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THE COMMITTEE FOR THE MARSHALL PLAN: ACTIVITIES AND IMPACT, 1947-1948

by
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April 1948 marked a milestone for the Truman administration: the European Recovery Program (E.R.P.), commonly known as the Marshall Plan, was endorsed by Congress after a long debate in both houses.¹ As we know, this program, a prime example of bipartisanship in foreign affairs, was fruitful. Suffice it to say that the European economies had essentially recovered by 1952 and were entering into a period of prosperity.² That partly explains why historian Michael Hogan has designated the Marshall Plan "as one of the most successful peacetime foreign policies launched by the United States in this century."³

Naturally, the congressional decision of April 1948 was not unrelated to the Communist coup of mid-February in Czechoslovakia. As historian Harry Bayard Price has

I would like to thank Dr. Virgil W. Dean of the Kansas State Historical Society (Topeka, Kansas) for his insightful comments on my initial text. Also appreciated were the suggestions made by historian Robert J. Grace.

¹Richard Kirkendall, ed., *The Harry S. Truman Encyclopedia*, (Boston, 1989), 233-234.

²*Ibid.*, 234.

³Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*, (Cambridge, 1987), 445.

underscored: "By this aggressive move, long in the making, the Soviet rulers showed their hand. The nations of western [sic] Europe...sped their plans for defensive alliance and recovery. In the United States, Congress intensified its work on the economic cooperation bill."⁴ However, some organizations in America, by their numerous activities, also contributed significantly to the authorization of such a program.⁵ Among these, the "Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery," formed in November 1947 to raise public support for the E.R.P., was certainly one of the most important.⁶

This essay, which is based primarily on an examination of the committee's records located at the Truman Library, aims to describe the activities and analyze the impact of this nonpartisan organization from its inception in the fall of 1947 to the successful outcome in the spring of 1948. But before

⁴Harry Bayard Price, *The Marshall Plan and its Meaning*, (Ithaca, 1955), 61. Richard E. Neustadt was categorical about that issue: "Czechoslovakia assured [the Marshall Plan's] final passage" (Richard E. Neustadt, *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership With Reflections on Johnson and Nixon*, (New York, 1976), 119).

⁵For example, Michael Hogan has contended that agencies such as the Council on Foreign Relations, the Business Advisory Council, the Committee for Economic Development and the National Planning Association "played an important role in shaping and promoting the ERP" (Michael Hogan, op. cit., 98).

⁶Thomas G. Paterson, *On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War*, (New York, 1979), 123.

examining these aspects, it is important to furnish some basic information about this pressure group.⁷

Some Landmarks

First of all, we must recall that the impetus for the Committee for the Marshall Plan was provided by an article signed by Henry Stimson and published in the October 1947 issue of *Foreign Affairs*.⁸ In this article, which a member of the pressure group subsequently depicted as “the basis of our platform,”⁹ the former secretary of war attacked isolationism and emphasized the importance for the United States to take a generous part in helping the peoples of Western Europe to help themselves.¹⁰ As Stimson explained: “The immediate and pressing challenge to our belief in freedom and prosperity is in western Europe. Here are people who have traditionally

⁷Incidentally, some political scientists have tended to distinguish the notions of “pressure group” and “interest group,” as Graham Wilson explained: “Attempts to establish differences between «interest» and «pressure» groups have usually been based on claims that interest groups are concerned with hard, material goals, while pressure groups are concerned with less self-interested, more altruistic goals and policies” — Graham K. Wilson, *Interest Groups in the United States*, (Oxford, 1981), 4. However, in this essay, we do not intend to make such a distinction for both terms fundamentally refer to “a shared-attitude group that makes certain claims upon other groups in society” — Norman J. Ornstein and Shirley Elder, *Interest Groups, Lobbying and Policymaking*, (Washington, 1978), vii.

⁸Harry Bayard Price, *op. cit.*, 55.

⁹Clark Eichelberger to Robert Patterson, February 13, 1948, Records of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Box 2, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

¹⁰Henry L. Stimson, “The Challenge to Americans”, *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 26, no. 1 (October 1947): 6-11.

shared our faith in human dignity. These are the nations by whose citizens our land was settled and in whose tradition our civilization is rooted. They are threatened by Communism.”¹¹ Convinced that world peace was directly linked to the rebuilding of this devastated area, Stimson considered that a refusal to contribute to the reconstruction of Western Europe would be nothing less than “the most tragic mistake in our history.”¹²

Interestingly enough, Stimson served as honorary president of this private organization when it was founded in the fall of 1947.¹³ However, he was not the only prominent American citizen to join it. Indeed, at its organizing meeting held in New York City (where its headquarters would be located), the Committee for the Marshall Plan, whose sole source of income consisted of the private contributions from its members and from the public,¹⁴ was comprised of personalities such as former Secretary of War Robert Patterson, who became chairman of the executive committee, the New Yorker Herbert Lehman, Philip Reed of General Electric, James Carey of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, and Dean Acheson, recently retired from the

¹¹Ibid., 11.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins of the Cold War*, (Baltimore, 1973), 221.

¹⁴Report on the Activities of the Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery — Submitted by the Executive Director — , April 5, 1948, Dean Acheson Papers, Political and Governmental File, Box 3, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. Incidentally, a total of just over \$158 000 had been received by the end of March 1948 (Ibid.).

State Department.¹⁵ A review of the correspondence of the Committee for the Marshall Plan also reveals that individuals such as Mrs. Wendell Willkie, the economist Herbert Feis, David Dubinsky of the International Ladies Garment Workers' Union, Allen Dulles of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Alger Hiss of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace were members of this organization.¹⁶

Convinced that the chance for peace would be dim "without American assistance to the European nations cooperating for their own recovery" and specifically organized for the purpose "of securing prompt and adequate legislation for the European Recovery Program,"¹⁷ this nonprofit organization had a membership of more than three hundred citizens in different parts of the country by the beginning of 1948.¹⁸ These men and women were from all spheres: leaders of business, agriculture, labor, education, publishers, public officials, etc.¹⁹ But, as the chairman of the executive committee

¹⁵Thomas G. Paterson, *Soviet-American Confrontation*, 221-222.

¹⁶John H. Ferguson to Hugh Moore, April 9, 1948, Records of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Box 1.

¹⁷Report on the Activities of the Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery — Submitted by the Executive Director — , April 5, 1948, Dean Acheson Papers, Political and Governmental File, Box 3.

¹⁸Statement by Robert P. Patterson, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 22, 1948, 1, Records of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Box 1.

¹⁹*Ibid.*

specified, "all agreed on the pressing necessity for a prompt, adequate, and sound European Recovery Program."²⁰

In other respects, it would be erroneous to think that the enactment of legislation for the E.R.P. in April 1948 marked the end of the Committee for the Marshall Plan. Of course, its current operations ceased and its staff was disbanded since its primary task was completed.²¹ Nevertheless, the recommendation of its executive director John H. Ferguson to the effect that "the Committee continue in existence during the next few weeks while the question of appropriations for the first year is before the Congress" was approved during a meeting of the organization on April 2, 1948.²² This situation was not extraneous to the fact that the leaders of this organization, like President Truman, believed that an appropriation of nothing less than \$6.8 billion was necessary for the first 15 months of the program.²³ Robert Patterson supported this viewpoint on January 22, 1948: "A four or a five billion dollar program of the European aid would, no doubt, prevent mass starvation. But it would not bring European recovery. In the long run it would cost more money, because relief always becomes increasingly expensive.

²⁰Ibid.

²¹John H. Ferguson to Hugh Moore, April 9, 1948, Records of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Box 1.

²²Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting, Committee for the Marshall Plan, Biltmore Hotel, New York City, April 2, 1948, 1-2, Records of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Box 1.

²³Statement by Robert P. Patterson, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 22, 1948, 6, Records of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Box 1.

And, more dangerous still, Western European nations facing the prospect of a perpetual dole would hardly be independent, strong and free.”²⁴ However that may be, the committee’s activities, which consisted primarily during this post-April 1948 period in sending telegrams to key members of Congress, were without comparison with the ones displayed during the period preceding the congressional assent.²⁵

Varied and Unceasing Activities

During its active period (November 1947 through April 1948), the Committee for the Marshall Plan employed several tactics in order to reach its goal. This can best be illustrated by the fact that it publicized the E.R.P. in full-page newspaper advertisements, organized speaker forums, circulated petitions in almost every Congressional district throughout the country and initiated letter campaigns directed at Capitol Hill.²⁶

On this last point, we know for example that in January 1948 Robert Patterson sent a letter to Congressman John McCormack of Massachusetts, influential in his capacity as

²⁴Ibid., 7.

²⁵For instance, when Robert Patterson learned in May 1949 that the House Appropriations Committee made some cuts in the current appropriation for carrying forward the Marshall Plan, he sent a telegram to its chairman Clarence Cannon denouncing this action as “hasty and unwarranted” (John H. Ferguson to Hugh Moore, May 25, 1949, Records of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Box 1).

²⁶Barton J. Bernstein, ed., *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration*, (Chicago, 1970), 97.

majority leader during the years 1940-1947,²⁷ asking him "to give support to an adequate and timely [European recovery] program."²⁸ Then, in March of the same year, Dean Acheson, who later wrote that the Committee for the Marshall Plan was one of the rare American private organizations created to support Government action,²⁹ congratulated Arthur H. Vandenberg, Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman from Michigan, for his "leadership in the battle for the Recovery Program."³⁰ Moreover, the interest group prepared testimonies for different organizations appearing before congressional committees: this was especially true for the National Farmers' Union which was supplied with prepared texts.³¹

The committee's efforts to publicize the Marshall Plan were particularly impressive. For instance, it organized a conference on the European Recovery Program on March 5,

²⁷Eleanora W. Schoenebaum, ed., *Political Profiles: The Truman Years*, (New York, 1978), 347.

²⁸*Congressional Record*, Appendix (January 26, 1948), A419.

²⁹Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, (New York, 1969), 240.

³⁰Dean Acheson to Arthur H. Vandenberg, March 3, 1948, Dean Acheson Papers, Political and Governmental File, Box 3.

³¹Charles L. Mee, Jr., *The Marshall Plan: The Launching of the Pax Americana*, (New York, 1984), 236. However, we must remember that, in spite of these efforts, the National Farmers' Union was among the groups opposing the E.R.P., asserting that the United States should act through the United Nations (Barton J. Bernstein, ed., op. cit., 111).

1948 at Hotel Shoreham in Washington, D.C.³² Among the speakers were the former senator from Wisconsin Robert La Follette, the Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs Will Clayton, and even Secretary of State George Marshall,³³ a man highly respected on Capitol Hill and in the country.³⁴ Harold Oram, the committee's acting executive secretary, reported that this event, covered by the press and photographers, was "a complete success."³⁵ Illustrative of Oram's assertion was the fact that about 200 people listened to the secretary of state's address and that several prominent persons from all over the country attended the entire conference.³⁶ Worthy of mention are the names Joseph Grew, former ambassador to Japan, Walter White, executive secretary of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and Anthony Valente, international president of the United Textile Workers of America.³⁷

³²Conference on the European Recovery Program, February 5, 1948, Records of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Box 1.

³³Ibid.

³⁴Richard E. Neustadt, *op. cit.*, 116.

³⁵Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting, Committee for the Marshall Plan, Biltmore Hotel, New York City, March 11, 1948, 2, Records of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Box 1.

³⁶Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting, Committee for the Marshall Plan, Roosevelt Hotel, New York City, February 26, 1948, 1, Records of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Box 1.

³⁷List of Persons Attending the Conference to Be Held in Washington at the Hotel Shoreham, Friday, March 5, 1948, Records of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Box 1.

Furthermore, in order to reach a large audience, the Committee for the Marshall Plan produced and distributed booklets on the E.R.P. One of these, entitled "4 Essentials of the Marshall Plan," had 70 000 copies distributed in January 1948,³⁸ a period during which Congress reconvened and the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committee of the Senate and House began their hearings on the subject.³⁹ Another one, called "The Marshall Plan is up to you," explained to the American public the nature of the European Recovery Program (goal, expected cost, advantages, etc.) and demolished some myths about it.⁴⁰ Thus, on the assertion that the adoption of the E.R.P would produce a disastrous inflation in the United States, this publication had the following response: "Our own heavy demand for goods has already led to inflation. A sound policy of conservation and

³⁸Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting, Committee for the Marshall Plan, Biltmore Hotel, New York City, January 23, 1948, 1, Records of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Box 1.

³⁹Report on the Activities of the Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery — Submitted by the Executive Director — , April 5, 1948, Dean Acheson Papers, Political and Governmental File, Box 3.

⁴⁰"The Marshall Plan is up to you" — Distributed by the Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery — , 4-17, Dean Acheson Papers, Political and Governmental File, Box 4. Incidentally, another booklet of the Committee for the Marshall Plan from this period, entitled "Who is the man against the Marshall Plan," also attempted to destroy the arguments made by opponents of the E.R.P.. ("Who is the man against the Marshall Plan" — Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery — , Dean Acheson Papers, Political and Governmental File, Box 4). My research shows that this pamphlet was very popular among the American public (Report on the Activities of the Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery — Submitted by the Executive Director — , April 5, 1948, Dean Acheson Papers, Political and Governmental File, Box 3).

such adequate controls as are decided to be necessary will keep the Marshall Plan from aggravating our inflation.”⁴¹ About the belief that the E.R.P. was an imperialist program directed against Moscow, it retorted on the one hand that “the European countries who responded to Secretary Marshall’s original suggestion in June 1947...did so voluntarily” and on the other hand that “the Soviet Union and her satellite [sic] countries were invited to participate and refused.”⁴² Finally, the booklet exhorted politically-minded people to write their congressmen and senators about any and all favorable reactions from local politicians towards the Marshall Plan.⁴³

In addition, the Committee for the Marshall Plan published a Question and Answer pamphlet which furnished answers to the twenty questions most frequently asked by the public concerning the E.R.P. — “What is it?”, “Why is Europe in such trouble?”, “Why should we help?”, “Will the plan succeed?”, “Will the plan weaken our economy?”, etc.⁴⁴ Interestingly enough, to question number 18, “Why isn’t Eastern Europe included?”, this pamphlet essentially blamed the Soviet Union for preventing countries such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, “whose natural trade channels are with the West,” from joining the E.R.P.⁴⁵

⁴¹Ibid., 7.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid., 20.

⁴⁴“The Marshall Plan: 20 Questions + Answers”, Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery, Dean Acheson Papers, Political and Governmental File, Box 4.

⁴⁵Ibid.

This considerable effort on the part of the Committee for the Marshall Plan to publicize the E.R.P. in 1947-48 (it provided during this period nearly one and one-quarter million pieces of literature)⁴⁶ was doubtless linked to the large amount of ignorance about it and to the uncertainties concerning the enactment of such legislation. Indeed, 40% of the American people had never heard of the Marshall Plan as late as November 1947⁴⁷ and several indicators showed that the pressure group quickly realized the extent of opposition.⁴⁸ For instance, in February 1948, committee staff member Harold Stein stated that the prospects for the adoption of an E.R.P. bill in the House of Representatives "are not so good."⁴⁹ An examination of the correspondence of this organization also reveals that the latter received some anti-Marshall Plan letters from individuals. This was the case of a woman from New York, Mrs. F. J. Frank, who sent a telegram in March 1948 saying that "this wasting of our

⁴⁶Report on the Activities of the Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery — Submitted by the Executive Director — , April 5, 1948, Dean Acheson Papers, Political and Governmental File, Box 3.

⁴⁷Barton J. Bernstein, ed., op. cit., 97.

⁴⁸According to the Committee for the Marshall Plan, much of this opposition to the E.R.P. stemmed from Henry Hazlitt's book of 1947 entitled *Will Dollars Save The World?* (Report on the Activities of the Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery — Submitted by the Executive Director — , April 5, 1948, Dean Acheson Papers, Political and Governmental File, Box 3).

⁴⁹Minutes of the Executive Committee Meeting, Committee for the Marshall Plan, Roosevelt Hotel, New York City, February 20, 1948, Records of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Box 1.

resources must stop” considering the extent of poverty in the United States.⁵⁰

The Committee's Impact

According to my analysis of the situation, the impact of the Committee for the Marshall Plan was not negligible. Indeed, it would appear that this organization contributed significantly to the congressional endorsement of April 1948.

Obviously other factors were important in such an approval: the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia, as previously mentioned, had a catalytic effect in that respect and some studies have emphasized the role played by the Herter Committee⁵¹ and by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg.⁵² In the same vein, the Committee for the Marshall Plan was not omnipotent in 1947-48. Its recommendations on the initial appropriation for the E.R.P. were, for example, disregarded:

⁵⁰Telegram from Mrs. F. J. Frank, March 12, 1948, Records of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Box 1.

⁵¹On this select committee of the House of Representatives which visited 18 European countries in September 1947 and recommended immediate interim aid for some of them, Harold Hitchens said without hesitation that it played “an important part in achieving favorable congressional opinion for the Marshall Plan” [Harold L. Hitchens, “Influences on the Congressional Decision to Pass the Marshall Plan,” *Western Political Quarterly*, vol. XXI (1968): 62].

⁵²Richard E. Neustadt, op. cit., 117.

instead of \$6.8 billion for the first 15 months of the program, Congress authorized \$5.3 billion for a one-year period.⁵³

Nevertheless, in agreement with historian Thomas Paterson,⁵⁴ it would appear that the very stature of the members of this interest group and, as shown above, the broad cooperation it received from the State Department,⁵⁵ necessarily assured the committee a noteworthy influence. This reality, combined with a high degree of effort, may explain the interesting results obtained by the committee's educational campaign. Thus, a Gallup poll released on December 7, 1947 showed that during a period of four and a half months, "the proportion of the population which had not «heard or read» about the Marshall Plan had dropped from 51 to 36 percent."⁵⁶ Naturally, the role of the pressure group in such figures must not be overestimated here considering its founding in mid-November. However, we know that this tendency persisted in the first months of 1948, a period which

⁵³Report on the Activities of the Committee for the Marshall Plan to Aid European Recovery — Submitted by the Executive Director — , April 5, 1948, Dean Acheson Papers, Political and Governmental File, Box 3.

⁵⁴Barton J. Bernstein, ed., *op. cit.*, 97.

⁵⁵Suffice it to say that, in addition to George Marshall's participation at the conference of March 5, 1948 at Hotel Shoreham, Will Clayton penned these evocative words in a letter of May 11 to the treasurer of the Committee for the Marshall Plan: "When I was in Dallas about two months ago, I called a meeting of some friends and asked one of them, Mr. Karl Hoblitzelle, to do his best to raise some funds for this Committee. He did so and sent in about \$3,000" (William Clayton to Hugh Moore, May 11, 1948, Records of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Box 1).

⁵⁶Harry Bayard Price, *op. cit.*, 59-60.

coincided with the peak of the Committee for the Marshall Plan's activities. The fact that the percentage of voters who had never heard of the E.R.P. dropped to 16 in February exemplifies this situation.⁵⁷ And more importantly for Robert Patterson's organization, aware that the numerous polls of public opinion were not devoid of interest for congressmen and senators, samplings of public opinion during 1948 revealed increasing support for the Marshall Plan.⁵⁸

In short, these facts certainly explain why, during the same year, an individual praised the committee for its "contribution to the enactment of ERP"⁵⁹ and why Will Clayton of the State Department lauded the "fine job" accomplished by this organization.⁶⁰ The foregoing also explains why Richard E. Neustadt, more recently, has characterized the Committee for the Marshall Plan as "one of the most effective instruments for public information seen since the Second World War."⁶¹

⁵⁷Harold L. Hitchens, loc. cit., 51.

⁵⁸Susan M. Hartmann, *Truman and the 80th Congress*, (Columbia, MO, 1971, 160.

⁵⁹Letter from J. K. Moffitt, ? 1948, Records of the Committee for the Marshall Plan, Box 1.

⁶⁰William Clayton to John Ferguson, April 19, 1948, William Clayton Papers, Alphabetical File, 1948-49, Box 78, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

⁶¹Richard E. Neustadt, op. cit., 117.

TRUMAN AND WANING "NEUTRALITY" IN THE FRANCO-VIET MINH WAR

by

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Throughout the fall of 1945, the United States government received eight appeals from Ho Chi Minh for United States recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam's (DRV) independence.¹ The United States took no action on these but also did not aid the French. Although the United States government took no official position supporting either the DRV of France, OSS officers in Hanoi and Saigon ostensibly supported the Viet Minh. This indecisiveness is worth examination.

Anonymous OSS memos from Indochina during late 1945 detail the positions taken by the operatives in the region.² A 21 August 1945 memo warned that if an occupation force had "French included, a pitched battle would ensue." A 22 August note described the "Annamites" desire "to bring Annam [referring to all of Vietnam] under the status of an American protectorate" similar to the Philippines. The memo further mentions that armed French re-entry from Yunan into Indochina was halted by Chinese and American troops. By 5 September, the OSS operatives reported that the Vietnamese were "in full control" in Vietnam and "should the French

¹Mike Gravel, *The Pentagon Papers*, (Boston, 1971), vol. 1, 17.

²These documents found in: Papers of Harry S. Truman, Rose Conway Files (PSF), Donovan Chronological File: OSS, Feb.-Dec. 1945, Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

attempt a return, the Annamese [*sic*] will maintain their independence at the cost of lives." The OSS representative in Hanoi reported "trouble brewing" as the French there became "belligerent" and the Chinese "aggressive." A 22 September dispatch quoted a Viet Minh official as hoping "that the American republic, having fought to defend the liberty of the World, will support and receive Indochina in its independence movement." After the Gracey-assisted coup, the OSS reported that the "Annamese were now thoroughly disillusioned with the British" and began reporting, on 7 September, that Chinese "plundering" had driven the regime in Hanoi to bankruptcy.

On 28 September, the OSS reported on Gracey's order to "shoot all armed Vietnamese on sight" and the corresponding Viet Minh slogan "Death to all Europeans." Many Japanese "appeared to have adopted native costume and joined the Annamese." Two notes from Ho Chi Minh to the President dated 17 September and 20 September expressed the Viet Minh's "willingness to cooperate with the U.N. in the establishment of peace, but, having suffered so much under French dominion, are determined never to let the French return to Indochina and will fight them under any circumstances." Yet both Ho's pleas and the OSS memos were never seriously considered by prominent cabinet officials. OSS Director William J. Donovan tried to communicate to the Cabinet that the Viet Minh-DRV was not a "full-fledged doctrinaire" Communist movement and that it enjoyed the support of the majority of the people as his agents in Indochina found out. Yet Acheson declared to the OSS on

5 October that America did not oppose "the re-establishment of French control over Indochina."³

The French under LeClerc consolidated their control of the major cities in the South by February 1946. It was also in this month that Ho acceded to Chinese pressure and included members from the pro-Chinese parties, the VNQDD and the Dong Minh Hoi, into his government. On 6 March 1946, the Viet Minh also had little choice but to accept a settlement with Sainteny to allow a number of French troops to return to the North in exchange for recognition as a "free State" within the French Union.⁴ Ho's position was weak and he needed time, so he compromised. Yet the French generally disregarded that settlement and reneged at other Conferences, all the while occupying one stronghold after another. Ho launched a surprise attack on 16 December 1946, when the French demanded that Ho's militia be disbanded after a customs incident at Haiphong. Ho's forces retreated in to the hills in a rout. This is considered the beginning of the Franco-Viet Minh War.

The United States stood by as French restoration occurred in Indochina. In 1946 negotiations, the French deliberately dragged their feet hoping that Vietnam would become pacified. American officials recognized French insincerity about Indochina, and recommended "that they abide by the

³Donovan to Byrnes, 5 September 1945, Acheson memorandum of 5 October 1945, quoted in Edward Rice-Maximin, *Accommodation and Resistance*, (New York, 1986), 24.

⁴James Pickney Harrison, *The Endless War: Fifty Years of Struggle in Vietnam* (New York, 1982), 107-09.

March 6 Convention.”⁵ Ho, in France at the time, pleaded with the American Ambassador to help him secure independence along the 6 March lines.⁶ The United States avoided any commitments on Indochina, and pursued a course of neutrality in the war as it regarded “the conflict as fundamentally a matter for French resolution.”⁷

Along with a renewal of hostilities in Indochina came reports from French sources which had the effect of stimulating American concern over Ho’s Communist leanings. The sudden French concern over Communism in Indochina was suspect, for they were fighting for colonial restoration and not against a Communist menace per se. There was also a continual threat of Communist victory at the polls in France itself. The United States began to reconsider the spectator role it had played since early 1945. A dispatch by Acting Secretary of State Acheson to Saigon in regard to a State Department fact-finding mission in December 1946 labeled Ho a Communist and stressed that the “least desirable eventuality would be establishment [of a] communist-dominated, Moscow-oriented state in Indochina.”⁸ Perceiving Ho as a Kremlin tool and worried about a Communist victory in France, it was easy to see why American officials began to sympathize with the French position in regard to Indochina. A long struggle in Indochina would undermine the French economy and

⁵Caffery to Secretary of State, 7 July 1946, U.S. Dept. of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1946: Vol. VIII (Washington: GPO, 1963), 48-49.

⁶Caffery to Byrnes, 11 September 1946, *ibid.*, 58.

⁷Gravel, *The Pentagon Papers*, 3.

⁸Acheson to Saigon Consul, *FRUS*, 1946: Vol. VIII, 72.

destabilize it politically. A defeat would weaken France, and a continual war would drain troops from France's European defenses. This was the line of thought that led to the U.S. aid to them. American officials thus became convinced that although Ho was "the only native leader with any widespread support and following," he was also a "Communist" and "not to be trusted."⁹

In accordance with this position, the French in Indochina sought to undermine Ho's following by fostering native opposition to the Viet Minh. By 1947, Bao Dai, the ex-Emperor who had fled the DRV regime in 1946 to resume his extravagant lifestyle in Hong Kong, was put forth as such a candidate. This was known as the "Bao Dai Solution" and it took until 1949 to implement. It was "not so much a policy worked out by the French Government as a solution forced upon it by developments in Vietnam."¹⁰ The French put forth this solution due to the failure of their 1947 fall offensive against the Viet Minh.

Bao Dai did not have the personality, the ambition, or the following to fill such a role. He was malleable and shy, a gambler and a womanizer. It took two years to persuade Bao Dai to return to Vietnam. The Along Bay Agreement of December 1947 set up the conditions for Bao Dai's return. But Bao Dai's advisors were critical of the accord and urged the ex-Emperor to demand greater concessions.¹¹ In an effort to force Bao Dai's acceptance of their terms, the French in the spring of 1948 proposed that General Nguyen Van Xuan

⁹Caffery to Marshall, *FRUS*, 1947: VI, 118-19.

¹⁰R.E.M. Irving, *The First Indochina War*, (London, 1975), 56.

¹¹Rice-Maximin, *Accommodation and Resistance*, 65-66.

form a provisional government for Vietnam. General Xuan had been the leader of a separate government for Cochinchina that the French had unsuccessfully pushed after the breakdown with Ho Chi Minh. This resulted in a second Along Bay Agreement with qualified "independence" for Vietnam and establishment Xuan's provisional government for all of Vietnam 5 June 1948.¹² Bao Dai signed it as a witness but not as a party to the agreement. Yet the Xuan government was

without an army, a government over which the French civil service retained full control...[and] although a tool of the French, was politically useless to them, and of no value whatsoever to the Vietnamese national cause.¹³

Secretary of State George C. Marshall, in July 1948, requested that the French completely alter their policy in Indochina, stating that it was critical that an anticommunist nationalist government "be given every chance to succeed by the granting to it of such concessions as will attract the greatest possible number of non-communist elements."¹⁴ Yet the situation in French Indochina remained static as Cabinets in France were reshuffled throughout 1948. The Saigon Consul urged greater American diplomatic pressure be brought to bear on France to give concessions so that Bao Dai could form an alternate government to the DRV.¹⁵ The French nevertheless remained intransigent.

¹²Ibid., 66.

¹³Joseph Buttinger, *Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled*, (New York, 1967), 716-17.

¹⁴Marshall to Caffery, *FRUS*, 1948; VI (3 July 1948), 30.

¹⁵Consul General to Secretary of State, 28 August 1948, *ibid.*, 39.

The dilemma for the U.S. was cited in a State Department policy paper on Indochina in September. The U.S.'s biggest pitfall was the "inability to suggest a practicable solution of the Indochina problem."¹⁶ The U.S. could not press France if it did not have a solution of its own and was not prepared to accept the possibility of intervention. The State Department could not put pressure on France, and did not through 1948. Instead, it chose to stabilize the Paris government by general acquiescence to its Indochina policy. It did not want to undermine the Bao Dai solution or France. The U.S. considered the French role in Europe critical. Particularly, French participation in the containment of Soviet expansionism in Europe was deemed as crucial. France was the only continental state in Europe large enough to provide troops for the organization (since Germany was still under occupation and the other states of Western Europe were too small).

The dramatic turning point was the Chinese Civil War's outcome. In January 1949, the Communists captured Peking. The United States judged China as doomed to fall to the Communists. This "meant that the Viet Minh would soon have powerful friends on its northern borders"¹⁷ and have new and strong supply lines. The imminent Communist victory in China made prospects for France's in Indochina bleak. But the U.S. State Department Europeanists were "more concerned about the possibility of exerting undue strain

¹⁶Policy Statement of the Department of State, September 1948, *ibid.*, 43-49.

¹⁷Ellen Hammer, *Struggle for Indochina*, (Stanford, 1955), 232.

on the fragile Queuille coalition in France than in resolving the Indochina problems.”¹⁸

Frenchmen were still opposed to granting meaningful concessions. However, they had to develop some solution to the Communist menace on Indochina's borders. The results were the so-called “Élysée Agreements” of 8 March 1949. They reconfirmed Vietnamese independence along the Along Bay lines.¹⁹ (Cambodia and Laos always considered separate associated states under their own Kings.)

The Élysée Agreements did establish greater autonomy for Vietnam and had the result of attracting the support of some non-Communist nationalists. These accords really meant something in terms of key territories in the North, which now reverted to official Vietnamese control. Furthermore, a national army was created as was a police force. The Vietnamese were also allowed to begin appointing their own ambassadors and their delegates to the French Union Assembly. The French still maintained control of the area unofficially.

Although U.S. officials believed that the Élysée Agreements afforded a “workable basis for the fulfillment of Vietnam's aspirations,”²⁰ the United States waited for full implementation of the accords. The French transferred a greater of authority to the Bao Dai regime in December 1949.

¹⁸Steven Sapp, “The United States, France and the Cold War,” Ph.D. Diss., Kent State Univ., 1978, 312.

¹⁹Gary R. Hess, *The United States' Emergence as a Southeast Asian Power*, (New York, 1987), 314.

²⁰Caffery to Acheson, *FRUS, 1949: VII* (16 March 1949), 12-14.

With that transfer of authority, U.S. recognition followed in February 1950 of the Associated States of the French Union of Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The advent of the People's Republic of China in October 1949 meant that the Viet Minh would be significantly strengthened. Also, the French and anticommunist nationalists in Vietnam would be in an increasingly tenuous position. This all meant that American support would have to be significantly increased in order to prevent a similar Communist victory in Indochina. This would be the primary reason for U.S. aid to the French in 1950.

Under the Truman Administration, the U.S. had adopted a position of neutrality with respect to French Indochina. This "Europeanist" attitude assumed that the French could solve the issues by themselves. America was unwilling to jeopardize the fragile coalition governments in France by pressuring them for reform in Indochina as their military reconquest failed again and again. The flawed "Bao Dai Solution" was put forth as the only answer to the problem and a French-controlled "State of Vietnam" was launched. The state was given an army which proved as ineffective in the field as the government was politically.

On a House Subcommittee trip to Asia in 1949, Representative Charles B. Deans of North Carolina reported a telling but reasoned assessment on his return.

The net result of the French action [to crush the nationalist movement] was largely to solidify the movement firmly behind a militant and Communistic leadership under the presidency of Ho Chi Minh. [They are] now trying to win over the Vietnamese by establishing an alternative nationalist government under Bao Dai. They have not genuinely transferred

sovereignty. [Bao Dai] must alienate a large segment of the nationalist support for Ho Chi Minh if the U.S. is to successfully assist Vietnam.²¹

He went on to advise against arms shipments to Vietnam until Bao Dai's regime had popular support, citing that 80 percent of the arms sent to the KMT were now in Communist Chinese hands.

This was the situation in Indochina by 1950. The French were increasingly being seen by the U.S. government as the anticommunist bulwark in Southeast Asia and Europe. It was realized in Vietnam, however, that French policy had to change from its pre-war, colonialist view of Asia. The U.S. could not "support an obsolete colonial policy against a movement with such a great popular appeal."²² The U.S. should have pushed France to grant independence to Indochina, although the new regime would have been a Communist-leaning one. Instead, pseudo-independence was given the Bao Dai regime, and the U.S. became obliged to extend financial and military aid to the French as they became further bogged down in what was perceived in the U.S. as a war against Communism and what the French perceived as a fight for colonial restoration. But it was primarily a war of colonialism against nationalism.

²¹Truman Papers, PSF Far East Subject File, report dated 19 October 1949.

²²Weldon Brown, *Prelude to Disaster*, (Pt. Washington, 1975), 36.

DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTATION UPDATE

01 July 1994

Hon. Warren Christopher
Secretary of State
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Secretary Christopher:

Enclosed is the report of the State Department Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation for the eighteen month period from January 1993 through June 1994, submitted in accordance with the requirements of Public Law 102-138 of 28 Oct. 1991 (22 USC 4351).

The report summarizes the Historical Advisory Committee's work and provides you with our assessment of the current status of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series and the State Department's program for making its historical record available to the public. Particular attention is paid to continuing efforts toward implementing all the provisions of PL 102-138.

Even though the Department has made good progress toward meeting the various time schedules established by Congress and tacitly extended by the Department's Working Group Report of June 1993, publication of the *Foreign Relations* series will fall behind the target dates, largely because of efforts to declassify documents denied in the initial go-around. The Advisory Committee has also become increasingly concerned about some major and recurring declassification issues over thirty-year old documents that immediately threaten to prevent the *Foreign Relations* series from being the "thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity" that is required by law.

The publication schedule for the *FRUS* series is also jeopardized by current State Department hiring limitations that have delayed and even prevented the Historical Office from filling vacancies on its professional staff with appropriately qualified persons.

The Department's efforts to meet the thirty year declassification review mark for its archival holdings have made significant progress, particularly in terms of the volume of documents reviewed. But some of the important recommendations of the June 1993 Working Group Report, approved by the Department, remain unfulfilled and expensive page-by-page review is all too often utilized despite the commitment to adopt "risk assessment" techniques. In addition, a lack of cooperation on the part of agencies which have equity in documents in State Department files has contributed materially to both delays and costs.

That issue of declassification review of other agency documents could be solved in good measure if the proposed new Executive Order on Information Security (PRD-29) is implemented in the spirit of the President's statements. The Advisory Committee has spent a great deal of time studying various drafts of that Executive Order and has made a series of recommendations about it to the Department.

The Advisory Committee continues to enjoy solid support from the Historical Office and the Historian (our Executive Secretary), Dr. William Slany, and from his superiors in the Bureau of Public Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretaries Bennett Freeman and Michael McCurry, and Assistant Secretary Thomas Donilon.

Reflecting on nearly three years of activity by the HAC since the "Foreign Relations Act" became law, I am struck by three things: first, how effective an independent public interest advisory committee like this can be, and how essential it has been for us to have the force of law behind us in our dealings with both career officials and political appointees; second, how much more of our time and effort has been required than any of us expected; third, how much can be accomplished, quickly and cost-effectively, when responsible officials become actively involved with the issues facing the HAC and press an agenda of openness rather than secrecy.

Sincerely yours,

Warren F. Kimball, Chair
Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HISTORICAL
DIPLOMATIC DOCUMENTATION FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY
1993-JUNE 1994

The Historical Advisory Committee (HAC) met four times during 1993 and three times during the first six months of 1994. The additional six months is included in this report to adjust the schedule to allow the Annual Report to be submitted at the end of August each year so as to coincide with the terms of office of the members and chair of the Advisory Committee. With only one exception, at least eight committee members attended all meetings. The exception was a special meeting, called on short notice, at which seven of the nine members were present. In addition, the HAC sent over twenty advisory letters and memoranda to officials inside the Department. This clearly indicates the importance Advisory Committee members attach to their work.

In accordance with the staggered terms established by Title IV of Public Law 102-138 of Oct. 28, 1991 [22 USC 4351] — the “Foreign Relations Series” statute — one member of the HAC was reappointed and two new members selected. Security clearances continue to take an untoward amount of time. The Executive Secretary has prepared a long-term nominating schedule that will allow professional organizations to make their recommendations in a timely fashion.

The HAC has worked to meet the responsibilities levied on it by the “Foreign Relations Series” legislation by focusing on the three broad tasks outlined in that law:

I. ensuring that the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* series is, in the words of the statute, “thorough, accurate, and reliable,” constituting a “comprehensive documentation of the major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government”;

II. ensuring that *FRUS* is published no later than 30 years after the events; and

III. monitoring, with random sampling, the declassification and transfer to the National Archives of all State Department historical records 30-years old or older.

In addition, under the broader mandate to advise the Secretary of State regarding the historical record, the HAC:

IV. spent considerable time assessing drafts of the proposed Executive Order on Information Security;

V. began to examine the Department's policy on publication of treaties and related legal documents; and

VI. began investigating the increasingly pressing issue of electronic records and information management.

To address each of those activities:

I. QUALITY OF THE *FRUS* SERIES. Assuring the comprehensiveness and accuracy of *FRUS* has been and will continue to be greatly affected by the increasing volume and complexity of the record, particularly its inter-agency nature. The HAC's efforts in this arena fall into three categories: (A) editorial practices and policies on the part of the Historical Office; (B) Historical Office access to the documentary record; (C) declassification issues.

(A). As noted in the last HAC report, the Historical Office made a major editorial policy decision to reduce the total pages for the *FRUS* that cover the Johnson presidency by eliminating the microfiche supplements. This will result in less total (microfiche and printed) pages than for the Kennedy presidency or the last subseries for the Eisenhower presidency that covered the years 1958-1960. However, the number of printed pages (the most accessible form of publication) per year remains the same when compared to the Kennedy years, and is increased from about 6,000 to about 7,200 pages when compared to the volumes for the 1958-60 period. To accommodate this page reduction, the Historical Office has been revising the editing format, applying tighter selection criteria to avoid repetition and greater use of bibliographical annotations to direct researchers to the archival sources. Initial monitoring by the HAC indicates that an appropriate balance between quality and quantity is being achieved. Nevertheless, the HAC remains concerned that this cut in documentation could prevent the *FRUS* series from being comprehensive, and will continue to monitor closely the Johnson presidency compilations to determine the effect of current policies. To do this it may become necessary to make use of outside professionals with extensive research experience in the documents of that era.

(B). Full and unhindered access to the documentary record is the essential starting point for the *FRUS* series. In general, the Historical Office has experienced good cooperation in that area within the Department and from most other government agencies. Access to Department of Defense records has been regularized by memoranda of understanding, leaving the National Security Agency as the only government entity that has not complied with the provisions of the Foreign Relations statute, despite the efforts of the Historical Office.

Inside the Department, through the efforts of the HAC working with the Historian, the records of the Intelligence & Research Bureau have been identified as official records and are now available to H.O. compilers. Those records will be transferred to the National Archives in accordance with the schedule recently established.

In addition, the HAC continues to press the C.I.A. for access to documents relating to pre-1960 intelligence activities that related to foreign policy so that the Historical Office can move ahead on a retrospective *FRUS* publication dealing with those intelligence activities. We are particularly, but not exclusively, interested in Guatemala and Iran, since previously published volumes of *FRUS* did not present a comprehensive and accurate record of American foreign policy toward those states. In addition, the HAC has regularly expressed concern that the C.I.A.'s own publishing program may be taking away resources from the support given to the *FRUS* series while failing to meet the editorial standards of that series.

(C). The refusal of the State Department and other agencies, most often the Central Intelligence Agency, to declassify thirty-year old documents needed for *FRUS* remains the greatest barrier to meeting the Congressional mandate that the *FRUS* series be accurate and comprehensive. As this report is being written, the HAC is preparing to contest declassification refusals by the Department of State and the CIA that will, in our unanimous opinion, seriously distort the record of American foreign policy with at least two nations during the Kennedy presidency — over thirty years ago. More disturbingly, the declassification issues are ones that will reoccur on a regular basis for subsequent volumes covering relations with those and other governments. The HAC hopes to avoid having to make the embarrassing recommendation not to publish a volume of *FRUS* to prevent a distortion of the historical record. But such a recommendation remains a distinct possibility unless the Department and other agencies

apply what we consider the appropriate balancing test between the public's right to know in a democracy, and overly cautious, often Cold War-generated conceptions of national security.

The HAC has indicated in the past its respect for legitimate requirements of national security. For example, in the volume *FRUS, 1958-1960, Japan; Korea*, the HAC warned the public that the exclusion of certain documents prevented that volume from being a comprehensive and accurate record, but it still recommended publication (see page VIII). However, in the cases currently under consideration, the HAC has concluded that the refusal to declassify material derives from fear of embarrassment rather than national security. The HAC sincerely hopes that these and similar cases can be resolved without confrontation, and it has proposed a number of compromises to that end, but without positive response. The Committee believes that, if the State Department and other agencies take to heart the public statements of President Clinton regarding the "need to know" of the public in a democracy, these and later potential confrontations can be avoided.

II. MEETING THE 30-YEAR MARK FOR *FRUS*. The major current cause of publication delays, with some volumes going beyond the thirty year limit, is the declassification appeals process, which can take well over a year despite the response deadlines mandated by the *FRUS* statute. Even with such holdups, most of which the HAC has found unnecessary, the committee notes, with pleasure, that the thirty-year publication mark is nearly within grasp.

Two actions by the Department have enhanced progress: first, establishment of an additional unit and personnel in the Historical Office, tasked with managing and accelerating the declassification process, appears to be working effectively. In one case it identified in advance a potential bottleneck caused by delays at the C.I.A., thus allowing the HAC and the State Department time to develop a solution.

The second action was a subvention, made at the recommendation of the HAC, of two additional positions at the Johnson Library. One will allow processing of documents for the *FRUS* series so as to minimize the effect of Historical Office research on other researchers. The other position will materially speedup the processing of the collection of President Johnson's dictabelt recordings and transcripts which are needed for the *FRUS* series.

However, reaching the 30-year publication mark is now materially threatened by the inability of the Historical Office to fill vacancies in the professional staff. For the past eighteen months, that staff has had up to 30% vacancies (three to five positions). Although the detailed Action Plan of the Historical Office for meeting the 30-year line appears to be practical, it cannot be achieved with such long-standing personnel deficiencies. The problem appears to be current State Department hiring limitations that do not permit the Historian to recruit persons with the required educational and professional credentials. Extensive delays in obtaining security clearance delays, another relic of the Cold War, exacerbate the problem.

In summary, the HAC believes that the Historical Office has made appropriate progress toward meeting the thirty-year publication mark, and that short delays (most of which are unnecessary) that enhance the completeness and quality of the published volumes are preferable to a mechanical adherence to the schedule. However, we are very concerned about the cumulative effect of persistent personnel shortages in the Historical Office's professional staff.

III. DECLASSIFICATION AND TRANSFER TO THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES OF 30-YEAR OLD STATE DEPARTMENT RECORDS. The HAC remains concerned about the progress of systematic declassification review and transfer to the National Archives and opening of 30-year old State Department documents. Early in 1993, the HAC warned that the Department ran the risk of being in violation of the statute. Continued pressure from the HAC eventually resulted in interagency discussions and the creation of an inter-bureau working group and an "Action Plan for Opening the Department of State's 30-year old and older Records," formally approved by the Department on 16 June 1993 and communicated to Congress.

(A) In the aggregate, significant progress has been made since then:

(1) a comprehensive description of Departmental records was compiled;

(2) using a new single-stage review process long recommended by the HAC, the 1963 Central Files (1,200,000 pages) were reviewed in four months. During that process the percentage of material withheld was reduced from six to three percent of the total. The review of the Central Files for 1960-1962

is scheduled for completion by autumn 1994. NARA personnel have reviewed Lot and Post files for 1963, and are working on those for 1960-62. Final processing on the 1963 State Department documents is nearly completed, and most of those documents are open to researchers. In addition, the backlog of pre-1960 records is being reduced (although many of these thirty-five year old records remain, in the opinion of the HAC, prime candidates for unrestricted bulk declassification);

(3) the Department has issued a significant number of new declassification guidelines, again a long-standing HAC recommendation, and indicated its willingness to allow Presidential Libraries and NARA greater declassification authority.

(B) Nevertheless, the HAC remains concerned that the "action Plan for Opening the Department of State's 30-year old and older Records," formally approved by the Department on 16 June 1993 and communicated to Congress, has not been fully or appropriately implemented, to wit:

(1) A State Department Center for Declassification, intended to accelerate the declassification process, has been created, but has not been provided with adequate or suitable facilities. According to its managers, the inadequate facilities make it difficult to perform the tasks laid out in the "Action Plan."

(2) For reasons difficult to determine (facilities, lack of other agency cooperation, lack of firm direction), the risk assessment concept contained in the "Action Plan" has not been effectively utilized. The concept called for assessing the potential risk entailed in declassifying large groups of files and for then declassifying in bulk those files where the risk was relatively low. Examples mentioned during Working Group meetings were administrative files and documents that were significantly more than thirty years old. But the declassifiers have been reluctant to adopt that risk assessment approach to bulk declassification and have continued to use very expensive page-by-page review procedures. Until such procedures are changed, declassification review costs will continue to require more and more resources.

(3) Special inter-agency declassification groups called for in the "Action Plan" have not been convened despite the fact that other agency classification equities in State Department files comprise the single greatest cause of delay and expense. Attempts by the State Department and the HAC to get the Central Intelligence

Agency to cooperate on such teams have met with bureaucratic delays and no concrete results. In the HAC Annual Report for 1992, we advised that "a change in procedures, which may require a change in the culture that dominates the declassification review process, is the *sine qua non* for meeting the current legislative mandate." That remains the case.

IV. PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW DIRECTIVE 29 (DRAFT EXECUTIVE ORDER ON INFORMATION SECURITY). The change in the culture of classification and declassification, mentioned above, must go beyond the Department of State if the public's right to know is to be protected. The President recognized that in his directive to review current information security practices by expressly stating that the end of the Cold War required a reassessment of information security requirements.

The HAC, in its advisory role to the Secretary of State, spent a great deal of time analyzing the various drafts of a new Executive Order prepared in response to PRD-29. In addition to discussions during regular HAC meetings, this included a trip by the Committee chair to a meeting at Maxwell AFB, and a special meeting of the HAC to discuss the drafts. This is not the place to provide details of the Committee's recommendations since they were communicated to the appropriate persons. In broad terms, the HAC unanimously recommended:

(A) that the Secretary support, as a minimum, the twenty-five year target for declassification of records;

(B) that the declassification exemptions for "foreign government information" as well as similar loopholes need to be tightened substantially to avoid the abuse of that category that has occurred in the past;

(C) that specific and enforceable compliance safeguards (including automatic declassification and public access for failure to conduct declassification reviews) as well as performance deadlines be established for any declassification and accompanying appeals process;

(D) that a "balancing test" be established for public interest versus national security that puts into practice President Clinton's public statements about need and right to know of the public in a democracy;

(E) that an effective independent public oversight committee with responsibilities to report directly to the President's Office be created.

V. In response to complaints from various quarters, particularly those doing research in international law, about the elimination of various State Department publications related to treaties and international agreements, the HAC has begun to study the broad question of preservation of and appropriate access to the historical record on such legal matters. That study is not completed, but the HAC's interest has apparently generated more effective liaison between the National Archives and the Department.

VI. Preliminary reports from the HAC Subcommittee on Electronic Records and Information Management indicate that the Department is generally well ahead of most other large government agencies in addressing these issues. This includes effective liaison with NARA records appraisers. Nevertheless, the HAC is becoming concerned whether or not the official record that is being created and preserved is adequately documenting the functions and activities of the Department. An environment that has become extremely cautious and litigious may adversely effect the type of information that is recorded and preserved. Moreover, the HAC encourages the development of a State Department and, eventually, government-wide database available to the public for documents declassified by FOIA or mandatory request actions. The HAC will consider these matters more fully over the next reporting period.

For the Committee:

Warren F. Kimball, Chair (Rutgers)

Committee Members:

Betty Glad (South Carolina)
George C. Herring (Kentucky)
Melvyn P. Leffler (Virginia)
Anna K. Nelson (American)
Bradford Perkins (Michigan)*

Jane Picker (Cleveland State)
Emily Rosenberg (Macalester)
Arnold Taylor (Howard)
Anne Van Camp (Hoover Inst.)

(*left during the reporting period)

ONCE AGAIN — EISENHOWER AND EXPORT CONTROLS: A REPLY TO TOR FØRLAND

by

Robert Mark Spaulding
UNC-Wilmington

I genuinely regret, as well no few *Newsletter* readers may, that I feel compelled to reply to Tor Førland's most recent contribution in an ongoing exchange between us.¹ The debate centers on the interplay of British and American policies in securing the 1954 relaxation of the Western anti-Soviet export control policy and the subsequent reduction of the international control lists maintained by COCOM.

Mr. Førland's most recent piece is largely a repetition of his earlier formalistic objections to my work, objections that I have already characterized as "archival fetishism." For that reason and because I shall address only the very largest interpretive points of difference between us, I shall be brief in my arguments here.

Nothing that Mr. Førland has added, including his most recent digression into British "perceptions" of American policy, requires material modification in my explication of British-American interaction in the policy revision process of 1953-54. That interaction might be summarized briefly around three points as follows. First, at Eisenhower's initiative,

¹Tor Egil Førland, "Eisenhower, Export Control, and the Perils of Diplomatic History: A Reply to Spaulding," *The SHAFR Newsletter* 25, No. 3 (September 1994): 9-22; earlier exchanges in this debate are cited there, note #1. Parenthetical citations in my text refer to this most recent piece by Førland.

American export control underwent a fundamental revision between March and July 1953 with the new policy defined as a “gradual and moderate relaxation” of the embargo to be embodied in new, shorter lists of internationally controlled items.² Second, knowing that the “UK [was] certain to welcome [the] new policy,” the Americans informed the British of the new line in the U.S. export control policy not later than 07 October 1953 and invited British participation in bilateral talks with the goal of achieving “maximum US-UK understanding” on adjusting COCOM practices accordingly.³ Third, having consciously waited for an “appropriate moment” which was now provided by the American invitation for consultation, the U.K. subsequently (20-21 November 1953) presented its own ideas on how best to reduce the control lists.⁴

Evidence introduced by Mr. Førlund himself has contributed greatly to our knowledge on these key points. Indeed, he has again acknowledged the accuracy of my views with his recent recognition that “the Europeans waited for a signal from across the Atlantic” before offering their own suggestions for cuts in the COCOM lists.

²Spaulding, “‘A Gradual and Moderate Relaxation’: Eisenhower and the Revision of American Export Control Policy, 1953-1955,” *Diplomatic History* 17 (Spring 1993): especially 232-238.

³Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State, 31 August 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-54 1:1014; Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 07 October 1953, *FRUS*, 1952-1954 1:1018. Førlund mentions a U.S. Aide-Memoir delivered on 06 October, but does not provide supporting documentation, (15-16 and note #13).

⁴Førlund, “Parochialism,” *SHAFR Newsletter* 24, No. 4 (December 1993): 14; Spaulding, “Reply to Førlund,” *SHAFR Newsletter* 25, No.1 (March 1994): 13-14.

On this basis, I have consistently advanced the following two convictions. First, that "the impetus for a reconsideration and relaxation of Western export control policy came from the American side, specifically from the new president."⁵ Mr. Førland's own judgement that the United States "would block" any European proposals for a less severe embargo carries as its logical corollary that the impetus for revision had to come from the American side (p. 20-21). Second, because the Americans solicited British opinion on implementing a relaxation of the embargo in COCOM we ought not to approach the COCOM revision process in "the explanatory dichotomy of the United States versus Britain."⁶

In contrast, Mr. Førland continues to operate in an analytic framework that obscures the important American decision to solicit British opinion on the content of the international control lists and how COCOM ought to proceed in revising them. Perhaps for this reason he then bifurcates what had become a collaborative Anglo-American effort in revising COCOM policies. As a result, Mr. Førland continues to see the question of "whose contributions were most important to the eventual list reduction" as an issue of primary importance (p. 21).

As at earlier points in this debate, one wishes for greater precision in Mr. Førland's formulation. If by "list reduction" he means in fact the shift in export control *policy* with the stated goal of producing shortened lists, then we are indeed at loggerheads. I maintain my view that inquiring after British

⁵Spaulding, "Gradual and Moderate Relaxation," *Diplomatic History*, (Spring 1993): 224.

⁶Spaulding, "Reply," 15.

versus American contributions to the "list reduction" is not a particularly fruitful exercise at the policy level in the period after the American invitation for joint consultation as both sides were already in basic agreement on relaxing the embargo and reducing the lists.

Alternatively, if by "list reduction" Mr. Førland means not the policy decision to reduce the lists, but rather the detailed negotiations that produced the shortened lists themselves, then we might have very little disagreement, although we are now discussing an issue of distant secondary importance. I have always recognized that there remained numerous differences of opinion between the allies regarding what the U.S. Embassy in London called the "operational details" of the new policy, i.e. the future status of each of the thousands of highly technical individual items on the international export control lists. Indeed, it was precisely in order to thrash out these technical details together as allies that the Americans invited British opinion on implementation of the new, relaxed embargo policy.⁷ Since both parties had already committed themselves to the larger goal of relaxing the embargo and shortening the international control lists, it can be only to this process of negotiating the future of individual items that Mr. Førland refers with his very general statement that "the U.S. vs. U.K. dichotomy is crucial to understanding what was going on from summer 1953 to summer 1954" (p.21).

The revised international control lists that emerged in July 1954 were indeed largely a product of extensive Anglo-American negotiations. Those negotiations were the last moves in common pursuit of what had already become a

⁷See my earlier treatment of these negotiations in "A Gradual and Moderate Relaxation," 242-245.

shared U.S.-U.K. effort to relax the embargo and reduce the control lists — an effort that began on the American side at Eisenhower's initiative.

Not unless and until Mr. Førlund produces evidence to refute the central points of chronology and causation as I have suggested them, will I feel compelled to revise the major outlines of my interpretation.

CONFERENCE SUMMARY

Historians of American Foreign Relations will be pleased to know about a successful conference on U.S. Latin American relations which took place in September in Jacksonville, Florida. Organized and convened by Tom Leonard of the University of North Florida, the Inter-American Conference brought together US and Latin American scholars. Mostly historians and a few political scientists demonstrated that the study of US-Latin American relations is alive and well. Over 50 papers and 2 roundtable discussions (one on textbooks, the other on the Haitian intervention) plowed mostly traditional ground. Topics discussed included an evaluation of certain 19th century diplomats and envoys, an exploration of the diplomatic style of Latin Americans, an assessment of the role of international law, an analysis of relations during and after the Cold War, and of course an application of the omnipresent Monroe Doctrine to specific incidents. Military history topics included Argentina's nuclear potential, Latin America's arms production, the US Army Air Force in Ecuador, and generally the uneven military relationship. Social/Cultural topics included race relations; drug problems; and the role of Protestantism, liberation theology, and the Knights of

Columbus in US-Latin American relations. More innovative was a session on Mexican movies and the Voice of America as foreign policy instruments.

Most successful and best attended was the conference's last session on the Haiti Intervention. Here historians turned policy analysts and in a few cases moral judges. Most participants agreed they didn't approve of the intervention but hoped it would go well. The preoccupation with evaluating the wisdom of the intervention left little room to analyze its nature and US motives. Is Haiti, as one historian suggested, maybe the first dramatic foreign policy issue of *post-modernism*, full of ambivalent cultural notions and lack of clearly motivated self interest?

What was reassuring at this conference was that scholars have taken seriously the call issued many years ago by Alexander DeConde and restated by Stephen Rabe¹ that we need to focus on cultural traditions, on the social milieu and on motivations of "the Other." A clear sense emerges that, even though US-Latin America relations consist of relatively unequal partners, Latin America continues to cajole, challenge, or cooperate with US intervention with a specific style that includes an emphasis on international law and multi-lateralism.

Maybe this conference can be accused of not being on the cutting edge of professional innovation but it was a relief to hear little deconstructionist jargon. Most participants hope a tradition was started and look forward to the second Inter-American Conference. After hearing much about US

¹Stephen G. Rabe, "Marching Ahead (Slowly): The Historiography of Inter-American Relations." *Diplomatic History*, Vol 13, No 3, (Summer 1989): 297-316.

paternalism, patriarchy and hegemonic positions, a gender interpretation of US-Latin America relations might at that point be a welcome new and stimulating addition.

Verena Botzenhart-Viehe,
Westminster College, Pa.

SHAFR COUNCIL MINUTES

June 24, 1994

Bentley College

Present: Melvyn Leffler, Allan Spetter, Lloyd Ambrosius, Garry Clifford, Joyce Goldberg, Gary Hess, Richard Immerman, Michael Schaller, Robert Schulzinger, Jonathan Utley, and Marvin Zahnizer. President Leffler called the meeting to order at 7:45 a.m.

Leffler opened the meeting by thanking Thomas Schwartz and the 1994 Program Committee for an outstanding performance.

Prizes: Leffler announced that the winner of the W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship was Christian Ostermann, and Wayne Cole received the Norman and Laura Graebner Award. He will inform the SHAFR membership at the luncheon.

1995 SHAFR meeting: Robert Schulzinger has agreed to chair next year's program committee. The committee will also include Schwartz, Thomas Zeiler, Susan Brewer, and Diane Kunz. The meeting will take place at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, MD, with Robert Love in charge of local arrangements. He has already composed a detailed schedule, which will slightly depart from the norm. Because of USNA restrictions on building use, the plenary session will be held on Wednesday evening, June 21, and the meeting will conclude on Saturday, June 24. Love will reserve rooms at several motels, with prices ranging from \$35 to \$150 per night. Graduate students will be able to make "special arrangements." Utley suggested that Love consider scheduling an activity for Saturday night.

1996 SHAFR meeting: After Leffler indicated that no location was available in the Washington, D.C. area for the annual meeting, he proposed that it be held at the University of Colorado in Boulder. Schulzinger explained that it would be necessary to begin on Saturday evening, June 22, with the last sessions scheduled for Tuesday, June 25. The Council approved this plan.

SHAFR Endowment: Gary Hess reported for the Finance Committee (comprised also of Zahnizer and Schulzinger). After extensive deliberation and interviews with several financial concerns, the Committee recommends that SHAFR combine the funds from its various endowments and entrust them as single entity to the investment management firm of Schafer Cullen Capital Management. Hess explained that Cullen has consistently expressed interest in managing SHAFR's assets, despite the total of approximately \$400,000 falling beneath its normal limit, and its conservative strategy is congruent with the guidelines the Council adopted in 1988. It intends to invest SHAFR's assets in a diversified portfolio, no more than 30% of which will be in stocks. For this service it will charge an annual fee of .5%.

Following consideration of the alternative of investing SHAFR's assets in a mutual fund, a consensus in favor of the Finance Committee's proposal emerged. The Council directed the Committee, however, to examine what "hidden costs" SHAFR might be obligated to pay. In addition, it should make sure that no legal impediments to consolidating the various funds existed. Notwithstanding the intention to commit SHAFR's endowment to Cullen for at least a 5-year period, moreover, the Committee should receive explicit assurances that the right to withdraw the monies from Cullen at any time is unambiguous. All on the Council agreed that it would be advisable to have an attorney review the ultimate agreement.

Zahnizer suggested that the Committee in addition provide Cullen with a statement as to SHAFR's expectations regarding the performance of the investment. He gave examples of how this might be worded. He also advised that Cullen should be required to notify SHAFR prior to revising the investment strategy. The Council endorsed both proposals and asked Hess and Zahnizer to write a statement incorporating both of these recommendations.

Utley, seconded by Goldberg, then moved that the Council authorize the three Finance Committee members to meet with Cullen in August. Should in their collective judgment the discussions satisfactorily meet the Council's concern, SHAFR would enter into an agreement with Cullen to manage the endowment. The motion carried by a unanimous vote.

Finance committee Change of Name: The council approved the Finance Committee's proposal that its name be changed to the Endowment Committee. Further, once an agreement was signed with Cullen, Hess will rotate off the Committee. Zahnizer will succeed him as chair, Schulzinger will remain a member, and the president will appoint a replacement for Hess. The Council concurred with this proposal. Leffler indicated, however, that prior to becoming effective the change of the Committee's name will require amending SHAFR's by-laws through a vote of the membership. Executive Secretary-Treasurer Spetter will orchestrate this procedure.

The Council entered into the record that the Endowment Committee will have the additional responsibility of recalculating twice annually each fund's percentage of SHAFR's total assets in order to reflect adequately the current distribution of funds.

Leffler expressed to Hess, Zahnizer, and Schulzinger the deep appreciation of SHAFR's Council and membership for their exceptional effort over the past years.

The meeting adjourned at 9:15 a.m.

SHAFR COUNCIL MINUTES

June 25, 1994

The meeting opened at 7:30 a.m. with Mel Leffler presiding. Attendance: Lloyd Ambrosius, Bill Brinker, John Gaddis, Joyce Goldberg, Peter Hahn, Gary Hess, Michael Hogan, Richard Immerman, Mel Leffler, Michael Schaller, Al Spetter, Jonathan Utley.

1. **Mary A. Giunta letter:** Leffler circulated a draft letter of April 2, 1994 with a questionnaire. (See item 5 below.)

2. **Association for Diplomatic Studies:** Steve Lowe reviewed the activities of ADS, which is involved in studies of American foreign service officers. ADS is creating an oral history collection. ADS is creating a research center with a reading room, fellowships, a senior historian to lecture on U.S. foreign relations after 1945, and a policy roundtable on current issues.

3. **Publication of Diplomatic History:** The Publications Committee (Joan Hoff, Michael Hunt, and Mel Leffler) has conferred with editor Michael Hogan regarding the proposals of Sage, Blackwell's, and Scholarly Resources. Leffler reported that the committee agrees with Hogan's recommendation that the Sage offer appears to be the best. Dan Helmstadter has offered to match the services that Sage proposes, but not to change the financial proposal. The key issues are: services, marketing, and finance. The committee is concerned with ambiguities in Sage's proposal.

Hogan distributed a synopsis of publishers' bids comparing Sage, Blackwell's, and SR. He reported that the working relationship with SR has been good in recent years. He has a slight preference for Sage because 1) Sage has been aggressive, 2) Sage has a good marketing program, and 3) Sage has broad experience in journal publication.

Ambrosius raised questions about membership and institutional prices. Utley also focused on the ambiguity of Sage's proposal. For example, "subscribers" in a contract should include life members. Hogan thinks that *Diplomatic History* is underpriced.

Gaddis raised the question of changing the focus of *Diplomatic History* to an international history orientation. Hogan wants to welcome more articles with international or transnational orientation, i.e. not state-centered. Copyediting and correspondence takes considerable time. Publishing more foreign scholars will take more time. Hogan wants to add foreign scholars to the editorial board to help attract foreign contributions. He would prefer higher dues to help pay for needed services.

Leffler noted that Sage will maintain the SHAFR membership list. Spetter elaborated on Sage's proposed services. Sage will also publish and distribute the research roster. Brinker discussed the newsletter, which Sage might distribute.

Spetter asked for a summary of reasons for shifting from SR to another publisher. He noted that the SHAFR membership is now at 1585. About 200-250 members fail to renew annually, while others join. The increase has been about 100 per year, but seems to have leveled off. Student memberships are 350-400 now. About 100 members are retired or unemployed. Life memberships are 110; these will not increase dues. Dues went to \$30 for 1993. Non-U.S. memberships are now 215.

MOTION: Hess moved to authorize Leffler and Hogan to negotiate with Sage, alternatively with Blackwell's, and alternatively with SR, to remove ambiguities from the proposed contract. If the contract with one or another of the publishers is satisfactory, they might conclude it on behalf of SHAFR. The motion was seconded and passed by a vote of 8 Yes, and 0 No.

4. **Name of Diplomatic History:** Leffler reported the Publication Committee's preference for a more international orientation, but the need for *Diplomatic History* to maintain its current niche. The committee does not recommend a name change, but thinks a mission statement would be appropriate.

Hogan noted that the question of a subtitle for *Diplomatic History* concerns the issue of how to position the journal. The journal depends on unsolicited manuscripts. He hopes that a new subtitle can help gain access to markets. He thinks it is better now to think about possible subtitles and a mission statement.

Gaddis favors "international" but not "comparative" in a subtitle. Hogan reminded the Council that Emily Rosenberg thinks "international" has misleading connotations.

Leffler suggested that Hogan and the *Diplomatic History* editorial board consider a subtitle and mission statement for discussion by the Council at the American Historical Association meeting. Goldberg observed that we are not sure what our mission is and we need to discuss that before writing a statement.

There was general discussion about the need to go to the membership to see if there is any consensus within SHAFR. The editorial board should discuss this and provide leadership in reporting to the Council. Hogan said

he will welcome any suggestions from the Council and other SHAFR members.

5. Bibliographic Guide: The Council reviewed Mary Giunta's letter of April 2, 1994, regarding a SHAFR Survey on the revision of the *Guide to United States Foreign Relations since 1700*. (See item 1 above.)

ACTION: The Council approved the SHAFR Survey.

Gaddis noted that H-DIPLO is run out of Marshall University, but Ohio University has agreed to take it over. The potential for SHAFR use for communications with and among members is excellent. He wants to work with SHAFR to make it more useful to SHAFR. Goldberg warned about the arcane material. Gaddis said that others do not have direct access to the net, but the material comes into H-DIPLO, which puts it on the net if it is not inappropriate.

6. Financial Management: Leffler said that Susan Shah will continue for a year. She has worked long and hard for nominal remuneration. As a thank you, she should be invited to the SHAFR meeting next year and honored with a bonus. Utley suggested also giving her an engraved plaque.

MOTION: Hess moved to recognize Susan Shah's many years of distinguished service with a plaque and \$2,000 honorarium. The motion was seconded and passed unanimously.

MOTION: Hess reported a statement on what is expected of a financial adviser. The Council endorsed this statement:

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations has the following expectations of Schafer Cullen Capital Management Inc.:

- 1) The implementation of the Schafer Cullen investment philosophy as outlined in March 1994;
- 2) The conservation and enhancement of the SHAFR endowment capital;
- 3) Consultation annually concerning investment strategies with the SHAFR Endowment Committee, quarterly financial reports, and a comprehensive year-end financial report;

4) Returns on the stock portion of the portfolio no less than the average of the S&P 500, and returns on the fixed income portion of the portfolio approximately equal to those on high quality government instruments or bonds.

ACTION: Hess also recommended a committee to consider fee structures. Leffler appointed Utley and Goldberg, with Spetter as support. Hogan and Leffler will also provide information. The committee should report to the Council in January 1995 at the AHA meeting. Spetter and Hogan said that dues should go up regularly by small amounts rather than with periodic big raises.

7. 1994 SHAFR Conference: The Council acknowledged the work of Tim Maga, his wife and others for handling local arrangements and Tom Schwartz and the Program Committee for arranging the sessions that made the 1994 SHAFR Conference successful.

MOTION: Thanks to Timothy Maga, Thomas Schwartz, and others for the local arrangements and the program for the 1994 SHAFR Conference. Approved without objection.

The meeting adjourned at 9:48 a.m.

Submitted by Lloyd E. Ambrosius (with Jonathan Utley's assistance)

ANNOUNCEMENTS

SHAFR Guide available

The Executive Secretary's office has a few remaining copies of the *SHAFR Guide to American Foreign Relations Since 1700*. Upon receipt of thirty dollars your copy will be in the mail. Contact Allan Spetter, Dept. of History, Wright State, Dayton, OH 45435.

AICGS/GHI Fellowships in Post-War German History

With a grant from the *Volkswagen-Stiftung*, the German Historical Institute in Washington and the American Institute for

Contemporary German Studies at The Johns Hopkins University in Washington/Baltimore offer three one-year resident research fellowships for the 1995-96 academic year at the junior level (ca \$25,000) and the advanced level (ca \$30,000). Historians and political scientists specializing in post-World War II German history and German-American relations, particularly the period 1945-1955, are eligible. Ph.d. required. The Program welcomes applicants from Eastern Germany and applications dealing with GDR history.

Successful applicants are expected to conduct their research using archival resources of the Washington area, and to give introductory and concluding seminars at the institutes. Residency should begin no later than October 1, 1995.

Applications, which must be written in English, should contain the following:

- (1) a *curriculum vitae*, including a list of publications;
- (2) a project proposal of no more than 10 pages, including statement of purpose, hypotheses, methodology, resources to be used in Washington, and relationship to prior research;
- (3) three letters of recommendation, in sealed envelopes accompanying the application;
- (4) information concerning annual salary, sabbatical leave, or other research support.

Applications should be received no later than **January 1, 1995** by Dr. Lily Gardner Feldman, AICGS, Suite 350, 11 Dupont Circle, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036-1207, USA. Fellowships will be awarded about March 15, 1995.

Call for Proposals

I am putting together a collection of essays, *Resistance, Accommodation and Collaboration: Responses of the Developing World to the United States after 1945*, for possible publication.

Several presses have already shown interest in the project including Scholarly Resources and Westview Press. Currently, I have seven essayists committed to the project. I need to find one, possibly two works more to complete the proposal. In particular, I am looking for people who can construct essays that stress foreign language sources and research materials (when available) and most importantly, the foreign perspective and response. I need to find essays on the period from 1965-1980 from one of the following regions: the Middle East (excluding Iran), the Near East (excluding India), Africa (all areas except Cameroon) or Asia (excluding the Philippines and Vietnam). Since the subjects are comparatively recent, the work will not be limited to historians. I encourage others from different disciplines to contact me. If you have questions or you are interested in making a proposal to the project, please contact me at the following address: Kyle Longley, Department of History, The Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina 29464. Tel: (803)953-5073, E-mail: Longley@citadel.edu

National Archives Conference on Women in the Armed Forces During World War II

The National Archives is sponsoring a conference, "A Woman's War Too: U.S. Women in the Military in World War II," to be held on March 3 and 4, 1995, at the National Archives at College Park, MD. This national forum will explore the vital contributions made by the approximately 400,000 women who volunteered to serve in the armed forces of the United States.

The conference will focus on such topics as "Women in the Services at Home and Abroad," "Realities of Service Life" and the "Impact of World War II on U.S. Women and the Military." Sheila A. Widnall, Secretary of the Air Force and the first female service Secretary, will be the keynote speaker. For information: National Archives (NEE), Room 18N (WWII), Washington, DC 20408.

CALENDAR

1995

- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
- January 5-8 The 109th annual meeting of the AHA will take place in Chicago. Deadline for proposals has passed.
- January 15 Deadline for the 1995 Bernath article award.
- February 1 Submissions for Warren Kuehl Award are due.
- February 1 Deadline for the 1995 Bernath book award.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for the March *Newsletter*.
- February 1 Deadline for Ferrell Book Prize.
- February 15 Deadline for the 1995 Bernath lecture prize.
- April 1 Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
- March 30-April 2 The 88th meeting of the OAH will take place in Washington with headquarters at the Washington Hilton and Towers.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
- June 21-24 The 20th annual meeting of SHAFR will be held at the U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD. Robert Love is chairing local arrangements.
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.
- November 1 Deadline, materials for the December *Newsletter*.
- November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
- November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
- November 15 Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.
- November 15 Deadline for M. Bernath Research Fellowship.

The OAH will meet at the Palmer House Hilton (Chicago), March 28-31, 1996. Program Co-chairs are Michael Hogan and Mary Kelly. Proposals must be submitted no later than January 15, 1995 to: 1996 Program Proposals, Organization of American Historians, 112 North Bryan Street, Bloomington, IN 47408-4199.

In subsequent years the OAH will meet at the San Francisco Hilton, April 17-20, 1997, at Indianapolis, April 2-5, 1998, and Toronto in 1999.

The AHA will meet in Atlanta, January 4-7, 1996. The program chair is Renate Bridenthal, Graduate School - CUNY, 33 West 42nd St., New York, NY 10036-8099. The first deadline for proposals is October 28, 1994.

PERSONALS

Victoria C. Allison (SUNY, Stony Brook), Cary Frazer (Princeton), Christian F. Ostermann (Hamburg), and Phyllis L. Soybel (Illinois) have received grants from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library.

Sadao Asada (Doshisha, Kyoto) has been awarded the Yoshino Sakuzo Prize for his book *Ryotaisenkan no Nichibei kankei* (*Japanese-American Relations between the Wars*). The prize is one of the most prestigious ones in Japan, awarded to "outstanding works on politics, economics, society, history, and culture."

Thomas Borstelmann (Cornell) has been awarded a grant from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

Robert John (New York, NY) received the *Outstanding Scholarly Contribution Award* from the International Institute for Advanced Studies in Systems Research, Informatics and Cybernetics following the Second Orwellian symposium at Carlový Vary, Czech Republic in August 1994. His paper was titled, "Orwell in 1994: How Misinformation is Used to Influence Laws and Suppress Liberty."

Shane Maddock (doctoral candidate, Connecticut) has received an Institute for the Study of World Politics Dissertation Fellowship and the Hubert H. Humphrey Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship in Arms Control and Disarmament for 1994-1995 in support of his research on U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy from 1945 to 1970. He also received grants from the Hoover Library, the Eisenhower World Affairs Institute, the Truman Library and the Kennedy Library.

Louis M. McDermott (Vallejo, CA) is Visiting Professor at the California Maritime Academy for the academic year 1994-95. He is also an adjunct faculty member at Solano Community college in Latin American History.

James L. McDonald (American) and Theodore A. Wilson (Kansas) have received grants from the Gerald R. Ford Library.

Renate Strelau (Arlington, VA) concludes a one-person exhibit at the Riggs Bank of Virginia, Rosslyn branch, by showing reproductions of twelve summer and early fall 1994 paintings featuring Washington D.C.'s Francis Scott Key Bridge, from November 21 to December 23, 1994.

**SHAFR Functions at the AHA-Chicago
Hilton Hotel and Towers**

Reception	Jan. 6	5:00 pm	Conf. Room 4d
Council Mtg.	Jan. 7	7:30 am	Conf. Room 4J
Luncheon	Jan. 7	12:15-1:45	Marquette Room

PUBLICATIONS

Nick Cullather (Indiana), *Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of United States-Philippine Relations, 1942-1960*. Stanford, 1994. ISBN 0-8047-2280-3, \$29.50.

Alexander DeConde (UC-Santa Barbara), *Ethnicity, Race and American Foreign Policy: A History*. Northeastern, 1994. New in paper, ISBN 1-55553-215-2, \$15.95.

Chiarella Esposito (Mississippi), *America's Feeble Weapon: Funding the Marshall Plan in France and Italy, 1948-1950*. Greenwood, 1994. ISBN 0-313-29340-6, \$55.00.

John L. Harper (Johns Hopkins Bologna Center), *American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F. Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson*. Cambridge, 1994. ISBN 0-521-45483-2, \$27.95.

Lawrence Kaplan (NATO Center), *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance*, updated version. Twayne, 1994. Cloth ISBN 0-8057-7925-6, \$26.95; paper ISBN 0-8057-9221-x, \$15.95.

Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke), *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East*. Princeton, 1994. New in paper, ISBN 0-691-10083-7, \$24.95.

Melvyn Leffler (Virginia), *The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953*. Hill and Wang, 1994. ISBN 0-8090-8791-x, \$7.95.

Melvyn Leffler and David Painter (Georgetown) eds., *The Origins of the Cold War: An International History*. Routledge, 1994. Paper, ISBN 0-415-09694-4, \$16.95.

Charles S. Maier (Harvard) ed., *The Cold War in Europe: Era of a Divided Continent*, revised second edition. Markus-Wiener, 1994. Cloth ISBN 1-55876-029-6, \$38.95; paper ISBN 1-55876-034-2, \$18.95.

Edward J. Marolda (Dumfries, VA), *By Sea, Air, and Land: An Illustrated History of the U.S. Navy and the War in Southeast Asia*. Navy History Center, 1994. ISBN 008-046-00145-6, \$43.00.

Richard B. Mulanax (Troy State), *The Boer War in American Politics and Diplomacy*. UPA, 1994. ISBN 0-8191-9356-9, \$46.50.

Frank Ninkovich (St. John's), *Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century*. Chicago, 1994. Cloth ISBN 0-226-58650-2, \$49.95; paper ISBN 0-226-58651-0, \$19.95.

-----, *Germany and the United States: The Transformation of the German Question Since 1945*, updated version. Twayne, 1994. Cloth ISBN 0-8057-7928-0, \$27.95; paper ISBN 0-8057-9223-6, \$15.95.

Thomas G. Paterson and J. Garry Clifford (both of Connecticut), *America Ascendant: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1939*. Heath, 1995. Paper ISBN 0-669-39361-4, \$16.00.

Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan (Naval Academy) eds., *American Foreign Relations: A History*. Heath, 1995. Vol. 1: *To 1920*. Vol. 2: *Since 1919*. Both in paper.

Thomas G. Paterson and Dennis Merrill (Missouri-Kansas City) eds., *Major Problems in American Foreign Relations*. 4th ed., Heath, 1995. Vol. 1: *To 1920*. Vol. 2: *Since 1919*. Both in paper.

John Curtis Perry (Fletcher School: Tufts), *Facing West: Americans and the Opening of the Pacific*. Praeger, 1994. Cloth, ISBN 0-275-94920-6, \$65.00; paper, ISBN 0-275-94965-6, \$20.00.

David Reynolds (Christ's College) ed., *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives*. Yale, 1994. ISBN 0-300-05892-6, \$27.50.

Robert Freeman Smith (Toledo), *The Caribbean World and the United States: Mixing Rum and Coco-Cola*. Twayne, 1994. Cloth, ISBN 0-8057-7925-6, \$26.95; paper, ISBN 0-8057-9220-1, \$15.95.

Tony Smith (Boston, MA), *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton, 1994. ISBN 0-691-03784-1, \$24.95.

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Georgetown), *Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992: Uncertain Friendships*. Twayne, 1994. Cloth, ISBN 0-8057-7929-9, \$29.95; paper, ISBN 0-8057-9224-4, \$17.95.

Regina



Books

SPECIAL SHAFR DISCOUNT

EMPIRE ON THE PACIFIC: A Study in American Continental Expansion Norman A. Graebner.

Graebner contends that Texas, California, and Oregon were acquired so that eastern merchants could gain control of the harbors at San Diego, San Francisco, and Puget Sound—and thereby increase their lucrative trade with the Far East.

LCCN 82-22680. Reprint ed. with updated bibliography. 278 pages. (1983) \$19.95 cloth [ISBN 0-87436-033-1], \$11.95 pbk, \$9.95 text

SHAFR Price \$7.00

THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES. Raymond R. Esthus.

The story of Roosevelt's role as a pragmatic diplomat, employing secret diplomacy to placate rivalries without involving his country in commitments abroad. This account deals both with TR's involvement in European and East Asian controversies. Bibliography, index.

165 pages. (1971, 1982) \$8.95 text

SHAFR Price \$6.00

U.S. DIPLOMATS IN EUROPE, 1919-1941. Kenneth Paul Jones, ed.

Essays on Thomas Lamont, Alanson B. Houghton, Owen D. Young, Hugh Gibson, John B. Stetson, Jr. Prentiss Gilbert, George Meessersmith, Claude Bowers, Loy Henderson, Joseph Kennedy.

(1981) cloth \$16.95, paper \$12.95, text \$9.95

SHAFR Price \$6.00.

AMERICAN-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 1770s-1990s: A Survey of Issues and Literature. James K. Libbey

Libbey has succeeded in summarizing the basic economic activities in the long commercial relationship between the United States and Russia. These industrialized giants, one noted for its high technology, and the other—after 1917—for its advocacy of scientific materialism, base their trade upon the exchange of minimally processed materials. This characteristic seems to follow a consistent pattern that was established in the 18th century. The problems and prospects of this trade for the 1990s is assessed. The bibliography chapter identifies and classifies over 500 key references.

202 pp. (1989) \$21.95 cloth [ISBN 0-941690-35-0], \$12.95 paper [ISBN 0-941690-36-9].

SHAFR Price \$6.00.

Individuals only, please

AMERICA AND THE INDOCHINA WARS, 1945-1990: A Bibliographical Guide. Lester H. Brune & Richard Dean Burns, eds 352 pp. 1992 \$39.95 author/subject indexes [ISBN 0-941690-43-1]

This bibliography focuses on the American involvement in Indochina's three wars since 1945 and the consequences of that involvement on American society—its military, politics, economy and culture. It continues the two previous bibliographies by Richard Dean Burns and Milton Leitenberg which covered the periods up to 1972 (ABC-Clio, 1973), and from 1973 to 1980 (ABC-Clio, 1982).

SHAFR Price

\$13.00

AMERICA SEES RED: Anti-Communism in America, 1890s to 1980s. A Guide to Issues & References. Peter H. Buckingham. 240 pp (1987) \$21.95 cloth [ISBN 0-941690-23-7] \$12.95 paper [ISBN 0-941690-22-9]

SHAFR Price \$7.00

Graebner <i>Empire on Pacific...</i>	\$7.00	_____
Esthus. <i>Theodore Roosevelt</i>	\$6.00	_____
Jones. <i>Dipls in Europe</i>	\$6.00	_____
Brune. <i>Indochina Wars</i>	\$13.00	_____
Buckingham. <i>Anticommunism</i>	\$7.00	_____

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AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976, respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath, in memory of their son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

DESCRIPTION: This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of the history of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations.

ELIGIBILITY: The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are included. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works which are representative of social science disciplines other than history are *not* eligible.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contribution to scholarship. Winning books should have interpretative and analytical qualities of high levels. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should be examples of careful organization and distinguished writing. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination and should be sent to: Emily Rosenberg, Department of History, Macalester College, St. Paul, MN 55105.

Books may be sent at any time during 1994, but should not arrive later than February 1, 1995.

The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the committee. The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition which meets the standards of excellence established for the prize. The 1994 award of \$2,000.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians' annual meeting in Spring, 1995.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1972 Joan Hoff Wilson
Kenneth E. Shewmaker
1973 John L. Gaddis
1974 Michael H. Hunt
1975 Frank D. McCann, Jr.
Stephen E. Pelz
1976 Martin J. Sherwin
1977 Roger V. Dingman
1978 James R. Leutze
1979 Phillip J. Baram
1980 Michael Schaller
1981 Bruce R. Kuniholm
Hugh DeSantis
1982 David Reynolds

1983 Richard Immerman
1984 Michael H. Hunt
1985 David Wyman
1986 Thomas J. Noer
1987 Fraser J. Harbutt
James Edward Miller
1988 Michael Hogan
1989 Stephen G. Rabe
1990 Walter Hixson
Anders Stephanson
1991 Gordon H. Chang
1992 Thomas Schwartz
1993 Elizabeth Cobbs
1994 Tim Borstelmann

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

DESCRIPTION: The Bernath Lecture Prize seeks to recognize and encourage excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. Prize-winners normally deliver their lecture at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH. The lecture is to be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address and is to address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The award is \$500, with publication of the lecture in *Diplomatic History*.

ELIGIBILITY: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or any other member of any established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

PROCEDURES: Nominations, in the form of a short letter and *curriculum vita*, should be sent directly to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter requires evidence of excellence in teaching and research and must reach the Committee no later than 15 February 1995. The Chairperson of the Committee for 1994-1995 is: Charles Brower, Department of History, U.S.M.A., West Point, NY 10996.

The award is \$500.00, with publication in *Diplomatic History*.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1977 Joan Hoff Wilson

1978 David S. Patterson
1979 Marilyn B. Young
1980 John L. Gaddis

1981 Burton Spivak
1982 Charles DeBenedetti
1983 Melvyn P. Leffler
1984 Michael J. Hogan
1985 Michael Schaller
1986 William Stueck

1987 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker
1988 William O. Walker III
1989 Stephen G. Rabe
1990 Richard Immerman
1991 Robert McMahon
1992 H.W. Brands
1993 Larry Berman
1994 Diane Kunz

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to any article or essay appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations that is published during 1994. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or, if more than 40 years of age, must be within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of acceptance for publication. The article or essay must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

PROCEDURES: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* shall be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR by January 15, 1995. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted to the chairperson of the committee: Mary Ann Heiss, Kent State University, Kent OH 44242.

The next award will be announced at the SHAFR luncheon held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH in Spring, 1995.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1977 John C.A. Staggs
1978 Michael H. Hunt
1979 Brian L. Villa
1980 James I. Matray
David A. Rosenberg
1981 Douglas Little
1982 Fred Pollock
1983 Chester Pach
1985 Melvyn Leffler

1986 Duane Tananbaum
1987 David McLean
1988 Dennis Merrill
1989 Robert J. McMahon
1990 Lester Folts
1991 William Earl Weeks
1992 Marc Gallicchio
1993 Daniel P. O'C. Greene
1994 Frederick Logevall

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

This grant has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some of the expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations.

Requirements are as follows:

1. The dissertation must deal with some aspect of United States foreign relations.
2. Awards are given to help defray costs for dissertation research.
3. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all other requirements for the doctoral degree.
4. Applications must include:
 - (a) a one-page curriculum vitae of the applicant and a dissertation prospectus;
 - (b) a paragraph regarding the sources to be consulted and their value to the study;
 - (c) an explanation of why the money is needed and how, specifically, it will be used; and
 - (d) a letter from the applicant's supervising professor commenting upon the appropriateness of the applicant's request. (This should be sent separately.)
5. One or more awards may be given. Generally awards will not exceed \$1000.
6. The successful applicant must file a brief report on how the funds were spent not later than eight months following the presentation of the award (i.e., normally by the following September).

Applications should be sent to: Peter L. Hahn, Department of History, Ohio State University, Columbus, OH. 43210. The deadline is November 1, 1995.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1985 Jon Nielson
1986 Valdinia C. Winn
Walter L. Hixson
1987 Janet M. Manson
Thomas M. Gaskin
W. Michael Weis
Michael Wala
1988 Elizabeth Cobbs
Madhu Bhalla

1989 Thomas Zeiler
Russel Van Wyk
1990 David McFadden
1991 Eileen Scully
1992 Shannon Smith
1993 R. Tyler Priest
Christian Ostermann

The Myrna F. Bernath Book Prize

A prize award of \$2,500.00 to be offered every two years (apply in odd-numbered years) for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Books published in 1991-93 will be eligible next fall. Five copies of each book (or page proofs) must accompany a letter of application. Contact: Anders Stephanson, History Department, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

1991 Diane Kunz
Betty Unterberger

The Myrna F. Bernath Research Fellowship

The society announces two Myrna F. Bernath Research Fellowships, 2,500 USD each, to research the study of foreign relations among women scholars. The grants are intended for women at U.S. universities as well as for women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and newly finished Ph.D's. The subject-matter *should be historically based* and concern American foreign relations or aspects of international history, as broadly conceived. Work on purely domestic topics will not be considered. Applications should include a letter of intent and three copies of a detailed research proposal of no more than 2000 words. Send applications to: Professor Anders Stephanson, Department of History, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027. Submission deadline is November 15, 1995.

WINNERS: 1992 Shannon Smith

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Society of Historians for American Foreign Relations is pleased to invite applications from qualified doctoral candidates whose dissertations are in the field of the history of American foreign relations. This fellowship is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Qualified applicants will have satisfactorily completed comprehensive doctoral examinations before April 1995, leaving only the dissertation as the sole, remaining requirement for the doctoral degree.

Applicants should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The prospectus should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method,

and chief source materials. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date should accompany the application and prospectus of the dissertation. In addition, three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one from the director of the applicant's dissertation, are required.

Applications and supporting papers should be sent before April 1, 1995 to: Katherine A.S. Siegel, Department of History, St. Joseph's University, Philadelphia, PA 19131.

The Holt Memorial Fellowship carries an award of \$1,500.00. Announcement of the recipient of the Holt Memorial Fellowship will be made at the Society's annual summer meeting. At the end of the fellowship year the recipient of the fellowship will be required to report to the Committee relating how the fellowship was used.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1984 Louis Gomolak

1986 Kurt Schultz

1987 David McFadden

1988 Mary Ann Heiss

1990 Katherine A.S. Siegel

1991 Kyle Longley

1992 Robert Brigham

1993 Darlene Rivas

1994 Christian Ostermann

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD: The Graebner prize will be awarded, beginning in 1986, to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older. The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

- (a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;

- (b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;
- (c) describes the candidate's career, lists any teaching honors and awards, and comments on the candidate's classroom skills; and
- (d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Chairman: James Matray, History Department, New Mexico State University, Las Cruces, NM 88003.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1986 Dorothy Borg

1992 Bradford Perkins

1988 Alexander DeConde

1994 Wayne Cole

1990 Richard W. Leopold

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

The award will be made every other year at the SHAFR summer conference. The next award will be for books published in 1993 and 1994. Deadline for submissions is February 1, 1995. One copy of each submission should be sent to each member of the selection committee.

Thomas Knock
Dept. of History
Southern Methodist
Dallas TX 75275

Melvin Small
Dept. of History
Wayne State University
Detroit, MI 48202

David Schmitz
Dept. of History
Whitman College
Walla Walla, WA
99362

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1987 Harold Josephson

1989 Melvin Small

1991 Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield

1993 Thomas Knock

ARTHUR LINK PRIZE FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING

The inaugural Arthur S. Link Prize For Documentary Editing was awarded at the American Historical Association meeting in December 1991. The prize will be offered hereafter whenever appropriate but no more often than every three years. Eligibility is defined by the following excerpt from the prize rules.

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. The award is \$500 plus travel expenses to the professional meeting where the prize is presented. For all rules and details contact the committee chair. One copy of each entry should be sent directly to each member of the committee. Current Chairperson: Mary Giunta.

M. Giunta, Act. Dir.
Documentary History
of US Foreign
Relations under the
Articles of
Confederation,
National Archives
Washington, DC 20408

Justus Doenecke
New College, U. of S.
Florida
Tampa, FL 33620

George Herring
Dept. of History
Univ. of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

PREVIOUS WINNER

1991 Justus Doenecke

THE ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in 1990 to honor Armin Rappaport, the founding editor of the Society's journal, *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office. It was initiated by Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, who donated earnings from their book, *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, and by the authors of essays in this book, who waived

fees. Further donations are invited from authors, SHAFR members, and friends. Please send contributions in any amount to Professor Allan Spetter, SHAFR Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Department of History, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This is competition for a book, published in 1994, which is a history of American Foreign Relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible. The prize of \$1,000 is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author. The deadline for submission of books is February 1, 1995.

Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. A letter of nomination should be sent to the Ferrell Prize committee chairman, and a copy of the book should be sent directly to each member of the committee at the addresses listed below.

Jim Miller
132 13th Street S.E.
Washington DC 20003

Ted Wilson, chair
Department of History
U. of Kansas
Lawrence, KS 66045

Doug Brinkley
Department of History
Hofstra University
Hempstead, NY 11550

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1992 David Anderson and Diane Kunz
1993 Mel Leffler

The SHAFR Newsletter

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William J. Brinker, Box 5154, Cookeville, TN 38505 Tel. 615 372-3332, FAX 615 372-3898.

EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS: Nanci Long, Dana Mason, and Jason Reed.

Address Changes: Send changes of address to the Executive Secretary-Treasurer: Allan Spetter, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

BACK ISSUES: The *Newsletter* was published annually from 1969 to 1972, and has been published quarterly since 1973. Copies of many back numbers of the *Newsletter* may be obtained from the editorial office for \$2.00 per copy (for members living abroad, the charge is \$3.00).

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION: The *Newsletter* solicits the submission of personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered or published upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, *et al.* Papers and other submissions should be typed and the author's name and full address should be noted. The *Newsletter* accepts and encourages submissions on IBM-formatted 5 1/4" or 3 1/2" diskettes. A paper submitted in WordPerfect is preferred. A hardcopy of the paper should be included with the diskette. The *Newsletter* goes to the printer on the 1st of March, June, September, and December; all material submitted for publication should arrive at least four weeks prior.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

1968 Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)	1981 Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State)
1969 Alexander DeConde (CA-Santa Barbara)	1982 Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa)
1970 Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)	1983 Ernest R. May (Harvard)
1971 Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)	1984 Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State)
1972 Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)	1985 Warren F. Kuehl (Akron)
1973 Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)	1986 Betty Unterberger (Texas A&M)
1974 Bradford Perkins (Michigan)	1987 Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut)
1975 Armin H. Rappaport (CA-San Diego)	1988 Lloyd Gardner (Rutgers)
1976 Robert A. Divine (Texas)	1989 George Herring (Kentucky)
1977 Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)	1990 Michael Hunt (North Carolina)
1978 Akira Iriye (Chicago)	1991 Gary Hess (Bowling Green)
1979 Paul A. Varg (Michigan State)	1992 John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio)
1980 David M. Pletcher (Indiana)	1993 Warren Kimball (Rutgers)