

Passport

The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Volume 39, Issue 3, January 2009



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The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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*President Reagan meeting with Jeane Kirkpatrick in the Oval Office, 12/11/84.
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
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Thoughts From SHAFR President Frank Costigliola

I sought perspective for this essay by reading minutes of SHAFR Council meetings from the early years. In 1973, Council began planning for an ambitious innovation: a national meeting separate from the OAH and AHA conferences. The first SHAFR conference met in Washington in 1975. The program totaled four sessions, two luncheons, and a dinner. A year later *Diplomatic History* appeared. The early SHAFR remained a boys' club. It is suggestive that in a raft of unanimous votes in 1978, Council voted only 7 to 3 in favor of a resolution, proposed by SHAFR pioneer Betty Unterberger, in support of the Equal Rights Amendment. The endowment was tiny; in 1972 income from it amounted to \$23.



SHAFR of 2009 is more active, ambitious, and inclusive. SHAFR boasts a far larger endowment, at least it does as I write these words in mid-November 2008. These advances are due to the dedication of the forty-one presidents who have preceded me and the hard work over the years of hundreds of Council members, members of prize committees, and special committees. SHAFR has also benefited from superb executive directors. The extraordinary generosity of Gerald and Myrna Bernath and of other benefactors and the sound judgment of the organization's financial managers have endowed SHAFR with resources that are the envy of more impecunious historical organizations. (Shhh!) Even in tough financial times, SHAFR benefits from the top quality articles written by its members and other scholars and vetted by the editors of *Diplomatic History*. Blackwell Publishers derives enough income from subscriptions to the journal and from downloads of articles to make a significant annual payment to SHAFR. In 1978, SHAFR derived no such income; indeed it had to pay \$5,150 for the publishing of *Diplomatic History*. In the last few years SHAFR has used its income to launch a number of initiatives, most aimed at benefiting graduate students and at broadening the membership and focus of the organization.

These initiatives are also a matter of self-preservation in a changing world. In contrast to the 1970s-80s when the roster of members increased dramatically, membership has fallen from 1,803 in 1996 to 1,404 in 2007. The decline among men (from 1,517 members in 1996 to 1,138 in 2007) is more severe than among women (from 286 in 1996 to 266 in 2007). SHAFR still remains, however, an organization

predominately male and white. There have been only two women and no minorities among the forty-two presidents of the organization. (See in this issue of *Passport* the report of the ad hoc committee on women in SHAFR.) Expanding the focus of the organization so that it is more welcoming to women, members of minority groups, and to scholars with non-traditional approaches to foreign relations/international relations history seems necessary to keep SHAFR vital.

I intend to advance my predecessors' work in reaching out to members and potential members outside the United States, to women and minority scholars, and to those pioneering innovative scholarship. I would also like to lure back into active membership former leaders and stalwarts of SHAFR whom we rarely see at annual meetings. If accepted by the 2009 program committee, a roundtable put together by *Diplomatic History* executive editor Tom Zeiler will discuss the future scope and name of the journal at the June meeting.

The remainder of this essay tries to illuminate how SHAFR operates: Who makes decisions? How do members get to become decision makers? What kind of initiatives have been approved in the past couple of years? I assume there are members interested in opening the window onto SHAFR – or inasmuch as this is the 50th anniversary of William A. Williams's *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* – in opening the door.

As one can see from the governance section on the SHAFR website, the bylaws authorize the president and Council to make decisions, including hiring employees of the organization. (There is a tradition of not using the definite article when referring to Council.) Council members, who serve three year terms, include in their ranks two graduate students and former presidents going back three years. Council meets twice a year, during the January AHA conference and the June SHAFR conference. The president is authorized to appoint and supervise all committees, including prize committees and the annual meeting program committee. In practice, various presidents and program committees divide decisions according to their predilections. The president can choose speakers for the luncheon meetings and may weigh in on the selection of evening plenary session speakers. Members wishing to propose a matter for Council to

discuss should contact the president or the executive director. The newly authorized Ways & Means committee – composed of the current and past presidents, the vice-president, and two at-large members appointed by the president – advises Council on spending initiatives and monitors existing programs. The committee that oversees the SHAFR Summer Institute is composed of the current and immediate past president and the vice-president. Presidents frequently confer with the executive director, who provides an element of continuity. SHAFR is fortunate in having as executive director someone with the sound judgment and scrupulous fairness of Peter Hahn. Sara Wilson has proven invaluable in the organization of the annual conference. SHAFR officers choose the editor of *Diplomatic History* for a five year term. *DH* receives \$40,000 per year from the organization.

The Nominating Committee, members of which are elected to three year terms, monitors the gateway to office. In the spring the committee issues on H-diplo and in *Passport* a call for nominations for vice-president, Council members (including the graduate student representatives), and the Nominating Committee. Those who are recommending someone should indicate the reasons why they are doing so. The key criteria are a potential nominee's standing as a scholar and past commitment and service to SHAFR. Of course these criteria are adjusted for the graduate student representatives. It can help to have more than one person recommend a potential candidate. Members who have been defeated in a previous election may be nominated again. Generally, the Nominating Committee meets during the June conference to decide on a slate. Although the vice-president is, according to the bylaws, automatically nominated for president, a petition signed by 25 members and submitted to the Nominating Committee by 1 August may nominate an additional candidate for president (or for any other office). Mailed ballots go out by 1 September and are due by 31

October. Terms of office begin on 1 January.

In 2007-08, Council responded to an increase in revenues by approving the following initiatives:

- Summer Institutes, 2008-11, \$45,000/year
- Dissertation Completion Fellowships (2@ \$20K), \$40,000/year
- Travel and lodging expenses for persons who will add to diversity at annual meeting (for details see Council Minutes 6/08 or 9/09 Call for Papers), 2009-2011 \$25,000/year
- Lecturers to travel to campuses (not yet activated) \$5,000
- Travel for Council members to twice yearly meetings \$10,000/year
- Doubling graduate fellowships to \$18,500/year
- Director of Secondary Education*, \$3,000/3 years
- Web-master*, \$6,000/year
- *Passport* editor stipend, \$3,000/year
- National History Center (2008 only; any renewal must be approved), \$5,000

*Director of Secondary Education John Tully (Central Connecticut) is now at work recruiting educators to compose lesson plans on the history of U.S. foreign policy for use in secondary education. The lessons plans will be published on the SHAFR website. Under the direction of our new Web editor Brian Etheridge (Louisiana Tech), the SHAFR website will be redesigned and re-launched in early 2009 and will include such new features as blogs, RSS feeds, and a more versatile organizational structure.

Finally, Council has approved \$30,000/year for Bemis travel awards, this money to come out of income from the endowment. The endowment dropped from \$1,294,000 on 31 October 2007 to \$1,044,000 on 31 October 2008. It may have shrunk more by the time you read this. It remain unlikely, however, that endowment income will return to the 1972 level of \$23. Nevertheless, SHAFR may well feel a financial pinch.

Though there is much room for

improvement, SHAFR continues to thrive because of the intellectual vitality and commitment of its members. I am deeply honored to serve as president in 2009. With the help of the superb people on Council and on the various committees, I will try hard to advance SHAFR's traditions and its innovations.

Frank Costigliola is Professor of History at the University of Connecticut.

A Roundtable Discussion of Walter L. Hixson's *The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy*

Andrew L. Johns, Naoko Shibusawa, Christopher Endy, and Walter L. Hixson

"The Bad News is There is No Good News": A Review of Walter L. Hixson's *The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy*

Andrew L. Johns

If you thought things were bad in U.S. foreign policy—a quagmire in Iraq, the perpetual threat of rogue states or terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons, problems with regimes in Tehran and Pyongyang, American credibility and reputation at a virtual nadir—then Walter Hixson has some news for you. As George Clooney told Carl Reiner in *Ocean's Eleven*, "Things are much worse than you think."

In *The Myth of American Diplomacy*, Hixson offers a sweeping and provocative reinterpretation of the history of U.S. foreign relations since the founding of the first European colonies in North America. Employing an über-cultural perspective and an expansively theoretical framework, he argues that "national identity drives U.S. foreign policy" through an affirmation of America as a "manly, racially superior, and providentially destined 'beacon of liberty,' a country which possesses a special right to exert power in the world." This "Myth of America" produces "a continuous, militant foreign policy, including the regular resort to war" (1-2). One of the reasons for this phenomenon is that the vast majority of the American people "consciously and unconsciously consent" to the

Myth, allowing "imperial conduct abroad while reinforcing domestic hierarchies" (9-10). Walter McDougall and Bill Brands, among others, have discussed the crusading nature of American foreign policy and the concurrent sense of destiny and belief in U.S. exceptionalism.¹ Hixson identifies similar strains within the Myth, but his darkly negative characterization of U.S. intentions and motivations stands in stark contrast to the way that many historians have framed the concept.

The broad base of support for the Myth among the American people limits dissent significantly. Hixson contends that campaigns against external "enemy-others" serve to marginalize—or even consign to "enemy-other" status—those who threaten the cultural hegemony of the Myth at home. War, then, becomes "the center of U.S. identity" as the country takes on the characteristics of a "heavily militarized warfare and national security state" (14-15). The emergence of a "psychic crisis" triggers this aggressiveness and, as a consequence of the primal militancy in U.S. culture, places the nation on the path to war. Going to war against the "enemy-others" assuages the psychic crises that arise periodically and satisfies the national lust for violence, which Hixson believes to be "pathological" in American culture (15). Apparently, America does "go abroad in search of monsters to destroy," John Quincy Adams notwithstanding. Even more distressing, conflict overseas solidifies the domestic consensus

in such a way that it undermines virtually all reform impulses and transnational efforts at peace, and challenges to the Myth fall victim to the potency of the Myth. Ultimately, Hixson considers the history of American foreign relations to be a constant, steroid-enhanced *Wag the Dog* scenario, but without the need for deception or propaganda by the nation's leadership.

For those of you who are ready to move to Canada in disgust or have fallen into a deep depression about the history and future of the United States, never fear—Hixson has the cure for the nation's woes. Americans must denounce the Myth and the violence it inspires by proving "willing to join those on the margins in opposition to identity-driven foreign policy aggression." Only then can "postmodern, multilateral solutions" be found (306-7). The United States, he concludes, needs to replace the Myth with "an alternative hegemony that will enable us to transcend the nation's congenital and pathological aggression against enemy-others in deference to genuine efforts at global community" based on human rights, peace internationalism, and domestic reform (307-8).

Laudable and worthy goals to be sure. Yet Hixson's three-page conclusion fails to provide any realistic blueprint on how to achieve such utopian aims, nor does it consider the realities of geopolitics. Would China or Iran, for instance, accept an international order based on those principles?

Not that striving for such a world is wrong, of course, but the brief prescription strikes the reader as just a bit naïve and excessively idealistic. More disconcerting, Hixson never addresses key questions that derive from his conclusion. How would the nation annihilate these deeply embedded ideals? How would a consensus be created to replace them, and what might be substituted for the Myth? What would prompt this intrinsic and irrepressible cultural reality to fracture and lead to an era of international peace and prosperity? The only response he provides lacks substance. Societies, he claims, are susceptible to change, and he points to the histories of Germany, Japan, South Africa, and the Soviet Union as exemplars. Yet in each case he cites, reform occurred as the result of a dramatic upheaval. Does he suggest that the United States needs to experience change of that magnitude in order to make the requisite alterations? That part remains unclear.

Hixson's thesis represents perhaps the most inculpatory indictment of U.S. foreign relations since William Appleman Williams's *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. One could argue that it goes even further than Williams in its critique of America's interaction with the world. Hixson never shies away from controversy, incorporating language that is always unrepentant and uncompromising. Presentist concerns clearly influenced this book. It is patently obvious throughout that the argument owes its existence in large measure to Hixson's overt frustration with the Bush administration's foreign policy. And yet while his anger and vexation with and even hatred for contemporary policy (and politicians?) emerge with each attack, in Hixson's view the war on terror is simply the latest manifestation of the "violent aggression [which] inheres in national identity" (305).

Embedded in his interpretation is a strong dose of theory for which he provides a brief primer for the uninitiated in four appendices (309-318). Scholars like Michel Foucault, Antonio Gramsci, and Jacques Lacan provide an intellectual justification

for the thesis, and his reliance on them reflects his proclivities. Indeed, while lauding the virtues of deconstruction, psychoanalytic theory, and postmodernism, Hixson summarily dismisses empirical historians, arguing that a "preoccupation with archival sources and conventional methodology . . . crowds out critical thinking"

(4). This blatant rejection of the foundation of much of the work done by diplomatic historians will surely cause many to question Hixson's arguments, particularly since this synthetic treatment of the history of U.S. foreign relations is based in large part on the work of historians who have done the kind of archival research that Hixson impugns.

Given the nature and themes of my own work, I am sympathetic to the notion that domestic political considerations represent a crucial element necessary for a complete understanding of the way the United States makes and implements foreign policy. In addition, using culture to conceptualize ideas and frame the way in which decisions are made, documents are evaluated, and historical actors are judged opens up intriguing avenues of inquiry. Moreover, some of the most interesting work in our field in recent years has derived from cultural approaches and interpretations.² In these respects, the book has merit not only for scholars in the field but also for those who criticize diplomatic historians for lacking a theoretical foundation for their work. Hixson's focus on the "cultural turn" culminates nearly a quarter century of scholarship that incorporates innovative methodologies to help broaden our understanding of U.S. foreign relations from a vantage point beyond the Oval Office or Foggy Bottom.

Furthermore, Hixson makes a number of insightful (if not wholly original) observations as

The book unquestionably contributes to the burgeoning literature on recognizing and understanding empire in the American context, and it dovetails with scholarship on the militarization of society and culture in the United States.

he reexamines three centuries of American foreign policy. For example, he recognizes the centrality of the phenomenon of "blowback"—the unintended consequences of

actions that come back to haunt a country in later years. "Blowback" has become especially critical as the United States attempts to wrestle with problems in Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan that directly correlate

with previous U.S. policy initiatives (279-80). Hixson is also on solid ground when describing the racist character of American foreign policy, accurately contrasting the moral hypocrisy of the nation's democratic rhetoric with the racial tenor of its actions.³ More generally, Hixson intervenes in a number of historical conversations as he makes his argument. The book unquestionably contributes to the burgeoning literature on recognizing and understanding empire in the American context, and it dovetails with scholarship on the militarization of society and culture in the United States.⁴ But Hixson does not intend his book to be mere historiographical spackle. He wants it to be much more: a fundamental reordering of the way scholars and the public understand the history of U.S. foreign relations.

Lamentably, the book falls short of fulfilling these lofty ambitions. While it provides a thought-provoking thesis and a useful challenge to dominant paradigms, its approach is ineffective and will be sure to generate substantial controversy. The scope and complexity of its aims also result in a series of problematic claims and themes. For example, the "Myth of America" comes across as reductionist. As a way of interpreting American exceptionalism it is like looking through the wrong end of a telescope: what results is a very small picture that excludes a number of important details. Hixson admits as much in the introduction, calling the Myth an "essentialist trope" (15).

This admission is emblematic of a tangible defensiveness pervading the book. Hixson tries to preempt criticism of his argument (not unlike John Yoo in the plenary session at the recent SHAFR conference in Columbus) with such admissions and with the disclaimer that he does not consider the United States “uniquely evil,” but these comments only serve to alert the reader to potential problems in the book (16). Hixson’s retroactive moralizing is another pervasive problem. He ignores contextual realities and projects contemporary values, mores, and concerns onto the past, holding everyone from John Winthrop to John Quincy Adams to John F. Kennedy to a twenty-first-century standard of progressive idealism. Of perhaps greater concern is that in doing so he implicitly negates the legitimacy of any moral framework other than his own. That would be fine on a personal level, but not so much on an academic or scholarly one. Hixson is, of course, well within his rights to proclaim the superiority of his moral framework, but it weakens his critique significantly.

The incessant attacks on U.S. policy decisions obscure the historical record. The United States can legitimately be characterized as the villain in any number of episodes, but it has had successes as well, and, relative to the actions of other countries, American foreign relations have not been uniquely problematic. Hixson might characterize this criticism as a function of the Myth, suggesting that perhaps I have been assimilated into the matrix of consent. But a simple review of the documentary evidence that he derides supports the assertion. Hixson’s analysis lacks comparative context. He writes as if the United States acted in a vacuum and was the only important—or accountable—actor on the international stage. In doing so, he obscures the complexities of foreign policy and the context of American decision-making. This is especially obvious with the notion of turning a foreign people into an “enemy-other.” That notion is at odds with Jeffrey Engel’s conclusions in his fascinating study

of how the American tendency to personify international conflicts affects its policymaking. Engel argues that the United States has actually focused its international condemnation on individual leaders of antagonistic nations rather than their peoples.⁵

Perhaps the most telling flaw in Hixson’s book emerges with his discussion of consent for the Myth. If support for the Myth is in fact so widespread, then how does Hixson explain the need for presidents to “sell” war and other foreign and domestic policies to the American people? In the American context, war poses a crucial test of presidential leadership, requiring the chief executive to seek the endorsement of both the public and Congress for policies that demand the expenditure of blood and treasure. Why do presidents need to sell war if Americans spontaneously consent to it (2-3)?⁶ Hixson also makes the curious suggestion that the United States has “no choice” but to lash out militarily. That claim oversimplifies the decision-making process in the American political system and makes it appear overdetermined (304). Both these ideas rest on the assumption that dissent does not exist in any substantive way, but that argument, like the Myth itself, tends toward reductionism and limits the true meaning and influence of dissent in U.S. history. One need only read the section on Vietnam to realize that Hixson does not grapple with the role dissent played in the evolution of policy.

In some ways, *The Myth of American Diplomacy* reminds me of Mark Moyar’s *Triumph Forsaken*.⁷ While it is likely that both Hixson and Moyar would resent and bristle at the comparison, in each case the author brings a perceptible sense of moral superiority and a disdain for existing scholarship to his writing. Their books are permeated by unrealistic expectations about what

could or should have occurred if people had simply acted the way the authors would have acted or believed what they believe. In his 1950 presidential address to the AHA, Samuel Eliot Morison suggested that the historian’s task is to “understand the motives and objects of individuals and groups, even those that he personally dislikes, and to point out mistakes as well as achievements by persons and movements, even by those that he loves. In a word, he must preserve *balance*.”⁸ Unlike Ted Widmer or Walter McDougall, whose recent books (*Ark of the Liberties* and *Promised Land, Crusader State*) assess the broad sweep of U.S. foreign

The United States can legitimately be characterized as the villain in any number of episodes, but it has had successes as well, and, relative to the actions of other countries, American foreign relations have not been uniquely problematic.

policy and recognize not only failures but also successes, Hixson fails to incorporate any sense of proportion or balance into the construction of his argument.⁹

The Myth of American Diplomacy unfortunately falls short of Morison’s standard, but Hixson should be

applauded for his ambition. His book is certainly useful as a corrective to more nationalistic histories. It is also instructive as a synthesis of the contribution that cultural approaches can provide for our understanding of the American encounter with the world, and perhaps most importantly, it demonstrates both the promises and perils of such approaches to the history of American foreign relations. Yet the book’s faults will limit its impact and prevent it from having the influence that Hixson intended. The true value of *The Myth of American Diplomacy* may lie in the conversations and arguments it will provoke in graduate seminars, roundtables, and other venues.

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Notes:

1. H.W. Brands, *What America Owes the World: The Struggle for the Soul of Foreign Policy* (New York, 1998); and Walter McDougall, *Promised*

Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World since 1776 (Boston, 1997).

2. For representative examples of the way culture is used to analyze U.S. foreign relations, see Loren Baritz, *Backfire: A History of How American Culture Led Us Into Vietnam and Made Us Fight the Way We Did* (New York, 1985); Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, *Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945-1955* (Baton Rouge, 1999); Walter L. Hixson, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945-61* (New York, 1997); and Robert Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs* (New York, 1983).

3. Hixson's comments on the racial cast of U.S. foreign policy are supported by, among others, Mary Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton, 2002); Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, 1988), esp. chapter 3; and Michael L. Krenn, *The Color of Empire: Race and American Foreign Relations* (Washington, D.C., 2006).

4. There has been a plethora of outstanding books published recently that have examined the concept and definition of American empire in its many iterations. See for example Charles Maier, *Among Empires: American Ascendancy and Its Predecessors* (Cambridge, MA, 2007); Bernard Porter, *Empire and Superempire: Britain, America, and the World* (New Haven, 2006); Niall Ferguson, *Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire* (New York, 2005); and Andrew J. Bacevich, *American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy* (Cambridge, 2004). On the relationship between militarism and U.S. society and culture, see for example Andrew J. Bacevich, *The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War* (New York, 2006); and Michael S. Sherry, *In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s* (New Haven, 1997).

5. Jeffrey A. Engel, *Seeking Monsters to Destroy: How America Goes to War from Jefferson to George W. Bush* (Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

6. The nexus of foreign policy and domestic political considerations in the context of war and framing public perceptions of U.S. conflicts is the subject of Kenneth Osgood, ed., *Selling War in a Media Age: The Presidency and Public Opinion in the American Century* (University Press of Florida, forthcoming 2009).

7. Mark Moyar, *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1945-1965* (New York, 2007).

8. Samuel Eliot Morison, "Faith of a Historian," *American Historical Review* 56 (January 1951): 269 (emphasis in original).

9. See Ted Widmer, *Ark of the Liberties: America and the World* (New York, 2008); and McDougall, *Promised Land, Crusader State*.

the heated debates that the book has already prompted. As most readers of this newsletter know, a lively roundtable about this book was recently published on H-Diplo.¹ One roundtable participant notes that books, especially grand syntheses such as this one, tell us much about their authors. It could likewise be said that the discussion a book generates reveals much about the state of the field.

Hixson's book makes a case for considering how long-standing cultural ideas in American foreign policy served as a causative engine for policy and helped win public support for particular policies. In the historiography of American foreign relations, this approach, now decades old, is called "the cultural turn," an unfortunate term that makes the consideration of culture *per se* sound either like a fad or an abrupt departure. It is neither, I submit, and let me clarify why by addressing this issue as a means to opening my discussion of Hixson's book and its historiographic significance.

There appears to be misapprehension among some scholars in our field that paying attention to culture is somehow incompatible with or hostile to archival or "empirical" research. This misunderstanding catches cultural historians off-guard, because we take pride in our archival research; we are historians after all, not literary critics. Hixson is careful to show that his synthesis rests on historical scholarship that was derived from archival research; understandably, he believes that goes without saying. It does seem, however, that he is taking a pot shot at archival research when he says that "while diplomatic historians do a splendid job of mining the available archives, a focus on documents alone crowds out critical thinking and leaves diplomacy disconnected from the domestic culture from which it springs" (4-5). What he means, of course, is that archival research is not enough. One cannot treat archival documents as if they were puzzle pieces that a historian must merely put together to complete an accurate portrait of the past. In other words,

we should not assume the puzzle pieces in the archives, stateside or abroad, can tell the whole story. His statement is simply a plea for greater contextualization: scholars must consider what perspectives are un- or under-represented in the archives and read what is in the archives with greater nuance. By the latter, he means that diplomatic historians should consider not only *what* historical actors thought but also *how* they thought. This plea ought to be rather uncontroversial; what historian disagrees with adhering to our disciplinary methods with more care?

What makes Hixson's book controversial is his intensely critical view of "the domestic culture from which [U.S. policy] springs." It is not his focus on culture, but rather how he analyzes American culture, that raises hackles. After all, Samuel Flagg Bemis and Arthur Schlesinger also examined the cultural origins of U.S. policy. They, however, were not very critical of it. Indeed, Bemis celebrated American exceptionalism. Thus the source of contention in our historiographic debates about the cultural approach does not concern the legitimacy of examining the influence of American culture in U.S. policy, but rather the seeming condemnation of this American culture as racist, sexist, jingoist, and chauvinistic by many of those who study culture. This depiction of American culture will strike some as totalizing, tendentious and unfairly damning. Indeed, three of the four H-Diplo reviewers in the recent roundtable view it that way. Kurk Dorsey, Jeffrey A. Engel, and Bruce Kuklick read Hixson's sweeping narrative as a relentless story of just one bad thing after another, a "litany of woe" or, as Engel puts it, a "litany of tragic examples." Since Engel could have said "litany of outrages" or "litany of crimes," his choice of words reveals perhaps a conviction about there being "an admirable core to the United States." These are the words Dorsey uses to describe William Appleman Williams who, after all, characterized American diplomacy as a "tragedy." Dorsey evokes *Tragedy of American*

Review of Walter Hixson's *The Myth of American Diplomacy*

Naoko Shibusawa

Perhaps as interesting as Walter Hixson's *The Myth of American Diplomacy* itself are

Diplomacy to suggest that even Williams thought the United States has redeeming qualities, whereas Hixson does not.

To be sure, Dorsey is correct about Williams, but it is inaccurate to imply this about Hixson. As Hixson says at the end of his roundtable response, he is “more of a patriotic nationalist than [he] care[s] to admit.” One does not have to be a psychoanalyst to see that Hixson writes with a righteous anger from the perspective of a native son who was educated and socialized in what he calls the “American Myth,” a conviction that the United States has and continues to have a special role in the world as a beacon of freedom. His anger comes from a sense of betrayal that the nation-state’s policies and actions have so often violated the very principles for which it is supposed to stand. In other words, Hixson wouldn’t be so angry if it weren’t for the failure of the United States to adhere more faithfully to its “admirable core,” to its stated principles of democracy, equality, self-determination, and liberty and justice for all.

Hixson and at least two (and probably all three) of his critics, then, are all patriotic to the ideals of America. They differ in their interpretations of the agreed-upon facts: they cannot agree on which ones to emphasize and which ones to downplay or ignore. There exists—to put it perhaps too simply—a tendency to see the glass as half-full or half-empty. This basic difference regarding the U.S. state *roughly* differentiates the post-revisionists from the revisionists, the so-called traditionalists from the cultural historians focusing on race, gender, class, and empire. About this difference much ink has flowed and will continue to flow because all parties care about which stories should be told and passed on. One side fears the weakness that would stem from loss of pride in nation and inattention to security matters. The other side fears continuing complacency towards injustice and suffering. Others stand somewhere between these two positions, but whatever our aspirations as historians for “objectivity” or accuracy about

the past, the stories we think ought to be told are intimately tied to our personal notions of what a good and safe society should be.

The discussion about Hixson’s book, then, proves a basic point that Hixson is trying to get across: that the stories we Americans tell ourselves and others about our past and who we are as a people matter. On one level they matter especially to American scholars because, as Hixson’s subtitle implies, the stories are part and parcel of U.S. national identity. On another level we care, whether we are U.S. citizens or not, because we realize these particular stories about America have real, not imagined or fictitious, consequences. Call it the American Myth, American exceptionalism, or a narrative of American national greatness: this story that (European) Americans were fated (by God or by “History”) to create and then to spread (with violence, if necessary) institutions of democratic and enlightened governance has had profound effects—first along the eastern seaboard, then across and down the continent, and now throughout the world.² Ask the Iraqis; they know. Or, to use a conceivably more positive example, ask the Japanese whose parents and grandparents “embraced defeat” after World War II. Thus, to emphasize the role of this story in the making of history is not conflating fact and fiction, as Kuklick would have it. Imagined stories have had real consequences in the material world.

Kuklick seems to have been misled by Hixson’s use of the word “myth.” At least, he seizes upon it as a point of weakness that he believes reveals the author’s egoism and egotism. He observes that Hixson seems very sure of his own piety and the truth of his own interpretation, and then asks how we are to know that Hixson’s version isn’t itself mythic or false. Yet rather than challenging the empirically verified, historic examples that Hixson provides—Rhode Island’s slave trafficking, the Sand Creek Massacre, the CIA-engineered overthrow of the democratically elected governments of Iran and Guatemala—Kuklick

criticizes an easily misinterpreted sentence about the “ontological status” of the Cold War. Still, Kuklick has a point, I think, in challenging the word “myth.” Despite my deep admiration for Sacvan Bercovitch, whose terminology Hixson has borrowed, this word can be misleading. The “myth of American diplomacy” suggests that American diplomacy has been non-existent or false. Perhaps Hixson is arguing that the United States did not use diplomacy as frequently as it could have. But I do know that he is saying that what is mythic about American diplomacy is this notion that the United States serves humanity. I point out this semantic confusion because I believe that a resistance to examining culture in American foreign relations has made it necessary to ward off misinterpretation, willful or otherwise. This leads me to my next point.

There is a misconception that cultural history is at odds with a materialist approach or a focus on economic power. Yet this type of cultural history, which is concerned with how power is expressed and maintained, is Gramscian, and, as we know, Antonio Gramsci was a Marxist and a founding member of the Communist Party of Italy. While languishing in one of Mussolini’s prison cells, Gramsci wondered why Italian workers and peasants acted against their economic and political interests, choosing to support the ruling fascist regime rather than the socialists or communists. He concluded that elite classes held control by consent of the ruled through a cultural hegemony, by which he meant (and Hixson means) the everyday narratives and ideas that make socio-political hierarchies and economic inequities appear natural and commonsensical. An example of a “naturalized” narrative in the United States is the prevailing idea that this is “the land of opportunity” where anyone can “make it” and attain financial success with hard work and determination, even though statistics tell us that social mobility is much more limited than we are led to believe by our media, movies, school lessons, and

handed-down tales. Or, there is the notion that free trade (known as Open Door in the previous century) means fair and democratic access to markets, when facts show that the large and the powerful dominate markets and restrict access to them. Although such tales and notions are hegemonic and dominant in our cultures, they are not a result of a vast conspiracy by ruling elites to hoodwink the poor and disempowered. The reason why the notions remain hegemonic is because so many people, regardless of their socioeconomic status, believe in them.

That said, Hixson is probably as Marxist as William Appleman Williams, which is to say not at all. Although Gramsci's reasoning rings true to cultural historians of our sort, most of us find Marxism more useful in its ability to analyze the past and the present rather than to prescribe the future. We gravitate towards Gramscian analysis because we seek to understand, as I have mentioned, how ideas circulating in a culture define what a people perceive as reasonable and proper in governance and in the allocation of resources. We do so, admittedly, with a presumption that inequity and injustice have occurred and continue to occur. This means that when we consider *how* historical actors (say, policymakers) thought, we seek to understand what internalized conceptions they held about the way the world functioned or should function and how these conceptions in turn guided and framed their actions or thinking about a particular issue. We do so by paying particularly close attention to language, word choice, and metaphors. We often examine a wide range of primary sources—such as films, novels, media, educational tracts, scientific reports, and so on. But our close readings of primary sources include those usually consulted by

It is an imagined national identity that has been one among other causative engines driving foreign policy, and it has certainly been the major means of rallying the public behind any given policy.

diplomatic historians: the memos and documents in the archives of the state or influential policymakers, either in the United States or abroad.

Needless to say, I am quite sympathetic to Hixson's methodology and interpretations. I agree that Americans, over the centuries, have imagined their nation/community as white, virile, liberty-loving, fair, Christian, and benevolent. They have de-emphasized class status and depicted "the" American as vigorous and mature, neither childish nor senescent. This self-image has allowed Americans to justify aggression and/or paternalism towards inferior others. It is an imagined national identity that has been one among other causative engines driving foreign policy, and it has certainly been the major means of rallying the public behind any given policy.

I am, however, uncomfortable with using psychoanalytic theory to analyze a national identity or a nation's actions. It is one thing to see how historic subjects have anthropomorphized their nation and other nations. It is another to engage in a similar sort of anthropomorphizing. I make a plea in my book against depicting nations as individuals with a gender or a life span of "development."³ Therefore, I am not wholly convinced that a nation can have a psychic crisis, as Hixson argues. It seems to me that what works to analyze an individual is not necessarily useful in understanding a massive collection of people. More to the point, if a nation is an imagined community, can it have a crisis? Perhaps I am confused here: perhaps Hixson is saying that at certain points in American history, people have imagined that the nation was going through a crisis, and that imagined crisis in turn prompted some policy. Still, I think we ought to be very specific when we are talking about crises of this sort if we want

to prevent misunderstanding and promote further analysis. Let me explain by way of an example. Once, as a graduate student, I blathered to my advisor about there being a "crisis in masculinity during the 1950s." Michael Sherry sighed, "When is there *not* a crisis in masculinity?" Indeed, when? So I repeat the critique of the fourth H-Diplo roundtable participant, Robert Dean, who points out that we need more than a repetition of an idea or a catch-phrase for a specific analytic point to be illuminating.

Finally, Hixson proposes, and I agree, that Americans need a new hegemony (I would prefer to say paradigm) committed to equity. One way to start is to replace the American Myth or exceptionalist narrative with another story. We need to break out of the old hegemonic discourse into a new paradigm. Perhaps it is time to rethink the way we do surveys of American history. Most U.S. history surveys essentially narrate the story of the Anglo-American state from its establishment to its expansion to its development as a preeminent global power. This has meant that textbooks and survey lecture courses may begin with European/Amerindian contact and spend a few sentences or up to a few pages on the Aztecs, Mayans, or Incas before turning to Jamestown, the Massachusetts Bay Colony, the creation of the United States, and the teleological march westward. Surveys of American foreign relations are often surveys of U.S. foreign policy, and as such, may begin with the Revolution, when it could be said that the nascent United States conducted foreign policy.

Hixson takes the more expansive view and begins his narrative with contact. Perhaps he concurs with me that a survey of American history can be the narrative of the various peoples who lived within areas now encompassed by U.S. borders. This is also a story of "us," how we came to be one nation, as an imagined community and a people bound by U.S. federal laws. I would also guess that Hixson agrees that most of early American history can be construed as foreign relations with various peoples

interacting with each other and jockeying for power. Thus the history of American foreign relations need not start in 1776, or at the conclusion of the Seven Years' War, which many now agree marks the origin of the United States. Yet Hixson repeats the traditional trajectory, albeit with a more jaundiced eye. We learn little of what was happening on the continent beyond the purview of the expanding Anglo-American state. I am not necessarily taking him to task for this; it is incredibly difficult to put together an American survey course such as the one I propose. It requires much more knowledge than most Americanists have of the histories of Native Americans and of other European colonialists, particularly the Spanish. But I will say this: Hixson's own narrative proves his point about the hegemony of the American Myth. We seem to be able to critique it only on its own terms and are unable to break away from its grasp.

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Notes:

1. H-Diplo Roundtable Review of Walter Hixson, *The Myth of American Diplomacy: National Identity and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, 2008). Roundtable Editor: Thomas Maddux. Reviewers: Robert Dean, Kurk Dorsey, Jeffrey A. Engel, and Bruce Kuklick. H-Diplo Roundtable Reviews, Volume IX, No. 13 (15 June 2008), at <<http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/MythAmericanDiplomacy-Roundtable.pdf>>
2. "National greatness" is what Michael H. Hunt terms a version of this narrative in his seminal *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, 1987).
3. Naoko Shibusawa, *America's Geisha Ally: Re-Imagining the Japanese Enemy* (Cambridge, MA, 2006).

What National Identity Can and Cannot Explain: A Review of Walter Hixson's *The Myth of American Diplomacy*

Christopher Endy

Walter L. Hixson's new synthesis represents a major accomplishment. *The Myth of American Diplomacy* ties together important threads of the

cultural turn that has energized the field of international history over the last two decades. He achieves this feat with lively narrative and lucid prose. Although Hixson relies largely on secondary sources, even expert diplomatic historians will benefit from engaging with his bold and creative argument. That argument, briefly put, holds that U.S. foreign policy flows from a hegemonic national identity shaped by core values such as manliness and white supremacy and a belief in the nation's righteousness and Christian mission.

This national identity in turn has led the United States into a pattern of "choosing war." Not even World War II gets a pass, as Hixson deftly builds on scholarship to show how the "Good War" was also a war of choice for Americans. Each chapter offers ample examples of the influence of cultural presuppositions and values on U.S. foreign policy. In all, Hixson delivers an efficient and stimulating way to engage with the recent cultural turn across the full sweep of U.S. history. His book, with its many virtues, is likely to become required reading in graduate seminars.

This praise, however, does not mean that the book is immune from topical gaps and conceptual limits, particularly with regard to the ambiguous concept of national identity. Because Hixson's book is likely to remain for some time the most prominent and up-to-date culturalist synthesis of U.S. foreign relations history, it is all the more important that we consider what the book leaves unanswered.

One of the book's limitations relates to its topical coverage. To be fair, Hixson's breadth is impressive, and every author must make tough choices when writing a synthesis. Still, it is worth noting that the book does not offer a full survey of cultural approaches to U.S. foreign relations. The focus on war and "continuous militarism" means that Hixson pays little attention to recent scholarship

In Hixson's constructivist framework, identity is like the oxygen of foreign policy; no significant human action can take place without it.

on public diplomacy or on the use of art, music, literature, tourism, and movies as tools of foreign policy. The emphasis on war also marginalizes economic policy. The U.S. government's leadership in post-1945 international economic institutions, for instance, receives a brief, almost cursory treatment (174, 274-76). The theme of war and militarism cannot explain all the important

aspects of the U.S. government's engagement with foreign peoples and states.

Far more important is Hixson's treatment of "national identity," which

yields powerful insights but is also conceptually fuzzy.¹ Hixson's emphasis on identity and cultural constructivism in foreign policy has much to be said for it, especially when compared to alternative models that treat policymakers as rational actors pursuing putatively objective goals such as security or economic wealth. As Hixson capably shows, concepts like security have no fixed meaning. Policymakers, like all humans, draw on cultural perceptions and notions of self and other in order to define their goals and determine appropriate means for obtaining them. In Hixson's constructivist framework, identity is like the oxygen of foreign policy; no significant human action can take place without it.

This constructivist approach is familiar to diplomatic historians, even if Hixson extends the method further than most. In an introductory footnote, Hixson contrasts his approach with that of an earlier culturalist synthesis, Michael H. Hunt's *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*. Hixson acknowledges the importance of Hunt's 1987 book but also faults Hunt's treatment of U.S. policy as "a consistent program of action." Replacing "ideology" with "national identity," Hixson emphasizes that foreign policy "flows from cultural boundaries—discursive, representational, and ritualized" (319). His reference

to cultural boundaries seems to underscore the importance of self-other perceptions and perhaps also domestic social tensions. This is a sophisticated vision, but Hixson's resulting argument, which stresses a remarkable degree of continuity in U.S. policy, in practice still resembles the "consistent program of action" that he finds problematic in Hunt. The real differences between Hixson and Hunt lie elsewhere. First, although Hunt's book did not ignore gender and religion, Hixson takes advantage of recent scholarship to bring those categories into sharper focus. Second, and more fundamentally, their approaches to ideology and culture differ. Hunt stressed the need "to leave room for diverse nonideological considerations, such as a need for access to export markets and raw materials [and] preservation of essential national security."² Hixson in contrast takes a more pronounced stand on the constructed nature of interests.

In sum, what sets Hixson's book apart is its emphasis on "identity" as an umbrella category for explaining almost all forces driving U.S. foreign policy. This approach yields some brilliant insights, but at times it flattens complex historical processes. To continue with an earlier metaphor, identity might be like oxygen, but it takes more than oxygen to start a fire.

Both the value and the limitations of Hixson's use of identity emerge in his treatment of economic factors. In its early chapters, *The Myth of American Diplomacy* gives relatively little analytical weight to economic concerns. Hixson's concept of U.S. national identity in these sections revolves primarily around notions of gender, race, modernity, and religion, and he provides compelling evidence to support that concept. Then, at some point in the twentieth century, economic motives, particularly in the form of multinational corporate expansion, emerge as a more integral part of U.S. national identity (see, for instance, pages 146, 223, 225, 251, and 302).

Overall, Hixson's inclusion of economic factors within U.S. national identity is laudable. It reminds

us that economic interests, like security calculations, depend on some kind of cultural framework. Before Americans can attempt to gain influence over Middle Eastern oil or South American copper, they must first imagine that it is both natural and feasible for Americans to control other people's resources. This approach has drawbacks, however. It makes it difficult for historians to grapple with topics such as the political influence of American business or the global competition for natural resources. The "need" for oil might be a cultural construction, but once most of the world buys into this modernist construct, material factors such as access to the actual oil become pressing concerns. The OPEC oil embargo of 1973-74 generated intense cultural anxiety and market panic, but it also reflected the material reality of U.S. oil dependence. Thus, to argue that "national identity produced ... corporate expansion" in the Middle East after 1945 seems both accurate and one-dimensional (225).

The Myth of American Diplomacy might have offered a more comprehensive synthesis without undermining its core cultural argument by paying more attention to the material sources of American power. It is hard to imagine the United States waging the Cold War and choosing militarism in Vietnam, for instance, without its massive post-1945 material advantages. Technological power, economic productivity, and ample gold reserves made identity-laden goals such as "preponderant power" appear attainable and sustainable to Americans. Moreover, if a bold national vision was by itself enough, then Charles de Gaulle's France and Fidel Castro's Cuba would have been Cold War superpowers. That they were not suggests the crucial role of material factors, especially economic and military resources, alongside questions of identity and ideology.³

Hixson's inclusion of economic interests within the framework of national identity also leads to some confusion about the meaning of identity. In a discussion of U.S. militarism in the Persian Gulf, he

notes that "corporate hegemony and elite profiteering comprised a critical element of national identity." On the same page he stresses that "Americans did not rally for war behind the oil companies or corporate profits but rather behind the flag" (302). Hixson does not claim that large numbers of ordinary Americans embraced "elite profiteering" in the same way that they embraced pride in their nation's military power or religious mission. His argument is sensible, but it makes one wish for a more precise definition of national identity. Is there one type of identification driving elite Americans and another type of identification driving the mass media and public opinion? Or is "elite profiteering" a part of U.S. identity only to the extent that most Americans don't seem to object to the corporate profits that typically result from U.S. militarism?

One solution to this ambiguity is to draw a clearer distinction between factors that "drove consent for war" and factors that drove policymakers (302). This is not to argue for a conspiratorial vision of backroom corporate masters controlling U.S. policy. Still, the reasons behind the public or mass media's support for war could conceivably differ from the concerns that drive cabinet-level discussions or business-funded think tanks. Hixson does an excellent job throughout the book of including voices of counterhegemonic dissent, but his treatment of Americans' hegemonic, militaristic identity at times overlooks tensions or contradictions within that dominant identity. For instance, corporate expansion in the Middle East—most notably, oil company alliances with Arab states—did not always sit easily with support for Israel. Likewise, trade deals with the Soviet Union appealed to export-hungry U.S. businesses even though they upset many anti-communist conservatives. How did Americans negotiate these tensions? Which form of identification proved more powerful and why?

What at first seems a bold argument—that U.S. foreign policy has been driven by national identity—ends up being in some

ways a very safe argument. If identity comprises economic concerns, security fears, and domestic cultural trends, then the conclusion that identity drives

U.S. foreign policy becomes almost a commonplace. Hixson has in essence taken the economic and security arguments, which often stand as rivals to the cultural approach, and included them under the rubric of culture and identity.

This argument serves as an effective rebuttal to realist or triumphalist scholars who stress an innocent United States repeatedly forced to fend off aggressive foreign monsters. Yet the notion of identity-driven foreign policy still leaves ample room to debate which particular aspects of U.S. identity were most salient in any given episode.

Assessing the ability of identity to drive U.S. foreign policy also brings us to Hixson's conception of the policymaking process. In *The Myth of American Diplomacy*, national identity works almost like a trump card. Whenever some aspect of U.S. identity is at play, the U.S. government seems bound to respond in a militant way. A crucial feature in this model is what Hixson describes as an ongoing "psychic crisis" in U.S. society. This psychic crisis emerges from domestic social divisions that contradict the ideal of equality and unity among all members of the nation. By choosing to go to war, Americans attempt to overcome, or at least temporarily forget, their internal divisions through cathartic rituals of violence and patriotic unity. This model has its merits, but at times it leaves readers wanting more evidence to bridge the gap between domestic psychic crisis and policymakers' decisions to choose war. Hixson suggests, for instance, that anxiety over the women's suffrage movement was one factor that "underlay" the decision to fight in 1917, but readers still might ask how extensively gender anxiety shaped U.S. policymakers'

discussions or if it served primarily to facilitate the public's acceptance of Wilson's call to arms (120-22). To take a later example, Hixson asserts that U.S. support for right-wing Latin American dictators such as Augusto Pinochet flowed in part from images of those dictators as manly, light-skinned Catholics, but he offers no evidence to support that assertion (223).

Scholars such as Kristin Hoganson, Robert Dean, and Seth Jacobs have produced studies that are models for showing how domestic cultural concerns influence the foreign policymaking process.⁴ Where Hixson draws on such studies, his synthesis succeeds admirably. But where his synthesis moves too quickly or outpaces existing scholarship, the causal connections become murkier, and we are left to guess at how domestic social tensions worked their way through the policymaking process.

More attention to the role of identity in the policymaking process could also help us understand how U.S. policymakers sometimes managed to resist cultural pressures to go to war. Hixson's model of cultural anxiety yields considerable insights into those occasions when the United States chose militarism, from the War of 1812 through the 1983 Grenada invasion and two wars with Iraq. Regrettably, Hixson devotes little attention to times when the United States did not choose war. Why, for instance, did the United States pass up an opportunity to engage in cathartic violence in 1956 during the Suez Crisis or the Hungarian uprising? The domestic psychic crisis was in place, as mid-1950s Americans fretted over juvenile delinquency, the 1953 Kinsey report on women, and the emerging civil rights movement. Why didn't Americans choose to fight? Similarly, why did it take so long for Americans to embrace violence during the massive psychic crisis of the Great Depression? By avoiding

questions like these, Hixson misses an opportunity to develop further his model linking identity with policymaking. Rather than seeing "national identity" as producing only one policy outcome, he might think of U.S. national identity as multivalent and capable of leading the United States toward but also away from war, depending on how deeply held American myths relate to military and diplomatic conditions, policymakers' personalities, and other historical contingencies. Public opinion and domestic crises might create pressure for choosing war, but these pressures still must be funneled through the policymaking process, in which all sorts of factors, including the military strength of potential opponents or the likelihood of support from allies, help determine when and where the U.S. unleashes its military.

Despite these shortcomings, Hixson's book is still the best kind of synthesis. It pulls together several decades of scholarship into a sorely needed single narrative. Newcomers to the field will find that it provides an important overview of the cultural approach to the history of international relations. Experts will benefit from grappling with Hixson's stimulating argument about the influence of religion, race, gender, modernization, and nationalism on U.S. foreign policy. Even the book's limitations are fruitful. Those sections where Hixson's causal connections seem thin provide us with a roadmap indicating where we need more scholarship that draws on the insights of the cultural turn. And while international relations historians need to refine their use of concepts like national identity, Hixson's work provides an invaluable springboard for collective discussion. Those qualities, in a nutshell, are why the book should find a place on graduate student reading lists for years to come.

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Notes:

1. The scholarly embrace of the term "identity"

has recently drawn some criticism, particularly from Frederick Cooper and Rogers Brubaker, who see the word as hopelessly imprecise. Their critique of the word applies most directly to scholars who study subgroups within a nation or who study non-national communities such as African tribes. Their specific suggestions have somewhat less relevance for historians of U.S. foreign policy, primarily because U.S. history reveals a relatively strong and persistent set of shared myths and values. Still, Cooper and Brubaker's essay serves the valuable purpose of reminding us to think carefully about how we use phrases like national identity, and their sensibility informs my reading of Hixson's book. See the chapter co-written by Brubaker and Cooper in *Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley, 2005), 59-90.

2. Like Hixson, Hunt observes that foreign policy visions were "rooted" in domestic divisions and inequalities. Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy* (New Haven, 1987), 12, 16, 196.

3. For a cogent argument on the value of incorporating social history's best features into the cultural approach, see William H. Sewell, Jr., *Logics of History: Social Theory and Social Transformation* (Chicago, 2005), esp. pp. 22-80.

4. Kristin L. Hoganson, *Fighting for American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars* (New Haven, 1998); Robert D. Dean, *Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy* (Amherst, MA, 2001); and Seth Jacobs, *America's Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia* (Durham, NC, 2004).

Response from Walter Hixson

Of course, I want to begin by thanking Mitch Lerner for organizing this Roundtable review of *The Myth of American Diplomacy* and Chris Endy, Andrew Johns, and Naoko Shibusawa for the energies they have brought to it. I appreciate their acknowledgment that the book has some value and was especially pleased by Endy's comments that "even the book's limitations are fruitful" and that it represents "the best kind of synthesis." That said, it is more productive to focus on the criticism of the book.

Rather than deal with each review consecutively, I will try to address some of the major issues the reviewers raise.

Morality

In a previous Round-Table on H-Diplo, Bruce Kuklick first

advanced the canard that I asserted my "own moral superiority" in the book. Andrew Johns has now unfortunately parroted this remark, so let me address this matter first.

The Myth of American Diplomacy identifies the regular resort to violence and militarism that characterize the history of U.S. diplomacy. It argues that a militant foreign policy is hegemonic within American culture and that it therefore marginalizes dissent, impedes domestic reform, and precludes the establishment of an alternative diplomacy. Beyond that, I locate within the nation's patriotic culture such practices as ethnic cleansing, massive destruction of civil societies, support for murderous and oligarchic regimes, and U.S. "leadership" in militarizing the planet through arms trafficking.

The book is thus an analytic synthesis of the history of U.S. diplomacy. Nowhere do I assert my own personal morality; I am not trying to start a new religion here.¹ My supposed claim to moral superiority is a red herring employed in an effort to dismiss the arguments of the book itself. After all, if Hixson has the temerity to assert that he is morally superior, or if he is just in a rage about U.S. foreign policy, then the book's substance becomes irrelevant and can be summarily dismissed. This tactic reminds me of the remark of an eminent diplomatic historian (I will not name him now or later) I encountered in the hall at the last SHAFR conference. When I told him I was heading for the "Is SHAFR Sexist?" session, he advised me knowingly that one of the participants was "a very angry young woman," implying that there was therefore no need to take the session seriously.

These are two good examples of how marginalization, or attempted marginalization, works within a given culture. Ad hominem argument is hardly an original tactic, and it often works, but ultimately it is the

province of those who are failing to command an argument on its merits.

Identity, Materialism, Hegemony

Both Endy and Shibusawa grapple directly with the central arguments of the book, offer insightful criticism, and ask some important questions. Endy's critique centers on two issues: the emphasis I place on "the ambiguous concept of national identity," which he finds dubious, coupled with a call for "more attention to the material sources of American power."²

Unstinting U.S. support for Israeli apartheid has flown into the face of Arab opposition and has cost the United States dearly in a number of ways and on several occasions.

Endy is uncomfortable with what he sees as an overemphasis on an "umbrella" concept of identity to the exclusion of economic motivation or causation in U.S. diplomacy. He calls for using the concept

of identity in a more conceptually limited or flexible way, pointing out as one example that "corporate expansion in the Middle East—most notably, oil company alliances with Arab states—did not always sit easily with support for Israel." But this point helps make my argument: unstinting U.S. support for Israeli apartheid has flown into the face of Arab opposition and has cost the United States dearly in a number of ways and on several occasions. Yet because of the cultural drives behind the American embrace of Israel, the policy has remained unchanged, regardless of its impact on the interests of oil companies or even the U.S. economy and "national security." But ultimately Endy is on firm ground in his insistence that material considerations are critically important; I could well have emphasized them more in the book.

In contrast to Endy, Shibusawa does not appear troubled by the "umbrella," averring that "it is an imagined national identity that has been one among other causative engines driving foreign policy, and it has certainly been the major means of rallying the public behind any

given policy.”³ Endy himself even notes (albeit in a footnote) that “U.S. history reveals a relatively strong and persistent set of shared myths and values.” We must always be careful about the use of any all-consuming trope, and I admit in the book to a tendency toward reductionism in order to drive home the argument. In the end, however, I find national identity much more persuasive than the Open Door or nationalist orthodoxy as the force that fuels a continuous diplomacy.

I wish Endy would grapple more with the role hegemony plays in all this. I do not use hegemony in the economic sense, as Thomas McCormick does, for example, in *America's Half Century*. Rather, the concept of hegemony as I and scholars such as Andrew Johnston employ it derives primarily from Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe but formatively, as Shibusawa notes, from Antonio Gramsci.⁴ Central to this argument is the notion that all societies operate on the basis of some sort of hegemonic construction. Hegemony is what results from cultural processes whereby certain ideas and ways of life are privileged over others within a society. In the final analysis, all nations are imagined communities—they depend on discourse and representation for their very identities. The essence of the American imagined community is the notion that the nation is a beacon of liberty and, as it is “bound to lead,” possesses a special right to intervene and use power, including the regular resort to war, as it sees fit. Not everyone agrees, of course, as hegemony always implies resistance, but that opposition (for example peace internationalism) is typically muted or marginalized and does not itself achieve hegemony within the society. Shibusawa embraces the primacy of culture, as she points out “the reason the notions remain hegemonic is because so many people, regardless of their socioeconomic status, believe in them.”

Ultimately, I argue, the hegemonic discourse and representations that comprise the myth of America must be replaced by an alternative

hegemony that emphasizes building a more progressive domestic society and pursuing a multilateral course of cooperative internationalism. Reviewers such as Johns, Engel, and Kurk Dorsey deride this notion and demand that I spell out how the new hegemony over foreign affairs is to unfold. The book argues, however, that the essential first step is to deconstruct the current hegemony in order for such a dialectical process to have a chance to play out. As the responses of these critics suggest, we are yet a considerable distance from any meaningful unpacking of the prevailing hegemonic regime. That said, there is no shortage of visions of peaceful internationalism and many steps toward this end have already been taken (typically over U.S. opposition). The International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Treaty, and the efforts of myriad non-governmental organizations such as Amnesty International all come to mind.

Criticism of Historians

Since diplomatic history has been so badly battered over the years, especially by scores of social historians who helped ensure that all too many college students do not learn anything about the subject, it is not surprising that I struck a raw nerve with this oft-quoted sentence: “While diplomatic historians do a splendid job of mining the available archives, a focus on documents *alone* crowds out critical thinking and leaves diplomacy disconnected from the domestic culture from which it springs.”⁵ First, note the high praise that anchors the sentence. I also make it clear, as Shibusawa acknowledges, that the book itself is “wholly dependent” on archival-driven work by diplomatic historians. She explains that my “statement is simply a plea for greater contextualization.”

The point is not that there is anything wrong or any problem with archival research—I’ve done a good bit of it myself. It is important; it produces knowledge; and I know it to be hard but gratifying work. History, of course, would be barren without it. That said, the field of

diplomatic history, like most fields of history, still operates too much within the confines of a Rankean positivism that holds that history is to be found (in the archives) and not made through narrative. Broadening our perspective, which would include legitimating the use of theory, will enhance understanding and, moreover, make history and historians more relevant in society.

The crucial point to grasp is that when historians decline to deconstruct the nation’s hegemonic foreign policy, they affirm the dominant narrative. Liberals especially fail to grasp this point. Therefore their opposition to specific foreign policy actions (such as the Iraq War) ultimately fails to usher in meaningful change, because they remain captive to the national mythology. When liberals such as John Kerry or Barack Obama vow to do a better job of hunting down evil enemies, they affirm the hegemonic regime that drives the nation’s unilateral and militarized foreign policy.

By clinging so tightly to empiricism, historians marginalize themselves. They risk becoming what Friedrich Nietzsche called the “eunuchs of history . . . who dress up in the part of wisdom and adopt an objectivist point of view.” Michel Foucault likewise pointed out that the historian tends to “silence his preferences and overcome his distaste, to blur his own perspective and replace it with the fiction of universal geometry, to mimic death in order to enter the kingdom of the dead, to adopt a faceless anonymity.”⁶

As I argue in the book, “The past will be shaped and made usable within the culture; the issue is whether the historian chooses to enter into the discussion.” If history can be useful in the cultural work of forging a new hegemony, of moving toward a safer and more peaceful world, we need not shy away from theory—because ultimately all historical interpretation is “theoretical”—nor from condemning the current discursive regime in no uncertain terms. “Interpretation,” Joan Scott explains, “is the means

by which we participate in shaping reality.”⁷ Thus, Andrew Johns is correct: “presentist concerns clearly influenced this book.” But he is wrong when he claims (in yet another ad hominem assault) that it is “patently obvious” that my “argument owes its existence in large measure to Hixson’s overt frustration with the Bush administration foreign policy.” Like many, I am plenty frustrated with this repugnant administration. But we should also be “frustrated” by our national history of domestic ethnic cleansing, regular resort to war, and support for oligarchic and murderous regimes worldwide.⁸

Psychic Crisis

If the highly divergent reviews of this book agree on any one thing it is that use of “psychic crisis” as an interpretive frame makes them feel, as Shibusawa delicately puts it, “uncomfortable.” While other reviewers who are themselves of course far too wise to indulge in such nonsense disdain my “naïve” use of the term, Shibusawa tries at least to advance the discussion through her own statements “I am not wholly convinced that a nation can have a psychic crisis”—and by asking excellent questions: “If a nation is an imagined community, can it have a crisis?”

In the book I contextualize “psychic crisis” in the introduction and in a brief but I think important appendix. I am not wedded to the term, which of course Richard Hofstadter used most famously, because no language can perfectly capture an idea. What I do not think we can do is dismiss the entire realm of psychology as if it plays no role in nations or world affairs, simply because our discipline does not equip us to deal with it very effectively, and it thus makes us uncomfortable. Empirical historians have long disdained “psychohistory,” which they perceive as wildly subjective even as they fail to interrogate the ultimate subjectivity of objectivity.⁹ But can we really understand, say, Nazi Germany, or Mao’s China, or concepts such as Orientalism and post-colonialism

without some understanding of the psychology of the peoples affected? What was the “Vietnam syndrome” if not a “psychic crisis?” Was it not acknowledged as such by the national security elites who strove so hard to eradicate it and ultimately did so through a combination of re-framing the history of the Indochina War and waging a new war in the Persian Gulf?

As I strove to think of other ways to respond to Shibusawa’s probing questions, I realized that she provided the answer herself with the vignette in which she describes herself as a graduate student asking Michael Sherry about the “crisis of masculinity.” Sherry responded astutely, “When is there not a crisis in masculinity?” And that is the point: as Freud, Lacan, and others have shown us, there is always a measure of psychic crisis in human affairs. Moreover, as the mainstream historian Michael Kammen points out, “We arouse and arrange our memories to suit our psychic needs.” It thus seems a reasonable task for the historian to attempt to explain when and why psychic crises might occur, how they affect the course of history, and, just as important, how “psychic needs”¹⁰ influence historical narration. While it may be standard practice, the alternative—to ignore psychology—is not productive of knowledge. No doubt I have dealt with this concept imperfectly in the book. I invite others to respond constructively, as Endy and Shibusawa have done: ask questions and provide some answers of your own.

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The author acknowledges David Zietsma for his critical reading of this essay.

Notes:

1. It is telling that the three most vociferous critics (Kuklick, Engel, and Johns) do not and cannot quote me in proclaiming some guru-like superior moral vision. The terms they use—“own moral superiority,” “his moral framework,” etc.—are strictly their own.
2. I do not think it is accurate to suggest that I do not deal with material forces until the twentieth century. In fact, I deal with

the rise of modern capitalism, slavery, the market revolution in the early republic, and the economic impact of the Civil War and industrialization in the late nineteenth century. But Endy is right: I do place more emphasis on the twentieth century, primarily because of the impact of dollar diplomacy, the depression, the two world wars, and the military-industrial complex.

3. Yet Shibusawa shares with many critics some doubt about the utility of the “myth of America.” Though she correctly reads me as “saying that what is mythic about American diplomacy is the notion that the United States serves humanity,” she also identifies some “semantic confusion.” The “myth of American diplomacy,” Shibusawa notes, “suggests that American diplomacy has been non-existent or false. Perhaps Hixson is arguing that the United States did not use diplomacy as frequently as it could have.” But this is not the primary argument. The myth of American diplomacy is the myth of America—the hegemonic national mythology—though it is certainly true that the nation often eschews diplomacy in favor of the raw exercise of power.

4. Andrew M. Johnston, *Hegemony and Culture in the Origins of NATO First-Use, 1945-55* (New York, 2005); Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (New York, 2001); Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*, ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Smith (New York, 1999).

5. In quoting the offending sentence above, I have placed emphasis on the word *alone*, which perhaps I should have done in the book.

6. Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” in Paul Rabinow, ed., *The Foucault Reader* (New York, 1984): 76-100. This essay should be required reading for any historian.

7. Joan Scott, “After History?” in Keith Jenkins and Alun Munslow, eds., *The Nature of History Reader* (New York and London, 2004): 267.

8. The ad hominem (and also derivative) nature of the attack inheres in Johns saying in essence, “Hixson is just an angry critic of Bush’s war”—which I don’t address until the tenth and final chapter of the book—“so there is no need to consider his arguments in the other nine chapters or the book as a whole.” Johns also errs when he writes that “one need only read the section on Vietnam to realize that Hixson does not grapple with the role dissent played in the evolution of policy.” I discuss the course of the Indochina wars in a chapter on neocolonialism and then contextualize the antiwar movement in the next chapter on the postwar reframing of Vietnam within American culture, which Johns apparently missed. See especially page 251, where I “grapple” quite directly with the role of dissent in the war and its aftermath.

9. The classic work on this subject is Peter Novick, *That Noble Dream: The “Objectivity Question” and the American Historical Profession* (New York, 1998).

10. Michael Kammen, *Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture* (New York, 1993): 9.

CALL FOR APPLICATIONS

“Turning Points in the Cold War”

The 2009 SHAFR Summer Institute at the University of Wisconsin-Madison

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations will hold its second annual Summer Institute at the University of Wisconsin-Madison on June 29-July 3, 2009. The Institute is designed for college and university faculty and advanced graduate students, with priority this year being given to the latter group. The Institute will pay each participant an honorarium of \$500 and cover expenses of travel and accommodations.

Fredrik Logevall of Cornell University and Jeremi Suri of the University of Wisconsin-Madison will co-direct the Institute, titled “Turning Points in the Cold War.” The Cold War dominated international affairs in the second half of the 20th century, and the scholarly literature on various aspects of the struggle is large and growing larger. Here the focus will be on turning points, on those moments when the nature of the struggle shifted (or appeared to shift) in an important way. The approach will be global, with due attention given to decision-making not only in Washington and Moscow but in other world capitals as well. Broader subjects to be addressed will include: structure vs. human agency in Cold War studies; the role of domestic politics in foreign-policy-making; the influence of ideas and culture; and the impact of the nuclear revolution.

All participants will be required to read a significant amount of relevant secondary literature, before and during the Institute. Substantial time will be devoted to discussion of that literature, broader historiographical debates, and selected primary sources. Students who have ongoing research projects related to the seminar’s focus will be mentored, as appropriate, by the host faculty. Those who are interested in beginning research on one of the seminar’s themes will be encouraged and guided by the host faculty in choice of topic, research design, and writing plans.

The deadline for applications is February 1, 2009. Applicants should submit a one-page letter detailing their interest and explaining how participation would benefit their careers. Submit materials (and pose any questions) to Jeremi Suri at suri@wisc.edu. Decisions about acceptances will be distributed in February.

The Institute will run from Monday, June 29 to midday on Friday, July 3. It will follow on the heels of the 2009 SHAFR Annual Meeting, to be held in Falls Church, VA, on June 25-27.

The Institute will make use of facilities at the Wisconsin Veterans Museum, as well as the campus of the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Madam Ambassador: An Appraisal of Jeane J. Kirkpatrick as U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1981-1985

Keith Hindell

Jeane Kirkpatrick was catapulted into America's most high-profile diplomatic post on the strength of an article she wrote in November 1979 for *Commentary*, entitled "Dictatorships and Double Standards." A professor at Georgetown University and a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, she had been an active Democrat for many years but became very disillusioned with President Carter's foreign policy, especially with regard to Central America. Impressed by her article's argument that traditional authoritarian regimes were less repressive than revolutionary autocracies and therefore more compatible with American interests, Governor Ronald Reagan recruited her as a foreign policy adviser for his presidential campaign. "It was like being courted," she confided years later.¹ She was nominated as ambassador to the United Nations by the president-elect in December 1980 and confirmed by the Senate in January 1981.

Once appointed, she excited more interest than any other UN ambassador since Adlai Stevenson in the 1960s. Despite making some bad mistakes early on, she attracted plaudits from the public and politicians in the United States and Israel and was showered with honors, awards, and invitations to speak. It was an indication of her popular fame that a chair at Harvard was named in her honor, as was a brigade of the Contras fighting to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. She reached her zenith at the Republican Convention in August 1984, where her star blazed for a few minutes as she hammered the Democrats, who "always blame America first."² Reagan repeated

the phrase and incorporated it into his own phraseology. He was still smitten, telling a journalist in October that "an awful lot of people would be ready to mark the ballot if Jeane Kirkpatrick ran for anything."³ Even after she resigned, he twice credited her with turning around a tough situation at the UN, and he professed he had wanted to find her another post but there was nothing in the White House worthy of her talent.⁴ Such was her reputation.

In the event, her diplomatic career was finished when she was fifty-eight, while her putative political career never started. Popular adulation among the right-inclined and among pro-Israel groups continued to furnish her with many well-paid platforms, but none that elevated her to office or returned her to government. What then were her achievements in her only significant post?⁵ Did the political science professor with no diplomatic training or experience shine as an ambassador at the UN? Did she advance the standing of her country at the UN, as Reagan thought? Were her diplomatic maneuvers effective in winning votes and support for the US? As the only American ambassador who held cabinet rank, did she influence foreign policy? I offer a reporter's view on her tenure from 1981 to 1985.⁶

When she was appointed, most media attention concentrated on her article, "Dictatorships and Double Standards."⁷ It certainly contained some striking ideas and neat turns

of phrase. It concentrated most of its fire on American policy towards the Shah of Iran and General Somoza of Nicaragua. She described both of them as "moderates" and declared that they were let down by the Carter administration in their hour of need. It was her view that traditional, authoritarian governments such as theirs were more susceptible to liberalization and more compatible with American interests. They left traditional ways of life in place, and "because the miseries of traditional life are familiar," she wrote, "they are bearable to ordinary people." "Such societies," she went on, "create no refugees," in contrast to revolutionary communist regimes, which "create refugees by the million." This was

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the era when hundreds of thousands of boat people fled from Vietnam and Cuba. She failed to mention that just as many people had migrated or

fled from wretched or coercive Latin American regimes.

In view of all the horrors inflicted by juntas in Argentina, Chile, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Peru, Paraguay, and Brazil, it was bizarre to speak up for "traditional autocracies." Nevertheless, her argument had resonated well with Reagan and some of his advisers. According to Reagan's first secretary of state, Alexander Haig, Kirkpatrick spoke up for Jean-Claude Duvalier in Haiti and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines to the very end. Could anyone make a worse judgment than that? Even among friendly

dictatorships some are surely so venal and so incompetent that it cannot be in any government's interest to support them.

The article in *Commentary* was a well-written manifesto for Cold Warriors. However, quite apart from her general thesis, she made one error of judgment that later made her blush. "Although there is no known instance of a revolutionary 'socialist' or Communist society being democratized, right-wing autocracies do sometimes evolve into democracies," she wrote. Ten years later the Soviet Union, its European satellites, and most of its third world client states evolved into some form of democracy.⁸

At her confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Alan Cranston refused to accept her description of Carter's foreign policy as a failure. Did she reject the Camp David agreement and the Egypt/Israel Peace Treaty? Or the normalization of relations with China? Or the Panama Canal Treaty? Well, she muttered, the treaty had not been finalized when she wrote her article. So had it had bad results, pressed Cranston? Well . . . not so far, she admitted.⁹

In her opening statement she unwisely boasted of "first-hand knowledge of virtually every corner of the world," but two senators showed she was not so familiar with the business of the United Nations. Larry Pressler asked a series of questions to which she could give no answer. Did the United States need a separate ambassador for the Law of the Sea negotiations? Or the Moon Treaty? Or global economic negotiations? Was Reagan going to advance nuclear disarmament with the Soviet Union? She had no answer.

Edward Zorinsky drew attention to three human rights instruments that were awaiting ratification by the Senate—the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and

Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. She admitted she had not read any of them and then apologized for having to say so many times to these and other questions, "don't know," "not sure," "I'm going to study that," etc.¹⁰

Finally, Joseph Biden undercut her ridicule of the Carter administration's record at the UN. He pointed out that the United States had persuaded most developing countries to vote against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, to deny Cuba a seat in the Security Council, and to stop the Vietnamese regime in Cambodia being recognized at the UN. In a written statement, he warned that her more confrontational style might well vitiate these gains. The committee recommended her appointment by a 16-0 vote, but few reporters or commentators, if any, followed up on her various lacunae.

Despite being exposed as being less than the master of her brief, she scorned an induction proffered by the State Department and underlined her view by appointing three outsiders to key positions in the UN mission, rejecting candidates from the Foreign Service. Instead, she took induction briefings only from the White House staff, in part because her instincts were political rather than institutional and in part because she realized that the center of power and decision-making on foreign affairs would be on Pennsylvania Avenue rather than at Foggy Bottom. She also began with an acute aversion to the new secretary of state, Alexander Haig, a dislike that

That petty, unprofessional piece of revenge exposed the deep divisions in Reagan's cabinet and was unbecoming for a serving ambassador.

adversely affected her first eighteen months at the UN. Two years after Haig left office, she let rip at him during a question-and-answer session with The Women's Forum in New York. "I'm sure Alex Haig thought he was going to wipe me out in the first nine months in the job, and he didn't."¹¹

That petty, unprofessional piece of revenge exposed the deep divisions in Reagan's cabinet and was unbecoming for a serving ambassador.

The Reagan team that came into

office intent on reversing much of Carter's foreign policy nevertheless took months to hit its stride with new, clearly defined policies. When she first presented her credentials to UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, Kirkpatrick did not give a proper news conference. Instead, her officials set up a microphone in the foyer of UN headquarters and informed the media that "she would pass by and might say a few words." Confronted by a media throng, she made a short statement and answered a few questions before being whisked away, leaving the impression she could not yet cope. A proper State Department briefing might have made her better informed over a wider range of subjects and helped her to explain some policies with which she did not agree—a common task for all diplomats.

At her first extended news conference she responded to a sharp question as she would have responded to a student, saying "If you'd read my book you would know the answer to that question." She could not answer questions about global economic negotiations, Namibia, and South Africa because they were still "under review." Only on Israel did she give a clear, substantive answer. Kirkpatrick declared that the intention of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Arab states to challenge Israel's credentials at the UN was "illegal, undesirable and extremely noxious."¹² Throughout her time at the UN she was at her best defending Israel, and consequently the Israelis were among her most enthusiastic supporters. Not that she blindly endorsed Israel "right or wrong." When Israel destroyed the Iraqi nuclear plant at Osirak in June 1981, she played an active part in drafting a resolution in the Security Council that censured the attack. Even though America had no diplomatic relations with Iraq, she negotiated directly with the foreign minister, Sadoon Hamadi, and staved off the imposition of sanctions. She told a new recruit to her staff that she "negotiated" the word "aggression" out of the resolution, against the advice of State Department lawyers.

A more flamboyant demonstration of her view of Israel came when Prime

Minister Menachem Begin addressed the General Assembly in June 1982. Begin gave a poor and obscure address on disarmament, quoting from the Hebrew prophets to explain why self-defence was among the "noblest concepts of mankind." As he left a half-empty chamber to get into his car, Kirkpatrick rushed out to embrace him at the entrance.¹³

Kirkpatrick got the job at the UN in part because of the Latin American expertise she acquired while writing her book, *Leader & Vanguard in Mass Society: A Study of Peronist Argentina*. But that expertise led her into her worst mistake on policy and her most embarrassing moment at the UN. In her second year as ambassador she tried to apply her knowledge and her view of "traditional autocracies" to the Falkland Islands dispute. The day after the Argentine invasion, she hoisted her colors by attending a dinner at the Argentine embassy in Washington. "I took the position that the US should remain neutral; to be pro-British would have had a very negative effect with Latin American countries. As could be seen in the speeches at the United Nations, they would be deeply alienated by the US supporting Britain."¹⁴ Her action then and throughout the crisis certainly had "a very negative effect" on the British ambassador to Washington, Sir Nicholas Henderson, who complained repeatedly to Haig about her.¹⁵

Initially, America supported Security Council Resolution 505, which called on Argentina to withdraw. When President Galtieri rejected the resolution, Haig tried to mediate by shuttling between the two sides, although he says he was never neutral and told the Argentines at the start that the United States would support Britain if negotiations failed. As ever, Haig did not feel confident of support from the White House, where he thought some key advisers regarded the affair as something of a comic opera. He also felt that Kirkpatrick was "closer to the President than I had ever been."¹⁶ Before Haig's mission actually began, Kirkpatrick argued in the White House for a position of long-term neutrality, only to be blown out of

the water by the deputy director of the CIA, Admiral Bobby Inman, who described it as "the most wrong-headed position" he had ever heard. To Haig and Inman, the Atlantic Alliance was far more important than any relationship with Argentina.¹⁷ It was strange that such a committed Cold Warrior as Kirkpatrick could not see that. She seemed to be letting her Latin American expertise cloud her overall judgment.

In his book *Caveat: Realism, Reagan & Foreign Policy*, Haig ruefully states that his efforts in the Falklands "ultimately cost me my job." He says he admired Mrs. Kirkpatrick and on most policy issues agreed with her. However, on the Falklands their views were "unreconcilable" (sic). "Each of us believed the other's position was contrary to the best interests of the United States."¹⁸

During Haig's shuttling between London and Buenos Aires, Kirkpatrick turned a blind eye to official policy and met with various Argentine officials in her Waldorf Hotel suite in New York, including Deputy Foreign Minister Enrique Ros. About the same time she complained to her staff that Haig was impossible: "he called (phoned) to yell at her for twenty minutes."¹⁹ In a speech two weeks after the invasion but before the fighting began, she responded to critics who cited her behavior and views as further evidence of the administration's preference for authoritarian, non-democratic regimes. On the contrary, she maintained, American neutrality was a means to prevent Argentina from invoking collective action under the Rio Treaty if Britain were to press home an attack.²⁰

In the event, the Falklands affair ended very badly for her. Not only was her advice rejected, but she made herself and the administration look incompetent right under the spotlight of an open Security Council meeting. As British forces closed in on Port Stanley, opinion at the UN shifted towards Argentina. Now that Britain was no longer the victim, her original supporters in Resolution 505 melted away. Four members of the council changed positions with the change in the wind. Ten days before

the Argentine surrender, the council voted 9-2 in favor of an immediate ceasefire and the implementation of the two original resolutions 502 and 505, which Argentina had ignored for ten weeks. This was unacceptable to Britain because it did not set a timetable for Argentine withdrawal and would have left Argentine forces in place in some parts of the islands.

The British ambassador, Sir Anthony Parsons, had announced in advance that Britain would veto such a resolution, so his negative vote was no surprise. Nor, indeed, was the negative American vote unexpected. A few minutes later, however, diplomats in the chamber gasped as Kirkpatrick shamefacedly announced that she would like to change her vote "if that's possible." It was too late and in any case would have made no difference to the outcome as the resolution had been killed by the British veto. By her totally unnecessary intervention, she had unnerved her closest ally yet got no credit from the Latin Americans, whether they were democrats or autocrats. She explained that her government had instructed her to state, for the record, that it actually wanted her to abstain. Kirkpatrick told reporters that her "instructions came too late."²¹ She confided to her staff that "she had been set up by Alexander Haig for public humiliation."²²

This episode laid bare the relative impotence of the UN ambassador within any U.S. administration, despite being of Cabinet rank, and it was also a reminder that size and technical competence are not always an advantage. The American administration is so huge it creates its own internal tensions and bottlenecks that too often result in poor decisions or slow decisions, which sometimes amount to the same thing. In this case, Kirkpatrick claimed that it was all a matter of communications. Although Britain had made its position clear on this draft resolution for the previous three days, she claimed that she heard only on the afternoon of the vote that Britain was not interested in exploring other amendments. Her instructions to veto, she told reporters, were then

confirmed by high-ranking State Department officials, although they did not reach Haig, who was in Paris. The final instructions to abstain came without explanation too late and were followed by further orders to state in public how she should have voted. "Throughout," said Kirkpatrick, "I acted on instructions from my government."²³

But who was "my government"? Was it the White House or the State Department or the secretary of state? The attempted abstention revealed that on this issue the hydra-headed administration could not make up its mind where its interest lay. A day or two later, Kirkpatrick pleaded *mea culpa* in a speech to the American Heritage Foundation. In the previous eighteen months, she said, she had become "deeply impressed with American incapacities at the United Nations." She claimed that ambassadors and assistant secretaries of state for international organizations had been changed far too frequently: on average they stayed only eighteen months. "By not learning the rules, the players, the game, we have often behaved like a bunch of amateurs."²⁴ This was one of several public criticisms of the State Department she made during her time at the UN.

This episode occurred after almost eighteen months of a resentful collaboration with Haig, during which she several times thought she would be dismissed. Luckily for her, it was Haig who resigned in June 1982, for reasons that she could appreciate. The White House was run by a small group of men who had their own agenda and had something near contempt for foreign affairs expertise. She did not see eye to eye with the next secretary of state either, although their differences did not flare up so obviously, since George Shultz was more balanced and skillful than Haig. When in 1983 Kirkpatrick's name was mooted for national security adviser, Shultz was very much opposed. He thought her

strength to be "passionate advocacy," which made her unsuitable for the job. "She was not a dispassionate broker and faithful representative of divergent positions that the National Security Adviser needs to be."²⁵

Kirkpatrick did not get her way over the Falklands, but she was much more influential on Central America. She strongly supported the Contras in their campaign to subvert the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. During a White House meeting in June 1984 with Reagan, Shultz, and other cabinet officers, she said that if Congress would not vote money for the Contras "then we should make maximum efforts to find the money elsewhere."²⁶ Along with James Baker, the president's chief of staff, Shultz thought that searching for alternative funds for the Contras, contrary to the expressed will of Congress, was an impeachable offence.²⁷ Nevertheless, this policy was later put into effect by Oliver North and others while the president looked the other way.

Where Kirkpatrick did score well with her abrasive public diplomacy was over the American invasion of Grenada in 1983. This time she had most of the Latin Americans behind her and most of the Caribbean states as well—it was after all an anti-Communist operation. Besides the Soviet bloc, Britain was her most credible diplomatic critic, but this time the British were powerless to influence the outcome. In the aftermath of a bloody power struggle among Marxist Grenadian politicians, the United States had stepped in to restore order, protect American students at a private medical school, and eject Cuban forces from the island, not necessarily in that order.

In two speeches to the Security Council on successive days in

In two speeches to the Security Council on successive days in October 1983, Kirkpatrick made a plausible case for the invasion, although it was clearly contrary to the UN Charter.

October 1983, Kirkpatrick made a plausible case for the invasion, although it was clearly contrary to the UN Charter. In the first speech, she made it clear that the United States acted mainly to protect its own citizens from

the risks of disorder and a shoot-on-sight curfew. However, primed by the prime minister of Jamaica, Edward Seaga, for her second speech, she used a detailed account of "a brutal military takeover of a civilian government" as the reason for protecting Grenadian citizens and American medical students alike.²⁸ Britain was very unhappy with the toppling of a Commonwealth government, particularly as it was done entirely without consultation, but once it emerged that the governor general had actually pleaded with the Organization of East Caribbean States and the United States to rescue the island from a nasty regime, it did not press its displeasure by casting a negative vote in the Security Council. Asked by correspondents if she felt betrayed by Britain because it did not reciprocate America's support during the Falklands campaign Kirkpatrick replied, "Yes. Britain, I should point out, not only failed to support our operation in Grenada, she condemned it. I never suggested that we should condemn Britain's policy in the Falklands. My most extreme position was that we should remain publicly neutral."²⁹

In the Security Council debate, some forty countries spoke against the invasion, while Britain abstained. The vote was 11-1 to deplore the invasion and to demand U.S. withdrawal. The United States was saved from further censure in the council only by its own veto.

Six weeks later the General Assembly discussed essentially the same resolution. An overwhelming majority condemned the invasion, with only the eastern Caribbean states voting with the United States. An attempt to bring the resolution back onto the main General Assembly agenda in 1984 failed, so Kirkpatrick never had the opportunity to deliver an eleven-page lecture in which she claimed the United States had saved Grenada from "the cruel fate of the people of Afghanistan." Instead, she published it in *Strategic Review*. If the General Assembly had deplored the rescue of Grenada, she wrote, it would surely have meant "the end of the dreams and hopes of the United Nations."³⁰ Such hyperbole would

not have been a sensible utterance for an ambassador. She should have known that the UN was a durable institution where her country would always need representation, whatever the political temperature or the wording of the last resolution.

At her confirmation she had criticized what she termed “doublespeak at the UN” and declared that she was “profoundly convinced that speech is action—and important action.”³¹ During her time at the UN, Kirkpatrick delivered seventy speeches in public sessions to the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the Third Committee (the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee). In addition, she addressed congressional committees on American influence at the UN and the U.S. contribution to the UN budget. Beyond that, she spoke to many civil, society, and academic audiences on UN-related themes, as well as writing many articles. She was very energetic, and more an advocate than a diplomat. “I am not a professional diplomat,” she said when appointed. “I’ve not signed over my conscience and intellect.”³²

It was her forthright speech-making that captured the approval of the American and Israeli public. Even here she made a slow and uneasy transition from academe to diplomacy. Her early speeches and press conferences were unimpressive. Her style was involved, often oblique, almost persnickety, and delivered in something close to a gabble. In her first UN debates she was easily eclipsed by other performers. However, over her four years at the UN, she certainly improved her style of public diplomacy. She learned that the “class” whom she now had to address and persuade—i.e., diplomats, bureaucrats and journalists—were not necessarily antipathetic to American policy just because they expressed skepticism or asked hard questions. Once she got into her stride she usually hit a rhetorical bulls-eye, but it was sometimes weighed down or lost amidst a sea of academic explanation and analysis. She probably helped to sustain the morale of America’s friends and the Soviet Union’s

enemies but may have lost a few votes as a result. She seemed to think that her sermons on political science would inhibit opposition to American policy, but they did not have a marked effect on voting patterns of member states. They certainly played well with public opinion and with the president but by her last year she realised the key policymakers in the White House were unimpressed. Why else would she cite a campaign of bitter innuendo and character assassination as a reason for resigning?³³

Finally, did she properly gauge the United Nations as an institution? Despite being a professional political scientist she had difficulty making up her mind. Early on, she had been scornful of the UN and of the American record there. Then, in the wake of the Falklands war, she praised both the new secretary general, Javier Perez de Cuellar, and the institution. Long before the end of her term, however, she reverted to a posture of public disgust that so many governments could reject her arguments and that the other western governments too often preferred to dodge important issues by abstaining. Actually abstention does not usually mean that a country cannot make up its mind; it means rather that it does not want to offend other states whose help or votes it may need to achieve something else. “Generally speaking,” she told an interviewer in 1987, “the UN is ineffective. It is a seriously bloated, overblown, international bureaucracy with a lot of the worst aspects of many international bureaucracies combined. The budget is basically out of control and so is personnel. . . . Its impact on us, our values, our friends is largely negative.”³⁴ That was not the well-balanced judgment of a diplomat who knows that she has to make the best of the system. The UN has many faults, but they only reflect the disparities of wealth, religion, ideology, culture, and political development that exist in the world.

While Kirkpatrick had shunned State Department advice and kept Foreign Service officers in subordinate positions in the UN mission, it seems the distrust and hostility was mutual.

To give up on the UN is to give up on the world.

While Kirkpatrick had shunned State Department advice and kept Foreign Service officers in subordinate positions in the UN mission, the distrust and hostility seemed mutual. The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection provides a revealing view from her peers of her policies, character and performance.³⁵ Twenty five FSOs who had close contact with her in New York, Washington or Latin America proffered an opinion about her. Four of them admired her forthright exposition of the administration’s policy and her eagerness to rebut criticism, especially from unsavory governments. She was a “feisty lady,”

said George F. Jones in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, but with “no moral distinctions at all.” Gilbert Kulick, another FSO at State, affirmed that Kirkpatrick was effective in implementing the administration’s policy, though he thought the policy was wrong. He described her as “a dyed-in-the-wool UN hater.”

Several contributors to the collection commented on the tension in the UN mission between her chosen politicians and the professionals. Her first deputy chief of mission, Marshall Brentem, whom she later derided in her own oral history interview, accused all her political appointees of having “a paranoid attitude towards staff.” David Adamson, a political officer at the UN mission, made a telling comparison with Andrew Young, who was ambassador from 1977 to 1979. Young’s emphasis was on practical diplomacy, while Kirkpatrick’s was on rhetoric. The director of UN political affairs in the State Department, Carl Dillery, said Kirkpatrick was not anti-UN as such but was definitely not a “consensus builder.” Roger Sorenson, ambassador to the UN agencies in Rome, was shocked to find that Kirkpatrick disregarded America’s treaty obligations to pay its UN

contributions, thereby diminishing the UN's capacity to carry out its mandate.

Despite Kirkpatrick's undoubted expertise in Latin American affairs, most of the FSOs in this field were critical. George Jones, who accompanied her on a tour of Latin America, censured her for refusing to see a human rights leader in Uruguay and an opposition leader in Chile. Gilbert Callaway, a public affairs counsellor in Managua who guided the Kissinger commission around Central America, in 1983, thought it remiss of her to refuse to go to Nicaragua. Overall, the collective assessment of her ability would be that she was competent and trenchant but also blinkered and opinionated.

The climax of her career occurred at the Republican convention in Dallas in 1984. For a few minutes she delighted the whole party. Her rhetoric raised the roof. In her most partisan speech while UN ambassador, she ridiculed the Democrats, who had just held their convention in San Francisco. "When Marxist dictators shoot their way into power in Central America the San Francisco Democrats don't blame the guerrillas and their Soviet allies. They blame United States policies of a hundred years ago. But then they always blame America first." Four times she belted out that refrain—"they always blame America first"—to great applause.³⁶ Reagan even repeated it as if it were established fact rather than a partisan tirade. When she reprinted this speech four years later she acknowledged the help of three pillars of the neo-con persuasion: namely, Norman Podhoretz, Irving Kristol, and Bill

Buckley (and their wives).

But for an ambassador it was surely too partisan? She was a political appointee, but she still represented the whole country at the UN. Even with a spoils system it was surely unwise to lambaste the loyal opposition who could have won the presidential election or the congressional election three months later. Curiously, no one appears to have criticized her for this, though I suspect professional Foreign Service officers must have winced. This speech showed conclusively that she was indeed not a diplomat but rather an advocate. Despite his somewhat dewy-eyed admiration for her, Ronald Reagan did not offer her a senior post in his administration. The applause and enthusiasm so apparent at the convention and in so many public meetings at which she was the guest speaker never developed into substantial political support.

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Notes:

1. James Mann, *Rise of the Vulcans* (New York, 2004), 98.
2. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, *Legitimacy and Force* (a collection of speeches and articles), 2 vols. (New Brunswick, NJ, 1988), 1: 147.
3. Ronald Reagan, *Public Papers 1984* (Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1987), II: 1699.
4. Reagan, *Public Papers 1984*, II: 1842, 1894.
5. She was recalled briefly by President George W. Bush in 2003 to lead the U.S. delegation to the UN Human Rights Commission.
6. I have not considered her standing as an academic either before or after her service as UN ambassador.
7. *Commentary*, Nov. 1979; reprinted in *Dictatorships & Double Standards* as Chapter 1 (Washington, DC, American Enterprise

Institute, 1982).

8. Kirkpatrick, *The Withering Away of the Totalitarian State & Other Surprises* (Washington, DC, AEI Press, 1990).
9. Nomination of Jeane Kirkpatrick. *Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 15 Jan 1981*, (Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 81-4.
10. *Nomination*, 88-91.
11. Kirkpatrick, "Reflecting on the Falklands." *Legitimacy and Force*, 2: 216-19.
12. My dispatch to BBC Radio N. 83, 25 Feb 1981.
13. Allan Gerson, *The Kirkpatrick Mission—Diplomacy Without Apology: America at the United Nations, 1981-84* (New York, 1991), 153.
14. "The Battle in the White House." BBC Radio 4, 4 April 2007. Her contribution was recorded in 1992.
15. Alexander Haig, *Caveat: Realism, Reagan & Foreign Policy* (London, 1984), 269.
16. "The Battle in the White House." BBC Radio 4, 4 April 2007.
17. Laurence I. Barrett, *Gambling with History—Ronald Reagan in the White House* (Garden City, NY, 1983), 237.
18. Haig, *Caveat*, 269.
19. Gerson, *The Kirkpatrick Mission*, 125.
20. Kirkpatrick, *Legitimacy and Force*, 2:216-19.
21. My dispatch N. 404, 3 June 1982.
22. Gerson, *The Kirkpatrick Mission*, 130.
23. My dispatch N. 406, 4 June 1982.
24. Kirkpatrick, *Legitimacy and Force*, 1: 215-20.
25. George P. Shultz, *Triumph and Turmoil* (New York, 1993), 414.
26. Theodore Draper, *A Very Thin Line-- The Iran-Contra Affairs* (New York, 1982).
27. Shultz, *Triumph and Turmoil*, 414.
28. Kirkpatrick, *Legitimacy and Force*, 2:233-4.
29. *The Daily Telegraph*. Obituary, 9 Dec 2006.
30. Kirkpatrick, *Legitimacy and Force*, 1: 238-49.
31. Nomination of Jeane Kirkpatrick, 7.
32. *The Times*, Obituary, 9 Dec 2006.
33. *The Times*, 3 Dec 1984.
34. Interview with Ann Miller Morin, 28 May 1987, in *The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies & Training*.
35. Seventy-three interviewees in the collection mention Kirkpatrick. The seven quoted are George Jones (46), Gilbert Kulick (6), Marshall Brement (7), David Adamson (11), Carl Dillery (29), Roger Sorenson (30), and Gilbert Callaway (34).
36. Kirkpatrick, *Legitimacy and Force*, 1: 417.

The Status of Women in Diplomatic and International History: A Report

Prepared by the SHAFR Ad Hoc Committee on the Status of Women:

Frank Costigliola (co-chair), Petra Goedde (co-chair),

Barbara Keys, Anna K. Nelson, Andrew Rotter, Kelly Shannon

In the summer of 2007 SHAFR President Richard Immerman authorized the formation of an ad hoc committee on the status of women. There was little doubt that much had changed for women at SHAFR since the founding meeting in 1967, when one woman, Betty Miller Unterberger, joined seventy-nine men to form the organization.¹ But the continued underrepresentation of women in positions of prominence within SHAFR seemed worthy of investigation.

The committee set itself the following tasks:

1. to gather and analyze data on female membership, women's representation in governance and committees, and women's share of scholarly contributions in *Diplomatic History* and *H-Diplo*; and
2. to begin to determine how women fare in the field of diplomatic and international history and why their numbers remain below those in comparable organizations.

With the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the status of women, SHAFR follows other academic organizations in exploring the status of women within their ranks. Those include the AHA, the American Political Science Association, as well as individual universities.² Their findings show some common challenges faced by many women in academia. They include balancing family and work, which often leads to a lower rate of publication for women early in their careers; lower rates of tenure and promotion (in part because of the above); lower salaries; a glass ceiling within departments and universities; and difficulty breaking

into "old-boy" networks, especially in fields long dominated by men. Research on women in academia also shows that barriers to full and equal advancement exist even when there is a lack of intentional, overt discrimination. One study, for example, found that male and female academics rated women's achievements as lower than men's, even when they were identical.³ Many of these problems cannot be solved within the confines of this organization. Nonetheless, SHAFR can take steps to ensure that it is governed by processes that are fair and transparent and that offer equal opportunities for advancement on the basis of merit.

The committee's findings show that women's representation in virtually all areas of the field has increased considerably over past decades. The findings also point to continued underrepresentation of women in crucial areas of the organization and within the field. The committee suggests that this underrepresentation may be due to factors external to merit-based considerations, and in particular that women in international history may be disproportionately affected by lingering predispositions to define the field in ways that marginalize non-traditional approaches. After outlining the committee's findings, the report offers suggestions that could help to eliminate the potential problems it identifies.

The data in this report were collected by this committee, the SHAFR Business Office, and the editorial staff of *Diplomatic History*. The committee would like to thank SHAFR's Business Office and the

Editors of *Diplomatic History* for their assistance.

Women in Diplomatic and International History


Since SHAFR's founding in 1967, female membership has risen gradually. The original 79 plus one members grew to 700 men and 53 women ten years later (with women comprising 7% of the total). By 1990 there were 162 women members, or 12% of the total. In 2007 women represented 19% of members (see Appendix 1).⁴

In the last decade the number of women in the organization appears to have remained fairly steady, ranging from 248 to 286. Women's rising share of SHAFR membership—which grew from 16% in 1996 to 19% in 2007—however, appears to be due less to the addition of women than to declining numbers of men.

Women graduate students represent a growing proportion of many other academic organizations, including our counterpart organization in political science, the International Studies Association (ISA). Because we do not have data on the status of members, we do not know whether increasing numbers of women graduate students are joining SHAFR, but the absolute numbers suggest the growth rate is quite small. We also do not have any data on the rates of progress women SHAFR members make as they advance from graduate study through the academic ranks.

Women (along with minorities) are more poorly represented in history than in most other humanities and social science fields. Women currently

Figure 1:
Percentage of Articles by Women
in Diplomatic History



receive about 40% of new History PhDs and comprise about 30% of the profession.⁵ The representation of women in diplomatic history is considerably lower than their representation in history in general, as the data below show.

In contrast, women's representation in political science and in international relations is much higher than in our organization, and women represent nearly identical proportions of both fields. In 2004, women represented 32% of the members of the American Political Science Association and of the International Studies Association.⁶ The higher representation of women in international relations (IR) as a subfield of political science compared to diplomatic history may be due to the very broad definitions of IR employed in the International Studies Association, which has sections, for example, on ethnicity, nationalism, and migration studies, feminist theory and gender studies, human rights, and international organization. The experience of the ISA suggests that the proportion of women in SHAFR might rise if it were perceived as espousing a broad conception of the field. The committee's informal consultations with women historians suggest that there are considerable numbers of women scholars working on topics that fall under the rubric of "international history" who are not members of SHAFR.

Diplomatic History

The number of women publishing articles in SHAFR's journal *Diplomatic History* (DH) has been highly variable (see Figure 1). Although in 1988 not a single woman appeared in any category (article author, book reviewer, and author of book under review), the trendline indicates a steady increase in women authors over the last 20 years.

In the last five years, there is no significant difference between women's representation as DH article authors and their membership in SHAFR.⁷ In particular, in the last three years women have been represented as DH article authors at or above their SHAFR membership levels.

It is worth noting, however, that women have consistently been better represented as SHAFR paper presenters than as DH article authors.⁸ SHAFR presentations arguably represent a rough guide to the pool of potential DH articles, if one assumes that the presentation of a paper at SHAFR represents one stage in the preparation of an article manuscript in the field of international history. Comparing SHAFR presentations with DH articles, we find a statistically significant difference in the proportion of women (see Figure 2).⁹ In the last five years, women as article authors represent slightly over 70% of their numbers as conference

presenters:

- Average percentage of DH articles written by women, 2003-2007: 17.5%
- Average percentage of SHAFR presentations given by women, 2003-2007: 24.5%

Among the possible explanations for the disparity are that men are more likely eventually to publish what they present at SHAFR and that women publish in venues other than DH in higher proportions than men.

According to DH's data, manuscripts by women were accepted at higher rates than those by men (31% compared to 24%) in the period between January 2004 and June 2008. (DH uses a double-blind review process.)

The situation with regard to books reviewed in DH is similar to articles published.¹⁰ The percentage of book reviews devoted to books written by women is slightly lower than their membership in SHAFR, but not significantly different.

The situation of women book reviewers in DH seems to present the clearest case of a potential problem. Women are significantly underrepresented relative to their numbers in SHAFR, constituting a statistically significant difference (see Figure 3).¹¹ Moreover, in contrast to the article and book data, recent years show a stark downward trend. In 2006-2007, 56 books were reviewed by men. Six (9.5%) were reviewed by women.

The averages over the last five years are as follows:

- Average percentage of DH book reviews by women, 2003-7: 12.5%
- Women SHAFR members (average of 2007 and 2003 figures): 18%¹²
- Average percentage of SHAFR presentations given by women: 24.5%

It is striking to compare the number of books by women that get reviewed with the number of women who are asked to review books. One would expect that the numbers would be

very similar. They are not.

- **Average percentage of reviewed books authored by women, 2003-7: 17%**
- **Average percentage of DH reviews by women, 2003-7: 12.5%**

SHAFR Annual Meetings


Women have consistently been more highly represented as presenters at SHAFR conferences than as members of SHAFR. In the last five years, women, while about 18% of the membership, have given 24.5% of the papers. The disparity suggests the possibility that women who present at SHAFR choose to join the organization at lower rates than men, or that women SHAFR members present papers at higher rates than men.

Women have consistently been much more poorly represented as panel commentators than as paper presenters (see Figure 4). In the last five years, women have appeared as commentators only at 60% of their number as presenters:

- **Average number of women presenting papers, 2003-2007: 24.5%**
- **Average number of women commentators, 2003-2007: 14.5%**

The situation for female panel

Figure 2:
DH Article Authors and SHAFR Presenters



chairs is roughly similar (see the data in Appendix 3). Women consistently appear as both chairs and commentators in considerably lower proportions than their membership in SHAFR. The rate of increase in the percentage of women as commentators is rising very, very slowly.

There are two main possible explanations for these disparities. The first is that women may be disproportionately concentrated in junior ranks and hence be less likely to be considered for positions perceived as requiring seniority. The stability in membership numbers for women over the last decade does not support this explanation. The second is that panel organizers (male and female) may prefer male

commentators and chairs, possibly because men are perceived as carrying more “weight” in the field.

H-Diplo

H-Diplo is the major electronic forum for SHAFR members. Its subscription list most likely overlaps to a significant degree with the SHAFR membership roster and its editorial board includes many prominent SHAFR members. The main function of H-Diplo is to review books and serve as a “discussion network and Web site dedicated to the study of diplomatic and international history, broadly defined.”¹³ One of its most prestigious features is the publication, since 2000, of a series of roundtable reviews on “key works” in the field. The glaring underrepresentation of women in H-Diplo, particularly in the roundtable reviews, should thus be of concern to SHAFR. Between 2000 and June 2008, H-Diplo organized 51 Roundtables. Only three of these featured single-author books by women, and of these three, two appeared in 2008.¹⁴

Women wrote 35 or 12% of the roundtable reviews. In the last five years (2003-2007), women authored 12% of the 98 regular book reviews (see Appendix 5).

Figure 3:
DH Reviewers and SHAFR Members





Figure 4:
% Women at SHAFR



Gender Representation by Sub-Field

The committee also analysed the gender ratio within subfields. It compiled data from *DH* articles between 1977 and 2007 on the subjects covered by male and female authors as well as books reviewed in H-Diplo roundtables between 2000 and 2008 (June). It categorized articles into two broad groups:

1. policy / security / intelligence / economics, and
2. culture / gender / race / non-governmental international relations.

These categorizations are necessarily imprecise, given the fluid boundaries among topic areas and the arbitrariness of such classifications. The data should thus serve only as a rough indicator of the broad trends within the field. For easier classification we have labelled these approaches traditional (1) and non-traditional (2).¹⁵

The data suggest a correlation between the number of articles by women and the number of articles on non-traditional topics. In other words, low numbers of articles by women coincided with low numbers of articles on culture, gender, race, and other non-traditional topics.

In *Diplomatic History*, both women's and non-traditional contributions increased starting around 1994. Prior to that date, the rate of articles taking a non-traditional approach hovered at about 4%; women's contributions

averaged about 7%. Since then they have averaged around 21% and 17%, respectively.

If we look at the subjects men and women have written about since 1994, we find that women have written in equal numbers in both areas (51% traditional, 49% non-traditional topics). Men, on the other hand, have written disproportionately on traditional topics (85% traditional, 15% non-traditional).

If we look at the gender proportion within each subfield since 1994, we find that the proportion of female authors in the non-traditional group is about 38%, roughly equivalent to the gender ratio within the American Historical Association and the International Studies Association. In the traditional subfield women make up 11% of the article authors (see Appendix 6).

The figures for H-Diplo exhibit the same trend. Of the 51 books reviewed in roundtables, four (8%) were on non-traditional topics. Three of the four were written by men, one by a woman. Within the traditional subfield women wrote 5% of the books. Within the non-traditional field, women's contributions rose to 25% (see Appendix 5)

The data above corroborate the committee's observations concerning the reasons for the higher proportion of women within the International Studies Association (see Section 2). The policy / security / intelligence subfield will most likely remain a male-dominated field. Yet with

the recent explosion of works in international and transnational history, *DH* can tap into a rich pool of studies with a much higher proportion of female authors. The more broadly *DH* defines itself, the more likely it is to attract women. If *DH* were actively to recruit article submissions in these non-traditional areas, it would most likely attract more female contributors. The same would be the case for H-Diplo and presumably for SHAFR conferences and membership as well.

Conclusions

The data above represent a starting point for a comprehensive investigation of women's roles in SHAFR. Much more remains to be done, including a survey of women's representation in the governing structure of SHAFR as well as their representation on appointed committees. Nonetheless, the available data allow us to draw the following conclusions:

- Women are far better represented today than they were four or even two decades ago.
- SHAFR is still lagging behind other comparable organizations (including the international relations branch of political science) in female membership.
- Women's article submissions to *DH* are lagging behind their contributions at SHAFR conferences.
- Women are disproportionately underrepresented in positions of authority such as book reviewing and serving as SHAFR conference commentators and chairs.
- There appears to be a culture at H-Diplo of giving greater recognition to books by men than to those by women, regardless of merit, and of giving strong preference to traditional subfields within international history.
- Women contribute to non-traditional subfields at a significantly higher rate than men do.

Recommendations of the Committee

1. Make the ad hoc committee a

standing committee.

2. Collect more data on women's participation in the governing structures of SHAFR, including appointed committees and elected offices. Ask the SHAFR business office and *DH* editorial office to keep data on gender on file for periodic review. Ask the SHAFR business office to collect data on gender and status (graduate students, assistant, associate or full professors, etc.).

3. Develop a networking program for junior faculty and new SHAFR members. This could include the following:

- Organize a breakfast or happy hour session for new SHAFR attendees where they can get to know SHAFR council members and senior historians (male and female), receive some useful information about the organization, and network in an informal setting.
- Set up a workshop at each SHAFR conference on a career-related topic such as applying for grants, finding a job, publishing, and so forth.
- Contact first-time conference participants prior to the conference and offer assistance in the form of introductions and alert women to special sessions at the conference for newcomers.

4. Establish a link on the SHAFR homepage to the women's committee with information, including this and subsequent reports, and links to other reports and resources.

5. Provide *DH* with a list of qualified women scholars in the field of international and diplomatic history who could be asked to submit articles (either peer-reviewed or commissioned) and write book reviews.

6. Explore the possibility of changing the name of SHAFR's journal from *Diplomatic History* to a title that signifies a broader conception of the field of international and transnational history. Possibilities

include: *Diplomatic and International History; The U.S. in/and the World; U.S.-Global History; Journal of Diplomatic and Transnational History; Journal of International History.*

7. Include a list of childcare options at the annual conference venue in the SHAFR conference program and on the SHAFR program website.

Frank Costigliola is SHAFR President and Professor of History at the University of Connecticut.

Petra Goedde is Associate Professor of History at Temple University.

Barbara Keys is Lecturer in History at the University of Melbourne.

Anna K. Nelson is Distinguished Historian in Residence at American University.

Andrew Rotter is Professor of History at Colgate University.

Kelly Shannon is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of History at Temple University.

Notes:

1. Betty Miller Unterberger, "Present at the Creation: Reflections on the Organization and Growth of SHAFR," *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 3 (June 2007), 383-4. (Unterberger recounts that it was not until 1977 that she got her first woman graduate student; she also notes that in "the early years"—presumably the early 1960s—there were no women in her classes.)

2. See the AHA's *Report on the Status of Women, 2005*, online at <http://www.historians.org/governance/cwh/2005status/intro.cfm> [accessed July 5, 2008]; and the APSA's Report on "Women's Advancement in Political Science," March 4-5, 2004; available online at <http://www.apsanet.org/imgtest/womeninpoliticalscience.pdf>. [accessed July 5, 2008]. Perhaps most prominently Harvard University launched a Task Force on women in 2005 after President Lawrence H. Summers' controversial remarks about women's under-representation in the sciences. See report in *Harvard Gazette*, February 3, 2005, at <http://www.hno.harvard.edu/gazette/daily/2005/02/03-taskforce1.html> [accessed July 5, 2008]. See also the now dated but still relevant report by the Association of American Colleges from February 1982, "The Classroom Climate: A Chilly One for Women?" online at the Educational Resources Information Center (ERIC), Document No. ED215628 at <http://eric.ed.gov/> [accessed July 5, 2008].

3. Male and female academics were asked to evaluate a CV. All participants were sent the same CV, but half the CVs were identified as belonging to a man, the other half to a woman. Respondents typically rated the achievements of the "female" job applicant less favorably. Rhea Steinhilber et al., "The Impact of Gender on the Review of the Curricula Vitae of Job Applicants and Tenure Candidates: A National

Empirical Study," *Sex Roles: A Journal of Research* 41, nos. 7/8 (October 1999), 509-28.

4. All figures in this report have been rounded to the nearest 0.5.

5. On faculty data, see Robert B. Townsend, "Federal Faculty Survey Shows Gains for History Employment but Lagging Salaries," *Perspectives on History* (March 2006), at <http://www.historians.org/Perspectives/Issues/2006/0603/0603new1.cfm> [accessed 23 April 2008]. Women comprised 30.4 percent of History faculty in 2003. History had the seventh smallest proportion of women of the 26 fields in the survey, as women comprised 42.5 percent of the faculty in all fields. On PhD recipients, see idem, "Undergraduate History Degrees Continue to Grow in Number," *Perspectives on History* (November 2007), at <http://www.historians.org/perspectives/issues/2007/0711/0711new3.cfm> [accessed 23 April 2008], which says that women received 40.8% of History PhDs in 2004-5.

6. Marijke Breuning and Kathryn Sanders, "Gender and Journal Authorship in Eight Prestigious Political Science Journals," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 40 (April 2007): 347-51.

7. All statistical tests run in this report were 2-tailed paired Student's t-tests of arcsine-transformed data. In this case, the test yielded $P=0.27$.

8. A statistically significant difference is an indication that a difference is not caused by random variation, but rather that intervening factors are producing a difference. In more rigorously scientific terms, a statistically significant difference is one that meets an *a priori* level of probability. In our case, it is an indication that there is at least a 95% chance that a difference is not caused by random variation.

9. Data compiled by the *DH* Editors show that women submitted 18% of the manuscripts in the period from January 2004 until June 2008, again suggesting that women are submitting to *DH* in lower numbers than they are presenting at SHAFR.

10. There is a statistically significant difference between the average percentage of books by women reviewed in *DH* and the average number of SHAFR presenters who are women ($P = 0.017$ over all years and $P = 0.038$ for the last five years), but not a statistically significant difference when compared to SHAFR members.

11. A 2-tailed paired Student's t-test of arcsine-transformed data yields $P = 0.014$.

12. We have membership data only for 2007, 2003, 1996, and 1990.

13. See the profile page of H-Diplo at <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/about.html> [accessed July 6, 2008].

14. In 2001, the Roundtable reviews featured a book co-edited by two men and one woman. In 2007, they featured another co-edited book by one female and one male author. That same year a roundtable included one single-authored book written by a woman. It was reviewed alongside a book authored by a man. In the first six months of 2008, two books by women have been discussed in roundtables (out of a total of thirteen).

15. For detailed data, see Appendix 6.

Appendix 1

SHAFR Membership¹⁶				
Year	Men	Women	Total	% Female
1990	1177	162	1339	12
1996	1517	286	1803	16
2003	1220	248	1468	17
2007	1138	266	1404	19

16. Data provided by SHAFR. For each year, SHAFR included roughly a dozen uncoded (gender-neutral) names. The Committee then coded most of these. The few remaining uncoded names are excluded from the data above.

Appendix 2

<i>Diplomatic History: Representation in Absolute Numbers¹⁷</i>						
Year	Article: Male	Articles: Female	Reviewers: Male	Reviewers: Female	Books: Male	Books: Female
2007	31	8	33	2	28	9
2006	22	5	23	4	23	4
2005	23	6	29	7	30.5	6.5
2004	28.5	3.5	25	2	24	4
2003	17.5	3.5	31	5	30	4
1998	22	2	22	1	21	6
1993	21	2	19	3	27	2
1988	17	0	5	0	9	0
1983	16	2	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
1978	18	3	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

17. These data were collected by the Committee. Books, reviews, and articles were coded as male or female: thus, an article co-written by two men was coded as one male article. An book co-edited by one man and one woman was counted as 0.5 male and 0.5 female. These data include Bernath Lectures but not Presidential Addresses.

<i>Diplomatic History: Percentage Representation by Women</i>			
Year	% Articles by Women	% Reviews by Women	% Books by Women
2007	20.5	6	24
2006	18.5	15	15
2005	21	19	17.5
2004	11	7	14
2003	18	14	12
1998	8	4	22
1993	9	14	7
1988	0	0	0
1983	11	-	-
1978	14	-	-

Appendix 3

Participants at SHAFR Annual Meetings, 1993, 1999, 2003-2007, by Category¹⁸

Presenters			
Year	Men	Women	% Women
2007	143	47	25
2006	108	41	28
2005	130	44	25
2004	116	40	26
2003	109	25	19
1999	142	34	19
1993	151	27	15
Overall Total	899	258	21.5

Commentators			
Year	Men	Women	% Women
2007	39	9	19
2006	36	6	14
2005	41	5	11
2004	39	10	20
2003	41	3	7
1999	41	7	15
1993	43	6	12
Overall Total	277	46	14

Chairs			
Year	Men	Women	% Women
2007	47	8	13
2006	36	11	23
2005	44	6	11
2004	39	8	17
2003	33	2	6
1999	44	7	14
1993	32	3	9
Overall	275	45	14

18. Data for 2007 were collected by the Committee. Data for earlier years were provided by SHAFR Business Office, with adjustments made by the Committee in determining "gender-neutral" names.

Appendix 4

*Diplomatic History: Article Submissions and Acceptance Rate, 2004-2007*¹⁹

	Submitted	Rejected	Revise / Resubmit	Accepted
Male	219 82%	91 42%	75 34%	53 24%
Female	48 18%	14 29%	19 40%	15 31%
Total	267	105	94	68

Percentage of women accepted authors: 22%

19. Compiled by Gerritt Dirmaat, Editorial Office *Diplomatic History*, June 2008.

Appendix 5

H-Diplo Roundtables, 2000-June 2008

A: Roundtable by Gender

Year	Male Authors and Editors	Female Authors and Editors	% Female
2000	7		0
2001	1.66	0.33 ²⁰	16
2002	2		0
2003	1		0
2004	1		0
2005	2		0
2006	6		0
2007	16	1	5
2008	11	2	15
Total	47.66	3.33	6.5

20. One of three authors of a co-edited book was a woman, earning her a 0.33 rating. The figures in 2007 represent one co-edited book with a male and female author and one roundtable review of a book jointly authored by a man and a woman.

B: Roundtables by Subfield

	Traditional Subfield	Non-Traditional Subfield	% Non-Traditional
2000	7		0
2001	2		0
2002	2		0
2003	1		0
2004	1		0
2005	2		0
2006	6		0
2007	15	2	12
2008	11	2	15
Total	47	4 ²¹	8

21. Three of the non-traditional books were written by men, one by a woman.

Appendix 6

Representation by Gender and Field
*Diplomatic History: Original Articles*²²

Year	Traditional	Non-Traditional	% Non-Traditional
1977	19	2	10.5
1978	21	1	4.5
1979	19	1	5
1980	23		0
1981	21		0
1982	14	2	12.5
1983	18		0
1984	21		0
1985	23		0
1986	17	1	5.6
1987	17		0
1988	15		0
1989	15	1	6.25
1990	23	2	8
1991	15	1	6.25
1992	28	1	3.4
1993	15	1	6.25
1994	11	2	15.4
1995	16	3	16
1996	12	5	29.4
1997	22	4	15.4
1998	11	6	35.3
1999	12	10	45.5
2000	11	4	26.7
2001	24	3	11.1
2002	18		0
2003	18	5	21.7
2004	22	4	15.4
2005	18	7	28
2006	19	9	32
2007	33	5	13.2
2008	10	2	16.7
Total	579	81	12%

22. Excludes commentaries on roundtables, book reviews, and historiographical essays. Included are presidential addresses and Bernath Lectures.

Comparisons of Articles Written by Women and on Non-Traditional Topics by Year²³

Year	% Non-Traditional	% Female
1977	10.5	4.6
1978	4.5	13.6
1979	5	0
1980	0	8.7
1981	0	5
1982	12.5	7.1
1983	0	11.1
1984	0	5
1985	0	8.7
1986	5.6	5.5
1987	0	17.6
1988	0	0
1989	6.25	6.25
1990	8	8
1991	6.25	6.25
1992	3.4	6.9
1993	6.25	6.25
1994	15.4	30.7
1995	11	11.1
1996	29.4	35.3
1997	15.4	15.4
1998	35.3	11.8
1999	45.5	18.2
2000	26.7	6.7
2001	11.1	16.7
2002	0	22.2
2003	21.7	18.2
2004	15.4	7.1
2005	28	19.2
2006	32	10.7
2007	13.2	15.8
2008	16.7	25
Total	12%	11.7

23. Articles include only original articles, peer-reviewed as well as solicited. Excluded are commentaries on roundtables, book reviews, and historiographical articles.

On SHAFR, H-Diplo, and Sexism: Informal Musings from a Middle-Aged Guy

Jeffery C. Livingston

Suddenly, sexism is a controversial issue in our guild. In the April 2008 issue of *Passport*, Barbara Keys looked at “H-Diplo, Women, and the State of the Field.”¹ Then, the SHAFR conference at Ohio State University in June featured a roundtable entitled “Is SHAFR Sexist? A Report and Discussion.” The roundtable included two prominent senior scholars in international history, Anna Nelson and Andrew Rotter, and two up-and-coming younger scholars, Keys and Petra Goedde.² Throughout the conference sexism was a frequent, sometimes even heated topic of informal conversation over food, coffee, and beers. Where and to what all this will lead is anyone’s guess, but it certainly has shaken things up in our normally quiet corner of the academic grove.

As a fifty-something white male who values equality and tolerance, I have learned the hard way that when members of an “outsider” group level charges of discrimination, it’s best to listen quietly and carefully for awhile. It’s important not to fire back quickly and defensively. That’s particularly the case when people I respect are voicing the critique. I am not obliged to agree with everything they say, but professional respect and collegial obligations dictate that I give them an honest hearing and careful consideration. What follows are some musings, formed after respectfully listening to, reading about, and thinking over the accusations of sexism.

First, we shouldn’t be surprised that the issue has come up. Granted, during the two decades that I’ve been a member, the number of women in SHAFR has grown noticeably.³ But proportionally, female membership

lags behind that of other historical organizations. Moreover, given the harsh economic realities in higher education today, gradualism simply is not a realistic option for women. Our colleagues face a tight job market that demands that, if they want good positions, promotions, tenure, and status, they must build and maintain a high professional profile via publications, conference participation, grants, and positions of leadership in academic organizations. A place at the table on H-Diplo, in *Diplomatic History*, and in SHAFR is crucial to their professional well-being and even survival.

That’s one of several important points made by Barbara Keys in her eye-opening article in *Passport*. Keys puts it succinctly: “H-Diplo wields power: it shapes how insiders and outsiders alike view the field, and it is not an exaggeration to say that it influences careers and the distribution of power and resources within the field.” She also presents some figures that don’t lie: women definitely have been underrepresented on H-Diplo. Keys calls for several changes that seem commonsensical and generally feasible; at the very least they offer a good start for dialogue.⁴

Too bad the response from H-Diplo’s board of editors was so weak.⁵ Rather than engage Keys’ evidence, the editors cited policy. That’s more the reaction of bureaucrats than academics: *shikata ga nai* (“it can’t be helped”), “we have these guidelines, you see, so our hands are tied. And anyway, we think we’re doing just fine.” I know several of the board members personally; they’re not sexist, their politics are left of center, and they probably voted for Obama this past November.

Nonetheless, there’s an awkwardness in their response that recalls the defensiveness of old boys’ networks when confronted by second-wave feminism in the 1960s-70s.

At the SHAFR conference the topic of sexism was prominent in all sorts of ways. A few men—including several who in print have unrelentingly damned American imperialism, capitalism, and racism—positively sneered at the idea that there might be a problem with gender discrimination in our field. A number of men, including several sympathetic to the charges of sexism, were especially bothered by women who complained about the social event planned for Saturday evening, an outing to a minor league baseball game. Attending a ballgame on the last evening of a SHAFR conference is a longtime, informal tradition; by placing the game on the official conference agenda, the organizers hoped to open it to more people. Some women apparently were unaware of the custom and the planners’ motives, and to a number of men the criticism seemed unfair and gratuitous. It was a classic example of people talking past each other.⁶

Regrettably, the attendance at the “Is SHAFR Sexist?” roundtable was thin. Granted, the session coincided with several other quality panels, but given the topic’s significance more people, especially men, should have sat in. A fair-minded person had to be impressed by the research and care that went into the panelists’ thought-provoking presentations. A handout contained statistical evidence suggesting that, while SHAFR conferences and *Diplomatic History* are doing better than H-Diplo, they still could stand a lot of

improvement. Particularly interesting was the discussion of what panelist Andy Rotter called “micro-inequities,” the subtle discrimination that results largely from ignorance rather than outright prejudice. Rotter’s analysis was confirmed in spades by Anna Nelson, a longtime, highly respected SHAFR member. Nelson noted that, some three decades after women’s liberation, females in SHAFR still are patronized, often simply ignored, and—of particular importance—largely shut out of the informal networks that are the real loci of professional power.

Some concluding thoughts:

First, I urge my male colleagues to bite their tongues, if necessary, and hear out the accusations of sexism. As intellectuals, surely we welcome the opportunity to stretch our horizons, even if it necessitates facing up to some unpleasant truths. We demand no less of our students, so why would we expect less from ourselves?

Second, as several of the roundtable panelists charged, there *is* something of an old boys’ network in SHAFR (with influence that spills over into *Diplomatic History* and H-Diplo). This of course is not due to some

antifeminist design to preserve international history as a male bastion. But SHAFR and H-Diplo both need to think about how they can open up access to positions of influence, both official and unofficial.

That’s only part of the story, however. I think some women would be surprised to learn how many men in SHAFR feel they are outside of the inner circle. I could use myself as an example. For various reasons—a middling

academic pedigree, a mundane publication record, employment at a university that focuses on teaching rather than research—I don’t feel like much of a player when I attend SHAFR conferences. The point is not to evoke pity or to complain that I’m discriminated against (I’ve always been treated as a professional at SHAFR meetings; in fact I’ve attended a number of the ballgames with the gang), but to suggest that, in matters of intellectual status and prestige, there are different kinds of hierarchies and boundaries.

Finally, I look forward to *Passport*, H-Diplo, and SHAFR continuing the dialogue. As Petra Goedde pointed out at the conference roundtable, SHAFR membership has declined over the past decade. We need new

members; to drive away women because of an arrogant and obstinate refusal to confront the issue of sexism is to court professional irrelevance. In sum, our female colleagues recently have made things in our guild very interesting, and I have the feeling that they will continue to stir the pot for quite some time. Bully for them.

Jeffrey C. Livingston is Professor of History at California State University, Chico.

Notes:

1. Barbara Keys, “H-Diplo, Women, and the State of the Field,” *Passport* 39 (April 2008): 23-26.
2. The other panel members were Kelly Shannon, an impressive graduate student at Temple, and Deb Ballum, Associate Provost for Women’s Policy Initiatives and Director of The Women’s Place at Ohio State University.
3. During one SHAFR conference in the 1980s, shortly after I joined the organization as a grad student, I recall looking at the back of a very tall woman some distance away and thinking that she was one of the few females in attendance. “She” turned around and to my initial shock, then amusement, was sporting a beard. Turns out it was Michael Krenn, then a grad student at Rutgers, who in those days wore his hair down to his back.
4. I do have doubts about electing H-Diplo’s editors—who would be eligible to vote?
5. H-Diplo Board of Editors, “A Response to Barbara Keys,” *Passport* 39 (April 2008): 26-28.
6. During the Q&A at the roundtable on “Is SHAFR Sexist?” an obvious solution was suggested. In the future the local arrangements committee should solicit suggestions for social outings while it is planning for an upcoming conference.

American Culture, American Democracy: The One Hundred and Third Meeting of the Organization of American Historians

Wednesday, April 7 to Saturday, April 10, 2010
Hilton Washington, Washington, DC

Paper Proposal Deadline: February 15, 2009

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Dorm Rooms and Cheap Hotels We Have Known: Tales from Twelve Summers at SHAFR

Doug Little and Steve Rabe

This past June at Ohio State, the two of us shared a room at a SHAFR summer conference for the twelfth time, which we're pretty sure means that we have spent more nights together since 1992 than Bill and Hillary Clinton. We had a great time reminiscing at the informal plenary session on opening night in Columbus, but not everyone was able to hear our stories over the swilling of beer and the sipping of wine. Several friends asked us whether we planned to post our slide show on the SHAFR website. We were of course eager to oblige and were prepared to violate all the necessary copyright laws, but our pal Mitch Lerner suggested that we save ourselves needless litigation by telling our story the old fashioned way—in print—in *Passport*. So here is our account of dorm rooms and cheap hotels that we have known. And remember, we don't make this stuff up.

Truth be told, we became roommates by chance in June 1992 at the SHAFR meeting at Vassar College in Poughkeepsie, New York. Now we had always thought that Poughkeepsie was a Dutch word that meant something like "a great place to hoodwink the Indians," but it is actually an Algonquin word that means "reed-covered hut near the little water place." Had we known this, we would have been better prepared for our three-night stay in Jewett Hall, which was built in 1892 from blueprints prepared by James Renwick, the same architect who designed the Inebriate and Lunatic Asylum on Ward's Island and, according to Vassar legend, Sing Sing Prison. Each of us had made a reservation at Vassar separately, and upon arrival we were assigned side-

by-side single rooms not much bigger than large closets equipped with furniture purchased sometime during the second administration of Grover Cleveland and lighted by a single bare 75-watt bulb dangling at the end of an ancient "B & X" electrical cable. The tiny common room in our "suite" was furnished not with couches but rather with hard wooden benches, from which we had an unobstructed view of the men's bathroom, which was outfitted with a wall-mounted "trough" urinal last seen at Fenway Park.

Adding to our misery, it was brutally hot, and Vassar's Office of Residential Life and Housing was unfamiliar with concepts like "micro-fridge" and "air conditioning." Portable fans, however, were available for a small fee. Unfortunately, the "Nurse Ratched" look-alike who served as Jewett Hall's "house parent" did not like the look of us, and when we noted that our rooms had not quite lived up to our expectations, she asked us exactly what we expected for \$29.00 per night. This was a question that those SHAFR members who, like us, had lacked either the good sense or the travel budget to book a hotel in Poughkeepsie were also asking themselves. After three nights of hell, Doug announced that Rudolf Hess had better accommodations at Spandau and insisted that it couldn't get any worse than Vassar. Steve replied: "Oh yes it could. Let me tell you about the SHAFR conference at

Stanford."

In an act of solidarity with the Pacific Coast branch of the American Historical Association, SHAFR had decided to hold its 1985 summer meeting in Palo Alto. The dorm rooms were surprisingly Spartan for such an elite institution—cramped,

musty, and hot. The bathroom floor was covered with so much green slime that Steve, a veteran of the U.S. Marine Corps who was familiar with primitive living conditions,

A few years later, when Tiger Woods claimed that it was the sorry state of the Stanford dorms that forced him to drop out and turn pro, Steve nodded knowingly and remarked that neither the PGA nor SHAFR would ever be the same.

felt compelled to wear his sneakers while showering. And because there were no screens on the windows, mosquitoes were a constant problem, especially at night, forcing many AHA and SHAFR members to don their pajamas in the dark to minimize the risk of contracting malaria or dengue fever. A few years later, when Tiger Woods claimed that it was the sorry state of the Stanford dorms that forced him to drop out and turn pro, Steve nodded knowingly and remarked that neither the PGA nor SHAFR would ever be the same.

Having agreed to serve as co-chairs of the program committee for the SHAFR summer meeting in 1993 at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville, we decided to share a dorm room to test our hypothesis that southern hospitality would guarantee better accommodations than what we had previously encountered at Stanford and Vassar. We were not disappointed. The paint was fresh, the mattresses were firm, and there were even lampshades and curtains.

Although Scarlett O'Hara would not have been impressed, a day trip to Monticello confirmed that we had things at least as good as Thomas Jefferson during the early stages of the Embargo. The high point of the 1993 meeting, however, was the SHAFR

luncheon, where we had managed to land a truly big fish—Lawrence Eagleburger, George H.W. Bush's second secretary of state—to speak about the deepening war in Yugoslavia. Eagleburger, who was built like Jabba the Hutt, surprised us by sounding a little like Darth Vader, something

we attributed to a growling stomach caused by the half-eaten dessert parfait that he stabbed hungrily with his spoon before waddling from our table to the podium to deliver his remarks.

We skipped the SHAFR summer meeting at Bentley College in 1994, but we decided to be roommates again in 1995 at the U.S. Naval Academy. Cheap dorm rooms were not available because the midshipmen remain on campus year round, so we were forced to seek other accommodations. The local arrangements committee recommended the Westin in downtown Annapolis, but that was way out of our price range. We opted instead for a threadbare bungalow-style room with twin beds at a Howard Johnson's motor lodge near the Chesapeake Bay Bridge. On the bright side, there was cable television, fresh linen, and a working shower. On the darker side, the faded décor had not been refreshed since Dean Acheson held sway at Foggy Bottom, there was a tarp-covered 1951 Cadillac parked outside our room that may have contained Jimmy Hoffa's body, and the motel's night manager looked a little like Norman Bates in *Psycho*.

Our first experience in a cheap hotel convinced us that we were

better off in cheaper dorm rooms, and during the late 1990s we began a six-year research project that we call "Studies in Cinder Block." Doug attended the 1997 meeting solo at Georgetown, where the dorms were spotless, the staff worked with

Jesuit efficiency, and the crucifixes on the walls were barely noticeable. The room we shared at the University of Maryland at College Park in 1998, by contrast, reminded us of Vassar without the charm, and the paper-thin walls led our "suite mates" to complain about our late-night bull sessions analyzing the pitching woes of

the Boston Red Sox. The following year at Princeton, our room in Scully Hall was actually better than most hotels and provided fresh insights into the social milieu that shaped the foreign policies of Woodrow Wilson, John Foster Dulles, George Shultz, and other notable Princetonians. SHAFR headed north of the border to Ryerson Polytechnic in Toronto in June 2000, where we not only had some god-awful urban barbecue at picnic tables in the basement of the student union, we also had our first encounter with bunk beds in more than thirty years. Ever considerate of his vertically challenged roommate, Steve took the top bunk, where he discovered that the ceiling was lovingly decorated with fluorescent stars replicating all the constellations of the zodiac.

Undaunted, we decided to share another dorm room the following year at American University on the assumption that both the meals and the sleeping arrangements had to be better. We did get better food, but we also got another set of bunk beds so high that Steve had to put a chair on the desk to reach the upper berth while Doug spotted for him from the floor. Our final stay in dorms—three nights at the University of Georgia in Athens in 2002—really put the "cinder" in cinder blocks. The rooms

The following year at Princeton, our room in Scully Hall was actually better than most hotels and provided fresh insights into the social milieu that shaped the foreign policies of Woodrow Wilson, John Foster Dulles, George Shultz, and other notable Princetonians.

were small, hot, and furnished only slightly better than the Civil War prison camp at Andersonville just outside Macon. More problematic were the unisex bathrooms, which presented an unexpected set of complications for a pair of sleep-deprived fifty-something cheapskates. Fortunately, Steve prefers to shave and then shower while Doug prefers to shower and then shave, so we were able to stand watch for each other and avoid any embarrassing bathroom surprises.

By the time we attended the SHAFR summer meeting at the LBJ Library in Austin in June 2004, we had decided that "Hotels "R" Us." Unwilling to take a chance on more bunk beds or unisex bathrooms in the University of Texas dorms, we shared a room at the Doubletree Suites just a few blocks from the Texas state capitol. (Doug had recently become dean of the college at Clark and Steve had recently become a distinguished professor in the humanities at UT-Dallas, so we felt we could afford better accommodations.) The room was spectacular, and so was the conference. Its highlights included a splendid tribute to Bob Divine, one of SHAFR's truly great guys, and a bus trip to the hill country just west of Austin for some real Texas barbecue.

With Doubletree visions dancing in our heads, we decided to skip the dorms when SHAFR returned to the University of Maryland at College Park in 2005 and share a room at the Quality Inn. We quickly learned that "quality" is a relative concept. The lobby was a shambles because of extensive renovations, the toilet in our room had to be repaired every time we flushed it, and the occupants of the room next door (thankfully not fellow SHAFR members) appeared to be dealing drugs. Our "motel hell" experience was completed the next morning by a continental "non-breakfast"—no bagels, no toast, no juice, and no milk—just coffee and dry cereal. When we inquired whether a more complete continental menu might be available, the woman at the front desk replied, "Sorry, we're renovating."

The room we shared at the Spring Hill Suites in Lawrence, Kansas,

in 2006 restored our faith in the hotel industry and the SHAFR local arrangements committee. The plumbing functioned well, the air conditioning handled the 100-degree heat, and the hot cross buns were exquisite, proof perfect that there was nothing the matter with Kansas. After we agreed to do an encore as co-chairs of the SHAFR program for 2007, we lobbied hard for a site that more closely resembled Versailles in 1919 than Brest-Litovsk in 1918. The Marriott Westfields outside Washington, D.C., more than lived up to our high standards. The spacious rooms, the faux marble atrium, and the manicured grounds convinced us that we would never go back to the dorms. Our most recent SHAFR summer experience at the Blackwell at Ohio State this past June merely reinforced our decision to leave dorm life behind. In fact, the queen-sized beds and the view of downtown Columbus were so magnificent that Doug almost forgot that the Big Ten football team that inhabits the stadium across the street from the Blackwell has a history of trouncing

the Wisconsin Badgers.

As we reflect back on our twelve summers as SHAFR roommates, several things stand out. Although we began sharing dorm rooms and cheap hotels largely because both of us teach at institutions where puny travel budgets make it necessary to cut costs wherever possible, we actually came to enjoy the experience of relative deprivation. We also got to meet a lot of interesting people, many of them graduate students who, over the years, have gone on to become outstanding diplomatic historians. Although we won't name names, trust us: "We remember who you are, but your secrets are safe with us." Finally, as we schemed to find ways to escape the dreadful dorms at College Park, we inadvertently invented a new SHAFR tradition—baseball. We started small in 1998, when four of us drove up to Camden Yards in Baltimore, where we watched Cal Ripken hit a home run off Roger Clemens. Then in June 2000, we saw the Red Sox lose to the Blue Jays at the Rogers Center in Toronto. Over the years, we made

a point of visiting Turner Field in Atlanta, the Ball Park outside Dallas, and Kauffman Stadium in Kansas City. More recently, Mitch Lerner has become SHAFR's unofficial director of baseball operations, arranging memorable road trips for groups of fifty to see the Washington Nationals and the Columbus Clippers while permitting the two of us to sit in the back of the bus.

Next year, when SHAFR returns to the Washington metropolitan area at Falls Church, Virginia, we plan to share a room for the thirteenth time. We look forward to seeing old friends, hearing some interesting papers, and watching a little baseball. We hope to avoid bunk beds, slimy showers, and unisex bathrooms, but we'll be ready to play whatever hand the local arrangements committee deals us. See you there.

Doug Little is Professor of History at Clark University.

Steve Rabe is Professor of History at the University of Texas at Dallas.

SHAFR Activities at the Annual Meeting of the Organization for American Historians

March 2009 Seattle, Washington

SHAFR Reception

(cash bar)

Friday, March 27

5:30-7:30 pm

Graduate Student Breakfast

Saturday, March 28

7:30-9:30 am

*SHAFR will sponsor this event for all
graduate student attendees.*

SHAFR Luncheon

Saturday, March 28

12:15-1:45 pm

At the SHAFR Luncheon on Saturday, March 28:

Paul Kramer (University of Iowa) will deliver the 2009 Stuart L. Bernath Lecture,

"Campus Ambassadors: International Students in 20th Century America."

SHAFR will also announce the winners of the 2009 Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize, Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize, Myrna Bernath Book Prize, Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize, Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize, Michael J. Hogan Fellowship, W. Stull Holt Fellowship, and Samuel Flagg Bemis Research Grants.

Tickets to the luncheon must be purchased in advance from the OAH. Details will appear in OAH registration materials.

Multimedia and the Teaching of Diplomatic History

Kristin Hoganson, Gary R. Hess, Carol Jackson Adams, Matt Loayza

The editors of Passport would like to thank the SHAFR Teaching Committee for soliciting the following essay. Like other teaching-related articles that have appeared in Passport, this one may also be found on the SHAFR website, under "Teaching Services."

Teaching with Images

Kristin Hoganson

I was asked to participate in the panel on using images in teaching because of the illustrations in my books. I pressed my editors to include these not only from my interest in cultural history, but also from my conviction that images can capture readers' interest. If you've ever paid particular attention to the illustrations as you've flipped through a book, you'll have to agree. Beyond drawing a reader in, illustrations can document points, much like quotations. For these reasons, I have always tried to use images in my lectures as well as my writing. But as a teacher, there is a third reason to use images: to help students develop their skills in visual interpretation. So how have I done this?

For longer than I care to admit, I shuffled transparencies on and off of overhead projectors, which had the advantage of few technological glitches, relatively easy preparation (the biggest snafus being copier jams), and the ability to scribble on the overheads during

class. My recent switch to Powerpoint took a year out of my life, as I struggled to master the necessary technologies and accompanying tech talk (DVI to VGA adaptors; .gif, .tif, and .jpg files, display resolutions of 1024x768 stretched and 720x480 unstretched; .mp3 files, .mp4 files) and to cope with technological mishaps that are funny only in retrospect. My learning curve has now leveled off, but it still takes a day or two for me to turn a set of lecture notes into a Powerpoint presentation. This is because I've been using this technology to make my lectures much more visual.

I use more maps than I did before, and the maps I use are now more likely to be multicolored. These help students locate unfamiliar places, brush up on familiar geographies, and understand things like troop movements, strategic considerations, world views, spheres of influence, and political changes, such as those pertaining to decolonization. I also use more cartoons, photographs,

graphs, posters and so forth, to make abstractions such as "human rights abuses" visceral, to clarify points such as what cultural engineering in post-World War II Japan entailed, and to help students remember material

by putting faces to names and illustrating concepts such as the Four Freedoms. Although sometimes I post visuals without comment, treating them as an obvious reinforcement

of whatever I'm trying to convey verbally, at other moments, I stop and direct students' attention to visual material – What assumptions does the cartoon reveal? What can the photograph really tell us and what does it obscure? What kinds of perspectives are embedded in the map?

In the "Teaching with Images" panel at SHAFR this past June, there was some debate over our students' ability to analyze images. I sided with those who think our students have relatively sophisticated visual skills, because mine tend to comment more readily and critically on images than on textual excerpts. But I also think that the more they practice interpreting images, the better they get at it, and that honing this skill is a valuable part of their education, given the heavily visual forms that information often takes in contemporary media.

In the hopes of enhancing my students' critical capacities, I don't stop with still images, but have relied on an increasing array of film clips, including excerpts from *Know Your Enemy – Japan* (1945), *Why We Fight* (1945), *Answer to Stalin* (1948), *Duck and Cover* (1956), *The King and I* (1956), the *Nixon-Khrushchev Kitchen Debate* (1959), *Hearts and Minds* (1974), and *The Global Assembly Line* (1990).

One result of these teaching strategies is that my U.S. foreign relations class may have more of a cultural history component than it would have had otherwise, but that fits with my goal of having students bring a variety of interpretive strategies to the subject of the United States in world context. I suppose a skeptic might argue that historians, or at least foreign relations historians, are fundamentally word people and

that too many images may distract attention from the heart of the enterprise. Besides reiterating my point that visual materials can serve as valuable sources, I'd add that I've never had a student complain that I used too many images and that my teaching scores jumped up a bit after my switch to Powerpoint. But for those who remain committed to words, I should also note that images can help us teach students to analyze written material and spoken communication.

Taking a cue from the increasing popularity of graphic novels, I've started to change the way I present passages that I want my students to interpret. Instead of just posting a paragraph or other excerpt, I try to find a picture of the author or speech maker and insert the text in a "callout" box that, cartoon-fashion, connects the individual to the passage. If it's a quotation, I put it in a rectangular call-out box with quotation marks around it; if it's a paraphrase, I stick it in a ruffle-edged "cloud call-out" with no attribution marks. I don't know how to measure the effectiveness of this technique, but I do think it keeps the eyelids open a little longer and it reminds students of the human agency behind the policy statements and political assessments that we are covering.

A second way that a visual approach can encourage students to engage with texts is to treat texts as images. I have found that students manifest more interest in text that I scan in, say from a newspaper, than text that I type in. Documents seem more compelling when they look like documents, not like typescripts produced by historians.

One of the questions that came up in the context of the panel was how to "go visual." A common starting point is the web. I have spent ample time searching Google Images, with some good results, but I've also found things that were inaccurately labeled, of uncertain origins, and just plain nuts (like the picture of the all-nude Nixon-Castro meeting). My preferred strategy is to rely on monographs, textbooks, and a scanner. This has worked well for other classes, but it seems to me that books on the

history of U.S. foreign relations tend to have fewer illustrations than books in many other fields. So I'd like to end these teaching reflections by returning to scholarship: the more visual our books, the easier it is to engage with images in our classrooms.

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Political Cartoons in the Classroom

Gary R. Hess

For pointing out the shortcomings and occasional absurdities of American foreign relations, nothing matches the power of the political cartoon. Richard Reeves observed that when he was writing his biography of John F. Kennedy, he needed "thousands of words and hundreds of statistics" to demonstrate that the "missile gap" Kennedy spoke about in the 1960 presidential campaign was a "complete and absolute fraud." During that campaign, however, two cartoonists instinctively questioned Kennedy's charge and made their suspicions vividly clear in cartoons that underscored the notorious unreliability of data on weapons systems. Reeves noted that he was "admiring and envious" of his "colleagues at their drawing boards." "It's just not fair that their work is so good, that they have the advantage because the cartoon is simply the shortest distance between one point and one citizen."

That directness is what makes political cartoons so effective in the classroom. They can help illustrate inconsistencies between rhetoric and practice, expose American ignorance and misunderstanding of other parts of the world, show the domestic reaction to overseas developments, and puncture the pomposity of American leaders. Students enjoy them and are able to appreciate the humor and the cartoonist's point of view. Their instinctive reaction is to see the cartoons as a "break"—some humor in the middle of a ponderous lecture. Getting them to see the

cartoons as historical documents that reinforce readings and lectures is a bit challenging. Hence, presentation is important. Early in my career I tended to summarize the cartoons to make certain that the students "saw" them correctly. Over the years I have moved toward making the presentation more interactive, asking questions such as who or what is being depicted? What do the images tell us? What is the message? What does the cartoon tell us about what Americans were thinking at the time? Are the criticisms fair? One cannot, of course, make too much of cartoons, because they are not subtle, but it is important to approach them from an analytical perspective. The instructor also needs to make the cartoons "important" by limiting the number used and making it clear that each one tells us something of significance. Whatever the pedagogical technique used to introduce them, the cartoons are generally well-received, and a number of former students have told me that they employ cartoons in their teaching at the high school or college levels.

By way of illustration, let me describe the cartoons I use when discussing the Vietnam War. That war produced a substantial outpouring of editorial criticism that was reinforced in cartoons. Lyndon Johnson was a favorite of cartoonists, in part because of his egotism and his larger-than-life personality. He came to epitomize Americans' frustrations about Vietnam and hence is featured in a number of the most illustrative cartoons of the war. Three of them are truly outstanding. The earliest is from 1964. It illustrates American frustration with the series of coups in Saigon after the overthrow of the Diem government. Drawn by Hugh Haynie of the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, it shows a perplexed Johnson on the phone to Saigon, with a map of Vietnam in the background, and he is asking, "May I speak to Our Staunch, Loyal Ally, the Head of the Vietnamese Government—Whoever It Is Today?" How better to emphasize the deteriorating situation that led to U.S. military intervention?

Perhaps the best known cartoon of Johnson is the "Vietnam scar" of 1966.

Drawn by David Levine of the *New York Review of Books*, it exaggerates Johnson's nose and ears more than other cartoons did and, interestingly, makes Johnson look considerably older than he did in the Haynie cartoon two years earlier. The Levine cartoon was based on Johnson's well-publicized display of a scar from his gall bladder surgery to startled White House reporters. In the cartoon, the scar on Johnson's abdomen is an outline of Vietnam. How better

In the cartoon, the scar on Johnson's abdomen is an outline of Vietnam. How better to emphasize the extent to which the war was overwhelming the Johnson presidency?

to emphasize the extent to which the war was overwhelming the Johnson presidency? The third especially effective cartoon illustrates how the Tet Offensive took Americans by surprise. Drawn by Paul Conrad of the *Los Angeles Times*, it depicts a startled Johnson, telephone in hand, sitting up in his White House bed, saying, "What the Hell's Ho Chi Minh Doing Answering Our Saigon Embassy Phone?" How better to emphasize the impact of Tet?

At once entertaining and illustrative of important points, the creativity of cartoonists like Haynie, Levine, and Conrad deserves a place in the classroom. Their work, and the work of many of their colleagues, can be found in the various editions of *A Cartoon History of United States Foreign Policy*, published by the Foreign Policy Association. This collection is a valuable resource for every teacher of American foreign policy.

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Using Graphics to Enhance an Online Course

Carol Jackson Adams

In an article in the June 20, 2008, edition of the *Chronicle of Higher Education* entitled "Short and Sweet: Technology Shrinks the Lecture," Jeffrey R. Young asserts that a fifty-minute lecture video clip embedded in an online course is too

long. Indeed, he argues that even a twenty-minute clip is too long. He then suggests that a fifty-minute lecture is too long for a traditional classroom and should be broken up. This is heresy. After all, many of us have wonderful memories of our best

professors standing at a podium or venturing out of that comfort zone and walking around the room imparting their vast knowledge to us while we took copious notes. And many of us believed that our own students would hang onto our every word as well—that they would live for our lectures. Or perhaps I was the only one of us who thought so.

And then my career took me to the community college classroom and increasingly to teaching adults who were not willing to endure many minutes of lecture after working all day. I sought ways to engage them in discussion and decrease the lecture time to a fraction of the class. That made it easier for me to transition to teaching courses completely online.

I did not use images or other elaborate additions in my first online classes. I never did a lecture video clip. I added notes to supplement the text, but that did not work very well. Students simply did not read or comprehend more words on a computer screen. After that failure, I turned to using graphics and let go of the concept of giving more information. I focused instead on enhancing the information they already had from various reading assignments.

Using images is an effective way to spice up a course in a traditional classroom, but in an online environment their use is imperative. The way to make history come alive is to bring to the computer screen the faces, voices, and photographs of the day.

Students cannot rely on a teacher's voice inflections, facial expressions and—let's face it—acting ability for emphasis. Converting class content to an online format is time consuming—much more so than using images in a traditional classroom. Many universities are hiring instructional designers who will do much of the work, but not all institutions have the funds for that level of support, and even if they do, it is still up to the professor to choose the content.

As an example, let me offer some suggestions on how to incorporate images, speeches, and film clips into a course on the sixties—a course that always attracts students seeking an elective. The sixties are a gold mine for historians of American foreign relations, and the vast resources available make the course an easy one to design. However, having so many resources is a double-edged sword. Materials will enrich the course, but too many can serve as a distraction. It is easy to believe that the absence of the time constraints that a traditional classroom setting imposes means there is no limit on the number of images, audio and video clips, and websites that can be added. But students may drown in additional material. A sensory and time overload will negate the best intentions.

I organized my course documents, including graphics, into clearly defined folders such as Berlin, Cuba, and civil rights. Over the years, SHAFR has introduced credible websites that are rich with graphics for foreign relations topics. I used History

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Matters: The U.S. Survey Course on the Web, which is part of the Center for History and New Media project at George Mason University, as a search engine for all other credible websites (<http://historymatters.gmu.edu>). Several years ago, CNN

produced *The Cold War* film series with a companion website that still has relevant digital material (<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war>). The National Security Archive at The George Washington University is a gold mine, particularly for the Cuban Missile Crisis (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/index.htm). Numerous civil rights projects have been digitized, but one of my favorites is the collection of audio oral histories at the Civil Rights in Mississippi Digital Archive (<http://www.usm.edu/crdp/html/transcripts.shtml>). Embedding links rather than the image or clip itself guarantees adherence to copyright laws, but material in the public domain can safely be included without requiring any extra clicks by the student.

Most of my students had little prior knowledge of why Berlin was a divided city. To give them some background and to supplement the textbook, I assigned Episode 4, "Berlin, 1948-1949" from the CNN Cold War website and instructed them to focus on the interactive map. Online students prefer links and interactive materials to flipping back to the textbook. I then embedded an audio clip of President John F. Kennedy's "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Berlin Crisis, July 25, 1961," from the Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum (www.jfk.library.org). This speech is rich with references. Kennedy speaks about the sacrifices the American population will have to make and mentions the map of Europe, referring particularly to the situation of Berlin in East Germany. He also brings up the challenges Americans will face in Southeast Asia (thereby introducing the subject of Vietnam). To help students understand Berlin more thoroughly, I included the link to Episode 9, "The Wall, 1958-1963" on the CNN Cold War website. The interactive map in that segment is superb; it even explains how heavily the wall was guarded. The last document I used was a video clip of Kennedy's speech in West Berlin in 1963.

To replace classroom discussion, an online course relies on asynchronous

discussion boards. To guarantee that students access the links, I designed discussion questions directly related to the speeches. Discussing course materials online is no different from discussing them in a traditional classroom format, where the professor has the opportunity to probe further and guide student discussion if it is superficial or if a student challenges others to think beyond the initial questions. The discussion questions were as follows:

As you listen to this speech, consider whether you agree with President Kennedy's assessment of the crisis. Remember that you have no knowledge of what is to follow. There is no wall yet. Remember that you have just learned a few months earlier of the failure at the Bay of Pigs. What do you think of the sacrifices he asks Americans to make? What is your view of President Kennedy so far? After all, he has been in office six months. Post your answers to these questions by (date) to prompt discussion among all of you. You must post on the comments of at least three of your classmates by (date).

After studying the map of the Wall and the defenses on the Eastern side, how would you have reacted if you had lived in the Eastern sector of Berlin in the fall of 1961? Do not answer this question flippantly. This is not an easy decision. Read the postings of your classmates. The expectation is that not all of you will agree. Be respectful of all views, but debate the danger of leaving and of staying in the East.

Listen to President Kennedy's speech in West Berlin in 1963. Then post your reaction on the appropriate discussion forum. You must describe what impressed you or whether you were impressed by his language at all. How would you have reacted as a West Berliner, realizing that the Wall had been built almost two years before? Make sure you comment on the postings of at least three of your classmates. I will chime in to redirect the discussion or to challenge you to think beyond the obvious. You should listen to the speech more than once to adequately address these questions.

The folder on Cuba included resources on the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis. I embedded links to photographs of the Bay of Pigs landing site and the captured

exiles found in a simple search on Google. I located an image of the cover of *Life* magazine, dated May 10, 1963, so that students could analyze the depiction of the men who landed. Although the discussion questions were related less to the images themselves than to challenging students to form opinions about the invasion, John F. Kennedy's actions, and the consequences of the failure, the images enhanced their understanding of the events. Eliminating sources on the missile crisis was more challenging. I opened with the first intelligence briefing on the missiles, dated October 16, 1962, informing Kennedy that U-2 photo reconnaissance flights over Cuba had discovered Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles. Obviously, the audio clips from the National Security Archive are extensive, and teachers can include more excerpts if they want to encourage specific discussions or, depending on the student population, deeper analysis (http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/). To transport students back to the early days of the crisis, I embedded Kennedy's televised speech on October 22, 1962, announcing to the nation the presence of Soviet missiles on Cuba. These examples of multimedia use illustrate the inadequacy of the printed word to stress the seriousness of the crisis and the uncertainty of the outcome. Another tool that reinforced the potential impact of the crisis was a map that used concentric circles to show how far the fallout would have reached if a nuclear weapon had been used in Cuba. Lastly, I embedded photographs that depicted the quarantine of Cuba, the Soviet ships, the island of Cuba itself, and the Cuban population.

In developing discussion questions for the Cuban Missile Crisis, I chose to guide students to comment on how they would have reacted to the crisis, how they would have judged Kennedy's response, and what relevance the crisis would have had to their own lives:

After listening to the Intelligence Briefings, what surprised you most about the decision making process? What were the various options facing

President Kennedy? Do you agree with his choice? Remember you do not know the outcome this early in the crisis. Post your comments and weigh in on those of at least three of your classmates.

What was your reaction to the televised speech of the president? Did he convince you that his actions were necessary? Defend your answer. After all students have posted their comments, review all to determine if there is consensus. Start a new discussion thread and answer the following: If there is agreement, do you believe that level of consensus would exist today when faced with a similar crisis? If there is a difference of opinion, explain why. Defend your answer for all to read.

While they are learning about the Cold War, students must remember that a number of domestic crises occurred at the same time and that each had an impact on the other. I intertwined the civil rights folder with the Berlin and Cuba folders to remind students of what was occurring at the time in Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, and elsewhere in the South. Oral histories and photographs were invaluable for that. In addition to discussion questions on the Freedom Riders and the desegregation of the University of Mississippi, I asked students to determine which crisis they believed Kennedy should have addressed first—foreign or domestic. The responses should vary and provide for engaged discussion. It goes without saying that the Vietnam folder includes similar multimedia source material and similar discussion opportunities.

These examples should illustrate how multimedia can whet the appetite of an online student and can stimulate the discussion forum postings beyond assigned readings. The professor may find, just as I did, that there are more materials available than can be used in any course. But the search process and the subsequent selection exercise make course design more rewarding for the professor and make the course itself more rewarding for professor and student alike.

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Teaching the History of U.S. Foreign Relations with Images: The Domestic and Foreign Contexts of Race

Matt Loayza

Photographs, political cartoons, and artwork are often visually compelling in their own right, and most of us have probably flipped through a monograph or searched the internet for just the right image to liven up a lecture or presentation. Although I certainly have a long list of favorite images, providing an overview of them would likely prove to be only marginally useful (or interesting). I have chosen instead to discuss a single lesson plan that uses a visual primary source as the foundation for exploring a particular course topic. I hope the details of this example will suggest some strategies and ideas for integrating historical images into the classroom.

The lesson plan described here began with some initial course revisions intended to improve student comprehension of the significance of racial oppression in the United States. A few years ago, I came upon a cartoon drawn by *Washington Post* editorial cartoonist Herbert Block in April 1961. The cartoon shows a maitre d' in a restaurant leaning over to speak to a hostess who is blocking the entrance of a black couple in traditional African dress. The caption reads: "It's all right to seat them. They're not Americans." The caption and illustration present a conundrum: how could it be acceptable for the restaurant to seat and serve black foreigners but not black Americans? This perplexing notion provides an opportunity to discuss the full ramifications of Jim Crow—including its geopolitical significance—by framing segregation in the context of decolonization, the developing world, and the Cold War. Herblock's illustration is thus a great asset; it helps students reach a deeper, more nuanced understanding of the domestic and international contexts of Jim Crow.

After my use of the Herblock cartoon in an upper level course

sparked extensive discussion and positive feedback, I devoted more thought to how I might use this document in the future. The following lesson plan reflects the evolution of my thinking on how to better frame and contextualize the questions raised by the cartoon. The material is tailored for use in a general education survey, U.S. History since 1877, which is a comparatively large course, with class sizes ranging from approximately 50 to 135 students in any given semester. The lesson, which draws primarily upon the materials listed below, takes approximately two 110-minute class periods to complete. Please note, however, that the first class period is devoted to establishing the content that provides the context for the Herblock cartoon and related issues that are introduced in the subsequent class.

Recommended Documents:

1. Memo of conversation, Secretary of State Dulles and Attorney General Brownell, September 24, 1957. *Foreign Relations of the United States IX* (1955-1957): 612-613.
2. Herbert Block (Herblock) cartoon captioned "It's all right to seat them. They're not Americans." April 27, 1961. Library of Congress, *Herblock's History: Political Cartoons from the Crash to the Millennium*, <http://www.loc.gov/rr/print/swann/herblock/animal.html> (accessed October 26, 2008).
3. Map of decolonized Africa.

I devote most of the initial class period to an overview of the 1954 *Brown v. Board of Education* decision and its repercussions. Assigned readings include the section in the course text on the *Brown* decision and two supplementary documents. The first, Kenneth Clark's 1955 essay "How Children Learn about Race," conveys the intangible factors that influenced the court's decision. The second, "The Southern Manifesto" (1956), exposes the class to the "Massive Resistance" to the court's decision. After reviewing these documents, students watch the second episode of the PBS

documentary series *Eyes on the Prize*, "Fighting Back," which follows the struggles of the "Little Rock Nine" throughout the 1957 school year at Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas. The documentary reinforces the assigned readings by narrowing the focus on southern resistance to a specific time and place.

Assigned readings for the next class period include two primary documents that are accessible via hyperlinks on the online course syllabus. Students are advised to download these original sources and bring them to class. The first document is a memo of a telephone conversation in which Attorney General Herbert Brownell and

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles discuss the Little Rock crisis and Dulles complains that it is "ruining our foreign policy." I usually start class discussion by asking why Dulles came to that conclusion. Subsequent conversation usually leads to questions about Dulles's lament that Little Rock would be "worse for us than Hungary was for the Russians," so one must be prepared to discuss the Soviet invasion of Hungary, as students who are unfamiliar with the event do not grasp the significance of Dulles's comparison. Since they have already read the Atlantic Charter, students often raise the basic contradiction between Jim Crow segregation and American proclamations (both official and unofficial) after World War II about the importance of liberty. One can then begin to shift attention to decolonization and the "less developed world" by asking students to consider the various peoples throughout the world that might be most offended or dismayed by the events in Little Rock.

Once this conversation runs its course, I introduce the Herblock cartoon. In addition to displaying the image on a PowerPoint slide, teachers may want to encourage students to

print the document and bring it to class if the classroom is really big, cursed with bad sightlines, or both.

The cartoon poses a new challenge for the class. Although my student historians lack the specific context that informs the image and text in this 1961 source, they now possess enough knowledge to analyze the document in the context of Jim Crow, grapple with the clues it provides, and make some tentative conclusions

about what the cartoon is referring to. To make sure that individuals analyze the cartoon instead of just staring at it, I ask them to answer the following questions:

1. *What is Herblock's argument? Please list three things in the picture that support the argument.*

2. *Please list at least two unfamiliar references or images that require more context or explanation.*

To ensure that the class actually attempts to answer these questions, one can collect and grade answers or ask students to address the questions in small groups and then have random groups record their findings on the whiteboard. (Be sure to bring plenty of dry erase markers for such occasions!) These observations provide the basis for subsequent analysis and discussion. In past semesters, my students have often started with and pondered the caption, then moved on to the cartoon in an attempt to decipher its meaning. They often comment on or ask questions about these features of the cartoon:

1. The two darker skinned individuals in the center/right of the picture, whom they often but not always identify as foreigners. When prompted, individuals usually point to the exotic dress as the visual cue that identifies them as foreign citizens.

2. The two restaurant employees. Many students note the expression

on the woman's face and interpret it as either "confused" or "worried." Observant participants often ask about or try to establish the precise relationship between the two employees in the illustration. If no one raises the issue, I pose a general question to the class about this relationship, upon which someone will correctly note that the woman appears to be looking to the male character for guidance.

3. The venue, which my students invariably identify as a posh, upper-class establishment. When asked to support these conclusions, students point out the well-dressed diners, the large dining area, the ornate chandeliers, and the text on the front of the menu held by the male figure on the left. (Is it a menu? Or, others wonder, possibly an employee handbook?) The word "plantation" in the name of the establishment leads some to conclude that the fictional restaurant is based in the South.

Since students are occasionally confused by the decision to allow foreigners but not Americans into the restaurant, one must be prepared to respond to a wide range of comments and questions. It is likely that a few individuals will offer very loose interpretations, and it is important to respond to off-the-wall or inaccurate comments with care so as not to discourage students from ever trying to interpret a document again! Although there is no real way to prepare for such occasions except to expect the unexpected, I generally try to encourage those who volunteer ideas that are a bit off the mark by noting that professional historians are also led astray by primary sources and require additional sources to make more precise and (hopefully) accurate judgments.

After reiterating the desirability of adequate context when interpreting primary sources, I provide a brief lecture on the importance of the developing world in the Cold War. I explain the events that inspired the Herblock cartoon by recounting how foreign diplomats such as Chadian Ambassador Adam Malik Sow were refused service at segregated

It is likely that a few individuals will offer very loose interpretations, and it is important to respond to off-the-wall or inaccurate comments with care so as not to discourage students from ever trying to interpret a document again!

facilities shortly after their arrival in the United States. Fearing that racial injustice within the United States would undermine efforts to rally the free world behind American leadership, President Kennedy sought to persuade the establishments in question to waive such rules. In outlining these events, it is often helpful to refer back to the Dulles/Brownell document, review Dulles's concerns, and then display a map showing the newly independent African nations, with the dates they became independent. Have students note the number of colonies that achieved independence after the Second World War and ask them if there are any guarantees that these nations will align with the United States in the Cold War.

Pairing a visual document with a text-based document, lecture material, or both can be a rewarding

and fruitful way of helping students understand and prompting them to consider and voice their opinions about a number of historical issues and topics. In this case, the Herblock cartoon helps students grasp the links between domestic race relations, decolonization, nationalism in the developing world, and the superpower rivalry. Such images can introduce topics by raising questions and posing mysterious problems. Asking students to try to answer those questions and solve those problems by deciphering the images they are shown can arouse their interest in the material and also make them active participants in primary source interpretation.

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Notes:

1. Kenneth Clark, "How Children Learn About Race," in Clayborne Carson et al., *The Eyes on the Prize Civil Rights Reader: Documents, Speeches, and Firsthand Accounts from the Black Freedom Struggle* (New York, 1991), 74-81. "The Southern Manifesto" (1956) is available online at several sites, including Clemson University's Strom Thurmond Institute of Government and Public Affairs, <http://www.strom.clemson.edu/strom/manifesto.html> (accessed October 25, 2008).

2. See Renee Romano, "No Diplomatic Immunity," *Journal of American History* 87, no. 2 (September 2000): 546-79.

FBI Response to: "Bureaucracy or Censorship? An Experience with the FBI"

John Miller

Editor's note: This response refers to an article in the September 2008 issue of Passport, written by Dr. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones. That piece can be viewed at the SHAFR web page at <http://www.shafr.org/newsletter/newsletter.htm>.

In his article "Bureaucracy or Censorship? An Experience with the FBI," author Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones claims that the FBI's request that its Seal be removed from the cover of his book, *The FBI: A History*, appears to be an effort to censor his work. Censorship had nothing to do with our request. In fact, the FBI takes no position on the content or merits of Mr. Jeffreys-Jones' book—which is in keeping with standard policy regarding publications written about the FBI. The FBI has made no attempt to limit distribution of the book, to

challenge any of its content, or, in any way, to interfere with Mr. Jeffrey-Jones' right to publish his work. Our sole concern is the unauthorized use of the Seal on the book's cover.

It is a federal crime to reproduce a U.S. Government agency's official insignia without authorization. Neither Mr. Jeffreys-Jones nor his publisher, Yale University Press, requested authorization to use the Seal on the cover of *The FBI: A History*. Because we assumed that Yale University Press was not aware of the restriction, we sent a letter notifying it of the law and requesting that the Seal be removed from the book cover.

The primary purpose of the FBI's Seal is to indicate the official actions, communications, and involvement of the agency. This purpose can not

be accomplished unless the Seal is used only when authorized by the FBI. Use of the FBI's Seal on the cover of a book without authorization has the potential to mislead the public about the official views of the FBI. We appreciate Yale's University Press's prompt action in correcting the situation.

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Researching American Foreign Relations at the Library of Congress

John Earl Haynes

The Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress has amassed extraordinary collections for documenting American foreign policy, surpassed only by the National Archives' holdings of the official records of the State Department. In addition to the foreign policy-related documents available in twenty-three presidential papers collections (Washington through Coolidge), the division houses the papers of more than half the individuals who have served as secretary of state, from the first secretary, Thomas Jefferson, who assumed office in 1789, to Alexander Haig, who resigned in 1982. More than three hundred other collections comprise the papers of American diplomats or contain significant material relating to American diplomacy. These, too, span American history, from Benjamin Franklin's letters as the American colonies' diplomatic representative to France in 1776 to the papers of William Howard Taft IV, who became the United States ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1989. The Library of Congress also hosts the on-line resource "Frontline Diplomacy: The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training," which includes searchable transcripts of more than 1,500 oral history interviews with U.S. diplomatic personnel. This resource is located at <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/index.html>.

The papers of key presidential confidants such as Sol M. Linowitz, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, and White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan also contain valuable foreign policy-related material, as do the papers of secretaries of defense Caspar Weinberger and Elliott Richardson and other military officials. The

papers of General Hugh L. Scott, for example, contain his diary and other documents relating to his role in the American diplomatic mission to Russia, 1917-19, while those of General Tasker Bliss, a member of the American Peace Commission, describe the complications of the American role in the negotiations ending World War I. General Frank McCoy's papers detail not only his long military career but also his role as member and first chairman of the Far Eastern Advisory Commission after World War II. Admiral William Leahy's papers document his service as ambassador to Vichy France as well as military chief of staff to presidents Roosevelt and Truman during World War II.

Many of the division's earliest documents relating to American diplomatic history are transcripts, photoreproductions, and other copies of rare materials held in repositories outside the United States. In 1898, within a year of its creation, the Manuscript Division acquired Benjamin Franklin Stevens's collection of facsimiles and transcripts of British manuscripts. Soon thereafter it obtained photoreproductions of additional papers relating to America held in European archives. Donations from two private sources—James B. Wilbur in 1925 and John D. Rockefeller, Jr., in 1927—provided financial resources for the expansion of the division's Foreign Copying Program, which today includes thousands of volumes of transcripts, photostats, microfiche, and microfilm. Supplementing the foreign reproductions were donations from two private collectors of original materials on early Spanish and Portuguese involvement in North America. The gifts of Edward S. Harkness in 1927 and Hans P. Kraus in 1969 have made available to the public invaluable documents from

the first two centuries of European exploration, conquest, and settlement of the New World.

American diplomatic affairs during the Revolution, the War of 1812, and the first third of the nineteenth century are reflected in the papers of presidents George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, James Monroe, Andrew Jackson, Martin Van Buren, William Henry Harrison, and John Tyler, as well as in the papers of various members of Congress and the cabinet, including Timothy Pickering, Roger Sherman, Oliver Ellsworth, James McHenry, Caleb Cushing, Henry Clay, and Daniel Webster. The mid- to late eighteenth century also witnessed important events in American foreign affairs and diplomacy, including the Mexican-American War, the American Civil War, and the Spanish-American War. Some of the more notable collections documenting these events and others include the papers of James K. Polk, John C. Calhoun, Abraham Lincoln, William McKinley, John Sherman, Theodore Roosevelt, and Elihu Root.

Diplomacy during World War I is extensively documented in the division's holdings, notably in the papers of President Woodrow Wilson, which are particularly rich with material on the Paris Peace Conference, and his cabinet members Robert Lansing, Philander C. Knox, William Jennings Bryan, Newton D. Baker, and Josephus Daniels, among others. Of particular interest are nine volumes of private memoranda in which Secretary of State Lansing recorded accounts of cabinet meetings, vivid impressions of dignitaries whom he met, and detailed descriptions of the Paris Peace Conference and the negotiations that led to the Treaty of Versailles and the covenant of the League of Nations.

In the twentieth century no foreign policy relationship has been so fraught with danger as that of the United States and the Soviet Union. The library's manuscript resources are particularly rich for studying the relations between these two superpowers, as the division's holdings include the papers of several of this country's diplomats to tsarist Russia, including George Washington Campbell, Simon Cameron, and George von Lengerke Meyer, and ambassadors to the Soviet Union W. Averell Harriman, Charles E. Bohlen, Laurence A. Steinhardt, William H. Standley, Malcolm Toon, and Joseph E. Davies. The Harriman Papers comprise one of the richest collections of primary source material on modern American foreign policy. Harriman served as President Roosevelt's special representative to Great Britain (1941-43), ambassador to the Soviet Union (1943-46), coordinator of the Marshall Plan (1948-50), United States negotiator for the Test Ban Treaty (1963), and American representative at the Paris peace talks with North Vietnam (1968-69). A significant addition to the Davies papers is currently being organized. A large addition to the Paul Nitze papers, already among the most heavily consulted collections dealing with American Cold War policies, has also just arrived at the library, and it is hoped that archival organization of this addition will begin in 2009.

The library's diplomatic collections are not limited to the papers of presidents, State Department officials, and appointed ambassadors. Included as well are the papers of those who promoted the nation's foreign policy through covert means. The collections of Central Intelligence Agency officials David Atlee Phillips, Archibald Roosevelt, Jr., and Cord Meyer and National Security Agency director William Odom document the institutionalization of American intelligence operations in the post-World War II period. These and other recently acquired collections focusing on the government's covert policies and activities complement the papers of ambassadors and State Department officials who pursued more open and

traditional diplomatic approaches to American foreign policy.

While the library advises members of Congress to place their papers in a depository in their home states to ensure maximum research use, the Manuscript Division has acquired some congressional papers that contain diplomatic material. The papers of Daniel Patrick Moynihan, for example, document not only his close attention to foreign policy during his long tenure as U.S. senator from New York, but also his service as ambassador to India and the United Nations. The Manuscript Division's collections of the papers of journalists such as Joseph Alsop, Hedrick Smith, Neil Sheehan, Whitman Bassow, and Henry Shapiro also contain material relevant to the history of American foreign relations. When consulted together, the division's varied holdings provide a remarkably complete and nearly unparalleled record of this country's most significant foreign policy initiatives.

The Manuscript Reading Room is open six days a week, Monday through Saturday, from 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and is located in the Madison Building of the Library of Congress on Capitol Hill. Researchers need a Library of Congress reader's card, easily obtained with a photo ID at the readers' registration station, also located in the Madison Building. Most collections are stored on site, and it rarely takes more than ten minutes for an archival box to be delivered to a researcher's table.

For collections stored off-site, researchers are encouraged to review a finding aid and contact the Manuscript Reading Room (phone 202-707-5387, fax 707-7791, e-mail mss@loc.gov) forty-eight hours prior to their arrival so that all the boxes they wish to consult can be brought to the Manuscript Reading Room for their use without delay. Currently, only a portion of the registers (finding aids) for the more than 11,000 manuscript collections are available on line at <http://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/f-aids/mssfa.html>. Researchers can consult reference librarians in the Manuscript Reading Room about access to paper copies

or electronic copies of other registers. With regard to the papers of persons active in the latter half of the twentieth century, researchers should also consult reference librarians about any donor-imposed restrictions that may be in effect and about procedures for requesting access from the donor. Some of the collections with diplomatic material also contain security classified material. Researchers can consult the reference librarians or the Manuscript Division classified documents officer about access to classified material.

Researchers are welcome to bring laptop computers and digital cameras (no flash) into the Manuscript Reading Room. Scanners are not permitted. Wireless access is available, and the Manuscript Reading Room has computer work stations for access to Library of Congress electronic resources and the Internet. Self-service photocopiers are also available. Other Reading Room rules and procedures are discussed at <http://www.loc.gov/rr/mss/>.

In addition to the personal papers and documents held by the Manuscript Division (more than 11,000 collections and sixty million items), researchers should keep in mind that the Library of Congress also has more than thirty-two million cataloged books and extensive holding of photographs, microfilm, motion pictures, videos and sound recordings. Information for researchers about resources available in specific library areas or special-format reading rooms can be found at <http://www.loc.gov/rr/research-centers.html>.

John Earl Haynes is 20th century political historian in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress.

The Diplomatic Pouch



1. Personal and Professional Notes

Jeffrey Engel (Texas A&M) has won the 2008 Paul Birdsall Award from the American Historical Association for his book, *Cold War at 30,000 Feet* (Harvard, 2007).


Edward Keefer has retired as General Editor of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series.

Melvyn Leffler (Virginia) has won the 2008 George Louis Beer Prize from the American Historical Association for his book *For the Soul of Mankind* (Hill and Wang, 2007).

Kyle Longley (Arizona State University) has received the Pearce Teaching Award, given to an outstanding teacher in the Humanities.

Mark Stoler (Williams) has been appointed editor of the George Marshall Papers.

2. Research Notes




CWIHP e-dossier: Weapons for Syria: The GDR's Secret Involvement in the 1973 October War

The Cold War International History Project is pleased to announce the publication of e-Dossier No.19, *Weapons for Syria: The GDR's Secret Involvement in the 1973 October War*, by Stefan Meining. The e-dossier sheds new light on the secret support provided by East Germany to Syria during the 1973 war.

The dossier can be downloaded from the CWIHP webpage at: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/>

New Kissinger Telcons Reveal Plotting at Highest Levels of U.S. Government about Chile



The National Security Archive has published for the first time formally secret transcripts of Henry Kissinger's telephone conversations that set in motion a massive U.S. effort to overthrow the newly elected socialist government of Salvador Allende. The telephone call transcripts include previously unreported conversations between Kissinger and President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State William Rogers. Just eight days after Allende's election, Kissinger informed the president that the State Department had recommended an approach to "see what we can work out [with Allende]." Nixon responded by instructing Kissinger: "Don't let them do it." After Nixon spoke directly to Rogers, Kissinger recorded a conversation in which the Secretary of State agreed, "We ought, as you say, to cold-bloodedly decide what to do and then do it," but warned it should be done "discreetly so that it doesn't backfire." Secretary Rogers predicted that "after all we have said about elections, if the first time a Communist wins the U.S. tries to prevent the constitutional process from coming into play we will look very bad."

For more information contact:

Peter Kornbluh
(202) 994-7116
peter.kornbluh@gmail.com
<http://www.nsarchive.org>

Secret Testimony Released from the Rosenberg Atomic Espionage Case



The National Security Archive has released transcripts and other information related to the Grand Jury files of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. According to historians who reviewed the documents, the most striking new evidence comes from the grand jury testimony of Ruth Greenglass, sister-in-law of Ethel Rosenberg. In contradiction to Greenglass's later trial testimony, her grand jury testimony does not mention Ethel Rosenberg's typing any of the information being passed to the Soviets about the U.S. atomic program. In fact, the grand jury testimony describes that information being passed in Ruth's own longhand. "It is quite clear that if the trial were held today the government would have had a very difficult time establishing that Ethel Rosenberg was an active participant in this conspiracy and indeed it looks like the key testimony against her was perjured," concluded lead counsel David Vladeck.

For more information contact:

Thomas Blanton
Meredith Fuchs
(202) 994-7000

<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20080911/index.htm>


New Materials on Al-Qaeda

On the tenth anniversary of U.S. cruise missile strikes against al-Qaeda in response to deadly terrorist attacks on U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, newly-declassified government documents posted by the National Security Archive (www.nsarchive.org) suggest the strikes not only failed to hurt Osama bin Laden but ultimately may have brought al-Qaeda and the Taliban closer politically and ideologically. A 400-page Sandia National Laboratories report on bin Laden, compiled in 1999, includes a warning about political damage for the U.S. from bombing two impoverished states without regard for international agreements, since such action "mirror imag[ed] aspects of al-Qaeda's own attacks." A State Department cable argues that although the August missile strikes were designed to provide the Taliban with overwhelming reason to surrender bin Laden, the military action may have sharpened Afghan animosity towards Washington and even strengthened the Taliban-al-Qaeda alliance.

Following the August 20 U.S. air attacks, Taliban spokesman Wakil Ahmed told U.S. Department of State officials "If Kandahar could have retaliated with similar strikes against Washington, it would have." Such an attack, although unfeasible at the time, was at least in part actualized by al-Qaeda on 9/11.

For more information contact:

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Out of the Black: The Declassification of the NRO


On the 16th anniversary of the declassification of the fact of the existence of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and National Reconnaissance Program (NRP), the National Security Archive has published a collection of documents concerning the declassification decision and its implementation. The NRO and NRP were established in 1961 to coordinate the satellite reconnaissance activities of the CIA and Air Force.

As the documents illustrate, the issue of NRO declassification was considered as early as 1973. The documents further show that DCI Stansfield Turner (1977-1981) concluded that the fact of NRO and NRP existence did not meet the test of classification. As a result, Turner included declassification as part of a plan to revise the system of handling Sensitive Compartmented Information - but that plan was not implemented before the Carter administration was replaced by the Reagan administration, nor thereafter.

The documents also portray the process of declassification that was set in motion in 1992 due to a variety of factors. The memos concern the recommendations from NRO Director Martin C. Faga and DCI Robert Gates, the issues that had to be considered, as well as the actions needed to prepare for and implement declassification.

For more information contact:

Jeffrey T. Richelson
(202) 994-7000
<http://www.nsarchive.org>



Trujillo Declassified: Documenting Colombia's 'tragedy without end'

As Colombian prosecutors begin to reopen investigations against individuals connected to one of the worst massacres in the country's modern history, the National Security Archive has published on the Web a collection of declassified documents detailing U.S. concerns about the wall of impunity that has long surrounded the case. These documents are central to an article published recently in Spanish on the Web site of *Semana* magazine, Colombia's largest newsweekly. An English version of the article is also available on the National Security Archive web page.

For more information contact:

Michael Evans
(202) 994-7029
<http://www.nsarchive.org>



Indo-Soviet Relations during the Late Stalin Years: New Russian Evidence

In the new Parallel History Project document collection *Indo-Soviet Relations during the Late Stalin Years*, Andreas Hilger from Hamburg University offers insights into Soviet thinking on Cold War India, as well as on the India-Pakistan-China triangle, and on the conflicts within the Communist Party of India in the late Stalin years. His essay is accompanied by selected records from the Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History (RGASPI). These materials can be found on-line at: www.php.isn.ethz.ch.

The documentary is the first part of a larger PHP documentation effort exploring the Cold War relations between the

Soviet Bloc and India. A further collection, also authored by Andreas Hilger, will focus on the Khrushchev years. It will be published on the PHP website soon.

For more information, visit the Parallel History Project website at www.php.isn.ethz.ch.



Robert H. Michel Papers, Dirksen Congressional Center

The Dirksen Center houses the papers, photographs, and memorabilia of former Senate Minority Leader Everett McKinley Dirksen, former House Minority Leader Robert H. Michel, and former Congressman Harold H. Velde. The Center's holdings also include over 70 other, mostly small collections, and more than 200 accessions. The Press Series of the Robert H. Michel Papers consists largely of documents that contain legislative issue information given by Michel's office to the public or other congressional offices. The 30 linear feet of records includes clippings, memoranda, newsletters, constituent questionnaires, remarks and releases, files of the Republican Press Secretary, and an extensive subject file. The bulk of the materials date from 1965 to 1994.

The Dirksen Center cropped these documents to allow search capabilities for each individual box number. This will allow users to go directly to the correct box number using their search query rather than scrolling through the entire 71 pages. Users should enter a keyword in the search box found at <http://www.dirksencenter.org/findingaids/index.htm>. For example, entering ORGANIZATION in the search box will pull up a list of documents in the Robert H. Michel Collection that include this word. To find this word in the Press Series collection, the search results would appear like this: Robert H. Michel Collection: Press Series, 1965-94: Box 12. Find the complete index page for the Robert H. Michel Collection: Press Series, 1965-94, including all box numbers and a brief listing of the contents for each at: http://www.dirksencenter.org/findingaids/rhm_pressseries.htm.

For more information, see the Dirksen Center website at www.dirksencenter.org.



Nixon White House Cabinet Room Recordings

<http://www.nixontapes.org> has posted recordings of every meeting, tour group, briefing, and private conversation that occurred in the Nixon Cabinet Room, as captured on the Nixon recording system between February 16, 1971, and July 11, 1973. These audio files were originally released by the National Archives and Records Administration's (NARA) Archives II at College Park, Maryland, in 2002, but were made available to onsite researchers only, and only on analog cassette format. With the assistance of the National Security Archive, these files are now available on [nixontapes.org](http://www.nixontapes.org).

What makes the Cabinet Room recordings unique is that the room itself could accommodate more participants than the average meeting recorded on a White House Telephone, in the Lincoln Sitting Room, or in the president's Executive Office Building retreat. Thus, these recordings often captured larger meetings with Congressional leaders, various domestic councils, presidential commissions, task forces, meetings of the National Security Council, an occasional Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting, top secret briefings by Director of Central Intelligence Richard Helms, an international summit meeting—such as the U.S.-Soviet meetings during June 1973, and, of course, Cabinet meetings, along with many other types of gatherings. Also, while taping at other White House locations was ended earlier in 1973 by Watergate-era Chief of Staff Al Haig, the Cabinet Room recordings continued until July 1973, even after the revelation of the taping system before the Watergate investigating committee by presidential aide Alexander Butterfield.



3. Announcements

“Turning Points in the Cold War”: The 2009 SHAFR Summer Institute *University of Wisconsin-Madison, June 29-July 3, 2009*

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations will hold its second annual Summer Institute at the University of Wisconsin-Madison on June 29-July 3, 2009. The Institute is designed for college and university faculty and advanced graduate students, with priority this year being given to the latter group. The Institute will pay each participant an honorarium of \$500 and cover expenses of travel and accommodations.

Fredrik Logevall of Cornell University and Jeremi Suri of the University of Wisconsin-Madison will co-direct the Institute, titled “Turning Points in the Cold War.” The Cold War dominated international affairs in the second half of the 20th century, and the scholarly literature on various aspects of the struggle is large and growing larger. Here the focus will be on turning points, on those moments when the nature of the struggle shifted (or appeared to shift) in an important way. The approach will be global, with due attention given to decision-making not only in Washington and Moscow but in other world capitals as well. Broader subjects to be addressed will include: structure vs. human agency in Cold War studies; the role of domestic politics in foreign-policy-making; the influence of ideas and culture; and the impact of the nuclear revolution.

All participants will be required to read a significant amount of relevant secondary literature, before and during the Institute. Substantial time will be devoted to discussion of that literature, broader historiographical debates, and selected primary sources. Students who have ongoing research projects related to the seminar's focus will be mentored, as

appropriate, by the host faculty. Those who are interested in beginning research on one of the seminar's themes will be encouraged and guided by the host faculty in choice of topic, research design, and writing plans.

The deadline for applications is February 1, 2009. Applicants should submit a one-page letter detailing their interest and explaining how participation would benefit their careers. Submit materials (and pose any questions) to Jeremi Suri at suri@wisc.edu. Decisions about acceptances will be distributed in February.

The Institute will run from Monday, June 29 to midday on Friday, July 3. It will follow on the heels of the 2009 SHAFR Annual Meeting, to be held in Falls Church, VA, on June 25-27.

The Institute will make use of facilities at the Wisconsin Veterans Museum, as well as the campus of the University of Wisconsin-Madison.



CFP: 2009 International Graduate Student Conference on the Cold War

London School of Economics, April 24-26 2009

Three partner institutions—The Cold War Studies Centre at LSE IDEAS, the George Washington University Cold War Group (GWCW), and the Center for Cold War Studies (CCWS) of the University of California Santa Barbara—are pleased to announce their 2009 International Graduate Student Conference on the Cold War, to take place at the London School of Economics on April 24-26, 2009.

The conference is an excellent opportunity for graduate students to present papers and receive critical feedback from peers and experts in the field. We encourage submissions by graduate students working on any aspect of the Cold War, broadly defined. Of particular interest are papers that make use of newly available primary sources. A two-page proposal and a brief academic C.V. (in Word or PDF format) should be submitted to IDEAS.cwc2009@lse.ac.uk by January 25, 2009 to be considered. Notification of acceptance will be made by February 24. Successful applicants will be expected to email their papers by March 24. Further questions may be directed to the conference coordinator, Artemy Kalinovsky, at the aforementioned e-mail address.

The conference sessions will be chaired by prominent faculty members from GW, UCSB, LSE, and elsewhere. The accommodation cost of student participants will be covered by the organizers (from April 24-26), but students will need to cover the costs of their travel to London.

For more information, contact:

Artemy Kalinovsky
IDEAS-Cold War Studies Centre
London School of Economics
Houghton Street
London UK WC2A 2AE
ideas.cwc2009@lse.ac.uk



CFP: "The United States and the World: from Imitation to Challenge"

Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland, May 29-30, 2009

This two-day conference, hosted by the Jagiellonian University's Chair of American Studies, will explore various aspects of the mutual connections between the United States and the world. It will concentrate on the problem of the model of American democracy, the presidential system, American politics, society, culture, and the world's reflections about them – from imitation to challenge. The conference aims to provide a forum for discussion of a range of ideas concerning the above-mentioned topic, and the conference will reflect on the significance of this phenomenon in current research. The conference will provide an exciting opportunity for colleagues to debate new developments in the field, and it is hoped that selected conference papers will form the basis of an edited collection.

The steering committee – chaired by Prof. Andrzej Mania – welcomes proposals for individual papers and complete panels from scholars in all fields, especially from those examining aspects of American politics, philosophy, gender studies, law, culture studies, economy, and sociology.

Papers are welcome from individuals and/or panels (of not more than four papers) that explore one of three broad themes: 1. The American impact on the world: normative and analytical aspects. Integration in Pax Americana and patterns of integration in other parts of the world, different and/or similar approaches to challenges to international order and dealing with international threats, continuity and change in politics. 2. The American "export" of values: separation of church and state, human rights, idea of sovereignty, the rule of separation of powers, the rule of accountability, modern federalism, democratization patterns, presidentialism. 3. The American credo, Americanism, American Studies: in search of a definition of America. American exceptionalism and uniqueness, contemporary American society, impact of/on American values.

Proposals for 15-minute papers should include the name, affiliation, and contact details (including email address) for all authors, as well as a brief (max. 250 words) abstract and paper title. Proposals for whole panels should include the full details for each paper (as above), plus the name, affiliation, and contact details for the panel convenor, as well as a short (max. 100 word) panel synopsis. Proposals should be sent in PDF or Word format to the above address, and are due by

January 15, 2009.

For further details, please contact:

Dr. Lukasz Wordliczek
lukasz.wordliczek@uj.edu.pl
<http://www.transatlantic.uj.edu.pl/main.php?id=66>.



CFP: *The Journal of War and Culture Studies*

The Journal of War and Culture Studies is planning a themed issue entitled 'The Figure of the Soldier'. Studies of war and culture often concentrate less on the soldier as an individual or on his experience of war, and more on the societal impact and repercussions of conflict. By way of contrast, this issue focuses exclusively on the soldier as the key representational figure of war. The figure of the soldier often lies concealed under the layers of mythology that have come to stereotype representations of warfare; his testimony is often silenced by the official discourses which sing his praise and laud his heroism. This issue seeks to examine this mythologization of the soldier figure in a variety of cultural forms but also welcomes studies of those representations of the soldier figure that, conversely, demystify the soldier figure and, indeed, the combat experience itself. The editors therefore welcome articles that, through their study of the soldier as the central figure of cultural representations and memory of war, emphasize the ambiguities and ambivalences of the experience of war, foregrounding the ideological and ontological conflicts that are often reflected in the figure of the soldier.

Articles should be written in English and be of 5,000–6,000 words in length. They should be sent to Helena Scott (H.Scott@westminster.ac.uk) at the University of Westminster by the February 1, 2009. Articles should be submitted in accordance with Intellect's guidelines to be found at <http://www.intellectbooks.co.uk/auth/links/StyleGuide.pdf>.

For more information, contact:

Helena Scott
University of Westminster
H.Scott@westminster.ac.uk



Dissertation Fellowships at GWU's Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies

The Program on Conducting Archival Research at George Washington University's Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies (IERES) is pleased to announce two opportunities for Ph.D students working on dissertations involving archival research on topics related to modern history and international relations: The Summer Institute on Conducting Archival Research (SICAR) at the George Washington University, May 25-29, 2009, and The Mellon Pre-doctoral Fellowship in Contemporary History for the 2009-2010 academic year.

For SICAR, applications should include the application form available at www.ieres.org, as well as a two-page proposal indicating how the week-long Summer Institute would benefit dissertation research, a curriculum vitae, and one letter of recommendation from a faculty member in the applicant's department.

Applications should be sent to sicar@gwu.edu by February 10, 2009, with the subject line reading "SICAR application." Recommendation letters may be e-mailed or sent to: The Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies; ATTN: SICAR; 1957 E St. N.W., Suite 412, Washington, DC 20052.

GWU will cover the costs of housing and meals for SICAR and accepted students may apply for subsidized travel.

To be eligible for the Mellon Pre-doctoral Fellowship in Contemporary History applicants must be an enrolled advanced graduate student at a U.S. University, have completed archival research for their dissertation in two or more countries and be at the final writing stage of their dissertation. The Fellow must be in residence at IERES from September 2009 through June 2010 and will be provided with an office and computer. The Mellon Fellow will also help IERES Director Hope M. Harrison administer several workshops that train Ph.D candidates to conduct archival research. The award will offer support in the amount of \$25,000, plus benefits.


For the Mellon Pre-doctoral fellowship, applicants must submit an 8-10 page proposal, a curriculum vitae, and a letter of recommendation from a member of the dissertation committee.

Applications should be sent to sicar@gwu.edu with the subject line "Mellon pre-doc" or mailed to: The Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies; ATTN: Mellon pre-doctoral Application; 1957 E St. N.W., Suite 412, Washington, DC 20052, by February 10, 2008.

For more information on any of the above please contact us at:

sicar@gwu.edu
(202) 994-6342
www.ieres.org

The Program on Conducting Archival Research is funded by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation.



Making the History of 1989

The Center for History and New Media at George Mason University is pleased to announce the launch of a new website on the collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989. The site, *Making the History of 1989* (<http://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/>), offers students, teachers, and scholars access to hundreds of primary sources on or related to the events of 1989 and the end of the Cold War in Europe, interviews with prominent historians, and a series of resources for teachers at both the high school and college level. As with all resources created by our Center, all the resources contained in *Making the History of 1989* are and will remain free and open access. If you have questions about this project, please contact the project's Executive Producer, T. Mills Kelly (tkelly7@gmu.edu). This project has been made possible by the generous support of the National Endowment for the Humanities and the German Historical Institute (Washington, D.C.).




American Foreign Policy Center at Louisiana Tech

The American Foreign Policy Center (AFPC) at Louisiana Tech University is pleased to announce a fellowship program to help defray the costs associated with travel to and research in the American Foreign Policy Center in Ruston, Louisiana.

Created in 1989 to promote research in the field of U.S. foreign policy and to increase public awareness of world affairs, the AFPC collection contains approximately 3,200 reels of microfilm and 2,000 microfiches of public and private papers associated with the Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, as well as State Department files for China, Cuba, El Salvador, Formosa/Taiwan, France, Germany, Indochina/Southeast Asia, Japan, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Palestine/Israel, and the former Soviet Union. With its collection drawn from several different archives across the United States, the AFPC is an optimal place to begin research on a topic, or an excellent resource to consult in the final stages of a project. A list of our holdings is accessible on-line at <http://history.latech.edu/afpc.htm>.

Both faculty and graduate students are invited to apply. Applications should include a detailed proposal outlining the project, a c.v., a budget, and two letters of support. A successful applicant will be expected to offer a brief presentation on the project and his/her findings in the Center at the conclusion of the stay. Interested parties should send applications the following address: Brian Etheridge, Department of History, Louisiana Tech University, P.O. Box 8548, Ruston, Louisiana 71272. Feel free to contact Brian Etheridge with questions at briane@latech.edu or by phone at (318) 257-2872.



Bradley University's Berlin Seminar

Bradley University's annual Berlin Seminar will be held from July 5 through July 11, 2009. This program is intended for academics interested in the history and contemporary culture, society, economy, and politics of Germany and Europe. Centered at the European Academy in Berlin-Grunewald, the seminar activities include discussions with leaders from the realms of academia, culture, and politics. There will also be guided trips to points of historical and contemporary interest, including a day trip to Dresden. All sessions are conducted in English or with a translator. The cost is \$1,600, which includes room and board in Berlin, the seminar program, and the Dresden trip. Applications are due by January 15, 2009. For further details and an application form, please visit our website at www.bradley.edu/academics/las/his/Berlin or contact Dr. John A. Williams at johnw@bradley.edu or (309) 677-3182.




The Institute for Historical Studies at UT-Austin

The Institute for Historical Studies at the University of Texas at Austin seeks four residential fellows at all ranks for the 2009-10 year, related to our theme: Global Borders. For more information about our fellowships, which provide full salary replacement, see:

<http://www.utexas.edu/cola/insts/historicalstudies/fellowships/>. Deadline for applications is January 15, 2009.

Please contact Julie Hardwick, Associate Professor & Director of the Institute for Historical Studies, at historyinstitute@austin.utexas.edu, with any questions.



4. Letters to the Editor

October 23, 2008

To the Editor:

In the April issue of *Passport*, I published an analysis of H-Diplo's coverage of the field of diplomatic and international history. The H-Diplo Editorial Board's response was disappointing on a number of counts. First, the Board had nothing to say about H-Diplo's systematic neglect of newer subfields and its decision not to devote a roundtable review to a book by a woman for eight years. Second, the Board defended its selection of book reviewers by taking a statistically unjustifiable

approach to the numbers, conveniently excluding a year (2004) with no women reviewers (or authors) in order to reassure us that “only” 86.5% of the authors of regular reviews are men. Third, the Board launched an *ad hominem* attack against me, making a false assertion and violating its own rules and professional ethics in disclosing irrelevant and private information, rather than engaging with the issues on their merits.

I note promising signs that H-Diplo’s Editorial Board is moving toward some of the reforms I endorsed—notably, the appointment of Chris Endy as a roundtable editor for cultural and international history. We can all hope that this is a sign of a more open and inclusive approach to the field in the future.

Sincerely,

Barbara Keys
University of Melbourne



Hogan Fellowship Report

October 13, 2008

Dear Professor Hahn:

In March 2008, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations honored me with the Michael J. Hogan Fellowship for foreign language study. I used the award to learn Persian for my dissertation, “Authoritarian Modernization and Anti-Americanism in the Middle East: The United States, Turkey, and Iran, 1961-1980.”

My dissertation argues that anti-Americanism in Turkey and Iran was not an irrational reaction to American power but a response to Washington’s support for authoritarian modernization programs in the two Middle Eastern countries. In the 1960s and 1970s, Turkish and Iranian leaders understood and acted on the imperative need for more jobs, more schools, more hospitals, and higher literacy rates. Yet they disregarded popular demands for more democracy.

Because the United States supported these authoritarian governments that pushed for socioeconomic development, Turkish and Iranian intellectuals complained that the United States did not differ from the imperialist countries of the old, which had converted their once glorious empires into peripheral states. Criticizing the implementation of development rather than its substance, those who opposed authoritarian modernization turned to Islam and Marxism (in certain cases, both) and created new political discourses in order to galvanize the people against their governments. The ensuing political agitation led to the overthrow of Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi in the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 and converted Iran from one of America’s closest partners into its sworn enemy. The *coup d’etat* in Turkey the following year, however, preserved that country as a U.S. ally.

Thanks to the agreements between Ankara and Tehran, as a Turkish citizen, I can stay in Iran for up to three months without a visa or a residency permit. I therefore decided to use the Hogan Fellowship to go to the Islamic Republic, where I took Persian classes at the University of Tehran’s International Center for Persian Studies.

From late May through late August, not only did I get to study Persian, but I also traveled within Iran. My journeys took me to the holy city of Qom (where the leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, underwent his religious training and formed the political networks among his fellow theologians who eventually carried out the revolution), former capitals Shiraz and Esfahan, and the ancient town of Yazd.

During these trips, I could not conduct meaningful research because of my rudimentary Persian. But I still reflected on certain questions from my dissertation and formulated new ones. For example, one of the most striking aspects of my travel to Yazd was to witness the efficiency of *qanats* (underground tunnels that carry subterranean water since ancient times) in providing water to rural Iranians. Ironically, as Mohammed Reza Shah carried out his modernization plan (the so-called “White Revolution”) in the 1960s, his state-of-the-art dams and irrigation ditches could not replace the *qanats* in supplying water to farmers at the right place at the right time. That led me to reconsider the very basics of certain assumptions that American, Iranian, and Turkish policy-makers held: Does modernization necessarily mean greater efficiency and increasing production? I certainly need more evidence but I will not be surprised if my answer will not be in the affirmative.

Another striking aspect of my stay in Iran was to realize that, just like the Shah’s regime, the current government also fails to deliver on its promises to the Iranian people. In my dissertation, I will discuss the discrepancy between what the Shah said in the 1960s and 1970s (that he was creating an egalitarian, prosperous, and democratic country) and what he actually gave to his people (anything but an egalitarian, prosperous, and democratic country). The Revolution broke out with the claim to end poverty and the Shah’s oppression. Nearly thirty years after the fact, the paradoxes that caused the Revolution have not been resolved. What that implies for the future of Iran remains to be seen.

From an intellectual and personal point of view, learning Persian in Iran was probably the best summer I have ever had. I am grateful to the fellowship committee and SHAFR for giving me this wonderful opportunity. Most importantly, I would like to thank Professor Michael Hogan for his generous donation to SHAFR and for paving the way for us new scholars.

Sincerely yours,

Barin Kayaolu
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of History
University of Virginia



October 5, 2008

With the support of the Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant, I was able to complete the majority of my U.S.-based dissertation research. My project, *Creating the Cold War State: The United States and Japan, 1952–1963*, explores various facets of the U.S.-Japanese relationship in the ten years following the U.S. occupation of Japan. With the Bernath Grant, I visited archives in both Washington, DC and Boston. In my two trips to the National Archives at College Park, I explored a variety of records including material related to the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, the State Department central files, and documents from the United States Information Agency, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, and the Mutual Security Program. As my project explores both governmental and popular involvement in this relationship, these materials will form the core of my research. In Boston, I visited the Harvard University archives to explore the papers of U.S. Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer. As Reischauer was also a Harvard University Professor, his papers provided valuable insights into the interactions between the government and academics during the Cold War and into the 1950s – 1960s era Asia specialist community. Moreover, research at both the National Archives and the Reischauer papers also showed interesting contrasts between the style of Ambassadors Douglas MacArthur II (1957–1960) and Reischauer, particularly in terms of their regular Japanese contacts and the ways in which they presented U.S. interests to the Japanese. As I hope to explore how U.S. and Japanese power was expressed, negotiated, and resisted, this closer understanding of who these Ambassadors talked to, who, on the Japanese side, they felt they could be honest with, and how they sought to accomplish their goals is very valuable. In Boston, I also spent several days conducting research at the John F. Kennedy Library, looking at the National Security Council Files, the President's Office Files, and several personal collections. Of particular interest were documents related to Robert Kennedy's visit to Japan in 1962, during which he sought to show U.S. interest in Japanese youth, going so far as to debate student protestors on stage at Waseda University.

In conjunction with other research grants, I also used the Bernath Grant to support research at the Truman and Eisenhower presidential libraries. At the Truman Library, I focused on material relating to the Truman administration's post-occupation conceptualization of the U.S.-Japan relationship, particularly as reflected by the San Francisco Peace Treaty. The Eisenhower Library was the site of some of my most fruitful research, particularly as related to the Mutual Security Program and U.S. military assistance to Japan. Combined with materials from Seeley Mudd library at Princeton University, I was also able to collect a large amount of material about John Foster Dulles, negotiator of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and Eisenhower's secretary of state. This material was particularly helpful in exploring how Dulles hoped to utilize the San Francisco Treaty to replace past conflict with a narrative of peaceful cooperation. Research at the Eisenhower Library was also crucial to understanding both how the U.S. government understood the U.S.-Japan relationship throughout the 1950s and how this understanding changed after large Japanese protests against the renewal of the U.S.-Japan security treaty in 1960. In particular, I was surprised to discover the extent to which the United States blamed these events on intellectuals, arguing that they had "failed" Japan. Through research in Japan, I am curious to explore further how Japanese intellectuals engaged in this relationship.

Without the invaluable support of the Bernath Grant, I would not have been able to complete this research. Building on my research conducted in the United States, I am now well-placed to begin research in Japan, which I plan to begin in the coming year. The Bernath Grant therefore allowed me to make great strides toward the completion of my dissertation.

Jennifer Miller

Ph.D. Candidate
Department of History
University of Wisconsin, Madison

October 5, 2008



I received a Samuel Flagg Bemis Research Grant of \$2,000 from SHAFR in the Spring of 2008. This is a report on how I used those funds. I mentioned three separate trips in my application for funding and completed all three, although I shortened one of the trips.

First, I spent three weeks in San Jose, Costa Rica conducting interviews and researching within the personal archives of several missionaries as well as in the archives of the Universidad Biblica Latinoamericana. Then I spent one week researching at the Hoover Institution's archives at Stanford University in Palo Alto, California. On that trip I also drove to Fresno, California and conducted several interviews with retired missionaries at the Mennonite Brethren Biblical Seminary. Later in the spring, I made a shortened trip to Cleveland, Tennessee to conduct an interview with a retired missionary at the Church of God Theological Seminary. Each of these trips was essential in developing my dissertation on evangelical missionaries in Central America during the 1970s and 1980s.

Rod Coeller

Ph.D. Candidate
Department of History
American University



5. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines:

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize recognizes and encourages excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The prize of \$1,000 is awarded annually.

Eligibility: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the PhD whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or of any other established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

Procedures: Nominations, in the form of a letter and the nominee's c.v., should be sent to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter should discuss evidence of the nominee's excellence in teaching and research.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH). The winner of the prize will deliver a lecture during the SHAFR luncheon at the next year's OAH annual meeting. The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to a SHAFR presidential address and should address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The lecturer is awarded \$1,000 plus up to \$500 in travel expenses to the OAH, and his or her lecture is published in *Diplomatic History*.

To be considered for the 2009 award, nominations must be received by February 28, 2009. Nominations should be sent to Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, San Diego State University, History Department, 5500 Campanile Dr., San Diego, CA 92182-6050 (ehoffman@mail.sdsu.edu).



The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. The prize of \$1,000 is awarded annually to the author of a distinguished article appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations.

Eligibility: The author must be under forty-one years of age or within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of the article's acceptance for publication. The article must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award or the Myrna F. Bernath Book Award are ineligible.

Procedures: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* will be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations may be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

To nominate an article published in 2008, send three copies of the article and a letter of nomination to Michael Krenn, History Department, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608 (krennml@appstate.edu). Deadline for nominations is February 1, 2009.



SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship


SHAFR invites applications for its dissertation completion fellowship. SHAFR will make two, year-long awards, in the amount of \$20,000 each, to support the writing and completion of the doctoral dissertation in the academic year 2009-10. These highly competitive fellowships will support the most promising doctoral candidates in the final phase of completing their dissertations. Applicants should be candidates for the Ph.D. in a humanities or social science doctoral program (most likely history), must have been admitted to candidacy, and must be at the writing stage, with all substantial research completed by the time of the award. Applicants should be working on a topic in the field of U.S. foreign relations history or international history, broadly defined, and must be current members of SHAFR. Because successful applicants are expected to finish writing the dissertation during the tenure of the fellowship, they should not engage in teaching opportunities or extensive paid work, except at the discretion of the Fellowship Committee. At the termination of the award period, recipients must provide a one-page (250-word) report to the SHAFR Council on the use of the fellowship, to be considered for publication in *Passport*, the society newsletter. The submission packet should include: a one page application letter describing the project's significance; the applicant's status; other support received or applied for, and the prospects for completion within the year; a three page (750 word) statement of the research; a curriculum vitae; and a letter of recommendation from the primary doctoral advisor. Applications should be sent by electronic mail to the chair of the Dissertation Completion Fellowship committee, Professor Emily S. Rosenberg, at erosenbe@uci.edu. The subject line should clearly indicate LAST NAME: SHAFR DISSERTATION COMPLETION FELLOWSHIP.

The deadline for submissions is April 1, 2009. Applicants will receive notification about the outcome by May 1, 2009. The names of the winners will be announced at the annual meeting in June.



The Michael J. Hogan Fellowship

The Michael J. Hogan Fellowship was established to honor Michael J. Hogan, long-time editor of *Diplomatic History*. The Hogan Fellowship of \$4,000 is intended to promote research in foreign language sources by graduate students. The fellowship is intended to defray the costs of studying foreign languages needed for research. It is announced at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. Applicants must be graduate students researching some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required. Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a detailed plan for using the fellowship to achieve the purposes of the program (5-7 pages); a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant's graduate adviser must write a letter of recommendation, to be submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail. Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*. To be considered for the 2009 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by February 1, 2009. Submit materials to: Kenneth Osgood, Florida Atlantic University, kosgood@fau.edu.



The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship


The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship of \$4,000 is intended to defray the costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to conduct research on a significant dissertation project. The fellowship is awarded annually at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation. Membership in SHAFR is required. Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a dissertation prospectus including a paragraph or two on how funds would be expended (8-12 pages), a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant's dissertation adviser must write a letter of recommendation, to be submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail. Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*. To be considered for the 2009 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by February 1, 2009. Submit materials to: Kenneth Osgood, Florida Atlantic University, kosgood@fau.edu.



Samuel Flagg Bemis Research Grants

The Samuel F. Bemis Research Grants are intended to promote research by doctoral candidates, by untenured faculty members, and by those within six years of the Ph.D. and working as professional historians. A limited number of grants of varying amounts (generally, up to \$2,000) will be awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects.

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations or post-doctoral research projects dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation or must hold the Ph.D. Membership in SHAFR is required. Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Graduate students should apply for the Holt Fellowship, under the guidelines above, as applicants for that fellowship will be considered automatically for Samuel F. Bemis Research Grants. Untenured faculty members and recent Ph.D.s working as professional historians should submit applications modeled on the Holt Fellowship application, making clear their professional status, substituting a research prospectus for a dissertation prospectus, and arranging a letter of recommendation from any referee. Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*. To be considered for the 2009 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by February 1, 2009. Submit materials to: Kenneth Osgood, Florida Atlantic University, kosgood@fau.edu.



The Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize

The Betty M. Unterberger Prize is intended to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by graduate students in the field of diplomatic history. The Prize of \$1,000 is awarded biannually (in odd years) to the author of a dissertation, completed during the previous two calendar years, on any topic in United States foreign relations history. The Prize is announced at the annual SHAFR conference.

The Prize was established in 2004 to honor Betty Miller Unterberger, a founder of SHAFR and long-time professor of diplomatic history at Texas A&M University.

Procedures: A dissertation may be submitted for consideration by the author or by the author's advisor. Three copies of the dissertation should be submitted, along with a cover letter explaining why the dissertation deserves consideration.

To be considered for the 2009 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by February 28, 2009. Submit materials to SHAFR Unterberger Prize Committee, Department of History, Ohio State University, 106 Dulles Hall, 230 West 17th Avenue, Columbus OH 43210.



6. Recent Publications of Interest

- Afkhami, Gholam Reza, *The Life and Times of the Shah* (California, 2009).
- Al-Ali, Nadje, and Nicola Pratt, *What Kind of Liberation? Women and the Occupation of Iraq* (California, 2009).
- Bilder, Mary Sarah, *The Transatlantic Constitution: Colonial Legal Culture and the Empire* (Harvard, 2008).
- Billy, George J., and Christine M. Billy, *Merchant Mariners at War: An Oral History of World War II* (Florida, 2008).
- Blussé, Leonard, *Visible Cities: Canton, Nagasaki, and Batavia and the Coming of the Americans* (Harvard, 2008).
- Brady, James, *Why Marines Fight* (St. Martin's Griffin, 2008).
- Brzezinski, Matthew, *Red Moon Rising: Sputnik and the Hidden Rivalries that Ignited the Space Age* (Holt, 2008).
- Burk, Kathleen, *Old World, New World: Great Britain and America from the Beginning* (Atlantic Monthly, 2008).
- Carter, James M., *Inventing Vietnam: The United States and State Building, 1954–1968* (Cambridge, 2008).
- Cho, Grace M., *Haunting the Korean Diaspora: Shame, Secrecy, and the Forgotten War* (Minnesota, 2008).
- Chu, Yun-han, Larry Diamond, Andrew J. Nathan, and Doh Chull Shin, eds. *How East Asians View Democracy* (Columbia, 2008).
- Clymer, Adam, *Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch: The Panama Canal Treaties and the Rise of the Right* (Kansas, 2008).
- Cobb, Daniel M., *Native Activism in Cold War America: The Struggle for Sovereignty* (Kansas, 2008).
- Crandall, Russell, *The United States and Latin America after the Cold War* (Cambridge, 2008).
- Curiel, Jonathan, *Al' America: Travels Through America's Arab and Islamic Roots* (New Press, 2008).
- DeLay, Brian, *War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War* (Yale, 2008).
- Deutsch, Nathaniel, *Inventing America's "Worst" Family: Eugenics, Islam, and the Fall and Rise of the Tribe of Ishmael* (California, 2009).
- Gallicchio, Marc, *The Scramble for Asia: U.S. Military Power in the Aftermath of the Pacific War* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2008).
- Gardner, Lloyd C., *The Long Road to Baghdad: A History of U.S. Foreign Policy from the 1970s to the Present* (New Press, 2008).
- Goldman, Kenneth H., *Attack Transport: USS Charles Carroll in World War II* (Florida, 2008).
- Gordon, Neve, *Israel's Occupation* (California, 2008).
- Hazbun, Waleed, *Beaches, Ruins, Resorts: The Politics of Tourism in the Arab World* (Minnesota, 2008).
- Headley, James, *Russia and the Balkans: Foreign Policy from Yeltsin to Putin* (Columbia, 2008).
- Hendon, Bill, and Elizabeth A. Stewart, *An Enormous Crime: The Definitive Account of American POWs Abandoned in Southeast Asia* (St. Martin's Griffin, 2008).
- Jalloh, Alusine, and Toyin Falola, eds. *The United States and West Africa: Interactions and Relations* (Pittsburgh, 2008).
- Kahn, Paul W., *Sacred Violence: Torture, Terror, and Sovereignty* (Michigan, 2008).
- Kane, John, *Between Virtue and Power: The Persistent Moral Dilemma of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Yale, 2008).
- Karner, Stefan, et. al., eds, *Prague Spring: The International Crisis Year 1968, Essays* (Cologne-Weimar-Vienna: Boehlau 2008).
- Karner, Stefan, et. al., eds, *Prague Spring: The International Crisis Year 1968, Documents* (Cologne-Weimar-Vienna: Boehlau 2008).
- Kaufman, Jason, *The Origins of Canadian and American Political Differences* (Harvard, 2009).
- Lakoff, Andrew, and Stephen J. Collier, eds., *Biosecurity Interventions: Global Health and Security in Question* (Columbia, 2008).
- Lipman, Jana K., *Guantánamo: A Working-Class History between Empire and Revolution* (California, 2008).
- Martinez, Samuel, *International Migration and Human Rights: The Global Repercussions of U.S. Policy* (California, 2009).
- Michael, John, *Identity and the Failure of America: From Thomas Jefferson to the War on Terror* (Minnesota, 2008).
- Mitchell, Lincoln A., *Uncertain Democracy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Georgia's Rose Revolution* (Pennsylvania, 2008).
- Parsi, Trita, *Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States* (Yale, 2008).
- Rodin, David, and Henry Shue, eds. *Just and Unjust Warriors: The Moral and Legal Status of Soldiers* (Oxford, 2008).
- Rossini, Daniela, trans. Antony Shugaar, *Woodrow Wilson and the American Myth in Italy* (Harvard, 2008).
- Schoonover, Thomas, *Hitler's Man in Havana: Heinz Luning and Nazi Espionage in Latin America* (Kentucky, 2008).
- Smallwood, Stephanie E., *Saltwater Slavery: A Middle Passage from Africa to American Diaspora* (Harvard, 2009).

Smith, Dan, *The State of the Middle East: An Atlas of Conflict and Resolution*, Revised and Updated (California, 2008).
Truxes, Thomas M., *Defying Empire: Trading with the Enemy in Colonial New York* (Yale, 2008).
Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf, *Strait Talk: United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China* (Harvard, 2009).
Winkler, Jonathan Reed, *Nexus: Strategic Communications and American Security in World War I* (Harvard, 2008).
Young, Marilyn B., and Yuki Tanaka, eds. *Bombing Civilians: A Twentieth-Century History* (New Press, 2008).
Zimmerman, Dwight Jon, and John D. Gresham, *Beyond Hell and Back: How America's Special Operations Forces Became the World's Greatest Fighting Unit* (St. Martin's Griffin, 2008).

Congratulations!

2008 SHAFR ELECTION RESULTS

In the 2008 election, the membership of SHAFR elected the following persons to offices in the Society:

President: **Frank Costigliola**
Vice President: **Andy Rotter**
Council member: **Erin Mahan**
Council member: **Jeffrey Engel**
Council Member (graduate student): **Jaideep Prabhu**
Nominating Committee: **Hang Nguyen**

In Memoriam: Bradford Perkins (1925-2008)

Bradford Perkins, President of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations in 1974 and recipient of SHAFR's Norman and Laura Graebner Career Achievement Award in 1992, died on June 29, 2008 at the age of 83. He was born in Rochester, New York on March 6, 1925 the son of Dexter and Wilma Lord Perkins. Following combat service in the European theater during World War II, service for which he was decorated, he completed his BA at Harvard in 1947. While there, he met and married his wife, Nancy Tucker Perkins, and they enjoyed a loving union until her death in 1993.

Perkins received his doctorate in History, also from Harvard, in 1952. Subsequently, he taught at the University of California, Los Angeles, before joining the Department of History at the University of Michigan in 1962. During his career at Michigan, he twice served as Department chairman and served on many department, College and university committees.

Perkins, an authority on Anglo-American relations, authored five books, two edited volumes, and many articles, reviews, and review essays. His trilogy—*The First Rapprochement, Prologue to War, and Castlereagh and Adams*—remains the standard account of the Anglo-American relationship from 1795-1825. For *Castlereagh and Adams* he was awarded the Bancroft prize. Perkins subsequently wrote *The Great Rapprochement* that considered the changing Anglo-American relationship at the turn of the next century. Although these books were written in the 1950s and 1960s, they are in some ways remarkably modern. They are deeply researched, multiarchival works, early examples of international history that placed American foreign relations in the context of European and world developments. In addition, earlier than most, Perkins took into account culture. Thus his first book, *The First Rapprochement*, included a chapter on "Transatlantic-Ties" that examined cultural aspects of American relations, factors that made it easier for the fledgling United States to reconnect with England rather than France. In *The Great Rapprochement*, Perkins expanded his treatment of cultural considerations, while race was front and center. In his final book, *The Creation of a Republican Empire, 1775-1865*, a volume in the *Cambridge History of American Foreign Relations* series (1993), Perkins returned to earlier American history and constructed an excellent overview of the diplomatic history of the first 90 years of an independent United States.

Perkins was particularly proud of his efforts to engage what was at times a yawning gap between "traditional" diplomatic historians and the "revisionists" associated with William Appleman Williams. The occasion came in when *Reviews in American History* invited Perkins to discuss the impact of Williams' work. At least one colleague attempted to dissuade him from accepting the invitation. But Perkins decided otherwise, and his essay, "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: Twenty-Five Years After," appeared in the March 1984 edition of the journal. Critical of much of Williams' thesis, he also found the revisionist's approach to be stimulating and useful, and his impact significant. Williams failed to produce a system into which all "eras and events" would fit, he wrote. Yet "no comprehensive scheme, no broad generalizations, and few but the narrowest studies of episodes in American foreign relations will be written, if they are to shine, without an awareness of and an accommodation to William Appleman Williams' *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*."¹ Brad was immensely proud when two years later Lloyd Gardner included his essay in *Redefining the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of William Appleman Williams*²

During his career, Perkins received a number of honors in addition to the Bancroft Prize. He was awarded fellowships by the Social



Science Research Council, the Guggenheim Foundation and the Charles Warren Center at Harvard. He delivered the Commonwealth Fund Lectures at University College, London, in 1965, and the Albert Shaw Lectures at Johns Hopkins in 1979. In recognition of his achievements, he was elected to membership in the Society of American Historians, the Massachusetts Historical Society and the American Antiquarian Society. In 1986 he received a Distinguished Faculty Achievement Award from the University of Michigan.

Perkins served on leading committees of the American Historical Association, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations and the Organization of American Historians. He was, for ten years ending in 1994, a member (and sometimes chairman) of the Department of State

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation. In this capacity, he achieved substantial but by no means complete success to improve scholarly access to the documentary record of recent American foreign policy.

As a teacher, Perkins was demanding yet eminently fair. Students appreciated his encyclopedic knowledge of the literature (which he expected them somehow to emulate), the seriousness with which he read their work, and the almost legendary promptness with which he returned dissertation chapters complete with numerous corrections and probing questions in the margins.

Outside of academe, Perkins enjoyed a variety of activities from poker to golf. He was a fervent, if often frustrated, Boston Red Sox fan and once saw Babe Ruth play (for the Boston Braves) at the end of Ruth's career. Brad also enjoyed travel, perhaps something instilled in him when his father took the family to Venezuela in 1935 and to Europe and the Middle East in 1938. Just a month before his death he returned from a trip to Japan with his son Dexter, daughter-in-law Betsy, and grandson Douglas.

Intensely interested in current events, Perkins was an avid reader of the *New York Times*. He marched with Martin Luther King on the road from Selma to Montgomery and contributed to many liberal causes. With Nancy, he transferred much of their property to the Superior Land Conservancy. Nancy, the more vigorous outdoorsperson, recycled before there was recycling. In recent years he had come to fear for the nation's future, foreseeing financial ruin as the result of excessive tax cuts and deficit spending.

Bradford Perkins is survived by his son Dexter, daughter-in-law Betsy, and grandson Douglas, grandson George Perkins (Los Alamos), son and daughter-in-law Matthew and Diana Perkins (Seattle), daughter Martha Nash Perkins and grandson Tobias (Seattle). His youngest son, James, died tragically in an automobile accident in 1988.

Kenton Clymer
Northern Illinois University

The author wishes to thank Martha Nash Perkins who provided information about her father and also some of the text for this obituary, which is incorporated with her permission.

Notes:

1. Bradford Perkins, "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy: Twenty-Five Years After," *Review of American History*, 12 (March 1984): 15.
2. Lloyd C. Gardner, ed., *Redefining the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of William Appleman Williams* (Corvallis, OR: Oregon State University Press, 1986).

The Last Word

Kenneth Weisbrode

Ever since E.P. Thompson issued his famous call to rescue their subjects from the enormous condescension of posterity, the historical profession has been preoccupied with redefining itself. This no doubt has included keeping up with fads in the social sciences. For even though historians may be fond of ghosts—albeit in pursuit of Geyl's argument without end—they sometimes find it hard to resist new approaches and theories. It is not only because of the inherent appeal of originality, but also because of the usual professional pressures for innovation.

Such pressures induced diplomatic historians a generation ago to begin to promote their field as something grander called international history. International history, of course, includes many things besides diplomatic history, and many international historians today know as much or more about the footprints of non-governmental organizations and private groups as they do about the careers of rulers, statesmen and ministers.

How we got to this point is well known. The search for a "new" approach to diplomatic history in the United States began in earnest soon after the wave of Cold War revisionists appeared in the 1960s. Earlier innovations, such as those by the now nearly forgotten historian Sidney Fay, focussed narrowly upon events. The Cold War revisionists in the United States forced students to rethink the entire premises of their country's foreign relations. The famous books by Williams, LaFeber, Kolko and others were mainly teleological efforts to undercut the liberal orthodoxy, but they also coincided with the importation of the Germans' *Primat der Innenpolitik*. Thenceforth the most original U.S. historians would write about diplomacy from the inside out, incorporating institutional, economic, financial and social history into their accounts of American relations with the rest of the world. Still, much of this work was indistinguishable from policy history.¹

It would only be a matter of time until others broadened the focus even further to include non-traditional subjects in their own right. The domestic lens of diplomatic history meant, on the one hand, that historians had to take seriously the existence of many individuals besides "state actors." There had always been the press and publicists, but new emphasis was placed on other groups—educators, churches, chambers of commerce and so on. Taking the "non-state" label abroad with missionaries, merchants, and even tourists was a logical extension.

Today the bevy of international historians claiming

expertise in the history of United States foreign relations exists strangely in three semi-detached groups: those who study the global proliferation of various non-state actors, movements, and even non-human subjects such as commodities; those who write about epiphenomena—democratization, modernization, etc.—and their manifestations in American and other societies; and those who continue to produce empirical analyses of decision-making at the highest levels of government though still with less concern for "the process of diplomacy than with the results."²

That the various international historians do not work interstitially is not, in itself, a problem. Most of us acknowledge and occasionally celebrate one another's work. Yet the parallel drives for specialization and diversification have resulted in a field of historical scholarship that now seems to include almost anything that crosses a border, hence the latest favorites: "transnational" and "global" history. We seem not too far off from what our nineteenth century predecessors called "universal" history; and soon we may find that our own field of study has come to touch everything under the sun. At the same time, there is the growing realization that the move to cultivate an ever richer variety of characters and settings does not extend itself, however, to plot. Do newly uncovered groups and phenomena fundamentally reorient our knowledge of the past? Or are we just adding more colors to the kaleidoscope?

Recently two young historians called for a back to basics movement: recognizing the appeal of the so-called "new political history" and "new military history" (both more or less variations on the old with added elements of social and cultural studies), they have begun to urge a return to the glorious tradition of Ranke, Butterfield *et al.*³ This is praiseworthy although there seems to be little that is especially new about it apart from the half-hearted invocation of gender history and behavioral science. It does not appear to be a way to bridge the methodological and epistemological gaps within international history, or a novel path forward.

To argue that a bridge is neither necessary nor desirable is certainly a defensible position. Innovation for innovation's sake is too often a bad idea. On the other hand, the moment is ripe for improvement. International history is more popular than ever among graduate students. The undergraduate demand for instruction in foreign relations continues to grow. But most course offerings that go by the label "United States and the

World" combine haphazardly the various trends in international history with a residue of political narrative. The field seems to call out for coherence, and a rethinking of its core approach. It need not despair. Staring all of us in the face is an important body of work that took off long ago in the social sciences but for some inexplicable reason has failed to catch on among international historians, especially in the United States. This is network analysis.

Most people with first hand experience in world affairs know that diplomacy has never been only about what one clerk said to another. Diplomats have always been political interpreters and cultural interlocutors, living, working, and thinking between and among diverse states and societies. Their webs of encounters and associations, including their extended families and their nominally private relationships, have long been at the nexus, and not on the anecdotal margins, of transnational history. The narrow focus on the official record and the self-conscious negation of the same have each overlooked these critical networks of persuasion and their intrinsic diversity. The result has

been an understanding of the past that is piecemeal and, ironically, less comprehensive on paper than in life.

To elaborate such official and unofficial networks and to consider them as part of an extended narrative of community building (or dismantling, as the case may be) would do away with the overdrawn distinction between state and non-state actors, and would highlight the importance of biography, prosopography, social geography, and psychology to the study of international history. The orthodox among us may say that this is what masters like Butterfield had been doing all along, and that may be so, although his material seems quaint by comparison to the vast range of subjects occupying today's international historians. We must return then to exploring and analyzing the machinery of diplomacy, but now more broadly and deeply than before, recognizing that high politics are almost always conditioned by relationships two or three levels down, while larger trends and forces are almost always mobilized at the very same levels of government and society. This vital, middle ground is a promising

"new" area for research that need not supplant other realms of scholarship, but may enrich them with relevant explorations of the minds of those who toil in the vineyard of world affairs. Their stories need to be better known, as do historical analyses of their *modus operandi*. It is finally time for us to restore everyday diplomats to their proper place of innovation at the center of international history.

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Notes:

1. The failure to differentiate between the two is now so common as to go unnoticed. See, for example, Michael H. Hunt, "The Long Crisis in U.S. Diplomatic History: Coming to Closure," in Michael J. Hogan, ed., *America in the World. The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 93-126.
2. Waldo Heinrichs quoted in Smith Simpson, ed. *Instruction in Diplomacy: The Liberal Arts Approach*. Monograph 13, The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia, 1972, p. 89.
3. Karl W. Schweitzer and Matt J. Schumann, "The Revitalization of Diplomatic History: Renewed Reflections" *Diplomacy and Statecraft* Vol. 19, No. 2 (2008).

Oxford University Press-USA Dissertation Prize in International History

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations and Oxford University Press-USA are very pleased to announce a new dissertation prize in international history. Administered by SHAFR, the Oxford University Press-USA Dissertation Prize in International History will be offered biannually for the best dissertation writing by a rising historian who has completed a research project defined as international history. The research must be multinational in framing and scope, and there will be a preference for works that have a multilingual source base. In endowing this prize, Oxford University Press hopes to recognize the stellar work of junior scholars and to highlight works that have not been the focus of area studies and other regional and national approaches. Winners of the prize will receive \$1,000 and be invited to submit the resulting manuscript to Oxford University Press-USA for a formal reading for possible publication. The authors must be members of SHAFR at the time of submission.

"Even as we are constantly exploring and experimenting with new forms of scholarly communication, OUP honors the deep research of dissertations and the first books they become, which often serve as the anchor for an author's future work, and so we are thrilled to be joining hands with SHAFR to create this award," says Niko Pfund, Vice President and Publisher of Academic and Trade Books at Oxford University Press.

"SHAFR has long encouraged and supported research by graduate students," Peter Hahn, executive director of SHAFR, notes, "and thus we are deeply grateful to Oxford University Press-USA for its generous gift that will enable us to reward the very best achievements in international history among our graduate student members."

The inaugural Oxford University Press-USA Dissertation Prize in International History will be awarded by SHAFR in 2010 for the best dissertation completed in 2008 or 2009. Details on the competition will be advertised on the SHAFR web-site (www.shafr.org).