



The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors two printed works of a quarterly nature, the **Newsletter**, and **Diplomatic History**, a journal. All members receive these publications.

FOREIGN POLICY TRENDS SINCE 1920*

by

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I am pleased to be delivering the first Bernath Lecture and had hoped to begin with an anecdote about the influence of women on American foreign policy. However, the only documented evidence I have seen of direct female impact on diplomacy occurred when Abigail Adams convinced John to negotiate a second loan with the Dutch in 1799. This example did not seem recent enough to be relevant. U. S. foreign policy has an enormous impact on women all over the world, but American women are scarcely involved in its formulation at top decision-making levels.¹ This is even true in the area of relations with developing nations where female-oriented problems of nutrition and fertility are paramount. Foreign policy formulation in this as in most countries will, in all likelihood, remain one of the last bastions of sexism for the remainder of this century. I will return to the question of sexism and diplomacy in a more symbolic way toward the end of this talk.

First I want to look at American foreign policy of the 1920s to see if it appears to have anything in common with that of the 1970s. I think that without relying on too much hindsight or historical sleight of hand, we can begin to see some unexpected similarities as well, of course, as the obvious dissimilarities.

In 1971 I summarized what I thought were two basic types of foreign policy practices that had emerged in the 1920s.² One set I said then had been preserved and reinforced for the next forty years and the other set I had suggested were re-emerging for reconsideration in the 1970s. I do not want to review in detail both sets here except to say that they overlap with the specific similarities and dissimilarities between the 1920s and 1970s that I have outlined above. It is the similarities I want to concentrate upon primarily after briefly considering two characteristics of American foreign policy that are now in the process of modification after having been carefully cultivated in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. These are: a leveling off of anti-communist paranoia and a pulling back from "Stimsonianism" in the conduct of foreign affairs. "Stimsonianism," according to Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., projects a world view based on U. S. military intervention because "if aggression were permitted to go unpunished in one place, this by infection would lead to a general destruction of the system of world order." This point of view has been recently

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referred to as "power realism"³ and it underscored many of the military interventions ordered by American Presidents.

The obvious dissimilarities are these: 1) the existence of multinational corporations that seem beyond the control of nations in which they theoretically are owned; 2) traditional energy sources that are IN FACT running out, rather than IN THEORY as in the 1920s; 3) proliferating military nuclear power in addition to conventional weapons of war; 4) some sense of loss of both power and confidence in America's position in the world and its leaders instead of the rising expectations following World War I; and 5) the existence of not simply a Third World of developing nations, as we have come to think of them since the Cold War, but also Fourth and Fifth World nations depending on their level of economic advancement and viability.

The obvious similarities are these: 1) renewed interest in disarmament; 2) decentralized decision-making; 3) overt emphasis on, and concern with, economic foreign policy; 4) candid recognition of the relationship between domestic and foreign policies; 5) the existence of a multinational world, rather than the bipolar one of the early Cold War years; 6) President Carter's rhetorical morality which is much more reminiscent of Wilson's moral legacy in the 1920s than FDR's in the 1930s even though the President is predisposed to emulate the latter; 7) the absence of women in significant positions of power in the diplomatic decision-making process, despite Carter's token appointment of Lucy Wilson Benson to oversee our runaway arms sales (this is a typical no-win female appointment); 8) substantially unchanged U. S. dealings with the USSR despite détente; 9) a reliance on male experts in the formulation of diplomacy that has quantitatively but not qualitatively changed since the 1920s; and finally, 10) the continuing antirevolutionary position of the United States in what remains a revolutionary world, during the Cold War years--up to and including Vietnam. There seems to be a consensus now among foreign policy specialists that the country is entering a period of "introversion" that cannot be characterized as either isolationist or internationalist. Instead, we are told by such experts that the future diplomacy of the United States will reflect various forms and degrees of global interdependence on an unprecedented scale.⁴

Despite the ominous overtones of how Gerald R. Ford and Henry A. Kissinger reportedly wanted to handle the situation in Angola, it is probably true that too many Washington officials are still haunted by the nightmare of the Indochinese War for the United States to embark on foreign military adventures in the near future. The same degree of introversion does not seem to be lingering among the general public as a result of the Vietnamese conflict. In fact, public amnesia about the alleged lessons of Vietnam has spread rather rapidly. As recently as 1969 national polls indicated that three-quarters of the American people DID NOT THINK the United States should use force even to resist overt communist aggression against Thailand, Japan, or Berlin. In 1970 a majority polled accepted the idea that this country NEED NOT BE MILITARILY SUPERIOR to potentially hostile nations. This was the first time since the Second World War

that public opinion seemed to sense or accept the relative decline in American military power vis-a-vis the rest of the world. Related questions also indicated less fear of the monolithic nature of communist regimes. In December, 1974, for example, Americans ranked "containing communism" ninth upon a list of eighteen foreign policy goals, behind concerns over adequate supplies of energy, job security, and world hunger.⁵

However, by 1976 something had happened to public opinion.⁶ People had not returned to the communist paranoia of the Cold War years, but their views on defense had changed considerably. Possibly their introversion had become more privatized and their personal anxieties about the domestic economy, especially after the 1973 oil scare, were now reflected in security concerns. At any rate, although a majority still believed that the United States was losing ground to the Soviet Union and could not maintain its military superiority beyond this decade, 52 percent now insisted as of last year that the United States should maintain its dominant position as the world's most powerful nation at all costs, even if that meant "going to the very brink of war." In 1974 only 42 percent felt this strongly; in 1972, only 39 percent. In fact, one would have to dip back into the pre-1968 period to find majority approval for maintaining American military superiority, regardless of the consequences. Another finding of this recent statistical study of security attitudes surprised even those analysts who compiled it. "The nationwide extent of increased approval for military and defense spending that we found in 1976 is little short of phenomenal," these social scientists reported. Their figures indicated that 28 percent of their sample favored INCREASED MILITARY EXPENDITURE. Not high in itself, this figure becomes significant only if compared with the proportion of respondents who favored cuts in the defense budget. Those who did favor such cuts declined from 37 percent in 1972 to 33 percent in 1974 to 20 percent in 1976. (As of last year, therefore, almost 10 percentage points separated those who wanted to CUT defense spending and those who wanted to INCREASE it with the latter representing the highest percentage.) This margin begins to become even more significant in light of the 40 percent who in both 1972 and 1974 expressed SATISFACTION with recent INCREASES in the defense budgets for those years. This percentage of approval rose to 43 in 1976. Clearly, it would not require great mental gymnastics for power realists to convert the original 28 percent in favor of greater defense spending into a net majority by combining it with the 43 percent already acquiescing to recently increased defense budgets.

As I have said, this latest, most comprehensive study of security attitudes does not indicate anything like a return to the communist paranoia of the 1920s, 1940s, or 1950s. It does indicate a much greater willingness among the public-at-large to sanction the use of conventional military force than probably exists among civilian officials in Washington at this time. Such latter-day Stimsonianism, however, appears highly selective on the part of most people polled. In 1974 and 1975, for example, only 48 percent approved the use of American troops to defend "major European Allies" against the USSR. In 1976 the proportion rose to 56 percent. Similarly since 1974 a majority of Americans favored defending Canada if that nation were attacked. Turning to the Far East, 45 percent

agreed in 1976 that the United States should defend Japan in the event of war in that part of the world. In 1974 only 37 percent held this position. It is the geographical specificity of these endorsements for the use of force that I want to emphasize because I do not believe they are completely fortuitous or even capricious expressions of grassroots opinion. But for the moment I am simply using them as examples of modifications in the foreign policy attitudes since the 1920s.

With respect to diplomatic trends from the 1920s, which I said in 1971 had been subordinated in the 1940s and 1950s and were only now re-emerging for consideration, the one most visible on the foreign policy horizon today is a renewed interest at governmental and public levels in disarmament. At first glance this appears to be in conflict with the defense attitudes I have just described, but the advent of nuclear weapons has created a difference in kind, not simply degree in the area of arms control and limitation, as all of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks have demonstrated. In their most recent security concerns Americans are endorsing the use of conventional, not nuclear, weapons. Although President Carter is also currently paying lip-service to a few other foreign policy characteristics of the 1920s, such as the importance of evaluating domestic priorities in relation to foreign affairs, the futility of attritional wars based on ideological considerations, and the need for a greater congruence between the goals of American economic and political foreign policies, it remains to be seen whether he will succeed in effecting new practical policies in these areas.

The acrimonious breakdown between the administration and Soviet leaders in their initial arms talks at the end of March, 1977, is not an auspicious beginning in the general area of Soviet-American relations. In fact, the failure of these negotiations was so abrupt and seemingly decisive that one cannot help but wonder if it was not orchestrated by a few, well-publicized acts on the part of American officials. These included advance announcements of the U. S. terms with a request for a prompt response, and, immediately before Secretary Cyrus Vance's departure, the President's announcement that he wanted to spend \$45 million on new transmitters for Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty--a pet project of Carter's national security adviser.⁷ Anyone who has read Zbigniew Brzezinski's major foreign policy articles over the last three or four years could have predicted a less than tactful approach toward détente by the Carter administration. Brzezinski views Kissinger's brand of détente with the Soviet Union as no more than an old bilateral, competitive version of balance-of-power international politics between First and Second World nations that is not adequate to meet the demands of global interdependence. Détente is also in direct conflict with what Brzezinski thinks should be "THE CENTRAL PRIORITY OF U. S. POLICY," namely "THE ACTIVE PROMOTION OF . . . TRILATERAL COOPERATION" between America, Europe, and Japan.⁸

Since the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs has been an all-too-obvious presence during the President's first meetings with various heads of state and in the attempts to explain the collapse of arms negotiations with the Soviets, I have as yet no reason to discount the

reported statement of an Atlanta aide who said during the Carter presidential campaign in response to an inquiry about his candidate's views on diplomacy: "Brzezinski IS Jimmy's foreign policy."⁹ Despite the emphasis Carter has personally placed on human rights and an open, moral American foreign policy, the fact remains that most of his top appointments, with the exception of his attorney general, were all former silent or vocal proponents of the war in Vietnam and members of what has been called "an exclusive association of the Western World's most powerful and influential individuals," namely, the Trilateral Commission. Founded in 1973 under the aegis of David Rockefeller this group consists of 80 members from Western Europe, North America, and Japan. Its purpose, according to the commission's newsletter **Triologue**, is to "promote economic cooperation between the industrialized nations of the West as a means of counterbalancing the economic clout of the Arab oil-producing nations and the economic influence of the Soviet Union over the developing nations."¹⁰ Brzezinski directed the Trilateral Commission until he resigned early in 1976 to become Carter's adviser on foreign policy during the presidential campaign.¹¹

Therefore, I see nothing new or novel in Carter's appointments. Certainly they do not indicate any disintegration of that elite group of men who have traditionally shaped our foreign policy. It may not be quite as WASPish, but it is still an "old boys" club. Also, the rhetoric about American foreign policy may have changed, but Brzezinski's trilateralism is no less a "balance of power policy in a multinational world" than Kissinger's *détente* and "linkage" approaches were. Trilateralism is certainly no more moral or open than previous U. S. approaches to the world since the Second World War.¹² To the degree that it succeeds in binding a major segment of the industrialized world together with energy supplies running out, it probably bodes ill for most developing nations for reasons I will briefly mention later. Also, it is interesting to note that the selective changes in American public opinion toward defense in the last three or four years just happen to coincide not only with the 1973 oil crisis, but with the formation of, and dissemination of information by, the Trilateral Commission.

These remarks are not meant to be excessively critical of the Carter administration. Rather, they are made to point out the difficulties any administration, "reborn" or not, would have in restructuring American foreign policy at the very moment when it seems more crucial to do so than at any time since the beginning of the Cold War. Basic redesign of diplomatic policies has been hampered for at least the last ten years by organizational and conceptual systems coming out of the depression and World War II. These were originally justified on the grounds of need for national security and ideological consensus (sometimes euphemistically referred to as bipartisan foreign policy). For the past quarter-century the United States has pursued these goals largely through an increasingly complex network of military agreements coupled with foreign aid and economic innovations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Marshall Plan, OECD, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Many of the procedures devised for directing these far-flung activities have been filtered through variations of the National Security Council, created in 1947. No president has relied exclusively on the NSC for advice; each has tailored

it to fit his own style of conducting foreign policy. Truman often defied it; Eisenhower didn't understand it; Kennedy largely ignored it; Johnson distrusted it because of the numerous Kennedy carry-overs; and Kissinger, with Nixon's approval, turned it into a temporary mechanism for centralized presidential control. Even with Kissinger's streamlined procedure for policy review by interagency studies under the direction of what was called the Defense Program Review Committee, the NSC has proven in recent years to be too narrow in composition and too dominated by political-military concerns to function effectively under today's altered world conditions. Most simply stated, "the foreign policy problems of today are not those of 1947, and recent U.S. experience in meeting them is far from reassuring," whether one looks at the failure to develop a coherent oil import policy since 1969, or our handling of the Panama question, or the embargo on soybeans. The problem was summed up in 1973 by former Undersecretary of State, U. Alexis Johnson, when he said that "economic considerations will dominate foreign policy over the next two decades, as security concerns dominated the last two."¹³

If this is true, and I believe it is, then we find ourselves faced with unprecedented economic problems. Fossil energy resources is perhaps the most prominent but, in all likelihood, international redistribution of wealth is the most basic. This assumption about the centrality of economic issues in international relations for the remainder of the century is MUCH GREATER than even revisionist critics of the Cold War maintain it was for American diplomacy in the 1940s and 1950s. It is this candid public assertion of the primacy of economic foreign policy that is more in keeping with the 1920s than with the years since 1947. That is why some of the experiences of the 1920s may prove more relevant in solving future world problems than those of the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s. In other words, IT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE THAT THE DIPLOMATIC EXPERIENCES OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION, SECOND WORLD WAR AND COLD WAR WILL APPEAR "THE GREAT ABERRATIONS" OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, RATHER THAN ITS TOUCHSTONES.

After all, the world is no longer dominated by one or two superpowers who negotiate bilaterally. It is defined by multinational and regional configurations, which are much more analogous to the situation following World War I rather than World War II. While no precise names were assigned to specific groupings within the multinational world of the 1920s, today it is possible to divide the globe into five distinct economic worlds instead of the usual racially and ideologically defined three worlds of the Cold War Period.¹⁴

Moreover, in 1950 the United States accounted for 50 percent of the world's military expenditures and held a short-term monopoly and invulnerability in the area of nuclear weapons. In 1975 the United States accounted for 25 percent of the world's military expenditures, had agreed to nuclear parity with the Soviet Union, and faced the danger of nuclear proliferation all over the world. In 1950 the GNP of the United States was 40 percent of the international total; in 1975 it had been reduced to 27 percent. In 1950 the United States produced 60 percent of all manufactured

goods; in 1975 American production accounted for 30 percent of the total. In 1950 the United States held 50 percent of the world's monetary reserves; in 1975 it held 7 percent. In 1950 we dominated the decisions of the United Nations Assembly when its membership consisted of fifty countries. Now that it has risen to 143, mostly less developed nations, we do not. Within the United Nations the United States also faces the "Group of 77" developing nations demanding a "new economic order."¹⁵ Even the Security Council is no longer under the control of the United States and in general the altruistic egalitarianism Wilson projected for the League of Nations seems to have become an unexpected reality in the United Nations Assembly today.

This relative decline in the international power and influence of the United States should not come as a surprise. Some of it was inevitable, given the artificially predominant position the country occupied after the Second World War. Even greater decline has been predicted, however, for the remainder of the century. What has been harder for Washington officials to accept than THE FACT of this continued decline, is the need for NEW STRUCTURAL AND CONCEPTUAL APPROACHES for dealing with it. We must now bargain in world affairs, as Marina Whitman has said, from a position of "leadership without hegemony."¹⁶ This requires more than recognition of relative decline; it requires structural changes in the foreign policy decision-making process; it requires better coordination between economic and political foreign policies; it requires attempts to stabilize Europe and other parts of the world without becoming involved in strategic matters that are not vital to American interests; and it requires a cessation to the century-long perpetuation of the antirevolutionary reputation of the United States among developing nations.

Not all of these requirements are new. Far from it. Foreign policy formulators in the 1920s struggled with many of these same problems as a matter of course until the Great Depression and then the Second World War provided traumatic circumstances that altered the orientation of later generations of diplomatists. Unlike the men of the 1920s, those in the 1940s and 1950s accepted a much larger role of the federal government in domestic and foreign affairs; gave up trying to contain American involvement abroad in favor of containing communism everywhere; and lost sight of the elusive balance between foreign and domestic priorities out of their conviction that preservation of American prosperity and domestic democratic institutions depended on unlimited economic expansion abroad. The "bigger and better" syndrome always lurking in the American psyche reached its logical extreme in the post-World War II years. So did blind faith in the benefits that would accrue both to the United States and developing countries through the indiscriminate exportation of capitalism and democracy. Most important, America was able, albeit for a shorter period than it wanted to admit, to operate from a position of unequalled world-wide predominance.

Little wonder then, that the circuitous diplomatic maneuvers of the 1920s seemed like insignificant muddlings to postwar Cold Warriors. But twenty-five years earlier even President Harding, not otherwise known for his astuteness in foreign affairs, recognized that "the solution of our

problems at home was inseparably linked with our foreign relations" and that some way of reconciling domestic and foreign priorities had to be devised.¹⁷ This is the same problem we now face without (I hope) the immediate prospect of either a world depression or a world war to camouflage the harshness of this long-ignored reality. While it is currently fashionable to say that the politics of interdependence, largely represented by trilateralism, is rendering "irrelevant the former distinctions between domestic and foreign policy," it is quite another thing to design a decision-making structure that satisfies both the goals of American diplomacy with its domestic needs. Average people and nations simply do not think like multinational corporations nor should they be guilt-tripped into doing so; nor should resentment of them be dismissed as ethnocentric parochialism. "Bigger is still better" to the multinationals represented in the Trilateral Commission and sooner or later President Carter will have to reconcile that with his domestic emphasis on "less is best."¹⁸ This foreign and domestic double standard simply will not wash, except in the rarefied atmosphere of the National Security Council or certain "think-tanks" across the country. Moreover, if the vast majority of people in the multipolar world are to have even a slim chance of survival, Americans and citizens of other industrialized countries are going to have to accept a substantial reduction in standard of living. It is to the 1920s we must turn to find recognition of the limits to American power and POSSIBLY EVEN TO THE STANDARD OF LIVING MOST IN BALANCE WITH THE ECOLOGICAL NEEDS OF THE REST OF THE WORLD.

Another interesting comparison between the 1920s and 1970s is not as apparent as the one I have been making about the position of America as an economic and military power with its grossly inflated and wasteful lifestyles. It has to do with decentralization within the decision-making process. For all the talk we have heard during and since Watergate about the "imperial presidency" and the enormous power of the executive branch of government, the fact remains that it employs proportionately fewer civilians today than it did in 1947, that is, 13 percent relative to the entire population in 1976 compared to 15 percent in 1947, or 2.8 million compared with 2.1 million people. These gigantic figures are not as important, however, for the decision-making process as the increase in the number of personal assistants to the president--too few of whom "have responsibilities sufficiently broad or a relationship sufficiently close to the President to understand the extraordinary range of his concerns." Presidential assistants have risen from two under Hoover to eleven under FDR to fifty-two under Nixon. Reduction under Ford and now Carter have not yet produced any significant reduction in personality or structural bottlenecks. Likewise, the Executive Office has grown from around 1,100 under Eisenhower to over 5,000 under Nixon.¹⁹ Recent indications are that Carter is finding it difficult to effect the cutbacks he announced during his campaign.

One should not assume from these figures that this tremendous growth in the executive branch has made for greater centralization or efficiency in the formulation of foreign policy. On the contrary, specialists in government organization constantly complain about the inertia of the standard operating procedures (SOPs) of this mammoth bureaucracy, about the

inconsistency and incoherence of "a system in which power is so widely diffused," and about the difficulty in solving more and more complex international problems through such "widely dispersed centers of authority." The decentralization these critics describe leads inevitably toward the DISINTEGRATION OF POLICY rather than toward the INTEGRATION OF POLICY.²⁰ They also raise the fearful question of what will happen if we continue to flounder in this bureaucratic morass until our foreign policy problems appear beyond solution within current constitutional and democratic (to say nothing of moral) constraints.

This is obviously a case of DECENTRALIZATION BY DEFAULT. In the 1920s it was a question of DECENTRALIZATION BY DESIGN and, therefore, perhaps there are valuable lessons to be culled from the failure of the policy makers of that decade to synchronize various agencies and departments involved in foreign affairs. Men like President Hoover at least realized they were dealing with problems of decentralization, and wanted to preserve its best features. In the 1970s the uncentralized chaos which actually exists has too often been confused with Nixon's personal megalomania and popularized theories about the omnipotence of the office of the presidency. This myth about the personal power of the president in foreign affairs is so widespread that it will take years for the general public to comprehend the gelatinous bureaucratic foundation on which it is actually based. Ironically, it could also lead to covert undemocratic centralization by those elite groups who recognize and resent the inefficient decentralization that does in fact exist, regardless of the public's contrary opinion.

As I indicated earlier, increasing interest in disarmament or more precisely in arms control, is another similarity the 1970s shares with the 1920s. This aspect of foreign policy is not only important because of the danger of nuclear holocaust and the relative decline in U. S. military power, but also because the SALT talks reflect two other trends in American diplomacy that have remained consistent over the last fifty years. They are the manner in which we have dealt with the Soviets since 1920 and the increasing use of male experts in federal decision-making. The first can be described briefly. Since 1917 this country has expressed an ideological antipathy toward the Soviet Union, yet its primary diplomatic contacts have been characterized by a crass materialism that not even detente has been able to disguise.

Beginning with the Bolshevik Revolution Washington officials have maintained that the Soviet Union needed American wheat, loans, and technology to survive. These items have also been proffered, especially in the early 1920s and early 1970s when the United States had either a grain surplus or trade deficits or both, on the assumption that they could be used for great diplomatic leverage. This policy and the rationalization about Soviet needs upon which it is based, has never worked. When most in need of U. S. economic aid or technology, for example, after World War II, the Soviets did not capitulate to our demands in Eastern Europe. Moreover, wheat deals since the early 1920s have usually resulted in much domestic controversy, often precipitated by official mismanagement or miscalculation in Washing-

ton. Another enduring feature of our economic contacts with the USSR has been repeatedly successful attempts to withhold most-favored-nation status and Export-Import Bank credits from the Soviets because of internal conditions in the USSR. In the 1920s trade and credit restrictions were related to charges about the use of slave labor in the Soviet Union and most recently, as we know, trade relations are stalemated over congressional objections to Russian emigration policies. Presumably the human rights issue will be added to this list of objections to trading with the Soviets.²¹

Nonetheless, trade has increased considerably, particularly in the last five years, despite these handicaps because as usual it is the American politicians and NOT the American businessmen who raise ideological or other objections to such trade. Brezhnev has held out the enticing possibility of doing \$10 billion worth of trade with the United States over the next five years if it were not for current congressional restrictions. U. S. exports to the Soviet Union exceeded \$2.5 billion in 1976, compared to \$1.8 billion in 1975. While these exports are still less than those to either Venezuela or Belgium, they remain symbolically important in terms of a gradual admission of the Soviet Union to the trading community of advanced industrial nations in the First World. The 1972 détente package, after all, contained nonmilitary agreements involving trade as well as cultural exchanges.²²

This improvement in trade relations is viewed ambivalently by American leaders. Secretary Kissinger warned the Organization for Economic Cooperation, meeting in June, 1976, that the fast-growing trade with the Soviet bloc nations could be used by Moscow for political leverage against Western nations. Currently the Soviet bloc trade debt hovers around \$40 billion dollars. Eighty-seven percent of this total is held by four countries: West Germany, 40.5 percent; America, 25.3 percent; and the remainder of the 87 percent almost equally divided between France and Japan. (The current balance of trade between the U. S. and the USSR is running 12 to 1 in our favor largely because of grain exports). A few months after Kissinger's warning the Joint Economic Committee of Congress issued a 821-page report, stating that increasing trade between the USSR and the U. S. in particular, and between Soviet bloc nations and the Western world in general, would make Moscow more dependent than ever before on the West, by rendering communist centralized pricing policies vulnerable to Western economic fluctuations.²³ Thus, the half-century dispute over how to interpret our economic relations with the Soviet Union in the light of our ideological objections to communism continue unabated.

The other consistent foreign policy trend that has remained essentially unchanged from the 1920s to the present has been the ever-increasing reliance of American presidents on so-called outside experts. Obviously think-tank organizations, along with private presidential advisers, who may or may not be experts, have both become an important part of the decision-making process within the institution of the modern presidency and other governmental agencies. The basic problem remains what it was from the beginning when presidents had few personal assistants and a limited number of advisory groups to draw upon. In the Brookings Institu-

tion, the Committee for Economic Development, the National Planning Association, the American Assembly, the Twentieth Century Fund, the National Industrial Conference, the Rand Corporation, the National Bureau of Economic Research, the Foreign Policy Association, the American Petroleum Institute, and World Affairs Council, we now have a privately-organized bureaucracy upon whom the federal bureaucracy calls for supposedly unbiased facts, opinions, and personnel. The problem lies in the fact that members of this intellectual establishment, regardless of its size, have traditionally been uniformly interchangeable. Usually recruited from the military or private academic and economic sectors, they appear as presidential advisers, as members of think-tanks, on special presidential task forces and most importantly on federal investigatory or regulatory commissions.²⁴

This raises the all-important question of their function within the government whether as captives or willing dupes of interest groups, or as men devoted to the public interest. Thomas K. McCraw has recently pointed out that the "public interest" and "captive" theories about these elite advisers have dominated the large body of literature on the subject. Although the answer to this question about their motivation and degree of "counterrevolutionary subordination" remains divided, one thing is clear--they constitute a homogeneous "old boys" club of the highest order. The Vietnam experience has not eroded the underpinnings of the foreign policy establishment enough to allow for "new blood" to enter to the degree necessary to achieve the race, sex, and class balance that is now needed for new diplomatic perspectives, as Ernest R. May and others have claimed.²⁵ Under the influence of trilateralism there is also little indication to date that these men will not continue to be collectively identified with refining and promulgating American corporate liberalism as they have in the past.²⁶

It is only when this exclusive group of public opinion molders and decision makers becomes divided as it did over Vietnam that we hear much about it. Generally an anonymous consensus prevails now as it did in the 1920s. When the intellectual establishment divides, however, it creates an opportunity for those among the lower echelons of opinion and decision-making to surface and legitimize alternative views. At the same time, however, any breakdown in the normal establishment consensus inevitably diminishes general public confidence in U. S. leadership and policies, especially in the field of foreign affairs. Paradoxically, while alternative views are needed, to insure the best possible foreign policy, "viable international action requires steadiness of purpose and tolerance for the compromises unavoidable in bargaining among nations. To effect such compromises, negotiators need some discretion--discretion based on trust. Rebuilding public confidence in government, and a measure of consensus, about the nation's foreign policy are therefore priority tasks" in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate.²⁷

For example, the proportion of the public expressing a "great deal" of confidence in the men running the government declined during the decade from 1966 to 1976 in the following areas: confidence in

the military establishment fell from 62 percent to 23; confidence in the House and Senate from 42 to 9; and confidence in the executive branch from 41 to 11.²⁸ Any restructuring of American foreign policy along new organizational and policy lines has to consider ways of restoring this loss of confidence engendered over the last ten years both among the public and the elite decision makers themselves without returning to the old order of things in terms of personnel, structure, and conceptualization.

So there are similarities and dissimilarities between foreign policy characteristics of the 1920s and 1970s, but there is one diplomatic issue that fits into no previous pattern or trend that I now want to consider. I began my remarks by noting the absence of women in foreign policy formulation and I should like to end with what is a symbolically-related problem. The less developed nations are in a position vis-à-vis the developed nations not unlike the one in which women find themselves in patriarchal societies. Their fate rests upon the goodwill and favor of the industrialized countries and now, to a lesser degree, upon the OPEC nations. Even the most successful national revolutions have not improved the relative strength of developing nations in relation to the international political economy. For all the bravado expressed by the Third, Fourth, and Fifth World nations in their "new international economic order" there is little indication that the major industrial nations are moving in its direction.²⁹ Worse yet is the projection of two reports to the Club of Rome that they could not move fast enough even if they were so motivated because of the EXPONENTIAL INCREASE in resources, population and pollution problems. The minimum amount of development aid needed would lead to an "average loss of \$3,000 in per capita income" in all developed countries and would amount to a "staggering \$2,500 billion over the years 1975-2025."³⁰ Nothing like this massive amount of aid and sacrifice is being contemplated individually or collectively by industrialized nations.

If anything, the First World countries are moving toward each other and not toward the less developed nations, not only in terms of trade and investment, but also, as I think we shall see in the near future, in terms of multilateralizing arms sales, and food distribution, and mutual co-optation of those Third World elites deemed important enough to co-opt.³¹ Such a coalition on industrialized nations will go far beyond trilateralism, I fear, as most of the major industrialized nations, whether capitalist or socialist, unite to insure their own energy supplies and other means of survival. Thus, the North-South conflict is not an evenly matched one and the traditional East-West one is becoming more rhetorical than real. Brzezinski has said that the problem of the less developed nations is the basic moral problem facing the world. I agree. But I think this ultimately means that their problem will not be resolved because the moral dilemma they pose is basically rooted in international economics which is not known for its morality. The scenario I project for the end of the century is one in which the current triad of Western Europe, North America, and Japan begin to operate with respect to developing nations on a TRIAGE basis.³² TRIAGE BY TRIAD this could be called. Or, if AS I suspect communist and socialist nations will also be included in the triage decisions, then it would be TRIAGE by multilateral consent. If this proves true in a one hundred years

historians will be wondering what the ideological disputes of the mid-twentieth century were all about. Likewise, the professed differences between state socialism and monopoly capitalism will mystify them.

Under this triage system I am projecting that the populations of the Fifth World--the very least developed nations that are already being referred to as the "globe's true basket cases"--will in all likelihood be "allowed" to starve. This is already occurring in a de facto sense in Bangladesh and Ethiopia. These countries cannot in the foreseeable future feed themselves.³³ I once thought that the worst aspect of American foreign aid and development programs for the Third, Fourth and Fifth World nations was that it totally ignored the adverse impact that modernization initially has on women in most of these nonwestern cultures because the male givers and male recipients of such monies were not concerned with this issue.³⁴ They still are not and will not be until women have more input into the decision-making process. But now I am more worried about the implication of recent studies which conclusively demonstrate the relationship between fertility and nutrition.³⁵ Malnourished populations simply do not have the runaway fertility rates that we attribute to them. "Poor diets impose restraints on fertility by affecting sex ratios, raising age at menarche, increasing pregnancy wastage, and child and maternal mortality."³⁶ MAL - NUTRITION IS A FORM OF BIRTH CONTROL AND STARVATION IS THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION TO THE MORAL PROBLEM POSED BY MARGINALLY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. This is an appalling statement and yet I fear that American secretaries of state in the future will be making triage decisions about the survival of starving populations, and that American public polls will reflect at least tacit approval. Such life and death decisions will become as commonplace as body counts once were on dinner time news casts during the Indochinese War.

I am concluding this talk with a most pessimist scenario because of all the foreign policy trends since the 1920s, this one reflects the ultimate in the economic interdependence we have heard so much about since that decade.³⁷ It is also the one scenario that we are least willing to discuss even in its most mundane terms like the fact that unless accompanied by massive educational and contraceptive campaigns at home and abroad, foreign aid will INCREASE NOT DECREASE population growth as it improves nutritional intake. Instead, we are bombarded with rhetoric about global interdependence, global community and the altruistic and beneficial goals of multinational corporations as long as they remain under the theoretical ownership of the trilateral countries. We are facing a problem that has no historical precedent and unless we conceptualize it honestly and bring it to the attention of the American people in the most stark and austere manner, we will never come close to solving it from a structural, economic, or moral perspective by the end of this century.

Notes

- ¹ At the end of the Ford administration only 9 percent of Foreign Service Officers were women. This represents an improvement of 3 percent in 10 years. Reported in **Boston Globe**, August 8, 1976, p. 14. No woman has ever held a major foreign policy advisory position within the government.
- ² Joan Hoff Wilson, **American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920-1933** (Lexington, Ky., 1971), pp. 240-41.
- ³ Schlesinger quoted in Richard M. Pfeffer, **No More Vietnams? The War and the Future of American Foreign Policy** (New York, 1968), p. 7; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "U. S. Foreign Policy: The Search for Focus," **Foreign Affairs**, 51 (July 1973) 712.
- ⁴ Brzezinski, "U. S. Foreign Policy," pp. 709-11; *idem*, "America in a Hostile World," **Foreign Policy**, No. 23 (Summer, 1976); 94-96; Graham Allison and Peter Szanton, **Remaking Foreign Policy: The Organization Connection** (New York, 1976), pp. 44-50; Richard A. Falk, "Beyond Internationalism," **Foreign Policy**, No. 24 (Fall, 1976), 79-113; George W. Ball, **Diplomacy for a Crowded World: An American Foreign Policy** (Boston, 1976), pp. 320-32; Frank L. Klingberg, "The Historical Alternation of Moods in American Foreign Policy," **World Politics**, January, 1952.
- ⁵ **Time**, May 2, 1969, pp. 16-17; **Nation**, October 19, 1970, p. 354; John E. Reilly, ed., "American Public Opinion and U. S. Foreign Policy 1975," **Chicago Council on Foreign Relations** (Chicago, 1975), *passim*.
- ⁶ Unless otherwise noted the following figures are taken from Walter Slocombe, et al., **The Pursuit of National Security: Defense and the Military Balance** (Washington, 1976), pp. 28-39, and William Watts and Lloyd A. Free, "A New National Survey: Nationalism, Not Isolationism," **Foreign Policy**, No. 24 (Fall, 1976): 3-26.
- ⁷ **Boston Globe**, March 26, 1977, pp. 1, 18; **New York Times**, April 2, 1977, pp. 1, 7, April 3, 1977, E, 1. For Brzezinski's central role in defending the March 30, 1977, breakdown in Soviet-American negotiations see the **New York Times**, April 2, 1977, pp. 1, 7 and April 5, 1977, p. 6.
- ⁸ Brzezinski, "U. S. Foreign Policy," p. 723. In addition to Brzezinski's articles cited above see: **Foreign Policy**, Nos. 7, 14, 17, 19, and 21 for others.
- ⁹ **San Francisco Chronicle**, December 12, 1976, p. 13.

- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 1, 12, 13; **Nation**, April 9, 1977, pp. 425-28. For details see the two Trilateral Commission reports: "Energy: A Strategy for International Action," and "Energy: The Imperative for a Trilateral Approach."
- ¹¹ Brzezinski, "America in a Hostile World," pp. 83-5; John G. Stoessinger, **Henry Kissinger: The Anguish of Power** (New York, 1976), pp. 79-112; Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Pathology of American Power," **International Security**, 1 (Winter, 1977); 3.
- ¹² If anything, the operations of, and reports by, the Trilateral Commission are more covert and less known to the American public than the policies and tactics of Kissinger which its members delight in criticizing at every opportunity. Liberal debunkers of "Nixingerism" who are now strong supporters of trilateralism often dismiss similar criticisms of their position by saying that "too much is being made of both the power and secrecy" surrounding the Trilateral Commission. They are especially sensitive to "New Left" attacks on the "multinational" or "transnational" corporation and reject most positive or negative comparisons between the diplomacy of the 1920s and 1970s. See Ball, **Diplomacy for a Crowded World**, pp. 290-98.
- ¹³ Allison and Szanton, **Remaking Foreign Policy**, pp. 5-10, 19, 24-25 (first quote), 28-30, 55, 75-76, 142 (second quote), 146-48, 162-63.
- ¹⁴ For detailed description of the First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Worlds and the North-South confrontation in general see: **Time**, December 22, 1975, pp. 34-40; Ball, **Diplomacy for a Crowded World**, pp. 278-98; and William B. Pickett, "The Origins of the North-South Dialogue: A Brief Historical Sketch," paper presented at the International Studies Association annual meeting, March 19, 1977.
- ¹⁵ Allison and Szanton, **Remaking Foreign Policy**, pp. 51-52; Charles William Mayers, "A U. N. Policy for the Next Administration," **Foreign Affairs**, 54 (July, 1976): 804-819; Nathaniel H. Leff, "The New Economic Order--Bad Economics, Worse Politics," **Foreign Policy**, No. 24 (Fall, 1976): 202-217; Richard N. Cooper, "A New International Economic Order for Mutual Gain," **Foreign Policy**, No. 26 (Spring, 1977): 65-120.
- ¹⁶ Marina v. N. Whitman, "Leadership with Hegemony," **Foreign Policy**, No. 20 (Fall, 1975): 160. For some early predictions about what this relative decline would mean in terms of the international power of the United States see: **Daedalus**, "Toward the Year 2000: Work in Progress", 96 (Summer, 1967).
- ¹⁷ U. S., Department of State, **Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States** (Washington, D.C., 1935), 1: vii.

- 18 Brzezinski, "U. S. Foreign Policy," p. 720; Carter's inaugural address, January 19, 1977; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Independence and Interdependence," **Foreign Policy**, No. 22 (Spring, 1976): 137-39; Ronald Muller and Richard J. Barnet, **Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporations** (New York, 1974), *passim*; **Peace and Change: A Journal of Peace Research**, articles on multinationals in 3 (Spring, 1976) and 4 (Fall, 1976); Louis Turner, **Invisible Empires** (London, 1970), *passim*.
- 19 Allison and Szanton, **Remaking Foreign Policy**, pp. 64-65, 220 (footnote 3)
- 20 *Ibid.*, pp. 15, 41, 43, 59, 68.
- 21 Joan Hoff Wilson, **Ideology and Economics: U. S. Relations with the Soviet Union, 1918-1933** (Columbia, Missouri, 1974).
- 22 **Commentary**, March, 1977, p. 36; Daniel Yergin, "Politics and Soviet-American Trade: The Three Questions," **Foreign Affairs**, 55 (April, 1977): 517-38; Joyce Kolko, **America and the Crisis of World Capitalism** (Boston, 1974), pp. 150-62.
- 23 **San Francisco Chronicle**, October 18, 1976, p. 8, October 24, 1976, pp. 1, 21, December 1, 1976, p. 8; Kolko, **America and World Capitalism**, pp. 162-72.
- 24 David Walter Eakins, "The Development of Corporate Liberal Policy Research in the United States, 1885-1965" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1966), *passim*; G. William Domhoff, **The Bohemian Grove and Other Retreats: A Study in Ruling-Class Cohesiveness** (New York, 1974), *passim*; John C. Donovan, **The Cold Warriors: A Policy-Making Elite** (Lexington, Massachusetts, 1974), *passim*.
- 25 Thomas K. McCraw, "Regulation in America: A Review Article," **Business History Review**, 49 (Summer, 1975): 159-83; Ernest R. May, "Lessons" of the Past: **The Use and Misuse of History in American Foreign Policy** (New York, 1973), pp. 149-50; Brzezinski, "America in a Hostile World," 83-84.
- 26 Eakins, "Development of Corporate Liberal Policy Research," pp. iii, 3, 53, 57, 105.
- 27 Allison and Szanton, **Remaking Foreign Policy**, p. 58.
- 28 Watts and Free, "Nationalism, Not Isolationism," pp. 6-7; Allison and Szanton, **Remaking Foreign Policy**, pp. 57-58.
- 29 Susan Eckstein, **The Impact of Revolution: A Comparative Analysis of Mexico and Bolivia** (SAGE, Comparative Political Sociology Series, 1975); Leff, "New Economic Order--Bad Economics," pp. 202-217;

Cooper, "New International Economic Order," pp. 70-75; Mayers, "A U.N. Policy," pp. 810-12.

- 30 Farrokh Jhabvala, "A Survey of Limits to Growth: Is Mankind Really at the Turning Point? **The Fletcher Forum**, 1 (Fall, 1976): 103-110.
- 31 **Nation**, April 9, 1977, pp. 425-28; Tom Farer, "The United States and the Third World," **Foreign Affairs**, 53 (October, 1975). Currently 65 percent of all international trade is conducted among First World nations.
- 32 Brzezinski, "U. S. Foreign Policy," p. 717; Garrett Hardin, "Living in a Life Boat," **Bioscience**, October, 1974; Wade Greene, "Triage," **The New York Times Magazine**, January 5, 1975, and Alan Berg's unconvincing response, June 15, 1975.
- 33 **Time**, December 22, 1975, p. 35; Jack Shepherd, **The Politics of Starvation** (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1975); David Simpson, "The Dimensions of World Poverty," **Scientific American**, 219 (November, 1968): 27-35; **Scientific American**, special issue on world agriculture (September, 1976).
- 34 See dittoed articles by Irene Tinker, Director, Office of International Science, American Association for the Advancement of Science, including: "Assessment of the Impact of AID Programs on Women," "Women in Developing Societies: Economic Independence Is Not Enough," and "The Transfer of Occupational Stereotypes."
- 35 See published articles by Rose E. Frisch, especially "Demographic Implications of the Biological Determinants of Female Fecundity," **Social Biology**, 22 (Spring, 1975): 17-22; "Food Intake, Fatness, and Reproductive Ability," in **Anorexia Nervosa** (New York, 1977) edited by R. A. Vigersky, and "Population, Food Intake and Fertility: Historical Evidence for a Direct Effect of Nutrition on Reproductive Ability," forthcoming in **Science**, 1977.
- 36 C. Gopalan and A Nadamuni Naidu, "Nutrition and Fertility," **The Lancet**, November 18, 1972, p. 1077.
- 37 For more dramatic and better publicized scenarios focusing on nuclear crises see: McGeorge Bundy, "After the Deluge, the Covenant," **Saturday Review/World**, August 24, 1974; David M. Rosenbaum, "Nuclear Terror, **International Security**, 1 (Winter, 1977): 140-61; William K. Stuckey, "Psychic Power: The Next Superweapon? **Special Year-end Issue/New York**, December 27, 1976-January 3, 1977; Daniel Yergin, "The Terrifying Prospect: Atomic Bombs Everywhere," **Harpers**, April, 1977.

**FOREIGN POLICY RECORDS AND PAPERS:
A CASE STUDY OF THE PRESERVATION
AND
ACCESSIBILITY OF ONE GROUP OF DOCUMENTS**

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(The first instalment of this paper appeared in the June issue of the **Newsletter**, pp. 14-26. The concluding portion will be carried in the December number).

III.

ACCESS TO RECORDS

The State Department

Although the State Department record managers feel that with the ADS problems of access are over, the researcher still has several problems to overcome. The first, most obvious problem is that the twenty-three years of central file records and lot files from 1950-1973 remain in disarray. The pre-computer records of the Department will continue to be misplaced or destroyed unless given proper archival care. Some members of the Historical Office feel that the solution lies in hiring an archivist. Record managers reject that suggestion. With the computer-at work, they argue that no further help is needed in the preservation of material. But as noted before, even with a computerized central file, there will continue to be the need to preserve office files. These files will not be of the magnitude of the current lot files, but they will be subject to the same kind of mismanagement that has resulted in the suspicions and accusations directed against the Department by frustrated historians.²¹

One way in which future access can be improved is through the restoration of policy-related research by the Historical Office. This work, consisting of special studies of recent events, was largely dropped as the Office attempted unsuccessfully to produce **FRUS** more quickly. If such research were revived, one side effect would be that historians there would gain experience from using the ADS, and could help on problems of indexes and finding aids for future historians. In addition, writing such special studies would present an opportunity to determine just what additional kind of documentation might be necessary to supplement the computerized central file.

A second problem of accessibility has been the insistence of the State Department Historical Office that declassification be tied to the publication of **FRUS**. The goal set for the publication schedule has been twenty to twenty-five years between the events and the publication of the documents. The series has, however, fallen behind and the last volumes

published were for events twenty-seven years ago. Volumes beyond that year have been completed by the Office but have been delayed by the Government Printing Office. Nevertheless, because the last volume published bore the date, 1949, researchers are not allowed into State Department records after that year. In fact, although DOD records are in the archives up to 1954, they are also closed after 1949 because it is felt that both sets of records are needed to avoid the distortions which come from seeing only part of the documentation.

The Historical Office is now unable to catch up to its own twenty-five-year goal and if the present system continues, may in fact fall further behind. In spite of their disorganized condition, collecting records from the State Department's own files is the easiest part of the compilation process. Post-war foreign policy planning often involved agencies other than State. Crucial documents which are located by the historians in the State Department are now often those which originated with, or were circulated to, the CIA or DOD, or were NSC-numbered documents circulated to every member of the Council. Before such documents can be printed in **FRUS** they must be cleared by the agency of origin or the agency of interest, as well as the Desk Officer assigned to the clearance task in State. Therefore, it takes longer to clear a volume than to compile it. The Defense Department, for example, receives a complete galley of the **FRUS** volume and can even question clearance on a document which it did not originate. It was estimated by one member of the Historical Office that clearance by DOD alone could take a year. Then once past the hurdle of clearance, State must await the pleasure of the Government Printing Office.

David F. Trask, who became Director of the Historical Office in May, 1976, immediately began seeking a remedy to the problems of accessibility. Taking the position that accessibility need not be tied to publication of **FRUS**, he began the process of moving documents to the archives for researchers before the volumes were actually published. Although supported by some members of his office, Trask is opposed by others who feel that the current method of declassification and release should be maintained. The Staff Secretary of the NSC also supports the view that documents should not be released until published in the context of **FRUS**, and may raise objections to the clearance of certain items.²² Nevertheless, Trask is moving ahead. Currently the plan is to turn over to the archives in the near future a block of records from 1950 to 1954. Negotiations involving this change in policy are not yet complete and no precise date for archival acquisition has yet been set.

Both Trask and Milton O. Gustafson, the Chief of the Diplomatic Branch of NARS, are committed to providing to the researcher greater accessibility more quickly than before. In their search for remedies, however, they have encountered handicaps within their own bureaucracy which have temporarily added to the confusion and delay.

State Department records have always been filed in blocks of several years--generally five-year blocks but not always. NARS officials would not accept partially-declassified blocks of records, arguing that they

were not able to deal with a situation in which they were given no declassification authority. Therefore, State maintained a research room in FADRC for certain groups of records, mostly lot files and often files from the Executive Secretariat. There was general dissatisfaction with this accommodation, however. Researchers found the record managers in FADRC courteous but minus the expertise and patience of archivists. Older members of the Historical Office were uneasy about the carelessness of FADRC personnel in caring for closed material, and the archivists at NARS suspected that the State Department used the excuse of their research room to slow down the declassification process. Meanwhile, other members of the Historical Office, joined by Trask, felt that State should not be serving what was in fact an archival function. The records belonged in the archives. As a result, last summer (1976) the research facilities in the State Department were closed. Due, however, to bureaucratic problems the documents are not yet even in the archives so that documents which were open only six months ago are now temporarily unavailable. It is generally assumed that the refusal of NARS to take partially-declassified documents stems largely from a desire to pressure State into declassifying more quickly. Meanwhile, the closing of the research room signifies the attempt on the part of the Historical Office to push the archives into accepting partially-declassified records so that more can be sent to NARS more quickly. So while State and NARS settle the bureaucratic snarls, the researcher who might want the records of the Policy Planning Staff for 1947-1949 will just have to wait.²³ Even the decision to send the 1950-54 documents to NARS will mean an inevitable delay for the researcher, as thorny classification snarls are bound to develop. But this effort to release records more quickly and in larger blocks will generally be applauded by historians and archivists who have long believed there was unnecessary delay in tying declassification to the publication of **FRUS**.

OFFICIAL HISTORY AS AN AID TO ACCESS

Some historians both inside and outside the government prefer to face the reality of classification needs and approach the access problem in a different manner. They point out that institutional or official history--whether classified or declassified--is one way to preserve the record before too much time has elapsed.

Government history offices have long been engaged in the writing of institutional history. The Defense Department has been in the forefront of that effort, writing both published institutional histories and unpublished classified histories. The Army and the Air Force in particular have written multi-volume institutional histories which are often used as source material by historians defeated by the sheer amount of documentation in the archival records of those departments.²⁴ In addition to the institutional histories which are published, there are a number of histories written within the various offices in the DOD which are for that Department only. These classified histories use documents which are not available to the general public. Sometimes these special studies are written by government historians, but often outside historians with top security clearances and special knowledge of the subject are brought in to do the projects.²⁵

Historians are not in agreement as to the usefulness of these classified studies and institutional histories. Although the level of scholarship is high in the military histories, some historians point out that when the histories are published before the documents are available there is no way to determine the nature of the selectivity which could cause the histories to be less objective than non-institutional histories. There are also historians with a general if unsupported suspicion of all government history: historians, they affirm, should not serve the government.

Government historians and those who have participated in the writing of either institutional histories or classified history point out that both have tremendous advantages. Assuming that the documents must remain closed for a number of years, the institutional histories of DOD (for example those on the Korean War), provide historians with their only source of information, and through citations in footnotes even provide information for FOIA requests. In addition, historians in government history offices argue that they have the great advantage of writing history with all the recent documents available and many of the participants nearby. History is better preserved, they argue, if they use the documents before they are destroyed or misplaced. Then their histories, classified when written, perhaps can serve historians once the information is open to the public.²⁶

The State Department Historical Office with its emphasis on the compilation of **FRUS** has never contracted for the kind of classified history projects often written in DOD. Recently, the new Director of the Office suggested that this may be something to consider, given the length of time necessary to declassify the records. Great benefits could accrue from histories written from documents still classified since it would enable public officials and historians to form more intelligent conclusions about recent foreign policy.²⁷

At best, the writing of institutional history or classified history is a poor substitute for the proper care and availability of the documents and papers. Institutional histories may be valuable to the flow of information, but neither they nor classified histories solve the problems of access--they merely ameliorate the condition. Historians who are chosen to write classified history are restricted from using the secret information they see, but any historian who writes any kind of history will retain background information in his memory, or will gain a structural framework within which to place his own work. Therefore, classified history raises before some historians the specter of privileged access for a select few. Historians have used their knowledge of classified information to make specific FOIA requests. Younger historians, completing Ph. D's, have used information from the classified history they were writing for DOD to ask for specific documents under FOIA which they could then use in this dissertation. Using information which only they have seen, they can specify documents which other historians cannot locate. Certainly if the State Department chose to join DOD and engage historians on contract to write history it would have to provide safeguards for the kind of privileged access to its records which the Historical Office has carefully eschewed in recent years. Not only would it have to assuage the fears of historians who are concerned

that the end product may be "official" in more than one way, but it must assure that the historians chosen represented a broad spectrum of views on American foreign policy.²⁸

Whatever other merits there are to classified or institutional history, it should not be used as an excuse to keep documents closed. It will never be a satisfactory substitute for real accessibility.

ACCESS TO RECORDS AND PAPERS IN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES

Since the passage of the Presidential Libraries Act in 1955, presidential papers have been housed in institutions built with private funds but maintained by NARS. The Presidential Libraries Act accepted the traditional view that Presidents own all their papers which are broadly defined to include White House files.²⁹ Following the pattern set by the provisions of the Franklin D. Roosevelt gift, the Act provides that materials accepted for the Presidential Libraries "are subject to restrictions as to their availability and use stated in writing by the donors or depositors". The restrictions which Presidents or their heirs impose generally fall within a half dozen categories: papers which are security classified, papers which would be prejudicial to good relations with foreign countries; papers relating to family or private business affairs, papers which contain information which would injure or harass individuals or their families, statements made to the President in confidence, any other papers which he or his heirs might specify. Certain problems of access then are inherent in the provisions of the Act which gave Presidents and their families the right of ownership.

According to the statistics kept by the Presidential Libraries Office in NARS by May, 1975, over 90% of the papers in every library except the Johnson Library were open to researchers. (The Johnson Library had 70% open at that time.) Such sweeping figures, however, are misleading. Researchers have found tremendous disparities between individual libraries and important gaps in the collections due to, 1) the enormous amount of material which is security classified, 2) the archivists' interpretations of the restrictions allowed by the gift, and 3) the tendency of living ex-Presidents to keep their most important files with them in their own offices.

President Truman, for example, retained in his office the Confidential File of the White House Central Files, and the President's Secretary's Files. Except for a brief period when members of the State Department Historical Office were allowed to look at some of those papers he did not make them available to anyone during his lifetime. Those papers were not deposited in the Truman Library until December, 1974. Acquisition of the papers was slow because under the terms of Truman's will, his daughter had sole control over the papers and was to place them in the library under the guidelines which he had left for her. Finally, in the Spring of 1975, portions of these papers were opened to researchers.³⁰

President Eisenhower also retained the file of his private secretary, Ann Whitman. This file was transferred to the Eisenhower Library in 1969, but only recently (Summer, 1976) have portions of it been opened to researchers.

Obviously under the restrictions placed in the deed of gift, a great many decisions affecting access are made within each of the libraries by the director of the library and the archivists. As the presidential papers are processed, the staff of each library must determine which papers can be released and which withdrawn under the terms of the restrictions. The decisions are difficult in many instances and some are bound to be controversial. Even when a President or his family establish a "committee of review", that committee only sets guidelines for the archivists. Some historians who have used the libraries feel that the ties between the family and the library influence these archival decisions. Directors, they note, are usually chosen because they meet the approval of both the heirs to the President and NARS. Even though officials of NARS admit that the directors of the libraries are "amenable" to the ex-President or his family, there is little evidence supporting the contention of some that the libraries therefore actively work to protect the reputation of the ex-President to whom the library is dedicated. Even so, as long as the papers are given by the family, researchers will continue to make such a charge and archivists will continue to deny it.³¹

Certainly decisions made by the directors and archivists do have an impact on access to papers. The first and most crucial decision concerns the question of which group of papers to process first. If papers are not processed, they cannot be used. Directors are influenced by many factors in their decisions, including guidelines set by the ex-President, or problems of time and space. The Eisenhower Library, for example, has held back on processing files which contain a great many national security papers, pointing out that most of those papers would not have been released through the review process, and therefore archival time was better spent on papers which would be available. As a result, researchers in foreign policy topics have a very vague knowledge of the extent of the papers concerning national security which were generated in the Eisenhower administration. The Kennedy Library on the other hand processed rather early many of the files containing national security documents, and offered to process others which were specifically requested by researchers. In the case of the Johnson Library, President Johnson made the decision to process the papers by subject, education being the first subject to be processed.³²

Archivists in the libraries also have the responsibility of making certain decisions under the standard deed of gift used by those who leave their personal papers in the national archive system. Aside from White House files and presidential papers, the presidential libraries contain numerous papers belonging to White House staff members, and actively solicit the papers of cabinet officers and other senior officials from the administration. Some White House staff files come to the libraries as part of the White House files--President Johnson was particularly successful in controlling the files of his assistants. Staff assistants from other adminis-

trations, however, often took their files with them and then returned them to the libraries under separate deeds of gift. The standard legal agreement made with donors allows the archivist to close material which contains "information or statements that might be used to embarrass, damage, or injure any living person". Researchers and archivists, however, often do not agree on what constitutes such information and how long it should remain closed. One historian who has seen certain collections of papers both before and after they have entered a presidential library, notes that the missing items in the papers indicate that archivists often go beyond the terms of the gift to protect reputations twenty years or more after the event. Other historians are concerned about the broadness of the criteria, suggesting that since individuals who enter public life accept the risks of public embarrassment, certainly a better set of criteria as well as less stringent time limitations could be applied. Several historians have noted that because of the more rigid interpretations of deeds of gifts in federal archives, they often have greater access to information found in the papers of individuals who choose to deposit them in private collections.³³

The largest collection of records and papers unavailable to historians of recent American Foreign Policy are those closed under national security provisions. Researchers ask for records from the executive departments under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), but in order to see classified records and papers in presidential libraries, the researcher must use the process of review provided in Executive Order 11652 (EO).³⁴ This Executive Order was issued on March 8, 1972, with Section 5 designed to provide a more orderly schedule for declassifying the vast number of documents which had accumulated since World War II.

The EO provided for automatic declassification of all material at the end of thirty years, except that small body still deemed essential to national security, or which if disclosed would "place a person in immediate jeopardy".³⁵ It then set up a schedule of declassification for Top Secret, Secret, and Confidential material. As far as the researcher is concerned, the importance of the schedule is that at the end of a ten-year period, all classified documents are not subject to review. In other words, after ten years, the researcher may request to see a classified document if he can describe the document with "sufficient particularity" to enable the Department to identify it, and if the document can be obtained "with only a reasonable amount of effort".³⁶ There are, however, four categories of information which are exempt from this declassification schedule; (1) information furnished by foreign governments on the understanding that it be held in confidence, (2) information disclosing intelligence sources or methods, (3) information disclosing a specific matter in foreign relations which must continue to be kept secret in the interest of national security, (4) information which would place a person in immediate jeopardy.

Although there are legal and administrative differences between the FOIA and EO, in practice the researcher uses the former for agency papers and the latter for material from presidential libraries, while the review staff in an agency handles both sets of requests in much the same manner. Unquestionably both FOIA and EO have greatly facilitated

the release of information on recent foreign policy decisions. In some cases, persistent researchers have been able to write with considerable authority on events in the early 1960's from documentary information gained under the provisions of the Act and Executive Order. Furthermore, their efforts have provided useful information on the kind of documents now being generated.³⁷

Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, neither the FOIA nor EO is a satisfactory method for research for historians or political scientists. First of all, the researcher cannot ask for specific records unless he has some finding aid as a guide. This is a considerable problem for anyone asking for post-1950 documents from the State Department or Defense Department, as indexes available for the State Department Central File are also closed after 1949 and there are no finding aids for DOD documents. Yet without these it is impossible to ask for enough documents to do a complete study of a particular event. Therefore researchers can only use the FOIA to supplement the information they have gained through secondary sources. Those who wish to assure the kind of thoroughness generally associated with the best volumes on American diplomacy simply cannot do research in the post-1950 period.

The situation in presidential libraries is considerably more favorable to the researcher. As the researcher works from a national security file which has been processed, he will find in the file "withdrawal sheets" describing all papers which have been withheld due to classification. That description, which at least gives the date, number of document, and who wrote it, can then be used to request a review of the document. If the researcher wishes a file--perhaps a country file within the national security files--which has not yet been processed, the archivist can cooperate by processing the file at that time, indicating the papers withdrawn and identifying them so that the researcher can proceed with his request for review.

The researcher is again highly dependent upon the archivists in the libraries for access to the material in the classified files. Most of the archivists share a sense of commitment to aid the researcher and implement the EO. The Kennedy Library has been especially well organized in its processing procedures and is very cooperative with researchers. The archivists there and in the other presidential libraries are extremely knowledgeable about their collections and are particularly helpful to researchers. Only part of the material in the Johnson Library is available under the review provisions, but the personnel there is moving in the direction of cooperation in the processing of files. The two older libraries present a mixed picture. Many of the national security files of the Truman Administration did not reach the library until the last group of Mr. Truman's papers arrived just last year. The Eisenhower Library received many of its national security files through the Ann Whitman File which was received in 1969 but is just now being processed. Some researchers have felt that their libraries have moved too slowly, but the archivists maintain that they are requesting declassification review and offering as much cooperation as possible.³⁸

Implementing the review process is in fact a terrible burden upon the libraries, just as it is a terrible burden upon the agencies. Those who designed the FOIA and EO assumed that individuals would ask for the declassification of a specific document, much as one would ask for a birth certificate. But historians work from groups of documents. Thus one researcher can and does request hundreds of pages. The libraries are neither funded nor staffed to do the job properly. The archivists in charge of national security files must have a high level security clearance, so that in the case of the Kennedy Library, for example, they only have the time of one and two-thirds persons involved in all of the work necessary for review requests. Yet the process is a very time-consuming one for all concerned. A researcher, for example, who wanted to write about U. S.-Indian relations from 1961 to 1964, would seek the country file on India and all related files. All of the classified documents which he wanted from one file would then be handled as a "case" by the library. The library would determine the originating agency for each document with all White House national security documents being returned to the NSC. If a document concerned intelligence or strategy, for example, or was seen by a number of agencies for any other reason, then it must be sent to those agencies also. Some documents may have to be copied and sent to five different agencies. The officials at the Kennedy Library have estimated that each year they put through requests for about fifty researchers, handling about 350 "cases" for them. They did not determine the number of pages this involved, but estimate that it costs them \$12-15 for each page they attempt to declassify.

It is not difficult to imagine that some of the older libraries which can look forward to the approach of the EO thirty years declassification rule, or the next group of **FRUS** volumes and the bulk declassification which will follow, are not eager to expend their resources and the time of their archivists in a review process which has very erratic results.

Meanwhile the researcher who chooses to pursue classified documents must be blessed with time, patience and good humor. If, for example, he seeks documents from a national security file in a presidential library then it is probable that the documents he seeks must be cleared by several agencies. If just one of those agencies turns down the document, then it is "exempted", that is, withheld under one of the EO exemptions listed above. Under the provisions of the EO the researcher can then persist and request the Interagency Classification Review Committee (ICRC) to review his request. This request necessitates another round of review. Although tenacious researchers have in fact gotten reversals through the Review Committee, most do not bother to appeal.³⁹

In spite of the statistics published by both the FOIA offices and the ICRC on the vast number of documents reviewed for declassification, it is very difficult to find historians who have spent much time or effort on the process. It is agreed by archivists and those who review, that most requests come from a small group of people who request large numbers of documents. Not only is it very time-consuming, but the odds for getting the requested documents are unknown as there is a certain arbitrariness about what will be released and what will be exempted. There are very few

guidelines for the archivist to use in advising the researcher, for they can see no pattern in the exemptions. This aspect of the process seems the most frustrating and most wasteful to the archivists. Standing at their copying machines, they prepare countless pages for review with a sense of hopelessness.

The very arbitrariness of the procedure serves to discourage researchers who have pursued projects for several years only to reach a dead end at a crucial stage because of the sudden denial of information. One historian noted that after two years of effort he obtained in 1973 some of the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence during the Cuban Missile Crisis. He has been unable, though, to pry out of the appropriate agencies the number of atomic bombs the U. S. had in 1945. Another historian pointed out that although NSC/68 had been "leaked", he could not get this 1950 document when he requested it a few years ago. (That document was, however, released in 1975). Yet another researcher, a political scientist, has tenaciously pursued his research through the Kennedy-Johnson period in spite of what is clearly the administrative problem of simply keeping his requests in order. Although he has obtained a great deal of material, he cannot explain the difference between those records exempted and those which are delivered. Fortunately he is blessed with patience, for his files illustrate that many of his requests have taken as long as year and a half to be completed. Archivists confirm that the process is a very slow one, and very arbitrary. At best, a researcher must wait six months. The Eisenhower Library has one request still outstanding from 1974, although it is now assumed that one was lost.

Along with the arbitrariness, comes the impression among archivists--confirmed by those in government history offices writing classified research--that sometime around April, 1975, the NSC began exempting more material than before.

Those who review, especially the NSC staff which reviews all security material from the White House records and presidential staff files, are often guided by changes in the international scene. They admit that they will get a review request which could have been granted three months before, but which at the moment must be denied. For example, in the summer of 1976 when the U. S. became interested in the Italian election, they stopped releasing information concerning U. S. interest in the Italian elections of the 1950s. Yet that information might have been given last year or will be given next year. This pattern is confirmed by the experience of one archivist in a presidential library who mistakenly submitted two review requests for the same document. The document was released under one request, and exempted under the other. Serious historical research takes several years at the very least. It is disturbing to think that research on the Korean War begun in 1973 would grind to a halt in 1976 because of an international incident at Panmunjon.⁴⁰

Therefore, most diplomatic historians write their books on the period before 1950 and confine their contemporary writing to analytical essays based upon published sources. Professors of diplomatic history

also advise their graduate students to do their doctoral research in the pre-1950 period as dissertations need to be completed within a reasonable time.⁴¹ Thus scholars, policy makers, journalists, and those who are leaders in the political and business communities are deprived of serious historical writing on events of twenty to thirty years ago, although the understanding of those events would seem essential to the understanding of current policy.

The system of classification review under the EO and implementation of FOIA breeds a great deal of suspicion and hostility between researcher, archivist, and agencies. The researcher is angry even though he is obtaining more information than could be obtained from any other government in the world. The delays which hinder his publishing, promotion, etc., are aggravating and the propensity of the agency--most often the NSC--to exempt a document under the broad umbrella of "Section 5(B), (1)", ("specific foreign relations matter the continuing protection of which is essential to the national security"), causes him to feel the "net of conspiracy" or the web of a "cover-up." On the other hand, staff assistants in the NSC no doubt reflect the view of other review staffs when they insist that researchers are voracious in their appetites for documents which, if fulfilled, would badly weaken the United States. They argue that other nations must feel that confidences are honored. Some even argue that there are certain kinds of information which should never be released, such as letters a president sends to another head of state, and minutes or summaries of NSC meetings.⁴²

Caught in the middle are the archivists. Researchers are effusive about the cooperation of archivists in some of the libraries and critical of others who fail to implement their view that the researcher should be helped to find out as much as possible. Those same archivists who are so helpful to the researcher, however, find themselves under constant assault by personnel in the NSC and other agencies. To those who perform the tasks of review, the archivists are the chief culprits in escalating demands to release documents. Without help from these archivists, the researcher would clearly be unable to burden agencies with requests which should not be made anyway.

In their anger, the review personnel also are suspicious of all "historians" who constantly demand yesterday's record today. In fact, as noted above, most historians are very conservative in their approach to research.⁴³ Many are eager to begin work in the 1950-54 period, but are dutifully waiting for the publication of **FRUS** to signal the declassification process. The most critical group of historians are those who write history or compile documents in government history offices. Historians in the State Department Historical Office are frustrated in obtaining clearance from other agencies, particularly the CIA and NSC. Historians in the DOD need information from a variety of offices to write their classified studies, yet if OSD needs a document from JCS or NSC, they too must ask for clearance from those agencies and are often denied. Even with his top security clearance, the expert for the Congressional Research Service may never see the document he needs to advise properly a member of Congress in a closed hearing. Government historians are particularly resentful when they are

denied use of government documents. It seems ironic that government historians complain more about government security policy than almost any other group.⁴⁴

Historians who use classified material generally agree that no more than 10% of what they see needs to remain closed for national security reasons. Theirs is a very subjective determination, however, and easily contested by on-the-line diplomats or policy makers in the White House. Considerably more weight can be given to the opinions of former policy makers. Coming from different political persuasions, administrations, and even eras (since the Truman White House staff organization bore little relationship to that of the Johnson staff), their approach to opening the record varies. None of those interviewed, however, were as eager to keep the record closed as more cautious members of the State Department and the NSC staff.

Walt W. Rostow, formerly Special Assistant for National Security Affairs to President Johnson, noted that after leaving office Lyndon Johnson was eager to open immediately every file and had to be persuaded otherwise. In an effort to examine the problems of such openings, a small group of foreign policy experts were called together, given all the documents concerning an important international event of five years before and asked to decide what could be released. The group concluded that 90% of the papers could have been released in five years, but that the 10% which could not represented the most important group of the papers. Without these papers, historians would get a distorted view. Yet, for two reasons, five years did not seem time enough for opening the record. One reason, was that some of the cables described events in foreign embassies at variance with what those governments were saying publicly; the other, was that U. S. diplomats were honestly reporting events on the assumption that their views would be held in confidence. The conclusion of the group was that release would not hurt national security, but that it would affect the candor of diplomats if they knew that what they said would be in the public eye so quickly. Johnson was convinced then that five years was not enough time. Rostow's conclusion from this episode was that the only element really necessary was a cushion of time to protect the candor of advisors. He definitely believes that all papers should be opened after twenty years, and would not be adverse to considering the possibility of ten or fifteen years in some instances.⁴⁵

Two officials of the Eisenhower White House, Gordon Gray and Andrew Goodpaster are now in the position of being authorities on a period of time researchers are eager to uncover. Neither man was concerned about the national security problems involved in opening papers. Gray in fact thought that they had made no policy decision which should still remain a secret, and reflected that opening the documents of the Eisenhower period would perhaps be useful in correcting distortions about that administration. Goodpaster also felt that the papers and documents of the Eisenhower Administration would change the opinions of many historians. He was cautious about the time limit of openings, but felt that thirty years was plenty of time for even the NSC summaries and minutes to be reviewed and

sent to the archives in an orderly fashion. He, too, was concerned with the cushion of time necessary to protect candor.

Only one of the former senior officials and policy makers interviewed seemed concerned with protecting national security through placing documents in vaults. Others were concerned with the issues of confidentiality between diplomat and the State Department, between foreign governments and the State Department, and between advisors and the President.⁴⁶

NOTES

²¹ Unless otherwise noted information on problems of access to State records came from interviews with Milton O. Gustafson, Chief, Diplomatic Branch, NARS, May 28 (and subsequent conversations); Trask, Kogan, Aandahl, Slany.

²² Interview with Davis.

²³ Indication of the importance of these files and the conditions in the FADRC research facilities may be found in a letter to the author from C. Ben Wright, Assistant Professor of History, Chatham College, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, September 8, 1976; interview with George F. Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff for that period, September 20, 1976.

²⁴ For example, the U. S. Army Center of Military History has published eighty volumes on the United States Army in World War II, and nineteen volumes on various aspects of the war in Vietnam. The Air Force has published a seven volume official history of the Air Force in World War II and a history of the Air Force during the Korean War. Two highly acclaimed histories using classified information unavailable to others were Richard G. Hewlett and Oscar E. Anderson, Jr., **The New World** (University Park, Pennsylvania, 1962) and Richard G. Hewlett and Francis Duncan, **Atomic Shield** (University Park, Pennsylvania, 1969). Both are official histories of the Atomic Energy Commission.

²⁵ Interview with David A. Rosenberg, Assistant Professor of History, University of Wisconsin, Green Bay, August 14; interviews with Goldberg and May. A famous classified study was later published as **The Pentagon Papers**.

²⁶ Interview with Walter LeFeber, Professor of History, Cornell University, August 14; also address delivered at the meeting of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), Columbus, Ohio, August 13. Interviews with Goldberg, May, Rosenberg.

- 27 Interview with Trask; address delivered by Trask and discussion which followed at SHAFR meeting, Columbus, Ohio, August 13, 1976.
- 28 One historian commented that it seemed unlikely that a student of Gabriel Kolko would be asked to write history in DOD. Interviews with Barton J. Bernstein, Associate Professor of History, Stanford University, September 8, 1976; interviews with Cunliffe, Wolfe, Goldberg, Rosenberg, May, LeFeber.
- 29 Public Law 373, 84th Congress. Unless otherwise noted, general information on presidential libraries from "The Treatment of Presidential Papers in the Presidential Library Era", a paper prepared by Jerome Nashorn and NARS for the Commission. (June 4, 1976)
- 30 Interview with Jacobs.
- 31 Interviews with Theodore A. Wilson, Professor of History, University of Kansas, and Alonzo L. Hamby, Professor of History, Ohio University, August 13, 1976; interviews with Bernstein, Jacobs.
- 32 Interviews with Curtis, Corcoran, Moss, Clark, Jacobs.
- 33 Interview with Wayne S. Cole, Professor of History, University of Maryland, June 18, 1976; interviews with Hamby, Bernstein, LeFeber, Rappaport.
- 34 A convenient printed version of Executive Order 11652 may be found in Carol M. Barker and Matthew H. Fox, **Classified Files: The Yellowing Pages** (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1972), Appendix 2.
- 35 Executive Order 11652, Sec. 5(E) (1).
- 36 *Ibid.*, Sec. 5(C).
- 37 Letter to the author with enclosures from Fred Bunnell, Professor of Political Science, Vassar College, July 10, 1976.
- 38 Interview with James O'Neill, Deputy Archivist of the United States, August 12, 1976; interviews with Jacobs, Moss Bunnell; de Santis letter.
- 39 Interviews with O'Neill, Moss, Corcoran, Curtis. Interagency Classification Review Committee, "1975 Progress Report", (Washington, D.C., May, 1976).
- 40 Interviews with Davis, O'Neill, Bernstein, Moss, Goldberg, Corcoran; Bunnell letter.
- 41 Interviews with the following diplomatic historians: Norman A. Graebner, University of Virginia, July 6, 1976; Richard W. Leopold, Northwestern University, August 13, 1976; Robert A. Divine, University

of Texas, August 13, 1976; Richard D. Challener, Princeton University, August 2, 1976; LeFeber and Rappaport.

⁴²Interview with Davis and Murphy.

⁴³See, for example, letter to the author from Gregg Herken, Professor of History, California Polytechnic State University, October 13, 1976. Prof. Herken began review requests last July for a series of documents in the Truman Library. He wishes NSC and FBI documents for 1945-49 which would indicate that his research is conservatively geared to the State Department declassification timetable.

⁴⁴Confidential interviews with personnel in the Congressional Research Service, State Department Historical Office, and other history offices.

⁴⁵Telephone interview with Walt W. Rostow, formerly Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Johnson), September 23, 1976.

⁴⁶Interviews with Morton Halperin, formerly a senior staff member of the NSC, August 5, 1976; Roger Hilsman, formerly an Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; telephone interview with Paul Nitze, formerly Deputy Secretary of Defense and member of SALT delegation, July 30, 1976; interviews with Elsey, Goodpaster, Gray, Kennan, Rostow.

On a quiz given by Salvatore Prisco, III (Stevens Institute of Technology) students were asked to identify the term "mare nostrum." One genius replied--"the influence of the Virgin Mary on foreign relations.(!)"

ANNUAL REPORT (1976) OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

The Honorable
Cyrus R. Vance,
Secretary of State

February 11, 1977

My Dear Mr. Secretary:

As chairman of the Advisory Committee on **Foreign Relations of the United States**, I take pleasure in enclosing the twentieth annual report of the Committee, which includes representatives of the American Historical Association, the American Political Science Association, and the American Society of International Law. The Committee met on November 12, 1976, with Secretary of State Kissinger and officers of the Bureau of Public Affairs to discuss the current status and prospects of the distinguished **Foreign Relations** publication.

Sincerely yours,
Covey T. Oliver
Hubbell Professor of International Law
University of Pennsylvania

PERSPECTIVE

This is the twentieth year in which an advisory committee broadly representative of the interests of the scholarly communities of America in the publication of **Foreign Relations of the United States**, has (1) met with officers of the Department of State to consider the course, pace, problems and prospects of this publication and, (2) thereafter, has deliberated apart and prepared a report for the attention of the Secretary of State and his staff. As has become customary, the drafter of the report is one who has served on the Committee for three years. Also, the twentieth report of this Committee coincides with a change in administration. To a new administration these generalizations may be useful:

1. **Foreign Relations** is produced by an excellent professional staff under able and energetic direction;

2. The burdens of the publication of **Foreign Relations**, including the heavy ones of clearances and production, fall upon a single agency of government, the Department of State, although, as the conduct of United States foreign affairs has evolved since World War II, other agencies and departments have significant roles in its formulation execution. There is need for a sense of mission as to **Foreign Relations** to be developed throughout the Government, without, however, diminution of the Department's leadership role.

3. **Foreign Relations** supports in a significant, equitable, and enduring way the Principle of Openness in government, which the American people have clearly shown they desire.

4. Exponential increases of source materials require, as a general systems management principle, adequate, incremental increases in budgetary support for **Foreign Relations**. The service function performed by this publication is not one that should ever be curtailed for lack of funds, as such curtailment inevitably would result in damage to the quality of the product.

LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION

The Advisory Committee is pleased that its help was sought in the replacement of the then Historian, Dr. William M. Franklin, upon his retirement. Dr. David F. Trask, the new leader, has already demonstrated an admirable capacity to meld his professional competence as a historian with the administrative skills required of a unit manager within the Department. It is reassuring to note, as we of the Committee do, the excellent support that the Office of the Historian (HO) receives from the Bureau of Public Affairs and to perceive that agreement exists, upon the basis of the principle of openness, between the Bureau and the Office as to the mission and needs of the latter. We sense, also, that working relationships within the Office are excellent.

We were informed of the reorganization of the Office better to apply the specialized skills of its personnel to discharge the two main duties of the Office, which are (1) The publication (seasonably) of **Foreign Relations** (the specific interest of this Committee) and (2) The preparation of Classified Historical Research, on demand or upon Office initiative, for use within the Department). We note that the reorganization now in effect removes from the professional historians doing historical work such administrative tasks as clearances and production, centralizing these in an Operations Staff, and that the Historian and his Deputy are sure that as a result of this reorganization the compilation and spot research functions of the Office will become mutually supportive. We were assured that the demands of Research would not detract from compilation capabilities as to **Foreign Relations** in relationship to time and manpower.

PRODUCTION: LAG TIME

This Committee represents the strong interest of the scholarly community in the publication of each of the volumes of **Foreign Relations** within the shortest interval that security and budgetary moderation permit. Over its twenty-year life the Committee has always found it necessary to express concern in its Reports about failures to achieve the target of a twenty-year "line" between event and publication. Although **compilation** within the Office is now almost within the proper time-frame, **publication** still is not. We were told that the Office expects the last three 1949 volumes

and all of the 1950 volumes to be published by the end of summer, 1977. This, of course, is considerably off-target. We were shocked that only two volumes were published in the year since we met.

The production lag is not the fault of the Office. It has worked hard and innovatively to get publication to the twenty-year line. Among its internal efforts has been the development of a three-year compilation-publication block. Although Committees in the recent past have had reservations about this compression, HO has followed it. In this Report we take no position on the product that results, pending opportunities for evaluation thereof by the scholarly community as a whole. We were assured that the "Triennial System" permits better compilation in general and results in the inclusion of more functional, as distinguished from geographical, material. As to the latter value, the reason given is that functional material tends to be somewhat less episodic and can be presented more comprehensively in volumes of longer time span.

The elements of lag that are largely beyond the control of the Office are (1) Declassification (often outside the Department); (2) Production. The first of these, it seems to us, links directly to the sense-of-mission problem. The importance of public affairs--the public's interest--tends to be downgraded by "operators" in government, and officers outside the Department naturally tend to put off something that to them is "State's baby." The only way to correct this syndrome, it seems to us, is for the very highest level of government to weigh-in on the problem. And the initiative as to this can only come from the Secretary of State. We hope that President Carter's assurances of a more open government will result in concrete actions, such as the one we here **request** to be considered.

Production problems include the form in which materials are cleared, technical editing, and printing. The Office deserves support for its initiative as to the first of these problems, seeking clearance of documents in manuscript, rather than in galley. We of the Committee cannot imagine why there should be any objection whatsoever to so sensible a proposal and trust that HO will be strongly supported in this effort should support become necessary.

Technical editing, apparently, presents no particular problems, assuming appropriate work force levels; but printing at the Government Printing Office has become a very serious problem indeed, one that relates very directly to failures to meet the "20-year line". The GPO seems unable to stay current with all the demands made upon it; and the printing, binding, warehousing, and shipping of **Foreign Relations** is not a high priority function there. This Committee is not in a position, obviously, to prescribe for the "type-paper-ink" problems of the United States Government. We do **recommend**, however, that urgent attention be given to the problem for **Foreign Relations** that results from these difficulties, including consideration of the possibility of taking this production task to other presses than GPO.

It is with understanding, but not resignation, that we note that, under present conditions the Historical Office expects to get to the "20-year line" by 1980. We note this but hope for improvement that will permit

more rapid achievement of the goal. We fear that, unless there is improvement over what now is the situation as to production, even the above modest timetable for the twenty-year line cannot be achieved. Hence we are **very seriously concerned**, on behalf of our constituencies.

NEW RECORDS-KEEPING TECHNOLOGY

We were the beneficiaries of a briefing on the advanced, computerized Central Files system of the Department of State. We were struck by the effectiveness of the new system for the absolute retrieval of materials for use by decision-makers within the Department, but we were told that as stored the materials would have to be "re-structured" for use on a "time-lag" (historical) basis. We **recommend** that working groups within the Department and this Advisory Committee in future give careful attention to the problem of ensuring that the new system be flexible enough to permit continued effective use of the Central Files by scholars, following declassification. We foresee potential problems of declassification in a "non-time" storage system, and we expect that these will be anticipated, to the end that historical research not suffer. We believe members of the Advisory Committee should have copies of the "Thesaurus", i.e., the guide to storage of information in the new system.

HO'S RELATIONS WITH NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES

Work in the National Archives or in Presidential libraries is a scholar's possible alternative to using **Foreign Relations**, but in all cases declassification is a condition precedent to use; and declassification first takes place for the compilation of **Foreign Relations**. The work of the Council on Classification Policy thus becomes central to research availabilities all along the line. (Except, possibly, should scholars more often resort to suits at law under the Freedom of Information Act.) We note that HO does not have a vote on the CCP but that its representative may be heard there. Apparently at this time there are no difficulties related to this arrangement. We recommend that future Advisory Committees keep the relationship within their scrutiny.

In relationship to triennial time-spans for volumes of **Foreign Relations**, we were informed of the reluctance of the National Archives to accept large blocks of files that have not yet been declassified. Since the Department's files for the 1950s and 1960s are organized in five-year and later in three-year blocks, this points up the urgency of prompt review and declassification of each block in turn. The triennial system is designed to achieve this purpose. In representation of the scholarly community, we **will not be satisfied** until arrangements are made for timely opening of the Department's older files at the National Archives.

UNDUE DELAYS IN DECLASSIFICATION

The Committee called for situation reports* on several cases of

long delay in declassifications of key materials, some going back to the early 1950s and others nearer to a 30-year, than to a 20-year "line." In some instances geographic bureaus within the Department are the sources of reticence; in others it is other agencies or staffs. The Committee intends, by this mention, **to urge** higher authorities in the Department **to call up for reconsideration** the few, but significant, cases involved. We do not think these cases are really "hard enough" to justify "bad law"! Both the scholarly communities and the Department could be damaged--but in different ways--by excesses of zeal in such cases. Obviously, considering our professional interests and unavoidable biases, we do not **judge** but only call for **re-consideration**. We prefer **not to recommend** patch-up alternatives, although some, such as later supplementation of volumes published with gaps in them, are perhaps better than indefinite hold-ups in the publication of complete volumes. We believe, though, that under the Principle of Openness it is usually better to publish (after the normal period of classification has passed) than not.

AN EXPANDED RESEARCH MANDATE FOR HO

We heard the views of Dr. Trask to the effect that the Research function of his Office should be expanded from responses to requests for topical research coming from within the government and occasional limited-topic studies undertaken at the initiative of the Office. Dr. Trask believes that HO should initiate more broadly-based historical studies (such as a volume on economic policy development) over a discrete time-span

As individuals we were not only understanding but attracted. Dr. Trask makes a forceful case for broadening the research mandate of HO. As representatives of only **Foreign Relations** constituencies, however, we did not feel it appropriate for us to make a recommendation on the research side. We do think that future Committees should keep before it the proposed broadening of the research function, and to this end we recommend that the Committee's functions be expanded to advisory appraisal of the research side.

The immediately foregoing **recommendation** and the conversation we had with Dr. Kissinger, in which he expressed himself very much in favor of the expansion of a government-wide, historian-based research function, brought to our minds the question whether the Advisory Committee as presently constituted adequately represents all the scholarly disciplines that in "academic equity" have claims as to research in foreign affairs, phenomena, such as the economists and economic historians, the modern "value" philosophers, international relations specialists (when distinguished from political scientists), and even some segments of social psychology, cultural anthropology, and sociology.

Intra-governmental and intra-departmental claims (such as, possibly, those of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research and some sectors of the Office of the Legal Adviser) were noted as being outside our bailiwick.

1975 REPORT USEFUL IN A TRANSITION YEAR

The Report of the 1975 Committee deals with what it calls the turning of a corner in the compilation and production of **Foreign Relations**. We believe that officers of the new administration will gain depth of understanding from reading that report along with this one. Hence, we **recommend** that distribution of this Report to the Secretary of State and other newly appointed officers **be accompanied** by the 1975 Report as an annex.

Respectfully submitted,

Bernard C. Cohen¹
Professor of Political Science
University of Wisconsin

Robert A. Divine²
Professor of History
University of Texas

Lloyd C. Gardner²
Professor of History
Rutgers University

Norman A. Graebner²
Professor of History
University of Virginia

Harold K. Jacobson¹
Professor of Political Science
University of Michigan

Philip C. Jessup³
International Court of
Justice, retired

Covey T. Oliver³
Professor of Law
University of Pennsylvania

¹ American Political Science Association

² American Historical Association (and member of SHAFR)

³ American Society of International Law

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

July 19, 1977

Professor Covey T. Oliver,
Hubbell Professor of International Law,
University of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Dear Professor Oliver:

I am grateful to you and your colleagues of the Advisory Committee on **Foreign Relations of the United States** for your constructive report on current problems and opportunities of this distinguished publication. As you

know, its balanced presentation of the basic documentary record of American diplomacy contributes to public understanding and opens the way for bulk declassification of our older records. This process is central to our policy of openness on matters of major public concern.

Your committee, representing the national organizations of historians, international lawyers, and political scientists, has regularly urged the Department of State to publish the principal foreign policy documents after a twenty-year interval designed to protect the legitimate needs of national security and the comity of nations. I agree with Secretaries of State Rusk and Kissinger that in general this period is long enough. In recent years the Department has striven to bring the series closer to a twenty-year interval, as your committee has recommended, but various production and declassification problems still stand in the way. We also face some decisions as to the proper scope and content of the series in covering the turbulent years after 1950. Your advice here will be invaluable. The difficult problems involved are now being studied, and I trust that we can find some constructive solutions.

I wish to express our deep appreciation to all of the members of the committee for your valuable assistance. It is heartening to know we are getting informed and thoughtful advice from the learned societies that are closely involved with the history and development of American foreign policy.

With warm regards,

Sincerely,

Cyrus Vance

MINUTES OF SHAFR COUNCIL MEETING

President Raymond A. Esthus opened an abbreviated Council meeting at 7:45 A. M. in Parlor A of Newcomb Hall, University of Virginia, at the Third Annual Meeting of SHAFR in Charlottesville, August 5, 1977. Present for the occasion were Council Members Akira Iriye, Joseph O'Grady, Armin Rappaport, and Lawrence Gelfand. Also on hand were Norman Graebner, Waldo Heinrichs, Samuel Wells, Robert Ferrell, and Lawrence Kaplan.

Norman Graebner as host of the Annual Meeting stated that over 125 reservations had been made by SHAFR members and friends. Then speaking as chairman of the committee charged with updating the Bemis-Griffin **Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States** he reported that the task of selecting an editor for the work was nearing completion, and that a choice would be made before the next meeting of the SHAFR Council.

Larry Kaplan, Joint Executive Secretary-Treasurer of SHAFR, informed those present that the Society was gaining members at a record pace with the total now over 700.

The issue of the costs involved in compiling, printing, and mailing the SHAFR **Roster and Research List** which had been a serious one earlier in the year is in the process of resolution, thanks to the efforts of Warren Kimball, its longtime editor. He has managed to secure a promise of institutional support from Rutgers (Newark) for 1977 and subsequent years. The budget for 1976 remains a problem, though, with only fifty dollars definitely available from the university to cover past expenses. For this year, then, the Council will, in accordance with its decision of last December, "advance whatever money is needed to cover the compilation and distribution of the publication."

Norman A. Graebner, newly appointed member of the Advisory Committee on the compilation and publication of the **Foreign Relations of the United States**, calmed any concern about the future of that Committee. Unlike its counterparts in the military services, it will continue to function, he asserted. There was agreement by the Council that SHAFR should be more centrally involved in the choice of membership upon that Committee. President Esthus will, therefore, ask the AHA to delegate to SHAFR the responsibility for nominating future AHA members of that body.

Waldo Heinrichs and Samuel Wells spoke concerning their continuing efforts to induce the State Department to rescind its decision to discontinue publication of the **Biographical Register** and the **Foreign Service List**. After discussion with the Director of Management Operations in July, they found no impending change of position on the part of the Department. Wells felt that his approach to Congressman Richardson Preyer (North Carolina) might yield results. Preyer has written a strong letter to the Secretary of State on behalf of the Society, suggesting ways of releasing information

without violating the Privacy Act. The Council agreed to send a letter to Congressman Preyer, endorsing his stand and offering SHAFR testimony before the Congress if it should be made useful. Because of the seriousness of the situation, Council decided to re-state its position by approving a second resolution re-affirming SHAFR's stance upon the issue:

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, through its elected Council, deplores the recent decision by the Department of State to discontinue publication and distribution of the Department's **Biographical Register** and **Foreign Service Lists** to depositories normally receiving U. S. Government publications. For the scholarly community of historians, political and social scientists, and others seriously interested in international relations, the **Biographical Registers** along with the **Foreign Service Lists** have in the past been indispensable to research and as reference books in teaching. We believe that the biographical data provided through these publications does not compromise the right to privacy of public officials nor does the dissemination of this information have an adverse effect upon the national security of the United States. The Society, therefore, urges the Department of State to reconsider its decision so that these series may continue to be available to the interested public and the academic communities on a regular basis through the U. S. Government depositories.

It was agreed that Heinrichs and Wells would in the meantime continue their efforts upon this project.

Some discussion was held with respect to the upcoming 50th anniversary of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. It was mentioned that Charles De Benedetti (Toledo) may write something regarding the event for the **Newsletter**. It was also suggested that the Program Committee try to arrange an appropriate session upon the topic for the OAH annual meeting next April.

Larry Kaplan raised the question of whether SHAFR should support the work of the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History. The Council strongly approved cooperating with other historical groups which are seeking employment opportunities for unemployed historians and voted unanimously to permit the Secretary-Treasurer to send a contribution not to exceed \$200.00 to the National Coordinating Committee. Kaplan observed that the money would be drawn from sale receipts of SHAFR membership lists and not from the regular treasury.

From a number of sources requests have come for the establishment of long-range funding plans by SHAFR which would yield interest or dividends that could be used to support special projects over the years, much as the Bernath Endowments do now. The Council endorsed the idea, and approved a committee chosen by President Esthus and consisting of four former presidents of SHAFR (Robert Ferrell, Chairman, Robert Divine, Richard Leopold, and Armin Rappaport) whose job it will be to examine the kinds of

projects the Society might embark upon before moving ahead with a specific campaign to achieve one or more of them.

Armin Rappaport, editor, talked about "getting out" the issues during the first year of SHAFR's journal, **Diplomatic History**, and disclosed that the only particular snag in a successful operation was the impossibility of producing an index for the first year; that deadline had passed on August 1. In subsequent years, he said, an annual index could be made, with the possibility that the first index would combine the first two years. Another alternative would be a separate five-year index. The Council was inclined toward the first position, although the problem would be studied further. The editor pointed out, however that abstracts of all articles carried in the first year of **DH** would be included in the nationally-known compendium, **America: History and Life**, published by the ABC-Clio Press.

The meeting ended at 9:15 A. M. with resolutions of thanks to Roger Trask, the Program Chairman for 1977, and to Norman Graebner and the University of Virginia, the Society's hosts for the 1977 Annual Meeting.

ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED, OR SCHOLARLY PAPERS DELIVERED, BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

(Please limit abstracts to a total of fifteen (15) lines of **Newsletter** space. The overriding problem of space, plus the wish to accommodate as many contributors as possible, makes this restriction necessary. Don't send lengthy summaries to the editor with the request that he cut as he sees fit. Go over abstracts carefully before mailing. If words are omitted, or statements are vague, the editor in attempting to make needed changes may do violence to the meaning of the article or paper. Do not send abstracts until a paper has actually been delivered, or an article has actually appeared in print. For abstracts, of articles, please supply the date, the volume, the number within the volume, and the pages. Double space all abstracts).

Justus D. Doenecke (New College of the U of South Florida), "Conservatism: The Impassioned Sentiment," **American Quarterly**, XXVIII (Winter, 1976), 601-609. A critique of varied works upon "the new conservatism," including books by John P. Diggins, Allen Guttman, Ronald Lora, George H. Nash, and anthologies by William F. Buckley, Jr., and Peter Witoski. The discussion included treatment of Cold War doctrines espoused by many new conservatives, with an effort made to put international policies in a more general ideological context.

Justus D. Doenecke (New College of the U of South Florida), "Non-Interventionism of the Left: The Keep-America-Out-of-War Congress, 1938-41," **Journal of Contemporary History**, XII (1977), 221-236. Based upon a paper originally presented to the Conference on the History of World War II, Washington, D. C., June 16, 1973, the essay covers the history,

organization, and ideology of a left-oriented isolationist group. The KAOWC, composed of seven socialist and pacifist bodies, lasted from March, 1938, until Pearl Harbor. Possessing a strong youth affiliate (The Youth Committee Against War) and a weak labor one (The Labor Anti-War Council), it stressed civil liberties, anti-colonialism, and continental defense. After May, 1940, when the Germans began to dominate continental Europe, it suffered from liberal, labor, and farm defections, pacific withdrawals, and loose organization. (As the printed essay contains a few minor errors--due to a severe delay in sending page proofs across the Atlantic--the author will send a corrected copy to anyone pursuing research in this area).

Justus D. Doenecke (New College of the U of South Florida), "Protest over Malmédy: A Case of Clemency," **Peace and Change**, IV (Spring, 1977), 28-33. This essay tells of the efforts of a peace lobby, the National Council for the Prevention of War, and of its director, Frederick J. Libby, to obtain amnesty for certain Germans sentenced to death during the American occupation. Although the Malmédy case is usually seen in light of Senator Joseph McCarthy's early career, it was quite significant in its own right, for it involved German-American pressures, the activities of the isolationist Senator, William Langer, and various church groups.

Charles R. Halstead (Washington College), "Historians in Politics: Carlton J. H. Hayes as American Ambassador to Spain, 1942-1945," **Journal of Contemporary History**, X (July, 1975), 383-405. This article was one of a series whose purpose was to assess the effects of historical and other professional training on historians who entered politics, including the field of diplomacy. Based heavily on unpublished sources in the United States and Britain, it suggests that Hayes' vast erudition and particular vocational experiences were no guarantee that he would perform well as a diplomat. This professor-turned-diplomat was dogmatic and intractable, and preoccupied with the centralization of authority in his hands in the Embassy. Emphasizing his own importance as a tactician and desirous of formulating strategy with regard to Spain, Hayes was not beneath lecturing Secretary Hull and on one significant occasion, violated the latter's instructions. In addition, Hayes was a poor judge of many Spanish personnel policies. His greatest sin, though, was to become immersed in the outlook of the government and country to which he was accredited. As a consequence, Hayes' ambassadorship generated contention not only in Washington but even in the American media. On the other hand, he functioned effectively on the eve of the Allied invasion of North Africa, ran a busy and burgeoning Embassy and sought to generate within Franco's Spain, a feeling of confidence in Allied intentions. It is of interest that President Roosevelt, who had probably appointed Hayes as a potentially pliable amateur, chose a professional diplomat to succeed the Columbia University teacher and scholar in Madrid.

Martin V. Melosi (Texas A & M), "National Security Misused: The Aftermath of Pearl Harbor," **Prologue**, 9 (Summer, 1977), 75-89. The Pearl Harbor disaster became the basis for a major political controversy during and soon after World War II, revolving around the question of domestic

responsibility for the breakdown in American defenses in the Pacific. Faced with constant pressure to release all information pertaining to the air raid, the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration attempted to silence critics, first, in order to avoid political recrimination and, secondarily, to keep national attention fixed on the war effort. As an alternative to full disclosure, the administration decided simply to remove the local commanders in Hawaii from duty, hoping that would be enough to shelve the issue for the duration of the war. Instead, the administration's policy intensified interest in the question of guilt and stimulated a political debate that threatened seriously to undermine Roosevelt's wartime leadership. The suppression of information about Pearl Harbor also brought into question what sort of data can justifiably be withheld under the veil of national security.

Salvatore Prisco (Stevens Institute of Technology), "Nixon's 'Quaker' Policy Toward China: Non-Traditional Sources of Foreign Policy Formation," Paper presented to the Popular Culture Association, Baltimore, Maryland, April 29, 1977. Investigates the influence of the American Friends Service Committee on the policy of detente pursued by the Nixon administration in dealing with the People's Republic of China. Nixon's Quaker background is seen as a link between A. F. S. C. lobbying efforts after 1965, and the former President's decision to alter United States policy in the Far East. The Quakers were not directly responsible for the Nixon-Kissinger initiative, but they did help to create a climate of opinion which made the shift in policy acceptable. In large measure A. F. S. C. objectives were achieved.

Klaus Schwabe (University of Frankfurt, Germany), "Die entfernten Staaten am Beispiel der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika--Weltpolitische Verantwortung gegen nationale Isolation," **Innen- and Außenpolitik unter nationalsozialistischer Bedrohung**, ed. by Erhard Forndran (Opladen, 1977), 227-294. This article is a contribution to a volume analyzing foreign reactions to Hitler's expansionist diplomacy during the year before the outbreak of World War II. The Roosevelt administration, after Munich, was guided by strategic rather than economic considerations, since it was convinced that Hitler could only be stopped by a show of military strength. Roosevelt knew that the most effective way for America to back up such a demonstration was to achieve a revision of the existing neutrality legislation. In Congress, however, the President's isolationistic and domestic opponents combined to defeat administration proposals for a modification of America's position as a neutral. Congress thus denied Roosevelt the means to carry out a foreign policy, which was urgently demanded by the Western European democracies and which, in fact, would have amounted to but a minimum of an American response to Hitler's expansion.

PERSONALS

Lawrence S. Kaplan, Joint Executive Secretary-Treasurer of SHAFR, was named University Professor, the top academic rank at Kent State, by that school's trustees on July 15. The rank of University Professor was established by Kent State in 1968 for the purpose of recognizing "creative and scholarly activity." The position is for a term of five years which may be renewed. Holders of that rank are allowed considerable flexibility to teach courses outside their field and freedom to continue their scholarship.

Roger R. Trask, current Chairman of the SHAFR Program Committee, recently accepted the position of Chief Historian of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. Prior to the assumption of his new post he was the Chairman of the Department of History at the University of South Florida.

Manfred Jonas, Chairman of the Department of History at Union College (N. Y.), has been appointed a fellow at the Charles Warren Center (Harvard) for 1977-78. He will spend the year there in completing a book upon U. S.--German relations to 1955.

Stephen G. Rabe, formerly at the U of Hartford, has accepted a teaching position with the rank of assistant professor of history at the U of Texas (Dallas).

Justus D. Doenecke (U of South Florida) will be a research fellow at the Institute for Humane Studies, Menlo Park, California, during the academic year 1977-78.

Arnold A. Offner (Boston U) was a member of the 1977 Nominating Committee for the AAUP.

In the Historical Office of the Department of State, Edwin S. Costrell has been named Adviser on Research Policy, and John P. Glennon has succeeded him as Associate Historian for Asia, Africa, and the Pacific.

The Navy Meritorious Civil Service Award was presented to John L. Gaddis, Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College for the last two years, by Rear Admiral Huntington Hardisty, president of the institution, in a summertime ceremony. Gaddis came to the War College from Ohio University where he held the rank of associate professor. This fall he will become professor of history at Miami University, Oxford, Ohio. (Members of SHAFR will recall that Dr. Gaddis was the winner of the 1973 S. L. Bernath Memorial Book competition with the work, **The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947**).

Jonathan Knight, until recently a member of the Department of Political Science at SUNY of Albany, is now a member of the staff at the National Office of the AAUP. His major task will be to work with inquiries in cases involving academic freedom and tenure.

Among the scholars who were recently awarded grants by the Eleanor Roosevelt Institute to aid in work at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library were the following members of SHAFR who are doctoral candidates: William A. Loveland (Rutgers-New Brunswick), Jean-Donald Miller (Connecticut), and Lawrence A. Yates (Kansas). Post-doctoral grants were made to Robert J. Butow (U of Washington), Ronald A. Mulder (Muskingum College), and Lawrence S. Wittner (SUNY at Albany).

Grants-in-aid for study at the Harry S. Truman Library have been made to SHAFR members Mark T. Gilderhus (Colorado State) and Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke).

Michael Grow (George Washington) has been appointed Research Associate at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars where he is writing **A Scholar's Guide to Washington, D. C. for Latin American and Caribbean Studies**, to be published by the Smithsonian Institution Press.

Hans Gunter Brauch, Heidelberg University (F. R. G.), is presently working on a research project, **American Foreign Policy towards Eastern Europe and the Third World (1969-1979): Continuity and Change in the Global and National Structures**. The work is being supervised by Prof. Klaus von Beyme, Vice-President of IPSA, Institute for Political Science, Heidelberg University, and it is being financed by a grant from the German Society for Peace and Conflict Research (OGFK) in Bonn. Dr. Brauch has also been invited by the Executive Committee of the Arms Control and Disarmament Program at Stanford U to become an affiliate with the program for the spring (April-July) of 1978.

Peter G. Boyle, University of Nottingham (England), will serve during the academic year 1977-78 as visiting professor at the University of Wisconsin (Milwaukee) and David Healy of UWM will reciprocate by spending the year at the University of Nottingham.

PUBLICATIONS IN U. S. DIPLOMACY BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

Ernest C. Bolt, Jr. (U of Richmond, Va.), **Ballots before Bullets: The War Referendum Approach to Peace in America, 1914-1941**. 1977. The University Press of Virginia. \$15.00.

The dissertation of Hans Gunter Brauch (Heidelberg), **Structural Change and Armament Policy of the United States, 1940-1950: America's World Power Role and its Domestic Preconditions** (1976) is now available from University Microfilms, Order No. 76-21,065. The writer intends to revise and publish separately portions of the work next year. He would, therefore, welcome criticisms of the document, which is in German, from SHAFR members.

John K. Fairbank's (Harvard) **China Perceived: Images and Policies in Chinese-American Relations**, published originally as a hardback in 1974 by Alfred A. Knopf at \$7.95, is now available in a paperback edition (Vintage Books) from Random House, Inc. for \$3.95.

Norman B. Ferris (Middle Tennessee), **The Trent Affair, A Diplomatic Crisis**. 1977. U of Tennessee Press. \$14.95.

Under the editorship of Manfred Jonas (Union College, N. Y.), the Da Capo Press has reprinted nine volumes bearing the general heading of "The Politics and Strategy of World War II." The volumes with the original dates of publication in parentheses are as follows: Lewis H. Brereton, **The Brereton Diaries** (1946); Dwight D. Eisenhower, **Crusade in Europe** (1948); David L. Gordon and Roydon Dangerfield, **The Hidden Weapon: The Story of Economic Warfare** (1947); William F. Halsey and J. Bryan, III, **Admiral Halsey's Story** (1947); Carlton J. H. Hayes, **Wartime Mission in Spain, 1942-1945** (1946); Ernest J. King and Walter Muir Whitehill, **Fleet Admiral King** (1952); Walter Lippman, **U. S. War Aims** (1944); Kenneth Pendar, **Adventure in Diplomacy: Our French Dilemma** (1945); Henry De Wolf Smyth, **Atomic Energy for Military Purposes** (1945).

Robert J. Maddox (Pennsylvania State U), **The Unknown War with Russia: Wilson's Siberian Intervention**. 1977. The Presidio Press. \$9.95.

George T. Mazuzan (National Archives), **Warren R. Austin at the U. N., 1946-1953**. 1977. Kent State U Press. \$10.00.

Theodore A. Wilson (Kansas), **The Marshall Plan, 1947-1951: How a Great Atlantic Decision Shaped Our World**. 1977. Foreign Policy Association. \$1.40, plus 40¢ for postage. HEADLINE Series #236.

Daniel Yergin (Harvard), **Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State**. 1977. Houghton Mifflin. \$15.00.

PUBLICATIONS BY DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Wilma Fairbank, **America's Cultural Experiment in China, 1942-1949**. 1976. U. S. Government Printing Office. Clothbound. \$5.10. This volume is the first of a series of monographs which recount the history of the International Educational and Cultural Exchange Program of the U. S. Department of State.

The Office of the Historian, Department of State, wishes to call attention to several recently published volumes in the series **Foreign Relations of the United States** and to its plans for future volumes. Recent volumes include **Foreign Relations, 1948**, volume V, **The Near East, South Asia, and Africa**, part 2, which presents documentation on U. S. policy with respect to the Palestine question and the creation of the state of Israel; **Foreign Relations, 1949**, volume V, **Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union**, volume VI, **The Near East, South Asia, and Africa**; and volume VII, **The Far East and Australasia**, part 2, with documentation pertaining to Japan, Korea, and general U. S. policy with respect to East Asia and the Pacific; **Foreign Relations, 1950**, volume I, **National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy**, including NSC 68 and related documentation; volume II, **The United Nations; The Western Hemisphere**; volume VI, **East Asia and the Pacific**, which includes documentation relating to China, Japan, and Indochina; and volume VII, **Korea**, with documentation concerning the Korean War. All volumes of the series through 1949 have now been published except **1949**, volume VIII, **China**, one of two volumes with documentation on U. S. China policy in 1949, which is still in the clearance process.

Other volumes in preparation for the year 1950 are as follows: volume III, **Western Europe** (scheduled for publication in 1977); volume IV, **Central and Eastern Europe; Soviet Union** (scheduled for publication in late 1977); and volume V, **The Near East, South Asia, and Africa** (scheduled for publication in 1978). There will be a total of seven volumes for 1950. The seven volumes for 1951 will deal with national security affairs and foreign economic policy, the United Nations and the Western Hemisphere, European security and the German question, European political and economic developments, the Near East and Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Korea and China. Except for volume VI, **Asia and the Pacific** (scheduled for publication in 1978), the 1951 volumes are all undergoing the clearance process.

Foreign Relations volumes for the years after 1951 are being compiled on a triennial rather than an annual basis. The sixteen volumes which have been compiled for the years 1952-1954 include three volumes on national security affairs, foreign economic policy, and the United Nations, one concerning the American Republics, four concerning European affairs, three pertaining to the Middle East, and five concerning the Far East, including one volume on Indochina, one on Korea, and one on the Geneva Conference of 1954. Preparation of twelve volumes for the years 1955-1957 is underway; they will include three volumes on national security affairs, foreign economic policy, the United Nations and the American Republics,

three on European affairs, three concerning the Middle East, and three concerning the Far East.

The Office of the Historian welcomes comments from users of the **Foreign Relations** series concerning the content and format of the published and projected volumes. Those who would like to receive announcements of the publication of new volumes in the series are invited to send their names and addresses for inclusion on the Office mailing list. Correspondence should be addressed to David F. Trask, The Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D. C. 20520. Inquiries concerning the cost and availability of published volumes should be addressed to the Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 20402.

SHAFR ANNOUNCEMENTS

The National Office wishes to remind members that there's a new dues fee--\$5.00 per year--for unemployed persons. A simple statement to that effect will be sufficient when renewing, or applying for, membership.

The prospects are good that SHAFR will have a fourth annual meeting next summer. Two individuals from different institutions are now working upon the details (date, place, accommodations, prices) of such a convocation, and this information should be available shortly. The other sine qua non of such an affair is, of course, a program. Anyone, then, who has any ideas along this line for the 1978 gathering should communicate at once with Dr. Betty Unterberger, Department of History, Texas A & M University, College Station, Texas 77843, who will chair the Program Committee next year.

The 43rd annual meeting of the SHA will be held in New Orleans, November 9-12, with headquarters at the Braniff Place. The SHAFR reception will take place on Thursday, November 10, 5:00-7:00 P. M., in the suite of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer at the headquarters hotel. The location of the suite will be posted near the Registration Desk, or in the lobby of the hotel.

Program proposals for sessions sponsored by SHAFR are needed for the following conventions:

Southern Historical Association, November, 1978
 American Historical Association, December, 1978
 Organization of American Historians, April, 1979

Fully-developed proposals, complete with papers, commentators, and chairpersons, are most useful. Suggestions for the 1978 SHA should reach the program Committee of SHAFR by November 1, 1977; for the 1978 AHA,

by December 15, 1977; and for the 1979 OAH, by February 1, 1978. Send proposals to Roger R. Trask (Chairman, SHAFR Program Committee), Historian's Office, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D. C. 20555, or to Betty M. Unterberger (Chairperson-designate, SHAFR Program Committee), Department of History, Texas A & M University, College Station, Texas 77843.

OTHER ANNOUNCEMENTS

A four-day lecture and laboratory course on using archives and other primary sources will be given Oct. 25-28 at the National Archives. "Going to the Source: An Introduction to Research in Archives" is designed for historians, curators, social scientists, teachers, and graduate students. Archives and Library of Congress staff members will serve as lecturers and panelists. Sessions will be held in the National Archives building, 8th Street at Pennsylvania, N. W. The cost, including all materials, is \$50.00. Enrollment is limited to 40 persons. For more information, write Elsie Freivogel, Education Division, National Archives and Records Service, Washington, D. C., 20408, or call (202) 523-3298.

James E. Hewes, Jr. (Center of Military History) says that in October there will be a parking ban upon all of Capitol Hill. That means that anyone going to do research at the Library of Congress or the Archives and planning to live in a Capitol Hill rooming house, or who will be living elsewhere but intends to drive to the Library and park during the day, should forget about bringing a car.

Peter G. Boyle (U of Nottingham, England) writes that a number of British scholars who are concerned about the origins of the Cold War held a one-day conference in London on July 6. Papers were read, and an organization was formed for the study of the beginnings of the Cold War by British scholars. Anyone interested should write to Dr. Anthony Polonsky, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC1.

MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE OF SHAFR (1977-78)

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THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL LECTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Annual Memorial Lectureship was established in 1976 through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, and is administered by SHAFR. The Bernath Lectures will be the feature at the luncheons of the Society, held during the conventions of the OAH in April of each year.

DESCRIPTION AND ELIGIBILITY: The lectures will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer will concern himself not specifically with his own research interests, but with broad issues of concern to students of American foreign relations.

PROCEDURES: The Bernath Lectureship Committee is now soliciting nominations for the 1979 Lecture from members of the Society. (The name of the 1977 recipient of the Lectureship is given below. The 1978 award winner will be announced in the near future). Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vitae, if available, should reach the Committee not later than December 1, 1977. The Chairman of the Committee, and the person to whom nominations should be sent, is Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr., Department of History, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27514.

HONORARIUM: \$300.00 with publication of the lecture assured in the Society's **Newsletter**.

AWARD WINNER

1977

Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITION FOR 1978

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations announces that the 1978 competition for the Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Prize upon a book dealing with any aspect of American foreign affairs is open. The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing of a lengthy nature by young scholars in the field of U. S. diplomacy.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1977. It must be the author's first or second book.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. Warren F. Kimball, Chairman, Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize Committee, Department of History, Rutgers University (Newark), Newark, New Jersey 07102. The works must be received not later than February 1, 1978.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$500.00. If two (2) or more writers are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be April, 1978, in New York City.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

| | |
|------|--|
| 1972 | Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento) Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth) |
| 1973 | John L. Gaddis (Ohio U) |
| 1974 | Michael H. Hunt (Yale) |
| 1975 | Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire) Stephen E. Pelz (U of Massachusetts-Amherst) |
| 1976 | Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton) |
| 1977 | Roger V. Dingman (Southern California) |

**THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE FOR THE BEST
SCHOLARLY ARTICLE IN U. S. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY DURING 1977**

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations announces that the 1978 competition for the best published article on any aspect of American foreign relations is open. The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of U. S. diplomatic affairs.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to the author of any article upon any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1977. The article must be among the author's first seven (7) which have seen publication.

PROCEDURES: Articles shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each article (preferably reprints) should be sent to the chairman of the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee by January 15, 1978. The Chairman of that Committee for 1977 is Dr. Robert L. Beisner, Department of History, American University, Washington, D. C. 20016.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$200.00. If two (2) or more authors are considered winners, the prize will be shared. The name of the successful writer(s) will be announced, along with the name of the victor in the Bernath book prize competition, during the luncheon for members of SHAFR, to be held at the annual OAH convention, meeting in April, 1978, at New York City.

AWARD WINNER

1977 John C. A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N. Z.)

GUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO **DIPLOMATIC HISTORY**

Diplomatic History is a new quarterly journal, sponsored by SHAFR and published by Scholarly Resources, Inc., which is devoted to scholarly articles in the field of American diplomatic history broadly conceived. The journal will include contributions that deal not only with the foreign policy of the United States but with the extensive foreign relations of the American nation--cultural, economic, and intellectual. Priority will be given to articles that make a significant scholarly contribution either by presenting new evidence and exploiting new sources or by offering new interpretations and perspectives. Preference will be given to manuscripts that illuminate broad themes in the American diplomatic experience, but articles that deal intensively with specific historical events are welcomed if they cast light on more central issues.

The journal is not designed to reflect any single ideological viewpoint. Articles by those who consider themselves traditionalists, revisionists, realists, moralists or generalists will receive an equally impartial reading. The sole objective is to further scholarly discourse among diplomatic historians and to provide them with a new outlet for their research and writing.

All manuscripts should be submitted in duplicate, with the author's name, affiliation and address on a separate cover page. Each manuscript should be typed in a double-spaced fashion on standard size paper, and the notes should be typed separately, in sequence, at the end of the manuscript. All the notes should follow the style set forth in **A Manual of Style**, published by the University of Chicago Press, 12th Edition.

All manuscripts should be submitted to: Dr. Armin H. Rappaport, Editor, **Diplomatic History**, Department of History, U of California--San Diego, La Jolla, California 92093.

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SHAFR ROSTER AND RESEARCH LIST

Please use this form to register your general and current research interests as well as your address. This **List** is stored upon computer tapes so that information may be quickly retrieved. In order for the system to work, though, two things are necessary from the members: (a) simple, concise, obvious titles should be used in describing projects; (b) a key word should be specified for each project. It would be quite helpful if members would send revised information to the editor whenever new data is available, since it will be much easier to keep the files up to date and avoid a rush in the fall. If a form is not available, a short memo will suffice. Changes which pertain only to addresses should be sent to the Executive Secretary, and he will pass them on to the editors of the **List** and the **Newsletter**. Unless new data is submitted, previously listed research projects will be repeated.

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_____ Key word _____

Current research project(s): _____

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If this is pre-doctoral work, check here _____

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