

# Passport

The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Volume 38, Issue 1, April 2007



## Inside...

AHA President Barbara Weinstein on  
Diplomatic History  
A Roundtable on Victoria de Grazia's  
*Irresistible Empire*  
How Clio Created a Provost

...and much more!

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## In This Issue


- 4 Thoughts from SHAFR President Richard H. Immerman
- 5 Changing the Topic: Diplomatic History and the Historical Profession  
Barbara Weinstein
- 7 A Roundtable on Victoria de Grazia's *Irresistible Empire*  
Daniel T. Rogers, Emily S. Rosenberg, Brian Etheridge, Lawrence Glickman, and Victoria de Grazia
- 21 Clio and Me: The Story of a Diplomatic Historian Who Became Provost  
Michael J. Hogan
- 27 SHAFR Council Minutes
- 30 In Memory: Charles Soutter Campbell, Jr.
- 31 In Memory: Richard W. Leopold
- 32 The Diplomatic Pouch
- 43 The Last Word  
Mitchell B. Lerner

# Thoughts from SHAFR President Richard H. Immerman

Serving as SHAFR's president at any time is a great honor. Because my term serendipitously coincides with our fortieth anniversary, the honor is perhaps even greater – certainly the thrill is. To understand, each reader of *Passport* should take a moment to review the names of our past presidents (accessible at <http://www.shafr.org/pastpresidents.htm>). The list provides terrific perspective on our field and on SHAFR's history. Doubtless the majority of our current membership, and I stress *current* membership, was, like me, unaware of SHAFR's founding in 1967. I was an undergraduate that year, taking my first course in U.S. Diplomatic History. The instructor was Walt LaFeber. Some might attribute the coincidence to fate; I attribute it to the Vietnam War and to Walt's richly deserved reputation as a model teacher/scholar. Regardless, looking back over the subsequent forty years, I consider myself incredibly fortunate to have taken that course. It was literally a life-changing experience, and one of its most positive consequences has been my membership in SHAFR. For this reason it is a special honor and a special thrill for me to serve as this year's president. Walt of course appears prominently on the list of my predecessors. Indeed, so do many historians who inspired me and still inspire me. This year, in *Diplomatic History*, at the annual meeting this summer, and I hope on numerous other occasions and in numerous other venues, we will celebrate their achievements, and those of SHAFR, over the decades. I get to sit in the front row as we do.

As we pay tribute to our past presidents, we should take pride in our growth and our prosperity. At the same time, however, we must make the necessary preparations to ensure that we grow even stronger and more prosperous over our next forty years. As most of you know, a defining manifestation of SHAFR's potency and stature is the quality, prominence, and circulation of *Diplomatic History*. Under a succession of committed and outstanding editors, *DH* has emerged as a journal without peer in our field. Last year this success translated into a new contract that will provide SHAFR with financial resources that doubtless surpass its founders' wildest dreams. The funds generated by *Diplomatic History*, coupled with the generosity of the Bernath family and so many of our members, endow SHAFR with enviable security and opportunities. At issue is how to exploit these funds to promote our continued expansion and vitality most effectively. Toward this end I invited some half dozen of our members to join me on an ad hoc steering committee to consider a spectrum of options. In a response characteristic of the SHAFR membership, everyone whom I invited accepted with enthusiasm. We are already hard at work, as the committee as a whole met in March at the OAH and will meet again this summer. I encourage anyone who has a suggestion to email it to me ([rimmerma@temple.edu](mailto:rimmerma@temple.edu)).

Vice President Tom Schwartz has agreed to chair a second and no less important ad hoc committee demanded by this



watershed year. The June annual meeting is distinctive not only because it will mark our fortieth anniversary. It will, in addition, serve as something of an experiment. For the first time we will not come together on a university or college campus: we are convening at Virginia's Westfields Marriott. Circumstances, not prior planning, drove this change. Now we must evaluate it. Tom's committee will assess the pros and cons of what we have come to call the "mini-OAH model" and then recommend whether or not to continue it. (Next summer's meeting will be at Ohio State in Columbus regardless.) His committee will also examine attendant questions ranging from the meeting's location (we currently alternate between the Washington area and elsewhere) to its normal date (June). These are highly complex issues, and this is an appropriate time to address them. You may receive some kind

of short survey/questionnaire. If you do, please respond.

In short, the state of SHAFR could not be better. Nevertheless, I do want to raise an issue that cannot be separated from the progress I mention above. It is an issue that does not lend itself to deliberations by or a recommendation from a committee. It concerns SHAFR's relationship with other scholarly organizations, and it has been discussed in various contexts by all of my predecessors.

It may be ironic that our robust health and expansion over the past decades evolved concurrent with and perhaps even contributed to our alienation, for want of a better word, from umbrella organizations such as the OAH and AHA. "Their" lack of interest in scheduling "our" sessions at "their" meetings, or publishing "our" articles in "their" journals, provided impetus for us to present at "our" meeting and to publish in "our" journal. Now, when "we" are thriving and "they" are in fundamental respects struggling, there is a temptation to ask, "Who needs them?" Why propose panels or submit articles where we do not seem to be welcome?

My personal answer is that both the era in which we live and the well-being of our discipline require that historians of foreign relations speak more, not less, to our fellow historians (among so many other constituencies). So let's turn the tables. We can use, or we can certainly try to use, our strength as leverage to build, or rebuild, bridges to the OAH, the AHA, and other organizations. At a minimum let's renew our memberships. I would go further. I would like to see us resume submitting proposals for conferences (we were well represented at the Minneapolis OAH, I should interject) and manuscripts. Small steps lead to bigger ones. OAH or AHA president? I know not everyone in SHAFR agrees with me. Therefore, in the tradition of Linda Richman on "Coffee Talk," I'll simply ask that you discuss amongst yourselves.

*Richard Immerman is the Edward J. Buthusiem Family Distinguished Faculty Fellow in History and chair of the History Department at Temple University.*

# Changing the Topic: Diplomatic History and the Historical Profession

*Barbara Weinstein*

I am delighted to have been invited, as the new president of the AHA, to address some remarks to the SHAFR membership and initiate a conversation about ways in which SHAFR and the AHA can strengthen their relationship to the mutual benefit of both organizations. It is in this spirit that I am sharing with you some of my thoughts on the changing composition of the historical profession and what it might imply for historians of diplomacy/foreign relations.

The January 2007 issue of *AHA Perspectives* included an intriguing article by Robert B. Townsend, academic data analyst extraordinaire, entitled "What's in a Label? Changing Patterns of Faculty Specialization since 1975." It was also, for historians in certain fields, a very sobering article. As a Latin Americanist I was stunned to see that my field's share of the historical profession had declined precipitously between 1975 and 1990 and that even after a slow but steady recovery over the last 15 years, its percentage as of 2005 remained below the 1975 level.

Latin America aside, in general, the data indicated that the shifts in geographic specialization were actually quite small; the distribution of academic jobs by region of study has changed remarkably little over the last thirty years. What the statistics did reveal, however, were significant changes in topical specialization. Some topics—for example, women/gender and cultural history—experienced dramatic increases in their percentages of the profession, while others—intellectual, economic and diplomatic/international—showed sharp declines. (Townsend gathered data using all related terms for each field.) For the members of SHAFR, no doubt the most arresting and disturbing of these trends is the decline in the proportion of diplomatic/international historians,

who made up 7 percent of listed faculty in 1975 but only 3.1 percent in 2005. The percentage of departments listing at least one faculty member specializing in diplomatic/international history fell from 75 to 46 percent in those thirty years.

Even for those of us who work in other topical fields, a shift of this magnitude should give us pause. To be sure, first we need to figure out what the numbers mean: we need to ask the question Rob Townsend posed in the title of this article: "What's in a label?" Do these numbers reflect a real decline in the percentage of historians researching and teaching about diplomacy/foreign relations, or do they indicate, first and foremost, a change in labeling? But our consideration of the "What's in a label?" question shouldn't end there: we need to ask whether changes in labeling indicate superficial alterations to keep up with academic fashion or a more profound re-thinking of categories and approaches.

Unfortunately, once we start inquiring into a label's meanings, we leave the terrain of hard and fast evidence and shift to the shaky ground of speculation. I would assume, for example, that at least some of the decline in the percentage of diplomatic historians reflects a sense in the profession that other labels carry more prestige or expand job opportunities. Some scholars may continue to do what we might describe as diplomatic history or history of foreign relations and simply refrain from calling it that. But I have no data beyond anecdotal evidence to support this claim.

There are two ways in which a topical field can decline in terms of its percentage of the profession: those previously in that field adopt a new topic of specialization, or new entrants to the profession favor other fields (partly in response,

presumably, to those fields being emphasized in job announcements). To make matters more complicated, there is also the factor of multiple topical specializations. If you look at directories of history departments, you will see that many scholars display no topical label at all. This seems to be especially true of my fellow Latin Americanists, who almost always list Latin America, their period of concentration (colonial/modern), and then the specific country or subregion (Mexico, the Andes), but only rarely a topical area. Historians in other fields, on the other hand, may list two, three, four topical areas. In these cases, one label that is very likely to appear these days is "cultural."

The increasing popularity of the "cultural history" label, which can be adopted by almost anyone except the hardcore economic or demographic historian, surely indicates not just a shift in methodology or object of study, but in academic vogue. If we take a look at the core faculty in the history department at Indiana University—43 historians—we discover that slightly over half (22) include cultural as one of their topical fields. But only 2 of those 22 indicate cultural history as their sole topical interest; of the other 20, 12 list "social and cultural" and 8 list "intellectual and cultural." Certainly, some of those historians listing "cultural" as one of their topical fields do study something we would all identify as "culture" and do adopt a particular interpretive approach associated with cultural history, but I think many of the self-identified cultural historians adopt this label in part because it currently has cachet and has the additional attraction of being a protean category that almost anyone can claim. In contrast, diplomatic history appears to be not nearly so fashionable and may pose the additional "disadvantage" of

not being particularly mutable. In other words, there are seemingly endless themes that can be glossed as cultural history, but what we regard as diplomatic history or history of foreign relations tends to be more fixed and finite. And given current fashions, if a historian is doing anything that can be remotely defined as cultural history, he/she is likely to claim that label, but only someone very directly and explicitly engaged in the history of foreign relations is likely to label him or herself that way.

There is some good news in this for SHAFR and the larger field of diplomatic/foreign relations history. Cultural history may have grown by leaps and bounds over the last thirty years, but it is a field with little coherence, a label that's an empty signifier, whereas diplomatic history/foreign relations has suffered a relative decline, but those who identify with this topical field are more likely to be grounded in some common questions and share certain research methods and objectives. Therefore, those concerned about the field's shrinkage (at least as a percentage of the profession — absolute numbers may have gone up because of the increase in the total number of historians) might focus not so much on rescuing the reputation of diplomatic history, which is still a major topical field that outpaces both religious and economic history, but on cultivating a more expansive notion of the field of "foreign relations" so that it can more easily encompass scholars working on transnational history and on topics such as colonialism and globalization.

To do so would require engaging with the issues that have led many scholars to refuse the "foreign relations" or "diplomatic history" label even as they conduct research that could comfortably fit within that framework, and here I think there is more in play than just a matter of academic fashion. Once again, we might consider the "surge" (if you'll forgive the language) in cultural history. Even though new cultural historians have leveled very serious critiques at both social and intellectual history, there are still many historians (and not just at Indiana) who list their topics of specialization as "social and

cultural" or "intellectual and cultural." In contrast, I could not find a single case (though I might have missed it — this was not a very scientific survey) of "diplomatic and cultural" or "foreign relations and culture," despite these combinations being every bit as intellectually viable as the previous ones. I would hazard a guess that the absence of such pairings reflects a lingering and excessively narrow conception of foreign relations history that sees it *solely* as the study of specific "official" actors operating within a limited socio-political framework that excludes considerations of gender, culture, race/ethnicity, and class. And this despite all the recent work on cultural diplomacy, on constructions of public opinion, on the gendered and racialized aspects of foreign relations, on the significance of transnational networks that transcend official venues.

Why the study of foreign relations continues to be seen by some as divorced from these other robust tendencies in the field of history is a bit of a mystery to me. It may be that precisely what gives this topical field an unusual degree of coherence may inhibit its capacity to accommodate a more expansive vision of its field of study. But I suspect that among some younger historians, a particular type of diplomatic/foreign relations history that many of them consider "old-fashioned" or even retrograde has come to stand in for the entire topical field, leaving them reluctant to take on the "foreign relations" label. In addition, they may see it as an academic identity that limits rather than expands their options on the job market.

It should be apparent that I have been assuming throughout this discussion that the statistics in the Townsend article are worrisome for those with an intellectual stake in the field of diplomatic/international history (a category certainly not restricted to practitioners). The problem, however, should not be exaggerated, since it is arguable that much of the decline is indeed a result of re-labeling and not a wave of rejection of foreign relations as an object of study, something that

would be nearly tragic under current circumstances. Still, labels are a form of language, and having lived through the linguistic turn, most of us recognize that language is not "just words." The fact that the percentage of departments with at least one self-declared diplomatic/international historian has dropped by over a third is a statistic of some significance.

How this trend should be addressed, or reversed, is a matter that escapes my analytical capacities, but I do have one specific suggestion that harkens back to my original purpose in writing this article. That is for historians of foreign relations to engage more actively in the annual AHA meetings. I realize that the holding of a separate mid-year SHAFR conference means that the AHA meetings are not the principal site for the presentation of work on the history of American foreign relations. However, the AHA is the *ideal* location for attracting new audiences and young scholars who may have a certain conception of the field that could be dismantled by one brilliant paper presentation or stimulating roundtable discussion. And for those who have been discouraged in the past when a panel has been rejected, or who feel that the program is dominated by social- and cultural-themed panels, let me emphasize that a deliberate effort has been made in recent years to expand the number of sessions and to diversify the offerings as much as possible. New formats — roundtables, workshops, poster sessions, book discussions, pre-circulated papers — also lend themselves to the kind of intense exchanges among panelists and with the audience that we usually associate with smaller conferences. So my parting suggestion is to expand the presence of SHAFR and the visibility of those who do the history of foreign relations at upcoming AHA meetings as a small step toward expanding the contours of the field.

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# A Roundtable on Victoria de Grazia's *Irresistible Empire*

## Review of Victoria de Grazia's *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth- Century Europe*

Daniel T. Rodgers

In a book as filled with vividly crafted stories as Victoria de Grazia's *Irresistible Empire*, readers will have their own favorite vignettes. Mine is the story of Richard W. Boogaart, a Kansan, owner and operator of supermarkets in Kansas and Mexico City, who was Nelson Rockefeller's agent in Italy in the winter of 1957. "He was tall and broad, with large hands and feet, and his slow gestures and pleasant face exuded quiet self-confidence," de Grazia writes. "They would have guessed that he was American even if he hadn't been wearing a cowboy hat against the raw February drizzle." (376) Brushing his Cadillac past Milan's small, cramped produce stores, crowded bakeries, and butcher shops as if they were seedy, small-time cattle farms cluttering up the space the big spreads needed, he was looking for vacant lots on which to build gleaming new supermarkets. Boogaart, the food distribution missionary, could have jumped right off the pages of a Graham Greene novel. When he and Rockefeller's International Basic Economy Corporation were done, the supermarket chain they had founded had blossomed into one of Italy's largest.

This story of the way in which modern, U.S.-style food marketing came to Italy is one of the dozens of extraordinary vignettes to be found in de Grazia's immensely learned, ambitious, and original history of European consumer patterns in the twentieth century. She opens with the story of the novelist Thomas Mann, the Old World chronicler of decadence and enervation, signing his name

in late 1928 to the founding charter of Munich's new Rotary Club. She paints a vivid picture of the Leipzig trade fair, where in the late 1920s thousands of manufacturers exhibited their wares in a market ruled by small batches and specialized production, radically unlike the mass-market, brand-name system of production that Henry Ford and others were pioneering. Her chapter on the post-war European consumer revolution opens with the army of sales agents that fanned out across France in 1968 with the goal of putting a box of Ariel, Procter & Gamble's newest laundry detergent, into the hands of every urban housewife. With hundreds of such telling details and a powerful synthetic framing, de Grazia has written a history of shifting and colliding consumption patterns that in its breadth, subtlety of argument, and intellectual engagement has not been seen since Simon Schama's *The Embarrassment of Riches*. For historians of modern consumer capitalism, this is an indispensable book, no matter what their national specialty.

For historians of international and comparative history, on the other hand, *Irresistible Empire* poses more of a puzzle. Boogaart's mission to Milan is the material out of which a history of the U.S. commercial conquest of the world might well be written. American consumer goods did pour out across the world in the twentieth century. In the thirty years after 1945, an army of Levis, Coca-Cola, and ball-point pens, and with them a new sense of universal norms and standards of living, invaded war-prostrated Europe. The mundane, de Grazia insists, was transformative: brand-name goods, packageable and predictable movie stars, and not the least, washing machines and laundry detergents.

The oddity of de Grazia's account of the Rockefeller mission to Milan is that

it comes so late in this large, densely packed book. For the first 300 pages of *Irresistible Empire*, the sales agents of American consumer capitalism beat on Europe's doors, but they are astonishingly ineffective at conquering its habits and institutions. Rotary, she shows, was taken up by the central European aristo-bourgeoisie as another marker of culture and status; when a group of genuine American Rotarians, straight off the pages of *Babbitt*, showed up in Dresden in 1931 to sing the clubs' anthem, "R-O-T-A-R-Y," their hosts could not conceal their astonishment. Edward Filene's mission to sell Europeans on the chain store idea in the 1930s, de Grazia shows, shattered on shopkeepers' resistance. European magazine advertisements turned more prosy, to be sure, in the manner favored by the J. Walter Thompson agency; Gillette razor blades (like the ones George Babbitt began his day with) dominated the disposable razor blade market; American movies washed over Europe in the early 1920s until quotas began to stem the flood. But de Grazia herself is much more interested in describing the ways in which Italian and German fascists built successful film counter-industries that co-opted Hollywood's formulas for their own, sharply distinctive purposes.

At almost every turn, from the 1920s through the early 1950s, she shows, the penetration of U.S.-style marketing systems was contested and incomplete, "erratic [and] often obstructed." (5) And that was, she insists, because U.S. and European consumer patterns after 1920 were rooted in fundamentally distinctive forms of capitalism. The "bourgeois regime of consumption" (10) that prevailed in Europe was a cultural system yoked to caste and status, in which goods were agents of class- and locally bounded solidarism. "Everything" in the European

pattern of consumption before 1945 was different from the pattern in the United States, she writes: from the size of markets to the modes of distribution, the notions of profit, and "the very concept of the consumer." (105) Scales were small and ambitions were restrained; upscale department stores catered to the wealthy; the working-class, tied to a "culture of poverty" (106), shopped at the local corner store, made do with mended clothes, and when they got more income spent it all on a slightly better cut of meat. Goods in this regime divided populations rather than homogenized them; "they produced new sources of differentiation and exclusion rather than making standards more homogeneous and accessible." (107)

In a culture of consumption framed like this, de Grazia suggests, it was not Ford or Filene, with their visions of overflowing cornucopias for everyone, who captured the mass imagination. It was Nazism, a system of "command

consumption" (125) that married the efficiencies of Fordist production to the ugliest status resentments of a shopkeeper culture. Through the first two thirds of de Grazia's book, virtually all her chapters end up in the vortex of Nazism. It was, she seems to suggest, the logical outcome of the European regime of consumption: the historical end of that line. In meta-contrasts like these, in de Grazia's pitching of her account as nothing less than a "transatlantic clash of civilizations" (10), Graham Greene links arms with Max Weber. The novelist's gift for detail fuses with the macro-sociologist's penchant for distinct, quasi-static, and virtually incommensurable ideal types.

The result, I suspect most readers will feel, is a brilliantly contradictory book. The title, the preface, and the chapter subtitles all run in one direction: the relentless advance of the U.S. "Market Empire." The actual argument for the first two-thirds of the book runs along a different line altogether, toward ideal types so different that only the exhaustion and defeat of outright war opened the way for the habits and ideals of mass consumption to take hold. Even then, de Grazia's treatment of the period of high imperial ambitions on the part of U.S. corporations after the Second World War stresses the persistence of the older cultural regime. She notes the hesitancy of Marshall Plan officials to encourage consumer ambitions, the "protracted and fraught" (401) struggles between supermarketers and shoppers, and the resistance of entrenched habits. The U.S. commercial hegemony was barely launched, she suggests, when in the 1970s others began to overtake it. The French retail giant Carrefour outmaneuvered U. S. supermarketers in Latin America and outsells Wal-Mart in China. The American advance through Europe was, in short, irresistible yet fraught with massive obstacles, almost a century in the making yet evanescent, peaceful in its means of persuasion yet utterly dependent on its rivals' military defeat.

There are difficulties on both sides of this oddly splayfooted argument, and Weber's ghost haunts both. The

long shadow of his influence has affected comparative history for a long time, turning tendencies into quasi-totalizing types and then conflating types with nations at the expense of all the contest and diversity they contain. These are common moves in the field of international studies, but they misread both the highly complex inner divisions of nations and the relations between them. At a certain altitude of analysis, consumption standards were sharply different in Europe and the United States throughout most of this period. But a step closer in, and the differences within the United States and the nations of Europe confound the easy labels.

"Nothing marked American consumer culture's precocious development more than the wide consensus that had emerged by the 1920s that all its citizens partook more or less of the American Standard of Living," de Grazia writes, echoing the convictions of many Europeans of the time. (100) By that standard, however, the cash- and commodity-poor American South was literally another country. Retail sales per capita in the South in 1930 were half the level of the industrial Northeast. In the heart of the cotton belt in 1930 there was one automobile for every 13 people, one radio for every 30 or more, and one telephone for every 60.<sup>1</sup> The red-clay, barefoot South of the 1920s and 1930s, where race and class were indelibly etched onto the space of the local crossroads store, sustained a consumption regime more different from the urban North than Mann's world was from Babbitt's.

Even in the heart of Babbitt territory, in Muncie, Indiana in the 1920s, the Lynds' reported, all you needed to do to tell a family's class position was to see whose light was on at 6 AM, when working-class shifts began. White working-class families in 1920s Chicago shopped at the local store for the same reasons that Milan housewives did: because they lived close by and transportation was expensive, because they felt a tie of ethnic solidarity with the owner, because they could argue in their own language with him, because he would give them credit. The family budgets of unskilled wage earners in Chicago

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show expenses for bananas, cherries, and biscuits, but there wasn't a bed per person in half the households. A generation later, in the early 1940s, when the modern revolution in mass consumer habits was clearly taking hold, California state experts on the standard of living circulated three different model budgets: one appropriate for an executive's family, one for a clerk's, one for a wage earner's. The wage earner's family was assumed to eat more than the executive's family but almost never to have a dinner guest. It was expected to buy its car used rather than new, to own a radio but not a phonograph, to make do with four times less lipstick and without any nail polish at all, to go on day excursions rather than the executive family's two-week rental-cottage vacation. Even in the land of mass consumption, the lines of class were deeply etched. Goods divided Americans, just as they divided Europeans.<sup>2</sup>

By the same token, the "Market Empire" of mass consumption had its entrepreneurs and innovators from the beginning in Europe as well as the United States, chafing at the regime of the small shopkeepers. Brand names, de Grazia notes, were as deeply seated in European commerce as in the United States in the 1920s. European department store innovators, who had battled the shopkeepers since the late nineteenth century, were quick to see the market to be captured in chain and "five-and-dime" outlets: Prisunic, Monoprix, Epa, Marks & Spencer, British Home Stores. One of the odd (and powerfully homogenizing) quirks of *Irresistible Empire* that this rare appearance of English referents underscores is the virtual absence of Britain from de Grazia's history of European consumption. Britain was the site of the Lever Brothers' brand-name empire, home of a middle class as brash and pushy as anything in Babbitt's Zenith, birthplace of the cooperative store and its distinctive labor/consumer politics, site of the 1920s "homes-for-heroes" campaign to build an entirely new standard of housing for the working class, a public program to raise general standards of the living that (for all its failures) had no counterpart in the United States

until the New Deal rural electrification project and the FHA.

Even supermarkets were not an American innovation. Boogaart was in Milan in 1957, rather than in Germany or England or Switzerland, because the market for mass-distribution food shops was, the Rockefeller people thought, already saturated there, dominated by European innovators and capital networks. The U.S. government, de Grazia tells us, sponsored a full-scale, fully stocked "American Way Supermarket" in Rome for the 1956 meetings of the International Congress of Food Distribution. But if this was empire—as, in a way, it was—it was an empire that from the beginning had its organizers and collaborators all across the older consumption regimes.

What we might better say, I think, is that the "Market Empire" was from the outset a multiply-located, transnational presence. The dream of a democracy of goods was not born in the United States. It was hardly present there as anything approaching a reality until the 1950s, just about the time when Boogaart was prowling through Milan.<sup>3</sup> Expansion of that empire of mass-distributed goods has been the project now of some governments, now of others. It was momentarily the project of the U.S. government in Europe in the generation after 1945. But the face it wears (American, multinational, or universal) is always to some degree a disguise, a veil drawn across the networks of a particular kind of highly mobile transnational, flexible capitalism. The globalization literature heralds those networks' power and allure, as if they were wired into the deepest human desires. De Grazia's achievement is to map out instead, with exceptional power and subtlety, the resistances those networks of commerce generate and the resentments they incite, the specificity of their contexts, and the power of the preexisting systems of goods and statuses that they must overturn. *Irresistible Empire* is a rarity in an age of hyped-up book marketing: a book vastly deeper and better than its title.

Daniel T. Rogers is Henry Charles Lea Professor of History at Princeton University.

## Endnotes

1. U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of American Business 1933: Retail Distribution*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of the Census, 1935); Howard W. Odum, *Southern Regions of the United States* (Chapel Hill, 1936), 256, 366.
2. Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, *Middletown: A Study in American Culture* (New York, 1929), chap. 7; Lizabeth Cohen, *Making a New Deal: Industrial Workers in Chicago, 1919-1939* (Cambridge, 1990), chap. 3; Leila Houghteling, *The Income and Standard of Living of Unskilled Laborers in Chicago* (Chicago, 1927), 108; Heller Committee for Research in Social Economics, *Quantity and Cost Budgets for Four Income Levels* (Berkeley, 1941).
3. Lizabeth Cohen, *A Consumer's Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York, 2003).

## Irresistible US

Emily S. Rosenberg

Victoria de Grazia's *Irresistible Empire* examines U.S. cultural influence in Europe during the twentieth century. She argues that the modern consumer revolution, born in America, became the wedge for a growing cultural hegemony that transformed work, pleasure, values, and even identity in Europe. Drawing on years of research in diverse archives, de Grazia has crafted an absorbing narrative that is driven by the stories of dozens of specific individuals and organizations, stories that spanned what she on one occasion refers to as the "White Atlantic."

De Grazia's clear and colorful prose is as stunning as her research. I kept pausing to savor and jot down phrases and examples that were just too well turned to skim past quickly. She describes the United States, for example, as a "great imperium with the outlook of a great emporium." She portrays the extension of the Rotary Club movement as "small-town America hobnobbing with the aristo-bourgeoisie" of Europe, and her account of the dilemmas involved in

translating into different languages the concept of Rotary “brother” and the organization’s occupational classification system reads as high comedy. Prepare for a few inserts into your lecture notes, SHAFR *compañeros/as y Brüder*.

Despite—or because of—the book’s virtues, however, the title seems inexplicable. Irresistible? Empire? Neither of these words seems to fit this admirable book. De Grazia suggests that Europeans often resisted Americanization. Moreover, her invocation of the word “empire” may connote the kind of heavy-handed “cultural imperialism” framework that her nuanced presentation adroitly avoids.

These two words may have been a marketing ploy. “Irresistible” suggests that the acceptance of U.S. influence was both inevitable and voluntary—a standard trope of the kind of exceptionalist interpretation (which this book is not) that is attractive to the Barnes & Noble crowd. The term “empire” has had a popular renaissance in the last four years that would have surely have amazed William A. Williams. Williams and his followers were constantly under attack for their use of the “e” word to describe the “American Way of Life.” Now, however, the word is ubiquitous, invoked routinely by both those who celebrate U.S. power and those who wish to condemn it. In the “recent nonfiction” section of bookstores, “empire” may be as prevalent on covers as, say, “well-being.” Taken together, the two words in the title have a pleasing ring: if the United States operates an empire, then at least let it be an irresistible one. It is appropriate that a book about the global spread of “market capitalism” should be so well packaged.

Enough grumbling about the title, however. If it attracts an audience to this book, should anyone complain? Unlike the title, the book portrays cultural interaction with a complexity that few scholars have matched.

It has remarkable strengths. De Grazia is a fine story-teller, and her chapters add depth and texture to the complicated processes that may be called Americanization or modernization. She analyzes how

America’s “Market Empire” propelled changes in twentieth-century Europe by examining the spread of a number of specific “social inventions” of America’s “consumer democracy”—corporations and their ethic of “service capitalism,” the Rotary Club movement, mass advertising and distribution, public opinion polling, Hollywood films, supermarkets, and other consumer industries. The much vaunted and admired American “Standard of Living”—a concept fashioned alongside the production and sales innovations that made more goods available faster and to more people—gradually wooed Europeans away from their older craft-based economies and their flirtations with various versions of command economies. She also examines interconnections and cross-flows, as groups of Americans and Europeans exchanged ideas about social and economic organization and shared their practices with each other.

Calling into question any single or simplistic framework for cultural interrelationships, de Grazia shows that Europeans simultaneously accepted and resisted various aspects of “Americanization.” The allure of American products and the resistance to their possible social consequences helped define the values and the ideologies that established fault-lines within European politics. Americans were both irresistible and abhorrent. Their reception depended on the time, place, and circumstances in which Europeans encountered them. Moreover, de Grazia’s study seems to amplify a point made by Richard Pells and others: while America may have helped transform Europe, the transformation itself promoted in Europe an idea that America was “not like us.” For example, the fast food and slow food movements (which in some quarters became simplified icons for America vs. Europe) both took definition from one another.

De Grazia also describes how some processes and habits that came to be identified with America sprouted simultaneously or even first in Europe. Department stores featuring international and especially imperial products and large-scale marketing, for example, emerged in both Europe

and the United States, and their entrepreneurs traded techniques and ideas. J. Walter Thompson spread into Europe in the interwar era, popularizing major American brands and affecting European marketing practices. But Europe also had advertising that grew from its own traditions of poster art. Similarly, although America tilted toward the model of “sovereign consumer” while Europeans leaned toward the model of “social citizen,” political platforms of the late 1940s on both sides of the Atlantic (from the New Deal to the Italian Constitution of 1948) emphasized an active social role for the state. De Grazia also notes that in recent decades America has declined as a center of the market revolution, as globalized capital—much of it Europe-based—has denationalized economic processes. Her work on these subjects is comparative and transnational history at its best.

*Irresistible Empire* also suggests some general thoughts about transnational cultural history. De Grazia’s in-depth research, often in highly unusual archives, illuminates all kinds of cultural and economic interactions and is an important corrective to international histories that focus only on state policy. Still, she could have expanded her account by dipping into government documents from the various “informational” agencies that tried to affect politics and culture in Europe. In “Enduring Freedom: Public Diplomacy and U.S. Foreign Policy” (*American Quarterly*, 2005) Liam Kennedy and Scott Lucas ask whether the recent scholarly emphasis on culture sometimes unwittingly provides cover for American power by slighting the efforts of government to shape cultural agendas. This article might well be read as a supplement to de Grazia’s book.

The U.S. government is the elephant that lives almost invisibly in the world that de Grazia presents. Its promotional activities on behalf of the American way figure briefly in her discussion of the Marshall Plan. But as work by Scott Lucas, Laura Belmonte, Kenneth Osgood, and many others shows, the overt and covert governmental efforts to carry out “psychological warfare” (or

“public diplomacy,” as it came to be known after the 1960s) comprised a major building block of U.S. Cold War strategy for decades. Western European countries, America’s most important trading partners and allies, became primary targets of this offensive to win hearts and minds.

To claim that these initiatives helped shape the “irresistibility” of American life in various ways is not to portray Europeans as dupes. Studies show that propaganda often fails to shape anyone but those already so inclined. Nevertheless, if it is important not to claim too much for government propaganda, it would be fatuous to imagine that the substantial U.S. support given to cultural “friends,” often through supposedly independent facades that even now are not all known, had no effect on Europeans. Historians must weigh the possible effects of well-funded, government-designed campaigns to “advertise” America, especially when presenting advertising as one of the major attributes of America’s “Market Empire.” Kennedy and Lucas warn that presenting cultural interactions within a transnational space in which the state has disappeared risks “glossing the workings of state power across national borders.” State-funded campaigns to contribute money and media exposure to some groups while disrupting and discrediting other groups may have affected the balance between resistance and irresistibility.

That caveat aside, I believe this book will make a fine teaching vehicle because it raises large issues related to both public life and to the making of history. De Grazia implicitly argues, for example, that America’s global power in the twentieth century rested primarily on the idea that America had created a middle-class lifestyle for most of its citizens. The promise of a high “Standard of Living” for the masses—explored in one of the book’s most valuable chapters—constituted the real American Revolution. If America had an irresistible magnetism, it stemmed from the country’s apparent ability to feed, clothe, and educate most of its diverse people and then to provide them with the leisure time to buy exciting new products and have fun. Is this

America—the land of confidence and promise, of social mobility and a broad middle class—still here and still thriving? De Grazia’s book provides no direct answer; it neither glorifies nor bashes contemporary America. But in these days of calls for better “public diplomacy” and “soft power,” her book may contribute to a discussion of what America symbolized to the world in the past and what it symbolizes today. Is it possible to recover America’s global magnetism, for example, in the context of domestic trends toward greater inequality, declining standards of living and health, aging infrastructure, public anxiety, and what Kevin Phillips calls the “de-enlightenment” of the population?

Finally, *Irresistible Empire* implicitly raises other significant issues related to language and discourse in the writing of history. De Grazia does not deeply engage the methodological terrain or interpretive dilemmas arising from the use of words such as Americanization, modernization, resistance, empire. Historians may use such words, of course, but readers should also continually problematize the discursive backgrounds with which they may be associated. De Grazia’s text (like the past itself) is open and rich enough to stimulate discussions about method and theory, and readers may take from it a diversity of meanings. *Irresistible Empire*. Or maybe not.

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### Simply Irresistible

Brian Etheridge

**I**n the interest of full disclosure, I have an admission to make. I am a sucker for “lumpers,” those historians who, in the formulation of John Gaddis, seek to “deliver themselves of sweeping generalizations that attempt to make sense out of whole epochs . . . [and] reduce the sheer untidiness of history to neat patterns that fit precisely within the symmetrical confines of chapters of books.”<sup>1</sup> I like books that

think big, and I am willing to overlook the ways in which they have to flatten history, compress events, and emphasize long-term themes to do so. Aware of the subject matter from reading several laudatory reviews, I was therefore favorably inclined toward Victoria de Grazia’s *Irresistible Empire* before even cracking its spine. Now, after finishing the book, I am convinced that it is a brilliant work that delivers in the way that the best “lumpers” do: it tackles a large subject and in so doing invites discussion on a range of topics, from the conceptualization of the subject to the methods it uses to achieve its objectives.

De Grazia’s subject is one of the biggest and most controversial of current times: the Americanization of Europe. Her focus is on the growth of the American consumer society, which she refers to as “the rise of a great imperium with the outlook of a great emporium.” To make sense of this phenomenon, she develops the concept of Market Empire, which she calls “an empire without frontiers” and others have described as an “empire by invitation” and the “empire of fun.” The most salient features of this empire are the interlocking and mutually supportive social institutions and cultural values that were exported along with its goods—namely, a civil society, American business norms, visions of democratic practice, and the firm belief that the spread of the empire contributes to international peace.

De Grazia traces the advance of the Market Empire by outlining a “transatlantic clash of civilizations” in which the American apostles of the consumer revolution are juxtaposed with the European defenders of bourgeois commercial practices. By the end of the century, she concludes, a “new transatlantic dialectic fostered by America’s consumer revolution” had come into being. She shows the large forces at work within this dialectic by relating the history of the spread of Rotary International, efforts to impose an American standard of living on Europe, the rise of American chain stores, the growth of American marketing and advertising, and the conquest of European cinema by

Hollywood.

It is obvious that de Grazia is a gifted historian in her prime. Her breadth of knowledge is staggering. In researching this impressive work she visited archives in the United States, Germany, Italy, France, and Switzerland, and she appears comfortable in all of these national contexts. What is more, she has mastered a number of subjects related to her overall research agenda. She appears equally at home talking about chain stores and Hollywood, as sure of herself discussing Frank Woolworth as Erich Pommer. Moreover, her grasp of the written word is dazzling. Only a true wordsmith could intermingle slangy words like “cockamamie,” “control-freak,” and “oddball” with GRE-prep words like “dudgeon” and “divagations” without sounding hackneyed and/or contrived. (I am not embarrassed to say that I had to break out the dictionary on more than one occasion.) If I have one reservation about assigning this book to graduate students, it is that her style could complicate my teaching of basic historical writing. De Grazia writes with such authority and felicity that I am afraid some students will try to mimic her, most likely with disastrous results. If I assign the book, I must be prepared to repeat to my beguiled students, “Yes, but you’re no Victoria de Grazia.”

My fears about students’ misguided and clumsy attempts to copy her style are more than counterbalanced by her exemplary craftsmanship, however. At many points throughout the book I was reminded of *A Midwife’s Tale*, in which Laurel Thatcher Ulrich masterfully contextualizes thin documents to tell a rich and significant story. I thought that this enviable ability was most evident in the first chapter on Rotary International. This chapter is written so gracefully, especially at the beginning, that it would be easy to miss how much work went into it. With vivid descriptions and absorbing insights, it contrasts Duluth and Dresden, Sinclair Lewis and Thomas Mann, *Babbit* and *Buddenbrooks* to set up the differences between America and Europe. The rest of the chapter explores the fascinating expansion of Rotary

across the Atlantic. A thorough look at the sources from which this mini-masterpiece is fashioned highlights how much imagination and creativity went into its creation. Just seeing how it was put together was worth the price of admission.

In fact, her writing is so mesmerizing and she is such a good storyteller that one can find oneself following along without being fully aware of what she is doing or how she is doing it (I am reminded, strangely enough, of George Kennan, who had a different but also very persuasive style). Since she is a “lumper” and covers such a large span of time with her book, failing to wake up and critically engage her work would translate into a failure to take advantage of one of the greatest contributions that lumpers have to offer—namely, that they provide an admirable departure point for discussing how and where current and future scholarship can build on, challenge, and otherwise revise the ways in which the subject has been synthesized.

In that spirit, I would like to raise a few issues that future scholars may choose to address. In the introduction, de Grazia lays out the big picture and familiarizes her readers with her integrative idea of Market Empire. After setting the macro-level stage, she then moves on to several case studies to flesh out how this Market Empire works. It is an interesting and almost necessary move, since tackling the entire phenomenon would be too much for one book or one lifetime. Yet I wish that she had returned more explicitly to the concept of Market Empire throughout the body of her book.

Her strategy of moving immediately from the macro level to case studies also deflects attention away from other significant developments. The effects of World War I and World War II are mentioned and are always, it seems, looming in the background. But the introduction and the narrative paint an almost fatalistic picture of the Market Empire’s inexorable movement through Europe, which raises a question that, while impossible to answer, is worthy of consideration: would Americanization

have proceeded without these cataclysmic events in European history? How central were the two world wars to America’s eventual domination of Europe?

On a related matter, while I applaud her focus on non-state actors, which certainly has not been the norm in foreign relations history, I wonder if policymakers are perhaps *too* absent in this narrative. She begins with an anecdote about Woodrow Wilson, but then she largely ignores American policymakers and American foreign policy, despite the amount of research that has been done on the relationship between private and public interests (such as the whole notion of corporatism). American policymakers make brief appearances in her discussion of the post-1945 world, but it is worth noting that the Republicans of the 1920s were also aggressive in encouraging business interests abroad.

Other questions regarding periodization and content come to mind. Why does she concentrate so heavily on the interwar years? Again, by her own admission, Americanization reached its zenith after World War II. Why spend so much time on the years before it? And why ignore the sixties and the seventies almost entirely? Her choice of case studies also raises questions. Why these particular “social inventions”? Why not a chapter on American clothing or American music? Why not a whole chapter on fast food?

Other reviewers have noted that the first six chapters follow a fairly standard pattern. A particular “social invention” is introduced, its American supporters are outlined, its European detractors are described, and finally Nazi Germany is presented as the only credible form of resistance to its spread. Are the differences between the American innovators and the European resisters as stark as de Grazia suggests? In many of these industries there was a greater degree of cross-fertilization than she lets on. Take Hollywood, for example. De Grazia admits that Hollywood was populated by Europeans such as Billy Wilder, Fritz Lang, and Fred Zinnemann. Yes, they were Americanized to a degree, but their

Europeanness also influenced their films.

De Grazia's overall narrative structure and argument also raise questions about resistance. That the Nazi regime emerges as the most effective form of resistance is both ironic and troubling. As Max Friedman points out in another review, positioning Nazi Germany as primarily anti-American ignores the true nature of the murderous regime.<sup>2</sup> But there has always been true resistance to mass society, and that resistance has manifested itself at all levels and in all regions. What de Grazia attacks with the pen has been and continues to be assaulted with the sword, whether it be in Middle America, Middle Europe, or the Middle East. How else does one understand the Days of Rage, the Red Army Faction, or 9/11? It is in relation to this notion of domestic resistance that I think an extended discussion of the sixties would have been a most welcome addition to the book. I also think it is very important to emphasize here that diverse groups in the United States have criticized large-scale capitalism and mass consumerism since their inception, which points up a real irony: much of what Europeans have regarded as quintessentially "American" has been viewed as perniciously "anti-American" by America's rural population. Put simply, there is evidence that the process De Grazia describes is a far more complex phenomenon than her trans-Atlantic clash of civilizations allows.

Finally, I think this question is worth asking: when compared to its eighteenth and nineteenth century ancestors and its twentieth-century rivals, is the modern consumer society that bad? Because consumerism's deficiencies are so obvious, I think we have a tendency to romanticize the past. Consumerism offers a numbing standardization of goods and services often targeted at the most vulgar level, but it also provides a great deal to the masses that was unavailable before. Consumer society simply would not work if consumers did not buy cheap goods from Woolworth's or Kmart. And while cheap, standardized goods and services may not necessarily

represent the good life (especially for elites), they often have represented a *better* life for people who did not have access to these kinds of goods before. To paraphrase a now-famous political question: are we better off now than we were one hundred years ago? Surely it depends on how the "we" is defined, but many alive today would probably answer "yes" (which in itself might mean that American standards of the good life have triumphed).

In sum, de Grazia's *Irresistible Empire* is an indispensable work for those who would seek to wrestle with the modern, globalizing world. It is an amazing piece of historical scholarship, immensely valuable on many different levels, and it establishes an agenda for future works on the complicated relationship between the United States and Europe. It is, like the empire it describes, simply irresistible.

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#### Endnotes

1. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).
2. Max Paul Friedman. "Review of Victoria de Grazia, *Irresistible Empire: America's Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe*," H-German, H-Net Reviews, June, 2006, at <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=235741159818672>.

#### The Other Side of Consumer Politics

Lawrence Glickman

It is an honor to participate in a roundtable discussion of Victoria de Grazia's stunningly erudite *Irresistible Empire*, which is one of the best books ever published in the burgeoning field of consumer history and certainly the most important work to examine the interactions among mass consumption, domestic life, and foreign relations. This is the kind of book that scholars of consumer society should be writing: bold, explicitly comparative, empirically rich, and analytically rigorous. Too often terms

like "Americanization," "consumer culture," and "mass consumption society" obscure more than they reveal. By defining her analytical framework so clearly and grounding her book in detailed case studies, de Grazia makes her arguments both bold and firmly rooted. At the same time, because her choices of topics are often surprising (as in the brilliant opening chapter on Rotary Clubs in the United States and Europe) or else they re-visit from fresh perspectives topics that we thought we knew (such as advertising or the Marshall Plan), *Irresistible Empire* is wonderfully imaginative. It is also beautifully written, with finely wrought sentences making de Grazia's powers of observation seem all the richer.

Consisting of interwoven case studies that proceed chronologically, *Irresistible Empire* offers a series of extraordinary windows into the society, economics, and politics of both the expanding American imperium and the European host regions. Without ever underestimating American commercial might, de Grazia confirms that "Americanization" has been a complex process with many unintended consequences and shows that while many aspects of American consumer culture were impossible to resist, as the title suggests, they were also desirable goals for ordinary Europeans. De Grazia rejects overly simplistic narratives of American hegemony, along with claims that Europeans were able to Americanize on their own terms, picking and choosing the characteristics they admired while rejecting the rest. For example, her examination of the Rotary Club phenomenon in America and Europe, highlighted by an instructive comparison of the Duluth and Dresden branches, demonstrates that while Europeans adapted these clubs for their own purposes, they also created new—and distinctly American—styles of rituals and social capital.

One of the many wonders of the book is that de Grazia is attentive to nuance and complication in each of her disparate case studies, yet she weaves them together into a coherent argument or, more precisely, set of arguments. Each of the cases

demonstrates what she labels the five characteristics of the American "Market Empire" (6-9): (1) the determination that other nations had "limited sovereignty over their public space"; (2) the inexorable exportation of America's civil society alongside its goods; (3) a parallel exportation of "norms-making," which made the "American Standard" seem both universal and compulsory; (4) a certain kind of democratic ethos that valued middle-American sociability over traditional modes of solidarity; and (5) an "apparent peaceableness" that masked the hegemonic intentions of what de Grazia calls an "imperium disguised as an emporium."

As these themes suggest, de Grazia zeroes in on the politics embedded in the nature of the American commercial relationship with Europe, a relationship that generally did not express itself in an explicitly political argot. She does this in a number of ways: by noting that American diplomacy was often geared toward commercial ends; by demonstrating the ways in which the American nation-state played a role in facilitating "Americanization," often serving as the handmaiden of business enterprises; and, most important, by arguing that the economic change engendered by America's commercial empire necessarily catalyzed changes in the social, legal, and cultural structure of European societies, changes that can only be categorized as political.

De Grazia's book is tough-minded but for the most part scrupulously fair, based as it is on the judicious reading of many sources in many languages. The one area where I felt this scrupulousness broke down was in her often one-sided depiction of American consumer democracy, in which the emphasis was on the former rather than the latter. (She also appears to deny that it is possible for the two to work in tandem, for consumer politics to act in the service of democratic politics, but I will discuss that later.) In the introduction, which begins with an analysis of a speech that Woodrow Wilson gave to the "World's Salesmanship Congress" in 1916, de Grazia notes that Wilson "infused contemporary statecraft

with a strikingly modern consumer sensibility." (2) Wilson's complex foreign policy is here reduced to one component of his vision; too much weight is accorded to one speech given at a sales convention. In this section and elsewhere de Grazia conflates Wilson and Ford. To be sure, Wilson saw commerce as the key to democratic development, but Ford envisioned Europe as an unbounded region, whereas Wilson famously proposed self-determination for the peoples of Europe and elsewhere as a way to prevent future wars.

It may seem unfair to offer critiques of a book that does so many things so superbly. Yet for the purposes of furthering our understanding of the history of "America's Advance" through Europe, I offer the following additional critiques. Most of these suggestions have to do with topics omitted from the book — topics that would, I believe, provide a fuller context for an understanding of the politics of the interactions among United States, Europe and consumer society.

One issue is chronological. De Grazia focuses on the period roughly from the Great War to the dismantling of the Berlin Wall. This is certainly a legitimate choice, because it allows her to explore the interaction between the incipiently Fordist (and eventually post-Fordist) American economy and what she felicitously calls Europe's "old regime" of "bourgeois consumption," which eventually became a Europe that was "as much a consumer society as the United States." (463) It would have been useful, however, to reflect on the pre-history of this relationship. The nineteenth century witnessed a vibrant trans-Atlantic traffic in commercial goods, performers, reformers (among them abolitionists, temperance advocates, and suffrage proponents), and organizations. We can quibble about whether the United States was a fully formed "consumer society" in this period, but there is no doubt that commercial and organizational exports shaped European culture well before Henry Ford exported his famed assembly line. One of the more intriguing of these exports, the National Consumers

League, founded in the United States in 1899, inspired sister groups in almost every European country well before the Rotary Club went abroad. *La Ligue sociale d'acheteurs*, for example, was founded in France in 1902 and was quickly followed by consumer leagues in Switzerland (1906), Germany (1907), Spain and Italy (between 1906 and 1908), and Belgium (1911). Many consumer activists of the Progressive Era — Maud Nathan, Florence Kelley, Jane Addams — went to Europe frequently and considered themselves part of an international reform community.<sup>1</sup>

And this leads to what is to my mind the most significant shortcoming of *Irresistible Empire*. Although de Grazia demonstrates the multifaceted nature of the politics of consumption, she unnecessarily limits her conception of what counts as consumer politics. This is because her focus is so heavily on the producers, as it were, of politics: governments, industry, business organizations, advertisers. She does not pay enough attention to those who shaped consumer politics from the other end. When de Grazia refers to the "consumer-citizen" (as Chapter Seven is entitled), she ignores the many significations of this phrase — significations that Lizabeth Cohen elaborates upon in *A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York, 2003). As de Grazia uses it, the phrase "consumer-citizen" suggests that the latter is inevitably subsumed by the former. In other words, consumers and citizens sit on opposite poles of the polity, the former acting in private, self-interested ways and the latter behaving in a solidaristic, public-spirited manner. Most telling in this regard is the short shrift that de Grazia gives to consumer activism — efforts to exercise citizenship through consumption that go some way toward breaking down the private/public divide between the two. Other than the epilogue on the "slow food" movement, there is little discussion of either consumer activism (a term mentioned only late in the book in regard to the American Esther Peterson [450]) or the consumer movement (mentioned briefly on

pp. 374-75), two American models of consumer politics and ultimately two influential European exports that were very different from the dominant model of commercial hegemony. De Grazia mentions boycotts, another nineteenth-century trans-Atlantic development, relatively infrequently (I noted mention of them on pp. 137, 180, 222, 300, 309, 401, although the term does not appear in the index) and does not describe them in depth. It is hard to know whether boycotts were simply less common in Europe or whether they escape her gaze because they represent another side of consumer politics, the consumer embracing a political role. (Of course, we must keep in mind that the politics of boycotters, in the United States and in Europe, were not always commendable; the Nazis' anti-Jewish boycott was perhaps the most popular boycott campaign in the period that de Grazia covers.) Consumer activists worked the middle ground between what de Grazia calls "the European vision of the social citizen and the American notion of the sovereign consumer" (342), and more attention to this group might have led to a more multifaceted understanding of citizen consumers. These groups were particularly attentive to the problem that Georg Simmel set out: "a growing distance in genuine inner relationships and a declining distance in more external ones" (quoted by de Grazia on p. 27). Although de Grazia touches on green anti-consumerist thought and practice in her excellent account of slow food, there is little discussion here of environmental politics as a trans-Atlantic phenomenon. Nor is there discussion of the politics of consumer protection and representation.<sup>2</sup> These aspects of consumer politics were transnational too; indeed, in 1960, the transnational relationship was formalized with the establishment of the International Organisation of Consumers Unions (IOCU), known today as Consumers International (CI).

This is not to suggest that it was a level playing field, or that the actions of consumer activists nullified the powerful forces of commerce that de Grazia treats. It is understandable that a scholar centrally concerned

with questions of power would make the determination that consumer movements had little impact in slowing or shaping the commercialization of twentieth-century Europe. Although at the end of the book de Grazia briefly discusses "critical consumption" as a phenomenon of the 1990s (466), to my mind she is insufficiently attentive to consumer activism, considering that it was another of the forces set in motion by the processes of commercialization that she analyzes so powerfully.

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#### Endnotes

1. See Marie-Emmanuelle Chessel, "Consumers' Leagues in France: A Transatlantic Perspective," in *The Expert Consumer: Associations and Professionals in Consumer Society*, ed. Alain Chatriot, Marie-Emmanuelle Chessel, and Matthew Hilton. (Ashgate: 2006), 53; idem., "Women and the Ethics of Consumption in France at the Turn of the Twentieth Century," in *The Making of the Consumer: Knowledge, Power, and Identity in the Modern World*, ed. Frank Trentmann (Oxford: Berg, 2006), 81-98. On p. 82 of this article, Chessel notes the frequency of "transatlantic exchanges among reformist movements in this period."
2. *Europe's Consumer Movement: Key Issues and Corporate Responses* (Geneva and New York: Business International S. A., 1980); "From America to Europe: Educating Consumers," *Contemporary European History*, vol. 11, n. 1, février 2002, 165-175.

### A Response from the Author


Victoria de Grazia

**T**hank you all for the generosity of your comments as well as your tactful and pertinent criticisms. Since I am by formation a Europeanist, I conceived of *Irresistible Empire* as relevant first and foremost to twentieth-century European history, only to have to turn to scrutinize the power of U.S. consumer culture in the place it was born, in the U.S. itself.

In fact, *Irresistible Empire* is a double history. Its central problematic is driven as much by the need to explain

the catastrophic decline of Europe as a center of great power as by the need to explain the rise of the United States as a great power. The two stories became completely intertwined. The novelty is that I tell this as a story of butter as well as guns, arguing that the emerging mass consumer society which we in the United States take more or less for granted as we write its history was deeply obstructed in early twentieth-century Europe, and these barriers were lifted only by huge and sustained pressure from the new global hegemon, the United States. This pressure mounted across the decades and was exercised through an unusual combination of civil society, state, and corporate institutions; it was speeded by armed conflict; and it eventually became effective through wide collaboration on the part of new alliances forming in the aftermath of war and the defeat of indigeneous conceptions of mass consumer society. For the purposes of my argument, American power operated in the realm of material culture: its centerpiece, the high standard of living. It embodied a particular kind of consumer democracy, one that was widely inclusive, based on access through money to an expanding market and driven by the mass production and distribution of innovative goods vaunted for creating a strong sense of sociability and reinforcing what I call a "democracy of recognition." This is a particular kind of democratic participation, one that permitted people to act or perform as if they were basically similar. For much of the twentieth century, it represented no small progress. If I were to be more emphatic about certain themes of the book, I would explain more clearly the interplay in the development of consumer culture between war-making and peacetime, and the specially privileged place that Europe has occupied in the scheme of American global hegemony. I would also want to clarify to younger critics a point that I took for granted because when I first went to Europe in the 1960s, the society was on the cusp of such huge changes: namely that up until five decades ago, most Europeans lived in a very different material culture, which at

# Diplomatic History at Its Best




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
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
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least outwardly we would regard as deep poverty; that the institutions of modern consumer society have a history in Europe just as in the United States; and that this history is not simply an unfolding of a natural history of material life.

All this is to preface the salience of your concerns, which I have broken down into four points. The most vexed question bears on whether the United States is appropriately characterized as an empire and how its consumer culture is bound up with its imperial disposition. Another question involves resistance: whether Europeans were as pliant as the word "irresistible" suggests and whether in discussing consumer culture I have given too short shrift to the democratic dimensions of American consumer activism at home and abroad. A third concern is whether I have properly identified differences between the United States and Europe and whether the trends I have identified as being manifestations of U.S. hegemony are not universal dimensions of modernization and/or globalization, playing themselves out across the Atlantic at different times and with different modalities. A fourth concern—or rather hesitation, expressed by Brian Etheridge as he so generously calls attention to the narrative style of the book—involves the methodology of the book and the cases on which its arguments rest.

To grapple with the first question: clearly, *Irresistible Empire* doesn't stand on whether readers agree that what I describe is an empire. In the worst case, the title could simply be considered irrelevant, a question of clever packaging. Or it could be taken as a provocation. Or it could be taken seriously, but the cases don't prove it. Admittedly, had the book come out a decade ago, I would have given it a different title. Probably I would have drifted around the word "hegemony," which once had its own allure. Or I might have used the phrase "consumer culture," now over-consumed. Titles are supposed to be attractive and perhaps give an heuristic jolt! That said, when I first conceived of the central problem of the book two decades ago—the originality of the U.S. exercise of

global power from the perspective of Europe—American imperialism was very much on my mind. The word "empire" was current, at least among radical historians, in the wake of William Appleman William's *Empire as a Way of Life*, and after the U.S.-backed coup in Chile there was widespread global discussion of U.S. "cultural imperialism," a term I never took to. As an unrepentant Gramscian, my problem was hegemony. And the mighty United States of the early twentieth century, coming into contact with a Europe whose closed empires were causing it to explode with conflict, was as powerful an international hegemon as Great Britain in the process of establishing the Pax Britannica over the crumbling structures of non-western empires in Africa and Asia, or the Napoleonic Empire as it confronted with its new regime of codes, institutions, and ideals the failing absolutist regimes of the turn-of-the-eighteenth-century European continent.

As I finished the book, the problem of empire had returned with a vengeance and with far different implications from the 1960s-1970s populist usage (which liberals and conservatives never accepted). Empire is on the political agenda, in analyses of the unilateral exercise of American power, the significance of the occupation of Iraq, the nature of the power exercised by global institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and the humanitarian mission of NGOs. Empire is also on the historian's agenda as global history, post-colonial studies, and the field of International Relations cope with a proliferation of empires, not just the venerable western models from Rome and Spain to Great Britain, but also the Qing and the Japanese, the Ottoman, Russian, and Soviet. The result is all kinds of cross-fertilization. There is more and more emphasis on the "soft" dimension of the Roman Empire, for example—on the transfer of the so-called Roman package (e.g., aqueducts, markets, coliseum); on the processes of the "Romanization" of Gaul; and on the distinctly different kinds of sovereignty exercised with respect to other collectivities, ranging from princely alliances to outright

enslavement. Meanwhile, in the case of single empires, like Great Britain's, historians find more and more movement—e.g., from informal to formal and vice versa—accompanied by different levels of violence and different claims for legitimacy. So the concept of empire is up for grabs, not just because we want or don't want the United States to be an empire, but because the concept of an "empire," understood as a closed, single-centered sovereignty, with a clear distinction between metropolis and periphery, and assuming a contrast of interests between ruler and ruled, a single kind of resource behind it, and one coherent mission has come under more and more scrutiny.

That said, I spoke of the United States as imperial in a specific way, as a "market empire," to underscore that in its claims to promote a global free market, it was ever more buttressed by a highly intricate and articulated institutional network, composed of civil society circuits as well as corporate enterprise and national governmental agencies, in addition to international agencies that I did not address, like the IMF, the GATT and the World Bank, which are deeply involved in defining consumer standards by their policies on fiscal restraint, debt payment, tariffs etc. That made its exercise of power special with respect to other imperial formations.

Opening with Woodrow Wilson, I did indeed conceive of the president as an informal imperialist, a debated but respectable position in U.S. historiography. That did not at all preclude his fervently believing in national sovereignty. To respond to Larry Glickman's concern, the sovereign nation-state was for Wilson, as I see it, an all-important container, but the model state within a world of states would be open to the very kind of institutions that the early twentieth-century United States had the duty and capacity to supply globally. That is what face-to-face diplomacy, as well as free trade, was about. But then it was always the goal of free-trade imperialists to leave local institutions more or less intact. The problem, as we know from the venerable work of Ronald Robinson

and John Gallagher on the "Scramble for Africa," is that "free trade imperialism" has a way of rotting out local institutions by offering unattainable models, encouraging indebtedness, promoting corruption, and stirring up rebelliousness, at which point the locals are blamed for their incapacity to maintain the law and order required for global trade, and the way is open for new and different levels of regulation and intervention, whose models come from the metropolis. Clearly Wilson could not have foreseen the so-called "K-Mart State" of the 1990s, which sought to make formerly more or less effectively sovereign units safe for international capital by outsourcing large dimensions of local policy, tolerating the undercutting of local cultural solidarities, and effectively diminishing local democracy. Even so, Wilson well understood the flexible forms of governance, as well as the critique of closed empire, that were indispensable to making the world safe for American "business democracy," and he began to prepare American business for that happy destiny by building up the Department of Commerce's external capacities at the same time as taking on the closed empires of Europe.

Clearly, the lens of consumer culture, broadly defined, doesn't contemplate the whole range of innovations exported by the United States. What I wanted to underscore was the unusual synchronization of impulses from civil society, corporate enterprise, and state agencies. Dedicating more attention to governmental mediation and coordinating devices, as Emily Rosenberg suggests, would not change the story. I think her concern is whether a well-conceived national policy would refurbish U.S. "soft power" today, as cultural diplomacy becomes a buzz word in policy circles and new study programs abound. In other words, could the United States today restore its old hegemony by using less force and more consent? My history suggests not: Joseph Nye's notion of "soft power" is not the same as mine. I am talking about hegemony, of which persuasion is a part, to the degree that it reflects broad national consensus around a global

vision. When cultural diplomacy works, as it did, say, in the 1950s, with "Satchmo playing the world" (Penny Van Eschen), it was as an adjunct or coordinator of other flows. In sum, cultural diplomacy is like packaging; it is only as good as the capacity of the American model, based on the higher standard of living, to offer globally the promise of that higher standard of living. If the United States rose to new challenges, presenting itself, say, as a model of global cooperation capable of spearheading policies to address global warming and creating institutions dedicated to the equitable redistribution of global resources, and if Americans rallied enthusiastically behind state policy, generating a wide new consensus for a global New Deal in the conviction that the United States truly had a winning way of life, then, perhaps, cultural diplomacy would be a very effective tool.

Was the empire "irresistible"? Emily Rosenberg and Dan Rodgers make the point that it was not. The surprise is rather that Europe took so long to be persuaded. And Larry Glickman makes another point: that within the United States, there was powerful resistance to American consumer culture; indeed, it was built into the consumer culture. Accordingly, he sees me as giving short shrift to the dialectic that would have American consumer movements emerging at the same time as U.S. consumer culture, thereby universalizing the anti-corporate consumer culture that in today's world lies behind "critical consumption."

Here we are dealing with two criticisms that are subtly linked by a notion of resistance as individual agency. This is a distinctly American or Anglo-American conception, now deeply embedded in a *radicalisant* social history that never paid much mind to how the hegemonic structures within resistance take place or to how these structures drive as well as deeply condition the conception of alternatives. If we find resistance, then everything is OK; power is somehow defanged. The title was intended to have a touch of irony: the author's little joke was to recall Brecht's *The Irresistible Rise of Arturo*

*Ui*, the play presenting Hitler's ascent as predictable and stoppable, so that the title has often been translated as "The Resistible Rise." "Irresistible" has yet another double sense. On the part of the United States, the push outward could not be explained only on economic grounds, its economy depending relatively little on exports compared to Europe's. But the vision of market was inexorably expansive by the nature of the market's size and complexity and by the competition, creativity, and communication systems required to operate on it. If I were to add now another important dimension, it would be the religious afflatus behind Manifest Destiny as interpreted by Anders Stephenson. Irresistible abroad: yes, but with huge resistance to the model and especially to all of the transformations required for the model to take. It took the European catastrophe for the American model to pass: in the meantime, all kinds of alternatives were thrown forward—all, including the Nazi New Order's *Grosswirtschaftraum*, with its incessant reference to the Monroe Doctrine and its claim to offer Europe a high standard of living, conditioned by America's ascendancy. Ditto for the Soviet bloc, pushed by American pressure to an untenable model, "to catch up and surpass," starting in the Khrushchev era, spending hugely on military and foreign competition and for that reason, too, unable to adapt its inflexible planning system.

In principle, Larry Glickman's National Consumer League, founded in 1899, could well fit into my story, though I would add it to the hegemony side of the equation. U.S. consumer democracy is a peculiar institution: there are so many other kinds of democracy, as well as citizenship. I see it as narrower in its concept of human rights, tolerant of inequality, and uniquely trusting in market forces, at the same time as it is clearly part of a vast movement to mitigate them. I have no difficulty arguing that American hegemony was dialectical, introducing dominant as well as oppositional forces as it reproduced its institutions within other societies. My point is that it challenged a very different concept

of social democracy, and for most decades, starting at the outset of the nineteenth century, it attached itself mainly to Catholic and Conservative movements as a weapon against the socialist left. From the 1960s, American-style consumerism, in the figure of Ralph Nader as well as Esther Peterson, found an echo in so-called radical parties with libertarian agendas as well as among conservative policymakers who used it to deflect the democratic organization of consumers.

More generally, one point of *Irresistible Empire* is to deflect social historians from looking for a usable past in a good consumer society. I am resolutely not against mass consumption: quite the contrary. My major critique of early twentieth-century European societies was that they forbade it to the mass of their citizens, whereas the United States held out that promise. As a progressive, I far prefer the new regime to the old regime of consumption. And by the last quarter of the twentieth century, citizens of Western Europe enjoyed high levels of consumption. But did that make the region more democratic? Did it mean that consumer activism is the only effective or legitimate form of opposition? If I ended the book with a brief reflection on Slow Food, it was to suggest that so-called critical consumption as an oppositional movement of something less than vast impact arises out of a new mix of trends not dependent only on American movements, though the Slow Fooders themselves recognize the potential contribution of American social movements to their cause. The point cannot be that consumer movements are the modern-day equivalents of the socialist movements of the last century. To start, Alice Waters, bless her, is no Karl Marx.

The most anguishing part of writing on such a big scale is that I mostly prefer the worm's eye view to the bird's eye view. How to deal with the myriad of acts of complicity, adventure, pleasure, or distaste that accompany a first encounter? Ethnographers are good at capturing processes categorized under the names of "creolization," "hybridization,"

etc., that are consistent with broad strokes of the canvas of hegemony. Business historians too are adept at calculating transfers of best practice. As goods, institutions, etc., go local, they lose their names; they become naturalized. That is part of the process. That said, these phenomena have origins, and my effort here has been to root them in the circuitry through which they were transferred. Hence, if this is called international history, it is a history of American hegemony, and the power of the United States to shape the direction and substance. It is not the story of what Dan Rodgers offhandedly calls "networks of highly international flexible capitalism." That implies an unacceptably Tom Friedmansque vision of markets, as if they were not deeply inflected by nation-states or other collectivities. It is U.S. liberal historiography's vision of the "international" as a level playing field. If nothing else, this view ignores the most important problem (after the exploitation of labor) posed by the great theorists of capitalism, from Adam Smith and Marx to Polanyi: namely, that capitalism is deeply inflected by power and particularly by the cultures, institutions, and regulations of states and other collectivities.

Whether Europe and the United States are as different as *Irresistible Empire* maintains boils down to a huge problem, which is not comparison in itself, but the different conceptions of class and stratification that lie behind the very definition of the American standard of living and that inflect how we ourselves, as historians, conceive of class. Relative poverty is not the issue: solid works like Peter Shergold's *Working Class Life*, which compared Pittsburg, U.S.A and Birmingham, England at the turn of the century, demonstrated that certain groups of American and British workers enjoyed comparable standards of living. But nothing effectively contradicts Werner Sombart's observations (and before him De Tocqueville's) that standards were conceived as well as lived differently, depending on prevailing notions of class hierarchy. If we cannot avoid the conclusion that the United States was different because of the awful legacy of slavery;

we cannot avoid the conclusion that most of Europe was different because of the legacy of feudalism. Dan Rodgers points out all sorts of indices demonstrating that there are significant numbers of poor in the United States and that the rural South, with its population of poor whites and especially poor blacks, was as poor as many parts of Europe. It is well known that the poverty line is a statistical fiction. In response to Rodgers, let me simply note that it sounds right that in the 1930s South on average only 30 out of 1000 people had an automobile, compared to 222 as the national average. But compare those figures to 9 out of 1000 in Italy, 25 in Germany; and 56 in Great Britain in 1938.

Such precise measurements are an exercise in positivism that contemporary Europeans rightly ridiculed. It is the genius of American consumer culture to imagine the market as inclusive—in principle, it did not exclude African-Americans, however poor or segregated they were. Americans used the term "consumer" freely; many groups spoke "as if" the American masses were consumers. In Europe they did not; the term "consumer" was rarely used in its modern sense down to the 1950s. In Europe, the shift was not simply a function of higher individual incomes; it was the result of a shift of regime, coming out of new arrangements of production on the large scale made possible by the European community and state intervention to support the consumption of modal goods now recognized as basics of civilized life, like housing, the small-cylinder car, the refrigerator, the washing machine. Institutions offering credit made it possible to reallocate relatively small incomes. That Europe should now have wide swathes of middle-classness is a relatively recent phenomenon.

In conclusion, let me respond briefly to Brian Etheridge's flattering comments about the style of the book. American culture has a wide puritan streak that sees style and substance not just as distinct but detracting from one another. It was a big shift for me to put a premium on narrative power, since my original love was

comparative history, which put a premium on economy of structure, clarity of concepts, citation of authority, and framing of evidence. The first study that went into this book, on cinema, was an exercise in comparison, looking at how the cinema establishments of three continental powers—Germany, France, and Italy—responded to Hollywood, the variables being intellectuals, the state, and the cohesiveness of the cinema sector. But comparison couldn't render complicated circuitries of power, so I radically de-structured the presentation, shifting to a form of *histoire croisée*. High-powered narrative comes at a cost; it stylizes argument, and it conceals meaningful gaps, lapses, and silences so as to create a false impression of seamlessness. The upside is that it renders complicated transfers, mimicking the language that protagonists themselves used to construe and bridge the great divide between the United States and Europe. Their exchanges, by speaking not

just to national rivalries but also to binary thinking, male one-upmanship, disorientation, and pleasure, yield a more complex modeling of motives and effects. Writing is a lonely process in the best of cases, and writing a long book often friendless; having to choose between speaking to my imaginary audience about my academic antagonists (and friends) and sharing with them the foibles and dilemmas of people in the world about which I was writing, I chose the latter.

American culture pretends transparency, and I have constantly been asked who wears the black hat, who the white? Europe or America? Or is consumer culture good or bad? I am not one for the post-modern ironic stance; my commitment is to illuminate the intertwining of pleasure and dread in a hegemony combined of consumer culture and an ever more massive array of military materiel. If there is a message to take away, it is that, ultimately, the American hegemony deep-sixed

certain alternative ways of imagining the distribution and enjoyment of social abundance. At the same time it was clearly better than many of the prevailing alternatives. But the system it ordained over the last century is now unsustainable. The U.S., once the biggest producer and consumer of practically everything, now has competition. And the terrain is not just markets, but the many other claims on the earth's resources, including those of future generations. To rise to that challenge requires as radical an imagination about the problem of needs and global governance as the revolutionary vision of globalizing mass consumption pioneered out of the United States in the early twentieth century.

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# Clio and Me: The Story of a Diplomatic Historian Who Became Provost

*Michael J. Hogan*

*Editor's Note: This essay derives from a speech given by Dr. Hogan to the Iowa City Foreign Relations Council on August 24, 2006.*

I am going to spend most of my time here describing the evolution of my scholarship over the last thirty years, and then I am going to discuss how my study of politics and diplomacy informs my work as a provost. As many of you probably know, I did my graduate work at Iowa, and while I was doing my dissertation, I got interested in the evolution and nature of the modern state system that emerged between the end of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth. This system was spawned by the forces of modernization, particularly industrialization, and was increasingly characterized by large-scale, well organized, and often very powerful private structures, organizations, and interest groups, including organized agriculture, organized labor, and especially organized business, which was often denounced as "the trust" or "the monopolies."

These developments were happening in virtually every modern society in the world, and different countries reacted in different ways. Governments grew larger in order to deal on an equal footing with these private concentrations of economic and political power, and in some countries the result was a form of statist domination—sometimes on the left, as under communism, and sometimes on the right, as under fascism.

The United States, on the other hand, pursued what we might call a middle way between the political economy of the nineteenth century, which was unregulated, fragmented, and characterized by small producers operating in local markets, and the modern trend toward concentrations

of economic power operating in vast national and international markets. Following this middle way, government would grow larger and would have the authority to promote the public good and regulate the economy; but at the same time, efforts would be made to limit the size and scope of government power. This would be done by officially recognizing the rights of organized private groups to regulate their own affairs in a responsible fashion and by promoting a pattern of enlightened collaboration among these groups and between them and the government to guarantee order, stability, and progress. In this sense, the middle way aimed to reconcile the modern trend toward organized capitalism and state power with the traditional values embedded in American political culture, such as localism, privatism, volunteerism, and individualism. In this kind of a system there is always a certain tension—between public power and private power, between individualism and the group, between volunteerism and regulation. And at different times the pendulum has swung more toward one side than the other, depending on circumstances and the administration in power. But as a country we have remained pretty much in the middle ground over the last hundred years or so. Or at least, this is what I discovered in the course of my research on diplomacy and state-making in the first half of the twentieth century.

Inspired by my two mentors, Ellis Hawley and Lawrence Gelfand, I focused in my first book on American efforts to rebuild the world economy after the First World War, from the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 through the late 1920s. I tried to show how the evolving middle way shaped the formulation of American foreign policy and the kind of global economic order the Americans wanted

to create—notably, their efforts to develop largely private, voluntary, and cooperative structures that would help regulate international oil, for example, or develop global communications markets, or resolve a host of thorny issues ranging from the problem of German reparation payments to the regulation of American loans that would help rebuild war-devastated Europe.

Diplomatic history may not be the first field of study people think of when they think "exciting." But the 1970s were an exciting time to be working on the history of the 1920s. The 1970s saw the beginning of what would become a revisionist movement among historians that would overturn the older view of Republican foreign policy as reactionary and isolationist. Indeed, in this work the 1920s emerged as a transitional decade in which the United States remained very active in international affairs and Republican policymakers revealed a surprisingly progressive global vision.

It was also an exciting time for me because the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library was just down the road from Iowa City, and Hoover's papers, which had remained sealed until his death in 1964, had recently been opened. I was among the first historians to delve into the Hoover archives, and they were a gold mine. As secretary of commerce under Presidents Harding and Coolidge, Hoover was in fact one of the principal shapers of American international economic policy after World War I. He was the first of three presidents I studied over time—the others being Truman and Eisenhower—and all three saw their historical reputations revised and upgraded in the years after they left the White House and their papers became available to historians.

Hoover lived to be ninety years old, and he liked to brag that he had

"outlived the bastards," meaning his opponents in Congress, who blamed him for the Great Depression, and Roosevelt, who soundly defeated him in 1932. The Democrats, of course, laid the country's misery on Hoover's shoulders and mocked his 1928 campaign ads that promised "a chicken in every pot" as evidence of his shortsightedness and his failure to act. After enjoying a reputation as an effective leader for most of his career, Hoover saw his popularity plummet as the Depression grew deeper. There is an old story that Hoover once asked Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon for a nickel to call a friend, and Mellon replied, "Here's a dime—call up all your friends." Hoover left office in disgrace, and his poor reputation stuck, carried forward in the history books for two generations.

The conventional textbook picture of Hoover was that of a coldhearted, reactionary Republican who cared more about the banking interests than the welfare of the people. But the truth is another story. Far from being a reactionary, Hoover was a Republican Progressive who had voted for Theodore Roosevelt and the Bull Moose party in 1912. His humble beginnings as an orphan from West Branch, Iowa, prepared him to identify with the aspirations of the people, and his Quaker background equipped him with a strong sense of ethics, including a strong work ethic that helped him become a very successful mining engineer. He turned failed mining operations all over the world into profitable operations, along the way earning a reputation as the "doctor of sick mines," not to mention a tremendous personal fortune. When World War I broke out, however, he put that life behind him and devoted himself to public service, for which he refused to accept any compensation.

Hoover first became the head of the Commission for the Relief of Belgium, which saved an estimated ten million people from starvation in that devastated country during the early years of the European War. When the United States entered the war, President Wilson tapped Hoover to head the Food Administration. In that role he established a reputation for organizational genius and efficiency

as well as for dedication to public service. And after the war, he ran the American Relief Administration, the U.S.-sponsored relief effort that in some ways set a precedent for the Marshall Plan. Hoover became known as the "The Great Humanitarian," a title he deserved and that unfortunately fell under the shadow of his disastrous departure from the presidency, four years into the Great Depression.

But let me come back to Hoover's role in shaping international economic policy after the war. As secretary of commerce, he became the central figure in efforts to implement the middle way I described earlier. He believed that through measures of voluntary cooperation and self-regulation, industrial and banking leaders could increase efficiency, raise living standards, and afford workers the kind of meaningful participation in vital decisions that was essential for industrial democracy. The government certainly was to play a part in regulating economic activity, but if this was done right, voluntary cooperation among responsible private groups would alleviate pressure for the kind of rigorous state intervention that would only foster waste and undermine the traditional values—such as volunteerism, privatism, and individualism—that supposedly undergirded American democracy.

When it came to international affairs, Hoover and his fellow Republicans were not isolationists. They wanted to cooperate in European recovery after the war, but they were unwilling to involve the United States in political complications or entanglements of the sort that Woodrow Wilson had envisioned with the League of Nations. They were convinced, instead, that the approach they were following at home could also work in the international arena. In other words, cooperation among American and multinational businessmen could achieve stability and prosperity by allowing disinterested private experts to regulate the international economy and by avoiding preferential and state-sponsored programs that were economically wasteful and

politically dangerous. Their formula for postwar aid to Europe, therefore, involved private programs organized by financial experts uncommitted to the political policies of their governments. And so, from the first Hoover-authored proposal for managing European reconstruction in 1921 to the Dawes Plan in 1924 and the Young Commission in 1929, Hoover and other Republicans insisted that the public interest would be best served by pursuing private, economic solutions as opposed to public, political ones. The 1924 commission headed up by Chicago banker Charles Dawes, for example, brought together financial experts from Belgium, France, Britain, Italy, and the United States to develop a nonpolitical solution to the problem of German reparations and to do so in cooperation with the treasury departments of the countries involved.

Unfortunately, these solutions ultimately failed, both in foreign and domestic policy, and the perfect balance of private and public power that Hoover envisioned soon gave way to Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal, which tipped the scales more toward the state.

When I finished my book on Hoover and the 1920s, it seemed logical to jump from the first postwar decade to the second, from the 1920s to the 1940s. In fact, I ended up doing *two* books on the post-World War II period—one about the Marshall Plan and another about Harry Truman and the origins of the national security state we live in today. I found, for one thing, that the two postwar eras were different but were also linked in ways that had not been fully appreciated. And I found striking similarities between President Hoover in the earlier period and Presidents Truman and Eisenhower in the later one.

Like Hoover, Truman was a self-made man from a humble background, having grown up working on the family farm. And, like Hoover, he left the White House almost in disgrace. Indeed, Truman may have been *the* most unpopular president of the twentieth century, less popular even than Nixon at the height of Watergate. Even though he shocked everyone by winning the election

in 1948, the anti-Truman slogans of the Dewey campaign continued to resonate with most of the American people, who still believed that “to err was Truman.” By 1952, stymied by the Korean conflict and McCarthyism, Truman was ridiculed and whipped around by the Republicans on their way to a landslide victory for Eisenhower.

But, as with Hoover, history has been relatively kind to Harry Truman. Historians always liked Truman, really. But now it is also in the general consciousness that Truman is considered, if not one of our great presidents, then one of the near-great presidents, largely for his successful record in foreign policy.

A similar wave of revision also helped to elevate Eisenhower’s reputation in the years after he left the White House. During Eisenhower’s administration, the Democrats made fun of him for his bumbling press conferences—he could not seem to string a coherent sentence together. They pictured him as a dithering old man who did nothing but play golf and sleep through his presidency. Actually, Ike was a pretty good golfer—in fact, he was allegedly the first president or former president to score a hole-in-one during a golf game. But his talent did not impress his opponents. He was portrayed as addle-brained and not in charge of his own administration, which was dominated instead by Cabinet secretaries like the very aggressive Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, whom Churchill once described as “the only case I know of a bull that carries his china shop with him.”

Eisenhower differs from the other two presidents I have mentioned because he was, in fact, popular throughout his administration, in spite of rhetoric from the other side. But that rhetoric did affect the way historians saw Eisenhower through the 1960s and 1970s, when they bought into Kennedy’s description of the Eisenhower team as the Geritol generation, headed by a president who was ill throughout his administration; spent more time on the golf course than in the Oval Office; loved the rich but ignored the poor; and was neither a good nor an effective leader. Again,

time has changed that perspective—and Eisenhower, too, is now widely viewed as a pretty good president who presided over eight years of peace and prosperity.

In fact, when Ike’s papers were unsealed it became clear that he dominated his administration and his Cabinet meetings. Suddenly historians could see what a skillful negotiator and diplomat he had been, what an able and effective leader, and what a world-class manager. It is true he wasn’t a gifted speaker, but he was a gifted writer—in fact, he had been a speechwriter for General Douglas MacArthur, who was generally regarded as a brilliant speaker. Eisenhower was the architect of his own major speeches, including the one in which he coined the phrase “the military industrial complex” and the famous “cross of iron” speech, from which I borrowed the title of my third book.

Eisenhower’s notes from Cabinet and National Security Council meetings reveal an active mind and a strategic thinker who had a philosophy about government and how to organize economic and social life in America that fits squarely within the formula of the middle way that I have been describing. Eisenhower did not add to the New Deal, but neither did he subtract from it; he accepted the role of the modern state as he had inherited it, along with many of the economic regulations and social programs that came out of the New Deal, and he focused like Hoover on trying to maintain the balance between private rights and responsibilities and the modern tendency toward statism. His outlook was more progressive than Hoover’s, and more conservative than Truman’s, but all in all he was much more of a middle roader than Senator Robert Taft of Ohio and other conservatives in the Republican party, who turned out to be the real bane of Eisenhower’s administration.

Which brings me back to Truman, who is the president I have spent the most time with, you might say. I first got to know Truman while researching my book on the Marshall Plan, which in many respects ought to be called the Truman Plan. When World War

II ended, Truman, Marshall, and other American leaders confronted problems very similar to those that had confounded Hoover and the recovery planners of the 1920s. And they built on some of the same strategies. Like their predecessors, for example, they encouraged European self-help and redoubled efforts to reduce reparations, fix exchange rates, and make currencies convertible. They believed these measures would permit individual initiative and normal market mechanisms to integrate economies and stimulate growth. They also tried to use the same kind of public-private partnerships and expert authorities that had been used in the 1920s. To administer the Marshall Plan, for example, Congress established the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), staffed by the “best brains” from business, labor, agriculture, and the professions. The ECA epitomized the kind of public-private partnership and power-sharing that had come to characterize the middle way: it was semi-autonomous, semi-public, semi-private, a group of individuals working together to implement public

### FREE LIST- SHARING FOR JOB ADVERTISEMENTS

SHAFR Council recently decided to provide SHAFR’s e-mail and postal mailing lists, free of charge, to any academic department in the world that is running a job search in diplomatic or international history.

SHAFR members are encouraged to notify departmental or search committee chairs of this new program and to encourage them to make use of these mailing lists.

Questions can be addressed to Peter L. Hahn, SHAFR Executive Director, at [shafr@osu.edu](mailto:shafr@osu.edu).

policy.

Of course, in the wake of the New Deal, the government played a much larger role in the second American effort to rebuild Europe than it did in the first – after all, government money fueled the Marshall Plan. And, in the end, where the planners in the 1920s failed, the Marshall Plan succeeded. Still, comparing the first and second postwar periods in this way makes it easy to begin to see them less as completely distinct epochs in modern history and more as parts of an evolving balance between public and private power that shaped American policy at home and abroad. This balance did not evolve without a struggle, and it is this struggle that began to capture my attention in this and my next book.

Truman believed that the Marshall Plan would one day come to represent the beginning of a “new era of mutual cooperation” for the benefit of peace and prosperity worldwide. But the plan’s opponents, like Senator Taft, were not so sure. They represented an older, isolationist tradition in American diplomacy, and they were convinced that Marshall aid would aggravate existing shortages at home, entangle the United States in European affairs at a time when tensions there could spark another war, and lead to the rise of statism, in this case a militarized state that would undermine individual rights and subvert democracy.

Indeed, in tracking the debates over the Marshall Plan, I was struck by two convictions that ran through arguments on both sides. The first was the conviction that things were changing – emerging policies were breaking with past practice, not only with American foreign policy but with economic and institutional policies as well. The second was the conviction that bad policies could put the United States on a slippery slope to a garrison state dominated by military leaders and devoted to military purposes. Both sides understood that a peacetime national security state was in the making, and both saw the need to guard against the potentially corrosive effects of this process on the American way of life.

This led me to my next major book,

which is called *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954*. This book examined the emergence, during Truman’s administration and the first Eisenhower administration, of a national security state where none had existed before, and again, dealt with the fascinating subject of the balance between public power and private rights. Let me talk about it briefly.

Although there are lines of continuity linking the two postwar periods, there is also no doubt that things were different after 1945. For most Americans, the peace was more precarious and the United States more vulnerable than ever before. They could no longer count on friendly powers to carry the burden of battle while they prepared. Nor could they count on the great ocean barriers to ensure their security in an age of long-range bombers, aircraft carriers, and atomic missiles. To most Americans, moreover, the Soviet Union had emerged from the Second World War as a dangerous aggressor; the United States was the only power able to contain the Soviet threat; and containment required the kind of entangling alliances and permanent defense establishment that earlier generations had abhorred. Guided by these convictions, American policymakers began to discard the last remnants of the country’s prewar isolationism. They talked more expansively about the national interest, used the phrase “national security” more frequently than ever before, and engineered a rapid expansion of American power into every nook and cranny of the world.

Much of this is discussed in my book on the Marshall Plan, but in *A Cross of Iron* I shifted focus drastically so that foreign policy and diplomacy were not the center of my attention but the backdrop to a new era of state-making in the United States – indeed, one of the most profound economic, political and institutional transformations in American history. It was during the first ten years of the Cold War, after all, when the same national security imperatives that drove Americans from the old isolationism to the new internationalism also forced them to build a national security state at home.

They created a large, permanent standing army for the first time in American history. They unified the armed forces, expanded the defense budget, harnessed science to military purposes, and forged new institutions, many of which, like the National Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency, are now among the best known and most powerful organs of government. During the Hoover administration, Secretary of State Henry Stimson had shut down the State Department’s code-breaking operation, purportedly with the declaration that “gentlemen do not read each other’s mail.” Now, Americans were building the CIA.

You can see this transformation in the architectural face of the federal government. The Old Executive Office Building, next to the White House, was once large enough to house the Army, Navy, and State departments, but now became the new home of the National Security Council. The State Department grew to such proportions that it required a building of its own, and the armed services, which now included a third branch, took up residence in the newly built Pentagon, a massive five-sided labyrinth with nearly eighteen miles of corridors, more than six million square feet of office space, and as many daily inhabitants as most small towns. The CIA eventually earned a new building, too, as did the Atomic Energy Commission, while dozens of other defense and security agencies either sprouted new facilities or squeezed older agencies from the spaces they had occupied for years. As these institutions of national security expanded in size and stature, older departments, once the major depositories of federal power and prestige, were quickly eclipsed, as were the political agendas they represented. National security affairs now began to dominate the budget and control the agenda of a government that had given little time or money to such matters only a decade earlier. After shrinking in the first years of the postwar period, defense spending began to grow as a proportion of the budget while nondefense expenditures started to decline. By 1960, defense and



international programs consumed the largest share of the federal budget and accounted for nearly all of a burgeoning national debt.

In sum, fighting the Cold War seemed to require peacetime military and diplomatic initiatives that departed from American tradition, and this possibility led some to ask if it was worth the cost, not just in dollars or lives but in the freedoms they held dear. These Americans resisted the new initiatives, usually in the name of tradition, while a second group, though hardly indifferent to tradition, tried to reshape the way Americans thought, both about their role in world affairs and about the new initiatives and institutions that national security appeared to demand. The struggle between these two groups, which runs through my book, was fundamentally a struggle to shape the nation's political identity and postwar purpose.

On one side of the national security debate stood the critics of American policy, mostly conservatives in the Republican party, who subscribed to a story of American greatness based on the republican ideology of the Founding Fathers. According to this traditional narrative, freedom-loving men and women had fled the oppression of the Old World, rebelled against the abuses of monarchical governments and military authorities, and founded a new republic with a constitution that constrained the state, divided authority, and guaranteed civilian over military leadership. As these conservatives saw it, both the welfare state that had emerged with the New Deal and the warfare state that was now taking shape imperiled the very traditions and institutions that had made America great. As the power of the state grew, they believed, so did the danger that it might be used recklessly.

On the other side of this debate stood the Truman administration and its supporters. They, too, borrowed from a traditional cultural narrative, but one that celebrated American exceptionalism and American destiny, and they adapted this narrative—we might call it the narrative of manifest destiny—in a way that made room for the important postwar responsibilities

that now fell to the United States. The result was a new ideology of national security that celebrated America's leadership of the free world as a sacred mission thrust upon the United States by divine Providence.

Of course, it is unfair and simplistic to present these two sides of the argument as black and white. President Truman himself was often pulled in different directions by the growth of the national security state. No one was more responsible for this important development than Truman, and yet no one was more convinced that national security needs, however urgent, could wreck the budget, militarize society, threaten civil liberties, and undermine the social programs that had grown out of the New Deal. Much the same was true of President Eisenhower. Truman and Eisenhower believed it was their job to reconcile older ways of thinking with the new ideology of national security, to merge the country's democratic traditions with its global obligations. In short, they worked to create but contain the national security state so it did not corrupt the traditional values embedded in American political culture, such as privatism, individualism, self-reliance, localism, and democracy. Their efforts, in my view, largely determined the size and shape of the national security state for the next half century.

That is an overview of the issues I have wrestled with for thirty years—issues having to do with the nature of the modern state, the politics, political culture, and ideology of state-making, and the role of the United States in world affairs. I have loved it. But along the way I became a department chair, and then a dean, and then a provost, and with each step I have had to put my scholarship a little further back on the burners. That has been hard for a research scholar who has devoted so much of himself to this work. So I have thought a lot about the connections between the two lives I have led and how the lessons I have learned from my research can matter to the work I do now.

I am tempted to begin by saying that a life spent studying politics is a life spent preparing to be provost. Actually, I will say that. It's true.

First, if nothing else, studying foreign policy and state-building keeps you always in mind of the importance of being politic and diplomatic in the process of university-building. You certainly cannot forget how difficult it is to manage a large institution, or how necessary it is to make it a collective enterprise rather than an individual one. The precarious balance between authority focused at the center and authority distributed among largely self-governing units, the struggle to move the institution forward while protecting individual interests and freedoms: these are definitely familiar concepts in a university setting! You are reminded of how much more effective it is to manage through the organization rather than on top of it, particularly at a university like Iowa, which has such a healthy tradition of shared governance.

Second, and in the same vein, it is easy to find parallels between the great machinery of state-making and the smaller but still formidable machinery of university-building when it comes to the importance of collaboration and partnerships, such as those between the public and private sectors. Truman and Eisenhower, I said earlier, sought "to merge the country's democratic traditions with its global obligations." Public universities also have democratic traditions to maintain, even as we meet our obligations to the states that support us, to our students, and to society at large. In this time of growing demands on state coffers, we find ourselves increasingly turning to other sources of support. The largest of these is increased tuition, and those increases, if not carefully managed, could threaten the democratic foundation of access to higher education in this country. For that reason and others, we look, too, to new sources of revenue, such as increased philanthropy and the opportunities afforded by technology transfer, licensing, and partnerships with business and industry. It is a constant balancing act to ensure that we simultaneously protect our core educational mission, play out our key role in the global advancement of knowledge, and participate in the

economic development of our state.

Third, anyone in a leadership position can and should take valuable lessons from public leaders like Hoover, Truman, and Eisenhower. For example, all of them led by finding excellent colleagues and giving them freedom to excel. Here at Iowa, appointing excellent deans and department chairs who know their stuff and will uphold the interests of their individual units in ways that serve the university is clearly one of my most important responsibilities. Without trying to suggest that I have successfully mastered them all, I could cite a long list of other leadership qualities the presidents I've studied have modeled: extraordinary management and organizational skills, a strong work ethic, mastery of the art of negotiation, devotion to public service, and the ability to think strategically, for instance. Not to mention the ability to grow a thick skin!

Fourth, as is the case in most any field, spending many years devoted to scholarly inquiry opens your mind to the great variety of questions to be asked and the different paradigms to be deployed. As editor for fifteen years of *Diplomatic History*, the journal of record for diplomatic

historians, and as president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, I observed and tried to foster new influences on our field. I believe we cannot grow as scholars, or as people, or as university administrators, without constantly exploring and honoring new perspectives, and valuing diversity in all its forms.

And finally, you can't study international relations your whole life, and people who understood America's connection to and deep involvement in the world, without developing an acute appreciation of the need to internationalize the American university. This means being as aggressive as we can be in promoting study abroad experiences for our students, recruiting the best and brightest international students and scholars, encouraging international exchanges at the faculty level, building internationalism into our curriculum, and urging our students to study foreign languages and to learn about the customs, culture, and traditions of other people around the world. Empowering our students to think critically and function successfully in a global society is a cornerstone of an excellent liberal arts education and a cornerstone of our future success as a

nation.

Now, I do not mean to suggest that my colleagues from fields other than diplomatic history are somehow less prepared than I was to become effective administrators. After all, no matter what your field of study, you can hardly have a career in academia without gaining an appreciation for the value of such things as diplomacy, diversity, and the ability to juggle multiple demands on time and resources. But I do think that my scholarship, fortuitously, has given me a particularly valuable perspective on the work I do now.

Clio, you know, was the Muse of History. I invoked her name in the title of this piece—well, maybe in a bit of an attempt to borrow some mythological cachet—but also because I feel lucky to have been “inspired,” shall we say, to pursue a career that has been so constantly engaging, and that has brought me to the (challenging! but) wonderfully rewarding work I enjoy today.

*Michael J. Hogan is Executive Vice President and Provost at the University of Iowa.*

## NEWS FROM THE SHAFR TEACHING COMMITTEE

The Teaching Committee has obtained the following information that will likely be of considerable interest to SHAFR members:

The digitization of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* is a collaborative project between the University of Wisconsin Digital Collections Center (UWDCC), a part of the UW Libraries, and other libraries throughout the United States that have contributed volumes for digitization. Currently, the digitized collection presents an incomplete run from 1861-1960, with missing volumes added as they are acquired and digitized. As of mid-February 2007, 325 volumes have been digitized, and 36 additional volumes will be added in the coming months. There are only 22 volumes that have yet to be acquired for the project.

As most readers of *Passport* know, the *FRUS* volumes for the Kennedy administration and subsequent years have been produced in electronic form and are available on the website of the Historian's Office, U.S. Department of State, at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/>. For more information about this or other digitization projects at the University of Wisconsin Digital Collections Center, please visit the project web site (<http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS>) or contact the UWDCC directly at: [digitalcontent@library.wisc.edu](mailto:digitalcontent@library.wisc.edu) or 608-265-3059.



--Vicki L. Tobias, Digital Services Librarian, UW Libraries

# SHAFR Council Meeting

Friday, January 5, 2007

12:00 PM

Vinings Room, Hyatt Regency Hotel  
Atlanta, Georgia



Present: Craig Daigle, Peter Hahn, Richard Immerman (presiding), Mark Lawrence, James Matray, Anna Nelson, Meredith Oyen, Stephen Rabe, Robert Robinson, Robert Schulzinger, Thomas Schwartz, Randall Woods, Thomas Zeiler.

## Business Items

### 1. Recap of motion passed by e-mail vote

Immerman reported for the record that since its last meeting Council had approved via e-mail a proposal to purchase ads in the OAH and AHA newsletters to publicize SHAFR programs.

### 2. Motion to accept 2006 financial report

Hahn presented the 2006 financial report in writing and orally. Both endowments had a healthy gain and the Society marked a net worth of \$1.3 million.

Hahn noted that Robert Divine completed his gift to endow the Divine Graduate Student Travel Fund, and an additional \$550 was donated in response to direct mail and published solicitations. All donations were transferred to the endowment.

Hahn explained various highlights of the 2006 budget. *Passport* royalties became substantial in 2006. Actual royalties from ABC-Clio in 2006 were \$2,500 less to offset an overpayment in 2005. Other items highlighted included: costs approved by Council in mid-year for advertising in the OAH and AHA newsletters, stipends for editors of the electronic *Guide* that Council authorized in June, and ten \$1,000 Bemis grants that were awarded in June.

Hahn talked briefly about the highlights of the 2007 budget and indicated he would field questions from Council members at any time.

Council unanimously passed a motion to accept the report.

### 3. Motion to set disbursement amount for Bemis Research Grants in 2007

Matray reported that the Bemis grants were set up with a recommendation of earmarking 20 percent of the increase in the endowment over the previous year for those awards. In early 2006, Matray recommended 10 grants of \$1,000, or about 10 percent of the endowment increase of 2005. As the endowment grew by more than 20 percent in 2006, Matray suggested that Council approve expenditure of 20 percent of the increase or about \$35,000.00.

In discussion, Hahn clarified that in 2006 Council authorized the Holt/Hogan committee to decide the number of awards and specific amounts. Immerman pointed out that the endowment will likely not do as well every year and asked whether expectations for the awards should be raised now if they would almost certainly diminish in later years. Schwartz asked if there is a minimum amount set for award disbursements, and Matray indicated that the guidelines permit awards in amounts up to \$2,000. Lawrence suggested that this cap should be raised. Hahn pointed out that almost all applicants last year received awards, and that awarding too many might result in a drop in the overall quality of successful applications. Immerman suggested giving the committee guidelines and trusting its judgment. Matray suggested an announcement through h-diplo that 2007 will be a particularly rich year for Bemis grants. The motion to authorize the committee to disburse up to \$35,000 passed unanimously.

### 4. Motions regarding the 2007 SHAFR conference

Immerman introduced motions to increase registration fees for the summer conference for regular members and to reduce those fees for student members. He indicated that subsidies of student fees would offset the relatively high room rates at the 2007 conference venue and that raising the regular fee to \$85 (up \$10 from 2006) would offset expected losses while bringing the conference fee in line with those charged by similar societies.

In discussion, it was clarified that about 400 persons might be expected to attend the 2007 meeting, including some 150 graduate students. It was noted that SHAFR could also subsidize student meals, which would also serve the purpose of meeting the catering minimum to be charged by the hotel. It was also noted that reducing the student fee to a mere \$10 might cheapen the conference and that a \$25 rate would be more appropriate. It was further stressed that any reductions approved for 2007 should be announced as special offers for that meeting only and not as precedents for all future meetings.

A motion was made to cut the graduate student rate to \$25, to authorize Hahn and Sara Wilson to determine an appropriate price cut for student lunches, and to raise the regular conference fee to \$85. The motion passed unanimously.

## **5. Sharing royalties with *Passport* (and newsletter) authors**

Hahn reported that SHAFR received more than \$4,000 in 2006 as fees collected by the Copyright Clearance Center for reprinting articles previously published in the SHAFR newsletter. Hahn asked Council to decide whether the money should be shared with the author(s) of the reprinted articles. After discussion clarifying that *Diplomatic History* did not share such proceeds with authors and that SHAFR owned the copyright to the newsletter, a consensus emerged that SHAFR should retain the proceeds and devote them to its programs. A motion so directing passed unanimously.

## **6. Discussion of change of month/season of SHAFR annual meetings**

Immerman explained that past Program Committee chair Frank Costigliola had reported that holding SHAFR meetings in June as usual excludes a number of international historians. Immerman suggested forming a committee of past presidents and program chairs to examine the issue of scheduling annual meetings in some other month. This committee might also study whether SHAFR should still meet in Washington, D.C. every other year.

In discussion, Oyen indicated that she too had missed annual meetings because of overseas research trips. Woods suggested May or August as alternatives to June. Rabe said that the availability of dorms was one of the original reasons justifying June. Rabe pointed out that 20 percent of the proposals for this year's conference were of international origin and noted that scheduling in May might cause conflicts with graduations. Schwartz suggested a survey of international scholars.

It was clarified that the committee should also examine the issue of holding conferences at hotels vs. university campuses. Hahn agreed to compose a list of past presidents, program committee chairs and local arrangements chairs.

Immerman indicated that based on enthusiasm for a committee he would appoint one using his presidential authority.

## **7. Sponsorship of events at the 100<sup>th</sup> OAH Meeting**

Hahn reported that the OAH has asked societies to consider sponsoring events or programs of the 100<sup>th</sup> OAH meeting in spring 2007. Possibilities included a graduate student breakfast, a special panel, a reception, and an advertisement, with costs ranging from \$500 to \$10,000.

Woods expressed great reluctance based on the treatment of foreign relations scholars by the OAH. Rabe said that any assistance must be accompanied by a letter to OAH leaders regarding the under-representation of our field in OAH activities and publications. Matray suggested that this might be a key moment to build a bridge back to the OAH. Immerman suggested that this might be a good way to advertise SHAFR's name and programs and that Council should find a way to air the organization's grievances at the same time. There was much discussion of whether such a contribution would be useful to the field or to SHAFR as an organization. It was clarified that SHAFR would gain exclusive sponsorship of the event it paid for.

A motion authorizing \$2,500 for an event such as a graduate student breakfast gained majority approval in a voice vote.

## **Reports**

### **8. Steering Committee**

Immerman reported that this committee would examine options available to use SHAFR's new financial resources to further its organizational mission. Immerman will chair the committee. In consultation, Immerman and Woods also appointed members Thomas Zeiler, Mark Lawrence, Frank Costigliola, Kristin Ahlberg, David Herschler, and Brian Etheridge. The committee will begin work soon.

### **9. *Diplomatic History* Contract Committee**

Woods reported that the new contract with Blackwell, effective January 1, 2008, was completed and signed. SHAFR should receive some \$1.2 million over the five-year contract. The new contract is also satisfactory from an editorial standpoint. Lawrence asked if the format would change. Woods explained that the cover would likely change. Proofs of possible cover designs were distributed.

### **10. *Diplomatic History***

Schulzinger said that the journal had 60 submissions five years ago and 91 last year. The current acceptance rate is approximately 20 percent. There are about two issues worth of material and several special issues in the pipeline. The June 2007 issue will be a 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary celebration including brief articles by a number of past presidents. A special issue on the environment edited by Kurt Dorsey is one of several topical issues anticipated for the near future. The new cover design will start in June with the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary issue.

### **11. Electronic version of the *Guide***

Zeiler reported that revisions of 31 (of 34) chapters are completed. Updates should be posted on-line by the end of March. New entries will appear at the beginning of every subheading. The cash honoraria and gift certificates were appreciated by the chapter editors. Immerman suggested an announcement in *Passport* to help launch the electronic guide.

## BOOK DONATIONS TO UNIVERSITY IN IRAQ

Because of war and civil turmoil, Basra University in Iraq has had much of its library collection destroyed. A scholar there has petitioned for American scholars to donate books on the history of the Cold War and other topics in international history.

With the approval of SHAFR Council, David Zierler, Ph.D. candidate at Temple University, has agreed to spearhead an effort to arrange such donations. SHAFR members are encouraged to bring relevant books to the SHAFR meeting at the Westfields in June 2007. Mr. Zierler will collect the books there and arrange shipping to Basra. Questions can be directed to Mr. Zierler at [dzierler@temple.edu](mailto:dzierler@temple.edu).

### 12. 2007 annual meeting

Rabe reported that 61 complete panels and 25 individual papers were submitted. Past meeting schedules have been limited to 48 regular sessions, but program committee co-chairs Rabe and Little would like to run 56 sessions if space permits (a point that Sara Wilson is checking on) and if cost for such space is not too high. If the program must be limited to 48 sessions, then most panels to be rejected would be ones featuring graduate students. Immerman asked if quality could be maintained if 56 panels were accepted. Rabe said it is hard to judge quality on the basis of synopses. Immerman asked Council for permission to decide together with Hahn, once Sara Wilson reported on space and cost issues, whether such an increase would be feasible. This suggestion was approved without a formal motion.

### 13. 2008 annual meeting

Hahn reported that the 2008 SHAFR conference will be held at The Ohio State University in late June. The Blackwell Inn will host the conference. Dorm space will be available.

### 14. Endowment

Matray reported that the endowment did particularly well during the last six months, growing by 10.6 percent. Matray reminded Council that his five-year term as Endowment Liaison will expire in June 2007.

### 15. Bernath Dissertation Grant

Hahn reported that the Bernath Dissertation Grant will be awarded to Blair Woodard at the University of New Mexico.

### 16. Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship

Hahn reported that the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship will be awarded to Sarah Manekin at the University of Pennsylvania.

Hahn said that the Link-Kuehl committee declined to award a prize this year, and asked that the scope of the award be expanded to include other works, including websites. Hahn will work with the committee to formulate recommendations, to be circulated by e-mail in time for Council consideration before the next prize cycle.

### Other Business

### 17. Resolutions of thanks to retiring Council members

Immerman expressed the thanks of Council and the entire Society to retiring Council members Michael Hogan, Frank Costigliola, Katherine Sibley, and Josip Mocnik. He also expressed appreciation to Robert Robinson, who will resign as assistant executive director of SHAFR later this month after three and a half years in the post.

Respectfully submitted,

Peter L. Hahn  
Executive Director  
PLH/rr

# In Memory: Charles Soutter Campbell, Jr. (1911-2006)

Charles Campbell, Professor of U.S. Diplomatic History at the Claremont Graduate University [formerly the Claremont Graduate School] from 1958 to 1985, died on August 17, 2006 at Friends House in Santa Rosa, California.

Campbell was born in Essex Fells, New Jersey and completed his B.A. at Yale University in 1933. Following a two-year stint in the Yale-in-China program in Changsha, Hunan – where he was a teacher of English and History – he returned to New Haven for graduate studies under his mentor Samuel Flagg Bemis. He completed his Ph.D. in 1938 and his well-received dissertation – *American Business Interests and the Open Door in China* – appeared in the November 1941 edition of *Far Eastern Quarterly*.

From 1938 to 1940 Campbell was an Adjunct Professor of Economics at the American University in Beirut, Lebanon. For the years 1940-1945 he served the U.S. Department of State as a Foreign Service Officer in the American Embassy in London where he worked for U.S. Ambassador John G. Winant. It was here that he met Anne Margaret Howson, who was at the time a decipher clerk on the Enigma project at Bletchley Park. Ms. Howson's father was English and her mother Australian. The two were married at Henley on Thames in June 1944 and in 1945 they moved back to Beirut, where Campbell taught one more year at the American University. In 1946 he took a position in the History Department at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore, where he stayed until 1958, with only a brief interruption in 1956, when he accepted a one-year appointment at the University of Melbourne, Australia.

He came to Claremont in 1958 to join a small but exceptional faculty of American historians that included Douglass Adair and John Niven. In 1961, while William Appleman Williams was on leave, Campbell agreed to teach for him at the University of Wisconsin, and in 1977-1978 he was Visiting Professor at the University of East Anglia, Norwich, England. He then returned to Claremont and was at the Graduate University until 1985. He continued to offer classes at adjoining Claremont McKenna College after his official retirement.

Professor Campbell's remarkable career, in addition to the teaching and government positions indicated above, included his dedicated guiding of graduate students to their Ph.D.s and the publication of numerous books and articles that represented an acknowledged impact on the history profession.

Yale University Press published a refined and expanded rendition of his dissertation in 1951, entitled *Special Business Interests and the Open Door Policy*. By carefully documenting the influence domestic interests exerted on U.S. diplomacy, the study became a seminal inspiration for a post-war generation of diplomatic historians. Campbell was also a prominent student of American-British relations. His *Anglo-American Understanding, 1898-1903* (Johns Hopkins Press, 1957, reprinted by Greenwood Press in 1980) remains a standard study of the topic, and his later work, *From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783-1900* was published by Wiley in 1974 for its series "America in the World."

Campbell's most ambitious project was his study of post-Civil War diplomacy, *The Transformation of American Foreign Relations, 1865-1900* (Harper and Row, 1976). A result of several years of

thorough research, the book reflects a commitment to primary source scholarship and addresses with matchless clarity and persuasiveness the more contentious issues raised by historians about this revolutionary period.

While Campbell's scholarly work will continue to be important to the profession, of equal significance was his teaching. The overused adjective unique legitimately applies to his seminars. Students encountered the first day a syllabus unlike any other they had seen. There were no books indicated, no lengthy instructions; rather a list of questions that were to be answered during each week's three-hour meeting. The questions were presented in a general chronological order. There was no correct answer to any of them, as can be judged from a typical favorite of his: "When did the Spanish-American War become inevitable?" And Campbell brought no lecture notes or books into the seminar room with him; only a box of note cards.

All students were to submit a typed answer to the question – not to exceed one page – for each seminar meeting; the answer had to be substantiated with accurate data and sound analysis. One student in each class session was responsible for presenting a report addressing the question and, of course, was immediately challenged by all the others once general discussion began. It became obvious during class meetings that answering these questions was not easy! And woe to the unprepared student, or the student who sought the easy route of sweeping through a textbook rendition of the issue. For the week between each session students roamed the documents section of the library, met with one another, reviewed as much literature as possible, and, too often, let other assignments lapse. The result was always a spirited, often memorable, class. And Professor Campbell (whose measured answer to the question we all awaited with nervous anticipation) inserted the most pointed queries during our deliberations and shepherded the discussion with subtle expertise.

Beyond his seminar teaching, Campbell was an accessible mentor, particularly for his thesis students. However, approaching him could lead to some demoralization. One of his students remembers submitting what he thought was the final version of his doctoral dissertation. Two weeks later, the student asked Professor Campbell what he thought of the presumably finished work. The answer was, "I have some comments, but then I always do." It took another six months of labor to produce the version which Campbell approved. Still, the ordeal paid off: the dissertation was accepted for publication as written. No higher compliment can be paid to the great teacher's exacting standards and benevolent attention to launching his students on their professional careers. Although always at work on his own research and writing, he remained constantly alert to his students' needs (and occasional tardiness). Moreover, he retained contact with his former students long after they had left his tutelage, and he savored their successes.

Professor Charles S. Campbell Jr. lived a long and productive life. He will be sorely missed by his friends, colleagues, and former students. He is survived by his son Patrick and daughter-in-law Faith Campbell of Glen Ellen, California, and by three grandchildren.

# In Memory: Richard W. Leopold (1912-2006)

Richard W. Leopold, a prominent diplomatic historian whose teaching and scholarship guided students and colleagues during an illustrious career, died of natural causes Thursday, November 23, 2006 in Evanston, Illinois. He was 94.

Among the hundreds of former students identifying Leopold as a mentor who profoundly affected their lives are former Sen. George McGovern (D-SD), former Rep. Richard Gephardt (D-Mo), Rep. Jim Kolbe (R-Az), former assistant secretary of state Phyllis Elliot Oakley, historian John Morton Blum (Sterling Professor of History Emeritus at Yale), journalist Georgie Anne Geyer, and television and motion picture producer/writer/director Garry Marshall. Kolbe wrote, "I used to say with great pride that I learned American diplomatic history at the feet of one of the greatest scholars in the United States -- Dick Leopold. I knew that statement would not be challenged in or out of academic circles. . . [He] believed that being a teacher and a mentor was a lifetime commitment, and for those who responded, it became a lifetime of friendship." McGovern noted, "I believe that every thoughtful student who studied under Professor Leopold's direction would agree that this country has produced no more dedicated and competent professor. He has not only mastered his field but he has had a lifetime passion to convey his knowledge and insight to his students." Marshall recalled his difficulty answering long essay questions in final exam blue books and how Leopold "allowed me to answer with dialogue scenes rather than prose writing and graded me on content rather than style. It helped me tremendously and I think my early Bismarck dialogue aided me in writing sitcoms and movies for a living."

The second son of Harry Leopold Sr. and Ethel Kimmelstiel, Richard Leopold was born on January 6, 1912 on the upper west side of Manhattan. He attended the Franklin School before enrolling in 1926 at Phillips Exeter Academy where he graduated *cum laude* in 1929. He then went on to Princeton University, graduating with highest honors and *Phi Beta Kappa* in 1933.

After Princeton he pursued graduate study at Harvard under the tutelage of Arthur M. Schlesinger Sr., receiving a master's degree in 1934 and a Ph.D in 1938. Leopold's doctoral dissertation became his first book, *Robert Dale Owen: A Biography* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 1940), which won the American Historical Association's John H. Dunning Prize as the best book on any subject relating to United States history.

During World War II, he was commissioned as a naval officer and worked at the Office of Naval Records and Library in Washington, where he devised a unique system -- used long thereafter -- for organizing materials relating to ongoing naval operations. After the war, he returned to Harvard for two years before joining the Northwestern University faculty in 1948. Over the subsequent three decades there, Leopold was instrumental in Northwestern's successful effort to build one of the finest collection of American history scholars ever assembled at a single institution of its size. In addition to Leopold, the 1950s roster included Ray A. Billington, Arthur S. Link, and Clarence L. Ver Steeg. Leopold and Link became especially close collaborators, producing *Problems in American History* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1952, 1957, 1966, 1972), among many other works. In addition to hundreds of articles, Leopold also wrote *Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition* (New York: Little, Brown, 1954), and *The Growth of American Foreign Policy: A History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), which remained a seminal treatise in United States diplomatic history for more than a decade after its first publication. He became the William Smith Mason Professor of History in 1963.

At the height of the Vietnam War protests in 1968, Leopold led


the successful effort to prevent Northwestern from dismantling its Naval ROTC program, even though virtually all other comparable academic institutions were doing so. He made a three-fold case in favor of retaining the program. First, it benefited the nation. He was concerned about the potential need to mobilize quickly in times of war; he was also concerned about a military whose officer ranks came exclusively from the service academies and the limited perspectives they offered. Second, the program benefited the university. He noted the many noteworthy program participants who had enriched the university and who would have been unable to attend Northwestern without the NROTC's financial support. Third, he argued that NROTC helped the students who participated. He was unmoved by those who argued that the program itself somehow proved the academy's support for a controversial war or "the teaching of killing." In his faculty address that turned the tide of the debate in favor of retaining the program, he said: "We do not ban the teaching of nuclear physics because someone might make a bomb; we do not avoid the study of Marxism because the student might become a Communist; and we do not discourage the study of sexual deviants because the student himself might become one." Many of the program's graduates went on to become career officers; some rose to the rank of admiral.

In 1969, Leopold was tapped to head an independent investigation into Francis L. Loewenheim's charges against the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library. Loewenheim claimed that the FDR Library staff had withheld certain documents in connection with his research and further asserted that the American Historical Association, Organization of American Historians, and National Archives had thereafter covered up his resulting charges. After a year-long investigation, the joint AHA-OAH committee that Leopold chaired issued a 447-page report, *Final Report of the Joint AHA-OAH Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate the Charges Against the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and Related Matters* (Washington, DC: American Historical Association: 1970). Contrary to Loewenheim's allegations, the Report concluded that there had been no conspiracy and that the professional bodies charged with investigating the original complaint had simply been ill-equipped to deal with the vicious and unprecedented assault that Loewenheim and his lawyer had launched against a group of academics.

Leopold served on numerous governmental advisory committees, including those for the Secretary of the Navy, State Department, Army, Marine Corps, Atomic Energy Commission, CIA, and Library of Congress. He was also a member of the Editorial Advisory Committee for *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* and of the board of directors for the Harry S. Truman Library Institute. He was president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations in 1970 and of the Organization of American Historians in 1976.

In 1984, Leopold's former doctoral students established the OAH's Richard W. Leopold Prize, which is awarded biannually. In 1990, former students, colleagues, and friends established the annual Richard W. Leopold Lectureship at Northwestern in his honor. This year's lecturer was Samantha Power. In 1997, more than 230 former students collectively endowed the Richard W. Leopold Professorship in American history at Northwestern.

He is survived by a nephew, John P. Leopold, who lives in Centennial, Colorado. Plans for an early 2007 memorial service are underway. A former student, Steven J. Harper, has written Leopold's biography, which Northwestern University Press has tentatively scheduled for publication in the fall of 2007.



# The Diplomatic Pouch

## 1. Personal and Professional Notes

**Nancy Bernkopf Tucker** (Georgetown University and the Georgetown School of Foreign Service) will serve as the first Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analytic Integrity and Standards in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (2006-2007). She simultaneously was named to the newly created post of Analytic Ombudsman for the U.S. Intelligence Community.

**Max Paul Friedman** (Florida State) has accepted the position of Associate Professor of History at American University.

**Lloyd Gardner** (Rutgers University) received the Award for Scholarly Distinction from the American Historical Association.

**Mark Lawrence** (Texas) won the American Historical Association's 2006 Paul Birdsall Prize in European Military and Strategic History and the George Louis Beer Prize in European International History for *Assuming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam* (University of California Press).

**Mark Stoler** will retire in May 2007 from the University of Vermont. In 2007-8, he will serve as the Stanley Kaplan Visiting Professor of American Foreign Policy at Williams College.




## 2. Research Notes

### National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 212: *PINOCHET: A Declassified Documentary Obit*

The National Security Archive has posted a selection of declassified U.S. documents that illuminate Augusto Pinochet's record of repression. The documents include CIA records on Pinochet's role in the Washington D.C. car bombing that killed former Chilean ambassador Orlando Letelier and his American colleague Ronni Moffitt; Defense Intelligence Agency biographic reports on Pinochet; and transcripts of meetings in which Secretary of State Henry Kissinger resisted bringing pressure on the Chilean military for its human rights atrocities. "Pinochet's death has denied his victims a final judicial reckoning," said Peter Kornbluh, who directs the Archive's Chile Documentation Project. "But the declassified documents do contribute to the ultimate verdict of history on his atrocities." Most of the documents posted are drawn from a collection of 24,000 declassified records that were released by the Clinton administration after Pinochet's October, 1998, arrest in London. The materials can be accessed at: <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB212/index.htm>.

For more information, contact Peter Kornbluh at 202-374-7281, or Yvette White at 202-994-7000.



### New CWIHP collection on Bulgaria and the Middle East in the Cold War

The Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) is pleased to announce the publication of the CD-ROM "Bulgaria and Middle East Conflict During the Cold War Years." This CD-ROM was produced by CWIHP's longtime Bulgarian partner, the Cold War Research Group - Bulgaria, in cooperation with the Diplomatic Archives section at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Sofia, with financial and research support from CWIHP.

The CD document volume contains 255 documents totaling more than 1,500 pages, selected from the Bulgarian state and Communist Party archives. The CD presents a rich and representative documentary collection and provides new information on the diplomatic, political, military, and security aspects of the Middle East conflict and the evolution of Bulgarian policy on the issue. The volume presents, for the first time, top-secret resolutions of the Bulgarian government, recently declassified in 2004. The CD also includes top secret cipher radiograms (cables) from the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry Archive, and new KGB information from the Bulgarian Interior Ministry on the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War. A number of other archival documents from the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs were specially declassified in 2005-2006 for inclusion in this volume.

For further information, see <http://www.cwihp.org>.



## Radio Free Europe Broadcasts to Poland Now Available on CDs in PIASA Sound Archives

Just before its closing in 1994, the New York Office of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty contacted the Polish Institute of Arts & Sciences of America (PIASA) and offered to deposit close to 300 large reel-to-reel audio tapes containing radio broadcasts to Poland. Unfortunately these reel-to-reel tapes were not catalogued and were so fragile and brittle that for all practical purposes they were not accessible to researchers. Recently, however, these conditions have been dramatically changed as a result of an agreement made between Poland's National Archives (*Naczelna Dyrekcja Archiwow Panstwowych*) in Warsaw and PIASA in New York. The audio tapes were sent to the National Archives in Warsaw for deposit. In return Poland's National Archives performed the formidable and labor intensive task of cataloging the contents of the tapes and then transferring them electronically to compact discs. Thus a large proportion of radio broadcasts produced by Radio Free Europe's New York office between 1956 to 1989 are now available to researchers. Over 600 radio broadcasts to Poland have been identified and can now be easily heard at PIASA's sound archives located at 208 East 30th St. in New York City.

These CDs include interviews with such notables as Czeslaw Milosz, Adam Ulam, Artur Rubinstein, Stanislaw Skrowaczewski, Henryk Grynberg, etc.; lectures by Leszek Kolakowski, Piotr Wandycz, Stanislaw Baranczak, Wacław Jędrzejewicz, Jerzy Lerski, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Feliks Gross and others. They also offer coverage of important events like the Papal visits to the U.S., PIASA's Congresses, and Polonia programs. A complete listing of the broadcasts will be made available on PIASA's website [www.piasa.org](http://www.piasa.org) under the link "Archival Information Center."

For more information, email [piasany@verizon.net](mailto:piasany@verizon.net).



## Finding Aid for Council on Foreign Relations Records at Princeton University now Available Online

The records of the Council on Foreign Relations have been fully arranged and described, and an electronic version of the finding aid is available on the website of Princeton University's Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library at: <http://diglib.princeton.edu/ead/eadGetDoc.xq?id=/ead/mudd/publicpolicy/MC104.EAD.xml>

The majority of the council's records were transferred to the Mudd Manuscript Library for research in 1998, and a gift agreement was completed between the Council and Princeton University in 2003. Additional, noncurrent records of the council are deposited at Mudd Library annually. Currently, the collection totals nearly 400 linear feet -- 800 boxes -- and includes records related to the inner workings of the council as well as the minutes of off-the-record meetings and study groups.

The finding aid describes each series of the collection and includes historical notes, scope and content notes and arrangement information, as well as a full folder listing. In addition to the folder lists, indices are extant for the early records (circa 1920-1973) of three of the council's departments: Studies Department, Meetings and Conferences. The index to the conferences has already been incorporated into the online folder list. The Meetings Index will be available electronically shortly, and plans are being made to digitize the Studies Department Index as well. The council's records currently include two temporary series that hold the most recent acquisitions, from May 2005 and June 2006; these series are described briefly and a full folder list is available for their materials. Most of the records within these series, and portions of records in the other 13 series, remain closed under the council's rule that records are closed for an initial 25-year period and then open only under the council's nonattribution rule.

The Mudd Manuscript Library recently has begun a digital audio transfer project that will make recordings of selected council meetings dating back to 1953 available online in digital format. Funding for this project was provided by over 20 members of the council and the John Foster and Janet Avery Dulles Fund.

For further information, contact:

Daniel J. Linke  
University Archivist and Curator of Public Policy Papers  
Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library  
Princeton University  
65 Olden Street  
Princeton, NJ 08544  
Phone: 609-258-6345  
Fax: 609-258-3385  
<http://www.princeton.edu/mudd/>



## 3. Announcements:

### Call for Papers: 75<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History

*April 17-20, 2008, Ogden, Utah*

The Society for Military History is pleased to announce its call for papers for the 75<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting, hosted by Weber State University at the Ogden Eccles Convention Center in Ogden, Utah, April 17-20, 2008. The conference theme is "The Military and Frontiers," highlighting the military's role relating to geographic, technological, political, social, and other frontiers. Panel proposals must include a panel title, contact information for all panelists, a brief description of the purpose and theme of the panel, abstracts of each of the three papers (one paragraph each), brief CVs for all panelists,

including commentator and panel chair. Proposals for individual papers are welcome and should include a brief abstract, brief CV, and contact information. Deadline for proposals is November 1, 2007. While the theme of the conference will provide a basic guide to determining the final program, the Program Committee will gladly consider proposals on other facets and perspectives of military history. Proposals may be submitted electronically to Dr. Nikolas Gardner at [Nikolas.Gardner@maxwell.af.mil](mailto:Nikolas.Gardner@maxwell.af.mil) or by regular mail to Dr. Nikolas Gardner, Chair, SMH 2008 Program Committee, Air War College, 325 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB, AL 36112.

The meeting will be held at the Ogden Eccles Conference Center in downtown Ogden, with the Ogden Marriott and Hampton Inn Downtown serving as host hotels. Ogden is easily accessible via Salt City International Airport. The conference site is located just off of Ogden's Historic 25th Street, which offers a range of local restaurants, pubs, and shopping. Information concerning registration and lodging can be found at: <http://www.weber.edu/History/WhatsHappening/SMH2008.html>. Please contact Dr. Bill Allison at [wallison@weber.edu](mailto:wallison@weber.edu) or 801-626-6710 for more details.



**Call for Papers: 2008 International Conference for American Studies: "American Studies and Imperial Designs: New Scholarship and Perspectives on the US in the World"**  
*September 11-14, 2008, West Lafayette, Indiana*

This conference will be held September 11-14, 2008 at Purdue University. We seek papers, panel proposals and performances that demonstrate bold new ways of thinking about the role and place of American Studies in challenging and describing current moments and acts of imperialism. These can include but are not limited to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, global economic restructuring, new forms of global culture, threats to academic freedom, censorship, forms of anti-globalization activism, media, the arts and building cultures of resistance. The conference especially invites papers that articulate new forms of social organizing and resistance to imperialist designs. Finally, the conference seeks to refresh understanding of the terms "imperialism" and "empire" on one hand, "resistance" and "revolution" on the other. The conference seeks to create a dialectical moment and space for the production of new work and ideas, and new networks of alliance that may move us past the 'imperial moment' into a just global future. Individual paper proposals with abstracts of up to 250 words; panel proposals of no more than one page, with a complete description of the panel and individual papers; roundtables and open hearings on crucial issues and ideas up to 250 words in length; performances and/or readings on the conference theme up to 250 words, are all acceptable. All proposals must include mailing address, e-mail address and telephone number for all proposed participants.

Proposals may only be sent via e-mail to Bill Mullen, Director of American Studies, Purdue University at [bvmullen@purdue.edu](mailto:bvmullen@purdue.edu) or to Delayne Graham, Program Assistant in American Studies at [dkgraham@purdue.edu](mailto:dkgraham@purdue.edu). Only e-mail submissions will be considered for review. Deadline for submission: December 15, 2007.



**Call for Papers: "The End of the Beginning: War Termination and Aftermath in Military History," Society for Military History Regional Conference, Delta State University**  
*October 19-20, 2007, Cleveland, Mississippi*

In May 1947, speaking to the annual meeting of the Delta Council, held at Delta State University, Under-Secretary of State Dean Acheson laid out a policy for the relief of post-war Europe that would come to be known as the Marshall Plan. To commemorate the sixtieth anniversary of this event, DSU is hosting a regional conference of the SMH examining the multifaceted aspects of what happens when peace returns, and both victors and defeated alike grapple with the new world that war has wrought. As Lord George Sackville said of the efforts to conclude the Seven Years War, in words as relevant today as they were almost 250 years ago: "Nothing is so easy as to declare war, nothing so difficult as to make peace." Thus it is clear that while this conference theme would appear particularly poignant given world events at the dawn of the twenty-first century, issues concerning the termination and aftermath of war have always been an important factor in military history.

While the Conference commemorates the inception of the Marshall Plan, its theme has also been chosen with an eye to being as broad as possible. Panels are welcomed that address not only political, administrative, and operational issues, but also issues concerning economic, cultural, and social aspects of the termination and aftermath of war. In addition to providing a venue for discussing these important issues, the intent of the Conference is to provide attendees with an environment for professional camaraderie, regardless of their specific field of research. This Call for Papers, therefore, is addressed to all scholars with an interest in this topic.

While chances of acceptance are improved for those who propose a full panel [three panelists, moderator, commentator], individual papers or offers to serve as a moderator or commentator are by no means discouraged. Submission deadline is May 15, 2007, and the Conference will be held on October 19-20, 2007. Further information is available at the Conference website: [www.dsuhist.com](http://www.dsuhist.com)

Email submissions to: [dsusmh07@deltastate.edu](mailto:dsusmh07@deltastate.edu), or send by mail to:

Delta State University  
DSU/ SMH Conference  
P.O. Box 3162  
Cleveland, Mississippi, 38733



## Call for Contributors: *Encyclopedia of the Cold War*

For the past year a team of scholars has been recruiting contributors for a multivolume encyclopedia of the Cold War, to be published by Routledge. MTM Publishing, a book packaging firm in New York City, is coordinating the development and production of this reference work. The encyclopedia aims to be the first upper-level reference work on the Cold War to take advantage of advances in Cold War studies following the fall of the Soviet Union and the opening of various national archives.

We are pleased to have attracted a stellar group of participants, ranging from grad students to full professors. More than 75% of the projected entries have been assigned. Among the remaining entries are a significant number of conceptual categories, such as "arms control", "capitalism", "communism", "democracy", "embargoes", and "international law." We recognize that it is more challenging to pen 3,500 words about "capitalism" in relation to the Cold War than it is to write a short definition of, say, the "Iron Curtain" or the "Khmer Rouge" (both of which are also unassigned!). Nevertheless, we hope that some of you will welcome this challenge as an opportunity to think in broad terms about the multi-faceted nature of the Cold War.

For further information about this project, please see: <http://www.referenceworld.com/mtm/coldwar/index.asp>

To consult the full list of headwords, click on "Access TOBIN" (on the left side of the page) and enter username = level4, password = guestcold. Once you have identified some prospective entries, please write to Tim Anderson <TAnderson@mtmpublishing.com> or one of the editors below to express your interest. Please also include a brief paragraph noting current affiliation, current research, and recent publications or conference presentations. You may also wish to attach a cv.

Contributors will be recompensed according to the length of their entry. Those crafting two or more entries will also receive a full copy of the encyclopedia set.

The encyclopedia's advisory editors, alphabetically:

Will Gray, Purdue University: [wgray@purdue.edu](mailto:wgray@purdue.edu)  
Svetlana Savranskaya, National Security Archive: [svetlana@gwu.edu](mailto:svetlana@gwu.edu)  
Jeremi Suri, University of Wisconsin-Madison: [suri@wisc.edu](mailto:suri@wisc.edu)  
Ruud van Dijk, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee: [vandijk@uwm.edu](mailto:vandijk@uwm.edu)  
Qiang Zhai, Auburn University: [qzhai1@mail.aum.edu](mailto:qzhai1@mail.aum.edu)



## Call for Contributors: *Encyclopedia of Military History*

ABC-CLIO, the award-winning publisher of historical reference works including recently published multi-volume encyclopedias of World War I, World War II, and the American Revolution, is currently developing a wide-ranging and definitive project on U.S. military history. This scholarly, comprehensive project consists of authoritative encyclopedic entries centered on 14 of the major wars of American history, including the current conflicts in the Middle East. It contains not only the military aspects of the conflicts, but also the political, social, economic, and technological developments that impacted or were impacted by the conflicts. These entries will appear in multiple products for the high school and academic market, including ABC-CLIO's award-winning database *United States at War: Understanding Conflict and Society*, ABC-CLIO's prestigious series of war encyclopedias, and ABC-CLIO's innovative workbooks.

ABC-CLIO has assembled a team of top military history scholars to work on this groundbreaking project, and we are currently seeking additional qualified contributors to give this study the depth and broad interpretation that it deserves. For more information on this project, including a project description, list of entries, compensation information, and sample entries, please email Dr. Paul Pierpaoli at [ppierpaoli@abc-clio.com](mailto:ppierpaoli@abc-clio.com). He will be happy to provide you with more information and materials. When contacting Dr. Pierpaoli, please indicate your affiliation, areas of interest, and attach a copy of your curriculum vitae.

For further information, contact:

Spencer C. Tucker, Ph.D.  
Senior Fellow, Military History  
ABC-CLIO

Paul Pierpaoli, Ph.D.  
Fellow, Military History and Diplomatic History  
ABC-CLIO

Pat Carlin  
Manager, Editorial Development for Military History  
ABC-CLIO



## Call for Submissions: Cold War Prize Competition, 2006-2007

For the third year, the John A. Adams Center at the Virginia Military Institute is pleased to announce that it will award prizes for the best unpublished papers dealing with the United States military in the Cold War era (1945-1991). Any aspect of the Cold War is eligible, with papers on intelligence, logistics, and mobilization especially welcome. Please note that essays on the Korean War, on Vietnam, on counterinsurgency and related topics are all open for consideration.

Prizes: First place will earn a plaque and a cash award of \$2000; second place, \$1000 and a plaque; and third place, \$500 and a plaque.

Procedures: Entries should be tendered to the Adams Center at VMI by 31 May 2007. Please make your submission by Microsoft Word and limit the length to a maximum of twenty-five pages, double-spaced. The center will, over the summer, examine all papers and announce its top three rankings early in the fall of 2007. The *Journal of Military History* will consider those award winners for publication.

Questions:

Professor Malcolm Muir, Jr., Director  
John A. Adams '71 Center for Military History and Strategic Analysis  
Department of History  
Virginia Military Institute; Lexington, VA 24450  
muirm@vmi.edu

Phone: (540) 464-7447/7338

Fax: (540) 464-7246



## CWIHP Publishes Working Paper #54, *Evolution and Revolution: Sino-Hungarian Relations and the 1956 Revolution*

The Cold War International History Project is pleased to announce the publication of Working Paper No. 54, *Evolution and Revolution: Sino-Hungarian Relations and the 1956 Revolution*, by Péter Vámos, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Drawing on newly available Hungarian and Chinese archival documents, Vámos examines a still controversial aspect of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution — China's role in the Soviet decision-making during October and November 1956. Arguing against the claim that Chinese pressure was critical in convincing Soviet leaders to intervene militarily in Hungary, Vámos notes that the commonly accepted narrative — namely that Mao Zedong realized the true "counter-revolutionary" character of the Hungarian events, and thus exerted Chinese influence in order to persuade a weak Khrushchev to intervene militarily — is not supported by the documentary record. Vámos argues that this legend only came into existence in the 1960s, with the attempt by Chinese propagandists to conceal evidence of Chinese subservience to the Soviet Union during the 1950s. Placing special attention on how the Hungarian events influenced Chinese policy-making and propaganda, Vámos concludes that Beijing's interest in the Hungarian events was primarily focused on drawing lessons for use domestically, and that in 1956, the Chinese government was not prepared for an open confrontation with Moscow over the Hungarian issue.

The paper can be downloaded at: [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic\\_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.item&news\\_id=213536](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.item&news_id=213536)



## Harry S. Truman Library Institute Research Grants

Research grants of up to \$2,500 are awarded biannually and are intended to enable graduate students, post-doctoral scholars and other researchers to come to the Harry S. Truman Library for one to three weeks to use its collections. Awards are to offset expenses incurred for this purpose only.

Graduate students and post-doctoral scholars are particularly encouraged to apply, but applications from others engaged in advanced research will also be considered. Preference will be given to projects that have application to enduring public policy and foreign policy issues and that have a high probability of being published or publicly disseminated in some other way. The potential contribution of a project to an applicant's development as a scholar will also be considered. An individual may receive no more than two research grants in a five-year period.

Deadlines: April 1 and October 1. The Committee will notify applicants in writing of its decision approximately six weeks after these dates.

Budgets: Budgets are calculated on the following basis: 1) \$75 per day for lodging and meals. 2) Airfare based on the best advance coach fare available. 3) Up to \$100 allowance for photocopying. 4) Roundtrip mileage for grantees using personal vehicles to drive in is currently reimbursable at 48.5 cents per mile (subject to change). Area ground transportation (airport shuttles, cabs, local bus service, etc.) is the responsibility of the grantee.

For more information, see the Institute web page at: <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/grants/index.html>.



## The George Bush Presidential Library Foundation O'Donnell Grant Program

The Peter and Edith O'Donnell Endowment in the George Bush Presidential Library Foundation provides grants to aid scholars doing research at the George Bush Presidential Library. Research must include, but not be limited to, holdings of the George Bush Presidential Library.

The program awards grants ranging from \$500 to \$2,500 to proposals approved by a committee of scholars and administrators at the George Bush Presidential Library Center. Funding priority will be given to proposals that have the greatest likelihood of publication and subsequent usefulness to educators, scholars, students, and policymakers. Awards are announced in the spring and fall. The deadline for spring awards is March 15 and for fall awards it is October 15.

Application information can be found at: <http://www.georgebushfoundation.org/bush/html/GrantPrograms/ODonnell.htm>.

For more information contact:

O'Donnell Grant Program  
George Bush Presidential Library Foundation  
Texas A&M University  
1145 TAMU  
College Station, TX 77843-1145  
bushfoundation@gbplc.tamu.edu  
Phone: (979) 862-2251  
Fax: (979) 862-2253



## Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum Grants

The Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute supports a program of small grants-in-aid, not to exceed \$2,500, in support of research on the "Roosevelt years" or clearly related subjects. Grants are awarded each spring and fall. The deadlines for grant submissions are February 15 and September 15. Funds are awarded for the sole purpose of helping to defray living, travel, and related expenses incurred while conducting research at the Roosevelt Library.

The grants program is particularly designed to encourage younger scholars to expand our knowledge and understanding of the Roosevelt period and to give support for research in the Roosevelt years to scholars from the emerging democracies and the Third World.

Applicants should write:

Chairman, Grants Committee  
The Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute  
4079 Albany Post Road  
Hyde Park, NY 12538



## 2007 CWIHP Internships

The Cold War International History Project (<http://www.cwihp.org>) is recruiting interns for 2007. Interns at the Project will assist in researching at archives and libraries, editing document manuscripts, publishing, translating, disseminating CWIHP bulletins and working papers, coordinating scholarly conferences, maintaining CWIHP's web page and answering various information requests. Interns at CWIHP will be at the forefront of the debate and research over the historiography of the Cold War and will gain valuable knowledge from interaction with Woodrow Wilson Center Fellows as well as visiting scholars.

The Cold War International History Project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to accelerate the process of integrating new sources, materials and perspectives from the former "Communist bloc" with the historiography of the Cold War that has been written over the past few decades largely by Western scholars reliant on Western archival sources. It also seeks to transcend barriers of language, geography, and regional specialization to create new links among scholars interested in Cold War history. The Wilson Center is a nonpartisan institute for advanced study and a neutral forum for open, serious, and informed dialogue. The Center's internship appointments are generally consistent with academic semesters (i.e. Fall, Spring, Summer / three to four months), although appointments are made throughout the year for periods of varying length. No internship will exceed one year in duration.

Successful applicants should have strong research and/or administrative skills; be detail-oriented; be able to work independently and collectively as part of group; be enrolled in a degree program, have graduated, and/or have been accepted to enter an advanced degree program within the next year. Knowledge of a foreign language (especially Russian, Hungarian, Romanian, Czech, Polish, Bulgarian, Vietnamese, Albanian, Mandarin Chinese, or German) is helpful, but not necessary. This internship with the Cold War International History Project is unpaid. As a general rule, our offices are looking for individuals who are willing to devote at least 15 to 25 hours per week. The Wilson Center is an equal

opportunity employer and follows equal opportunity employment guidelines in the selection of its interns. Internships are open to all U.S. residents and qualified foreign students with U.S. Student Visas (F1).

Deadline for Summer 2007 is April 30, 2007. To apply, send a resume and short writing sample (preferably via e-mail) to: Ryan Gage, [ryan.gage@wilsoncenter.org](mailto:ryan.gage@wilsoncenter.org).

For more information, contact:

Cold War International History Project  
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars  
One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300  
Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20004-3027

<http://www.cwihp.org>



## H-Diplo Call for Reviewers

H-Diplo is in the process of re-vamping its database of potential commentators and reviewers.

### 1. Article Reviewers/Commentators

We work with an expanding set of journals that presently includes *Diplomatic History*, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, *Cold War History*, *Journal of Vietnamese Studies*, *Journal of the Historical Society*, and the working papers of the CWIHP. We invite interested commentators or reviewers to send a brief message to [h-diplo@h-net.msu.edu](mailto:h-diplo@h-net.msu.edu) that includes a note on the applicant's academic background, professional qualifications, and research interests. Please include a short list of publications and teaching fields. H-Diplo commentators and reviewers will normally possess a doctorate (although we will consider ABDs.), publications in the field, or professional experience in the area of foreign policy/international relations. We welcome promising new researchers as well as senior scholars. Those who require information regarding the format, scope, and length of the article reviews can access our published H-Diplo Article commentaries at <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/commentaries/>

### 2. Reviewers for H-Diplo Roundtables

Each year H-Diplo commissions a large number of roundtable reviews of notable scholarly books in the field. We invite interested roundtable reviewers to send a brief message to [h-diplo@h-net.msu.edu](mailto:h-diplo@h-net.msu.edu) that includes a note on the applicant's academic background, professional qualifications, and research interests. Please include a short list of publications and teaching fields. The minimum requirement for roundtable reviewers is a doctorate and at least one published monograph in the field. We tend to rely upon senior scholars or professionals with extensive experience in the field of foreign policy/international relations. Those who require information regarding the format, scope, and length of the roundtables can access our published H-Diplo Roundtables at <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/>.

More information can be found at the H-Diplo webpage at: <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/>.



## Call for Submissions: *The European Journal of American Studies*

*The European Journal of American Studies* (EJAS), the new online journal of the European Association for American Studies, welcomes submissions. EJAS is the official, peer-reviewed academic journal of the European Association for American Studies, a federation of national and joint-national associations of specialists of the United States gathering approximately 4,000 scholars from 26 European countries. EJAS aims to foster European views on the society, culture, history, and politics of the United States, and how the US interacts with other countries in these fields. In doing so the journal places itself firmly within the continuing discussion amongst Europeans on the nature, history, importance, impact and problems of US civilization. As part of this task, EJAS wants to contribute to enriching the contents, broadening the scope, and documenting the critical examination of "American Studies" in and outside of the United States. EJAS welcomes contributions from Europe and elsewhere and endeavors to make available reliable information and state-of-the-art research on all topics within its broad field of interest. As a matter of policy, the journal will pay particular attention to objects, phenomena and issues less documented or less often debated in the United States, as well as to innovative cultural modes and the diversity of reception of United States culture abroad. Associated with this outlook, it welcomes submissions that elaborate and renew critical approaches, paradigms and methodologies, and that express varied and pluralist views.

For more information, contact Pawel Frelik at [ejas-lit@eaas.info](mailto:ejas-lit@eaas.info) for contributions bearing on literature, culture and the arts, and Cornelis A. van Minnen at [rsc@zeeland.nl](mailto:rsc@zeeland.nl) for contributions bearing on history, social sciences and international relations.



## Call for Papers: "Russian-American Relations: 200 Years of Collaboration"

The Institute of the World History of Russian Academy of Sciences invites paper proposals for an international scientific conference, to be held November 7-9, 2007, dedicated to the bicentennial of Russian-American relations. The conference will consist of three main sections devoted to different aspects of the history of Russian-American relations. The conference is also providing a special section for graduate students specializing in Russian or US history. The organizers are interested in papers from a variety of approaches on the themes of the history of Russian-American relations, however papers on Russian or the US history are also welcome.

Please send a 750 word abstract together with a current CV to Samuel Volfson, Managing Secretary, or to Dr. Alexander Petrov, Institute of the World History, 32-a Leninskii pr., 1506 . You may submit by email at [confrus-usa2007@mail.ru](mailto:confrus-usa2007@mail.ru) or [Samuel.B.Volfson@gmail.com](mailto:Samuel.B.Volfson@gmail.com). The deadline for submitting abstracts is June 30, 2007.

If you have any questions or wish to receive the program of the conference, please, contact:

Samuel B. Volfson  
Institute of the World History  
1403 Leninskii pr., 32-a  
119334 Moscow, Russia  
Phone: 79 1 6320 9524  
Email: [samuel.b.volfson@gmail.com](mailto:samuel.b.volfson@gmail.com)



## Call for Contributions: *Projections of Power in the Americas*

Historians, political scientists and other scholars with an interest in the study of the Americas are invited to propose contributions to an international, inter-university publication project entitled "Projections of Power in the Americas." The project has been initiated by the Center for the Study of the Americas at the Copenhagen Business School, and the primary purpose is to investigate the ways in which power or the discourse of power is represented in or projected onto society (or segments of society) in the Americas. The project is envisaged to involve discussions of the framing of political discourses, symbolic representations of presidential power, iconography, the struggle over collective memories and the counter-strategies involved in notions of empowerment. The following sections - each of which is expected to include chapters on North America as well as Latin America - have been suggested so far:

1. The Visualization of Power (currently, this section includes contributions on the Vietnam Memorial in Washington, D.C. and portraits of American business celebrity).
2. The Institutionalization of Power (this section currently includes contributions on transnational practices in the Mexico-US border region, as well as the influence of international institutions in shaping ideals of youth in Latin America).
3. The Power of Symbols (this section currently includes three contributions - on "principal discursive resources used in the symbolic projection of the 'national-revolutionary' power in contemporary Cuba;" on the conservative "commemoration crusade" for Ronald Reagan in the United States; and on "The Power of Powerlessness: The Symbolic Presence of Haiti in the American Imagination").
4. Power and Empowerment (this section currently includes a contribution on the colonial past in Canada, focusing on imperial policy towards the indigenous people as well as the counterstrategies developed by some Indian leaders).

For more information, please contact Professor Niels Bjerre-Poulsen, Center for the Study of the Americas at Copenhagen Business School, [nbp.eng@cbs.dk](mailto:nbp.eng@cbs.dk).



## 4. Letters to the Editor

November 25, 2006

Dear Editors:

I quite enjoyed Carmel Coyle's article "Changes in the Mary Ball Washington Chair in American History at University College-Dublin," in the April 2006 issue of the *Passport*. The Mary Ball Washington Chair is really a wonderful appointment. Dublin is of course an elegant city and the History Department at University College Dublin is most welcoming and congenial. This is certainly a visiting professorship abroad in which SHAFR members can make a valuable contribution and enjoy themselves enormously.

It did occur to me that the article tended to focus on the holders of the Chair since it was integrated into the Fulbright program and on the current administration of the Chair, which is understandable considering that the author is the Executive Director of the Irish Fulbright Commission. Actually, the professorship had quite a life while University College Dublin undertook the recruitment and administration of the Chair itself. *Passport* readers might be interested to know that there were eight people who served as Mary Ball Washington Professors before 1986, several of whom are SHAFR

members. They are as follows:

1976-77 Donald R. McCoy	University of Kansas
1977-78 Lloyd E. Ambrosius	University of Nebraska
1978-79 Richard Reinitz	Hobart and William Smith College
1979-80 Peter Karsten	University of Pittsburgh
1980-81 vacant	
1981-82 Stephen E. Ambrose	University of New Orleans
1982-83 George S. McGovern	former Senator
1983-84 vacant	
1984-85 Francis M. Carroll	University of Manitoba
1985-86 Kim McQuaid	Lake Erie College

Yours Sincerely,

Francis M. Carroll

Professor Emeritus  
St. John's College  
University of Manitoba



December 20, 2006

Dear Editors,

I want to thank the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations for supporting my research project, "Borderline Citizens: Puerto Ricans and the Politics of Race, Migration and Empire, 1898-1950," with the 2006 Bernath Dissertation grant. The grant funded a research trip to San Juan, Puerto Rico where I was able to use the unique collection of the Archivo General de Puerto Rico and the University of Puerto Rico.

At the Archivo General, I researched records from the Puerto Rican government files, known collectively as "Fortaleza," including records of strikes against U.S. sugar companies in 1905 and 1915, and petitions of workers sent to the governor in San Juan begging for money to travel to the U.S. for work. Also included in this collection were files on contract labor such as the 1905 case of 54 Puerto Rican women contracted to work for the St. Louis cordage factory who, after being "thrown into the street," solicited the help of the governor of Puerto Rico in fighting for labor protections from their U.S. employer. I examined labor union records of the Federación Libre de Trabajadores, Puerto Rico's preeminent labor organization of the early twentieth century, and selected court cases relating to citizenship and labor from Supreme and District Court records.

At the University of Puerto Rico I visited the Colección Puertorriqueña, home to the most complete collection of Puerto Rican newspapers, most of which are not available elsewhere. While there, I examined such publications as: *El Águila* (1907-1931), which published daily reports of suicides of working people in Ponce in the late 1910s; *Unión Obrera* (1903-1934), the official newspaper of the Federación Libre de Trabajadores; and other labor publications such as *Puerto Rico Workingmen's Journal* (1905-1911) and *Justicia* (1914-1922).

This research, conducted in April 2006, has proved critical to my dissertation research. I have now drafted the first three chapters of my dissertation, all of which make use of sources I found in San Juan. In supporting this research, the Bernath Grant has helped me find Puerto Rican sources describing the effects of U.S. policy on the island in the early twentieth century, an essential piece of my project.

Specifically, grant funds were used to pay for roundtrip airfare from Philadelphia to San Juan (approximately \$300) as well as lodging for two weeks (approximately \$500), for a total of \$800.

Thanks again to SHAFR for this support!

Sincerely,

Robert McGreevey

PhD candidate  
Brandeis University  
Waltham, MA





## 5. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines:

### The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

The Bernath Dissertation Grant of \$2,000 is intended to help doctoral candidates defray expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. The grant is awarded annually at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation. Membership in SHAFR is not required. Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a dissertation prospectus including a paragraph or two on how funds would be expended (8-12 pages), a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant's dissertation adviser must write a letter of recommendation, to be submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail. Applicants for the Bernath Dissertation Grant will also be considered for the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*. The deadline for applications for the 2008 grant is November 15, 2007. Application materials should be sent to Andrew L. Johns, Department of History, Brigham Young University, andrew\_johns@byu.edu.



### The Lawrence Gelfand - Armin Rappaport Fellowship

SHAFR established this fellowship to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*. The Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship of \$2,000 is intended to defray the costs of dissertation research travel. The fellowship is awarded annually at SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of United States foreign relations history. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation. Membership in SHAFR is not required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a dissertation prospectus including a paragraph or two on how funds would be expended (8-12 pages), a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant's dissertation adviser must write a letter of recommendation, to be submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail. Applicants for the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship will also be considered for the Bernath Dissertation Grant. Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*. The deadline for applications for the 2008 grant is November 15, 2007. Application materials should be sent to Andrew L. Johns, Department of History, Brigham Young University, andrew\_johns@byu.edu.



## 6. Recent Publications of Interest

Bayly, Christopher and Tim Harper. *Forgotten Wars: Freedom and Revolution in Southeast Asia*, Belknap Press, \$35.00.

Beck, Peter J. *Using History, Making British Policy: The Treasury and the Foreign Office, 1950-1976*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$74.95.

Burke, Anthony. *Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence: War Against the Other*, Routledge, \$125.00.

Chung, Jae Ho. *Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States*, Columbia University Press, \$40.00.

Cirincione, Joseph. *Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons*, Columbia University Press, \$27.50.

Clarence, William. *Ethnic Warfare in Sri Lanka and the U.N. Crisis*, Pluto Press, \$28.95.

Clifford, J. Gary and Theodore A. Wilson, eds. *Presidents, Diplomats, and Other Mortals*, University of Missouri Press, \$39.95.

Eby, Cecil D. *Comrades and Commissars: The Lincoln Battalion in the Spanish Civil War*, Pennsylvania State University Press, \$39.95.

Fink, Carole, Frank Hadler, and Tomasz Schramm, eds. *1956: European and Global Perspectives*, Leipzig University Press.


Friesendorf, Cornelius. *US Foreign Policy and the War on Drugs: Displacing the Cocaine and Heroin Industry*, Routledge, \$120.00.

- Fursenko, Aleksandr and Timothy Naftali. *Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary*, W.W. Norton, \$35.00.
- Gati, Charles. *Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt*, Stanford University Press, \$24.95.
- Hunt, Michael H. *The American Ascendancy: How the United States Gained and Wielded Global Dominance*, University of North Carolina Press, \$34.95.
- Katzenstein, Peter J. and Robert O. Keohane, eds. *Anti-Americanisms in World Politics*, Cornell University Press, \$24.95.
- Keys, Barbara J. *Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s*, Harvard University Press, \$49.95.
- Large, David Clay. *Nazi Games: The Olympics of 1936*, W.W. Norton, \$27.95.
- Lawrence, Mark Atwood and Frederick Logevall, eds. *The First Vietnam War: Colonial Conflict and Cold War Crisis*, Harvard University Press, \$45.00.
- Legro, Jeffrey W. *Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order*, Cornell University Press, \$19.95.
- Leonard, Thomas M. and John F. Bratzel. *Latin America During World War II*, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, \$29.95.
- Lowenheim, Oded. *Predators and Parasites: Persistent Agents of Transnational Harm and Great Power Authority*, University of Michigan Press, \$24.95.
- Mayers, David. *Dissenting Voices in America's Rise to Power*, Cambridge University Press, \$85.00.
- Moyar, Mark. *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965*, Cambridge University Press, \$32.00.
- Murray, Donette. *US Foreign Policy and Iran: Relations Since the Islamic Revolution*, Routledge, \$120.00.
- Neptune, Harvey. *Caliban and the Yankees: Trinidad and the United States Occupation*, University of North Carolina Press, \$59.95.
- Oren, Michael B. *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East: 1776 to the Present*, W.W. Norton, \$35.00.
- Paupp, Terrence E. *Exodus from Empire: The Fall of America's Empire and the Rise of the Global Community*, Pluto Press, \$40.00.
- Qing, Simei. *From Allies to Enemies: Visions of Modernity, Identity, and U.S.-China Diplomacy, 1945-1960*, Harvard University Press, \$49.95.
- Raby, D.L. *Democracy and Revolution: Latin America and Socialism Today*, Pluto Press, \$29.95.
- Ramet, Sabrina P. *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005*, Indiana University Press, \$65.00.
- Record, Jeffrey. *The Specter of Munich: Reconsidering the Lessons of Appeasing Hitler*, Potomac Books, \$24.95.
- Roberts, Geoffrey. *Stalin's Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939-1953*, Yale University Press, \$35.00.
- Roberts, Priscilla, ed. *Behind the Bamboo Curtain: China, Vietnam, and the Cold War*, Stanford University Press, \$65.00.
- Serewicz, Lawrence W. *America at the Brink of Empire: Rusk, Kissinger, and the Vietnam War*, Louisiana State University Press, \$40.00.
- Shapiro, Ian. *Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror*, Princeton University Press, \$24.95.
- Shibusawa, Naoko. *America's Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy*, Harvard University Press, \$35.00.
- Siani-Davies, Peter. *The Romanian Revolution of December 1989*, Cornell University Press, \$24.95.
- Taffet, Jeffrey. *Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy: The Alliance for Progress in Latin America*, Routledge, \$95.00.
- Thomas, Leonard M. *Latin American During World War II*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, \$29.95.
- Van Der Pijl, Kees. *Global Rivalries from the Cold War to Iraq*, Pluto Press, \$95.00.
- Wald, Alan M. *Trinity of Passion: The Literary Left and the Antifascist Crusade*, University of North Carolina Press, \$34.95.
- Walton, Hanes, Robert Stevenson, and James Rosser. *The African Foreign Policy of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger: A Documentary Analysis*, Lexington Books, \$100.00.
- Wenger, Andreas, Christian Nuenlist, and Anna Locher, eds. *Transforming NATO in the Cold War*, Routledge, \$120.00.
- Zimmerman, Jonathan. *Innocents Abroad: American Teachers in the American Century*, Harvard University Press, \$45.00.

# The Last Word

*Mitchell B. Lerner*

I love the annual SHAFR conference. I really do. It is not as enjoyable as, say, the Red Sox winning the World Series, but it does happen with more regularity and the process of getting there causes me less emotional trauma. And my wife has never threatened to throw me out of the house because of the SHAFR Conference (which actually makes it one of very few things to meet this standard). But last year I missed the conference for the first time in recent memory. Instead I was fortunate enough to attend a number of meetings in Europe that operated somewhat differently, and that experience made me wonder if it was not time for SHAFR to consider making some reforms.



The most significant change I might propose is one that I observed at a conference in Hamburg. All panelists were required to submit final versions of their papers by e-mail roughly thirty days in advance. Papers were then placed on the conference website, and attendees were encouraged to download relevant ones before arrival. At the conference, speakers were given only ten to fifteen minutes to sum up their findings; they were also expected to do so extemporaneously rather than by reading from the paper itself. The bulk of the time was thus given over to questions and dialogue between the panelists and the audience.

This strikes me as an excellent way to proceed. Anyone who has attended SHAFR panels knows how hard it can be to stay focused when three presenters each spend twenty-five minutes reading directly from their papers. I personally can barely stay awake when my sister-in-law directs four consecutive sentences in my direction (fortunately, they are never very important); my chances of remaining fully focused for an hour of passive listening to even the most exciting paper are slim. If panelists were expected to talk rather than read, I firmly believe that the audience would be more focused and the panels more beneficial for everyone.

Such a policy has other benefits. Allowing attendees to download papers from the webpage in advance of the conference would enable them to familiarize themselves with the arguments and thus deliver better feedback at the

panels. Limiting the oral presentations to fifteen minutes would allow more time for discussion and questions, which would likely be necessary with a more prepared audience. Those who found themselves torn between two panels meeting at the same time could skim the papers in advance to decide which one to attend and still come away with an idea of what they missed at the other one. SHAFR might even consider creating an optional archive for each year's papers, with an eye towards creating a fantastic digital resource for members. Imagine finding yourself in need of some last-minute detail for your research and being able to head to the SHAFR webpage to

search through the last fifteen years of conference papers to find the information.

We might consider other changes. The recently created SHAFR Teaching Committee has done an excellent job of organizing at least one teaching-related panel at the last few conferences. There was also a panel last year about making the transition from graduate student to professor. Perhaps we should start expanding into other professional areas as well. I can recall attending a panel on finding a job while I was in graduate school, and while I cannot remember who the panelists were I do recall finding their advice very helpful. Is it time for the program committee to redouble its efforts to organize more panels related to the profession as a whole? A panel on publishing? A panel on tenure? A panel on using archives or the internet? For graduate students and younger scholars in general, the benefits seem obvious.

No doubt some would argue that any conference foolish enough to invite me should automatically be dismissed as a role model. Fair enough. And certainly the annual meeting has worked well in the past and continues to do so today. I offer these suggestions merely to generate conversation, nothing more. As the late, great Groucho Marx once said, "These are my principles, and if you don't like them, I have others." But as the new century advances, we as a society would be remiss if we did not constantly seek to use the new technologies to advance ourselves as well. Consider this just an attempt to get such a process started.