



The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Founded in 1967. Chartered in 1972.

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MEMBERSHIP: Anyone interested in U.S. diplomatic history is invited to become a member. Annual dues are \$5.00 per year, payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Student memberships are \$3.00 per year, while institutional affiliations are \$10.00. Life memberships are \$75.00.

MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in conjunction with the yearly convocation of the American Historical Association in December. The Society also meets with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZE: The Stuart L. Bernath Prize of \$500.00 is awarded each year at the December meeting of the Society to that person whose first or second book in U.S. diplomatic history is adjudged the best for the previous year.

ROSTER: A complete listing of the members with their addresses and their current research projects is issued once a year to all members. Editor of the *Roster and Research List* is Dr. Warren A. Kimball, Department of History, Rutgers University, Newark, N. J. 07102.

THE STATE OF DIPLOMATIC HISTORY*

by Norman Graebner

On April 17, 1972, the *Christian Science Monitor* featured an editorial presumably gratifying to historians of American foreign relations. To explain what it termed "the dreadful morass of the Vietnam war," the editors pointed not to the faults of the Constitution or the imbalance in executive-congressional relations, but to the supposition that in 1964 the President, the Congress, and the people of the United States were viewing the world through distorted lenses which blurred the nature of the Communist threat and reenforced the assumption of American omnipotence. Thereupon the editorial proposed a remedy against the repetition of such an involvement. Arguing that the national mood of 1964 comprised the real foundation of policy and that this mood, if aroused again, would sweep around all congressional barriers, the *Monitor* rejected legislative solutions. What the country required was a mature and informed public. The editorial concluded:

More knowledge of history would be a better safeguard against a repetition of the Vietnam story than any new laws Congress could write. If it wants to write new laws, probably no great harm will come from them, or good either, except that in trying to write the new laws perhaps some useful thinking will occur. But the only real remedy to the problem is in higher wisdom.

This effort to place much of the burden for the nation's future on its educational processes repeated assumptions about the relationship of knowledge to democratic government long heralded by American philosophers. Yet the *Monitor* editorial raised at least two fundamental questions concerning the need for greater wisdom. First, was there indeed an absence of available information in 1964 which might have predicted the consequences of a major United States involvement in Vietnam? Or was the problem for government less the question of knowledge than the inertia of established policies; for the public less the question of ignorance than the inertia of apathy? Second, if the editorial was correct in stressing the need for better education, what about the

*This paper was delivered as the presidential address at the luncheon of SHAFR, December 28, 1972, during the annual convention of the AHA in New Orleans. Dr. Graebner is professor of history at the University of Virginia.

majority of the American people, including the country's pro-Vietnam leadership, which seemed to favor the policies which that newspaper condemns? For them the educational system was either performing heroic service in behalf of United States policy or education in foreign affairs was quite properly uncritical, irrelevant, or nonexistent on American college and university campuses.

But what is even more disturbing in the *Monitor's* suppositions about the role of education is the fact that diplomatic history has been widely-recognized as a separate and important aspect of United States history for at least two generations. If the influence of diplomatic history remains doubtful, the editorial's appeal for greater wisdom cannot be dismissed as inapplicable to us as members of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. For if we cannot agree that there is some relationship between the country's educational processes and the quality of its international behavior, we shall face increasing difficulty in rationalizing our importance as possessors of useful knowledge. What really do we share beyond a general interest in the history of American foreign relations? What would it matter if all American officials and molders of public opinion were compelled to study under us? Education is an influence, but what is the nature of the influence which we exert?

No one is competent to answer that question fully, but I might answer it better than most. For during recent weeks I have examined 250 completed questionnaires -- approximately two-thirds of the 380 which I mailed late in October to members of our society. Inasmuch as the first forty or fifty responses established patterns of thought which the remaining 200 merely confirmed, I conclude that the responses reflect the views of diplomatic historians generally. The criticism of the dozen respondents who either challenged the questionnaire's form and brevity, its open-endedness or lack thereof, or who insisted simply that certain questions were unanswerable, is well taken. I claim no expertise in questionnaire-construction and sought far more information than one could normally expect from a one-page form. That I gained a far clearer impression of the profession than I had anticipated is a measure of the graciousness and admirable spirit of cooperation displayed by the vast majority of the society's members who were determined, through thoughtful and highly competent replies, to make my endeavor a success, whatever the shortcomings of the questionnaire.

What this study demonstrates is a diversity of background, perception, and role in the profession which a common interest in American foreign relations does not transcend. Historians no less than educated citizens everywhere are the product of a large and complex educational system. My 250 respondents represented no less than sixty graduate schools. Only Columbia, Harvard, Illinois, Indiana, Stanford, and Wisconsin had ten or more graduates among them, although Berkeley and

Chicago followed closely with nine each. Happily the research interests of the Society's membership touch all significant aspects of this country's external relations both as to time and as to foreign area. Still there is a rather steady progression of interest from the American Revolution to the Cold War, with only five respondents claiming major interest in the period before 1800 contrasted to some fifty, or twenty per cent of the whole, who cited World War II and the Cold War as subjects of primary concern. Over one-half the respondents claimed at least partial research interests in United States relations with Europe, whereas ninety listed Asia and forty-five Latin America as primary or secondary interests. Canada claimed four, Africa three, specialists within the responding group. A significant minority, focusing on general history, emphasized its interests in the American outlook toward all regions of the world.

This diversity reflects no more than the natural state of the profession, for historians no less than academics generally will pursue their own interests and preferences, including identification with one or more of the loosely-defined schools of thought which now characterize and circumscribe the intellectual vision of much of the profession. Of the 200 respondents who acknowledged some affiliation with one of four groupings, somewhat over 100, or slightly more than one-half, declared themselves realists; fifty viewed themselves as traditionalists; some thirty-five, as members of the New Left (or some offshoot which tended to deny a sole concern with economic factors). A dozen preferred some combination which they termed eclectic. But what is equally significant in this overview is the wide dispersion of age and graduate affiliation in each group. Wisconsin graduates, for example, do not dominate the New Left.

II

On the broadest definitions of nineteenth-century success and failure historians of American foreign relations stand in essential agreement. Over eighty per cent view the American experience before 1900 as successful; the twenty per cent which categorized it as "partially successful" held notions scarcely distinguishable from those of the majority. But this apparent consensus scarcely conceals the widespread divergence of judgment which separates the different schools of thought. For with limited exceptions traditionalists explain the country's diplomatic success by citing the *evidence* of that success. The United States maintained its independence; it expanded to the Pacific and beyond. It protected its security even while it avoided major wars in Europe and Asia. As one respondent phrased it, "We got everything we wanted at practically no cost. What better definition could there be of success?" Successes abroad enabled the country to undergo its vast internal development. And as the century evolved, ran a common judgment, successive administrations shaped the long-range objectives of the United States in terms that seemed to reflect the national interest.

Whereas traditionalists tend to explain the nineteenth-century record with excerpts from the abundant evidence, the realists, with remarkable consistency, seek to measure the success by *accounting* for it rather than by describing it. Traditionalist observations did not ignore the conditions of success, especially the well-established notion that Europe's distresses accounted at least in part for America's successes. But the realists focused almost exclusively on some aspect of the ends-and-means analogy. Some stressed the favorable setting. Stanford's Tom Bailey phrased it succinctly, "We had Europe's balance of power and two oceans going for us." Some pointed to the absence of competing powers in the Western Hemisphere. Others singled out the generally limited, attainable, and explicable goals -- all achieved with readily circumscribed and discriminating involvements. One young Princeton graduate characterized the realist approach when he noted, "Since goals were (for the most part) limited and risk-taking minimized, the results were satisfactory, although the quality of leadership after J.Q. Adams was relatively low." Whatever the character of the national leadership, realists agree that until 1898 United States policy adhered to realistic perimeters.

More than traditionalists and realists, members of the New Left had trouble with my request for summary views on the successes and failures of the American experience in foreign affairs. As one young historian complained, "Please note the difficulty of the New Left historian in attempting to answer questions formulated from a rather different perspective." For this reaction the explanation is clear. New Left historians tend to measure success, not by the policy's relationship to the national welfare, broadly defined, but by its capacity to achieve the specific objectives of governing elites. Thus a policy which might terminate in political and moral disaster could still, some New Left respondents made clear, be regarded successful if it fulfilled its declared or undeclared purposes. New Left historians, moreover, are concerned less with either the evidence or the reasons for success than with the motivations and forces behind the policies. They are concerned more with long-range than with immediate results. Accepting the notion of continuity between the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, they detect less significance in the events of 1898 to 1900 than do the realists. More than others, New Left historians focus on what appear to be the troublesome tendencies in the nineteenth-century record -- the lack of concern for the weak in the Mexican and Spanish-American wars and the creation of a heritage of ill will in Latin America. Despite its claims to humanity, wrote one member of the New Left, American policy in the nineteenth century lacked humaneness. New Left adherents agree generally that the nation's nineteenth-century triumphs planted the seeds of disaster for the present century.

Clearly the profession judges America's twentieth-century experience in external relations far less satisfactory than its nineteenth. Indeed, less than thirty respondents -- approximately twelve per cent -- adjudged the twentieth-century record successful. On the other hand, no more than fifteen per cent viewed it as a failure. The remainder -- or three-fourths -- accepted the verdict of "partial success." Still the responses revealed again three rather clear schools of analysis.

Except for that minority of New Left respondents who were willing to judge this century according to standards set by policy-makers, those who registered approval were overwhelmingly traditionalists. The reason is clear. Measured by the visible elements of power, victory in two world wars, world leadership since Pearl Harbor, and the relative national security since 1945, the record, some would insist, was truly astonishing. On the wide assumption that the United States has, in recent decades, faced a very dangerous world, some traditionalists would measure success in simple terms of survival. As one respondent wrote, "We would not be here if we were not successful." If the United States, on occasion, made errors or became overinvolved, such decisions were inevitable; in the long run the country could not escape the consequences of international conflict. Where it had choices, concluded several respondents, another course of action would not necessarily have been more satisfactory than the one pursued. At any rate, the United States had avoided the ultimate failure -- a nuclear war.

Other traditionalists defined the country's success in terms that transcended mere survival. One recurrent theme ran as follows: "America has followed a sensible, moral, and moderate policy respecting high human ideals for the individual." It achieved world leadership in a reasonable manner and without provoking any major domestic upheaval, wrote another. Despite its power the United States resisted imperial challenges and established an open world economy beneficial for great and small countries alike. For many who viewed the nation's twentieth-century role as a generally meritorious extension of national power, the transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century appeared continuous, smooth, and logical.

Among realists the judgment that United States foreign relations declined in the twentieth century as an effective and thoughtful expression of American interests is almost universal. Such conclusions do not ignore the outward measures of success, but they question the nature of national objectives in the light of the country's needs and the limits of its power. That the loss of nineteenth-century insulation would create new dangers and increase costs seems clear enough, but realists stress the vast extension of national objectives as well as the decline of strategic advantage to account for the imbalance of ends and means which

did not seem to exist in the previous century. Focusing on the country's loss of special protection as a factor in the decline of American success, Bailey wrote: "Things got too complicated. We are a major factor in the world balance of power and the oceans have shriveled into small lakes."

Repeating George Kennan's charges of moralism, several respondents emphasized the trend toward abstract and universal national goals which always seemed to elude American power, whatever the nation's effort. One young realist phrased the problem in these words: "United States goals increased greatly and United States military and economic power did too, but the power of those being acted upon also increased, limiting United States's success." Another respondent argued in similar terms: "A strong isolationist mentality was broken down by 1939 to be succeeded only by an unrealistic commitment to ideological conflict with Communism." Some realists sensed a similar gap between policy and understanding, noting especially that twentieth-century leaders seemed to lack a sense of history and failed to explain national interests, goals, and policies in adequate terms. As one respondent observed, leaders generally "have not been educated to the task they confronted or have been unable to educate Americans to the task when they have been knowledgeable." If United States policies after 1945 served the economic and security interests of the United States, they often did so, complained several respondents, at the expense of the country's image and political standing, and at the price of vastly extended defense budgets.

New Left historians have treated the American record since 1900 less kindly than have others. Some, of course, claim extreme success for objectives which American leaders, as spokesmen for business, have assigned to American economic and military power. One New Left historian expressed national success in such terms: "Because of the chaos and general anarchy prevailing among the leading capitalist states, and their general decline, the United States has been forced to assume the burden of stabilizing the world as a capitalist hegemony." When they apply their own standards, however, New Left historians doubt that United States foreign policy has defended the general American interest in this century or portrayed a laudable sense of values. Some accuse the national leadership of too much corporatism and obsession with power in its effort to make the world safe for American investment and commerce. Others accuse it of corrupting American democratic and humanitarian ideals in both its marked tendency toward ethno-centrism and its counter-revolutionary policies in the third world.

III

In placing its hopes for future peace in Asia on the altar of history, the *Christian Science Monitor* assumed that scholars would share its view of Vietnam -- that indeed historic wisdom would argue against the

war. Beyond that, Vietnam offers a unique historical issue for measuring the capacity of the profession to reach agreement when a large body of historical evidence has been generally available to all. It seems clear that the reactions of diplomatic historians to the war transcend any identification with schools of thought or general evaluations of the nation's experience. Among the war's most vigorous critics were retired traditionalists.

Actually the reactions of the society's membership to Vietnam covered the full spectrum to be found in Congress or among the public at large. What differed greatly were the proportions. Less than twenty, or some eight per cent, of the respondents approved of the war. Some sixty admitted mild disapproval, whereas 150, or sixty per cent, indicated extreme disapproval. Still a careful examination of the questionnaires uncovers a predictable complexity. Among those who favored the war were several who recognized no acceptable alternative to victory. As one phrased it, one does not fight to obtain a draw. Another insisted that the United States, once it made the decision to intervene militarily, should have made the involvement swift, ruthless, and decisive. That would have saved American and Vietnamese blood and treasure. Others believed the evidence still insufficient for judging the war. One recommended that historians pay less attention to the war and consider rather the wisdom of the policy goals which led to the involvement.

Among those who expressed mild disapproval were a number who questioned the means rather than the ends of national policy. Some -- perhaps a half dozen -- criticized the war largely because of the country's failure to win. One who admitted disagreement with the war hoped to remind historians that national divisions were common enough in American history. How would historians, therefore, view the Vietnam war in another fifty years? Among those who condemned the war were many who acknowledged a transition from approval to mild disapproval as late as 1965 to extreme disapproval by 1968. Some in this group turned against the war also, not because they disagreed with the goals, but because they became convinced that victory was not possible. At any rate, after Tet the great majority of society members regarded the Vietnam war as at least a minor disaster in the nation's history.

Rating national leadership in external affairs is perhaps no more difficult than rating it generally. If historians have, on occasion, rated the presidents merely by assigning numbers, the responses to my questionnaire demonstrated the limited validity of such an endeavor. For the judgment on any national leader must weigh goals, effectiveness, and the consequences of actions on a variety of issues. It must include some differentiation between times and circumstances, between the executive's role as maker of policy and his role as world leader. In the

period since Pearl Harbor any estimation must include military as well as diplomatic factors. Indeed, one respondent insisted that Cold War specialists possess some knowledge of national security policy. Yet within the limits imposed by a reliance on generalizations, the questionnaires presented the clear judgment that United States leadership in this century has not been outstanding. Only eight per cent regarded the leadership good. Twice that percentage judged it poor, leaving the vast majority of some three-fourths viewing the leadership as "fair" to "satisfactory." The judgments on individual leaders and time periods varied so widely as to preclude any precise analysis. The poll of the last five presidents illustrated again the hopelessness of placing leaders in simple categories. Still the profiles of the five presidents, based on almost 250 separate votes, may have some significance. Those of Truman and Nixon, both of whom were favored by traditionalists and realists alike, were clearly the most approving. Somewhat less so, but again almost identical, were the profiles of Eisenhower and Kennedy. Johnson, who received the heaviest anti-Vietnam vote, ran a poor fifth.

IV

It appears, then, that the profession of American diplomatic historians today is characterized by a clear, but reasonably limited, diversity. In general its members seem to be concerned with the same national experience. Still it is far easier to determine the general views of the profession on matters of history than to analyze its role and impact. The overwhelming majority of respondents agreed that the close relationship between foreign affairs and national welfare assigned some special obligation for raising the level of public competence and awareness in the realm of external concerns. Indeed, less than 50, no more than twenty per cent, rejected the notion that their intellectual interests placed any special obligation upon them. What is more, the vast majority of the society's membership -- over seventy per cent -- admitted a high interest in recent foreign relations. The remainder, with few exceptions, claimed at least average interest. All respondents attempted to bring their courses into the post-World War II era and a full two-thirds sought to include events of the current year.

But whether historians can arrive at any substantial conclusions relative to the past decade is a matter of more serious controversy. True, two-thirds of the respondents believed that historians might deal satisfactorily with contemporary history, especially if they used caution. Several acknowledged that the difficulty lay less in the historian's competence than in the time required to examine current materials adequately. Retired Ambassador Loy W. Henderson, for example, believed that history need not suffer because of recency, provided that the student was willing "to work like hell to keep up with history as it is being made." Spokesmen for the minority, however, doubted that the historian could derive valid conclusions from studying the recent past, whatever the effort.

One thought it immaterial. "I don't think you have to arrive at a conclusion about everything," he wrote. Another thought that solid conclusions on recent events were not available but that one ought to engage in the pursuit of them nevertheless.

Still a matter of such importance demands further observation. To consign responsibility for interpreting recent events to journalists, sociologists, and political scientists is an admission that the task is too great, that historians possess lesser obligation for national performance than others, or that history simply fails to supply information useful in analyzing certain important aspects of the recent past. One thing is certain: someone will interpret current policies. And it is not clear that historians, despite the limited documentation available, are not better equipped to analyze major foreign policy issues than those who claim little or no knowledge of history at all. It is true that one cannot teach by analogy alone, but historians might at least accept the precepts of Montaigne:

As no event and no shape is entirely like another, so also is there none entirely different from another, an ingenious mixture on the part of nature. If there were no similarity in our faces we could not distinguish one man from beast; if there were no dissimilarity we could not distinguish one man from another. All things hold together by some similarity; every example is halting, and the comparison that is derived from experience is always defective and imperfect. And yet one links up the comparisons at some corner.

It seems strange, indeed, that historians decry the effort to deal with contemporary matters because the facts are not in when almost every subject in American diplomatic history stretching back to the American Revolution is subject to conflicting interpretations. There is very little consensus on any major episode in the history of American external relations. Are we still awaiting the evidence on the War of 1812 or the Mexican War? Or do the problems of understanding and interpretation transcend the facts and thus do not apply uniquely to the past decade?

Beyond the issues of obligation and recency is the further problem of defining the relationship between conviction and action, both inside and outside the classroom. Certainly a strong minority of this society's membership would deny that there could be any legitimate connection between the two. For some, historical experience has no relevance for the present. The past, wrote one respondent, "has its own integrity and may not be used to argue about current affairs." One rebuked those who would pass judgment even on the past. "It is not our job to grade American history as we grade our students," he noted. Some respondents insisted that the classroom was an improper forum to express one's views on contemporary matters. "My personal convictions are my own," wrote one, "and I try to keep them that way in the classroom." Many

members admitted a determination to guard their reactions to Vietnam from their students, and one anonymous young historian pointedly refused to share his views with me. Several respondents decried demonstrations as either useless or dangerous. One traditionalist wrote, "When the historian becomes propagandist, he loses all claim to professional objectivity and endangers academic freedom." Another thought that the 1972 election would have a salutary effect on activists by bringing them back to their basic mission of understanding the past. In their teaching members of this group claimed objectivity, although in refinements of their purposes, which scarcely distinguished them from the membership generally, they cited a wide variety of objectives designed primarily to create some capacity for critical thought in their students.

How different the perceptions of another minority regarding its educational role! For this group the divorcement of action from knowledge or conviction was not only unthinkable but a denigration of the entire historical endeavor. For them the study of the past filled what journalist William V. Shannon once termed "an inherent human need to find standards for judgment, sources of inspiration, and guides to wiser actions." A teacher, wrote one New Left historian, had the obligation to use his knowledge in the service of his values. "Life, thought, and scholarship are all tied together," wrote another. Anyone who felt differently, wrote still another, "ought to reexamine his personal value system and sense of public responsibility." In similar vein a young realist declared that diplomatic historians had no choice but to "assert themselves as the critics, not the apologists, of power. We must," he continued, "learn what it truly is, as Hans Morgenthau put it, to speak truth to power." One young member of the New Left asserted that any abdication of the history profession to other action groups served no national interest. "If our knowledge of history makes no obvious difference in our lives," he asked, "why then should students come to us, what difference would it make to them to know what we know?"

Some respondents wondered how the historian could teach skepticism while claiming objectivity. To claim functional objectivity, wrote one young historian, is an expression of ignorance or self-deceit. For many historians, certainly, objectivity assumed a decidedly pro-American bias. A Canadian respondent noted that in his country an uncritical approach to United States diplomatic history "would be looked upon as simplistic and as American propaganda, not as a serious approach to intellectual investigation." Similarly a young critic of traditionalism charged that objective history served the interests of government and not the interests of either the country or the students. Some fifty of the respondents, or approximately twenty per cent, engaged in anti-Vietnam demonstrations; far more than one-half of all respondents revealed their reactions in teaching, writing, and speaking.

Today the profession, partly because of its divisions and its limited effectiveness, is confronted by a strong undercurrent of pessimism. The history of American foreign relations is not a popular subject in the colleges and universities. Approximately one-fourth of the respondents noted that interest in the field was high on their campuses. But some fifty-five per cent regarded its popularity as average whereas twenty per cent judged it to be low. Some predicted a brighter future for diplomatic history because of the subject's intrinsic significance. More believed that the trend was downward -- that if diplomatic history could not increase its importance, its intellectual attractiveness, and its influence against the background of the past two decades, it would never do so. Among the respondents were those who questioned the whole academic endeavor. "With more scientists in government and more intellectuals in government since 1945," he wrote, "we wound up with Vietnam and enormously destructive weapons. Do you *really* think that we professionals have been an asset to either our country or the world community?" Those who had attempted to influence the public or the government could point to little success. Others concluded simply that academic education in foreign affairs would never succeed in competition with the views of other foreign policy elites, especially those associated with government. Education in external matters, in short, would triumph when it reached those responsible for national decisions. One young New Left historian concluded: "I feel that historians, of whatever interpretive persuasion, must feel a sense of frustration and even failure when they compare the level of understanding they try to develop in their writing and teaching to the level of understanding among the public at large -- including those with college-level educations."

That the profession is divided on questions of perception and purpose may comprise no cause for concern. For many, it seems clear, American diplomatic history holds its proper place in the country's intellectual life. Still there are those who see the need for a different, more useful history -- one that might instill a deeper comprehension of where the country has been and where it is going. Unless we can develop some scholarship that is readily transferable to impact levels, wrote one young respondent, American foreign relations will become a dying subject. What has no impact, he charged, can have only limited value. For some leading professionals Vietnam has suggested new approaches that might better enlighten the present -- a reexamination of the isolationist dogma of the Thirties or a new focus on the growth of executive power in the present century. Finally some anticipate a new synthesis. One distinguished member of the Society suggested a new realism which embraced the non-economic aspects of revisionism. Perhaps a greater consensus is not possible; for some, not even advisable. Still we pay a price for our divisions in our limited appeal to students and our limited impact on the nation's thought.

Prior to the presidential address, Dr. Gerald J. Bernath of Beverly Hills, Calif., spoke briefly to the assemblage concerning his late son, Stuart L. Bernath. The latter was a most promising diplomatic historian, and in his memory his mother and father have established an annual award which is to be administered by SHAFR. Dr. Bernath stated that his son was not only gifted in the field of history--he had published one book and seven articles, had the research well under way for another book, and had plans for several more when he was taken at the untimely age of thirty-one--but he was also a good musician, a fine photographer, and had a strongly-developed social conscience. At the conclusion of his talk, Dr. Bernath presented checks to the co-winners of the first annual Stuart L. Bernath Prize in U. S. diplomatic history, Drs. Joan Hoff Wilson and Kenneth E. Shewmaker.

ABSTRACTS

SHAFR shared a session, titled "The Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan: Containment from the Perspective of Twenty-Five Years," with the AHR at the latter's annual meeting in New Orleans, Dec. 20, 1972. Profs. Richard D. McKinzie, Harry S. Truman Library Institute, and Theodore A. Wilson, U of Kansas, presented a paper, "The Marshall Plan in Historical Perspective," while Prof. John L. Gaddis, Ohio U, read the paper, "The Truman Doctrine Reconsidered." Both papers were brief, but they were heavily documented.

Approximately one-third of the McKinzie-Wilson paper was given over to recounting the background of the European Recovery Program (ERP), and an assessment of its accomplishments. For something over a decade, said the writers, few questioned the assertion that the ERP, in operation from the summer of 1947 until June, 1950, had been a resounding success. In the 1960's, though, the revisionists had asked many hard questions relative to the objectives of the ERP and its achievements. The writers contended that the ERP did accomplish much in its short tenure, but they agreed that a greater (and much-to-be-desired) attainment had not been realized. The bulk of their paper was addressed to the latter problem -- why more substantial gains had not been secured.

The writers argued that both the defenders and critics of the ERP have been partially in error as to what happened, and how it happened,

during those years. In order to clarify the problem, they directed the attention of the audience to three vital areas. In the first place, no one in governmental circles had an overall idea or concept in 1947 of what would actually be necessary to effectuate the recovery of Europe. Likewise, no one held a clearcut notion of what European recovery would consist of. Lacking precision at these crucial points, how could one then use the words "fail" or "succeed" with respect to the program?

Secondly, much might have been done within the fields of clarification and objectification, but the political situation in the United States at that time was not favorable. In order to get -- and to keep -- Congressional support for the program, the Truman Administration was often forced to resort to misleading and simplistic arguments. Congress and the country needed much hard-headed education about the straits of Western Europe and the capabilities of the United States, but to do this would entail much time and might cause the program to collapse at the outset. Appeals to Congressional prejudices and peeves did help to move the ERP to fruition, but in so doing severely limited the results that would be achieved.

The final domestic impediment to the ERP was the factor of bureaucratic politics. At least a dozen departments and agencies had a hand in administering the program. None of these tried deliberately to sabotage the work of others, but the result was often of that nature as the officials in each domain set forth, and defended, the course of action they felt desirable, even necessary. The ECA (Economic Cooperation Administration) was established in order to effect unification of methods and objectives among the departments and agencies, but it, too, had to admit defeat.

In commenting upon the McKinzie-Wilson paper, Prof. Thomas G. Paterson, U of Connecticut, felt that the duo had stressed too much the angle of the bureaucratic squabbles. The establishment and the ongoing of the ERP was no different from that of purely American programs -- there was always bickering and wrangling, but the responsible parties "still manage to produce something which essentially satisfies their goals." For the duration of the ERP he was convinced that "there was a studied consensus of purpose which was not sacrificed."

Prof. John L. Gaddis in his paper, "The Truman Doctrine Reconsidered," contended that there was a vast gap between President Truman's statement of March, 1947, that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures" and the implementation thereof. In documenting his contention he argued from three bases: "(1) that the Truman Doctrine, far from representing a revolution in American foreign policy, was very much in line with previously-established precedents

for dealing with shifts in the European balance of power; (2) that despite its sweeping language, the Truman Administration, between 1947 and 1950, had neither the intention nor the capability of policing the rest of the world; and (3) that the real commitment to contain communism everywhere originated in the events surrounding the Korean War, not the crisis in Greece and Turkey."

Prof. Gaddis stated that it had been a cardinal point of U. S. foreign policy since 1917, at least, to maintain a balance of power in Europe. The U. S. had entered World War I in order to repel Germany who seemed on the point of upsetting that balance. We had fought Germany in World War II for the same reason. President Truman and his advisers in 1946-7 saw Russia as trying to attain the old German objective. Thus, in line with the traditional American policy President Truman in 1947 had sounded the call for curbing Russia's westward penetration.

America had not viewed Russia in this light during World War II. The latter's efforts during that struggle had rehabilitated her in American eyes. But the establishment of Russian influence in the countries on her periphery after World War II, as well as the revival of the call for a spread of communism upon a world-wide basis, had been disillusioning.

Prof. Gaddis mentioned the statement of several of the high Administration officials of the Truman era to buttress his argument that the U. S. had no overall plan for containing communism -- this despite the President's rhetoric. The prime hope of the Administration was to preserve a balance of power in Europe. As proof of the U. S. intentions, he noted that the U. S. military forces had shrunk from twelve to one and one-half million, and the military budget had dropped to fifteen billion dollars.

In commenting upon Prof. Gaddis's paper, Prof. Thomas G. Paterson, U of Connecticut, challenged several of the former's statements. He particularly objected to a lack of precision in the use of such terms as "balance of power", "police the world", "concessions", etc., plus a reliance upon some untested assumptions. He (Paterson) agreed that the U. S. had no intention of "policing the world", vis-a-vis communism, in a military sense, but she intended to -- and did -- "influence" the postwar world. This she did through her operations within the World Bank, the United Nations and its allied agencies such as UNRRA, plus the throwing of her economic weight around the world.

Prof. Paterson, too, thought that Prof. Gaddis had viewed the matter of the military too narrowly. The latter had mentioned troop strength but had neglected to mention America's awesome sea and air power, as well as her industrial might which allowed her to turn out the material of war at will. True, the U. S. had reduced her troop strength greatly, but so had Russia.

Prof. Richard S. Kirkendall, U. of Missouri (Columbia), had few points of disagreement with the subject matter of the two papers. But he did bewail the fact that a more precise methodology had not been used. He singled out the economic factor in this era and showed that it was not held in equal importance by the writers of the two papers. But what they did, or didn't do, was true of the writers of history in general. Methodology simply has not advanced to the point where so much of the hypothesizing, equivocating, subjectivism, or just plain imprecision can be eliminated.

All four papers alluded to the fact that much of the archival material of the Truman era has not yet been opened to the public; hence many of their statements had of necessity to be of a tentative nature.

Minutes of meeting, SHAFR Council
Chancellor Room, Fairmont-Roosevelt Hotel, New Orleans
December 27, 1972, 8:00-10:30 P.M.

Members present: Norman Graebner, president, Wayne Cole, vice president, Richard W. Leopold, David Trask, Warren F. Kimball, editor, *Roster and Research List* of SHAFR, Nolan Fowler, editor, *SHAFR Newsletter*. Present by invitation: Mary Kihl, Lawrence Gelfand, W. Stull Holt, and Dr. Gerald Bernath.

President Graebner invited Dr. Bernath, donor of the Stuart L. Bernath prize in U. S. diplomatic history, to speak. Dr. Bernath indicated that he would be present at the SHAFR luncheon on the morrow and would make the awards to the chosen recipients. He requested, and was granted, time in which to address the assemblage at the luncheon.

Dr. Holt, chairman of the committee which selected the co-winners of the Bernath prize for 1972, Kenneth E. Shewmaker, *Americans and Chinese Communists, 1927-1945: A Persuading Encounter*, and Joan Hoff Wilson, *American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920-1933*, was next asked to speak. Dr. Holt said that the task of the Committee had not been unusually difficult in deciding upon the initial awards. He disclosed that eighteen books had been submitted to the Committee, but said that after the first reading only four of them remained in the running. Dr. Holt repeated a request which had appeared previously in the formal report of the Committee—that "The publisher or persons submitting books for the Prize must be asked to submit five copies, otherwise SHAFR will be compelled to purchase several copies of the winning book or books

each year." The big question, of course, was whether the companies entering books in the competition would honor such a request. Dr. Holt said there had been no apparent problem in getting two copies of each of the eighteen books reviewed for the 1972 prize. The consensus seemed to be that there would be no harm in asking companies for the five copies. If they weren't forthcoming, then other measures could be undertaken. Dr. Leopold's suggestion that the Executive Secretary be directed to circularize the various companies, informing them of the prize competition and asking them to submit the requisite copies to the Committee, was approved.

With no dissent, the proposed budget of SHAFR for 1973, as submitted by Dr. Joseph P. O'Grady, Executive Secretary-Treasurer, was approved.

Dr. Graebner stated that he would be personally responsible in securing a chairman for the Program Committee. The lacuna in this area was (and is) demonstrated by the fact that one of the two sessions agreed upon for the joint meeting with the Organization of American Historians in April has not yet been finalized.

At this juncture Dr. Kimball raised the point of conflicting sessions at the annual meetings of the American Historical Association and the Organization of American Historians. He said that, for example, two programs, both of great interest to U. S. diplomatic historians, would be held at the same hour the next morning. If one were scheduled at a different time, not a difficult thing to do, then everyone could attend both meetings. President Graebner said that, in conjunction with the new SHAFR Program Chairman and the chairmen of the larger organizations, he would attempt to see that this dilemma was avoided at future meetings.

The question of a chairman for the Membership Committee was left unresolved. Dr. Gelfand suggested that this individual come from the Washington, D. C. area, because so many of the newer breed of diplomatic historians were going into U. S. Government service.

Nolan Fowler, newly-appointed editor of the *SHAFR Newsletter*, was invited to describe his plans for the publication. The *Newsletter* will be sponsored by Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee, for the next quadrennium. The *Newsletter* will henceforth be a quarterly instead of a twice-a-year affair, and the University will assume all the costs of publishing and mailing up to 600 issues per quarter, with each issue not to exceed thirty-two pages. The text will be set through the use of a Varsity which has twelve different type faces, and which justifies the right margin. The printing will be done by the photo-offset process. A format similar to that of the *Newsletter* of the American Historical Association will be employed.

The editor affirmed that the format and organization of the *Newsletter* would conform to high standards, but stressed the fact that there still remained the task of filling thirty-two pages each quarter. It was neither desirable nor feasible for the editor to fill those pages by his own efforts. To meet this quota would require efforts from the membership-at-large. Personals, which have been conspicuous by their absence thus far in the *Newsletter*, will have to be supplied. Announcements of meetings and programs must find their way, before deadlines, to the editor. Bibliographical essays upon various topics or periods of U. S. diplomacy will have to be done, and abstracts of dissertations in the diplomatic field will have to be forwarded for publication. And so on. The *Newsletter* can--and should--serve a valuable role in furthering an *esprit de corps* in the organization, but multilateral efforts will be necessary in attaining that objective.

Drs. Mary Kihl and Warren Kimball presented a cautiously-optimistic report concerning the establishment of a journal in the field of U. S. diplomatic history. They stated that after some "some six months of discussion with printers, journal editors, and school administrators" they had a good picture of the anticipated costs, plus some definite ideas of how the costs might be met. The cheapest type of printing would utilize the photo-offset method at a university press and this would cost around \$7,500 a year, assuming four issues of about 120 pages each. A foreign printer could be engaged, and a Belgian firm which does the *Journal of Slavic Studies* was mentioned. The cost of doing that *Journal*--1,200 copies of 160 pages, four times a year--was \$10,000 per year, and that sum included the mailing costs. If a local printer were employed, the publishing price would be about \$12,000 for a journal of some 128 pages, with 1,000-1,500 copies per issue, and printed thrice a year.

Drs. Kihl and Kimball disclosed that they had contacted two institutions which, they felt, would be willing to contribute around \$4,000 each for the first year of the journal. If subscriptions in the neighborhood of \$3,000-\$4,000 could also be obtained the first year, then the journal could be launched. The two institutions would then contribute a lesser amount each year over the next four years as the Society absorbed more of the costs so that the journal should be self-supporting at the end of the period. Suggested subscription rates would be \$15.00 to institutions, \$12.00 to members, and \$8.00 to students. Advertising would be \$50.00 per page or \$30.00 for a half page.

Assuming that the two institutions came through with their suggested shares, the big question was whether the membership wanted a journal badly enough to pay \$12.00 a year for it. Dr. Kihl asserted that there was a definite need for the journal because there simply were not enough outlets for diplomatic historians in the existing publications. In a five-

year survey which she had run she had found that only 2% of the articles in historical journals dealt with diplomacy, while the figure for the political science journals stood at 3%. Since companies were also cutting back severely upon their output of books, there was more pressure than ever for a separate journal as a publishing outlet, especially for younger diplomatic historians.

The Council agreed that the Secretary should poll the members of the Society in order to ascertain whether they would be willing to pay the sum of \$12.00 a year for a journal.

In case the project was approved, Drs. Kihl and Kimball did not anticipate that the journal could make its appearance before late 1974 or early 1975.

Some discussion ensued at this point respecting the roles which the *Newsletter* and a journal, assuming that one materialized, would play and whether there would be any overlapping of functions. The editor of the *Newsletter* wondered whether there would be any need for such a publication if and when a journal should become operative. The Council was of common accord that the need for the *Newsletter* would be imperative even though a journal did come into being. The members felt that a journal should confine itself almost exclusively to articles and book reviews. The president was authorized, though, to confer with the editor respecting the categories which should and should not be handled in the *Newsletter*.

Dr. Kimball, editor of the *SHAFR Roster and Research List*, announced that the next edition of this publication should be out around the end of January. All present agreed that this annual *List* was a great aid to those working in the area of U. S. diplomatic history and commended Dr. Kimball for his painstaking and thorough work.

Dr. Lawrence Gelfand, Chairman of the Bibliographical Planning Committee which has been seeking ways and means of modernizing and expanding the outdated and outmoded *Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States* (S. F. Bemis and Grace G. Griffin, 1935), spoke at some length upon his efforts. He had been in Washington, D. C., in the fall and had talked with officials at the National Endowment for the Humanities. He found the men there enthusiastic about the project, and they thought his estimate of the money required for the venture--\$750,000 spread over a period of ten years--quite reasonable. In fact, they felt it was too low; \$1,250,000 would be a more realistic figure. They indicated that they would be willing to underwrite two-thirds (66%) of the cost if a sponsor could be found for the remaining 34%. He had then gone to the Historical Office of the State Department for further talks. He was given the impression there that the Office could come up

with the requisite amount of money, especially since it could be spread over a ten-year period.

Dr. Gelfand asserted, however, that no official negotiations could be entered into with either the National Endowment or the Historical Office until a board of editors was set up. At this point the Council instructed President Graebner to write a formal letter to Dr. Gelfand, designating him as the general editor of the project and empowering him to recruit the needed associate--and honorary--editors. The sole stipulation was that the editorial staff so recruited would be subject to approval by the Council.

The president stated that he had been contacted by the Franklin Mint. It seems that the latter contemplates the issuance of a medal in commemoration of the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine and would like the backing of SHAFR in the venture. The Council was of the view that the medal would be forthcoming, with or without the support of SHAFR, and with a unanimous vote rejected the overture.

From the Executive Secretary-Treasurer

February 9, 1973

Dear Colleague:

1973 now appears as an important year for the Society. With this issue of the *Newsletter*, we have a new editor, Professor Nolan Fowler, and a new sponsor, Tennessee Technological University. There is little doubt that the Society will continue to grow as a result of this change, and we hope that both Professor Fowler and his institution gain as much from us as we shall from them. Once again we have to thank Professors Gerald Wheeler and Peter M. Buzanski and San Jose State College for establishing the *Newsletter* and setting the example for Professor Fowler to follow.

In addition the Society will experience a second major change in the coming months with the search for a new Executive Secretary-Treasurer. The success it has in effecting this change will hopefully reflect its degree of maturity as a viable organization.

In another important decision, the Council has approved the appointment of Professor Lawrence Gelfand as General Editor of the Biblio-

graphical study which will demand major funding and eventually involve numerous members of the Society.

We are approaching another major decision -- whether to hold our annual convocation separate from the AHA (or the OAH) or to continue meeting with that organization. The Council will discuss this problem at the OAH in April. If the decision is then to plan for a separate meeting, the Society will have passed another milestone.

At the same time the now normal chain of events will continue. As you can see, the details for the OAH meeting are now complete. We ask that you complete the luncheon form as soon as possible and return it directly to the OAH. Secondly, please note that we will have a session on Wednesday afternoon which will be devoted to the issue of what impact the President's declassification decision of last March will have upon our work as diplomatic historians.

Also please note the change in the format of the Bernath Prize competition. If you know of an eligible book published in 1972, please nominate it for the award and have the publisher send the five copies directly to Professor Bradford Perkins.

President Wayne S. Cole has appointed Armin Rappaport as Chairman of the Program Committee and Leon E. Boothe, Chairman of the Membership Committee. If you have any ideas for programs, send them directly to Professor Rappaport, Department of History, University of California at San Diego, La Jolla, Calif., 92037. If you have suggestions regarding membership, please forward them to Professor Boothe, Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences, George Mason College, Fairfax, Va., 22030.

With that I had better close as I am again pressed with deadlines. I hope to see you in Chicago.

Sincerely, Joseph P. O'Grady

ANNOUNCEMENT

After serving nearly seven years as Executive Secretary-Treasurer of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Professor Joseph P. O'Grady of La Salle College has asked to be relieved of his duties. Personal responsibilities, departmental duties, a research pro-

ject under way, and a pending leave, all account for his decision. Professor O'Grady was the moving force in the creation of SHAFR and has ably devoted more time and energy than any other individual to the success of the organization. Members owe him a very great debt of gratitude. He has thoughtfully given a substantial lead time in which to locate a successor, and promises to help break in his successor to the duties. The position is extremely important to the future of SHAFR and calls for an able, responsible, and dedicated person.

The Council and officers invite applications or nominations of individuals who might capably fill the position. The individual will need not only the necessary personal and professional qualities, but also the cooperation of his or her college or university to the extent of providing supporting clerical help and supplies. Please send applications, nominations, or suggestions to Dr. Wayne S. Cole, President, 10203 McGovern Drive, Silver Spring, Maryland 20903.

NEW PUBLICATIONS

Of much interest to many researchers in American diplomatic history is a recent announcement by the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, that the hearings held in executive session by that body during the Truman era are in the process of being published. One volume, *The Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine*, is already available. Other volumes will be concerned with the following topics: post-UNNRA Relief, Interim Aid, the European Recovery Program, China Aid, Continued Aid to Greece and Turkey, the Point Four Program, later foreign aid legislation, and other executive hearings of historical importance. The present and future publications may be obtained from the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Washington, D. C. 20510, or from the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C. 20402.

* * * * *

Prof. Robert Beitzell, University of Maine, has authored *The Uneasy Alliance; America, Britain and Russia, 1941-1943*. A Borzoi book, it is retailed by Alfred A. Knopf in the United States and Random House in Canada at \$10.00 in the clothbound edition.

* * * * *

Dr. Forrest M. Pogue, Director of the George C. Marshall Research Library, VMI, Lexington, Va., has finished the third volume of his definitive biography of General Marshall. Titled *George C. Marshall; Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945*, it is available from the Viking Press for \$10.00.

PERSONALS

The President of SHAFR, Dr. Wayne S. Cole, will be a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for scholars, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D. C., from January through August.

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Justus D. Doenecke, New College, Sarasota, Florida, has received a grant from the John Anson Kittredge Educational Fund for archival investigation this summer in the area of the non-interventionists and the Cold War.

* * * * *

John Chay has been elevated to the chairmanship of the History Department at Pembroke State University, Pembroke, North Carolina.

MEETINGS

The Southeast Regional Conference for members of SHAFR, co-hosted by the Departments of History of West Georgia College and Georgia State University, met at the latter institution on February 24. Two sessions were held. The first, titled "Colloquium on the Tension between Involvement and Non-Involvement Abroad", and presided over by Prof. Robert W. Sellen of Georgia State U, consisted of presentations of these papers: "Isolationists of the 1930s and 1940s: A Historiographical Essay", Justus D. Doenecke, New College (Sarasota, Fla.); "American Involvement in China, 1937-1941: Tension Between Involvement and Non-Involvement", J. Larry Durrence, Florida Southern College; "The Resurgence of Isolationism at the End of World War II", Thomas M. Campbell, Florida State University; and "Some Observations on U. S. Involvement in the Middle East, 1930-1972", Glen W. Swanson, University of Kentucky. The discussants were J. W. Moore, the Citadel, Richard Eubanks, University of Georgia, and Frederick B. Hoyt, Southern Illinois University.

Prof. Thomas A. Bryson, West Georgia College, was chairman at the other colloquium, "What are the Boundaries of American Diplomatic History?" The following papers were read: "The Diplomatic Historians: Bailey & Bemis", Lester D. Langley, University of Georgia; "Texts and Teaching: A Profile of Historians of American Foreign Relations in 1972", Sandra C. Thomson, University of Hawaii at Hilo, and Clayton A. Coppin, Jr., University of Utah; and "Untapped Resources for American Diplomatic History", Milton Gustafson, National Archives. Lionel Summers, Rollins College, and Albert H. Bowman, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, served as the discussants.

* * * * *

One session upon United States diplomatic history, titled "American Imperialism", was held in conjunction with the Missouri Valley History Conference which met at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, March 8-10. Prof. David F. Healy, University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, chaired the program which featured the following papers: "General Tasker H. Bliss on the Responsibilities of American Civilization" by Philip W. Kennedy, University of Portland (Oregon); "Reaction along the Missouri Valley to Wilson's Caribbean Policy" by Purvis M. Carter, Prairie View A & M College, and "American Businessmen and the Recognition of Mexico, 1920-1923" by N. Stephen Kane, Wisconsin State University at Oshkosh.

* * * * *

The Eighth Annual Walter Prescott Webb Memorial Lectures, to be held on March 22 at the University of Texas, Arlington, will be devoted this year to the topic, "United States Foreign Relations." Three papers will be presented by the faculty of the host school: David C. De Boe, "Secretary Stimson and the Kellogg-Briand Pact"; Van Mitchell Smith, "Africa: The Kennedy Years, 1961-1965"; and Elliott West, "The Roots of Conflict: Soviet Images in the American Press, 1941-1947." Guest lecturer will be Norman A. Graebner, University of Virginia and the immediate past president of SHAFR, whose topic will be "Japan: Unanswered Challenge, 1931-1941." Information concerning the event may be secured by contacting Prof. Sandra L. Myres, Chairman, Webb Lecture Committee, at the host institution.

* * * * *

Pembroke State University will have a symposium on "The Problems and Prospects of American-East Asian Relations" on April 6 and 7, 1973. Robert A. Scalapino, Ernest R. May, Norman A. Graebner and eleven others in history, political science, and economics will participate in the symposium. For further information please contact John Chay, Department of History, Pembroke State University, Pembroke, N. C. 29372.

FINANCIAL REPORT (1972)

| | Budget | <u>Income</u> | Actual |
|--------------------------------------|----------|--|----------|
| Dues | 2,200.00 | regular 1,860.00 student 39.00 life 225.00 | 2,124.00 |
| La Salle College | 200.00 | | 200.00 |
| Interest from Endowment | 20.00 | | 23.08 |
| | 2,420.00 | | 2,347.08 |
| | | <u>Expenditures</u> | |
| A. Salaries | | | |
| 1. Executive Secretary-Treasurer | 00.00 | | 00.00 |
| 2. Student Assistants | 00.00 | | 255.60 |
| B. General Supplies | | | |
| 10. Postage and Mailing | 300.00 | | 269.00 |
| 11. Telephone | 300.00 | | 379.43 |
| 12. Office Supplies | 100.00 | | 90.70 |
| 13. Computer | 160.00 | | 125.00 |
| 14. Off-Campus Printing | 200.00 | | 290.90 |
| | | | 1,410.63 |
| C. Council and Committee Costs | | | |
| 21. Committee Costs | 200.00 | | 00.00 |
| 22. Convention Costs | | | |
| a) AHA | 200.00 | | 175.50 |
| b) OAH | 200.00 | | 325.19 |
| | | | 500.69 |
| 23. Incorporation | 350.00 | | 00.00 |
| D. Miscellaneous | | | |
| 30. Petty Cash | 100.00 | | 00.00 |
| E. Transfer to Endowment | | | |
| (owed to endowment) | 384.12 | | |
| interest | 23.08 | | |
| life memberships | 225.00 | | |
| | 632.20 | | 632.00 |
| | | | 2,543.52 |
| Balance (upon transfer to Endowment) | | - 196.44 | |
| Balance (before transfer) | | + 436.36 | |

THE STUART L. BERNATH PRIZE COMPETITION FOR 1973

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations announces the opening of competition for the Stuart L. Bernath Prize for a book dealing with any aspect of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of America's foreign relations. The 1972 Prize was shared by Joan Hoff Wilson for her study, *American Business and Foreign Policy, 1920-1933*, and Kenneth E. Shewmaker for his *Americans and Chinese Communists, 1927-1945*.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations, published during 1972. It must be the author's first or second book.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Professor Bradford Perkins, Chairman, Stuart L. Bernath Prize Committee, c/o Department of History, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106, and must be received by May 31, 1973. The award will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations in December, 1973.

AMOUNT: \$500.00. If two (2) or more works are deemed winners, as in 1972, the amount will be shared.

THE SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS
OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOINT SESSIONS WITH
THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN HISTORIANS

The Palmer House, State and Monroe Streets, Chicago, Illinois 60603,
April 11-14, 1973.

Wednesday, April 11

Session: 2:00-4:00 P.M., Private Dining Room #17, Club Floor.
Armin Rappaport, University of California at San Diego, will chair a panel discussion titled "The Opening of the Documents". Panelists will be Milton Gustafson and Edwin A. Thompson, National Archives; Robert M. Blum, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; Dean Allard, Department of the Navy; Howard D. Langley, the Smithsonian Institution; and John de Novo, University of Wisconsin.

Reception: 4:30-6:00 P.M., Crystal Room, Third Floor.

Council Meeting: 8:00 P.M., Private Dining Room #6, Third Floor.

Thursday, April 12--No SHAFR meeting scheduled.

Friday, April 13--12:00 noon, Luncheon in Private Dining Room #16, Third Floor. Henry F. Graff, Columbia University, chairman, Arthur P. Whitaker, University of Pennsylvania, will read paper, "Aren't We All Revisionists?" Thoughts on American Diplomatic Historians since 1920". A business meeting will conclude the session.

Joint

SHAFFR-OAH Meeting

Palmer House Chicago, Ill.

April 11-14, 1973

PREREGISTRATION FORM

Preregistration forms will be accepted until March 30, 1973. Please list your name and affiliation as you wish them on your badge.

Name _____

Home Address _____

| | | |
|------------|-------------|----------------|
| City _____ | State _____ | Zip Code _____ |
|------------|-------------|----------------|

Institution _____

Spouse Attending? _____ Name _____

_____ OAH Member _____ Non-Member

| | Number of Tickets | Amount |
|---|----------------------|--------|
| Preregistration fee, spouse free | | \$3.00 |
| Luncheon: Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, Friday, April 13 | \$7.00 _____ | _____ |

TOTAL AMOUNT ENCLOSED _____

Check _____ Money Order _____

PLEASE DO NOT SEND CASH.

Fill out information as indicated. Local address and room number can be supplied when you pick up tickets and badge at preregistration desk. Please mail this page with check or money order. Make all checks payable to the Organization of American Historians. All forms and checks should be sent to Professor Thomas D. Clark, Executive Secretary, Organization of American Historians, Indiana University, 112 North Bryan Street, Bloomington, Indiana 47401.

NOTE: If registration is done at the convention the cost will be \$4.00. Friday luncheon tickets must be obtained no later than Thursday noon. Tickets may be purchased at the convention registration desk.

SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: Nolan Fowler, Department of History, Tennessee Tech,
Cookeville, Tennessee 38501

ISSUES: March, June, September, and December. All members receive the publication.

DEADLINES: All material must be in the hands of the editor not later than the 1st of the month preceding each issue.

MATERIAL DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, awards), announcements, synopses of scholarly papers delivered upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, lists of accessions of diplomatic materials to libraries, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting diplomatic materials in various depositories. Because of space limitations articles and book reviews are unacceptable.

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