

Passport

The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Volume 39, Issue 1, April 2008



Inside...

A Roundtable on Amy Staples's *The Birth of Development*
H-Diplo and Women

Scott Lucas on the Politics of Fear

Meredith Fuchs on the White House and Historical Records

Teaching Vietnam through Oral Histories

...and much more!

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The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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Cover Photo

President George W. Bush is joined by House and Senate representatives as he signs H.R. 3199, USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Thursday, March 9, 2006 in the East Room of the White House. White House photo by Eric Draper.

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Thoughts from SHAFR President Thomas A. Schwartz

Probably one of the most salient facts in my biography is that I was a high school debater. While my classmates achieved honor and glory on the sports fields, we members of the forensics team labored away in relative obscurity, collecting our evidence, building our cases, and learning how to reason and argue, logically and effectively. Debate had a profound influence on me intellectually, leading me always to consider the strengths and weaknesses in any argument I was presenting, and recognizing instinctively, the Pieter Geyl description of history as an "argument without end." Later when I was in graduate school a medieval historian criticized me for taking a debater's approach to some issue in that field, telling me that I should simply figure out what the facts were and present them. I knew then that I didn't want to be a medieval historian.

I mention this bit of biography in trying to explain the invitation to Professor John Yoo to address a SHAFR plenary meeting at our annual conference this year in Columbus. As anyone who's served on a Program Committee knows, it is not always easy to recruit important policymakers to come to the conference, although SHAFR has had success in recent years, with such controversial notables as the diplomat Joseph Wilson and CIA Director Michael Hayden. I proposed Yoo to the Program Committee with the intention of stimulating a debate about presidential powers over foreign policy and national security, knowing full well, as I told Yoo, that most in SHAFR would be unsympathetic and/or extremely hostile to his arguments. Perhaps as a favor to his former professor - I taught Yoo in a class at Harvard more than twenty years ago - or perhaps because he is accustomed to debating these issues, he agreed to appear.

No sooner did the Program appear that I began to receive emails demanding that the invitation be withdrawn. An on-line petition also circulated with the same demand, arguing, in effect, that SHAFR should not provide a forum for Yoo. The petitioners also objected to having their membership fees used for this speaker. Many of those



who signed are people for whom I have a great respect and affection, and their powerful and passionate opposition to Yoo's appearance certainly made me pause. However, I believe strongly that SHAFR, as a leading intellectual forum for the study of the history of America's international relations, must remain an organization open to controversial views. Yet I did recognize that there was a way we could improve the discussion and dialogue over the issues that Yoo would raise. We invited Prof. David Cole of Georgetown University, a prominent critic of Yoo's interpretation of presidential power, to provide a commentary on his address and to set off what promises to be a vigorous and interesting debate at the Friday plenary session. I encourage all SHAFR members to attend this forum.

One final story - after a conference at the University of Virginia's Miller Center back in 1999, a group of us were sitting around and lamenting diplomatic history's poor standing within the profession, when someone asked Tim Naftali, then the assistant director of the Center, how he described his work to skeptical social and cultural historians. Tim answered that he considered himself a "historian of power, in all its dimensions." This description came back to me during the controversy about Yoo's appearance. Historians of American foreign relations study power, power that can protect and attack, liberate and oppress, sustain life or destroy it. The study of power up close can be an exceptionally depressing and ugly thing, even as it fascinates us with its complexities and moral conundrums. Many historians, and doubtless many who signed the petition opposing Yoo's appearance, believe that one duty of the historian should be to "speak truth to power." But in order to do that, it seems to me, you should let power enter the room.

Thomas Schwartz is professor of History at Vanderbilt University.

The White House: Off Limits to Historians?

*Meredith Fuchs**

The president of the United States is often called the leader of the free world. It is no wonder that historians and political scientists consider the records related to presidential activities, policy, and decisionmaking so valuable for analyzing U.S. government policy at home and abroad. But over the last seven years there have been a series of moves by the current administration that may ensure that the records of the White House and the federal offices and agencies that work closely with the White House will not be available to historians.

The problem is twofold. First, the Bush administration does not value (or may even be hostile to) the preservation and disclosure of records. Second, we have seen advances in technology that have transformed the way in which we all communicate. The juxtaposition of these circumstances may mean that primary sources on the most important decisions and activities in the government may be lost, destroyed, or closed to the public.

This administration's hostility towards public access to records has deep roots. Soon after becoming governor of Texas in 1995, George W. Bush signed a law that newly permitted former governors to send their records to institutions other than the Texas State Library and Archives, which had received the records of every former Texas governor since 1846. When the time came for Governor Bush to make use of the law at the end of his term, he sent his gubernatorial records to his father's presidential library at Texas A&M University. That move would have delayed and limited access to the records under Texas law. It was necessary for then-Texas Attorney

General John Cornyn to rule that the records belonged to the state of Texas and remained subject to Texas open-government laws.¹ As a result, the records were returned to the Texas State Archives in Austin to prepare them for research use.²

Other senior administration officials have exhibited a similar attitude about the records of the presidency. In a tribute speech in honor of former President Gerald R. Ford, delivered at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum on September 14, 2007, Vice President Dick Cheney told an audience that: this Museum, and the Ford Library in Ann Arbor, mean a great deal to me – not just personally but from the standpoint of history, because I was chief of staff in the Ford White House. I'm told researchers like to come and dig through my files, to see if anything interesting turns up. I want to wish them luck – [laughter] – but the files are pretty thin. I learned early on that if you don't want your memos to get you in trouble some day, just don't write any.³

The decision not to create records documenting government decisionmaking is in itself troubling. Its impact is compounded by the proliferation of BlackBerries, instant messaging, and other new means of communication that often do not leave traces unless specific efforts are made to preserve the communications. This issue came to light most prominently in news stories about White House officials' use of BlackBerries and e-mail accounts issued by the Republican National Committee.⁴ But the problem is not limited to hot-button controversies at the White House. The

use of BlackBerries, voicemail, instant messaging and other emergent technologies is spreading, while records management policies may not be keeping pace.

The risk of disappearance and destruction has also arisen with electronic communications that most people think are safely recorded and maintained for future disclosure – e-mails. The apparent large-scale loss of White House e-mails was first publicly disclosed on January 23, 2006, when prosecutors investigating the leak of Valerie Plame's identity as a CIA agent informed "Scooter" Libby's defense attorneys that "not all email records from the Office of the Vice President and the Executive Office of President for certain time periods in 2003 were preserved through the normal archiving process on the White House computer system."⁵ In April 2007, it became clear that the problem was much larger, with potentially as many as five million e-mails deleted from the Executive Office of the President servers.⁶ These may include e-mails from the Office of Management and Budget, the United States Trade Representative, the Council on Environmental Quality, and others, including the Office of the Vice President (OVP) and the National Security Council.

For records that may have survived these poor information management policies, there is a significant risk that they may never be accessible to historians because of a concerted campaign to impede the release of the remaining records with various hurdles, any one of which may prevent them from being subject to disclosure. For instance, records marked as classified – whether properly or improperly – will be

less likely to be released, or their release will be delayed by the need to conduct declassification reviews, and there is evidence that at least within the OVP, classification-like markings were routinely used on materials that may not have merited classification under the terms of Executive Order 12958, as amended by Executive Order 13292.⁷

In addition, this administration is attempting to transform agencies and records that would ordinarily be subject to disclosure laws into non-agencies and non-federal records that are no longer subject to requests under the principle public disclosure law, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). For example, the White House Office of Administration has long been acknowledged as a federal agency subject to the FOIA. It has processed FOIA requests for many years, has published its own FOIA regulations since 1980, had – until recently – an FOIA website, and submitted annual FOIA reports to Congress. Yet when the advocacy group Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) sued the Office of Administration under the FOIA for records about the White House e-mail system, the office changed its tune and argued that it was not even an “agency” under the terms of the FOIA, so the suit should be dismissed.⁸ The tactic of redefining a government entity’s status is not entirely new. During the Clinton administration, the White House successfully took the position that the National Security Council (NSC) was not an “agency” under the Federal Records Act or the FOIA, resulting in NSC records being thereafter considered presidential in nature and managed under the requirements of the Presidential Records Act of 1978 (PRA).

The OVP is also attempting to redefine itself. After traditionally reporting data about its records classification practices to the Information Security Oversight

Office (ISOO), which is charged with oversight of the government-wide national security classification system, the OVP stopped providing the data in 2003 and refused to subject itself to an onsite audit by the ISOO. The rationale for evading records management oversight? The OVP contended it was not a part of the executive branch of government.⁹

Without original source materials concerning the White House role in instituting a war or transforming intelligence policy and military policy, the only story to tell will be the one the politicians in office choose to share with the public.

A similar tactic has been attempted with respect to categories of records. In response to suits brought by the *Washington Post* and CREW, the administration has taken the position that Secret Service visitor logs, which are created and maintained by the Secret Service and have traditionally been considered agency records, instead should be considered presidential records.¹⁰

White House records that are not missing, destroyed, misclassified as secret, or withdrawn from federal record status should eventually be considered for disclosure under the terms of the PRA. The administration, however, has set up new hurdles for those records as well. This article addresses only one of these hurdles in depth – the undermining of the Presidential Records Act. The PRA merits particular attention now because, mere months away from a presidential transition, the time left to preserve remaining records is limited. Moreover, this issue has been raised in relation to Hillary Clinton’s candidacy for the presidency and her view about the release of presidential records from President Bill Clinton’s term.¹¹ Finally, at the time this article was written, a bill to return the PRA to its original standards for release of presidential records was pending in Congress. Despite overwhelming support in the House of Representatives, however, the bill has been subject to three holds, the most recent by Senator Jeff Sessions (R-Alabama), thus preventing a vote in the Senate.¹²

These controversies should matter to historians. As time marches on,

the documentary records that reflect agency decisionmaking may be the best evidence of how decisions were reached, who made those decisions, whether they were good or bad decisions, and how they impacted the nation and the world. Without original source materials concerning the White House role in instituting a war or transforming intelligence policy and military policy, the only story to tell will be the one the politicians in office choose to share with the public. That story is not the one that will help future leaders learn how to make better decisions or that will give the American public the information it needs to be informed voters.

Background: Executive Privilege

Although the phrase “executive privilege” does not appear in the Constitution of the United States, presidential administrations often use it to explain why the president and his advisors have the right to withhold information from the courts, the Congress, and the public. It was used by our first president and in all administrations since, including the current one. It is the basis for the White House resisting subpoenas, refusing to testify in Congress, and refusing to disclose records of who visited the White House and when. And it lies at the heart of disputes regarding presidential records.

According to Mark Rozell, a professor at George Mason University who has authored two books on executive privilege, the term “executive privilege” was first used during the Eisenhower administration, when the president had an expansive view of its reach. Most scholars describe the privilege as implied by Article II of the Constitution, although at least one scholar, Raoul Berger, has called it a myth. Today, with the privilege entrenched in case law, statutes and executive orders, it has become a potent weapon for the White House and high-level executive branch officials to fight off inquiries into their conduct.

It is, however, a conditional privilege, so it can be overridden if

there is a strong reason to dispense with it, such as when the president is under investigation for a crime. Thus, when President Nixon sought to protect the Watergate tapes that had been subpoenaed by the special prosecutor, the Supreme Court turned him down. The Court acknowledged "the valid need for protection of communications between high Government officials and those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties."¹³ Nevertheless, it held that the privilege is neither absolute nor strong enough to withstand the needs of the government and the defendants in a criminal prosecution. The tapes were turned over, and President Nixon resigned soon afterward.

The Presidential Records Act of 1978 (PRA)

The fallout from the Watergate scandal changed the nation in many ways. Among congressional reactions to the scandal was the passage of the Presidential Records Act of 1978.¹⁴ The PRA altered the practice that had been in place for much of our nation's history, which left the documentary materials generated during a president's term in office largely subject to the president's control both during and after his presidency. The PRA makes it clear that the records of the presidency belong to the public and must be turned over to the Archivist of the United States at the end of the president's term. It limits a president's control over White House records and provides for public access to them after the president leaves office.

Although the PRA does not provide any public access for the first five years after the presidency, after that period the records become subject to information requests through the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act. The outgoing president has the right to restrict certain categories of information for up to an additional seven years (twelve years in full). These categories include:

1. Classified national security

- information
2. Information about federal appointments
3. Information exempt from disclosure by statute
4. Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial information
5. Confidential communications between the president and his advisors
6. Information that would invade personal privacy

If the president extends the restriction on disclosure for these categories of information, then those records become subject to the provisions of the FOIA after twelve years. Though subject to the FOIA, the records are not subject to withholding under Exemption (b)(5) of the FOIA, which protects against disclosure of deliberative process or privileged information. Thus, after twelve years, presidential materials—including confidential communications between a president and his advisors or among his advisors—may not be withheld as deliberate executive branch communications, but instead must be released to the public unless the FOIA provides a different basis for withholding them (such as the national security classification of the materials).

The PRA does not leave former presidents without any safety valve concerning the release of information, however. It requires the Archivist of the United States to notify the former president if any planned disclosure of records might "adversely affect any [of his] rights and privileges." To implement its notification function, the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) issued a regulation allowing the former president or his designated representative thirty days to assert any rights or privileges regarding the records. Under the regulation, as under the PRA, the Archivist is not bound to withhold the records on the basis of the former president's assertion of rights or privileges. However, the regulation requires written notice to the former president if the Archivist rejects the assertion and provides time for him to seek

judicial review. It also requires notice to the incumbent president.

The PRA took effect on January 20, 1981, making the records of President Ronald Reagan the first to be subject to its rules. Shortly before his term ended in 1989, President Reagan issued Executive Order 12667, which set forth additional procedures regarding implementation of the PRA. That order required the Archivist to identify any possible executive privilege issues, gave the incumbent president the authority to extend the review time for the records of a former president and asserted the right of the incumbent president to block the release of the records unless otherwise ordered by a court or sitting president.

Applying the Presidential Records Act to the Records of Former Presidents

When President Reagan left office on January 20, 1989, the Archivist received his presidential records, which include almost forty-four million pages of documents, electronic records such as e-mail messages, and photographs and audiovisual materials. Before leaving office, Reagan exercised his right under the PRA to restrict for the maximum period of twelve years all materials falling within the restricted categories enumerated in the law. During the twelve-year period NARA opened up many records that did not fall into the categories of restricted information.

The twelve-year restriction period expired on January 20, 2001. By that time NARA had identified sixty-eight thousand pages of documents that were restricted solely because they were considered "confidential communications"—i.e., they were not classified or otherwise subject to continued withholding. Because the PRA provides that the "confidential communications" restriction only applies for twelve years, at the end of the twelve-year restriction period NARA notified both Reagan and the sitting president, George W. Bush, that the sixty-eight thousand pages were scheduled for disclosure.

NARA's notice prompted then-

White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales twice to instruct the Archivist to postpone any action regarding the sixty-eight thousand pages. A third communication from Mr. Gonzales to NARA indicated that the White House was considering various “constitutional and legal questions” and that NARA should continue to postpone any action. Then, on November 1, 2001, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13233 (the “Bush Order”), which superseded the Reagan executive order. The Bush Order sets forth procedures and standards governing the assertion of claims of executive privilege over “confidential communications” by both former and incumbent presidents following the expiration of the twelve-year restriction period. It specifically describes constitutional executive privilege as including the common-law attorney-client and work-product privileges, the deliberative process privilege, and the state secrets privilege. It also places a burden on individuals seeking such records to demonstrate their need for them.

Procedurally, the Bush Order permits former presidents and the sitting president to delay indefinitely their review of the records scheduled for release by NARA. Essentially, it grants the former president the power to make the decision to withhold records absent “compelling circumstances.” And even if the sitting president finds compelling circumstances for releasing the records, they still cannot be released unless the former president agrees or a court mandates their release. The sitting president also has the authority independently to prevent disclosure of the records. Not only can the public be denied access to the records under this scheme, but the Archivist is not permitted to provide the records in response to a congressional or judicial subpoena unless the former president and the sitting president agree or a court orders access. The Bush Order also stipulates that former presidents can pass along their power to prevent disclosure to family members or designated representatives, and it grants former vice presidents the

right to claim executive privilege independently and to prevent access to vice-presidential records on that basis.

The Bush Order led to a storm of controversy in the historical community. A lawsuit was filed by the American Historical Association, the Organization of American Historians, Vanderbilt University Professor Hugh Graham, University of Wisconsin Professor Stanley Kutler, the National Security Archive, Public Citizen and the Reporters’ Committee for Freedom of the Press in November 2001. The lawsuit sought to challenge the Bush Order’s provisions permitting indefinite review of records that NARA determined were subject to release and the extension of authority to assert executive privilege to the heirs and designees of a former president and vice president.

Over many months, the original sixty-eight thousand records that NARA had scheduled for release were released, but it became apparent that additional records had been withheld. Parties to the lawsuit continued to seek access to these records. Eventually, the government announced that President Reagan’s representative had claimed a constitutional executive privilege to bar the release of seventy-four pages of the documents.¹⁵ The incumbent president concurred in the decision to assert privilege because there was no circumstance that would have compelled him not to do so.

Meanwhile, in addition to Reagan’s presidential records, the presidential and vice-presidential records of George H.W. Bush have been subject to review under Executive Order 13233, as have the records of Bill Clinton. The effect of the reviews called for by the Bush Order has been to delay substantially the release of materials in response to such requests. For instance, the Reagan Library’s estimated

completion time frames increased from eighteen months in 2001 to an estimated seventy-eight months (six and a half years) in 2007.

In October 2007, the court ruled that one part of the Bush Order is invalid. Specifically, the court held that the Archivist of the United States acts arbitrarily, capriciously, and contrary to law by relying on E.O. 13233 in delaying the release of the records of former presidents.¹⁶ Unfortunately, the court did not consider the issue of whether it was permissible for President Bush to extend the authority over disclosure of presidential papers to a former president’s heirs or to former vice presidents, nor did it rule on the substantive changes effected by the Bush Order, such as its expansive notions of executive privilege. The court put those issues off for another court at another time, holding that they are not ripe for review. For historians and political scientists, this is bad news. It has long been understood that executive privilege is not only conditional; it also dissipates over time.¹⁷ Indeed, this is the basis for the PRA provision that allows confidential communications of the former president to be subject to release under the FOIA after twelve years. Furthermore, the possibility

that some records could be withheld forever on the basis of private citizens asserting executive privilege is alarming, and the creation of vice presidential privilege dramatically expands the universe of potentially withheld records.

Challenging these provisions may have to wait until a former

president, former vice president, or their children or grandchildren overreach and claim the privilege for materials that should not be protected. Until then, the Bush Order, like the law he signed in Texas that allowed him initially to send his records to the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library instead of the Texas Archives, puts a gaping hole in

The Bush Order, like the law he signed in Texas that allowed him initially to send his records to the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library instead of the Texas Archives, puts a gaping hole in the United States’ records disclosure mandates.

the United States' records disclosure mandates.

The Presidential Records Act was designed to ensure that the records of the presidency would ultimately be turned over to the American people and made available through the orderly procedures of the FOIA. It is becoming increasingly apparent that the law is not sufficient. President Bush's executive order has delayed the release of presidential records, and Congress's attempt to override it is stuck in the Senate because one senator objects to it being voted on. There are very limited controls on how presidential records should be maintained prior to the end of a presidency. The White House e-mail problems of the Clinton and the Bush administrations demonstrate that without some standards and oversight for the preservation of records, a critical part of the documentary history of the U.S. government may remain forever beyond reach.

Meredith Fuchs is general counsel of the National Security Archive at George Washington University.

*The author is the general counsel of the non-profit, non-governmental National Security Archive (the Archive) at George Washington University (www.nsarchive.org). The Archive was a plaintiff in *American Historical Ass'n v. Nat'l Archives and Records Admin.*, Civ. No. 01-2447 (D.D.C.), which challenged Bush Executive Order 13233 regarding the Presidential Records Act, resulting in invalidation of a portion of the executive order.

It is also a plaintiff in *National Security Archive v. Executive Office of the President (EOP)*, Civ. No. 07-1577 (D.D.C.) (challenging the destruction of White House e-mails).

1. "Interpretation of Texas Government Code section 441.201 concerning the official records of a former governor," Opinion No. JC-0498 (May 3, 2002), available at <http://www.oag.state.tx.us/opinions/op49cornyn/jc-0498.htm> (all website references herein were last checked on February 11, 2008).

2. See Texas Archival Resources Online, "Texas Governor George W. Bush: An Inventory of Executive Office Records at the State Archives," available at <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/taro/tslac/60007/tsl-60007.html>.

3. Text available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/09/20070914-3.html>.

4. Tom Hamburger, "GOP-issued laptops now a White House Headache," *Los Angeles Times*, April 9, 2007, available at <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-na-laptops9apr09,0,4563806.story?coll=la-home-headlines>.

5. Letter of Patrick J. Fitzgerald to Libby Defense Counsel, January 23, 2006, available at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/news/2006/02/fitz012306.pdf>.

6. "Without a Trace: The Missing White House E-mails and the Violations of the Presidential Records Act, April 12, 2007," available at <http://www.citizensforethics.org/node/27607>; see also National Security Archive, "White House Admits No Backups Tapes for E-mail Before October 2003," January 16, 2008, available at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20080116/index.htm>.

7. Michael Isikoff, "Challenging Cheney: A National Archives Official Reveals What the Veep Wanted to Keep Classified — and How He Tried to Challenge the Rules," *Newsweek*, December 24, 2007, available at <http://www.newsweek.com/id/81883/output/print>

8. "CREW Files Opposition Brief in Office of Administration Suit," September 4, 2007, available at <http://www.citizensforethics.org/node/30038>.

9. Michael Isikoff, "Challenging Cheney: A National Archives Official Reveals What the Veep Wanted to Keep Classified — and How

He Tried to Challenge the Rules," *Newsweek*, December 24, 2007, available at <http://www.newsweek.com/id/81883/output/print>.

Similarly, it has been reported that the OVP has exempted itself from reporting travel and related expenses to the Office of Government Ethics. See <http://www.publicintegrity.org/lobby/report.aspx?aid=760>.

10. Michael Abramowitz, "Secret Services Logs of White House Visitors are Records, Judge Rules," *Washington Post*, December 18, 2007, available at <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/17/AR2007121701397.html>.

11. Michael Isikoff, "Papers? I don't see any papers," *Newsweek*, Oct. 29, 2007, available at <http://www.newsweek.com/id/57351>.

12. "Senator Sessions Places Hold on Presidential Records Bill," National Coalition for History, January 23, 2008, available at <http://historycoalition.org/2008/01/23/senator-sessions-placest-hold-on-presidential-records-bill/>.

13. *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974).

14. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207.

15. Those seventy-four pages included several duplicates. Among the unique records were: March 13, 1986, Alfred H. Kingon, "The White House, Washington, Memorandum for Donald T. Regan, 'International Economic Issues'" (four pages); November 22, 1988 and December 1, 1988 memoranda, Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the President, Memorandum, for the President, "Pardon for Oliver L. North, John Poindexter, Joseph Fernandez" (two records, one totaling four pages and one totaling two pages).

16. "Court Rules Delay in Release of Presidential Papers is Illegal," The National Security Archive, October 1, 2007, available at <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20071001/index.htm>.

17. See *Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen'l Servs.*, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (allowing the transmission of recordings to archivists less than three years after Nixon left office); *Nixon v. Freeman*, 670 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (permitting Nixon recordings to be made available to the public eight years after he left office).

Book Drive for Basra University

Because of war and civil turmoil, Basra University in Iraq has lost much of its library collection. A scholar there has petitioned American scholars to donate books on the history of the Cold War and other topics in international history.

In response, SHAFR has organized a drive to collect volumes for Basra University. Last year members brought dozens of titles to the annual conference, and graduate students from Temple University shipped them to Iraq. SHAFR would like to continue that tradition at this year's annual conference in Columbus.

SHAFR members are encouraged to bring relevant books to the SHAFR meeting in June 2008. Graduate students at Ohio State will have a table ready to collect titles. They will also accept cash contributions to help with postage. If you have questions, please contact Ryan Irwin (irwin.126@osu.edu).

A Roundtable Discussion of Amy Staples's *The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945-1965*

David C. Engerman, Thomas Zeiler, Nicholas J. Cullather, Michael E. Latham,
& Amy L. Sayward

The Birth of Development Experts

David C. Engerman

I will begin, as Amy Staples does in her impressive new book, *The Birth of Development*, by recalling an encounter with a development expert. Staples's encounter came at an archive in Geneva, one of eleven in five countries that she visited while researching the dissertation that became her first book. Mine came, oddly enough, in the business-class cabin of a Lufthansa flight to Kazakhstan. I was the beneficiary of one of those rare academic junkets that involve two weeks of lectures in exchange for royal treatment in (not to mention to and from) an American ally reorganizing its higher educational system. Next to me was a World Bank economist en route to Uzbekistan, where she was visiting a Bank project called the "Enterprise Institution Building Project." This World Bank expert was a Ugandan – not, like so many of the development experts who populate Staples's book, a visitor from the First World trying to share the secret of success with the Third. She was an exemplary international civil servant, part of a large and growing

group of local elites from localities all around the world, trained in economics and engineering, usually in Euro-American institutions; such international civil servants, lacking for neither training nor ambition, seek to eradicate poverty and its causes through the organized deployment of knowledge and resources around the world.

This World Banker carried herself with a sense of certainty, occasionally bordering on soft-spoken righteousness, that no doubt came from years of experience in some of the poorest parts of the world. And yet how could she be so sure that the World Bank program she worked with would do any good in Uzbekistan? Did Uzbekistan really need the "growth of a highly qualified domestic consulting industry" (I am quoting here from the World Bank website) and computer systems for the national stock market? On the one hand, her rationale for the project was a welcome relief from the breathless ratiocination of free-marketeers like Tom Friedman (no doubt flying first-class on the same flight) who see markets as the natural state of things, rather than institutions that need to be constructed. Certainly,

markets need to be built, not liberated. But were management consultants and stock markets really the solution to Uzbekistan's grinding poverty and political repression? The World Banker was optimistic. She explained that the Uzbek project applied the latest lessons from the experience of Latin American economies; besides, similar projects were succeeding in Eastern Europe. My historian's skepticism raised, I wanted to know what Latin America and Eastern Europe had to do with Uzbekistan, with radically different pasts and present problems. Not surprisingly, I remained unconvinced even after our seven-hour flight.

I recalled this conversation when reading Amy Staples's *The Birth of Development* because she explores so effectively the mindset of this World Banker's predecessors, who had a heartfelt belief that cutting edge ideas and technologies would solve the world's great problems. Staples does an admirable job of showing how post-1945 development worked. An indefatigable researcher with a keen eye, she captures especially well the optimism of the 1940s, when a world that had just conquered fascism would soon turn its attention to other afflictions: poverty, hunger,

and disease. Staples makes a major contribution to the history of development— itself entering a take-off stage— both chronologically and thematically. Her vision of development, like that of her subjects, includes not just industrialization, but also public health and agrarian reform. Her history is not just about national development agencies such as USAID and various other national counterparts in bilateral projects, but about transnational organizations. Finally, *The Birth of Development* is inhabited by people, not just institutions and ideas, and Staples's engaging portraits of these people contribute to the readability of her book, even with its alphabet soup of organizational acronyms. Her wide and deep research brings once-obscure individuals to life and explains the experiences, commitments, and aspirations that made them exemplars of a new kind of international civil servant.

The book's straightforward organization makes Staples's case— and her contributions— obvious. Framed by the usual introductory and concluding materials is a trio of chapters for each of the three organizations listed in the subtitle: the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development (World Bank, IBRD), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the World Health Organization (WHO). The first chapter in each set recounts the intellectual backdrop that shaped each organization, identifying the core assumptions in the fields of economics, agricultural economics, and public health that emerged over the half century or more before the 1940s. The second chapter shows how those assumptions shaped the initial vision of the IBRD, FAO, and WHO. And the third in each trio deals with development-in-action at each of these organizations. For the World Bank and the FAO, Staples takes a long view, emphasizing chronological breadth over analytic depth, but nonetheless showing how development ideas and development experts shaped organizational policies and national economies. For the WHO, Staples focuses more narrowly and to better effect

on a single initiative, the Malaria Eradication Project (MEP), which was its signature program in the 1960s and 1970s. In the tragic tale of the MEP failure, the complexities of development come to life, as does the hubris of the experts who are at the center of Staples's book.

The Birth of Development might just as well have been entitled *The Birth of Development Experts*, as Staples takes the international staffs of her three nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as the protagonists of her story. The chapters on development ideas maintain a clear and steady focus on the role of experts: economists, agricultural specialists, and public health officials. Staples's concentration on the experts who founded and staffed these NGOs is an important element of the book, and one well worthy of our attention. As much as impresarios like David Lilienthal and Walt Rostow tried to put themselves at the center of the story, it was the lesser-known economists, doctors, and other experts who really defined the origins and operations of these three transnational institutions.¹ Staples follows the experts of the 1940s and their predecessors dating back to the Progressive Era to show how they defined their sort of expertise outside politics— indeed, as the antithesis of politics. She thus presents political problems— domestic disputes about the distribution of resources and the international tensions of the Cold War— as an imposition that kept NGO staff from their appointed tasks. The global powers' insistence on the importance of their own economic needs— reflected, for example, in Great Britain's sabotage of an ambitious FAO mission in favor of a narrow one— comes to seem like a selfish betrayal of a new globalist spirit. Staples deserves credit for taking these nameless and/or obscure experts out of metaphorical cubicles and drawing our attention to their dedication and desire to make a better world.

Along with this well-earned praise, though, come hard questions that are often more challenging than the ones Staples herself engages. After generations of scholarship imputing

ill intent to the experts— progressive reformers aiming for "social control," social scientists pursuing "objectivity" over social utility, or experts using professional discourse to "discipline" populations— it is striking to read about these more innocent experts. Staples does not shy from discussing the experts' errors, especially in the malaria program, where they sprayed DDT around the world on a large scale in spite of its known dangers (178). WHO experts saw themselves in a race against the ability of mosquitoes to develop resistance to not just one but both major forms of the chemical, but they ignored increasing alarms about its dangers. In 1969, years after the United States had banned DDT, WHO finally admitted defeat. It was, Staples notes sadly, a "cautionary tale about good intentions and medical and international authority run amok" (169). Thus she ends her historical narrative on a down note.

But such cautions and concerns are less conspicuous in the book's chapters on the World Bank and FAO. Staples recovers the perspectives of these organizations' experts perhaps too well; she seems to accept their basic premise that they could be apolitical, disinterested arbiters of others' welfare or the global common good. A small but telling example: in her historical section on the rise of economic/banking expertise before the IBRD, Staples rightly goes back to the example of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank's creation in 1913. The Fed, she writes, took a whole range of economic policy out of the "partisan political arena" and was both a symptom and a cause of economists' growing "self-constructed identity as apolitical professionals" (10). Yet she does not deconstruct this identity or even challenge it. Ironically, the work upon which Staples bases much of this paragraph is a deconstruction of American economic and banking expertise by historian James Livingston, who argues that the Fed was created by a "business elite" that "was ultimately able to translate its particular vision of the world into institutionalized political authority."² Livingston shows how the construction of supposedly

apolitical economic expertise (and expert economists) was a profoundly political act. However, after a brief gesture towards the economists' "self-constructed identity," Staples seems to accept the central bankers' constructions of impartial expertise.

There have been many scholarly works, especially since the 1960s, that question claims of apolitical expertise, none better than the work of anthropologist James Ferguson.

It is unfortunate that Ferguson's *The Anti-Politics Machine* is among the works missing from Staples's extensive (42-page) bibliography. Ferguson offers an unusual

ethnography of Lesotho, one in which the indigenous peoples are not as important as the Western development officials working there. He shows brilliantly how development officials construed their project—development—as the antithesis of politics (the anti-politics machine of the title). Development, he writes, "depoliticize[s] everything it touches, everywhere whisking political realities out of sight, all the while performing, almost unnoticed, its own pre-eminently political operation." The brilliance of development, Ferguson suggests, lies in its successful pursuit of politics by stealth.³

One need not accept the class analysis of James Livingston or the Foucauldian deconstruction of James Ferguson to view the claim of apolitical expertise skeptically; indeed, Staples is too good a historian to omit evidence of politics. For instance, she does an especially good job of describing the debate over the FAO's organizational aims by following nutritionist Sir John Boyd Orr, the "strong-headed Scotsman" who was the organization's founding director (79). She takes us carefully through the arcane debates about FAO organization and mission, showing clearly how Orr's vision of the FAO was quickly hemmed in by his own government's attitude toward the organization, which ran the gamut from apathy to antipathy. The British government argued

The World Bank had a development mission, clearly, but it was one closely aligned to the Western vision of a global market economy.

that food should be treated like other globally traded commodities and should fall under the rubric of the proposed International Trade Organization. Orr complained that the United Kingdom wanted to limit the FAO's role to that of a clearinghouse for technical information; the FAO would do little more than monitor food production and trade, generate statistical tables of food production and consumption,

and promote new agricultural techniques and technologies. It would not offer direct food aid. Orr

summed up the situation angrily at the FAO's inaugural conference: though "the hungry people of the world [want] bread, they [are] to be given statistics" (79). Political economy trumped apolitical expertise.

Geopolitics, too, would play a role in all three organizations. The World Bank had a development mission, clearly, but it was one closely aligned to the Western vision of a global market economy. Staples chooses a particularly apt example here: Iran in the early 1950s. The World Bank played an important role in the confrontation that resulted in Mohammad Mossadegh's ouster in 1953 at the hands of the CIA. As World Bank experts sought a solution to the controversy over the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, they found themselves hampered by geopolitics: the United Kingdom and the United States were not really interested in a viable program of Iranian control, even with guarantees that the oil would still flow to the world market (46-53). But the problem was not just that the Cold War impinged on expert actions. Staples contrasts "the international professionalism of the World Bankers" with the "anticommunist imperative of America foreign policy" (46). But she also cites anticommunism as a factor motivating World Bank involvement in Iran. The Bank could, in some settings, be a "constructive alternative" to bipolar conflict over

development, as Staples clearly shows in her Indus Basin example, but in places like Iran it was closer to an instrument of Western policy than an alternative to it.

Throughout the book, then, Staples too often accepts the perspective of the international civil servants—that they were merely technical experts, unencumbered by interests or geopolitics. While this perspective offers a clear alternative to much darker visions of development, from the broad attacks of the *dependencia* economists in the 1970s to more recent criticisms by historians, it is limited. Recent scholarship by Nick Cullather and Mathew Connelly, for instance, makes the malaria program seem a more typical form of development than the programs of the FAO and the World Bank, as Staples portrays them. The conclusions these historians draw contrast especially starkly with her broad and optimistic speculations about the future of development in the epilogue.⁴ Staples rightly refocuses scholarly attention on the development experts who aspired to disseminate technical expertise around the world. She shows convincingly that these experts were part of a century-long transformation of knowledge and its application. By paying close attention to these experts as individuals and as members of professional communities, she makes it easier to recover the optimism and altruism of the 1950s.

Staples started, apparently, with a higher assessment of the development experts' selflessness than she felt upon completing the book. Her trajectory, then, is precisely the inverse of that of Nils Gilman, author of the path-breaking *Mandarins of the Future*. Gilman began work on his book ready to believe the worst about his modernization theorists, but he conceded by the end of his project that they really did mean well.⁵ Clearly there is something about development experts, full of both hubris and altruism, which unsettles our opinions. We owe Amy Staples a great debt not for leading us to a definite assessment of development experts, but for doing the opposite:

helping us challenge our own assumptions about these experts who would log so many millions of miles – and not always in business class – in pursuit of a better world.

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Notes:

1. David Ekbladh, "Mr. TVA: Grass-Roots Development, David Lilienthal, and the Rise and Fall of the Tennessee Valley Authority as a Symbol for US Overseas Development, 1933-1973," *Diplomatic History* 26:3 (Summer 2002), 335-374; Mark H. Haefele, "Walt Rostow's Stages of Economic Growth: Ideas and Action," in *Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War*, ed. David C. Engerman, Nils Gilman, Mark H. Haefele, and Michael E. Latham (Amherst, MA, 2003).
2. James Livingston, *Origins of the Federal Reserve System: Money, Class, and Corporate Capitalism, 1890-1913* (Ithaca, 1986), 233.
3. James Ferguson, "The Anti-Politics Machine: Development," *Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (Cambridge, 1990), xv. Other works have followed, broadly, in Ferguson's path: see especially Timothy Mitchell, *Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 2002) and Tania Murray Li, *The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics* (Durham, N.C., 2007).
4. See, for instance, Matthew Connelly, "Population Control Is History: New Perspectives on the International Campaign to Limit Population Growth," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 45 (January 2003), 122-147; Nick Cullather, "The Foreign Policy of the Calorie," *American Historical Review* 112 (April 2007), 337-364.
5. Gilman, *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America* (Baltimore, 2003).

Review of Amy Staples, *The Birth of Development*

Thomas Zeiler

For her new book, *The Birth of Development*, Amy Staples carefully studies three organizations (the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture Organization [FAO], and the World Health Organization [WHO]) that were established to spur international development after the Second World War. She believes that the world has built and will continue to build upon the mighty efforts of the architects of postwar development in the battle against poverty, hunger, and sickness. But her case studies do not bode well, and she admits that

underdevelopment and the problems of process and implementation that go with it still burden the globe. Thus a paradox arises from her judicious book, one founded on both hope and frustration, creation and failure, and bureaucratic problem-solving versus market initiatives. The contradictions within this paradox are evident in the very first chapter of the book, as the first paragraph portrays international developers as near-saints, while the next paragraph notes their disappointing performance.

At the end of this carefully researched study, the answers to the scourge of worldwide suffering and inequity are no clearer than at its beginning. That is not the author's fault, but it nevertheless left me feeling at sea as to what historians can bring to the table to solve the seemingly ageless crises of global misery.

This book should be welcomed by diplomatic historians who search for new topics, an internationalization of our field, and a sophisticated (though, thankfully, not over-corporatized) approach to a topic of critical importance to anyone concerned with the less-developed world. I was among the lucky ones who read this manuscript when it was at the dissertation stage, so I knew early on that it competently explored the complexities of development. Staples is to be applauded for her prodigious work in the archives in the United States and abroad, but particularly for plumbing the vast sources of the World Bank, the WHO, and the FAO. The book seems massive when held, yet the text is only 194 pages. However, the notes, bibliography, and index do not fall far short of matching that total – testimony to her assiduous care for detail and her firm footing in the sources. Furthermore, scholars will recognize the familiar faces of Truman, Acheson, and McCloy, but Staples gives a deserved place in history to the World Bank's

Emilio Callado and Eugene Black, the FAO's Norris Dodd and B.R. Sen, and the WHO's George Chisholm.

Actually, she might have brought more people into the study. In the chapter on malaria eradication, I could not find the name of one individual working for the WHO. Ironic, that a book on humanitarianism suffers from a paucity of humans! Staples refers to staff, technocrats, experts, and top bureaucrats as groups and entities,

but it would have made the developers and their plans more approachable if she had injected her study with more biographies. In addition, it was surprising to find very little information on the reception of

these programs and on the targets of aid (families, farmers, women, teachers, etc.). Perhaps this is a topic for another book, but with all of her multinational research, Staples might have presented some vignettes of how the victims of hunger and disease were affected by the organizations' help. More than that, she could have better explained why the results often did not match the rhetoric, as the reasons for failure sometimes lay not with bureaucratic difficulties, diplomacy, or the ambivalence of rich nations but with the poor people themselves. That said, the study adds many dimensions to our knowledge of a (literally) underdeveloped story of the Cold War and reveals in detail the wholehearted commitment of certain individuals to the internationalist campaign in the Third World.

The story, unfortunately, does not have the happy ending of the Cold War's denouement. We might come to appreciate the long peace of the Cold War, but we will have to live with the even longer impoverishment of much of the world caused, in large part, by the inability of politicians to overcome politics and do the right thing. Global bureaucrats were hard-headed idealists who understood the

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political and diplomatic obstacles they faced as they tried to put in place brave new projects for the downtrodden, while also addressing such chronic needs as immunization or stable food prices. Sir John Boyd Orr's plan for a World Food Board was one example. As Staples explains, this international, apolitical body would have maintained acceptably high food prices by acting as a financier, storehouse, and distributor of commodities, thereby boosting Third World development. Neither the Americans nor the British could stomach this: the latter because of budgetary constraints created by London's postwar payments crisis; the former because of its antipathy to managed trade (even though the Department of Agriculture supported such a New Deal approach). The State Department quashed the idea, as it did not fit with market ideas and the trend against statism after the war. Aid was smitten by ideology, nationalism, and security concerns. No new story there, but one that bears insistent repeating.

The issue is, essentially, whether economic and humanitarian policies pushed by motivated, caring, and farseeing international financial, agricultural and health experts could achieve the internationalist mission of benevolence aimed at trumping brutish, self-interested politics. To say the record is mixed is an understatement. Right off the bat, for instance, John McCloy's World Bank attempted, in an effort to place the economic over the diplomatic, to reconstruct the Polish coal mining industry. However, the Truman administration set up a roadblock in the name of national security policy and barred help to East European nations under the sway of the Soviet Union. The World Bank did, of course, make development loans, but always with nations, especially the United States, looking over its shoulder to ensure compatibility with official financial policies and the economic health of the advanced nations. As Staples deftly notes, such an approach often made the World Bank no more than a tool of U.S. Cold War diplomacy, as it found itself in bed with dictators (i.e., making loans

to Nicaragua and the Philippines) and, ironically, on the wrong side of the development table as the gap between rich and poor grew larger. Time and time again, the developers' plans were right, but the results were wrong. The author offers the tantalizing suggestion that World Bank economic solutions might have resolved disputes over Anglo-Iranian oil and the Aswan Dam (56), but that is just wishful thinking, because in the end, no advanced nation really had a stake in development for development's sake.

It is instructive to gauge the wins and losses in the development story in Staples's era of study (roughly the first two postwar decades). Loans by the World Bank were positives, although they came with costs that many less-developed nations still chafe at paying. The FAO conducted hundreds of expert surveys to determine where food aid should go, and these led to achievements such as increases in rice production, the eradication of the desert locust in the Arabian Peninsula, and vaccination programs for livestock throughout the world. Milk conservation improved nutrition in the Third World, olive flies were brought under control by better irrigation and drainage practices, and new strains of barley and wheat were developed. Educational efforts yielded stunning achievements, particularly in curbing hunger and disease. Those efforts also succeeded in coaxing nations to raise the budgets of the international development agencies so they could do even more. A tally seems to show more victories than setbacks.

Actually, the book needs a few tables and more statistics to illustrate these successes in terms of numbers of people helped and the percentage of poor served. Staples has a tendency to describe more than conclude, as in her mention of the WHO's mission to ease the epidemic of tuberculosis in Greece after the war (140-41). She provides information on funding, hospitals, and doctors, but what was the result of this effort? Likewise, the increased use of penicillin as a remedy for syphilis represented a tremendous undertaking by the WHO, and

we read much about consultation, demonstrations, and training. But how many were saved? How many inflicted were there in the first place?

Today we have the tragedies of Darfur, Somalia, and other crisis points. At the same time, as Staples aptly points out, we also have the successful experiment of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. The persistence of crises, along with the occasional NGO success story, leads me to wonder if the FAO, WHO, and World Bank were really all that necessary. That may sound tendentious, and the answer self-evident, for these institutions did make a difference in the lives of millions of people. At least I think they did. Imagine a postwar history without them. On the American side, there would still have been the Food for Peace program and other aid projects, not to mention the Peace Corps (which Staples mentions only in passing). And, one would presume, millions of dollars in charity would have flowed abroad to support the Red Cross, missionaries, and other agencies, as they do today. The Grameen Bank arose on its own, not with coaching from the World Bank (at least I did not detect its presence in Staples's description), although the Grameen founders certainly drew on much of its philosophy of self-help. On the flip side, we would still have poor-fatigue and, in all likelihood, a general distrust of international bureaucrats of the sort we see reflected in the jurisdictional disputes over the WTO's reach. My guess is that the Jimmy Carters would still be around, and because of their individual power in the bully pulpit of aid, they would do an effective job in drumming up support for development. There might even be more Carters, Doctors Without Borders, and Mother Teresas, in place of the developers, as people felt the need to save the world and fill the gaping holes between rich and poor without relying on international bureaucrats. Imagining a world without international aid agencies is not to denigrate the developers explored in this book. It is only to ask again, as Staples does, why, with all of these organizations and global awareness, the crises of poverty and

sickness are just as bad today as they were a half century ago.

The fact is that the developers and their idealism did not face a particularly difficult time at the end of World War II.

After all, the internationalist bureaucrats had the advantage of pushing their projects in the context of the worst destruction in human history, which essentially compelled people to listen to suggestions for recovery, rehabilitation, and the prevention of similar calamities in the future. One could argue that the wartime and immediate postwar eras were a most auspicious period for instituting and redrawing major modernization projects, for the world enjoyed the blankest slate of the twentieth century on which to design international structures that would address global needs. As Staples notes at the outset, this was a “majestic moment” (1); if not then, when would the world ever mobilize to attack worldwide misery? And if hunger, poverty, and ill health could not be conquered then, should we hold out much hope that they can be beaten back now?

Certainly, many are trying, but much of the prospect for success seems to depend on which entities carry the aid burden. In other words, governments are responsible, but they also look to the market to bear responsibility. The relationship between the two is often troubled by bureaucratic red tape and badly directed programs. We know this is the case in Iraq, as private companies have flocked to provide services to the military as well as the people there. Aid programs in places like Afghanistan have reflected the goodwill of entrepreneurs (see, for instance, the article on creating soap cooperatives in the December 2007 issue of *The Atlantic*) who get bogged down in dealing with USAID requirements and incompetent bureaucrats who slow, and sometimes halt altogether, their well-conceived projects. It could be that

The forces of industrialization and nationalism are as strong as ever, regardless of the corporate globalization that many believed would circumscribe the nation-state after the Cold War.

the world agencies Staples presents are dinosaurs standing in the way of market forces that do a better job than the bureaucrats in saving lives, driven as they are not only by humanitarianism but by the profit incentive. Perhaps other market forces hold the key to

development, through such means as unfettered immigration into rich nations, from which poor foreigners can send ever greater remittances back home. But ideas involving immigrant workers obviously stir highly charged emotions and create political fallout. What seems clear is that the state, NGOs, and the market must cooperate, with the utmost sensitivity to local conditions, to combat the ills of global poverty.

The forces of industrialization and nationalism are as strong as ever, regardless of the corporate globalization that many believed would circumscribe the nation-state after the Cold War. The Chinese and Indians are developing by leaps and bounds, and their progress is taking a crushing toll on the environment. The Americans and Europeans continue to consume and also aid, but not enough to head off human disasters. The bureaucrats might agree with Eugene Black of the World Bank, who said, “We do not think of a man as a Dane, a Cuban, or an Indian, but as an economist, a lawyer or an accountant” (24), but the true global powers — presidents, prime ministers, cabinets, and legislatures — certainly think in terms of nations. Nationalism will not abate, but neither will the efforts of the business agents of globalization who forage for profits out in the Third World. Thus, the international bureaucrats fill the role of intermediaries who recognize the constraints of the nation-state but who also have the helpless in mind. Sometimes they run up against obstacles, and sometimes they themselves are the enemy of the development they pursue. Where does that leave the Third World? Suffering will continue, and it might even increase, although as Staples

reminds us, we should not stop trying to find a way to prevent it.

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“Leave it to the Professionals”: A Review of Amy Staples’ *The Birth of Development*

Nicholas Cullather

Speaking to a group of journalists in 1961, Britain’s Prince Philip whinged that whenever he and the queen traveled in Africa they could count on the same reception at every stop: the freshly-scrubbed schoolchildren, the costumed dancers, “and of course the inevitable FAO man.”¹ Until lately, historians have largely shared the prince’s sniffy indifference to the global civil servants dispensing fertilizer, vaccine, and accounting methods in tropical lands. Their activities were commendable, high-minded, but less consequential than those of the envoys of national governments. In Cold War dramas, international institutions appear as stage sets for performances by state actors: they provide forums to be stunned by U-2 photos, or podiums to be shoe-whipped. They only become significant, Akira Iriye recently observed, “if one construes international affairs in a different way,” by giving cooperative ventures a role alongside nations in making the contemporary world. In such a version, the FAO man might be heard to grumble about the caravans of itinerant royalty interrupting his work.²

Amy Staples has reconstrued international affairs, depicting the big three international agencies as semiautonomous actors, inventors of a style of global management that today characterizes multilateral aid. “Development,” in rhetoric, doctrine, and practice had multiple origins. William McKinley and Woodrow Wilson used the term to differentiate America’s benevolent colonialism from the old-style imperialism of Europe. Decades earlier, Britain devised development policies

for Australia and Canada to give white colonists a measure of local control over land and resources. The Rockefeller Foundation pioneered international research and action on tropical disease. But in the two decades after World War II, the World Bank, the World Health Organization, and the Food and Agriculture Organization made development an ongoing enterprise in which the formerly “internal” concerns of most of the world’s countries fell under the continuous supervision of international authorities. This was something radically new in world politics, according to Arturo Escobar; it altered drastically “the character and scope of relations between rich and poor countries and, in general, the very perception of what governments and societies were to do.”³

Staples reveals how the early architects—John Boyd Orr, a Scots nutritionist, John McCloy, a Wall Street banker, and Dr. Brock Chisholm, a Canadian physician—institutionalized the new system in three stages. First, they fostered a global, professional identity for the organization and its corps of civil servants. McCloy rejected the notion that any economist should recuse himself from decisions on borrowing

by his own country. Instead, both the official and the client nation should recognize that, when it came to bank business, professional competence superseded national loyalty. Building a global technical class was no cinch. A physician in Djakarta might possess qualifications and experience very different from a doctor in Geneva or Tegucigalpa. During the interwar years, the League of Nations prepared the way by setting international standards for training, statistics, and reporting. Conferences, fellowships, and journals with a worldwide circulation created a global community of technicians from which the postwar agencies could draw talent. The organizations encouraged a sense of urgency and high ideals, but they really did not have to. The new institutions had a risqué glamour that Hollywood quickly recognized. Sydney Poitier played a WHO doctor as the romantic lead in *Guess Who’s Coming to Dinner* (1967), and Cary Grant revealed his substance in *That Touch of Mink* (1959) by lecturing on exchange rates at a World Bank conference. “How do you feel about the untapped resources of the underdeveloped nations?” he whispered “I think,” Doris Day responded, “they ought to be tapped.”

Secondly, the architects of the new organizations replicated their techniques and professional hierarchy within the member countries. The FAO required each member state to have an agriculture ministry. Singapore has one, even though it has no farms. Finance ministers worked partly for their own party and government, but they also met benchmarks and schedules set by the World Bank. Standardized procedures for reporting and analyzing statistics made countries more directly comparable than ever before, making external interventions a routine part of governmental practice. Nations and independence movements could express their aspirations for progress only in the specialized language used in Rome, Geneva, or Washington.

Finally, international institutions carved out a domain of expertise over which they claimed jurisdiction. Medicine, agriculture, and economics

were defined as areas of human activity governed by best practices and theoretical principles, rather than by local preferences, culture, or the vote. “Political” was a term of dismissal, signifying unscientific, parochial considerations that undermined the efficiency of policy. But while the World Bank drew a sharp distinction between its neutral expertise and the prerogatives of governments, it assumed the subordination of the political to the economic. If a dam project or a reallocation could alleviate a critical scarcity, “political” difficulties would soon vanish. The founding creeds of these organizations stressed that their work would ultimately build world peace. The most fascinating parts of this intelligent and well-argued book describe the tensions along the boundaries of authority, where institutions tried to protect their reputations for impartiality while simultaneously pushing for politically consequential solutions. Mossadeq’s government flatly rejected the Bank’s technical rationale for allocating one third of Iran’s oil revenue to a British firm. India and Pakistan, to the Bank’s disappointment, did not set aside their differences once an agreement for the joint development of the Indus had been struck. Political tension was more apt to dissolve development than vice versa.

Staples commends international agencies for remaining “largely true” to their apolitical ideals. Difficult as it was, “they strove always to be above national issues” (63). She admits, however, that this was true mainly in the narrow sense of national rivalries among individual member states. If one considers geopolitics on the grander scale of the East-West or North-South confrontation, the agencies were principal players, and they saw themselves as such. Gunnar Myrdal, the Scandinavian expert-of-all-trades who was in many ways the archetype of the new peripatetic class, observed that international civil servants filled roles only recently vacated by colonial officials. He told a gathering of agricultural experts in 1966 that they were the “inheritors of the imperial *mission civilisatrice*.”

THANKS!!

SHAFR and *Passport* wish to thank Ed Goedeken of the Iowa State University Library System for his many years of hard work on behalf of SHAFR members. Ed has compiled the annual list of dissertations relevant to diplomatic history, which has run in the newsletter since 1989. The list now appears on the SHAFR website, rather than in print, and can be accessed at: <http://www.shafr.org/publications.htm>. The 2007 list is now available.

Boyd Orr framed the FAO as a neo-imperial project, a solution to “the white man’s dilemma.” The hope that scientific authority would fill the void left by the departure of imperial viceroys was widely shared in the Anglo-American countries that founded these institutions. “The future guardians of the Asiatic heartlands,” Robert Payne predicted in *The Revolt of Asia*, “will not be the feudal owners but the trained agricultural chemists.”⁴

Geopolitical agendas can be glimpsed behind the problems the agencies identified and the solutions they adopted. The WHO, for instance, aimed its campaigns at infectious diseases (tuberculosis, cholera, smallpox, malaria) that disrupted commerce and investment by requiring the quarantining of ships and preventing exploitation of affected areas. Less attention was paid to intrinsic conditions, such as cancer, heart disease, or infant mortality, which killed more people. Motivations often lay close to the surface. U.S. appointees to the presidency of the World Bank—McCloy, Eugene Black, Robert McNamara, Paul Wolfowitz—were usually career cold warriors. Dean Acheson announced in 1952 that the United States intended to control the FAO. “There is an organization,” he told the Senate, “that has great possibilities of usefulness to us and great possibilities of danger for us.” Together with Canada, the United States had enough of the world’s surplus stocks to manipulate world food distribution, and Jon McLin has argued that under that duopoly the FAO acted as a U.S. surrogate until 1965.⁵

U.S. officials recognized that they could accomplish more by masking their actions behind multilateral institutions and technical interventions. Lyndon Johnson’s agriculture secretary advised in 1965 that while “in the field of food and agriculture we have unquestioned superiority,” nonetheless “there are certain advantages that may be expected from carrying out food and agriculture programs on a multilateral basis.”⁶ Staples acknowledged that the institutions

played a subtle, “nuanced” role in waging the Cold War, and for her, nuanced is better. Multilateral development offered an understated, “constructive” alternative to the clumsy, overtly self-interested “contentious” maneuvers of national diplomacy (62-3). Some historians have been inclined to regard this concealed power within development as insidious and inherently destructive of democracy and local culture. C. Douglas Lummis argues that development is useful in the international arena largely because of its “concealing function,” and what it conceals is a fundamentally elitist, undemocratic power arrangement. Policies affecting the livelihoods, health, and futures of underdeveloped peoples are made for them and not by them. Staples endorses bottom-up development strategies such as micro-lending and programs to empower women, but she ends with the hope that the big multilateral agencies will take these up and be “revitalized in their mission” (194).⁷

Other historians regard the agencies’ political detachment as the chief cause of their failure. James Ferguson and James Scott, for instance, would agree with Staples that multilateral bureaucracies are uniquely able to abstract themselves from parochial squabbles, as well as from the historical and political realities of the locales in which they operate, while imposing universalist, cookie-cutter solutions. The development community, according to Ferguson, is an “anti-politics machine” sweeping aside the knowledge and livelihoods of the people in its way and supplanting them with state planning. The ruins of village resettlement schemes, silted dams, and failed disease prevention schemes that litter the Third World are testimony to the inadequacy of this approach. Staples counters that multilateral institutions are learning organizations capable of adapting new approaches, but this

does not fully answer the objection. Scott and Ferguson contend that universal knowledge applied from a distance is inherently inferior to local, temporally bounded knowledge and therefore multilateral development will always fail.⁸

The whole question of success

or failure, however, involves counterfactual suppositions of which historians should be wary. Development is a word with transitive and intransitive senses;

Development is a word with transitive and intransitive senses; it is something that both happens of its own accord and can be made to happen.

it is something that both happens of its own accord and can be made to happen. When a development agency declares success or is accused of failure it is alleged that the intended outcomes would or would not have happened in any case (or that a different outcome could and should have happened), and such claims are invariably problematic. If the death rate from malaria in Lesotho declines is that because the DDT is working or because the vulnerable individuals have already died? As Fredric Jameson cautions, we must think of modernization not as a process or an outcome, but as a narrative strategy. Development projects are essentially stories that identify the inadequacies of the present, the enemies of change, the obstacles to be overcome, and the future to be envisioned. Failure occurs when the story has lost plausibility.⁹

For this reason, historians must be careful to frame and contextualize the stories developers tell about themselves and to separate their own language from the tropes of development. In this regard Staples occasionally slips and presents the developers’ own version of their motives as history. She concludes, for instance, that “World War II witnessed a revolution in expectations that compelled the imperial and indigenous governments of most countries to contribute to the development of peoples throughout the Third World” (181). The revolution of rising expectations was an axiom of

modernization theory in the 1950s, and it was first articulated in a public arena in a speech by Adlai Stevenson in 1954.¹⁰ Modernization theory came along after the development agencies were up and running, and developers were quick to project the new rationales back onto their earlier actions, but these stories should be historicized, rather than taken at face value. Like international civil servants, we historians have our own reputation for detachment and impartiality to protect.

Nicholas Cullather is associate professor of history at Indiana University.

Notes:

1. "The Queen Watches the Italian Derby at Capanaelle," *Times*, May 5, 1961, 12.
2. Akira Iriye, *Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World* (Berkeley, 2002), 5-6.
3. Albert J. Beveridge, "The Development of a Colonial Policy for the United States," *Annals of the American Academy* 30 (1907): 3; Albert Shaw, ed., *Messages and Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (New York, 1924) 1: 407-8; M. P. Cowen and R. W. Shenton, *Doctrines of Development* (London, 1996), 174-199; Arturo Escobar, "Power and Visibility: Development and the Intervention and Management of the Third World," *Cultural Anthropology* 3 (November 1988) 4: 429.
4. Gunnar Myrdal, "FAO—The Imperative of Altruism," *The Nation*, December 19, 1966, 666; John Boyd Orr, *The White Man's Dilemma: Food and the Future* (London, 1953); Robert Payne, *The Revolt of Asia* (New York, 1947), 278.
5. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Executive Sessions, 82nd Cong., 2nd sess., 1958 (Washington, 1976), 4: 4; Ovid A. Martin, "U.S. Now 'Calls the Tune' in World Farm Policies," *Washington Post*, May 13, 1956, 22; Jon McLin, "Surrogate International Organization and the Case of World Food Security, 1949-1969," *International Organization* 33 (Winter 1979) 1: 47.
6. Orville Freeman to LBJ, "Matters Relating to the FAO," July 21, 1965, Declassified Documents Reference System, www.gale.com, item ck3100460064.
7. C. Douglas Lummis, *Radical Democracy* (Ithaca, 1996), 46.
8. James Ferguson, *The Anti-Politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (Cambridge, 1990); James Scott, *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed* (New Haven, 1998).
9. Fredric Jameson, *A Singular Modernity: Essay on the Ontology of the Present* (London, 2002), 40.
10. John B. Fenton, "Stevenson Warns on Colonial Issue," *New York Times*, March 19, 1954, 3.

Review of Amy L. S. Staples, *The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945-1965*

Michael E. Latham

At the outset of her intriguing new book on the United Nations development agencies, Amy Staples describes the "birth of development" as a remarkably optimistic and fundamentally idealistic moment in which "discrete groups of people with international stature, expertise, money, power, influence, and the best of intentions began working to better the lives of other human beings whom they had never met or known, for no other reason than the desire to improve the fate of the human race." The leaders of the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and World Health Organization (WHO), she explains, saw themselves as part of "an international civil service" (1-2). Standing amid the ashes of the Second World War, they perceived a great opportunity to transform the world in sweeping, progressive ways.

Beyond the boundaries of particular state interests, committed internationalists sought to deploy their technical and scientific expertise to promote the integration of the international economy, dramatically improve living standards for the poor, and ultimately prevent the kind of socioeconomic crises that had promoted the rise of aggressive, expansionist regimes and plunged the globe into devastating conflict. As Staples argues, however, those hopes were largely unmet. In an ironic and compelling analysis, she documents the way that a technocratic faith in rational planning and scientific principles collided with the political realities of postcolonial nationalism as well as the ideological imperatives of the Cold War. As the internationalist ambitions of the UN

development agencies were pushed aside, their programs also produced unintended and often devastating consequences for the populations they most wanted to help.

Staples starts with the World Bank. She emphasizes the degree to which its proponents imagined development as an objective, scientific task instead of a divisive and inherently political undertaking. The World Bankers, she explains, shared a remarkable faith in the ability of technical and financial management to solve deeper structural and political problems.¹ In the Third World, they aimed to promote private foreign investment, tried to provide funding for crucial infrastructure, and sought to bring postcolonial economies into the larger network of global trade. They believed these goals would best be pursued through universally valid, objectively determined market principles. Seeking independence from its national contributors, including the United States, the World Bank insisted on "untied loans," the recipients of which would be free to spend funds in any country. In contrast to national development agencies, the Bank also required that the projects it funded be subjected to international, competitive bidding. In addition, since they envisioned their work as based purely on scientific approaches to economic growth, World Bankers showed

As Staples's research reveals, however, the attempt to promote "apolitical" development frequently led to politically disastrous results.

"little hesitation when it came to demanding tax reform and other unpopular domestic measures as conditions for their assistance" (31).

As Staples's research reveals, however, the attempt to promote "apolitical" development frequently led to politically disastrous results. Because the World Bank limited its deliberations to the economic merits of proposed development plans, it was quite willing to make loans to dictatorial governments in Nicaragua and the Philippines. Less than one month after it violently attempted to

suppress nationalist movements in its Indonesian colony, the Dutch government received a substantial World Bank loan. When the World Bank attempted to act as a mediator in the Anglo-Iranian oil crisis, it proposed solutions that displayed a remarkably tin ear for the depth of Iranian nationalism, and it seemed perplexed at the apparent intrusion of political realities into what it considered a purely economic matter. Staples argues that in dealing with Nasser's Egypt and the negotiations over the Aswan High Dam, the World Bank proved more tolerant and patient with the forces of nationalism than the U.S. government. Yet she also finds that the Bank's reductive understanding of development generally led it to support elite-centered, top-down approaches that slighted more democratic alternatives, ignored considerations of women's status, and did great environmental damage.

In analyzing the Food and Agriculture Administration, Staples tells a somewhat different story — one of roads not taken. Like the World Bankers, the FAO staff envisioned themselves as an internationalist cohort, dedicated to serving the common, global good instead of the narrower interests of particular states. But figures like the FAO's John Boyd Orr pursued more innovative approaches than the Bank's leaders, who maintained a free-trade, market-centered perspective. Orr and his colleagues expected that global problems of malnutrition would ultimately require a sharp expansion in food production as well as a fundamental restructuring of global agricultural trade. Beyond the provision of technical assistance and credits, they proposed a World Food Board that would fix international agricultural prices by manipulating reserve holdings of staple crops and relieve famine by selling large quantities of food well below market prices. Concerned with Cold War priorities, however, American officials objected that such a plan would limit the U.S. government's power to regulate its own food production and interfere with its ability to use offers of food aid to draw new, postcolonial

governments toward the West. They helped kill the proposal.

The FAO defined global nutrition and meeting the needs of the poor as a primary goal and argued that addressing that problem would, in turn, stimulate economic growth. However, U.S., Canadian, and Dutch officials reversed FAO priorities. Economic growth and industrialization, they insisted, would ultimately lift all boats. In the late 1950s the FAO tried another approach. Its Freedom from Hunger Campaign, which lasted through the mid-1960s, emphasized the needs of the poorest countries once more. This time around its initiative received greater support from the United States. By recruiting nongovernmental organizations, encouraging national self-sufficiency in food, and providing local communities with improved education in nutrition and food production, the FAO pursued policies that resonated with Kennedy's "decade of development." The U.S. government's concerns about the welfare of American farmers and its desire to use food aid as a foreign policy instrument, however, continued to clash with the FAO's focus on the overriding need to address world hunger.

The World Health Organization, Staples argues, also grew out of sincere internationalist convictions. In its campaigns against epidemic disease, however, she once more finds evidence of the extent to which a reverence for the supposedly apolitical, objective methods of professional science pushed development efforts in unfortunate directions. Focusing on the WHO's global campaign against malaria, "the most ambitious public health program ever attempted" (161), Staples documents the failures of a plan centered on the liberal spraying of DDT by teams of mobile technicians. Ignoring safety warnings, the WHO pushed forward with a program that ultimately spread lethal toxins into vulnerable ecosystems, stimulated the growth of insecticide-resistant mosquitoes, and ignored the complex problems for disease eradication posed by human

migration and surging population growth.

Grounded in work in UN agency archives in Washington, Rome, and Geneva, in addition to British, Canadian, and American sources, Staples's study is very carefully researched. By focusing on the UN agencies, she has made an important contribution to a growing literature documenting the extent to which development was driven forward by international and nongovernmental organizations. As her work illustrates, during the 1940s and 1950s, while the Truman administration made only halting efforts in the realm of technical assistance and the Eisenhower administration remained largely committed to policies of "trade, not aid," major UN agencies were already pursuing far more ambitious development goals.

I remain somewhat unconvinced, however, about Staples's claim that the "internationalist" sensibility of the UN agencies gave their development efforts a substantially different cast than those promoted by the United States government. In some cases this certainly seems to be true, particularly with regard to the FAO's willingness to challenge market orthodoxy and its emphasis on the moral responsibility created by global hunger. In other respects, however, UN agencies clearly perceived the world through a framework very similar to the one in place in Washington. Like American proponents of modernization in the Agency for International Development and the State Department, World Bankers and WHO planners operated within an ideology that tended to push aside questions of politics, history, and culture in favor of economic, administrative, and technical solutions. When World Bankers condemned economic nationalism and insisted that, in Staples's words, "development would increase Third World living standards, decrease the possibility of desperation-fed revolutions, and ultimately provide the building blocks for the creation of liberal democracies" (33), they put forward arguments that, by the 1960s, would stand at the very center of U.S.

government approaches to the global Cold War.

Staples grounds the ideological orientation of the UN staff she studies in a progressive, internationalist tradition that combined hopes for expert-led reform with the ability of international organizations to mediate disputes, ensure stability, and promote progress. Yet the aspirations of World Bankers to promote "an international economy that would operate as a unitary organism, limit competitive nationalism by integrating economies, and generate an economic growth in which all could share" (22) also seem to fall squarely within the Wilsonian framework that shaped U.S. foreign policy throughout most of the twentieth century.² Staples is certainly right that as a group the World Bankers identified themselves as expert, internationalist professionals uniquely qualified to play pivotal roles in shaping the global economy. It is also clear that on various questions ranging from tariff levels to the government practice of making economically "unsound" loans to U.S. allies, the World Bank took issue with some of the more narrowly nationalist practices of U.S. officials. Yet these disputes seem to have more to do with questions of administration and technique instead of fundamental goals. When World Bank president Eugene Black declared that "investment . . . in world development means nothing less than the illumination of the central idea of freedom" (38), he expressed a view that was entirely congruent with that of American cold warriors.

The book might also have benefited from a closer examination of the way that specific development programs were implemented and executed in postcolonial nations, and what resulted from them. The chapter on malaria eradication is very useful in that regard, as it explores the complex factors involved in the space between scientific intervention, local politics, and cultural practices. Other chapters, however, remain centered on the level of central bureaucratic planning and policymaking. While valuable in documenting the

fundamental goals and strategies of the agencies, they do not provide as much information on the way that development programs actually affected the lives of those they were expected to help.³

In her conclusion, Staples bravely takes on the challenge of attempting to formulate a better way of thinking about development. The overall pattern since World War II, she admits, is not an encouraging one. Although GNPs were raised during the 1960s, "there was no correlating decline in malnutrition, infant mortality, illiteracy, unemployment, or the gap between the rich and poor countries" (181). During the 1970s and 1980s, she reflects, plans to try to address those problems only led to the twin crises of massive debt and structural adjustment. Perhaps unwilling to leave the reader on a despairing note or to reject the idea that development itself remains a worthy goal and a humanitarian imperative, Staples finds promise in more recent, smaller-scale efforts to empower local communities democratically. The Deccan Development Society's work among women in Andhra Pradesh, India, and the Grameen Bank's "microcredit" initiatives in Bangladesh both come in for extended praise, as does the WHO's recent attempt to promote community-based, "grassroots" campaigns against AIDS. Will these approaches ultimately succeed? Staples, of course, cannot provide an answer to that question. But this well-written, insightful, and important book certainly suggests that while many of the specific initiatives of the UN development experts failed, their more idealistic aspirations remain alive and well.

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Notes:

1. For a look at an earlier cohort with similar views, see Emily S. Rosenberg, *Financial Missionaries to the World: The Politics and Culture of Dollar Diplomacy, 1900-1930* (Durham, NC, 2003).

2. On this point see, for example, Frank Ninkovich, *The Wilsonian Century: U.S. Foreign*

Policy Since 1900 (Chicago, 1999).

3. For a closer look at these issues, see James Ferguson's treatment of the World Bank and FAO in *The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development," Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho* (New York, 1990).

The Joys of Historiography

Amy L. Sayward¹

I teach a class on "The Historian's Craft" to undergraduate history majors at Middle Tennessee State University, and one of the hardest concepts for them to understand is that of historiography. It is the first time that some of them have entertained the notion that historical interpretations can change over time or that history might seek something other than simply to determine the Answer to what happened in the past and why. They find it difficult to understand how exciting (and scary) it can be to promote one's own thesis about what happened in the past and why, and to engage other scholars who are equally committed to understanding that past in conversation. But *Passport* readers perusing this roundtable will understand what a joy it is to have an opportunity to converse with colleagues, especially when they are as thoughtful as these.

It seems to me that we are very much at the beginning of the historiography on development during the early Cold War. The questions are only just being framed, the research to be done is truly immense, and the stakes are truly important in human and global terms.

Little did I realize what a daunting field I was entering when I first started doing my research during my second quarter of graduate school. At that time, my project was simply going to be about international economic policy after World War II. The fact that the International Monetary Fund (IMF) archives were then closed to researchers prevented me from pursuing that topic, however, and led me to look at a broader range of specialized UN agencies. I then decided that I would research the new class of

international bureaucrats, trying to understand how they approached the topic of development and sought to make it a reality through their new organizations. My dissertation title was "Constructing International Identity," and, as my commentators noted, this led to the emphasis in the book on development bureaucrats and their worldview. It was only after graduating and surviving the first year of university teaching that I found the time to sit and think about why anyone would want to publish or read this study. At that point I realized that the real importance of the topic was that these bureaucrats had begun a fundamentally new project of promoting development, not that they had defined a new identity for themselves (this was simply a by-product of their development project). Feeling that I was finally seeing at least part of the forest, I revised and renamed the work and decided it was time for the manuscript to go to the publisher.

But as everyone who has written a book knows, the process does not end with publication. Indeed, in some ways, publication is just the beginning, because suddenly one's colleagues begin engaging these ideas on a new level. In January, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars hosted a conference entitled "The Liberal Foreign Policy Tradition: Pluses, Problems, and Prospects"² that led me to think about my research again in an even broader context beyond development. In a paper for that conference, I framed my research within the idea of a "liberal moral sensibility" that emerged after World War II. Now, reflecting on the thoughtful commentaries in this roundtable, I would like to engage a broader historiography in a way that might both help and challenge us all to think about the changing roles of governments,

I would like to engage a broader historiography in a way that might both help and challenge us all to think about the changing roles of governments, international organizations, markets, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and peoples in promoting, derailing, and reconceptualizing development.

international organizations, markets, multinational corporations, nongovernmental organizations, and peoples in promoting, derailing, and reconceptualizing development.

Although there are always hegemonic ideas about economies and the "proper" roles of states, markets, and peoples within those discourses, there are also always challengers. Nations, not peoples, were the focus of the dominant economic paradigms of mercantilism and imperialism in the eighteenth century. But in 1776, the American colonies declared their independence, challenging their subordinate position in the international economy

and asserting a new set of ideas about individual rights and government. In the same year, Adam Smith published *The Wealth of Nations*, challenging mercantilism and arguing that rational economic self-interest was the surest path to the common good. In these ways, individuals

seem to have first entered the realm of economic philosophy. The nineteenth century was rife with shifting and highly charged debates about the proper balance between business, government, and market and about whether or not the vast changes taking place in national and international economies were good for peoples, countries, and the world. In addition to industrial revolutions, a round of decolonization in the Americas, and another round of conquest and imperialism in Africa, this century witnessed the divisive dispute about whether human beings from Africa should be bought and sold in the marketplace. In sum, there was an increase in the number of factors that had to be taken into account in making national and international economic decisions. Among them were individuals and moral sensibilities. This inclusive

trend has certainly continued into the twentieth century.

Laissez-faire ideas and the human wreckage that followed in their wake gave birth to the Progressive and Social Democratic movements of the early twentieth century, when Americans and European experts began to play an active role in managing the economy by influencing the terms of government legislation. The global disaster of the Great Depression prompted another rethinking. Fascism, Keynesianism, and the New Deal all called for national governments to take unprecedented control over their economies, and in the wake of the Second World War, in something like a New Deal writ globally, the UN system of specialized agencies created international institutions to help regulate key areas of the global economy and promote capitalist economic development. These events, I believe, make up the context in which we must frame any discussion of development activities during the Cold War.

Considering this context, it is not surprising that there is no consensus about the proper role of experts, governments, international organizations, NGOs, peoples, and all the rest in promoting development. Just as there was a reaction against large-scale government interference with national economies after World War II, there has been a backlash against expert- and institution-led development on the international scene. Nick Cullather and David Engerman rightly point out the critiques of this type of internationally normed and institutionally driven development, whose flaws have been only too obvious in the half century since the Second World War. But would markets and charitable NGOs be adequate replacements, as Tom Zeiler encourages us to consider? Certainly one of the primary critiques of the World Trade Organization and the World Bank (and by extension most other intergovernmental organizations) is their lack of transparency and democratic process, as well as their seeming indifference to local conditions. And whereas

governments – at least in democratic settings – can be more transparent and more sensitive, it seems unlikely that multinational corporations and private organizations would be. Despite the experts' lament about politics warping economics and policies, perhaps it will be national governments working together and against one another in a constant struggle to promote their own national self-interest that will provide the best outcome at this point in human history. Perhaps if Adam Smith were to visit the twenty-first century, his sequel would be entitled *The Politics of Nations*.

But where do the people who seek to escape poverty, disease, and hunger fit into these macro-ideas? The new models of microlending and microdevelopment that I touch upon in the conclusion of my book offer some interesting contrasts to the macrodevelopment projects that I focus on in the book and that made up the bulk of development lending in the early Cold War. Modernization theory – the idea of building infrastructure and economic statistics until a nation's economy reaches the take-off stage – is very much out of vogue at present, because there was rarely any take-off, because the economic development that did occur seemed unconnected to and unexplained by the theory, and because so many people were apparently left behind. In fact, the entire argument that economic development will lead to improvements in the lives of ordinary people has, in recent decades, been turned on its head. This first became evident to me during the Beijing World Conference on Women in 1995 (sponsored by the United Nations Development Programme), when the argument that development would improve women's lives was transformed into "Women's empowerment and their full participation on the basis of equality in all spheres of society, including participation in the decision-making process and access to power, are fundamental for the achievement of equality, development and peace."³ The fact is that we do not know if empowering women will promote

development more effectively than limiting population, promoting industrialization, eradicating malaria, or building dams. If development is, as Nick Cullather says in his commentary, primarily a narrative strategy, it is also very much a contested story, because there is still no ending. We have not figured out how to alleviate human pain and suffering; the story cannot end with "happily ever after" while the four horsemen of the apocalypse still ride freely through the twenty-first century.

The conclusion of my book has been criticized in other venues, but I would still like to offer some of the thoughts I put forward there on what this history might, as Tom Zeiler says, "bring to the table to solve the seemingly ageless crises of global misery." In the Deccan Development Society (DDS), operating in southern India, I saw a group of women who were making key decisions about how to improve their lives and their communities. These decisions, which were supported by the nongovernmental DDS, began to challenge governmental policies in the province of Andhra Pradesh (which favored large-scale, input-intensive agriculture). But the environment in which these changes could be made included a democratic government that allowed the voices of the people to change policy and an international community that has come to support women's agency and to value local initiatives.

I believe this is a fine example of what it might mean to take seriously the view of Amartya Sen (winner of the Nobel Prize in economics) that development itself should be defined as "a process of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy" and removing "major sources of unfreedom," such as poverty, tyranny, poor economic opportunities, systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities, and intolerance.⁴ International organizations and experts cannot accomplish such an ambitious goal – they could not in the seeming *tabula rasa* of the post-World War II era, they cannot in the twenty-first century, and they will not so long as we believe in national sovereignty.

But they have helped to establish international norms and even values about what human beings need and how they should be treated. And even the failures of development in the early Cold War have provided valuable lessons about how countries might or might not proceed to try to improve the lives of their peoples (if they hold this as a goal). I believe that it will take the best efforts of all the players in the development effort to help make life at least bearable for all, and I believe that historians can play an important role by critically examining and researching the narrative of development. I truly look forward to continuing to be part of that critical community, and I thank my colleagues in this roundtable for starting our conversation on such a high level.

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Notes:

1. *The Birth of Development* was published under Sayward's former name, Amy L.S. Staples.
2. Co-sponsored by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for International Studies and the History and Democracy Project of the University of Massachusetts-Amherst, video of the conference is currently available at <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1427&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=368612>.
3. "Beijing Declaration," Annex 1 in "Report of the Fourth Conference on Women (Beijing, 4-15 September 1995)," p.4, available on-line at <<http://www.un.org/esa/gopher-data/conf/fwcw/off/a--20.en>>, accessed 17 February 2008.
4. Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York, 1999), 3.

H-Diplo, Women, and the State of the Field

Barbara Keys

The letter below, which was sent to H-Diplo in February 2008, was written with the intention of sparking a potentially useful and productive online debate. H-Diplo's editors declined to post it on the grounds that they do not publish threads relating to "editorial practices." I am publishing the letter here, in its original form except for Passport copyediting, because I, and many others who have read the letter, believe the issues are important and worthy of discussion. To encourage such a discussion, I invite readers to send comments to me (bkeys@unimelb.edu.au) for possible collation and dissemination.

– B.K.

Dear Fellow H-Diplo Subscribers:

I am writing to raise issues about representation and governance at H-Diplo. I believe that H-Diplo could and should be doing a better job of representing the field of diplomatic and international history and its members. Because these issues are of wide concern, I invite your comments and discussion.¹

Let me first stress the significance of these issues. H-Diplo is one of H-Net's biggest networks, with more than four thousand members—over twice as many as the main professional body in our field, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). It is a high-visibility forum that reaches an extraordinarily wide audience. At last year's SHAFR conference, H-Diplo's editors shared data showing high numbers of hits on its roundtable webpage. In addition, because H-Diplo's book reviews and roundtables usually appear much

more quickly than those in print outlets, they can have a significant impact on the recognition accorded a book or an author. (As one H-Diplo editor remarked to me, getting a roundtable on your book is "a coup!") Thus, like a professional journal, H-Diplo wields power: it shapes how insiders and outsiders alike view the field, and it is not an exaggeration to say that it influences careers and the distribution of power and resources within the field.

We all have a stake in what H-Diplo publishes and in how it is run. It is in all of our interests that H-Diplo fairly represent our field, both its members and its diverse subfields, and that it be as meritocratic as possible. If a forum of this importance marginalizes major areas of research in favor of a narrow conception of the field, the field itself suffers. If it is being run in a way that privileges its male constituents and disadvantages its female ones on the basis of judgments that have nothing to do with merit, we all lose. I believe these issues deserve serious and urgent attention.

1. Women and H-Diplo

The representation of women on H-Diplo presents potentially serious concerns. Relative to their numbers in the field, women scholars are sharply underrepresented in H-Diplo book reviews and review roundtables. We should not expect a one-to-one correspondence between women's membership in the field and their representation in various forums, but there are very large discrepancies at work on H-Diplo, and I think it is reasonable to ask why.

The underrepresentation of women is most notable in the case of H-Diplo roundtables. H-Diplo began publishing roundtables in 1999. Over the next eight years, it published thirty-three roundtables devoted to single-author books. All thirty-three books were by men: eight years, thirty-three men, zero women. Last month I became the first woman author to get a roundtable devoted to her book. H-Diplo has also published joint roundtables that cover two books. In that category, Margaret Macmillan became the first woman author to appear in a roundtable, sharing the forum in late 2007 with Robert Dallek.

Between 1999 and 2007 the authors of books reviewed (covering single and joint roundtables and authored and co-authored but not edited books) included forty men and one woman (Macmillan).² Women (actually, one woman) thus accounted for 2.4% of authors of books in roundtables. Men accounted for 97.6%.

How significant is this underrepresentation? It depends on what we choose as a comparison point. Ideally, we would compare the 2.4% of women (woman?) who made the roundtable author list with the percentage of women writing books in international and diplomatic history that met the criteria for inclusion in roundtable reviews during those years. In the absence of any list of all the books that met H-Diplo's criteria (vaguely defined as "new and notable" works), let me offer a few other points of comparison. Compare, for example, the 2.4% of women authors in roundtables to the percentage of

women who won SHAFR's Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize (for best first book) in the same period: three women and ten men, or 23% women. Women thus won the Stuart Bernath Prize at ten times the rate they got roundtable reviews. Compare 2.4% with the 14% who won SHAFR's Robert H. Ferrell Prize (for best book beyond the first book). Or compare 2.4% to the percentage of SHAFR's members who are women, which is currently about

19%: that is an eight-fold difference. These comparison points suggest important problems in H-Diplo's coverage.

H-Diplo cannot run roundtables on every important or significant book in the field, but when eight years go by without a roundtable devoted to a book by a woman, a pattern emerges that cannot be explained by random variation.

The pattern with respect to regular book reviews is similar. According to my count of the H-Diplo reviews archived at <http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showlist.cgi?lists=H-Diplo>, women constituted 11% of the reviewers and 12% of the authors of books under review.³ These percentages are, again, considerably lower than women's membership in SHAFR. Again, it would be ideal to compare the percentage of books by women reviewed on H-Diplo with the percentage of books by women in the field as a whole. There is no such list, nor are there precise definitions of which books fall within our field, but let us take a smaller sample size and compare it to other forums. According to my count, H-Diplo reviewed thirty-six books in 2004 and 2005. Four, or 11%, were by women.⁴ In those same years, according to my count, *Diplomatic History* reviewed a slightly larger number of books, of which 17% were authored by women. According to my count of books reviewed in those years by the *American Historical Review* that fall under the category of international

history, 25% were by women.⁵

What accounts for the discrepancies I describe above, and should we do anything about them? I offer these questions to fellow subscribers for discussion. As an economist friend of mine said when he read an earlier version of my comments, "These numbers mean nothing. The number of females whose books get roundtables is irrelevant; the question is what percentage of top intellectuals

If women have been disproportionately denied the opportunity to participate in scholarly debate on H-Diplo, it has been done without reference to arguments or evidence, without anything that can be challenged or debated.

in your area are females? Is it 0%, 10%, 50%?" It may be that H-Diplo's editors and many of its readers feel that the top intellectuals

in the field are almost entirely men and that they are participating in a meritocracy in which women are fairly represented according to the quality of their work. In the OAH *Newsletter* in late 2006, H-Diplo advisory board member Tom Zeiler wrote that "the H-Diplo staff has worked wonders in ensuring that the list deals with the most germane scholarship."⁶ Are women writing scholarship that is not germane?

My economist friend went on to say of my comments: "This is standard feminist propaganda. I think it is counterproductive. You're implicitly making the threat that next time male colleagues are critical of your work (or of any other female colleague) you can infer that your critic is a male chauvinist pig. This has a chilling effect on the intellectual life of a community." Let me be clear: the problem is not criticism. The problem is lack of criticism. I am calling for open debate about practices that have thus far not been openly discussed. Criticism of other scholars' work is natural and healthy: when published, it is public and open; the bases for the criticism are made clear; arguments are made on the basis of evidence that can be debated and challenged. If women have been disproportionately denied the opportunity to participate in scholarly debate on H-Diplo, it has been done without reference to arguments or evidence, without

anything that can be challenged or debated. Let's bring this issue out into the open.

In order to stimulate discussion, let me suggest two factors that might account for the underrepresentation of women. The first and most obvious possibility is gender discrimination. Is there sexism at H-Diplo—and in the field of diplomatic history more broadly? Women represent over 40% of the Ph.D.'s awarded in history, but less than 20% of the members of SHAFR. Does this reflect only personal choice, or are other factors at work? Diplomatic history as a field has been notoriously slow to adapt to change. It was for many decades an exclusively male sphere run by old-boy networks, and it remains heavily male-dominated today. (It is also overwhelmingly white.) Are remnants of the old-boy mentality still at play? That is, are the men who are largely still in charge more likely to distribute favors to their male colleagues, regardless of considerations of merit? These are difficult questions to answer. Discriminatory attitudes, where they exist, are generally no longer overt. But unless such attitudes exist—or unless the women in our field are on average considerably inferior in the quality of their intellectual output to the men—it is difficult to account entirely for the discrepancies outlined above.⁷

2. The Question of Subfields

The other possibility relates to subfield: this is both a likely partial explanation for women's underrepresentation and a significant concern in itself. Diplomatic or international history has broadened in scope tremendously in recent years, but despite the claim of H-Diplo's editors to represent "foreign relations history, broadly defined," they have consistently espoused a much narrower vision of what constitutes diplomatic and international history than is reflected in the content of *Diplomatic History* and SHAFR conferences. Take, for example, the books given roundtable reviews. By my count, roughly 90% deal with the traditional fare of elite

policymaking and high politics. Areas where top editors have interests (e.g., twentieth-century France) are strongly represented. But many areas where exciting innovations are occurring have minimal or no visibility on H-Diplo.

My survey of books reviewed in the *American Historical Review* in 2004 and 2005 suggests that the “new” areas of “the new international history” (that is, works on topics outside of the traditional areas of war, elite policymaking, national security issues, and intelligence, or works that deal with such topics in nontraditional ways) comprise roughly 28% of the books in diplomatic and international history. Nothing close to this proportion is reflected on H-Diplo. My survey also suggests that women are represented in the “new” areas of “the new international history” in roughly the same proportion they are represented in most other historical fields: about 40%. (My data set here is limited and my categorizations are necessarily subjective, but I think these percentages make sense.) H-Diplo’s focus on traditional areas, then, is probably contributing to the exclusion of women. It also means that many scholars in international history, men and women, are disproportionately denied access to and visibility on an important forum.

3. A Call for Change

The issues cited above raise larger issues of representation, accountability, and governance at H-Diplo. What obligations does H-Diplo have to the field of diplomatic and international history and its members? At least in statutory terms (i.e., H-Net regulations), it is not clear that it has any. H-Diplo’s editors in effect represent themselves.

In his OAH *Newsletter* essay, Tom Zeiler described H-Diplo as “democracy in action.” In terms of management, however, H-Diplo works far more like an oligarchy than a democracy. Compared to other (much smaller) listservs, H-Diplo is run by a tiny group of people. Professional societies like SHAFR are at least nominally democratic:

nominating committees restrict our choices, but members do get a voice in choosing the leadership. Likewise, a journal such as *Diplomatic History*, SHAFR’s official organ, is at least nominally beholden to SHAFR and hence indirectly to its members. H-Diplo’s editors are not elected, and H-Diplo’s readers have no say in who edits the network and hence in who determines its content.

That does not mean, however, that women, those who work in non-traditional areas, and those who want to see a broad-minded meritocracy in place should simply cede this forum to other voices—as I think has been the case over the last decade. Instead, we need to press for change. I believe the network would benefit from broader editorial leadership, greater transparency, and greater professionalization in terms of policies, standards, and the qualifications of editors. I have detailed my proposals in a letter to H-Diplo’s advisory board, which I am happy to send to anyone who requests a copy. I summarize the issues of general interest to subscribers below.

We can all be grateful to the current volunteer scholar-editors who donate large amounts of their time to make the list a valuable resource. Will Gray’s fledgling “International History” project and George Fujii’s beautiful (and time-consuming) efforts to format roundtables and make them accessible, for example, deserve high praise. Roundtable reviews are a wonderful innovation, allowing for in-depth discussion and varied perspectives on books. More generally, the current team has pushed the professionalization of the list in useful directions, making it more relevant than it was a few years ago.

However, long-term, systemic problems in representation suggest that it would be healthy to broaden the editorial leadership of H-Diplo and thereby to include new and different visions of the field and its members. H-German has eight editors and one undergraduate editorial assistant. H-Diplo has a single managing editor, graduate student Diane Labrosse, whose work

for H-Diplo is generously funded by the National Security Archive; Chris Ball plays a major supporting role. There are other people involved (Tom Maddux in roundtables, for example), but their roles are limited. If H-Diplo had half a dozen active managing editors and half a dozen book review/roundtable editors, we could be more confident that a broad span of the field was represented, in terms of geography, chronology, and subfield. H-Diplo now has such a team in place for its article reviews. Why not do the same for book reviews, roundtables, and list management in general? With over 4,000 members, surely there is a substantial pool of people out there who would be willing and eager to help shape the list.

Fairness would also be promoted by greater transparency. H-Diplo’s policies and procedures are currently opaque and sometimes arbitrary. How books are chosen for roundtables is one example: we cannot evaluate the fairness of the selections unless we know the criteria for inclusion. The network would benefit from the establishment of clear and public rules—and from the appointment of an ombudsman to monitor compliance.

Finally, why not entrust the top management of H-Diplo to the same kind of leadership our print forums receive? H-Net regulations specify that list editors should have “strong qualifications in the field” and that review editors should have a Ph.D. I think it is reasonable to entrust tasks like choosing reviewers and choosing which books are reviewed to scholars who have substantial publishing experience of their own and deep experience in the field. H-Diplo is increasingly devoted to the kind of functions that print venues handle: reviews and announcements. The more it becomes a forum for publicizing and evaluating scholarly work, the more important it becomes that the network be bound by the same professional standards that guide other such forums.

H-Diplo provides great benefits to scholars and many others with an interest in diplomatic and international history. At the same

time, it wields significant power, and everyone with a stake in the field has an interest in seeing that its power is wielded fairly and in the best interests of the field as a whole. I suggest that H-Diplo can do better – and that it must do better.

Erratum: I was incorrect to suggest that women comprise 40% of professional historians. In recent years women have been awarded about 40% of the Ph.D.'s in History, but their proportion in the profession as a whole is lower – around 30%. – B.K.

Barbara Keys is lecturer in history at the University of Melbourne.

Notes:

1. I would like to thank the many friends and colleagues who provided helpful advice and comments on this posting.
2. I chose these years in order to allow comparisons with other data sets. I have left out entirely the category of edited books. H-Diplo ran several roundtables on edited collections, in which women coeditors appeared twice, but it seems to me that edited and authored books are two very different categories: the latter carry far more weight in shaping and advancing historians' careers.
3. I have left out edited books that include editors of both sexes.
4. I excluded a very small number of volumes whose coeditors or coauthors include both men and women. Note that in 2004 H-Diplo reviewed 18 books by men, and zero by women; all reviewers were also men.
5. Any such count must necessarily rely on subjective judgments about what constitutes the field of diplomatic and international history. My own criteria were relatively conservative. To give a rough sense, I excluded comparative works, many works on empire, most on immigration and diasporas, and anything before about 1800 with the exception of works on the American Revolution; and I maintained a relatively U.S.-centric bias. (Note that the AHR's own indexing scheme is unreliable. It categorizes books under the headings of "foreign relations/diplomacy" and "war," but such listings left out many books I counted, such as Eric Love's *Race over Empire*.)
6. Thomas Zeiler, "Is Democracy a Good Thing?" *OAH Newsletter* 34, November 2006, at <http://www.oah.org/pubs/nl/2006nov/zeiler.html> (accessed 1 February 2008).
7. I note that SHAFR has an ad hoc committee on the status of women, of which I am a member. The committee is collecting and analyzing a range of data, including data about H-Diplo, on which it will base a report and roundtable at the next SHAFR conference. This posting represents my own views and not the views of the committee.

A Response to Barbara Keys

H-Diplo Board of Editors

Editor's note: This response includes a number of letters previously sent from H-Diplo to Dr. Keys. They are reprinted here as originally sent, except in a few instances where the names of third parties were removed. The decision to excise these names was made by the Passport editor, not by H-diplo.

M.L.

We appreciate the chance to address the issues Prof. Keys has raised in her essay. In the interest of full disclosure and to provide some context for *Passport's* readers, we are also releasing the contents of two previous responses that we sent as members of H-DIPLO's Editorial Board and staff to Prof. Keys. We hope they will be helpful both to readers of this exchange and to the broader discussion of fair representation.

While H-DIPLO welcomes comments and suggestions from subscribers, the decision not to post Prof. Keys's message that is published here followed standard policy based on H-DIPLO's published guidelines. Like most scholarly publications, H-DIPLO discusses editorial matters at the editorial level. In view of the list's overall purpose as well as a desire to avoid adding to the deluge of email that we all experience, H-DIPLO limits online discussions and publications to the subject of international relations.

Subscribers who wish to appeal the decisions of the list moderators may do so according to H-DIPLO's published procedures. Prof. Keys submitted an appeal, and she received a thorough and fair hearing from the Editorial Board, which has expressed full confidence in the list editors. We also concluded that the charges of sexism at H-DIPLO do

not stand up to serious scholarly investigation.

We should note that there is a back story to Prof. Keys's essay about the representation of women on H-DIPLO. While we are not able to publish correspondence with subscribers without their permission, we must point out that the issue at hand originated thirteen months ago in a dispute over a review – one written by a woman, incidentally -- that appeared in a roundtable about Prof. Keys's book, *Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s*. The H-DIPLO Editorial Board considered this matter, and concluded that the editorial staff had handled the review properly.

You will find, below, the Editorial Board's responses to Prof. Keys's appeal. Those responses contain important statistical information that shows that women have indeed been active and frequent participants in H-DIPLO roundtables and reviews relative to the field as a whole.

Since its inception in 1993, H-DIPLO's policy has been to offer an inclusive and welcoming site for all scholars. There is always room for improvement, since we have consistently maintained that H-DIPLO is a work in progress. We are proud, however, of the participation of women in discussion threads, in book and article reviews, as scholars whose books and articles are the subject of reviews, and as members of the Editorial Board. H-DIPLO will continue to evolve in response to new developments in academia and in the field of international relations. As always, we welcome suggestions that will improve H-DIPLO.

In June 2008, along with a few other founding H-NET lists, H-DIPLO will celebrate its fifteenth anniversary. We have grown from a fledgling list to one with 4000

subscribers, and we rank among the top five H-NET lists. This growth is primarily the product of countless hours of volunteer work done in the spirit of fairness and good faith by the editors and moderators who maintain H-DIPLO on a daily basis. Through their careful management and steady work to professionalize our publication, they have created the flagship electronic forum about international relations. As a survey of our web site will indicate, H-DIPLO publishes scholarly exchanges on a wide range of international topics. And, of course, what makes H-DIPLO so vital and valuable is the participation of scholars from around the world who often have different views, different interpretations, or different interests, but share a commitment to one of the most important areas of historical scholarship.

With Best Wishes,
Signed,
The H-Diplo Editorial Board
Tom Blanton,
Malcolm Byrne,
Diane Clemens,
Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman,
Robert Hanks,
Jim Hershberg,
William Keylor,
Fredrik Logevall,
Sally Marks,
Chester Pach,
Yone Sugita,
Janice Terry,
Odd Arne Westad,
Thomas Zeiler

Part II: Christopher Ball's response to Prof. Keys

Prof. Keys:

While I appreciate the time that you put into this submission, H-Diplo does not publish threads on H-Diplo's editorial practices. These issues should be raised before H-Diplo's editorial advisory board, whose members are listed here: <http://www.h-net.org/%7Ediplo/personnel.html#board>.

Since I am dual-hatted as the book review editor, handling H-Net Book Reviews but not review essays, article

reviews, or RTs, I would note that the majority of the H-Net book reviews are based on books submitted to H-Net by publishers, and most submit only one copy of a book for all H-Net lists. If another list selects the book first, H-Diplo cannot readily review it. For example, according to H-Net's database, Harvard did not submit your 2006 book to H-Net (there have been several recent Harvard books that were relevant to H-Diplo but not submitted to H-Net). While H-Net has a procedure for review editors to request specific books from publishers, few publishers respond to these requests.

The real question is how many books submitted to H-Net and within the parameters of diplomatic or international history broadly conceived are authored by women. This is a hard figure to come by. According to H-Net's database, over 5,000 books were received in 2007. Coding over 5,000 books is not easy. Not all of them are relevant to H-Diplo's coverage, but H-Net only provides for words searches based on Bowker or BISAC subject guides or title; there is no "keyword anywhere" capability. BISAC has no category for women's history at all. A search for books published in 2007 with the Bowker tag "UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS" produced only 32 books, with two authored by women. I've appended that list below. One is the Statler book that was the subject of an RT published earlier this month. Of course, there were more books that fell under the broad rubric of diplomatic or international history, but H-Net, and by derivation, H-Diplo is dependent largely on the books made available to it via H-Net since H-Diplo has no funds to mail books on its own.

We are also limited on the reviewer side. Our decline-to-review rate is over 40%. When we issued a call for H-Diplo reviewers in Oct. 2004, only 7 of the 50 respondents were women, or 14%. I made an effort to recruit female reviewers when I took over as review editor, but it remains an issue of matching expertise to books available to willingness to review. We have many would-be reviewers for whom we lack relevant books,

and many books for which we lack relevant reviewers.

I did compile a list of all single-authored books reviewed since 1996 (when H-Net's on-line archive begins), excluding RTs and edited volumes. Of the 183 books, 30 were authored by women, or 16.4% (I've attached the Excel file).

Christopher Ball
H-Diplo List Editor & Book Review
Editor

Part III

Dear Dr. Keys:

We write in response to your letter of appeal concerning the decision of the H-Diplo Editors to reject your submission, "Women, Subfields, and the Future of H-Diplo."

On behalf of the list editors, Christopher Ball sent the following response:

"While I appreciate the time that you put into this submission, H-Diplo does not publish threads on H-Diplo's editorial practices. These issues should be raised before H-Diplo's editorial advisory board, whose members are listed here..."

Mr. Ball was correct: we refer to Article 12 of the H-Diplo Guidelines:

12. H-DIPLO has an appeal mechanism in case objections to these procedures arise. Moderators will first refer unresolved disputes to the editors. If the editors are unable to resolve them to the satisfaction of the subscriber in question, they will then refer the issue to the Editorial Board, whose collective decision will be final. Procedural disputes that come before the Board for resolution are considered matters of privacy and may not be divulged without the permission of everyone concerned. Even if permission is granted, H-DIPLO will not disseminate such information to the list in keeping with its mission as a forum purely for discussing the history of international relations.

We have now reviewed your submission and we report for the record that we concur with the decision of the list editors. Your

submission does indeed involve the editorial practices of H-Diplo. It is list policy not to discuss such matters online, in keeping with H-Diplo's "mission as a forum purely for discussing the history of international relations." Moreover, your "call for a change at H-Diplo" is a matter that concerns the H-Diplo Editorial Board only. List governance is the purview of the Editorial Board. The moderators and editors are responsible to us.

Since you have raised serious issues that concern the members of the Editorial Board, we offer the following response to the two main arguments in your letter:

A. Regarding your "call for a change at H-Diplo" we state for the record that we are completely satisfied with the H-Diplo editors and moderators. We are unanimous in our total confidence in the abilities of Diane Labrosse as H-Diplo Managing Editor as well as the abilities of Thomas Maddux, Christopher Ball, and George Fujii as Editors. We also fully support and have total confidence in the team of review editors that Diane has recruited.

We will also note that we are in possession of the full record of your correspondence with Diane Labrosse concerning [name removed] review of your book. We are satisfied that your book was fairly reviewed [name removed] and that any possible concerns that you might have had about H-Diplo's Review process were fully met by the subsequent roundtable on your book.

B. The charge that H-Diplo discriminates against women is one that we take very seriously. We have examined this charge and we find it to be groundless. One of our members took the trouble of comparing the participation rate of women on H-Diplo with that of *Diplomatic History*, the flagship journal in the field.

Here is the substance of the report:

BEGIN QUOTATION:

I also compiled some statistics about female reviewers and reviewers of books by women in *Diplomatic History*. This is what I found.

I surveyed the Feature Reviews in *DH* from January 2005 through January 2008. During the time, *DH* ran reviews of 100 books. (I did not count reviews of three volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series.) Of those, 82.5 books were written or edited by men; 17.5 written or edited by women. (The .5 arises from one book having a male and a female editor.) The reviews were written by 84 men and 14 women. (There are fewer reviewers than books, since a couple of reviews were of two books.) That means that over a period of a little more than three years, 17.5 percent of the reviews in *DH* were of books that had female authors or editors, and 14.3 percent of the Feature Reviews had female authors.

I did a count of both the book reviews and the roundtable reviews on H-DIPLO during the same period of time. Taking the book reviews first, 25 percent of the books had female authors or editors, and 13.5 percent of the reviews were by women. For the roundtables, 10.3 percent of the books had female authors or editors, and 18.3 percent of the roundtable reviewers (I did not count the roundtable editors) were women.

The combined totals for both the book reviews and roundtables are these: 18.1 percent of the books under review had female authors or editors, and 17.1 percent of the reviews were by women.

Thus, my count shows that H-DIPLO and *DH* had almost identical figures for the percentage of female-authored or edited books that they reviewed, and H-DIPLO had a slightly higher percentage of female reviewers.

Someone might review these figures and conclude that women are under represented in both H-DIPLO and *DH*. I think one would need much more data about the subscribers to each publication and the percentage of women in international/foreign relations/diplomatic history before reaching that conclusion.

Instead, I would conclude from the data that H-DIPLO is doing about as well—or even a little better—than the leading publication in U.S. international history in reviewing

books by women and in publishing reviews by women. Of course, both publications could do better, and we ought to discuss ways to accomplish that goal on H-DIPLO.

END QUOTATION

Christopher Ball sent you a detailed response that contains similar findings regarding H-Diplo reviews in general. The roundtable review on your book, of course, was commissioned by a female and had two female reviewers. As scholars in the field, we are all concerned with the fair treatment of women on H-Diplo, in SHAFR, and in the profession as a whole. Certainly there is room for improvement on the matter of representation of women—as well as minorities—in the field, and we will continue to pursue that goal at every opportunity.

We welcome your future participation on H-Diplo, subject to the list guidelines. We also consider the file on this particular matter to be closed.

Signed,
The H-Diplo Editorial Board

Tom Blanton,
Malcolm Byrne,
Diane Clemens,
Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman,
Robert Hanks,
Jim Hershberg,
William Keylor,
Fredrik Logevall,
Sally Marks,
Chester Pach,
Yone Sugita,
Janice Terry,
Odd Arne Westad,
Thomas Zeiler

The Vietnam Oral History Project: A Corrective for Historical Analogies

Christy Jo Snider

The editors of Passport would like to thank the SHAFR Teaching Committee for soliciting the following essay. Like other teaching-related articles that have appeared in Passport, this one may also be found on the SHAFR website, under "Teaching Services."

I began teaching my course in the history of American foreign policy the year the United States went to war in Iraq, and although my lectures conclude with the end of the Cold War, my students have always found ways to tie several of the historical events we cover to the current conflict in the Middle East. To students searching for relevance in incidents that occurred many decades ago, George Washington's warning about "entangling alliances" in his Farewell Address becomes an indictment of a long-term commitment to Iraqi stability, and James Polk's justifications for beginning the Mexican-American War foreshadow George W. Bush's claims about weapons of mass destruction stockpiled by Saddam Hussein.

Students use historical analogies most frequently, however, during our discussions about the United States' involvement in Vietnam. They have suggested correlations

between recent events in Iraq and everything from Richard Nixon's decision to turn the bulk of the fighting over to the South Vietnamese army to the difficulty U.S. soldiers had in distinguishing civilians from

the Vietcong. At times such analogies can be a useful teaching tool, but they can also mask the very real and significant differences between events that occurred in distinctive contexts.

In an effort to combat this inclination to generalize about the similarities between Iraq and American involvement in Southeast Asia, I have begun assigning an oral history project on the conflict in Vietnam to the undergraduates in my U.S. foreign policy course. In the final stage of this project the students conduct and transcribe an oral interview with a member of the community who was influenced or touched by the war in Vietnam. The oral interview itself offers a partial corrective to students' tendency to perceive connections between what are actually unique historical situations, but the research that goes into preparing for the interview is just as important in helping them to differentiate between those situations.

Students begin this project by locating someone to interview. In the past, I have provided them with a list of potential interview subjects, including faculty and staff members, who were on campus during the mid-to-late sixties and early seventies. It is also possible to work with the alumni relations office to locate

former students who live near campus and would be willing to participate in this project. Although the selection of an interviewee may be left solely to the students' discretion, contacting and making arrangements

with someone to interview was the part of the assignment that caused my students the most anxiety. Therefore, if this portion of the process can be made as stress-free as possible, the students are more likely to enjoy the project and focus their attention on its research aspects.

Once students have lined up interview subjects, they are asked to examine the secondary literature on American foreign policy toward Vietnam from 1960 to 1975 so that they can acquire a general understanding of U.S. interest in the region and how America's relationship to Vietnam changed over time. They are also required to research more specifically attitudes about U.S. involvement in Vietnam held by Americans whose situations were similar to those of their interviewees. For example, if the subject was a faculty member during the Vietnam War, the student would be expected to look at sources that explore the views of professors and university administrators toward the conflict. If the interviewee was a student during the conflict and never served overseas, the researcher would want to focus on how the home front responded to the war.

Using this research, students then write a five-to-six page report on how public opinion affected American foreign policy during the Vietnam War. It is likely (and even desirable) that, given the different experiences of their subjects, class members will approach the topic from a variety of perspectives. Teachers can highlight this diversity by holding a class discussion on the day the assignment is due about the relationship between the development of U.S. foreign policy and public opinion.

The report, along with the class

discussion, serves a dual purpose. First, it gives the students a clear sense of exactly how American policy toward Vietnam developed over several decades and enables them to recognize at least some of the differences between the situation in Southeast Asia and that in Iraq. This more nuanced understanding of the conflict in Vietnam makes it easier to dismantle some of the common analogies they use. Second, the research provides the background knowledge necessary to develop interesting and appropriate questions to ask their oral history interviewees.

Soon after students turn in their reports, they are required to write a list of questions to ask their subjects. In order to conduct a forty-to-fifty-minute interview, they must prepare between twenty-five and thirty questions that touch on four different topics: subjects' backgrounds, their memories of the war period, their recollections about their reactions to events of the time, and their judgments about those events.

Background questions help both


the subject and student become comfortable with the oral interview process, provide some basic context for the rest of the discussion, and shed light on the personal history of the interviewee. They should elicit information about where subjects grew up, what their childhoods were like, and what their parents did for a living. To jog subjects' memories about the war period, students should begin by asking them to recall what they were doing between 1964 and 1975. They should then move on to questions based in part on their research for the report on the American government's policies toward Vietnam. Such questions might focus on their subjects' experience with the draft, what college was like during the conflict in Vietnam, whether they ever did anything to protest or support the war, and if the war had any impact on their daily lives. Students should encourage interviewees to talk about the sort of individual experiences, personal stories, and memories that are not found in standard history books.

Questions about subjects' reactions to events of the era should probe a bit deeper and focus on getting subjects to explain their feelings and viewpoints during the Vietnam War. Students might ask subjects what they thought about the United States' draft policies, why they voted the way they did in the election of 1968, or what they thought about Nixon's decision to pursue the Vietcong into Cambodia. Questions about subjects' judgments on events of the time should provide interviewees with the opportunity to discuss the overall impact and importance of the Vietnam War and express their own opinions about it. Students might ask what mistakes their subjects thought were made during the Vietnam War, whether they would change anything if they could re-live those years, what they felt was the saddest thing about the war, or what they thought people should remember about the war.


Teachers should urge students to write their questions in a manner that precludes yes or no answers. They should begin their questions with




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
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SHAFR SURVEY

Please either fill out this paper survey and **mail** it to the SHAFR Business Office, Dept. of History, 106 Dulles Hall, OSU, Columbus, Ohio 43210, or take the **online** survey on the SHAFR homepage at <http://www.SHAFR.org/survey.htm>. The deadline for submission is June 1, 2008.

Please feel free to use more sheets of paper if needed.

Personal Information: Male Female

Student Tenured faculty Non-tenured faculty
Pre-collegiate Teacher Non-Academic

If you wish, please state how you self-identify your race/ethnicity:

How would you define your primary subfield of research interest?

1. Do you attend the annual SHAFR Conference: a. regularly b. rarely c. never
2. How would you rate your overall experience at SHAFR conferences you've attended?
 - a. highly positive
 - b. mostly positive
 - c. neutral
 - d. mixed
 - e. negative
 - f. highly negative

Please comment on your above rating:

3. How important is SHAFR to your professional and intellectual interactions?
 - a. very important
 - b. somewhat important
 - c. unimportant

4. Have you ever been nominated for a SHAFR committee? If so, how many times?

5. Have you ever nominated yourself for a SHAFR committee? If so, how many times?

6. Have you ever held an appointed office at SHAFR? If so, how many times?

7. Have you ever held an elected office at SHAFR? If so, how many times?

8. Would you like to have more of a voice in SHAFR? If so, in what way?

9. Do you think offering child care at SHAFR conferences should be:

- a. a high priority
- b. a low priority
- c. not necessary at all

10. Is *Diplomatic History* likely to be one of your top choices when thinking of where to publish articles? If yes, why? If no, why not?

11. Have you ever submitted an article for publication to *Diplomatic History*? Yes No

12. If yes, was it: accepted (including with revisions) or rejected
(If you have submitted more than one article, please answer for the first one.)

13. Is the field of diplomatic history:

- a. Male dominated?
- b. Gender neutral?
- c. Becoming too concerned with women and gender?

14. Do you think that over the last 15 years the position of women within SHAFR and within the field has gotten better, worse, or remained largely unchanged?

15. Have you ever experienced gender discrimination with SHAFR? If so, what was the nature of the discrimination?

This survey was prepared by the ad hoc committee on women in SHAFR. Co-chairs are Petra Goedde and Frank Costigliola. Members are Barbara Keys, Anna Nelson, Andy Rotter, and Kelly Shannon. The results of this survey and other data will be the topic of a Roundtable session at the annual conference in June.

what, why, how, and where. Instead of asking “Was it difficult to watch students leave campus to serve in the military?” students should ask “What was it like watching students leave campus to serve in the military?” Teachers should also emphasize that negative questions – questions that ask what was bad about or wrong with a situation – often elicit interesting results. For instance, asking “Why did so many students think the draft process was unfair?” will generate a range of responses that differ from those elicited by the more neutral question “What was the draft like?” A subject might be inclined to make only favorable comments about an experience unless prompted to remember other aspects of it.

Teachers should review the students’ lists of questions before the interview to ensure that they have covered all the important issues and have a firm grasp on standard question format. It can also be useful to distribute a list of the best questions from the class when returning students’ individual lists. Students may be motivated to revise their questions further before they meet their subjects for the actual interview.

The second-to-last stage of the oral history project is the interview itself. Once students have assembled their final list of questions, they should contact their subjects to schedule a time and to ask that they sign a waiver form. Requiring interviewees to sign a waiver is standard practice for oral history interviews. The waiver forms used for this project allow subjects to determine whether or not they want the final interview turned over to the university’s archive for

preservation or destroyed/returned after completion of the project.

The following guidelines may help students prepare for the interview:¹

- 1) The interview must be tape-recorded or video-taped to ensure accuracy, and it should last between forty and sixty minutes.
- 2) The ideal interview setting involves only the interviewer and the subject in a location with comfortable seating and no distractions.
- 3) If the subject expresses concern or anxiety about the interview process or being recorded, students can offer to provide a list of questions before the interview. They should also assure the subject that the recording will be used only to make a transcript for the final assignment if that is the interviewee’s preference. The recording can be destroyed or returned to the subject once the assignment is completed.
- 4) Students should make sure that they have the list of questions and that the tape or video recorder is functioning properly before they leave for the interview. They should

also bring spare batteries and a notepad for jotting down ideas.

5) Before asking their first question students should record an introduction that states the date and time, where the interview is taking place, who is conducting the interview, and who is being interviewed.

6) Students should limit their own remarks as much as possible. Brief questions will allow subjects to tell their story without interference. While it may be appropriate at times to prompt the interviewee to expand on a topic, students should not turn the interview into a dialogue.

7) Students should only ask one question at a time. They can make notes on follow-up questions to ask after the subject has finished answering the initial query.

8) Students should not immediately ask another question once interviewees have finished answering a question. A moment of silence might give subjects a chance to think of something else to add to the response.

9) Continuous taping of the

Oral History Waiver Form

I agree to allow this taped interview to be used for the purpose of a class project in *History 445 : The History of American Diplomacy* at Berry College.

- Destroy the oral interview transcript after it has been graded.
- Return the oral interview transcript to me after it has been graded.
- The interviewer may retain the sole copy of the oral interview transcript.
- The oral interview transcript may be retained by the Berry College Archives.

*Please fill in the blanks. Fields marked with * are required.*

Printed Name: _____

Signature: _____

Date: _____

interview is less distracting than switching the tape or video recorder on and off. Unless the interview is interrupted by a phone call or other intrusive event, students should leave the recorder running even if some of the material taped is unrelated to the topic.

10) Students should thank their subjects for their time once the interview is complete and send thank-you notes soon after.

The last part of the project involves transcribing the interview in a manner that is both accurate and understandable. If teachers are planning on submitting their students' oral history projects to a university's archives, it would be useful to contact the archivist before beginning the assignment. Most university archives have transcription formats that they use for their projects, and it will be helpful to have the students follow those guidelines. If a local archive is not involved, however, students should follow common transcription procedures:²

1. The transcription should have one-inch margins, each page should be numbered, and the text should be double-spaced.

2. At the beginning of the transcription, students should identify who transcribed the tape and the date(s) the transcription was done.

3. All speakers should be identified at the start of their comments with their names in bold capital letters, followed by a colon. For example: **MICHAEL SMITH:** In 1964, I entered Berry College as an undergraduate....

4. Transcriptions should omit expressions like "um" or "ah," but should include "um-hum" or "uh-huh" when used to indicate yes or no in response to specific questions.

5. The interviewee's words should not be revised so that they conform to standard written grammar. Sentence fragments, run-on sentences, and incorrect verb tenses should be left alone. Commas and dashes can be used to reflect pauses made by the subject.

6. Brackets should be used to explain any instances where the interview was interrupted or the tape recorder

turned off. For example: [Interview interrupted by a telephone call].

7. If a word or phrase used by the subject is unclear, question marks should be placed both in front of and behind it. For example: **MICHAEL SMITH:** And then the building was ?destroyed? by a huge sink hole.

8. Students should indicate in the transcription the end of a side of the tape in capital letters. For example: END OF SIDE ONE, TAPE ONE; BEGIN SIDE TWO TAPE ONE.

9. Like research papers, transcriptions must be proofread for misspellings or other obvious mistakes.

Student reactions to this assignment have been fairly positive. In the anonymous evaluations conducted at the end of the semester the majority of students mentioned that they enjoyed the actual interview process, and some even suggested expanding it to cover conflicts other than the war in Vietnam. Doing so might shed light on other issues in the history of American diplomacy.

From a pedagogical point of view, it is clear that the project has advanced students' research skills beyond those used in typical library research by giving them the opportunity to write questions that produce evidence, to find ways of communicating effectively in a one-on-one situation, and to learn the procedures used in transcribing interviews so that later researchers can use them. Many of my students have also done a remarkable job linking the individual experiences and views about the Vietnam War recounted in their projects to the larger question of American foreign policy during the Cold War. Others have produced interesting studies about the variety of ways in which U.S. citizens supported, protested, or were conflicted about American actions in Southeast Asia. More important, after exploring in depth the development of U.S. policy toward Vietnam, the impact of public opinion on those policies, and how individuals thought about or were affected by those policies, the students are much less likely to rely on simple historical analogies to explain the diverse reasons for America's international

actions. It seems clear, thus, that this project can address some of the important issues involved in teaching students to more accurately analyze and differentiate distinctive historical events—a useful skill while the United States remains heavily involved in Iraq.

Christy Jo Snider is assistant professor of history at Berry College.

Notes:

1. The oral history guidelines I give my students are modified from Willa K. Baum, *Oral History for the Local Historical Society* (Walnut Creek, CA, 1995). Other useful texts on oral history include Barry A. Lanman and Laura M. Wendling, *Preparing the Next Generation of Oral Historians: An Anthology of Oral History Education* (Lanham, MD, 2006), James Hoopes, *Oral History: An Introduction for Students* (Chapel Hill, 1979), and Baum, *Transcribing and Editing Oral History* (Nashville: American Association for State and Local History, 1977, reprint 1991).

2. This transcription format is based on that recommended by the American Folklore Center of the Library of Congress.

The Manufacture of Fear: U.S. Politics Before and After 9-11

W. Scott Lucas

"The chief costs of terrorism derive not from the damage inflicted by the terrorists, but what those attacked do to themselves and others in response. That is, the harm of terrorism mostly arises from the fear and from the often hasty, ill-considered, and overwrought reaction (or overreaction) it characteristically, and often calculatedly, inspires in its victims."

-John Mueller¹

I would like to begin with two incidents, one from the perspective of the academic, one (with apologies in advance) from a much more personal standpoint. Recently, my mother, who has been concerned for more than twenty years that I am cut off here in Britain from what is going on in the United States, forwarded a letter to me that has been widely circulated on the Internet:

Are we fighting a war on terror or aren't we? Was it or was it not started by Islamic people who brought it to our shores on September 11, 2001?

Were people from all over the world, mostly Americans, not brutally murdered that day, in downtown Manhattan, across the Potomac from our nation's capitol and in a field in Pennsylvania?

Did nearly three thousand men, women and children die a horrible, burning or crushing death that day, or didn't they?

And I'm supposed to care that a copy of the Koran was "desecrated" when an overworked American soldier kicked it or got it wet? Well, I don't. I don't care at all.

I'll start caring when Osama bin

Laden turns himself in and repents for incinerating all those innocent people on 9/11.

I'll care about the Koran when the fanatics in the Middle East start caring about the Holy Bible, the mere possession of which is a crime in Saudi Arabia.

I'll care when Abu Musab al-Zarqawi tells the world he is sorry for hacking off Nick Berg's head while Berg screamed through his gurgling slashed throat.

I'll care when the cowardly so-called "insurgents" in Iraq come out and fight like men instead of disrespecting their own religion by hiding in mosques.

I'll care when the mindless zealots who blow themselves up in search of nirvana care about the innocent children within range of their suicide bombs.

I'll care when the American media stops pretending that their First Amendment liberties are somehow derived from international law instead of the United States Constitution's Bill of Rights.

In the meantime, when I hear a story about a brave marine roughing up an Iraqi terrorist to obtain information, know this: I don't care.

When I see a fuzzy photo of a pile of naked Iraqi prisoners who have been humiliated in what amounts to a college-hazing incident, rest assured that I don't care.

When I see a wounded terrorist get shot in the head when he is told not to move because he might be booby-trapped, you can take it to

the bank that I don't care.

When I hear that a prisoner, who was issued a Koran and a prayer mat, and fed "special" food that is paid for by my tax dollars, is complaining that his holy book is being mishandled, you can absolutely believe in your heart of hearts that I don't care.

And oh, by the way, I've noticed that sometimes it's spelled "Koran" and other times "Quran." Well, Jimmy Crack Corn and—you guessed it—I don't care!!!!

If you agree with this viewpoint, pass this on to all your e-mail friends. Sooner or later, it'll get to the people responsible for this ridiculous behavior!

If you don't agree, then by all means hit the delete button.

Should you choose the latter, then please don't complain when more atrocities committed by radical Muslims happen here in our great country.²

Almost 60 years ago, when the foe of America was not radical Islamists but Communists, President Harry Truman hosted a meeting with Congressional representatives. The Truman administration, having been told by Britain that it could no longer provide aid to Greece or Turkey, faced a challenge: how could it persuade the American public and Congress to send hundreds of millions of dollars to those two Mediterranean countries? The advice to the Democratic president from Arthur Vandenberg, the Republican leader in the Senate, was blunt: make a speech to "scare hell" out of the American people.³ Two weeks later, the president went

before a joint session of Congress and issued what would become known as the Truman Doctrine: "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."⁴

Of course, there are differences between the two cases. One is the action of "official" executive political networks, using the method of formal communication to justify policy; the

other is that of private individuals taking advantage of the technological shift and acceleration brought by the Internet to disseminate an urgent message. In both cases, however, the purpose of the discussions is the "mobilization of fear."

Notions of the "culture of fear" are far from new,⁵ but I think they can be applied effectively to the reconsideration of policymaking, specifically the making of U.S. foreign policy, in both historical and contemporary cases. I would put two general hypotheses:

1. Scholarly study of U.S. foreign policy in the Cold War has been so focused on objective explanations of strategy, geopolitics, and, most important, "national security" that it has ignored the subjective construction and projection of that policy. Provocatively stated, the Soviet Union served not as much as an actual nightmare as a constructed nightmare to justify the projection of American power around the world.

2. Contemporary U.S. foreign policy, like its 1950s predecessor, did not respond to fear with plans for "security"; rather, it has sought to channel and even stoke fear to bolster implementation of a predetermined policy. Specifically and provocatively stated, the Bush administration did not stage the tragedy of 11 September 2001, but within hours of the event it began to consider how to use a War on Terror to implement plans for regime

change in Iraq.

To take the historical case first, it is commonly known that on 9 February 1950 a then little-known senator from Wisconsin named Joseph McCarthy

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addressed a Republican women's club in Wheeling, West Virginia, and declared that he had a list of 205 Communists who worked in the State Department.⁶ The number on the list fluctuated wildly, but McCarthy's

persistent message of infiltration and subversion encouraged a climate of fear and domestic repression.

The problem with this narrative is that it risks an inversion of cause and effect.⁷ By the time McCarthy made his Wheeling speech, the U.S. government was already well advanced in its mobilization of the threat within and without. Nine days after Truman set out his doctrine, the government issued an executive order requiring that any federal employee not only pass a security vetting but also sign a loyalty oath.⁸ Truman issued other high-profile declarations about menace inside American society, notably a speech on St. Patrick's Day in 1948 in which he asserted the following: "I do not want and I will not accept the political support of Henry Wallace and his Communists. If joining them or permitting them to join me is the price of victory, I recommend defeat."⁹

Domestic policing of fear was connected to the government's foreign policy through its guidelines on "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," first adopted in November 1948.¹⁰ In its most famous incarnation, NSC 68 of April 1950, the policy sanctioned not only development of the hydrogen bomb but also substantial increases in conventional forces, economic and military aid to "friendly" governments, information programs, and covert operations. All of this depended upon congressional authorization of expenditure,

however, and that in turn rested upon an intensive campaign to persuade the American public: "The whole success of the proposed program hangs ultimately on recognition by this Government, the American people, and all free peoples, that the cold war is in fact a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake."¹¹

On 20 April 1950 President Truman, addressing the American Society of Newspaper Editors, launched the Campaign of Truth: "We must pool our efforts with those of the other free peoples in a sustained, intensified program to promote the cause of freedom against the propaganda of slavery. We must make ourselves heard round the world in a great campaign of truth."¹² Truman may have emphasized the "positive" dimension of the American way of life but, in the Manichaean construction of the Cold War, that way of life could only exist in tandem with the projection of the Soviet menace: "Unwillingly our free society finds itself mortally challenged by the Soviet system. No other value system is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy ours, so capable of turning to its own uses the most dangerous and divisive trends in our own society, no other so skillfully and powerfully evokes the elements of irrationality in human nature everywhere, and no other has the support of a great and growing center of military power."¹³ Thus two months later, the incursion of North Korean troops across the 38th parallel marked a global showdown with Stalinist and Maoist Communism rather than a post-colonial civil war. And two years later, with that war turned into stalemate, the anti-Communist mobilization would rebound upon the Truman administration when presidential candidate Dwight Eisenhower accused the Democrats of "the negative, futile, and immoral policy of 'containment'."¹⁴

It could be contended that, for all its damaging virulence, the climate of fear had receded by 1954. In an extensive national survey conducted by Samuel Stouffer that year, less than one percent of Americans listed

Communism as their primary concern. In contrast, more than eighty percent cited “personal and family problems,” forty-three percent focusing on business or financial issues.¹⁵

That, however, is too simple a reading. If the Communist menace was no longer the explicit priority for most in the United States and if its most “extreme” proponents such as McCarthy had fallen from grace, the threat could always be invoked. Thus, when the Cold War moved beyond the European theater to “peripheries” such as Asia and Latin America, Chinese and Cuban evils were presented from White House press conferences to Hollywood films to weekly television series.¹⁶ The spectre of Communism would not be vanquished by military victory or by a recognition of its “realities” but by the collapse of political culture—at home and abroad—over Vietnam. Fear had not been met by a positive projection of “freedom” but by tensions and even contradictions in the representation of that freedom, embodied in the famous (perhaps apocryphal)

remark of an American officer in the aftermath of the Tet Offensive: “It became necessary to destroy this village in order to save it.”¹⁷

What relevance does this historical background have when, for some, our current dilemmas and challenges only began on 11 September 2001?

At one level, I would make the simplistic assertion that a society conditioned in part by the fear of the “other,” a fear re-stoked by Ronald Reagan’s declaration in 1982 of the American confrontation with an “evil empire,”¹⁸ did not put that fear to rest just because the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed. To the contrary, other villains had emerged before and during those supposedly climactic events—Iran’s “mullahs,” Nicaragua’s Sandinistas, Libya’s crazed Colonel Qaddafi in the mid-1980s, Panama’s Manuel Noriega in 1989, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein (complete with photographically altered Hitleresque moustache) in

1990.

More important, the worries that could be harnessed by the American executive were actually mobilized by those in authority. To be sure, this was not a process that was always consistent—another lengthy essay would be needed to explain how the Reagan administration was trying to sell aircraft parts and missiles to the same ayatollahs that they were publicly denouncing—but it was ever-present. And in 1992, in what I believe was an unprecedented effort, White House officials tried to link that mobilization to a new global strategy, specifically seeking a “preponderance of power” throughout the world. In a document called the Defence Planning Guidance, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz proposed that the administration’s “first objective is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival. This is a dominant consideration underlying the new regional defense strategy and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose

[A society conditioned in part by the fear of the “other,” a fear re-stoked by Ronald Reagan’s declaration in 1982 of the American confrontation with an “evil empire,”¹⁸ didn’t put that fear to rest just because the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed](#)

resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia.”¹⁹

Pursuit of the strategy was deferred because of the defeat of the first President Bush

by Bill Clinton, but it continued to color American political discourse. Former Government officials such as Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Elliot Abrams (many of whom would later re-emerge in the current Bush administration) pressed their case for an American quest for “preponderance of power” in think tanks and government commissions.²⁰ In one notable case, the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, chaired by Rumsfeld, dismissed intelligence from agencies like the CIA to declare that Iran, Iraq, and North Korea would

pose missile threats within the next five to ten years.²¹ Perhaps more important, the Clinton administration contributed to the ongoing projection of those threats with their identification of “rogue states.” Consider, for example, the words of National Security Advisor Anthony Lake in 1994:

Our policy must face the reality of recalcitrant and outlaw states that not only choose to remain outside the family but also assault its basic values. There are few “backlash” states: Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya. For now they lack the resources of a superpower, which would enable them to seriously threaten the democratic order being created around them. Nevertheless, their behavior is often aggressive and defiant. The ties between them are growing as they seek to thwart or quarantine themselves from a global trend to which they seem incapable of adapting.²²

None of this is to suggest that 9-11 was a mere incident in a chain of events dating back to the start of the Cold War. (And I hasten to add that I am not arguing that 9-11 was “manufactured” to implement a plan for American dominance.) That tragedy, however, was not the *ab initio* foundation for a new U.S. foreign policy or for a new construction of “fear” in American culture. Rather, it acted upon—indeed, served as a catalyst for—both government planning and the context in which that planning was projected and developed.

On 31 January 2001, less than two weeks after the inauguration of George W. Bush, the president’s National Security Council met for the first time. The lead item on the agenda was “Regime Change in Iraq.” Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld asked his colleagues to “imagine what the region would look like without Saddam and with a regime that is aligned with U.S. interests. It would change everything in the region and beyond. It would demonstrate what U.S. policy is all about.”²³ In effect, Iraq was going to be a demonstration case both of American power and the U.S. quest for preponderance in the

Middle East and beyond.

That quest was frustrated, in the short term, by other foreign policy issues and crises, such as the recurrence of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian dispute and the downing of an American reconnaissance plane by China in April 2001. The deferral of the quest did not mean, however, that the "threat" had dissipated. Saddam continued to be held up as a menace to regional stability, and U.S. warplanes periodically bombed Iraqi anti-aircraft positions. Other challenges to American "security" were ever-present, and indeed, in the aftermath of the incident with the U.S. spy plane, there was the prospect of a showdown with the Chinese.

September 11, of course, was more than an abstract threat. It was a far too real, unprecedented illustration of how terrorism could be waged on the U.S. mainland. Even more daunting, it was an act carried out not by an identifiable enemy state but by a trans-national organization with no clear center that could be attacked in response. So, on one level, the threat was met with the imagery of a "War on Terror": the posters of Osama bin Laden "Wanted Dead or Alive" and photographs of his acolytes, the institution of a color-coded measure of the level of danger, the declarations that these enemies "follow in the path of fascism, Nazism and totalitarianism."²⁴ At another, however, the challenge had to be made tangible by giving the United States someone or something to attack – in this case, the Taliban regime of Afghanistan that was allegedly giving shelter to bin Laden.

But September 11 was far more than a manifestation of how "fear" would be met by an ongoing battle for "security." What it offered to the Bush administration, tragically, was the opportunity to re-frame that battle in the service of its long-term foreign policy goals. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice asked her staff, "How do we capitalize on these opportunities [presented by 9-11]?"²⁵ Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld offered the answer in instructions to his staff: "Best info fast. Judge whether good enough hit S.H. [Saddam Hussein] at same time. Not only UBL [Osama

bin Laden]. Go massive. Sweep it all up. Things related and not."²⁶ While Bush and his advisors deferred an immediate attack on Iraq, which some in the administration supported, notably Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, the president made it clear that "if we could prove that we could be successful in [the Afghanistan] theater, then the rest of the task would be easier."²⁷

This is not to deny that the upsurge in fear, accompanied by grief, anger, and displays of patriotism, was not heartfelt. The government, however, did not stand aside from or merely provide support for those emotions. As in the Cold War, plans to vanquish the "enemy" had to contend with, and try to defer if not resolve, tensions and contradictions raised by their implementation.

Consider, for example, the "Campaign for Freedom" of the Advertising Council – the non-profit service organisation through which ad agencies produce government campaigns. In one television spot, a young man attempts to check out a book from a local library. His request is not only met by hostility by the librarian; as he turns, with some trepidation, from the counter, he is met by two dark-suited gentlemen who escort him from the building. Those who saw the commercial, run through the autumn and winter of 2001-02, may have been unaware of the irony that at that time the FBI was demanding that librarians hand over lists of readers who had checked out books on subjects such as Islam (or that more than 1,000 people in the United States had been detained without charge after 9-11).²⁸

Consider, in the "foreign policy" complement to this domestic projection, the mistaken but persistent linkage of Saddam Hussein with Al Qa'eda and 9-11 by a majority of the American public and the encouragement of that linkage by government statements, including those by President Bush.²⁹ Consider the "public diplomacy" effort in which, as Vice President Cheney was proposing to Tony Blair in March 2002 that planning move from Afghanistan towards an invasion of Iraq, his wife was opening at the Museum of

London an exhibit of twenty-eight photographs of 9-11's "Ground Zero" by Joel Meyerowitz. (To heighten the message, the photographs were displayed in the room next to the permanent exhibit on the Blitz of World War II.)³⁰

We are, at the time of this writing, entering the fifth year of the war in Iraq. It can easily be argued that, far from fulfilling the global blueprint set out by the Bush administration with the president standing on U.S. warships declaring, "Mission Accomplished,"³¹ the venture has clearly marked the downfall of the quest for a "preponderance of power." Perhaps more provocatively, it could be contended that there has been an assimilation of "fear" similar to that of the mid-1950s, a duality holding together spectres of the fear of the "other" with the immediately relevant challenges of family, finance, and well-being. The threat level continuously scrolls at "Elevated: Orange" on Fox's news ticker, hundreds of detainees remain in Camp X-Ray and other prisons around the world, Osama bin Laden sits (probably in the northwest frontier of Pakistan) beyond the reach of American forces, and Saddam's execution fades before everyday terror, political turmoil, and civil war in Iraq. If you can forgive a personal assertion for this point, my mother may send me e-mails such as the one that I used to open this essay, but her concerns – and those of my father, my sisters, and other relatives in the United States – are usually far removed from the purported "clash of civilisations."

However, as with the Cold War, fear may be re-mobilized against new enemies or old enemies restored. It remains to be seen whether the current denunciations of Iran will lead to military action or whether we have reached a "tipping point" where the images cannot be translated into another campaign. It remains to be seen whether another theater of conflict – for example, Israel/Palestine or Israel/Lebanon – becomes a stage for wider intervention, whether there is a re-configuration of the old tensions with Russia or China, or whether another unexpected "terrorist" atrocity turns the international kaleidoscope once more. For, unlike the Cold War,

there is no symbolic marker – no fall of the Wall, no end to an enemy system such as Communism – that can offer long-term absolution of the fear that has been cultivated in past generations and, in particular, in the first years of this century.

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Notes:

1. John Mueller, *Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them* (New York, 2006).
2. The letter was purportedly written by a Ms. Pam Foster to a family member in Iraq. The actual author was Doug Patton, identified on the Internet as a former speechwriter for Republican candidates. It originally appeared on the website www.gopusa.com on 6 June 2005 and can be seen in its entirety at <http://www.americandaily.com/article/8987>.
3. See Joseph Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (New York, 1955).
4. Truman speech to Congress, 12 March 1947, transcript at The Avalon Project, Yale Law School, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/trudoc.htm>.
5. For one provocative examination of the concept, see Barry Glassner, *The Culture of Fear: Why Americans are Afraid of the Wrong Things* (New York, 1999).
6. A copy of the speech is at History Matters, <http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/6456>.
7. For an excellent and still relevant study of the Truman Administration and anti-Communism, see Richard Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism* (New York, 1971).
8. Executive Order 9835, 21 March 1947, reprinted at <http://tucnak.fsv.cuni.cz/~calda/Documents/1940s/Truman%20Loyalty%20Act,%201947.html>.
9. Truman address to the Friendly Sons of St. Patrick, New York City, 17 March 1948, transcript at <http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1452>.
10. NSC 20/4, "U.S. Objectives with Respect to the USSR to Counter Soviet Threats to U.S. Security," 23 November 1948, reprinted at <http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/coldwar/nsc20-4.htm>.
11. NSC 68, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 14 April 1950, reprinted at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm>.
12. Truman speech to American Society of Newspaper Editors, 20 April 1950, cited in "Truth as a Weapon in Cold War," *The Times* (London), 21 April 1950. See also "Man of the World," *Time*, 1 May 1950, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,812295,00.html>.
13. NSC 68, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," 14 April 1950, reprinted at <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68.htm>.
14. 1952 Republican Party platform, reprinted at The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=R1952>.

15. Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (New York, 1992 [1954]).
16. See, for example, J. Fred MacDonald, *Television and the Red Menace* (New York, 1985).
17. See, for example, "Beginning of the End," *Time* (8 November 1971), <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,877412-2,00.html>.
18. Reagan speech to British House of Commons, 8 June 1982, transcript at http://www.cfif.org/htdocs/freedomline/current/america/ronald_reagan_evil_empire.htm.
19. Defense Planning Guidance, 1992, excerpts at Public Broadcasting System, *Frontline: The War Behind Closed Doors*, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html>.
20. For one now well-known example, see the documents of the Project for a New American Century at: <http://www.newamericancentury.org>.
21. Executive Summary, Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, July 15, 1998, reprinted at <http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/missile/rumsfeld/>.
22. Anthony Lake, "Confronting Backlash States," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 1994), <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19940301faessay5095/anthony-lake/confronting-backlash-states.html>.
23. Quoted in Ron Suskind, *The Price of Loyalty: George W. Bush, The White House, and the Education of Paul O'Neill* (New York, 2004).
24. Bush speech to Congress, 21 September 2001, transcript at <http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript>.
25. Quoted in Nicholas Lemann, "The Next

- World Order," *The New Yorker* (1 April 2002).
26. "Plans for Attack Began on 9/11," CBS News, 4 September 2002, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/04/september11/main520830.shtml>.
27. Quoted in Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, 84.
28. The "Campaign for Freedom" no longer survives on the Advertising Council's website (www.adcouncil.org), although a related campaign, "I am an American," can be found at <http://www.adcouncil.org/default.aspx?id=61>. A good summary of the Campaign for Freedom, including the contradictions of the "Library" spot, is in Peter Norman, "The Ad Council's Campaign for Freedom," *Flak Magazine* (9 July 2002), <http://www.flakmag.com/tv/freedom.html>. On the detentions after 11 September, see Andrew Gumbel, "US Detaining Foreign Nationals Without Charge and Legal Advice," *The Independent* (12 November 2001), <http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/article143675.ece>.
29. Consider, for example, Bush's speech of 1 May 2003: "The battle of Iraq is one victory in a war on terror that began on September the 11th, 2001." [Transcript at <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/US/05/01/bush.transcript>.] Two years after 9-11, almost 70 percent of Americans still believed that "Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the Sept. 11 attacks." [Associated Press, 7 September 2003, quoted in "69% of Americans Believe Saddam Linked to 9/11: Poll", *Arab News* (7 September 2003), <http://www.arabnews.com/page=4§ion=0&article=31530&d=7&m=9&y=2003>.]
30. The photographs are exhibited at "After September 11: Images from Ground Zero," <http://www.911exhibit.state.gov>.

Fulbright Scholar Program for US Faculty and Professionals

The Fulbright Scholar Program is offering 89 lecturing, research or combined lecturing/research awards in American history during the 2009-2010 academic year, including awards in diplomatic history in Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, and Malaysia. U.S. Fulbright Scholars in over 130 countries around the world enjoy an experience of a lifetime, gaining a broad cultural perspective on their academic disciplines and connecting with colleagues at institutions around the globe.

Awards range from two months to an academic year. Faculty and professionals in American history may apply for awards specifically in their field or for one of the many "All Discipline" awards open to any field. Grants are awarded to faculty of all academic ranks, including adjunct and emeritus. In most countries lecturing is in English, though awards in Latin America, Francophone Africa, and the Middle East may require proficiency in another language.

The application deadline for Fulbright traditional lecturing and research grants worldwide is August 1, 2008. U.S. citizenship is required. For other eligibility requirements, detailed award descriptions, and an application, visit our website at www.cies.org, or send a request for materials to apprequest@cies.iie.org.

Primary Source Materials on Foreign Policy Issues at the John Glenn Archives, The Ohio State University

The John Glenn Archives located at The Ohio State University contains a substantial amount of previously untapped primary source materials on American foreign policy issues dating from the 1970s to the 1990s. First elected in 1974, John Glenn (D-OH) served in the U.S. Senate for twenty-four years, retiring in January 1999 at the end of his fourth term in office. During his time in office, Glenn's personal legislative interests and his committee assignments combined to place him in the forefront on such policy issues as nuclear non-proliferation, the use of chemical and biological weapons, arms control, and relations with the former Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China, Taiwan, and other countries in Southeast Asia.

In his first year in the Senate, John Glenn obtained assignments on the Government Operations Committee and the Interior and Insular Affairs Committee. He served on the Energy Research and Water Resources Subcommittee of the latter, and, following the reorganization of Senate committees in 1977, he chaired the Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Federal Services Subcommittee of the newly formed Governmental Affairs Committee. Glenn used his position as chairman of this subcommittee to introduce legislation to oppose the spread of nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 proved to be the first of six major pieces of legislation on nuclear non-proliferation that Glenn introduced during his career in the Senate. As chairman of the Governmental Affairs Committee from 1986 to 1995, Glenn published a newsletter on the spread of nuclear weapons, focusing especially on India and Pakistan.

In 1978, Glenn became a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and obtained the chairmanship of the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee. As chairman of this subcommittee, Glenn formulated, introduced, and helped pass the Taiwan Enabling Act of 1979. This legislation established the basis for continued relations between the United States and Taiwan in the wake of the recognition by the United States of the People's Republic of China.

During the Carter administration, Glenn opposed the SALT II Treaty due to doubts over America's technological capabilities to monitor and verify Soviet compliance with some of the treaty's provisions. In 1985, Glenn resigned his membership in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to take a place on the Senate Armed Services Committee. As a member of this committee Glenn became a leading opponent of deployment of both the Strategic Defense Initiative and the MX missile. He also cosponsored legislation to halt production of the B-2 Bomber, favoring instead the proven technology of the B-1 Bomber. Glenn became a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 1989, a position he retained until his retirement in 1999.

In keeping with his committee assignments Glenn took numerous fact-finding trips to foreign countries and attended various national and international conferences pertaining to foreign relations and arms control. These trips included the Shimoda Conference on Japanese-U.S. relations in 1977 and the Pacific Dialogue Conference at Penang, Malaysia in 1994. From 1989 through 1995, Glenn was a regular attendee of the Wehrkunde Conferences on arms control, NATO, and European security held in Munich, Germany. He also attended conferences on U.S.-Russian relations sponsored by the Aspen Institute in 1996 and 1997.

Materials documenting Glenn's activities in regards to foreign policy issues are located in a number of record series and sub-series of the John Glenn Archives. A detailed guide to the collection is located on-line at <http://library.osu.edu/sites/archives/glenn/glenn.php>.

Specifically, many foreign policy documents are found in the JHG's Office Files Sub-series and the Foreign Trips Sub-series of the Personal/Political Series. Within the JHG's Office Files Sub-series are two sets of subject files kept by Glenn's personal secretaries. The 1975 to 1984 set of files includes documentation on the sale of AWAC aircraft to Iran and Saudi Arabia, China-Taiwan relations, the MX missile, and the SALT II Treaty. Also included are numerous files pertaining to the energy crisis of the 1970s, nuclear non-proliferation, arms control matters, the nuclear freeze movement of the early 1980s, and the sale of nuclear fuel to India and Pakistan. Additional records on nuclear non-proliferation are located within the 1984 to 1998 set of subject files, as are materials pertaining to weapons procurement by the Department of Defense.

Included in the Foreign Trips Sub-series are the records of trips Glenn made to the People's Republic of China in 1976, 1979, 1981, 1994 and 1996. He also traveled to the Soviet Union in 1978, 1990 and 1994 and made trips to the Middle East or the Persian Gulf region in 1976, 1982, 1987, 1990 and 1991. Records kept from these trips include Glenn's personal notes, memoranda, correspondence, briefing books, and background materials.

Further information on these records is located in the scope and content notes for the sub-series available on-line at <http://library.osu.edu/sites/archives/glenn/collection/senate/senatepapers.htm>. A browse link on the scope and content note provides a listing of folder headings within each record box.

Other materials pertaining to foreign relations, especially on nuclear non-proliferation and arms control, are located within the Committee Files of the Legislative Series. The files contain a variety of reports, studies, background materials, correspondence, memoranda, and briefing books. Additional documents are found within of the papers of Patricia Buckheit, Donald Mitchell and Laura Beers located within the Legislative Aides Sub-series.

Scope and content notes for these record sub-series, along with browse links to folder heading listings, are available on-line at <http://library.osu.edu/sites/archives/glenn/collection/senate/senatepapers2.htm>.

All of the records listed above are available for public research in the reading room of the Ohio State University Archives Building located at 2700 Kenny Road in Columbus, Ohio. Reading room hours are from 9 a.m.-12 p.m. and 1-4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday. Although not required, it is highly recommended that researchers make an appointment to use the collection. To make an appointment or to obtain further information about the John Glenn Archives, contact Jeff Thomas at 614 688-8429 or Thomas.1082@osu.edu.

Jeff Thomas is the John Glenn Archivist at the Ohio State University

The 2007 State Department Conference on Détente and the Release of *U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Era of Détente, 1969-1976*

Amy Garrett*

The historians of the State Department are uniquely situated to bring together respected scholars of diplomatic history and the diplomats they study, and they have done so at annual conferences since 2003. One of the most recent conferences hosted by the Office of the Historian of the Department of State was held at the new George C. Marshall conference facility on October 22 and 23, 2007. It brought together practicing diplomats, former diplomats, and scholars for a discussion of détente, the negotiations that led up to it, its implementation, and the global implications of this crucial episode in Cold War history. The conference coincided with the precedent-setting release of *Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969-1972*, a volume of U.S. and Soviet documents produced jointly by the Office of the Historian and the History and Records Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which published a matching volume in Russian. This project marks the culmination of the first joint publication effort between the Office of the Historian and the history office of another government.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, a scholar of the Soviet era in her own right, delivered the conference's keynote address before an audience that included the current Russian ambassador to the United States, Yuri Ushakov, and four other Russian diplomats. She discussed current issues in U.S.-Russian relations as well as the historical context for contemporary events, and she emphasized that in order to understand present-day relations

between the United States and Russia, it is necessary to appreciate the complex relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War and their "shared history in common terms." Commending Henry Kissinger and Anatoly Dobrynin for establishing the back channel through which détente negotiations were conducted, she directly attributed several factors that led to the eventual end of the Cold War to decisions that were made during the Nixon administration. She also pointed out that the United States and Russia have several common interests now, including intelligence-sharing and non-proliferation, but also several significant differences. In particular, she stressed the need for Russia to strive to preserve independent democratic institutions. The secretary concluded her comments by emphasizing that "what history teaches us is that it is possible for the United States and Russia to disagree, even to disagree vehemently, but not to let our differences destroy the positive work that we can, and must, do together." And finally, she encouraged scholars to continue working toward explaining the shared past and congratulated them for encouraging the international scholarly dialogue necessary to do so.

Following Rice's speech, the conference proceedings began with a panel of former officials who had been directly involved in shaping the events of the détente era. These panelists included former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger. (Former Secretary of State Alexander Haig had been scheduled to participate

but was unable to attend.) Kissinger and Schlesinger commented on their roles in shaping détente from 1969 to 1976 and on the broader scope of U.S. foreign relations during those years. According to Kissinger, the concept of détente grew out of a commitment on the part of the Nixon administration to achieving "peaceful resolutions of disputes." Kissinger also attributed the establishment of the confidential Kissinger-Dobrynin channel to President Nixon, who wished to run foreign policy more directly from the White House. The channel was established, he said, after careful consideration of various alternatives, and it operated very efficiently until its existence became known to the wider Washington bureaucracy, at about the time he became secretary of state.

In Kissinger's opinion, one of the most valuable functions of the channel was that it allowed him to present issues in the abstract to Ambassador Dobrynin before discussing specific agreements. The two men thus developed a better understanding of each other's perceptions, limitations, and requirements before it came time to engage in concrete negotiations. In Kissinger's view, this manner of communicating enabled them to reach a number of lasting agreements, including the strategic arms limitation agreement, arrangements on access to Berlin, and the establishment of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).

Schlesinger agreed that the channel had been an effective tool, but not having been privy to it himself, he spoke mostly on the matters that occupied his time as Director of

Central Intelligence and Secretary of Defense during the détente years. His greatest concern during the early years of the détente negotiations was managing what he called “the arms issue”: that is, “the growth of a Soviet counter-deterrent to America’s strategic forces and what that might imply about America’s credibility for extended deterrence protecting our allies in Europe.” The United States was troubled by the perception, particularly among its European allies, that the Soviets had achieved total conventional arms dominance and were moving toward nuclear parity. Compounding the problem was the Vietnam War, which Schlesinger believed had diminished the status of the U.S. military in the Europeans’ eyes. Western Europeans were especially worried because they had based their own strategy on the belief that U.S. nuclear forces provided a sufficient deterrent to any Soviet maneuver against the West. To allay their concerns Schlesinger announced a change of nuclear strategy in 1972, affirming that the United States would indeed use strategic forces against the Soviets but would avoid cities and would still seek to maintain communications with the Soviets.

For Schlesinger, the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 was an important turning point. In his view, even though the European allies disapproved of the U.S. airlift to Israel, its success was instrumental in changing their view of U.S. military strength. With this action, Schlesinger opined, “the squeamishness that many of our allies had had to that point began to disappear in that they recognized that the United States was quite capable of effective action despite their European [*sic*] misgivings about Vietnam.” Schlesinger also made an effort to boost the Europeans’ confidence in the United States by taking a harder line in détente negotiations. To preserve effective counter-deterrence in Europe, he revised his position that any agreements involving Soviet and U.S. forces should result in fair and equal drawbacks in relative terms and declared that the United States would deploy the large throw-weight MX missile if the Soviets continued to introduce new missiles and increase

their throw-weight.

The two former secretaries responded to questions from the audience on issues relating to détente. These questions addressed a wide range of subjects, including the relationship between détente and the opening of relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, changing policies from the Nixon to the Ford administrations, how the channel facilitated Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, global issues such as human rights, and missed opportunities during the détente years.

After the comments and discussion by Kissinger and Schlesinger, the conference turned to an examination of U.S. and Soviet documentary sources from the détente period. The focus was on the recently published volume of documents compiled by historians from the U.S. Department of State and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which provides unprecedented insight into Soviet-American relations during the détente years. Published in both the United States and Russia with complete translations of all documents, the collection in many cases puts U.S. and Russian versions of the same conversation side by side and thus offers an unparalleled opportunity for students of diplomatic history to compare and contrast two different versions of the same meetings at a pivotal point in the Cold War.

The thousand-page English edition presents accounts of meetings between then Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin as they developed a confidential channel for negotiations. It includes reports made by Kissinger and Dobrynin to their respective heads of state, instructions from President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev to their deputies, and a wealth of other official documents from the years leading up to the Nixon-Brezhnev Moscow Summit in 1972. The volume also includes forewords by Kissinger and Dobrynin in which they reflect upon the creation of the channel and its influence on U.S.–Soviet relations. Although many of Kissinger’s

memoranda were declassified in 2002, Dobrynin’s reports were, until the release of this volume, sealed in the Russian archives.

Dr. Marc J. Susser, the historian of the Department of State, and Ambassador Konstantin Provalov, the chief of the History and Records Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, introduced the collection of documents and discussed the process by which the volume was created. Their remarks were followed by comments from a panel of academic experts on this period, including Robert Schulzinger (University of Colorado at Boulder), Jeremi Suri (University of Wisconsin-Madison), and Vladislav Zubok (Temple University). These scholars commented on the importance of détente and on this volume’s contribution to the study of U.S.–Soviet relations.

On the second day, the conference turned to academic analyses of U.S.–Soviet relations during the Nixon and Ford administrations. A dozen scholars from around the world gathered to address détente from a variety of perspectives. In a panel chaired by Thomas Schwartz (Vanderbilt University), Douglas Selvage (Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University) and David Geyer (Office of the Historian, Department of State) discussed the impact of détente on Eastern Europe and offered observations about documenting the confidential channel, while Stephen Twigge (United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office) spoke specifically on Operation Hullabaloo, the secretive collaboration between the United States and Great Britain to conclude an agreement with the Soviets regarding the non-use of nuclear weapons.

Bernd Schaefer (German Historical Institute/Woodrow Wilson Center) led a session that addressed other regional issues. This panel included a paper by Effie Pedaliu (University of West England-Bristol) on the impact of détente in the Mediterranean and a presentation by Lorenz Lüthi (McGill University) on how Vietnam affected U.S.–Soviet relations and U.S.–Sino rapprochement. Angela Romano (University of Florence) presented her

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research on the role that the Helsinki CSCE played in U.S.-Soviet relations during these years.

Another panel, chaired by David Engerman (Brandeis University), explored the domestic contexts of détente in both the United States and the Soviet Union. Dan Caldwell (Pepperdine University) discussed elements of Nixon and Kissinger's grand design, their attempts to win public and congressional support, and the extent to which the Nixon administration was successful in legitimizing its foreign policy framework. Andrey Edemskiy (Slavic Studies Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences) submitted a paper that sought to account for Soviet public opinion regarding détente, and Julian Zelizer (Princeton University) spoke on the efforts of Nixon and Ford to foster a centrist national security policy, which ultimately faced resistance from neoconservatives and hawkish Republicans. The resulting bifurcation of the Republican party, Zelizer concluded, contributed to the failure of the Nixon and Ford administrations to create a centrist political majority at home and ultimately paved the way for the success of a right-wing national security policy by the late 1970s.

The final panel of the conference, chaired by Christian Ostermann (Woodrow Wilson Center), examined détente through literature, science, and human rights. Kathleen Parthé (University of Rochester) presented her findings on the efforts of the American intellectual community to attract public attention to the Soviet government's treatment of

nonconforming writers and to use the American scholars' assessments as a measure of the political atmosphere in the Soviet Union. Shelley Hurt (Vassar College) presented a paper in which she argued that the strategic significance of biological advances in the 1970s played a significant role in encouraging détente between the superpowers, while Michael Morgan (Yale University) examined the role of human rights in the negotiation of the Helsinki Final Act.

Overall, the conference received positive attention from the media and the public. Many of the panels attracted more than 250 people. The conference also received significant attention from both U.S. and international media. Several U.S. networks sent camera crews, including CNN, C-Span, the Voice of America, and the Associated Press. A number of television stations in Russia and the former Soviet republics also provided video coverage. C-Span broadcast repeated showings of the first morning's proceedings. In addition, print journalists representing newspapers and journals in the United States, Russia, Europe, and Latin America attended and reported on the conference.

Members of the current foreign policy making community also showed great interest in the conference and in the official release of the détente volume. The Office of the Historian worked closely with staff from the offices of the secretary of state and the under secretary of state for political affairs, as well as the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, in planning this event. Under

Secretary of State for Political Affairs R. Nicholas Burns hosted a luncheon honoring Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger. Ambassador Burns offered some brief comments on his own assessment of U.S.-Russian relations to the luncheon guests, among them the two former secretaries, Archivist of the United States Allen Weinstein, Ambassador Ushakov, other members of the Russian diplomatic corps, and conference panelists.

The conference on U.S.-Soviet relations was the most recent in a series of annual meetings that the Office of the Historian began hosting several years ago. The 2006 conference focused on U.S.-Chinese relations during the 1970s, tracing the opening of diplomatic relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China from Kissinger's secret visit in 1971 to full normalization in 1979. Other conferences have examined U.S. policies in South Asia from 1961 to 1972; U.S. relations with the Middle East, with a focus on the Arab-Israeli War of 1967; and U.S.-Latin American relations with particular attention to the coup in Guatemala in 1954. In an effort to bring academic and government historians together to address issues of common interest, the Office of the Historian has timed each conference to coincide with the publication of corresponding documents in the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* series, which it compiles (with oversight from the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation) under the mandate of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1991. Transcripts and video from the two most recent conferences are currently available on the website of the Office of the Historian at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/>, and more conference materials will be made available in the months to come.

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*The views expressed in this essay are the author's own and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of State or the U.S. government.

SHA FR Council Meeting
Friday, January 4, 2008

12:15-1:45

Committee Room, Omni Shoreham
Washington, DC

Present: James Banner, Frank Costigliola, Craig Daigle, Catherine Forslund, Peter Hahn, Richard Immerman, Andrew Johns, Mark Lawrence, William Roger Louis, James Matray, Kenneth Osgood, Meredith Oyen, Stephen Rabe, Chapin Rydingsward, Thomas Schwartz (presiding), Amy Sayward, Randall Woods, Thomas Zeiler

Business Items

1. Announcements

Thomas Schwartz expressed his desire to focus on two particular issues during his presidency. First, he plans to promote the further internationalization of SHA FR and to encourage membership in currently under represented countries. Second, he hopes to develop the Society's relationship with students across the field and in doing so take advantage of the recent upsurge of interest in foreign relations history.

2. Recap of motions passed by e-mail vote

Schwartz reported for the record that since its last meeting Council had approved via e-mail the following motions:

- 1) Resolution congratulating Michael Hogan on his recent appointment as President of the University of Connecticut.
- 2) Expenditure of \$2,500 to host the graduate student breakfast at the upcoming OAH conference.

3. Motion to accept 2007 financial report

Hahn presented the 2007 financial report in writing and orally. He highlighted generous contributions to the Divine and Hogan Funds, the new level of subsidy to the *Diplomatic History* office, the expenditure of \$35,000 on Bemis fellowships, the transfer of the same amount from the General Endowment to the checking account to cover that expenditure, the record-high publisher subsidy (which included a sizeable contract signing bonus). He noted that the Society finished the year with a net gain of \$11,000 in operating funds. Hahn invited Council members to examine the detailed written report and forward to him any questions or corrections.

Hahn noted that in 2007 the Bernath Endowment grew by 7.6% and the General Endowment by 1.4%. The smaller rate of growth in the General resulted from the \$35,000 withdrawal to cover the Bemis grants.

In discussing the named prize accounts, Hahn asked for Council's direction in deciding if the projected growth of the individual prize funds should be calculated based on general endowment growth after deducting the annual Bemis funds. The other option would be to inflate the rates of growth by assuming the absence of the annual Bemis withdrawal. Woods moved to allow Hahn to determine the best way to proceed in this matter. The motion passed unanimously.

4. Motion to set disbursement amount for Bemis Research Grants in 2008

Matray noted that last year Council allocated 20 percent of the General Endowment growth for the Bemis Research Grants, which amounted to \$35,000. It was stated that if Council allocates 20 percent this year, the Bemis Grants would be reduced to \$20,000.

Matray explained that Council could maintain the grant allocation at 20 percent in the coming year but that he would also support increasing it to 30 percent. He emphasized the importance of maintaining SHA FR's financial commitment to graduate student and junior faculty research.

Immerman suggested that Council allocate Bemis money this year on a basis independent from endowment growth. He also advised against reducing funds in 2008. Costigliola supported Immerman's suggestion. Matray advocated publicizing the Bemis grants more widely. Woods agreed and suggested that advertisements highlight the high success rate of Bemis applicants. Costigliola proposed advertising in the *OAH Newsletter* and/or in *Perspectives*.

Immerman motioned to authorize \$35,000 for the Bemis Research grants this year with the proviso that Council devise a more permanent solution when it meets in June. The motion passed unanimously.

5. Compensation for *Passport* editor

Schwartz introduced a motion to provide a \$3,000 annual stipend to the editor of *Passport*. He stated that the current editor's dedication and hard work have greatly improved the publication. Immerman and Osgood also attested to Lerner's solid contribution. The motion passed unanimously.

6. Management of new initiatives

1. Dividing graduate student fellowships

Hahn explained that Council had previously approved \$30,000 for two Dissertation Completion Fellowships. The fellowship selection committee, in launching the program, studied various issues and became concerned that the funds are insufficient to cover the tuition, healthcare, and living expenses of an ABD graduate student. Discussion ensued regarding the many variables determining the cost of tuition and living expenses of a non-teaching ABD graduate student.

Costigliola moved to increase funds to \$40,000 in order to support two \$20,000 graduate fellowships. The motion passed unanimously.

2. Recruitment of web-master and director of secondary education

Schwartz announced that recruitment for a web-master and director of secondary education will begin shortly. In accordance with Council's decision last June, an annual stipend will be attached to each position. Schwartz emphasized that the two posts are intended to elevate SHAFR's profile and organizational growth.

3. National History Center

Immerman introduced William Roger Louis and Jim Banner who were in attendance to make a request on behalf of the National History Center (NHC).

Louis described the origins of the NHC and its current situation. It was described as an independent institution that seeks to promote research, teaching, and learning in all fields of history. It originated from the idea that there ought to be a national history center in Washington, DC to provide a physical space for the AHA and other historical organizations to exchange ideas and to help historians reach out to a broader audience. The NHC is also intended to shape the public discourse by providing the historical context necessary to understand contemporary events.

Louis described various NHC projects, including the Decolonization Seminar, the *Reinterpreting History* series, and a project examining why historians have not proven successful as public figures shaping governmental policy.

Louis highlighted two other programs which he hoped SHAFR would support financially: the Congressional Briefings Project and a joint lecture series with the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR).

Louis explained that Congressional Briefings are designed to provide historical context and perspective on current issues for policy makers and members of their staff. The speakers focus on historical events and developments that influence current policies. Previous briefings have included a session on U.S. domestic race relations headed by John Hope Franklin and Eric Foner and one on the history of social security led by Edward Berkowitz and Alice Kessler-Harris. Louis indicated that a briefing on Pakistan might be approved in the near future.

The NHC has also entered into a partnership with the Council on Foreign Relations in support of a biannual lecture series in which historians discuss foreign relations topics. Louis spoke of the importance of such events, including a lecture by Ernest May on surprise attacks in U.S. history.

In conclusion, Louis requested that SHAFR provide the NHC with \$10,000 annually for the next three years. He explained that the funds would be split equally in support of the Congressional Briefings and the CFR lecture series. He stated that SHAFR's support would be recognized at both venues.

In response to questions about governance of the NHC, Louis answered that a six member steering committee, one third of whom are named by the AHA and two-thirds of whom are chosen by the AHA appointees, made decisions. In reply to a question about the spending on the CFR lecture series, Louis explained that the total cost of organizing each lecture is \$10,000 split equally between the CFR and the NHC. In reply to a question about whether a SHAFR member could be placed on the NHC steering committee, Louis and Banner answered affirmatively. In reply to a question, Louis stated that there are currently three congressional briefings per year and that the NHC hopes to increase that number to five. It was suggested that the NHC produce an article for publication in *Perspectives* or *Passport*. Louis and Banner expressed willingness to consider writing such an article.

Louis and Banner left the room.

Schwartz began discussion stating that the steering committee will empower the endowment committee to devise a procedural policy to deal with future requests for funding.

Immerman noted that the NHC funding request was proposed several months ago to the steering committee, which after much consideration accepted a resolution to support the NHC at a rate between \$5,000 and \$10,000 annually.

A vigorous debate ensued regarding the merits of the NHC, the nature of its request and the degree to which SHAFR's mission might be further advanced in supporting the two proposed programs.

After much discussion, Costigliola motioned that Council provide the NHC with \$5,000 for one year with the proviso that all the funds go to support the Congressional Briefings. Osgood introduced an amendment stating that SHAFR should have a part in determining how the money is spent.

The amended motion passed unanimously.

Reports

7. Diplomatic History

Zeiler was happy to report that *Diplomatic History* had a fine year. He reported that there were just over 100 submissions and the

acceptance rate was 17 percent. A special issue on the environment edited by Kurk Dorsey is one of several topical issues anticipated for the near future. Others special issues will include one on biography edited by Frank Costigliola and one on the end of the Cold War edited by Jeff Engel. A special issue focusing on U.S. troop withdrawals is currently being considered.

8. Electronic version of the *Guide*

Zeiler stated that a full report on the electronic version of the *Guide* has been issued and distributed to Council.

9. 2008 annual meeting

Sayward reported that the 2008 program committee will meet on January 5. She noted that there have been 58 panels proposed for 48 slots. Panels focusing on early U.S. history are up from previous years. The committee is currently organizing the plenary sessions but suggested that Council consider having the President determine the topic and composition of the Friday session given the relatively late appointment of the program committee. Staples also suggested that the electronic version of conference program contain links to panel abstracts.

10. 2009 annual meeting (Thomas Schwartz, 5 minutes)

Schwartz announced that SHAFR's 2009 annual conference will be held on June 25-28 at the Fairview Park Marriott in Falls Church, Virginia. A local arrangements committee will be put together in the near future.

11. Bernath Dissertation Grant and Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship

Johns announced that the Bernath Dissertation Grant was awarded to Jennifer Miller and the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship to Min Song. It was noted that the number of applicants remained consistent with previous years. Johns also suggested that the deadline for the Bernath Dissertation Grant be moved back from November 15 to October 15.

Other Business

12. Resolutions of thanks to retiring Council members

Schwartz introduced a resolution thanking former Council members Mark Stoler, Anna Nelson, and Fred Logevall for their valuable service. The resolution passed unanimously.

13. Announcements and other business

Hahn announced that he will schedule a three-hour Council meeting in Columbus on Thursday morning, June 26.

The meeting adjourned at 1:45pm.

Respectfully submitted,

Peter L. Hahn

Executive Director

PLH/cr



The Diplomatic Pouch

1. Personal and Professional Notes

Stephen G. Rabe has been named University Professor of History at the University of Texas at Dallas.

2. Research Notes

The INF Treaty and the Washington Summit: 20 Years Later

Previously secret Soviet Politburo records and declassified American transcripts of the Washington summit between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev 20 years ago show that Gorbachev was willing to go much further than the Americans expected—or were able to reciprocate—regarding arms cuts and resolving regional conflicts, according to documents posted by the National Security Archive at George Washington University. The posting includes the internal Soviet deliberations leading up to the summit, full transcripts of the two leaders' discussions, the Soviet record of negotiations with top American diplomats, and other historic records being published for the first time. The documents show that the Soviet Union made significant changes to its initial position to accommodate the U.S. demands, beginning with "untying the package" of strategic arms, missile defense, and INF in February 1987 and then agreeing to eliminate its newly deployed OKA/SS-23 missiles, while pressing the U.S. leadership to agree on substantial reductions of strategic nuclear weapons. Gorbachev's goal was to prepare and sign the START Treaty on the basis of 50 percent reductions of strategic offensive weapons in 1988 before the Reagan administration left office. In the course of negotiations, the Soviet Union also proposed cutting conventional forces in Europe by 25 percent and starting negotiations to eliminate chemical weapons.

The documents also detail Gorbachev's desire for genuine collaboration with the U.S. in resolving regional conflicts, especially the Iran-Iraq War, Afghanistan, the Middle East, and Nicaragua. However, the documents show that the U.S. side was unwilling and unable to pursue many of the Soviet initiatives at the time due to political struggles within the Reagan administration. Reading these documents one gets a visceral sense of missed opportunities for achieving even deeper cuts in nuclear arsenals, resolving regional conflicts, and ending the Cold War even earlier.

For more information, visit the web site of the National Security Archive at: <http://www.nsarchive.org>



Fujimori on Trial: Secret DIA Intelligence Cable Ties Former President to Summary Executions

The National Security Archive has posted a declassified Defense Intelligence Agency cable tying former President Alberto Fujimori directly to the executions of unarmed rebels who had surrendered after the seizure of the residence of the Japanese Ambassador in 1997. "President Fujimori issued the order to 'take no prisoners,'" states the secret "roger channel" intelligence cable. "Because of this even MRTA [Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement members] who were taken alive did not survive the rescue operation."

The new DIA cable was released on the Archive web site along with other declassified documents that shed light on human rights crimes under Fujimori's government, his close ties to his intelligence chieftain, Vladimiro Montecinos, and the two cases for which the imprisoned former president is being prosecuted: the death squad kidnapping and disappearance of nine students and one professor at La Cantuta University in July 1992, and the massacre of a group of 15 leftists and an eight-year-old child during a neighborhood community barbeque in Barrios Altos in November 1991.

The documents were obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by analysts at the Archive's Peru Documentation Project. The project has provided declassified evidence drawn from U.S. records to Peruvian human rights advocates and officials for over a decade.

For more information, visit the web site of the National Security Archive at: <http://www.nsarchive.org>



Rendition in the Southern Cone: Operation Condor Documents Revealed from the Paraguayan "Archive of Terror"

On the fifteenth anniversary of the discovery of the Archive of Terror in Paraguay, the National Security Archive has posted Spanish-language documents that reveal new details of how the Southern Cone military regimes collaborated in hunting down, interrogating, and causing to disappear hundreds of Latin Americans during the 1970s and 1980s. The collaboration, which became officially known as "Operation Condor," drew upon cross-border kidnapping, secret detention centers, torture, and disappearance of prisoners, interrogation and detention techniques that some human rights advocates are comparing to those used today in the Bush administration's counterterrorism campaign.

The National Security Archive also posted a series of other records from the Paraguayan archive to inaugurate a new website of 60,000 records of repression [http://test.aladin.wrhc.org/gsd1/collect/terror/terror_e.shtml]. The website, created in collaboration with the Paraguayan Supreme Court and the George Washington University, is believed to be the largest internet site of Spanish-language military and secret police records relating to abuses that took place during the military regime in Paraguay and elsewhere in the Southern Cone. It is designed to facilitate research and international legal efforts to prosecute human rights violators.

For more information, visit the web site of the National Security Archive at: <http://www.nsarchive.org>



Colombian Paramilitaries and the United States: "Unraveling the Pepes Tangled Web"

U.S. espionage operations targeting top Colombian government officials in 1993 provided key evidence linking the U.S.-Colombia task force charged with tracking down fugitive drug lord Pablo Escobar to one of Colombia's most notorious paramilitary chiefs, according to a new collection of declassified documents published by the National Security Archive. The affair sparked a special CIA investigation into whether U.S. intelligence was shared with Colombian terrorists and narcotraffickers every bit as dangerous as Escobar himself. The new documents, released under the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, are the most definitive declassified evidence to date linking the U.S. to a Colombian paramilitary group and are the subject of an investigation published recently in Colombia's *Semana* magazine.

The documents reveal that the U.S.-Colombia Medellín Task Force was sharing intelligence information with Fidel Castaño, paramilitary leader of Los Pepes (*Perseguidos por Pablo Escobar*), a clandestine terrorist organization that waged a bloody campaign against people and property associated with the reputed narcotics kingpin. One cable describes a series of meetings from April 1993 where, according to sensitive US intelligence sources, Colombian National Police director General Miguel Antonio Gómez Padilla said "that he had directed a senior CNP intelligence officer to maintain contact with Fidel Castano, paramilitary leader of Los Pepes, for the purposes of intelligence collection." The new collection also sheds light on the role of U.S. intelligence agencies in Colombia's conflict--both the close cooperation with Colombian security forces evident in the Task Force as well as the highly-sensitive U.S. intelligence operations that targeted the Colombian government itself. Key information about links between the Task Force and the Pepes was derived from U.S. intelligence sources that closely monitored meetings between the Colombian president and his top security officials.

For more information, visit the web site of the National Security Archive at: <http://www.nsarchive.org>



Suharto: A Declassified Documentary Obituary

With the recent burial of the Indonesia's former dictator Suharto, the National Security Archive has posted a selection of declassified U.S. documents detailing his record of repression and corruption, and the long-standing U.S. support for his regime. The documents include transcripts of meetings with Presidents Richard M. Nixon, Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan, as well as Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Vice-President Walter Mondale, then Vice-President George W. Bush, and former Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke. Additional documents detail U.S. perceptions of Suharto from the earliest years of his violent rule, including the 1969 annexation of West Papua, the 1975 invasion of East Timor, and the so-called "Mysterious Killings" of 1983-1984.

For more information, contact Brad Simpson at 443-845-4462, or visit the web site of the National Security Archive at: <http://www.nsarchive.org>



CIA 1974 Estimate Found that Israel Already Had a Nuclear Stockpile and that "Many Countries" Would Soon Have Nuclear Capabilities

In the wake of the Indian "peaceful nuclear explosion" on May 17, 1974 and growing concern about the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities, the U.S. intelligence community prepared a Special National Intelligence Assessment, "Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons," recently published by the National Security Archive, which concluded, among other things, that Israel had already stockpiled a small number of nuclear weapons.

The 1974 Indian test created shock waves in the U.S. government, not only because of its broader implications, but because the intelligence community had failed to detect that it was imminent (this failure led to an intelligence post-mortem). The possibility that the Indian test might lead to a nuclear arms race in South Asia and create new pressures for nuclear proliferation elsewhere induced the U.S. government, which under Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had treated this problem as a lower-level issue, to make policies to curb proliferation a higher priority.

That the SNIE estimated that "many countries" would have the economic and technological capability to produce nuclear weapons by the 1980s underlined the seriousness of the problem, as did another statement: "Terrorists might attempt theft of either weapons or fissionable materials." Noting that there were over 50,000 nuclear weapons in the world, the report observed that "absolute assurance about future security is impossible."

For more information contact William Burr at the National Security Archive at 202-994-7032, or visit the web page at: <http://www.nsarchive.org>



New Evidence on the Origins of Overkill: First Substantive Release of Early SIOP Histories

The first comprehensive U.S. nuclear war plan, produced in 1960, was controversial within the U.S. government because top commanders and White House scientists objected to its massive destructiveness--the "high level of damage and population casualties"--according to newly declassified histories published by the National Security Archive. The war plan also appalled Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, who wanted to find ways to curb its overkill, but the first nuclear plan revised on his watch remained massively destructive.

The nuclear war plan, the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), has been among the U.S. government's most sensitive secrets. No SIOP has ever been declassified, and details about the making of U.S. nuclear war plans have been hard to pry loose. Declassified histories from the early 1960s of SIOP-62 (for fiscal year) and SIOP-63 provide an acute sense of the way that the U.S. government planned to wage nuclear war, as well as how the plans were made and the inter-service conflicts over them. Among the disclosures:

- * The availability of options for preemptive or retaliatory strikes against Soviet and Chinese targets.
- * Goals of high levels of damage ("damage expectancy") were intrinsic to the plan, which explains why historians have treated "overkill", or excessive destruction, as one of its most distinctive features.
- * The internal debate within the military over the war plan, especially Army and Navy concern about excessive destruction and radiation hazards to U.S. troops and people in allied countries near targeted countries.
- * The high priority of military targets; according to the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy (NSTAP), one of the SIOP's purposes was "to destroy or neutralize the military capabilities of the enemy."
- * How the JSTPS constructed the five alternative strikes that constituted SIOP-63 (fiscal year 1963) in order to be responsive to Secretary of Defense McNamara's quest for alternatives to nuclear attacks on urban-industrial areas, and limit the destructiveness of nuclear war, by focusing on nuclear targets only ("no cities/counterforce").
- * The role of "strike timing sheets" in the plan, showing how each bomber and missile would reach its target without destroying each other ("fratricide").

For more information contact William Burr at the National Security Archive at 202-994-7032, or visit the webpage at: <http://www.nsarchive.org>



New FRUS Volume on European Security

The Department of State has released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. XXXIX, European Security*. This volume documents U.S. efforts to negotiate multilateral agreements with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and the Soviet Bloc, which would allow for greater European security. It has a broader scope than most, since it covers the entire span of both the Nixon and Ford administrations, 1969-1976. The volume is centered around two basic questions the U.S. Government faced: how best to achieve security and cooperation in Europe, and how to reduce both NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. While the general focus is on European security, the specific focus is on two overriding issues that faced the Nixon and Ford administrations: 1) whether to hold a conference on European security

attended by the United States and its NATO allies, and the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies; and 2) whether the United States and its European allies would negotiate an agreement with the Soviet Union and its European allies on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Europe, which would ensure security but reduce the costs of defending Europe.

Also covered in the volume are related issues, such as whether to combine the security conference with negotiations on force reductions. In addition, the question of negotiations with the NATO allies looms large in the volume, which includes many memoranda of conversation between U.S. officials and their NATO counterparts. Kissinger carried on parallel negotiations with Soviet officials on both a European security conference and MBFR, which are also documented in this volume.

The volume and this press release are available on the Office of the Historian website at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xxxix>. Copies of the volume will be available for purchase from the U.S. Government Printing Office online at <http://bookstore.gpo.gov> (GPO S/N 044-000-02611-2; ISBN 978-0-16-077109-5), or by calling toll-free 1-866-512-1800 (D.C. area 202-512-1800).

For further information, contact Edward Keefer, General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, at (202) 663-1131 or by e-mail at history@state.gov.



New FRUS Volume on Germany

The Department of State has released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Vol. XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969-1972*. The volume represents a departure in coverage on Germany in the *Foreign Relations* series. Previous volumes covered bilateral relations between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany in breadth, including documentation on economic and military issues, as well as on matters of politics and diplomacy. Although this volume covers such issues, especially when decision-making was at a high level, more extensive documentation on discussions between Washington and Bonn on international economics and national security has been and will be published in other volumes. Instead, this volume examines key issues in German-American relations in more depth, emphasizing two issues in particular: the response of the Nixon administration to Chancellor Willy Brandt and his Eastern policy (*Ostpolitik*), and the secret negotiations leading to signature of the Berlin quadripartite agreement in September 1971. Moscow was a key player in the diplomacy behind both Bonn's *Ostpolitik* and the Berlin agreement. This volume, therefore, also focuses on the Soviet Union, and places bilateral relations between the United States and the Federal Republic in the context of the competition between the two superpowers. This is, in other words, a "Cold War" volume-or perhaps, more accurately, a "détente" volume.

President Richard Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, were initially wary both of Brandt and of his foreign policy. Their suspicions were reflected not only in informal discussions, but also in the formal decision-making process. The White House eventually played an important role in the execution of U.S. policy on Berlin, practicing "backchannel" diplomacy with Moscow and Bonn to negotiate the terms of a Berlin agreement, while pursuing agreements with the Soviets on SALT, a summit meeting, and the Middle East. Kissinger established both a "confidential channel" in Washington with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, and a "special channel" in Bonn with Ambassador Kenneth Rush and German State Secretary Egon Bahr (through a U.S. naval officer in Frankfurt). These secret communications allowed the White House to discuss Berlin-and to link progress on a quadripartite agreement to progress with the Soviets on other bilateral and multilateral issues-and to do so without participation from the Department of State. The substance of the agreement was too complicated, however, to ignore completely the political, legal, and diplomatic expertise of the Department's officials on Germany and Berlin. This volume, therefore, presents documentation on "front channel" decision-making, as well as on "backchannel" diplomacy, examining the respective roles of the White House and the Department of State in negotiating the terms of the 1971 quadripartite agreement.

The volume and this press release are available on the Office of the Historian website at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xl>. Copies of the volume will be available for purchase from the U.S. Government Printing Office online at <http://bookstore.gpo.gov> (GPO S/N 044-000-02598-1; ISBN 978-0-16-079016-4), or by calling toll-free 1-866-512-1800 (D.C. area 202-512-1800). For further information, contact Edward Keefer, General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, at (202) 663-1131 or by e-mail at history@state.gov.



Oral History Collection on Military Planning For European Theatre Conflict During The Cold War

For decades, the opposing camps on both sides of the Iron Curtain made efforts to project a vigilant state of military readiness that they themselves regarded as defensive, while perceiving their respective opponents as potential aggressors. A roundtable conference took place in Stockholm, Sweden, in April 2006, co-sponsored by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Parallel History Project (PHP), the Swedish National Defence College (SNDC), and the Netherlands Institute of Military History (NIMH). The event brought together retired generals, military experts, and Cold War scholars from East and West who exchanged recollections and views on war plans for conflict in Central

Europe. The focus was on the late 1970s and early 1980s, when détente came to an end and the Cold War reached a new peak with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, martial law in Poland, NATO's deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe, and Ronald Reagan's announcement of the Strategic Defence Initiative. The conference marked the first time that high-ranking officers from countries of the former Warsaw Pact and of NATO held organized discussions of their military planning, the role of nuclear weapons in that planning, and their perception of each other's intentions and capabilities. The first day of sessions dealt with plans for conventional war; the second day turned to expectations regarding the use and effects of tactical and strategic nuclear arms.

The Center for Security Studies (CSS), as a main partner in the Parallel History Project, is pleased to announce the publication of the transcript of this oral history conference in its Zuercher Beitrage series. The volume, edited by Jan Hoffenaar (NIMH) and Christopher Findlay (CSS), is available online in full-text at www.php.isn.ethz.ch and can be ordered as a hard copy from php@sipo.gess.ethz.ch.



New FRUS Volume on The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955

The Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, has released a retrospective intelligence volume in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series, documenting the development and consolidation of the intelligence community. This volume, *The Intelligence Community, 1950-1955*, is the sequel to *The Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950*, published in 1996. This new volume, which is organized chronologically from January 1950 to December 1955, documents the institutional growth of the intelligence community during its heyday under Directors Walter Bedell Smith and Allen W. Dulles, and demonstrates how Smith, through his prestige, ability to obtain national security directives from a supportive President Truman, and bureaucratic acumen, truly transformed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). It closes with a collection of relevant National Security Council Intelligence Directives (NSCIDs) issued during the years 1950-1955 as approved by the National Security Council and the President, as well as revisions to earlier NSCIDs published in the *Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, 1945-1950*.

The volume and this press release are available on the Office of the Historian website at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/truman/c24687.htm>. Copies of the volume will be available for purchase from the U.S. Government Printing Office online at <http://bookstore.gpo.gov> (GPO S/N 044-000-02605-8; ISBN 978-0-16-076468-4), or by calling toll-free 1-866-512-1800 (D.C. area 202-512-1800). For further information contact Edward Keefer, General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, at (202) 663-1131 or by e-mail at history@state.gov.



New FRUS Volume on South Asia, 1973-76

The Department of State has released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-8, Documents on South Asia, 1973-1976*, as an electronic-only publication. This volume is the latest publication in the subseries of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important foreign policy decisions and actions of the administrations of Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford. Volume E-8 is the eighth *Foreign Relations* volume to be published in the electronic only format, available to all free of charge on the Internet. Approximately 25 percent of the volumes scheduled for publication for the 1969-1976 subseries, covering the Nixon and Nixon-Ford administrations, will be in this format.

This e-volume documents the foreign policy of the Nixon and Ford administrations toward South Asia, 1973-1976, and should be read in conjunction with *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972*, and *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971*, also available online. In addition to coverage of U.S. policy toward India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh, Volume E-8 provides documents on U.S. relations with the smaller South Asian states of Nepal, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka, and the Indian Ocean region, including the Republic of the Maldives.

The text of the volume and this press release are available on the Department of State's website at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e8/index.htm>. For further information, contact Edward C. Keefer, General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, at (202) 663-1131, or by email at history@state.gov.



New FRUS Volume on Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, 1973-6

The Department of State has released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXX, Greece, Cyprus, Turkey, 1973-1976*. This volume includes documentation that illuminates the critical connections between regional concerns and bilateral issues, and provides a fascinating window into the ways in which the Nixon and Ford administrations managed a foreign crisis in the midst of a U.S. domestic one. The volume provides documentation on, among other things, the restoration of democracy in Greece, the problem of Turkish opium, the potential conflict between Greece and Turkey over oil exploration rights in the Aegean Sea, and U.S. policymakers' efforts to develop a solution to the problem caused by the

increasing tensions in the region. Taken as a whole, this volume highlights a significant shift in U.S. policymakers' goals toward the region and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's unique role in U.S. foreign policy.

The volume and this press release are available on the Office of the Historian website at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xxx>. Copies of the volume will be available for purchase from the U.S. Government Printing Office online at <http://bookstore.gpo.gov> (GPO S/N044-000-02600-7; ISBN 978-0-16-079017-1), or by calling toll-free 1-866-512-1800 (D.C. area 202-512-1800). For further information contact Edward Keefer, General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, at (202) 663-1131 or by e-mail at history@state.gov.



3. Announcements:

Call for Contributors: *Advancing Military History*

ABC-CLIO, award-winning publisher of historical reference works including recently published multivolume encyclopedias of World War II and the Cold War, is currently developing a wide-ranging and definitive project on U.S. military history. This scholarly, comprehensive project consists of authoritative encyclopedic entries centered on the major wars of American history, including the current conflicts in the Middle East. It covers not only the military aspects of the conflicts, but also the political, social, economic, and technological developments that impacted or were impacted by the conflicts.

ABC-CLIO has assembled a team of top historians to work on this groundbreaking project, and we are currently seeking additional qualified contributors to give this study the depth and broad interpretation that it deserves. For more information on this project, including a project description, list of entries for this year, compensation information, and sample entries, please email Dr. Paul Pierpaoli, ABC-CLIO Fellow of Military History and Diplomatic History, at ppierpaoli@abc-clio.com. When contacting Dr. Pierpaoli, please indicate your affiliation and areas of interest, and attach a copy of your curriculum vitae.



Cold War Essay Competition, 2007-08

For the fourth year, the John A. Adams Center at the Virginia Military Institute is pleased to announce that it will award prizes for the best unpublished papers dealing with the United States military in the Cold War era (1945-1991). Any aspect of the Cold War is eligible, with papers on intelligence, logistics, and mobilization especially welcome. Please note that essays on the Korean War, on Vietnam, on counterinsurgency and related topics are all open for consideration.

Prizes: First place will earn a plaque and a cash award of \$2000; second place, \$1000 and a plaque; and third place, \$500 and a plaque.

Procedures: Entries should be tendered to the Adams Center at VMI by 15 June 2008. Please make your submission by Microsoft Word and limit your entry to a maximum of twenty-five pages of double-spaced text, exclusive of documentation and bibliography. The center will, over the summer, examine all papers and announce its top three rankings early in the fall of 2008.

For further information, contact:

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Call For Papers: The 22nd United States Air Force Academy Military History Symposium, "The History of the United States Air Force Academy"
September 28-30, Colorado Springs, CO

The Department of History at the United States Air Force Academy (USAFA) invites proposals for papers on the history of the USAF Academy for the 22nd Military History Symposium, to be held at USAFA in Colorado Springs, Colorado,

September 28-30, 2009.

Paper proposals are welcome on all aspects of USAFA history. The Department of History offers its assistance in obtaining access to archival resources and oral history interviews to facilitate research leading to papers to be submitted to the symposium. The Proceedings of the Symposium will be published following the event.

To submit a paper proposal, please send an abstract (not more than 500 words), a CV, and a short research plan (if the research is not yet complete) to:

Major J. D. Went, USAF
Program Chair, 22nd Military History Symposium
HQ USAFA/DFH
2354 Fairchild Hall, Suite 6F101
USAF Academy CO 80840
james.went@usafa.edu

Electronic submissions are preferred, but not required.

For questions, please contact:

Major Grant T. Weller, USAF
Director, 22nd Military History Symposium
HQ USAFA/DFH
2354 Fairchild Hall, Suite 6F101
USAF Academy CO 80840
grant.weller@usafa.edu



Call for Papers: The 1989 Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe: Twenty Years On
September 10-12, 2009, Sheffield, UK

The aim of this conference, to be held September 10-12, 2009 at Sheffield Hallam University, Sheffield, UK, is to take a fresh look at the 1989 revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe to mark the occasion of the twentieth anniversary in the autumn of 2009. The approach is broadly historical, but we would welcome proposals from a range of different disciplines, such as Cultural and Gender/Women's Studies, Sociology, Modern Languages and of course History. By bringing together scholars working on the 1989 revolutions in national and transnational contexts, we hope to make a distinctive and worthwhile contribution to this area. Key themes considered could include:

- * Protest movements and crowds
- * Strategies and responses of regimes
- * The origin and role of civic groups
- * The external context (Gorbachev's Soviet Union, Bush, Kohl, Thatcher and Mitterand)

Round-table discussions:

- * Elections and the end of revolutionary protests- 1989 in popular and official memory
- * Comparisons with earlier uprisings against communist rule (1953, 1956, 1968, 1980-81)
- * Sources and archives

We invite contributions from scholars working on all Soviet-bloc Eastern European countries that saw the overthrow of communist rule in 1989/90, including the GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. We are also looking for contributions on the role and significance of external players, particularly Gorbachev's Soviet Union and the leading western nations (USA, Britain, West Germany, France).

A key element of this conference is the planned publication of a selection of papers in an edited volume (projected publication date 2011). The organisers have published two previous collections of essays on post-1945 Eastern Europe: *Revolution and Resistance in Eastern Europe: Challenges to Communist Rule* (Oxford: Berg, 2006); and *Stalinist Terror in Eastern Europe: Elite Purges and Mass Repression* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, forthcoming in 2009).

Contributors should seek funding from their own institutions in the first instance, but it is anticipated that some support might become available through potential sponsors.

Please send proposals, including working title and brief description of your paper (max. 350 words), by July 31, 2008.

For further information, contact:

Dr. Kevin McDermott and Dr. Matthew Stibbe
Department of History
Sheffield Hallam University
City Campus
Howard Street
Sheffield S1 1WB
m.stibbe@shu.ac.uk; k.f.mcdermott@shu.ac.uk



Call for Papers: "Symposium on the Vietnam Experience"

September 12, 2008, Kingsville, TX

The 3rd Texas A&M University-Kingsville "Symposium on the Vietnam Experience" is issuing a call for papers to all interested scholars for presentation on September 12, 2008, in Kingsville, Texas. This year's focus is on drawing comparisons between conflict in Southeast Asia and conflicts in the Middle East and more broad comparisons between the Vietnam War and the Global War on Terror. To submit a paper or panel proposal, please email an abstract to Dr. Michael Houf, Department of History Texas A&M University-Kingsville at kfmsh00@tamuk.edu. Graduate students are especially encouraged to submit.

The purpose of the Texas A&M University-Kingsville "Symposium on the Vietnam Experience" is to bring together scholars, students, veterans, and the community in an attempt to further understanding of the history of Southeast Asia and the United States involvement there.

Deadline for submissions and proposals is May 15, 2008.

For more information, contact:

Dr. Michael Houf
Department of History
Texas A&M University-Kingsville
Kingsville, TX 78363
kfmsh00@tamuk.edu
361-593-3596



Call for Submissions: "Perspectives on War: Media and Memory"

InterCulture is a peer-reviewed e-journal seeking academic papers (3,000 to 6,000 words), reviews (1,000 to 3,000 words) and creative work pertaining to the theme "Perspectives on War: Media and Memory."

InterCulture is seeking papers, creative work, and reviews that connect media and memory through a discussion of a war or wars. This issue works alongside InterCulture's Fall/ Winter issue devoted to "The Front" available at <http://dih.fsu.edu/interculture/>. Possible subjects include, but are not limited to:

- construction of memory through film
- use of Cold War rhetoric in current War on Terror
- documentation of survivor accounts
- discourses on the soldier (hero)
- how social theory 'remembers' or implicates war
- identity (gender, race, class, sexuality) and the memory of war
- capitalism and the discourse of war
- monuments and memorials
- violence and issues concerning human rights
- memory in popular culture (film, television, video games, etc)
- memory as ideology in literature, music, sport

All citations must use the MLA format. Please include a 100 - 200 word abstract with your submission that will be included with your paper should it be published. No abstract is required for reviews.

Please send submissions via email to:

Katheryn Wright, Managing Editor
Florida State University
kwright@fsu.edu



Call for Papers: "Contest for Continents: The Seven Years' War in Global Perspective"

October 22-24, 2009, St. Catharines, Ontario and Niagara Falls, New York

The Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, together with Niagara and Brock Universities, will host a conference on October 22-24, 2009, to examine the Seven Years' War (the French and Indian War, 1754-1763) as a global conflict. With nearly one million battlefield deaths and fighting on four continents and in three oceans, the Great War for Empire stands as the first world war. The conference will address the conflict as one that transcended the national and imperial categories that have traditionally been used to evaluate it. The object is to study the war both globally, involving North America, South Asia, Europe, the Caribbean, West Africa, and the Philippines, and in transnational perspective, including its military, diplomatic, political, cultural, economic, and social aspects.

This conference seeks to cross disciplinary as well as national and imperial boundaries and will welcome paper proposals from a variety of disciplines and scholarly approaches. The perspective of military history might analyze the campaigns

in various theaters, the effect of the colonial context on the conduct of operations, and the role of “natives,” including indigenous North-, Anglo-, and Franco-Americans and the peoples of the South Asian Indian states. Broader economic questions such as trade interests (or the lack thereof), resource mobilization, the economics of navies, and the varying costs of the struggle for combatant states are fruitful avenues of inquiry. Political historians might examine Parliament in Great Britain and the courts of other states, the parts played by individuals (such as Frederick the Great or William Pitt), center-periphery relations, and the long-term effects of the war on North America, South Asia, and Europe. War aims and diplomacy involve such issues as empire building and the European balance of power. Within the cultural sphere, scholars could address representations of the overseas “other” or the war’s effect on popular memory as seen in literature, material objects, and commemorative ceremonies. The conference organizers intend to publish selected papers in an edited volume.

To underscore the war’s international dimensions, sessions will be held on both sides of the U.S./Canada border, on the campuses of Brock University in St. Catharines, Ontario, and Niagara University in Niagara Falls, New York, and at Old Fort Niagara in Youngstown, New York, which will be commemorating the 250th anniversary of its 1759 siege and surrender. Although English will be the working language of the conference, we aim to guarantee a diversity of exchanges and points of view by drawing participants from a wide variety of fields and national perspectives.

The program committee invites proposals for complete panels and individual papers on any aspect of the Seven Years’ War in any of its theaters, especially submissions that treat the war thematically across geographic boundaries. We stress that we examine the Seven Years’ War in its full geographic dimension and are therefore interested in papers that examine the conflict in Eastern and Central Europe, involving Prussia, Russia, France, and Austria, as well as the North American, South Asian, and other theaters. We welcome proposals from advanced graduate students as well as more senior scholars. The conference will cover accommodation, meals, and travel for program participants, but we encourage individuals with access to travel funds to draw on that resource. Scholars who are citizens of countries that require visas for the United States and Canada should bear in mind that they will need to secure these documents well in advance of the conference. As of January 1, 2008, passports will be required for entry into the United States and Canada from either country.

To apply, send a 500-word synopsis of your proposal along with a short c.v. to: ieahc1@wm.edu, as an attachment in MS Word. You may direct questions to program co-chairs Thomas A. Chambers (chambers@niagara.edu) and David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye (dschimme@brocku.ca). The deadline for submissions is June 30, 2008.



George Bush Presidential Library Research Grants

The Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government and Public Service has instituted two research grant programs to assist scholars doing research at the George Bush Presidential Library in College Station, Texas. The Peter and Edith O’Donnell Research Grant supports research in any field, but it must make use of the holdings of the George Bush Presidential Library. The Korea Grant Program focuses on Asia, particularly Korea, and the research also must make use of the holdings of the George Bush Presidential Library. The Korea Grant Program is made possible through an endowment from the Korea Foundation. Awards for both grants range from \$500 to \$2,500. Information and applications for these grant programs can be obtained from the Foundation office, or simply by clicking on the links at: <http://bush.tamu.edu/scowcroft/grants/>.



John F. Kennedy Presidential Library Research Grants

The John F. Kennedy Library Foundation provides funds for the award of a number of research grants in the range of \$500 to \$2,500. The purpose of these grants is to help defray living, travel, and related costs incurred while doing research in the textual and non-textual holdings of the library. Scholars and students are invited to apply for these research grants.

Grant applications are evaluated on the basis of expected utilization of available holdings of the Library, the degree to which they address research needs in Kennedy period studies, and the qualifications of applicants. Preference is given to dissertation research by Ph.D. candidates working in newly opened or relatively unused collections, and to the work of recent Ph.D. recipients who are expanding or revising their dissertations for publication, but all proposals are welcome and will receive careful consideration.

Applications may be submitted at any time, but the postmark deadline is March 15 for spring grants and August 15 for fall grants. Applicants will be promptly notified of their project’s eligibility. Awards are announced on April 20 and October 20. Applications received after one deadline will be held for consideration in the next cycle.

To obtain information about the Library’s collections, each applicant who has not already conducted research at the library should contact a member of the research room staff at the address below or by phone (617- 514-1629) to explain the topic and request a copy of Historical Materials in the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. To apply, submit an application form accompanied by a brief proposal (three to four pages) in the form of a letter or memo describing the planned research, its significance, the intended audience, and expected outcome; two letters of recommendation from academic or other appropriate references; a sample of your writing (ca. ten pages); a project budget; and a vita. List the collections in the Kennedy Library and other institutions that you plan to use. Describe how the funds will be applied, other fellowships or grants that will support the project and whether matching funds are available to you from your institution or elsewhere. Preference is given to projects not supported by large grants from other institutions. Describe your qualifications and

similar research projects you have undertaken.

For further information and to apply, please contact:

Grant and Fellowship Coordinator

John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum

Columbia Point

Boston, MA 02125

Phone: (617) 514-1624

Fax: 617-514-1625

kennedy.library@nara.gov



University of Texas Fellowships at the Institute for Historical Studies

The Department of History at the University of Texas at Austin announces the establishment of a new Institute for Historical Studies. The Institute provides a dynamic and multi-faceted intellectual community. It fosters creative and productive conversations within our department, between the Department of History and other UT-Austin departments and centers, between our faculty and colleagues nationwide, and between the department and our community of alumni and neighbors. The Institute explores themes whose historical roots are of critical importance for the contemporary world as well as for the historical profession. It enhances and expands the Department's long tradition of and continued commitment to excellence in historical research through publication and programming.

The first two year theme is "Global Borders," defined very broadly, conceptually as well as geographically. We are seeking four residential fellows for the 2008-09 year, and we also invite proposals for papers related to the theme to be given at Institute workshops.

For more information, contact:

Julie Hardwick

Associate Professor & Director of the Institute for Historical Studies

Department of History

1 Univ Sta B7000

University of Texas at Austin

Austin, TX 78712

(512) 475-7221

<http://www.utexas.edu/cola/insts/historicalstudies/>



German Historical Institute Doctoral and Postdoctoral Fellowships

The GHI awards short-term fellowships to German and American doctoral students as well as post-doctoral scholars/Habilitanden in the fields of German history, the history of German-American relations, and the history of the role of Germany and the USA in international relations. The fellowships are usually granted for periods of one to six months but, depending on the funds available, can be extended by one or more months. The research projects must draw upon primary sources located in the United States.

The GHI will not provide funding for preliminary research, manuscript composition or the revision of manuscripts. It will give clear priority to those post-doc projects that are designed for the "second book". The monthly stipend is approximately \$ 1,600 for doctoral students and \$ 2,800 for post-doctoral scholars. In addition, fellowship recipients based in Germany will receive reimbursement for their roundtrip airfare to the U.S. All fellowship recipients are required to present the results of their research at the GHI during their grant period.

The next deadlines for applications are May 20, 2008 and October 15, 2008. Applications (two copies) should include cover letter, curriculum vitae, proof of academic degree (or transcripts), project description (3,000 words), research schedule for the fellowship period, and at least one letter of reference. While applicants may write in either English or German, we recommend that they use the language in which they are most proficient. They will be notified about the outcome within approximately two months after the deadline.

Please send applications to:

German Historical Institute

Doctoral/Postdoctoral Fellowships

1607 New Hampshire Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20009-2562



4. Letters to the Editor

March 19, 2008

To the Editor:

I am well aware of the pitfalls of memory. Nevertheless I feel dutibound to cite my own memory in response to Mark Moyar's claim in the December 2007 *Passport*—that David Kaiser “launched into a hysterical tirade about me [Moyar] at a conference at Williams College earlier this year.”¹ I attended that conference and have no recollection of any “hysterical tirade” by Kaiser during the session at which he spoke. Indeed, his comments in that session as I remember them were similar to his written comments in the December issue of *Passport*. They clearly constitute a strong and direct attack upon Moyar's scholarship as well as his conclusions, but if anyone believes those comments constitute an “hysterical tirade,” we obviously have very different definitions of those two words.

I also attended the SHAFR Conference at which David Anderson in his presidential address supposedly accused revisionist historians of the Vietnam War, according to Moyar, of arguing “only on emotion, not reason.”² Again, I have no recollection of any such comment. To check my memory, and my hearing (the sound system left something to be desired that evening!), I reread Anderson's presidential address in *Diplomatic History*. There is no such accusation in the published version either. Anderson did draw a distinction between what he labeled “analytical” and “idealistic” interpreters, with the latter defined as those “who make abstract beliefs and general principles of human perfectibility their guide to understanding international affairs” as opposed to those who rely on “reasoned analysis of observable activities.”³ Again, however, we have very different definitions of words if idealist arguments are the same as arguments based on emotion.

I do not claim to have the archival knowledge necessary, and I do not intend, to participate in any debate over Moyar's book and interpretations. But as a member of the audience in two of the episodes he describes, I believe I have a responsibility to offer my own memories and analysis and to contradict his claims. If anyone else attended these events and has different memories, please let me know.

Mark A. Stoler

Stanley Kaplan Distinguished Visiting Professor of American Foreign Policy
Williams College

1. Mark Moyar, “A Call to Arms,” *Passport: The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations* 38 (3) (December 2007): 17.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Anderson did say that the rise of dictators in the 1930s, Soviet military power after World War II, and the threat of terrorism by Islamic radicals “all created a source of fear that, if not properly channeled, could lead to emotional or irrational thinking,” but that is hardly equivalent to claiming that Vietnam revisionists argue on the basis of emotion instead of reason. David L. Anderson, “One Vietnam War Should be Enough and Other Reflections on Diplomatic History and the Making of Foreign Policy,” *Diplomatic History* 30 (1) (January 2006): 1-21.

February 17, 2008

Dear *Passport*:

A great deal of the argument between Prof. Moyar and other participants in the recent roundtable on his book here in *Passport* turned on his analysis and characterization of sources. The same problem arises in something he said at the conclusion of the roundtable, when he accused me of having delivered an “hysterical tirade” at Williams College in 2007. For the record, my talk during the conference at Williams on his book was almost word for word identical to my contribution to the roundtable. Indeed, that is why the heading, “Moyar Talk,” appeared at the beginning of it—I had worked from my draft of the talk and had neglected to change it. Thus, even without reviewing the tapes of the conference which exist, any *Passport* reader can evaluate that particular characterization themselves.

Sincerely yours,

David Kaiser

January 31, 2008

The Editor
Passport
Mershon Center for International Security Studies
1501 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201

Martin J. Sherwin and Kai Bird find it “utterly bizarre” that during the summer of 1945 in the “context of the war” Japan might seek peace by means “other than surrender.” If one means unconditional surrender, which was the issue at the time, the documentary record, from the American MAGIC intercepts to contemporary Japanese documents to postwar American interrogations of Japanese leaders, makes it clear that what Sherwin and Bird find impossible to accept

indisputably was the case.

As for Tsuyoshi (not "Tadoshi") Hasegawa's *Racing the Enemy*, its "massive new and important" evidence yielded the assessment in the concluding chapter that "it is doubtful that Japan would have capitulated before the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and the Soviet Union entered the war" (p. 291). Lest the reader miss the point, several pages later we find, "Without the twin shocks of the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war, the Japanese never would have accepted surrender in August" (p. 295). Whatever *Racing the Enemy* says about other aspects of the events that led to Hiroshima, which this commentator has critiqued in another venue, it offers no support to Sherwin and Bird's discredited thesis that Japan was prepared to surrender, unconditionally or otherwise, on terms even minimally acceptable to the United States and its allies prior to the events of August 6-9.

Very truly yours,

Michael Kort
Professor of Social Science
Boston University



5. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines:

The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship

The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship was established by the Bernath family to promote scholarship in U.S. foreign relations history by women. The Myrna Bernath Fellowship of \$5,000 is intended to defray the costs of scholarly research by women. It is awarded biannually (in odd years) and announced at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. Applications are welcomed from women at U.S. universities as well as women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and those within five years of completion of their Ph.D.s.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a prospectus including a paragraph or two on how funds would be expended (8-12 pages), a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant must also arrange to have a letter of recommendation submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail. Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*. The deadline for applications for the 2009 Fellowship is December 1, 2008. Send applications to Darlene Rivas, Pepperdine University, (Darlene.Rivas@pepperdine.edu).



The Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize

The Betty M. Unterberger Prize is intended to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by graduate students in the field of diplomatic history. The Prize of \$1,000 is awarded biannually (in odd years) to the author of a dissertation, completed during the previous two calendar years, on any topic in United States foreign relations history. The Prize is announced at the annual SHAFR conference.

The Prize was established in 2004 to honor Betty Miller Unterberger, a founder of SHAFR and long-time professor of diplomatic history at Texas A&M University.

Procedures: A dissertation may be submitted for consideration by the author or by the author's advisor. Three copies of the dissertation should be submitted, along with a cover letter explaining why the dissertation deserves consideration. To be considered for the 2009 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by February 28, 2009. Submit materials to SHAFR Unterberger Prize Committee, Department of History, Ohio State University, 106 Dulles Hall, 230 West 17th Avenue, Columbus OH 43210.



Arthur S. Link-Warren F. Kuehl Prize for Documentary Editing

The Link-Kuehl Prize is awarded for outstanding collections of primary source materials in the fields of international or diplomatic history, especially those distinguished by the inclusion of commentary designed to interpret the documents and set them within their historical context. Published works as well as electronic collections and audio-visual compilations are eligible. The prize is not limited to works on American foreign policy, but is open to works on the history of international, multi-archival, and/or American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. The award of \$1,000 is presented biannually (odd years) to the best work published during the preceding two calendar years. The award is announced at the SHAFR luncheon during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Procedures: Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. Send three copies of the book or other work with letter of nomination to Edward C. Keefer, Chair, Link-Kuehl Prize Committee, General Editor, *FRUS*, PA/HO, Rm L-409, SA-1, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520 (e-mail: keeferec@state.gov). To be considered for the 2009 prize, nominations must be received by November 15, 2008.



6. Recent Publications of Interest

Alvah, Donna. *Unofficial Ambassadors: American Military Families Overseas and the Cold War, 1946-1965*, New York University Press, \$42.00.

Atkinson, David C. *In Theory and in Practice: Harvard's Center for International Affairs, 1958-1983*, Harvard University Press, \$17.95.

Borzecki, Jerzy. *The Soviet-Polish Peace of 1921 and the Creation of Interwar Europe*, Yale University Press, \$55.00.

Brands, Hal. *From Berlin to Baghdad: America's Search for Purpose in the Post-Cold War World*, University Press of Kentucky, \$45.00.

Carter, James M. *Inventing Vietnam: The United States and State Building, 1954-1968*, Cambridge University Press, \$22.99.

Chabal, Patrick and Nuno Vidal, eds. *Angola: The Weight of History*, Columbia University Press, \$50.00.

Chernus, Ira. *Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity*, Stanford University Press, \$60.00.

Clymer, Adam. *Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch: The Panama Canal Treaties and the Rise of the Right*, University of Kansas Press, \$29.95.

Coleman, Bradley Lynn. *Colombia and the United States: The Making of an Inter-American Alliance, 1939-1960*, Kent State University Press, \$45.95.

Connelly, Matthew. *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population*, Harvard University Press, \$35.00.

Cordesman, Anthony H. *Arab-Israeli Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars*, Stanford University Press, \$35.00.

Cox, Terry, ed. *Challenging Communism in Eastern Europe: 1956 and its Legacy*, Routledge, \$125.00.

Dahl, Ann-Sofie. *US Policy in the Nordic-Baltic Region: During the Cold War and After*, Santerus Academic Press, \$30.00.

Demetz, Peter. *Prague in Danger: The Years of German Occupation, 1939-1945: Memories and History, Terror and Resistance, Theater and Jazz, Film and Poetry, Politics and War*, Hill and Wang, \$25.00.

Dimitrov, Vesselin. *Stalin's Cold War: Soviet Foreign Policy, Democracy and Communism in Bulgaria, 1941-1948*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$74.95.

Dudas, Jeffrey. *The Cultivation of Resentment: Treaty Rights and the New Right*, Stanford University Press, \$50.00.

Dunsky, Marda. *Pens and Swords: How the American Mainstream Media Reports the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, Columbia University Press, \$27.50.

Dyson, Tom. *Politics of German Defence and Security: Policy Leadership and Military Reform in the Post-Cold War Era*, Berghahn Books, \$70.00.

Fenemore, Mark. *Sex, Thugs and Rock 'N' Roll: Teenage Rebels in Cold-War East Germany*, Berghahn Books, \$90.00.

Fujiwara, Chris. *The World and Its Double: The Life and Work of Otto Preminger*, Hill and Wang, \$35.00.

Gallicchio, Marc, ed. *The Unpredictability of the Past: Memories of the Asia-Pacific War in U.S.-East Asian Relations*, Duke University Press, 23.95.

Hammond, Philip. *Framing Post-Cold War Conflicts: The Media and International Intervention*, Manchester University Press, \$85.00.

Hartman, Andrew. *Education and the Cold War: The Battle for the American School*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$74.95.

Heiss, Mary Ann and Victor S. Papacosma, eds. *NATO and the Warsaw Pact: Intrabloc Conflicts*, Kent State University Press, \$55.00.

Hill, T.H.E. *Berlin in Early Cold-War Army Booklets: 1946-1958*, CreateSpace, \$17.95.

Hixson, Walter L. *The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Yale University Press, \$35.00.

Huebner, Andrew J. *The Warrior Image: Soldiers in American Culture from the Second World War to the Vietnam Era*, University of North Carolina Press, \$24.95.

Iokibe, Makoto, Caroline Rose, Junko Tomaru, and John Weste, eds. *Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration*, Routledge, \$150.00.

Joyce, Miriam. *Anglo-American Support for Jordan: The Career of King Hussein*, Palgrave Macmillan, \$74.95.

- Kang, David C. *China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia*, Columbia University Press, \$24.95.
- Kemp-Welch, Anthony. *Poland under Communism: A Cold War History*, Cambridge University Press, \$99.00.
- Klare, Michael T. *Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy*, Henry Holt, \$26.00
- Klein, Alan M. *Growing the Game: The Globalization of Major League Baseball*, Yale University Press, \$18.00.
- LeBor, Adam. "Complicity with Evil": *The United Nations in the Age of Modern Genocide*, Yale University Press, \$20.00.
- Lee, Yong Wook. *The Japanese Challenge to the American Neoliberal World Order: Identity, Meaning, and Foreign Policy*, Stanford University Press, \$60.00.
- Luthi, Lorenz M. *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World*, Princeton University Press, \$65.00.
- McGuinness, Aims. *Path of Empire: Panama and the California Gold Rush*, Cornell University Press, \$35.00.
- Milne, David. *America's Rasputin: Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War*, Hill and Wang, \$26.00.
- Morris, Benny. *1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War*, Yale University Press, \$32.50.
- Myers, Phillip E. *Caution and Cooperation: The American Civil War in British-American Relations*, Kent State University Press, \$55.00.
- Normand, Roger and Sarah Zaidi. *Human Rights at the UN: The Political History of Universal Justice*, Indiana University Press, \$29.95.
- Nutter, John Jacob. *CIA's Black Ops: Covert Action and Foreign Policy, from the Cold War to the War on Terror*, Prometheus Books, \$19.95.
- Patterson, David S. *The Search for Negotiated Peace: Women's Activism and Citizen Diplomacy in World War I*, Routledge, \$36.95.
- Pekkanen, Saadia M. *Japan's Aggressive Legalism: Law and Foreign Trade Politics Beyond the WTO*, Stanford University Press, \$29.95.
- Pickering, Paula M. *Peacebuilding in the Balkans: The View from the Ground Floor*, Cornell University Press, \$39.95.
- Preston, Peter. *Singapore in the Global System: Relationship, Structure and Change*, Routledge, \$150.00.
- Reichard, Gary and Ted Dickson, eds. *America on the World Stage: A Global Approach to U.S. History*, University of Illinois Press, \$25.00.
- Richmond, Yale. *Practicing Public Diplomacy: A Cold War Odyssey*, Berghahn Books, \$29.95.
- Saeki, Chizuru. *U.S. Cultural Propaganda in Cold War Japan: Promoting Democracy, 1948-1960*, Edwin Mellen Press, \$109.95.
- Schumann, Matt and Karl W. Schweizer. *The Seven Years War: A Transatlantic History*, Routledge, \$140.00.
- Shaikh, Nermeen. *The Present as History: Critical Perspectives on Global Power*, Columbia University Press, \$24.50.
- Shapiro, Ian. *Containment: Rebuilding a Strategy against Global Terror*, Princeton University Press, \$14.95.
- Sikkink, Kathryn. *Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy and Latin America*, Cornell University Press, \$19.95.
- Sneider, Allison L. *Suffragists in an Imperial Age: U.S. Expansion and the Woman Question, 1870-1929*, Oxford University Press, \$19.95.
- Steil, Benn and Robert E. Litan. *Financial Statecraft: The Role of Financial Markets in American Foreign Policy*, Yale University Press, \$16.00.
- Steininger, Rolf. *Austria, Germany and the Cold War: From the Anschluss to the State Treaty 1938-1955*, Berghahn Books, \$60.00.
- Stromquist, Shelton, ed. *Labor's Cold War: Local Politics in a Global Context*, University of Illinois Press, \$70.00.
- Wax, Dustin M. *Anthropology at the Dawn of the Cold War*, University of Michigan Press, \$32.50.
- Widmer, Ted. *Ark of the Liberties: America and the World*, Hill and Wang, \$24.00.
- Wilford, Hugh. *The Mighty Wurlitzer: How the CIA Played America*, Harvard University Press, \$27.95.
- Yasushi, Watanabe and David McConnell, eds. *Soft Power Superpowers: Cultural and National Assets of Japan and the United States*, M.E. Sharpe, \$72.95.
- Zubok, Vladislav M. *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*, University of North Carolina Press, \$39.95.

In Memoriam:

Dr. Larry I. Bland (1940-2007)

This issue of *The Journal of Military History* is dedicated to the memory of Larry Bland, who served for 19 years as its Managing Editor. Larry died of heart failure in Lexington, Virginia, on 27 November, 2007. He was 67 years old. He is survived by his wife, Joellen, and two sons, Neil and Ryan.

Larry will be remembered in years to come as the world's foremost expert on the life and career of General George C. Marshall, one of the great architects of Allied victory in the Second World War and father of the Marshall Plan, which helped bring Europe out of the ruins of that war. Larry was the editor, along with Sharon Ritenour Stevens, of *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*. He also edited a volume of *George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences* and *George C. Marshall's Mediation Mission to China*. Larry was a much sought-after speaker on the Marshall legacy, both in the USA and abroad. Barely a month before his death, he gave the keynote address at the dedication of the George C. Marshall Conference Center at the State Department in Washington. At its 2007 Conference, the Society for Military History presented the Victor Gundos Memorial Service Award to Larry in recognition of his long, distinguished, and outstanding service to the Society and to the historical profession.

At *The Journal of Military History*, where his departure has left an enormous void, we will remember him as one of the founders of the *Journal* in its current incarnation. He, along with Dr. Henry Bausum and Captain Blair Turner, was responsible for bringing the *JMH* to Lexington in 1988. The design of the *Journal* you

are holding in your hands was his work. Larry had been employed at the George C. Marshall Library and Museum in Lexington since 1977 and it was thanks to him that the Marshall Foundation agreed to provide support for the *Journal*, including office space for its editorial and production functions. Over the years, in spite of the many other demands made upon his time, Larry gave unstinting service as the production manager of the *Journal*. It was Larry who typeset the *Journal*, saw to the accuracy of its content, and put it to bed. We relied upon him for so much.

But Larry Bland was also my good friend. We first met in 1969, when we were both graduate students at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, in what is now a long-ago and very different time. Our paths diverged afterward and we only met up again, exactly twenty years later, when I joined the History Department at the Virginia Military Institute. Larry was already Managing Editor of the *Journal* and he and Blair Turner persuaded me to join the staff as Book Review Editor. The rest, as they say, is history. Larry and I have walked down a long road together, the last miles of it in almost day-to-day contact. He was too young to die and I shall miss him terribly.

Bruce Vandervoort
Virginia Military Institute

(Editor's note: This obituary first ran in *The Journal of Military History*. It is reprinted here with their kind permission.)

The Last Word


Brad Simpson

The decision by SHAFR President Thomas Schwartz to invite John Yoo to deliver the keynote address at the June 2008 annual meeting of SHAFR has sparked considerable and justifiable outrage among our organization's US and non-US members. In response to a petition signed by many SHAFR members calling for the invitation to be rescinded, as well as many more private emails expressing concern and opposition, David Cole, a professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center and a chief critic of Yoo, has been invited and given "equal billing" to rebut and debate him. As one of the initiators of this petition (along with Naoko Shibusawa and Barbara Keys, who first raised the issue), I wanted to explain some of our thinking, though I don't pretend to speak for my colleagues or those who signed the petition.

Yoo, a faculty member of the Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, is scheduled to speak on "Presidential Power and the War on Terrorism," a subject on which his views are already well-known. He has been a chief proponent of the "Unitary Executive" theory of executive power, maintaining that a wartime President holds ultimate and sole authority to interpret and thus disregard international treaties. Most significantly, this includes the right to disregard the Geneva Convention and its restriction against torture and other "[o]utrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment." Yoo's positions have been harshly criticized, by a wide range of legal scholars whose views span the political spectrum, as historically ill-informed, tendentious, and shockingly deficient in their constitutional reasoning, in addition to their -literally - murderous and tortuous consequences.

This is not simply a matter of freedom of speech or SHAFR providing for a diverse range of views. In private communications some SHAFR members have argued that our organization is a merely another node in the "marketplace of ideas," much like the educational institutions where most of us teach, and that to dis-invite Yoo would amount to selective censorship and violate principles of free speech.

Yoo's invitation and the use of SHAFR funds to honor him send a clear message that we as an organization view his positions as part of a legitimate "debate" on torture and executive power. But some discussions lie beyond the pale of responsible and civil discourse. The same principle could be used to justify paying Guatemalan General Rios Montt to present his "controversial" positions on exterminating 70,000 Mayan Indians during his genocidal reign in 1982-1983 - so long as we presented the



"opposing" side.

Foreign relations history has witnessed a renaissance in recent years as scholars - increasing numbers of whom are non-U.S. - have expanded their methods and scope of inquiry to include a vast range of state and non-state actors, cultural, social, political, and economic forces. Increasing numbers of us study the history of human rights, bringing us face to face, figuratively and sometimes literally, with survivors of war, dictatorship, imprisonment, and torture.

Our field, however, remains uncomfortably close to American state power, too often privileging its discursive frameworks, assumptions and agents in the choices we make.

One of the many SHAFR members who wrote us in recent weeks asked, perhaps only half in jest: rather than providing a platform for another agent of state power, why not listen to a view from the receiving end, perhaps Syrian/Canadian citizen Maher Arar, abducted from JFK airport in 2002 by U.S. authorities and subjected to "extraordinary rendition" and torture in a Syrian prison? It's not hard to think of other examples. Several duly horrified foreign colleagues noted the narrow, America-centered parochialism of Yoo's invitation, all the more striking for a scholarly association that prides itself on its internationalism.

In the end, the decision to honor John Yoo with a seat at our plenary diminishes us as scholars and SHAFR as an organization. Allowing him to share a platform with David Cole does little to mitigate the moral and intellectual bankruptcy of the choice. This was Yoo's response to a question posed by Notre Dame Law Professor Douglas Cassel in a radio interview in December, 2006:

Cassel: If the President deems that he's got to torture somebody, including by crushing the testicles of the person's child, there is no law that can stop him?

Yoo: No treaty.

Cassel: Also no law by Congress. That is what you wrote in the August 2002 memo.

Yoo: I think it depends on why the President thinks he needs to do that.

Do we wish to privilege such views - and pay to hear them - over the myriad of other voices that might challenge us as scholars and widen our analytical and interpretive horizons? Is this really the face that SHAFR wants to present to the global community of foreign relations historians?

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