

Passport

The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Volume 35, Issue 3 December 2004



Inside...

What History Can Teach Us About the Iraq War

FDR's WWII Media Strategies

The Guatemala Coup as a Teaching Tool

New Evidence from Vietnam

LBJ and Phone Rage

...and much more!

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The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles discuss foreign policy.
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Passport is published three times per year (April, August, December), by the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and is distributed to all members of the Society. Submissions should be sent to the attention of the editor, and are accepted in all formats, although electronic copy by e-mail to passport@osu.edu is preferred. Submissions should follow the guidelines articulated in the Chicago Manual of Style. Manuscripts accepted for publication will be edited to conform to *Passport* style, space limitations, and other requirements. The author is responsible for accuracy and for obtaining all permissions necessary for publication. Manuscripts will not be returned. Interested advertisers can find relevant information on the web at: <http://www.shafr.org/newsletter/passportrates.htm>, or can contact the editor. The opinions expressed in *Passport* do not necessarily reflect the opinions of SHAFR or of The Ohio State University.

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The editors of *Passport* wish to acknowledge the generous support of The Ohio State University, The Ohio State University-Newark, and the Mershon Center.

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
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Thoughts From SHAFR President Mark A. Stoler

In last April's issue of *Passport*, editor Mitch Lerner called for a greater emphasis in SHAFR on the teaching of diplomatic history and on those SHAFR members holding "more teaching-oriented positions."¹ I was quite pleased that Mitch wrote this article, as it focused on an issue that is close to my heart and has long concerned me. Quite frankly, I went into this profession primarily because I wanted to teach, and I have always considered the teaching of undergraduates to be my calling and my primary responsibility as a professor. I also love to teach, get a great deal of satisfaction out of the classroom, and am enormously proud of the teaching awards I have received.

I have been a teacher for more than three decades. During that time the teaching of history has never been a focus of SHAFR or any of the other professional societies to which I belong. Indeed, as Mitch pointedly noted, not one of the forty-eight scheduled panels at the last SHAFR conference in Austin focused on the teaching of diplomatic history, and ironically, the plenary session honoring Robert Divine as a teacher "did not include a single voice from the ranks of those who face the most demanding teaching schedules."² Not surprisingly, the "publish or perish" doctrine continues to dominate our professional societies as much as it dominates tenure and promotion decisions at major universities.

Yet a large number of our members do not work at such institutions and have a very different set of priorities. Furthermore, many of us who teach



undergraduates have over the past decade or two noted a serious decline in the academic skills of incoming students and have recognized the need to address this problem in our classes via new teaching methods. So have college administrators, who have begun to focus on high quality, innovative teaching as a means of retaining students—and their tuition checks. While I thoroughly deplore and have consistently criticized the financial rationale for student retention, with its "student-as-consumer" mentality and the resulting massive overemphasis on and misuse of student evaluations of faculty, I cannot help but applaud the institutional powers-that-be for finally showing an interest in the ability of their faculty to teach as well as publish. Highly illustrative of this new emphasis on teaching is that numerous graduate programs in history now include excellent instruction as well as substantial experience in teaching—something that was not available to my generation of budding historians in graduate school.

Prior to the publication of Mitch's column, Richard Werking, an old friend (and SHAFR mem-

ber) who teaches at the U.S. Naval Academy, had proposed to me a series of teaching initiatives for SHAFR, to be undertaken in conjunction with his sabbatical project on this topic. Subsequently I appointed a task force on the teaching of the history of U.S. foreign relations, composed of Mitch, Richard, Tom Zeiler, Catherine Forslund, John McNay, and Carol Adams, with former SHAFR president Mark Gilderhus as chair. The task force is charged with a host of teaching-related activities: preparing a questionnaire on our teaching practices, posting syllabi on the website, informing members of new pedagogical practices, and reporting to the SHAFR Council on whether or not to establish a standing SHAFR committee on teaching.

I am happy to report that, thanks to Peter Hahn, the syllabus section of the website is already up and running. I encourage you in the strongest terms to post your own syllabi, using Robert Robinson's instructions in the August issue of *Passport*, and to explore the syllabi of your colleagues.³ I also encourage you to read Mark Gilderhus's excellent column about the task force, to respond to the questionnaire that you will soon be receiving, and to read about future teaching-related initiatives in the pages of this newsletter.⁴ Recognition within SHAFR of the importance of teaching and of our colleagues who work at teaching-oriented institutions is long overdue.

1. *Passport*, April 2004, 63.

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*, August 2004, 33-4.

4. *Ibid.*, 55. See the SHAFR website at www.shafr.org.

The 1954 Coup in Guatemala and the Teaching of U.S. Foreign Relations

Robert Shaffer

When history professors talk about student writing, we too often focus on shortfalls in understanding, lapses in logic, and humorous malapropisms. I myself have quoted to colleagues student papers that mention "Custard's Last Stand" or the "Dullest" U.S. foreign policy under President Eisenhower. More seriously, I have sometimes been profoundly disappointed by my students' papers. On one occasion an otherwise good student proved ignorant of the facts and oblivious to the historical ironies involved when she wrote, in an analysis of Ho Chi Minh's 1945 "Declaration of Independence" for Vietnam, that naturally the United States supported the Vietnamese against the French in their quest for independence.

Too rarely, however, do we discuss or highlight the more sophisticated work of our students, and too rarely do we discuss what constitutes successful undergraduate work in U.S. foreign relations. Indeed, the editor of this newsletter for historians of American foreign relations has recently lamented the absence of submissions on issues of teaching in our field.¹ This essay seeks to contribute to a dialogue about teaching foreign relations by suggesting that a worthwhile culminating writing project is to have students analyze a historical issue or source in order to evaluate one or more historiographical perspectives. Perhaps especially in U.S. foreign relations, following and testing a few major themes that historians of various schools of thought have developed will be of great value to our students,

who should be encouraged to see how particular "facts" fit into larger perspectives and why these larger perspectives matter. I hope that the sample student papers I include here, which were written in class for a final exam, can provide models both of how to design such assignments and of successful student work in which we as teachers can take pride.

I also want to draw attention here to a recent work in U.S. foreign relations that I believe is perfectly suited for classroom teaching: Nick Cullather's *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954*, which was published by Stanford University Press in 1999. Both Cullather's subject matter and the highly unusual publication format of his book force students to consider interpretive issues in U.S. foreign relations, the availability of evidence from which historians can draw, and the relationship between past and present in U.S. foreign relations.

Every two years I teach a one-semester undergraduate survey course on U.S. foreign relations at Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania, a mid-sized regional state college, with a class capped at twenty-five students, most of whom are history majors. For the development of overviews of U.S. foreign policy that serve as themes for the course, I rely mainly on the essays included in the opening chapters of each volume of the reader, *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, edited by Dennis Merrill and Thomas Paterson and now published by Houghton Mifflin. Most helpful,

in my view, in orienting students to think broadly and critically about trends in U.S. interaction with the world are the excerpts from books and essays by William Appleman Williams, Bradford Perkins, and Michael Hunt.

Williams argues, in this excerpt from his path-breaking and controversial 1959 book, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, that the U.S. goal of spreading liberalism and capitalism around the world--making the rest of the world more like us--has often had negative consequences for peoples abroad, resulting in their becoming enmeshed in an open-door American imperialism. Perkins, in an excerpt from his 1993 survey of early U.S. foreign relations that my students have found difficult, analyzes the origins and implications of an exceptionalist view among Americans--what he calls "the unique American prism"--on the conduct of the nation's foreign policy. He seeks to explain U.S. conduct more than to celebrate or criticize it. Hunt, in an excerpt covering one major theme of his book, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (1987), places racist attitudes in American society at center stage in the formation of U.S. policy abroad and at home, thus adopting a critical stance, as does Williams, but one that is based on more self-evidently malevolent motives.²

The narrative textbook for the course, Walter LaFeber's *The American Age: U.S. Foreign Policy at Home and Abroad, 1750 to the Present* (2nd edition, 1994),³ follows to an extent the intellectual path forged by Williams, LaFeber's mentor. But LaFeber develops in his text four

overarching themes that students can be encouraged to analyze as the course unfolds: territorial and commercial expansion; the "steady centralization of power at home, especially in the executive branch of government after 1890"; "isolationism," by which LaFeber means what most of us would refer to as unilateralism; and American efforts abroad, especially after 1914, to preserve the international status quo. I might add here that in the past I wished that LaFeber would not use "isolationism" as a synonym for "unilateralism," but with George W. Bush's doctrine of "preemptive war" the convergences between isolationism and unilateralism are more readily apparent.

These perspectives are challenging for my students, most of whom grew up in the very conservative region of south-central Pennsylvania. Therefore in the first week of class I also include an overview essay written from a perspective with which they are much more familiar and comfortable. Samuel Flagg Bemis's 1961 presidential address before the American Historical Association argues that the United States has played a decidedly benevolent role in spreading democracy and liberty throughout the world.⁴ Bemis's speech has the virtues of serving as a clear counterpoint to Williams, Hunt, and LaFeber and of providing a concrete example of the type of exceptionalist thinking about foreign policy that Perkins analyzes. In its impassioned call to mix "history" and "current politics," the speech reflects Bemis's belief that the history of the United States and its foreign policy wholeheartedly support the U.S. Cold War policies of his time. I suppose that Merrill and Paterson do not include Bemis's call to arms in their collection because his dated perspective has little influence on professional historians today. However, as a

means of engaging undergraduates in thought and debate about fundamental assumptions about U.S. foreign policy and about the connections between historical scholarship and current U.S. policy, the speech is quite helpful. Moreover, Williams and Bemis were writing at more or less the same time, and students can be encouraged to see how each view has stood the test of time. One may note here that while most professional historians are skeptical of the kind of exceptionalist rhetoric about history presented by so many politicians and media commentators during the mourning period for former President Ronald Reagan in June 2004--rhetoric that resurrected Bemis's perspective--undergraduates such as mine are very much influenced by it.

Throughout the course, I encourage students to use events, documents, and more specific case studies by these and other historians as opportunities to test the conflicting perspectives we had discussed. The better students come to enjoy the spark of recognition when they see how a war speech by a president, an article from a newspaper abroad, or a debate in the Senate can be used as evidence to support one or more of these perspectives. Students are performing more sophisticated intellectual work when they have to place events and opinions in a broader theoretical or historiographical framework.

It is in the context of these course goals and procedures that I assign Cullather's brief and clearly written book on U.S. involvement in the 1954 coup in Guatemala, *Secret History*. The Central Intelligence Agency commissioned the study, as Cullather explains in his introduction, while he was working as a historian for the agency in 1992-93, during the brief heyday of the agency's openness policy. He notes that he had free access

to hitherto blocked files, and that the plan was that this book, as well as others commissioned by the CIA on other covert operations, would eventually be published, along with "a significant portion" of the documentation on which it was based.⁵

Instead, the openness initiative soon lapsed, and outside pressure on the agency was able to secure release in 1997 only of an edited, or redacted, version, together with "less than 1 percent" of the documents. In the introduction to *Secret History*, Cullather highlights the critique of the openness policy offered by historian George Herring, who served on the CIA's Historical Review Board. In frustration Herring calls the openness policy "a brilliant public relations snow job." Cullather also acknowledges that his study, which was designed as "a training manual, a cautionary tale for future covert operators," was by no means intended to be a full study of the CIA's role in the Guatemalan coup or a complete investigation of the agency's sources. (*Secret History* contains only 123 pages of text, plus an introduction, an impassioned afterword by historian Piero Gleijeses, and a few brief appendices.) Indeed, Cullather informs readers that the most "sensational disclosure" in his book is contained in an appendix on CIA plans to assassinate Guatemalan officials, a subject on which he touches only briefly in his text.⁶

In Cullather's book students have access to a well-researched and historiographically informed secondary source that functions also as a primary source. His introduction and many of his footnotes help students understand not only the work of the CIA in the 1950s, but also the twists and turns of its policies in the 1990s, when the agency was being pressured to open its files. More strikingly, we have a book commissioned

by an agency of the U.S. government, and now published by a major university press, that has sections of text expunged--bringing to mind stereotypes of censored newspapers in political dictatorships. The redactions often erase merely a name of a CIA operative or contact, but at some points (for example on pages 64 and 70-71) enough material was deemed out of bounds to make a smooth reading of the narrative impossible. Sections of the timeline, and even the bibliography accompanying the narrative, have also been removed. The effect is to make the reader wonder what he knows or does not know, based on access to documents, and whose interests are served by this continued secrecy. One need not be a postmodern literary scholar to understand that significant silences in a narrative can be just as jarring to a reader as a narrative of horrific events told in a conventional fashion.

Three specific examples of censorship may be noted--out of numerous possibilities--that should generate interest or even spirited discussion in class. On page 117, toward the end of the study, Cullather discusses how dissatisfied U.S. officials were with the Guatemalan president, Carlos Castillo Armas, and the new reactionary government they had installed. "In Guatemala, US officials learned a lesson they would relearn in Vietnam, Iran, [] and other countries: intervention usually produces 'allies' that are stubborn, aid-hungry, and corrupt." The blanked-out passage leaps out at the reader: in which additional country or countries did the United States intervene, the identity of which is so sensitive that it cannot be made public even after forty years? Was it the Philippines, Indonesia, Brazil, Greece, Chile, Congo/Zaire? Was there yet another major coup in which CIA

intervention has not yet been firmly established, and about which the agency is making a last-ditch effort to forestall public knowledge? The very act of listing the possibilities that might fill in this blank contributes to the identification of a pattern in U.S. foreign policy and in turn, I suggest, helps students think through some of the major perspectives on U.S. foreign policy.


Much the same can be said of the two sections of the "Study of Assassination" in Appendix C. The chilling plans in the first section, which include instructions on how to maintain what we today call "plausible deniability," are not themselves heavily censored, but in the second section there is a memo listing specific people in Guatemala who may have been targets of assassination by the CIA or its associates. At that point, under the heading "Biographic data," Cullather notes tersely that "five pages follow, redacted in full."⁷ Do the people of Guatemala not have the right to know, forty-five years after the fact, which of their leaders or prominent citizens were on a CIA hit list? Do American historians have the right to know? The impression of openness that the CIA's commissioning of Cullather's study created evaporates when one sees this insistence on continued secrecy. One of my students in the fall 2002 semester commented, with regard to this passage, that political assassination was precisely the type of behavior that led the United States to commit itself to ending Communism in East Europe. I might add that very few people reading this section today could fail to draw connections with the headlines in 2004 about torture and mistreatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib, in Afghanistan, and elsewhere, and about memos from Bush administration officials that seemed to open the

door to such mistreatment.

Finally, in one of the more Kafkaesque passages in the published version of *Secret History*, Cullather's evidently brief discussion of the CIA's efforts in the 1950s to censor or cover up any hint of its involvement in the coup in Guatemala has itself been censored (page 119). This censorship serves as a graphic reminder of a point that Cullather develops through his book, and to which his title alludes on several levels: that U.S. involvement in the coup was secret; that the sources on which this book was based were hitherto secret; and that there are still elements of this history that top officials of the CIA believe must remain secret.

Naturally, Cullather opposed the redactions, and he is sometimes able in this edition to circumvent them, at least in part, by adding a footnote quoting similar information from public sources. Analyzing these efforts can also lead to fruitful class discussions.

With regard to the standard issues involved in historical evaluations of U.S. participation in the overthrow of the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in Guatemala, Cullather has found confirmation in the CIA materials of the perspectives offered previously in greatest detail by Richard Immerman and Piero Gleijeses.⁸ Thus he argues that Arbenz was a democrat, not a Communist, and that there were no substantive ties between him and the Soviets in 1952, when the CIA began to work towards his removal. Indeed, Cullather asserts that Arbenz took inspiration for his policies in Guatemala from Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal and that the land reforms he proposed, so alarming to U.S. policymakers in the early 1950s, were not that different from U.S. reforms in postwar Japan. The repressive measures that began to be apparent under Arbenz in



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Guatemala after 1952, according to Cullather, were reactions to real subversion organized by the CIA and its associates. Cullather details the outright lies that U.S. officials offered to the United Nations and to the press before and during the coup, and he describes the pressure that the United States placed on its right-wing allies in central America to participate in the violent overthrow of the elected Guatemalan government. In no way, according to Cullather, did the CIA's actions boost democracy or liberty in Guatemala. In fact, the reverse was true.

Cullather's central contention is that the CIA, like other major players in both the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, ignored the local political and social conditions in Guatemala and inaccurately interpreted events in that nation as an indication of Soviet expansionism. In addition, he argues that U.S. policymakers wanted control over conditions in Guatemala in order to enhance global stability.

However, Cullather discounts the idea that U.S. involvement in the coup was mainly a result of pressure from the United Fruit Company, concerned about its immediate economic interests. He argues instead that national security considerations, inaccurate though they may have been, held sway. But he very fairly presents some of the evidence that analysts such as Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer have used to build the case for a determining role for United Fruit. My students have used Cullather's own account to argue intelligently on either side of the issue.

As noted above, Cullather's original intent was to help the CIA learn from its mistakes in Guatemala. He emphasizes that the coup very nearly failed because the invasion from the U.S.-armed rebels based in Honduras and El Salvador did not go as planned and the CIA's propaganda and psychological warfare campaign did not, as was expected, lead to the collapse of the Arbenz government. He found

that after the coup the CIA was surprisingly uninterested in discerning why the Guatemalan army turned against Arbenz, thus insuring the coup's success, and he suggests that the later failure of the CIA-led invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs resulted in part from the Agency's indifference to a serious analysis of what worked and what did not in Guatemala. After briefly surveying the crimes committed by Castillo Armas and his successor dictators, along with the civil wars that have engulfed Guatemala, Cullather pointedly concludes that the United States failed even to create stability in Guatemala and that the Agency should therefore be wary of covert operations that might ultimately negate its goals. The picture one gets from Cullather of the CIA in the 1950s is of a sloppy organization, not committed at all to rigorous analysis or self-analysis, let alone to the spread of democracy.

Re-reading *Secret History* in the summer of 2004, I am struck more than ever by the relevance

of Cullather's brief narrative to current events. I am writing these words on a day when the lead headline in the *New York Times* reads: "Senators Assail C.I.A. Judgments on Iraq's Arms as Deeply Flawed -- Panel Unanimous -- 'Group Think' Backed Prewar Assumptions, Report Concludes."¹⁰ I look forward to seeing how my students make the connection between the CIA then and now when we read Cullather's book in the fall 2004 semester.

In class I asked my students to describe Cullather's key themes, point out the most significant passages in his book, and explain its implications for current U.S. foreign policy. The last time I taught the course, in the fall of 2002, I also informed them that the final exam would include a question in which they had to analyze *Secret History* in light of overall course themes and use the book to evaluate some of the major historiographical perspectives we had discussed. This assignment requires students to think on several different levels, or in other words, using educational psychologist Benjamin Bloom's famous "taxonomy of educational objectives," to exhibit a hierarchy of thinking skills. Students exhibit "comprehension" when they present the salient points of Cullather's book. They show the more difficult "synthesis" when they have to interpret Cullather's ideas in light of a different theory or framework. And they demonstrate the most sophisticated intellectual skill, "evaluation," when they can use one set of data to argue for or against a certain hypothesis.¹¹

I have reprinted three of the answers in the next section of this essay. My students did not get the specific questions on Cullather in advance of the exam, but they were encouraged to refer directly to their copy of his book while they were writing.

They were given two choices, as can be seen below: one in which they used Cullather's book to "test" LaFeber's four major themes, and one in which they imagined how Williams and Bemis would react to Cullather's book. (One of Bemis's earliest books, by the way, published in 1943, focused on the U.S. and Latin America.¹²) This was the third section of a two-hour exam; I recommended that they leave forty-five minutes to address their question. I was not expecting a full term paper. Some lapses in organization and writing were inevitable, and I have made slight changes here to correct minor spelling and grammar errors.

Readers may judge for themselves how successful these essays were, and whether they justify my enthusiasm for Cullather's book and for this focus on evaluating contrasting historiographical perspectives. I will note that the three essays reproduced here were among six or seven of equally good quality, in my view.

The first student author, Teresa Sillman, graduated from Shippensburg in 2003 with a B.A. in history. She was a member of Phi Alpha Theta, the national history honor society, and was enrolled in Army ROTC. Soon after graduation she was called to active duty. Bryan Gosnell is scheduled to graduate in December 2004, with a B.S. in History and social studies education. Beth Diehl, who is among the most outstanding students I have worked with at Shippensburg, was also a member of Phi Alpha Theta. She graduated in 2003 with a B.S. in History and social studies education, and is now teaching at a local high school.

Robert Shaffer is an assistant professor of history at Shippensburg University of Pennsylvania.

Notes:

1. Mitchell Lerner, "The Last Word," *Passport* 35 (April 2004): 63.
2. The sixth edition of this two-volume collection of documents and essays has just been published by Houghton Mifflin, with a copyright date of 2005. There are slight changes in the overview essays in this latest edition, and the excerpt by Michael Hunt discussed in this article is not included.
3. LaFeber's text is, in my view, the only good, comprehensive, reasonably up-to-date, one-volume survey text on the subject of any historiographical perspective.
4. For one published version, see Samuel Flagg Bemis, "American Foreign Policy and the Blessings of Liberty," *American Historical Review* 67 (January 1962): 291-305.
5. Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954* (Stanford, 1999), esp. vii-viii, xiv.
6. Cullather, *Secret History*, xiv-xv. One may note that the openness policy became more closed under the administration of President Bill Clinton.
7. Cullather, *Secret History*, Appendix C, esp. 138, 142.
8. Richard Immerman, *The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention* (Austin, 1982); Piero Gleijeses, *Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954* (Princeton, 1991).
9. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, *Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala* (Garden City, NY, 1982).
10. *New York Times*, 10 July 2004, p. A1.
11. For in-depth discussion of Bloom's ideas, see Benjamin Bloom, ed. *The Taxonomy of Educational Objectives: The Classification of Educational Goals*, (New York, 1956), or Lorin Anderson and David Krathwohl, eds. *A Taxonomy for Learning, Teaching, and Assessing: A Revision of Bloom's Taxonomy of Educational Objectives*, (New York, 2001). For a briefer discussion with particular relevance to teaching history, see

any social studies education textbook, such as Alan Singer, *Social Studies for Secondary Schools: Teaching to Learn, Learning to Teach* (Mahwah, NJ, 1997).

12. Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation* (New York, 1943).

Test Questions

Option One: Walter LaFeber, in his textbook *The American Age*, develops a number of themes that he says are exemplified in U.S. foreign relations over the long run: territorial and economic expansionism, unilateralism (he calls it isolationism), a growing centralization of power in the foreign policy process, and (after 1870 or so) a tendency to act on behalf of the established order, or the status quo, in the world. If LaFeber were using *Secret History* as a major source for his chapter on the United States and the world in the 1950s, to what extent (if any) would he find evidence to confirm his major themes? To what extent (if any) would the evidence in *Secret History* challenge his major themes? Write a 5-7 paragraph essay, with an introduction that states the issues and your thesis, and a conclusion which summarizes your thesis, on these issues. Your conclusion should also attempt to make some generalization about the significance of the material in *Secret History* on the conduct of U.S. foreign relations as a whole. You are expected to refer to several specific passages or incidents in *Secret History* that illustrate your points. When you quote from *Secret History* or refer to a particular passage or incident, place the page number to which you are referring in parentheses.

Option Two: William Appleman Williams and Samuel Flagg Bemis were both writing major

works on U.S. foreign policy in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but they did not have access to the CIA documents that Cullather refers to and discusses in *Secret History*. Imagine that Williams and Bemis had both just read Cullather's book and were in a conference of historians to discuss this work. Based on what you know about the views of Williams and Bemis, and on what you read in *Secret History*, construct a dialogue between these two historians about this issue. Your dialogue should reveal the views of the two historians, the major points and some important passages or incidents from *Secret History*, and the ways that Cullather's book either backs up or challenges the views of either Williams or Bemis. You should include a concluding paragraph in your own voice that gives your evaluation of how the evidence in *Secret History* affects the overall perspectives about U.S. foreign relations of Williams and Bemis.

The Student Papers

Teresa Sillman (Option One):

Throughout his textbook *American Age*, historian Walter LaFeber illustrates several themes that are present in U.S. foreign policy. For example, LaFeber stresses the centralization of power that the U.S. government does in terms of foreign policy; the economic and territorial expansion of the United States, the unilateral action that the United States often takes, which LaFeber refers to as isolationism; and the tendency of the United States to support the status quo around the world, not incite revolution. The book *Secret History* by Nick Cullather is a good example of the themes proposed by LaFeber.

In 1954, the United States backed an overthrow of Guatemala's president Arbenz and replaced him with Col. Castillo

Armas. This was a covert operation carried out by CIA operatives. This operation can be looked at as supporting the U.S. tendency to support the status quo in the world because of the methods used to complete the operation. The overthrow of Arbenz was a covert operation that even the American people did not know about. The information about this operation remained highly classified until 1997, almost fifty years after the fact. The only result of the operation that was known until Cullather's book was published was that Communists did not take over in Guatemala, "America's Backyard." In this sense, the events in Guatemala are maintaining the status quo.

The fact that the CIA was able to perform this operation in a covert manner and keep it classified for the amount of time that they did shows the centralization of power by the federal government. The CIA was under the power of the executive branch until the 1970s, when Congress was finally able to gain some control over the agency. It only took the National Security Council to "determine that the Arbenz government posed a threat to the national security sufficient to warrant covert action against it" (38). No one in Congress knew about these actions or this decision, much less voting on whether to go forward or not. This action was completely initiated and carried out by the CIA, which shows the great power of the executive branch.

Cullather's book also supports LaFeber's idea of economic and territorial expansion. The United States was not trying to gain land or territories from their actions in Guatemala, but they were trying to prevent Communists from gaining territory. While Cullather's book has shown that the Communists actually had little to no influence in Guatemala, the information

available is from CIA analysts, who perceived the communist threat to be larger than it was. The United States was involved in Guatemala mainly for economic reasons. The United Fruit Company owned 42 percent of the arable land in Guatemala and Arbenz began taking land away and forcing United Fruit, a U.S. company, to work with unions and pay better wages, etc. United Fruit then asked the U.S. government to help them, which they tried to do by placing a pro-U.S. leader, Armas, in power. Also, "undoubtedly, the disappearance of the Communist regime in Guatemala will leave behind a certain economic and financial chaos which must be rectified by American aid" (63).

The other theme that LaFeber makes prevalent is his idea of isolationism, by which he means that the United States wants to keep its options of unilateral action open, despite being in organizations like the U.N. Cullather's book discusses how the Guatemalan foreign minister put a resolution before the U.N. Security Council "to intervene to stop the outside aggression" (92). However, no one in the international community knew that the United States was behind the aggression because it was a covert operation. Most believed that it was United Fruit acting without the support of the U.S. government. The agency "took steps to ensure that coverage in the American press had a favorable slant" (94). As a result, the United States was still able to carry out its operation without getting in trouble with any other organization it was a member of.

Clearly, Cullather's book supports the themes of Walter LaFeber. His book does make some interesting points about the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The fact that even today, there are parts of this history that are blacked out says a lot. We as citizens and historians

don't really know all the facts about some events and the reasons for them. This makes the historian's job very difficult and leads to the question, how much do we really know about history in general?

Bryan Gosnell (Option One):

Over the course of the previous four months our class has allowed Walter LaFeber to prove some key and recurrent themes in American diplomatic history. It is my belief and opinion that he has done so successfully. In Nick Cullather's book we can see many of LaFeber's views come to life in a very unique and controversial event which took place in Guatemala during the 1950s. Walter LaFeber and Nick Cullather pair to solidify the assumption of several prevalent themes in American diplomatic history.

Economic and territorial expansion have certainly been keystones in making America what it is today. The system of capitalism thrives on expansion, and it is a part of American nature. This expansion does not occur without a great effort or price. As Cullather noted, the CIA has a determined course in removing Arbenz, who was elected as president, from power. He states that in doing so, "final plans included three areas of action: propaganda, paramilitary, and politics" (63). The CIA took it upon themselves to create a different future in the economic, political, and military role of Guatemala. This U.S.-born plan trained Guatemalans to fight for American desires. This expansion, perhaps, is even more effective than economic or territorial could have been. But the level of U.S. involvement was, also, economic as well. Big business controlled a vast portion of Guatemalan wealth, territory, and power. The United States used the "Boston based United Fruit Company...[which] occu-

pied hundreds of square miles and employed as many as 40,000 Guatemalans" (10). Economic and territorial expansion had been under way in Guatemala for many years.

LaFeber's theme of unilateralism is also evident in Cullather's work. Covert operations seemingly fit into the ideas of isolationism as well as the idea of the growing centralization of power. The practices of the Eisenhower administration were silent to the public. These unknown actions were cheaper than large military ventures, and they allowed for a maximum freedom of movement politically (at least until the publicity of Cullather's documents). The centralization of power is evident in the actual carrying out of such operations as PBSuccess. It is truly amazing that a government can be overthrown without congressional knowledge. The role of the president has continued to grow even today.

President Eisenhower loved these covert operations because "he believed that the Cold War was entering a period of protracted, low-level conflict. Relying too much on the military would exhaust the economy and leave the United States vulnerable" (36). The threat of spreading Communism in the Western Hemisphere was one that the administration refused to tolerate or correctly recognize. The Arbenz government's progressive vision was not compliant with many "suits" in the United States. On August 12, 1953, "the staff of the National Security Council determined that the Arbenz government posed a threat to the national security sufficient to warrant covert action against it" (38).

This action displays the continued "status quo" efforts of the United States in foreign and global policy. The United States is today recognized as the West (with parts of Europe).

Economic wealth and technological superiority have fueled the American machine. Since the Monroe Doctrine, U.S. government officials have not been reluctant to flex the American muscle abroad, and Operation PBSuccess is merely another example of this. As Samuel Flag Bemis so eloquently pronounced, the United States of America is a "City on a Hill," and throughout the late 19th century and after, her actions have been justified in this manner. Walter LaFeber's major themes in U.S. diplomacy are evident in Cullather's work, as well as most historical American texts.

Beth Diehl (Option 2): A dialogue between William A. Williams and Samuel F. Bemis

Bemis: First off, I would like to tell the audience about my views. America is a great and glorious nation! Being the wonderful country that she is, America realizes her duty to share her advantages. Sure, there have been a couple of missteps along the way (nations, like people, can make mistakes), but overall America's foreign relations have been shaped by her genuine desire to spread the blessings of liberty. I just read Nick Cullather's book, *Secret History*, and in a moment I will tell you how America's efforts in Guatemala definitely back up my views.

Williams: Say what you like, Dr. Bemis, but I think I'll show you that you're wrong. You see, America is not always in the right and trying to spread blessings, like you suggest. Sure, she starts out with good intentions, but sometimes they are compromised in the name of self-interest. America believes that success should come American-style, but sometimes we compromise our revolutionary ideals. Economics and trade are a big part of American foreign relations. In Guatemala, for

example, America stepped in at least partly to protect her interests, in this case the United Fruit Company. Look here, on page 35. The desk officer for Central America writes, "Communist strength grows, while opposition forces are disintegrating... Ultimate Communist control of the country and elimination of American economic interests is the logical outcome..." See? The reason we were in Guatemala in the first place was economic...

Bemis: No, no, no. You've got it all wrong. That quote backs up my ideas. We were there to prevent the evils of communism! We were doing it to protect the Guatemalan people!

Williams: Well, sir, you'll see on page 15 that United Fruit "regarded any trespass on the prerogatives they enjoyed under Ubico as an assault on free enterprise." On page 20, you'll note that Arbenz came to power through an election, and he wanted reforms that would be good for the people: "Twice he had risked his life and career for democracy. His plans for development and agricultural reform were modest," writes Cullather. Then, he continues to talk, now mentioning U.S. involvement, "Stiffening resistance from the United States and United Fruit led him to reassess his assumptions, adopt a more radical program, and find friends who shared his opinions" (20).

Bemis: Yes, and those friends were communists. Do you know what communism is? It's EVIL --that's what. Our glorious nation couldn't just stand by and just let poor Guatemala get swallowed up under the communist influence of the Soviet Union. Our goal is to spread the Blessings of Liberty, not to look the other way.

Williams: Well, that's just it. When we intervened in Guatemala, we compromised our values. What interest was it of ours? If we want to promote

self-determination, we need to recognize it. Guatemala was a self-determining country. Also, Arbenz might have had friends who were Communist, but he wasn't a communist. And we had pledged non-intervention (31).

Bemis: Desperate times call for desperate measures, you know. We couldn't just stand by! We had to encourage people like Castillo Armas to rise up and confront communism. I remember the passage where it says he needed our encouragement (33). We were bound to give it to him!

Williams: I hope you also remember the passage where Cullather writes, "The reform intensified conflict between the regime and United Fruit, drawing the U.S. into confrontation with Arbenz" (23).

Bemis: Well, economics could be part of the reason, but I think it had more to do with freedom. After all, our radio station was called "Voz de Liberacion" -- the Voice of Freedom! Also, the country was getting arms shipments from the U.S.S.R., at least according to the State Department. We couldn't let the Soviet Union expand into the Western Hemisphere like that, you know.

Williams: How do you explain all of the other times America intervened in Latin America, then? How about Theodore Roosevelt's conduct in building the Panama Canal? You cannot possibly tell me that that incident did not stem from American self-interest and compromised American ideals.

Bemis: Yes, I can. The Panamanians wanted freedom, and we helped them get it. Looking back over history, there are just so many instances where American has become involved to spread the Blessings of Liberty...

Beth Diehl: Here we'll conclude our little debate. While

History and Understanding the Iraq War

James I. Matray, Chester Pach, and Mark Atwood Lawrence

Bemis would argue that America was trying to spread the blessings of liberty through intervention in Guatemala, Williams would say that the motive was economic and that our values were compromised in the process. Evidence does show that America's involvement (from backing military dissent, to dropping bombs, to utilizing a radio station) was primarily because of U.S. interests. This was also another place where America worked hard to curtail Soviet influence. In the end, Arbenz would indeed flee, and with him Guatemala's hopes for a brighter future. The U.S. instead succeeded in installing Castillo Armas, who was the first in a long line of military dictators and of difficult times for Guatemala. The covert operation's success also led to American involvement in operations like the Bay of Pigs.

The following three essays are all modified versions of papers presented at the 2004 Policy History Conference in Clayton, Missouri, sponsored by the Institute for Political History.

"The Iraq War in Historical Perspective" *James I. Matray*

On 21 May 2004, I served as moderator for a roundtable on "The Iraq War in Historical Perspective" at the 2004 Policy History Conference near St. Louis, Missouri. Joining me as speakers were political scientist Michele Angrist of Union College and historians Mark Lawrence of the University of Texas at Austin and Chester Pach, Jr. of Ohio University. To open the two-hour session, I repeated a quotation attributed to Mark Twain: "History doesn't repeat itself; at best it rhymes." My colleagues and I attempted to test the truth of that axiom by seeking some assonance between the Iraq War and previous American conflicts.

In my opening comments I noted that it was difficult to achieve historical perspective on a war that American forces still were fighting, and I pointed out that while it made sense at a Policy History Conference to discuss U.S. wartime policy in Iraq, it was not clear that President George W. Bush had one. I then presented a brief discussion

of how, in my view, the Iraq War reflected a pattern of unilateralist behavior in foreign policy dating back to the beginning of the Bush presidency. My purpose was to provide a context for my colleagues' comparative analysis.

On 17 March 2003, President Bush delivered an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein demanding that he leave Iraq or face U.S. military action to oust him from power. Two days later the war began. On 1 May, Bush declared victory aboard the *USS Abraham Lincoln*. Not only had the U.S. military prevailed after just six weeks, they suffered fewer casualties than they had in the Persian Gulf War twelve years earlier. But this rapid march to victory was only the long fuse that ignited the real Iraq War.

Bush and his advisors had followed a curious road to the president's day of apparent triumph on a carrier flight deck off the coast of San Diego. In a debate with Democratic opponent Al Gore during the 2000 presidential campaign, candidate Bush had criticized prior American attempts at "nation-building" abroad. He insisted instead that the United States should be "humble" in world affairs. His stunning volte-face after taking office exposed a brazen arrogance that would propel him toward war with Iraq. For eight months his administration rejected international cooperation and pursued narrow,

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self-serving objectives.

That the United States stood as the world's only superpower had an intoxicating impact on Bush and his closest advisors. Far from being humble, they were in fact developing a national security strategy that provided a blueprint for the achievement of nothing less than global hegemony. Since no nation could match American power, they seemed to believe, nothing would stop the fulfillment of their vision of an orderly post-Cold War world. For its first eight months, however, the administration could not come up with a compelling rationale to persuade countries to unite behind the U.S. plan. Then came the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.

Bush opened his "War on Terrorism" by warning other countries that "you are either with us or against us." Afghanistan in fact was a sideshow in his hegemonic plan, as the president made clear in January 2002 when he identified the "Axis of Evil" as his real target. Iraq would be the test case. But Bush had problems from the start, at least abroad, because he could not establish a definite link between Saddam Hussein and 9/11. More persuasive to his skeptical international audience was the case he made for removing Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. UN inspectors found none, however, and the United Nations balked at sanctioning a new war.

Bush's determination to remove Saddam Hussein from power led to preparations for a preemptive war. Public references to this planned course of action signaled the revival of unilateralism in U.S. foreign policy after the opportunist embrace of international cooperation following 9/11. Many historians objected that initiating war would constitute a dramatic break in U.S. foreign policy. George F. Kennan, the father of containment, was among Bush's critics. He argued that the

United States had contained Saddam Hussein, just as it had the Soviet Union.

After presenting this summary of events, I then read comments I had posted on H-Diplo in October 2002, voicing my own concerns about the Bush administration's war plans. It was difficult for me to believe, I wrote, that it would serve the interests or the image of the United States to throw away everything American leaders and average citizens had done for more than two centuries to offer an admirable model for the rest of the world to emulate, merely to satisfy the personal and political goals of one president and his doctrinaire advisors.

Then, in an admitted act of self-congratulation, I read the following comments that I had posted on H-Diplo on 20 March 2003:

George W. Bush made it clear in his ultimatum address of 17 March that his war against Iraq seeks regime change as its exclusive goal. References to Saddam Hussein possessing weapons of mass destruction have been Bush's excuse to build domestic and international support. Absolutely nothing that the UN inspectors accomplished would have satisfied the Bush administration, which, to repeat, has had as its sole aim to oust Saddam Hussein, regardless of the consequences. . . . Just yesterday I recalled what Madame Nhu said in November 1963 after the assassination of her husband and brother-in-law in South Vietnam: "This will be just the beginning of the story" . . . Americans should know that dictating what sorts of governments people should have is a dangerous business that can have unexpected and disastrous results. This war is unnecessary and a grave mistake.

At the time, some responders ridiculed my comments, dismissing the connection with the Vietnam War as a false analogy. Yet, since Bush's victory decla-

ration, events in Iraq—among them the prisoner abuse scandal, the attack on what purported to be an Iraqi wedding party, and the repudiation of Ahmad Chalabi—have provided justification for my warning. The emerging irony of the Iraq War is that it is providing an answer to the question so many Americans were asking after 9/11: "Why do they hate us?" They hate us because of the towering hubris of U.S. leaders seeking to remake the world.

For Bush, the mission in Iraq was not to find and remove weapons of mass destruction. Rather, it was to create a democratic Iraq that would be a rock of pro-American stability in a turbulent region and a model for emulation in the Arab world. These expectations explained the arrogant prediction of Vice President Dick Cheney that Iraqis would greet American soldiers as liberators. William Sloane Coffin was right when he observed that "power blinds before it corrupts."

In my concluding remarks I sought to emphasize that the negative consequences of the Bush administration's preemptive war in Iraq were predictable. In 1998, President George H.W. Bush wrote a book with Brent Scowcroft, his former national security advisor, in which he defended his decision not to pursue regime change in the Persian Gulf War. "Trying to eliminate Saddam, extending the ground war into the occupation of Iraq," he wrote, "would have incurred incalculable human and political costs. . . . The United States could conceivably still be an occupying power in a bitterly hostile land." More than one thousand dead U.S. soldiers provide tragic proof that father knows best.

James I. Matray is Professor and Chair of History at California State University, Chico.

"The Past Has
Another Pattern":
Vietnam and Iraq
Chester Pach

We often try to understand the present or imagine the future by remembering the past, and for many people the war in Iraq seems to be a lot like the war in Vietnam. Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) bluntly called Iraq "George Bush's Vietnam."¹ Kennedy's colleague, Senator Joseph Biden (D-Del.), compared the sharp fighting around Fallujah this past spring to the Tet Offensive of 1968.² Many commentators have called Iraq a "quagmire," invoking, of course, David Halberstam's metaphor for Vietnam as a conflict that progressively immersed the United States in disaster.³ Even Secretary of State Colin Powell invoked the My Lai massacre as he struggled to explain the U.S. abuse of Iraqi detainees at the Abu Ghraib prison.⁴

These comparisons show how powerful our memory of Vietnam is. That is especially true for those who were part of the baby boom and can remember the deceptions of the Gulf of Tonkin incident forty years ago, or *Life* magazine's photographs in November 1969 of the bodies of the Vietnamese murdered at My Lai, or Richard Nixon's grandiose--and, ultimately, cynical--proclamations that the United States had achieved "peace with honor" by signing the Paris accords. The comparisons between Iraq and Vietnam have some value, but that value is limited. Iraq is not Vietnam, unless by Vietnam we mean a generic term for a war that does not go right or according to expectations. The Iraq war is the product of the Bush administration's way of looking at the world and conceiving of U.S. security, which is very different

from the outlook that prevailed in the Johnson administration forty years ago. The Bush administration is not repeating the past, but doing something new.

Surely one of the most striking differences between Vietnam and Iraq is that in the former war, the U.S. goal was regime preservation, not regime change. Always at the center of U.S. difficulties in Vietnam was the problem of making a South Vietnamese government with limited legitimacy and limited effectiveness stand on its own. Never could a U.S. president, even prematurely, proclaim "mission accomplished." All that almost twenty years of aid and advice and eight years of combat could produce by 1973 was an indecent interval of two more years before the South Vietnamese government collapsed in April 1975.

Never did the U.S. war effort in Vietnam--even briefly--elicit the public approval that the war in Iraq did in the spring of 2003.⁵ Public support for Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam policies was much more limited, and it eroded rather quickly--in fact, long before the Tet Offensive, although many people who make Vietnam/Iraq comparisons now inaccurately claim that it was the Tet Offensive that began that erosion. By January 1967, polls showed that by a margin of 43 to 38 percent, the American people disapproved of the way the president was handling the war. The Tet Offensive brought public support of Johnson's policies to a new low, as the boldness of enemy attacks and the hard fighting that followed seemed to belie the president's repeated claims of U.S. progress in the war effort. Public discontent with Vietnam had become so great by September 1967 that Johnson told a group of educators that he was "in deep trouble."⁶

What is also different about the two wars is the pessimism that characterized Johnson's

outlook at the beginning of U.S. combat involvement in Vietnam and the optimism that seemed to drive the Bush administration as it chose war with Iraq. Johnson authorized the sustained bombing of North Vietnam and the dispatch of combat forces to South Vietnam because he feared a South Vietnamese collapse. His advisors told him that more aid and more advisors would not be enough to sustain South Vietnam. Yet even as he went to war, as recently released telephone tapes reveal, Johnson expressed doubts that military measures would produce success. As he told Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara only days after approving the Rolling Thunder bombing campaign, "I don't think anything is going to be as bad as losing, and I don't see any way of winning."⁷ In those telephone tapes Johnson also said that he believed in the domino theory and feared that the loss of South Vietnam would have larger repercussions in Southeast Asia.

George W. Bush and his top national security advisors also apparently believe in a domino theory, but theirs is a very different way of thinking about the interconnection of security issues. The Bush administration reformulated U.S. national security policy in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The administration's policy statement published in September 2002 asserted that "traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents." Nor would deterrence work against "states that sponsor terror and those that pursue" the development of weapons of mass destruction. The war with Iraq grew out of this embrace of preemptive warfare, however much the threats that the Bush administration sought to preempt turned out


to be neither clear nor present dangers. But it also seems that the Bush administration hoped that a strike against Iraq would have larger effects--that it would not only lead to the democratization of that country, but also that it would start a kind of domino effect in the Middle East. Apparently, the hope was that Saddam Hussein's ouster would bring about changes in other Middle Eastern nations, which would begin to eliminate safe havens for terrorism and terminate programs for the development of

weapons of mass destruction, as Libya appears to have done. The democratization of Iraq would open the way for the spread of democratic or representative institutions that would diminish threats to U.S. security.⁸ It is possible to question the Bush administration's strategy from all sorts of angles. But surely this kind of optimism about the ability of the United States to bring about a wholesale transformation of the Middle East is far different from the doubts and pessimism that character-

ized Johnson's thinking as he committed U.S. forces to war in Vietnam. In addition, the Bush administration's strategy is far more ambitious--and depending on your point of view, arrogant or imperial--than the strategy of containment that underlay the war in Vietnam.⁹

I do not know what lies ahead in Iraq, the Middle East, or the war on terrorism. But I doubt that the war in Vietnam will help us to anticipate the future in Iraq. There never was any possibility of multilateral

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action through the United Nations to end the war in Vietnam. In Iraq, UN action may still be important in shaping that country's future. Of course, there will continue to be echoes of Vietnam in Iraq, and as the campaign for the presidency revealed, the debate about the Vietnam service of John Kerry or the National Guard service of George W. Bush occasionally got even more attention than the war in Iraq. But the debate about who served or didn't meet his military obligations more than thirty years ago is another indication of how deeply etched Vietnam is in our memory. Much of what will happen in Iraq we will probably not be able to anticipate. For now, one of the few things that is clear is that "peace is not at hand."

Chester Pach is Professor of History at Ohio University.

Notes:

1. Transcript, "Speech by Senator Edward M. Kennedy Delivered at the Brookings Institution," April 5, 2004, <http://www.brookings.edu/dybdocroot/comm/events/20040405kenedy.pdf> [accessed September 13, 2004].
2. *Boston Globe*, April 8, 2004, A25.
3. David Halberstam, *The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam During the Kennedy Era*, rev. ed. (New York, 1988).
4. Transcript, "Larry King Live," May 4, 2004, CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/transcripts/0405/04/lk1.00.html>. [accessed September 13, 2004]; Christian G. Appy, "Faces of War," *Boston Globe*, May 16, 2004.
5. According to the Washington Post-ABC News poll, public approval for Bush's handling of "the situation in Iraq" reached a high point on April 30, 2003, when 75 percent of the sample approved, 22 percent disapproved, and 2 percent expressed no opinion. The strongest approval for Johnson's "handling [of] the situation in Vietnam occurred in January

1966, when 57 percent approved, 27 percent disapproved, and 15 percent expressed no opinion. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/vault/stories/data030804.htm> [accessed September 13, 2003]; Peter Braestrup, *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington*, 2 vols. (Boulder, 1977), 1: 700.

6. Notes, president's meeting with educators from Cambridge, Massachusetts, colleges and universities, September 26, 1967, Box 1, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings, Special Files, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas.
7. Michael Beschloss, *Reaching for Glory: Lyndon Johnson's Secret White House Tapes, 1964-1965* (New York, 2001), 194.
8. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>. [accessed September 13, 2004].
9. For a superb and provocative discussion of the Bush national security strategy in historical perspective, see John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA, 2004).

From the 'Water Cure' to Abu Ghraib: The U.S. Wars in the Philippines and Iraq
Mark Atwood Lawrence

In his recent book *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*, John Lewis Gaddis responds boldly to critics of the Bush administration who contend that the war in Iraq represents a radical and dangerous departure from longstanding traditions in the making of American foreign policy. In fact, argues Gaddis, Washington's decision to attack Iraq reflected the same blend of motives that had animated policymakers on previous occasions following attacks on American soils. If the

September 11 terrorist strikes drove Washington to strike unilaterally, to embrace preemption, and to seek positions of unchallengeable power, so too did the British attack on the United States in the early nineteenth century and the Japanese assault on American territory in 1941. In its recent behavior, Gaddis suggests, the Bush administration is operating according to time-honored traditions that have served the country well.¹

While Gaddis makes his case with his usual combination of conviction and eloquence, his argument in this case suffers from a critical flaw. Gaddis assumes that we should understand the Iraq war as part of a defensive reaction to the September 11 attacks—a line of thinking that has been seriously called into question by a host of recent commentators. Thanks to Richard Clarke, Bob Woodward, Hans Blix, and several other journalists and memoirists, we now know that Bush and his aides were contemplating regime change in Iraq well before September 11. Moreover, we know that they worked obsessively in the days following the attacks to establish a connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda that would justify the sort of assault on Iraq about which the Bush administration's neoconservatives had fantasized.

It seems, then, that Gaddis may have fallen prey to the same sort of obfuscation that the administration has sought to practice on the American public. This is not to suggest that Gaddis's aim in the book—to find historical parallels to recent U.S. behavior and to argue against the notion of a radical break with the past—is in any way invalid. It may simply be that in focusing on moments in American history when the United States came under attack, he chooses to scrutinize the wrong points of historical comparison. If we

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understand the Iraq war in a different way—as an aggressive war of choice undertaken at a moment when Americans were disinclined to scrutinize their leaders' precise motives—we would need to look at different points of historical comparison. We might examine the U.S. war in Vietnam. Or better yet, we might consider the American war in the Philippines between 1899 and 1902, the conflict that bears perhaps the most striking resemblance to the current war in Iraq.

As with any historical comparison, it is important to point out that the parallels between the two wars are hardly perfect. For one thing, the explicitly colonial intentions that motivated Americans during the Philippine War contrast with more complex U.S. purposes in Iraq. For another, the weapons of mass destruction allegedly harbored by Saddam Hussein had no parallel in the Philippines; no American argued that military action was necessary to put down a threat to U.S. national security from Manila. More generally, it is worth noting that the Philippine War and the Iraq invasion came at very different moments in the 150-year rise of the United States to global preeminence. Behavior that marked a bold departure in 1898 had become familiar, even routine, more than a century later. The debate over Iraq is informed by vast historical experience unavailable to an earlier generation.

And yet the parallels between the two episodes are remarkable. One of the most striking is the effort by both President McKinley and President Bush to describe their wars as endorsed by no less an ally than God. In both cases, leaders known for their public moralizing defended their decisions by invoking the Almighty even as advisers motivated by political and economic calculations

maneuvered behind the scenes. In the Philippine case, McKinley famously explained his decision to annex the Philippines as divinely inspired. Uncertain of the proper course, he told an audience of Methodist clergymen in 1899, he had dropped to his knees and “prayed to Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night” before arriving at a decision.² McKinley reported that God instructed him to seize the Philippines and to “uplift and Christianize” the Filipinos. President Bush claimed no such direct channel to the Almighty, telling Bob Woodward that he would not “justify the war [in Iraq] based on God.” Still, Bush echoed McKinley in describing his decisions in early 2003 as the result of vigorous prayer. “Going into this period,” he explained to Woodward, “I was praying for strength to do the Lord’s will.”³

Another similarity lies in the distinct pattern that the two wars followed. Both conflicts involved a strikingly successful “combat phase” followed by an extended period of counterinsurgency warfare carried out by increasingly frustrated and overstretched U.S. forces against the very people they had initially set out to liberate from dictatorial rule. In Iraq, as in the Philippines, the vast majority of U.S. casualties came after Washington’s victory over its initial, avowed enemy. In the Filipino case, U.S. forces destroyed the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay without a single casualty, only to find themselves bogged down the following year in a war against a second enemy—Filipino nationalists—who would exact a toll of more than 4,200 American lives. In Iraq, the initial victory over Saddam Hussein’s army involved only 138 U.S. deaths. Since President Bush declared the end of “major combat operations” on May 1, 2003, the United States has

suffered almost 1,000 deaths (as of November 1, 2004) at the hands of an Iraqi insurgency motivated, like its Filipino predecessor, not by loyalty to the old regime but by a determination to oust American occupiers.

The events that led to American embroilment in the two wars also bear a remarkable resemblance. In the Iraq case, the path to the U.S. invasion is now painfully familiar: the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon provoked the U.S. attack on Afghanistan and the destruction of much of the Al Qaeda leadership based there. Before that operation had even begun, however, clusters of like-minded policymakers who had been eager for years to overthrow Saddam Hussein and to establish a friendly regime in Iraq detected a golden opportunity to advance their agenda. With Americans incensed against renegade Muslim nations, the Bush administration manipulated fragments of intelligence to suggest a connection between Iraq and terrorism. In this way, U.S. leaders exploited a delicate moment when Americans were unlikely to look closely at the subtleties of international affairs to pursue goals only distantly connected to the actual source of threat to the United States.

In the Philippines the pattern was strikingly similar. One can pinpoint the spectacular destruction of American property—the sinking of the *U.S.S. Maine* in Havana harbor—that led Washington into a war aimed at protecting U.S. interests and destroying an unpredictable and brutal regime. Sensing an opportunity, a small group of policymakers, with Teddy Roosevelt at its center, worked to exploit the situation in order to advance longstanding designs on a distant territory—the Philippines—with limited connections to the original site of conflict.

Just as in Iraq, Americans used a war undertaken for ostensibly defensive purposes in one region as a smokescreen for attack in another.

Such deception provoked public outrage in both cases—yet another parallel. The backlash against the Bush policy in Iraq was so fierce as to imperil the president's chances of reelection. The backlash against the conquest of the Philippines came to the fore during the well-known 1898 debate over annexation and then, in subsequent years, in fierce criticism of the war to suppress Filipino nationalists. In each case, administrations deeply invested in the overseas adventures kept their critics in check by claiming to be bringing enlightenment to barbarous places and by hinting, at least implicitly, that their critics were somehow disrespectful of American soldiers who risked their lives for the lofty principles they allegedly represented. Teddy Roosevelt foreshadowed the tactics of the Bush White House when he charged in 1898 that opponents of annexation were "little better than traitors" and accused Democrats of "a lamentable indifference to the true interests of the nation."⁴ In both Iraq and the Philippines, policymakers sought to cover cynical manipulation by relentlessly invoking humanitarianism and patriotism.

Finally, the two wars bear a similarity in the controversies that arose because of the brutal methods employed by Americans in conducting counterinsurgency warfare. The abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib recalls atrocities committed against Filipino rebels, including the "water cure" method of torture for which American troops became famous in the Philippines. Perhaps Andrew Carnegie, a noted anti-annexationist, was correct in 1899 when he suggested that as a

general rule, "soldiers in foreign camps, so far from being missionaries for good, require missionaries themselves more than the natives."⁵ More likely, however, there was something particular about the Iraq and Philippine wars that elicited this sort of behavior. So overweening were professions of high-minded purpose and so sweeping was the denigration of America's enemies that U.S. authorities could plausibly see those who opposed the United States as, by definition, enemies of civilization. The reaction to American brutality is perhaps the ultimate tragedy that links the two wars: many of those who initially regarded Americans as liberators came within a short time to view them as oppressors. A Baltimore paper put it best during the Philippine War: "We have actually come to do the thing that we went to war to banish."⁶

What does this all mean? It is one thing to call attention to historical parallels, another to explain why the comparison is more than an idle academic exercise. The crucial point to be made is that the American war in the Philippines was distinguished by two characteristics—disingenuousness among top policymakers and reprehensible methods—that surely rate it among the more unfortunate undertakings in the history of U.S. interventionism abroad and connect it to more recent times. The same disturbing combination marred the U.S. experience in Vietnam. And now the same combination is evident again in the Iraq war.

In the two previous instances, popular discontent with official malfeasance and unwarranted methods helped produce momentous turning points in the conduct of American foreign relations. Following the Philippine War, Americans backed away from formal colonialism

and would not make a bold return to the great-power arena until Woodrow Wilson had recast the United States as the champion of self-determination and collective security. Following the Vietnam War, the United States exercised greater caution in the use of force abroad and, at least for a time, sought to reposition itself as a champion of democratization and human rights.

Will a similar kind of shift take place in the wake of a war similarly marred by official duplicity and questionable methods? George W. Bush's reelection—the first time a president has been returned to office during an inconclusive war since McKinley's victory in 1900⁷—would seem to suggest that new departures are unlikely. Moreover, the sheer barbarity of the September 11 attacks and the ruthlessness of Saddam Hussein's rule will, to a degree, insulate the administration from its critics and enable it to make a plausible case for preserving unilateralism and preemption as key ingredients of national security policy. Still, prospects appear reasonably bright for a significant shift in the conduct of U.S. policy abroad. Widespread opposition to the Iraq war and the danger of mirroring the United States in similar conflicts elsewhere will surely force this Republican administration, like its turn-of-the-century predecessor, to operate with more restraint and, perhaps, transparency. That, at least, is what history suggests.

Mark Atwood Lawrence is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Texas at Austin.

Notes:

1. John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA, 2004).
2. Quoted in Ernest R. May, *Imperial*

Democracy: The Emergence of America as a Great Power, new ed. (Chicago, 1991), 252-3.

3. Quoted in Ron Suskind, "Faith, Certainty, and the Presidency of George W. Bush," *The New York Times Magazine*, October 17, 2004, 1.

4. Quoted in H.W. Brands, *Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines* (New York, 1992), 32.

5. *Ibid.*, 28.

6. *Ibid.*, 57.

7. Max Boot, "A Solid Win, but Bush Must Learn from his Errors," *Austin-American Statesman*, November 7, 2004.

The Betty M. Unterberger Prize is intended to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by graduate students in the field of diplomatic history. The Prize of \$1,000 is awarded biannually (in odd years) to the author of a dissertation, completed during the previous two calendar years, on any topic in United States foreign relations history. The Prize is announced at the annual SHAFR conference.

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Professor Carole Fink, in conjunction with the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University, has established a network of historians of European International Relations. Located at www.mnih.org and titled the Mershon Network of International Historians (MNIH), the website serves as an electronic bulletin board for posting current information. Its primary purpose is to promote collaborative work among scholars on specific subjects in international history, such as panels, conferences, and volumes as well as joint research projects. Our other goals include posting archival information, announcing meetings and publications, and disseminating news of graduate and postgraduate study programs. There is also a plan for the future: to post each year an original essay for discussion. The success of this project will largely depend on its participants, who will help to create links among a community of scholars without an organizational base.

Membership will require no fee, and privacy will be assured. The electronic bulletin board will be run and monitored by the directors of the MNIH from The Ohio State University. In addition, all announcements, postings and information will be placed on the website by the directors.

If you are interested in becoming a member please contact Ursula Gurney at gurney.13@osu.edu. Once you become a member, you will also be able to submit information to post, such as: a) calls for conference papers, b) archival and fellowship information, and c) upcoming publications and conferences. In addition, you will be able to request names of members, or have the directors of the MNIH send information to other participants, working in specific fields, on specific topics, and in specific cities and universities.



“Spinning” the Casualties: Media Strategies During the Roosevelt Administration

D.M. Giangreco

In the fall of 1944, questions concerning current and future American casualties and the duration of the war were generating a great deal of discussion within the Pentagon. Commencement of large-scale operations earlier that year in June, with the invasions of the Marianas in the Pacific and Normandy in France, had produced the long-expected “casualty surge.” This rapid increase in combat casualties turned out to be beyond what the U.S. Army anticipated¹ and was so politically sensitive that the War Department changed how it reported Army losses not only through the civilian press, but to its own troops as well, principally through the Army publication *Yank*, which distributed up to 2.6 million copies weekly to soldiers and airmen starved for reading material.

This essay examines the casualty data the U.S. Army presented to its troops (plus any civilian willing to pay the price of a subscription); the methodologies it used to produce the inflation, then deflation, of cumulative casualty figures from June 1944 through the end of the war; and the Roosevelt administration’s effort to prepare the American public for steep increases in the draft during 1945. A secondary issue — but one of some significance in light of the recent controversy over the display of the *Enola Gay* — is that all this activity occurred within the public arena.


The claims of veterans that they remembered being told of

massive casualty projections for the invasion of Japan were dismissed as a “largely fictitious, comforting story”² by former National Air and Space Museum Director Martin Harwit and many in the academy when they defended the institution’s proposed *Enola Gay* exhibit script. However, Robert Newman, who was one of the few academics to defend veterans’ claims publicly, notes that while the xenophobia of some veterans groups can often distort judgment about foreign policies, in the *Enola Gay* context, “any account of this argument should acknowledge the basic accuracy of what veterans ‘knew.’”³ Indeed, servicemen had been regularly exposed to huge casualty figures in both Army and commercial newspapers since the middle of 1944, and the numbers moved from past tense to future tense early in 1945.

The War Department, through the Office of War Information or its own Bureau of Public Relations, seldom released cumulative casualty data during the first year and a half after Pearl Harbor, preferring instead to present such information at the conclusion of individual campaigns or operations such as those at Guadalcanal or in North Africa, the Gilbert Islands, and Aleutians. A fairly comprehensive account of casualties through the third week of June 1943 was published in mid-July and listed four principal loss categories — killed, wounded, missing, and prisoners — and their totals by theater of

operation. Army casualties from these categories totaled 63,958. That number included 12,506 Philippine Scouts, who were among the nearly 32,000 personnel lost when the islands fell. Navy, Coast Guard and Marine casualties in these four categories increased the total number by nearly a third to 90,860.⁴

Not included in the tally were other categories that were




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even then draining the U.S. Army of manpower. "Non-battle" losses among troops in the field were omitted, as were losses from administrative attrition such as separations from the service due to age or infirmity. Most apparent to commanders overseas were the destructive effects on unit combat strength of nonbattle losses from disease and, to a lesser degree, the psychiatric breakdowns popularly known as "battle fatigue." For example, the destruction of Merrill's Marauders in Burma by disease and fatigue is recounted in a number of works,⁵ and in New Guinea, the 32d Infantry Division attained a rate of 5,358 cases of malaria, dengue, and fevers of undetermined origin per 1,000 troops from October 1942 to February 1943.⁶

Naturally, the war's other belligerents also lost great numbers of men from "noncombat" factors. The Germans in particular were painfully aware of the debilitating effects of disease on the successful prosecution of combat operations. Disease among German forces in North Africa regularly sapped a stunning 40 to 50 percent of their front-line strength in 1942 and 1943.⁷ What would Afrika Corps commander Erwin Rommel have been able to do with a force twice the size of the one he had? U.S. forces in that theater later found that approximately nine of every ten admissions to field hospitals were not the result of combat.⁸

Excluding soldiers who recovered enough to return to duty, the U.S. Army would ultimately discharge from the service some 50,520 men for non-battle injuries in combat zones (such as loading accidents), 312,354 for combat-related psychiatric breakdowns, and 862,356 soldiers for diseases contracted during the war.⁹ There was little public interest in these numbers after the close of hostilities, and

the mounting losses they represented went essentially unreported during the war except for a seven-month period in 1944, when they were released somewhat obliquely.

There were two very good reasons for never releasing figures for sickness among deployed troops. First, unlike the periodic accountings by the Army Medical Corps of personnel discharged in the United States because of ailments like heart defects or mental disabilities, these numbers came principally from the overseas theaters and thus would provide the enemy with a much fuller picture of the U.S. Army's effective fighting strength. Just prior to the invasion of France, totals for wounded troops were omitted as well, undoubtedly for the same reason.¹⁰ Second, the American public was understandably focused on the cost of *combat* operations. There was no crying demand for collateral information — no squeaking wheel.

The exclusion of figures for both the sick and wounded, however, created other problems, not the least of which was that smaller, more selective loss figures were reported to the public at a point in the war when many Americans already believed, to varying degrees, that the United States was making less of a contribution to the war effort than its allies. This was a very sensitive subject, often raised by the media and the government itself. Discussing what the Roosevelt administration did to manage this perception, and what effects it had on everything from congressional elections to global war-planning with Great Britain and the Soviet Union is beyond the scope of this article. We can, however, examine how it affected what the public was told about the U.S. Army's "losses."

The last-released U.S. Army casualty figures before the 1944

casualty surge were published at the beginning of June and totaled 156,676 from the categories killed, missing, prisoners, and wounded through April of that year.¹¹ The Army publication *Yank*, which was published by Brigadier General Frederick H. Osborn's Special Services Division of the Army Service Forces and had a circulation of millions, contrasted this number with the nearly 670,000 men lost by the British Empire,¹² and had earlier editorialized on the Soviet loss of some six million troops in battles against the Nazis. Other Special Services products such as Frank Capra's *The Battle of Britain* (1943) and his Oscar-nominated *The Battle of Russia* (1943) reinforced this contrast. Moreover, stories of the huge sacrifices made by the United States' allies were not limited to mass-distribution military publications and films, but were common in civilian newspapers, radio, newsreels, and feature-length Hollywood films as well.

As noted, the cumulative figures for wounded through April 1944 were dropped from casualty totals released just before the invasions of France and the Marianas. This should have resulted in an even greater disparity between U.S. and Allied casualty figures. However, the Army now established a policy to disseminate virtually the entire administrative flux and flow of manpower not periodically, but on a monthly basis through public relations channels to the press and through its own organs to its troops. By adding the categories "honorable discharges" and "other separations" to the totals for April 1944, released in late June, published Army losses almost immediately jumped from 156,000 to 1,163,000 even before the casualty surge began to show up in the figures.¹³ For those who did not look too closely at how the number was constructed, the

clear implication was that most or all of these losses were combat-related.

This new accounting method produced figures that seemed to be much more in tune with the combat losses of the British and Soviets and ostensibly demonstrated to the public and to allies and enemies alike that America's commitment to the war was unequivocal and its resources were enormous. These figures also implied that America was already pulling its share of the load against the Axis.

Releasing the artificially large monthly totals, which lumped together losses through purely administrative matters with battle and nonbattle deaths, prisoners, and missing while still withholding figures for the sick and wounded, would also prove useful for the Roosevelt administration because doing so inadvertently provided a way to soften the potential blow to America's war resolve when the sudden upsurge of major ground operations beginning in the summer of 1944 caused real casualties to skyrocket.

Through this month-by-month release of figures combining administrative separations with selected combat-related categories, soldiers, airmen, and the public at large became conditioned to seeing steadily growing million-plus loss figures months before it became apparent that American troops were now experiencing the frightening attrition of manpower that had been commonplace among the other antagonists for several years. For example, in August 1944, after the standard seventy-five days it took to collect, collate, vet, and publish the data, the War Department released an inflated "total Army losses" figure of 1,234,000 for December 7, 1941, through May 1944.¹⁴ As noted earlier, however, it was department policy not to indicate how many of these were

casualties directly related to combat. By this time combat-related casualties numbered no less than 194,000 men, and that figure did not include the appalling losses to sickness in the disease-ridden overseas theaters.¹⁵

The June 1944 reporting period, which covered the first three weeks in Normandy and two from Saipan, was added to the total made public in September and was handled in the same manner as the other recent releases. The 1944-45 casualty surge had begun that month and was clearly visible in the marked jump in the number of "total losses" reported. That figure, still minus the sick and wounded, suddenly spurted well beyond the roughly one-and-a-quarter million mark to 1,279,000 in the space of just one month.¹⁶ If the War Department had not taken certain measures, such as putting an almost complete halt to administrative separations, the figure released for the August 1944 reporting period would have soared to approximately 1,407,000.

The total-losses formula had certainly produced much larger numbers that were seemingly more in sync with the casualties suffered by the United States' principal allies, but the problem now had to be considered from a different perspective. At what point did the numbers become too big and start to become a hindrance to the war effort? The Army was set to release the August figures in November, and one can only speculate as to whether or not there was now, after only six months of using the uniform new system, an apprehension that the upcoming tally would constitute a psychological crossroads for the American people. It was clear that attrition alone could push "total Army losses" past the million-and-a-half mark in the December release.

The American public,

already uneasy over the lengthening name-by-name casualty lists appearing in nearly every hometown newspaper, would be sure to notice such huge figures. The release of loss figures in the million-and-a-half range would not only provide a long string of zeros guaranteed to command the attention of news writers and pundits but would also coincide with fresh combat along Germany's western frontier and in the Philippines. Additionally, the release of these loss figures and the intensified fighting would occur at precisely the time the Army was formulating both the following year's steep increase in draft quotas for the planned invasion of the Japanese Home Islands and the "points system," which would allow some soldiers to be released after a specified amount of time in combat combined with length of service.¹⁷

Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, and President Franklin D. Roosevelt were already contending with the political fallout from their decision to withdraw 110,000 men from college under the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP) and transfer them and others from the Army Air Forces to the Army Ground Forces (AGF).¹⁸ Later, during the uproar over the transfer of Army Service Forces and even more Air Forces personnel to the AGF, largely to compensate for severe losses among the infantry, an exasperated General Marshall wrote: "I think I heard from the mothers of most of these men who were taken from the other branches, and from every father whose son I was forced to take out of college."¹⁹ The artificially high casualty listings would serve only to aggravate a worsening situation.

Of course, the War Department had put itself onto this path the previous summer by

releasing total-loss figures that included the full range of the Army's administrative separations. But the department could minimize or delay this fast-approaching public relations bombshell, which was likely to explode at the worst possible time, immediately before Selective Service inductions were scheduled to be nearly doubled in preparation for the 1945 and 1946 invasions of Japan, by returning to some form of narrowed criteria for publicly released casualty figures.

The War Department did not publish figures in October. In November 1944 it publicly experimented with various formulas that distinguished casualties from total losses. One listed a narrow range of specific combat-related casualty categories--a complete reversal of the policy of presenting total losses. This format restarted the base-line numbers at a far lower level and resulted in a figure of 384,395 "Army battle casualties" through October 6, 1944. The category "wounded" (208,392 men) was displayed for the first time since April, but those incapacitated by disease were still not included.

Once reinstated, however, the listing of wounded could not easily be dropped. When the monthly total-losses figure was released two weeks later, it glaringly excluded wounded in action from the total of 1,357,000 through August 31, 1944.²⁰ Although the respective figures represented end points five weeks apart, the number of wounded was a subject of intense interest to soldiers and civilians alike and all could do the math. Adding wounded to the equation pushed total Army losses to far beyond one-and-a-half million.

The casualty surge had rendered the policy of releasing total losses politically unacceptable only seven months after

it had been initiated. Yet the battle casualties formula was not completely satisfactory either, particularly in how it was presented. The War Department's January 1945 release of figures, which stopped short of Germany's December counterattack in the Ardennes, used the same formula as the revamped November listing and displayed a cumulative Army casualty figure of 483,957. The department also stated that "some 55,000 enlisted men from the Air Forces and 25,000 men from the Service Forces are being transferred to the Ground Forces" by the end of January.²¹

When figures next appeared in the February 2, 1945 edition of *Yank*, it was apparent that total losses listings had finally been completely abandoned, but the narrowly constructed Army battle casualty listing, which incorporated the first week of the German counteroffensive, had nevertheless climbed to a whopping 556,352 through December 21, 1944. Moreover, instead of continuing to list the numbers in easy-to-read column form, they were now buried within a lengthy paragraph that

included Navy casualties, limited comparative analyses for weeks in mid-December, estimates of German losses for the same period, and a warning that "the number of returned sick and wounded is now so large that the Medical Department can no longer make it a policy to send patients to hospitals nearest their home towns." Further down the column was also a reminder that the United States still had not experienced the grievous human cost incurred by its stalwart British ally. Under the headline "British Losses" was a breakdown by country of the 1,043,554 casualties within the British Empire. It stated that "the United Kingdom suffered most heavily with 635,107 military casualties," a figure far larger than the U.S. total to date.²²

Manipulating the way casualties were reported, however, could only go so far to mask the fact that roughly 65,000 young American men were now being killed, wounded, injured, or declared missing in combat theaters each and every month during the casualty surge, and that figure did not include the

Cumulative U.S. Army Loss/Casualties Totals in *Yank*

(Excludes published totals for individual battles or campaigns which were run separately)

	23 July 1943 (thru 24 June)	63,958 (all-services, 90,860)	
Army Killed	24 Dec 1943 (thru 15 Nov)	94,918 (all-services, 126,919)	
Wounded	11 Feb 1944 (thru 23 Dec)	105,229 (no figure published)	
Missing and Prisoners	3 Mar 1944 (not given)	112,030 (all-services, 150,478)	
	2 June 1944 (thru 28 Apr)	156,676 (all-services, 201,454)	
Screened areas:	23 June 1944 (thru 31 Mar)	1,163,000 (no figure published)	
Army Deaths	28 July 1944 (thru 30 Apr)	1,200,000	"
Honorable Discharges	25 Aug 1944 (thru 31 May)	1,234,000	"
Prisoners and Missing	29 Sept 1944 (thru 30 June)	1,279,000	"
Other Separations			
	17 Nov 1944 (thru 6 Oct)	384,895*	"
	1 Dec 1944 (thru 31 Aug)	1,357,000	"
	12 Jan 1945 (thru 28 Nov)	483,957 (all-services, 562,368)	
	2 Feb 1945 (thru 21 Dec)	556,352 (all-services, 638,139)	
	2 Mar 1945 (thru 28 Jan)	676,796 (all-services, 764,584)	
	9 Mar 1945 (thru 7 Feb)	693,342 (all-services, 782,180)	

* The casualties total published in the 17 November 1944 edition of *Yank* did not include prisoners.

sick and psychological casualties. Postwar tabulations for November, December and January put losses at 72,000, 88,000, and 79,000.²³

The Roosevelt Administration and military chain of command tried to soften the blow that these losses represented. Their efforts ranged from the nonsensical to the well-considered and straight forward.

European Theater commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower sent out a directive to use the term "reinforcement" for individual soldiers sent to units at the front instead of "replacement,"²⁴ which had a cannon-fodder ring to it. This order went essentially unnoticed and unenforced at lower command levels since a young rifleman sent forward from what was now called a reinforcement depot was nevertheless understood by all concerned to be a replacement for another soldier killed, sick, missing, or wounded.

General Marshall, however, took a very different tack. In a public address on December 9, 1944 at New York's Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, shortly before Germany's Ardennes counteroffensive and the announcement of increased Selective Service inductions, he stated that:

[w]e are daily confronted with the bitter human cost of this great struggle. We do not have the destroyed homes of England or daily casualties among our peaceful civil population as they do; but because of our expanding battlefront our military casualties are steadily increasing. . . . The great battles now in progress must be kept going, every front must be kept blazing until we break the Nazi control of the German Army and people. . . . [It is] far better to accept heavy casualties for a brief period than the much greater total which inevitably accumulates from the daily attrition of prolonged periods of inactivity on the battlefield.²⁵

Passions ran high during

the winter of 1944–45, and in a March 5 letter Marshall assured Congressman William E. Hess that "I, and others in responsible places in the War Department, are keenly sensitive to the daily casualties we are suffering."²⁶ The next day, he wrote to General Eisenhower in Europe that there was "a terrific drive on against the use of 18-year-old men in combat which has been fulminated by a speech by Senator [Robert A.] Taft on the floor of the Senate."²⁷ Although casualty information was made available to members of Congress by Marshall and Stimson in numerous closed sessions at both the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill,²⁸ the Roosevelt administration felt that continued publication of the cumulative totals was inflammatory, and during its intense negotiations with Congress over the sensitive manpower issue the Army abruptly went from running monthly listings to running no listings at all.

The last U.S. casualty figures ever displayed in *Yank* were in its March 9, 1945 edition. The final published casualty figures through February 7 totaled 782,180, including 693,342 for the Army alone, and were displayed next to a tongue-in-cheek cartoon depicting a lone pup tent flanked by a campfire and swaying palm trees under a starry sky. From inside the tent in this idyllic scene comes a voice: "So I says to the captain, 'Where are all these guys to send overseas?'"²⁹

What was this cartoonist getting at? A soldier certainly wouldn't know, if *Yank* was his sole source of information. The last time that publication had run anything on the draft was nearly a year before, when it printed comments from Selective Service Director Brigadier General Lewis B. Hershey and informed readers about the War Department's announcement that the Army had reached its

planned strength of 7,700,000.³⁰ Beyond the pages of *Yank*, however, the Roosevelt administration and commanders of both the Navy and Army were putting the publication's future readers — young men who had yet to enter the armed services — as well as the rest of America on notice that the war was far from over and that additional sacrifices were necessary.

Months before public demand peaked in May 1945 for what was essentially a partial demobilization in the middle of the war through the "points system," the Roosevelt administration and the Army struggled with how to juggle America's dwindling reserves of eligible manpower. Secretary of War Henry Stimson continually pressed for better legislation to support manpower needs and stressed to Congress that "Selective Service calls are now confined almost entirely to combat replacements."³¹ Fortunately, a short-term personnel crisis caused by unexpected and extensive troop losses during Germany's December counterattack in the Ardennes was solved, although less by the arrival in Europe of Army replacements already in the pipeline than by the draconian culling of excess support personnel in the European Theater's rear areas.

With the invasion of Japan less than a year away, Stimson hoped there might be some benefit to be derived from Hitler's last throw of the dice. He believed the Battle of the Bulge would help soften congressional resistance to a variety of manpower proposals to tighten draft deferments on such groups as agricultural workers. He also wished to expand the categories of those to be inducted, although one proposal in particular made no headway: the Senate, with Harry S. Truman as its presiding officer, balked at a House bill to draft women nurses.³² On

January 4, 1945, Stimson was pleased to write in his diary about "[t]he general excitement in Congress over the German attacks making it possible for us to get legislation which would give us more individuals from the draft."³³

A telegram sent the day before from Selective Service Director Hershey to the state Selective Service directors got to the heart of the matter. Although Congress and the public were understandably focused on the Ardennes fighting, this January 3 message tied proposed or directed changes in various draft deferments to the long-term needs of the coming one-front fight against Japan rather than to a passing crisis precipitated by the German counteroffensive. In his message Hershey quoted a letter from the director of the Office of War Mobilization, Truman's future secretary of state, Jimmy Byrnes: "The Secretaries of War and Navy have advised me jointly that the calls from the Army and Navy to be met in the coming year will exhaust the eligibles in the 18 through 25 age group at an early date. The Army and Navy believe it is essential to the effective prosecution of the war to induct more men in this age group."³⁴

The following week, on January 11, Secretary Stimson held a press conference to announce that the Army's monthly Selective Service call-up, which had already been increased from 60,000 to 80,000 in January, was to be raised again in March to 100,000 per month.³⁵ The total draft calls actually climbed to over 140,000 when the Navy and Marine calls were added.³⁶ One week later, President Roosevelt, Army Chief of Staff Marshall, and Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Ernest J. King sent letters outlining the military's critical manpower needs to House Military Affairs Committee Chairman Andrew J. May. Those

letters were released to the *New York Times* on January 17, 1945. The public was informed in front-page articles that "the Army must provide 600,000 replacements for overseas theaters before June 30, and, together with the Navy, will require a total of 900,000 inductions by June 30."³⁷

In the winter and spring of 1945 the administration had thus moved from discussing official published cumulative casualty numbers in the past tense to discussing them in the future tense. Interestingly, briefings and motivational addresses held by the Army at such diverse locations as the U.S. First Army Headquarters in Weimar, Germany, B-29 training bases in the southwestern United States, and the Pentagon all utilized a uniform figure for expected casualties that was somewhat lower than the one released to the *New York Times* — just 500,000.³⁸ Frank McNaughton, an early Truman biographer who had worked on Truman's Senate Investigating Committee, also noted that interservice politics of the day led to the Navy leaking casualty figures that were somewhat larger.³⁹ Those figures showed up in some very public places.

Kyle Palmer, the *Los Angeles Times'* long-time political editor, had traded in his editorial desk for a position as the paper's war correspondent in the Pacific. Attached to the headquarters of Central Pacific Commander Admiral Chester A. Nimitz, he covered the first aircraft carrier strikes against Japan and the costly U.S. invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, then made a brief return to Los Angeles for a medical checkup. Before he shipped out again, Palmer hammered away at the need for additional manpower in both articles and appearances before civic groups. "It will take plenty of murderous combat before our soldiers, sailors and marines polish off the

fanatical enemy," he declared.⁴⁰ Under the headline "Palmer Warns No Easy Way Open to Beat Japs," the *Los Angeles Times* quoted one of his speeches: "We are yet to meet the major portion of the ground forces of the Jap empire. They have 5,000,000 or 6,000,000 under arms and it will cost 500,000 to 750,000, perhaps 1,000,000 lives of American boys to end this war."⁴¹

At this point it is worthwhile to mention again that veterans of World War II have been roundly dismissed when they claim to "remember" being told that the invasion of Japan might result in a half-million or even a million casualties. Although these men failed to take detailed notes for the benefit of future historians on where they had seen the numbers, they had in fact been regularly exposed to huge casualty figures in Army and commercial newspapers since the middle of 1944, as the imperatives of both politics and maintaining morale led the War Department to first inflate, then deflate, numbers of casualties through statistical manipulation.⁴²

By early 1945, similar figures for the upcoming fighting in Japan were beginning to appear in daily newspapers, and although the Army stopped running casualty figures in *Yank*, the paper nevertheless quoted a series of unnamed "War Department strategists" and "military experts" who warned veteran troops and new draftees alike of prolonged fighting ahead. They repeatedly estimated a year and a half to two years as the minimum time it would take to "get it over unless there is a sudden collapse."⁴³ This was not good news. Many years later an old soldier named Paul Fussell would need few words to sum up his feelings over the "sudden collapse," which came unexpectedly in August 1945: "Thank God for the atom bomb."⁴⁴

Dennis Giangreco is an editor for *Military Review* at the U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Notes:

1. Even before the advent of the casualty surge, the U.S. Army struggled to keep combat units up to strength, and Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson was convinced that there was insufficient Army manpower available for the American field armies that would conduct the final drive into Nazi Germany. Events during the Germans' Ardennes counteroffensive of December 1945 would prove him right. See Henry L. Stimson diary entries of May 10 and 16, 1944, in Larry I. Bland and Sharon Ritenour Stevens, eds., *The Papers of George C. Marshall*, vol. 4, (Baltimore, 1996-): "Aggressive and Determined Leadership," 450-51 [hereafter Marshall Papers]. Also see Marshall's "Memorandum for the President - Subject: Strength of the Army," *ibid.*, 556-60.

2. Martin Harwit, *An Exhibit Denied: Lobbying the History of the Enola Gay* (New York, 1966), viii.

3. Robert P. Newman, *The Enola Gay and the Court of History* (New York, 2004) in press, 133.

4. "Our Casualties," *Yank* 2 (July 23, 1943), 11.

5. A useful synthesis of these works is found in Mary Ellen Condon-Rall and Albert E. Cowdry, *The Medical Department: Medical Service in the War Against Japan* (Washington, DC, 1998), 302-11.

6. *Ibid.*, 130-41.

7. Colonel Ronald F. Bellamy and Colonel Craig H. Liewellyn (Ret.), "Preventable Casualties: Rommel's Flaw, Slim's Edge," *Army*, May 1990, 52-56.

8. Dr. Michael E. DeBakey (Colonel, ret.) and Captain Gilbert W. Beebe (ret.), *Battle Casualties: Incidence, Mortality and Logistic Considerations* (Springfield, IL, 1952), 14; see also 31.

9. Frank A. Resiter, ed., *Medical Department, United States Army: Medical Statistics in World War II* (Washington, DC, 1975), 13-14, 43.

10. The Allied deception campaign aimed at Nazi Germany, Operation Bodyguard — and specifically its component Fortitude South — was geared to creating the impression that the Allies had considerably larger forces massing in England than they in fact did. While it is true that the Allies were leading the German intelligence agencies around by the nose at this point in the war, they had to presume that the Abwehr and other agencies had some very smart number crunchers within their ranks. A detailed analysis of the casualty figures in conjunction with demographic information, shipping data, etc. might have severely complicated the invasion of France if it led the Germans to reassess the manpower actually available to the United States. See Anthony Cave Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies*, 2 vols. (New York, 1975), 1: 511; 2: 532-33, 549, 559-60, 691-92; Charles G. Cruickshank, *Deception in World War II* (New York, 1979), 87-88, 177-185. For a useful summary of deception operations during this period see Major James R. Koch, "Operation Fortitude; The Backbone of Deception," *Military Review* 72 (March 1992), 66-77.

11. "Casualty Lists," *Yank* 2 (June 2, 1944), 17.

12. "They Could Have Been Worse," *Yank* 2 (July 23, 1943), 17.

13. "Army Separations," *Yank* 3 (June 23, 1944), 17.

14. "Total Army Losses," *Yank* 3 (August 25, 1944), 17.

15. *Army Battle Casualties and Non-battle Deaths in World War II*, Final Report, 7 December 1941-31 December 1946 (Washington, DC, 1987), 6.

16. "Total Army Losses," *Yank* 3 (September 29, 1944), 17. See also *Army Battle Casualties*, 6.

17. The finely tuned "points system" was structured in such a way that public demand for a return of troops after V-E Day might be satisfied but the Army would still retain a sizable core of veterans for the upcoming series of campaigns in Japan, which were expected to last at least through 1946.

18. Marshall Papers vol. 4, 285-89,

308-11.

19. Marshall Papers vol. 5, "The Finest Soldier," in press, 225.

20. "Army Casualties," *Yank* 3 (November 17, 1944), 17; and "Army Losses," *ibid.*, (December 1, 1944), 17.

21. "Army Casualties" and "Transfers to AGF [Army Ground Forces]," *Yank* 3 (January 12, 1945), 17.

22. "Casualties," *Yank* 3 (February 2, 1945), 17.

23. *Army Battle Casualties*, 6. This information was made available soon after the war, but other data, such as the loss by at least 7,000 families of two or more sons serving in the U.S. Army, was never released, even within the numerous comprehensive Army Medical Department analyses produced over the following twenty years. Apparently such data did not fit the criteria of the published works. The information on multiple deaths per family was outlined in a 1947 War Department memo to a member of President Truman's White House staff. The memo was discovered in 1998 at the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, Missouri. See D.M. Giangreco and Kathryn Moore, *Dear Harry . . . Truman's Mailroom, 1945-1953: The Truman Administration Through Correspondence with 'Everyday Americans'* (Mechanicsburg, PA, 1999), 100-102.

24. Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, in United States Army in World War II* (Washington, 1948), 230-31.

25. Marshall Papers vol. 4, 690-92.

26. Marshall Papers vol. 5, 75.

27. Marshall Papers vol. 5, 77. See also text to note 23.

28. For example, see Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session, on the Military Establishment Appropriations Bill for 1946, conducted 25 May 1945, (Washington, DC, 1945), 1-18. Marshall and Stimson testified separately before Congress. Both went off the record when they discussed this highly

charged manpower question. Only many years later did references to what was discussed surface in other congressional testimony. In addition to his off-the-record testimony before the House Appropriations Committee in which he discussed, among other matters, the "inadvisability of war of attrition," Marshall testified before the House Military Affairs Committee and discussed "the terrific losses which we would sustain when we invaded Japan." See the transcript of Charles E. Bohlen's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on March 2, 1953, in Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History: 1929-1969* (New York, 1973), 317.

29. "Casualties," *Yank* 3 (March 9, 1945), 17.

30. "Army Full Strength," *Yank* 2 (April 28, 1944), 17.

31. Mattie E. Treadwell, *United States Army in World War II: The Women's Army Corps* (Washington, DC, 1954), 686.

32. *Selective Service and Victory: The 4th Report of the Director of Selective Service, July 1, 1944 to December 31, 1945* (Washington, DC, 1946), 53-59, 70-71, 85-88.

33. Diary entry, January 4, 1945, *Diaries of Henry Lewis Stimson* (microfilm edition reel 9), Henry Lewis Stimson Papers, Yale University Library, New Haven, CT, from microfilm at Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, MO.

34. *Selective Service and Victory*, 112.

35. Diaries of Henry Lewis Stimson, January 11, 1945.

36. *Selective Service and Victory*, 595.

37. *New York Times*, Jan. 18, 1945, p. 1.

38. D.M. Giangreco, "'A Score of Bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas': President Truman and Casualty Estimates for the Invasion of Japan," *Pacific Historical Review* 72 (February 2003), 93-132, esp. 104-5; and Giangreco, "Casualty Projections for the U.S. Invasions of Japan, 1945-1946: Planning and Policy Implications," *Journal of Military History* 61 (July 1997), 521-81, esp. 537-38.

39. Frank McNaughton and Walter Hehmer, *Harry Truman: President* (New York, 1948), 3.

40. "Palmer Warns Nips Set for Murderous Combat," *Los Angeles Times*, May 8, 1945, sect. 2, p. 1. This article was published alongside "New Casualty List Released," which named 78 dead,

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missing and wounded from the Los Angeles area.

41. "Palmer Warns No Easy Way Open to Beat Japs," *ibid.*, May 17, 1945, sect. 1, p. 5.

42. How did this much casualty data, readily available in the public record, escape becoming part of the debate during the Enola Gay affair or the earlier controversy over "atomic diplomacy"? Harwit displays a pronounced aversion to military historians (*Exhibit Denied*, 53) that is shared by many others in the academy. In addition, logistical/manpower analysis is complex and

uninviting (see Giangreco, "Letters to the Editor," *Journal of American History* 84 [June 1997], 322-23).

However, while these may be part of the answer to the question of why obvious military sources for what servicemen were learning about their own destinies were not consulted, other questions persist. For example, anyone studying the diary of Henry Stimson will note that he was not one to affix newspaper clippings to his typescript pages. Hence, the inclusion of a single newspaper clipping within Stimson's heavily cited diary--the

January 18, 1945, page-one *New York Times* article announcing that 900,000 replacements needed to be drafted within the next six months--should have attracted a great deal of attention. Inexplicably, no one has mentioned it.

43. "The Jap War," *Yank* 3 (June 8, 1945), 1.

44. Paul Fussell, *Thank God for the Atom Bomb and Other Essays* (New York, 1988). See also Matthew Stevenson, "War's End on Okinawa: In Search of Captain Robert Fowler," *Journal of Military History* 67 (April 2003), 517-28, esp. 528.

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training: Oral Histories and Book Program

Stuart Kennedy

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training (ADST) is a nonprofit organization founded in 1986 to support the training of American diplomats and promote understanding of U.S. foreign policy. In pursuit of the latter goal, and of particular interest to members of SHAFR, the association records and transcribes oral histories of former foreign affairs practitioners, facilitates publication of books on diplomacy, and produces exhibits.

Oral Histories

Historians will soon have a new research tool at their disposal. The ADST is working with the Library of Congress to make its Foreign Affairs Oral History Program's collection of transcripts available free over the internet at the library's American Memory

website (www.loc.gov). The collection, which includes some fourteen hundred individual oral histories, will be on line by the end of 2004, and new interviews will be added as they are completed. The ADST has already issued a CD-ROM, *Front-line Diplomacy*, which contains the first nine hundred transcripts; it can be purchased from the ADST and is also available at a number of university libraries. The full collection, in the form of transcripts on paper, has been deposited at the Lauinger Library of Georgetown University and is open to the public.

The Library of Congress website will give researchers from around the world immediate access to the transcripts. Both the CD and the website have excellent search engines to facilitate exploration of the collection by keyword.

The following are examples of subjects that can be pursued

through the ADST's oral history collection.

Franco-American Problems

Oral history interviews have exposed aspects of the conduct of American diplomacy that are not available through official records. One theme that can be traced through several decades is the continuing "problem with the French." It is hardly news that American and French diplomats have frequently been at odds over various issues. A case in point was the conflict between the French and newly arrived American diplomats in postcolonial Africa. French authorities in the former colonies suspected that the Americans were trying to supplant them, and accounts of such suspicions are related in the transcripts.

My closest collaborator on the European side was the Belgian

ambassador. The Belgian ambassador always thought that the French were up to something. And so he would be always sharing information with me about the latest perfidy that the French were up to. There's no question that on economic issues and a lot of other issues that the French and the Americans, and the French and everybody else, were really in an adversarial sort of relationship. And it was at a time when the Senegalese were anxious to break away from their sort of complete dependence on the French economically. And so the French were always very concerned about what the Americans might be up to, or anybody else.

--Walter C. Carrington (ambassador, Senegal, 1980-1981)

Arab-Israeli Conflict

The transcripts recount more than a half-century of efforts by American diplomats to bring peace between the Arab and Israeli peoples. Despite the skill and sacrifices of our Foreign Service officers and political appointees, the situation is worse than ever. Men and women Arabists speak frankly about their reasons for pursuing this particular area of concentration and answer the common charge that they are anti-Israel. The political pressures on Department of State personnel regarding support for Israel are spelled out in detail by those who have experienced them.

The Israeli Foreign Ministry and the intelligence service keep a dossier on every substantive officer in the embassy. Pretty soon you're put in one of the categories that they classify in: friend of Israel, or not friend of Israel. And not friend of Israel means that you're not actively supporting them on everything that they consider to be important. I was asked many times when I was in Israel, "Well, whose side are you on?" (as the chief economic officer out there). I said, "I'm on the side of the

United States of America. That's where my allegiances are. I'm neither pro-Israeli, nor anti-Israeli. I'm pro-American." That is interpreted as being anti-Israeli. Everything you send back to Washington, no matter how classified, has a very strong chance of finding its way into the Israelis' hands. If you write it, you'll be identified to the Israelis as the author of the piece. And if they don't like it, they go after you, and frequently are successful in having you out of there.

--Samuel F. Hart (economic counselor, Tel Aviv, 1977-1980)

1990 Gulf War

There are interesting perspectives on the 1990 Gulf War in interviews with the principal officers in Baghdad, Amman, Tel Aviv, Riyadh, Dhahran, and the Gulf States, as well as senior officers in Washington dealing with the Middle East. During the war the major problems for American diplomats were keeping the Saudis firmly committed to the alliance and keeping American technicians from leaving the oil fields. Meanwhile embassy personnel in Tel Aviv worked to keep the Israelis out of the battle.

The Oral History Program will eventually contain accounts for Gulf War II. The association has already interviewed several people involved in recent negotiations in Baghdad and Kabul, along with two Foreign Service officers who resigned over U.S. Iraq policy in 2003. In this context it should be noted that the collection is designed to reflect a variety of views of past and current foreign policy and is not merely a forum for dissent.

Many things are possible as long as they're not in the public eye. Despite the fact that Saudi society has become even more conservative . . . the chaplain corps was more heavily represented in this war than in any previous one. But they were not identified as chaplains;

they were called morale officers. Nevertheless, they ministered to the troops, on a sectarian or non-denominational basis, very effectively -- Catholic, Jewish, Christian, Muslim, and I believe there may have been a Buddhist or two.

The other problem, of course, was the continuing tension over the role of female troops, which, of course, is largely logistical. That is, the women tend to be very heavily represented in the logistical functions--truck drivers, loadmasters, and this sort of thing. Essentially, the Saudis agreed to turn a blind eye to this, and when problems occurred were quite good about intervening with those who objected to this to ensure that a problem did not develop.

--Chas F. Freeman Jr. (ambassador, Saudi Arabia, 1989-1992)

The Soviet Union and Berlin

There is a major archive of the experiences of officers who dealt with the Soviet Union from World War II to its dissolution, and the collection continues with the successor states. The art of the Kremlin watcher is explained by some of those who practiced it over the years, from 1945 to 1992. Officers who were stationed in Washington and Berlin document their management of the long Berlin crisis.

This is the period, incidentally, when Kremlinology got its start. When people learned to figure out what was going on in Russia from these abstruse signs that you got, bird droppings, so to speak, and one thing and another. I remember years later, Walter Stoessel, on his first assignment to Moscow, had to cover the cultural world. And he got onto it. At that point I was back in Washington reading some of these materials. I was struck by the extent to which Walter had caught on to this technique. He could tell you about a performance of "Swan Lake" at the Bolshoi and draw from

it the correct political conclusions about what was going on inside the Kremlin. To people who don't know the technique, it seems extremely weird, but it's a perfectly valid thing that worked for a while. It went beyond just looking to see who was on Lenin's Tomb on the First of May or November 7.

--James McCagar (vice consul, Moscow, 1942)

Vietnam

The work of nation building has been the stock-in-trade of the Foreign Service since the end of World War II, although that part of its mission is seldom recognized. Those who served in South Vietnam, as well as Laos and Cambodia, recount their attempts to help shape those nations. Embassy personnel tell war stories. The duty officer in the embassy building recalls being under attack during the Tet Offensive. Another officer describes how, during the collapse of South Vietnam, he had to evacuate a consulate general, with all of its Vietnamese staff and their families, by river. Relations between senior mili-

tary officers and the young officers attached to the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support program who reported on developments in the Vietnamese countryside were sometimes tense. Senior military officers did not want bad news relayed to the ambassador.

We were trying to make things as plain as possible to Ellsworth Bunker -- what the situation was. He was getting a very limited point of view from the military and perhaps to a certain extent from the Agency. The Agency was trying to be honest in many ways but unfortunately they were under pressure from their powers-that-be back in Washington. I forget who was Agency Director at the time. George Jacobson, the mission coordinator and a retired Army colonel, and I would bring in some people to talk with the ambassador. We gave them false names for the ambassador's calendar or maybe didn't even put them on the calendar. Some of these were military officers like John Paul Vann who would come in under an assumed name because General Westmoreland would have hit the roof if he knew that Vann

was talking privately with the ambassador. And the ambassador was appreciative of that. George [Jacobson] brought in his military contacts, and I brought in some of our provincial people. I think it helped to lighten the situation for the ambassador. We were all beginning to become very pessimistic as to how things were going to come out.
-- Gilbert H. Sheinbaum (political officer, South Vietnam 1964-1968)

China and Taiwan

The collection has broad coverage of diplomatic service in China from the 1920s to the present. Nancy Tucker of Georgetown University has assembled some of these oral history accounts into a book entitled *China Confidential*, which has been translated into Chinese. China watchers in Hong Kong recount their efforts to make sense of the erratic policies of Mao Tse-tung over the decades. Several people who accompanied Kissinger on his trip to China describe what they saw and heard, and embassy personnel stationed in Taiwan describe the distress that arose from the changing American relationship with the evolving democracy on that island. Liaison staff recount problems dealing with the Peoples' Republic in the early years after offices were opened in the PRC.

What we benefited from was a sort of first-hand, visual kind of feel, and having for the first time working level contacts with Chinese counterparts, which in Hong Kong you don't have. However, our lives were very circumscribed; the lives of all diplomats were circumscribed -- though technically we were not diplomats. We couldn't travel very much; Chinese officials were very withdrawn and circumspect about what they talked about. I was there from 1973 to 1975. I think the reporting we did was a contribution, but in many ways the reporting

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from Hong Kong was better. They had more people, they had files and they were getting bits and pieces of information from different parts of China -- people who left China, travelers, provincial radio broadcasts. So there were a number of things that they in Hong Kong saw in better perspective than we did sitting in the Liaison Office. I think what we did was a contribution but it didn't supplant the China watchers in Hong Kong.

--Herbert E. Horowitz,
(economic counselor, Beijing,
1973-1975)

Jonestown, Guyana

American diplomats have been observers of many horrific events--wars, disasters, pogroms and plagues--but once in a while they find themselves unwilling participants in such events. One of the most terrible of these was the mass suicide of more than nine hundred American citizens in the People's Temple cult in Guyana. Congressman Leo Ryan of California flew to Jonestown to check on complaints that some cult members were being held there against their will. He found that to be the case and along with the embassy's deputy chief of mission and a group of newsmen went to the small airport near the temple to leave the area.

[Members of the cult were on a] cart that was being towed by the tractor. They had various guns--shotguns, 22s, 306 and various other things, but no automatic weapons. And they began firing. The congressman was obviously a target. He and I ran around the front nose of the aircraft. The tractor which had the cart from which people were firing at us was between the airplane and the bush on the one side of the airstrip so those people who were closer to the bush could run off into the bush, while those of us at the airplane and in front of it didn't have much of a place to

go. We decided to independently run across the tarmac to the protection of some houses and trees on the other side.

About at that stage the NBC television tape ends with the murder of the cameraman. It was all filmed from the time the firing began. He was obviously a target. I got to the other side of the airplane and decided that there was just no way that I could possibly make it across another seventy-five yards of open territory and decided that I would play dead. As I was about to artistically fall to the ground, and indeed I must have almost been on the ground, somebody shot me. [In Indiana where I am from you only shoot birds on the fly you don't shoot them on the ground.] Somebody got me with a 22 long. As I later learned I wasn't badly hurt. It had entered my left thigh and lodged up near the spine--it is still there, it is more dangerous to take it out than leave it alone.

Anyway, I was on the ground there. Staccato firing continued for what seemed like a long time, but probably couldn't have been more than a couple of minutes. I had thought that the reason I didn't want to run across the tarmac or try to go any further was because I thought we were in a cross-fire between the big truck that was parked on the other side of the tarmac from the tractor. I had thought that we were being fired on from that truck. Later only one other person thought we had been fired on from that truck, so I don't know whether we were or not. Anyway, I was convinced we were and that I would never make it past that truck.

I lay on the ground and the firing stopped. I was trying to pretend that I was dead. I couldn't decide whether I would be more convincing playing dead with my eyes open or closed. Finally I decided that I at least would like to see those bastards. I heard feet on the loose stones of the dirt on the tarmac and a shotgun went off. More steps and the shotgun went off again. Ryan had obviously been hit more than

once. I had seen those five or six feet from me curled around the wheel of the airplane landing gear apparently for protection. The shotgun continued for five shots including right next to me--Ryan. I was waiting for the next shot which never came. To this day I do not know why. I suspect that it was a five shot shotgun and the last one was used on Ryan.

The steps went away and I lay on the ground until finally I heard the vehicles drive away. There was no conversation, no shouts that I recall.

--Richard A. Dwyer (deputy chief of mission, Guyana, 1978).

Pakistan and Bangladesh

In diplomacy, conflicts and tensions are not restricted to relations between countries. At times strong feelings develop within an embassy staff or between posts in a country. The classic example of such conflict is the ongoing tension between the U.S. consulate general in Jerusalem, which reports on developments in the West Bank and Gaza, and the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv. Another instance arose during the war between East and West Pakistan, which resulted in the birth of Bangladesh in 1971.

The March 23, 1971 invasion came just three and a half months before I left. The Pakistani Army was very brutal when it moved in. It made a large number of arrests and shot many students. The consul general--Archer Blood--in Dacca sent in a "protest" telegram--Dacca 231. This was an LOU [LIMITED OFFICIAL USE] or OOU [OFFICIAL USE ONLY] message signed by every member of the staff of the consulate general. Essentially, this message said that the U. S. has no major strategic interest in South Asia. Therefore, our national values should prevail--our concern for human rights and democratic freedoms. It urged U. S. condemnation of the Pakistani military crackdown and called for support of

self-determination in East Pakistan.

When the message came in, I happened to be with Ambassador Farland. The message was sent to the Department of State in Washington, with a copy to the Embassy in Islamabad. Farland shrugged his shoulders and said, "Hmmm." Sid Sober [Deputy Chief of Mission, Islamabad], however, took a very different view. He was very upset. The next day a cable came back from the Department, reclassifying the Dacca cable from OUI or LOU to NODIS [No Distribution Outside the Department of State], which was the highest restriction. Arch Blood had classified the cable somewhat disingenuously. At the very end of the cable he said that he had not signed the cable, because he did not think that it would be appropriate for a consul general, but he added that he had the highest respect for the members of the staff, whose views he shared. In fact, the cable was distributed in about eighty-five or ninety copies and was sent all over Washington, which I assume was Arch's intention.

There followed a period of very, very bitter and bad feelings between our people assigned to East Pakistan, who were evacuated later, and our embassy people in West Pakistan. There were also tensions within the embassy. The Dacca staff felt that we were backing the Pakistani government in Islamabad in its repressive activities in East Pakistan, which wasn't really the case. The embassy didn't share those views, but understood that the Dacca staff would be much more agitated since some of its Pakistani friends had been arrested and killed. The crackdown happened very fast. It was made worse by the fact that when the consulate general staff in Dacca had to be evacuated, originally the intention was that our people would fly from Dacca to Bangkok on an American aircraft which the U.S. government would charter. At the last moment the Pakistani Foreign Ministry said that they didn't want the consulate general to be evacuated via Bangkok. They want-

ed them to fly out by way of Karachi on a Pakistani aircraft. We didn't argue with the Foreign Ministry; our concern was to get our people out of Dacca.

We weren't thinking about whether they flew on an American carrier or a Pakistani plane to Karachi. We really didn't consider that. However, our people in Dacca were furious. The Americans in East Pakistan were furious that they had to fly to Karachi, which was quite far [around fourteen hundred miles in the direct line]. They later said that, on the way to Dacca, the Pakistani airliner had ferried Pakistani troops that had come to butcher their friends. It was as if they were Jews leaving Eastern Europe on a train returning from the "gas chambers." When the people from the consulate general in Dacca arrived in Karachi, they were greeted by Sid Sober. There was a lot of tension and a bad scene ensued. The Dacca staff was very unhappy with the way they had been evacuated. They felt that the embassy had let them down and that we should have fought with the Pakistani government.

--Dennis Kux (political officer, Islamabad, 1969-1971)

Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus

Similar disagreements sometimes exist between American embassies in countries where feelings run high. Greece, Cyprus and Turkey are good examples. These disputes are not common, but they do exist. Sometimes these posts work well together and sometimes not, depending on the personalities in charge. The oral history transcripts bring diverse outlooks to life.

Disagreements between Foreign Service posts are not the only example of how policy and personalities play a role in the development of American foreign policy. Sometimes there are conflicts between the Department of State and another

branch of the government, most often the Pentagon, and those are fought in the corridors of Washington.

Kathimerini is the primary [newspaper in Greece] and the other Vima. Both were papers of very influential persons. We tried to influence them; but they were way above us. They were going to write it as they saw it and it was their view. Eleni Vlashos was particularly sound and represented the center right. Our problems were with individual newsmen who kept pestering us for details. The English-language paper, the Athens News, was very difficult. In one period back in 1963 they were getting inside interviews about Greece with the Pentagon back here in Washington, with top generals, American generals who didn't know when to shut up about our nuclear capacity in Greece. They were a bane in our side; we attempted to get the Pentagon to shut down those generals because it was causing a lot of trouble, but no success.

--Herbert Daniel Brewster (political counselor, Athens, 1961-1965)

Spanish Base Negotiations

Disagreements between the Departments of State and Defense often came about because of base negotiations. Several American bases were located in Spain before Spain joined NATO, and maintaining those bases was a diplomatic problem.

I think, when our military had to examine what the Spaniards were demanding, they had to make the decision of which was more important--Torrejon or Moron. You could have Rota and Zaragoza, but you couldn't have Torrejon. Zaragoza was the only all weather bombing range we had in Europe. It was essential.

At that time we had not told the Spanish that we were prepared to go from Torrejon. Obviously

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2004 SHAFR Election of Officers

Congratulations to the following individuals who were elected by SHAFR membership to serve in the offices indicated:

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blood, sweat and tears were being produced in Washington over getting the Pentagon to agree that's what they would probably have to do. I wasn't really involved in that. It was all done in Washington.

I was very fond of Bob McCloskey [the special base negotiator]. It never struck me as if he had a great grip on all of this, but I may be wrong on all of that. Obviously here in Washington when it came to the business of dealing with the Pentagon, it wasn't just Bob McCloskey who got involved. There was the Deputy Secretary, the Assistant Secretary of EUR, Political Military Bureau, etc. So it was then the weight of the institution that was being brought to bear on the whole Pentagon. I don't doubt that they had quite a time to get the Pentagon to agree to this. But I always found these negotiations frustrating because again to try to get our government organized into action with somebody making a decision about something could be awfully painful.

We had not yet gotten to the point of telling the Spanish we

Passport December 2004

were getting out of Torrejon, and when the time actually came to do it, I don't know what would have happened--whether we would have done so or not. If the Spanish had said that there would be no facilities agreement of any sort unless you do "this," that was the price we were apparently prepared to pay. But in the final analysis at that time we did not have to make that agonizing decision. Indeed, it is the price we are prepared to pay today but in different circumstances because Spain is part of NATO. The Italians rallied around and gave us additional facilities and now you have the whole changed situation in Europe anyway.

But I think one of the most difficult things of all is that negotiations with foreign governments are difficult enough, but negotiations within one's own government are sometimes hopeless.

--Wells Stabler (ambassador, Madrid, 1975-1978)

Personalities of American Diplomats

For scholars whose interests lie in the workings of diplomacy on the personal level, the collection has many accounts of how American diplomats viewed each other and rated each other's effectiveness.

Tom Enders [Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Ambassador to Canada and Spain], he's a dominant personality. He's six feet seven or so. He has the Harvard, Yale, Groton, monied, New England, pedigreed type of background that Foreign Service people at that time were rumored to need. He was married to an Italian countess, Qaetana. He had money; he had position; he had brilliance; he had physical presence; and he had an enormous amount of arrogance. And those things, by and large, stand you in good stead in the Foreign Service.

Charlie Bray (Ambassador to Senegal, Director of the Foreign

Service Institute) was of a different cut. Charlie Bray had a nice touch. Not that he wasn't smart, and to some degree, I wouldn't say that anybody in the group I've talked about is arrogance-free, but Charlie's arrogance was not so palpable and he camouflaged it pretty well. Charlie achieved his ends by persuasion, by humor, by other things which were total anathema. . . . I mean, they were just something Tom Enders would never consider. Tom Enders was dominant. Charlie was much more the other kind of person. I think Charlie went to Princeton, I'm not sure; so he certainly wasn't from the outback, but a different style.

What values did they have? The values of the people, I would say, were mixed. When we sat around and talked about why did you join the Foreign Service, you probably got about as many different answers then as you would today. One person said, "It was the best job I could get." Somebody else talked in romantic terms about, you know, travel and all that stuff. There were a few who talked about looking for a career that would afford excitement and perhaps a chance, once in a while, to do good, who were in the Foreign Service essentially because they thought a life of public service, in the best sense of the word, was something they had found rewarding. There were some who saw it as a way station, maybe, to something else they wanted to do...

I'm an overseas person. You know, people expect, particularly at the senior level, Foreign Service officers to have two different sets of skills, which in some cases are really mutually exclusive. On the one hand, when you're overseas, you're expected to behave toward the host government, the host country, the host people, as a diplomat, in which you are an interpreter, you are a compromise seeker, you are an honest broker, you are a message carrier. You're a lot of things that involve essentially being warm and fuzzy, keeping your intellectual

ethics and integrity and your interpretive and analytical skills going all the time, but being of a personality type that you might call "B."

In Washington, the successful bureaucratic infighter, the successful person who gets things done around Washington, is an entirely different type. You're expected to be an infighter, a nut cutter, a fast maneuverer, a sleight-of-hand artist, and all this stuff, particularly if you're in the State Department, because we frequently come to the battle poorly armed in terms of domestic constituencies and resources, et cetera, if it's a policy battle over, say, trade policy, or something like this. So, in order to get things done in Washington, you're really expected to have, if you're a successful bureaucratic operator, a totally different set of skills.

--Samuel Hart (ambassador, Ecuador, 1982-1985)

The Foreign Service and Social Change

As the collection grew, more time was spent in interviews on the background of American diplomats, career and non-career. Political appointees are now questioned about their work outside diplomacy, in politics, business, the media or academia. Foreign Service officers describe what they did before entering the service. After the 1950s relatively few came from what might be called the social elite, although they did well in school. Their schools were not confined to the Ivy League or the top schools on the West Coast. During the Cold War few of the men and women who reached senior rank in the Foreign Service had parents who graduated from college. This has changed, as a new generation has come to the fore and college degrees have become commonplace.

For those interested in gender studies or in minority representation, the collection has numerous accounts of the prob-

lems the Foreign Service had in coming to terms with changes in American society.

Frances [Wilson, Executive Director of the Economic Bureau] had invited me to her office. We were all terrified of Frances, but she congratulated me on my engagement [to Peter Constable, another young FSO, later Ambassador to Zaire], and I was touched. My goodness, how nice. And then she said, "When do you plan to resign Miss Greer?" And I said, "I don't plan to resign." Now, I have to tell you, I was quaking inside. But I had heard about this "requirement", that female Foreign Service officers had to resign when they got married, no matter who they married, foreigner, American, Foreign Service officer, it didn't matter. You had to resign. She looked at me quite severely, I mean you did not say no to Frances Wilson. And no women had ever done this, in the history of the Foreign Service. I said, "You can't force me to resign. If you want me out of the Foreign Service, you have to fire me." Wow! She said, "Miss Greer, you are required to resign." And I said, "Show me the regulation. Show me the law. Where is it?" Well, there wasn't one. This came as a shock. I was quite prepared for her to pull out a book, and show me some regulation, and at that point I would fight it as far as I could. There was none. There was no regulation. It was custom, plain old custom, buttressed by two practical limitations. One, you did not have to grant maternity leave to women in those days. So you had in effect to choose between family and work. And second, there was a restriction on the books about family members working together at the same post. So, again, you would have to choose, and if your spouse was sent to Mexico City, you couldn't go there, and the department would not lift a finger to help you out. They would probably just send you off to Burma. And in those days transportation was difficult. So this was

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not something you would do lightly. But we were in Washington, and I said, this makes no sense. I am not going to be a different person after I am married. Nothing is going to change. And I am going to continue to do this job. Well, she had a fit. "I'll have to go check on this." "Fine, you go check on this." I was very calm externally, but thinking, "Elinor, what have you done." I think even Peter was a little nervous about this. But we wanted the second income, and I liked what I was doing. And it just didn't make sense.

Maybe other oral histories will illuminate this. Allegedly the issue was taken to the secretary, then John Foster Dulles. Personally, I don't believe this, but it obviously went up fairly high. And the answer came back. "Well, okay, you don't have to resign. But you have to submit a letter of resignation without a date." So I did that. I suppose I could have refused to submit the letter. But one of the things about negotiating is you've got to

recognize the deal. When you've got it, take it. We got married. We took a short honeymoon and I went back to work. And then, of course, we started our family right away, and there was no such thing as maternity leave, so at that point I did resign.

Now, just an interesting footnote. The following year, or later that year, another young woman joined the Foreign Service, Melissa Foelsch [Wells, ambassador to Mozambique]. She married but was not asked to resign. Years later, when I got to know her better, we were trading stories and she said, "You know, they never asked me to resign and that was amazing." She chose a different path, which was to have a child and do it on a combination of annual leave and a little bit of sick leave, and come right back to work. I wouldn't have had the physical stamina to do that. And then she and her husband, then a Foreign Service officer, took separate assignments. They eventually got divorced but they got back together

again. But she never left the service, ever. It was interesting.

[When the Foreign Service changed its attitude towards married women, Elinor Constable returned to her career.]

--Elinor Constable (ambassador, Kenya, 1986)

The Historical Record

For the diplomatic historian, the paper record is going to be sparser and sparser as e-mail and the telephone have become the major means of communication between the State Department and its posts abroad and as travel between Washington and various hot spots becomes faster and easier. While oral history will not give the full or even the most accurate story, it does enable the historian to get inside the diplomatic process and to understand what these public servants do and have done.

[During the October War of 1973] you worked continuously.

You had people calling you from everywhere. In a fast moving situation, the telegrams only tell part of the story. And you can't record telephones. That's why if people say, "Well, what are you hiding?" Well, you're not hiding anything, it's just that you frankly are more concerned about doing your job and doing it right than the historical record.

--Nicholas Veliotes (Deputy Chief of Mission, Tel Aviv, 1973-1975)

Volunteers Needed to Interview Foreign Affairs Specialists

The oral history program is constrained by a lack of travel funds and can use help in interviewing retired diplomats and others concerned with American foreign affairs who live beyond the Washington, DC area. Members of SHAFR would make ideal oral history interviewers. We can send interviewing guidelines and are available on the internet for consultation in preparing for an interview. This is an excellent opportunity for those who write about the diplomatic process to

interact with those who have experienced it. Please contact stukennedy@erols.com.


Book Program

In 1996, the ADST and DACOR (Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retired) created the *Diplomats and Diplomacy* Book Series to increase public knowledge and appreciation of the involvement of American diplomats in the events of world history. By 2004 the series included twenty-two volumes published by a variety of university and other scholarly presses. Currently, six manuscripts are under review by publishers, and eight others are under consideration for the series. Margery Boichel Thompson, the ADST's publishing director, coordinates the book series, acquires manuscripts, has them reviewed, advises authors, and negotiates with publishers. The association's online book and CD-ROM store is at www.adst.org. All books published through 2002 are described and reviewed there. Most series books are by

or about American diplomats. Many seek to demystify diplomacy by telling the story of those who have conducted our foreign relations. Two series books -- Herman J. Cohen's *Intervening in Africa* (Macmillan/St. Martin's 2000) and John Boykin's biography of Philip Habib, *Cursed is the Peacemaker* (Applegate Press, 2002) -- won the American Academy of Diplomacy's Douglas Dillon Award for Distinguished Writing on American Diplomacy. Books by Dennis Kux on U.S.-Pakistan relations and Robert Hopkins Miller on diplomacy in the Vietnam War received special citations from the academy. Among series bestsellers are Jane Loeffler's *Architecture of Diplomacy* (Princeton Architectural Press, 1998) and Ulrich Straus's *The Anguish of Surrender: Japanese P.O.W.s in World War II* (University of Washington Press, 2004).

Stu Kennedy is Director of the Foreign Affairs Oral History Program at the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training.

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New Evidence from Vietnam

Pierre Asselin

On February 3, 1997, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) issued Resolution 25-QD/TW sanctioning the publication of a series containing documents relating to party policymaking. Entitled *Van kien Dang - Toan tap* (Party Documents - Complete Works) and published by the Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia (National Political Publishing House), the series has been released gradually since 1998, with new volumes made available every few months. It is organized (and was released) chronologically beginning with the period leading to 1930, the year of the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party, which was the forerunner to the wartime Vietnamese Workers' Party (1951–1976) and the VCP (1976–present). Each volume is in Vietnamese (abridged English and French editions may be published in the future), typically encompasses one year, and includes dozens of documents on domestic and foreign affairs from the first/general secretary (the party head), prominent revolutionary leaders affiliated with the party, the Politburo, and the Central Committee.¹ Most valuable for researchers are the abundant instructions and resolutions issued by the Politburo and the Central Committee relating party concerns, detailing policies, and establishing guidelines for the implementation of those policies.

As of the end of 2003, the series extended to the year 1968. With new volumes being released every few months, it is only a matter of time before the

series covers the entire period of the American military intervention in Indochina. While the record that is presented for the period 1954 to 1968 was subjected to a thorough review and editing process and is therefore partial, the documents contained therein offer fascinating insights into the party's policymaking process and, more significant, its position on a wide range of important yet heretofore vaguely understood issues.

Recently, I scrutinized the volume for the year 1954 in hopes of acquiring a better understanding of the party's position regarding implementation of the Geneva provisions and the prospects for achieving reunification through the nation-wide elections to be held in 1956. Directives and resolutions issued by the party in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the accords leave no doubt that Hanoi entered the post-Geneva era intent on avoiding further bloodshed and confident that implementation of the accords would bring about national reunification. Indeed, the leadership went to great lengths to make sure that the membership and other supporters did nothing to sabotage the accords, undermine their "spirit," or otherwise provoke or justify non-compliance on the part of the Saigon regime and its French and American backers.

Among the more interesting pieces of evidence are: 1. A July 27 directive from First Secretary Truong Chinh instructing cadres to respect the letter and the spirit of the Geneva Accords and make no allowances for the resumption of hostilities. "Our

nationalist struggle has entered a new era," the secretary wrote, and has "become a political struggle to consolidate peace." For the sake of prompt reunification, the Revolution must continue "according to a peaceful approach" (*phuong phap hoa binh*). For the time being, the most pressing task was "explaining the present situation" to the rest of the membership and the masses and impressing upon them the importance of avoiding violent action and resisting provocations by the enemy.

"Our people must continue their protracted and arduous struggle by peaceful methods in order to consolidate peace and achieve reunification, total independence, and democracy throughout the nation."¹ Shortly thereafter, the first secretary elaborated on his previous instructions, stating that it was crucial for revolutionary forces to do nothing that could adversely influence the political situation in the South and thereby legitimate the desire of the Americans and their allies to sabotage the accords. He also urged all supporters of the Revolution to court elements within the Vietnamese communities that had traditionally supported Western interests—such as Catholics and those who had served in the colonial administration—and make them understand the policies of the party and the DRVN government.²

2. An August 31 missive in which Truong Chinh instructed cadres to supervise closely the movement of southerners who chose to relocate to the North and of northerners who opted to return home after time spent fighting in the South. Under the

terms of the Geneva Accords, all Vietnamese could move freely between the two zones and settle wherever they wished before May 19, 1955. Convinced that the movement of people would impact the general elections planned for 1956, the first secretary asked that those who chose to come to the North from the South be treated with utmost kindness. Positive experiences would most likely have a "very big influence" (*anh huong rat lon*) on the spirit of "southern compatriots" and increase the prospects for peaceful reunification under the party leadership in 1956.³

3. A September 5 document expressing concern over the departure of northerners for the South. The party apparently believed the French and the Ngo Dinh Diem regime were enticing (*du do*) and pressuring (*bat ep*) northerners to move south as part of a strategy to influence the political situation there and "gather a few more votes for the upcoming elections." Undermining those efforts by the enemy and limiting the number of people who chose to relocate to the South from the North was a "pressing struggle." In order for it to succeed, cadres at all levels had to work closely with religious organizations, and particularly Catholic communities, as they were the most susceptible to enemy propaganda. Cadres had to publicize the policy of the party regarding the protection of religion and freedom of belief. Winning the "hearts and minds" of the sizeable Catholic communities at Bui Chu and Phat Diem was especially important. To that effect, Truong Chinh instructed local cadres to coopt patriotic Catholics and use them to propagate favorable information about the party and the North Vietnamese government. Such individuals could also be used to publicize and assist in the implementation of specific policies for

those areas. Starting in September 1954, the party temporarily suspended the rent reduction and land redistribution (agrarian reform) campaigns; allowed the circulation of foreign currencies, including the southern currency, prohibited in the rest of North Vietnam; and ordered the return of property seized from Catholic authorities as well as the release of clergy members who had been placed under house arrest.⁴

4. Correspondence from September 26 urging the membership to cultivate a healthy relationship with the members of the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC), an organization created under the terms of the Geneva Accords to supervise their implementation and deter as well as document cease-fire violations. The document explained the nature and political dispositions of the member states (Poland, India, and Canada) and emphasized the importance of developing a cordial relationship with the commission membership. Should the Americans and their allies accuse Hanoi of violating the agreement or infringe upon its terms themselves, a good relationship with commission members could be helpful. Truong Chinh described the Poles as "our friends" and the Indians as "agreeable to peace in Indochina" but was less sanguine about the Canadians. "Canada is [ideologically] close to the United States," he warned, and as a longtime friend and ally of the Americans, it was the ICSC member most likely to prove problematic for Hanoi. Accordingly, the party had to exercise caution in its dealings with the Canadians while striving to "develop good diplomatic relations" with them. The first secretary instructed cadres to make every effort to accommodate the Canadians and pay particular attention to their basic needs, including food preparation, accommoda-

tion, and access to information. Maintaining good relations with the commission members would "create favorable conditions for the struggle to consolidate peace and achieve our reunification."⁵

5. A Politburo resolution issued in September offering the strongest and clearest articulation yet of the party's position on the Geneva Accords. Entitled "New Situation, New Responsibilities, and New Policy," this lengthy document sanctioned and reiterated directives issued by First Secretary Truong Chinh and the Central Committee between late July and early September 1954. Moreover, it listed pressing tasks to be accomplished and fundamental responsibilities to be fulfilled in order for peace to be sustained and reunification to be achieved promptly. This document governed the actions of the party until late 1956, at which point Hanoi abandoned hopes for a peaceful reunification of the nation and began effecting a major policy shift.⁶

The newly available documentary record reveals that despite some skepticism, Hanoi officials genuinely believed the accords were workable and that they clearly intended to implement them. However, they were concerned that their own supporters might endanger the accords by failing to abide by their terms, and they were aware of the threat represented by the machinations of France, the United States, and Saigon. While there was little Hanoi could do to change the mindset and disposition of its opponents, it could see to it that its own followers in the North and in the South did not become responsible for the collapse of the peace and the resumption of hostilities. With the eyes of the world on Indochina, the more that was done to respect the agreement, the greater the pressure on the other side to do the same.

In retrospect, it appears that the period immediately following the signing of the Geneva Accords may have been the most crucial in the broader context of the Vietnamese Revolution. After July 1954, Hanoi seemed seriously and genuinely to have believed that a resumption of hostilities was not a foregone conclusion and that the terms of the accords and their implementation would advance the interests of the Revolution and lead to its eventual triumph. By all indications the party leadership, fatigued by years of continuous warfare, opposed a prolongation of hostilities and endeavored to make the peace promised by the Geneva Accords work.

The volumes of this series will have a significant impact on our understanding of the period of the American intervention in Indochina. With their release,

Western scholars no longer have an excuse to ignore the policy-making process in Hanoi and the role that North Vietnam played in the conflict.

Pierre Asselin is an Associate Professor in the Department of Historical and Political Studies at Chaminade University of Honolulu.

Notes:

1. Certain volumes for the period before 1948 cover multiple years, including Vol. 1 (1924-1930), Vol. 6 (1936-1939), and Vol. 7 (1940-1945).
2. "Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 27 thang 7 nam 1954: Tuyen truyen ve nhung Hiep dinh cua Hoi nghi Gio-nevo - Tinh hình va nhiem vu moi" in Van kien Dang - Toan ta, Tap 15: 1954 (Ha Noi: Nha xuất bản Chính trị quốc gia, 2001) [hereafter referred to as VKD: 1954], 238-41.
3. "Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 30 thang 7 nam 1954: Ve viec chap

hanh lenh dinh chien" in VKD: 1954, 248-9.

4. "Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 31 thang 8 nam 1954: Ve viec don tiep bo doi, thuong binh, mot so can bo va dong bao mien Nam ra Bac" in VKD: 1954, 259.

5. "Chi thi cua cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 5 thang 9 nam 1954: Ve viec dau tranh chong Phap va bon Ngo Dinh Diem du do va bat ep mot so dong bao ta vao mien Nam" in VKD: 1954, 263-70.

6. "Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, ngay 26 thang 9 nam 1954: Ve nhiem vu cua cac cap uy Dang o cac dia phuong thuoc bac vi tuyen 17 doi voi Uy ban quoc te" in VKD: 1954, 320-3.

7. The Politburo issued the resolution at the conclusion of a meeting/conference held September 5-7, 1954. It is reproduced in "Nghị Quyết của Bộ chính trị: Về tình hình mới, nhiệm vụ mới và chính sách mới của Đảng" in VKD: 1954, 283-315.

SHA FR at the 2005 OAH

SHA FR will sponsor two events at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians in San Francisco, March 31-April 3, 2005

Reception (cash bar)

Friday, April 1

5:00-7:00 pm

Room to be announced

Luncheon

Saturday, April 2

11:15 am -12:45 pm

Room to be announced

Kurk Dorsey of the University of New Hampshire will deliver his Bernath Lecture, "Dealing with the Dinosaur: The Environment in Diplomatic History."

SHA FR will also announce the winners of the 2005 Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize, Robert Ferrell Book Prize, Myrna Bernath Fellowship, Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize, and Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize.

Tickets to the luncheon must be purchased in advance through the OAH. Details will appear on the OAH registration form.

Phone Rage: LBJ, Averell Harriman, and G. Mennen Williams

Thomas J. Noer

Lyndon B. Johnson was not the first president to express his frustration with the in-fighting and bureaucratic politics of the State Department or to get upset about comments made by a foreign policy advisor or the press, nor would he be the last. But in two phone conversations on April 4, 1964, Johnson took on one of his own appointees, the press, and the entire State Department all at once and vented his rage against them in his typical bombastic, earthy style.

What provoked Johnson's tirade were comments made by veteran diplomat Averell Harriman, whom he had just appointed ambassador at large with major responsibility for overseeing the United States' African policy. Many in Washington saw the appointment of the cagey Harriman as a public demotion of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs G. Mennen "Soapy" Williams. That was the interpretation that appeared in the newspapers immediately after Harriman's comments, and it infuriated the president.

During his six terms as governor of Michigan (1948-1960), the flamboyant Williams had been the most outspoken advocate of racial equality in the Democratic party and had been a frequent critic of Johnson's civil rights record. At the 1960 Democratic Convention he announced he would support any vice-presidential nominee "with the exception of Lyndon B. Johnson." When Kennedy selected the majority leader as his running mate, Williams was

outraged and tried to organize liberals for a floor fight. Unable to persuade any other delegate to join him, he vowed to vote against Johnson even if his was the only voice of dissent. Convention Chairman Sam Rayburn knew of Williams's plans to speak publicly against the nomination and moved to have Johnson selected by acclamation, avoiding a roll call vote. When Rayburn called for a voice vote, Williams seized the microphone in the Michigan delegation and shouted "NO!" Rayburn ignored him and proclaimed the nomination unanimous. Williams was the only delegate to vote against Johnson.¹

Based on his actions in Los Angeles in 1960, many in Washington assumed Williams would be one of the first of the New Frontiersmen to be pushed out of office, but to the surprise of many in the government and the press, Johnson retained the Michigan liberal. Ten days after he took office, the president phoned Williams and assured him that he would be "as welcome and as effective in the White House as you had been with Kennedy." He dismissed Williams's hostility to his nomination in 1960, claiming it would not jeopardize their relationship: "We've pulled down the curtain on Los Angeles that night. We're a team." He also encouraged Williams to suggest new civil rights initiatives, noting that he had "operated in Michigan so long," he was "bound to know some things . . . that will be good in Mississippi," and urged him to "get ideas on our Negro

community," since he "had more experience than any of us" on racial issues.²

Despite his reassurances, within five months of taking office Johnson had become disenchanted with the direction of American policy toward Africa and appointed Harriman to oversee Williams and the African Bureau. At the press conference announcing his appointment, Harriman made it clear that he was in charge of Africa and Williams would report directly to him rather than to Secretary of State Dean Rusk. He told reporters that Johnson wanted "a seventh-floor man" in control, not "a sixth-floor person" (the African Bureau was on the sixth floor of the State Department). The press immediately concluded that Williams had been demoted and attributed his reduced role to lingering friction over his public opposition to Johnson's selection as vice-president.³

Johnson was outraged by both Harriman's comments and the press reaction and took the opportunity to express his scorn for his new appointee, the press, and the entire State Department. He immediately phoned Press Secretary George Reedy and read him newspaper accounts of Harriman's comments. He argued that Harriman had been "totally irresponsible" by trying to humiliate Williams and told Reedy that Williams "works hard and has my complete confidence. He and his wife have been as diligent and responsive as any two people in the government. I'm very fond of both of

them." Johnson then ordered Reedy to tell the press that Harriman's appointment was not a reflection on Williams and had nothing to do with the 1960 convention. Reedy promised to "blow hell out of the story."⁴

After finishing with Reedy, Johnson was still seething and immediately phoned Rusk. "Dean have you seen all this stuff Averell's been spewing out about Mennen Williams?" Rusk responded that Harriman had "just got tangled up" and public relations officials in the department were working to counter the press coverage, but Johnson was not appeased and launched a tirade against Harriman and the State Department. He ordered Rusk to tell Harriman to call reporters and explain that there had been no demotion of Williams and to apologize personally to the head of the African Bureau. "Be God damn sure to make him walk the carpet or apologize or resign. I just think this is awful!" He told Rusk "if Harriman can't get it straightened out, I can because I'll have [a press conference] and I'll damn sure make it clear. Tell him those fellows that sit around in their armchairs and mouth over in the State Department on background how Goddamned important they are ought to get out. I'm not pleased with Harriman's griping around here all through this thing. Ever since I took over he's been mouthing about something and now he's promoting himself."⁵ He added that he was "no intimate of Williams as you know, but I think it's cruel and unfair and I don't play that way. And I think you ought to tell Harriman that. If you don't want to tell him, I will." He then read Rusk a United Press story on Harriman's comments that suggested some people in the State Department were happy to see Williams's authority diminished. "All these damned officials over there talk-

ing instead of doing something," he fumed. He then hung up on his secretary of state.⁶

The White House immediately tried to reassure the press that the Harriman appointment was not a demotion of Williams and had no relation to his actions in Los Angeles in 1960. Williams called Reedy to ask for a meeting with Johnson to talk about "the Harriman thing." National Security Council staffers suggested the president personally announce Williams's forthcoming trip to Africa to "please Soapy" and end "the gossip" about his reduced role. The White House quickly issued a press release praising Williams, confirming Johnson's confidence in his ability, and hailing his upcoming trip to Africa.

Despite Johnson's public relations efforts, the damage had been done. The Harriman appointment began a gradual erosion of Williams's direct influence on diplomacy and foiled his attempts to make Africa a major priority in U.S. foreign policy. Although Williams would remain in office for two more years before resigning to run for the Senate from Michigan, he never regained the access to the president or the power to shape policy that he had enjoyed under Kennedy.

Thomas Noer is Valor Distinguished Professor in Humanities, and Professor and Chair of History at Carthage College.

Notes:

1. *New York Times*, April 28, 1960. For details of Williams's anger and solitary dissent see G. Mennen Williams oral history, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts, and G. Mennen Williams oral history, Lyndon B. Johnson Library, Austin, Texas [hereafter LBJL]. When Robert Kennedy told him "the liberals will raise hell. Mennen Williams will raise hell," Johnson reportedly responded: "Well piss on Mennen Wil-

liams!" See Michael Beschloss, ed., *Reaching for Glory: Lyndon Johnson's Secret White House Tapes, 1964-1965* (New York, 2001), 259.

2. White House Telephone Conversation, Lyndon Johnson and G. Mennen Williams, December 2, 1964, K6312.01, LBJL.

3. Telephone conversation, Lyndon Johnson and George Reedy, April 4, 1964, WH6404.05, LBJL.


4. *Ibid.* Williams's wife, Nancy, had a close rapport with Lady Bird Johnson, as they both had daughters and met often to discuss wedding plans. Nancy Williams would later invite Mrs. Johnson to visit her summer home on Mackinac Island, and the Williams were frequent guests at dinners and receptions at the Johnson White House. See W. S. Woodfill to Nancy Williams, June 18, 1964, box 104, G. Mennen Williams papers, Bentley Historical Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan; Lady Bird Johnson to Nancy Williams, March 3, 1966, Social Files, box 2115 and Social Event Cards, LBJL.

5. Telephone conversation, Lyndon Johnson and Dean Rusk, April 4, 1964, WH6404.05, LBJL.

6. *Ibid.*

7. William Brubeck to McGeorge Bundy, May 1, 1964, National Security Files: Africa, box 76, LBJL; Telephone conversation, Lyndon Johnson and George Reedy, May 2, 1964 WH 6405.01, LBJL; White House press release, "Governor Williams' Trip to Africa," May 4, 1964, National Security Files: Africa, box 76, LBJL.

The Diplomatic Pouch



1. Personal and Professional Notes

Guenter Bischof was the 2003-4 Marshall Plan Professor at the University of New Orleans.

Alex Danchev has accepted a chair in International Relations in the School of Politics at the University of Nottingham.

Joseph Harrington (Framingham State College) completed his 10th year as editor of *The New England Journal of History* and was appointed Professor Emeritus.

Geoffrey Jensen (University of Southern Mississippi) has joined the faculty of the Virginia Military Institute to take the John Biggs '30 Cincinnati Chair in Military History.

Melvyn Leffler (University of Virginia) has been named the 2005 Henry Alfred Kissinger Scholar in Foreign Policy and International Relations at the Library of Congress.

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes (Texas A&M University--Commerce) has accepted a position as a visiting associate professor at the Air War College at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama during the 2004-2005 school year.

Hugh Wilford (University of Sheffield) will be a visiting scholar at the UCSB Center for Cold War Studies for the academic year 2004-05.

2. Research Notes

United States Department of State: Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI

The Department of State has released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXI, South and Central America; Mexico*. On November 26, 1963—4 days after the assassination of John F. Kennedy—President Lyndon B. Johnson promised that relations within the Western Hemisphere would be “among the highest concerns of my Government.” Although the war in Vietnam would soon intervene, Johnson essentially kept his promise, devoting considerable attention over the next five years to political and economic affairs “south of the border.”

This volume features eleven bilateral and two regional compilations, demonstrating the breadth of the U.S. government’s relations with the countries of South and Central America. Many of the bilateral compilations document the Johnson administration’s responses to a series of crises: the 1964 Panama Canal flag incident; the 1964 coup d’etat in Brazil; the 1964 presidential election in Chile; the 1966 coup in Argentina; the 1967 hunt for Ernesto “Che” Guevara in Bolivia; the 1968 coups in Peru and Panama. The bilateral compilations also show how the administration tried to address more fundamental problems: the Panama Canal treaty negotiations; the insurgencies in Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela; the authoritarian regimes in Brazil and Argentina; the continuation of covert political support in Bolivia and Chile; economic assistance in Brazil, Colombia, and Chile; and the protection of American business interests in Venezuela, Argentina, Peru, and Chile.

The Latin American regional compilation emphasizes the broader themes of the administration’s policy in the hemisphere: the Alliance for Progress; the threat of Cuban subversion; the Punta del Este conference. This regional compilation also highlights how personalities affected policymaking, especially the working relationship between Johnson and advisor Thomas Mann. The Central American regional compilation examines how the United States exercised its influence in the region, from elections in Costa Rica and Guatemala to authoritarian regimes in Honduras and Nicaragua. Given subsequent events—including the assassination of Ambassador Gordon Mein in August 1968—the compilation also emphasizes the U.S. response to the escalation of violence between the insurgents and the government in Guatemala.

The text of the volume, the summary, and this press release are available on the Office of the Historian website (<<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxi>>). Copies can be purchased from the U.S. Government Printing Office online at: <http://bookstore.gpo.gov/index.html>.

For further information contact Edward Keefer, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series at (202) 663-1131; fax (202) 663-1289; e-mail: history@state.gov.



*The Gulf of Tonkin Incident, 40 Years Later
Flawed Intelligence and the Decision for War in Vietnam*

Forty years ago, President Johnson and top U.S. officials chose to believe that North Vietnam had just attacked U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin, even though the highly classified signals intercepts they cited to each other actually described a naval clash two days earlier (a battle prompted by covert U.S. attacks on North Vietnam), according to the declassified intercepts, Johnson White House tapes, and related documents posted by the National Security Archive at George Washington University.

Compiled by Archive senior fellow and Vietnam expert John Prados, this 40th anniversary electronic briefing book includes Dr. Prados's detailed analysis of the intercepts -- only declassified in 2003 -- together with audio files and transcripts of the key Tonkin Gulf conversations between President Johnson and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. The latter are excerpted from Dr. Prados's book, *The White House Tapes* (New York: The New Press, 2003). The posting also contains photographs and charts from the Tonkin Gulf incident courtesy of the U.S. Naval Historical Center, a detailed documentary chronology compiled by the State Department's Office of the Historian for the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, a CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate on possible North Vietnamese responses to U.S. actions from May 1964 (just declassified in June 2004), and links to previous and upcoming Archive publications on Vietnam.

For more information contact: John Prados or Thomas Blanton, (202) 994-7000.
<http://www.nsarchive.org>



*The Kissinger State Department Telcons
National Security Archive obtains release of 3,000 transcripts, including calls on Vietnam, China, Pinochet, and Sinatra*

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger berated top aides for State Department efforts in 1976 to restrain human rights abuses by military dictators in Chile and Argentina, according to newly declassified transcripts of Mr. Kissinger's telephone calls ("telcons") posted on the Web by the National Security Archive at George Washington University.

The Archive obtained 3200 Kissinger telcons through a Freedom of Information Act request to the State Department. Some 1900 additional telcons are still under review by agencies other than State. During Mr. Kissinger's tenure first as National Security Adviser to Presidents Nixon and Ford starting in 1969 and then as Secretary of State from 1973 through 1976, his secretaries listened in on his phone calls—unknown to most of the other callers—and typed these almost verbatim transcripts. Mr. Kissinger took the telcons with him when he left office in January 1977, and the State Department only recovered copies in August 2001 after the National Security Archive initiated legal action. Earlier this year, the National Archives and Records Administration released the telcons from Kissinger's White House years, a set that NARA acquired in February 2002 also as a result of the National Security Archive's initiative.

In addition to the Latin America human rights telcons, the posting includes historic conversations such as the phone call informing Mr. Kissinger that Saigon had just surrendered in April 1975, the Soviet ambassador's commiseration on President Ford losing the 1976 election, Mr. Kissinger's call to the senior Chinese diplomat in Washington expressing condolences on the death of Chairman Mao, and Kissinger phone calls with journalists such as *Time's* Hugh Sidey and ABC's Ted Koppel.

For more information contact: Peter Kornbluh, William Burr, or Thomas Blanton: (202) 994-7000, <http://www.nsarchive.org>



Cold War International History Project Bulletin No. 14/15 Available in Hardcopy

The Cold War International History Project is pleased to announce the publication of *CWIHP Bulletin, issue No. 14/15*. This issue, with 450 pages of translated documents, is the largest ever published by the Project, and features new evidence about:

- North Korea and the Cold War;
- The War in Afghanistan;
- Cold War Crises (Korea, Cuba);
- Ukraine and the Soviet-Czechoslovak Crisis of 1968;
- Zhivkov and the Cold War;

as well as a host of other subjects from the Southern Caucasus to the Kennedy assassination.

Bulletin issue No. 14/15 is now available for downloading at no charge from the project website listed below. You can also request a free hardcopy by emailing your full mailing address to coldwar1@wwic.si.edu.

Woodrow Wilson Center
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
1300 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
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<http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm>



Cold War International History Project Publishes New Working Paper: "North Korean 'Adventurism' and China's Long Shadow, 1966-1972."

In this new working paper, Bernd Schaefer draws on extensive research in East German archival records on Korea to present an original and important interpretation of the effect of the Chinese Cultural Revolution on the development of North Korean foreign relations. He demonstrates that China's Cultural Revolution was a greater threat to Kim Il Sung's rule and to DPRK security than scholars have previously understood. At the same time, Kim viewed China's chaos and preoccupation as an opportunity to enhance his stature as a leader of Asian Communism. Inspired by the Vietnamese Communists' struggle to reunify their country, Kim Il Sung prepared his people for forthcoming reunification with the South and developed audacious schemes to achieve it. The seizure of the *USS Pueblo* in January 1968 served as a distraction from one of his failed unification plans, the attempted assassination of the South Korean president through a commando raid on the Blue House in Seoul. Schaefer argues that it remains doubtful, however, whether the April 1969 shutdown of a US spy plane with thirty-one men on board was part of this effort.

You can download the paper from the CWIHP web site at: <http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm>



3. Announcements:

Call for Papers: The Cold War and its Contexts
Deadline: 15 December 2004

The UCSB Center for Cold War Studies (CCWS), the George Washington Cold War Group (GWCW), and the LSE Cold War Studies Centre (CWSC) are pleased to announce their 2005 International Graduate Student Conference on the Cold War, which will be held at UCSB from 29-30 April 2005. The conference is an excellent opportunity for graduate students to present papers and receive critical feedback from peers and experts in the field. Each paper will have a faculty discussant, and there will be a keynote address by a distinguished scholar in the field.

We encourage submissions by graduate students working on any aspect of the Cold War, broadly defined. Proposals, including a brief CV and one-page abstract, should be submitted to the conference website, <http://www.history.ucsb.edu/projects/ccws/conference/>, or directly to gfuji@umail.ucsb.edu by 15 December 2004. This web site describes the conference in greater detail and further questions may be directed to the conference coordinator, George Fujii, at gfuji@umail.ucsb.edu. The conference chair is Professor Tsuyoshi Hasegawa of UCSB. We also seek faculty members to serve as chairs and discussants. Those interested in serving in this capacity should contact George Fujii directly at gfuji@umail.ucsb.edu.



Call for Papers: Globalization, Empire, and Imperialism in Historical Perspective

Deadline: January 31, 2005

The Historical Society is pleased to announce that the organizing theme for its 5th conference, scheduled for early June 2006, will be "Globalization, Empire, and Imperialism in Historical Perspective." The conference will be held in Chapel Hill, North Carolina and will be hosted by the University of North Carolina. We envision a meeting in which historians across fields come together to deepen and enrich the state of knowledge about these vital concerns. Although we suffer no delusions about the degree of influence scholars typically have on contemporary policy debates, we are hopeful that the addition of historical context may lessen to some small extent the level of ignorance, if not partisanship, characteristic of the same.

Please send 6 copies of your proposal (no more than 2 pages) accompanied by 6 copies of a brief curriculum vitae to: 2006 Conference, The Historical Society, 656 Beacon Street, Mezzanine, Boston, MA 02215-2010. The deadline for proposals is January 31, 2005. Questions? E-mail us at historic@bu.edu or call (617)-358-0260.



Call for Papers: International Symposium on "Reflections on War and Peace: 30 Years After the End of the Vietnamese-American War," April 2005, Hanoi, Vietnam

In commemoration of the end of the war thirty years ago, Vietnam National University (Hanoi) is organizing an international symposium to bring together respected scholars from various disciplines and areas of specialization. This two-day symposium (specific dates have not yet been finalized) will explore the diplomatic, political, economic, social, and environmental dimensions of the conflict, as well as its legacy on the domestic and international fronts for Vietnam. It will consider the war as a seminal event that has shaped Vietnam's international relations and the development and modernization of its economy and society.

"Reflections on War and Peace" seeks to highlight a new generation of scholarship from Vietnam and overseas that has gained from exchanges made possible by and research materials available with the end of the Cold War. Accordingly, the organizers invite proposals for papers that consider the war through a lens not colored by the anxieties of the Cold War and offer new insights into the perspectives of the parties directly and indirectly involved in the conflict (e.g., Hanoi, Saigon, the NLF, Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Australia, Cuba). The organizers also invite proposals for papers focusing on original topics (e.g., mass mobilization campaigns, socialist industrial production) or discussing the impact of the war on Vietnam's postwar reconstruction, development, and reintegration into the international community.

Please send an abstract (maximum 400 words) by 1 January 2005 to Grace Cheng at gcheng@hpu.edu or Pierre Asselin at passelin@chaminade.edu. Hard copies may also be submitted to:

Professor Pierre Asselin
Department of Historical and Political Studies
Chaminade University of Honolulu
3140 Waiialae Avenue
Honolulu, HI 96816
fax: (808) 739-8530



Call for Papers: Remembering World War II

Deadline: March 1, 2005

Drew University's Caspersen School of Graduate Studies announces the 2005 Modern History & Literature (MHL) Graduate Student Conference, to be held on October 7-8, 2005 at the Drew University campus in Madison, New Jersey.

Drew's MHL Program invites graduate students and junior scholars in history, literature, film and media, religion, cultural studies, and allied disciplines to participate in an interdisciplinary conference exploring the ways in which World War II has been remembered and the political, social, and cultural uses these memories have served.

The conference program committee will consider individual presentations and full panel proposals. Please forward a 300-500 word proposal and brief vita for each paper (panel proposals should also include a brief panel description including the name and vita of the proposed moderator) to mhlgrcon@drew.edu. Please note: no attachments will be opened. Send all info in the body of the e-mail text.

Panels should include no more than three speakers, with a total time for speakers, commentary, and discussion not to exceed 85 minutes. Individual presentations should not exceed 20 minutes.

Further information on the conference will be posted on the MHL website in the months to come at the web address shown below. Questions should be sent to:

Nichole Bennett
mhlgrcon@drew.edu



Call for Submissions: Teaching About Women and Gender in Times of War

The Journal of Women's History is inaugurating a new special section of the journal that will be devoted to the practice of women's history. We are interested in short individual pieces (1,000-2000 words), as well as full roundtable forums of four to five contributors (5-10,000 words total) that explore cutting edge questions in history practice – from the archive to personal narrative work, from grant-writing and publishing to teaching, from activism and community service to campus and department politics.

We are currently soliciting short papers for our first roundtable forum: "Teaching gender and women's history in times of war."

We would like to assemble a range of perspectives from across the globe. Although we realize the importance of addressing the topic of women and war, for this forum we are interested in pieces that discuss teaching about women and gender in times of war. If you would like to contribute to this first forum or have ideas about future history practice sections (either individual or roundtable), please contact the editors at the e-mail address or contact information provided below.

Editors

Journal of Women's History
The University of Illinois
810 South Wright
Urbana, IL 61801
womenshistory@uiuc.edu



Call for Submissions: Americans at War on the Home Front: A Biographical Encyclopedia

Authors are sought to write 1, 3, and 5-page biographical entries for *Americans At War on the Home Front*. Entries will include the scientists, engineers and inventors; journalists, poets, and novelists; protesters and social activists; religious, labor and civil rights leaders; artists, musicians, and photographers; financiers, industrialists, and manufacturers; and nurses and physicians who made a difference on the home front during American war efforts from the Revolutionary War to Gulf War II. Authors contributing a total of 25 pages will receive an honorarium and a free copy of the 3-volume set upon publication by Greenwood Press.

Deadline for completed submission to the executive editor is June 30, 2005.

Benjamin F. Shearer, Ph.D.
Executive Editor
3700 Longchamp Circle
Tallahassee, FL 32309
Phone: (850)-877-3409
shearerben@hotmail.com



Call for Submissions: Encyclopedia on the History of Military Communications

Authors are sought for a one-volume encyclopedia on the history of military communications. A list of available topics is on our website—most entries will be from 500 to 1000 words. Those writing many entries will receive a copy of the published book, but otherwise no payment is involved. Planned coverage is worldwide, ancient times to modern, with an emphasis on the USA. Main categories of entries include key people, modes of transmission, battles and wars, places, organizations and commands. The book will be published by ABC-CLIO in 2007 and is aimed more at a general audience rather than specialists.

For more information contact:

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202-994-0363 (voice)
202-994-5806 (fax)
chriss@gwu.edu



Call for Submissions: Working Papers Series

The Nathan Hale Foreign Policy Society seeks submissions for our working papers series. We proceed with a broad definition of foreign policy—contributions need not, but may, offer suggestions for national policy, and pieces are equally welcome that advance understanding of the institutional, political, social or ideological development in countries of current U.S. foreign policy interest. Papers need not represent finished pieces of research, but should offer new analytical or research findings.

The Nathan Hale Foreign Policy Society was formed by a handful of young academics at Oxford, Yale, and Harvard as a focal point for new research by a younger generation of foreign policy scholars, and to create spaces in the United States and abroad for nonpartisan, friendly, and serious public discussion of foreign policy issues. Our national program organizes roundtable discussions, panel events, and essay contests in eleven cities (including Montreal, Puerto Rico, and Oxford/London) and includes as members foreign policy professionals, scholars, and other interested members of the public.

For further information about our working paper series, or to discuss a possible topic for inclusion in the series, please contact our director of studies, Robert Kokta, at robert.kokta@foreignpolicysociety.org.



Call for Manuscripts: Naval War College Press

The Naval War College Press publishes the quarterly *Naval War College Review*, the Newport Paper monograph series, and a limited number of books. *The Review* (circulation 10,000) and other press publications reach a wide audience of flag and general officers, military staffs and operators, foreign officers and officials, scholars, policy practitioners, defense industry executives as well as a large number of informed citizens. The press's interests, although centered on naval and maritime affairs, cover a broad area of topics involving international, regional, and national security. Our editorial staff strives to publish material that treats complex strategic, operational, tactical, and policy issues in a style and language accessible to nonspecialists.

If you would like your research to reach a large, policy-oriented audience, the Press is interested in considering article manuscripts, book reviews, essays, and, proposals for Newport Paper monographs. Although the Press occasionally publishes commissioned articles, speeches, and editorials, our research section is fully refereed using the standard blind review process.

Please refer to our website for further information regarding submissions, subscriptions, permissions, and services. You may also contact us directly at:

Peter Dombrowski, Editor
Naval War College Press
686 Cushing Road

Newport, RI 02841-1207
(401) 841-6583 / (401) 841-1071 (F)
dombrowp@nwc.navy.mil



Call for Submissions: The International Social Science Review
Deadline: January 14, 2005

The International Social Science Review, the official refereed journal of Pi Gamma Mu International Honor Society in Social Science published biannually, invites submissions of manuscripts in history, political science, sociology, anthropology, economics, international relations, criminal justice, social work, psychology, social philosophy, history of education, and cultural geography. Articles must be based on original research, well-written and shorter than thirty pages in length (including endnotes/references, double-spaced, written in Times New Roman 12 font).

Deadline for submissions for publication in the Spring 2005 issue of the journal is January 14, 2005. All authors interested in publishing in the *ISSR* are asked to submit two hard copies and one disk copy of their manuscripts (using Microsoft Word 2000), contact information (phone number, mailing address, and e-mail address), and an abbreviated c.v. to:

Dean Fafoutis
Editor, *International Social Science Review*
Department of History
Salisbury University
1101 Camden Avenue
Salisbury, MD 21801
(410) 546-6004
dxfafoutis@salisbury.edu



Herbert Hoover Presidential Library Association Travel Grant Program
Deadline: March 1, 2005

The Herbert Hoover Presidential Library Association awards travel grants to researchers to cover the cost of trips to the Hoover Presidential Library in West Branch, Iowa. Funds must be used for research at the Hoover Library. Grants in recent years have ranged up to \$1500 per applicant. The application deadline is March 1.

Funding priority is given to well-developed proposals utilizing the resources of the Hoover Presidential Library. Finding aids for the Library's major holdings are available at www.hoover.nara.gov. Applicants should consult with an archivist prior to submitting an application. Archivists can be reached at hoover.library@nara.gov or at 319-643-5301.

For more information, contact:

Patricia Hand
Manager of Promotions & Academic Programs
Herbert Hoover Presidential Library Association
P.O. Box 696
West Branch, IA 52358
319-643-5327
Fax: 319-643-2391
pathand@hhooverassociation.org



Gerald R. Ford Library Research Travel Grant

The Gerald R. Ford Foundation awards grants of up to \$2000 each in support of research in the archival collections of the Gerald R. Ford Library, part of the system of presidential libraries administered by the National Archives and Records Administration. The collections are especially rich on U.S. government


domestic policies, diplomacy, and national political affairs in the 1970s. A grant defrays the travel, lodging, meal, and photocopy expenses of a research trip to the Library.

Application deadlines are March 15 and September 15.

Any person with a serious interest in the holdings of the Gerald R. Ford Library may apply. Selection criteria include the scope and pertinence of Library archival collections, project significance, appropriateness of project design, and applicant qualifications.

The Library strongly encourages advance inquiry by email, telephone or letter for guidance on the scope and availability of historical materials on any given topic. Detailed search reports from our internal collection description database, PRESNET, are available upon request. A *Guide to Historical Materials in the Gerald R. Ford Library* and finding aids to all "open" collections are available at the Library's website.

Helmi Raaska
Grants Coordinator Gerald R. Ford Library
1000 Beal Avenue
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
Phone: (734) 205-0559
Fax: (734) 205-0571
helmi.raaska@nara.gov



National Air and Space Museum Research Fellowships
Deadline: January 15, 2005

The Smithsonian Institution's National Air and Space Museum invites applications for fellowships for predoctoral, postdoctoral, and non-academic investigators for the 2005-2006 academic year. The following research fellowships are offered at the National Air and Space Museum:

- * Daniel and Florence Guggenheim Fellowship
- * Verville Fellowship
- * Ramsey Fellowship in Naval Aviation History
- * Charles A. Lindbergh Chair in Aerospace History
- * Postdoctoral Earth and Planetary Sciences Fellowship

The following research grant is also offered at the National Air and Space Museum:

- * National Air and Space Museum Aviation/Space Writers Award

Further information and applications are now available online at the web address shown below.

Ms. Collette Williams
Fellowship Coordinator
Rm. 3313, MRC 312
PO Box 37012
6th and Independence Ave, SW
National Air and Space Museum
Smithsonian Institution
Washington, D.C. 20013-7012
collette.williams@nasm.si.edu
<http://www.nasm.si.edu/getinvolved/fellow/index.cfm>



"Contemporary Conflicts in Light of the Cold War"

The UCSB Center for Cold War Studies (CCWS), formerly known as COWHIG, is pleased to announce the launch of "Contemporary Conflicts in light of the Cold War," an online teaching guide for high school and college teachers. This project was sponsored by the United States Institute of Peace (USIP).

Based on a week-long workshop held in August 2004 at UCSB, the Web site features lesson plans and background briefing materials organized around five themes:

- * Crisis Diplomacy
- * Israel/Palestine and the Cold War
- * International Terrorism and the Cold War
- * Nuclear Proliferation and the Cold War
- * International Peacekeeping

Lesson plans exist for both high school and college-level survey courses, suitable for disciplines including history and political science. High school teachers developed high school plans, while graduate students developed college-level materials. Five specialists on these topics prepared the background briefing materials on the site.

We hope these materials may be useful and we welcome your comments on the site and its contents at the e-mail address given below:

George Fujii
UCSB Center for Cold War Studies (CCWS)
Department of History
University of California
Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9410
comments@coldwarclassroom.org



*Call for Applications: The George Washington University Cold War (GWCW) Group
Third Annual Summer Institute on Conducting Archival Research, June 13-16, 2005*

Ph.D. students from any discipline working on dissertations involving archival research on Cold War topics are invited to apply to participate in a four-day Summer Institute on Conducting Archival Research at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C. The Summer Institute will focus on training graduate students to get the most out of their time conducting research in archives and offer the following sessions: how to prepare to go to an archive, how to structure your time in the archives, understanding how archival documents come to be written and deposited in archives, understanding the challenges of interpreting archival documents, issues of culture and language in working in non-American archives, how to search for information not in the archives, such as consulting private papers, making Freedom of Information Act requests for still-classified documents, and conducting oral history interviews.

Summer Institute participants will be actively involved in reading archival documents (in English translation) provided to them during the sessions and discussing their interpretations. There will be an optional session on Friday, June 17 for those students wishing to visit the staff at the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD.

The Summer Institute is directed by the faculty of the GW Cold War Group (including Hope M. Harrison, James G. Hershberg, James M. Goldgeier, and Gregg Brazinsky). Speakers include researchers from the National Security Archive and the Cold War International History Project as well as staff from the National Archives and State Department Historian's Office.

The Summer Institute will be limited to 25 participants. Applicants must submit the application form (to be downloaded from <http://ieres.org>), a two-page proposal indicating how they would benefit from participation in the Summer Institute on Conducting Archival Research, a curriculum vitae, and one letter of recommendation from a faculty member in their department. The deadline for applications is February 1, 2005 and decisions will be announced by March 1, 2005.

APPLICANTS: Please send applications via e-mail to jeresvh@gwu.edu (letters of recommendation can be sent via regular mail to: The Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies; ATTN: SICAR; 1957 E Street, Suite 412, Washington DC 20052)

Applicants are expected to obtain travel costs from their home department, and GWU will cover their housing and meals during the Institute.



Edgar S. Furniss Book Award

Each year, the Mershon Center at The Ohio State University presents the Edgar S. Furniss Book Award to an author whose first book makes an outstanding contribution to the field of international security studies as it relates to four main themes:

- (1) The use of force and diplomacy in international relations.
- (2) The study of political and economic decision-making that affects war and peace.
- (3) Culture and Identity and their impact on national security.
- (4) Law and institutional management of violent inter-group conflict that might arise from a variety of causes, including conflicting material interests, normative beliefs or resource scarcity and usage.

The 2004 competition is open to all books copyrighted in 2004. Edited volumes are not eligible. The winner will receive a cash prize and an invitation to address the faculty at the Mershon Center. Submissions from authors or publishing companies are accepted. Entries will be accepted until January 31, 2005. For more information, including a list of past winners, please see www.mershon.ohio-state.edu. To submit a book for consideration, please send two non-returnable copies to:

Mershon Center
Furniss Book Award
Attn: Julie Rojewski
1501 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201



4. Upcoming SHAFR Award Deadlines:

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize recognizes and encourages excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The prize of \$500 is awarded annually.

Eligibility: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the Ph.D. at the time that the awardee would deliver the lecture, whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or of any other established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

Procedures: Nominations, in the form of a letter and the nominee's c.v., should be sent to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter should discuss evidence of the nominee's excellence in teaching and research.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH). The winner of the prize will deliver a lecture during the SHAFR luncheon at the next year's OAH annual meeting. The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to a SHAFR presidential address and should address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The lecturer is awarded \$500 plus up to \$500 in travel expenses to the OAH, and his or her lecture is published in *Diplomatic History*.

To be considered for the 2005 award, nominations must be received by February 28, 2005. Nominations should be sent to Chester Pach, Department of History, Bentley Annex, Ohio University, Athens, OH 45701-2979; pach@ohio.edu; phone: (740) 593-4353; fax: (740) 593-0259.



The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. The prize of \$1,000 is awarded annually to the author of a distinguished article appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations.


Eligibility: The author must be under forty-one years of age or within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of the article's acceptance for publication. The article must be among the first six publications

by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are ineligible.

Procedures: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* will be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations may be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

To nominate an article published in 2004, send three copies of the article and a letter of nomination to Kurk Dorsey, Department of History, Horton Social Science Center, University of New Hampshire, 20 College Road, Durham, NH 03824. Deadline for nominations is February 1, 2005.



The Michael J. Hogan Fellowship

The Michael J. Hogan Fellowship is designed to promote research in foreign language sources by graduate student members of SHAFR. The fellowship of \$2,000 is intended to defray the costs of studying foreign languages needed for research.

Eligibility: Applicants must be graduate students researching some aspect of United States foreign relations.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Each applicant should include a thesis or dissertation prospectus (8-12 pages, double spaced), a statement explaining how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used, and a letter of recommendation from the graduate advisor.

Hogan Fellowships are awarded at SHAFR's annual meeting. Recipients of the fellowship must report to the Committee how the fellowship was used, and such reports may be published in *Passport*.

To be considered for the 2005 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by 15 April 2005. Submit materials to: W. Michael Weis, Department of History, Illinois Wesleyan University, P.O. Box 2900, Bloomington, IL 61702-2900.



The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship

The Holt Fellowship is designed to promote research by doctoral candidates writing dissertations in the field of the history of American foreign relations. This fellowship of \$2,000 is intended to defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to conduct research on a significant dissertation project.

Eligibility: Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of United States foreign relations. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Each applicant should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The prospectus (8-12 pages, double spaced) should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, chief source materials, and historiographical significance of the project. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date is required, as well as three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one from the director of the applicant's dissertation.

Holt Fellowships are awarded at SHAFR's annual meeting. At the end of the fellowship year, recipients of the fellowship must report to the Committee about how the fellowship was used. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.

To be considered for the 2005 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by 15 April 2005. Submit materials to: W. Michael Weis, Department of History, Illinois Wesleyan University, P.O. Box 2900, Bloomington, IL 61702-2900.



The Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize

The Betty M. Unterberger Prize is intended to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by graduate students in the field of diplomatic history. The Prize of \$1,000 is awarded biannually (in odd years) to the author of a dissertation, completed during the previous two calendar years, on any topic in United States foreign relations history. The Prize is announced at the annual SHAFR conference.

The Prize was established in 2004 to honor Betty Miller Unterberger, a founder of SHAFR and long-time professor of diplomatic history at Texas A&M University. The first Prize will be awarded at SHAFR's annual meeting in June 2005 for the best dissertation finished in 2003-2004.

Procedures: A dissertation may be submitted for consideration by the author or by the author's advisor. Three copies of the dissertation should be submitted, along with a cover letter explaining why the dissertation deserves consideration.

To be considered for the 2005 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by 28 February 2005. Submit materials to H.W. Brands, Department of History, University of Texas at Austin, 1 University Station B7000, Austin, Texas, 78712-0220.



The Norman and Laura Graebner Award

The Graebner Award is a lifetime achievement award intended to recognize a senior historian of United States foreign relations who has significantly contributed to the development of the field, through scholarship, teaching, and/or service, over his or her career. The award of \$2,000 is awarded biannually. The Graebner Award was established by the former students of Norman A. Graebner, professor of diplomatic history at the University of Illinois and the University of Virginia, to honor Norman and his wife Laura for their years of devotion to teaching and research in the field.

Eligibility: The Graebner prize will be awarded to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic or international affairs. The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Procedures: Letters of nomination, submitted in triplicate, should (a) provide a brief biography of the nominee, including educational background, academic or other positions held, and awards and honors received; (b) list the nominee's major scholarly works and discuss the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs; (c) describe the candidate's career, note any teaching honors and awards, and comment on the candidate's classroom skills; and (d) detail the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices and discussing particular activities. Self-nominations are accepted.

Graebner awards are announced at SHAFR's annual meeting.

The next deadline for nominations is March 1, 2006. Submit materials to Brenda Gayle Plummer, Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 4011 Mosse Humanities, 455 N. Park St., Madison, WI 53706.



5. Letters

September 27, 2004

To The Editor:

Barton Bernstein's convoluted effort to "prove" that United States Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall gave a projected casualty estimate of 63,000 for the invasion of Kyushu during a June 1945 meeting between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and President Harry S. Truman should not be taken seriously.

Bernstein neglects to inform his readers that, two days after the meeting, Chief of Naval Operations Ernest J. King (who had been present) sent a memorandum to the other chiefs stating that "It appears to me that the Chiefs of Staff will have to give an estimate of the casualties expected in the operation." [King to JCS, 20 June 1945, xerox 1567, George C. Marshall Papers, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA.] "It seems unnecessary and undesirable," Marshall replied, "for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to make

estimates, which can at best be only speculative.” [Marshall to JCS, 25 June 1945, Box 6, George A. Lincoln Papers, United States Military Academy Library, West Point, NY]. This exchange, obviously, never would have taken place had Marshall already stated a figure during the meeting with Truman.

Sincerely,

Robert James Maddox

The Pennsylvania State University



October 23, 2004

Dear Editors:

Barton Bernstein’s response to my critique of his analysis of casualty projections for the invasion of Japan generates a great deal of heat, but sheds little light. He accuses me of oversimplification and not doing sufficient archival work, but the real fault here is Bernstein’s attempt to obfuscate what certain key and readily accessible documents say because they contradict his unfounded assertions about those casualty projections.

A significant part of Bernstein’s response is an attempt to discredit the minutes taken by Brigadier General A. J. McFarland at the 18 June 1945 meeting that Truman held with his top military and civilian advisors. Nothing Bernstein says—from his description of how those minutes were put together, to his recitation of his own research, to his digression into how the Truman Library constructed certain archival collections, to his presumption, without a shred of evidence, about at which point in the meeting Marshall supposedly gave his estimate of 63,000 casualties—can put that number into the minutes or in Marshall’s mouth at that meeting. Nor is there any basis for criticizing the accuracy of the minutes, especially regarding anything that Marshall himself, the most important person at the meeting aside from the President, might have said. As I pointed out in my article, the minutes were carefully reviewed by McFarland and corrected, which leaves the burden of proof on Bernstein to come up with a creditable document to support his claim that Marshall made any such estimate.

Leahy’s diary does not meet that standard. I am gratified that Bernstein has belatedly recognized that the verb tenses diarists use in their entries are important. But he has it backwards, and his reference to Leahy’s memoir *I Was There* is a grasp at a nonexistent straw. True, Leahy did change some verb tenses in his memoir, but the tenses that matter are the ones in the *original* 18 June 1945 diary entry. As I pointed out in my article, here is where we find events that took place that day recorded in the past tense and opinions that are not fixed in time recorded in the present tense, and the alleged Marshall estimate is in the present tense. Five years later, Leahy simply inserted part of his 18 June 1945 diary entry into his memoirs—including the references to the Army’s intention to occupy and govern Japan and Leahy’s opposition to those intentions—which, as pointed out in my article, were subjects we know were *not* discussed at the 18 June meeting. *All* the verbs were changed to the past tense for the memoir—a logical step since by now everything was in the past—but what this leaves us with is copy editing, nothing more. If anything is “doubly clear” as a result of Leahy’s changes of tense in his memoirs, it is that the reference to Marshall’s alleged 63,000 casualty estimate belongs *in the same category* as the Army’s plans for occupying Japan and Leahy’s reaction to them, and that category is opinions held by various individuals or groups that did not come up at the 18 June meeting. *Passport* readers should examine Leahy’s diary and then check pages 384-385 of *I Was There* so they can decide for themselves whether Bernstein or I better explained Leahy’s use of tenses.

As for Leahy and the matter of battle versus nonbattle casualties, the fact is that nonbattle casualties had long been a concern for American leaders and constituted an especially serious problem in the battle for Okinawa. By the end of May, nonbattle casualties on Okinawa had surpassed 14,000, a key reason the infantry divisions on the island were below strength. Furthermore, nonbattle casualties were crowding the field hospitals on Okinawa, with the result that divisions established rest camps for their nonbattle casualties and, on 25 April, the Tenth Army opened a field hospital *for those cases alone*. In short, there is simply no way that American officials in Washington monitoring the fighting on Okinawa could have been unaware of nonbattle casualties, and Leahy’s stated figure of a 35 percent casualty rate, which parallels what the Tenth Army itself reported as its total (battle and nonbattle) casualty rate after the battle, is convincing proof of what he had in mind when he spoke on the subject on 18 June. It is important to remember that Leahy clearly was not satisfied by Marshall’s numbers and wanted to give a more complete picture of what was happening on Okinawa. Nonbattle casualties were an essential part

of that grim picture.

Finally, Bernstein's personal attacks and insinuations about my integrity contribute nothing to the current discussion and say far more about him than they do about me.

Michael Kort

Boston University



6. Recent Publications of Interest

Alexander, Stephen. *Antiamericanization And Anti-Americanism: The German Encounter With American Culture After 1945*, Berghahn Books, \$60.00.

Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore. *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics*, Cornell University Press, \$17.95.

Bischof, Guenter and Anton Pelinka, eds. *The Americanization/Westernization of Austria*, Transaction Publishers, \$40.00.

Butterfield, Samuel Hale. *U.S. Development Aid—An Historic First: Achievements and Failures in the Twentieth Century*, Greenwood Press, \$92.95.

Cohen, Michael. *Strategy and Politics in the Middle East: Defending the Northern Tier*, Frank Cass Publishers, \$36.56.

Daly, Jonathan W. *The Watchful State: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1906-1917*, Northern Illinois University Press, \$39.00.

Danchev, Alex and John MacMillan. *The Iraq War and Democratic Politics*, Routledge, \$34.74.

Defty, Andrew. *Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1945-1953: The Information Research Department*, Frank Cass Publishers, \$78.95.

Dizard, Wilson P. Jr. *Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Information Agency*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, \$49.95.

Frankel, Max. *High Noon in the Cold War: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Presidio Press, \$23.95.

Frantzen, Henning A. *NATO and Peace Support Operations, 1991-1999*, Frank Cass Publishers.

Ganser, Daniele. *NATO's Top Secret Stay-behind Armies and Terrorism in Western Europe*, Frank Cass Publishers, \$35.95.

Gehler, Michael, Anton Pelinka, and Guenter Bischof, eds. *Austria in the European Union: Assessment of her Membership*, Boehlau Publishers, \$40.00.

Hahn, Peter L. *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War*, University of North Carolina Press, \$24.95.

Hanhimäki, Jussi M. *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, \$35.00.

Hanhimaki, Jussi and Odd Arne Westad, eds. *The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts*. Oxford University Press, \$35.00.

Harrington, Joseph. *American-Romanian Relations, 1989-2004: From Pariah to Partner*, Columbia University Press, \$45.00.

Hughes, R. Gerald, Peter Jackson, and L.V. Scott. *Exploring Intelligence Archives*, Frank Cass Publishers, \$104.95.

Johnson, Gaynor. *The Foreign Office and British Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, Routledge, \$105.00.

Johnson, Gaynor. *Locarno Revisited: European Diplomacy, 1920-1929*, Routledge, \$105.00.

Kihl, Young Whan. *Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture*, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., \$79.95.

Levermore, Roger and Adrian Budd. *Sport and International Relations: An Emerging Relationship*, Routledge, \$38.95.

- Lilleker, Darren G. *Against the Cold War: The History and Political Traditions of Pro-Sovietism in the British Labour Party, 1945-1989*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$59.50.
- Longley, Kyle. *Senator Albert Gore, Sr.: Tennessee Maverick*, Louisiana State University Press, \$39.95.
- Love, Eric T. L. *Race over Empire: Racism and U.S. Imperialism, 1865-1900*, University of North Carolina Press, \$19.95.
- Lui, Elizabeth Gill. *Building Diplomacy: The Architecture of American Embassies*, Cornell University Press, \$50.00.
- Matray, James I., *Korea Divided: The 38th Parallel and the Demilitarized Zone*, Chelsea House Publishers, \$26.95.
- Mertus, Julie A. *Bait and Switch: Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Routledge, \$75.00.
- Mihalkanin, Edward S. *American Statesmen: Secretaries of State from John Jay to Colin Powell*, Greenwood Press, \$99.95.
- Motyl, Alexander J., Blair A. Ruble, and Lilia Shevtsova, eds. *Russia's Engagement with the West: Transformation and Integration in the Twenty-First Century*, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., \$89.95.
- Murphy, John F. *The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs*, Cambridge University Press, \$85.00.
- Norris, John. *Collision Course: NATO, Russia, and Kosovo*, Brassey's, \$34.95.
- Percox, David. *Britain, Kenya, and the Cold War: Imperial Defense, Colonial Security and Decolonization*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$65.00.
- Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. *Globalization or Empire?*, Routledge, \$25.50.
- Pons, Silvio and Federico Romero. *Reinterpreting the End of the Cold War*, Frank Cass Publishers, \$34.95.
- Reeves, Julie. *Culture and International Relations: Narratives, Natives, and Tourists*, Routledge, \$97.00.
- Ritchie, Sebastian. *Our Man in Yugoslavia: The Story of a Secret Service Operative*, Frank Cass Publishers, \$28.95.
- Ross, Andrew and Kristin Ross, eds. *Anti-Americanism*, NYU Press, \$19.95.
- Schissler, Hanna and Yasemin Soysal, eds. *The Nation, Europe, and the World*, Berghahn Books, \$25.00.
- Smith, Paul J. *Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability*, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., \$72.95.
- Smith, Robert W. *Keeping the Republic: Ideology and Early American Diplomacy*, Northern Illinois University Press, \$38.50.
- Williams, David. *Defending Japan's Pacific War: The Kyoto School Philosophers and Post-White Power*, Routledge, \$114.95.

The Last Word

By Peter L. Hahn



In recent years I have been listening to a discussion among SHAFR members about the state of the field of diplomatic history. In this discussion, conducted intermittently during SHAFR lunches, at Council meetings, and in the corridors of convention hotels, two voices predominate.

One voice bemoans the decline of our field and blames sinister forces in the larger profession for causing it. According to this voice, history departments are discontinuing positions in diplomatic history because the field is too wedded to elite white men in power, and the American Historical Association (AHA) and the Organization of American Historians (OAH) have marginalized diplomatic history at their annual meetings and in their journals. The cultural barons and other postmodernists, this voice charges, have identified our field for extinction.

The other voice celebrates the vitality of our field. It emphasizes such evidence as the high quality of scholarship in the area, the excellent reputation of the journal *Diplomatic History*, the burgeoning membership of SHAFR, the success of our annual meetings, and the sustained demand for the collective wisdom of the field evident in book sales and course enrollments. This voice hints that we might have excluded ourselves from the AHA and OAH under the mistaken impression that we were no longer welcome. Occasionally, this voice also urges us to explore and adapt the methods of cultural and social history in order to connect with the larger profession, make the field more accessible to scholars with other specialties, and raise provocative new questions about the past.

Recently, the AHA distributed numerical data that shed some light on this debate. When renewing their annual memberships, AHA members are invited to indicate their fields of specialization by checking boxes next to 53 thematic fields, ranging from *African-American* to *Women*.

The good news is that *Diplomatic/International* ranked among the most popular specialties of AHA members in 2004, with 501 of the AHA's 13,216 members—about 3.8 percent—identifying themselves as practitioners. *Diplomatic/International* ranked as the ninth most popular field, behind only *Cultural* (1,081), *Religion* (952), *Women* (945), *Intellectual* (766), *African-American* (630), *Gender* (597), *Political* (568), and *Social* (537). *Diplomatic/International* outranked such other

fields as *Military* (484), *Science & Technology* (449), and *Law* (388). (SHAFR members will be pleased to know that we well outpaced *Numismatics* [7] and *Psychohistory* [6].)

The bad news is that *Diplomatic/International* has experienced a decline since 1992. In that year, the field counted 784 adherents (about 8.3 percent of the AHA's 1992 membership of 9,503).

At that time, *Diplomatic/International* ranked in fourth place, behind only *Social* (1,361), *Women* (1,046), and *Intellectual* (839).

These raw data are open for interpretation, of course. One might express regret that as a part of the AHA, we have fallen from fourth place to ninth in popularity, losing in both actual numbers and percentage of the whole. Yet one might also find reason to hope that *Diplomatic/International* is holding its own in a stormy sea. The steepest decline in the field's count occurred between 1992 and 1999, when it fell from 784 to a mere 466. At that time post-Cold War popular thinking declared foreign affairs irrelevant. In the early 2000s, by contrast, the *Diplomatic/International* count has steadily registered in the low 500s. One can also note that *Social*, the vanguard movement of the 1970s and 1980s, lost more than 800 disciples between 1991 and 2004, falling from first place to eighth, a trend that suggests that all fields experience cyclical forces and that *Cultural*, the monarch of the moment, will also fade someday.

Comparing the AHA data to SHAFR's own membership rolls is also instructive. The 784 people who checked *Diplomatic/International* in 1992 comprised 58 percent of SHAFR's 1,343 members. In 2004, the 501 people who checked *Diplomatic/International* comprised only one-third of SHAFR members. As SHAFR has grown, its members have withdrawn from the AHA.

Count me among the optimists in the SHAFR guild. The events of 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have proven that the world is shrinking in size and growing in danger—underscoring the need for expertise in our field. If we continue teaching well, writing great books, attracting the attention of colleagues, and showing up in AHA membership counts, then *Diplomatic/International* should prosper again.