert David Johnson's recent article on his tenure struggle at CUNY Brooklyn is an indication that sailing the stormy seas of contemporary academe continues to place individuals in harm's way. My own experience would suggest that some additions to Johnson's four excellent warnings to junior faculty would be in order.

I received my doctorate from Berkeley in 1966 and joined the history department of a large Midwestern state university. Determined to write a publishable dissertation, I had stayed an extra year in graduate school. My director gave this plan his enthusiastic blessing.

Joining a tense, joyless and divided group of senior people, I discovered that about half the people who had interviewed me at the A.H.A. meeting had already departed for other jobs. Those who would fire me were not those who had hired me. The department was every man for himself. Keeping a properly low profile in department meetings as a junior faculty member, I quickly realized that the few alliances that were formed were single-issue, ad hoc and

constantly shifting. People essentially agreed on negatives, on what they did not like. (Eventually, eight of eleven concluded that they did not like me.) Senior faculty made all tenure decisions, meeting once each year on Wednesday night at nine o'clock on the top floor of the university library. Tenure was awarded only by unanimous vote, and there was no appeal process. Unfortunately, not until I reached the university did I learn that the colonial historian had strenuously opposed my hiring; no one told me that at the time I accepted the position.

I made at least three major mistakes and doubtless a host of minor ones. First, I submitted my doctoral dissertation for publication six months after reaching campus, and it won honorable mention in the Frederick Jackson Turner Prize competition for 1967. The book (*Prologue to Democracy: The Federalists in the South, 1789-1800*) was published by the University of Kentucky Press in the spring of 1968 to generally favorable reviews. Kentucky thought it good enough to submit for Pulitzer Prize consideration. Subsequently, I was

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invited to comment over the next two to three years at meetings of the Organization of American Historians, the Southern Historical Association and one or two other historical organizations whose names escape me after a third of a century. I also wrote quite a number of book reviews between 1969 and 1974. You could, as they say, look it up.

I soon realized, however, that some senior people—and not only those who had published little or nothing—found my efforts rather distasteful. Rushing into print was seen as a kind of threatening grandstanding (“publish and perish”). It was considered poor form and insufficiently deferential to academic mores. A junior colleague worthy of senior consideration as a congenial department mate did not immediately raise a high professional profile. Nor did he buy a house before being tenured. I did so when my late wife and I discovered at the last moment (pediatric technology being comparatively crude and non-predictive in those days) that our family was about to expand from three to five. Twin babies would require exponentially more room. Compounding the felony, I accepted the kind offer of the medievalist, who was moving on, to purchase his nice home in an upscale neighborhood for a fair price. Word quickly came through the grapevine after we’d moved that this was not the thing an untenured young faculty member did. Several senior wives made their displeasure particularly clear. One lady was heard to declare, “We never had anything that nice at their age.”

My second mistake was in reading Gar Alperovitz and Gabriel Kolko and deciding to do something about it. I found *Atomic Diplomacy* and *The Politics of War* intriguing but utterly wrong-headed. At that time, the department had one man in twentieth-century history, a specialist on the Progressive Era. Not being entirely stupid, I went to him, to the department chairman, and to several other senior people and asked them how they would feel about my doing a book on the origins of the cold war. In his letter confirming my appointment, the

chairman who hired me just before leaving for another university had said that I would be on tenure track and for the first year would be expected to teach the early national period of American history. In any case, the twentieth-century man, the chairman, and the several senior people I spoke to all said roughly the same thing: “We don’t tell you what to write here.” I seem to remember that a few people, including the twentieth-century man, were even more supportive. Foolishly, however, I didn’t press on to ask if such writing would one day jeopardize my tenure chances.

My third mistake was to commit a number of “service” blunders of the kind Robert Johnson talks about avoiding. The students, who generally liked me, asked me very early on to be faculty adviser to the student disciplinary court. I also taught a class or two in a new “team teach” formula worked up by several colleagues, which did not long survive. And, after my fate was already decided, I worked with a handful of others to defuse the extreme tensions on campus following Kent State and Cambodia by agreeing to participate in a “free university” that folded after one class, when the kids discovered that I wanted them to do some reading and thinking, not just vamping. I also chaired a large, highly emotional meeting at a local high school where the radicals did vent and calm down.

So for all these reasons, opposition to me grew rapidly within the senior circles of the department. Before he left, the medievalist warned me to be careful. I tried to be. I spoke whenever appropriate about my sincere pleasure at being at the university. After all, it was a good job. Sometime in the early fall of 1968, at the beginning of my third year, the senior faculty held its annual Wednesday night tenure meeting, and my name came up for the first time. The book had come out and some people suggested that in light of that and my active participation in the profession through meetings and book reviews I was ready for tenure. One of the associate professors was usually designated

to tell those up for tenure why it had not been granted. (Presumably the chair told the successful people; I know he told those who were denied outright.) The designated messenger told me that there was opposition, but it was basically on the grounds I hadn’t been at the university long enough to get tenure. Fair enough.

Then one day about a month later, the twentieth-century man caught up with me on campus as I was walking to teach a class and informed me that I should be warned that I was not liked. When I asked him why, he said, “They just don’t like you.” When I asked what I could do to reverse matters, he replied, “Not much.” I began quietly looking about at the AHA and other meetings for another job. It was at this time, of course, that the bottom fell out of the job market. In any case, people would plausibly ask, “Why do you want another job? You’ve got a good one.” A difficult question to answer.

Things went swiftly down hill. The following year, we hired a new chairman who was interested in military/diplomatic history. He promptly informed me that my ongoing but still preliminary research on the cold war would jeopardize my tenure chances, and I just as promptly informed him that, fine, I would drop it and return to research in the early national period (I had an interest in analyzing the similarities and differences between Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy, which still seems to me a plausible and untouched subject). I received the distinct impression from a number of people that if I dropped my cold war research, tenure, despite all the tensions and animosities, would be granted. It was not. Indeed, I learned through the grapevine that at the next annual tenure meeting (at the beginning of my fourth year) a senior colleague brought the one bad review *Prologue* had received, read it to the meeting, and declared that my scholarship was not good enough for me to be considered for tenure.

Left in limbo (I had one more year on my contract, one last chance at

tenure), I called a senior historian who had been one of the interview group that had recommended hiring me (and had since left). When I told him of my predicament and asked his advice, he replied, "Lisle, you've been fired." Accepting that evaluation, I returned to my cold war research, which gave my colleagues what they considered an iron-clad reason to fire me: I had not fulfilled my contract to be the early national man (I continued to teach early national history to the end). According to the department, of course, I "resigned to seek other opportunities."

At no point was I given an opportunity to confront the senior department faculty en masse and ask for explanation, clarification, forgiveness, whatever. Some would talk to me; most would not. One told me that "many elements go into the tenure decision"; another told me to take my impending dismissal "like a man." The new chairman just chuckled uneasily and said: "You can never tell what these characters are going to do."

On one point my few supporters and many detractors could agree. I had come to be considered a "troublemaker." It would be folly for me to fight for tenure because that would further disrupt the department and confirm beyond all question my "troublemaker" status. The thing was to go quietly and hope that prospective employers would not ask and I would not have to tell about the troubling times. Unfortunately, the word apparently seeped out anyway. During my three-year job hunt, several highly promising leads ("we've got a position and you seem to be the person for it") and one firm job offer abruptly dried up—this in spite of the fact that professors Robert H. Ferrell of Indiana University and Lawrence Kaplan of Kent State suddenly leaped to my defense out of the blue, as it were (I had met neither man before), and provided much badly needed aid and comfort.

I was traveling on the West Coast in late August 1970 (after teaching a summer session at the University of Arizona) when I received a short, cold

note from the department chairman informing me that there had just been a meeting and I had not been granted tenure. I returned for my final year, and very late in the following spring managed to obtain a last-minute one-year appointment at Carnegie-Mellon, but any chance for a permanent position fell through when that university lost tons of money in the stock market. I found a job in government, which at that time was considered in academic circles tantamount to selling your soul to the devil. Perhaps it still is.

My experience raises four more red flags for those engaged in the job/tenure hunt.

First, understand what academic freedom is and is not. It does not include (at least before the granting of tenure) the right to follow your interests wherever they might lead. Practically speaking, academic freedom is the right of each department in a college or university to police itself, to set its own rules, procedures and criteria regarding who will "make partner" and who will not. And justice has nothing to do with the decision. No one is "entitled" to tenure because of hard work and productivity.

Second, ask openly if the decision to hire you is unanimous or whether there are those who oppose you. In the openly divided and venomous climate that seems to pervade many academic history departments today opposition may not be a total show stopper because divisions may be so rigid and run so deep that you—or your champions among the senior people—may be able to negotiate your tenure with your antagonists for some sort of quid pro quo. But in any case, find out who may be hostile before or just as soon as you come aboard.

Third, familiarize yourself with the tenure procedures of the department you wish to join before committing to a job. By what means and procedures are tenure decisions made? Is there an appeal process in place? Can you in any way prevent people who are hostile to you from destroying your career through innuendo or outright lying and malice? (Robert Johnson's brief allusion to a

whispering campaign that he was having affairs with three married male colleagues is pertinent in this context.) Despite a persistently wretched job market, aspiring academics should give departments that do not provide sufficient safeguards a wide berth. Your entire professional life may depend on it.

Fourth, be highly sensitive to the vibes around you and don't get out of line before attaining tenure. "Getting above yourself," calling undue attention to yourself, is very bad form and will be dealt with accordingly. Do not rush to publication at the outset and do not participate in too many professional meetings early on. Two or three articles in the first three to four years and perhaps commenting or giving a paper or at most two is sufficient. Hit for the big book publication just before the tenure decision is about to be made. Above all, avoid the "troublemaker" label that can follow you down through the years, perhaps even into other lines of work. (I once examined my personnel records at the State Department under the Freedom of Information Act and discovered that when the security people went out to interview my past employers they had to caution one unidentified individual not to pass on "hearsay evidence.")

Academe is now long behind me and I've been off happily doing other things. In eleven plus years as a professional diplomat, I worked with Eliot Richardson on the Law of the Sea, developed a U.S. policy on the Arctic, and helped negotiate a space satellite international search and rescue system with the Soviets, French and Canadians that has saved well over ten thousand lives to date. I've written some more books (eight in all) and enjoyed doing every one. Aside from a very few friends, I have had no contact with academics. I hope academic life has largely reformed itself into more pleasant and just pathways. Unfortunately, Robert Johnson's article suggests that in all too many instances, my experiences and recommendations remain relevant.

Lisle Rose is a retired State Department official and an independent scholar.

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The End of History? The Beginning of Global Perspective? The Threat to Sources

By Thomas Blanton

[Ed. note: The following essay is a revised version of the luncheon address given by Dr. Blanton at the 2003 SHAFR Conference at George Washington University in Washington D.C.]

Thanks very much for coming out today to this luncheon speech that was listed in the program without a title. Sort of a surprise main course, if you will. Mystery meat. For the sizeable crowd here, I give all the credit to my colleagues at the National Security Archive, for it is their credit account, or credibility account, on which I constantly draw. Perhaps I also had help from the rain. There was not much else to do today.

Why was there no title for my address in the program? Well, remembering John Lewis Gaddis' admonition in his wonderful Oxford lectures, published as *The Landscape of History*, to look to the sciences for help in history matters, I look to psychiatry, sort of a science, which tells us that procrastination basically represents an unarticulated conflict. It wasn't until earlier this week, while talking with a fantastic group of graduate students who attended the George Washington University Cold War Group's first Summer Institute on archival research, that I realized what my conflict was over this title. I can blame it, like so much else in our profession and our modern world, on Richard Nixon.

Picture the scene: April 27, 1971, after eight in the evening, and the White House operator is calling; President Nixon wants to speak with his national security adviser. Henry Kissinger picks up the phone, and unbeknownst to Nixon, so do Kissinger's secretaries, who proceed to tape and type an almost verbatim

transcript of the conversation, as they do for all of Henry's calls.¹

Of course, unbeknownst to Kissinger, Nixon's voice-activated tape machine is also rolling, as on all of Nixon's conversations. It's a mutual wiretap society, the perfect metaphor for that administration.

The two men are exhilarated on this day, because there's been a breakthrough, a secret message from the People's Republic of China. Premier Zhou En-lai has sent an invitation through a Pakistani channel for a Nixon emissary to come to China and arrange what would become Nixon's historic trip to China. The Chinese message had even mentioned Kissinger as the possible emissary, but Nixon now proceeds to torment Kissinger with other names instead. The knife twists as Nixon mentions the U.S. representative at the Paris talks on Vietnam, Ambassador David K.E. Bruce, and then asks, "How about Nelson?"—meaning Nelson Rockefeller, Kissinger's long-time patron. At first Kissinger says no, but when Nixon keeps raising other possibilities, Kissinger comes back to Rockefeller because "I could keep him under control." Nixon muses that Tom Dewey, former Republican presidential candidate, could do it, but of course, Dewey's dead. Nixon even suggests Kissinger's military assistant, then-Colonel Alexander Haig, because "he's really tough." You can just feel Kissinger's pain at this moment. He's probably thinking, "Tough? Tough? I'll show you who's tough. I'll order

some more secret bombing of Cambodia soon as I get off the phone!"

The most cutting comments are reserved for George H.W. Bush, then serving as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. Nixon asks, "How about Bush?" and Kissinger replies, "Absolutely not, he is too soft and not sophisticated enough." Later, Kissinger volunteers, "Bush would be too weak," and Nixon says, "I thought so too but I was trying to think of somebody with a title."

Well, I didn't have a title until earlier this week. Now I do. "The End of History? The Beginning of Global Perspective? The Threat to Sources." Let me explain.

For starters, it's a real pleasure to be here today, as an adopted member of the diplomatic history profession. I say adopted because my own training, such as it was, was in economic history. And while there was a certain international and comparative dimension to it, comparing the economic growth and in particular the textile industries of England and New England and the American South and the Asian Tigers, I left history for journalism and only came back to history when in the mid-1980s documents from declassified files that journalists and scholars had requested had piled up so high in their basements that several of their spouses threatened to divorce them if they didn't get the papers out of the house!

Thus was born the National Security Archive. I was in the right place at the right time, visiting a little

three-room office in an upper corner of the Brookings Institution where the basement files had been dumped, and I had just gotten one of those dunning letters from the student loan agency. You know, those people chased me down in Guatemala and in Washington; I think if we just put them in charge of immigration and naturalization they'd have caught the 9/11 hijackers before they got on the plane. So I needed a job, and the archive gave me the grandiose title of director of planning and research, which only meant that I filed declassification requests all day. Through the application of the well-known Peter Principle, which decrees that one rises to one's level of incompetence, I am now the executive director of the archive.

From the very beginning, the archive had a project collecting documents on the Nicaraguan contras. We treated them as if they were a federal agency (which in a sense they were). We also had a project collecting documents related to the taking of the American hostages in Iran, U.S. policy towards the Shah, and the Ayatollah. So in the fall of 1986, when President Reagan announced that a fellow named Oliver North had connected the two, the archive became the primary source for people studying arms deals, diversions, covert operations, and Iran-contra.² The rest is history.

I should clear up one item, though. Our name. National Security Archive. It's not really accurate. We're not national. We've done what Michael Hogan suggested yesterday for the diplomatic history profession as a whole: we've gone global. We are working with the Cold War International History Project and with partners, scholars, journalists, and truth commissions in thirty-five countries, with more added every year.³ Ulan Bator, anyone?

Security? Financially speaking, we have very little. We live on foundation grants, mostly, and some royalties from our books and microfiche and the Digital National Security

Archive subscription, marketed by ProQuest and Chadwyck-Healey, which publishes hundreds of thousands of pages that would still be secret today if not for our Freedom of Information requests.⁴ And we certainly don't give much of a sense of security to the government officials whom we're constantly barraging with our requests.

And Archive? We're not a traditional archive, since almost all of our collections are declassified documents, which is to say, photocopies of the originals. In a couple of cases, our copies are the only versions that have survived—which leads me to the main topic of my talk today: the threat to sources.

But before I go there, I have to say I was fascinated to see the portrait of Benjamin Franklin in Paris on the

cover of the SHAFR program. At first glance, I thought – how dated! Diplomacy from the 1700s? Sure, he was a father of our country, but couldn't we come up with a more modern, contemporary, hip image? Isn't this what so many of us complain about, that diplomatic history is backing itself into a corner, isolating itself from world trends, becoming a niche market, gazing inward rather than going global like everyone else?

But then I talked about the cover with my colleague and guru in matters historical and diplomatic, Bill Burr, and we applied a little belated post-modernist thinking and soon detected several layers of meaning. First, of course, is the obvious reference to the Bush-Chirac handshake at the recent summit, current French-

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VMI Department of History

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Documentation

AND MUCH MORE



American tensions over Iraq, the renaming of French fries as freedom fries, and so forth. Here's Benjamin Franklin, arranging the French-American alliance against a despot who lives in London (!), with the added irony that the French are keeping their despot throughout (or are soon to be trading him in for a new one).

Then the cover anticipates globalization, with the French lady reaching up to touch – I can't quite tell – is it his coonskin cap? She evokes a fascination with things American, cultural exports, coonskin as the predecessor of blue jeans, kites as the predecessor of rock'n'roll, from electricity to soft power, if you will. Joseph Nye was not the first American to understand soft power, as Edmund Morgan's brilliant short biography of Franklin shows. Morgan describes Franklin's adventures at the French court and his acquisition of a harem, or as John Adams and other American members of the delegation to France saw it, a harem's acquisition of him.⁵

Then, to take the modernist cultural references even further, there's the obvious connection to the Bob Dylan lyric, "he's in the alley, with his pointed shoes and bells, speaking to some French girl, who says she knows me well."⁶

Well, as you see, there can be too much of a good thing, and as historians we may well be further along towards Michael Hogan's sage advice of yesterday about the future of diplomatic history in a global age than we thought.

But if you listen to the pundits, we recently arrived at the end of history. Where would that leave us? Unemployed, no doubt. The most recent manifestation of this kind of doomsaying for our profession appeared just this week in *Slate*, the Microsoft online magazine. The article was written by a prominent journalist from the *Boston Globe*, Fred Kaplan, who was one of the original donors of documents to the National Security Archive and who also has quite a scholarly pedigree,

with a Ph.D. from MIT and a wonderful book called *Wizards of Armageddon* on the history of thinking about nuclear weapons.⁷

Fred's article is titled "The End of History." It builds on several postings by our colleague from the Air Force history office, Eduard Mark, on H-DIPLO, warning that the government is no longer saving the kinds of operational documentation on which our profession relies.⁸ Dr. Mark's examples are frightening indeed. He cites the PC-based records of the 1989 invasion of Panama, which would have been deleted but for his own intervention, and the multitude of PowerPoint files rotting on, if not already deleted from, PCs in thousands of military units, yet representing the only evidence, attenuated at that, of the primary form of military communications, that of briefings.

Fred Kaplan takes this very real problem and turns it into a misdiagnosis. The subtitle of Fred's posting is "How e-mail is wrecking our national archive." But Dr. Mark's concern is not as much about e-mail as it is about the absence of any computerized or electronic substitute for the typing pool, which used to guarantee that documentation could be centralized and saved. In fact, I would argue that e-mail has actually resulted in the generation of far more documentation on policymaking than previous generations of historians could ever imagine having access to, and we have actually succeeded in saving the most important, highest-level material.

You may remember the saga of the White House e-mail lawsuit. We at the National Security Archive filed suit on the last full day of the Reagan administration, after a national security adviser named Colin Powell ordered the deletion of all the back-up tapes of White House e-mail from the Reagan years. We got an injunction and fought the case all the way through the first Bush term and well into Clinton's term. Before we won, the National Archives contained only a handful of electronic

records. More than 130,000 White House e-mail records survived on those back-up tapes from the Reagan years, as e-mail use started in 1982 and became common by 1988, and from the first Bush term. From the full eight years of Clinton's presidency, White House e-mail amounts to more than 30 million records! And all of this is preserved at College Park by court order.⁹

Another example: Just think about the electronic sources that allow us to document September 11. In the *New York Times* reconstruction of the final minutes inside the two towers, for example, the reporters relied on voicemail and e-mail records from more than 140 people inside the towers, most of whom did not survive, as well as more than fifteen hours of audio tapes made by various units of the police and fire departments.¹⁰

This does not refute Ed Mark's point in the least, because the disappearance of computer-based files at the operating level is a very real and very dangerous problem. But at policymaking levels, our problem as historians will likely be too many sources, not too few, and it is only their preservation as digital files that will allow us to overcome the numbers and actually work through them.

The other counter to Cassandras of history comes from the remarkable new opportunities in the realm of international history. Again, the problem is too many sources, not too few, and in too many languages. Does anyone here speak Hungarian? It's part of the Urdu-Finnish family, and there are file cabinets full of it in Budapest, archives open to researchers regardless of any 30-year or 20-year rule, through the collapse of Communism there in 1989.¹¹

I would say we are nowhere near the end of history. Instead, we are only at the beginning of the possibility of global perspective. The excitement among our international partners is palpable. Multiple archives, multiple languages, multiple countries, multiple perspectives. And over and over, Eureka moments.

Think about the sheer intellectual, historical, and yes, even moral joy that comes from finding the Soviet copy of Mao Zedong's cable to Stalin on October 2, 1950, that directly contradicts the official Chinese version published in Beijing. Instead of rushing into the Korean War, Mao hesitated, while Stalin was willing to fight to the last Chinese.¹²

Experience the vertical learning curve that comes from being a fly on the wall, courtesy of the Czechoslovak Communist Party leadership's notes, as Khrushchev explains, only two days after he ordered the missiles withdrawn from Cuba, that he did so in large part because of "that crazy Fidel." Nikita was then positioned as the world's leading pacifist – even Bertrand Russell was writing him fan letters.¹³

Listen to the arguments, the condescension, the prickliness in conversations between the Chinese and the North Vietnamese during the Vietnam War, pieced together by a multinational group of scholars who combined the Vietnamese and Chinese versions produced by the Communist Party in each nation as a way to explain to cadres how two fraternal socialist states could come to blows in 1979.¹⁴

Shiver as you peruse the 1964 Soviet war plan for Europe (the parallel U.S. war plans remain top secret) that shows the Warsaw Pact and NATO had very similar assumptions: each believed the other would strike first, and each assumed that the conflict would quickly go nuclear, perhaps even on the first day. The difference between the two lay in their reaction to the first strike. The Warsaw Pact, with its rear guard turned into a smoking, radiating rubble, would move forward; as *Le Monde* said on its front page, "Lyon en huit jours." NATO would fall back, getting lunch at La Bousse on the way to the Paris bistros, with maybe a cookout at the Fulda Gap.¹⁵

Lift your eyebrows when you read the comment from the Czechoslovak general in one of the internal Warsaw Pact meetings, after

1968 I believe, who questioned the whole notion of national sovereignty and his oath to defend his country when the war plan meant that his country would disappear into a bottomless crater.¹⁶

Share what must be the ultimate fantasy for a historian: Jim Hershberg's exhilaration as he delivers to Fidel Castro in person, face to face, at the conference for the fortieth anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis last fall in Havana, the secret message from JFK, forwarded through the Brazilians (and found by Jim in the archives in Brasilia) but overtaken by events on October 27 and 28, 1962, and therefore never delivered at the time, warning Castro that his erstwhile allies, the Soviets, were bargaining away the missiles and selling him out and he'd be better off making a deal for himself with the Yanquis.¹⁷

I'm already belaboring my point. There are plenty of sources, too many sources for a single historian to analyze. Oh for the good old days that E.H. Carr mentions in his *What Is History*, when a specialist, say, in vanished Sumerian civilizations could actually peruse every known cuneiform tablet or pottery shard – all that was left from hundreds of years and thousands of human lives.¹⁸ Our only hope is for parallel processing of all these new sources by means of a vast expansion of the kinds of networks created by the Cold War International History Project and my own organization, involving multiple scholars proficient in multiple languages. These networks would resemble the networks of thousands of personal computers that process interstellar signals for NASA in the form of background programs and provide a mass of computing power far greater than NASA could otherwise afford.

My argument today is that the real threat to sources is not the digital age, but the rising tide of secrecy, both in terms of what it directly withholds and in terms of what it covers up. Sources on diplomatic history are

disappearing into the vaults of the securocrats.

The Bush administration's obsession with secrecy began well before September 11, and it did not arise from the war on terrorism. Rather, the ideological origins of the secrecy fetish for this White House lie in the battles over presidential power that Presidents Nixon and Ford lost in the 1970s. President Bush and Vice President Cheney do sincerely believe that the American people have made the White House way too open, way too accountable, over the past thirty years since Vietnam and Watergate. One might say that this administration is trying to haul those pesky open government laws off to the secure, undisclosed location where they've been keeping the vice president.

Perhaps the single most illuminating conversation on this subject occurred in January 2002 on ABC News "This Week," when ABC's Cokie Roberts asked Vice President Cheney about his energy policy task force. Cheney had refused to give Congress, the General Accounting Office, or the public any documents from the task force or even the names of advisers. "These things generally end up with people turning over the papers," said Roberts. "The Republicans are dying to have you turn over the papers. Why not turn over the papers? . . . It looks like they're hiding something." Cheney began by saying that withholding the information was where "the lawyers decided" to draw the line, then he went on to give his core belief: "In 34 years, I have repeatedly seen an erosion of the powers and the ability of the president of the United States to do his job . . . We've seen it in cases like this before, where it's demanded that the president cough up and compromise on important principles . . . unwise compromises that have been made over the last 30 or 35 years."¹⁹

What occurred some thirty-five years ago, of course, in 1966, was the passage by Congress of the first version of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, signed, grudgingly, by President

Johnson. His signing statement emphasized the need for secrecy as much as openness. The law acquired teeth only with the 1974 amendments enacted in the wake of Watergate (almost thirty years ago on the Cheney time scale). (Many of the current battlegrounds for openness revolve around statutes like the Presidential Records Act that were offspring of the Watergate scandal.) Those 1974 amendments were a defining experience for the new White House deputy chief of staff, a thirty-four-year-old in his first really big job in Washington – Richard Cheney. He reported to a more experienced Washington hand, a former congressman named Donald Rumsfeld, chief of staff to President Ford; and their first big challenge was to keep President Ford's veto of the 1974 amendments from being overridden by Congress. They failed, but their objection animates today's retrenchment: the president, Rumsfeld, Cheney and their lawyers believed that any law that could force the president to release information he didn't want to release was unconstitutional, particularly on national security grounds.²⁰ President Bush is an absolutist, repeatedly asserting unilateral power to withhold information even from Congress. For example, in the October 23, 2002 signing statement for the fiscal year 2003 defense appropriations bill, Bush declared that "the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the President's authority to classify and control access to information bearing on national security flows from the Constitution and does not depend upon a legislative grant of authority."²¹

That assertion, of course, does not tell the whole story. As the 1997 Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy concluded, "the Necessary and Proper Clause in Article I, section 8, of the Constitution, which grants the Congress the authority to 'make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces,' provides a strong basis for Congressional action in this

area. As an area in which the President and the Congress 'may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain,' the security classification system may fall within the 'zone of twilight' to which Justice Robert H. Jackson referred in 1952 in his famous concurring opinion in *Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer* (the 'steel seizure' case)."²²

A belief in the God-given right to secrecy is not the whole story either, of course. Control of information keeps people (like Congress, other bureaucrats, nosy reporters, or critical voters) from interfering with your agenda. The grave danger to openness today in the United States comes from the combination of secrecy theology at the highest levels and the bureaucratic imperative at all levels.

Besides the energy task force, the other prominent example of pre-September 11 secrecy targeted the Presidential Records Act. A routine release of 68,000 pages of Reagan-era records landed on the new White House counsel's desk in January 2001, and instead of letting the release go forward (four million pages of Reagan White House documents had already been released), the White House stalled. Ultimately, in November 2001, the White House issued a new executive order that turned the Presidential Records Act on its head, giving former presidents and even their heirs the ability to stall release of their records indefinitely. Curiously, the first former vice president to be accorded this executive privilege was the incumbent president's father. A lawsuit by historians and public interest groups to prevent the National Archives from implementing the order is pending in federal district court.²³

There are many other examples of the rising tide of secrecy – too many to describe here – but we do have at hand an extremely useful tool with which to assess the government's new secrecy claims. During the decade of the 1990s, especially after President Clinton's 1995 executive order

reforming the national security secrecy system, the U.S. government declassified more than one billion (!) pages of historic secrets. In fact, President Clinton deserves credit for declassifying more documentation than all his predecessors put together. These documents comprise a remarkable parallel to the DNA databases that are now proving guilt or innocence in capital cases, with dozens of accused murderers released from Death Row and growing doubts about the whole system of capital punishment. The billion pages we now have of historic secrets raise similar doubts about the whole system of national security secrecy.

For example, the new evidence illuminates the most prominent single test of national security secrecy claims, the Pentagon Papers case of 1971. In that case the government did persuade three justices to rule against the plain language of the First Amendment (but lost 6-3). Now we have the secret briefs that the government filed with the Supreme Court. The scholar John Prados was able to test the 11 “drop-dead” secrets that were too sensitive even to discuss in open court and concluded that none were truly damaging.²⁴

We now know that the then-solicitor general of the United States, Erwin Griswold, who argued the “drop-dead” items, concluded in 1989 that no damage was done by his losing the case:

I have never seen any trace of a threat to the national security from the publication. Indeed, I have never seen it even suggested that there was such an actual threat . . . It quickly becomes apparent to any person who has considerable experience with classified material that there is massive overclassification and that the principal concern of the classifiers is not with national security, but rather with governmental embarrassment of one sort or another. There may be some basis for short-term classification while plans are being made, or negotiations are going on, but apart from details of

*weapons systems, there is very rarely any real risk to current national security from the publication of facts relating to transactions in the past, even the fairly recent past.*²⁵

We now have the crash report, declassified in the 1990s, that was the centerpiece of the Supreme Court case in 1953 that established the “state secrets” privilege. In that case, *U.S. v. Reynolds*, the Court accepted Air Force affidavits claiming that release of the crash report would reveal national security secrets and therefore the civil case brought by the widows and families should be dismissed. More than nine hundred subsequent federal cases cite this precedent, which has served the government as a kind of neutron bomb against whistleblowers: no case left standing. The actual text of the crash report, found by one of the victims’ children via the Internet, refers obliquely and without detail to secret electronic gear on board but focuses on the repeated acts of negligence on the part of the Air Force that allowed the airplane’s engines to catch on fire. The government lied, but there is no justice: this year the Supreme Court declined to review a new petition by the Reynolds families.²⁶ That leaves it to us, to review – with utmost skepticism – all the government’s secrecy claims.

Even before the 1990s, we already had the secret evidence behind the single most egregious violation of American civil liberties in modern times – the internment of 120,000 Japanese-Americans during World War II. In 1982, under the Freedom of Information Act, Professor Peter Irons of the University of California at San Diego obtained Justice Department documents on the key internment prosecution, *Korematsu v. United States*, decided for the government by the Supreme Court in 1944. Irons’ documents encouraged Fred Korematsu to sue to vacate his conviction on grounds of government misconduct; and in fact, in 1984 a federal district court did vacate his conviction, finding that “the

government knowingly withheld information from the courts when they were considering the critical question of military necessity in this case.” Judge Marilyn Patel concluded with this warning about the Supreme Court’s 1944 decision:

*Korematsu remains on the pages of our legal and political history. As a legal precedent it is now recognized as having very limited application. As historical precedent it stands as a constant caution that in times of war or declared military necessity our institutions must be vigilant in protecting constitutional guarantees. It stands as a caution that in times of distress the shield of military necessity and national security must not be used to protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and accountability. It stands as a caution that in times of international hostility and antagonisms our institutions, legislative, executive and judicial, must be prepared to exercise their authority to protect all citizens from the petty fears and prejudices that are so easily aroused.*²⁷

For me, those words echo all too loudly today. Right now, in the halls of the National Archives out in College Park, goon squads of securocrats are roaming the hallways, pulling boxes from the shelves when a scholar asks for them. Instead of rolling on carts to the reading room, the boxes get a trip to the back room for a once-over under the bare lightbulb! Millions of pages already declassified are now going through a re-review on the off chance that somewhere in there might be information about – horrors! – the fact that we had nuclear-armed Jupiter missiles in Turkey in 1962.

Who’s behind this travesty of a mockery of a sham? Some of the usual suspects, like the CIA and the Department of Energy, no doubt in search of a full-employment program for classification officers. But the original initiative arose in Congress, among a handful of Republicans who really did believe that Bill Clinton

Call for Papers
2005 OAH Annual Meeting
San Francisco, California
31 March - 3 April 2005
Deadline: January 15, 2004

Telling America's Stories: Historians and their Publics

Historians work in a variety of ways and in a variety of places. The 2005 Organization of American Historians convention program will celebrate this diversity, while at the same time exploring its implications for the study of the American past. The Program Committee seeks proposals that bring diverse methodologies to bear on large questions. We envision a conference that features a series of conversations among scholars working across fields as diverse as political, social, cultural, intellectual, economic, diplomatic, military, technological, and environmental history. Similarly, the meeting will also bring together historians who work in different venues, representing the spectrum of the OAH membership, and underscoring the variety of ways in which historians reach/engage the public. The Program Committee seeks to involve historians whose work is disseminated in a wide variety of places including (but not limited to) classrooms, parks, print publications, the World Wide Web, government documents, film, television, radio, and exhibits in libraries and museums.

The OAH strategic plan calls for a greater variety of session formats at the annual meeting. The Program Committee thus welcomes proposals for innovative modes of presentation. These proposals might include panel discussions, innovative use of audio-visual materials, inter-related sequential sessions, presentations involving pre-circulated materials, shorter sessions, and presentations that do not involve the formal reading of papers.

In addition to proposals that explore the conference theme, we welcome submissions that explore other issues and themes in American history. We encourage proposals for entire sessions, but the Program Committee will accept proposals for individual papers and make every effort to place those papers on the program. Full panel proposals lacking commentators are welcome; the committee can recruit scholars who would be appropriate commentators.

By OAH policy, the Program Committee actively seeks to avoid gender-segregated sessions; the committee urges proposers to include members of both sexes whenever possible. Including scholars who are at different stages of their careers can often invigorate a session. We also urge proposers to consider including members of ethnic and racial minorities, independent scholars, public historians, American historians from outside the U.S., historians teaching at a different types of institutions, and graduate students.

Complete session proposals must include a chair, participants, and, if applicable, one or two commentators. All proposals must include five collated copies of the following information: (1) a cover sheet, including a complete mailing address, email, phone number, and affiliation for each participant; (2) an abstract of no more than 500 words for the session as a whole; (3) a prospectus of no more than 250 words for each paper or presentation; and (4) a single-page vita for each participant. Proposals sent with fewer than five collated copies will be returned. No e-mail or faxed proposals will be accepted.

All proposals must be postmarked no later than 15 January 2004 and sent to:
2005 Program Committee
Organization of American Historians
112 North Bryan Ave
P.O. Box 5457
Bloomington, IN 47408-5457

Participation in Consecutive Annual Meetings: The Program Committee discourages participation as a paper presenter in consecutive annual meetings. The Program Committee will try to avoid placing a presenter from the 2004 Annual Meeting program as a presenter on the 2005 program. A person may serve as a chair or commentator in one year and a presenter in the other.

Membership requirements: All participants must register for the meeting. Participants who specialize in American history and support themselves as American historians are also required to be members of the OAH. Participants representing other disciplines do not have to be members.

Call for Papers
119th Annual Meeting of the AHA
Seattle, Washington
January 6–9, 2005
Deadline: February 16, 2004

Archives and Artifacts

The 119th annual meeting of the Association will be held in Seattle January 6–9, 2005. The Program Committee welcomes proposals from all members of the Association (academic and nonacademic), from affiliated societies, from historians working outside the United States, and scholars in related disciplines. Proposals on all historical periods and topics and from all chronological and geographic areas of specialization are welcome. To encourage proposals that concern basic aspects of historical research that are relevant to everyone who studies history, the Program Committee has chosen as a theme for the annual meeting the topic, "Archives and Artifacts." Please note, however, that the designation of this theme does not in any way exclude from consideration or put at a disadvantage panels unrelated to the theme.

The theme of "Archives and Artifacts" invites consideration of both the promise of greater access to historical information and the fragility of documentation and artistic objects, which, as recent events have reminded us, can be looted and destroyed. The exponential increase in government records and a more expansive definition of what constitutes historical sources also has a dual effect of creating more data while at the same time making it more ephemeral (the decline of hard-copy written records of important transactions and the rise of e-mail and the like). Specific areas of possible interest include: the opening of formerly closed archives; the ability to put material on the Web; the difficulty of using rare materials that are made available to scholars only as facsimiles (illuminated manuscripts, for example); and aspects of the commodification of the evidence from the past—such as the protection of collections, the rising incidence of forgery (Babylonian tablets but also Civil War artifacts), and the growth of the antiquities markets (legal and illegal). Public historians and archivists from the United States are particularly asked to share their experiences and thoughts. All historians have had occasion to consider both promises of easier access and threats to historical material in an era that truly appears to be the best and worst of times for historical research.

There is only one deadline for submission: February 16, 2004. Any proposal postmarked after that date will not be considered. The committee will consider only complete panels or workshops (those that include all presenters, chair, and commentator). Because there is only one deadline, single-paper submissions cannot be considered. Experience has shown that it is virtually impossible to find matches for single papers or form panels around them with the single, later deadline. There will also be no "poster sessions."

The AHA has established a Panel Locator on its web site to assist members in finding suitable copanelists. The Panel Locator will be searchable via keyword and subject area, and may be accessed at <http://www.theaha.org/annual/panels>.

The H-Net lists, which are also a useful resource in finding prospective panel members, can be accessed at <http://www.h-net.msu.edu>.

Please consult the "Program Committee Guidelines" when preparing a proposal. A cover sheet is mandatory for all submissions. Copies of all materials may be obtained from the AHA office with a request addressed to: 2004 Materials, AHA, 400 A St., SE, Washington, DC 20003-3889. (202) 544-2422, ext. 104. Fax (202) 544-8307. E-mail: aha@theaha.org. All materials may also be found on the Annual Meeting page on the AHA's web site.

All persons appearing on the program must be members of the AHA, the exceptions being foreign scholars and scholars from other disciplines. Only in exceptional circumstances will individuals be allowed to appear consecutively on the 2004 and 2005 programs.

Please mail four copies of the complete proposal (including the cover sheet) to Paul Freedman, Department of History, Yale University, P.O. Box 208324, New Haven CT 06520-8324. Please mark your envelope AHA 2005.

declassified all those documents in order to give our nuclear secrets to the Chinese in return for big campaign donations in 1996. I'm serious, that really was their theory, and now the taxpayers are paying tens of millions of dollars for a re-review of millions of pages, and we as scholars are losing our essential evidence behind a cardboard curtain.

So where are the SHAFR squads? Where is our profession's expert study of what the securocrats are doing? Where are our hot letters to the national archivist, John Carlin, or to the members of Congress like Senator Kyl of Arizona who legislated this idiocy?

Where is our litigation? Why can't SHAFR join the current lawsuit to save the Presidential Records Act that in alphabetical order has the American Historical Association as the name plaintiff (the National Security Archive is in the middle of the list)?

Where is our professional assessment of the problem Ed Mark points to, of disappearing personal computer files on the operations of government, especially the military?

Where are our grant applications that would fund expert working groups to save our history?

Where are our campaigns to change the law? As Martin Luther King remarked, change the law and their hearts and minds will follow.

Perhaps our biggest success as a profession to counter the threat to sources from secrecy was our victory in 1991 enshrining in law the requirement that the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series be an accurate and comprehensive documentary account of U.S. foreign policy and include the CIA, much to its dismay. Left to its own devices, the CIA would have ensured that *FRUS* carried no mention of U.S. covert actions or intelligence operations, much less U.S. fingerprints on regime changes. Not only did we win that requirement, we also won a key enforcement mechanism in the form of the Historical Advisory Committee at the State Department. The HAC does not deserve its acronym,

unless in the sense of Michelangelo hacking at Carrara marble, because the HAC has provided crucial leverage against the prevailing mindset in the securocracy that once a secret, always a secret. Every department needs such a committee, with a statute behind it, ordering such an independent outside guarantee of comprehensive accurate documentary history.²⁸

Imagine how such a statutory framework would change the recalcitrance of the CIA, which has persuaded its non-statutory advisory committee not even to publish its recommendations, as if such publicity could diminish the candor of these senior scholars. In fact, by going along with the CIA's charade, the members of the CIA advisory committee have voluntarily given up the only actual power they have to leverage more openness at Langley, and that is the power of public exposure.²⁹

So there you have it. We have to rally ourselves to combat the real threat to sources, that of excessive government secrecy. But we have much to look forward to, since the digital age is vastly expanding the potentially available sources and even giving us some of the tools to search them, use them, and save them. And we have a new international history to embrace, with extraordinary excitement (especially in the Brazilian archives, like water for chocolate).

The internationalization of our discipline does present us with some problems, though, starting with our name. Will we become the Society for International and Global History? S-I-G-H? My wife says we definitely have to keep the word "society"—it's high-toned, much better than "association" or "organization" or the other professional titles, and closer to the original American formulation, as exemplified by the Society of the Cincinnati. Personally, I'd like to see something with action in it, something that signifies clout, maybe something like the Society for International and Contemporary

Matters, SICM (sickem)! Well, maybe not.

In the final analysis, I have to agree with our society's distinguished president, Michael Hogan, who yesterday suggested the new name of Society for the Study of International Relations, or SSIR. Well, on that subject, I would like to raise a toast, quoting that estimable child of the Cold War, that voluble author of espionage thrillers, that inspiration for John F. Kennedy's covert operations (not only in Cuba but also in the boudoir, according to Robert Dallek and many others). I'm referring, of course, to Ian Fleming, author of the James Bond series, and particularly to his volume titled: *To SSIR, With Love*.

Thank you.

Thomas Blanton is Director of the National Security Archive at George Washington University.

Notes:

¹ Dr. William Burr found this document, titled "TELCON, The President/Mr. Kissinger, 8:18 p.m., April 27, 1971," in Exchanges Leading up to HAK Trip to China – December 1969– July 1971 (1), Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Security Council Files, Box 1031, National Security Archives, Washington, DC. A copy is available online at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/ch-18.pdf

² Scott Armstrong, Malcolm Byrne, and Tom Blanton. *The Chronology: The Documented Day-by-Day Account of the Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras* (New York, 1987); Peter Kornbluh and Malcolm Byrne, eds. *The Iran-Contra Scandal: The Declassified History* (New York, 1993).

³ See, for example, the virtual network of freedom of information advocates at www.freedominfo.org.

⁴ See www.il.proquest.com/products/pd-product-DNSA.shtml.

⁵ Edmund Morgan, *Benjamin Franklin* (New Haven, 2003), 246-49.

⁶ The song is "Stuck Inside of Mobile with the Memphis Blues Again," from the *Blonde on Blonde* album, © 1966 Dwarf Music.

⁷ Fred Kaplan, "The End of History," *Slate Magazine*, June 4, 2003, <http://History.slate.msn.com/id/2083920/>.

⁸ See, for example, Eduard Mark, "History, recordkeeping, cultural assets," posted Tuesday, 22 April 2003, and "NARA and recordkeeping," posted Friday, 27 April 2001, on H-Diplo at <http://h-net.msu.edu/>.

⁹ Tom Blanton, ed. *White House E-Mail: The Top-Secret Computer Messages the Reagan-Bush White House Tried to Destroy* (New York, 1995).

¹⁰ *New York Times*, 26 May 2002, A25.

¹¹ For one recent example in English, see Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, Janos Rainer, eds. *The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents* (Budapest, 2002), of which Istvan Deak commented, "There is no publication, in any language, that would even approach the thoroughness, reliability, and novelty of this monumental work."

¹² Shen Zhihua, "The Discrepancy between the Russian and Chinese Versions of Mao's 2 October 1950 Message to Stalin on Chinese Entry into the Korean War: A Chinese Scholar's Reply," *Cold War International Project (CWIH)*, Bulletin 8-9, Cold War in the Third World and the Collapse of Detente Pact, Winter 1996/1997, 237-39. http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=library.document&topic_id=1409&id=20

¹³ "The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Political Perspective After 40 Years, *Conference Briefing Book, Primary Source Documents, Volume 2, The Crisis of October*, Document 45, "Czechoslovakia, Minutes, Conversation between the Delegations of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" October 30, 1962.

¹⁴ Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung and James G. Hershberg, eds. "77 Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977," *Cold War International Project (CWIHP)*, Working Paper #22, http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=library.document&id=951; Stein Tonnesson, "Le Duan and the Break with China," *Cold War International Project (CWIHP)* Bulletin 12-13, End of the Cold War, Fall/Winter 2001, 273-278. Virtual

Archive, <http://wwics.si.edu/topics/pubs/ACF37.pdf>.

¹⁵ Jacques Isnard, *Le Monde* "En 1964, l'armée rouge se vantait d'atteindre Lyon en huit jours" 2000-05-25, 1. Parallel History Project of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/documents/collection_1/texts/media_echo_texte.htm

¹⁶ See Vojtech Mastny, "Did NATO Win the Cold War?" *Foreign Affairs* 78, 176-189.

¹⁷ The exchange took place in the Palacio des Convenciones, Havana, on October 12, 2002. Interestingly, Ted Sorensen promptly interjected that the message must be a fake, since he wrote JFK's messages and did not remember any such item. Professor Hershberg pointed out that according to the White House tapes of the discussion of the message (which had been drafted by the State Department), Sorensen was not present, and JFK had in fact approved.

¹⁸ Edward Hallett Carr, *What Is History?* (New York, 1961), 11-13.

¹⁹ Vice President Dick Cheney interview with Cokie Roberts, *ABC News This Week*, 27 January 2002.

²⁰ For LBJ's signing statement, Ford's veto statement, and copious legislative history, see Will Ferroggiaro, Sajit Gandhi, and Thomas Blanton, eds. "The U.S. Freedom of Information Act at 35," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book 51, at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB51/ (posted July 1, 2001).

²¹ Together with key documents of the Bush administration's secrecy policy and national security secrecy claims the signing statement is on-line at www.fas.org/sgp/news/2002/wh102302.html

²² *Secrecy: Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy*, S. Doc. 105-2, 103rd Congress

SHA FR Bibliographic Guide Editor: Call for Applications

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations seeks applications for editor-in-chief of the SHA FR bibliographic project. The editor-in-chief will be responsible for working with chapter and subject editors to produce supplements to *American Foreign Relations Since 1600: A Guide to the Literature*, 2d ed. (ABC-CLIO, 2003), and to prepare those supplements as well as the print edition of the *Guide* for electronic publication. Applicants should have extensive knowledge of the secondary literature on American foreign relations and a familiarity with electronic databases and/or electronic publishing. The term of service of the editor-in-chief and the amount and form of any compensation will be determined through negotiation prior to appointment. Review of applications will begin on 15 October 2003 and continue until the position is filled. Those interested in being considered should email or send a letter of application and curriculum vitae to:

Chester Pach
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Department of History, Ohio University
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pach@ohio.edu

(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 15 (available on the Web at <http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secretcy/index.html>)<http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secretcy/index.html>).

²³ For the text of the Executive Order, statements from Congressional testimony, White House statements, and the legal complaint filed by historians and public interest groups, see www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20011128/andwww.citizen.org/litigation/briefs/FOIAGovtSec/PresRecords/index.cfm

²⁴ See Thomas S. Blanton, ed., *The Pentagon Papers: Secrets, Lies and Audiotapes* (National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 48), posted June 5, 2001, updated June 29, 2001, at www.gwu.edu/~nsarchive/NSAEBB/NSAEBB48/index.html

²⁵ Erwin N. Griswold, "Secrets Not Worth Keeping: The courts and classified information," *Washington Post*, 15 February 1989, A25.

²⁶ For a summary of the case and the new evidence, see *In Re Patricia J. Herring et al* "Petition for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis to Remedy Fraud Upon This Court," submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court on February 26, 2003 (awaiting docketing) by the Philadelphia law firm of Drinker Biddle & Reath. For the importance of *Reynolds*, see Morton H. Halperin and Daniel Hoffman, *Freedom vs. National Security: Secrecy and Surveillance* (New York, 1977), 103-4; and Stephen Dycus et al., eds. *National Security Law – Third Edition* (New York, 2002) 975-79.

²⁷ Dycus, *National Security Law*, 805-7.

²⁸ For an excellent succinct account of the CIA's censorship of *FRUS*, the resulting public scandal, the profession's campaign, Congress's response, and the HAC's effectiveness, see Kate Doyle, "The End of Secrecy," in Craig Eisendrath, ed. *National Insecurity: U.S. Intelligence After the Cold War* (Philadelphia, 2000), 101-4.

²⁹ For discussion of this issue and an open letter to the committee's chair, Robert Jervis, see <http://www.fas.org/sgp/advisory/ciahrp4.html>; for an August 2003 statement by the CIA Historical Review Panel, see <http://www.fas.org/sgp/advisory/ciahrp8.html>; for related issues, see Steven Aftergood, Federation of American Scientists, Project on American Secrecy, online at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/>

Decent Interval or Not? The Paris Agreement and the End of the Vietnam War

By Jeffrey Kimball

[Ed. note: The following essays by Jeffrey Kimball and Larry Berman are based on their comments made at a panel entitled, "A Decent Interval or Not?: The Paris Agreement of 1973 and the End of the Vietnam War," at the 2003 SHAFR Conference on June 6, 2003. The panel was chaired by Chris Jespersen.]

In previous *SHAFR Newsletter* exchanges Larry Berman and I debated the question of whether the decent interval solution was part of the Richard Nixon-Henry Kissinger strategy for exiting Vietnam. My hope is that Larry and I will be able to resolve our differences about this issue. If not, I hope at least that we can clarify what it is we disagree about—that we can, so to speak, clear the air and thereby advance scholarship on a complex topic with broad significance.

The exchanges began after my brief article "The Case of the 'Decent Interval': Do We Now Have a Smoking Gun?" appeared in the September 2001 issue of the *SHAFR Newsletter*. The smoking-gun document I had cited in this article is one I had recently uncovered in the Nixon papers: a briefing book that Kissinger's staff had drafted in preparation for his first meeting with Zhou Enlai in Beijing in early July 1971. Relevant information about the decent interval appears in the first paragraph on page five of the "Indochina" section: "On behalf of President Nixon I want

to assure the Prime Minister solemnly that the United States is prepared to make a settlement that will truly leave the political evolution of Vietnam to the Vietnamese alone. We are ready to withdraw all of our forces by a fixed date and let objective realities shape the political future."¹

In deploying the Leninist-sounding expression "objective realities," Kissinger intended to assure Zhou that, once having withdrawn its armed forces from South Vietnam, the United States would not re-intervene in order to influence the continuing military and political struggle between Vietnamese adversaries. But the most pertinent evidentiary item was what Kissinger had written in the left margin of page five: "We want a decent interval. You have our assurance."²

I believed in August 2001, when I wrote the article, that these sentences provided convincing evidence, especially when combined with corroborating documents, that at least by 1971 Nixon and Kissinger were pursuing a decent interval strategy.³ In other words,

I was not and am not now just blowing smoke.

In the course of reviewing the historiography of the issue in my historical note, I briefly discussed Frank Snepp's 1977 book, *Decent Interval: An Insider's Account of Saigon's Indecent End*, and Larry Berman's 2001 book, *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam*. Based on what I thought I understood about Larry's position, this is the core of what I wrote about the thesis he had put forward:

"[Larry Berman] offered a twist on Frank Snepp's thesis. Like Snepp, Berman denied that Nixon and Kissinger had deliberately pursued a decent-interval solution, even though a decent interval in effect came about. He, like Snepp, proposed that they had intended instead to bring about an equilibrium or stalemate between South Vietnamese and Communist forces following the American withdrawal. And like Snepp, he blamed Kissinger more than Nixon for the deceptions of the U.S. government. The twist Berman offered was that the stalemate was to be achieved, not by great power diplomacy between the U. S., the USSR, and China [as Snepp had argued], but by continued [and 'permanent'] fighting between the Vietnamese parties and heavy bombing by American B-52 airmen."⁴

The main difference between Larry and me about the decent interval, as I understood it then and understand it now, is that I maintain that sometime between 1970 and 1971 Nixon and Kissinger, out of necessity, had *deliberately* chosen to pursue a decent interval solution. Their choice of this strategic option was, in other words, a matter of policy. Moreover, the two Vietnamese parties, as well as the Soviets and Chinese, knew this to be the case. The decent interval was a central feature of Nixon and Kissinger's evolving strategy in Vietnam, and their denials about having pursued this approach help to sustain the historical myth they fabricated about how the war ended and the Republic of Vietnam fell.

I had discussed these issues in

my 1998 book, *Nixon's Vietnam War*, which had been based on substantial documentation from the United States and elsewhere, and I had followed up in subsequent years with several articles and papers on U.S., Soviet, Chinese, and Vietnamese policy and strategy. Since 1998, considerably more documentation about Nixinger strategy and the decent interval solution has become available to researchers, much of which, including transcripts of White House tapes, is excerpted in my forthcoming book, entitled *The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy* (to be published in November of this year), a book that reflects my better understanding of the decent interval and other issues.

My argument is that in November and December of 1969—that is, after the failure of their initial, "tough" strategy—Nixon and Kissinger turned to what they called the "long-route" strategy: that is, unilateral, paced U.S. troop withdrawals coupled with Vietnamization, continuing military operations, the stratagem of détente, and the madman theory. Probably by the fall of 1970, and certainly by the spring of 1971, they turned to a longtime option that had circulated within the American national security bureaucracy: the decent interval solution. It was now their strategy, or, as they sometimes referred to it, their "game plan." According to this plan, they timed the negotiations so that a settlement would be reached (assuming one could be reached) just before or just after the American presidential election of 1972.

Kissinger used the terms "decent interval," "healthy interval," "sufficient interval," and "reasonable interval" in referring to a scenario in which the period of time between America's withdrawal from Indochina and the possible defeat of President Nguyen Van Thieu's government in Saigon would be long enough that when the defeat took place—assuming it would take place—his and Nixon's policies would not appear to have been responsible. To put it another way, the interval of time between

an armistice agreement and the fall of Saigon would have been sufficiently long that it would lend credence to Nixon's and Kissinger's claim that they had negotiated an honorable settlement on ending the war, thereby preserving U.S. credibility as a counterinsurgency guarantor and Nixon's reputation as a skillful and trustworthy foreign policy leader. Neither the American public nor America's allies or adversaries would therefore perceive Saigon's fall as a humiliating U.S. defeat.

Despite the continuing presence of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong (or National Liberation Front) forces in South Vietnam, the decent interval option did not guarantee Thieu's defeat. Nixon and Kissinger could hope that Thieu's government might possibly be sustained by means of several measures: continued U.S. economic and military assistance; reforms in the Saigon government and army; successful "pacification" programs; the massive bombing of North Vietnam (or the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [DRV]) as American forces were leaving Vietnam; the collaboration of the USSR and the People's Republic of China (PRC) in restraining the DRV; and the re-introduction of U.S. air power in the event of renewed fighting after an American pull-out. However, Nixon, Kissinger, and their inner circle knew that the success of these stopgap measures was problematic, because not one of them was sustainable in the long term, considering the erosion of support for such efforts across the entire political spectrum in the United States, the economic and budgetary crises afflicting America and the rest of the capitalist world during the 1970s, and the intrinsic weaknesses of the Saigon government and its military forces. Acknowledging these realities, Nixon told Kissinger in March 1971, "I'm not going to allow their [i.e., the South Vietnamese's] weakness and their fear of the North Vietnamese to . . . delay us [from withdrawing]."⁵

If the administration's stopgap measures could not sustain Saigon's government and army following the

withdrawal of U.S. armed forces, Nixon and Kissinger believed that South Vietnam's defeat could then be blamed on Saigon's incompetence, Congress's obstructionism, the American public's irresolution, and historical "fate."⁶ Having said this, the point to be made is that Nixon and Kissinger did not want Thieu to fall from power, even if they did not want to fight a permanent war to keep him in power. They were therefore prepared to sign a cease-fire agreement in late 1972 or early 1973 that included the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces—on condition that it provided for the release of American POWs, allowed the United States to continue providing aid to Thieu, and did not require the removal of Thieu from power by the United States.

When they arrived at their decent interval solution sometime between late 1970 and early 1971, neither Nixon nor Kissinger had given up hope of achieving his goal of strengthening Thieu's government through Vietnamization while weakening Hanoi and the Viet Cong through diplomatic and military measures. In 1972, for example, they tried to revive the mutual withdrawal formula in the Paris negotiations and launched two "Linebacker" bombing campaigns to bolster Saigon's morale and damage Hanoi's military capabilities. Nonetheless, by early 1971 they had come to realize that they *could* and *might* fail in their effort to shore up Thieu's regime permanently, since his chances for survival after an American pullout were at best, they believed, "fifty-fifty."⁷

The issue of whether or not Nixon and Kissinger followed a decent interval strategy can be resolved, as I have tried to demonstrate, by means of empiricism, or evidence-based observation, logic, and interpretation. But there is another issue Larry has raised: namely, that of whether Nixon and Kissinger *betrayed* Thieu. This, I think, is mainly a *normative* issue, only partially resolvable through empirical methodology: that is, it is a judgment call, which is dependent not only on the facts of the

case but on differing standards or understandings of ethics and diplomatic behavior.

For now, I will concede that Nixon and Kissinger were often disingenuous with Thieu, but I want to observe, on the other hand, that Thieu essentially knew what Nixon and Kissinger were offering to Hanoi in the Paris negotiations. He had known for almost two years before the Paris Agreement, for example, about Nixon's abandonment of the mutual withdrawal formula, which was Nixon's key concession, and he knew that even without this formal diplomatic accommodation, American combat troops would in fact be completely out of Vietnam by late 1972. The fact is that Thieu could not accept these realities and did not appreciate the dilemmas American policymakers faced (that they had brought these upon themselves is irrelevant). Thieu had not wanted to leave office but had wanted American forces to fight for him permanently. As it happened, Nixon and Kissinger had pursued a game plan that had kept American armed forces in South Vietnam long enough to protect and strengthen Thieu and safeguard Nixon's reelection. For critics of the war, and for many combat soldiers and airmen and their families, this was far too long a period. Having stayed in Vietnam through January 1973, Nixon and Kissinger had prolonged the war and postponed the inevitable, causing, in the process, more American and Indochinese casualties, as well as more bitterness. But whether or not Thieu was in fact betrayed, the *accusation* of betrayal assumes that the war could somehow have been won after 1972. Another perspective—and the one I think is correct—is that Thieu was a failed leader and that South Vietnam was a failed nation. Neither Thieu nor South Vietnam could have been "saved." Indeed, the fall of Saigon had much to do with intrinsic weaknesses in South Vietnamese leadership and the ersatz nature of the South Vietnamese state.

In defeat, betrayal is a rampant theme. Nixon and Kissinger accused the

antiwar movement, the press, liberals, and Congress of betraying the cause of victory; Thieu had accused American policymakers of betrayal. How ironic it is that some Americans should now accuse Nixon and Kissinger of having betrayed the goal of victory.

Appendix: Selected Document Excerpts Relevant to the Decent Interval Question

[From Jeffrey Kimball, *The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2003).]

Oval Office Conversation no. 466-12, Nixon and Kissinger, after 4:00 P.M., March 11, 1971, WHT, NPMP (transcribed by J. Kimball).

Nixon: And because, uh, it's quite clear that, uh, [unclear] how strong they are. I'm not going to allow their weakness and their fear of the North Vietnamese to, to, to delay us. On the other hand, let me say, though, you see, we've been thinking all along [unclear]. Now we, we've tried everything; we've done everything the military wants. We have, we have, we've done everything to our own satisfaction in order to bring the war to a successful conclusion. I think, I think it's going to work. I think it will, I think, I agree with you that there's a 40 to 50 percent chance, maybe 55, that it will work, that we might even get an agreement. But what of an agreement? I think, I think, in other words, I guess, in other words, of course there will still be war out there, back and forth, but the South Vietnamese are not going to be knocked over by the North Vietnamese—not easily, not easily—

Kissinger: —Not easily, and this we could bring about—[both talking]

Nixon: —That's all we can do.

Oval Office Conversation no. 471-2, Nixon and Kissinger, 7:03-7:27 P.M., March 19, 1971, WHT, NPMP (transcribed by J. Kimball).

Kissinger: . . . I think that

SHAFR AT THE AHA

SHAFR members are encouraged to attend the following events at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in Washington on January 8-11, 2004:

Joint session between SHAFR and the AHA

Friday, Jan. 9
9:30-11:30 a.m.
Marriott, Virginia Suite B

Session 12: Inventing "Us and Them": Identity and Culture in Cold-War America

Chair: Wendy L. Wall, Colgate University

Papers:

"The American Way of War: National Identity and Nuclear Weapons in Cold-War America"
Andrew M. Johnston, University of Western Ontario

"Germany Belongs in the Western World: Answering the German Question in Cold-War America"
Brian C. Etheridge, Louisiana Tech University

"Blocbusters: The U.S. Escapee Program and the Complications of Cold-War Defection"
Susan Lisa Carruthers, Rutgers University

Comment: Frank Costigliola, University of Connecticut

Reception (cash bar)
Friday, Jan. 9
5:30-7:30 pm
Omni Shoreham Capitol Room

Council meeting
Saturday, Jan. 10
7:30-9:00 am
Omni Shoreham Suite 252

Luncheon
Saturday, Jan. 10
12:15-1:45 pm
Omni Shoreham Executive Room

James M. Olson, CIA Officer-in-Residence at Texas A&M University, will deliver the keynote address: "The Moral Dilemmas of Intelligence."

The luncheon price is \$37, which includes gratuity and tax. To obtain a ticket, please mail a check (payable to SHAFR) by Dec. 15, 2003 to SHAFR Business Office, Ohio State University, 106 Dulles Hall, 230 West 17th Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210. Very few tickets will be available for sale at the door.

there's a chance of a negotiation [unclear]. Again, it's less than even, but it's still—

Nixon: It might be. [Unclear] boy, [unclear] negotiation, but I think we've played the game down to the nut-cutting. It's very much to their advantage to have a negotiation to have us get us the hell out of there and give us those prisoners.

Kissinger: That's right. That's why—

Nixon: And we've got to do it, and, uh, we know that if they are willing to make that kind of a deal, we will make it better[?]-anytime they're ready.

Kissinger: Well, we've got to get enough time to get out; it's got to be because—

Nixon: Well, I understand—

Kissinger: —because we have to make sure that they don't knock the whole place over—

Nixon: —I don't mean [unclear; both talking]. But—

Kissinger: —Our problem is that if we get out, after all the suffering we've gone through—

Nixon: We can't have them knocked over brutally.

Kissinger: —we can't have them knocked over brutally, to put it brutally, before the election.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: And, uh—

Nixon: So that's why, that's why this strategy works pretty well, doesn't it? . . .

Oval Office Conversation no. 474-8, Nixon, Nixon, Laird, Connally, Packard, Moorer, Kissinger, Haig, after 4:25 P.M., March 26, 1971, WHT, NPMP (transcribed by Ken Hughes).

Nixon: I said [to Democratic congressmen], "Now, on this withdrawal, let's just understand one thing." I said, "I have a plan. I know the date that we're going to be out of there. It's a reasonable date. It's one that I am convinced is the earliest possible date we can get out without risking a South Vietnamese debacle. And also, it's the one

that I think is essential for us to have in terms of our—any possible bargaining position with regard to prisoners and the rest. . . . If you on the other hand, decide that you're going to take over and set arbitrary dates. . . then you will have to take the responsibility for an American defeat in Vietnam after all these deaths [and] for the communization of South Vietnam." I said, "This is what is on the line here. . . . You can play it one way or another". . . I said, "It's a hell of a risk." I said, "It's a chancy thing to know whether South Vietnam can survive. Who knows? . . .

Oval Office Conversation no. 527-16, Nixon, Haldeman, Kissinger, and Ehrlichman, 9:14 A.M.-10:12 A.M., June 23, 1971, WHT, NPMP (transcribed by J. Kimball).

Nixon: —because, because, you've gotta remember that everything is domestic politics from now on. And, uh, [unclear]. Everything's domestic politics. Maybe, maybe, maybe, Henry, we have got an excuse, I mean, they have to do it. To hell with the whole thing. You know what I mean? Even if we thought we didn't have that after, we wouldn't have it after November, uh, November '69, I said, all right, we gotta decide now, either, either stand up or flush it. We stood up, and we stood up again in April the next year. We didn't, we never had this opportunity again. Maybe. We've got to remember this one solid thing: LBJ couldn't be more right—talking about staying in until December of next year, August of next year, and so forth. This is frankly now moot. It is moot. Oh, I don't mean to tell, tell Thieu we're getting out in the fall. But it's moot, because we are without question gonna get out—cut off this [unclear: "fucker"?]. . . .

Nixon: . . .and as far as the date, we can do it. It's the one thing we can do.

Kissinger: Mr. President, the date, that's not the issue. The date was always gonna be around nine months, because we've offered them twelve previously, and they have offered six, and

it's got to be nine. So, you know, so that's no—

Nixon: [Unclear], yeah.

Kissinger: It's not gonna break down on three months. There's only one issue, and one only: must we impose a Communist government in Saigon?

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: If they settle that one, everything else will be settled in, in a month. If they're willing to leave Thieu in place while we get out and then let them, let them go at each other afterwards, uh—

Nixon: Yeah, [unclear].

Kissinger: —let us continue giving military aid or let both sides cut off military aid. . . .

Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, July 9, 1971, folder: China—HAK Memcons July 1971, box 1033, For the President's Files—China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMP.

Kissinger: I would like to tell the prime minister, on behalf of President Nixon, as solemnly as I can, that first of all, we are prepared to withdraw completely from Indochina and to give a fixed date, if there is a cease-fire and release of our prisoners. Secondly, we will permit the political solution of South Vietnam to evolve and to leave it to the Vietnamese alone.

We recognize that a solution must reflect the will of the South Vietnamese people and allow them to determine their future without interference. We will not re-enter Vietnam and will abide by the political process. . . .

Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou, July 10, 1971, folder: China—HAK Memcons July 1971, box 1033, For the President's Files—China/Vietnam Negotiations, NSCF, NPMP.

Kissinger: What we require is a transition period between the military withdrawal and the political evolution. Not so that we can re-enter, but so that we can let the people of Vietnam and other parts of Indochina determine their own fate.

Even in that interim period, we

are prepared to accept restrictions on the types of assistance that can be given to the countries of Indochina. And if no country of Indochina is prepared to accept outside military aid, then we are even prepared to consider eliminating all military aid.

I have told the prime minister yesterday, and I am willing to repeat this, that if after complete American withdrawal, the Indochinese people change their governments, the U.S. will not interfere. . . .

Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, September 18, 1971, folder: Vietnam Elections, box 872, For the President's Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, NSCF, NPMP.

We recognized from the beginning the uncertainty that the South Vietnamese could be sufficiently strengthened to stand on their own within the time span that domestic opposition to American involvement would allow. It has always been recognized that a delicate point would be reached where our withdrawals would coincide with maximum domestic uncertainty to jeopardize the whole structure at the final hour.

Therefore a negotiated settlement had always been far preferable. Rather than run the risk of South Vietnam crumbling around our remaining forces, a peace settlement would end the war with an act of policy and leave the future of South Vietnam to the historical process. There would be a clear terminal date rather than a gradual winding down. We could heal the wounds in this country as our men left peace behind on the battlefield and a healthy interval for South Vietnam's fate to unfold. In short, Vietnamization may be our ultimate recourse; it cannot be our preferred choice. . . .

Memcon, Kissinger and Andrei Gromyko, May 27, 1972, folder: Mr. Kissinger's Conversations in Moscow, May 1972, box 73, Country Files—Europe—USSR, HAKOF, NPMP.

Kissinger: The North Vietnamese are heroic people and personally

very attractive people. On the other hand they will not rely at all on the historical process. They want everything written down and today. . . . I think the evolution is even more important than the agreements. If North Vietnam were wise—I'm being candid—it would make an agreement with us now and not haggle about every detail, because one year after the agreement there would be a new condition, a new reality. . . .

If they don't want a . . . comprehensive settlement, then let us agree on a cease-fire, let us agree to exchange prisoners of war, and we would withdraw all our forces, and let them work out a political solution with the South Vietnamese. We would then guarantee, except for economic and military aid, to keep our hands out of it; we would be neutral in the political process. . . .

Gromyko: My impression sometimes from the president and Dr. Kissinger [about the] the official position of the United States is that it is impossible to leave Vietnam to some kind of Communist or Socialist government. This by itself throws a shadow on statements. Is your main preoccupation the character of the government?

Kissinger: That is a good question when it is posed by reasonable people. What we mean is that we will not leave in such a way that a Communist victory is guaranteed. However, we are prepared to leave so that a Communist victory is not excluded, though not guaranteed. I don't know if this distinction is meaningful to you. . . .

Memcon, Kissinger and Zhou Enlai, June 21, 1972, folder: China—Dr. Kissinger's Visit June 1972, box 97, Country Files—Far East, HAKOF, NPMP.

Kissinger: I believe that if a sufficient interval is placed between our withdrawal and what happens afterward that the issue can almost certainly be confined to an Indochina affair. It is important that there is a reasonable interval between the agreement on the cease-fire and a reasonable opportunity for political negotiation. . . . The out-

come of my logic is that we are putting a time interval between the military outcome and the political outcome. No one can imagine that history will cease on the Indochina peninsula with a cease-fire.

Jeffrey Kimball is a Professor of History at Miami University.

Notes:

1. Briefing Book for Kissinger's July 1971 Beijing trip, POLO I [Part I], box 850, For the President's Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, National Security Council Files (NSCF), Nixon Presidential Materials Project (NPMP), National Archives, College Park.
2. Two archivists at the Nixon Presidential Project affirmed that Kissinger wrote these words.
3. See appendix.
4. Jeffrey Kimball, "The Case of the 'Decent Interval': Do We Now Have a Smoking Gun?" *SHAFR Newsletter*, September 2001.
5. Oval Office Conversation no. 466-12, Nixon and Kissinger, after 4:00 P.M., March 11, 1971, White House Tapes (WHT), NPMP (transcribed by J. Kimball).
6. Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, September 18, 1971, folder: Vietnam Elections, box 872, For the President's Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, NSCF, NPMP.
7. Oval Office Conversation no. 527-16, Nixon, Haldeman, Kissinger, and Ehrlichman, 9:14 A.M.-10:12 A.M., June 23, 1971, WHT, NPMP (transcribed by J. Kimball).

A Final Word on the Decent Interval Strategy

By Larry Berman

I want to thank Mitch Lerner for providing the opportunity to recapitulate what I learned from the “decent interval” exchange between Professor Jeffrey Kimball and myself. Mitch has offered me much more space than I need.

First, it is important to remind readers of this *Newsletter* that I was minding my own business when the September 2001 SHAFR *Newsletter* arrived with Jeff’s article on the Paris agreement and the end of the Vietnam War. In that article he made the case for a “decent interval” strategy with new documents purporting to constitute a “smoking gun.” Not content to build his case from a mountain of evidence, Jeff brought me into this (I would have preferred just to have read the essay) by characterizing my new book, *No Peace No Honor*, as a “recent philippic.” I took this as a compliment, but he added the far more serious charge that I had “misinterpreted” primary source evidence at my disposal.

That’s how all this started. Jeff and I then enjoyed an exchange in the *Newsletter*, and a SHAFR roundtable was organized so that we could present our cases and clarify our differences. Let me say right off that I’ve had fun and enjoyed all this and learned quite a bit. It was gratifying to see how many people attended the roundtable, and we fielded some great questions. I have benefited from the entire exchange, and I have only the highest respect, as I have previously acknowledged, for Jeff Kimball’s contributions to the field. I have learned so much from him and from his scholarship.

At the roundtable I learned that Jeff and I disagree on the most fundamental point—the very meaning of a decent interval. This is not insignificant. Jeff sees the decent interval as a strat-

egy Nixon and Kissinger reached a decision about in 1970, when they concluded that American involvement in Vietnam should end through a plan that would leave the political evolution of Vietnam to the Vietnamese. Jeff brought along several interesting documents, which he described in the *Newsletter* as “incontrovertible” evidence of this strategy, that seem to support his conclusion that Nixon and Kissinger decided on a decent interval as early as 1970 and that this might or might not have resulted in the end of the country once referred to as South Vietnam.

I made the point at the roundtable that we really won’t know the answer to the decent interval question until all the documents are opened. Two decades hence I expect the younger generation, led by Mitch Lerner, to end this debate. Find me on the river after the trout stop biting to tell me who is correct. At the roundtable I argued that Nixon and Kissinger knew that leaving the political future of Vietnam to the Vietnamese, given the balance of forces in 1970, would result in a communist Vietnam. Kissinger may have wanted some cover for his future resume and for history, but Nixon had no intention of betraying Thieu. Moreover, in 1970 the North Vietnamese had no intention of agreeing to a political solution while American military forces were still in Vietnam. They could afford to wait until the balance of forces was in their favor. Le Duc Tho conceded that when that time arrived Thieu could remain in power. This was the North’s big concession, for which Kissinger has taken great credit. The concession was made, in my opinion, because the North believed they would win the political battle once the Americans were gone. I believe that

Nixon shared this belief and therefore did not intend to have elections take place while North Vietnamese forces remained in the South. The documents don’t tell us this yet, but let’s give the screeners twenty years.

Jeff maintains that Thieu was not betrayed, since he was aware of the concessions that had been made during the negotiations. I maintain that Thieu was merely informed of the concessions made by Kissinger in secret meetings with Le Duc Tho. Thieu was never part of the negotiations between North Vietnam and the United States. When he learned of the concessions, most especially the North Vietnamese army remaining in the South, he was told that if he did not go along, he would not get the B-52s back in April 1973. By that time the last American POW would have been released, and communist violations of the agreement were expected to begin.

The evidence I have seen shows that Kissinger and Nixon encouraged President Thieu not to hold elections until the northern troops went home and suggested that he use political prisoners as hostages for getting the northern troops out of the South. Thieu was told that the political apparatus designed to organize elections was a joke and that he, not the communists (who respected only bullets and hardware) would control the timing of any election. Although it sounded so noble, leaving the future of Vietnam to the Vietnamese meant nothing to Nixon or Kissinger if it might result in a communist government. No elections would occur until the northern armies left the South. I do not believe that I have misinterpreted the evidence, but we will know when all the evidence is opened for scholars.

I believe Nixon and Kissinger knew that the treaty was unenforceable, knew violations would occur, and expected to use air power again in the spring of 1973 to create a permanent stalemate that would keep Thieu in power through 1976. Only Watergate prevented this. I rejected the decent interval thesis because leaving the politi-

cal future of Vietnam to the Vietnamese meant only one thing to Nixon and Kissinger—the betrayal of an ally. I just don't believe Nixon could have ever accepted this. Kissinger is another story. Now I would like to suggest that SHAFR schedule a panel in 2023 on the subject "Twenty Years Later: What Have We Learned About the 'Decent In-

terval' since Berman and Kimball?" Jeff and I will be discussants, and Mitch Lerner will be the chair. Jeff and I hope to see you all there!

Larry Berman is a Professor of Political Science at UC-Davis, and the Director of the UC Washington Center.

2003 SHAFR Election of Officers

In the SHAFR election of 2003, the following individuals were elected to serve in the offices indicated. Their terms of service will begin on January 1, 2004:

PRESIDENT:

Mark A. Stoler, University of Vermont

VICE-PRESIDENT:

David L. Anderson, University of Indianapolis

COUNCIL:

Katherine A.S. Sibley, St. Joseph's University

Frank Costigliola, University of Connecticut

COUNCIL (GRADUATE STUDENT MEMBER):

Joe Mocnik, Bowling Green State University

NOMINATING COMMITTEE:

Steven Phillips, Towson University

The Gerald Ford Library

by Geir Gundersen

The Gerald R. Ford Library is located in Ann Arbor, Michigan, on the north campus of the University of Michigan, Gerald Ford's alma mater.¹ As part of the presidential library system administered by the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), the Ford Library is home to twenty-one million manuscript pages and audiovisual items documenting the life and career of the thirty-eighth president. These materials range from Gerald Ford's congressional, vice-presidential and presidential papers, to selected federal records and personal papers donated by individuals associated with Gerald Ford and his presidency.² Selected strengths of the holdings include domestic affairs and policies, economics, the 1976 presidential campaign, media relations, White House management and decision-making, congressional relations, and foreign policy.

At the core of the library's holdings on foreign relations and national security are the National Security Adviser Files of Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft. These files total approximately eight hundred thousand pages and are divided into over forty smaller collections containing security classified and nonclassified material. These collections encompass such areas as geographical regions, high-level meetings, memoranda of conversations, economic affairs, decision and study memoranda, program analysis, back-channel messages, press and congressional relations, liaison with commissions and committees, and correspondence with foreign leaders. Two other important foreign relations collections are the White House Central Files (WHCF) Subject File subject categories for countries, foreign affairs, international organizations, and

national security-defense, and the U.S. President's Commission on CIA Activities within the United States (Rockefeller Commission). Our holdings also encompass personal papers donated by former government officials involved with foreign affairs and national security issues, including those of Howard "Bo" Callaway, Secretary of the Army; Leo Cherne, chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; Wolfgang Lehman, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Saigon; and James Wilson, State Department Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs.

The Ford Library opened to research in 1981. In the early years, the library focused its work plan and resources on processing collections possessing a minimum of security classified materials, with the intent of opening as much material as quickly as possible.³ This approach benefited researchers interested in domestic affairs more than diplomatic historians, but foreign affairs materials, most notably those in the WHCF Subject File, were not entirely overlooked. However, these materials provided primarily general overviews of U.S. foreign policy, summit meetings, and state visits rather than in-depth background, analysis and insights into the decision-making process and surrounding diplomatic activities.

There were, nonetheless, incremental gains in the declassification of national security classified materials. Some material became available through mandatory declassification review. This is a process requiring researchers to identify specific documents, typically using information from withdrawal sheets in our files. Requests for review are limited to thirty-five

documents per request.⁴ Additional declassification progress usually resulted from unexpected mandates issued by Congress, the president, or the courts, such as the Kennedy Assassination Records Act and projects on MIAs and POWs and human rights in Chile and Argentina.⁵

President Bill Clinton's issuance of Executive Order 12958 in April 1995 establishing deadlines for the review of all classified materials over twenty-five years old had a major impact on processing priorities and declassification at the Ford Library.⁶ Our focus shifted to the more sensitive files on the Ford presidency, such as the Kissinger-Scowcroft files from the White House West Wing, the presidential and other files of the National Security Council (NSC) staff, and the files of the Rockefeller Commission on CIA activities.

Executive Order 12958 also led to our participation in the Remote Archives Capture (RAC) program, an interagency review project developed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to assist NARA and other executive branch agencies in reviewing their classified materials. Under RAC, over two hundred thousand pages have been digitally scanned for review by government agencies in Washington. Upon completion of their review, the agencies will notify the library of their decisions, and we will make these materials available to researchers as quickly as possible. Not all of our classified materials, however, have been scanned for RAC, because certain agencies, most notably the Department of State, chose not to participate in the Ford Library RAC program.

Equally important as RAC to

SHAFR Calendar

2003

November 15: Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant application deadline

November 15: Lawrence Gelfand- Armin Rappaport Fellowship application deadline

2004

January 8-11: Annual meeting of the AHA in Washington, DC.

February 15: Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize nomination deadline

February 15: Myrna F. Bernath Book Award nomination deadline

February 15: Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize nomination deadline

February 15: Deadline for submissions to the April 2004 issue of *Passport*

February 28: Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize nomination deadline

February 28: Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize nomination deadline

March 1: Norman and Laura Graebner Award nomination deadline

March 25-28: Annual meeting of the OAH in Boston.

April 15: Michael J. Hogan Fellowship nomination deadline

April 15: W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship nomination deadline

June 15: Deadline for submissions to the August 2004 issue of *Passport*

June 24-27: SHAFR's 30th annual conference will meet at the University of Texas at Austin.

Mark Lawrence is the Local Arrangements Chair.

October 15: Deadline for submissions to the December 2004 issue of *Passport*

November 15: Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship Award application deadline

November 15: Arthur S. Link-Warren F. Kuehl Prize for Documentary Editing nomination deadline

Sites for future AHA meetings are: Seattle, January 6-9, 2005 and Philadelphia, January 5-8, 2006.

Sites for future OAH meetings are: San Francisco, March 31-April 3, 2005 and Washington, DC, April 19-22, 2006.

declassification has been the decision of some government agencies, in particular the Department of State and the National Security Council, to delegate declassification authorities to Ford Library archivists and provide special training on how to apply their declassification guidelines in systematic declassification review. Armed with these powers, library archivists have devoted many hours to systematic review of unprocessed, non-RAC material in the National Security Adviser Files and previously withdrawn materials in processed collections.

Our systematic review efforts have been helped by an unintended consequence of the State Department's decision to forgo RAC. Within the last year, the State Department has chosen instead to send on-site review teams comprised of retired foreign service officers to review systematically their documents and equities that are outside our declassification authority and purview of subject expertise. These ongoing review trips have had a noticeable impact on our declassification efforts. We are able to follow the department reviewers and open the vast majority of these documents in conjunction with our own systematic review efforts. We are also able to prioritize collections for future State Department review visits, thereby making our substantive foreign affairs materials more readily available to researchers.

We began our systematic review efforts several years ago in earnest. In preparation for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the fall of Saigon in 2000, we undertook a special project to locate and make available materials regarding the Vietnam War.⁷ Taking a topical approach, we located and reviewed approximately thirty-nine thousand pages of readily identifiable materials related to Indochina and the war. Of this material, some twenty-five thousand pages from the numerous collections within the National Security Adviser Files have been opened.⁸ These materials include country files for Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; back-channel cables passing

between the ambassador in Saigon and the White House; memoranda of high-level White House and other diplomatic conversations; NSC and other high-level meeting minutes; intelligence reports on Vietnam going back to 1967; and correspondence with foreign leaders. The project also included files related to the *SS Mayaguez* crisis that occurred on the heels of the U.S. evacuation from Saigon. These materials have been well received and used intensively by diplomatic historians in the past few years.

Following the Indochina project, we set our sights on the five geographical regions represented in the National Security Adviser's Presidential Country Files. In this project, we also incorporated researcher requests in prioritizing countries to be reviewed and have presently completed final review and opening of all country files for Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Canada, and Latin America, and we have reviewed and opened the majority of the Middle East and South Asia files. We have so far opened approximately sixty-five thousand pages of material from these collections consisting primarily of memoranda, reports, briefing papers, schedule proposals, correspondence, and telegrams. These materials concern U.S. relations with emerging and established nations on a bilateral and multilateral level and are arranged by region or country name with separate sequences for NSC documents and State Department telegrams. The NSC documents consist mostly of high-level finished products, especially memoranda, created by the senior staff member for a particular region and addressed to either the assistant or deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs or created and addressed to the president on their behalf. The State Department telegrams provide an interesting look at communications between officials in Washington and staff at embassies throughout the five regions, and are valuable for on-the-scene, current reporting and analyses of conversations and events. Sample topics addressed in the country files include the Turkish

invasion of Cyprus, Henry Kissinger's negotiating efforts in the Middle East, emerging relations with China, military base negotiations, the worldwide energy crisis, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Cuban incursions in Africa, the Panama Canal treaty negotiations, the transition to majority rule in Zimbabwe, and the first international economic summits.

Pending completion of our systematic review of the few remaining countries in the Presidential Country File for Middle East and South Asia, the Ford Library will for the first time in its history have substantive materials available on U.S. bilateral and multilateral relations with every country and geographical region, a true indicator that our foreign affairs materials are starting to come of age. These materials will be of interest to those researching country and regional studies, Cold War issues, U.S. foreign policy-making and its role in a post-Vietnam world, intelligence and military issues, conflict and cooperation among nations, and Henry Kissinger's enigmatic role as secretary of state.

Other National Security Adviser collections that have been opened in recent years include a copy set of National Security Decision Memoranda and National Security Study Memoranda, the National Security Council Meetings File, NSC Latin American Affairs Staff File, Presidential Name File, and a partial set of the Memoranda of Conversations File. Future projects will include such National Security Adviser collections as the Kissinger Reports on the USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions; NSC Outside-the-System Chronological File; Trip Briefing Books and Cables for President Ford; Presidential Transition File; and NSC Staff Affairs Files for economics and the geographical regions represented in the Presidential Country Files.

In the near future, the Ford Library will receive an important segment of Ford administration NSC Historical Files totaling nearly fifty thousand pages. These records, many of which will fill existing holes in our National

Security Adviser Files, have been maintained by the NSC as “institutional files” to help facilitate continuity of government, starting with the Eisenhower administration and continuing through subsequent administrations. Following a court ruling declaring these files to be governed by the Presidential Records Act (PRA), President Clinton decided to remove the materials from the NSC and divide them among the presidential libraries of the originating presidents, as well as NARA’s Nixon Presidential Materials Staff. The Ford materials are likely to include complete sets of formally numbered NSC documents, formal studies initiated by National Security Study Memoranda, and meeting minutes and other files of NSC subgroups such as the Washington Special Action Group, Verification Panel, Defense Review Panel, and Committee on Foreign Intelligence. The materials are presently in Washington undergoing review by the NSC Access Management Office and other government agencies having equity interest in the records, including the CIA for intelligence sources and methods and the Department of Energy for information related to nuclear weapons. When they do arrive at the library, we will process them under the PRA rules and procedures. This includes making them available under provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.

Two years ago, we received another sign that our foreign affairs collections are coming of age when historians from the Department of State began visiting the library to research and compile materials documenting the major policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the Ford administration for their Foreign Affairs of the United States (FRUS) series. Topical visits have so far compiled documents on Africa, China, foreign economic affairs, Latin America, Middle East, Soviet Union, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Mutually Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), and Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. We expect these FRUS visits to continue for several more years.

Researchers contemplating a visit to the Ford Library are encouraged to contact the library in advance for information on our holdings. The library will provide a PRESNET database search report on requested topics listing open collections, folder titles, and estimated page counts. Our website (www.ford.utexas.edu) is also a good source of pre-trip information. Along with a guide to our historical materials and online collection finding aids, the website offers sample documents, a frequently asked questions section on conducting research at the library, travel directions, and information about the Gerald R. Ford Foundation grants program.⁹

If not driving, those traveling to the Ford Library can fly into Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, an international airport servicing all major domestic and international air carriers, located twenty-five miles east of Ann Arbor, or use Amtrak passenger rail service. Once in Ann Arbor, researchers without automobiles have several options, including Ann Arbor’s top-rated mid-sized city bus system, the free bus system operated by the University of Michigan between its two campuses, or local taxi services.

Ann Arbor also offers visitors a wide range of lodging, restaurants, and cultural activities. Lodging encompasses European-style hotels, major motel and hotel chains, friendly bed and breakfasts, and on-campus housing through the University of Michigan. Accommodations nearest the library include the Red Roof Inn–North, Holiday Inn–North, Hampton Inn–North, Microtel Inn & Suites, and Hawthorn Suites. Information about availability of on-campus accommodations on the north and central campuses is available through the university’s Conference Management Services (www.cms.housing.umich.edu).

Those visiting Ann Arbor’s vibrant downtown and central campus areas, both within walking distance of each other, will find numerous restaurants featuring an interesting array of

international and American cuisine.¹⁰ There is also a wide range of cultural events and activities, including an acclaimed summer art fair, local and university libraries, museums and art galleries, theater productions, classical music concerts, folk and jazz clubs, and a multitude of bookstores. Additional information on lodging, restaurants, events, attractions, and transportation is available through the Ann Arbor Area Convention and Visitors Bureau (www.annarbor.org).

We welcome the opportunity to assist those planning a research trip to the Gerald R. Ford Library. Along with substantive foreign relations materials and an active declassification program, researchers will find a knowledgeable and experienced staff and an operation geared toward maximizing the efficiency of a researcher’s time at the library. For additional information please contact us at the Gerald R. Ford Library, 1000 Beal Avenue, Ann Arbor, MI 48109; e-mail: ford.library@nara.gov; telephone 734-205-0555; fax 734-205-0571.

Geir Gundersen is an archivist at the Gerald Ford Presidential Library.

Notes:

¹ Unlike other presidential libraries, the Gerald R. Ford Library and Museum is a split facility, with the Ford Museum located across the state in Grand Rapids, Ford’s boyhood home and the heart of the congressional district he served for nearly twenty-five years.

² Examples of federal records include those of the U.S. Council on Economic Advisers and the U.S. President’s Commission on Olympic Sports. Personal papers have been donated by such individuals as Melvin Laird, Ford congressional colleague and President Nixon’s secretary of defense, and Arthur Burns, chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, 1971-1978.

³ To date, the library has opened seventy percent of its holdings.

⁴ While response time on requests is often slow, as most documents are submitted to

their originating agencies for review, mandatory review does provide requestors with certain appeal rights for information denied.⁵ These mandated projects, however, always diverted staff and placed our mandatory review work on hold.

⁶ President George W. Bush recently issued amendments to Executive Order 12958, including an extension of the deadline for completing review of classified materials.

⁷ The project was in association with the conference "After the Fall: Vietnam Plus Twenty-Five," co-sponsored by the library, the Gerald R. Ford Foundation, and the University of Michigan Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy.

⁸ The Vietnam project also included a mini-RAC component in which the CIA scanned nearly ten thousand pages of documents for which it wholly or partially controlled access, many of which have since been reviewed and opened.

⁹ Gerald R. Ford Foundation research grants are awarded semi-annually and help defray the travel, living, and photocopy expenses of a research trip to the Ford Library. Foreign applicants are responsible for the cost of travel between their home country and North America, since the grants only cover travel within North America.


¹⁰ Researchers should be forewarned that the library does not have lunch facilities, but cafeteria meals, fast food and coffee bar are available at the nearby North Campus Pierpont Commons. Those having an automobile will find a variety of fast food and restaurant options within a short driving distance of the library.

Are you missing an old issue of the SHAFR Newsletter? Are you lying awake at night worried about your incomplete set? Do you feel like other historians are secretly mocking you because of your partial collection?

DON'T DESPAIR!

Copies can be ordered through the Passport office at 1501 Neil Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210, or by e-mail at passport@osu.edu.

Orders are \$3.00 per issue, \$4.00 for international orders.



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DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

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ARTICLES

"Mr. TVA": Grass-Roots Development, David Lilienthal, and the Rise of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for U.S. Overseas Development, 1933-1973 *by David Ekbladh*

Diplomatic Weapons of the Weak: Mexican Policymaking during the U.S.-Mexican Agrarian Dispute, 1934-1941 *by John J. Dwyer*

Seeing Diplomacy through Bankers' Eyes: The World Bank, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis, and the Aswan High Dam *by Amy L. S. Staples*

Unions and Cold War Foreign Policy in the 1980s: The National Labor Committee, the AFL-CIO, and Central America *by Andrew Battista*

Transnational Coalition-Building and the Making of the Cold War in Indochina, 1947-1949 *by Mark Atwood Lawrence*

FEATURE REVIEWS

A Global Group of Worriers *by Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hlecht*

Perception and Misperception: The Role of Culture in American-Japanese Relations *by F. G. Notebelfer*

The Virtues of Persistence *by Gary Hess*

The Diplomacy of Shame *by Michael L. Krenn*

Information about submitting articles to *Diplomatic History* can be found online at: <http://www.colorado.edu/history/diplomatic>, maintained at the journal's editorial offices at the University of Colorado at Boulder. The editor-in-chief of *Diplomatic History* is Robert D. Schulzinger, and the executive editor is Thomas W. Zeiler. The editorial staff can be reached via email at: diplomat@colorado.edu.

For other information about *Diplomatic History*, including permissions, editorial information, subscription information, the contents of recent issues, abstracts of recent articles, and electronic access to the journal, please check the *Diplomatic History* home page, maintained by Blackwell Publishers at: <http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0145-2096&site=1>.

The Diplomatic Pouch

1. Personal and Professional Notes

Francis Carroll (St. Johns College, University of Manitoba) was awarded the Albert B. Corey Prize, given jointly by the American Historical Association and the Canadian Historical Association, for the best book on the history of Canadian-American relations, for his book *A Good and Wise Measure: The Search for the Canadian-American Boundary, 1783-1842*

Richard V. Damms has been named Director of the Center for Historical Studies at Mississippi State University.

Joseph (Andy) Fry has been named a University Distinguished Professor at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas.

Mitchell Lerner (Ohio State) won the North American Society for Oceanic History's 2003 John Lyman Book Award for the best work of U.S. Naval History published in 2002, for his book *The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy*.

Kyle Longley received the Associate Students of Arizona State University's Centennial Professor Award for 2003-2004 for outstanding teaching, and was also named a Dean's Distinguished Professor.

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes (Texas A&M University--Commerce) received a Campus Visiting Fellowship from the University of Salford in Manchester, England.

Jeremy Suri (Wisconsin) received the 2003 Phi Alpha Theta (National History Honor Society) Best First Book Award for his book *Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente*.

David J. Ulbrich, a doctoral candidate at Temple University, received the 2003 General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. Dissertation Fellowship offered by the U.S. Marine Corps Heritage Foundation. This fellowship will fund research for Ulbrich's dissertation titled "Managing Marine Mobilization: Thomas Holcomb and the U.S. Marine Corps, 1936-1943."

2. Research Notes

New CWIHP e-Dossier on Soviet Reactions to the Arab-Israeli, June 1967 War

Thirty six years after the June 1967 war between the State of Israel and its Arab neighbors, the role played by the Kremlin in the events which led to this armed conflict and during the war, remains enigmatic. Soviet documents on the subject remain hard to obtain. New archival evidence from Poland sheds light on the role played by the USSR in the events leading up to the outbreak of the Six Day War and during the conflict. This evidence is based on Leonid Brezhnev's secret report at a plenary session of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party (CC CPSU) held on June 20, 1967 entitled "On Soviet Policy Following the Israeli Aggression in the Middle East."

Dr. Uri Bar-Noi, a lecturer of Soviet history and diplomacy at the Open University in Israel, obtained and translated the documents contained in Cold War International History Project e-Dossier #7 on the Soviet role in the June War. This Polish record was acquired as part of a recent research project on the Cold War in the Middle East undertaken by the Chaim Herzog Center for Middle East Studies and Diplomacy at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev in Israel in cooperation with CWIHP.

To read the e-Dossier, go to <http://cwihip.si.edu>

National Security Archive Update, November 5, 2003
JFK tape details high-level Vietnam coup plotting in 1963

<http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB101/index.htm>

A White House tape of President Kennedy and his advisers, published in a new book-and-CD collection and excerpted on the Web, confirms that top U.S. officials sought the November 1, 1963 coup against then-South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem without apparently considering the physical consequences for Diem personally (he was murdered the following day). The taped meeting and related documents published on the National Security Archive web site (www.nsarchive.org) show that U.S. officials, including JFK, vastly overestimated their ability to control the South Vietnamese generals who ran the coup 40 years ago.

The Kennedy tape from October 29, 1963 captures the highest-level White House meeting immediately prior to the coup, including the President's brother voicing doubts about the policy of support for a coup: "I mean, it's different from a coup in the Iraq or South American country; we are so intimately involved in this." National Security Archive senior fellow John Prados provides a full transcript of the meeting, together with the audio on CD, in his new book-and-CD publication, *The White House Tapes: Eavesdropping on the President* (New York: The New Press, 2003, 331 pp. + 8 CDs, ISBN 1-56584-852-7), featuring audio files from 8 presidents, from Roosevelt to Reagan.

To mark the 40th anniversary of the Diem coup, a critical turning point in the Vietnam War, Dr. Prados also compiled and annotated for the Web a selection of recently declassified documents from the forthcoming documentary publication, *U.S. Policy in the Vietnam War*, to be published in spring 2004 by the National Security Archive and ProQuest Information and Learning. Together with the Kennedy tape from October 29, 1963, the documents show that American leaders discussed not only whether to support a successor government, but also the distribution of pro- and anti-coup forces, U.S. actions that could be taken that would contribute to a coup, and calling off a coup if its prospects were not good.

National Security Archive Update, November 2, 2003
Mexico's Southern Front: Guatemala and the Search for Security

<http://www.nsarchive.org/NSAEBB/NSAEBB100/>

The National Security Archive has published on its website a new collection of declassified documents from U.S. and Mexican archives on Mexico's policy toward Guatemalans seeking refuge in Mexico during that country's internal conflict. The documents complement an article appearing in Mexico's *Proceso* magazine written by National Security Archive senior analyst Kate Doyle, director of the Archive's Mexico Project.

During Guatemala's protracted and savage internal conflict, which raged from 1963 to 1996, tens of thousands of Guatemalan citizens fled the violence in their country for the safety of Mexico. Whether they arrived as refugees, illegal immigrants, exiled political activists or members of one of the four guerrilla groups, most of them found safe haven on Mexican soil. Having survived the war, many of them today cherish a strong and enduring affection for Mexico.

The emerging record of that era, however, is a complicated one. Files recently released in Mexican and U.S. government archives document Mexico's ambivalent and at times contradictory policy toward the Guatemalan conflict. On the one hand, the Mexican government criticized the political violence employed by decades of successive regimes in Guatemala, and extended a life-saving welcome to Guatemalans fleeing the brutality in their homeland. On the other hand, Mexico harbored profound concerns about the implications of the violence for its own internal security. Those concerns led the Mexican government to collaborate "secretly and selectively" with the same repressive forces it opposed.

For more information contact Kate Doyle:
In Mexico: 5255 5574 7897; in Washington: 202 994 7000
kadoyle@gwu.edu

3. Mailbox

To the Members of SHAFR,

I would like to suggest to the editors of *Diplomatic History* that they issue a new cumulative index of the journal and place it online at the SHAFR website if at all possible. It has been some years since the last cumulative index and the need grows every year. For those younger scholars without access to this index or a complete run of the journal, reexamining the earlier work of our predecessors in the field has become difficult and time-consuming. Such an index, if prepared electronically, could be updated annually with minimal additional effort and would be easily searchable. I urge the editors to undertake this worthy project.

Yours Sincerely,

Jonathan Winkler
PhD Candidate
Yale University

SHAFR Colleagues:

I am writing on behalf of the program committee of the Organization of American Historians for the 2005 Annual Meeting.

The meeting will be held in San Francisco, and I have been promised that there will be several sessions and panels on military history and the history of foreign relations. I hope that you will pass this information on to colleagues and graduate students who may be interested and that you will consider organizing a panel yourself.

The theme of the 2005 meeting is "Historians and Their Audiences." Given the diverse audiences, sponsors, and professional relations of military history, this should be a rewarding theme around which to organize our discussion.

Please let me know if you have any questions or ideas.

Best Regards,

Ronald Spector
George Washington University
spector@gwu.edu

[Ed. note: *The OAH Call for Papers for the 2005 annual meeting appears on page 22*]

4. Announcements

Library of Congress Fellowship in International Studies

The Library of Congress Fellowships in International Studies are sponsored by the Library of Congress with the Association of American Universities and the American Council of Learned Societies. These fellowships provide postdoctoral scholars in the humanities and social sciences with support for four to nine months of residence in Washington, D.C. to use the foreign language collections of the Library of Congress. Fellows occupy research space in the Library's John W. Kluge Center (www.loc.gov/kluge), and are part of the Center's regular programming.

Generously funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Association of American Universities, and the Library of

Congress, with additional funds from the Henry Luce Foundation for research concerning Asia or Southeast Asia, the Library of Congress Fellowships in International Studies increase the use and visibility of the Library's outstanding international and foreign language collections in formats that include books, periodicals, maps, music, motion pictures, recorded sound, video, prints, photographs, microform, and electronic media.

The program is designed for postdoctoral scholars who are at early stages of their careers (within seven years of their degree). Research projects in the history, language, culture, politics, economics, and other disciplines of the humanities and social sciences that further understanding of the global partners of the United States will be welcome, as will multi-disciplinary and cross-disciplinary proposals, and proposals focused on single or multiple geographical areas.

For more information and to apply for a Library of Congress Fellowship in International Studies, visit the web at: <http://www.loc.gov/loc/kluge/int-fellow.html> or call the John W. Kluge Center at the Library of Congress, 202-707-3302.

Robert Saladini
John W. Kluge Center
Office of Scholarly Programs
Email: rsal@loc.gov

Carnegie Council Nonresidential Fellowships

The Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs is now accepting applications for its nonresidential Fellows Program.

The program supports promising younger scholars, educators, and practitioners who are engaged with the ethical dimensions of international affairs. The program is open to junior scholars and mid-career professionals worldwide. Individuals from developing countries are encouraged to apply. All fellows must be fluent in English.

Candidates must link their applications to one of the Council's five program areas:

Environmental Values
Ethics and the Use of Force
History and the Politics of Reconciliation
Human Rights
Justice and the World Economy.

The deadline for applications is January 15, 2004. Please visit our website at <http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/page.php/prmID/48> for more details.

Inquiries may be addressed to:
Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs
170 East 64th Street
New York, NY 10021
e-mail: fellows@cceia.org

Miller Center Fellowships in Contemporary History, Public Policy, and
American Politics

The Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia annually offers up to ten \$18,000 fellowships to Ph.D. candidates and independent scholars to support one year of research and writing toward the completion of their dissertations or independent book research. The work should focus on important public policy questions relating to twentieth century politics and governance in the United States.

Each fellow is matched with an academic mentor who serves as a guide to the literature of the field, offers advice on methodology, and critiques the fellow's work. Residence of fellows is encouraged but not required. Fellows are expected to participate in a conference in the spring of the academic year to present their research and findings to scholars from the University of Virginia and other conference attendees.

Applications are judged on their scholarly quality and on their potential to shed new light upon important public policy questions. The Miller Center encourages applicants from a broad range of disciplines, including, but not limited to: history, political science, policy studies, law, political economy, and sociology.

Visit www.millercenter.virginia.edu/programs/apd/fellowship.html to download the application. Applications for the 2004-2005 academic year should be postmarked by February 2, 2004. For further information, contact:

Michael Lynch
Managing Director, Miller Center Fellowships in Public Affairs
Miller Center of Public Affairs
2201 Old Ivy Road
P.O. Box 400406
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4406
mpl4c@virginia.edu
<http://www.millercenter.virginia.edu/programs/apd/fellowship.html>

Newberry Library Fellowships

The Newberry Library, an independent research library in Chicago, Illinois, invites applications for its 2004-05 Fellowships in the Humanities. Newberry Library fellowships support research in residence at the Library on topics appropriate to the collections of the Newberry Library. Our fellowship program rests on the belief that all projects funded by the Newberry benefit from engagement both with the materials in the Newberry's collections and with the lively community of researchers that gathers around those collections. Long-term residential fellowships are available to postdoctoral scholars (and Ph.D. candidates in the case of the Kade Fellowship) for periods of six to eleven months. Applicants for postdoctoral awards must hold the Ph.D. at the time of application. The stipend for these fellowships is up to \$40,000. Short-term residential fellowships are intended for postdoctoral scholars or Ph.D. candidates from outside of the Chicago area who have a specific need for Newberry collections. Scholars whose principal residence or place of employment is within the Chicago area are not eligible. The tenure of short-term fellowships varies from one week to two months. The amount of the award is generally \$1200 per month. Applications for long-term fellowships are due January 15, 2004; applications for most short-term fellowships are due February 15, 2004.

Committee on Awards
Newberry Library
60 West Walton Street
Chicago, IL 60610-3380
Phone: (312)255-3666
Fax: (312)255-3680
Email: research@newberry.org
Visit the website at <http://www.newberry.org/nl/research/L3rfellowships.html>

Gerald R. Ford Library Travel Grants

The Gerald R. Ford Foundation semi-annually awards travel grants of up to \$2000 in support of significant research in Gerald R. Ford Library collections. Collections focus on federal policies, institutions, and politics in the 1970s. Processed archival collections contain materials on foreign affairs and national security issues such as the Vietnamese War, foreign aid, the Middle East peace process, Latin America, the Mayaguez incident, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, trade, and foreign economic policy. The collections contain materials on domestic issues such as the 1974 congressional elections, 1976 presidential campaign, economic policy, fiscal and regulatory matters, health and environmental issues, and White House operations. Application postmark deadlines are March 15 and September 15.

Helmi Raaska, Grants Coordinator

Gerald R. Ford Library

1000 Beal Avenue

Ann Arbor, MI 48109

Telephone: (734)205-0559

Fax: (734)205-0571

Email: helmi.raaska@nara.gov

Visit the website at <http://www.ford.utexas.edu>

American Foreign Policy Center at Louisiana Tech

The American Foreign Policy Center (AFPC) at Louisiana Tech University is pleased to announce the establishment of a fellowship program to help defray the costs associated with travel to and research in the American Foreign Policy Center in Ruston, Louisiana.

Created in 1989 to promote research in the field of US foreign policy and to increase public awareness of world affairs, the AFPC collection contains approximately 3,200 reels of microfilm and 2,000 microfiches of public and private papers associated with the Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, as well as State Department files for China, Cuba, El Salvador, Formosa/Taiwan, France, Germany, Indochina/Southeast Asia, Japan, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Palestine/Israel, and the former Soviet Union. With its collection drawn from several different archives across the United States, the AFPC is an optimal place to begin research on a topic, or an excellent resource to consult in the final stages of a project. A list of our holdings is accessible on-line at <http://history.latech.edu/afpc.htm>.

Both faculty and graduate students are invited to apply. Applications should include a detailed proposal outlining the project, a cv, a budget, and two letters of support. A successful applicant will be expected to offer a brief presentation on the project and his/her findings in the Center at the conclusion of the stay. Annual application deadlines are April 15 and October 15. Please send applications to Brian C. Etheridge, Department of History, Louisiana Tech University, P.O. Box 8548, Ruston, Louisiana 71272. Inquiries should be directed to Professor Etheridge at briane@latech.edu or (318) 257-2872.

Bloomington Eighteenth Century Workshop

May 19-22, 2004

Indiana University

Announcing the third Bloomington Eighteenth-Century Workshop, to be held on 19-22 May 2004 at Indiana University. The workshop is part of a series of annual interdisciplinary events that has been running since 2002, with 20-30 scholars presenting and discussing pre-circulated papers on a broad topic in a congenial setting. It will be hosted by our newly established Center for Eighteenth-Century Studies.

Our topic for 2004 is "Geographies of the Eighteenth Century: The Question of the Global." What does it mean to locate the invention of the global in the eighteenth century? What does this location of the global legitimate or make visible? What does it neglect or occlude? We would like to interrogate the meaning and distinctiveness of 'the global' in the eighteenth century, encouraging comparisons across space and time and debates across disciplines.

To mark the edges of the global geographically, it helps to globalize the question itself: was this idea conceptualized differently in different parts of the world? Are there in fact many "globals"? Where did the global fail to reach, and why? To mark the historical parameters of the question, it helps to question whether eighteenth-century notions of the global were distinctive from what came before or after. What sort of practices -- political, representational, juridical, technical, narrative, scientific -- furthered or, alternately, thwarted the development of the idea of the global? Conversely, what practices did this idea help put to rest?

The workshop format, which has proven to be extraordinarily fruitful, will consist of intense discussion of 4-6 pre-circulated papers a day, amidst socializing and refreshment. The workshop will draw both on the wide community of eighteenth century scholars and on the large and growing group of scholars in this field at Indiana University-Bloomington. Papers will be selected by an interdisciplinary committee. The workshop will cover most expenses of those scholars chosen to present their work: accommodations, travel (up to a certain limit) and most meals.

We are asking for applications to be sent to us by the 5th of January 2004. The application consists of a two-page description of the proposed paper as well as a current CV. Please email or send your application to Dr. Barbara Truesdell, Ashton-Aley West, Room 264, Bloomington, IN 47405, Telephone 855-2856, email barbara@indiana.edu.

For further information check our website, <http://www.indiana.edu/~voltaire/cfp04.html>, or contact Dror Wahrman
Dept. of History
Indiana University
dwahrman@indiana.edu.

GWU-UCSB Graduate Student Conference on the Cold War

April 30-May 2, 2004

George Washington University

The George Washington University Cold War Group (GWCW) and the UC Santa Barbara Center for Cold War Studies (CCWS) announce their second annual graduate student conference on the Cold War, to be held at the George Washington University, April 30-May 2, 2004. Prior to 2003, the programs held separate spring conferences; they now hold a jointly sponsored conference held at each campus in alternating years. The conference is an excellent opportunity for graduate students to present papers and receive critical feedback from peers and experts in the field. Each panel has one or more established scholars serving as discussants. There will also be tips for research provided in sessions led by leading scholars in the field.

We encourage submissions by graduate students working on any aspect of the Cold War. Proposals, including a brief CV and one-page abstract, should be emailed to conference coordinator Yvette Chin at yvette@gwu.edu by January 15, 2004. The conference chair is Professor James M. Goldgeier of GWU.

We also seek faculty members to serve as chairs and discussants. Those interested in serving in this capacity should contact Yvette Chin.

For more information on GWCW and the CCWS, see the respective websites:
<http://ieres.org>
<http://www.history.ucsb.edu/projects/ccws>

Mid-America Conference on History
September 30-October 2, 2004
Springfield, MO

Call for Papers

The Twenty-Sixth Annual Mid-America Conference on History, September 30-October 2, 2004 in Springfield, Missouri.

Sessions on all fields and phases of history

Proposal deadline May 15, 2004

For proposals and further information contact:

James N. Giglio, Conference Coordinator
Department of History
Southwest Missouri State University
Springfield, MO 65804
Jng890f@smsu.edu

War and the Environment: Contexts and Consequences of Military Destruction in the Modern Age
Conference at the German Historical Institute, Washington, DC
May 6-9, 2004

Wars have had major impacts on urban and natural environments. As a consequence of military campaigns and destruction, landscapes and cityscapes have been transformed, oceans and air have been polluted. At the same time, environmental factors, such as climate and the availability of resources, have influenced military strategies and the conduct of war. Some wars have been fought in order to gain access to natural resources. Others have been compared with natural events.

Our conference invites historians and social scientists to explore the nexus of environment and war from multiple perspectives. It seeks to bring together historians of culture, environment, technology, economics, etc. whose work deals with war, particularly since the onset of industrialization, anywhere in the world. We invite proposals addressing some of the following topics and questions:

- * What immediate and long-term environmental consequences have wars and the use of modern destructive weapons had on nature (land, air, and sea) and natural resource policies? In what ways have such factors as nuclear radiation, pollution, toxification, and military installations (landmines etc.) contributed to the transformation of landscapes? How have they influenced agriculture and transportation?
- * To what extent and in what ways have sites and installations of war (battlefields, fortifications, etc.) influenced the environmental and cultural alteration of landscapes?
- * How has war affected urban environments (water supplies, transportation systems, etc.), cityscapes, and patterns of settlement? What lessons did urban planners learn from wars, and how did they apply their experience in postwar reconstruction? To what extent did they take the prevention of future environmental damage into consideration?
- * What types of environmental damage have military planners taken into account? How have the public and media reacted? To what extent has the growing awareness of environmental damage led to new legal regulations and military concepts in the course of the 20th century?
- * What consequences have resulted from the storage of hazardous wastes at military sites? How have legal systems evolved to remediate toxic waste sites and compensate nearby residents—or soldiers—exposed to such materials? What military and legal discourses, and what policies have evolved in regard to burning oil wells, oil spills, and similar environmental disasters?
- * What are the connections between war, science, and the environment? How has this complex relationship evolved over time?

* How has nature (or, for that matter, the social and cultural constructions of nature) been used to justify military aggression, conquest, and resistance? What role have comparisons between war and nature, or natural and military disasters, etc. played in politics and ideology? In turn, what military terms and strategies have been applied in environmental campaigns, for instance against ocean flooding, the "bio-invasion" of non-native species, etc.?

Proposals that deal with a variety of these issues, and papers that focus on comparisons (over time or between different wars) are especially welcome. However, we shall also accept case studies that address broader analytical questions about the relationship between war and the environment. Successful applicants will be invited to present their work at the German Historical Institute in Washington, DC.

Applications must be received by January 15, 2004. They should include a proposal not longer than 500 words and a brief CV. Please send applications to the email address below or send a fax to the German Historical Institute.

Baerbel Thomas
German Historical Institute
1607 New Hampshire Avenue, NW
Phone: 202-387-3355
Fax: 202-483-3430
Email: b.thomas@ghi-dc.org
<http://www.ghi-dc.org/>

Women and War

Work has begun on *Women and War: An Encyclopedia* to be edited by Prof. Bernard Cook and published by ABC-CLIO. Scheduled to appear in 2006, the work will consist of alphabetically arranged entries and is intended to provide an overview of current scholarship. War is broadly interpreted to include revolutionary violence, terror campaigns, and guerrilla struggles as well as inter-state warfare. The scope is world-wide and will focus on women as combatants, political figures, war workers, victims, and survivors. Inquiries by individuals interested in participating in the project should be addressed to Bernard Cook via email.

Dr. Bernard Cook,
Department of History
Box 218
Loyola University
New Orleans, LA 70118
USA
Email: cook@loyno.edu

Radical History Review, Special Issue on Homeland Security

Radical History Review invites submissions for a forthcoming thematic issue devoted to "Homeland Security."

The shift in U.S. domestic and international agendas in the wake of 9/11 -- with the accompanying rhetorics of national defense, the war on terrorism, and "homeland security" -- establishes a complex challenge for radical scholars and activists. While the agencies and policies grouped under the rubric of "homeland security" ostensibly address issues of the safety of this nation and its citizens, its implications reach far beyond the borders of the U.S. They raise both new and familiar questions about transnational mobility, imperialism, nation, and citizenship. Increasingly, governments around the world are adopting the discourse of "national security" to beef up their militaries, quash dissent, and crack down on those considered alien to particular conceptions of national identity.

What is the role of radical historians and engaged intellectuals under this "new normalcy"?

RHR invites submissions that address topics such as the following:

- * The genealogies of "homeland security" - both its geopolitical contexts and its intellectual underpinnings
- * The creation of the national security state and its implications for the nation-state
- * The new imperialism at home and abroad and its various guises: "democracy", free markets, global anti-terrorism alliances, the war on drugs
- * The internationalization of Plan Colombia and the restructuring of clientelism, especially in Latin America;
- * The War on Terror, the war in Afghanistan, the occupation of Iraq, the coalition and allies, and international critique and resistance to the coalition
- * The new domestic normalcy in the U.S. and the militarization of everyday life, and their implications for citizenship, immigration policy, surveillance, and urban policy; new domestic agendas in non-U.S. contexts (e.g. Israel, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan)
- * The resurgence of nativism in various national contexts
- * Right wing popular culture in the U.S. and the legacies of McCarthyism, Vietnam, and the '60s
- * Resistance and popular culture; art in/as activism; the internet and activism
- * The academy and the national security state (including issues such as the contribution of the University to "homeland security," the state and scholarship, the role of the intellectual under the new normalcy, the student body and travel restrictions)
- * The role of the "other" in the constitution of nation/homeland: race, gender, citizenship, and transnational flows
- * Reproduction, bodies, and medicine in the new global order

We are also interested in short essays that can trace the histories of several key concepts through the laws, institutions and policies of various national regimes. These concepts may include but are not limited to: Homeland Security, National Security State, Intelligence, and Citizenship.

We are eager to broaden the discussion beyond the domestic policies of the Bush administration and welcome submissions that treat any of the above issues in terms of non-U.S. national contexts.

Submissions are not restricted to traditional research articles; we welcome short reports and reflections, including ones that describe specific cases or document the impact of these policies; and artwork on related themes (along with an artists' statement or brief commentary). We also welcome interviews with activists or intellectuals, teaching resources including syllabi and original documents, and film, exhibit and book reviews.

The deadline for submissions is February 1, 2004. Essay submissions should be no longer than 25-30 double-spaced pages, and should follow the guidelines for RHR submissions, available at <http://chnm.gmu.edu/rhr/guidelin.htm>.

Submissions should be sent to the contact below.

Essays should be submitted electronically, as an attachment, with "Issue 92 submission" in the subject line. For artwork, please submit 3 copies by mail. For preliminary e-mail inquiries, please include "Issue 92" in the subject line.

The Radical History Review
Tamiment library, NYU,
70 Washington Square South, 10th Floor,
NY, NY 10012
Email: rhr@igc.org

The Ten Most Wanted List

In an effort to fight increased government secrecy, OMB Watch in concert with several other groups is calling for input from various disciplines for the for the "Ten Most Wanted Project 2004" list. OMB Watch is seeking to identify the ten or twenty

government documents (or categories of documents) of 2003 that researchers would most like to see the government make available to the public. An example would be the 28 pages kept classified from the report by Congress on the September 11 attacks, or taxpayer-funded Congressional Research Service reports available to the public only through members of Congress. The organization will cull through the ideas submitted, make a list of the 20 or so best suggestions, and then ask the public to vote on which documents the public most wants the government to make available. The Ten Most Wanted Project 2004 is being prepared by OMB Watch and the Center for Democracy and Technology for OpenTheGovernment.org. OpenTheGovernment.org is a new coalition of over 30 organizations created to fight increased secrecy and promote open government. The Center for Democracy and Technology (<http://www.cdt.org>) works to promote democratic values and civil liberties in the digital age. OMB Watch (<http://www.ombwatch.org>) advances social justice, government accountability and citizen participation in federal policy decisions. Please submit your nominations via email to: <info@openthegovernment.org> by 31 October 2003.

5. Recent Publications

Bahgat, Gawdat. *American Oil Diplomacy in the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea*, University Press of Florida, \$39.95

Baron, Samuel H. and Cathy A Frierson. *Adventures in Russian Historical Research: Reminiscences of American Scholars from the Cold War to the Present*, M.E. Sharpe, \$24.95

Bieler, Stacey. *Patriots or Traitors?: A History of American-Educated Chinese Students*, M.E. Sharpe, \$89.95

Brown, D. Clayton. *Globalization and America since 1945*, Scholarly Resources, Inc., \$19.95

Cha, Victor D. and David C. Kang. *Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies*, Columbia University Press, \$24.50

Damms, Richard. *The Eisenhower Presidency, 1953-6*, Longman, \$15.00.

DeRoche, Andy. *Andrew Young: Civil Rights Ambassador*, Scholarly Resources, \$19.95.

Doherty, Thomas. *Cold War, Cool Medium: Television, McCarthyism, and American Culture*, Columbia University Press, \$27.95

Engerman, David C. *Modernization from the Other Shore: American Intellectuals and the Romance of Russian Development*, Harvard University Press, \$49.95

Frey, Marc, Ronald W. Pruessen and Tai Yong Tan (editors). *The Transformation of Southeast Asia: International Perspectives on Decolonization*, M.E. Sharpe, \$27.95

George, Alice L. *Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis*, The University of North Carolina Press, \$29.95

Hanhimaki, Jussi M. and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts*. Oxford, \$99.00

Hughes, Jeff. *The Manhattan Project: Big Science and the Atom Bomb*, Columbia University Press, \$19.50.

Jones, Matthew. *Conflict and Confrontation in Southeast Asia, 1961-65: Britain, the United States, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia*, Cambridge University Press, \$60.00.

Kimball, Jeffrey. *The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy*, University Press of Kansas, \$34.95

Lidegaard, Bo. *Defiant Diplomacy: Henrik Kauffmann, Denmark, and the United States in World War II and the Cold War, 1939-1958*, Peter Lang Publishers, \$78.95

Lykins, Daniel L. *From Total War to Total Diplomacy: The Advertising Council and the Construction of the Cold War Consensus*, Praeger Publishers, \$64.95

Maiolo, Joseph A. and Robert Boyce (editors). *The Origins of World War Two: The Debate Continues*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$24.95

Maiolo, Joseph A., Anthony Best, Jussi M. Hanhimaki, and Kirsten E. Schulze. *An International History of the Twentieth Century*, Routledge, \$29.95

Matthewson, Tim. *A Proslavery Foreign Policy: Haitian-American Relations during the Early Republic*, Praeger Publishers, \$64.95

McMahon, Robert J. *The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford University Press, \$9.95

McPherson, Alan. *Yankee No! Anti-Americanism in U.S.-Latin American Relations*, Harvard University Press, \$39.95

Ramsden, John. *Man of the Century: Winston Churchill and His Legend Since 1945*, Columbia University Press, \$37.50

Rosenberg, Emily S. *A Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory*, Duke University Press, \$24.95

Ryan, David. *The United States and Europe in the Twentieth Century*, Longman Publishers, \$16.00

Schaffer, Howard B. *Ellsworth Bunker: Global Troubleshooter, Vietnam Hawk*, The University of North Carolina Press, \$34.95

Schlesinger, Stephen. *Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations*, Perseus Books, \$27.50

Schoonover, Thomas. *Uncle Sam's War of 1898 and the Origins of Globalization*, University Press of Kentucky, \$30.00

Shattuck, John. *Freedom on Fire: Human Rights Wars and America's Response*, Harvard University Press, \$29.95

Simons, Geoff. *Libya and the West: From Independence to Lockerbie*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$55.00

Stoler, Mark A. *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II*, The University of North Carolina Press, \$21.95

Wadman, Robert, and William Allison. *To Protect and To Serve: A History of Police in America*, Prentice Hall, 2004, \$46.67.

Weir, Gary E. and Walter J. Boyne. *Rising Tide: The Untold Story of the Russian Submarines that Fought the Cold War*, Perseus Book Group, \$26.00

Wilford, Hugh and David Cauter. *The CIA, The British Left and the Cold War*, Frank Cass Publishers, \$67.50

Wittner, Lawrence S. *Toward Nuclear Abolition: A History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present*, Stanford University Press, \$32.95

Zeiler, Thomas W. *Unconditional Defeat: Japan, America, and the End of World War II*, Scholarly Resources, Inc., \$17.95

6. Upcoming SHAFR Award Deadlines

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded annually to an author for his or her first book on any aspect of the history of American foreign relations.

Eligibility: The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works that represent social science disciplines other than history are not eligible.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contributions to scholarship. Winning books should have exceptional interpretative and analytical qualities. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should display careful organization and distinguished writing. Five copies of each book must be submitted with a letter of nomination.

The award will be announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the selection committee. The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition which meets the standards of excellence established for the prize.

To nominate a book published in 2003, send five copies of the book and a letter of nomination to Nick Cullather, Department of History, Indiana University, 742 Ballantine Hall, 1020 East Kirkwood, Bloomington, Indiana 47405. Books may be sent at any time during 2003, but must arrive by February 15, 2004.

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize recognizes and encourages excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The prize of \$500 is awarded annually.

Eligibility: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the PhD whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or of any other established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

Procedures: Nominations, in the form of a letter and the nominee's c.v., should be sent to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter should discuss evidence of the nominee's excellence in teaching and research.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH). The winner of the prize will deliver a lecture during the SHAFR luncheon at the next year's OAH annual meeting. The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to a SHAFR presidential address and should address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The lecturer is awarded \$500 plus up to \$500 in travel expenses to the OAH, and his or her lecture is published in *Diplomatic History*.

To be considered for the 2004 award, nominations must be received by February 28, 2004. Nominations should be sent to: Frank Costigliola, Department of History, 241 Glenbrook Road, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut 06269

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. The prize of \$1,000 is awarded annually to the author of a distinguished article appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations.

Eligibility: The author must be under forty-one years of age or within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of the article's acceptance for publication. The article must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are ineligible.

Procedures: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* will be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations may be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

To nominate an article published in 2003, send three copies of the article and a letter of nomination to Cary Fraser, Department of African and African American Studies, 133 Willard Building, University Park, PA 16802. Deadline for nominations is February 28, 2004.

The Myrna F. Bernath Book Award

The purpose of this award is to encourage scholarship by women in U.S. foreign relations history. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded biannually (in even years) to the author of the best book written by a woman in the field and published during the preceding two years.

Eligibility: Nominees should be women who have published distinguished books in U.S. foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of SHAFR. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contribution to scholarship. Three copies of each book (or page proofs) must be submitted with a letter of nomination.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

Deadline for nomination of books published in 2002 and 2003 is February 15, 2004. Submit materials to Susan Brewer, University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point, Department of History, Rm 422 CPS, Stevens Point, WI 54481. Email: sbrewer@uwsp.edu.

Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize

This prize is designed to reward distinguished scholarship in the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded annually. The Ferrell Prize was established to honor Robert H. Ferrell, professor of diplomatic history at Indiana University from 1961 to 1990, by his former students.

Eligibility: The Ferrell Prize recognizes any book beyond the first monograph by the author. To be considered, a book must

deal with the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of SHAFR. Three copies of the book must be submitted.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

The deadline for nominating books published in 2003 is February 15, 2004. Submit books to Andrew Rotter, Colgate University Department of History, 319 Alumni Hall, Hamilton, NY 13346.

The Norman and Laura Graebner Award

The Graebner Award is a lifetime achievement award intended to recognize a senior historian of United States foreign relations who has significantly contributed to the development of the field, through scholarship, teaching, and/or service, over his or her career. The award of \$2,000 is awarded biannually. The Graebner Award was established by the former students of Norman A. Graebner, professor of diplomatic history at the University of Illinois and the University of Virginia, to honor Norman and his wife Laura for their years of devotion to teaching and research in the field.

Eligibility: The Graebner prize will be awarded to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic or international affairs. The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Procedures: Letters of nomination, submitted in triplicate, should (a) provide a brief biography of the nominee, including educational background, academic or other positions held, and awards and honors received; (b) list the nominee's major scholarly works and discuss the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs; (c) describe the candidate's career, note any teaching honors and awards, and comment on the candidate's classroom skills; and (d) detail the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices and discussing particular activities. Self-nominations are accepted.

Graebner awards are announced at SHAFR's annual meeting.

The next deadline for nominations is March 1, 2004. Submit materials to David Anderson, Department of History, University of Indianapolis, Indianapolis, Indiana 46227, <anderson@uindy.edu>.

The Michael J. Hogan Fellowship

The Michael J. Hogan Fellowship is designed to promote research in foreign language sources by graduate student members of SHAFR. The fellowship of \$2,000 is intended to defray the costs of studying foreign languages needed for research.

Eligibility: Applicants must be graduate students researching some aspect of United States foreign relations.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Each applicant should include a thesis or dissertation prospectus (8-12 pages, double spaced), a statement explaining how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used, and a letter of recommendation from the graduate advisor.

Hogan Fellowships are awarded at SHAFR's annual meeting. Recipients of the fellowship must report to the Committee how

the fellowship was used.

To be considered for the 2004 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by 15 April 2004. Submit materials to: Michelle Mart, Penn State Berks Campus, P.O. Box 7009, Reading, PA 19610.


The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship

The Holt Fellowship is designed to promote research by doctoral candidates writing dissertations in the field of the history of American foreign relations. This fellowship of \$2,000 is intended to defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to conduct research on a significant dissertation project.

Eligibility: Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of United States foreign relations. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Each applicant should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The prospectus (8-12 pages, double spaced) should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, chief source materials, and historiographical significance of the project. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date is required, as well as three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one from the director of the applicant's dissertation.

Holt Fellowships are awarded at SHAFR's annual meeting. At the end of the fellowship year, recipients of the fellowship must report to the Committee how the fellowship was used. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*. To be considered for the 2004 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by 15 April 2004. Submit materials to: Michelle Mart, Penn State Berks Campus, P.O. Box 7009, Reading, PA 19610.



A Twentieth-Century Odyssey: Memoir of a Life in Academe. Norman A. Graebner (January 2003) Cloth ISBN 0-930053-16-9, \$ 36.95. Paper ISBN 0-930053-17-7, \$ 17.95. pages iv, 219. Photos.

A prolific writer, stimulating speaker and past president of SHAFR, Norman A. Graebner is internationally recognized as one of the outstanding "realist" diplomatic historians of the last half of the 20th century.

His work set a standard for critical examination of American foreign policies.

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2003 Membership Referendum on the SHAFR By-Laws

In June 2003, Council unanimously approved seven motions to amend the SHAFR By-Laws and directed that each motion be submitted for membership approval in Autumn 2003. A referendum, held in conjunction with the annual election of officers, has now been completed.

All seven motions passed. The text of each motion and the margin of its passage appear below. The By-Laws, as amended by the referendum, appear in the following pages and on the Web at <http://shafr.history.ohio-state.edu>.

Drafted in the 1970s, the By-Laws had been previously amended in 1994 and 1999.

1) LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS CHAIR (Article V, Section 3).

The following sentence should be struck from the By-Laws:

“Two co-chairpersons shall be designated, one to oversee the program and one primarily responsible for local arrangements.”

The following sentence should be added in its place:

“The program committee may include the local arrangements chair (but not as chair or co-chair).”

YES: 237

NO: 6

2) ABOLITION OF MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE (Article V, Section 2). Article V, Section 2, which provides for a Membership Committee, should be deleted.

YES: 241

NO: 6

3) CHANGE IN THE TIMELINE OF THE ANNUAL ELECTION CYCLE (Article II, Section 5) The deadlines of the annual election cycle should be advanced 4-6 weeks as follows:

Nominations by membership petition accepted until August 1;

Nominating Committee completes a ballot by August 15;

Ballots are mailed by September 15;

Ballots are returned by October 31;

Results are announced as expeditiously as possible.

YES: 242

NO: 4

4) TIMING OF MEMBERSHIP MEETINGS (Article VIII).

The following sentences should be deleted:

“There shall be an Annual Membership Meeting open to all members of the Society in good standing. Notice of the final time, place, and agenda of the Annual Membership Meeting shall be mailed by the Executive Secretary-Treasurer to

each member of the Society at least thirty days prior to that meeting.”

The following sentences should be added in their place:

“Council shall schedule a membership meeting, to be held during the SHAFR annual conference, upon presentation of an appropriate petition signed by at least 25 members of SHAFR in good standing. Notice of the final time, place, and agenda of the Membership Meeting shall be mailed by the Executive Secretary-Treasurer to each member of the Society at least six months prior to that meeting.”

Articles I, II, III, and VIII should be copy-edited to conform with the substantive change.

YES: 230 **NO: 12**

5) EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR TITLE (passim).

Throughout the By-Laws, the title “Executive Director” should replace the title “Executive Secretary-Treasurer.”

YES: 240 **NO: 3**

6) GENDER-NEUTRAL LANGUAGE (passim).

Gender-neutral language should replace gender-specific language throughout the By-Laws.

YES: 209 **NO: 31**

7) NEWSLETTER REFERENCES (passim).

References to the “Newsletter” should be changed to the “newsletter.”

YES: 228 **NO: 19**

By-laws of The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

[revised 2003]

Article I: Membership

Section 1: Any person interested in furthering the objects of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations as set forth in the Certificate of Incorporation shall become a member upon submitting an acceptable application and paying the dues herein provided.

Section 2: The following are the classes of membership in the Society: Regular, Student, Life, and Institutional. The specific qualifications of each class of membership shall be established by the Council.

Section 3: Annual dues for Regular, Student, and Institutional members shall be established by the Council.

Section 4: (a) All members in good standing, except institutional members, shall have the right to attend, participate in, and vote in all of the Society's meetings and to vote in its elections. Each member shall be supplied without additional charge one copy of each issue of *Diplomatic History* and the newsletter while a member, and shall have such other privileges as may be prescribed by the Council.

(b) Membership in good standing is defined as paid membership certified by the Executive Director at least thirty days before participating in an election or in a Membership Meeting.

Section 5: Any member whose dues become three months in arrears shall be automatically suspended.

Section 6: Dues are payable in advance of the first day of each year. New membership shall become effective at the beginning of the calendar year in which application is received and dues are paid except that dues paid after August 31 shall be applied for the following year.

Article II: Officers, Elections, and Terms of Office

Section 1: The officers of the Society shall consist of a President, a Vice President, and an Executive Director.

Section 2: The President and Vice President shall be elected for terms of one year each, beginning on January 1. The Vice President shall be an automatic nominee for the office of President the following year, although contesting nominees may be offered in accordance with provisions of the By Laws.

Section 3: The Executive Director shall be appointed by the Council to serve at the pleasure of the Council.

Section 4: In the event of the death, resignation or disability of the President, the last to be determined by a majority vote of the Council, the Vice President shall succeed to the Presidency until the following January 1.

Since the office of Vice President will then be vacant, the Council by majority vote may designate one of its own members to act as chair of meetings in the President's absence. A Vice President who succeeds to the Presidency under the provisions of this section shall still be an automatic nominee for the next year's Presidency. If the Presidency, while filled by the elected Vice President under the terms of this section, shall again become vacant, the Council, by majority vote, shall designate a President *ad interim* to act until the office is filled by an annual election.

Section 5: (a) Elections shall be held annually by mail ballot. The candidate for each office who receives the highest number of votes is elected. When more than two nominees are slated for a particular office, a run-off election will be held between the candidates with the two highest vote totals.

(b) The Nominating Committee shall present the name of the outgoing Vice President as an automatic nominee for the office of President.

(c) The Nominating Committee shall also present a slate of two candidates for each of the following offices: Vice President, members of the Council, graduate student member of Council (in appropriate years), and member of the Nominating Committee.

(d) Additional nominees for any office shall be placed on the ballot when proposed by petition signed by twenty-five members in good standing; but such additional nominations, to be placed on the ballot, must reach the Chair of the Nominating Committee by August 1.

(e) The Chair of the Nominating Committee shall certify the names to be placed on the ballot to the Executive Director by August 15. The Executive Director shall mail the completed election ballot to the membership not later than September 15 for return by October 31. The election results, certified by the Nominating Committee, shall be announced as expeditiously as possible.

Article III: Powers and Duties

Section 1: The President shall supervise the work of all committees, formulate policies for presentation to the Council, and execute its decisions. He or she shall appoint the members of the Program Committee and of special committees, commissions, and boards. He or she shall sign all documents requiring official certification. The President shall be *ex officio* a member of the Council and shall preside at all Membership and Council meetings at which he or she is present. A retiring President shall retain membership on the Council for three years after the expiration of his or her term of Office as President.

Section 2: The Vice President shall preside at Membership and Council meetings in the absence of the President and shall perform other duties as assigned by the Council. The Vice President shall be *ex officio* a member of the Council.

Section 3: The Executive Director shall have charge of all Society correspondence, and shall give notice of all Council meetings. He or she shall keep accurate minutes of all such meetings, using recording devices when deemed necessary. He or she shall keep an accurate and up to date roll of the members of the Society in good standing and shall issue a notification of membership to each new member. He or she shall see that the By Laws are printed periodically in the newsletter. He or she shall submit all mail ballots to the membership and shall tabulate the results. He or she shall retain those ballots, for possible inspection, for a period of one month. He or she shall give instructions of the Council to the new members of committees when necessary. Under the direction of the Council, he or she shall manage all funds and securities in the name of the Society.

He or she shall submit bills for dues to the members and deliver an itemized financial report annually to the membership. He or she shall have custody of all records and documents pertaining to the Society and be responsible for their preservation, and shall prepare an annual budget for approval by the Council. The Executive Director shall be *ex officio* a member of the Council, but without vote.

Article IV: The Council

Section 1: The Council of the Society shall consist of (a) those officers or former officers of the Society who, in accordance with Article III of the By Laws, serve *ex officio* as members of the Council; (b) six members (three year terms) elected by the members of the Society; and (c) two graduate student members (three year terms) elected by the members of the Society. In the event of a vacancy on the Council caused by death or resignation, the vacancy shall be filled at the next annual election.

Section 2: The Council shall have power to employ and pay necessary staff members; to accept and oversee funds donated to the Society for any of the objects of the Society stated in the Certificate of Incorporation; to appoint the Executive Director; to arrange for meetings of the Society; to create, in addition to committees named in the By Laws, as many standing or *ad hoc* committees as it deems necessary to fulfill its responsibilities; and to transact other business normally assigned to such a body.

Section 3: The Council may reach decisions either at meetings or through correspondence filed with the Executive Director, provided that such decisions have the concurrence of two thirds of the voting members of the Council.

Article V: Committees

Section 1: The Nominating Committee shall consist of three members in good standing who hold no other office in the Society and shall be elected for a term of three years, except that members of the first Nominating Committee shall be appointed by the President to terms of one, two, and three years, respectively. The Chair shall be held by the member with the longest years of service, except that when two or more members have equal length of service the President shall designate which of them shall serve as Chair. If a post on the Nominating Committee becomes vacant through death, resignation, or ineligibility through acceptance of an office in the Society, the President shall appoint a member to fill the post until the next annual election, when a replacement shall be chosen for the unexpired term.

Section 2: The Program Committee shall consist of five members in good standing appointed by the President for a term of one year. The Program Committee may include the Local Arrangements Chair (but not as chair or co-chair).

Section 3: The Endowment Committee shall have responsibility for (1) recommending investment management and policy to Council; (2) serving as SHAFR's advisory board to the investment management firm approved by Council; (3) monitoring the endowment investments; (4) reporting regularly (at least twice a year) to Council on the status of the endowment investments. The membership of the Committee will be three members appointed by the President (each serving three-year rotating terms, with the senior member normally Chair) and the Executive Director as an *ex officio* member.

Article VI: Diplomatic History

Section 1: The Editor of *Diplomatic History* shall be appointed by the President with the approval of the Council for a term of at least three years and not exceeding five years.

Section 2: The Editorial Board shall consist of the Editor and nine members nominated by the Editor and appointed by the Council. Members shall serve three years except that for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a regular rotation members may be appointed for a term of shorter than three years.

Article VII: Amendment

Section 1: Amendments to the By Laws may be proposed by twenty five members in good standing or by any member of the Council.

Section 2: Once proposed, amendments must be approved by a majority vote of Council and a concurring majority vote of those participating in a mail ballot.

Article VIII: Membership Meeting

Section 1: Council shall schedule a Membership Meeting, to be held during the SHAFR annual conference, upon presentation of an appropriate petition signed by at least 25 members of SHAFR in good standing. Notice of the final time, place, and agenda of the Membership Meeting shall be mailed by the Executive Director to each member of the Society at least six months prior to that meeting.

Section 2: Resolutions tentatively approved at a Membership Meeting shall be submitted by the Executive Director directly to the full membership of the Society by mail ballot for final approval.

IN MEMORY


Linda Killen, long time member and former Council member of SHAFR and professor emerita of history at Radford University, died of cancer on January 15, 2003. A graduate of the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, where she studied under Sam Wells, Linda was the embodiment of the teacher/scholar. While constantly engaged in developing more effective methods of sharing knowledge with her students, she challenged them to think for themselves and to approach history with an open, yet critical, approach. A practicing scholar, Linda published numerous books and articles, including Versailles and After: An Annotated Bibliography of American Foreign Relations, 1919-1933 (1983), The Russian Bureau: A Case Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy (1983), The Soviet Union and the United States: A New Look at the Cold War (1989) and Testing the Peripheries: U.S.-Yugoslav Economic Relations in the Interwar Years (1994). She also held a Fulbright research Fellowship to Yugoslavia in 1986 and a Woodrow Wilson Center Fellowship in 1993. An engaging, good-humored colleague and friend, Linda will be missed.

—Richard Lael
Westminster College

The Last Word...

Peter L. Hahn, Executive Director of SHAFR

These are exciting times to be part of SHAFR, and I consider myself privileged to be in a position to serve the Society. My goals as Executive Director are to elevate the status of our Society, to streamline its modes of operation, to increase its membership, and to broaden its impact on the academic and non-academic worlds. In short, I seek to help SHAFR fulfill



its original mandate, as expressed in the May 1972 Certificate of Incorporation, to promote “a Society of Historians for the study, advancement and dissemination of a knowledge of American Foreign Relations and the doing of all acts incidental to the accomplishment thereof.”

At the direction of Council, I have sought to achieve these aims by formulating and following a strategic plan. Several steps in that plan have already been accomplished:

- ‡ The By-Laws have been revised to reflect the actual practices of the Society.
- ‡ Accounting methods have been reformed to ensure financial integrity and security.
- ‡ Guidelines have been enacted to streamline the appointment of committees and to clarify their responsibilities and procedures.
- ‡ Communications have been reformed to improve the timeliness and accuracy of information distributed to members. Steps taken include (1) the assumption of responsibility for the newsletter, which, under the very able leadership of Mitchell Lerner, has been reconceptualized, reformatted, and renamed; (2) the assumption of responsibility for the web-site, now based at <http://shafr.history.ohio-state.edu>; and (3) coordination with Blackwell Publishers to ensure the proper distribution of information about membership renewals and prize and fellowship competitions.

The strategic plan also envisions several major steps designed to elevate SHAFR’s membership and reach in the future. Plans are underway:

- ‡ to improve ties with colleagues in other scholarly fields and disciplines by promoting collaboration in conferences and other professional endeavors.

- ‡ to promote the standing of SHAFR within

both the American Historical Association and the Organization of American Historians, in part by promoting SHAFR-sponsored panels at their annual meetings.

- ‡ to ensure that the electronic roster remains accessible, updated, and thus useful to members.

- ‡ to serve the public interest and increase the visibility of SHAFR by (1) promoting media interviews with SHAFR experts, (2) encouraging the study of American foreign relations history in high school social science curricula; and (3) seeking to disseminate Diplomatic History and Passport to larger audiences.

This strategic plan was designed to be ambitious, on the conviction that with diligent planning and effort SHAFR could claim a position of strength and visibility in the academic community and in the public realm. It was also based on the assumption that no one person could single-handedly fulfill the plan. As Executive Director, I am in a position to coordinate the collective efforts of the many SHAFR members who are needed to move the Society to the next level.

Therefore, I encourage you to contact me with comments and ideas about any of the Society’s programs or initiatives, and I urge you to volunteer to serve the Society. Collectively, we can promote our interests as historians of American foreign relations, and advance the public interest as well.