

Passport

The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Volume 37, Issue 2, August 2006



Inside...

Missing Documents at the National Archives
Stamp Collecting in Cuba

A Roundtable on Gareth Porter's *Perils of Dominance*

...and much more!

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In This Issue

- 4 *A Roundtable on Gareth Porter's *Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam**
Robert K. Brigham, Edwin E. Moise, Anne L. Foster, Fredrik Logevall,
and Gareth Porter
- 23 *History, Stamp Collecting, and the U.S. Embargo Against Cuba*
Thomas G. Paterson
- 25 *A Night to Remember: Walt LaFeber's Last Waltz*
Douglas Little
- 28 *The Case of the Disappearing Documents*
William Burr
- 33 *The Sixth Edition of *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations: An Appreciation, a Critique, and Some Suggestions**
Robert Shaffer
- 41 *SHAFR Council Minutes*
- 46 *The Diplomatic Pouch*
- 63 *The Last Word*
Richard Hume Werking

A Roundtable on Gareth Porter's *Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam*

The National Security Bureaucracy Made Me Do It: A Review of Gareth Porter's *Perils of Dominance*

Robert K. Brigham

For over three decades, Gareth Porter, an independent scholar, has been one of the leading authorities on the Vietnamese side of the Vietnam War. While earning his Ph.D. in political science at Cornell, he was also a co-director of the Indochina Resource Center, an organization that challenged Washington's official justification and explanation for the war. He was active in the antiwar movement and used his knowledge of Vietnamese to challenge many commonly held assumptions.

In 1975, as the war entered its final deadly year, Porter published his first book, *A Peace Denied*, an in-depth look at the implementation of the 1973 Paris Peace Accords. This book was well received and soon became a standard for students looking at the flawed negotiations in Paris and the implementation of the agreement's provisions. Even as he pursued these lines of inquiry, Porter was hard at work on a massive two-volume documentary history of the war. Published in 1979, this document collection provided an entire generation of scholars with their first glimpse into the corridors of power in Hanoi. In 1993, Porter published a path-breaking work, *Vietnam: The Politics of Bureaucratic Socialism*, that established him as one of the leading experts on postwar Vietnam.

In recent years, Porter's scholarly activities have taken him in a variety of fascinating and fruitful directions. He has become increasingly interested in American Cold War foreign policy and the international diplomatic environment that surrounded it. With *Perils of Dominance*, Porter joins a growing list of scholars who

challenge the dominant Cold War narrative. He seems particularly interested in debunking the notion that U.S. policymakers were driven by ideology and that the Cold War was a contest between two rival superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Porter argues instead that "strategic asymmetry" was the most important factor in the Cold War. He suggests that key policymakers inside the national security bureaucracy understood that the United States actually enjoyed "something approaching absolute strategic dominance" and that this belief in American superiority created adventurism—not fear—in Washington. He thus challenges a fundamental assumption about the Vietnam War. The United States did not wander unknowingly and unwillingly into the quagmire, he says, but purposefully chose war, thinking it could not lose. A major difference between Porter's interpretation and those of others who challenge the quagmire thesis, however, is that he blames the "national security bureaucracy" and not U.S. presidents for the decision to go to war.

It is an equally important tenet of Porter's thesis that Moscow and Beijing knew that Washington possessed military hegemony and did whatever they could to appease the United States. After the armistice in Korea, China and the Soviet Union—despite their growing rivalry with each other—agreed that neither should take any bold action that might lead the United States to cash in on its superiority. Their goal was to keep the United States out of Asia and focused on the Cold War in Europe. Porter sees Moscow and Beijing as having a more benign view of the world than most previous scholars have suggested. According to him, it was pragmatism, not adventurism, that dominated

Soviet and Chinese foreign policy throughout the early years of the Cold War, because neither nation could afford a direct conflict with the United States.

Porter offers plenty of examples to prove his point. He suggests that Moscow and Beijing took Secretary of State John Foster Dulles at his word when he threatened to "retaliate instantly, by means and at places of our choosing" should Beijing or Moscow promote war on their periphery. Accordingly, China and the Soviet Union limited their commitments in several newly emerging post-colonial nations. Nowhere is this appeasement more apparent to Porter than in Vietnam. He recounts the now infamous negotiations between Zhou En-lai, Vyacheslav Molotov, and the Vietnamese delegation at Geneva, when Hanoi's communist allies promoted a divided Vietnam as a way to keep the Americans at bay. Zhou issued a prophetic warning in April 1954, when he apparently told Ho Chi Minh that Vietnam "could not count on China to assist it openly, much less participate directly in the war" should the United States intervene in Indochina. Zhou shared Mao's fear that Washington could effectively isolate China in a sea of anti-Chinese sentiment if Beijing threatened American interests.

Porter also shows how the Eisenhower administration used its position of strength to circumvent the Geneva Accords. For decades, historians have argued that Eisenhower was good at taking the pulse of Congress and knew that neither house wanted to go to war in Vietnam. Congressional caution forced him to reject French pleas for more forceful U.S. intervention. Indeed, Eisenhower historians have applauded the general's pragmatic attitude toward Vietnam, especially

in light of subsequent events. Porter rejects this standard explanation for Eisenhower's cautious Vietnam policy, however, suggesting instead that the imbalance of power gave Washington all the cover it needed to resist bailing out the French and to undermine the Geneva Accords. Dulles and Eisenhower believed that Hanoi posed no real threat to American plans, so they made a series of what Porter calls "extreme demands" on North Vietnam. Ironically, because of strong Sino-Soviet pressure, Hanoi was willing to accept all the demands, among them allowing an independent state to develop south of the seventeenth parallel and suspending the national elections. Ultimately, Porter argues, it was Eisenhower's willingness to ignore and undermine the Geneva Accords that "created a ticking time bomb for future administrations" and eventually led to war in Vietnam.

Some of the more interesting moments in Porter's book occur when he returns to his long-held interest in Vietnamese politics. In his fourth chapter, he traces Hanoi's grudging acceptance of the Sino-Soviet appeasement line and argues that the Vietnamese Communist Party took great pains to reunify the country through the political struggle alone, even when the United States supported the state-sponsored terrorism of the South Vietnamese president, Ngo Dinh Diem, and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. Despite the calls of many southern revolutionaries, including the party's secretary general, Le Duan, the military commission of the political bureau held the People's Army in check. In fact, regular main force infantry units did not get the green light to head south until after the party's ninth plenum in 1963. The first offensive infantry troops eventually made their way south in 1965: proof enough, Porter believes that Hanoi was a good appeaser. Eventually, however, Hanoi had few options but to match the Americanization of the war, and so it allowed a wider war in the South and sent infantry troops by the tens of thousands to support the southern revolution. Many of Porter's conclusions about Hanoi's actions rest on research in Vietnamese-language

source material.

In the final chapters of the book, Porter takes his provocative thesis one step further. Armed with confidence born of personal arrogance and their faith in strategic dominance, key members of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations took the nation to war. In a plot line that has several twists, turns, and conspiracies, Porter traces the origins of U.S. intervention in Vietnam. He makes the case that Kennedy wanted to get out of Vietnam and that he used Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and General Maxwell Taylor as cover to promote that idea. In a passage that sounds too much like Oliver Stone for my taste, Porter suggests that Kennedy could not go through the normal channels of the national security bureaucracy because to reveal his plans to the National Security Council would be "too risky." According to Porter, Kennedy believed that Dean Rusk, his secretary of state, and McGeorge Bundy, his national security advisor, would not accept his secret plan to withdraw all American advisors from Vietnam by 1965. Accordingly, Kennedy promoted this policy through McNamara and Taylor, two family friends who could be counted on not to reveal that the president was actually behind the policy. While there is no hint that this secret plan led to Kennedy's death, Porter assumes that many people in the national security bureaucracy were pleased that the plans for withdrawal never materialized.

Ironically, Taylor and McNamara, who supported Kennedy's plans for a phased withdrawal, dramatically reversed themselves after the president's assassination. Once Kennedy was laid to rest, Taylor and McNamara began to lay the groundwork for American intervention, something Porter insists that they really wanted all along. Porter believes Taylor and McNamara were joined by others in the national security bureaucracy who were waiting in the shadows, hoping for a chance to take a more aggressive line against the Soviets. Porter's Lyndon Johnson was an unwilling participant in hawkish discussions on the war, but was eventually bullied into accepting

the recommendations of McNamara, Taylor and the joint chiefs to introduce ground troops to South Vietnam and launch a deadly air war over North Vietnam. These hawks saw inaction as weakness and played on Johnson's fears about his own power and legitimacy to convince him eventually to take a harder line in Vietnam.

In many ways, Porter's challenging book is trying to shift the paradigm on the Cold War and U.S. intervention in Vietnam. In my view, he is successful at marshaling the sources to make the argument that the United States did in fact enjoy strategic dominance in the Cold War. He is far less successful at making the case for the influence of this hegemony on U. S. policy. It is difficult for me to imagine, for instance, that the Vietnam War was actually the result of the national security bureaucracy's understanding of strategic dominance. If that were the case, why embrace Robert Osgood and Thomas Schelling's theories about limited war? Why fight a protracted war at all? Given what we know of Kennedy and Johnson's decision-making and their views on the Cold War, this interpretation makes little sense.

The overwhelming evidence on U.S. intervention in Vietnam indicates that many in what Porter calls the "national security bureaucracy" — an unfortunate term that he uses far too often — were pessimistic about military success in Vietnam from the very beginning. David Kaiser, George Herring, and Fred Logevall make this clear in their work. Why are they more convincing than Porter? For one, they conduct sustained historical research, uncovering many new sources. Porter relies primarily on the published record. For another, they engage the sources. Porter's work at times reads more like a legal brief than history. He makes points but does not engage the literature or the sources. He is also far too selective in his use of sources. Although there are plenty of sources that reveal Johnson's skepticism about the war, for example, there are plenty more that show his unwillingness to throw in the towel — even in 1964. Fred Logevall is far more convincing when he argues that the president chose war.

Porter is trying to convince readers

that the president is not really in charge of national security affairs and that commanders-in-chief often find it difficult to hang on to decision-making power. He concludes that “the national security bureaucracy acted as an independent power center within the U.S. government with the right to pressure the president on matters of war and peace.” Certainly advisors have the right to pressure the president on key matters of national security, but to say at this stage of the game that Kennedy allowed his advisors to take control of decision making or that Lyndon Johnson was intimidated by or could not control his national security staff is unsustainable. There is little if any documentary evidence for such a conclusion.

In the end, there is plenty of blame to go around for the tragedy in Vietnam. Why settle for casting stones at the “national security bureaucracy,” however defined? Porter’s book will make us think hard about the power dynamics of the Cold War, but it will probably do little to alter our understanding of America’s path to war in Vietnam.

Robert K. Brigham is Shirley Ecker Boskey Professor of History and International Relations at Vassar College.

A Review of Gareth Porter’s *Perils of Dominance*

Edwin E. Moise

Gareth Porter has long been a controversial figure in his field, and *Perils of Dominance* will not make him less so. It provides new and valuable information and interpretations, but it also has enough defects to provide plentiful ammunition for his detractors.

Large portions of the book center on an important insight: that the picture many of us have of a rough balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, each restrained in its behavior by the knowledge that an all-out conflict would destroy them both, is not really valid for the early part of the Cold War. Porter argues that in the 1950s and early 1960s the United States was clearly much stronger than the Soviet

Union and China and that awareness of this fact helped shape the policies of all three powers and of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The Communist states restrained their actions in an effort to avoid direct conflicts with the United States, while the United States was confident enough to push its advantage and indeed, sometimes pretended to be more willing to fight than it actually was and in that way got the other side to back down. Porter says the Communist states’ “appeasement” policies were “aimed at avoiding the risk of a clash with the United States at any cost,” especially during the Eisenhower years (xi).

The broad outlines of this interpretation are clearly correct. The United States was the dominant power, and even those scholars who are aware of that fact (this reviewer included) have not given it the attention it deserves. This view of U. S. dominance has led Porter to reinterpret Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’ policies toward Indochina in the first half of 1954, at the time of the Geneva Conference. Dulles was not nearly so ready as other authors have believed to use U.S. military power to block a Communist victory in Vietnam. Porter offers convincing evidence that Dulles did not think he would need to use force. Instead, he bluffed, exploiting the superior strength of the United States and using the threat of U.S. military intervention to intimidate China and the Soviet Union.

This interpretive lens works well when applied to some crucial decisions on Indochina in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but when Porter writes about the mid-1960s it becomes apparent that he is exaggerating the evidence on Communist restraint. A CIA intelligence memorandum dated March 18, 1963¹ does not, as Porter claims, state “that the USSR had no interest in helping local Communists gain power anywhere in the world” (19). Further on, Porter makes the startling assertion that “Soviet archival sources and recently published Chinese accounts of the period both indicate that the USSR gave no military assistance to the North Vietnamese during the entire period from 1960 to early 1965, except

for a few thousand World War II-era German weapons provided in 1962” (48). Neither of the two sources Porter cites for this statement supports it, and one obvious counterexample comes to mind. The PT boats involved in the Tonkin Gulf incident of August 2, 1964, were built in the Soviet Union in the 1950s and sent to North Vietnam in the early 1960s.

If Porter had used his view of American dominance to analyze the escalation decisions of 1965 he might have produced some really interesting results, but he does not apply it as much as he did for earlier periods. He discusses the realization of American officials, in June 1965, that despite the presence of American ground and air combat forces in Vietnam, the Communists might be about to win the war there (222). Yet he does not mention that the People’s Republic of China began sending significant numbers of military personnel into North Vietnam at about that time. The Communist leaders’ increased willingness to take strong action in Vietnam, despite the risks of confrontation with the United States, cries out for a much more detailed analysis, as does the process by which American leaders recognized that they were losing their ability to intimidate their opponents.

The other major thread running through *Perils of Dominance* is the belief that Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson were all less inclined to adopt extreme Cold War policies than their principal advisers were. On this issue Porter makes some valid points, but he sometimes goes well beyond his evidence. His story of how and why Secretary Dulles decided to encourage Premier Ngo Dinh Diem not to meet with representatives of the Communist government in Hanoi to discuss holding elections for the reunification of Vietnam, as called for by the Geneva Accords, is new and extremely interesting. American officials had been planning to encourage Diem to meet Hanoi’s representatives because they were confident that Hanoi would refuse to agree to conditions for a truly free election. It would then be clear to the world that Hanoi was blocking the elections. Toward the middle of 1955, however, Dulles became seriously

CALL FOR PAPERS

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The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) invites proposals for panels and individual papers at its annual conference, June 21-24, 2007, to be held at the Marriott Westfields Conference Center in Reston, Virginia, just outside Washington, D.C. Although proposals for individual papers will be considered, proposals for complete or nearly complete panels are encouraged and will receive higher priority. In order to receive full consideration, proposals should be submitted no later than December 15, 2006.

SHAFR president Richard Immerman will deliver his presidential address at the Saturday luncheon. Although it is hard to believe, 2007 will mark the 40th anniversary of the founding of SHAFR. In this spirit, special invitations will be extended to all SHAFR past presidents, and program co-chairs Steve Rabe and Doug Little will organize a PowerPoint slide retrospective recapping the history of the SHAFR summer conference entitled: "Dorm Rooms, Cafeterias, and Low-Rent Hotels We Have Known."

Panels and paper proposals are encouraged from all areas of diplomatic history, foreign relations, and international studies. Panels can follow one of the following formats: 1) three or four papers, chair, and commentator or 2) a roundtable with a chair and participants. The program committee also welcomes innovative formats.

Electronic submissions are encouraged (as Word or WordPerfect attachments), but paper submissions will be accepted. Panel submissions should total no more than three pages and must have the following information: the name of each panelist as she/he would like it to appear on the program should the panel be accepted (please check the proper spelling of everyone's name); each participant's institutional affiliation and status (graduate student, assistant professor, lecturer, professor, etc.); the role of each panelist; and contact information, including an e-mail address and phone number for each participant. Each panel or roundtable should include a brief rationale, the title of each paper, and a short description of the work to be presented. Each panelist should include a brief bio. Please adhere to the limit of three pages.

This year the SHAFR Council will offer up to \$1,500 total in travel funds to assist graduate students who present papers at the conference. The following stipulations apply: 1) no award will exceed \$300 per student; 2) priority will be given to graduate students who receive no or limited funds from their home institutions; and 3) expenses will be reimbursed by the SHAFR Business Office upon submission of receipts. The program committee will make all decision regarding the awards.

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If you have questions about submitting a panel or would like some assistance in finding participants for a panel, please feel free to contact the members of the program committee, or post your panel ideas on such discussion groups as H-Diplo and others related to our field.

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concerned that Hanoi would make reasonable proposals in the meeting. He then decided to discourage Diem from going, and in July 1955 Diem announced that he would not attend. The documentation for most of this story seems very solid, although there does not appear to be much evidence for the assertion that Dulles did not consult President Eisenhower about his decision.

Porter paints an accurate picture of the hawks in the Kennedy administration who were pressing for U.S. military action in Vietnam, but his picture of Kennedy's resistance to that pressure is problematic. He says the president was determined to avoid an American war in Vietnam but for political reasons wanted to hide the fact, not only from the public, but to the extent he could, from his own national security bureaucracy. There are two problems with Porter's approach to this issue. One is the way he picks and chooses statements from the documentary record that support his argument or can be re-interpreted to support his argument. He says that in March 1962, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed that plans be drawn up for the introduction of U.S. combat forces into Vietnam if a crisis should occur there. He quotes Kennedy's response to McNamara: "An important item in this planning . . . is the timing of a decision for US action *and the factors that go into such a decision* [emphasis added]." He interprets these words to mean that if there were a crisis in Vietnam, the United States should be planning not to send additional forces but to pull out the ones already there (167). This interpretation goes rather far beyond the apparent meaning of the words. Later on, Porter writes that "on July 17, [Kennedy] began to define 'withdrawal' as *immediate* withdrawal, and expressed his opposition to it. 'For us to withdraw from that effort,' he said, 'would mean a collapse not only of South Viet-Nam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there'" (174). Kennedy said nothing about the immediateness of the withdrawal; Porter reads that into his statement.

In the last months of the Kennedy presidency, there was a series of meetings at which plans for

withdrawing U.S. forces from Vietnam were discussed. Porter argues that Kennedy wanted the National Security Council to approve and publicly announce a withdrawal plan but did not want to support such a plan openly even within the NSC, fearing that this would make him vulnerable to accusations of being soft on communism. Apparently, Kennedy is supposed to have hoped that the United States could withdraw from Vietnam during his presidency without either the public or high officials ever thinking of the withdrawal as having been his policy. Porter quotes Secretary of Defense McNamara as saying that once such a plan was announced, "it would be in concrete," impossible to change (176). This logic is very strange. Changing such a plan would not have been difficult. Indeed, it is hard to think of any major decision the United States ever made in Vietnam that did not represent a reversal of some previously announced policy.

The other problem with Porter's approach to the Kennedy administration is that he ignores crucial parts of what the administration actually *did* while tracing Kennedy's policies though what various people said. He claims that from the mid-summer of 1962 onward, "a plan for phasing out the U.S. military presence in South Vietnam" had become Kennedy's "main policy line" for Vietnam (164). He does not appear to notice that the policy Kennedy actually implemented, from mid-summer of 1962 to the time of his death, increased the number of U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam by slightly more than 50 percent.

Porter's chapter on the Kennedy administration reads as if Kennedy sent only military advisers to South Vietnam. He refers to Kennedy's "consistent opposition to deployment of combat forces" (167). In an endnote he concedes that the Air Force pilots sent to Vietnam late in 1961 were flying combat missions, but he says "it is not clear whether Kennedy understood" this was occurring (331, n. 115). The documents in the *Vietnam 1962* volume of *Foreign Relations of the United States* contain enough

references to the air strikes conducted by the "Jungle Jim" unit in South Vietnam to render most unlikely the notion that the president might have been unaware of what was going on. I do not see even in Porter's endnotes any reference to the Army and Marine helicopter pilots who were flying combat missions or the Special Forces troops who were leading, not just advising, locally recruited troops in combat operations. President Kennedy had put considerable numbers of military personnel into combat in Vietnam, and he knew it.

Porter's picture of the Johnson administration is much like his picture of the Kennedy administration: he sees a coterie of hawks pushing a reluctant president toward war. But since that was indeed the situation in 1964, his evidence is considerably better. The argument for Porter's most extreme assertion, that Secretary of Defense McNamara concealed from President Johnson the weakness of the evidence for the second Tonkin Gulf incident when he was getting Johnson's approval for retaliatory air strikes, does not seem strong enough to justify the confidence with which the assertion is made. But Porter makes a better argument here than he does for similar assertions about the Kennedy administration.

Porter does not take the domino theory very seriously. In his view the senior policymakers believed too strongly in the superior strength of the United States and in their ability to intimidate the Communist powers to worry as much as they sometimes pretended they did about all of Southeast Asia falling to communism. Dwight Eisenhower and William Bundy sometimes talked as if they believed in the domino theory and sometimes talked as if they did not, but Porter makes a solid case that neither of them did. He is much less convincing about Dean Rusk and Robert McNamara, at times reading meanings into their statements that are not really there. For example, the record of a meeting at which McNamara was present in Honolulu on October 8-9, 1962, states that Thailand was "not an easy target" for Communist subversion and that "the real danger is Thailand's wavering

confidence in US determination to beat the communists in SEA." The record does not go into the question of how the fall of South Vietnam to communism would or would not change the situation.² Porter's summary omits the second of these statements and treats the first as if it meant that Thailand would not be an easy target *if South Vietnam fell*:

At least one important piece of documentary evidence supports the view that McNamara, along with Taylor and McCone, understood that Thailand was not likely to be "gravely threatened" in the event of a Communist victory in South Vietnam, as Bundy's draft had suggested. In October 1962, McNamara and other participants in a conference on Vietnam in Honolulu discussed the situation in Thailand and registered a consensus that it would not be "an easy target" for Communist subversion, given the stability of the government of Sarit Thanarat (246-47).

At the end of his discussion of the domino theory, Porter makes an extremely interesting point: that when American officials worried about Southeast Asian governments falling to or reaching an accommodation with communism if South Vietnam were to fall, they were worrying about what might seem to us quite modest accommodations. The United States was determined to keep the People's Republic of China a pariah state isolated from the international community. The notion that the fall of South Vietnam was sure to cause Thailand to fall under Communist domination was silly. The notion that the fall of South Vietnam would prompt the Thais to adjust their international stance to the extent of establishing normal diplomatic relations with Beijing and exchanging ambassadors was not silly at all, and American officials felt this would represent a serious defeat for the United States.

Perils of Dominance is an important book, despite its serious flaws. I not only learned interesting new facts by reading it, I gained a significantly better understanding of some very

important issues relating to a subject I thought I already understood pretty well. Although I felt obliged to exercise caution in places where he has been careless in his argument and his documentation, Porter has compensated for that by compelling me really to notice the fact that the United States was the world's dominant power throughout the years of the Vietnam War, and he has persuaded me to reevaluate my understanding of a number of issues, including the domino theory.

Edwin E. Moise is Professor of History at Clemson University.

Notes:

1. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. V, *Soviet Union* (Washington, DC, 1998), 645.
2. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963*, vol. XXIII, *Southeast Asia* (Washington, DC, 1995), 974.

Review of Gareth Porter's *Perils of Dominance*

Anne L. Foster

At first I thought Gareth Porter's new book was going to be the latest entry in the long line of publications asking, essentially, "why Vietnam?" The title suggests as much, and the introductory material Porter presents reflects his sense that existing interpretations of the U.S. military commitment to Vietnam do not fit the facts as he understands them. Porter has also spent much of his career thinking and writing about the nature of the U.S. involvement with Vietnam. After reading the book, however, I began to think it is instead one of the first entries in what will probably be a long, although probably less long, line of "why Iraq?" publications. Given the book's lengthy period of gestation, it clearly began as an attempt to ask why the United States went to war in Vietnam, but Porter realized that his subject would be useful for understanding the decision to go to war in Iraq as well.

Each time a new article or book appears on the U.S. war in Vietnam or on the broader topic, increasingly popular now, of U.S.-Vietnamese

relations, it occurs to me that there may be enough of these studies. We now have a wide range of approaches to the subject, profound knowledge about the creation and implementation of U.S. foreign and military policies, growing knowledge about the policies of U.S. allies and of Cold War rivals, and the beginnings of greater knowledge about what went on in the governments of Vietnam. A high percentage of the leading scholars in U.S. foreign relations currently research or have written seriously in the past on the Vietnam War era. An abbreviated list would include Lloyd Gardner, Fredrik Logevall, Robert Buzzanco, Robert Shulzinger, Robert McMahon, Marilyn Young, Mark Bradley, Robert Brigham, David Anderson, George Herring, Sandra Taylor, Seth Jacobs, Mark Lawrence, and Gary Hess. And the subject remains compelling to a new generation of scholars. Many of those listed above were born during the war and do not have the compelling personal connection to it that older scholars do.¹

As I read each new study, however, I am struck by the vibrancy of the intellectual exchange in this field, which seems to attract able, creative scholars. These scholars have been in the forefront of some of the most exciting trends in the history of foreign relations: they have led the way in focusing attention on the international history of the war, in studying Vietnamese policies (once it became possible to conduct research in Vietnam), in exploring the cultural aspects of the relationship between the United States and Vietnam, and in thinking seriously about the effect of the war on the United States and about what the creation and implementation of U.S. policy reveals about the country more generally. Their scholarship has also been motivated by a hope that policymakers will learn from what most scholars believe was a tragic mistake, and many of them explicitly attempt to teach the lessons of the war while at the same time producing history of great integrity.

Porter's book shares some of these strengths. He has creatively used theory from international relations about the relationship between

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Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize:


David Engerman, Brandeis University

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W. Stull Holt Fellowship:

Kate Burlingham, Rutgers University



peace and the balance of power in the world and, as in the case of Vietnam, war and the imbalance of power. The argument he makes, briefly, is that the United States held vastly more military power than its rivals during the 1950s and 1960s, and this imbalance of power emboldened U.S. national security officials to call for war in Vietnam. They believed that the United States would win and that there would be no cost to intervention. Porter claims that, contrary to popular perception, what kept the United States from full military commitment until the mid-1960s were the fears of three successive presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson, that military power would not be effective in Vietnam. He argues that these presidents did not desire war in Vietnam, but that the national security bureaucracy wanted it and maneuvered deftly and persistently to get it. On a broader level, he concludes that foreign policymaking in the United States is dysfunctional and undemocratic, since the elected leader of the country was unable, in three successive administrations, to get the bureaucracy to carry out his wishes. This dysfunction is directly linked to the global imbalance of power, since it gave (and in the post-Cold War era still gives) national security officials irrational confidence. Clearly, Porter fits directly into that admirable tradition of creative and skilled Vietnam War scholars who are motivated by a strong desire to promote a more democratic and peaceful U.S. foreign policy.

The question of "why Vietnam?" still lingers, however. Porter persuasively argues that there was a global imbalance of military power during most of the 1950s and 1960s. He provides ample evidence that many U.S. policymakers were at least at times emboldened by this imbalance of power and shows that they applied analysis that was informed by their assessment of that imbalance to the situation in Vietnam. But does he shed light on "why Vietnam?"

Porter pursues what has now come to be a somewhat old-fashioned

approach, focusing on what happened in offices in Washington, D.C., almost to the exclusion of what happened anywhere else in the world. And to the extent that Porter is interested in foreign capitals, those are Beijing and Moscow, not Hanoi and especially not Saigon. If he is correct, of course, there is little that either government in Vietnam could have done to change U.S. policy. Indeed, the government that receives the least attention in his book, that of the Republic of Vietnam, perhaps did the most to push the United States toward war, albeit inadvertently. Porter's narrative demonstrates that whenever officials from the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) explored possible negotiations or a neutralist solution, the U.S. national security bureaucracy went into high gear to do whatever it took to stop them.

Yet that example demonstrates one of the ways in which Porter does not help us better understand "why Vietnam?" All the participants in the conflict, but especially both governments in Vietnam, could have done more to shape the course of U.S. policy there. The RVN could have insisted on pursuing negotiations and could have invited the United States to leave, as many U.S. officials feared they would. The Democratic Republic of Vietnam could have pursued the case for the 1956 elections more strongly in the United Nations, creating a difficult public relations situation for the United States. I raise these examples not to engage in counterfactual speculation, but to show that whatever the thoughts of U.S. officials about the degree of U.S. military power, it had to be usable and effective in the eyes of the United States and, to a lesser degree, its allies and even its enemies.

Porter's analysis of the nature of Cold War and post-Cold War foreign policy is incisive and disturbing in its implications. Yet while it does suggest why Vietnam was likely to become a military conflict, it does not show why it actually became a military conflict. Porter demonstrates convincingly, often using novel analysis and impressive research, that the national security bureaucracy believed war was a good solution in Vietnam. Was

Vietnam the only place they perceived the benefits of military action? One suspects not, especially since covert military operations did take place around the world during these years. The U.S. operation in Indonesia in 1958 is one example. So the notion of a global imbalance of power and of a national security bureaucracy arguing for war does not help us understand "why Vietnam?" It helps us understand the likelihood that the United States would pursue military options when many in the nation and across the globe saw political and diplomatic solutions as possible and preferable.

Porter does not look for the answer to "why Vietnam?" in U.S. domestic politics or in Vietnam itself, although he does hint that both are more important than the space they have been allotted in the book would indicate. On the domestic front, he insists that Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson all wished to avoid war, based on their insightful analyses of the situation in Vietnam and their sense of the inappropriateness of military solutions for what was essentially a political problem. This will probably be the most controversial part of the book. It will be a rare reader who will be prepared to accept the argument for all three presidents. Many will agree about Eisenhower, though not all. Adherents will drop away as the story reaches Kennedy, and their numbers will shrink further in the Johnson era. Most readers will find it difficult to overlook the fact that each president acquiesced in, accepted, or even promoted a major expansion of the U.S. commitment, military and nonmilitary, to the Republic of Vietnam.

To the extent that Porter answers the question of why these presidents turned against their own ideas about the right policy for Vietnam, he argues that each president was outmaneuvered by his national security team. Perhaps so, but presidents can discipline unruly national security officials, even fire them. None of these presidents did that, partly because Vietnam was rarely their highest priority or even their highest foreign policy priority. More important, however,

the presidents, especially Kennedy and Johnson, were afraid that they would be accused by political rivals (and maybe even some supporters) of being soft on communism and allowing another country to be "lost" to communism. The presidents sometimes talked about the impact of the loss of Vietnam on allies, but more often those arguments were used by national security officials to persuade them to take action. What the presidents feared was a domestic backlash. So Eisenhower allowed John Foster Dulles to undermine the Geneva Accords; John F. Kennedy approved a major commitment to the counterinsurgency war in South Vietnam; and Lyndon B. Johnson approved the bombing of North Vietnam and then committed U.S. ground troops to combat. Each time, the most convincing argument was not the one deployed by the national security officials about the effect that a failure to act would have on U.S. relations with countries in the region or close allies elsewhere. The most convincing argument was the one the presidents made to themselves about their political futures. It was particularly convincing for Kennedy, in the aftermath of accusations that he had not responded effectively to the Soviet presence in Cuba, and for Johnson, since Richard Nixon was already promising to hold his feet to the fire on Vietnam. The national security bureaucracy did not succeed because U.S. foreign policy was undemocratic. It succeeded because the presidents always had to think about the next election.

Vietnam itself provides another answer to "why Vietnam?" As Porter suggests in the last few pages of his book, the global imbalance of power may constrain the states that are a rung or two below the most powerful nation, but the least powerful nations do not feel the same constraints. They may have a lot to lose in a relative sense, but they also have more chances to succeed. Their absolute power is so minimal that they cannot make much difference as a part of the global power balance. More important, the global power imbalance that Porter analyzes so well is merely a military power balance.

Small states like Vietnam understood well, and medium-rank states like the People's Republic of China (PRC) understood even better, that military power is not the only efficacious kind in international relations. So Porter's long and persuasive analysis about the effect of the global imbalance of power on the major powers, emboldening the United States and constraining the Soviet Union and the PRC, does not apply to either Vietnamese government. Vietnamese officials did have to analyze the effect of their actions on all the great powers and decide whether they could tolerate those effects, but they were not constrained by the global balance of power in the same way.

Vietnamese leaders, both North and South, understood that their struggle did not occur in isolation. As scholars like Mark Bradley have shown so convincingly, long before World War II, Vietnamese who wanted independence were weighing various ideologies and carefully considering which countries might support them and which might stand in their way, just as anticolonialists of all political persuasions were single-mindedly pursuing their goals. It is of course one of many ironies of the U.S. war in Vietnam that Soviet leaders had long considered Ho Chi Minh politically unreliable because they believed he was more committed to his nation than to the cause of international socialism. They understood that the developing Cold War had limited Ho's options after 1945, but they understood equally well that he would pursue the course he believed would lead to a unified and independent Vietnam.² Ngo Dinh Diem also proved to be a less malleable client than the United States would have liked. His reputation as a nationalist is more compromised than Ho Chi Minh's, but he too pursued policies that infuriated the United States when he believed they were for the good of his nation. Vietnamese leaders from both the North and the South were careful about not unnecessarily provoking the United States, especially in ways that might lead to military intervention, but they were not constrained from taking the necessary steps toward their goals in

the way that the Soviet Union and the PRC were constrained by the global imbalance of power.

Why Vietnam? One could say that there are many answers. There was an unfortunate convergence of factors that contributed to the U.S. decision to go to war: domestic anticommunism, the global imbalance of power, Cold War ideologies, a lack of understanding of Vietnamese history and culture, the Vietnamese determination to have full independence, and each president's powerful fear of stepping away from South Vietnam. At bottom, however, there is just one answer: the United States decided it could not tolerate an independent and unified Vietnam that had chosen its own form of government.

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Note:

1. Even by the typical standards for the field of the history of U.S. foreign relations, the list includes remarkably few women.
2. Ho Chi Minh was a dedicated communist but an even more dedicated nationalist.

**Review of Gareth Porter's
*Perils of Dominance***

Fredrik Logevall

Gareth Porter advances two principal arguments in *Perils of Dominance*. The first is convincing, in my judgment, even if he stretches it too far; the second is not. Porter is not the first to see in the period 1953-1965 an imbalance of power between the United States and its main Communist adversaries that overwhelmingly favored the former, but he develops the argument more fully than any other scholar I know. He goes so far as to assert the existence in this period of a unipolar international system, in which both the Soviets and Chinese were acutely aware of Washington's strategic superiority and therefore disinclined to allow military action that would challenge U.S. interests – including, in this case, in Southeast Asia. American officials, meanwhile, fully aware of their advantage, developed an

“extremely high level of confidence” that Washington “could assert its power in Vietnam without the risk of either a major war or a military confrontation with another major power” (259). They could act with impunity, that is to say, in working to keep South Vietnam from falling to Communism, at least as far as Nikita Khrushchev (and the Kosygin/Brezhnev team that followed him) and Mao Zedong were concerned.

The argument for a fundamental imbalance of power in these years is persuasive, and powerfully rendered, and it raises profoundly important questions for our understanding of the Cold War international system as a whole. Blithe references to a superpower rivalry between two giants of more or less equal stature, dubious enough before this book, will be harder to make after it. Porter is at his best here, and really very good, as he describes this strategic disparity and analyzes its meaning for the larger Cold War. With respect to Vietnam in the mid-1950s, he makes a strong case that U.S. strategic superiority decisively influenced Eisenhower's and Dulles's decision to subvert the 1954 Geneva Accords, confident as they were that neither the Chinese nor the Soviets would do more than issue empty protests. Porter misses the degree to which South Vietnamese leader Ngo Dinh Diem was the architect of his government's policy vis-à-vis the Accords, but the basic point stands: for U.S. leaders there was, in Cold War terms, “no serious downside to scrapping the elections called for by the Geneva Accords,” and to working to build up the Diem regime.

The question, though, is how much explanatory power this imbalance of power has for the American decision a decade later to wage large-scale war in Vietnam. Here Porter offers considerably less. He does not demonstrate that the U.S. superiority drove the decision to launch Rolling Thunder and commit ground troops, and he presents no real challenge to the prevailing view that concerns about the possible responses from Moscow and especially Beijing helped shape the nature and extent of the Americanization of the conflict in

1964-65 and thereafter – precluding, notably, an invasion of the North and a wholesale expansion of the war into Laos and Cambodia. He underplays, moreover, the degree to which some senior officials feared for how America’s global “credibility” would be affected by the outcome in Vietnam, a concern based on perceived vulnerability, not overweening confidence.

The book’s second major argument, which is connected to and ultimately overshadows the first – and which I will focus on here – is that what Porter calls the “national security bureaucracy” consistently advocated deeper U.S. military engagement in Vietnam, even in the face of opposition from Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. The three presidents, Porter doggedly insists, were the exceptions to the general rule of American hubris and hawkishness; the three men sought at all times, ultimately unsuccessfully, to prevent the outbreak of major war. But was this “national security bureaucracy” really the cohesive, undifferentiated mass Porter makes it out to be? In his telling it consistently speaks with one voice (“The national security bureaucracy believed...” [187]; “The national security bureaucracy was firmly opposed...” [208]), and consistently advocates one basic course of action, i.e. escalation. In fact, though, there were always important differences among national security officials over Vietnam policy. This was true at the beginning under Eisenhower and at the end under Johnson; it was true among top and mid-level civilian officials at State, at the CIA, and in the Pentagon, and among their counterparts in the uniformed military. Even when principal advisers were united on the need for expanded military action, they often disagreed on why it was necessary, and on what form it ought to take.

Contrary to Porter’s claim, for example, top advisers did not react to the 1961 Taylor-Rostow report with unanimity, and were not, as a group, “shocked” when JFK rejected some of its recommendations. Contrary to his claim, “Johnson’s advisers” at the start of 1965 had not concluded that “he

was holding off on the bombing in the hope that a neutralist regime would emerge in Saigon to negotiate a peace settlement with Hanoi” (208). (I doubt, indeed, that a single one of them had so concluded.) Far more than Porter allows, moreover, these advisers early in 1965 differed among themselves regarding the likely efficacy of air power, and the advisability of sending U.S. ground troops.

Like an attorney trying to present the clearest (though not necessarily the best) case possible before the jury, Porter time and again flattens out ambiguities. Thus one gets little sense that top and mid-level officials were themselves at times uncertain about the outlook for the conflict – even with the introduction of U.S. ground troops – and about the stakes involved. Dean Rusk, in my judgment, was a true believer on Vietnam, whereas Robert McNamara wasn’t; both men, however, though ultimately champions of Americanization, often expressed uncertainty about the best course to follow. Already in October 1963 McNamara told his colleagues that “we need a way to get out of Vietnam,” and at several points in 1964 he expressed deep concerns about the state of the war and the prospects for victory. Porter quotes the October 1963 line, but his McNamara becomes an über-hawk the minute Lyndon Johnson assumes office. Why? Because, Porter argues, McNamara did not feel constrained by loyalty to the new president. Really? It seems to me well-established that he had a profound sense of loyalty to Johnson, arguably as great as he had to Kennedy. This loyalty, which may have been to the office as much as to the two men, in my view goes a long way to explaining his advocacy in the lead-up to major war. Certainly, the defense secretary’s attitude on the war was much more complex, more internally contradictory, than we see in this book.

The same smoothing out of rough edges occurs with the presidents. In *Perils of Dominance* each one is a dove, continually striving with all his might to prevent large-scale escalation – until February 1965, when Johnson, determining he can resist the bureaucracy’s pressure

no longer, gives up. Evidence for such an interpretation can be found in the vast published and archival material – for the Kennedy and especially the Johnson periods, in particular, the amount is now truly staggering – but the question is how it stacks up against the totality of that

Arthur S. Link-Warren F. Kuehl Prize for Documentary Editing

The Link-Kuehl Prize recognizes and encourages analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. The award of \$1,000 is presented biannually (odd years) to the best book published during the preceding two calendar years. The award is announced at the SHAFR luncheon during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Eligibility: The prize is awarded to published documentary works distinguished by the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any published collection of documents that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship.

Procedures: Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. Send three copies of the book with letter of nomination to Nancy Mitchell, Department of History, North Carolina State University, Department of History, 161 Harrelson Hall, Campus Box 8108, Raleigh, NC 27695-8108 (phone: 919-513-2214, fax 919-515-3886; e-mail: nancy_mitchell@ncsu.edu). To be considered for the 2007 prize, nominations must be received by November 15, 2006.

material. Too often in this book the author bases his claims on memoirs and oral histories, which, though certainly legitimate sources, are weak reeds upon which to build sweeping interpretive arguments.

Porter maintains, for example, that JFK made a serious effort to open a diplomatic channel with Hanoi in 1962. His main evidence: the memoir by Chester Bowles, a minor player in the administration who did not have the president's confidence and who was prone to writing long-winded memos seldom read by anyone who mattered. Porter then uses this abortive 1962 plan to buttress his argument that Kennedy in 1963 initiated a full withdrawal from Vietnam. Here again memoirs and oral histories figure prominently in the notes. Porter acknowledges that the president in the fall voiced reservations about a withdrawal, but he insists it was a ruse: "Kennedy's apparent skepticism about a withdrawal was political theater to complete the fiction that he was only responding to urging [sic] of his top national security advisers" (176). And later: "At the meeting, Kennedy was still pretending to be undecided" (176). How do we know he was pretending, in a political theater? Porter can't really tell us. He is not unpersuasive in portraying Kennedy as a skeptic on the war, as a flexible and pragmatic leader, and he is right to emphasize that JFK rejected aides' recommendations for a larger escalation on his watch. Too often, though, Porter reads inconclusive evidence only one way and imposes a clarity on the material that is not there.

The way I interpret a series of important White House meetings on October 2 and 5, for example, is that Kennedy at that late hour was still uncertain about which way to go, still postponing the tough decisions for the future, and moreover that he had not given the proposal for a 1000-man withdrawal from South Vietnam very much thought. He says at one point: "My only reservation about this [1000-man withdrawal] is that it commits to a kind of a...if the war doesn't continue to go well, it'll look like we were overly optimistic, and I don't—I'm not sure we—I'd like to

know what benefit we get out [of] at this time announcing a thousand."¹ Could this be part of the ruse, as Porter maintains? Yes, but neither Porter nor others who have put forth this "incipient-withdrawal" thesis (as I have called it elsewhere) have been able to find persuasive evidence to that effect.² A president determined to withdraw from Vietnam regardless of the state of the war would have taken care in the autumn of 1963 to speak more elliptically in public pronouncements, and would have been far less dismissive of exploring possibilities for a negotiated settlement of the conflict. He would have been more reticent about endorsing a showdown between Diem and dissident generals.

One also wonders about Kennedy's supposed need for total secrecy. Why the elaborate ruse? According to Porter, the president worried that public association with a withdrawal plan would risk serious political fallout for him if the war subsequently went sour. Maybe, but Porter uses an odd historical example to bolster the point: he writes that JFK endured a "fierce political attack" (166) in September-October 1962 for his failure to take forceful action against the Soviet military presence in Cuba. Some criticism he certainly suffered, but a fierce political attack seriously threatening his political position at home? Not remotely.

This issue of American domestic opinion is of critical importance to Porter's analysis, not merely with respect to Kennedy but Johnson as well. In his preface he refers to "the strongly interventionist cast of domestic opinion" the two men had to confront (x). Later, in a key passage in the conclusion, he writes that LBJ hoped for "an evolution of congressional sentiment that would make possible a negotiated exit from the war" (263). Each of these assertions is almost wholly unsubstantiated, however, for Porter has done no research to speak of on Congressional and public attitudes in the 1961-65 period—or even made use of the secondary literature on the subject. Few lawmakers ever appear in the text, and there is no systematic analysis of editorial opinion in

U.S. newspapers, of the views of syndicated columnists, of opinion polls. Had Porter undertaken such research, I believe he would have found incontrovertible evidence that domestic opinion was never strongly interventionist in this period, certainly not in 1964-65. He would have found that the Senate Democratic leadership (and numerous other Democrats and moderate Republicans) in early 1965 expressed deep misgivings about the prospect of an Americanized war, and expressed those misgivings to Johnson—albeit more timidly than they might have. He would have found similar concerns in a broad cross-section of newspapers, including the *New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, and the *Washington Post*, as well as among leading columnists. And he would have found that the general public, to the extent it paid attention at all, was ambivalent, not wanting to lose in Vietnam but also not wanting to send America's young men to fight and die there.³

Johnson's own vice president thought in terms of this domestic opinion in arguing forcefully against an expanded war. In two remarkable memos written precisely at the time the administration prepared to launch Rolling Thunder and commit the first ground troops, Hubert H. Humphrey, a savvy and seasoned politician with a deep understanding of Democratic precinct politics across the country, did not doubt that there were political risks in disengagement. But he argued that 1965 was the optimal time to incur those risks and—of central importance—that the risks of escalation were greater. "If we find ourselves leading from frustration to escalation and end up short of a war with China but embroiled deeper in fighting in Vietnam over the next few months," he warned Johnson, "political opposition will steadily mount."

It is always hard to cut losses. But the Johnson administration is in a stronger position to do so now than any administration in this century. Nineteen sixty-five is the year of minimum political risk for the Johnson administration. Indeed, it is the first year when we can

face the Vietnam problem without being preoccupied with the political repercussions from the Republican right. As indicated earlier, our political problems are likely to come from new and different sources (Democratic liberals, independents, labor) if we pursue an enlarged war.⁴

Porter mentions neither of the two memos, nor does he tell us that Humphrey opposed an expanded war. Johnson's response perforce also goes unmentioned, but it's worth noting. "We don't need all these memos," he told Humphrey, before excluding the vice president from Vietnam meetings for the better part of a year.

The point is not that Porter had an obligation to refer to these Humphrey missives—or to any specific documents, for that matter. The point is that he needed to do much more to substantiate his claims regarding popular and Congressional attitudes in those fateful weeks in late 1964-early 1965. His thesis depends on it. His endnotes show that he's conversant with the recent scholarship on the war, and though he's largely uninterested in engaging that literature (beyond bland reference to "mainstream" scholarship), he knows that some of it addresses public attitudes in the United States in the key months of decision. One would have expected him to offer more than hoary claims regarding a "strongly interventionist" domestic opinion.

If one considers that senior Democrats and powerful voices in the press had deep reservations regarding escalation, and that the bureaucracy itself was internally divided about the best way to proceed in Vietnam, it becomes hard to accept Porter's depiction of a Lyndon Johnson heroically doing all he can to head off war. The author avers that LBJ hoped for the emergence of a neutralist regime in Saigon that would ask the U.S. to leave, and further that the president actively sought a negotiated settlement with Hanoi. The weight of the archival evidence points precisely in the opposite direction: to the conclusion that Johnson, from the time he took office through the summer of 1965, and beyond, wanted

nothing to do with early negotiations, except those involving the particulars of Hanoi's surrender. He was a hawk on Vietnam, not because he was eager for war or because he was optimistic about the prospects (he was neither), but because he "associated negotiations with compromise and compromise with defeat" (218). That last phrase is from Porter, who uses it to describe the top advisers; it's at least as apt in reference to their boss.

Porter asserts that the bureaucracy worked incessantly to compel Johnson to expand the war. He lists a dozen such attempts, and declares: "There is surely no parallel in modern history to the twelve separate attempts by the national security bureaucracy over a fourteen-month period [November 1963 to January 1965] to get Johnson to authorize the use of military force against the same state" (267-68). Strong words, indeed. Even a cursory glance at the list of twelve, however, reveals that most of them cannot be construed as attempts to get LBJ to approve military action; they belong in the category of contingency planning for possible future use of force. Several, moreover, had Johnson's tacit support, while others were backed by some advisers but not others. Not one involved what Porter clearly implies all twelve involved: an all-out effort by the bureaucracy to force the president's hand.⁵

Were Vietnam War presidents subject to bureaucratic pressures that reduced their maneuverability in policy terms? Unquestionably.⁶ But it won't do to argue, as Gareth Porter does, that John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson were forced by such pressures effectively to give up the reins of authority on Vietnam. That argument misrepresents the attitudes both in the Oval Office and in the bureaucracy—and in the country as a whole. As an examination of America's strategic dominance vis-à-vis the Chinese and the Soviets in the years after Korea *Perils of Dominance* has much to teach us. As a study of American decision-making on Vietnam in the lead-up to major war, it falls well short of the mark.

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Notes:

1. Recordings and transcripts of these October 1963 meetings can be found under "Transcript and Audio Highlight Clips" at www.whitehousetapes.org; last accessed on January 27, 2006.
2. Fredrik Logevall, "Vietnam and the Question of What Might Have Been," in Mark J. White, ed., *Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited* (London: Macmillan, 1998). Porter's argument here echoes James K. Galbraith, "Exit Strategy," *Boston Review*, October/November 2003, 29-34; and John M. Newman, *JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle of Power* (New York: Warner Books, 1992).
3. See Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1999).
4. The memorandum is reprinted in full in Hubert H. Humphrey, *The Education of a Public Man: My Life and Politics* (Garden City, NJ: Doubleday, 1976), 320-24. For Johnson's response, see Carl Solberg, *Hubert Humphrey: A Biography* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1984), 287-88; and Humphrey, 327.
5. For detailed examinations of this fourteen-month period, relying heavily on primary sources, see David Kaiser, *American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 284-411; and Logevall, *Choosing War*, pp. 75-374.
6. See here Andrew Preston, *The War Council: McGeorge Bundy, the NSC, and Vietnam* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

***Perils and Paradigms:* A Response to the Reviewers**

Gareth Porter

I. The Power Imbalance Paradigm

In writing *Perils of Dominance*, my aspiration was to "shift the paradigm" on Cold War politics and U.S. intervention in Vietnam from the dominant paradigm, with its emphasis on Cold War doctrines and belief systems as driving forces in U.S. policymaking, to one that acknowledges U.S. dominance in the East-West power relationship and recognizes its significance in shaping the pattern of Cold War policies. I did not expect widespread acceptance of the new paradigm from older historians of the Cold War or from historians who had written on the Vietnam War themselves. So I was

SHAFR Awards Bernath Book Prizes

Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath book prize committee decided to split the prize among two books: Elizabeth Borgwardt's *A New Deal for the World: America's Vision for Human Rights* (Belknap Press) and Seth Jacobs's *America's Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia* (Duke University Press). This was not a case of some committee members favoring one book and some the other. Rather, the committee unanimously agreed that both books had emerged from a very competitive pool of 15 entries as particularly meritorious and that both deserved the recognition accorded by the prize.

A New Deal for the World struck committee members as an important contribution to the nascent field of human rights history and the place of the United States within it. This book fruitfully connects the realm of domestic policy formation with foreign policy. In contrast to historians who have emphasized the break between the New Deal and post-war international arrangements, Borgwardt draws our attention to continuities. Another signal contribution of *A New Deal for the World* is its examination of the status of human rights in international law. Even as she focuses on the American contributions to human rights law, Borgwardt is keenly attentive to the role of other nations in laying the intellectual, juridical, and political framework for human rights in the post World War II world. This is a book of magisterial sweep – ranging from the Atlantic Charter through Bretton Woods, the establishment of the United Nations, the Nuremberg Trials, and the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It tacks between high ideals and lived realities; individuals and institutions; national aims and international outcomes. It is a readable book that reaches beyond academic audiences to the general public.

America's Miracle Man in Vietnam is impressive in a different way. It revisits an old but not adequately treated subject: U.S. support for Ngo Dinh Diem from 1954 to 1963. Jacobs rightfully reminds us that other choices were possible – a point that is often made on U.S. involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s, but that is sometimes ignored in discussions of U.S. support for Diem. Just as significantly, Jacobs explores the significance of race and religion. Very little attention has been paid to this latter topic in U.S. foreign relations history outside of accounts of nineteenth-century missionaries. Jacobs, however, convincingly argues

that religion mattered when U.S. officials looked for allies in postwar Asia. He does a marvelous job of analyzing how Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's religiosity affected his thinking about the Cold War in general and Vietnam in particular. He finds that many U.S. policymakers regarded Buddhism as more of a philosophy than a religion, and hence as a faith that could be reconciled with "godless communism." But they saw Catholicism as a profoundly anti-communist faith and hence the Catholic Diem as a man who would stand fast against the red menace. In telling this story, Jacobs skillfully weaves government documents together with popular culture; developments in Southeast Asia with developments in the United States. The result is a highly original book that underscores the cultural dimensions to U.S. relations with Vietnam in the Eisenhower and Kennedy years. And finally, *America's Miracle Man* is a compelling read, a book that can capture the interest of students even as it pushes the historiography of U.S. foreign relations in new directions.

Submitted by committee chair Kristin Hoganson, Associate Professor of History at the University of Illinois.

Myrna F. Bernath Book Prize

The 2006 Myrna F. Bernath Book Prize committee has awarded the prize to Prof. Victoria de Grazia of Columbia University for her book *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through 20th-Century Europe* (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005). This was a unanimous choice out of the ten books nominated for this biannual prize, in this case books published in 2004 and 2005. The work offers a broad-gauged and compelling analysis of the expansion of American cultural influence abroad. Prodigiously researched, methodologically innovative, and elegantly written, Professor de Grazia's book breaks new ground in revealing the mechanisms for the rapid spread into Europe of what she calls the 'Market Empire.' *Irresistible Empire* is an impressive model of transnational history upon which future studies of globalization will build.

Submitted by committee chair Thomas Borstelmann, Elwood N. and Katherine Thompson Distinguished Professor of Modern World History at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.

not surprised that the four reviews compiled here all reject, in varying degrees, my interpretation of the policymaking process on Vietnam during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. What did surprise me was the degree to which three of the reviewers accept my thesis that the Cold War was governed by U.S. military dominance and that the power imbalance dynamic did indeed shape U.S. policymaking on Vietnam – at least up to the early 1960s.

Fred Logevall and Edwin E. Moise appear to agree with me that U.S. dominance decisively influenced a series of policy decisions on Vietnam from 1954 through the late 1950s. Robert Brigham's summary of my argument on Eisenhower administration policy and the policies of Moscow, Beijing and Hanoi implies that he does not have any significant objections to my interpretation of that period either. It is puzzling, however, that while accepting that the imbalance of power shaped the general policies of major powers during that period of the Cold War, Anne L. Foster seems to doubt that the pattern applied to Vietnam. Equally puzzling is her assertion that I had scant interest in Hanoi's policies toward the war. I devoted an entire chapter exclusively to how the imbalance of power constrained the North Vietnamese and forced them to remain open to a negotiated compromise to end the war.

All these reviewers sharply differentiate, however, between the Kennedy-Johnson era and the earlier period when it comes to the applicability of the power imbalance thesis. Although they are prepared to accept the idea that the East-West power imbalance could explain U.S. policy short of the use of force, both Logevall and Brigham reject my thesis that the imbalance profoundly influenced actual decisions for war. Echoing a major assumption running through the literature, Logevall argues that the "nature and extent of Americanization of the conflict in 1964-65" was shaped by "possible responses from Moscow and especially Beijing" and thus cannot be seen as wholly or primarily a decision made from the perspective of

U.S. dominance. Taking a somewhat different angle on the same issue, Brigham suggests that if the national security bureaucracy were convinced of U.S. strategic dominance, the United States would not have fought a limited, protracted war at all.

I argue that the actual relationship between dominance and the choice of strategy during that period of the Cold War was not so simple. Project Solarium, the Eisenhower administration's mid-1953 strategy review exercise, generated alternative Cold War strategies aimed at taking advantage of the strategic dominance that the United States was generally recognized as possessing at that juncture. One of the strategies advanced in that exercise was that the United States should take as its foreign policy objective the "overthrow of the Communist regime in China" and the "reduction of Soviet power and militance [sic] and the elimination of the Communist conspiracy." Despite their undeniable conviction that the United States held a decisive strategic advantage over the Soviets, however, Eisenhower and Dulles rejected that strategy as too risky. They favored using the threat of "massive retaliation" to block any Communist political-military expansion while exploiting U.S. strategic dominance to pursue low-cost, low-risk actions to improve U.S. political-military positions around the world at the expense of the Soviet Union and its allies. It was that strategy, I suggest, that led to the sequence of U.S. policy decisions on Vietnam in 1954-55.

The same logic obviously applies to the decisions to use limited force in South Vietnam and against North Vietnam. The policymakers who advocated that policy wanted to exploit the U.S. military position to enhance American power in East and Southeast Asia without risking a major war with Communist states. They had no interest in fighting a war with China, much less with the Soviet Union. I emphasize that it was precisely the low-cost, low-risk aspect of this strategy that appealed to national security bureaucrats in 1961 and again in 1964 and early 1965. The absence of more expansionist military goals through three administrations

is therefore not an argument against the relevance of the power imbalance to U.S. policymaking, nor is the fact that the carefully targeted bombing in North Vietnam was aimed at reducing the likelihood of direct Chinese involvement in a war.

Another objection Logevall raises to the applicability of the imbalance of power thesis to the Kennedy and Johnson administration decisions to wage war is that it slights the linkage between Vietnam policymaking and the needs of the United States in its global power competition with the Soviet Union. According to Logevall the power imbalance interpretation "underplays . . . the degree to which some senior officials feared for how Americans' global credibility would be affected by the outcome in Vietnam, a concern based on perceived vulnerability, not overweening confidence." If the national security bureaucracy believed the U.S. position in the world was so weak and feared a loss of credibility so much that it felt compelled to use force in Vietnam, however, one would expect to find intelligence analysis, policy papers and arguments in policy meetings expounding on that theme and providing examples of where policymakers feared credibility would be harmed. In fact, there is no such evidence, whereas there is considerable evidence that national security advisers were making the domino and bandwagon arguments, especially in the Johnson administration. We know from Johnson's complaint to Richard Russell in May 1964, for example, that his advisers were pushing the domino theory, not the "credibility doctrine," as the rationale for using force against North Vietnam.

To support his emphasis on credibility as a driving force in Vietnam policy, Logevall cites a memo in his book *Choosing War* (491, n. 66) that he (along with George Kahin and George Herring) attributes to John F. Kennedy. As I document in *Perils* (325-26, n.56), however, this document was actually a page from a memo from Walt Rostow to Kennedy making a final pitch for sending troops to South Vietnam on November 14, 1961. It was somehow inserted

(but clearly not integrated by the president) into the Kennedy memo of the same date. It is worth noting that in these memos Kennedy and Rostow came to opposite conclusions about negotiating on Vietnam. It is time to withdraw this document from the debate about Kennedy's views on Vietnam and to concede that Kennedy was not as preoccupied with credibility in the case of South Vietnam as historians once thought.

Moise claims that when I write about the mid-1960s, I am "exaggerating the evidence of Communist restraint." He writes that an intelligence memorandum I cite, dated March 18, 1963, does not state "that the USSR had no interest in helping local Communists gain power anywhere in the world." I was not writing about "Communist restraint" on those pages (18-19), but about official U. S. perceptions of the power balance and, in that specific paragraph, about intelligence estimates that recognized Soviet "defensiveness and respect for the status quo." In this context, Moise is correct that the March 1963 memo did not actually make the point that the

USSR had no interest in helping local Communists gain power. Instead, it emphasized Khrushchev's worry that the power balance had shifted decisively against Moscow. The point about the Soviets' lack of interest in helping Communists gain power was made in the more important document I cite in that paragraph: the National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet foreign policy for 1963. Although I did not quote the conclusion of that NIE, it stated flatly that Moscow regarded attempts by Communist parties to gain power in capitalist countries as "prejudicial to Soviet interests." My point, therefore, was indeed supported by the evidence, and I was not "exaggerating the evidence of [U.S. perceptions of] Communist restraint."

Finally, Moise appears to suggest that the decisive power imbalance I cite as the basis for U.S. policy in Vietnam had already eroded by mid-1965. He writes that I fail to mention the dispatch of significant numbers of Chinese personnel to North Vietnam in June 1965 and adds that "the Communist leaders' increased willingness to take strong action in Vietnam, despite the risks of

confrontation with the United States, cries out for a much more detailed analysis, as does the process by which the American leaders recognized that they were losing their ability to intimidate their opponents."

It is not clear why the arrival of large numbers of Chinese troops in North Vietnam in 1965 is relevant to the question of power imbalance. I cited the Chinese intention to dispatch troops to the North to deter a U.S. ground invasion of North Vietnam in chapter 2. There is no reason to believe that the Johnson administration was surprised that Chinese troops were deployed in North Vietnamese provinces bordering China. Moreover, in light of the preference of civilian policymakers for limited objectives in relation to Vietnam, the Chinese troops did not significantly affect the Johnson administration's plans for North Vietnam. Although some in the military certainly favored a ground invasion of North Vietnam, civilian policymakers had never been attracted to that option.

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II. JFK: Literal vs. Contextual Interpretation

My reinterpretation of John F. Kennedy's Vietnam policy is the subject of particularly acute criticism from Logevall and Moise. Before dealing with their arguments, however, I want to examine the peculiar methodological problem associated with interpreting Kennedy's Vietnam policy. My argument that Kennedy deceived not only the public but much of his own administration on his policy toward Vietnam challenges some of the most basic premises of diplomatic history. Official records are considered the main source for documenting a president's policies, and the absence of administration records detailing Kennedy's personal role in Vietnam policy during the last eighteen months of his life has been enough for most historians to dismiss that theory as unfounded.

Relying on official records and on their literal meaning is a reasonable way to approach presidential policymaking under "normal" historical circumstances. But there are some historical episodes that demand a different approach, and Kennedy's Vietnam policymaking is one of them. The problem confronting historians in this case is that in May 1962, McNamara presented the JCS with a proposal to be used as the basis for planning that called for withdrawing all U.S. military personnel by the end of 1965, except for the 680 allowed under the Geneva Accords. He reiterated the plan the following year in specific and forceful terms and added a proposal for withdrawing the first 1,000 troops by the end of 1963. The plan was not for public relations purposes, nor was it contingent upon the success of the counterinsurgency war, and it was regarded by the military as going too far too fast. In October 1963, both of those deadlines were adopted as official administration policy by the National Security Council, based on the recommendations of the Taylor-McNamara mission to South Vietnam.

The question that historians are forced to address, therefore, is whether this withdrawal policy was

carried out from May 1962 to October 1963 without Kennedy's personal authorization. If Kennedy authorized it from beginning to end, then the historian must reinterpret the public statements Kennedy made in 1962 and 1963, which everyone agrees suggested a different policy, in order to square them with his direction of the withdrawal policy.

In their criticisms of my interpretation of Kennedy's policy, Logevall and Moise are completely indifferent to the central issue of whether Kennedy was actually behind the policy or not. Logevall takes aim at my interpretation of Kennedy's behavior at two meetings on October 2, 1963, in which McNamara's and Taylor's recommendations for withdrawal were discussed. He asks, "How do we know . . . [that Kennedy's skepticism was] political theater? Porter can't really tell us. . . . Too often . . . Porter reads inconclusive evidence only one way and imposes a clarity on material that is not there."

I argue in *Perils* that Kennedy's attitude of studied skepticism at the two meetings with advisers on October 2 was "political theater" because of the body of evidence I developed that Kennedy had been behind the withdrawal scheme from the beginning. Thus I am not "imposing clarity" on a single piece of inherently unclear evidence, as Logevall suggests, but rather making sense of an entire pattern of evidence. The proper focus of a review of my treatment of this and related episodes, I submit, is the broad pattern of evidence on the overarching question of Kennedy's authorship of the withdrawal policy. If Kennedy's policy was a backchannel operation, historians should not expect to find any "smoking gun" document showing Kennedy's hand in it. Rather, their task is to piece together the most likely reasonable interpretation of the overall pattern shown by the documentation rather than to provide only literal interpretations of an incomplete and contradictory documentary record.

Both Logevall and Moise seem committed to the proposition that each piece of evidence can be interpreted in isolation from the rest. Moise takes

me to task for interpretations of public and private statements by Kennedy in 1962 that go beyond the apparent meaning of his words. For example, in a meeting with the JCS on March 1, 1962, Kennedy made this tortuous statement: "An important item in this planning is the timing of a decision for U.S. action *and the factors that go into such a decision.*" I suggest that he was referring to his previous insistence that any U.S. combat intervention in South Vietnam would have to be supported by the British and the French. Kennedy had resorted to similarly circuitous wording in May 1961, using the phrase "diplomatic setting within which this action might be taken" to refer to his requirement for British and French support for any introduction of combat troops.

Moise's criticism of my interpretation would be valid if he could show that I had misunderstood Kennedy's May 1961 statement, but he ignores the contextual argument entirely. When he writes that my interpretation "goes rather far beyond the apparent meaning of the words" Moise fails to comprehend the proper role of the historian in dealing with a situation in which the words in a document are clearly not the same as the meaning intended by the historical figure in question.

Moise then attacks my suggestion about interpreting Kennedy's July 17, 1962 speech in which he expressed opposition to withdrawing from South Vietnam and said "we are going to stay there" even as the process of planning for a withdrawal by the end of 1965 was proceeding. By suggesting that he was defining withdrawal to mean only immediate withdrawal, I was suggesting that Kennedy was saying something different from what he expected the public to understand. My main point was that Kennedy was being highly misleading in taking a hard line in public on South Vietnam. But again Moise treats this as going beyond the literal interpretation of the meaning of the words. "Kennedy said nothing about the immediateness of the withdrawal," he complains. "Porter reads that into his statement."

Logevall minimizes the risk Kennedy and Johnson were taking in opposing top national security

advisers who were committed to victory in South Vietnam. He takes me to task for suggesting that there was an interventionist cast of opinion, complaining that I did not do the kind of in-depth research into press and congressional opinion that he did for *Choosing War*, in which he argues that public opinion was quite open to conceding South Vietnam. I concede that I could have made my case stronger by dealing with that issue in greater depth. But I cannot agree with his dismissal of the 1962 political assault on Kennedy as inconsequential politically or having no bearing on Kennedy's and Johnson's domestic political calculations about Vietnam policy. Bundy recalled later that the administration felt compelled to draw a line against missiles in Cuba during that campaign against Kennedy's inaction, because it felt it had no choice but to do so in light of the political climate.

Logevall also charges that I rely "too often" on memoirs and oral histories, which he suggests are "weak reeds upon which to build sweeping interpretive arguments." He cites as an example of this over-reliance my having based my case about JFK's attempt to open a diplomatic channel to Hanoi in 1962 on Chester Bowles's memoir. In fact, however, I relied not on Bowles's memoir but on primary documents found in Averell Harriman's papers in the Library of Congress. They show that JFK had ordered Harriman in mid-April 1962 to send a cable to Ambassador Galbraith in New Delhi to begin opening a channel through the Indian foreign ministry and that Harriman had sandbagged JFK's initiative. Bowles's memoir was cited in regard to a related but wholly different diplomatic initiative on neutralism in Southeast Asia.

III. LBJ and the National Security Bureaucracy

Logevall asserts flatly that I do not "demonstrate that U.S. superiority drove the decision to launch Rolling Thunder and commit ground troops." Readers of *Perils* will find that I go into considerable detail, in two full pages (186-88), to make the case that the CIA,

the Department of Defense, the State Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff all agreed that the overwhelming U.S. power advantage in East Asia and vis-à-vis the Soviet Union constrained the ability and willingness of Hanoi and Beijing to respond to a U.S. bombing campaign with any military initiative and that those views were directly reflected in McNamara's initial effort, through Bundy, to sell the idea of a bombing campaign against North Vietnam to LBJ.

I then return to that question (203-205) to explain the thinking of LBJ's senior advisers in preparing the recommendation for a "phase 2" bombing program in November 1964. The unanimous recommendation that was made to Johnson for the bombing campaign in November was based on the assumption that, as William Bundy later put it, "the cost of carrying on seemed moderate" because it would not "include the possibility that large U.S. ground forces would be needed."

As for the commitment of ground troops, I show (218-19) that the decision in April to commit an additional 82,000 troops to South Vietnam was heavily influenced by McNamara and Bundy, as well as the intelligence community. All believed that the United States could raise the ante in South Vietnam, and thus strengthen its bargaining position in eventual negotiations, without a major commitment of ground forces in the South by Hanoi. I do not argue that the final commitment to an open-ended ground war was influenced by the imbalance of power. I argue explicitly that the final decision was a matter of internal bureaucratic politics, colored by broader domestic political considerations.

By using terms ("decision-making power," "reins of authority") that go well beyond anything I use, Logevall and Brigham attempt to make my argument about the role of the national security advisers in pushing Kennedy and Johnson toward war appear extreme. But I state the problem clearly: national security advisers were able to use the political power inherent in their socio-political status to make it difficult for a president to reject their advice to use force. Furthermore, my argument in Kennedy's case is

not that he gave in to his national security team, but that he resorted to extraordinary means to keep control over his Vietnam policy. However, he did so in a way that implicitly recognized that his national security advisers had the power to pressure him to adopt their policy preferences and to obstruct policy initiatives that went in a different direction.

Both Kennedy and Johnson, I argue, would have been taking extraordinary political risks in rejecting their adviser's recommendations on Vietnam completely, because they could be accused of having "lost" a country to the Communists. They both perceived a need to reduce their own political risk by avoiding a situation in which key national security advisers were fundamentally at odds with them on Vietnam. Their national security advisers had real leverage to force concessions to their preference for war, leverage they exerted in part through bureaucratic maneuvering but more particularly by forming a united front against the president's policy.

Logevall attacks a straw man ("Was this 'national security bureaucracy' really the cohesive, undifferentiated mass Porter makes it out to be?") to counter my argument about the "national security bureaucracy." But I make it very clear from the beginning (x) that I am not arguing that the bureaucracy was "uniform in its policy preferences regarding the use of military force in Vietnam." Obviously the JCS consistently advocated escalating the bombing in 1964-65. The issue is not whether all major national security officials were in agreement on every subject at all times, but whether they achieved broad consensus on the fundamental question of using force to prevail in South Vietnam, especially when opportunities arose to make a formal case to the president. Logevall cites the reaction of JFK's top advisers to the Taylor-Rostow report as an example of the supposed pluralism of views among the ranking national security officials. It is well known, of course, that the recommendation to send 8,000 combat troops to South Vietnam generated immediate disagreement between the authors of the report and those in the Pentagon who thought 8,000 was

not nearly enough. Not a single high-ranking official suggested that the recommendation was too warlike.

But the real test of my thesis lies not in the initial reactions to the report, but in whether Kennedy's principal advisers, along with the heads of the special mission to South Vietnam, arrived at a unanimous recommendation. They did in fact call unanimously for approving a military commitment to win in South Vietnam, with U.S. troops to be deployed as necessary. Furthermore, immediately after Kennedy rejected their advice, he was reminded of that unanimity by McGeorge Bundy, in a memo that, I submit, did reflect the view that the rejection of unanimous advice on the use of military power against a Communist movement was irresponsible.

It was not the only time there was such a show of unanimity on the part of the principal national security advisers. In November 1964, McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and CIA Director John McCone unanimously agreed on the systematic bombing of North Vietnam. That consensus led to the November 29, 1964 draft action paper calling for a "second phase program . . . of graduated military pressures against the DRV" beyond retaliation for major Viet Cong actions in the South.

Logevall seems to suggest that even such a specific consensus is not enough to demonstrate that the national security bureaucracy's preference for war influenced policy. "Even when principal advisers were united on the need for expanded military action," he asserts, "they often disagreed on why it was necessary, and on what form it ought to take." One wonders what level of agreement on the "form" of the bombing Logevall would require for it to count it as effective pressure on the president and how any disagreements on why military action was necessary would be relevant to the impact of the advisers' recommendation.

Logevall challenges my assertion that LBJ's advisers tried to get him to commit to using military force on twelve different occasions in fourteen months. He suggests that a " cursory glance" reveals that most of these were not really attempts to get LBJ

to approve military action. Instead, he argues, they were "in the category of contingency planning for possible future use of force." He concludes that none of them involved "an all-out effort by the bureaucracy to force the president's hand" and that several of them even "had Johnson's tacit support."

This is a curious reading of the record. In fact, not a single one of these attempts involved the mere drafting of contingency plans. In only one instance—the changing of the wording of NSAM 273 to include the preparation of plans for covert actions that would include U.S. air attacks on North Vietnam—could the formal purpose be interpreted as the preparation of contingency plans. And it is unambiguously clear from the record that McNamara, Taylor, Bundy and Rusk actively intended to use that change in wording as a springboard to establish a new policy that would escalate the conflict to ensure victory in South Vietnam and that McNamara and Bundy tried to get the plans referred to the "303 Committee," which was under McGeorge Bundy's direct control and which could make decisions on some covert operations without consulting the president.

As for the other eleven episodes detailed in the book, every move by LBJ's advisers was aimed either at committing the president to the use of force against North Vietnam or at getting him to carry out bombing immediately or within a matter of weeks. I cannot imagine how any of them could be construed as having LBJ's "tacit support," much less "several" of them. And certainly the November 28, 1964 action paper qualifies as "an all-out effort by the bureaucracy to force the president's hand."

I am even more mystified by Logevall's refusal to acknowledge the documented fact that Johnson's advisers concluded in January 1965 that he was refusing to go ahead with the bombing of North Vietnam because he hoped that a neutralist regime would emerge in Saigon that would ask the United States to leave. In his unpublished manuscript, William Bundy writes that LBJ's insistence in January 1965 that no bombing of the

North could begin as long as it would expose American women and children in the South to possible harm "could be interpreted and indeed did strike some of us at the time, as a stalling tactic, in effect a repeated demand . . . that he knew would tie up the situation until he could sort it out or until a dramatic new event gave him a new handle."

It is true that Bundy does not say explicitly that this "stalling tactic" was meant to delay the bombing until a neutralist regime could come to power. But in light of the constant reiteration by Bundy and other advisers that a failure to carry out their bombing project quickly enough would almost certainly result in just such a neutralist regime that would ask for U.S. withdrawal, it is difficult to interpret these statements in any other way. Furthermore, McGeorge Bundy was more explicit in his own recollection of that period, telling one interviewer that he concluded the president was "coming to a decision, a decision to lose."

Logevall portrays me as an attorney-like partisan who "time and again flattens out ambiguities." The reader, he complains, "gets little sense that top- and mid-level officials were themselves at times uncertain about the outlook for the conflict—even with the introduction of U.S. ground troops—and about the stakes involved." Yet in my account of the process leading to the final decision on an open-ended commitment of ground troops, I note that in early to mid-June, "Johnson, McGeorge Bundy and McNamara were all aware of the real possibility of an early Communist victory over the Saigon government" (222), and I suggest that only Rusk believed that limited combat deployment was capable of preventing a U.S. defeat.

However, the issue here is not whether these officials developed serious doubts about the efficacy of the project in the late spring and early summer of 1965, but whether they pushed Johnson systematically to accept their preference for bombing throughout 1964 and early 1965. Logevall is particularly protective of McNamara. In his own book he argues that McNamara really wanted to avoid escalation in 1964-65 but

was drawn deeper into war by his loyalty to LBJ, whose personality was, Logevall believes, inherently warlike. The record now available, however, provides no support whatever for such a view of McNamara, who emerges as the leading advocate of a bombing strategy from the very first days of LBJ's presidency. I cite episode after episode in which McNamara led the way in pushing for a bombing program against North Vietnam. There is further evidence, moreover, that LBJ became increasingly opposed to the idea of bombing through the course of 1964 and was far more determined after his election to avoid that course than he had been months earlier. On this evidence Logevall is silent.

Despite his criticisms of my treatment of the national security advisers' role, Logevall seems to concede my central argument that they worked together to bring effective pressure on the president in regard to the use of force in Vietnam. He asks, "Were Vietnam War presidents subject to bureaucratic pressures that reduced their maneuverability in policy terms?" and answers "Unquestionably." He may feel that he is maintaining some vitally important distinction between this conclusion and my interpretation, but I suspect that most readers will find it hard to discern the difference.

Gareth Porter is an independent historian and foreign policy analyst. Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam (University of California Press, 2005), is his most recent book.

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History, Stamp Collecting, and the U.S. Embargo against Cuba

Thomas G. Paterson

What in the world? An article on stamp collecting in SHAFR's newsletter? Well, I am both a stamp collector and an historian of U.S.-Cuba relations, and there is a story here about how the two roles intertwine. Postage stamps can help us fill in blanks in our knowledge of the past, and they can teach us much about the history, leaders, identity, goals, culture, language, and geography of other peoples.

One learns, for example, a good deal about U.S. imperialism and a small island nation's loss of sovereignty in the discovery that after U.S. forces and officials invaded Cuba in the late 1890s, they seized the postal system and replaced Cuban stamps with United States stamps. Depicting great Americans, with prices in cents, these stamps were overprinted with "CUBA" and "de PESO." To cite another example: William McKinley, the very president who had denied the Philippines independence, appeared in 1906 on that country's stamps, emblazoned with "Philippine Islands/United States of America." Filipino nationalists must have

bristled. An avid student of history and geography, President Franklin D. Roosevelt enthusiastically collected stamps, as Brian C.

Baur notes in his book, *Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Stamp Collecting President* (1999). Roosevelt once showed Prime Minister Winston Churchill a favorite stamp "from one of your colonies." "Which one?" the imperious Englishman wondered. "One of your last.... You won't have them much longer, you know." Churchill was not amused.

Unlike FDR, I am only an amateur collector, but with some purpose. When I was young, a thoughtful elderly lady in my Seaside, Oregon, neighborhood handed me hundreds of stamps from Germany and Japan, perhaps given to her by relatives or friends returning from abroad after military service in the Second World War. Like most collectors, to avoid being overwhelmed by stamps from every part of the globe, I eventually decided to specialize in a manageable number of countries: places where the United States had intervened. Such a focus had to change, of course, because that group grew tremendously as the Cold War and the rise of the Third World unsettled the international system, spawning more U.S. interventions. Cuba had long been on my list, but as I began to research (including two trips to the island) and to write on U.S.-Cuba relations, especially my book *Contesting Castro: The United States and the Triumph of the Cuban Revolution* (1994), that Caribbean nation moved

to the top of my philatelic interests.

Simón Bolívar, José Martí, V. I. Lenin, Che Guevara, Ho Chi Minh—one might expect to find these champions of revolution or communism adorning Cuban postage stamps after Fidel Castro toppled Fulgencio Batista's regime in 1959. But George Washington? Benjamin Franklin? Abraham Lincoln? Martin Luther King, Jr.? Ernest Hemingway? Marilyn Monroe? Cuban stamps have not only trumpeted the history of *beisbol*, victory at the Bay of Pigs, socialist solidarity with Vietnam, Soviet space exploration, national art treasures, and flora and fauna; they have also celebrated U.S. heroes and heroines.

Why? Although many Caribbean nations have printed mounds of stamps sporting U.S. popular-culture images, high-profile individuals, and "topicals," such as trains and butterflies, to attract U.S. stamp buyers and hence raise revenue, the Cuban case suggests intensely cultural and political motives.

Through their postage stamps, Cuban officials are both acknowledging a shared cultural heritage and sticking it to North Americans and their economic embargo, a cruel imperial device, they argue, designed to subjugate a small neighbor and starve its eleven million




1950 Philippines stamp of Franklin D. Roosevelt as stamp collector




1899 U.S. stamp of George Washington overprinted with Cuba



1906 Philippines stamp of William McKinley



1965 Cuba stamp of Abraham Lincoln



1986 Cuba stamp of Martin Luther King, Jr.

people. Remember, they seem to be saying in their stamps, Washington and Franklin rebelled against empire. Lincoln and King helped free enslaved peoples. Hemingway, who often resided at his estate overlooking Havana beginning in the 1930s and used the island as the setting for novels such as *The Old Man and the Sea* (1952), wrote on a theme *fidelistas* admired: the underdog in struggle.



1963 Cuba stamp of Ernest Hemingway as author of *The Old Man and the Sea*

And Monroe? Well, she is Marilyn. Who in Cuba could “rival the glitter of Marilyn Monroe’s lips,” the Cuban writer Pablo Medina wondered in his autobiography, *Exiled Memories* (1990). Hollywood films have always been popular in Cuba. A 2001 set of stamps, including Rita Hayworth and Rock Hudson, and again, Marilyn Monroe, even portrays “Film Stars Who Never Won Oscars.” As Louis A. Pérez, Jr. amply demonstrates in his impressive book, *On Becoming Cuban: Identity,*



2001 Cuba stamp of Marilyn Monroe

Nationality, and Culture (1999), U.S. and Cuban cultures have long intersected and the U.S. cultural imprint on the island persists, in this case through pictures on stamps.

But for many

years it was difficult to collect Cuban stamps because the U.S. embargo against the island prohibited their importation. On July 8, 1963, the Kennedy Administration issued Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR, Title 31 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Part 515), under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Those regulations read: “Goods and services of Cuban origin may not be imported into the United States either directly or through third countries, such as Canada or Mexico. The only exceptions are publications, artwork, or other informational materials.” The U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has administered and enforced the regulations. (See <http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac> for OFAC, CACR, and “What You Need to Know About the U.S. Embargo.”) U.S. officials considered Cuban stamps dangerous, not so much because the stamps displayed anti-yanqui messages, or because their revolutionary banners challenged world order, or because they showcased Fidel Castro (actually there are few stamps picturing el jefe), but rather because the Cuban government might earn dollars from their sale and thus sustain itself in the face of the U.S. campaign to dethrone it.

OFAC had long ruled that Cuban stamps did not qualify for exemption. Cuban stamps were merchandise and thus could not be imported. But, in a letter to a private U.S. stamp company in 2001, OFAC redefined *used* or *cancelled* stamps from Cuba as “informational materials” and declared that they could be imported and sold. More, OFAC stated that it would issue specific licenses for the importation into the United States of *new* or *uncancelled* Cuban stamps, so long as they were for personal use and would not be resold. Not until the *Scott Stamp Monthly* announced the change did many collectors hear of this breach in the embargo.

Soon dealers began to advertise special offers of used Cuban stamps in the Scott magazine. One company hailed “Once Forbidden” stamps that provided “a unique glimpse into the Cuban propaganda machine,” asserting that the

illustrations on the stamps proved that “the Cuba of Fidel Castro has been influenced by American culture in spite of itself.” Another company touted stamps of “alluring Latino dancers” and revolutionaries. One ad exuberantly claimed that “each stamp is a direct connection to Fidel Castro’s Cuba, one of the last Communist nations.” Now, collectors of stamps from Cuba did not have to fear prosecution for violating the embargo by obtaining their stamps from friends in Canada or from colleagues who traveled to Cuba and then risked fines and confiscation when they returned through U.S. customs inspection stations with a mere packet of Cuba stamps.

For historians of foreign relations, the enduring U.S. embargo against Cuba has much in common with the obstructive U.S. government regulations on the declassification of documents and the recent reprehensible reclassification program. The latter two prevent scholars from writing thorough history. The first, which includes restrictions on travel to and research in Cuba, prevents Americans from learning about another people and place. All three deny us the freedom to explore and understand. In the case of Cuba today, the nation’s stamps provide us with one of the few ways to narrow our ignorance of its life and past.

A past SHAFR President, Thomas G. Paterson has moved from the University of Connecticut to Ashland, Oregon, where he is loosely affiliated with Southern Oregon University. He can be reached at tgpateron@worldnet.att.net. He thanks Deborah Kisatsky, Garry Clifford, Roxanne Rae, Shane Maddock, and Frank Costigliola for their suggestions on this piece.

A Night to Remember: Walt LaFeber's Last Waltz

Douglas Little

Although the atmosphere in Broadway's Beacon Theater on April 25, 2006, was reminiscent of an opening night, the evening's events actually brought to a close Walter LaFeber's remarkable forty-seven-year run teaching American diplomatic history high above Cayuga's waters. The setting would have been familiar to anyone who has heard Walt lecture over the years—a table, a podium, and a blackboard with a brief outline chalked in his distinctive scrawl. Over 2,500 friends, colleagues, and former students had gathered in the Beacon (which looked like a jumbo version of Bailey Hall, the largest auditorium on the Cornell campus) to hear their favorite teacher's long goodbye, delivered as always without notes.

Walt did not disappoint. Calling his valedictory lecture "Half a Century of Friends, Foreign Policy, and Great Losers," he offered a primer on the perils of American exceptionalism for the born-again Wilsonians who sent the United States on a fool's errand to Iraq in 2003. In the beginning, there was John Quincy Adams, whom Walt has always regarded as America's greatest secretary of state. (This may be the only point on which Walt and Samuel Flagg Bemis agree.) JQA was great not just because he loved opera and swam nude in the Potomac, but because he was committed to the U.S. national interest while appreciating both the limits of power and the power of ideas. "America, with the same voice which spoke herself into existence as a nation, proclaimed to mankind the inextinguishable rights of human nature," Adams remarked in 1821. "But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy." In not so many words, John Quincy Adams was saying that exporting democracy was a risky business in



Photo by Robert Barker; Courtesy of Cornell University Photo.

places like Latin America, where wars of independence had unleashed radical social forces that were proving difficult to control.

Had Woodrow Wilson heeded JQA's warning, Walt suggested, he might not have been so quick to try to make the world safe for democracy a century later. Perhaps because Wilson was a political scientist rather than a historian (or perhaps because he attended Princeton rather than Cornell), he never really understood that democracy doesn't travel well. Wilson's famous prescription for bringing order out of chaos in revolutionary Mexico—"we must teach the South Americans to elect good men"—might have made a nice sound bite in 1914, but his decision to send Black Jack Pershing and 6,000 U.S. troops south of the Rio Grande two years later led many Mexicans to charge that America was trying to export democracy at gunpoint. When left-wing radicals translated national self-determination into revolutionary nationalism in China, Russia, and parts of Europe during and after World War I, Wilson was not amused,

and he aligned himself with some decidedly undemocratic forces to combat Bolshevism, which he came to see as the biggest threat to democracy, American-style. The self-righteous Wilson, of course, failed to see the irony in employing undemocratic means to promote democracy, but his pragmatic secretary of state, Robert Lansing, was very well aware that the Presbyterian in the White House was "playing with dynamite" by preaching self-determination to peoples whose political and economic objectives were very different from those of the United States.

Nowhere, Walt emphasized, was the gap between the rhetoric and reality of Wilsonian self-determination greater than in the Middle East, where the Fourteen Points publicly promised democracy to Arabs, Kurds, and other subject peoples liberated from Ottoman rule while France and Britain, with America's blessing, ruthlessly carved out spheres of influence behind closed doors at Versailles. Despite strong objections from Arab nationalists, the French established protectorates


over Lebanon and Syria while the British made similar arrangements in Palestine and Transjordan. And after occupying oil-rich Mesopotamia at the end of World War I, Whitehall fused three Ottoman provinces--Kurdish Mosul in the north, Sunni Baghdad in the center, and Shiite Basra in the south--into Iraq, a new nation-state headed by a king whose vocabulary did not include words like democracy or free elections. In short, having set out to make the world safe for democracy in 1917, Woodrow Wilson helped make Iraq safe from democracy three years later.

Walt closed the lecture by retelling a story that most of his audience had heard in one form or another in History 314, his legendary survey of U.S. Foreign Relations since 1914. Among the young progressives who accompanied Woodrow Wilson to Versailles was William Christian Bullitt, a Yale-educated action intellectual from a main-line Philadelphia family who was committed to exporting democracy to the world. Deeply disillusioned by what he regarded as Wilson's sell-out of American principles at the conference table, Bullitt and several of his friends very publicly resigned from the U.S. delegation. When a startled reporter asked, "Now what are you going to do?" Bullitt replied, "I'm going to lie in the sands of the Riviera and watch the world go to hell." Walt brought the house down with his own laconic quip: "He went, and it did." The "great



losers" were not only Woodrow Wilson and William Bullitt but, more important, the Arabs, Asians, and Africans who were foolish enough to believe that American leaders meant what they said about self-determination.

Although Walt remains quite critical of U.S. military intervention in Iraq, his lecture was not a Jonathan Edwards-style fire and brimstone sermon but rather a Reinhold Niebuhr-style meditation on the irony of American history. This came as no surprise to his students, because Walt has always been a teacher, not a preacher. Walt LaFeber has to be the only former president of SHAFR who can claim to have taught two National Security Advisers. One of them, Sandy Berger, was seated in the front row at the Beacon Theater and, like the rest of us, gave Walt a standing ovation. The other National Security Adviser was a last minute no-show. The pressure of making policy on Iraq and elsewhere



Photos courtesy of Cornell University Photo.

prevented Stephen Hadley, who currently sits in the West Wing a few doors from the Oval Office, from making the trip from Washington to New York City to hear his old teacher. I have never met Stephen Hadley, but my hope is that had he been able to be at the Beacon Theater on April 25, he would have recognized that the realism of John Quincy Adams, the irony of Reinhold Niebuhr, and the gentle wisdom of Walt LaFeber made quite a compelling case for rethinking the Bush administration's approach to the Middle East.

Douglas Little is Professor of History and Dean at Clark University.

IMPORTANT CHANGES TO SHAFR GRANT AND FELLOWSHIP PROGRAMS FOR GRADUATE STUDENTS



In June 2006, SHAFR Council authorized several important changes to the six prize and fellowship programs designed to benefit graduate students. Those programs include the Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant; the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship; the Myrna Bernath Fellowship; the Hogan Fellowship; the Holt Fellowship; and the Bemis Travel Grants. The changes were designed to streamline the application procedures for the benefit of applicants, their advisers, and the selection committees.

Three specific changes deserve attention of all SHAFR members:

- (1) The Holt Fellowship, Hogan Fellowship, and Bemis Travel Grants will be awarded at the OAH meeting rather than the SHAFR conference, so that recipients might better plan expenditures of funds during summer months. **This change required an advance of the application deadlines for all three programs from April 15 to February 1--a change that will take effect in 2007.**
- (2) Applications and letters of recommendation must be submitted by e-mail. This change will greatly facilitate the paperwork process, especially as SHAFR continues to grow more international in membership and reach.
- (3) The Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship was increased to \$2,000, and applicants may now apply for that fellowship and the Bernath Dissertation Grant with a single application.

The full, updated announcements of the prize and fellowship programs are printed in the Diplomatic Pouch and posted online at www.shaftr.org.

SHAFR WISHES TO THANK THE FOLLOWING
PEOPLE FOR THEIR SERVICE RELATED
TO THE 2006 CONFERENCE:

PROGRAM COMMITTEE:

Frank Costigliola, *University of Connecticut, Chair*
George White, Jr., *University of Tennessee Knoxville*
David Engerman, *Brandeis University*
Dennis Merrill, *University of Missouri-Kansas City*
Katherine Sibley, *St. Joseph's University*
Randy Sowell, *Harry S. Truman Library*

LOCAL ARRANGEMENTS COMMITTEE:

Ted Wilson, *University of Kansas, Chair*
Carol Adams, *Ottawa University*
Nicole Anslover, *University of Kansas*
Alice Butler-Smith, *School of Advanced Military Studies, Fort
Leavenworth*
Michael Devine, *Harry S. Truman Library*
Dennis Merrill, *University of Missouri-Kansas City*
Hal E. Wert, *Kansas City Art Institute*
Lawrence Yates, *U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort
Leavenworth*

SHAFR would also like to thank:

The University of Kansas
The Harry S. Truman Library
The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library

The Case of the Disappearing Documents

William Burr

Scholars who have visited the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in College Park in the last six or seven years to conduct research on Cold War-era foreign relations may have copies of some newly reclassified documents in their files. Unbeknownst to them, while they were turning on their laptops and opening archival boxes, personnel from a number of federal agencies were working behind the scenes to reclassify over 25,000 documents.

Fortunately, Matthew Aid, an independent scholar who was researching a project on secret intelligence and Cold War crises, was a bit uncertain about some documents he had already seen. As many readers know, Aid revisited some collections at the Archives and discovered an unusual pattern.¹ He found that many documents fifty years old or older from files in the Defense and State Departments that had been reviewed and released in the 1980s and 1990s had been pulled, and in their place were red-bordered "pull" sheets dated from 2002 through 2005. That some documents were being reclassified was not a surprise. It was well known that, under the Kyl-Lott Amendments, the Department of Energy was impounding "inadvertently" released documents that included "Restricted Data." But Aid could tell that "Restricted Data" was not the issue in the documents that had been pulled. During the 1990s, he had done research in State Department Intelligence and Research (INR) files and had copied some of the documents that had been recently withdrawn. Through a painstaking and complex process of comparison he discovered that some of the pulled documents, mainly from State Department INR files, had been published in the State Department's *Foreign Relations* series (*FRUS*) or

declassified under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). These documents were so innocuous that it was hard to understand why they had been reclassified. Could researchers no longer trust the integrity of the declassification process at the National Archives?

Other researchers, including this writer, were also troubled by the withdrawal of documents but had not done recent research in the older records that Aid was reviewing and were not sure whether recently pulled records had been reclassified because of the Department of Energy Kyl-Lott review or NARA's post-9/11 "records of concern" program.² However, when they questioned NARA staffers about withdrawn documents they could not get satisfactory answers. Little did they know that Archives employees were under a virtual gag order forbidding them to discuss the disappearing records in their contacts with the public.

This story and its immediate aftermath will be familiar to newspaper and newsletter readers. While pressing NARA for a meeting to disclose what had happened, Matthew Aid reached out to staffers at the National Security Archive, who in turn contacted Public Citizen and the National Coalition for History. NARA officials agreed to a meeting and on January 27, 2006, they gave a briefing that brought out preliminary details. More than 9,000 documents (over 55,000 pages) had been returned to the vaults, and the officials intimated that there had been formal understandings with government agencies concerning the withdrawal of records. They explained to the group that what had driven this effort was the assertion by the CIA and other agencies that NARA and the State Department had disregarded these agencies' legitimate right to review documents that contained

their information when State opened up historical files at NARA under the twenty-five-year automatic declassification rule contained in Executive Order 12958. The conviction that the State Department had ignored their "equities" led the CIA and the Air Force to insist that NARA make the open files available to them so that they could then impound inadvertently released documents that contained sensitive intelligence information. Although E. O. 12958 includes specific requirements for the reclassification of documents, the CIA believed that those provisions applied only to documents that had been properly declassified in the first place.

During the January 27 briefing, staffers from NARA's Declassification Office acknowledged that they had raised questions about the reclassifications in the early stages, even pointing out to the CIA that some of the withdrawn items had already been published in *FRUS*. It was evident, however, that they largely accepted the arguments and authority of the agencies that sought reclassification. Indeed, the Declassification Office facilitated the process, providing staffers to insert withdrawal sheets in the files.

Whatever the merits of the CIA's arguments about equities, Aid and representatives of SHAFR, the National Security Archive, the National Coalition for History, and Public Citizen questioned the integrity of the reclassification process. Troubled by the sheer number of reclassified pages and by NARA's complicity with the secret review program, those organizations wrote to NARA's Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) on February 17 to raise questions about the lack of "clear and transparent standards" for reclassification and to ask the ISOO to "exercise its authority" and audit the "withdrawn records to determine

whether they are properly subject to classification." They also questioned the failure of the CIA and the Air Force to follow the formal reclassification procedures of E.O. 12958 because they were not convinced that the procedures required by that order were irrelevant.³

A few days later, on February 21, the *New York Times* put the emerging controversy on the front page with a story by Scott Shane entitled "U.S. Reclassifies Many Documents in Secret Review." Shane's story and the simultaneous publication on the National Security Archive's web-site of Matthew Aid's findings and the letter to the ISOO created a flood of newspaper stories and editorials, not only in the major media, but in the local and regional press, as well as on late-night comedy and talk shows. For example, the *Washington Post* opined that "you don't need to be a classification expert to know that at least some of this reclassification wasn't only inappropriate—it was just plain dumb." A Florida newspaper, the *Daytona Beach News*, argued that the reclassification program showed that the "culture of secrecy"

had become "absurd," while the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer* declared that "declassifying material after 25 years should remain the default policy, and once made public, documents should remain so. This is a cornerstone of self-governance."


The *New York Times* story got the attention of Archivist of the United States Allen Weinstein, who later testified before a congressional committee that he had not been aware of the reclassification program until he read about it in the newspaper.⁴ At best, his deputies had given him a vague briefing about the scale and scope of the program. Once he was in the loop, Weinstein announced on February 22 that in response to the earlier inquiries the ISOO had already begun an audit. But that was a preliminary response (and a barely adequate one at that). Weinstein understood that the revelation of a clandestine reclassification program was a challenge to NARA's integrity and that more had to be said and done. To show that NARA had some control over its own house, he announced interim actions on March 2. There would be a reclassification

moratorium until the completion of the ISOO audit; a "summit" with the agencies involved in reclassification; restoration to the public shelves of the reclassified documents to the extent possible; "clear and concise standardized guidance" with "an appropriately high threshold" for any future reclassifications; a review of NARA's internal procedures for "implementing agency classification/declassification decisions"; and a reassessment of the steps needed to ensure "timely public access" to declassified records.

Some government officials and interested researchers believed that the controversy presented an opportunity to modernize the review processes for historical records. While agencies had the right to review inadvertently released documents to justify reclassification, it was this assertion of equities by a multitude of agencies that had needlessly complicated and delayed the release of older records under E.O. 12958. The 1997 recommendation of the Moynihan Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy for assigning policy control over

CHRONOLOGY OF THE COLD WAR: 1917-1992

Lester Brune
Richard Dean Burns, Consulting Editor



"This solid reference work will appeal to scholars, historians, librarians, students, and others. It belongs in all types of libraries. **Recommended!**"
-Choice

As the U.S. faces the consequences of its actions during the Cold War in Afghanistan and elsewhere, study of the period becomes more important and timely. More than just a timeline, the *Chronology of the Cold War* is an in-depth chronological narrative. Based on sections of the *Chronological History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, this easy-to-use reference also includes an introductory section reviewing the history leading up to the Cold War from 1917 to 1945, a general bibliography of resources on the Cold War, and is illustrated with photographs from presidential libraries.


2005: 704pp: 130 b/w illus: 18 maps
8 1/2 x 11: Hb: 0-415-97339-2

ALSO OF INTEREST

Chronological History of U.S. Foreign Relations
2nd edition

Lester Brune
Richard Dean Burns, Consulting Editor

2002: 1488pp: 300 b/w illus: 38 maps: 3 vols
8 1/2 x 11: Hb: 0-415-93914-3
www.routledge-ny.com/ref/usforelations



classification and declassification policy to an independent executive body – a National Declassification Center – had been very much on the mind of participants in the controversy.⁵ Indeed, on March 6, 2006, when Weinstein and ISOO director J. William Leonard presided over the summit of federal agencies, they supported the concept of a “National Declassification Initiative” (NDI) to replace the “agency-centric approach to declassification.” The experience of the past brought credibility to that proposal. In the 1990s an interagency working group had declassified thousands of pages of documents on U.S. policy toward Chile, El Salvador, and Guatemala, and in the 1980s a similar group had reviewed thousands of pages of material on the Iran-Contra scandal. Those examples showed that a cooperative review effort could be productive and efficient.

At the agency summit, the CIA and other agencies professed to support “new procedures” for declassification, but they also claimed that they had more important priorities, such as meeting the December 2006 deadline for automatically declassifying non-exempt records under E.O. 12958.⁶ The CIA did not say whether it would willingly accept any outside control over its declassification policies and practices. That remains an open question. Congress responded to the controversy on March 21. The House Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, chaired by Christopher Shays (R-CT), held hearings that were entitled “Drowning in a Sea of Faux Secrets.” Matthew Aid, Anna Nelson, and Thomas Blanton testified. Sparks flew during the aggressive questioning of Weinstein by Congressman Shays and by Henry Waxman (D-CA).⁷ Weinstein acknowledged that reading about the reclassification program on the front page of the *New York Times* was an “impossible and absurd way” for him to have found out about it. During his testimony some mysterious records that had been the subject of a number of FOIA requests – the rumored memoranda of understandings (MOU) that NARA had signed with

federal agencies – became central to the controversy. However, the wrangling over the status of one MOU that the Archives had signed with an unspecified component of the Defense Department generated more heat than light. Citing its classified nature, Weinstein declared that he could not discuss it in an open session. Shays insisted that the Archives declassify the document, and Weinstein agreed to seek its release.

Responding to congressional pressure and FOIA requests, on April 11, 2006, the National Archives released, in excised form, the MOU that it had signed with the Air Force in March 2002. The MOU shows that a supposedly sensitive Air Force intelligence activity had been a factor in the drive to remove documents from open files that may have shed light on that program. While the nature of the intelligence activity led to some head-scratching, that excision was not as troubling as the discovery that both parties had agreed that it was in their interest to manage the reclassification program on a clandestine basis. NARA promised that it would “not disclose the true reason for the presence of [excised agency] ... personnel at the Archives,” and both parties agreed that it was important to avoid “the attention and researcher complaints that may arise from removing material

that has already been made publicly available.” More may be learned about this MOU if the Archives and the Air Force respond positively to FOIA appeals to restore the excisions. The next shoe dropped that same week. Some observers believed the MOU with the Air Force was only part of the story. They thought it likely that the CIA had played an instigating role in the reclassification program and surmised that even if there was only an informal understanding between the agency and NARA, some paperwork memorializing it had to exist. Indeed, in mid-April, ISOO staffers conducting the reclassification audit discovered another secret MOU which the assistant archivist of the United States had signed with the CIA in the fall of 2001, partly to ensure that the agency followed an orderly procedure when it reviewed documents. (The CIA had already disarranged some documents in State Department INR files.) The document had not surfaced previously because NARA staffers claimed that it was “generic and procedural” and not “part of the reclassification program.” The MOU with CIA could not have been more relevant, however, and when Weinstein learned about the discovery on April 13 he insisted that the document be declassified immediately. It must have taken a call to former CIA director Porter Goss,

WORKING GROUP ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

Inderjeet Parmar (University of Manchester, UK) and John Dumbrell (University of Leicester, UK) announce the creation of a new Working Group on US Foreign Policy within the British International Studies Association. The intention is that the group should concern itself both with contemporary issues and with the history of American foreign relations.

The new group is being launched at a one day conference to be held at the University of Leicester on September 21, 2006.

More information about the Working Group may be obtained from Inderjeet Parmar (inderjeet.parmar@manchester.ac.uk) and from John Dumbrell (jwd5@le.ac.uk).

The group's activities will also be advertised and reported on the British International Studies Association website (<http://www.bisa.ac.uk>).

but the MOU was declassified within twenty-four hours—possibly record time.

Weinstein released the document on April 17 with a note decrying the previous secret understandings. “There can never be a classified aspect of our mission,” he wrote, adding that “classified agreements are the antithesis of our reason for being.” The previous archivist, John Carlin, would go on record expressing his “shock” about the secret agreements, but senior archives officials told members of the historical and public interest community that they had in fact briefed him about the MOUs when he was in office.⁸

On April 26, ISOO director J. William Leonard released the reclassification audit, “Withdrawal of Records from Public Access at the National Archives and Records Administration for Reclassification Purposes.” The thirty-page report is remarkable as a factual account. It shows, for example, that the reclassification effort actually involved over 25,000 documents (including some DOE withdrawals), more than twice as many as had been suggested earlier. The Air Force had taken the lead by withdrawing over 17,000 records. The ISOO report is a tough critique of agency conduct in impounding publicly available material.⁹ One of the ISOO’s key conclusions, from its sampling of 1,353 records, is that only 64 percent—around two-thirds—had been properly classified. Most of the others were “clearly inappropriate for continued classification.” Moreover, even in the instances where the documents remained legitimately subject to classification the report concludes that “insufficient judgment was applied to the decision to withdraw the record from public access.” Not only had NARA “acquiesced too readily to the re-review efforts or withdrawal decisions,” the entire process was characterized “by the absence of standards.”

For the CIA and the Air Force, 64 percent was a vindication of their efforts. It showed they were right about most of the documents that had been pulled. But some ISOO officials disagreed. They argued privately that

the agencies only called attention to the documents by withdrawing them. It would have been wiser to leave them alone. They also indicated that many of the withdrawals showed poor judgment. For example, some documents were withdrawn simply because they had a cc: to a CIA official. More important, ISOO officials pointed out that under E.O. 12958 hundreds of millions of pages had been declassified. The release of 16,000 or so still-sensitive documents (some two-thirds of the 25,000) represented a tiny and wholly acceptable error rate.

In his important “Director’s Message,” Leonard expressed his disappointment that “trained classifiers” had failed to get it right, but he argued that the “deliberate decisions highlighted in this audit ... constitute a misuse of the classification system.”¹⁰ He was referring to one of the most striking findings of the audit: that a CIA deception operation had shaped many of the reclassification actions. According to the ISOO report, the “CIA withdrew a considerable number of purely unclassified records in order to obfuscate the classified equity that they agency was intent on protecting.” The CIA action made it difficult for ISOO staffers to differentiate between the withdrawn documents that were legitimately classified and those had been reclassified only to “obfuscate other, more sensitive equities.” Leonard stressed that “the damage such practices can inflict on the integrity of the classification system cannot be denied.”

The ISOO report highlights the many problems revealed by the reclassification process: violations of the Executive Order, poor judgment, quality control problems, the absence of standards, the lack of documentation to track the process, and the inadequacy of the current complex referrals process for declassifying documents. An important finding for those concerned about NARA’s role in the events is that, compared to other agencies, the Archives devoted insufficient resources to implementing the historical declassification requirements of E.O. 12958. The resulting “mismatch in capabilities” meant that

NARA is always lagging in opening up processed records to researchers. “Access delayed can equate to access denied.” But the complex referral process created by multiple agency equities also complicates and delays access. In light of that assessment, consideration of a National Declassification Initiative is all the more imperative.

One of the most important recommendations in the ISOO audit, alluded to in the “Director’s Note,” is one that Leonard had made many times in the past. The agencies that took the lead in reclassification had studiously ignored a basic assumption embodied in E. O. 12958: declassification of historical records should follow “risk management” principles. When historical records are declassified, there will inevitably be some inadvertent releases. It would be better for the agencies to accept that risk and let the inadvertent releases stay buried in the files than to call attention to them by withdrawing them. By implicitly following “risk averse” principles, the agencies had created a controversy that brought the entire declassification system into disrepute. When the ISOO released its audit, Weinstein announced the end of the reclassification moratorium, but at the same time he declared that there would be no return to the status quo pro ante. Weinstein approved interim guidelines that require greater transparency for further withdrawal of records. Meanwhile, the ISOO continues its audit, and even as NARA works to restore improperly withheld records to the open stacks and analyze its procedures for processing classified records, the Archives will take the lead in establishing a pilot National Declassification Initiative as a step toward creating a “more reliable executive-branch wide declassification program.”

The ISOO audit report represents an important first step. However, the sampling of documents was relatively small, and the exercise was conducted in a hurry, so it is possible that a more thorough review encompassing more documents might produce different results. The guidelines that the agencies use for declassification

review of historical documents should also be reviewed to make sure they are up-to-date and not unnecessarily stringent, since the conclusion that some two-thirds of the documents were properly classified flows from the assumption that the guidelines that CIA and other agencies follow are justifiable. Only government officials at the ISOO level are in a position to determine whether the guidelines are appropriate.

Those cavils aside, the high quality of the audit report reflects well on the integrity of the ISOO's leadership. However, the ISOO has more moral than political authority. Getting the agencies to de-reclassify impounded documents will not be an easy process, not least because it is likely to involve costly page-by-page review, and the agencies will fight over whose budgets will fund the review. Moreover, it may be beyond the ISOO's power to get the agencies to support a meaningful NDI proposal and to accept Leonard's view that "risk management" is an appropriate standard for reviewing and releasing classified historical files. In addition, even if the agencies agree to a sound plan for an NDI, the new arrangements could founder unless NARA allocates more resources to process the expanded flow of declassified records.

On May 9, 2006, the recently constituted federal advisory committee, the Public Interest Declassification Board (PIDB), held its first public meeting, which included discussions of the reclassification controversy and the prospective National Declassification Initiative. William J. Bosanko, a representative from the ISOO who is conducting a major study on a "more viable and reliable executive-branch wide declassification program," briefed the PIDB on a program to expedite a massive backlog of 450 million pages slated for declassification review under E.O. 12958. The PIDB also heard testimony from Public Citizen attorney Adina Rosenbaum, National Security Archive director Thomas Blanton, and National Coalition for History director Bruce Craig, all of whom spoke in favor of reform of the declassification system. Blanton emphasized the need for legislation and according to Bruce

Craig's account of the meeting, some PIDB members and audience members had also drawn the conclusion that executive orders were not enough to establish a better declassification system.¹¹

Although the need for a well-funded and effective declassification system is obviously pressing, the situation is not likely to improve in the short term. Many of the reclassified documents may not be seen for years. The current leadership in Congress and the White House is unlikely to take an interest in, much less support, the necessary changes to the declassification system. Getting a better system will require political pressure and political will. To the extent that the archivist of the United States has political connections on the Hill that are worth something, it will take active lobbying on his part on behalf of an NDI to secure even modest funding for declassification at NARA. To get real improvement in arrangements for historical declassification, SHAFR and other organizations will need to support a concerted campaign against the "agency-centric" system that now hinders openness in the archival record of U.S. foreign relations.

William Burr is Senior Analyst at the National Security Archive. He wishes to thank Anna K. Nelson, Thomas Blanton, and Meredith Fuchs for helpful comments.

Notes:

1. See Matthew M. Aid, ed., "Declassification in Reverse: The U.S. Intelligence Community's Secret Historical Document Reclassification Program," 21 February 2006, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB179/index.htm>. See also Christopher Lee, "The Amateur Sleuth Who Gave the Archives a Red Face," *Washington Post*, 8 June 2006.
2. The latter refers to the post-9/11 effort to locate in archival holdings and then impound such documents as blueprints of U.S. government buildings that could point to vulnerabilities in the federal infrastructure.
3. See Aid et al to J. William Leonard, 17 February 2006, at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB179/Aid-3-Letter_to_ISOO.pdf. Besides Aid, the letter was signed by SHAFR president Randall Woods, National Coalition for History director R. Bruce Craig, National Security Archive director Thomas Blanton

and general counsel Meredith Fuchs, and Public Citizen staff attorney Adina Rosenbaum.

4. For Weinstein's statements and press releases from the National Archives on reclassification, see <http://www.archives.gov/declassification/>.
5. Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, Pursuant to Public Law 236 103d Congress, Appendix C-1; available on-line at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/index.html>.
6. Barring some last-minute reprieve from the White House, all classified file series that are over twenty-five years old that federal agencies have not already designated as exempt from automatic declassification will, in theory, be declassified as of 1 January 2007. The agencies have had ten years to prepare for this deadline.
7. For a partial, unofficial, transcript of the exchange, see http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20060411/Shays_hearing_3-14_transcript_excerpt.pdf. An official transcript of the hearings is not yet available but for statements by Christopher Shays, Allen Weinstein, J. William Leonard, Matthew Aid, Anna Nelson, Thomas Blanton, and others see: <http://reform.house.gov/NSETIR/Hearings/EventSingle.aspx?EventID=40820>
8. For "shocked," see "National Archives Pact Let C.I.A. Withdraw Public Documents," *New York Times*, 18 April 2006.
9. For the report, see <http://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2006/nr06-96.html>.
10. For the Director's message, see <http://www.archives.gov/isoo/reports/2006-audit-report-attach-1.pdf>.
11. For a full report on the PIDB meeting, see NCH WASHINGTON UPDATE (Vol. 12, #22; 11 May 2006), Item 2, at <http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-NCH&month=0605&week=b&msg=i6Z43B7y%2b2GcJhgWeihLBQ&user=&pw=>.

The Sixth Edition of *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*: An Appreciation, a Critique, and Some Suggestions

Robert Shaffer

The latest revision of *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*, published approximately five years after the last edition, brings students important and challenging primary sources from the makers and critics of U.S. foreign policy, along with well-chosen excerpts from secondary works of diverse perspectives that are focused around key events and themes in that history. Spanning almost four hundred years in two volumes, this collection, originally edited solely by Thomas Paterson and co-edited since the 1995 fourth edition by Dennis Merrill, is indispensable in teaching survey classes in the history of U.S. foreign relations.

Paterson, who is professor emeritus at the University of Connecticut and former president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, is the lead author of a popular narrative textbook in U.S. foreign relations, a co-author of a major survey textbook in U.S. history, and the editor of important collections of essays in diplomatic history.¹ He is also general editor of the "Major Problems in American History" series, which Houghton Mifflin took over from D.C. Heath, and which now includes over twenty titles. Merrill, of the University of Missouri-Kansas City, is a former student of Paterson who has written on U.S. policy toward India and who supervised a major documentary editing project on the Truman administration.² Paterson's first edition of the present collection, itself an update of Heath's 1964 one-volume *Major Problems in American Diplomatic History*, edited by Daniel Smith, appeared in 1978. Paterson may have drawn some inspiration as

well from a similar collection edited by William Appleman Williams, originally published in 1956, with a second edition in 1970.³

Each volume of *Major Problems* begins with an introductory chapter presenting a range of overviews of key themes in U.S. diplomatic history. In volume one these include, for example, extracts from Williams on U.S. economic expansionism and the problems arising from American efforts to remake the world. Williams's account is contrasted with Norman Graebner's analysis of early American diplomacy as an effort to maximize U.S. interests in the world by utilizing "balance of power" politics in and with regard to Europe. Excerpts from works by Bradford Perkins, Mary Renda, and Andrew Rotter round out this chapter. Each subsequent chapter begins with an overview of the topic by the editors, including major questions of history and historiography. A set of primary source documents follows, representing a range of political viewpoints, with one or two from abroad. Finally, each chapter includes excerpts from two or three essays representing divergent perspectives. Generally, these essays draw from one or more of the documents included, so that students can evaluate the historiographical debates and see how historians use evidence. Many of the documents and essays illustrate or challenge the overview essays in the introductory chapters, thus encouraging students to be aware of themes that resonate throughout the history of U.S. foreign policy and to develop their own worldviews about this history.

The primary source documents illustrate not only actions, decisions,

and perspectives on issues facing the United States, but also attitudes and assumptions about American society and its interactions with others. For example, the vitriolic attack on Jay's Treaty by a Democratic-Republican society in South Carolina in 1795 exemplifies the partisan passions of the 1790s and the fears of many Americans that the ascendant power

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of the national government and the secrecy surrounding Senate negotiation of the proposed treaty compromised the republicanism of the revolutionary era (vol. 1, 64-65).⁴ These defenders of republicanism were also demanding free access to West Indian and European ports for American ships, however, so in their attack on the treaty students can see a colorful piece of evidence to support Williams, while Jay's Treaty itself might be used to support Graebner.

Similarly, comparing documents from different periods allows students to identify continuing themes of American thought. For example, in his 1812 war message James Madison declared that warfare by Indian "savages . . . a warfare which is known to spare neither age nor sex and to be distinguished by features peculiarly shocking to humanity" was outside the bounds of civilization (vol. 1, 113). Sam Houston's 1835 call for the independence of Texas combined the fear of slave revolts with antipathy to irregular warfare (see vol. 1, 195). Students may also note the dichotomy between "civilization" and "savagery" in Andrew Jackson's call for the removal of the Cherokees (vol. 1, 165-67), in Theodore Roosevelt's justification of U.S. intervention in Latin American affairs (vol. 1, 404), and in the way current U.S. leaders have framed the issues in the "war on terror." The recurrence of such rhetoric can have a powerful impact on student thinking and helps build the case for the perspectives on U.S. foreign policy outlined in the introductory essays by Andrew Rotter ("Gender, Expansionism, and Imperialism") and Mary Renda ("Paternalism and Imperial Culture").

The foreign documents in the collection, especially those from Latin America, will stimulate students' critical thinking and help them understand the challenges the United States faces in the realm of global public opinion.⁵ In volume one, there are contrasting responses to the Monroe Doctrine from Colombia and Argentina. José Martí's warning in 1895 about U.S. intentions towards Cuba helps explain statements U.S. leaders would make three years later and sheds light on the continuing

conflict between these nations. Students might be asked to refer to these documents when they consider one of the newest documents in this edition, the speech by George W. Bush in which he asked, "Why do they hate us?"

Some documents from antagonists of the United States serve as counterpoints to American views. Some show surprising commonalities. Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Novikov's 1946 telegram to his government about American aggression after World War II is paired with George F. Kennan's 1946 telegram about Soviet expansionism. Nikita Khrushchev's view of the arms race of the 1950s is paired with a surprisingly similar statement from Dwight Eisenhower. Ronald Reagan's thoughts on his Strategic Defense Initiative are contrasted with those of Mikhail Gorbachev.

The presentation of clashing historiographical perspectives will help students evaluate issues that are still subject to debate, as policymakers use the past to make sense of the present. In the chapter on World War II in volume two Warren Kimball defends Franklin Roosevelt's diplomacy as essential to the successful prosecution of the war in Europe and portrays Roosevelt as attempting despite difficult circumstances and a lack of leverage to balance a range of interests for the post-war world. Meanwhile, Joseph Harper attributes the failure of the alliance to endure into the post-war world to FDR's refusal to commit the United States to stay fully involved in European affairs and to his rejection of Winston Churchill's warnings about the Soviets.⁶ Among the documents used by both historians and included in this chapter are statements by FDR and Joseph Stalin on the "second front," Churchill's account of his "percentages deal" with Stalin, and extracts from the Yalta proceedings. Other chapters that are particularly useful for students evaluating still-vital issues are the Cuban missile crisis chapter, in which Paterson squares off against Robert Dallek, and the chapter on Theodore Roosevelt's "Big Stick" policy in the Caribbean, in which Mark Gilderhus and Emily Rosenberg

offer criticisms while Richard Collin provides a defense.

This edition includes a number of improvements. A different selection by Peter Onuf and Leonard Sadosky about diplomacy in the revolutionary era exemplifies the internationalization of American history by showing how developments in the United States arose in conjunction with and response to similar developments elsewhere. An excellent excerpt from Joyce Appleby's new study of Thomas Jefferson replaces essays on the Louisiana Purchase by Alexander DeConde and Drew McCoy. Appleby shows Jefferson as a shrewd diplomat and a determined empire builder "for the white families of the United States" (vol. 1, 103). Garry Wills's hard-hitting critique of Madison's policy in the War of 1812 replaces Bradford Perkins's more leisurely analysis. Walter LaFeber's narrative of "the origins of the U.S.-Japanese clash," which replaces a fine but overly long essay by Kenneth Shewmaker on Daniel Webster's Asia diplomacy, emphasizes Japanese actions as much as American actions and thus exemplifies recent trends in our field.

An essay by Kristin Hoganson on the global roots of certain American consumption patterns in the late 1800s continues a trend in *Major Problems* of placing more emphasis on culture and the manifestations of foreign relations in daily life. The essay is accompanied by an 1892 magazine article about the international origins of American interior design trends. Excerpts from Leila Rupp's *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (1997) show the editors' continuing efforts to explore transnational identities and integrate non-state actors and women into the story of American foreign relations. Rupp's essay on the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom in the United States and Europe in the 1920s is accompanied by Jane Addams's laudatory 1922 article on the League of Nations. These essays join Jane Hunter's now-classic exploration of American female Protestant missionaries in China.

Other new essays include Arnold Offner's excellent critique of Truman's

Cold War policies, which provides a counterpoint to John Lewis Gaddis's determined defense of the United States in that conflict. The three essays in the chapter on the Vietnam War replace ones by George Herring and Gabriel Kolko and represent some of the best work of a new generation of scholars on that conflict. All three are critical of U.S. goals and methods in Vietnam. Robert Buzzanco provides a more sophisticated view than did Kolko of how Vietnam's struggle for independence challenged international capitalism, and he includes the economic consequences of the war on the U.S. and global economies. Frederick Logevall, in a long essay that may be too dry for undergraduates, shows how Johnson administration officials had some freedom of action on Vietnam but nevertheless "chose war." Supporting documents include memoranda and position papers from the U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy. Robert Brigham, an associate of Robert McNamara on *Argument Without End* (1999), uses North Vietnamese and Chinese sources to show convincingly that alternative military strategies, such as those proposed by military strategist Harry Summers, would not have led to U.S. victory. Mao Zedong's advice to the North Vietnamese in 1965 to keep fighting supports Brigham's contention that if the United States had invaded the North, China might have entered the war.

There is one new chapter in each volume of this edition. The chapter on the Civil War and foreign policy is welcome: the war is of great interest to students, and it is important to show them its international context. The first document of this chapter, South Carolina Senator James Hammond's 1858 speech, "Cotton is King," is an inspired choice. Hammond's argument that the North, Britain, and "the whole civilized world" (vol. 1, 263) were dependent upon the South economically mirrors the overly optimistic assertions during the American Revolution about the colonists' superior bargaining position with European powers. Other documents focus on Lincoln's efforts to prevent British recognition of and aid to the Confederacy. James McPherson and Howard Jones agree

that public opinion in Britain played a role in that government's response to the Civil War, although they evaluate British conduct differently. It might have been helpful to include a document from one of the British mass meetings championing Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation or even from one of Karl Marx's wartime dispatches in the *New York Tribune*.

The second new chapter, "Cold War Culture and the 'Third World,'" broadens the postwar coverage both geographically and conceptually. In previous editions, discussion of the Third World was based either on high-level diplomacy (non-recognition of China, the Cuban missile crisis) or war (Korea, Vietnam). This chapter contains three essays, each accompanied by two or three documents, on discrete case studies. Mary Ann Heiss writes about the U.S. response to the nationalization of oil in Iran in the 1950s, Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman discusses the Peace Corps in the 1960s in Ghana, and Dennis Merrill describes the building of an infrastructure for tourism in Puerto Rico. The editors summarize the analyses of the three historians as "culture clash" (Heiss), "cultural cooperation" (Hoffman), and "cultural negotiation" (Merrill), and thus present to students a range of ways in which the United States interacted with the world.⁷

The chapter is worthwhile but unwieldy. The case studies and the concept of culture differ too much. Moreover, two of the documents included to illustrate the impact of tourism are not particularly successful. A cartoon from a pro-independence Puerto Rican newspaper criticizing the insensitivity of American tourists is poorly reproduced in the original Spanish (vol. 2, 339), with a partial, paraphrased translation eleven pages away (vol. 2, 328). The photograph of the Caribe Hilton Hotel in San Juan (vol. 2, 338), which is intended to show how tourism embodied "modernity," should be coupled with photos of old San Juan.

When I used the book in the fall of 2004, I linked Heiss's discussion of Iran with a book on the 1954 coup in Guatemala⁸ to show that U.S. participation in the overthrow

of elected leaders constituted a pattern. I used Cobbs Hoffman's positive portrait of the Kennedy administration's actions in West Africa as a counterpoint to the more ambiguous portrait by Thomas Borstelmann of the international dimensions of that administration's racial policies.⁹ And I contrasted Merrill's nuanced picture of tourism in Puerto Rico with the more negative impact of 1950s U.S. tourism on Cuba and the "dependent independence" (in Stanley Karnow's words) of the Philippines.¹⁰

The changes in the sixth edition are not all positive. The editors missed the opportunity to make corrections.¹¹ The edition is more expensive than previous editions, even though it is significantly shorter (in part because of stronger editing or the substitution of more succinct essays for longer ones). There are only a handful of new documents, apart from the ones that illustrate new chapters, some documents have been eliminated, and some chapters have been pared from three essays to two. For example, the 1783 speech by Yale president Ezra Stiles incorporating the Protestant idea that America fulfilled a providential design is gone. It was a valuable link between John Winthrop's "City on a Hill" sermon of 1630 and John O'Sullivan's invocation of "manifest destiny" in 1839. It also served as a religious variant on Tom Paine's view of American promise in *Common Sense* and as background for the Christian discourse of the current president, and it contained prescient references to U.S. trade with Asia. Given the editors' efforts to show how non-diplomats participated in foreign relations, this elimination is disappointing.

Other excised documents also leave gaps. The removal of a 1790s statement by James Madison leaves the Charleston Democratic-Republicans as the sole opponents of Jay's Treaty. Rev. Josiah Strong's 1891 statement melding the Protestant "chosen people" theme with Anglo-American racism helped outline the cultural context of the U.S. rise to world power. A 1916 debate between U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing and German Ambassador Johann-Heinrich

Bernstorff on submarine warfare worked well to help students think about past and present innovations in warfare, such as aerial bombardment and even suicide bombing. Also helpful in class was the dialogue between presidential advisor Harry Hopkins and Joseph Stalin in May 1945 about Soviet actions in Eastern Europe. Senator William Borah's 1931 plea for diplomatic recognition of the Soviet Union, already eliminated from the fifth edition, highlighted the U.S. response to revolutions, illustrated an underappreciated aspect of so-called isolationists, and demonstrated that economic motives could underpin both opposition to and accommodation with foreign radicalism. A description of a 1957 nuclear test in which GIs were exposed to atomic radiation was also dropped after the fourth edition, although it provided a tangible look at the impact on Americans of Eisenhower's focus on nuclear over conventional warfare and provided a backdrop for discussion of the more recent use of Agent Orange and depleted uranium.

Most puzzling is the elimination of two documents that constituted important evidence for the chapters they accompanied. Missing from the chapter on the Cuban missile crisis is the Cuban government's October 8, 1962 protest at the United Nations against U.S. aggression, which provided a crucial perspective on the crisis. The chapter on the Vietnam War no longer includes Eisenhower's 1954 statement about Vietnam's importance to the free world, in which he enunciated the domino theory and spoke about the region's economic importance, with its tin, tungsten, and rubber. While this chapter now focuses on Johnson's decision-making, Eisenhower's statement provided perspective on the U.S. commitment and correlates directly with Buzzanco's argument.

Why eliminate documents? They are already typeset, and most are in the public domain, so the cost of keeping them is marginal. They do not make students' workloads more difficult, as overly long essays might do. But the elimination of documents does add to professors' workloads, since they

must either revise lessons or provide documents on library reserve. The editors might have been justified in cutting documents to provide new sources and perspectives, but not solely to reduce total pages.

While many of the essay substitutions are helpful in including new perspectives or presenting important views more clearly, others are less successful. The elimination of Reginald Stuart's sympathetic account of Madison's policy in the War of 1812 as one of "defensive expansionism" leaves that chapter with two essays, both critical of the United States. Stuart provides a useful counterpoint to Williams and other critics of U.S. expansionism writing on other episodes in U.S. history, from the Mexican War to the annexation of the Philippines and beyond. His account also has contemporary reverberations, since Bush's argument for war in Iraq resembles "defensive expansionism." Also unfortunate is the elimination from the introductory chapter of volume one of Michael Hunt's essay on racism as a continuing theme in U.S. foreign relations in favor of an excerpt on paternalism and imperial culture from Mary Renda's book on the U.S. occupation of Haiti. The clarity, accessibility, and breadth of Hunt's explanation of racial dynamics in foreign relations make it more appropriate as an overview to which students can return as they consider other documents and essays.

The elimination after the fourth edition of C. Vann Woodward's sympathetic overview of U.S. foreign relations also leaves a gap for teachers. Woodward identified the important theme of "free security," meaning that the United States had a relatively free hand in national development for much of its history because of its distance from Europe. That idea strongly influenced policymakers and historians, as they tended to conflate foreign relations with interaction with Europe. Also, while few historians today would present with so little critical analysis what Woodward called the "national myth that America is an innocent nation in a wicked world," many of our leaders and our students do. In order to help students analyze the platitudes they have heard

from politicians or accepted without challenge in high school, we must present and discuss such views, as well as contrast them with contrary perspectives from Williams, Hunt, and others. Similarly, a judiciously edited version of Samuel Flagg Bemis's stridently ideological Kennedy-era AHA presidential address,¹² which students should take seriously and evaluate critically against the work of Williams, Hunt, and Graebner, would be a welcome addition to this collection.

Publishers would undoubtedly argue that adding new chapters requires eliminating others, but including an additional chapter in volume one (while keeping the World War I chapter in both volumes for teachers who divide their two-semester courses differently) would have been preferable. As it is, what had been two separate chapters on the turn-of-the-century wars in Cuba and the Philippines is now one, with all the essays focused on Cuba and only two documents on the Philippines. While survey textbooks and lectures could supplement the material on the Philippines, much is lost here. The three contrasting essays on the Philippines raised important themes barely addressed elsewhere. In particular, Stanley Karnow's essay on the intentions behind and consequences of U.S. intervention in the Philippines concretely illustrated William A. Williams's ideas. Robert Rydell's dissection of the cultural and racial politics of the display of Philippine ethnic groups at the 1904 St. Louis World's Fair was both a stunning example of how racism was dressed up as benevolence and a reminder of how Americans used the memory of the Louisiana Purchase in the construction of an overseas empire. In an era when Americans are debating the unorthodox treatment of wartime prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, Abu Ghraib, and in Afghanistan, documents describing the torture of Filipinos one hundred years ago are essential reading for students, along with Glenn May's reexamination of the reasons for the high mortality rate of Philippine civilians during the war.¹³

To make room for the new chapter


on culture and the Cold War in volume two, the editors combined the chapter on U.S. resistance to recognition of the People's Republic of China with that on the Korean War. But six of the eight documents in the new chapter, and two of the three essays, are on Korea. For a reader on diplomatic rather than military history, a focus on China would have been preferable, with added material on the impact of non-recognition on later events, including the Korean War. The communication in the late 1940s between U.S. diplomats in China, the State Department, and President Truman, along with documents from China, provided an excellent case study of foreign policy decision-making and enabled students to evaluate the evidence in the historiographic debate about the "lost chance" thesis. Also, the case study showed students how

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the United States responds to the emergence of revolutionary regimes abroad, a theme which is touched on in other chapters but is not the focus of any particular chapter. Moreover, the question of non-recognition of the People's Republic of China illuminates the connection between White House policy-making, domestic political pressures, and non-governmental interest groups. The editors say they want to highlight that connection, but it is not present in the new Korean War chapter. Material on the decision not to recognize the PRC is also indispensable to an analysis of the foreign policy of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in the 1970s, which is, appropriately, the subject of a later chapter. One last complaint about this chapter: most of the documents do not illustrate the essays. There are no documents to accompany Bruce Cumings's important but here quite isolated analysis of "Korea's civil war and the roots of U.S. intervention," and there is no essay focused on the largest number of documents in the chapter, which illustrate U.S. military policy on the peninsula.

While many of the changes in the sixth edition have been positive, the editors missed the opportunity to broaden coverage of several issues. They added Renda's analysis of American "imperialist culture" in Haiti in the early twentieth century, but there is virtually no mention of the importance of the Haitian revolution of the 1790s or Haitian independence for U.S. foreign policy. Jefferson's horror at events in Haiti, in particular, demonstrates the complex interconnections among race, slavery, economics, foreign and domestic policy, and typifies U.S. reactions to revolution. Historian Thomas Bender addressed this subject in an essay in the *New York Times* in 2001, while David Brion Davis, Winthrop Jordan, Tim Matthewson, and Donald Hickey, among others, have written on the issue in scholarly books and essays.¹⁴ Primary sources are available from Abraham Bishop and Theodore Dwight, who urged support for the Haitian rebels, and from Jefferson and South Carolina Governor Charles Pinckney, who feared that the Haitian slave revolt would lead to similar

uprisings in the United States.¹⁵ Over one hundred years ago, W.E.B. DuBois wrote that "the role which the great Negro Toussaint, called L'Ouverture, played in the history of the United States has seldom been fully appreciated."¹⁶ It is high time diplomatic historians recognized that role. Similarly, the importance of Haiti to the abolitionist movement, which Edward Crapol has written about,¹⁷ is worth a document in the Civil War chapter, either on unsuccessful antebellum efforts to gain diplomatic recognition or on Lincoln's granting of recognition during the war.

Other documents might also be added. The Ostend Manifesto, which showed how intertwined were sectionalism, slavery, foreign expansionism, and the coming of the Civil War, deserves space. In the chapter on open door diplomacy in China, Merrill and Paterson might borrow a page from the older reader by Williams and include material on reactions in China and Japan to the efforts to close American doors to immigration.¹⁸ The Spanish-American-Cuban-Filipino War lends itself to illustration by political cartoons from a variety of viewpoints.¹⁹ Finally, in addition to the material on Theodore Roosevelt and the Caribbean there should be documents on Wilson's intervention in the region. The 1920 report by African-American diplomat and writer James Weldon Johnson on the U.S. occupation of Haiti, which emphasizes the racism of American troops, would be useful.²⁰

That report might also prove relevant in a reconceptualized chapter on Wilson and World War I that scrutinizes Wilsonian internationalism from a truly global perspective. Paul Gordon Lauren's devastating critique²¹ of Wilson's dismissal of Japan's plea for an endorsement of the principle of racial equality would complement Tony Smith's defense of Wilson and Jan Wilhelm Schulte-Nordholt's critique, which are included in the chapter, as would material from Elizabeth McKillen on the reservations that many Irish-Americans had about the League of Nations.²² Williams's 1970 reader had framed a chapter on Wilson and the

League of Nations around the theme of "Making Peace in the Midst of Revolutions," thus including Russia, China, and Mexico as well.²³

Merrill and Paterson might respond that this edition deals with race and diplomacy through Gerald Horne's essay in the first chapter of volume two, which surveys the relationship of African-Americans to U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century. But Horne's essay, while useful, will only be meaningful to students if it is reinforced with supporting documents. The two most important African-Americans whose works must be represented are DuBois, whose work is relevant to many chapters in both volumes, and Martin Luther King, Jr., whose April 1967 declaration of opposition to the war in Vietnam is among the most cogent expressions of the antiwar movement.²⁴

The chapter on the origins of the Cold War could also benefit from a more global perspective. As presented, the conflict appears to derive almost entirely from disputes over Europe. Many contemporaries saw U.S.-Soviet conflict as deriving from clashes around the world, from China to Indonesia to the Middle East. While some of these areas are addressed in later chapters, the fact that they are later chapters signals students that they are somehow subsidiary to actions in Europe. Two primary sources on Indonesia would be good additions, because they appeal to a long-range historical perspective. In late 1945, the editors of the *Christian Century* described how British troops with American lend-lease equipment were "taking a leading part in refastening the shackles of imperialism on a major portion of the southwest Pacific." The Indonesians, seeing the United States side with European imperialism, appealed to the Soviet Union for aid. "Think that over," the editors wrote. "It may have a lot of future history tied up in it."²⁵ In 1946 Raymond Kennedy, perhaps the leading American expert on Indonesia, analyzed how economic interests, racism, Navy expansionism, anti-communism, and the State Department's bureaucracy contributed to American aloofness from Indonesia's struggle for independence.

He addressed precisely the strands of U.S. foreign policy Merrill and Paterson ask their readers to consider.²⁶

The reworked chapter on the approach of war in the 1930s might include the Spanish Civil War, which pitted the American left against the Catholic faithful and severely tested U.S. diplomacy. Students would understand FDR's cautious internationalism better if they read an isolationist statement, perhaps by Charles Lindbergh. Bruce Russett's revisionist argument against U.S. entry into World War II is once again in the collection. Since he argued that joining the war fostered a belief among American policymakers and the public that the United States would henceforth intervene around the world at will, perhaps the classic statement of this perspective, Henry Luce's "The American Century," should be included.²⁷

At least one chapter demands complete rethinking. The chapter on Reagan, Gorbachev, and the end of the Cold War appeared in the fourth edition with documents narrowly focused on negotiations over nuclear weapons and the Strategic Defense Initiative and essays reflecting a range of viewpoints about why the Cold War ended as it did. It now has fewer documents and two fewer essays on Reagan and the Soviets, but two new documents and one new essay on the appeal and pitfalls of unilateralism for the United States and U.S. power in the post-Cold War era. The editors presumably believe that the new readings relate to the

Bird and Sherwin Win 2006 Pulitzer

SHAFR would like to congratulate
Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin,
winners of the 2006 Pulitzer Prize for Biography for

*American Prometheus:
The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert
Oppenheimer*

(Alfred A. Knopf)



Columbia University President Lee C. Bollinger (left) presents Kai Bird (center) and Martin J. Sherwin with the 2006 Pulitzer Prize in Biography. Picture courtesy of Columbia University.

chapter's theme in that they show that the end of the Cold War meant neither the end of history nor a free hand in the world for the sole remaining superpower. However, I suspect that most professors would rather use the chapter to analyze the successes and costs of Reagan's foreign policy. The two essays that formerly balanced John Lewis Gaddis's pro-Reagan triumphalism — Michael Mcgwire on the sources of change within the Soviet Union and Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry on how "engagement and anti-nuclearism" rather than military brinkmanship ended the Cold War — are gone. Paterson's own essay explaining the long-term decline of superpower influence on both sides is useful, though now very dated. In most of the chapters that Merrill and Paterson designed, a student could evaluate a

clear historiographical disagreement by reflecting on the documents. That is not possible here.

The passage of time also forces us to reconsider the Reagan administration's policies in relation to central Asia, Central America, and the Iran-Iraq war. In light of 9/11, it is not possible to evaluate Reagan without addressing U.S. support for the Islamist "freedom-fighters"/"terrorists" in Afghanistan. Nor is it possible to evaluate the means by which the United States battled communism in Europe without also evaluating the allies Reagan embraced in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Moreover, there should be some mention of the social movements of the 1980s that pushed for a nuclear freeze and an end to Reagan's constructive engagement with apartheid South Africa.²⁸ Finally, with so much focus on the Strategic Defense Initiative there should be a document from the present on the progress (or lack thereof) of this alleged technological breakthrough.

The final chapter on 9/11, Bush's policy toward terrorism and Iraq, and U.S. relations with the Arab/Muslim world has a clear unity and enables students to evaluate divergent scholarly perspectives. The chapter represents a major revision of the original fourth-edition essay on the United States and the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is now framed around two essays debating the causes of Muslim hostility to the United States. Bernard Lewis argues his familiar clash of civilization thesis, focusing on Islam's antipathy toward Western modernity, while Ussama Makdisi maintains that U.S. policy since the 1940s has created anti-Americanism where little had previously existed. A third essay addresses globalization from a perspective different from Lewis's. The documents, which range from correspondence between FDR and the Saudi king in 1945 to George W. Bush's war message in March 2003, are appropriate, although Jimmy Carter's 1977 paean to the Shah of Iran and material on Reagan's behind-the-scenes role in the Iran-Iraq war might also be included.

The latest essay or document included in this chapter is from September 2003, even though the

copyright date for the edition is 2005. It was abundantly clear by the beginning of 2004 that the crux of Bush's argument for the invasion of Iraq—that there was "no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised" (vol. 2, 555)—was incorrect. Surely a newspaper report or statement from a United Nations inspector would have provided balance to Bush's assertions. Moreover, it was clear by mid-2003 that Bush not only led the United States into a war with Iraq and the radical Islamist world, but that his doctrine of preemptive war put the country at odds with many of its traditional allies and with global public opinion. The push for early publication of the new edition, which appeared in time for use in the fall 2004 semester, resulted in a collection that misses a major aspect of what diplomatic historians and their students will be discussing for years about Bush's war in Iraq. At the very least, the edition should have included a diplomatic historian's preliminary evaluation of preemptive war or of the intelligence problems in Bush's decision-making process.

Textbook publishers seem to be encouraging frequent updating of editions not simply to take account of the latest scholarship or events, but to combat the increasingly sophisticated used-book marketplace. They have an interest in issuing versions that are different enough so that previous editions are difficult to use in class, but not so different that they would take too much time and effort by the editors to produce.²⁹ Given the rapidly rising cost of textbooks, professional organizations such as SHAFR should address this issue with publishers.

There have been improvements, to be sure, in the format as well as the content of recent editions of *Major Problems*. The numbering of documents in each chapter makes the book easier to use in class and homework assignments. The more consistent inclusion of bibliographic information for primary source documents has been helpful, and chapter introductions are more comprehensive. *Major Problems* has come a long way from its earliest

incarnations, when there were often only two or three primary sources per chapter, far fewer foreign documentary sources, and almost no attention to the cultural aspects of foreign relations. Merrill and Paterson continue to improve the collection so that it is more representative of a range of viewpoints, addresses more of the issues considered by historians, and is better adapted for classroom use as an accompaniment to lectures, as the basis for discussions, and as the source material for writing assignments. I hope that the editors, as well as other professors who assign this collection, will consider this critique to be a contribution toward more reflective classroom use of these volumes and toward further improvements in the future.

Robert Shaffer is Associate Professor of History at Shippensburg University.

Notes

1. See, among others: Thomas Paterson et al., *American Foreign Relations: A History*, 2 volumes (Boston, 2005), sixth edition; Mary Beth Norton et al., *A People and a Nation: A History of the United States*, 7th edition (Boston, 2005); Thomas Paterson, ed., *Kennedy's Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 1961-1963* (New York, 1989).
2. Dennis Merrill, *Bread and the Ballot: The United States and India's Economic Development, 1947-1963* (Chapel Hill, 1990); Dennis Merrill, ed., *A Documentary History of the Truman Presidency*, 35 volumes (Bethesda, MD, 1995-2002).
3. William Appleman Williams, ed., *The Shaping of American Diplomacy*, 2 volumes (Chicago, 1956 [1st edition] and 1970 [2d edition]).
4. References to specific pages of the current edition of *Major Problems* will be in the text, as here; other references will be in endnotes.
5. For a recent AP dispatch that exemplifies such challenges, see: "Below That in China," *Harrisburg Patriot-News*, 24 June 2005, A5.
6. Harper's argument is much more sophisticated than George W. Bush's recent comments on Yalta. For representative coverage in my local newspapers of Bush's attacks on FDR's actions at Yalta see "President Critical of FDR's WWII Decision," *Carlisle (PA) Sentinel*, 8 May 2005, A1, and "That Was Then: Second-Guessing Yalta Belittles Sacrifices of Earlier Generations," *Harrisburg Patriot-News*, 8 May 2005, A6.
7. For Heiss, "culture" refers to the coded

language that U.S. diplomats, acting from arrogance and ignorance, used to characterize Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq, whom they called unmanly and mentally unstable. One might point out to students that such characterizations of foreign leaders continue: in the 1990s the CIA referred to Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide as a "psychopath." See Steven Holmes, "Administration is Fighting Itself on Haiti Policy," *New York Times*, 23 October 1993, A1.

8. Nick Cullather, *Secret History: The CIA's Classified Account of its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954* (Stanford, 1999).

9. Thomas Borstelmann, "'Hedging Our Bets and Buying Time': John Kennedy and Racial Revolutions in the American South and Southern Africa," *Diplomatic History* 24 (Summer 2000): 435-63.

10. Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines* (New York, 1989), chap. 6, "Dependent Independence." If I were redesigning this chapter, I would include material on the impact of U.S. military bases abroad and the non-military interactions between U.S. soldiers and sailors and their hosts as further examples of ways that non-diplomats engage in "foreign relations." See Katharine H.S. Moon, *Sex Among Allies: Military Prostitution in U.S.-Korea Relations* (New York, 1997); Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley, 1990).

11. Among the minor details here is the continued characterization of the Louisiana Purchase as comprising 828,000 acres rather than square miles (vol. 1, 80).

12. Samuel Flagg Bemis, "American Foreign Policy and the Blessings of Liberty," *American Historical Review* 67 (January 1962): 291-305.

13. When teaching the war in the Philippines I also use the brilliant comparison of U.S. policy toward the Philippines with earlier policy toward American Indians in Walter Williams, "United States Indian Policy and the Debate Over Philippine Annexation," *Journal of American History* 66 (March 1980): 810-31.

14. Thomas Bender, "Founding Fathers Dreamed of Uprisings, Except in Haiti," *New York Times*, 1 July 2001, IV-6; David Brion Davis, *Revolutions: Reflections on American Equality and Foreign Liberations* (Cambridge, MA, 1990), esp. chap. 2; Winthrop Jordan, *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812* (Chapel Hill, 1968), esp. 375-99; Tim Matthewson, "George Washington's Policy Toward the Haitian Revolution," *Diplomatic History* 3 (Summer 1979): 321-36; Donald Hickey, "America's Response to the Slave Revolt in Haiti, 1791-1806," *Journal of the Early Republic* 2 (Winter 1982):

361-79.

15. For primary sources by Bishop, see Matthewson, "Abraham Bishop, 'The Rights of Black Men,' and the American Reaction to the Haitian Revolution," *Journal of Negro History* 67 (Summer 1982): 148-53; for Dwight, see Davis, *Revolutions*, 51-52 and 111, n.52; on Jefferson, see especially Matthewson, "Jefferson and Haiti," *Journal of Southern History* 61 (May 1995): 209-48; on Pinckney, see Sylvia Frey, *Water from the Rock: Black Resistance in a Revolutionary Age* (Princeton, 1991), 232-33.

16. W.E.B. DuBois, *The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade to the United States of America, 1638-1870* (Boston, 1896. Reprint. Mineola, NY, 1970), 70, and see 70-93 more generally.

17. Edward Crapol, "The Foreign Policy of Antislavery, 1833-1846," in *Redefining the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of William Appleman Williams, Lloyd Gardner*, ed. (Corvallis, OR, 1986), 85-103.

18. Williams, *The Shaping of American Diplomacy*, 2nd ed., 1:427-28 (on the 1905 Chinese boycott of U.S. goods) and 432-34 (on the "Gentleman's Agreement" of 1907).

19. Luis Martinez Fernandez, "The Birth of the American Empire as Seen Through Political Cartoons (1896-1905)," *OAH Magazine of History* 12 (Spring 1998): 48-54; Kristin Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven, 1998); Abe Ignacio et al., *The Forbidden Book: The Philippine-American War in Political Cartoons* (San Francisco, 2004).

20. James Weldon Johnson, "Self-Determining Haiti," *The Nation* 111 (28 August 1920 and 4 September 1920): 236-37, 266-67, excerpts reprinted in *Eyewitness: The Negro in American History*, William L. Katz, ed. (New York, 1967), 391-92. A current essay by Haitian-American author Edwidge Danticat, written for a popular audience, appeared in the *Miami Herald* on 25 July 2005, and is at <<http://www.commondreams.org/views05/0725-20.htm>> (accessed 29 July 2005).

21. Paul Gordon Lauren, *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination* (Boulder, CO, 1988), 76-101.

22. Elizabeth McKillen, *Chicago Labor and the Quest for a Democratic Diplomacy, 1914-1924* (Ithaca, NY, 1995), especially chap. 5.

23. Williams, *The Shaping of American Diplomacy*, 2d ed., vol. 2, chap. 2.

24. Martin Luther King, Jr., "Declaration of Independence from the War in Vietnam," *Ramparts* (May 1967): 33-37, reprinted in *Vietnam and America: A Documented History*, Marvin Gettleman et al., eds. (New York, 1985), 306-14; on the web at <<http://www.commondreams.org/views04/0115-13.htm>> (accessed 30 July 2005).

25. "The Brave New World Reaches

Java" (editorial), *Christian Century* 62 (21 November 1945): 1276.

26. Raymond Kennedy, "The Test in Indonesia," *Asia and the Americas* 46 (August 1946): 341-45.

27. Henry Luce, "The American Century," *Life* (17 Feb. 1941), reprinted in *Diplomatic History* 23 (Spring 1999): 159-71, followed by essays by prominent diplomatic historians addressing its themes.

28. See, e.g., John Tirman, "How We Ended the Cold War," *The Nation* (1 November 1999), already the right length for an anthology, and David Cortright, *Peace Works: The Citizen's Role in Ending the Cold War* (Boulder, CO, 1993).

29. The inclusion of new materials in the suggested readings of each chapter could be more systematic. Among important recent books on the Nixon/Kissinger years not noted in the relevant chapter are Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976* (Chapel Hill, 2002), and Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability* (New York, 2003). The chapter on Wilson has no references to studies by Lauren and McKillen, cited above.

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SHAFR Council Meeting



Friday, June 23, 2006

8:30 am

Paul Adams Lounge, Adams Alumni Center
University of Kansas

Present: David Anderson, Frank Costigliola, Craig Daigle, Brian Etheridge, Peter Hahn, Mary Ann Heiss, Mark Lawrence, Fred Logevall, Jim Matray, Joe Mocnik, Anna Nelson, Brenda Gayle Plummer, Stephen Rabe, Robert Schulzinger, Katherine Sibley, Mark Stoler, Sara Wilson, Ted Wilson, Randall Woods (presiding), Tom Zeiler

Business Items

1. Diplomatic History Contract

Woods reported on the deliberations of the *Diplomatic History* Contract Committee (Mary Ann Heiss, Robert Schulzinger, Tom Zeiler, David Anderson, Mark Stoler, Randall Woods, and Peter Hahn). The committee met with multiple publishers and visited their facilities to meet staff and gather information. Blackwell, Oxford, Cambridge, and Routledge (Taylor and Francis) made serious offers.

Woods reported that the committee unanimously recommended signing a contract with Blackwell to publish *Diplomatic History* for five years (2008-2012). The committee noted that Blackwell staff members have worked hard to improve their services to SHAFR, in terms of both publishing the journal and providing member services. Blackwell also offered lucrative financial incentives. Committee members also stressed the value of continuity between the current contract with Blackwell and the one to follow.

In discussion, Schulzinger said the membership of SHAFR is about 1500 and that *Diplomatic History* has been increasing its institutional subscriptions even as many libraries cut back in general. Blackwell has thought seriously into the future, in terms of electronic content and other issues. When members of the committee visited Blackwell offices in Boston in September 2005, Blackwell staff shared many ideas for advancing the journal. Woods said that Blackwell seriously contemplated our goal of expanding the profile of the journal, discussing how to get *Diplomatic History* into bookstores and market it to an informed lay-audience, much like *Foreign Affairs*. In response to a question about prospects for redesigning the journal, Schulzinger said that Blackwell is very willing to look into such changes if they are found to be desirable and that the press had already begun to implement reforms.

Woods pointed out that the shorter time frame of the new contract (five rather than the current eight years) should help maintain quality of services delivered. Stoler added that it was not initially a foregone conclusion that the committee would recommend staying with Blackwell, but that through negotiations presided over by Woods, Blackwell produced a first-rate offer.

In response to questions, committee members discussed the strengths and weaknesses of the bids by other presses.

Costigliola commented that he would not want to see the rigor or critical tone of the articles sacrificed in an effort to reach a lay audience. Woods gave proper assurances, indicating that articles are presently accessible to educated general readers.

Hahn provided a general summary of past and anticipated future royalties from Blackwell. He also noted that Blackwell will digitize all past issues of the journal and publish and distribute *Passport* at no cost to SHAFR. He also noted that Blackwell has already built the new member services web-site.

Council unanimously approved a new five-year contract with Blackwell and instructed the committee to execute an agreement.

2. Steering committee to envision major initiatives

Woods explained that SHAFR continues to search for ways to use its revenue to support its mission and indicated that he planned to appoint a new committee to think strategically about such matters and report to Council at a later date. Discussion ensued on the ongoing need to protect SHAFR's tax-exempt status by increasing its spending on worthy causes and by engaging in other relevant activities including fund-raising. Council indicated its approval of Woods's proposed action.

3. Graduate Student Travel Grant program

Woods and Hahn reported that Robert Divine offered to make a substantial gift to SHAFR to fund the Graduate Student Travel Fund permanently. They moved that Council approve formally the establishment of the Robert A. and Barbara Divine Graduate Student Travel Fund upon receipt of the Divine gift, and authorize expenditures of \$1,500 per year under the program. Hahn provided a synopsis of funds raised and expended under the current program during its first two years. It was clarified that the Divine Fund would pay the costs of travel to SHAFR conferences by graduate students delivering papers.

The motion passed unanimously.

4. Electronic ballots in SHAFR elections

Hahn asked Council for guidance on conducting SHAFR's annual elections. He explained that in most years members return only 200-300 ballots (of some 1,500 distributed) and described how elections might be conducted by e-mail or some web-based means in an effort to increase voter turn-out. He also explained security concerns with all these methods of voting. After discussion, Costigliola moved (Lawrence seconded) that annual elections continue to rely on paper ballots sent both ways through postal mail and that ballots should be mailed first-class rather than bulk rate to speed their distribution worldwide. The motion passed unanimously.

5. Reforms of fellowships for graduate students

Hahn moved that Council authorize the Executive Director, in conjunction with chairs of relevant grant and fellowship committees, to streamline application procedures for graduate students and recent Ph.D.s seeking SHAFR funding according to the following principles: (a) all competitions will be open to all qualified applicants, regardless of membership in SHAFR; (b) applicants will be encouraged to submit their applications (and referees, their letters) by e-mail; (c) required application materials will be streamlined; (d) all programs should be defined as assisting persons conducting research in "some aspect of the history of U.S. foreign relations;" (e) graduate students will be permitted to apply for the Bernath Dissertation Grant and the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship with a single application; (f) the Holt, Hogan, and Bemis Fellowships should be issued at the OAH meeting rather than the SHAFR conference, so that recipients can more effectively plan to use the funds over summer months; (g) those working as professional historians and within six years of receiving their Ph.D.s should be eligible for Bemis grants on the same terms as untenured faculty members.

Hahn explained that these reforms would greatly ease the burden on students (and their advisers) applying for fellowships and grants and on committees that evaluated the applications. Several of the reforms were tried experimentally in the last cycle and worked extremely well. E-mail submissions in particular seemed highly desirable as SHAFR becomes more international in membership and reach.

Council directed the Executive Director to reform the programs as suggested.

Lawrence moved (Costigliola seconded) that the Gelfand-Rappaport fellowship should be increased to \$2,000. The motion was unanimously approved.

6. 2007 annual meeting

Anderson reported that SHAFR had an option to hold its 2007 annual meeting at the Marriott Westfields hotel near Washington, D.C. Anderson, Woods, and Hahn (with S. Wilson's help) had negotiated a contract with the Westfields after Anderson proved unable to confirm conference arrangements at any Washington-area university. Because holding a conference at a hotel would be unprecedented for SHAFR and would carry certain financial risks, Woods had refrained from signing the contract with the Westfields until and unless Council thoroughly considered the matter and indicated its approval.

Hahn, Woods, and Anderson clarified that adopting what they called the "mini-OAH" model at a hotel conference center has certain advantages, such as eliminating the need to deal with a university bureaucracy. Yet the new model also has drawbacks, including financial risks to SHAFR inherent in room commitments, catering minimums, and cancellation fees; and high room costs for members. The Westfields in particular has certain disadvantages, including its isolated setting in suburban Washington and its high room costs. But the hotel also offered to share shuttle fees and waived room fees for conference sessions; double, triple, and quad rates would mitigate the high room costs for individuals.

In discussion, various members questioned whether a hotel on a Metro line might prove a better option. Anderson explained that such sites prove markedly more expensive and that virtually none was available when he began searching for alternatives as the university locales failed to work out. If the mini-OAH model were followed in future years, an earlier start in finding a site would be advisable.

Anderson moved (Rabe seconded) that Council approve the draft contract with the Westfields for the 2007 meeting and authorize Woods to sign it. The motion passed unanimously.

In further discussion, it was stressed that SHAFR should find some way to subsidize individual expenses of graduate students to ensure that the conference remained affordable.

S. Wilson suggested that a local arrangements committee of Washington-area faculty might still prove useful in planning for and hosting the conference.

It was suggested that the decision be explained in *Passport*.

It was suggested that Council carefully evaluate the 2007 experience at the Westfields before accepting or rejecting the mini-OAH model in principle for future conferences.

Hahn announced that Richard Immerman had appointed Stephen Rabe and Doug Little as co-chairs of the 2007 program committee.

7. Honoraria for chapter editors of the *Guide*

Zeiler reported that the position of chapter editor is a challenging position that requires significant effort. He proposed offering a \$250 honorarium to editors for their work on the five-year update, and then \$100 each year thereafter. After vigorous discussion on the modest amount of the compensation and the difficulty of cashing checks in Europe, Rabe moved (Stoler seconded) that editors would be compensated with their choice of a check or a gift certificate to a book store. The proposal was unanimously approved.

8. American Association of University Professors Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure

Woods explained that the American Association of University Professors asked SHAFR to indicate its approval of the "1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure with 1970 Interpretive Comments." After a brief discussion on the value of tenure, Council approved the proposal by acclamation.

9. Discounted membership fees

Hahn explained that for reasons he cannot determine, membership discounts are officially available through Blackwell for members of the AHA or the Marshall Foundation. He proposed that Council eliminate these discounts. This proposal was unanimously approved.

Reports

10. Membership Services

Etheridge reported that only 18 percent of members have registered on the Member Services web-site and only five percent have entered their information on the roster. He distributed registration forms at the conference and will continue to advertise the importance of members signing up for this vital program. Etheridge further discussed a long-term plan for building the SHAFR web-site into a resource more valuable to the general public.

11. Guide

Zeiler reported that he was waiting for five editors to submit their chapters, but that overall progress has been made toward an updated version.

12. 2006 annual meeting

Costigliola reported that the program committee successfully enlisted senior members to participate more fully as presenters rather than only as commentators and chairs. Efforts to recruit historians with a non-U.S. focus were less successful because many such scholars spend summer months outside the United States. S. Wilson said that 269 people pre-registered for the conference, exactly the same number as at the 2004 meeting in Austin. T. Wilson said there was some overlap this year with freshmen orientation at KU, which caused us to move the beginning date to Friday. He also pointed out that the Continuing Education office at KU had a lot to do with local arrangements.

A brief discussion ensued on the possibility of scheduling the annual meeting in a month other than June.

13. 2008 annual meeting

Woods moved (Stoler seconded) that the 2008 annual meeting should be scheduled at The Ohio State University, subject to confirmation of availability and fees. Stoler mentioned for the record that the University of Wisconsin, the University of Tennessee, and the University of San Diego have all expressed interest for 2010. The motion was unanimously approved.

14. Endowment

Matray reported that the two endowment accounts have grown nearly six percent since December (that is, a 12 percent annual rate). He reminded Council that in January 2007 he will recommend the number of Bemis grants to award in 2007. It was originally planned to use about 20 percent of the annual growth for Bemis grants. In 2006, 10 awards of \$1,000 were granted.

Hahn suggested that Council, after setting a pool of funds to be distributed, authorize the Bemis committee to use discretion and award different amounts to different applicants based on merit and need. Support was indicated for that idea.

In response to a question, Hahn indicated that of the 10 Bemis winners, three were women and three were beyond the Ph.D.

15. Prizes and Fellowships

Plummer reported that Graebner Prize would be awarded to Gary Hess of Bowling Green State University.

On behalf of Carol Chin, Hahn reported that the Holt Fellowship would be awarded to Kate Burlingham of Rutgers University with honorable mention to John Gronbeck-Tedesco of the University of Texas; and that the Hogan Fellowship would be awarded to Ryan Irwin of Ohio State University.

Hahn reported that the first ten winners of Bemis grants would be announced at the Sunday luncheon.

Other Business

16. Resolutions

Woods moved that Council acknowledge and thank the local arrangements and program committees of the 2006 meeting, and that Council acknowledge and thank Prof. Edward A. Goedecken of Iowa State University for his tireless service composing the annual dissertations list.

All three resolutions were approved unanimously.

17. Other business

It was agreed that the longer time frame of this current Council meeting was necessary. Council members should probably plan on another session of this length on the morning just before the start of the next annual meeting in June 2007.

Respectfully submitted,

Peter L. Hahn
Executive Director

PLH/rr

Mason Chair in Military History at The Ohio State University


The Department of History and the Mershon Center for International Security Studies of The Ohio State University jointly invite nominations and applications for the Raymond Mason Chair in American Military History. Senior scholars who approach the field broadly, including examining military policy and institutions, wartime operations, and relationships between the military, society, and culture, are encouraged to apply. A research specialization in Modern American History is preferred. Candidates should have a distinguished record of publication and demonstrated excellence in teaching. Responsibilities include graduate and undergraduate teaching and participating actively in the programs and activities of the Mershon Center. The Committee will begin reviewing applications on December 1, 2006, and continue until the position is filled. Please send a letter of application, a C.V., and three letters of reference to Professor Robert McMahon, Mason Search Committee Chair, Department of History, The Ohio State University, 230 West 17th Ave., Columbus, Ohio 43210-1367. The Ohio State University is an AA/EOE. Qualified women, minorities, veterans, and persons with disabilities are invited to apply.

In Memoriam: Richard P. Dauer (1941-2006)

A longtime history teacher and assistant headmaster at Williams School in Connecticut and at the time of his death an adjunct professor of history at Springfield College in Massachusetts, Rick Dauer received his B.A. from Middlebury College, M.A. from the College of William & Mary (after a tour of military duty in Germany), and Ph.D. from the University of Connecticut. A dedicated, excellent teacher, coach, sports fan in the land of the Red Sox and Huskies, and public servant, Rick was active in the New England History Teachers Association, Clinton (CT) Historical Society, and University of Connecticut Foreign Policy Seminar. An avid athlete, Rick played organized amateur baseball until a heart condition forced him to slow down in his fifties. While carrying a heavy teaching and administrative load, he nonetheless traveled regularly to the extensive Chester Bowles Papers at Yale University to complete his dissertation, which we had the reward of directing. Using Bowles's diary, books, memoranda, and correspondence, Rick expertly and respectfully explored Bowles's Wilsonian world view, devotion to economic development in and food aid to the Third World as an antidote to communism, bureaucratic tussles in Washington (as Kennedy's undersecretary of state in opposition to the Bay of Pigs venture and deepening intervention in Vietnam), and love for India, where Bowles served as ambassador, 1951-1953 and 1963-1969. Bowles argued persistently against the militarization of the Cold War. Dauer also captured Bowles's personal shortcomings—his self-promotion, penchant for long-windedness, "localitis" in making India's case—which helped marginalize him as a policymaker. The dissertation ultimately became Dauer's book, *A North-South Mind in an East-West World: Chester Bowles and the Making of United States Cold War Foreign Policy, 1951-1969*, published by Praeger in 2005. Rick Dauer's many friends remember his good humor and warm smile, his careful reading (with a comparative bent), and the obvious enjoyment he derived from being part of a community of teacher-scholars. He was "a real gem," recalled a colleague. Memorial contributions may be made to the Richard P. Dauer Scholarship Foundation, c/o Keith Dauer, 19 Bates Rd., Chester, CT 06412.

--Thomas G. Paterson and J. Garry Clifford, University of Connecticut

The Diplomatic Pouch



1. Personal and Professional Notes

Clea Bunch has become Assistant Professor of History at the University of Arkansas-Little Rock.

Peter Hahn has been named Chair of the Department of History at the Ohio State University.

Mark Lawrence (Texas) has accepted the Cassius Marcellus Clay Fellowship at Yale University.

Timothy Naftali has become the Director of the Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum.

Sutayut Osornprasop (Corpus Christi College, Cambridge) won the prize for the best paper presented at the fourth annual LSE-GWU-UCSB International Graduate Student Conference on the Cold War, for "Amidst the Heat of the Cold War in Asia: Thailand and the American Secret War in Indochina."

Jason Parker has accepted a tenure track position at Texas A&M University starting in 2007-08, and will be a visiting scholar at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at The Ohio State University in 2006-07.

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes accepted a position as associate professor of joint and international operations with the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in Augusta, GA.

Robert Schulzinger (Colorado) has been named a College Professor of Distinction by the University of Colorado College of Arts and Sciences.



2. Research Notes

New FRUS Volume

The Department of State has released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, volume VI, *Vietnam, January 1969-July 1970*, the first of five volumes to cover the end of the Vietnam War. This volume demonstrates that Vietnam was the new President's first priority, although it also shows that in the early months of 1969 there was no specific plan to end the war. Rather, the Nixon administration searched for ways to demonstrate to the leaders in Hanoi that there was a new "firm hand at the helm" prepared to both talk and fight. Nixon and his advisers hoped to convince Hanoi that it was dealing with an adversary that would negotiate only from a position of strength. This volume documents the search for the formula to convince Hanoi: the secret bombing of Cambodia, Vietnamization and U.S. troops withdrawals, integration of the secret war in Laos with the conflict in Vietnam, covert operations against North Vietnam, and most importantly the U.S. and South Vietnamese attack on the enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia.

The volume also covers the efforts to end the war, with the initial negotiations focusing on the private talks in Paris between the heads of the delegations at formal, but sterile, peace talks. The Nixon administration also sought to engage the Soviet Union to moderate North Vietnamese behavior, but without much success. The secret negotiations between Henry Kissinger; Xuan Thuy, the head of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's delegation in Paris; and Politburo member Le Duc Tho are all covered in detail.

The last part of the volume focuses on Cambodia, where in March 1970 General Lon Nol overthrew Norodom Sihanouk. The documentation suggests that U.S. officials did not have much foreknowledge of the coup, but nevertheless the Nixon administration was quick to support the new regime. The volume ends in July 1970, with the President and his advisers reviewing the situation after U.S. troops left Cambodia. While this material does not have any Nixon presidential tape recordings--they did not begin until February 1971--it does rely on transcripts of Kissinger telephone conversations and a broad range of documents from the Nixon Presidential Materials, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, the Haldeman Diaries, and the Kissinger and Lodge papers.

The volume, the summary, and this press release are available at the Office of the Historian website at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/vi>. Copies can also be purchased from the U.S. Government Printing Office at

<http://bookstore.gpo.gov> (GPO stock number 044-000-02602-3; ISBN 0-16-075260-4).

For further information contact:

Edward Keefer
General Editor of the Foreign Relations series
Phone (202) 663-1131
Fax (202) 663-1289
history@state.gov



U.S. Intelligence and the Indian Bomb

Long before India detonated a nuclear device in May 1974, the U.S. Intelligence community was monitoring and analyzing Indian civilian and military nuclear energy activities, according to documents released by the National Security Archive at George Washington University. This posting consists of forty documents - whose original classifications range from unclassified to Top Secret Codeword - produced by interagency groups, the CIA, the State and Defense Departments, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and the Defense Intelligence Agency. The documents cover a forty-year time span, from 1958 to 1998, and show that as early as 1958 the CIA was exploring the possibility that India might choose to develop nuclear weapons. The reports focus on a wide range of nuclear related matters such as nuclear policy (including policy concerning weapons development), reactor construction and operations, foreign assistance, the tests themselves, and the domestic and international impact of the tests.

Documents from 1974-1975 and 1998 provide assessments of the reason why U.S. Intelligence failed to provide warning of the 1974 and 1998 tests, assessments that are strikingly similar. They also include recommendations to address the deficiencies in performance that the assessments identified.

For more information contact:

Jeffrey Richelson
(202) 994-7000
<http://www.nsarchive.org>



The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev

The National Security Archive has published the first installment of the personal diary of Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev, a senior policy adviser during the final years of the Soviet Union. Published in English for the first time, the diary is a unique and important resource for understanding the end of the Cold War, the peaceful withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and Eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The diary gives the reader a rare opportunity to become a fly on the wall during the heady discussions during the early days of perestroika and witness how the dying ideology held the reins on the hearts and minds of Soviet society.

In 2004, Anatoly Chernyaev donated the originals of his diaries covering the years 1972-1991 to the National Security Archive to provide full public access to his private notes. The Archive is planning to publish full English translations of the diaries in regular installments.

This first installment of Chernyaev's diary covers the year 1985, which saw the election of Mikhail Gorbachev to the post of General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the changes that were evident first in the "style," and then in the practice of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. The author observed these changes from his position as a senior analyst in the International Department of the Central Committee, where he was in charge of relations with West European Communist parties.

For more information contact:

Svetlana Savranskaya
(202) 994-7000
<http://www.nsarchive.org>



Massive Collection of Formerly Secret and Top Secret Transcripts of Henry Kissinger's Meetings with World Leaders Published On-Line

The National Security Archive has announced the publication of the most comprehensive collection ever assembled of the memoranda of conversations (memcons) involving Henry Kissinger, one of the most acclaimed and controversial U.S. diplomats of the second half of the 20th century. Published on-line in the Digital National Security Archive (ProQuest) as well in print-microfiche form, the 28,000-page collection is the result of a seven-year effort by the National Security Archive to collect every memcon that could be found through archival research and declassification requests. Nearly word-for-word records of the meetings, the memcons place the reader in the room with Kissinger and world leaders, and future leaders, including Mao Zedong, Anwar Sadat, Leonid Brezhnev, Georges Pompidou, Richard Nixon, Gerald R. Ford, Donald Rumsfeld, and George H.W. Bush.

The memcons show Kissinger at work from 1969 to early 1977 as policymaker, negotiator, and presidential adviser.

They show him pursuing détente with the Soviet Union, rapprochement with China, strong ties with Europe and Japan, stability in the Middle East, and, most important, a diplomatic resolution to the Vietnam War. The near-verbatim transcripts vividly show Kissinger's style as negotiator, his use of flattery and humor, his outbursts, and his musings on U.S. interests and the use of power. They show Kissinger in the early days of the Nixon administration as his influence was growing as presidential adviser, at the height of power when he served simultaneously as Secretary of State and national security adviser, and later after President Ford fired him from his White House post. The documents are equally revealing of Kissinger's numerous interlocutors.

A sampling of twenty of the newly-published memcons have been posted on www.nsarchive.org, and document a variety of episodes in Kissinger's career in statecraft.

The complete collection of memcons is available through the Digital National Security Archive (ProQuest): http://www.proquest.com/products_pq/descriptions/dnsa.shtml.

For more information, contact:

William Burr
(202) 994-7000
<http://www.nsarchive.org>




Eyes on the Bomb: U-2, CORONA, and KH-7 Imagery of Foreign Nuclear Installations

The Central Intelligence Agency and National Reconnaissance Office used the nation's spy satellites and spy planes to obtain high-resolution images of the nuclear facilities of allies, adversaries and neutral nations alike, as illustrated in a collection of overhead reconnaissance images posted on the Web by the National Security Archive. The posting includes 15 photographs and five photographic interpretation reports from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. The images were obtained by U-2 spy planes and CORONA and KH-7 reconnaissance satellites. The interpretation reports were produced by the CIA's Photographic Intelligence Center as well as its Imagery Analysis Division and the National Photographic Interpretation Center.

The images and photographic interpretation reports illustrate the variety of nuclear installations targeted by these programs, ranging from uranium mining facilities to nuclear tests sites and the installations used to convert the mined material into testable weapons, as well as the growing capabilities of U.S. overhead reconnaissance systems.

For more information contact:

Jeffrey Richelson
(202) 994-7000
<http://www.nsarchive.org>



U.S. Intelligence and the South African Bomb

The U.S. Intelligence Community failed to penetrate the veil of secrecy surrounding the nuclear activities of South Africa's apartheid regime, particularly its nuclear weapons program, according to documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and archival research and posted on the Web by the National Security Archive. Included in the Archive posting are over thirty documents--many originally classified Top Secret/Codeword--produced by interagency groups, the CIA, and the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).

The documents show that years after South Africa claimed that it had developed a new technique for uranium enrichment the U.S. was uncertain as to what it entailed. In addition, the documents show that in the 1980s the U.S. did not know the status of South African bomb development. They also reveal a dispute between the Director of Central Intelligence's Nonproliferation Center and State's INR over the likelihood that South Africa's declaration to the International Atomic Energy Agency constituted an honest declaration or an act of deception.

For more information contact:

Jeffrey Richelson
(202) 994-7000
<http://www.nsarchive.org>



Declassified Materials on Repression and U.S. Support for Military Dictatorship in Argentina

The National Security Archive has posted a series of declassified U.S. documents and, for the first time, secret documents from Southern Cone intelligence agencies, recording detailed evidence of atrocities committed by the military regime in Argentina. The documents include a formerly secret transcript of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's first staff meeting after the coup during which he ordered the immediate support of the U.S. government for the new military regime. The Archive also posted actual internal records from the infamous Argentina intelligence unit, Battalion 601, as well as a document from the Chilean secret police agency, known as DINA, which was secretly collaborating with the military in Buenos Aires and which provided an internal military account of the number of dead and disappeared at the hands of the

Argentine security forces.

For more information contact:

Carlos Osorio
(202) 994-7000
<http://www.nsarchive.org>



U.S. Intelligence and the French Nuclear Weapons Program

The U.S. Intelligence Community devoted significant effort to the collection and analysis of intelligence concerning the French nuclear weapons program beginning in the early days of the Cold War through the mid-1970s, according to documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act and archival research and posted on the Web by the National Security Archive at George Washington University. The posting includes more than 30 documents -- many originally classified Top Secret -- produced by interagency groups, the Manhattan Engineer District's Foreign Intelligence Section, the CIA, the State Department, the U.S. Pacific Command, and the Strategic Air Command. The documents show that French nuclear activities were of sufficient concern to prompt the Manhattan Engineer District's intelligence section to produce a series of reports in 1946--based on a variety of sources on French nuclear research and development activities -- on the possibility that French scientists were willing to sell nuclear know-how to the right bidder, and described the French search for uranium deposits. Documents from the early 1950s show U.S. intelligence interest in personnel changes in the French atomic energy organization. The documents also indicate that new technological improvements in U.S. nuclear intelligence gathering were used to monitor the French program closely.

For more information contact:

Jeffrey Richelson
(202) 994-7000
<http://www.nsarchive.org>



Israel Crosses the Nuclear Threshold

The National Security Archive has published for the first time 30 recently declassified U.S. government documents disclosing the existence of a highly secret policy debate during the first year of the Nixon administration about the Israeli nuclear weapons program. Broadly speaking, the debate was over whether it was feasible--either politically or technically--for the Nixon administration to try to prevent Israel from crossing the nuclear threshold, or whether the U.S. should find some "ground rules" that would allow it to live with a nuclear Israel.

For more information contact:

Avner Cohen
(202) 489-6282 or (202) 994-7000
<http://www.nsarchive.org>



National Archives makes State Department Records Available Online

For the first time, the National Archives and Records Administration has made available online more than 400,000 State Department telegrams and other records for 1973 and 1974. These digital records from the Department of State's Central Foreign Policy Files are publicly accessible at the National Archives website at www.archives.gov/aad.

Files consist of telegrams determined to have permanent historical value, index references to paper documents created in 1974, and withdrawal notices for permanently valuable telegrams and index references that could not be released for national security or other reasons. Items include a report of a TV interview with former Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan concerning the West Bank, a report of an interview with the Syrian Defense Minister discussing Israeli nuclear weapons, and a summary of possible French reactions to Indian nuclear testing. Beginning in mid-1973, the State Department replaced its paper-based Central Foreign Policy Files, begun in 1906, with digitally based files. The State Department began with recorded telegram traffic from the various Foreign Service Posts. In 1974, the State Department added to the telegram database indexing information on paper documents that were then microfilmed. Although these microfilmed documents are not now available online, paper copies can be obtained from the National Archives (for documents filmed in 1974 and 1975). Access to these newly released electronic records is enhanced by the recent redesign of the National Archives Access to Archival Databases (AAD) system, a research tool that makes a selection of the Archives' most popular electronic records available to the public over the Internet. AAD currently includes over 86 million electronic records from 48 series in 29 Record Groups and three collections of donated historical materials. AAD highlights include records of passengers who arrived at the Port of New York during the Irish Famine, records of World War II Army enlistment and Prisoners of War, records of Japanese internment, and Awards and Decorations of Honor during the Vietnam Conflict.

For more information, contact:

National Archives, Public Affairs
(202) 357-5300



3. Announcements:

John Carter Brown Library Research Fellowships

The John Carter Brown Library will award approximately thirty short- and long-term research fellowships for the year June 1, 2007-July 31, 2008. Short-term fellowships are available for periods of two to four months and carry a stipend of \$1,800 per month. These fellowships are open to foreign nationals as well as to U.S. citizens who are engaged in pre- and post-doctoral, or independent, research. Graduate students must have passed their preliminary or general examinations at the time of application and be at the dissertation-writing stage. Long-term fellowships, partially funded by the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, are typically for five to nine months and carry a stipend of \$4,000 per month. Recipients of long-term fellowships may not be engaged in graduate work and in some cases must be U.S. citizens or have resided in the U.S. for the three years immediately preceding the application deadline.

The Library's holdings are concentrated on the history of the Western Hemisphere during the colonial period (ca. 1492 to ca. 1825), emphasizing the European discovery, exploration, settlement, and development of the Americas, the indigenous response to the European conquest, the African contribution to the development of the hemisphere, and all aspects of European relations with the New World, including the impact of the New World on the Old. Research proposed by fellowship applicants must be suited to the holdings of the Library. All fellows are expected to relocate to Providence and to be in continuous residence at the Library for the entire term of the fellowship.

The application deadline for fellowships for 2007-2008 is January 10, 2007. For application forms or more information, write to:

Director
John Carter Brown Library
Box 1894
Providence, RI 02912
Tel.: (401) 863-2725
Fax: (401) 863-3477
E-mail: JCBL_Fellowships@brown.edu
<http://www.JCBL.org>



Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Fellowships in the Social Sciences and Humanities, 2007-2008

The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars is announcing the opening of its 2007-2008 Fellowship competition. The Center awards approximately 20-25 academic year residential fellowships to individuals from any country with outstanding project proposals on national and/or international issues. Topics and scholarship should relate to key public policy challenges or provide the historical and/or cultural framework to illuminate policy issues of contemporary importance. Applicants must hold a doctorate or have equivalent professional experience. Fellows are provided stipends (which include round trip travel), private offices, access to the Library of Congress, Windows-based personal computers, and research assistants. The application can be downloaded from the Center's website at <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/fellowships>. Application deadline is October 2, 2006.

For more information and application guidelines please contact the Center at:

Tel.: (202) 691-4170
Fax: (202) 691-4001
E-mail: fellowships@wilsoncenter.org



The George Bush Presidential Library Foundation O'Donnell Grant Program

The Peter and Edith O'Donnell Endowment in the George Bush Presidential Library Foundation provides grants to aid scholars doing research at the George Bush Presidential Library. Research must include, but not be limited to, holdings of the George Bush Presidential Library.

The program awards grants ranging from \$500 to \$2,500 to proposals approved by a committee of scholars and administrators at the George Bush Presidential Library Center. Funding priority will be given to proposals that have the greatest likelihood of publication and subsequent usefulness to educators, scholars, students, and policymakers. Awards are announced in the spring and fall. The deadline for spring awards is March 15 and for fall awards is October 15.

Application information can be found at: <http://www.georgebushfoundation.org/bush/html/GrantPrograms/ODonnell.htm>.

For more information contact:

O'Donnell Grant Program
George Bush Presidential Library Foundation

Texas A&M University
1145 TAMU
College Station, Texas 77843-1145
bushfoundation@gbplc.tamu.edu
Phone: (979) 862-2251
Fax: (979) 862-2253



Gerald Ford Foundation Research Travel Grants Program

The Gerald R. Ford Foundation awards grants of up to \$2,000 each in support of research in the holdings of the Gerald R. Ford Library. A grant defrays travel, living, and photocopy expenses of a research trip to the Ford Library. Foreign applicants are responsible for the costs of travel between their home country and North America, since the grants only cover travel within North America.

Library collections focus on federal policies, institutions, and politics in the 1970s. Selected strengths of the holdings are domestic affairs and policies, economics, the 1976 presidential campaign, media relations, White House management and decisionmaking, congressional relations, and foreign policy.

Selection criteria are: pertinence of "open" Library holdings; project significance; appropriateness of project design; and applicant qualifications. The Gerald R. Ford Foundation typically authorizes \$20,000 for grants each year.

The Grants Screening Committee usually meets about a month after the application deadline, and the Grants Coordinator notifies grant recipients about six to eight weeks after the deadline. Grants must support research to be conducted after the awards are announced and will not be awarded retroactively for research already conducted. The Library staff presents the grant check when the recipient arrives to begin research.

Grant recipients must begin Ford Library research within one year of receiving an award notice, acknowledge Foundation support in the resulting publication(s), and donate to the Library a copy of the publication(s).

More information, and an application form, can be found at: <http://geraldrfordfoundation.org/>.

For more information, contact:

Grants Coordinator
Gerald R. Ford Library
1000 Beal Avenue
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
Phone: (734) 205-0555
Fax: (734) 205-0571



Visiting Scholars Program at the Carl Albert Center, University of Oklahoma

The Carl Albert Congressional Research and Studies Center at the University of Oklahoma seeks applicants for its Visiting Scholars Program, which provides financial assistance to researchers working at the Center's archives. Awards of \$500-\$1000 are normally granted as reimbursement for travel and lodging.

The archival holdings include the papers of many former members of Congress, such as Speaker of the House Carl Albert (D-OK); representatives Helen Gahagan Douglas (D-CA), Jeffery Cohelan (D-CA), Neil Gallagher (D-NJ), Andrew Biemiller (D-WI), and Sidney Clarke (R-KS); and senators Robert S. Kerr (D-OK) and Fred Harris (D-OK). Most materials date from the 1920s to the 1970s, although there is one nineteenth century collection. More information on the collections can be found at our Web site: <http://www.ou.edu/special/albertctr/archives>.

The Visiting Scholars Program is open to any applicant. Emphasis is given to those pursuing post-doctoral research in history, political science, and other fields. Graduate students involved in research for publication, thesis, or dissertation are encouraged to apply. Interested undergraduates and lay researchers are also invited to apply. The Center carefully evaluates each research proposal.

For more information, please contact Carolyn G. Hanneman at:

The Carl Albert Center
University of Oklahoma
630 Parrington Oval, Room 101
Norman, OK 73019-0375
Phone: (405) 325-5835
Fax: (405) 325-6419
Email: channeman@ou.edu
<http://www.ou.edu/special/albertctr/archives>




United States Institute of Peace, Senior Fellowships

The United States Institute of Peace invites applications for the 2007-2008 Senior Fellowship Competition in the Jennings Randolph Program for International Peace.

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan institution created by Congress to strengthen the nation's capacity to promote the peaceful resolution of international conflict. Twelve to fifteen fellowships are awarded annually to scholars and practitioners from a variety of professions, including college and university faculty, journalists, diplomats, writers, educators, military officers, international negotiators, NGO professionals and lawyers. The Institute funds projects related to preventive diplomacy, ethnic and regional conflicts, peacekeeping and peace operations, peace settlements, democratization and the rule of law, cross-cultural negotiations, nonviolent social movements, U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century, and related topics. This year the Institute is especially interested in topics addressing problems of the Muslim world, post-war reconstruction and reconciliation, and responses to terrorism and political violence. Projects which demonstrate relevance to current policy debates will be highly competitive. Fellows reside at the Institute in Washington, DC for a period of up to ten months to conduct research on their projects, consult with staff, and contribute to the ongoing work of the Institute. Books and reports resulting from fellowships may be published by the USIP Press. The fellowship award includes a stipend of up to \$80,000, travel to Washington for the fellow and dependents, health insurance, an office with computer and voicemail, and a half-time research assistant. The competition is open to citizens of all nations. Women and minorities are especially encouraged to apply.

All application materials must be received in our offices by September 15, 2006.

The Jennings Randolph Program
U.S. Institute of Peace
1200 17th St. NW
Suite 200
Washington DC, 20036
(202) 429-3853
jrprogram@usip.org
<http://www.usip.org>



Harry S. Truman Library Institute Research Grants

Research grants of up to \$2,500 are awarded biannually and are intended to enable graduate students, post-doctoral scholars and other researchers to come to the Harry S. Truman Library for one to three weeks to use its collections. Awards are to offset expenses incurred for this purpose only.

Graduate students and post-doctoral scholars are particularly encouraged to apply, but applications from others engaged in advanced research will also be considered. Preference will be given to projects that have application to enduring public policy and foreign policy issues and that have a high probability of being published or publicly disseminated in some other way. The potential contribution of a project to an applicant's development as a scholar will also be considered. An individual may receive no more than two research grants in a five-year period.

Deadlines: April 1 and October 1. The Committee will notify applicants in writing of its decision approximately six weeks after these dates.

Budgets: Budgets are calculated on the following basis; 1) \$75 per day for lodging and meals; 2) airfare based on the best advance coach fare available; 3) up to \$100 allowance for photocopying; 4) roundtrip mileage for grantees using personal vehicles to drive in is currently reimbursable at 48.5 cents per mile (subject to change). Area ground transportation (airport shuttles, cabs, local bus service, etc.) is the responsibility of the grantee.

For more information, see the Institute web page at: <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/grants/index.html>



Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey Memberships in the School of Historical Studies for the academic year 2007-2008

The School of Historical Studies supports scholarship in all fields of historical research, but is concerned principally with the history of Western, Near Eastern, and Far Eastern civilizations, with particular emphasis upon Greek and Roman civilization, the history of Europe (medieval, early modern, and modern), the Islamic world, East Asian studies, the history of art, and modern international relations. Residence in Princeton during term time is required. Members are provided with offices, access to libraries, subsidized restaurant and housing facilities, and some secretarial and word-processing services. The only other obligation of Members is to pursue their own research. If they wish, Members may participate in seminars and meetings within the Institute. There are also ample opportunities for contacts with scholars at nearby universities.

Approximately forty Members are appointed for either one or two terms each year. The Ph.D. (or equivalent) and substantial publications are required of all candidates at the time of application. Member awards are funded by the Institute for Advanced Study or by other sources, including the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Gerda Henkel Foundation, and the Thyssen Foundation.

Application may be made for one or two terms (September to December, January to April). Further information and application materials may be found on the School's web site, www.hs.ias.edu, or can be obtained by electronic mail from mzelazny@ias.edu. Inquiries may also be sent by post to: School of Historical Studies, Institute for Advanced Study, Einstein Drive, Princeton, New Jersey 08540. Completed applications must be returned by 15 November 2006.

Mellon Fellowships for assistant professors are also offered each year to two qualified Assistant Professors. These full-year memberships are designed specifically for assistant professors at universities and colleges in the United States and Canada to support promising young scholars who have embarked on professional careers. Applicants must have served at least two, and not more than four years as assistant professors in institutions of higher learning in the United States or Canada and must have approval to return to their institution following the period of membership. Stipends will match the combined salary and benefits at the Member's home institution at the time of application, and all the privileges of membership at the Institute for Advanced Study will apply. Application materials are the same as for membership, and can be obtained from the web at www.hs.ias.edu, or by contacting the address above.

In the academic year 2007-2008 the Institute for Advanced Study anticipates it will also take part in the Frederick Burkhardt Fellowship, which is sponsored by the American Council of Learned Societies. These fellowships support more adventurous, more wide-ranging, and longer-term patterns of research than are current in the humanities and related social sciences. Depending on the availability of funds, ACLS will provide fellowships for up to eleven recently tenured faculty, most of whom will spend a year at one of several residential research centers, including the Institute for Advanced Study. A scholar applying for the academic year 2007-2008 must normally have begun her/his tenured contract at a U.S. institution no earlier than the fall 2002 semester or quarter. Applicants must submit a research plan, typically covering a three to five year period; one of the first three years of research could be spent as a Member at the Institute, either in the School of Historical Studies or the School of Social Science. Qualified candidates who would like to apply under the auspices of this program should visit the ACLS website, <http://www.acls.org/burkguid.htm>, for a more detailed description of the terms of the fellowship and information about how to apply. Applications for this program must be submitted through the ACLS Online Fellowship Application system (OFA) no later than 9 p.m., Eastern Daylight Time, September 28, 2006. OFA is accessible at <http://ofa.acls.org> <<http://ofa.acls.org/>> or through the ACLS website. Information about this program may also be obtained from the ACLS Fellowships Office, 633 Third Avenue, 8th floor, New York, NY 10017-6795.



Formation of the British International Studies Association (BISA) Working Group on United States Foreign Policy

A major feature of contemporary International Studies is the central place occupied by US foreign policy. This centrality derives as much from the extraordinary international power of the United States as from the controversial nature of contemporary American foreign policy. Study of US foreign policy now finds a key place in numerous areas of International Studies, including Foreign Policy Analysis, IR Theory, International Political Economy, Security Studies, and so on. The teaching of the subject is now central to the work of many departments, with students opting in large numbers for US foreign policy options. The published research in the area from British scholars – again, across a range of fields including International History and contemporary discourse analysis – has also grown considerably in recent years.

The formation of a BISA working group on US foreign policy is a further step forward and institutionalization of this central and integrating sub-field. BISA has recently sponsored the emergence of several new working groups, including one on British foreign policy. We see this as an appropriate time to put forward the idea for a US foreign policy group. This will augment and enhance the work of several existing groups with whom we wish to cooperate. We would also like to emphasize that the group will be entirely academically neutral. We wish to encourage a variety of methodological and, indeed political, perspectives. We certainly do not wish to tie the group to current debates about the George W. Bush Administration. While contemporary controversies may well give the group a beneficial initial fillip, we anticipate the group remaining in existence well beyond the shelf life of current debates.

The main activity of the new group will be the organization of an annual conference on US foreign policy. This can, we feel, begin fairly modestly with an event at the University of Leicester in September 2006. We envisage a one-day workshop-conference, including a lecture by a leading academic in the field, to launch the group. In addition to the annual conference, we are thinking in terms of a range of activities: US foreign policy panels at the annual BISA and other conferences, including conferences in the US; liaison with the British Association for American Studies and the American Politics Group (a sub-group of the Political Studies Association); the setting up of an electronic newsletter, with information about group activities, also serving as a database for contact between researchers; liaison with publishers on behalf of researchers in the area; and the development of a group website.

Information on the activities listed above, and any new matters, will soon be placed on the US Foreign Policy WG's web pages on the BISA main website at <http://www.bisa.ac.uk/groups/usforeignpolicy.htm>.

Co-Convenors:

Dr Inderjeet Parmar (University of Manchester)
Inderjeet.Parmar@manchester.ac.uk

Professor John Dumbrell (University of Leicester)
jwd5@leicester.ac.uk



Call For Papers: *The International Public Policy Review*

The International Public Policy Review is a student-run academic journal of the School of Public Policy at University College London, published electronically twice per year. The Review is currently accepting manuscript submissions. Manuscripts that will be selected for publication are those of superior quality that are situated within the field of international public policy, defined as "all areas of governance and public policy that are either international or strongly affected by international factors."

The *Review* publishes works of academic scholarship under two rubrics: Articles and Notes. Article submissions should not exceed 10,000 words while Note submissions should be between 3,000 and 5,000 words in length. Both totals are inclusive of all text, footnotes, and references. Articles typically situate themselves within an ongoing debate and treat their subjects comprehensively. Notes, on the other hand, devote less attention to canvassing existing scholarship. Notes may address novel or contentious areas of debate, report on work in progress, or explore emerging areas of academic inquiry within the field of international public policy.

All submissions should be saved as a Word file. References should be compiled in the University of Chicago Style (documentary-note), amalgamated and signaled serially in the text of the article by superscripts. A references section must be included at the end of the work. Please include the manuscript's title on the first text page, along with an abstract of 300 words and keywords. To facilitate our anonymous review process, please confine your name, affiliation, biographical information, and acknowledgments to a separate cover page. Please avoid tables of contents and appendices. Papers that do not conform to these guidelines will be returned to authors and could delay the evaluation process. For all other questions of reference and style, refer to *The Chicago Manual of Style, 15th edition* and the IPPR website (www.ucl.ac.uk/ippr).

Please submit manuscripts via email to: ippr@ucl.ac.uk.



Call For Papers: "Allies and Clients: America's 'Special Relationships'"

April 2007, *The David Bruce Centre for American Studies, Keele University, Staffordshire, UK*

The David Bruce Centre For American Studies (Keele University), in association with the Centre for Diplomatic and International Studies at the University of Leicester, announces a colloquium, to be held at the University of Keele on April 12-14, 2007, on "Allies and Clients: America's 'Special Relationships.'"


The intention of the conference organizers is to focus firstly on sets of bilateral relationships between the United States and various allies. Obvious candidates are US-UK, US-Israeli, US-Canadian, US-Japanese and US-Mexican relations. The approach of the papers may be partially historical, though particular attention will be drawn to bilateral relations in the 21st century. The War on Terror and the foreign policies of the George W. Bush Administration have brought to the fore the difficulties and complexities inherent in various sets of America's bilateral allied relationships. At the same time, problems and setbacks for multilateralism - seen in the recent US-UN difficulties, in the rise of American unilateralism, and in the current crises for European integration - have also highlighted the contemporary importance of these bilateral allied relationships. The conference is intended to reflect these various developments. We are also interested in papers that look at the way 'special relationships' are institutionally and ideologically nurtured by government, business, and third-sector organizations at home and abroad.

In the past, Bruce Centre Colloquia have resulted in the publication of peer-reviewed volumes, and the organizers are once again planning to pursue the publication of a selection of papers.

Participation in the Colloquium is by invitation only. The David Bruce Centre for American Studies will cover travel costs, room and board for colloquium speakers. Submit proposals by September 30th, 2006, in the form of a 1-2 page abstract summarizing your paper to the conference organizers.

Dr Axel Schaefer, School of Humanities, American Studies, Keele University, Staffs. ST5 5BG, a.schaefer@ams.keele.ac.uk

Prof John Dumbrell, Dept of Politics and International Relations, University of Leicester, Leicester, LE1 7RH, jwd5@le.ac.uk



Call For Papers: Rethinking Public Diplomacy: Toward an International History

April 2007, *Mershon Center for International Security Studies, The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio*

We invite proposals for an academic conference that will form the basis for a planned volume on the theme: Rethinking Public Diplomacy: Toward an International History. Public diplomacy entails using communication methods - propaganda, media, policy initiatives, cultural production, or other means - to achieve desired geopolitical aims. Our goal is to bring together the latest scholarship on public diplomacy from a number of different disciplines and international perspectives, with an eye toward the publication of an edited book that will introduce scholars, graduate students, practitioners, and the general public to the "state of the field" in public diplomacy studies.

Ideally, the book will serve as a launching point for future analyses of public diplomacy. We hope to foster intelligent,

historically well-informed dialogue within the academic and policy communities about the potentialities and limits of public diplomacy as both an ingredient of statecraft and an object of scholarly analysis. We are especially interested in exploring the international dimensions of public diplomacy – how nations other than the United States have used public diplomacy as instruments of foreign policy. We also hope to encourage comparisons across geographical and chronological lines. In addition, we hope to address the difficult, but exceedingly important, question of effectiveness: how do we assess the impact and effectiveness of public diplomacy programs? Finally, we hope to search the record of past public diplomacy programs for lessons for the future.

The focus of this project then is neither on one country or one set of countries nor on one era or range of eras; rather the conference and edited book are primarily concerned with the nature of public diplomacy itself, and how scholars have wrestled with integrating it into the historical study of foreign policy, domestic culture, media studies, and the like. As such, the organizers are particularly interested in papers that illuminate and innovatively address some of the common concerns that affect all studies of public diplomacy, such as:

- Makers – what actors, aside from national policymakers, have been involved in making public diplomacy?
- Motivations – what have practitioners of public diplomacy hoped to accomplish?
- Strategies and Tactics – how have practitioners of public diplomacy sought to achieve their objectives?
- Methodologies – how can scholars apply different methodologies and theories to analyses of public diplomacy?
- Effectiveness – how should scholars assess the impact and effectiveness of public diplomacy campaigns?

Essays should go beyond mere narratives of public diplomacy campaigns to assess broad conceptual issues related to the history and analysis of public diplomacy (including but not limited to those cited above). We also welcome papers that discuss historiographical trends, or that analyze the role of the intersection between public diplomacy and the related fields of cultural relations, advertising, public relations, and others.

Since the ultimate objective is an edited book that addresses public diplomacy as a process and phenomenon, case studies are welcome provided that they illuminate fresh approaches in dealing with the process of public diplomacy for understanding international relations. We are keenly interested in exploring the international dimensions of public diplomacy during the 20th century, as well as historical precedents from earlier periods. Although we do welcome papers on the US, we especially encourage papers addressing the public diplomacy of nations other than the United States.

Invited participants will be asked to submit their 30-35 double-spaced page paper approximately one month before the conference is held. In the interest of fostering dialogue, participants will also be asked to provide comments on the paper of a fellow participant. It is anticipated that 10-12 scholars will be invited to present.

Funds are available to compensate participants for travel to the conference and to cover their local accommodations, and perhaps for modest honoraria.

Paper proposals should consist of a brief abstract (no more than 3 pages) and cv (of no longer than 3 pages). In addition to spelling out the parameters of the study, abstracts must address how the proposed project contributes to the conference goals articulated above. Please submit your proposals electronically on or before September 30, 2006 to both kosgood@fau.edu and briane@latech.edu.

Questions should be directed to:

Kenneth Osgood, Florida Atlantic University, kosgood@fau.edu
Brian Etheridge, Louisiana Tech University, briane@latech.edu
Robert McMahan, The Ohio State University, mcmahan.121@osu.edu
Peter Hahn, The Ohio State University, hahn.29@osu.edu

Funding for the conference is provided by the Mershon Center for International Security Studies at The Ohio State University and the American Foreign Policy Center at Louisiana Tech University.



Call For Papers: Society for Military History 74th Annual Meeting

April 2007, Catocin Center for Regional Studies, Frederick Community College, Frederick, Maryland

The Catocin Center for Regional Studies located at Frederick Community College will host the 74th meeting of the Society for Military History. The conference will take place April 19-22, 2007 in historic Frederick, Maryland.

The theme for the conference will be "Crossroads of War." The Program Committee seeks papers and panels that address those intersections during the war-time experience between the military and other sectors of society, including, but not limited to, the home-front, the economy, politics and constitutionalism, as well as culture. This topic includes both the impact of the military on society as well as the influence of societal factors in shaping and defining the military experience during war. Although the conference will focus on the Crossroads of War, the Program Committee also desires papers and panels dealing with any facet of military history.

Panel proposals must include: 1) A panel coversheet listing the title of the panel and contact information for all members, 2) A brief overview of the panel highlighting its scholarly contributions, 3) One-page abstracts for each paper, and 4) A brief vitae for all members of the panel, including chairpersons and commentators. Individual paper proposals must include a one-page abstract and brief vitae. The Program Committee welcomes volunteers to serve as chair persons and commentators. Volunteers should submit a vitae with their request. All information related to the conference can be found online at <http://catocincenter.frederick.edu/>.

Deadline for this call for papers is October 15, 2006. The Program Committee prefers that all proposals be sent electronically by e-mail attachment in Microsoft Word. If this is not possible, hard copies can be sent.

Submit all materials to: smh2007papers@yahoo.com

Mailing Address:
SMH Papers 2007
PO Box 839
Carlisle, PA 17013

For more information, contact:

Dr. Conrad C. Crane
Program Chair
SMH Papers 2007
PO Box 839
Carlisle, PA 17013

<http://catocincenter.frederick.edu/>



4. Letters to the Editor

To the Editor:

Demonstrating that even the bleakest desert may contain a small oasis somewhere amid the desolation, Robert Buzzanco's "Fear and Loathing in Lubbock Texas, or How I Learned to Quit Working and Love Vietnam and Iraq" (*Passport*, December 2005) made me aware of Keith Taylor's "How I Began to Teach About the Vietnam War." Taylor's compelling memoir will now join works such as George Herring's "Peoples Quite Apart: Americans, South Vietnamese, and the War in Vietnam" as required reading in the Vietnam War unit of the course I teach on the Cold War. Professor Buzzanco can take satisfaction that his *Passport* article played an essential role in enabling more than 100 students each spring to read and evaluate for themselves Taylor's view of the Vietnam War.

Very truly yours,

Michael Kort
Professor of Social Science
Boston University



5. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines:

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded annually to an author for his or her first book on any aspect of the history of American foreign relations.

Eligibility: The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works that represent social science disciplines other than history are not eligible.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contributions to scholarship. Winning books should have exceptional interpretative and analytical qualities. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should display careful organization and distinguished writing. Five copies of each book must be submitted with a letter of nomination.

The award will be announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the selection committee. The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition that meets the standards of excellence established for the prize.

To nominate a book published in 2006, send five copies of the book and a letter of nomination to Mark Bradley, Department of History, Northwestern University, Harris Hall #202, 1881 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208. (E-mail: mbradley3@northwestern.edu.) Books may be sent at any time during 2006, but must arrive by December 1, 2006.



The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize recognizes and encourages excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The prize of \$500 is awarded annually.

Eligibility: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the PhD whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or of any other established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

Procedures: Nominations, in the form of a letter and the nominee's c.v., should be sent to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter should discuss evidence of the nominee's excellence in teaching and research.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH). The winner of the prize will deliver a lecture during the SHAFR luncheon at the next year's OAH annual meeting. The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to a SHAFR presidential address and should address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The lecturer is awarded \$500 plus up to \$500 in travel expenses to the OAH, and his or her lecture is published in *Diplomatic History*.

To be considered for the 2007 award, nominations must be received by February 28, 2007. Nominations should be sent to Stephen Rabe, University of Texas at Dallas, School of Arts & Humanities, JO45, P.O. Box 830688, Richardson, TX 75083-0688. (e-mail: rabe@utdallas.edu).



The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. The prize of \$1,000 is awarded annually to the author of a distinguished article appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations.

Eligibility: The author must be under forty-one years of age or within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of the article's acceptance for publication. The article must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award or the Myrna F. Bernath Book Award are ineligible.

Procedures: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* will be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations may be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

To nominate an article published in 2006, send three copies of the article and a letter of nomination to Anne Foster, Department of History, Indiana State University, Terre Haute, IN 47809 (e-mail: hifoster@isugw.indstate.edu). Deadline for nominations is February 1, 2007.



The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship Award

The purpose of this award is to encourage scholarly research by women in U.S. foreign relations history. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded biannually (odd years) to a woman conducting research in the field.

Eligibility: Applications are welcomed from women at U.S. universities as well as women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and those within five years of completion of their Ph.D.s. The subject of research should be historically based and should concern American foreign relations or aspects of international history, broadly conceived. Work on purely domestic topics will not be considered.

Procedures: Applications should be submitted in triplicate and should include (a) applicant's c.v.; (b) a brief letter of intent; (c) a detailed research proposal of no more than 2000 words that discusses the sources to be consulted and their value, the funds needed, and the plan for spending those funds.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

The deadline for applications for the 2007 Fellowship is December 1, 2006. Send applications to Carol E. Anderson, Department of History, University of Missouri, 101 Read Hall, Columbia, MO 65211-7500 (e-mail: andersonce@missouri.edu).



The Lawrence Gelfand - Armin Rappaport Fellowship

SHAFR established this fellowship to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*.

The Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship of \$2,000 is intended to defray the costs of dissertation research travel. The fellowship is awarded annually at SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of United States foreign relations history. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation.

Membership in SHAFR is not required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a dissertation prospectus including a paragraph or two on how funds would be expended (8-12 pages), a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant's dissertation adviser must write a letter of recommendation, to be submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail.

Applicants for the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship will also be considered for the Bernath Dissertation Grant.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.

The deadline for applications for the 2007 fellowship is November 15, 2006. Application materials should be sent to Max Paul Friedman, Department of History, Florida State University, mfriedma@fsu.edu.



Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize

This prize is designed to reward distinguished scholarship in the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded annually. The Ferrell Prize was established to honor Robert H. Ferrell, professor of diplomatic history at Indiana University from 1961 to 1990, by his former students.

Eligibility: The Ferrell Prize recognizes any book beyond the first monograph by the author. To be considered, a book must deal with the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of SHAFR. Three copies of the book must be submitted.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

The deadline for nominating books published in 2006 is December 15, 2006. Submit books to Susan Brewer, Department of History, University of Wisconsin-Stevens Point, 1901 Fourth Avenue, Stevens Point, Wisconsin 54481 (e-mail: sbrewer@uwsp.edu).



The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant was established through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath, in memory of their late son, Stuart L. Bernath, Ph.D.

The Bernath Dissertation Grant of \$2,000 is intended to help doctoral candidates defray expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. The grant is awarded annually at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation. Membership in SHAFR is not required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a dissertation prospectus including a paragraph or two on how funds would be expended (8-12 pages), a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant's dissertation adviser must write a letter of recommendation, to be submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail.

Applicants for the Bernath Dissertation Grant will also be considered for the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.

The deadline for applications for the 2007 grant is November 15, 2006. Application materials should be sent to Max Paul Friedman, Department of History, Florida State University, mfriedma@fsu.edu.



The Michael J. Hogan Fellowship

The Michael J. Hogan Fellowship was established to honor Michael J. Hogan, long-time editor of *Diplomatic History*.

The Hogan Fellowship of \$2,000 is intended to promote research in foreign language sources by graduate students. The fellowship is intended to defray the costs of studying foreign languages needed for research. It is announced at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

Applicants must be graduate students researching some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is

not required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a detailed plan for using the fellowship to achieve the purposes of the program (5-7 pages); a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant's graduate adviser must write a letter of recommendation, to be submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.

To be considered for the 2007 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by February 1, 2007. Submit materials to: Robert Dean, Department of History, Eastern Washington University, RDean@mail.ewu.edu.



The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship

The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship of \$2,000 is intended to defray the costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to conduct research on a significant dissertation project. The fellowship is awarded annually at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation. Membership in SHAFR is not required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a dissertation prospectus including a paragraph or two on how funds would be expended (8-12 pages), a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant's dissertation adviser must write a letter of recommendation, to be submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.

To be considered for the 2007 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by February 1, 2007. Submit materials to: Robert Dean, Department of History, Eastern Washington University, RDean@mail.ewu.edu.



Samuel Flagg Bemis Research Grants

The Samuel F. Bemis Research Grants are intended to promote research by doctoral candidates, by untenured faculty members, and by those within six years of the Ph.D. and working as professional historians. A limited number of grants of varying amounts (generally, up to \$2,000) will be awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects.

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations or post-doctoral research projects dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation or must hold the Ph.D. Membership in SHAFR is not required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Graduate students should apply for the Holt Fellowship, under the guidelines above, as applicants for that fellowship will be considered automatically for Samuel F. Bemis Research Grants. Untenured faculty members and recent Ph.D.s working as professional historians should submit applications modeled on the Holt Fellowship application, making clear their professional status, substituting a research prospectus for a dissertation prospectus, and arranging a letter of recommendation from any referee.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.

To be considered for 2007 awards, nominations and supporting materials must be received by February 1, 2007. Submit materials to: Robert Dean, Department of History, Eastern Washington University, RDean@mail.ewu.edu.



The Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize

The Betty M. Unterberger Prize is intended to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by graduate students in the field of diplomatic history. The Prize of \$1,000 is awarded biannually (in odd years) to the author of a dissertation, completed during the previous two calendar years, on any topic in United States foreign relations history. The Prize is announced at the annual SHAFR conference.

The Prize was established in 2004 to honor Betty Miller Unterberger, a founder of SHAFR and long-time professor of diplomatic history at Texas A&M University.

Procedures: A dissertation may be submitted for consideration by the author or by the author's advisor. Three copies of the dissertation should be submitted, along with a cover letter explaining why the dissertation deserves consideration.

To be considered for the 2007 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by February 28, 2007. Submit materials to Terry Anderson, Department of History, Texas A&M University, Melburn G. Glasscock Building, Room 101, College Station, TX 77843-4236.



Arthur S. Link-Warren F. Kuehl Prize for Documentary Editing

The Link-Kuehl Prize recognizes and encourages analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. The award of \$1,000 is presented biannually (odd years) to the best book published during the preceding two calendar years. The award is announced at the SHAFR luncheon during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Eligibility: The prize is awarded to published documentary works distinguished by the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any published collection of documents that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship.

Procedures: Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. Send three copies of the book with letter of nomination to Nancy Mitchell, Department of History, North Carolina State University, Department of History, 161 Harrelson Hall, Campus Box 8108, Raleigh, NC 27695-8108 (phone: 919-513-2214, fax 919-515-3886; e-mail: nancy_mitchell@ncsu.edu). To be considered for the 2007 prize, nominations must be received by November 15, 2006.



6. Recent Publications of Interest

Bartholomew-Feis, Dixee. *The OSS and Ho Chi Minh: Unexpected Allies in the War against Japan*, University Press of Kansas, \$34.95.

Basu, Dipa and Sid Lamelle, eds. *The Vinyl Ain't Final: Hip-hop and the Globalization of Black Popular Culture*, University of Michigan Press, \$24.95.

Birmingham, David. *Empire in Africa: Angola and its Neighbors*, Ohio University Press, \$22.00.

Bowen, Wayne H. *Spain During World War II*, University of Missouri Press, \$39.95.

Callahan, James Morton. *The Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy*, Kessinger Publishing, \$28.95.

Cohen, Warren I. *America's Failing Empire: United States Foreign Relations since the End of the Cold War*, Blackwell, \$21.95.

Dueck, Colin. *Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy*, Princeton University Press, \$29.95.

Feffer, John. *The Future of US-Korean Relations: The Imbalance of Power*, Routledge, \$39.95.

Gaines, Kevin K. *American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era*, University of North Carolina Press, \$34.95.

Garcia, Maria Cristina. *Seeking Refuge: Central American Migration to Mexico, the United States, and Canada*, University of California Press, \$19.95.

Gems, Gerald R. *The Athletic Crusade: Sport and American Cultural Imperialism*, University of Nebraska Press, \$39.95.

Grandin, Greg. *Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism*, Metropolitan Books, \$25.00.

Hafez, Mohammed M. *Manufacturing Human Bombs: The Making of Palestinian Suicide Bombers*, Institute of Peace Press, \$12.50.

Haley, P. Edward. *Strategies of Dominance: The Misdirection of U.S. Foreign Policy*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, \$22.95.

Hendrickson, Ryan C. *Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action after the Cold War*, University of Missouri Press, \$16.95.

Henning, Joseph. *Outposts of Civilization: Race, Religion and the Formative Years of American-Japanese Relations*, NYU Press, \$55.00.

Kakar, M. Hassan. *A Political and Diplomatic History of Afghanistan, 1863-1901*, Brill Academic Publishers, \$103.00.

- Kim, Samuel. *The Two Koreas and the Great Powers*, Cambridge University Press, \$80.00.
- Kramer, Paul A. *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines*, University of North Carolina Press, \$69.95.
- Layne, Christopher. *The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present*, Cornell University Press, \$29.95.
- Lebovics, Herman. *Imperialism and the Corruption of Democracies*, Duke University Press, \$21.95.
- Leiner, Frederick. *The End of Barbary Terror: America's 1815 War against the Pirates of North Africa*, Oxford University Press, \$28.00.
- Lewis, Jeff. *Language Wars: The Role of Media and Culture in Global Terror and Political Violence*, University of Michigan Press, \$27.95.
- Maier, Charles. *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors*, Harvard University Press, \$27.95.
- Maoz, Zeev. *Defending the Holy Land: A Critical Analysis of Israel's Security and Foreign Policy*, University of Michigan Press, \$45.00.
- Marding, William H. *How "American" is Globalization?*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, \$24.95.
- Martin, Andrew and Patrice Petro. *Rethinking Global Security: Media, Popular Culture, and the "War on Terror,"* Rutgers University Press, \$24.95.
- Metzler, Mark. *Lever of Empire: The International Gold Standard and the Crisis of Liberalism in Prewar Japan*, University of California Press, \$49.95.
- Mickenberg, Julia L. *Learning from the Left: Children's Literature, the Cold War, and Radical Politics in the United States*, Oxford University Press, \$74.00.
- Olzak, Susan. *The Global Dynamics of Racial and Ethnic Mobilization*, Stanford University Press, \$55.00.
- Osgood, Kenneth. *Total Cold War: Eisenhower's Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad*, University Press of Kansas, \$45.00.
- Pholsena, Vatthana. *Post-War Laos: The Politics of Culture, History, and Identity*, Cornell University Press, \$22.95.
- Reynolds, David. *From World War to Cold War: Churchill, Roosevelt, and the International History of the 1940s*, Oxford University Press, \$45.00.
- Rudalevige, Andrew. *The New Imperial Presidency: Renewing Presidential Power after Watergate*, University of Michigan Press, \$19.95.
- Saul, Norman E. *Friends or Foes? The United States and Soviet Russia, 1921-1941*, University Press of Kansas, \$40.00.
- Seib, Philip. *Broadcasts from the Blitz: How Edward R. Murrow Helped Lead American Into War*, Potomac Books, \$24.95.
- Smith, Derek. *Deterring America: Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Cambridge University Press, \$75.00.

Rethinking Public Diplomacy: Toward an International History

*Conference from April 19-21, 2007 at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies,
The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.*

The organizers invite proposals for an academic conference that will form the basis of a planned volume on the theme: Rethinking Public Diplomacy: Toward an International History. Their goal is to bring together the latest scholarship on public diplomacy from a number of different disciplines and international perspectives, with an eye toward the publication of an edited book that will introduce scholars, graduate students, practitioners, and the general public to the "state of the field" in public diplomacy studies. The focus of this project then is neither on one country or one set of countries nor on one era or range of eras; rather the conference and edited book are primarily concerned with the nature of public diplomacy itself, and how scholars have wrestled with integrating it into the historical study of foreign policy, domestic culture, media studies, and the like. The full call for papers may be found in the Diplomatic Pouch in this issue.

The deadline for proposals is September 30, 2006.

For more information contact the conference organizers: Kenneth Osgood, Florida Atlantic University, kosgood@fau.edu; Brian Etheridge, Louisiana Tech University, briane@latech.edu; Robert McMabon, Ohio State University, mcmabon.121@osu.edu; Peter Hahn, Ohio State University, hahn.29@osu.edu

Spalding, Elizabeth Edwards. *The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the Remaking of Liberal Internationalism*, University Press of Kentucky, \$40.00.

Stoler, Mark. *Allies in War: Britain and American against the Axis Powers, 1940-1945*, Oxford University Press, \$39.95.

Suleiman, Susan Rubin. *Crises of Memory and the Second World War*, Harvard University Press, \$29.95.

Tan, Andrew T. *The Politics of Terrorism: A Survey*, Routledge, \$230.00.

Thakur, Ramesh. *The United Nations, Peace and Security: From Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect*, Cambridge University Press, \$80.00.

Tran, Nhung Tuyet and Anthony Reid, eds. *Viet Nam: Borderless Histories*, University of Wisconsin Press, \$24.95.

Tudda, Chris. *The Truth is our Weapon: The Rhetorical Diplomacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles*, Louisiana State University Press, \$39.95.

Wee, Paul A. *American Destiny and the Calling of the Church*, Ausburg Fortress Publishers, \$9.99.

Woods, Ngaire. *The Globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and Their Borrowers*, Cornell University Press, \$29.95.

Zolberg, Aristide R. *A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America*, Harvard University Press, \$39.95.

SHAFR at the AHA

SHAFR is planning two major functions at the 2007 meeting of the American Historical Association in Atlanta in January. Please plan to attend:

--> Reception (cash bar) on Friday, January 5, 5:30-7:30 pm

--> Luncheon on Saturday, January 6, 12:00-1:45 pm

Please note that this year's luncheon will be held at Pittypat's Porch, 25 International Blvd., a short walk from the convention center and hotels. **Mahmood Mamdani of Columbia University will deliver the keynote lecture, "Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror."** The Bernath Dissertation Fellowship, the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship, and the Link-Kuehl Prize will also be awarded.

The luncheon price is \$20, which includes a hearty buffet meal, dessert, soft drinks/coffee/tea, gratuity, and tax.

To obtain a ticket to the luncheon, please mail a check (payable to SHAFR) by December 15, 2006, to SHAFR Business Office, Department of History, The Ohio State University, 106 Dulles Hall, 230 West 17th Avenue, Columbus, OH 43210. Inquiries may be directed to shafr@osu.edu.

The Last Word


Richard Hume Werking

What assignments do you give your students? What books, articles, and audiovisuals do you use in your courses? Are you ever curious about what your peers at other colleges and universities are requiring of their students? These are among the questions that the SHAFR Teaching Committee has been asking and addressing.

Since its establishment in 2004, members of the SHAFR Teaching Committee have paid considerable attention to what historians of American foreign relations teach and, especially, how they teach it. Hence last year we surveyed the SHAFR membership and reported the results in the December issue of *Passport*. And at the annual conference in June, the committee conducted a combination program/discussion session on assignments and other student encounters with old and new media.

Another way to learn about what other teachers do is to consult their syllabi. In 1983, Warren Susman and John Chambers of Rutgers University published a 3-volume set that reproduced syllabi of American history courses; second and third editions appeared in 1987 and 1990. Among the teachers whose syllabi appeared are names quite familiar to SHAFR members, including Richard Challener, John Dower, Norman Graebner, Peter Karsten, Walter LaFeber, Allan Millett, and Charles Neu.

In this era of the World-Wide-Web, the sharing of syllabi with one's colleagues has potentially become much easier. Although apparently neither the American Historical Association nor the Organization of American Historians has yet ventured into this territory, some scholarly associations have, including the American Studies Association (see http://www.georgetown.edu/crossroads/as_syllabi.html), the American Political Science Association (http://www.apsanet.org/content_3807.cfm), and the American Sociological Association (<http://www.asanet.org/index.wv>). See also the compilation of Nick Sarantakes at <http://faculty.tamu-commerce.edu/sarantakes/stuff-coursematerial.html>. But the great-grandmother of syllabus sites belongs to the Center for History and New Media at George Mason University (<http://chnm.gmu.edu/tools/syllabi/>), whose "Syllabus Finder" is said to search more than 700,000 syllabi at the Center plus another 500,000 on Google.



SHAFR's Teaching Committee, with the support of our association's Business Office, has begun a "syllabus initiative" on the SHAFR website. (I hasten to add that we have no intention of seeking to gather thousands, much less hundreds of thousands, of syllabi for our site.) Already a respectable collection is displayed there; as of this writing there are 29 syllabi for undergraduate and graduate courses, with plenty of room for additions from the membership. When I Google the terms "diplomatic," "history," and "syllabi", our SHAFR site comes up first.

Readers who peruse these syllabi online will encounter many

interesting items, including these:

--Peter Hahn's pages on "Research and Writing Procedures" and "The Extended Critique";

--Nicole Phelps requires that her students bring to class each day their copy of the *Hammond Historical World Atlas*;

--Stephen Rabe on attendance: "This is not a correspondence course;"

--Robert Shaffer has his students compile a scrapbook relating current events to the history of U.S. foreign relations;

--Mark Stoler requires a research paper for history majors or for those students who wish to be considered eligible for an A or a B; and

--Tom Zeiler's course on American diplomacy from 1865-1941 is set within an unusual framework for this time period: globalization and deglobalization.

The Teaching Committee is in the process of expanding this project to include additional materials to complement the course syllabi and illuminate the physiology of our courses. We hope that SHAFR members will look through the syllabi currently available on the website and contribute their own, along with exams and other assignments. Just go to the "Teaching Services" page on the SHAFR website, at <http://www.shafr.org/teaching.htm>, click on "Syllabus Initiative", and follow the instructions there. Good journeys.

Richard Hume Werking is library director and professor of history at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, and a member of the SHAFR Teaching Committee.