

Passport

The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Volume 36, Issue 2, August 2005



Inside...

*A Roundtable on John Gaddis's *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience**

Doing History: A Focus on Teaching

Russian and American Conversations on World War II

...and much more!

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The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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President George W. Bush meets Iraqi Governing Council members Abdel-Aziz al-Hakim, left, and Dr. Adnan Pachachi in the Oval Office, January 20, 2004.

Photo by Eric Draper. Courtesy of the White House at www.whitehouse.gov.

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John Gaddis's *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*: A Roundtable Critique

Andrew J. Rotter, Mary Ann Heiss,

Richard Immerman, Regina Gramer and John Lewis Gaddis

Searching for Monsters: John Gaddis on Adams II, Roosevelt II, and Bush II

Andrew J. Rotter

Exercises like this one, in which a handful of scholars comment on a recent, controversial book by a leading figure in their field, bring to mind the expression “lèse-majesté” (thumbing the nose at a sovereign), or better, the immortal wisdom of Dr. Seuss:

Hop, hop.

We like to hop.

We like to hop on top of pop.¹

“Pop” in this case is John Lewis Gaddis, the prolific Yale historian whose small book *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* is the subject of discussion here. It typifies the erudition of Gaddis’s work and the grandeur of his vision that he quotes frequently from Shakespeare. It typifies the mild subversiveness required of those asked to serve as Gaddis’s interlocutors that one of them, at least, resorts to quoting Dr. Seuss.

I accepted this assignment with ambivalence. On the one hand, I have profound disagreements with most of Gaddis’s books. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War* seems to me to understate the contribution of American ideology to the polarization of the world after 1945; *Strategies of Containment* convinced a generation of undergraduates (wrongly, in my judgment) that George Kennan had actually differentiated between “perimeter” and “strongpoint” defense; the titles *The Long Peace* and

We Now Know bespeak callousness and overconfidence, respectively; and *The Landscape of History* seems a bit forced, with its discussion of fractal geometry and marmite spilling on the motorway. And yet I like all these books and have assigned several of them over the years. I like them because Gaddis takes documents seriously and reads them carefully, because they are analytically rigorous even if wrongheaded, because they are written with conviction and elegance and sometimes humor, and most of all because they are ambitious and provocative, eschewing the trivial and avoiding the hairsplitting that make monographs in diplomatic history so often dreary. I admire Gaddis for having the courage to be boldly mistaken.

This brings us to *Surprise*. Gaddis argues that the response of the George W. Bush administration to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 was not a sharp break with past practice but had precedent in history, and specifically in the diplomacy of John Quincy Adams. The United States has always sought to guarantee its security by expanding rather than contracting or “hiding,” as Gaddis puts it. What was already an impulse—James Madison exhorted Americans to “extend the sphere” in Federalist No.10—was codified by Adams, whom Gaddis properly calls “the most influential American grand strategist of the nineteenth century.”² Following the traumatic burning of the Capitol and the White House by the British in 1814, Adams developed three principles meant to assure America’s future security: preemption (hit potential enemies before they hit the United States), unilateralism (do not assume that other states care much about U.S. security—if need be,

smite enemies alone), and hegemony (establish control of the immediate environment to deny possible enemies a foothold nearby). For the most part presidential administrations through the rest of the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth followed Adams’s example. Americans “preempted” Indians, Mexicans, Spaniards, and Latin American dictators and revolutionaries. They avoided alliances even unto the Great War, which they entered, as Gaddis notes, not as allies but “associates” of the Triple Entente states. And they permitted no other nation to encroach on their North American possessions or claims, thus ensuring their hegemony on the continent.

Franklin D. Roosevelt, who is the subject of Gaddis’s second substantive chapter, not only maintained U.S. hegemony but laid the groundwork for extending it. He did so in part by abandoning Adams’s principles of preemption and unilateralism. FDR obviously failed to preempt the Japanese and thereafter refused, for a variety of reasons, to strike first at the Russians, even as it became clear that U.S. and Soviet postwar policies would be at serious cross-purposes. Unilateralism seemed to him obsolete in a world of great danger, and, as Gaddis points out, particularly inappropriate in light of American expectations that Europeans would “do most of the fighting” against Germany.³ Besides, if after the war the European allies would concede U.S. hegemony in order to ensure their own recovery and protection, there was no point in paying the escalating costs of unilateralism. The Cold War coalition successfully contained Soviet power without resort to all-out war and kept the United States at the

forefront of world power, though not so brazenly that the allies resented it.

With the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001, the Bush administration returned, as if by instinct, to the Adams strategy. It launched preemptive strikes on Afghanistan and Iraq, tried for multilateralism but went ahead largely without it when it attacked Saddam Hussein, and sought a global U.S. hegemony linked to universal values, including democracy, which it was determined to implant everywhere. As “misunderestimated” as Prince Hal, Bush proposed a sweeping doctrine that promised to destroy terrorism at its source, effect regime change in states that harbor terrorists, and midwife democracy into being in places where it now exists only as a fond wish or a remote abstraction. All this Gaddis discerns in “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (NSS), dated September 17, 2002. Gaddis is not uncritical of the Bush vision. He regrets the administration’s inability to create an international coalition for the invasion of Iraq, worries that Bush has remained attached to the seismic strategy of “shock and awe,” and, what is most significant, acknowledges that the scope of Bush’s plans goes well beyond anything imagined by Adams and indeed, borders on arrogance. But it is the unabashed paean to military service and patriotism with which Gaddis concludes his book, coupled with his apparent admiration for the “grandness” of Bush’s strategy, that lingers at the end, and not his particular criticisms of the administration.

My reservations about Gaddis’s argument begin with his characterization of Adams’s diplomacy. In the first place, it is unlikely that Adams would describe his strategy as “preemptive.” Though Adams was, as Gaddis notes, entirely willing to use Andrew Jackson’s punitive incursion into Spanish and Seminole Florida in 1818 for his own diplomatic purposes, he did not initiate the expedition, nor did he follow it up with others elsewhere on the continent. In fairness to Jackson and Adams, the Seminoles had raided

Georgia and then retreated back to Florida; Jackson’s incursion was more hot pursuit than preemption and was more decisively for cause than the Bush attack on Iraq 185 years later. As Gaddis knows, Adams (not Jackson) planned for tightly regulated expansion on the North American continent, seeking an empire bound together by a system of internal improvements and the careful stewardship of the federal government. Gaddis quotes Adams’s dictum from his famous July 4, 1821 speech: “We go not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.” Elsewhere in the speech Adams is, if less memorable, even more direct: “She [the United States] has abstained from interference in the concerns of others, even when conflict has been for principles to which she clings, as to the last vital drop that visits the heart.” Thus Adams would disallow not only preemption but also intervention on behalf of, say, democracy—surely a principle to which Americans have always clung. Apart from an interest in taking Cuba, Adams resisted thinking that American institutions could jump water. He would probably have been horrified at William McKinley’s decision to annex the Philippines in 1898 and appalled at the Nietzschean antics of Theodore Roosevelt.

As for unilateralism, Gaddis is right to note Adams’s pivotal role in spurning George Canning’s offer and going it alone with the Monroe Doctrine. Like everyone else, Americans have always preferred to act without constraint in foreign relations. That preference is less a principle than a truism. In the United States, the desire for unilateralism antedated Adams. But playing nicely with others is sometimes necessary for all but the most powerful nations, and Adams frankly reveled in a good negotiating session, in which he could flaunt his knowledge of history and his sharp wit to good effect. According to Adams’s diary, “the most important day of my life” was not the day Monroe announced his doctrine or even his own wedding day: it was the day in 1819 on which he and the Spanish diplomat Luis de Onís signed the Transcontinental Treaty. Over the

next 120 years there were dozens of treaty agreements between the United States and a variety of nations, made in the best tradition of John Quincy Adams; they indicate that FDR was not altogether breaking precedent when he determined to work with allies during World War II.

That Adams pursued U.S. hegemony on the North American continent there can be no doubt. Adams’s commitment to expansionism, in fact, long preceded the British attack on Washington in 1814, and he was, as a contemporary described him, an “amphibious animal,” who coveted the North Atlantic fisheries and maritime trade along with lands to the west. But establishing a “preponderance of power” on a continent without effective rivals is very different from attempting to gain hegemony over peoples on distant continents. I do not agree with Gaddis that had “Adams lived to see the end of the Cold War, he would not have found the position of the United States within the international system an unfamiliar one.”⁴ I think he would have been saddened and alarmed by the extension of American power, at least in its military form. Adams believed that the United States was destined to expand over much of North America because European imperialism on the continent was a spent force—and a good thing, too, for it was, he wrote, “a physical, moral, and political absurdity” that nations so far away from North America should hold colonies on a continent occupied by a strong nation. Means mattered as well. Disappointed that he could not wrest Texas from Spain by negotiation in 1818-19—he might have had it, but colleagues in the Monroe administration and Congress failed to support his demand for it—he nevertheless recoiled when, near the end of his life, he saw President James Polk go to war with Mexico to preserve the annexation of Texas and extend the Texas boundary south. Mexico was, in Adams’s view, a monster needlessly confronted.

The Bush administration argues that democracy is a universal good, a thing that all people crave and for which they, and we on their behalf, are prepared to sacrifice. Democracy

is supposed to be the natural result and close relative of freedom. The United States should thus work to undermine or overthrow regimes that oppress their people and prevent them from practicing democracy. "We are confident," Bush said in a March 8, 2005, speech, "that the desire for freedom, even when repressed for generations, is present in every human heart." Some of Bush's critics argue that this is not true: not everyone wants democracy or believes it is the concomitant of freedom. Respect for cultural difference or the sovereignty of other states ought to give the United States pause before it seeks to place democracy elsewhere.

Gaddis lists a series of Bush's post-9/11 foreign policy accomplishments: "a modest improvement" in the American and world economies; more discussion in Arab countries about the possibility of political reform; a withdrawal of U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia and their redeployment elsewhere in the Middle East and Eastern Europe; and an increase in pressure on the authoritarian governments of Syria and Iran. (Recent elections in Iraq and Palestine and street demonstrations in Egypt and Lebanon may provide even better news, though it is not yet clear who will emerge as political victors in those places.) But against all this must be weighed the mistrust generated across the globe by perceived American arrogance; the rapid fall in the value of the American dollar and the escalating price of oil; the continuing instability in Afghanistan and the awful violence in Iraq; and the ongoing specter of al Qaeda terrorism directed against the United States and its allies, made worse, not better, by the invasion of Iraq.

This final point deserves a bit of elaboration. Gaddis implies that he agrees with Bush's explanation for the 9/11 attacks. "They hate our freedom," is how the president puts it; Gaddis says that the United States is "an irresistible target for those few whose aspiration is to kill hope."⁵ It is surely true that religious extremists—Muslim, Christian, Hindu, and Jewish—associate freedom with license and deplore what they see as an absence of decency at the core

of expansive American culture. But "those few," along with many others in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, Africa and Latin America, resent not America's freedom or hope but its power, and in particular the way that power is deployed. They mistrust its fickle use: yes in Iraq, eventually in Yugoslavia, a bit in Haiti, no in Rwanda, the Congo, and Darfur. They fear it as provocative, as in Kuwait and Korea, and they fear its possible withdrawal (same places). They dislike its seeming arbitrariness—pressure on the Palestinians but not the Israelis, on the North Koreans but not the Chinese. Most of all, they are angry that Americans use their power to buttress reactionary regimes, as in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan, that they kill civilians, and that they humiliate and torture prisoners. They believe Americans use their power to destroy rather than build, and they do not hate freedom or the promise of hope so much as they want Americans genuinely to honor them.

Thus, the Bush administration plans to spread democracy everywhere because it is universally desired, while some of the administration's opponents deny that democracy is wanted everywhere. There is a third position. Perhaps all people do want democracy or at least want to have the freedom to try it out. But democracy and freedom must grow in native soil and remain self-generating. They cannot be fabricated and imposed by outsiders or they will reflect the attitudes and institutions of outsiders rather than the deepest hopes of recipients. Thus the United States would be better advised to serve as an example of freedom and democracy than to seek to impose its values by force. This is a liberal adaptation of John Winthrop's admonition to his fellow Puritans on board the *Arbella* at Massachusetts Bay in 1630. He called upon them to create a "City on a Hill," a place of godly virtue to be admired and imitated by others. A just nation is an influential nation. That is not always enough, of course. A nation must have a foreign policy. It ought to treat other nations with respect, aim at consistency, offer help and advice when and where it can, and use force only as a genuine

last resort. There is nothing wrong, as Dean Acheson once put it, with a nation having "a gun or two around at a critical moment" in case its security or interests are threatened. Still, the United States would do better to make its foreign policy from the inside out. A United States free of repression, race and gender discrimination, nagging inequality and poverty, and a policy of remanding terror suspects to regimes certain to torture them, would do more for the spread of freedom and democracy than a column of tanks rolling down a Baghdad street.

In all likelihood John Quincy Adams would agree. Adams was not always a paragon of virtue. He was a grouch who enjoyed a negotiating adversary's discomfort. He supported Britain's Opium War with China, and while I disagree with Gaddis's view that Andrew Jackson's policy toward the Indians "was a predictable extension of Adams's own thinking," the hands with which Adams manipulated the Native American population were far from clean.⁶ But Adams developed a strong moral opposition to slavery, a monster at the heart of the union that demanded destruction. Above all, he thought carefully about patriotism, like John Gaddis. His conclusion: "I disclaim as unsound all patriotism incompatible with the principles of eternal justice." Those are words worth pondering in this age, as in every other.

Andrew Rotter is Professor of History at Colgate University. The author gratefully acknowledges the help of Frank Costigliola and Carl Guarneri, who read and commented on this essay.

Notes:

¹ Dr. Seuss, *Hop on Pop* (New York, 1963). In a speech given at Penn State University-Delaware County on April 2, 2002, President Bush said, "Sometimes when I sleep at night I think of 'Hop on Pop.'"

² John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA, 2004), 18.

³ *Ibid.*, 50.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 116.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 18.

On Becoming the Dictatress of the World

Mary Ann Heiss

John Lewis Gaddis's *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* has received attention from across the spectrum.¹ The *Washington Times*, the *Boston Globe*, and the *Financial Times* have mentioned it. Full-fledged reviews have appeared in a variety of print and on-line venues, including *Foreign Affairs*, the *National Review*, and H-DIPLO. And it has even been the subject of feature discussions on *Booknotes* and at the Council on Foreign Relations.² Judging from what has been said about the book in these manifold forums, most, if not all, of this attention stems from its effort to interject "relevance" into the study of history. Specifically, Gaddis seeks to locate the George W. Bush administration's response to the events of 11 September 2001 and the subsequent war in Iraq within the long sweep of U.S. responses to surprise attacks. In other words, he mines the past for insights into the present, or at least the not-so-distant past. Although Gaddis is quick to admit that the search for relevancy too soon after the events one is studying sacrifices "accuracy," he claims that "an incomplete map [of the recent past] is better than no map at all." "We act in the present," he avers, "with a view to shaping the future only on the basis of what we know from the past. So we might as well know our recent history as best we can, however imperfect the exercise may be."³ To that end, he sets out in a scant 118 pages of highly readable text to provide a rudimentary, incomplete, and ultimately imperfect map of how the nation arrived at the Bush administration's 2002 report, "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America" (NSS).⁴

The episodic character of *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* bears witness to the book's origins as the Joanna Jackson Goldman Memorial Lectures on American Civilization and Government, delivered at the New York Public Library in 2002. The text addresses

in turn the three surprise attacks on U.S. soil since the nation's founding: the British attack on Washington, DC, in August 1814 near the end of the War of 1812; the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 that ushered in U.S. involvement in World War II; and the events of September 2001 that inaugurated the U.S. war on international terrorism. The lag time between the lectures' public presentation and their submission to Harvard University Press in the fall of 2003 allowed Gaddis to incorporate reflections on the war in Iraq into a series of essays originally drafted before U.S. military operations in that country commenced. If the luxury of time permitted him to extend his gaze chronologically, it has not perceptibly deepened that gaze or resulted in more critical reflection. On the contrary, where the Bush administration is concerned Gaddis's tone is generally laudatory, and he seems cautiously optimistic about the foreign policy direction the administration has charted for the nation.

Some readers will undoubtedly be put off by much of what Gaddis has to say about the present course of U.S. policy. That is to be expected of a volume that could be accused of privileging relevancy to accuracy. Yet whether one agrees with what Gaddis has to say is not the point. Far more important is that he has at least laid the groundwork for serious discussion of the relationship between the past and the present, even though his claims and conclusions may not be definitive or universally accepted. Readers familiar with Gaddis's numerous contributions to the field of U.S. foreign relations know well that he has ever been provocative and thought-provoking. Those qualities certainly mark this volume as well, and there is plenty here to keep specialists talking for quite some time.

As might be expected, given that he is the acknowledged pioneer of the post-revisionist approach to the study of U.S. foreign relations, Gaddis considers the nation's response to the events of 9/11 to be externally rather than internally driven.⁵ In a nutshell, he situates that response in three principles outlined by John Quincy

Adams in the aftermath of the War of 1812: preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony. Generations of Adams's successors hewed firmly to these ideas, which Gaddis terms the first formulation, of a coherent U.S. foreign policy, and by the early twentieth century the United States reigned supreme in the Western Hemisphere. In the nation's second foreign policy formulation in the wake of Pearl Harbor, Franklin D. Roosevelt abandoned preemption and unilateralism and forged a great-power coalition. Despite his break with the past, FDR nevertheless cleared the way for the achievement of U.S. hegemony on a global scale, an end Gaddis is confident Adams would have sanctioned despite the means by which it was achieved.⁶

George W. Bush and his advisers resurrected—Gaddis is not sure "whether intentionally or not"—Adams's three principles in the fall of 2001 and used them as the basis for the NSS report they rolled out a year later.⁷ Possessing "unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world," the United States of the twenty-first century, intones the NSS report, "will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise [its] right of self-defense by acting preemptively against... terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country."⁸ To be sure, the report does pay lip service to consultation with allies and cooperation with other nations. Yet these sops merely cloak an essentially unilateralist policy of preemption and world hegemony that many, both in the United States and around the world, find troubling in the extreme. The adoption of such a strategy, with its reliance on preemption, was "hardly surprising," Gaddis maintains, since "deep roots do not easily disappear." Far from breaking new ground in arrogating to the United States the authority to identify and destroy foreign terrorists and their supporters anywhere in the world, the administration, he believes, has merely returned to the nation's nineteenth-century principles.⁹ Indeed, the NSS report itself proclaims that "the United States has long maintained the option of preemptive



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actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security."¹⁰ In other words, there is nothing new in the administration's seemingly unilateralist approach to foreign policy and in fact there is a great deal that is deeply rooted in the past.

Gaddis makes much of what he sees as the similarities between the foreign policies of John Quincy Adams and George W. Bush. At seemingly every turn, Adams lurks in the shadows, casting approval on this or that aspect of the present administration's policy.¹¹ How Gaddis knows what Adams would have thought of situations and policies so totally different from those of his own life experience is a good, but unexplored, question. Another is whether it is accurate or even appropriate to draw comparisons between the two across time. Adams, after all, sought to defend U.S. security by driving potential threats from the Western Hemisphere. The present administration, it would seem, has undertaken an effort to extend America's sway the world over. Is the latter truly a defensive strategy? Gaddis has apparently accepted the administration's argument that it is, but valid concerns exist to suggest otherwise.¹² Gaddis's somewhat simplistic comparisons across the centuries raise basic questions about validity and appropriateness that this volume, unfortunately, does not address. As a result, its accuracy does indeed seem to have been sacrificed on the altar of relevancy.

Another problem with Gaddis's comparative framework is a key difference between Adams and Bush that *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* treats only desultorily: to wit, their starkly divergent ideas regarding the wisdom or desirability of U.S. immersion in the world for the purpose of saving or reforming it. As students of U.S. foreign relations are well aware, and as Gaddis does note, Adams was deeply committed to the idea of American exceptionalism, never believed for one moment that the rest of the world could ever be like the United States, and cautioned against an activist, interventionist foreign policy. The nation, he boasted in 1821, "'goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy,'" lest it "'become

the dictatress of the world.'"¹³ Yet that is, in a very real (some would say tragic) sense, precisely what the Bush administration proposes to do in the NSS report, imparting to the United States the job of "identifying and destroying" global threats and committing it to "actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world."¹⁴ Unfazed by Adams's caution about trucking with the outside world, the present administration proudly touts its intention "to help make the world not just safer but better."¹⁵ This crusading spirit—going abroad in search of monsters to destroy—is not at all in keeping with Adams's views regarding the nation's proper place in the world, and Gaddis would have been well served to have explored the implications of the present administration's apparent crusaderism, a subject that other historians have addressed quite fruitfully.¹⁶ Doing so would have made for a more valuable volume that went beyond somewhat simplistic and ultimately unsustainable comparisons between Adams and Bush to serious, meaningful analysis.

Gaddis's tour through three centuries of U.S. foreign policy also slights the role of moral and ethical considerations in the making of that policy. John Quincy Adams, he suggests, cared not a whit what others thought of the United States and its policies, a sentiment laid bare in his overt and unwavering unilateralism. Franklin D. Roosevelt and his Cold War-era successors, in contrast, cared quite a lot. They worked tirelessly to retain the moral high ground in the ideological struggle with the Soviet Union, seeking to ensure, in Gaddis's words, "that there should always be something worse than the prospect of American domination."¹⁷ What might be called the reflection-in-the-mirror test would seem all but forgotten in the present climate, as the Bush administration has eschewed the post-World War II concern about others' opinions of the United States for the nineteenth-century attitude that the opinion of the rest of the world does not matter. Although again Gaddis makes note of this

phenomenon, observing "a growing sense throughout much of the world that there could be nothing worse than American hegemony" the way the Bush administration has used it, he seems little bothered by it. "Comfort alone," he notes in another context, "cannot be the criterion by which a nation shapes its strategy and secures its safety." On that score, he is certainly correct. But without question the cavalier manner in which the present administration has tossed aside moral and ethical objections to its foreign policy deserves more pause for reflection than *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* provides. Gaddis asks in passing, "How comfortable will our descendants be with the choices we make today?"¹⁸ This is a good question, and to many Americans today the fundamental question, yet it receives far too little attention here.

Gaddis concludes his volume with some musings on the future direction of U.S. foreign policy, several of which deserve much greater attention than they receive. One is the warning "that we need always to see ourselves as others see us," "that you can't sustain hegemony without consent," and that "consent requires the existence of an alternative more frightening than your own hegemony." I would not argue. Yet I do believe that Gaddis could and should have done much more to hold the present administration accountable to these precepts than he does. International legitimacy and consent should be more than lofty goals for the future. They should also be *sine qua nons* in the here and now. Another area where further discussion would have been desirable concerns Gaddis's admonition to Americans "to reflect, long, hard, and carefully . . . about where their empire of liberty is headed."¹⁹ This is good advice that many Americans have certainly taken to heart; it is not, however, something that Gaddis does himself. Readers looking for insights into and explanations of the present direction of U.S. foreign policy will, regretfully, have to look elsewhere. Unfortunately, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*, ultimately proves unsatisfying.

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Notes:

¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA, 2004).

² For a sampling of the coverage of the book see Tony Blankley, "George W. Bush—Grand Strategist," *Washington Times*, 11 February 2004; Austin Bay, "New Security Goals," *Washington Times*, 6 August 2004; Laura Secor, "Grand Old Policy," *Boston Globe*, 8 February 2004; Dominique Moisi, "Lessons from the Bismarck Model of Diplomacy," *Financial Times*, 21 January 2005; Stephen Graubard, "The Bush Fantasies That Are Guiding History," *Financial Times*, 3 February 2005; Walter Russell Mead, review of *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*, *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2004, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20040501fabook83330/john-lewis-gaddis/surprise-security-and-the-american-experience.html> (accessed 13 March 2005); Victor Davis Hanson, "Wars New and Old," *National Review*, 19 April 2004, <http://www.nationalreview.com/books/hanson200406010918.asp> (accessed 27 January 2005); Thomas R. Maddux, review of *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*, H-DIPLO, May 2004, <http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=h-diplo&month=0405&week=c&msg=Gw5lKyyhmpsVKZoskBkEpQ&user=&pw=> (accessed 11 September 2004); *Booknotes* transcript, 16 May 2004, <http://www.booknotes.org/Transcript/?ProgramID=1780> (accessed 27 January 2005); and Council on Foreign Relations transcript, 14 May 2004, http://www.cfr.org/publication_print.php?id=7040&content= (accessed 27 January 2005).

³ Gaddis, *Surprise*, 5.

⁴ "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America," 17 September 2002 (hereafter NSS), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> (accessed 21 March 2005).

⁵ Readers looking for a more internally oriented exploration of the roots of present policy should consult Walter LaFeber, "The Bush Doctrine," *Diplomatic History* 26 (Fall 2002): 543-

58, part of the journal's roundtable on "The Road to and from September 11th." Other discussion of the domestic influences on the course of present policy may be found among the essays in "History and September 11: A Special Issue," *Journal of American History* 89 (September 2002): 413-557; and Mary L. Dudziak, ed., *September 11 in History: A Watershed Moment?* (Durham, NC, 2003).

⁶ Gaddis, *Surprise*, 59.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 31.

⁸ NSS, 1, 6.

⁹ Gaddis, *Surprise*, 38.

¹⁰ NSS, 15.

¹¹ See, for example, Gaddis, *Surprise*, 38, 87.

¹² On these concerns see the wide-ranging essays in Lloyd C. Gardner and Marilyn B. Young, eds., *The New American Empire: A 21st Century Teach-in on U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York, 2005).

¹³ John Quincy Adams quoted in Gaddis, *Surprise*, 28-29.

¹⁴ NSS, 6, v.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1.

¹⁶ The extensive literature on U.S. "crusaderism" includes, but is by no means limited to, Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right* (New York, 1995); and Walter A. McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776* (Boston, 1997). Recent manifestations of the phenomenon may be found throughout the essays in Gardner and Young, eds., *The New American Empire*.

¹⁷ Gaddis, *Surprise*, 63, 64-65.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 100-101 (emphasis in original), 33 (emphasis in original).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 117, 111.

The Sources of American Conduct

*Richard Immerman and
Regina Gramer*

John Gaddis is back at it, and we should be thankful. We do not mean to suggest that our collective gratitude can or should be correlated to the persuasiveness of his arguments. We both disagree,

often strongly, with many of them, including those articulated in *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*. Yet if one takes stock of the spectrum of Gaddis's publications, and that is no small order, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that his goal is something (or several things) other than persuading his reader. Part of what appears to drive Gaddis's arguments is a streak of iconoclasm and a desire to offer the most triumphalist narrative of the American empire. He identifies questions, and frames the manner by which he addresses them, in order to provoke his readers to think about problems in new ways. This distinctive framing makes it easy to dispute his conclusions but almost impossible to avoid engaging them. And to engage them, Gaddis is convinced, is to participate in the most fundamental and vital debates over national security and public policy. To paraphrase Bonnie Raitt, he gives us something to talk about.

In this regard Gaddis is most effective when he is lumping issues together rather than splitting them apart. For example, in *We Now Know*, Gaddis gave pride of place to archives released following the end of the Cold War (or at least other scholars' interpretations of those archives) to reexamine, or to split, key components of the history of the Cold War. Without minimizing its historiographic contribution, *We Now Know* does not compare to *Strategies of Containment* in influence, likely shelf life, and, perhaps most salient, buzz. Relying less on the release of archives than on reconceptualizing problems and evidence, Gaddis lumped in *Strategies*, and he lumped brilliantly. The whole far exceeded the sum of its parts. It gave us, and still gives us, something to talk about.¹

Composed of essays (revisions of the 2002 Joanna Jackson Goldman Memorial Lectures) that together total less than 120 pages of text, *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* will never take a place next to *Strategies of Containment*. What is more, because the book's most controversial "history" concerns the Bush administration, about which the jury remains out, its legs are not likely to be nearly as long as those

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of *Strategies*. Yet like *Strategies*, it provokes us to think hard, in large part because Gaddis again lumps. He might have entitled it *Strategies of Hegemony*.

Gaddis's premise, which is sound albeit overdrawn (a tactic he relies on heavily whenever lumping), is that "surprise attacks tend to sweep away old conceptions of national security and what it takes to achieve it. They bring about new—and sometimes radically different—assessments of vital interests and available capabilities."² It follows then, that America's most significant and successful grand strategists operated in environments shaped by surprise attacks. They were, or are, John Quincy Adams (on August 24, 1814, the British "attacked" the White House and the Capitol), Franklin D. Roosevelt (December 7, 1941, Pearl Harbor), and George W. Bush (September 11, 2001, the World Trade Center and the Pentagon). Gaddis takes historical liberties because he is lumping, and in *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*, the lumps are big ones. Each constitutes a century: the nineteenth (Adams), twentieth (FDR), and twenty-first (Bush). Gaddis manifestly judges George W. Bush a much better grand strategist than most of us who are critical of Bush (probably members of Historians against the War). To include "43" in this rarified pantheon of strategists will infuriate and even insult many historians of U.S. foreign relations. Gaddis is mindful of that but willing to pay the price.

Building on his first premise about the influence of surprise attacks on the strategic planning environment, he posits a second: the United States is "exceptional" because historically it responds to such attacks not by hunkering down defensively but by "taking the offensive, by becoming more conspicuous, by confronting, neutralizing, and if possible overwhelming the sources of danger rather than fleeing from them. Expansion, we have assumed, is the path to security." It enlarges, not contracts, its "sphere of responsibilities."³ Gaddis has taken a page out of William Appleman Williams's book. Not only does

the chapter cover familiar material, but in many respects it could have been written by Walter LaFeber (who, unlike Gaddis, has long been identified with championing Adams). To no SHAFR member's surprise, Gaddis's focus is almost exclusively on security and geopolitics. Nevertheless, starting with references to Benjamin Franklin's concerns about a multiplying population, Madison's Federalist No.10, and Washington's Farewell Address, Gaddis covers continental expansion and America's rise to globalism in the nineteenth century in much the same way LaFeber does. Adams is at the center of the narrative, because, as demonstrated by his support of Andrew Jackson in Florida and formulation of the Monroe Doctrine, he constructed the three essential pillars of U.S. grand strategy: preemption, unilateralism, and hegemony.

Gaddis agrees with his critics that breathtaking expansion marks the history of the United States. Nevertheless, he ignores his critics' conclusions that what drove U.S. expansion was greed, glory, racism, or efforts to forestall revolution. Gaddis's American empire was built out of fear—fear of British imperialists and Native Americans at first, second- and third-world communists later, and now, terrorists and tyrants around the globe. Of course, there is no better way to substantiate such fears than to look at surprise attacks. Here, instructively, Gaddis does not follow the narrative of popular imagination, drawing analogies between Native American attacks upon unsuspecting white settlers out West, the hidden-hand warfare of the Vietcong, and the rescue of Jessica Lynch to evoke the so-called captivity narrative. Instead, focusing on elite perceptions of fear, Gaddis places unprecedented emphasis on 1814, along with the widely discussed analogies between Pearl Harbor and 9/11. Gaddis offers not a captivity narrative, but a surprise-response narrative of the American empire.

This narrative suffers from flawed logic, reversal of cause and effect, and a quasi-mythical ideation that celebrates the mobilization

of fear rather than reassesses it. Gaddis's analogy springs from the exceptionalist assumption that "[m]ost nations" flee from danger just as "most animals do," whereas Americans respond by "taking the offensive"—a characterization that interprets empire-building as the only "civilized" response to attacks by a hostile world.⁴ Perhaps most worrisome in this context is the lack of documentary evidence to show how and when the burning of Washington led John Quincy Adams to rethink his grand strategy. While the British attacked the capital, in a war that the Americans had declared, Adams was in Ghent negotiating the peace. Based on his published diaries and the correspondence with his father, Adams's concerns focused on "boundaries, fisheries, and Indian savages." The burning of Washington never came up, and Adams was satisfied with negotiating an honorable peace without loss of any United States territory. It was the British who responded to Adams's prayers and decided not to capitalize upon their military success in Washington. They signed a less-than-perfect peace treaty in Ghent because they were preoccupied with the turmoil of the Napoleonic Wars. Even Gaddis's own source (James Chace and Caleb Carr, *America Invulnerable*) suggests that the search for absolute security led the Americans into the War of 1812 in the first place (without which there would not have been a British surprise attack on the Capitol). Thus it is not clear why the search for security should cause rather than follow expansion.⁵

The watershed leading to the next lump is Pearl Harbor. In a turn reminiscent of his borrowing from Thomas Kuhn in *Strategies of Containment*, Gaddis maintains that in light of the late nineteenth-century advances in transportation and other technologies, which influenced American expansion across the Pacific, intervention in World War I, and Wilsonianism, Adams's paradigm for a grand strategy proved remarkably resistant to change. It took the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor for the notion that U.S. security required enlarging its sphere of responsibility to take hold

among strategists, notwithstanding the enlargement that had already occurred. But Roosevelt did more than institutionalize this change; he emerges as an unexpected hero who kept his proclaimed interests in line with his actual capabilities.⁶ Appreciating the need to keep U.S. casualties to a minimum during World War II and produce a cooperative framework that would prevent conflicts among the wartime allies from erupting afterward, Roosevelt rejected Adams's unilateralism. Roosevelt also appreciated that a preemptive strike against the Soviet Union as the war wound down would undermine U.S. capabilities by dissipating allied support. Hence he repudiated that pillar as well. He retained Adams's most fundamental principle, the goal of hegemony (here Gaddis implicates Melvyn Leffler by equating hegemony with "preponderance of power"), but he added a twist. Roosevelt envisioned America becoming a hegemon by consent. Again, we wonder how Gaddis can argue that the democratization of Japan and Germany resulted from the Pearl Harbor surprise when the postwar planners were guided by lessons they drew from failures of the peace settlement after World War I and from that other, and arguably more traumatic, surprise for interwar America—the Great Depression.

Gaddis argues that Roosevelt's Cold War successors realized the vision of hegemony by consent, and praises Bush for spreading this notion behind the remaining iron curtains and velvet veils. Bush's grand strategy to foster democracy everywhere becomes the ultimate manifestation of Thomas Jefferson's "empire for liberty." We agree that it is a noble idea to call for hegemony based on consent, but did Jefferson care about the consent of 50,000 Creoles in his Louisiana Purchase? Or did Cold War presidents care much about the fallout from their rather carefully "constructed" hegemonic "consent" (having no qualms about using Marshall Plan goodies and CIA covert sticks simultaneously)? Nor is it clear that the Bush administration's dabbling in "public diplomacy" will do much

to engineer genuine consent in the Middle East or elsewhere around the globe.

By the time Gaddis reaches the chapter on the twenty-first century, then, he has constructed an unorthodox foundation for his evaluation of Bush. He contends that while Bush's critics have remained prisoners of the Roosevelt/Cold War security paradigm, in the immediate aftermath of the surprise attack of 9/11 Bush recognized the changed strategic environment (above all the salience of terrorists and erosion of the state system) and responded accordingly.

Gaddis awards the response high marks, asserting that the benefits far outweigh the costs. Not only does he compliment Bush for using force in Iraq as well as Afghanistan, but he also applauds without qualification the administration's 2002 report, "The National Security Strategy of the United States" (NSS). Rather than contravene the legacies of Adams and Roosevelt, the strategy pays homage to them by enlarging America's sphere of responsibility again and, more than anything, favoring innovation. The innovations Gaddis identifies do not include preemption (Adams's pillar). They do include the juxtaposition of unilateralism with great power cooperation. Gaddis congratulates Bush for appreciating that the great powers want the international system managed by a "benign" hegemon that shares their values. Another of the innovations Gaddis celebrates is the willingness to use force to spread democracy and, as was evident in the case of Iraq, to "shock and awe" the globe's tyrants in order to break their confidence and upset the status quo. Bush's strategy is by any definition a "grand strategy" (original emphasis), Gaddis concludes. "There'd been nothing like this in boldness, sweep, and vision since Americans took it upon themselves, more than half a century ago, to democratize Germany and Japan, thus setting in motion processes that stopped short of only a few places on earth, one of which was the Muslim Middle East."⁷

Gaddis's positive portrayal of Bush's strategy is seriously defective, at least if judged by the evidence available. Adams engineered the

Transcontinental Treaty, and the British did not challenge the Monroe Doctrine. World War II ended in triumph for the Grand Alliance, and while America's Cold War strategy did not evolve in as linear a fashion from Roosevelt's strategy as Gaddis's lump suggests, it safeguarded U.S. security. Notwithstanding the elegant conceptual simplicity of *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience*, it is premature to consider lumping Bush with Adams and Roosevelt as the catalyst for an equivalent accomplishment. What is more, Gaddis defines Bush's strategy as a success (he does concede some shortcomings, but they can be readily remedied) largely on the basis that there has not been a follow-up to 9/11. But there can be multiple reasons why a dog does not bark, and Gaddis can connect the dots only by problematic inference. Then there is his uncritical acceptance of Bush's public record, especially but not exclusively the NSS report. Gaddis maintains that preemption supplements deterrence and containment in Bush's strategy. That does not square with what happened in Iraq. The evidence is robust that deterrence and containment were working. He argues that the combination of Saddam Hussein's foot-dragging and the climatic conditions in Iraq compelled the administration to cut "a set of corners" in estimating the intelligence on weapons of mass destruction in order to avoid military operations in hot weather. He does not even acknowledge the possible politicization of the intelligence, as if such allegations do not warrant consideration. And what about Gaddis's confidence in Bush's allegiance to multilateral cooperation and his assertion that the great powers prefer American hegemony? He extrapolates from international relations theory for the latter, while for the former he relies on speeches and the NSS report. Is it viable for a historian to depend on these sources, especially when he does not account for the incorporation of "Old Europe" and "Freedom Fries" into the national vocabulary? (One wonders how Gaddis would have explained Bush's nomination of John Bolton as U.S.

representative to the UN after the book went to press.) These criticisms, moreover, do not even touch on the question of whether, Gaddis to the contrary, the costs of the invasion of Iraq will turn out to be greater than the benefits.

There is a more fundamental blemish to the chapter on Bush. Two propositions drive Gaddis's argument: Bush's grand strategy was a bold and visionary reaction to 9/11, and its fundamental goal "is to spread democracy everywhere."⁸ We have profound reservations about both. We begin with the Vulcans. The two most comprehensive examinations of Bush's strategy, *America Unbound* by Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, and Thomas Mann's *Rise of the Vulcans*, both emphasize the pivotal role played by this group of advisors during the transition. Conceived by Richard Cheney, led by Condoleezza Rice and Paul Wolfowitz, and with a membership that included Richard Armitage, Stephen Hadley, and Richard Perle, the group schooled George Bush in a set of beliefs about America's place in a dangerous world of anarchy. Prominent among these beliefs were a lack of faith in the efficacy of international institutions and the fortitude of U.S. allies, a concomitant conviction that the United States could rely on no one and nothing other than its own capabilities to protect its interests, and because of its exceptionalism, a certainty that the United States was condemned to confronting the constant threat that it would be attacked by those who resented it. The implications for strategy were inescapable. Daalder and Lindsay are right when they posit that the Bush administration had to turn "John Quincy Adams on his head" and, freed from the constraints imposed by alliances and institutions, "aggressively go abroad searching for monsters to destroy."⁹

Gaddis writes not a word about the Vulcans. Yet does it not seem that for them, and by extension Bush, 9/11 was a self-fulfilling prophecy as well as a surprise attack? Viewed in this way, 9/11 was not the cause of the new strategy so much as it was, like Pleiku in Vietnam, a streetcar that Bush's strategists hopped aboard. And

Saddam Hussein became a monster that had to be destroyed—the first on an endless list. Further, the priority placed on destroying monsters casts serious doubt on the administration's commitment to spreading democracy (Albert Wohlstetter's influence on Wolfowitz was greater than Leo Strauss's). Certainly Bush and his advisors talk the talk. Yet only *after* the tragic consequences of their initial planning (or lack thereof) for the occupation of Iraq did they begin to walk the walk. Bush, no less than Clinton or Woodrow Wilson, would like to spread democracy everywhere. But first there are all those monsters to destroy. Gaddis's musings at the end of the book seem disconcertingly close to the mark. In the interest of national security, the Bush strategy seeks not a democratic peace, but an American empire—an American imperium.

Readers of this book will be alarmed by the parallels between Gaddis's reinterpretation of the American empire and George F. Kennan's assessment of Soviet imperialism. The United States could not trust Soviet expansion into Eastern Europe, Kennan argued in his 1947 "Sources of Soviet Conduct," because it was built on "too great" a "sense of insecurity." "For ideology," wrote Kennan after his return to Washington from Moscow, "taught them that the outside world was hostile and that it was their duty eventually to overthrow the political forces beyond their borders."¹⁰

Gaddis closes his reinterpretation of the sources of United States conduct by pointing to the Founding Fathers' creation of "the most durable ideology in modern history" and to the Bush administration's strategic premise that the United States "cannot be safe as long as terrorists and tyrants remain active anywhere in the world."¹¹ Can the world trust George W. Bush? Gaddis suggests it can as long as Bush seeks not only to make the world safe for democracy but also "safe for federalism"—a proposal based on the universal acceptance of Adam Smith's utopian concept that the pursuit of self-interest will contribute to a greater collective good.¹² At issue is not only whether insecurity caused expansion or expansion caused insecurity, but also the relationship between real and

imaginary threats. The Soviets lost upwards of 25 million lives to the real hostilities of World War II—a casualty record omitted by Kennan and other American Cold War strategists and unmatched by any attack Americans ever experienced.

Walter Lippmann famously characterized the strategy of containment expressed in Kennan's "X" article as a "strategic monstrosity." Who would understand Lippmann's reasons better than John Gaddis? Yet Gaddis not only lets Bush off the hook, he also sings his praises as a grand strategist. To provoke or not to provoke, that is the question.

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Notes:

¹ John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking the Cold War* (New York, 1997); idem, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar National Security* (New York, 1982).

² Gaddis, *Surprise, Security and the American Experience* (Cambridge, MA, 2004), 37.

³ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 13.

⁵ Samuel Flagg Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1956), 211; James Chace and Caleb Carr, *America Invulnerable: The Quest for Absolute Security from 1812 to Star Wars* (New York, 1988), 34.

⁶ Gaddis, *Surprise*, 47.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 94.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 89.

⁹ Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound: The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington, DC, 2003), 13. See also James Mann, *The Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet* (New York, 2004).

¹⁰ George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," reprinted in George F. Kennan *American Diplomacy: Expanded Edition* (Chicago, orig. ed. 1951, exp. ed. 1984), 110, 111.

¹¹ Gaddis, *Surprise*, 117-18, 110.

¹² *Ibid.*, 113.

Passport Roundtable Response

John Lewis Gaddis

The response to *Surprise, Security, and the American Experience* has been, well, a surprising experience. Having dashed a draft off hastily during the summer of 2002 for a set of lectures commemorating the first anniversary of September 11th, then revised it in the aftermath of the invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003, and finally had it published early in 2004, I'd not expected all that much from this little book. But the initial reviews were laudatory; President Bush read it and inflicted it on his staff; and a follow-up lecture has been blogged throughout the known universe, most conspicuously by a swimsuit model who poses provocatively next to the commentary she runs with a view to distracting young men from acts of terrorism they might otherwise commit.¹ We are all, I'm sure, safer as a result.

It did not surprise me, however, that the response from my diplomatic history colleagues would be less enthusiastic. Lecturers must lump if audiences are to be kept awake, but this usually irritates splitters. Essays derived from lectures that cram centuries into short chapters tend to alarm them. And any book that has anything positive to say about the current administration in Washington risks absolutely infuriating them.

Knowing this, I found the *Passport* critiques a bit watery. They fret nervously about this or that, but fail to evaluate the principal argument of the book, which is that surprise attacks, to a surprising degree, have shaped American grand strategy. They confuse exposition with advocacy, assuming that if I discuss preemption I must be in favor of it. They resort to reductionism, insisting that American expansion, because aggressively pursued, cannot have been motivated by insecurity. And they fall into what appears to be an occupational hazard these days among American academics: the underestimation of leaders who are, as Winnie-the-Pooh might have said, Not Like Us. Let me

say more about each of these points.

First, confusing exposition with advocacy. This shows up right away in the Immerman-Gramer essay with their observation that "it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that [Gaddis's] goal is something (or several things) other than persuading his reader."

They go on to say that part of what drives my arguments "is a streak of iconoclasm and a desire to offer the most triumphalist narrative of the American empire." Presumably anyone who is an iconoclast or a triumphalist would be trying to persuade readers, so I am at a loss to discern my own hidden motives here – the "something (or several other things)" apart from persuasion that I am trying to accomplish.

Regarding persuasion itself, guilty as charged – although I know few historians who try to be unpersuasive. As for "triumphalism," I've never been quite sure what the word means. I'm tempted to define it as a term of opprobrium those who've lost arguments like to hurl at those who've won them – but that would no doubt also be seen as triumphalist. So I am at a loss here too.

The more serious problem comes when Immerman and Gramer say that my narrative "suffers from . . . a quasi-mythical ideation that celebrates the mobilization of fear rather than reassesses it," and that it "interprets empire-building as the only 'civilized' response to attacks by a hostile world." Puzzled by this, I checked page 13 of *Surprise*, where these offenses are alleged to have occurred. I found there no celebration but rather a generalization: that "for the United States, *safety comes from enlarging, rather than from contracting, its sphere of responsibilities.*" Whether this qualifies as a "quasi-mythical ideation" I've no idea, but I do know that the observation was intended to be neutral, rather like acknowledging the ubiquity of gravity. It was not meant to imply that enlargement – or gravity – is, or is not, a good thing.

Throughout the rest of their commentary, Immerman and Gramer continue to assume that whenever I describe something, I approve of it – a path they themselves certainly do not follow. One of their claims is that

I "applaud without qualification" the 2002 Bush administration National Security Strategy statement, and that I "[do] not even acknowledge the possible politicization of the intelligence [on Iraq], as if such allegations do not warrant consideration."

Well, *Surprise* is a short book, so it seems strange that Immerman and Gramer appear not to have made it to pages 95-107, where there is a detailed critique of the NSS and the way in which the strategy it articulates was put into effect in Iraq. I cite an "obvious failure" to gain multilateral consent, a military buildup that "was creating its own problems," "alarming [intelligence] assessments . . . [that] seemed strained at the time and have proven since to be wrong," a "coalition of the willing" that turned out to be "more of a joke than a reality," and the fact that "within little more than a year and a half, the United States exchanged its long-established reputation as the principal stabilizer of the international system for one as its chief destabilizer." Plain English can hardly be plainer.

Heiss too seems to have missed these pages, finding that I have neglected the implications of the Bush administration's "apparent crusaderism, a subject that other historians have addressed quite fruitfully." Rotter, in contrast, acknowledges my criticisms, but notes that what lingers after finishing the book is its "unabashed paean to military service and patriotism" and my "apparent admiration for the 'grandness' of Bush's strategy."

I make no apologies whatever for praising military service and patriotism. As for "grandness," I think we ought to be able to acknowledge that the Bush strategy is indeed "grand" – in the sense of being ambitious, comprehensive, and a dramatic departure from what immediately preceded it – while still reserving judgment about its ultimate results.² A careful reading of *Surprise* will show that that is what it tries to do.

A second claim that shows up in these commentaries, most clearly again in Immerman and Gramer, is that American expansionism could

not have been both aggressive and motivated by fear. I ignore, they say, the conclusion of critics “that what drove U.S. expansion was greed, glory, racism, or efforts to forestall revolution.” Instead I insist that the American empire “was built out of fear – fear of British imperialists and Native Americans at first, second- and third-world communists later, and now, terrorists and tyrants around the globe.” And, they add, I fail to follow “the narrative of popular imagination, drawing analogies between Native American attacks on unsuspecting white settlers out West, the hidden-hand warfare of the Vietcong, and the rescue of Jessica Lynch to evoke the so-called captivity narrative.”

Guilty for sure on that last point, and it's a good thing too, because had I attempted this linkage between Native Americans, the Vietcong, and Jessica Lynch, my readers would have been as puzzled as I as to what Immerman and Gramer mean for it to accomplish. With respect to their more substantive point, why can't empires be built on greed, glory, racism, attempts to suppress revolution – and perceptions of insecurity? Even a superficial reading in the history of empires would suggest the presence of all these attitudes. “Fear,” Thucydides has the Athenians tell the Spartans, “was our chief motive, though afterwards we thought, too, of our own honor and our own interest. . . . And we were not the first to act in this way.”³

I made it a point to acknowledge, in *Surprise* (p. 33), that “[l]ike most nations, we got to where we are by means that we cannot today, in their entirety, comfortably condone.” But I also suggested that “before we too quickly condemn how our ancestors dealt with such problems,” we might ask ourselves: “What would we have done if we had been in their place then? And, even scarier, how comfortable will our descendants be with the choices we make today?” Both are important, though difficult, questions. I regret that none of the *Passport* reviewers attempted to answer them.

Although the September 11th attacks provided the occasion for the lectures that became this book – and for the

grand strategic revolution it attempts to describe – none of the commentaries devote more than cursory attention to the events of that day and their larger implications. Rotter even claims, erroneously, that the Bush administration responded with “preemptive strikes on Afghanistan” – a strange way to describe actions taken while the debris from attacks orchestrated in that country was still being cleared away in New York, Washington, and rural Pennsylvania. Anyone who lived through these horrors, or near them, or even witnessed them from afar, should have no difficulty understanding how citizens of the most powerful state in the world can, under certain circumstances, fear for their lives. To claim otherwise is to suffer from much shorter memories than historians are supposed to have.

Finally, a thread that runs through all of these commentaries is one that is all too prevalent in the academy these days: it is that we must never ever say anything good about George W. Bush. Either he is the puppet of his advisers, as Immerman and Gramer suggest, or he is following “an essentially unilateralist policy of preemption and world hegemony that many . . . find troubling in the extreme,” as Heiss insists, or before attempting to conduct foreign policy he must free the United States from “repression, race and gender discrimination, nagging inequality and poverty, and a policy of remanding terror suspects to regimes certain to torture them,” as Rotter concludes.

Leave aside that Rotter's standard would abolish foreign policy altogether, thereby putting SHAFR out of business. The other two allegations are, for an American diplomatic historian of advancing years otherwise known as “Pop,” more than vaguely familiar. I can certainly recall hearing them made of Dwight D. Eisenhower and Ronald Reagan, both of whom historians now treat with much greater respect than when they were in office. One of the *Passport* commentators even contributed significantly to the Eisenhower reassessment. A lemming-like rush to judgment on President Bush, therefore, seems unwise. It is much

too soon to say for sure how history—as opposed to today's historians—will regard him.

Surprise, Security, and the American Experience was not meant to be the definitive word on that or any other subject: I called it (p. 5) a presumptuous but necessary speculation on recent history. I reserve the right to change my mind about what I've said, as I have in other books I've written. As Immerman and Gramer correctly point out (although I had not made the Bonnie Raitt connection), it's meant to start a discussion, not to try to end one.

I do think, though, that in order to have such a conversation, we need to listen to one another more carefully – and also to our students, from among whom the historians will come who will write the definitive histories of our times. We need to remind ourselves that even with such exchanges, the SHAFR membership imperfectly mirrors the country whose foreign policy it studies. And we'd do well to be cautious, even open-minded, in evaluating national leaders, lest we find ourselves – again – surprised.

Finally I suppose all of us should admit, in all candor, that none of us really knows what the hell John Quincy Adams would have made of all this.

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Notes:

¹ http://www.gabriellereillyweekly.com/gabriele_reilly/Professor_john_gaddis/John_lewis_gaddock.htm.

² For an updated criticism of the Bush grand strategy, see John Lewis Gaddis, “Bush and the World: Grand Strategy in the Second Term,” *Foreign Affairs*, 84(January/February, 2005), 2-15.

³ Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, 1: 75-76.

A Russian-American Scholarly Exchange on the Second World War

Christopher Phelps

Gusting winds, snow, ice, and subzero temperatures greeted American scholars arriving in Moscow for a March 2005 conference on World War II as seen by Russians and Americans. The bracing weather provided a persuasive demonstration of why it had been so fateful for Hitler's invading armies to become ensnared in the bitter Russian winter.

Convened on the sixtieth anniversary of the war's end and sponsored by the Center for American Studies of the Russian State University for the Humanities (RSUH), the two-day conference brought together six American presenters, six Russian scholars, and three Russian graduate students, along with an eclectic audience of American émigrés and Russian students and scholars. Excellent simultaneous translation was provided in both languages through headsets.

Given the wartime Grand Alliance between the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain, a commemorative meeting of intellectuals from two of the victorious allies might have been expected to gravitate toward triumphal celebration, but the conversation proved wide-ranging and self-reflective. Three themes emerged: the war in patriotic and transnational imaginations; questions of technology, war, and culture; and the moral character of the Second World War.

John Dailey, senior advisor to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, was among those who spoke of patriotism in the memory and experience of war. In distinguishing patriotism from nationalism, he held that nationalism, which motivated Nazism, was exclusive and aggressive, while patriotism was inclusive, allowing all citizens to contribute. As examples of the latter, he cited American women who went to work in defense plants and feats of Soviet industrial reorganization during the

"Great Patriotic War."

Alexander Logunov of RSUH spoke to complications arising from the use of Victory Day in Russia to legitimate authoritarian state leadership, not merely to commemorate the war. However, Elena Senyavskaya, a scholar at the Institute of Russian History in the Russian Academy of Science, held that in the 1990s, politically motivated "democratic journalists" had destroyed heroic myths, symbols, and memorials in the name of anti-Stalinism, damaging ordinary citizens' capacity for patriotic belief. She argued that historians had a moral obligation to restore pride about the war in Russian national consciousness.

In poignant internationalist contrast were remarks from the sole war veteran in attendance, RSUH's Georgij Knabi. With medals displayed on his chest, the 85-year-old distinguished professor recounted his participation in the battle of Moscow at the age of 21. He recalled marching with his friends through the city, singing German political anthems to convey that their fight was with Nazi barbarism, not Germany or German culture. In October 1941, with the Nazi lines just miles away, he and his student cohort insisted upon being allowed to serve in the city's defense. Provided with a "wholly inadequate" Canadian musket from 1898, Knabi was wounded during the battle and was unable to take part in the Red Army's eventual advancement westward.

Several speakers focused upon technology and the culture of war. In a multimedia presentation on tanks as an illustration of the "opposition of mentalities," Aleksey Kilinichenkov of RSUH examined the introduction of the Panzer V in 1943 as indicative of differing national approaches to technological development. German engineers, seeking superior design, created a tank that was better than

its Soviet, British, and American competitors in numerous respects. However, in their pursuit of perfection the Germans rethought the entire tank. Production slowed because the new tank required the retooling of assembly lines from top to bottom. American and Soviet engineers simply modified their existing tank designs, thereby rapidly eliminating the German advantage.

From the floor, RSUH vice-rector Natalia Basovskaya whimsically noted that the lack of interior space in Soviet tanks implied a lack of concern for the comfort of the soldiers, itself an indication of Russian mentality.

Alexander Gayevsky, RSUH graduate student, demonstrated several Russian computer games about the Second World War. He noted that Russian game producers were not averse to including swastikas on the tail of German planes, a detail erased by programmers at Microsoft, a company "known for its pacifism." Despite this attempt to claim popular culture for academic inquiry, most of the Russian scholars present appeared skeptical, if not derisive, about the historical value of computer war games.

On the final day of the conference, the conversation turned to a vigorous discussion of the moral character of the war. RSUH graduate student Sergey Mruz invoked his aunt, a sniper in the war, and implored his generation to adopt a reverential stance toward the memory of the war. Peter Hahn of The Ohio State University provided a thorough overview of American diplomatic efforts for the duration of the Grand Alliance, exploring Allied tensions as well as commonalities. His comprehensive presentation yielded questions about the propriety of the Yalta agreement and the decision to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Irwin Weil of Northwestern University and RSUH, a convener

of the conference, maintained with passion that the unique moral horror of the Nazi campaign of “extermination” should be given a special primacy, since that was what unified those fighting to defeat it. Others, however, both Russian and American, stated that knowledge of the Holocaust was widespread only at the conclusion of the war, and pointed out that the United States was initially slow to act against Hitler or to defend European Jewry. They cited Studs Terkel’s decision to put the phrase “The Good War” in quotation marks, not only because of the horrors inherent in war but because of the internment of Japanese Americans, the prevalence of Jim Crow racial segregation in the 1940s American South and U.S. military, and the “total war” targeting of civilian populations by the Allied as well as the Axis powers.

This exchange transpired against a background of increasingly strained official relations between the United States and Russia. One week earlier, Russian President Vladimir Putin and American President George W. Bush, at a summit in Bratislava, had chided each other about their respective backtrackings from democracy. The conference dialogue, by contrast, did

not polarize by nationality. Among Russian scholars there were many differences in political and interpretive judgment—and so, too, among the Americans.

All the same, the conference highlighted distinctive national styles of scholarship. Russian presentations were often emotive, tapping letters and memories of relatives who fought in the war. This tendency suggests that the Second World War remains a raw wound for Russians, who sacrificed twenty million lives, more than it does for Americans, who lost half a million lives. Russian scholars were far more likely to be concerned with the guarding of memorials, myths, and symbols.

American presenters’ style was less nationalistic, more critical, and (somewhat paradoxically) more objective. They focused upon event-centered narratives and evaluation. They were more likely than the Russian participants to mention the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939-1941 and the dictatorial character of the Stalinist state, as well as to express doubts about measures taken by the United States government in the course of the war.

Some participants sought directly to illuminate such cultural differences.

Anthony Brown of Brigham Young University shared his survey of American and Russian students. Asked to name significant Russian historical or cultural figures, Americans tended to list Lenin and Stalin. Russians, by contrast, listed Pushkin and Peter the Great.

Further intellectual and cultural exchange is indispensable for bridging such perceptual divides. A truly international conference on the Second World War, bringing together Japanese, German, Polish, Italian, Finnish, Ethiopian, and British scholars as well as Russians and Americans, might yield even more interesting results. A world war, it is clear, requires a global scholarship.

Christopher Phelps is Associate Professor of History at The Ohio State University at Mansfield. At the conference, he presented a paper entitled “The American Left, the Second World War, and the ‘Russian Question.’” He expresses gratitude to Elena Smetanina of RSUH’s American Center for her superb organizational work, and to RSUH students Olesya Sukonnikova and Matvey Dzyuba for guiding him to Red Square and beyond. Scholars wishing to obtain information about further activities of the RSUH’s American Center should write to amcenter@rsuh.ru.

Balancing Teaching and Researching

John McNay

Mitch Lerner’s recommendation in a recent *Passport* that SHAFR devote more attention to historians who do not work at major research universities was a welcome note to those of us working at institutions where there are heavy teaching loads.

The job market has been poor for diplomatic historians for many years, and as a result there are very good historians in small colleges and branch campuses all over the country. One need only scan the list of home institutions of presenters at the SHAFR annual meetings to realize

that many people remain productive despite the demands for teaching and service at smaller colleges.

Because I have published and been active in SHAFR while teaching at Raymond Walters College, a suburban branch campus of the University of Cincinnati, Lerner asked if I might have some advice on how to stay active, publish, and meet the demands of teaching and service at a small college. I certainly do not have a simple solution, since I routinely struggle with this problem. I can, however, offer some suggestions, and I hope most of what will follow will

be useful to anyone who would like to publish more, regardless of the nature of their institution.

In order to write a more useful piece I consulted with two SHAFR colleagues who have been productive and active in the profession while working at institutions where the teaching demands are greater than at major research institutions. Phil Nash teaches at Penn State-Shenango, a branch campus near Pittsburgh. Robert Shaffer teaches at Shippensburg University, a state college in south central Pennsylvania. Both of them have been generous with their

experience and suggestions. Because I am incorporating their views with my own, they must share credit for what follows, while any blame should be attached to me alone (or to Lerner).

One way in which almost everyone can be more productive is to make full use of time off. Most historians, no matter where they work, get plenty of time off between school years. During the school year, those of us who have heavier teaching loads and greater demands on our time find research and writing almost impossible. Summer, spring break, and even winter break all provide opportunities to make progress on a project.

Another way to be more productive is to have an efficient research design. There are many great projects that ask really interesting questions, but the difficulty of actually doing the research makes them impractical, especially with a heavy teaching load and a small research budget. In addition, beginning with an idea and then trying to find relevant archival sources is like looking for the proverbial needle in a haystack. To maximize productivity, the best idea is to seek out an unexploited or inadequately exploited archival collection. Get to know the archivist. Start with the archives first, see what the documents have to say, and then develop an idea. Narrow the focus to decrease the number of archival sources that must be examined. This is not meant to discourage historians from considering big questions or thinking "outside the box," but those who have serious demands on their time and energy and are still hoping for tenure and/or promotion must focus, focus, focus. What the profession really needs, in any event, are good solid monographs rather than sweeping Braudelian interpretations.

It is a good idea to make the most of work that is already done before moving on to another project. Some people leave their dissertations sitting around for years. When asked why, they often reply that "it isn't a book." That might be true, but the first step to making a dissertation into a book is getting it into a publisher's hands and having peers suggest ways to revise it. Manuscript reviews at university

presses are very valuable. Use the process. Those who have unpublished dissertations can also mine the larger work for smaller pieces that can be published as articles without doing damage to the publication potential of the dissertation. Once the work for one paper is done, look for ways to expand on the topic rather than launching into a new field.

Send papers to a broad range of journals. Rejections happen, but the odds of being published increase with the number of journals targeted. Aiming for just the top tier of journals is risking great disappointment. As the number of academic journals shrinks, it is critical to make use of the full range of available publishing opportunities.

It is also a good idea to submit papers for conferences. By presenting at conferences scholars can increase their exposure, get an audience for unpublished work, and elicit valuable criticism. In addition, journal editors often express an interest in publishing papers they have heard. The essay will still need to go through review, but it is very helpful to have an editor who is favorably disposed to a paper.

Those of us who are employed at institutions where the primary objective is teaching have the option of writing about teaching-related issues: how textbooks and curricula have changed over the years, how to engage students in writing and critical thinking exercises, or good primary sources to use in class. Many colleges

that stress teaching have funding for this work, and some have centers that concentrate on the scholarship of teaching, like the Center for Learning and Teaching at my institution.

Getting funding for discipline-based research can be a serious problem for those who work at a teaching institution. Those at branch campuses should make full use of available main-campus funding opportunities. But once again, creative approaches are important. I was recently awarded a small grant from the Cincinnati chapter of the English-Speaking Union to conduct some research on a project at the Public Record Office in London. The grant was not large enough to cover expenses, so I approached my dean about matching it. She did, and the combined monies provided enough funding for the trip. The lesson is to consider all options for funding.

Finally, despite the pressure and desire to publish, find time to enjoy your career. Have a life. Value your students. Getting away from the documents and the footnotes can allow you to return with a fresher perspective. Having previously had a career in the world outside academia, I can vouch for how fortunate we are to be serving the public in this profession.

John McNay is Assistant Professor of History at Raymond Walters College, University of Cincinnati.

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Encounters and Other People's Mail: Teaching the History of U.S. Foreign Relations

Richard Werking

In the mid-1980s, when he was president of the American Association for Higher Education, Russell Edgerton offered this valuable insight: we measure our success as educators, and our successes as educational institutions, on the basis of the quality of the encounters we arrange.¹

Edgerton's metaphor has helped me articulate what I believe a college education should be. In addition to encounters with professors I would include encounters with other students and with a wide variety of people, ideas, experiences, and contexts, nonacademic as well as academic. Among these might be encounters in laboratories, on athletic fields, and on debate teams; encounters with scholars through their writings, and with historical actors through their writings and other

legacies.

In 1985 William Appleman Williams demonstrated the value of this last type of encounter when he described how he involved his students in what he called "doing History." "I always send undergraduates as well as graduate students off into the bowels of the library to read other people's mail," Williams wrote. "Students return from such trips into the unknown ecstatic, engaged, and confused. . . . The play of the mind with the evidence. The coming to terms with causes and consequences. The joy of making one's own sense of the documents. . . . That is doing History."²

Edgerton and Williams offer articulate and useful reminders of what good educators do. Yet it could be said that they are not telling us anything new. After all, college

teachers of history have always wanted their students to obtain a basic knowledge of what happened, when, why, through whose agency, and what it all means. Most of us have given considerable thought to arranging encounters for our students, although we may not have thought of our teaching in these terms. We have considered what we want our students to confront, contemplate, and analyze: their classmates' ideas and assumptions, as well as their own; our lectures and our other words of wisdom; and the books, articles, films, and other documents we assign to them, as well as others that they discover on their own as part of their research. Long before the verb and adverb came to be packaged as the compound noun "critical thinking," we wanted our students to think critically and to articulate their thoughts more

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clearly.

On the other hand, reminders such as these from Edgerton and Williams can be very useful indeed. They prompt us to recall some of the fundamentals and, sometimes, to adapt them to new technologies and new generations of students. In my courses over the years I have given more thought to the books and other documents, especially primary sources and visual resources, that I want my students to confront and wrestle with just as they confront my ideas and those of their peers. In addition to what the students and I do in the classroom, I have come to place considerable emphasis on what they do outside of class, particularly work that takes them beyond assigned readings into what Williams called other people's mail.

Learning How Others Teach

For the most part we have acquired our teaching practices and skills through our individual efforts. When we begin our careers we often take as points of reference the examples provided by the good (and not-so-good) teachers we encountered as students. Subsequently we rely on the occasional conversation at a professional conference (what historian David Pace, perhaps too unappreciatively, has recently termed "haphazardly shared folk wisdom"³) and, if we are lucky, on the productive discussions that occur in some of our history departments on a fairly formalized basis. Our teaching roles contrast sharply with our role as scholars. We are trained to conduct research, we usually profit greatly from the work of others who have gone before, and we are eager to publish our results. But as college teachers we tend not to publish much information about our teaching, and consequently there is relatively little information readily available.⁴ Diplomatic historian Ken Bain, in his new book *What the Best College Teachers Do*, spells out the consequences of this neglect: "Teaching is one of those human endeavors that seldom benefits from its past. Great teachers emerge, they touch the lives of their students, and perhaps only through some of

those students do they have any influence on the broad art of teaching. For the most part, their insights die with them, and subsequent generations must discover anew the wisdom that drove their practices."⁵ This is hardly a situation we would wish to see prevail in historical research and writing.

Nevertheless, this contrast between the record of our scholarship and that of our teaching is understandable. In-depth research, particularly when combined with the act of laying out the results for the scrutiny of peers, tends to make us expert on a particular topic. As researchers we can usually speak with authority about our interpretations of events. When it comes to teaching, however, relatively few of us believe that we have the same kind of expertise. We have faith in our practices for our colleges and our students, but for the most part we probably do not consider our experiences sufficiently generalizable to write them up and share them with our colleagues elsewhere.

Those SHAFR members who would like to learn more about what their colleagues teach and how they teach it will likely be interested in two recent developments. One is SHAFR's "syllabus initiative," begun last year, which makes syllabi available on our association's website. As William Cronon wrote in 1986, "the next best thing to asking someone how they teach is to look at the syllabi they hand out to students."⁶ We on SHAFR's Teaching Committee strongly encourage you to submit your syllabi to the SHAFR website.⁷ We also would like this enterprise to expand beyond syllabi to include assignments and other useful descriptions, which should illuminate the physiology of our courses along with their anatomy.

In addition to the syllabus initiative, the Teaching Committee has in fact asked SHAFR members what they teach and how they teach it via the recent Survey on Teaching. The purpose of the survey was to obtain information about what courses SHAFR members are offering on the history of U.S. foreign relations and how they are teaching them. By "how" we meant what materials (books,

articles, audiovisual productions, other documents, etc.) teachers require students to read or view, what kinds of assignments they make, and how teachers and students use their time together in class. Some 150 SHAFR members responded, providing data on more than 300 courses. A full analysis of the survey will take many months, perhaps years, but the committee expects to provide some of the survey results in the December 2005 issue of *Passport*.

SHAFR Conference Program

A few months ago, the Teaching Committee thought it would be useful to schedule a program on teaching at the 2005 annual conference. We wanted to do several things: 1) encourage discussion about teaching among our colleagues; 2) get ideas from those in attendance about how they believe SHAFR might be able to contribute to their teaching; 3) inform colleagues about what the Teaching Committee is planning and get their reactions; and 4) provide some preliminary results from the survey of teaching conducted this past spring. The program took place on Friday, June 24. Five members of the committee were on hand, and there were fifty-five attendees.

Committee chair Mark Gilderhus welcomed the audience and outlined the organization of the program. The committee members then briefly summarized their own approaches to teaching. For example, Mitch Lerner described in some detail techniques that he uses to enliven the classroom because he cannot expect all of his students to love history the way he does. These include music as students come into and leave class and a different tie carefully selected to fit the topic for each day. Lerner also noted that he often tells his students, "There's no such thing as a wrong answer, just one that's insufficiently supported." In her classes, Catherine Forslund emphasizes her own "enthusiasm and honesty" and reminds students that they too are historians. Carol Adams observed that a large number of courses students take are of the more general survey variety, and that it is important to make the history of

foreign relations an integral part of these. Some of the points I made at the session are outlined in the first few paragraphs above.

One member of the audience expressed concern that the higher education departments on our campuses are failing to help prepare people for teaching at the university level. Mark Gilderhus agreed, saying that we tend to model our performance on the good teachers that we have had. He added that his university, Texas Christian, is one of the few he knows of that offers a course on university teaching.

Another teacher in the audience advocated reviewing oneself. He asks his audiovisual center staff to make a video of him every couple of years, and he reviews several years' worth of these. Other suggestions from the audience included keeping a teaching journal and asking students on the final exam how they would have designed the course differently.⁸ As for the discussion about how SHAFR might help with teaching, there were a number of comments from the audience advocating sharing various teaching tips at SHAFR conferences and including information about what course materials are being used.

Straws in the Wind?

As the size of the audience at our June 24 program might suggest, it appears that teachers of American diplomatic history are becoming more interested in sharing information about their teaching with other practitioners, and there seems to be some interest in building a professional infrastructure to support teaching in this field. As further evidence I would point to a number of straws in the wind: 1) in the April 2004 issue of *Passport*, Mitch Lerner's provocative Last Word column advocating more emphasis in SHAFR on teaching; 2) soon afterward, SHAFR president Mark Stoler's creation of a SHAFR Task Force on Teaching, since renamed the Teaching Committee; 3) the Mark Gilderhus and Mark Stoler columns in *Passport* last August and December, respectively, speaking to teaching issues; 4) Robert Shaffer's very interesting and useful article for

last December's *Passport*, describing how his students reacted to books by Nick Cullather and Samuel Flagg Bemis in his classes (one member of the Teaching Committee has already followed Shaffer's suggestion and used Cullather's book, with very good results); 5) in January the SHAFR Council's action funding a graduate assistant at The Ohio State University to help launch a web version of the survey; 6) the survey itself, made available both on paper, in the April 2005 issue of *Passport*, and on the web at <http://www.shaftr.org/index.htm>.

Another indication of a growing interest in the teaching of history, coming from the broader historical profession, is a review article in last October's *American Historical Review*. The tone of David Pace's article can be inferred from its title: "The Amateur in the Operating Room: History and the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning."⁹ Interest in the subject of teaching is also visible across higher education more generally. The National Survey of Student Engagement, conducted by researchers at Indiana University, is growing significantly, as is its companion, the Faculty Survey of Student Engagement. Since its inception in 2000, the NSSE has been administered to more than 850 colleges and universities, institutions that account for approximately two-thirds of all undergraduates enrolled in four-year schools. The findings of NSSE and FSSE are part of a growing body of higher education research that emphasizes the importance of several factors that many of us can appreciate, including an "academically rigorous curriculum, . . . challenging writing assignments," and "undergraduate research experiences."¹⁰

Two related conclusions drawing upon this body of research come from Professor George Kuh of Indiana University, chief architect and administrator of the NSSE survey: 1) "What counts most in terms of desired outcomes of college is what students do during college, not who they are or even where they go to college. . . .The time and energy students devote to educationally purposeful activities is the single best predictor of their learning and personal development."¹¹

2) "On balance, students do pretty much what their teachers expect and require them to do."¹²

In light of these findings and conclusions it is worth contemplating the mix of elements that makes for students' educational success in our own institutions, from the generally accepted characteristics of student ability and motivation to high expectations and academically demanding assignments from faculty.

Richard Hume Werking is Library Director and Professor of History at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis.

This guest column on teaching is the first of what the Teaching Committee hopes will be a regular and long-lived series in Passport. We encourage your submissions and would like to see them reflect a wide array of views, ranging from the most traditional to the unimaginably innovative, about what teachers of the history of U.S. foreign relations have found useful for themselves and for their students learning within the context of this vital subject.¹³

Notes

¹ Quoted in Paul G. Pearson, "Powerful Encounters: Defining and Achieving Excellence," in *The State of the University* (Oxford, OH, 1986), 3. Pearson was President of Miami University, and this essay was his address to the University Senate.

² William Appleman Williams, "Thoughts on the Fun and Purpose of Being an American Historian," *Organization of American Historians Newsletter* 13 (February 1985), 2-3. Emphasis in the original.

³ David Pace, "The Amateur in the Operating Room: History and the Scholarship of Teaching and Learning," *American Historical Review* 109 (October 2004), 1172. See also Mark Gilderhus, "The Last Word," *Passport* 35 (August 2004), 55.

⁴ William Cronon, "History Behind Classroom Doors: Teaching the American Past," *The History Teacher* 19 (February 1986), 201.

⁵ Ken Bain, *What the Best College Teachers Do* (Cambridge, MA, 2004), 3.

⁶ Cronon, "History Behind Classroom Doors," 201-2.

⁷ Mark Gilderhus, Texas Christian

University, chair; Carol Jackson Adams, Ottawa University; Catherine Forslund, Rockford College; Mitchell Lerner, The Ohio State University Newark; John McNay, University of Cincinnati; Richard Werking, U.S. Naval Academy; and Thomas Zeiler, University of Colorado.

⁸ One of the most worthwhile assignments I have experienced was in John Smail's course on Southeast Asian history at Wisconsin. The graduate students had a choice of either writing the typical research paper or developing a syllabus for a course on Southeast Asian history and then meeting with the professor for an hour one-on-one to discuss it at the end of the semester. The syllabus option was a most interesting, challenging, and useful assignment.

⁹ Pace, "The Amateur in the Operating Room," 1171-1192.

¹⁰ George D. Kuh, Thomas F. Nelson Laird, and Paul D. Umbach, "Aligning Faculty Activities and Student Behavior: Realizing the Promise of Greater Expectations," *Liberal Education*, 24-25. See also Association of American Colleges and Universities, *Greater Expectations: A New Vision for Learning as a Nation Goes to College* (Washington, D.C., 2002).

¹¹ George D. Kuh, "The National Survey of Student Engagement: Conceptual Framework and Overview of Psychometric Properties," available at www.indiana.edu/~nsse [accessed July 5, 2005], 1.

¹² Kuh et al., "Aligning Faculty Activities," 26. See also John Biggs, "What the Student Does: Teaching for Enhanced Learning," *Higher Education Research & Development*, 18, #1 (1999), 57-75, and Ross Douthat's regretful conclusion about his own education: "Harvard was easy because almost no one was pushing back." Douthat, "The Truth About Harvard," *The Atlantic Monthly*, 295 (March 2005), 99.

¹³ For example, two historians have recently published highly pertinent pieces about college teaching that offer quite different perspectives. See Roy Rosenzweig, "Digital Archives Are a Gift of Wisdom to Be Used Wisely," and Patrick Allitt, "Professors, Stop Your Microchips," *Chronicle of Higher Education*, June 24, 2005, B20-24, B38-39. (The entire section is entitled "10 Techniques to Change Your Teaching," *Chronicle*, B1-43.)

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"The Lessons of Independence: How the Algerian Crisis Shaped Early American Identity," *Diplomatic History* 28:3 (June 2004), 297-319

Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize:

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Remember the Roster!

Brian Etheridge

For many years, the SHAFR Roster and Research List has been a vital tool for locating colleagues or identifying fellow members working on a particular topic. Published several times in paper format in the 1980s and 1990s, the Roster and Research List was recast in electronic format in the late 1990s under the very able direction of Professor Amy Staples of Middle Tennessee State University. Recently, SHAFR Council appointed me the Roster and Research List Coordinator with the charge to redesign the electronic Roster and Research List, to make it more user friendly, and to work with Blackwell Publishing to integrate the Roster and Research List with the SHAFR membership/ mailing list that Blackwell maintains under its contract with SHAFR.

At the recent SHAFR meeting in College Park, we unveiled the redesigned roster as part of our new **Member Services** site. In revisiting the roster and brainstorming about ways to make it more effective, Eric Hall at Blackwell and I decided that it made more sense to package the roster with other services to which SHAFR members are entitled but of which few are aware. Now located on SHAFR's website under **Member Services**, the Roster and Research List has become part of a clearly defined and easily accessible package of services offered to SHAFR members. At this new site, members can perform the following tasks:

- search for fellow members by name, home institution, location, research interests, or keywords;
- link to *Diplomatic History* online and read the latest issue, search the journal archive, and read submission guidelines;
- access the latest issue of *Passport*;
- and renew SHAFR membership securely online.

For those who missed the annual meeting and Blackwell's excellent slide show on the new site, we thought it wise to recount the major points below. (Blackwell also sent out a letter recently to all SHAFR members outlining some of the instructions; alternatively, the registration instructions are on the website itself. Members who fail to take advantage of these services will have only themselves to blame!)

Registering to use the site is simple. In the past, access to the roster and *Diplomatic History* required different usernames and passwords. This is no longer the case. Now one username enables access to all the privileges of SHAFR membership. To register, simply visit the SHAFR Website Registration Page at <http://www.shaf-members.org>. Make sure that you have handy your SHAFR Membership Number, which can be found in a number of places, most notably the carrier sheet that accompanies your journal. Enter it, along with a

username, password, password hint, and e-mail address of your choice, and you are finished. It's that easy. You now have access to the complete range of features on the site, including *Diplomatic History* and the roster. You will not have to register again, but you will need to revalidate your password at each visit. You can also bookmark this page to save time on future visits.

The roster itself has also undergone a significant upgrade. The previous roster software did not allow information sharing between Blackwell's membership database (Eclipse) and the roster. In other words, updates provided on the roster did not reach the database (i.e. the mailing list) and information given to the Blackwell membership team did not affect the roster. The result was confusion and often multiple roster listings for the same individual. The new technology ensures that this will not take place and that the two will "talk" to each other on a daily basis. But they will do so according to the wishes of the individual member. For example, a member who wishes to receive his/her journal at home can maintain his/her institutional address on the roster.

Regrettably, a casualty of this upgrade was that information on the old roster was lost. To ensure that the roster fulfills its potential, members must take a few moments to modify their roster information. After logging in, please select "amending your profile" on the left, verify your contact information (and modify it if necessary), type in your publications and previous courses, and finally select your geographical, chronological, and topical areas of interest. You can select multiple entries by holding down the control key. This should only take a few minutes. Once you have amended your profile, you not only will have created an entry that will serve as your public face to the rest of the membership, but also will have strengthened the organization by making the roster more complete.

Members owe Eric Hall and the web services team at Blackwell a debt of gratitude for their hard work in transforming the old electronic roster into a full-fledged **member services** site. SHAFR also owes thanks to graduate students Bob Lay and Madeline Moore for their help in generating the geographical, chronological, and topical lists. Together, we've done as much as we can; now it's up to SHAFR members to help the new site realize its potential!

Brian Etheridge is Assistant Professor of History at Louisiana Tech University. Members with questions or concerns should contact him at briane@latech.edu or Blackwell Customer Service at membership@bos.blackwellpublishing.com.

26th Annual U.S. Foreign Affairs Doctoral Dissertation List

Edward A. Goedeken

SECTION I

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

A. Arms Control, Arms Race, and Antiwar Efforts

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SECTION III

REGIONS

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- Bricker, Calvin Lee. "Beer Wars: A Theoretical Examination of the Epistemic Community in the Canada-US Trade Disputes on Beer," University of Alberta (Canada), 2003 (PS), DANQ 82084, Jan. 2004.

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- Blase, Julie Melissa. "Has Globalization Changed U.S. Federalism? The Increasing Role of U.S. States in Foreign Affairs," University of Texas at Austin, 2003 (PS), DA 3117854, Je. 2004.
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- Belloni, Roberto. "Scramble for Bosnia: International Intervention for Post-Settlement Peacebuilding," University of Denver, 2003 (PS), DA 3108673, Apr. 2004.
- Johnson, Rebecca Jennifer. "Contentious Collaboration: Explaining Great Power Cooperation in the Balkans," Georgetown University, 2003 (PS), DA 3093232, Dec. 2003.

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- Grubbs, Larry Benjamin. "*Literally a Continent to Win: The United States, Development, and the Cold War in Africa, 1961-1963,*" University of South Carolina, 2003, DA 3084787, Sept. 2003.
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
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The syllabus initiative on the SHAFR website is designed as a teaching resource for SHAFR's membership and friends. It contains a repository of syllabi submitted by SHAFR members from their own courses which may be used as a reference by those preparing to teach foreign relations history. The syllabi are organized by graduate and undergraduate courses, and then subdivided by the type of course (e.g. chronological, thematic).

Syllabus Initiative
@
www.shafr.org

Please consider contributing your syllabi to this valuable database. This project will provide a useful resource only if members of SHAFR are willing to share their syllabi with the broader community. To submit a syllabus, email it as an attachment to webmaster@shafr.org, or mail a paper copy to the SHAFR Business Office, 106 Dulles Hall, 230 W. 17th Avenue, Columbus, Ohio 43210.




In the Next Issue...

Bob Buzzcano on
Remembering the
Vietnam War

History and
the Intelligence
Community

Doing Research in
Canada and Europe

And More!



SHAFR Council Meeting

Friday, June 24, 2005
11:15 am-12:45 pm
University of Maryland Inn and Conference Center
College Park, Maryland

Present: David L. Anderson (Presiding), Frank Costigliola, Brian Etheridge, Peter L. Hahn, Mary Ann Heiss, T. Christopher Jespersen, Scott Laderman, Melvyn P. Leffler, Fredrik Logevall, James Matray, Josip Mocnik, Anna K. Nelson, Arnold Offner, Robert Robinson, Robert Schulzinger, Mark A. Stoler, J. Samuel Walker, Sara Wilson, Ted Wilson, Randall Woods

Business Items

1. Motion to establish SHAFR Travel to Collections Grants program

In a motion circulated in advance of the meeting, Matray and Hahn proposed that Council authorize a new SHAFR Travel to Collections Grant to promote research by doctoral candidates and by faculty members working to earn tenure in the field of the history of U.S. foreign relations. The Holt-Hogan Committee would determine the recipients of annual awards of up to \$1,000 each to help defray costs of travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects. Normally, approximately twenty percent of the annual calendar increase in the value of the SHAFR endowment funds would finance and determine the number of awards issued each year.

Matray explained that he and Hahn wrote the motion as Council directed after its January 2005 discussion on devoting additional funds from endowment earnings to subsidize research travel by graduate students. Matray explained that the endowment is very healthy and that it grew substantially in 2004, that the proposed program would use some of the earnings in a way that fulfills SHAFR's mission, and that the motion allows Council the freedom to allocate the money for this program as it wishes. Hahn added that SHAFR, based on its earnings-to-spending ratio in 2004 (figured on a complicated IRS formula with five-year moving averages), is apparently close to being reclassified as a non-profit foundation, which might involve new tax liabilities of one percent on earnings; the new program would help SHAFR fulfill its public mission and maintain its status as a non-profit organization with no new tax liabilities.

Logevall asked if the tax might grow beyond one percent; the answer was no. At Costigliola's suggestion, the motion was amended to include all non-tenured faculty in the program. In reply to a question by Mocnik, it was specified that the program would cover domestic and international travel.

Council unanimously approved the revised motion.

2. Motions to increase subsidy to *Diplomatic History* editorial office and place the journal on JSTOR

David Anderson moved that Council authorize an increase in funding of \$1,000 per year (from \$13,500 to \$14,500) to the *Diplomatic History* editorial office. Anderson explained that the growth in submissions and level of work together with available institutional support made this a reasonable request and asked Council for its support.

Council unanimously approved this motion.

Council discussed the possibility of contracting with JSTOR to post back issues of *Diplomatic History* on-line. Anderson and Schulzinger had initially favored having Council authorize the editors of the journal to sign a contract with JSTOR. In talks over recent days between the *Diplomatic History* Contract Committee and various publishers, however, it became clear that some publishers offer a product that might out-perform JSTOR and that SHAFR should thus address the issue of

on-line storage of back issues in the context of its larger contract talks.

3. Motion to increase membership dues

Anderson moved that Council increase SHAFR membership dues to the following rates:

Regular members:	\$45 in 2006
	\$50 in 2007
Student members:	no change in 2006
	\$25 in 2007

Anderson explained that the current dues of \$40 per year (\$20 for students) is inexpensive for the services SHAFR provides and is lower than the dues of other, similar organizations and that dues have not increased in a number of years. He indicated that he made this motion at the request of the *Diplomatic History* editorial office.

Logevall asked why the increases were necessary given the state of the endowment. Anderson said that the user fee becomes a basis for valuing the product. It is not that SHAFR needs the money, but it is a question of how the organization positions itself. Nelson asked what specific prices were for other small organizations. Anderson said most are in the \$50-60 range. T. Wilson added that the Society for Military History increased its dues from \$40 to \$55 last year.

Laderman suggested that because this was not a financial issue, Council should not increase the student rate. Matray concurred, arguing that SHAFR could show the value of the product through raising the regular fees while also showing its commitment to graduate students by keeping their fees the same. Schulzinger observed that the graduate student rate traditionally has been fifty percent of the regular rate and that breaking this ratio now would render it difficult to reestablish it later.

Laderman moved an amendment to raise the standard rates while maintaining student rates at the current level, which was approved by four votes in favor to three opposed.

The amended motion was approved unanimously by council.

4 . Motion to pass resolution on action by British Association of University Teachers

Anderson moved that Council approve the following resolution:

“SHAFR wishes to commend British Association of University Teachers’ recent decision to repeal its earlier motion calling for a boycott of Haifa and Bar Ilan Universities. SHAFR is committed to the free exchange of ideas among academics without regard to the policies of their respective governments. We reject proposals that curtail the freedom of teachers and researchers to engage in work with academic colleagues, and we reaffirm the paramount importance of the freest possible international movement of scholars and ideas. SHAFR supports the right of all in the academic community to communicate freely with other academics on matters of professional interest.”

Anderson explained that he brought this motion at the suggestion of former SHAFR presidents Arnold Offner and Melvyn Leffler, who were invited to present a rationale for it. Offner and Leffler explained the history of the AUT’s boycott against Haifa and Bar-Ilan and observed that it involved a disturbing move to try to censure colleagues over a political issue. Other organizations had gone on record with respect to the principle involved. The motion commends the AUT for repealing the original boycott and praises the idea of openness. Leffler encouraged Council to pass the resolution even though the AUT repealed the boycott three weeks ago because there is an effort underway to restore the boycott. There is a prospect that the AUT will merge with another organization that might support the resolution. If Council approves, Anderson indicated that he would communicate this resolution to the AUT and the media. Matray mentioned that the Chronicle of Higher Education has dealt with this issue in depth.

Council approved the motion unanimously.

5. Motion to authorize Teaching Committee to pursue a “digital archive” initiative

On behalf of the Teaching Committee, Hahn proposed that Council authorize the Teaching Committee to explore a partnership with the libraries at Ohio State University and the University of Wisconsin to establish a digital archive of resources in diplomatic history.

Hahn explained that the Teaching Committee wanted to explore the creation of a digital archive of resources in diplomatic history with the Ohio State University and University of Wisconsin libraries. This autumn, the libraries will apply for

a federal grant ranging between \$50,000 and \$1,000,000 to subsidize the digitization of primary records in diplomatic history, beginning with the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series. The libraries are prepared to do the work of applying for the grant and digitizing the records and invited SHAFR to serve as an intellectual partner to add status to the project and to provide expert advice. The Teaching Committee would take responsibility for this project. The motion asks Council's permission to explore the possibilities, and reserves for Council the privilege of reviewing any formal proposal at a later time.

Costigliola asked if this program would involve a financial contribution; Hahn and Anderson said no financial commitment is contemplated at this time. Leffler asked if the Department of State is already digitizing the *FRUS* series and Schulzinger said that he believed that only recent volumes are available online. Nelson said "partnering" is a problematic word because it seems to involve money and she suggested "endorse" as an alternative.

Anderson indicated that he would direct the Teaching Committee to explore the possibilities discussed without a vote from Council.

6. Motion to amend specifications for Bernath Article Prize

On behalf of the Bernath Article Prize Committee, Hahn proposed that winners of the Myrna Bernath Book Prize would be ineligible to win the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize. Hahn noted that winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize were currently ineligible for the Bernath Article Prize and that in the judgment of the Article Prize Committee it seemed logical to extend such an exclusion to winners of the Myrna Bernath Book Prize, given that winning either book prize indicates a degree of intellectual achievement that places one above the level of competition intended in the Article Prize competition. Hahn clarified that winners of the Myrna Bernath Fellowship would not be excluded from the Bernath Article Prize competition.

Council unanimously approved this motion.

7. Report on Nixon Archives

Anderson called attention to the issues related to getting the Nixon Library formally integrated into the NARA system. He has been in touch with Bruce Craig of the National Coalition for History. Craig advised that history organizations have their presidents write letters to Allen Weinstein offering support of NARA's efforts to hold the Nixon Library to NARA's standards for management and access. Craig has said societies should not complicate talks with specific requests, just basic support. This would help NARA in its negotiations and would help maintain support within NARA itself. Nelson supported this idea. Anderson indicated that he will write a letter along the lines described.

Reports

8. SHAFR Roster and Research List

Etheridge explained the changes made recently to the electronic roster with the help of Eric Hall at Blackwell. Blackwell will send a letter to all members next week with information on how to access this database. The new site is significantly expanded. Members not only can search the roster but also renew membership, look at *Diplomatic History*, access *Passport*, and link to www.shaf.org. This new site also aligns the roster with the membership list.

Anderson praised Etheridge's work and the new site.

9. 2005 annual meeting

Walker reported that conference logistics have proceeded smoothly with the partial exception of parking. S. Wilson reported that she expected a total of 370-380 registrants and that the conference is expected to achieve a small positive financial balance.

Hahn called attention to two major reforms for this year's conference. First, he moved the conference website to the SHAFR server rather than using a server at the host institution. The new website was created by Hahn's assistant Robert Robinson, who established a template that can be reused for future conferences, which will save thousands of dollars in web-designer fees. Second, Hahn, Robinson, and S. Wilson built a system to move conference cash flow through the Business Office and to establish a means to register on-line and pay with a credit card (via Paypal). These reforms dramatically streamlined the conference finances, kept SHAFR's assets under SHAFR's full control, and eased the registration process. Hahn noted that on-line registrations out-numbered mailed registrations by a 3-to-1 margin. He noted that Paypal collected fees of two-to-four percent per transaction (a total of some \$800). Hahn recommended that Council authorize continued use of the Paypal on-line system and Council indicated concurrence.

In response to a question about the new graduate student travel fund, S. Wilson replied that more than \$600 had been

raised as part of the registration process and that additional contributions were possible. Hahn added that a \$500 contribution received last winter was not part of that total.

Anderson asked for a motion of thanks for Program Chair Chris Jespersen, conference consultant Sara Wilson, local arrangements co-chairs J. Samuel Walker and Keith Olson, the Local Arrangements Committee, and Robert Robinson. Council approved the motion unanimously.

10. 2006 annual meeting

T. Wilson provided a thorough report on the arrangements made for the 2006 SHAFR conference in Lawrence, Kansas. He reported that the University of Kansas office that does on-site arrangements would collect a management fee. Getting to the University should not pose any significant problems as a number of airlines service Kansas City airport and as Lawrence is easily accessible by interstate freeway. Accommodations have been arranged at hotels in a lively area of downtown Lawrence. There will be shuttle service. Kansas Union, which was recently refurbished, will be main site of the conference. The conference will begin on a Friday and run to Sunday because of local scheduling issues. On Friday evening, there will be a reception provided by the Dole Institute. It is hoped that a U.S. Senator will be the Sunday evening banquet speaker. The University has made a modest financial commitment.

Stoler asked if any arrangements had been made with the Truman and Eisenhower Presidential Libraries. T. Wilson replied that the Truman Library has committed some money and other support for a full set of sessions on Saturday afternoon there, with a social event on site Saturday evening. Some sessions would still be held at the Union for those not working on the Truman era.

Hahn suggested that Council schedule its June 2006 meeting in a three hour time block on Friday morning before the conference begins. He observed that the 90-minute time frame of recent June meetings has been insufficient and that the June 2006 meeting will include detailed consideration of the *DH* contract issue. Council indicated support for the idea.

11. 2007 annual meeting

Anderson reported that he plans to schedule the 2007 meeting in the Washington, D.C. area. He is exploring the possibility of Georgetown as host. Anderson also suggested that conferences might be held at convention centers or hotels rather than universities. Matray suggested that SHAFR consider the University of San Diego as a future venue. Stoler mentioned that in the past Council talked about putting Ohio State on the list for 2008 and perhaps giving it priority and that Wisconsin and Tennessee were also interested.

12. Endowment

Matray reported that the endowment has not done as well during the first five months of 2005, earning a total of \$8,000. He advised that under the new research fund motion approved today, Council should routinely decide in each January what portion of the Endowment's annual earnings of the preceding year should be made available for the program. He also suggested that Council could approve one-time expenditures beyond the percentage of endowment growth set aside for these grants if the previous year's earning were modest.

13. Holt Fellowship

Hahn reported that the Holt Fellowship was split between Jongnam Na and Keri Lewis.

14. Hogan Fellowship

Hahn reported that Heather Dichter was awarded the Hogan Fellowship.

15 Unterberger Prize

Hahn reported that Jonathan Winkler was awarded the Unterberger Prize and that David Ekbladh received an honorable mention.


Respectfully submitted,

Peter L. Hahn

Executive Director

PLH/rm

The Diplomatic Pouch



1) Personal and Professional Notes

Christopher Jespersen (North Georgia College & State University) has been selected by the Organization of American Historians to receive an OAH-JAAS Short Term Residency Fellowship in diplomatic and cultural history at Kyoritsu Women's University.

Robert John (International Council for Human Ecology and Ethnology) won the Garrett Hardin award at the 2004 meeting of the International Institute for Advanced Studies in Systems Analysis and Cybernetics at Baden-Baden, Germany.

Wayne Patterson (St. Norbert College) has been named Fulbright Distinguished Lecturer at the Graduate School of International Studies at Yonsei University in Seoul, Korea for the spring semester of 2006.



2) Research Notes

Secret Understandings on the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1974

Since late 1950, when British Prime Minister Clement Atlee worried that President Truman might use nuclear weapons in the Korean War, the British government has sought commitments from American presidents not to launch nuclear strikes without first consulting London, according to declassified documents posted on the Web by the National Security Archive. These U.S. archival records disclose the long history of one of the most sensitive aspects of the historic Anglo-American "special relationship," which was always treated as a Top Secret item in the official record.

With this electronic briefing book, the National Security Archive publishes for the first time the record of Anglo-American discussions and understandings on nuclear weapons use from Atlee and Truman to Richard Nixon and Edward Heath. The documents, released through Freedom of Information Act requests or identified through archival research, also disclose secret understandings with Canada, West Germany and NATO.

For more information, contact:

William Burr – (202)-994-7032
wburr@gwu.edu
<http://www.nsarchive.org>



The Secret Pinochet Portfolio

The National Security Archive has posted key documents released on March 15 by the Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs showing conclusively that former Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet had used multiple aliases and false identification to maintain over 125 secret bank accounts at the Riggs National Bank and eight other financial institutions in the United States. In their investigation into money laundering, foreign corruption and inadequate enforcement of banking rules to fight terrorism, the staff of Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) obtained thousands of internal banking records, among them confidential memoranda, emails, accounting reports, and even private letters from Riggs officials to General Pinochet.

For more information contact:

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CIA Files on Adolf Eichmann

The CIA was surprised by Israeli agents' capture of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in Argentina in 1960, and a subsequent CIA file review uncovered extensive ties between Eichmann and men who served as CIA assets and allies, according to the CIA's three-volume Directorate of Operations file and their Directorate of Intelligence file, posted recently by the National Security Archive at George Washington University.

Obersturmbannführer (Lt. Col.) Eichmann was originally a member of the SD (Sicherheitsdienst or Security Service), and went on to head Gestapo Section IV B4 (responsible for Jewish affairs) where he helped plan and implement the Holocaust. Eichmann was captured at the end of World War II by allied forces, but managed to escape the internment camp where he was confined in 1946. On May 2, 1960, Eichmann was apprehended by Israeli secret agents in Argentina - where he had been hiding under an assumed name - and smuggled back to Israel to stand trial for his crimes. After a highly publicized trial in 1961, he was sentenced to death and executed in 1962.

The 289-document names file on Eichmann was compiled by the CIA in response to the Nazi War Crimes Disclosure Act. The Eichmann names file reveals CIA attempts to locate relevant documents among captured German records, files in the Berlin Document Center in Germany, and other sources like the International Tracing Service. To help strengthen the close ties between the CIA and Israel's intelligence agencies, the Counterintelligence Staff at the Directorate of Operations (headed by James Angleton) combed through the archives and submitted for further research other German officers names that were mentioned in the Eichmann documents. The consequence was the discovery that some of those linked to Eichmann also had ties to the CIA and the CIA-sponsored West German intelligence service (BND).

For more information contact:

Tamara Feinstein – (202)-994-7000
<http://www.nsarchive.org>



Records on Poland and Vietnam, 1963

The Cold War International History Project is pleased to announce the publication of "Poland and Vietnam, 1963: New Evidence on Secret Communist Diplomacy and the 'Maneli Affair,'" CWIHP Working Paper No. 45, by Malgorzata Gnoinska (George Washington University). Using new evidence from Warsaw archives, Gnoinska brings missing pieces to a lingering mystery of the Vietnam War: the rumored attempts by a Polish diplomat in Saigon to initiate a secret dialogue between North and South Vietnam in the autumn of 1963--reports that intensified the Kennedy Administration's suspicions toward the Diem regime in the period leading up to the November 1, 1963 coup. Gnoinska also discloses fresh evidence on a previously unknown Polish peace initiative on Vietnam in 1963 involving JFK's ambassador to India, economist John Kenneth Galbraith. The Working Paper, including its extensive documentary appendix, is available at <http://cwihip.si.edu>.



The Negroponte File

The National Security Archive has recently posted hundreds of cables written by Ambassador John Negroponte from the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa between late 1981 and 1984. The 392 cables and memos record Negroponte's daily, and even hourly, activities as the powerful Ambassador to Honduras during the contra war in the early 1980s. They include dozens of cables in which the Ambassador sought to undermine regional peace efforts such as the Contadora initiative that ultimately won Costa Rican president Oscar Arias a Nobel Prize, as well as multiple reports of meetings and conversations with Honduran military officers who were instrumental in providing logistical support and infrastructure for CIA covert operations in support of the contras against Nicaragua -- "our special project" as Negroponte refers to the contra war in the cable traffic. Among the records are special back channel communications with then CIA director William Casey, including a recommendation to increase the number of arms being supplied to the leading contra force, the FDN in mid 1983, and advice on how to rewrite a Presidential finding on covert operations to overthrow the Sandinistas to make it more politically palatable to an increasingly uneasy U.S. Congress. Conspicuously absent from the cable traffic, however, is any reporting on human rights atrocities that were committed by the Honduran military and its secret police unit known as Battalion 316, between 1982 and 1984, under the military leadership of General Gustavo Alvarez, Negroponte's main liaison with the Honduran government.

For more details, contact:

Peter Kornbluh – (202)-994-7116
pkorn@gwu.edu
<http://www.nsarchive.org>

Reagan Diaries to be Published

The Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Foundation and publisher HarperCollins announced their plans to print Ronald Reagan's personal diaries, which were written during his presidential years. Few scholars have seen the complete set of diaries. Reagan wrote diligently every day and only one significant gap occurred, after the attempted assassination by John Hinckley Jr. HarperCollins will publish the contents (most likely only excerpts rather than a definitive edition) of Reagan's five leather-bound diaries next year, although the company has not decided on a precise format. Reportedly, none of the content will be withheld from the editors, but the resulting book will pass through a national security review for inadvertent mention of classified information. For more information, contact the editors at <http://www.harpercollins.com>, or the Reagan Library at www.reaganlibrary.com.



New FRUS Volume

The Department of State has released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana*, the second volume in the 1964-1968 sub-series covering the foreign policy of the Lyndon Johnson Administration towards Latin America. The text of the volume, the summary, and this press release are available on the Office of the Historian website at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xxxii>. Copies can be purchased from the U.S. Government Printing Office at <http://bookstore.gpo.gov/index.html>. For further information contact Edward Keefer, General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series at:

Phone (202)-663-1131
Fax (202) 663-1289
history@state.gov



3) Announcements

Fellowships: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars announces the opening of its 2006-2007 fellowship competition, with an application deadline of October 1, 2005. The Center offers residential fellowships for the entire U.S. academic year (September through May), or for a minimum of four months during the academic year, to individuals in the social sciences and humanities who submit outstanding project proposals on a broad range of national and/or international issues. Proposed topics should relate to key public policy challenges or provide the historical and/or cultural framework to illumine policy issues of contemporary importance. Fellows are provided with a stipend (including a round-trip transportation allowance), part-time research assistance, and, through the assistance of professional librarians, access to the Library of Congress. Fellows work from private offices at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, DC. For academic applicants, eligibility is limited to the postdoctoral level and, normally, to applicants with publications beyond the Ph.D. dissertation. For other applicants, an equivalent level of professional achievement is expected. Applications from any country are welcome. All applicants should have a very good command of spoken English. The Center seeks a diverse group of Fellows and encourages applications from women and minorities.

For additional information and for application materials, please visit our website at: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/fellowships>, or write to:

Scholar Selection and Services Office
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20004-3027
fellowships@wwic.si.edu
(202)-691-4170
fax: (202)-691-4001



Fellowships: Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, School of Historical Studies, 2006-2007

The Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, offers a community of scholars where intellectual inquiry, research and writing is carried out in the best of circumstances. Members have access to libraries, offices, seminar and lecture rooms, subsidized housing, stipends and other services. Fellowships are open to all fields of historical research, and the School of Historical Studies' principal interests are history of western, near eastern and far eastern civilizations, Greek and Roman civilization, history of Europe (medieval, early modern, and modern), the Islamic world, East Asian studies, history of art, music studies and modern international relations. Candidates of any nationality may apply for one or two terms. Residence in Princeton during term time is required, and the deadline for applications is November 15, 2005. The only other obligation of members is to pursue their own research. The Ph.D. (or equivalent) and substantial publications are required. Information and application forms for this and other programs may be found on the school's web site, www.hs.ias.edu. For more information, contact:

The School of Historical Studies
Institute for Advanced Study
Einstein Dr.
Princeton, N.J. 08540
mzelazny@ias.edu



NEH Summer Stipends Program (2006 Awards)

The NEH Summer Stipends program received 870 applications last fall and made 115 awards for the summer of 2005. We are now making plans for the October 1, 2005 deadline. This will be the fourth year in which the NEH Summer Stipends program applications will be submitted online. Individuals who are interested in obtaining access to the guidelines are invited to visit the NEH Summer Stipends website at the address below. The list of awards for the summer of 2005 is available on the website. Click on "Frequently Asked Questions" for additional information concerning the application process and the program. Questions about the program can be sent via e-mail to the address shown below, or via telephone: 202-606-8202.

National Endowment for the Humanities
Division of Research
Summer Stipends Program, Room 318
1100 Pennsylvania Ave. NW
Washington DC 20506
stipends@neh.gov
<http://www.neh.gov/grants/guidelines/stipends.html>



The Abe Fellowship Program

The Social Science Research Council (SSRC), the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP), and the American Council of Learned Societies (ACLS) announce the annual Abe Fellowship Program competition. The Abe Fellowship is designed to encourage international multidisciplinary research on topics of pressing global concern. The program seeks to foster the development of a new generation of researchers who are interested in policy-relevant topics of long-range importance and who are willing to become key members of a bilateral and global research network built around such topics. Applications are welcome from scholars and non-academic research professionals. Funding for the program is provided by the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership. Applicants are invited to submit proposals for research in the social sciences or the humanities relevant to any one or combination of the following three themes: (1) global issues, (2) problems common to industrial and industrializing societies, and (3) issues that pertain to US-Japan relations.

Terms of the fellowship are flexible and are designed to meet the needs of Japanese and American researchers at different stages in their careers. The program provides Abe Fellows with a minimum of 3 and maximum of 12 months of full-time support over a 24-month period. Fellowship tenure may begin between April 1 and December 31 of a given year. Fellowship tenure need not be continuous, but must be concluded within 24 months of activation of the fellowship. Candidates should propose to spend at least one-third of the fellowship tenure in residence abroad in Japan or the United States. Proposals may also include periods of research in other countries. Applicants must hold a Ph.D. or the terminal degree in their field, or have attained an equivalent level of professional experience. Applications from researchers in professions other than academia are encouraged. Previous language training is not a prerequisite for this fellowship.

However, if the research project requires language ability, the applicant should provide evidence of adequate proficiency to complete the project. Projects proposing to address key policy issues or seeking to develop a concrete policy proposal must reflect non-partisan positions. Applications must be submitted online at <http://applications.ssrc.org>. The deadline for receipt of applications is September 1, 2005. For further information, please visit www.ssrc.org/fellowships/abe/ or contact the program directly by email at abe@ssrc.org.

Call For Papers: War Without Limits: Spain 1936-39 and Beyond

The aim of this three-day, international conference is to explore the international social, political, military and cultural history of this conflict from 1936 to the present. The organizers therefore welcome proposals for papers on any aspect of the conflict from established scholars or postgraduates working in a range of disciplines including, for example, social, political and cultural history, military history and war studies, intellectual history, cultural memory, literary studies, art history, photography, media studies, and film studies. Proposals should not exceed 350 words and should be sent, in English or in French, the two official languages of GWACS, to the addresses below by December 31, 2005.

Dr. Martin Hurcombe
Department of French
University of Bristol
19 Woodland Road
Bristol, BS8 1TE
Tel. 0117 9288447
Fax: 0117 9288922
m.j.hurcombe@bristol.ac.uk
http://www.bris.ac.uk/arts/birtha/centres/war_withoutlimitsconference.html



Call For Papers: Policy History Conference

The *Journal of Policy History* issues a call for papers for a conference on Policy History to be held at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, June 1-June 4, 2006. All topics concerning the history, development and implementation of public policy, as well as American political development, broadly conceived, will be considered. Complete sessions are encouraged, but individual paper proposals are welcome. The deadline for proposals is November 15, 2005. Please send two (2) copies of proposals, including a one-page summary of each paper(s) and a C.V. of each panelist to the following mailing address. Direct inquiries to the address shown below.

Policy Conference
Journal of Policy History
Saint Louis University
3800 Lindell Blvd.
P. O. Box 56907
St. Louis, MO 63156-0907.
jpolhist@slu.edu
<http://www.slu.edu/departments/jph>



Call For Papers: With US or Against US: American Culture and Anti-Americanism in the Developing World

Contributions are solicited for a volume of essays tracing the impact of American culture on major countries and regions in Africa, Asia, and South America, including the Middle East and Central Asia. An additional section might cover Canada and Australia. Each essay should employ an interdisciplinary approach to analyze the transmission and reception of American culture, including anti-Americanism. It is suggested that authors discuss the following topics:

- Historical review of U.S. influences in the region
- U.S. government programs (libraries, exchanges, official publications)
- Dissemination and reception of U.S. high culture (literature, theater, arts) and popular culture (jazz/rock/pop, film, TV, youth culture, life style)
- Anti-Americanism (government initiatives, religious responses, conservative and leftist reactions, regionalism/nationalism)

Essays must be written in English and should not exceed 9,000 words. They should be accompanied by a bibliography relevant for the country or region. Contributors will have the opportunity to present their papers and to discuss the parameters of the book during a three day conference at the Merhson Center for International Security Studies located at The Ohio State University in Columbus, Ohio (USA). Funding for this event, which is scheduled for November 2 – 5, 2006, has been secured. Support for travel to the conference can be made available when authors have been unsuccessful in applying for travel subsidies to their home institution, a local U.S. Embassy, or organizations like Fulbright and IREX.

Please send a proposal and CV, preferably by e-mail, before October 30, 2005 to

Alexander Stephan
Professor and Ohio Eminent Scholar
Senior Fellow, Mershon Center for International Security Studies
The Ohio State University
1501 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201-2602
USA
Tel. 614-247-6068
Fax 614-292-2407
stephan.30@osu.edu



Call for Papers: International Conference: Europe and the End of the Cold War 1985-1991

The end of the Cold War and, in particular, German unification and the demise of the Soviet Empire, are among the best documented and the most thoroughly researched events in recent history. Yet, whatever its impressive results both quantitatively and qualitatively, the effort to understand the end of the Cold War historically can be described, to this day, as partial. Most of the historical production so far has indeed focused on two or three of the key players at the expense of other, sometimes influential actors or processes. Thus the literature typically concentrates on the role of the two superpowers --the United States and the former USSR-- in the demise of the Cold War system, while also naturally recognizing the role of Germany, but only inasmuch as its own unification is concerned. The historiography of the end of the Cold War, in other words, remains overwhelmingly Soviet-American if not exclusively American in scope, methodology, documentation and, last but not least, interpretation.

Time has come to translate what has so far been an essentially bipolar effort to understand the end of the Cold War into a broader, more European-focused endeavor. This conference, which is organized in cooperation with: The Cold War Studies Centre, LSE, (London); the Machiavelli Center for Cold War Studies, (Florence), the Cold War International History Project (Washington) and the Gorbachev Foundation (Moscow), will meet in Paris from June 15th-17th, 2006 in an attempt to do just that. By choosing to concentrate on "Europe" in its various dimensions (Western Europe, Eastern Europe as well as the pan-European dimension) this conference intends to bring to the forefront of historical research previously neglected actors or processes whose contributions to the end of the Cold War were, in our view, decisive.

Papers in English are invited on the following topics, approached either broadly or through the perspective of key states or individuals:

1. Europe, perestroika and the new détente (ca.1985-1989)
2. Europe and the process of German unification (ca. 1989-1990)
3. Europe, the end of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new European architecture

The organizers would be happy to consider additional proposals that potential contributors believe would fit in the overall intellectual framework of the conference. The conveners aim at a publication of the conference proceedings in an edited volume.

The deadline for proposals is September 15, 2005. Proposals should include a title, a one page outline and a one page CV of the author with a list of major books and articles. Following the acceptance of the proposals, authors will receive editorial guidelines. Proposals should be emailed or sent by regular mail to:

Prof. Marie-Pierre Rey
Université de Paris I Panthéon Sorbonne
Centre de recherches en histoire des Slaves
1 rue Victor Cousin
75005 Paris
France
Marie-Pierre.Rey@univ-paris1.fr



Call for Papers: Empire, Borderlands and Border Cultures

California State University Stanislaus will host a conference on "Empire, Borderlands and Border Cultures" on March 16-18, 2006. In an effort to facilitate a wide-ranging and interdisciplinary conversation about empire, scholars working in a variety of disciplines are invited to submit papers. We hope participants will address the issues of empire from antiquity

to postmodernity, on every continent and from many cultures, including topics such as diaspora, immigration, reverse colonization, imperialism and visual culture, gender and empire, the empire in popular culture, and the construction of national, religious and ethnic identities.

One page vitas and proposals for a 20-minute paper should be submitted by November 11. Panel proposals are welcome. No attachments please. All proposals should be mailed to:

Betsy Eudey (BEudey@csustan.edu)
or
Arnold Schmidt (AShmidt@csustan.edu)
Empire Conference Committee
Department of English
California State University Stanislaus
801 W Monte Vista Ave
Turlock, Ca 95382



Free to Good Home!

The National Archives has a limited number of the three-volume set *Emerging Nation*, the documentary history of U.S. foreign relations, 1780-1789 that it would like to offer, free of charge, to interested scholars. This collection of primary sources materials traces the battles of John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, and others to establish a credible international presence for the United States as a new nation. Interested SHAFR members should direct inquiries to Keith Donohue (Keith.Donohue@nara.gov), Communications Director of the National Historical Publications & Records Commission.



Call For Papers: *The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era*

The *Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era* invites manuscripts on any aspect of U.S. diplomatic history and international relations between roughly 1870 and 1920. Published by the Society for Historians of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, this is the only journal specifically devoted to this decisive period for the role of the United States in the world. The journal hopes to expand submissions in foreign relations history. Please contact the editor:

Professor Alan Lessoff
Department of History
Illinois State University
Campus Box 4420
Normal, IL 61790-4420
ahlesso@ilstu.edu



Call For Papers: *Yale Journal of International Affairs*

Yale Journal of International Affairs is a new journal that encourages discussion of issues in international affairs by highlighting the research of professors, graduate students, and practitioners in the international affairs field. The inaugural edition was published in May 2005. *YJIA* is interested in policy and research articles covering international politics, security, economics, and diplomacy, as well as reviews of recent books on foreign policy topics. In addition, *YJIA* will pay special attention to publishing articles on specific regional topics, as well as global health and development.

All articles should follow Chicago Manual of Style guidelines. Articles should be between 3,000 to 5,000 words, and book reviews should be 1,000 to 2,000 words. Please send submissions to:

jonathan.baum@yale.edu or
Yale Journal of International Affairs
International Affairs Council
34 Hillhouse Avenue
New Haven, CT 06520

For more information please contact puongfei.yeh@yale.edu

CFP: *Cold War History*

Cold War History is a new journal, based in the Cold War Studies Centre at the London School of Economics, which was recently re-launched with a new format and design. It aims to make available to the general public the results of recent research on the origins and development of the Cold War and its impact on nations, alliances, and regions at various levels of statecraft, as well as in areas such as the military and intelligence, the economy, the social and intellectual developments. The new history of the Cold War is a fascinating example of how experts --often working across national and disciplinary boundaries -- are able to use newly available information to refine, or in some cases destroy, old images and interpretations. *Cold War History* aims at publishing the best of this emerging scholarship, and welcomes contributions from historians and representatives of other disciplines on all aspects of the global Cold War and its present repercussions. This call for papers is permanent. We look forward to receiving your submissions.

Garret Martin/Louise Woodroffe
Managing Editors of *Cold War History*
London School of Economics and Political Science
Room E 395
(+44) 207 955 6526
cwh@lse.ac.uk
<http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CWSC/coldWarHistoryJournal/Default.htm>



Encyclopedia of the Cold War

ABC-CLIO, an award winning publisher of academic reference works, is seeking contributors for a comprehensive reference encyclopedia about the Cold War entitled *The Encyclopedia of the Cold War: A Political, Social, and Military History*. Development is proceeding under the general editorship of Dr. Spencer C. Tucker, formerly the John Briggs Chair of Military History at the Virginia Military Institute, and Senior Fellow of the Military History Institute at ABC-CLIO.

Interested potential contributors should contact ABC-CLIO directly at the address shown for compensation and timeline details. Please attach to your response a current CV detailing your academic qualifications and, if possible, a recent writing sample.

Aron Hsiao
Project Editor, Military History
ABC-CLIO
136 Cremona Drive
Santa Barbara, CA, 93117-5505
(805) 968-1911 x130
(805) 685-9685 fax
ahsiao@abc-clio.com



Gerald R. Ford Library Research Grant

The Gerald R. Ford Foundation awards grants of up to \$2000 each in support of research in the archival collections of the Gerald R. Ford Library, part of the system of presidential libraries administered by the National Archives and Records Administration. The collections are especially rich on U.S. Government domestic policies, diplomacy, and national political affairs in the 1970s. A grant defrays the travel, lodging, meal, and photocopy expenses of a research trip to the Library. Application deadlines are March 15 and September 15.

The Library strongly encourages advance inquiry by email, telephone, or letter about the scope and availability of historical materials on a given topic. Detailed search reports from our internal collection description database, PRESNET are available upon request.

Helmi Raaska, Grants Coordinator
Gerald R. Ford Library
1000 Beal Avenue
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
Phone: 734-205-0559
Fax: 734-205-0571
helmi.raaska@nara.gov
<http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov>

John F. Kennedy Library Research Grants

Each year in the spring and fall, the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation provides funds for the award of a number of research grants in the range of \$500 to \$2,500. The purpose of these grants is to help defray living, travel, and related costs incurred while doing research in the textual and non-textual holdings of the library. Grant applications are evaluated on the basis of expected utilization of available holdings of the Library, the degree to which they address research needs in Kennedy period studies, and the qualifications of applicants. Preference is given to dissertation research by Ph.D. candidates working in newly opened or relatively unused collections, and to the work of recent Ph.D. recipients who are expanding or revising their dissertations for publication, but all proposals are welcome and will receive careful consideration.

Applications may be submitted at any time, but the postmark deadline is March 15 for spring grants and August 15 for fall grants. To obtain information about the Library's collections, each applicant who has not already conducted research at the library should contact a member of the research room staff at this address to explain the topic and request a copy of Historical Materials in the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library.

Applicants must submit a required form, which can be obtained from the website; a brief proposal (three to four pages) in the form of a letter or memo describing the planned research, its significance, the intended audience, and expected outcome; three letters of recommendation from academic or other appropriate references; a writing sample (ca. ten pages); a project budget; and a vita. List the collections in the Kennedy Library and other institutions that you plan to use. Describe how the funds will be applied, other fellowships or grants that will support the project and whether matching funds are available to you from your institution or elsewhere. Describe your qualifications and similar research projects you have undertaken.

For further information and to apply, please contact:

Grant and Fellowship Coordinator
John F. Kennedy Library
Columbia Point
Boston, MA 02125
Telephone: (617) 514-1600
Fax: (617) 514-1652



Harry S. Truman Library Research Institute Grants

The Harry S. Truman Presidential Library offers grants of up to \$2,500, awarded biannually to enable graduate students, post-doctoral scholars and other researchers to come to the Library for one to three weeks to use its collections. Awards are to offset expenses incurred for this purpose only.

Graduate students and post-doctoral scholars are particularly encouraged to apply, but applications from others engaged in advanced research will also be considered. Preference will be given to projects that have application to enduring public policy and foreign policy issues and that have a high probability of being published or publicly disseminated in some other way. The potential contribution of a project to an applicant's development as a scholar will also be considered. An individual may receive no more than two research grants in a five-year period.

Deadlines are April 1 and October 1. The Committee will notify applicants in writing of its decision approximately six weeks after these dates. Application forms are available via the Library's web page: <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/grants/> or by writing to:

Grants Administrator,
Harry S. Truman Library Institute
500 West U.S. Highway 24
Independence, Missouri, 64050-1798
Telephone: (816) 268-8248
Facsimile: (816) 268-8299
lisa.sullivan@nara.gov

4) Letters to the Editor:

Dear Editor:

J. Samuel Walker is to be commended for tackling a project that has needed to be done for quite a long time in his "Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground," published in *Diplomatic History* in April 2005, since a considerable amount of new documentation has become available in both the military sphere after the Enola Gay controversy, and in Japan after the death of Emperor Hirohito. I must, however add some small correctives.

My February 2003 *Pacific Historical Review* article does not depict Herbert Hoover's well known memorandum warning of 500,000 to 1,000,000 American deaths during an invasion of Japan "as conclusive evidence that Truman knew about and accepted huge casualty projections." The article's central point is not simply that the memo was seen by Truman, but that he reacted decisively to it. I used documents I discovered at the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library to demonstrate that the subsequent flurry of memoranda between Truman and his senior wartime advisors --- the Truman-Grew-Hull-Stimson-Vinson exchange --- prompted him to convene the June 18, 1945, meeting at which the invasion of Japan was given final approval. Yet another discovery, by the Hoover Presidential Library's former senior archivist Dwight Miller, indicates that the casualty estimate likely originated during Hoover's regular briefings by a group of Military Intelligence officers from the Pentagon who Robert H. Ferrell wryly refers to as "a cabal of smart colonels."

The PHR article is available through the University of California Press at [http://caliber.ucpress.net/action/doSearch?action=runSearch&type=advanced&result=true&prevSearch=%2Bauthorsfield%3A\(Giangreco,DM\)s&cookieSet=1](http://caliber.ucpress.net/action/doSearch?action=runSearch&type=advanced&result=true&prevSearch=%2Bauthorsfield%3A(Giangreco,DM)s&cookieSet=1) and is very briefly summarized in my April-May American Heritage piece at http://www.americanheritage.com/xml/2003/2/2003_2_dept_histnow.xml.

Walker also says that "[Giangreco] elaborated his objections [to one of Bernstein's essays] at length on a web site." In fact, I sent a draft of my letter intended for publication in the *Journal of Military History* to a number of scholars in the Society for Military History and SHAFR soliciting their opinions on what should be cut because "its current version is far too long to be printed in the journal (and is somewhat more 'hot' than the final product should be)." Much to my surprise, the draft and cover letter soon appeared on an Internet site: <http://members.aol.com/VonRanke/giangreco.html>. After some discussion with the webmaster, I gave permission to leave it online principally because the draft contained a detailed defense of the work of both Ferrell and Robert P. Newman, as well as some fascinating quotes from Martin Harwit's *An Exhibit Denied: Lobbying the History of the Enola Gay*, that there was simply no room for in *JMH*.

Yes, there were attendees at the 1998 SMH conference who displayed considerable hostility to Bernstein calling him a "charlatan," a "vampire," and, several times, a "crackpot." I said then and later wrote, as Walker correctly quotes from the draft, that this was "overly harsh" and ventured that "he is really just a misguided scholar completely and irretrievably out of his element when discussing things related to the military." But Walker incorrectly surmises that this is "poorly disguised name calling." This is hardly "disguised." It is indeed what was said by some of the attendees. The irony is that in his search for the "middle ground," Walker overlooked the fact that these comments were made at least partially as criticism of me because of the generous praise I made of Bernstein in the summary of my address at the awards luncheon:

"... In recent times, the public's perception of Truman's decision has been influenced by [a] misplaced focus on limited briefing documents produced literally after the invasion ships had already started to sail. I earnestly hope that members of the Society will examine this area more closely because SMH can greatly influence scholarly opinion and public perceptions on this subject and, ultimately, how we as a nation view our history and ourselves.

"I would like to thank the awards committee and the members of the Society as well as Larry Bland and Bruce Vandervort who did a splendid job editing the study. I'd also like to thank Dr. Michael DeBakey at Baylor for his continued encouragement and support as well as Fred Schultz at the Naval Institute who patiently allowed me to bend his ear with my random thoughts. And, finally, Barton Bernstein whose early work in this area and encouragement prompted me to examine the subject more thoroughly."

Now, obviously, Bernstein and I disagree on a number of matters and have carried on a vigorous debate in several venues where, subsequent to the awards luncheon, he has in print described my "strained," "deeply flawed," "self serving" work as filled with "confusion and intellectual sloppiness," "dubious conclusions," and the "misreading/misreporting" of documents, plus referred to me personally as an "amateur historian." But in all the heat, more than a little light has shown. And objective scholars have taken note of this. In Newman's fine new book, *Enola Gay and the Court of History*, he writes "Three persons have been of inestimable help in prodding me away from heresies and banalities without end: Barton Bernstein, D. M. Giangreco, and Edward Linenthal. I hope they are not disappointed with my conclusions."

It is fair to say that there is not likely to ever be consensus on the events surrounding the final days of World War II. All that the participants in this debate can hope for is that scholars will objectively and comprehensively examine their work instead of finding it characterized, as Walker charges, as having "reduced the tone of professional discourse to unprecedentedly low levels."

D.M. Giangreco
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

5) Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded annually to an author for his or her first book on any aspect of the history of American foreign relations. The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works that represent social science disciplines other than history are not eligible.

Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contributions to scholarship. Winning books should have exceptional interpretative and analytical qualities. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should display careful organization and distinguished writing. Five copies of each book must be submitted with a letter of nomination.

To nominate a book published in 2005, send five copies of the book and a letter of nomination to Kristin Hoganson, Department of History, University of Illinois, 446H Gregory Hall, 810 South Wright Street, Urbana, IL 61801. Books may be sent at any time during 2005, but must arrive by December 1, 2005.



The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize recognizes and encourages excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The prize of \$500 is awarded annually. The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the PhD whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or of any other established history, political science, or journalism department or organization. Nominations, in the form of a letter and the nominee's c.v., should be sent to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter should discuss evidence of the nominee's excellence in teaching and research.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH). The winner of the prize will deliver a lecture during the SHAFR luncheon at the next year's OAH annual meeting. The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to a SHAFR presidential address and should address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The lecturer is awarded \$500 plus up to \$500 in travel expenses to the OAH, and his or her lecture is published in *Diplomatic History*.

To be considered for the 2006 award, nominations must be received by February 28, 2006. Nominations should be sent to Penny von Eschen, Department of History, University of Michigan, 029 Tisch Hall, 435 S. State St., Ann Arbor MI 48109-1003, pmve@umich.edu.



The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. The prize of \$1,000 is awarded annually to the author of a distinguished article appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations. The author must be under forty-one years of age or within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of the article's acceptance for publication. The article must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award or the Myrna F. Bernath Book Award are ineligible.

All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* will be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations may be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR. To nominate an article published in 2005, send three copies of the article and a letter of nomination to Jessica Gienow-Hecht, Wilhelminenstrasse 45, 65193 Wiesbaden, Germany, gienow-hecht@soz.uni-frankfurt.de. Deadline for nominations is February 1, 2006.



The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

This grant has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of United

States foreign relations. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation.

Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: (a) applicant's c.v.; (b) a brief dissertation prospectus focusing on the significance of the thesis (2-4 pages will suffice); (c) a paragraph regarding the sources to be consulted and their value; (d) an explanation of why funds are needed and how, specifically, they will be used; and (e) a letter from the applicant's supervising professor commenting upon the appropriateness of the applicant's request (this letter should be sent separately to the selection committee chair.) Applications must be submitted in triplicate.

One or more awards may be given each year. Generally, awards will not exceed \$2,000. Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Awards are announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Applications should be sent to Amy L. S. Staples, Department of History, Middle Tennessee State University, Peck Hall Room 274, MTSU Box 23, Murfreesboro, TN 37132. Phone 615-898-2569; e-mail astaples@mtsu.edu. Deadline for applications for the 2006 grant is November 15, 2005. Graduate students may apply for both the Bernath Dissertation Grant and the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship provided they indicate clearly to which grant they are applying.



The Lawrence Gelfand - Armin Rappaport Fellowship

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*. The Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship is intended to defray the costs of dissertation research travel. The \$1,000 prize is awarded annually at the SHAFR luncheon at the American Historical Association conference.

Applicants must be doctoral candidates who are members of SHAFR. Self-nominations are expected. Each applicant should include a thesis or dissertation prospectus (8-12 pages, double spaced), a statement explaining how the fellowship if awarded, would be used, and a letter of recommendation from the graduate advisor.

Applications, in triplicate, should be sent to Amy L. S. Staples, Department of History, Middle Tennessee State University, Peck Hall Room 274, MTSU Box 23, Murfreesboro, TN 37132 (phone: 615-898-2569; e-mail astaples@mtsu.edu). Deadline for applications for the 2006 grant is November 15, 2005. Graduate students may apply for both the Bernath Dissertation Grant and the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship provided they indicate clearly to which grant they are applying.



The Myrna F. Bernath Book Award

The purpose of this award is to encourage scholarship by women in U.S. foreign relations history. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded biannually (even years) to the author of the best book written by a woman in the field and published during the preceding two calendar years. Nominees should be women who have published distinguished books in U.S. foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies.

Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of SHAFR. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contribution to scholarship. Three copies of each book (or page proofs) must be submitted with a letter of nomination.

The deadline for nominations for the 2006 prize is December 1, 2005. Send nominations to Thomas Borstelmann, Department of History, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 640 Oldfather Hall, Lincoln NE 68588.



Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize

This prize is designed to reward distinguished scholarship in the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined. The Ferrell Prize was established to honor Robert H. Ferrell, professor of diplomatic history at Indiana University from 1961 to 1990, by his former students. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded annually. The Ferrell Prize recognizes any book beyond the first monograph by the author. To be considered, a book must deal with the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible.

Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of SHAFR. Three copies of the book must be submitted. The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

The deadline for nominating books published in 2005 is December 15, 2005. Submit books to Emily Rosenberg, Macalester College, Old Main 303, 1600 Grand Avenue, St. Paul, MN 55105. Phone: 651-696-6787; e-mail: rosenberge@macalester.edu

The Norman and Laura Graebner Award

The Graebner Award is a lifetime achievement award intended to recognize a senior historian of United States foreign relations who has significantly contributed to the development of the field, through scholarship, teaching, and/or service, over his or her career. The award of \$2,000 is awarded biannually. The Graebner Award was established by the former students of Norman A. Graebner, professor of diplomatic history at the University of Illinois and the University of Virginia, to honor Norman and his wife Laura for their years of devotion to teaching and research in the field.

The Graebner prize will be awarded to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic or international affairs. The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Letters of nomination, submitted in triplicate, should (a) provide a brief biography of the nominee, including educational background, academic or other positions held, and awards and honors received; (b) list the nominee's major scholarly works and discuss the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs; (c) describe the candidate's career, note any teaching honors and awards, and comment on the candidate's classroom skills; and (d) detail the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices and discussing particular activities. Self-nominations are accepted.

The next deadline for nominations is March 1, 2006. Submit materials to Brenda Gayle Plummer, Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 4011 Mosse Humanities, 455 N. Park St., Madison, WI 53706.



6) Recent Publications of Interest

Azuma, Eiichiro. *Between Two Empires: Race, History, and Transnationalism in Japanese America*, Oxford University Press, \$21.95.

Barrett, David M. *The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy*, University Press of Kansas, \$39.95.

Bercuson, David and Holger Herwig. *One Christmas in Washington: Churchill, Roosevelt and the Making of the Grand Alliance*, Overlook Publishers, \$29.95.

Best, Jacqueline. *The Limits of Transparency: Ambiguity and the History Of International Finance*, Cornell University Press, \$37.50.

Cooper, Chester L. *In the Shadows of History: Fifty Years behind the Scenes of Cold War Diplomacy*, Prometheus Books, \$28.00.

Glantz, Mary E. *FDR and the Soviet Union: The President's Battles over Foreign Policy*, University Press of Kansas, \$34.95.

Gould, Eliga H. and Peter S. Onuf. *Empire and Nation: The American Revolution in the Atlantic World*, John Hopkins University Press, \$49.95.

Greenberg, Amy S. *Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire*, Cambridge University Press, \$25.99.

Hawley, Thomas, George Steinmetz and Julia Adams, eds. *The Remains of War: Bodies, Politics, and the Search for American Soldiers Unaccounted-for in Southeast Asia*, Duke University Press, \$22.95.

Hillman, Elizabeth Lutes. *Defending America: Military Culture and the Cold War Court-Martial*, Princeton University Press, \$29.95.

Hirsch, Francine. *Empire of Nations: Ethnographic Knowledge & the Making of the Soviet Union*, Cornell University Press, \$27.95.

Ignatieff, Michael. *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights*, Princeton University Press, \$24.95.

Kochavi, Arieh J. *Confronting Captivity: Britain and the United States and Their POWs in Nazi Germany*, University of North Carolina Press, \$45.00.

Lawrence, Mark Atwood. *Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam*, University of California Press, \$34.95.

Lerner, Mitchell B., ed. *Looking Back at LBJ: White House Politics in a New Light*, University Press of Kansas, \$34.95.

Levy, Daniel. *To Export Progress: The Golden Age of University Assistance in the Americas*, Indiana University Press, \$45.00.

Mauch, Christof and Jeremiah Riemer. *The Shadow War against Hitler: The Covert Operations of America's Wartime Secret Intelligence Service*, Columbia University Press, \$19.95.

Morley, Morris and Chris McGillion. *Cuba, the United States, and the Post-Cold War World: the International Dimensions of the Washington-Havana Relationship*, University Press of Florida, \$65.00.

Murphy, David E. *What Stalin Knew: The Enigma of Barbarossa*, Yale University Press, \$30.00.

Murphy, Gretchen. *Hemispheric Imaginings: the Monroe Doctrine and Narratives of U.S. Empire*, Duke University Press, \$21.95.

Neu, Charles E. *America's Lost War: Vietnam, 1945-1975*, Harlan Davidson, Inc., \$18.95.

Odom, William E. and Robert Dujarric. *America's Inadvertent Empire*, Yale University Press, \$18.00.

Pitts, Jennifer. *A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France*, Princeton University Press, \$39.50.

Porter, Gareth. *Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam*, University of California Press, \$27.50.

Powell, Jim. *Wilson's War: How Woodrow Wilson's Great Blunder Led to Hitler, Lenin, Stalin, and World War II*, Crown Publishing Group, \$27.50.

Rosenberg, Emily. *Date Which Will Live: Pearl Harbor in American Memory*, Duke University Press, \$18.95.

Rydell, Robert W. and Rob Kroes. *Buffalo Bill in Bologna: The Americanization of the World, 1869-1922*, University of Chicago Press, \$26.00.

Sartori, Anne E. *Deterrence by Diplomacy*, Princeton University Press, \$32.50.

Sathasivam, Kanishkan. *Uneasy Neighbors: India, Pakistan, and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Ashgate Publishers, \$94.95.

Schiff, Stacy. *A Great Improvisation: Franklin, France, and the Birth of America*, Henry Holt, \$30.00.

Smith, Joseph. *The United States and Latin America: A History of American Diplomacy, 1776-2000*, Routledge, \$32.95.

Solaun, Mauricio. *U.S. Intervention and Regime Change in Nicaragua*, University of Nebraska Press, \$59.95.

Stephens, Michelle A. *Black Empire: The Masculine Global Imaginary of Caribbean Intellectuals in the United States, 1914-1962*, Duke University Press, \$84.95.

Stern, Sheldon M. *The Week the World Stood Still: Inside the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Stanford University Press, \$37.50.

Stone, David. *War Summits: The Meetings that Shaped World War II and the Postwar World*, Potomac Books, \$29.95.

Sullivan, Michael J. *American Adventurism Abroad: 30 Invasions, Interventions, and Regime Changes since World War II*, Praeger Publishers, \$84.95.

Swenson-Wright, John. *Unequal Allies?: United States Security and Alliance Policy Toward Japan, 1945-1960*, Stanford University Press, \$60.00.

Tarling, Nicholas. *Britain, Southeast Asia, and the Impact of the Korean War*, University of Hawaii Press, \$32.00.

Towle, Philip. *From Ally to Enemy: Anglo-Japanese Military Relations, 1900-1945*, University of Hawaii Press, \$60.00.

Weinberg, Gerhard. *Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World War II Leaders*, Cambridge University Press, \$25.00.

Winter, Jay and Antoine Prost. *The Great War in History*, Cambridge University Press, \$28.99.

Fulbright Scholar Distinguished Chair in American History (Ireland)

Applications are still being accepted for the Fulbright Scholar Distinguished Chair Program's Mary Ball Washington Chair in American History. The Distinguished Chair will teach three courses at University College Dublin in Ireland at the graduate or advanced undergraduate level and assist with tutorials and postgraduate research. Desired specializations are American diplomatic history, the U.S. presidency, and 20th-century American political history. The grant is for nine months, beginning September 2006. Applicants for a Fulbright Distinguished Chair award must be U.S. citizens with a prominent record of scholarly accomplishment. Visit www.ucd.ie for more information about the host institution, or www.cies.org for more information about Fulbright Scholar programs. Contact Assistant Director Maria Bettua (mbettua@cies.iie.org) or Stephen Money (smoney@cies.iie.org) for more information about the Distinguished Chair award.

In Memoriam: George F. Kennan

Walter L. Hixson

The death of George F. Kennan on March 17, 2005, at the remarkable age of 101, prompted the extended obituaries and widespread eulogizing one would anticipate for the patriarch of the postwar containment policy. Indeed, Kennan's strategy, as propounded in the famous "X" article in the July 1947 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, created such an enduring legacy as to obscure his standing as arguably the most significant U.S. foreign policy intellectual of the twentieth century.

While the collapse of the Soviet empire in 1989 tended to affirm the association of Kennan with containment, he had long since transcended his early diplomatic career. For more than a half-century after the "X" article he served as one of the last of a breed of public philosophers. He was, as Stanley Hoffmann once put it, "a national treasure."

Kennan's powerful early postwar discourse calling for "patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies" constituted the Manifest Destiny of the mid-twentieth century. Much as John O'Sullivan had done a century before, as the United States launched a war on Mexico, Kennan set the era on its course. And yet the famous and not long anonymous "X" article marked only one of many occasions during Kennan's long public life in which he displayed his remarkable talent for commanding center stage to advance various jeremiads against the prevailing direction of national foreign policy. The irony is that the hard-line containment doctrine, which played an instrumental role in launching the Cold War, overshadowed Kennan's subsequent sharp criticisms of U.S. foreign policy and his long-term advocacy of arms control and diplomacy rather than confrontation.

By the 1980s, scholars and journalists had acclaimed Kennan as one of the "wise men" of the Cold War. Certainly no professional diplomat rising through the ranks of the Foreign Service achieved Kennan's influence on world affairs, historical scholarship, and cultural criticism. His was an extraordinary career. Born in Milwaukee on February 16, 1904, Kennan graduated from Princeton in 1925. After entering the newly professionalized Foreign Service in 1926, he rose to prominence in the State Department and returned to serve Presidents Harry S. Truman and John F. Kennedy in two brief ambassadorships, to the Soviet Union (1952-53) and Yugoslavia (1961-63). He could not stomach either mission (literally, as he long suffered from bleeding ulcers) and precipitously removed himself from both. He then moved back to Princeton, where he had longed to live since reading F. Scott Fitzgerald's *This Side of Paradise* as a youth.

At Princeton, Kennan emerged an eminent scholar, foreign policy analyst, and cultural critic. He displayed his remarkable talents in a series of books beginning with the landmark "realist" tract, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (1951). The retired diplomat wrote numerous other books on diplomatic history and garnered two Pulitzer Prizes, one for *Russia Leaves the War* (1956) and another for his elegant *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (1967). His articles appeared regularly in

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many newspapers, magazines, and journals, and he spoke widely and eloquently and appeared on television in various forums, ranging from the controversial Fulbright hearings on the Vietnam War to many more routine network appearances.

As a young graduate student working on a doctoral dissertation in the mid-1980's, I spent four months immersed in Kennan's papers at Princeton and interviewed him in his office in the bucolic setting of the Institute for Advanced Study. The consummate professional diplomat, Kennan spoke with rare clarity and erudition. Every sentence he uttered seemed the result of polished reflection. In other words, he spoke in the manner in which most of us strive to write. Nor was his verbal mastery confined to English. Apparently he was equally eloquent in French, German, Russian, Norwegian, and Serbo-Croatian.

Kennan's mastery of Russian enabled him to drink deeply of Russian culture, which he revered. He long contemplated but never wrote a biography of Anton Chekhov. Profoundly nostalgic for the Russia of the tsars (no matter how horrible life under them was for the vast majority of Russians), he hated the Bolsheviks for ruining the romance of Russia with their Marxist pretensions. Living through the dark and depressing years of Stalinist collectivization and party purges in the mid-1930s would have undermined the spirit of the strongest of men, let alone a man with the sensitivity of an artist and a weak stomach.

Kennan captivated the Truman administration in February 1946 with his famous "Long Telegram," the precursor to the "X" article, which he sent from his sickbed in Moscow, the city where he had been stewing since Pearl Harbor over Roosevelt's policy of wartime collaboration with the Soviet Union. With the country on the precipice of a massive policy reversal—from Grand Alliance to Cold War—the Long Telegram burned over the foreign affairs bureaucracy in Washington. The Truman administration summoned the Soviet-weary Kennan home to conduct briefings, to embark on a speaking tour to promote containment, and then to assume stewardship of the State Department Policy Planning Staff.

It did not take long for Kennan to become disillusioned, however. He sharply opposed the creation of NATO in 1949 because he clearly saw that it would militarize the continent and ensure a lasting division of Europe, thus cementing Soviet imperial dominance over Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, places Kennan had lived and still cherished. Already deeply disturbed by the direction of U.S. foreign policy, especially under John Foster Dulles, Kennan witnessed with horror the phenomenon of McCarthyism, the anti-communist purge that victimized so many of his close friends in the Foreign Service, including Charles Thayer, John Paton Davies, and to a lesser extent Charles "Chip" Bohlen. Partially insulated because of his "X"-article reputation for hard-line anti-communism, Kennan nevertheless risked his own career to mount a vigorous defense of all these men, as well his close friend and fellow tormented Cold War intellectual, J. Robert

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Oppenheimer. The wave of mindless anti-communism reinforced Kennan's growing loss of faith in democratic society.

The retired diplomat continued to command the stage. His 1958 BBC Reith Lectures ignited a renewed and vigorous debate over "disengagement" from Europe and earned him a rebuke from his old boss, Dean G. Acheson. Less than a decade later, the tall, imposing Kennan, with his prominent baldness and dignified diplomatic bearing, upstaged all other witnesses with his incisive critique of the Vietnam War in the Fulbright hearings. Yet another generation later, in 1984, Kennan again ignited debate in an influential *Foreign Affairs* article condemning the U.S. policy of maintaining the prerogative of first use of nuclear weapons. The ongoing nuclear arms race sickened him. It was nothing less than "a blasphemy . . . offered to God."

What is most striking about Kennan--and still poorly understood, even after several books and a spate of obituaries--is the profound irony that a man so deeply alienated from his own culture should be best known for articulating an enduring vision of national foreign policy. Despite his call for Washington to take the lead in containing communism, Kennan's writings dating back to the 1930s reveal that he actually had little faith in the ability of the United States to function effectively as a global power.

It would become clear that Kennan wanted *neither* Russia *nor* the United States to conduct a prolonged postwar occupation of Europe, which he viewed as more advanced in civilization than both of the big, blundering postwar great powers. Who can forget Kennan's metaphor for U.S. foreign policy: a brontosaurus, a prehistoric brute whose thrashing tail, unchecked by its tiny and ineffectual brain, reaped destruction at every turn? In contrast, Kennan deeply admired the Germans and once complained that the problem with Hitler's order was simply that it was Hitler's and not that of a moderate--yet still preferably authoritarian--German regime.

As for the United States--and here lies the Kennan paradox--Kennan could be quite explicit about his disgust with our way of life. Since early manhood he deplored the automobile (with its attendant parking lots, highways, billboards, and pollution), advertising and consumer culture, and television, the movies, and all forms of passive entertainment, which he believed hamstrung human potential. He also deplored the microchip. During an appearance on the MacNeil-Lehrer News Hour he responded, his voice aged and straining, to a comment exalting the wonders of the information age by growling that he could think of nothing we needed less, at this stage, than more information. It would serve only to render us even more addled about the human condition than we obviously already are.

It was vintage Kennan. During the 1960s he had become so outraged with student protesters, whom he compared to "a flock of truculent village geese," that he condemned them with a book, *Democracy and the Student Left* (1968). I recall erupting in laughter as I read Kennan's reflection upon entering a Danish port and encountering a youth festival "swarming with hippies, motorbikes, girlfriends, drugs, pornography, drunkenness, noise—it was all there." The architect of the postwar policy of containing the Soviet menace "looked at this mob and thought how one company of *robust Russian infantry* would drive it out of town."

Kennan ultimately concluded that the problem with the United States was democracy itself, and he advocated "a high degree of dirigisme, a strengthening of the hand of government, which is quite foreign to our habits and concepts." By the 1970s he concluded that the United States, "honeycombed with bewilderment," had "nothing to teach the world." On the fortieth anniversary of the "X" article in 1987, Kennan declared that "the first thing we Americans need to learn to contain is, in some ways, ourselves."

When the Soviet empire vaporized before our eyes, the first Bush administration ceremoniously feted Kennan as the father of containment, the man who had seen it all coming. The press played the story as Kennan's vindication, but he was not enthusiastic, for he probably anticipated the orgy of corruption that lay around the corner for his beloved, and ever beleaguered, Russia. In any event, the storybook ending featuring the Princeton sage and his prophecy-come-true, which proved irresistible to the media, did not come about in quite that way. In those early postwar treatises on containment, Kennan invariably concluded with the promise of success, yet he was elusive as to when this might come to pass. On at least one occasion he predicted a Soviet collapse, or at least a "mellowing," within "five to ten years," but he never anticipated a half-century of Cold War and global militarization. Nor did he ever envision both great victors in World War II remaining astride Europe, with a wall down the middle of Berlin, perhaps his favorite city, and the rest of the world engulfed in peripheral wars and menaced by every conceivable weapon of mass destruction.

As sober and compelling as the onetime professional diplomat often strove to appear, Kennan is best understood as an alienated foreign policy intellectual rather than the Machiavellian realist that the "X" article suggests. Like all members of his species, Kennan was a man of many contradictions. The Vietnam imbroglio that he condemned, for example, was a logical extension of his containment strategy; indeed, Kennan mapped out a containment policy for Indochina during his stint on the Policy Planning Staff in 1947, though he sharply opposed direct U.S. military intervention there. Like Henry Kissinger, Kennan also viewed history as operating on an East-West axis. Both men reflected Orientalist prejudices; neither possessed much interest in North-South issues or the plight of Third World countries. Kennan had been slow to condemn segregation at home and apartheid in South Africa.

When Kennan's life finally ebbed away it had spanned more than a century, and no one could say that he had failed to make the most of it. Along with his professional accomplishments, he helped raise a family and maintained a marriage with his Norwegian-born wife, Annelise, that lasted longer than most people's lives.

Undeniably brilliant, yet deeply conflicted, Kennan will always be remembered for the "X" article and containment. When I think of him, however, I remember a gangly octogenarian slowly pedaling his one-speed bicycle amid a haze of rush-hour traffic down Princeton's busy Nassau Street alone in a world of his own conceptualization.

Walter L. Hixson is Professor of History at the University of Akron.

The Last Word

Alexandra Epstein

Because I am primarily a historian of American women, my perspective on the field of American foreign relations is from the margins, but my position may be less marginal now than it was a decade ago. This change is a result of the burgeoning scholarship in foreign relations using new methodologies and new knowledge from other subfields such as cultural history and women's and gender history to reshape our perceptions of diplomatic history. The increase in such scholarship is a positive development for diplomatic history as a field and SHAFR as an organization, because these new approaches to foreign affairs prompt scholars to think about the field in fresh ways. I have benefited greatly from using diplomatic scholarship in my research and teaching, and I believe diplomatic historians should make more of an effort, where appropriate, to incorporate women's history and gender in their scholarship and especially in their teaching.

I first became involved in U.S. foreign relations when I began working on my dissertation on California female internationalists between the world wars. I had to become knowledgeable about both the traditional foreign relations scholarship for my period and the burgeoning body of literature reflecting the cross-fertilization between diplomatic history and the subfields of women's and gender history. That literature was recently surveyed by Kristin Hoganson in an article entitled "What's Gender Got to Do with It? Gender History as Foreign Relations History," which appeared in Michael Hogan and Thomas Paterson, eds., *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, 2d ed. (New York, 2004).

Incorporating gender into both graduate and undergraduate courses is imperative. Producing graduate students who are familiar only with the traditional literature and research questions based on male-dominated state-to-state relations will not suffice when hiring committees are seeking innovative methods and analysis. The familiarity with the new literature that I gained through my dissertation has served me well, because I have been given the opportunity to teach courses that utilize my knowledge of diplomatic history: a senior reading seminar, "United States and the World: American Perceptions of Asia," and an upper-division course, "The United States Empire in the Nineteenth Century." Whether this background will help me in my search for a tenure-track job in women's history is questionable. This past year there were a number of women's history jobs for those working from an international perspective, but I have yet to come across a women's history advertisement that asks for the ability to teach diplomatic history.

Similarly, diplomatic history job postings seeking a foreign relations specialist rarely if ever advertise for a candidate who can also teach women's history.



Nevertheless, my experience as a job applicant leads me to believe that scholars who engage in this cross-fertilization have options beyond the ads calling for one subfield or the other. In addition to the women's history job ads, this past year there appear to be an increasing number of openings for assistant professors specializing in twentieth-century United States history who are able to teach foreign relations courses. Perhaps some departments are creating these positions to replace retiring faculty in diplomatic history, but they want to broaden teaching portfolios. Alternatively, some departments may be strapped for funds and so may be hoping to fill two positions with one. Regardless, these ads illustrate a number of academic opportunities for applicants without a primary specialization in foreign relations.

SHAFR needs to do more to reflect gender and women's history in its own conference programs. It is a chicken-and-egg problem. If few women's historians are on the program, others may not feel comfortable attending, especially when most women's and gender historians are female. Scholars should be encouraged, even recruited, to submit proposals. Unfortunately, the SHAFR conference usually takes place around the same time as the Western Association of Women Historians annual conference, which is the largest yearly gathering of women's historians.

Some large conference programs do reflect this new interest in the cross-fertilization between women's history and diplomatic history. There are a few examples from this year's circuit, including my own panel, "In the Service of America: Foreign Service Officers, Diplomatic Wives, and Military Families," at the 2005 American Historical Association Conference in Seattle. Two of the papers from this panel addressed the history of American women and the U.S. Foreign Service. One focused on wives and the other on high-ranking officers; a third paper explored military families overseas in the Cold War era. However, program committees may not know how to classify this new scholarship, as was the case with the AHA. In the program index my panel was listed under "military" and "family/marriage/children."

SHAFR owes it to its younger members to do what it can to have a more inclusive membership base. Furthermore, it owes it to the profession to make an effort to display more of the new cross-fertilized scholarship. Not only would this encourage others to take up this kind of inter-field work, but it would also provide graduate students with models for future study.

Alexandra Epstein is Lecturer in the Department of History at the University of San Diego.