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SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

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MEMBERSHIP: Anyone interested in U.S. diplomatic history is invited to become a member. Annual dues are \$5.00 per year, payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Student memberships are \$3.00 per year, while institutional affiliations are \$10.00. Life memberships are \$75.00.

MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in conjunction with the yearly convocation of the American Historical Association in December. The Society also meets with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZE: The Stuart L. Bernath Prize of \$500.00 is awarded each year at the December meeting of the Society to that person whose first or second book in U.S. diplomatic history is adjudged the best for the previous year.

ROSTER: A complete listing of the members with their addresses and their current research projects is issued once a year to all members. Editor of the *Roster and Research List* is Dr. Warren A. Kimball, Department of History, Rutgers University, Newark, N. J. 07102.

THE DIPLOMATIC HISTORIANS: BAILEY & BEMIS*

Lester D. Langley

Among the principal interests of diplomatic historians nowadays is a most welcome attention to the historiography of diplomatic history. Though the scrutiny has yet to produce that kind of historiographical inquiry found in, let us say, intellectual history, both European and American, a beginning has been made, and the future holds some promise that more is to come. We have yet to see anything in American diplomatic history on the level of the late Richard Hofstadter's *The Progressive Historians*, a sustained thought-piece, written in Hofstadter's inimitable style, on Frederick J. Turner, Charles A. Beard, and Vernon Louis Parrington. But we do have a festschrift for Thomas A. Bailey (*Essays Diplomatic and Undiplomatic of Thomas A. Bailey*), an edited work on Samuel F. Bemis (*American Foreign Policy and the Blessings of Liberty*), and the autobiography of Dexter Perkins. Granted, the first two do not provide an in-depth analysis of the way each man pondered the implications of his work, and the last offers no brilliant insights, no fascinating world-view of international politics, although Perkins elaborates on the way *The Monroe Doctrine* came to be written. And, finally, the first issues of the *Newsletter* of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations have carried the Society's presidential addresses, and these have focused on some of the problems of the profession and, in part, on the history of diplomatic history.

One reason for the paucity of literature on the historiography of diplomatic history is the fact that we are now only in the third generation of U. S. diplomatic historians. Before the 1920's few American historians called themselves specialists of diplomatic history (or specialists of anything, for that matter). Bemis was greatly influenced by the Europeanists at Harvard. Bailey worked with Frank Golder and Herbert F. Bolton, who were interested principally in frontier and borderlands history. Bailey wrote his dissertation on party irregularity in the Senate, 1865-1900. Along with Dexter Perkins and Julius Pratt, who also began their teaching careers in the 1920's, Bailey and Bemis constituted the first generation of American diplomatic historians. The second generation of diplomatic historians of the United States got their degrees in the forties and early fifties -- in many instances with the first generation as advisors -- and began to make their mark in the late fifties and early sixties. The third generation comprises, of course, the doctorates in diplomatic history since the mid-sixties, and here, too, there is a remarkable continuity in the laying on of hands by the second generation.

What all of this means is not that diplomatic history is attempting to achieve some kind of intellectual fraternal order, but that in the profession

*An earlier study of Bemis and Bailey, with the same title but with a radically different emphasis, appeared in the November, 1972, issue of *The History Teacher*. This paper was delivered at a regional meeting of SHAER, held in Atlanta, Ga., on February 24. Dr. Langley is a member of the History Department at the University of Georgia (Athens).

of diplomatic history there is more intellectual continuity between mentor and student than in other fields of history. I cannot explain why, except to offer the suggestion that it has something to do with the impact of the first generation of diplomatic scholars and with the oft-repeated observation that there is more continuity in foreign policy traditions than in economic, social, or political history.

While I am talking about "intellectual continuity" and shared values, you are doubtless thinking about all the fuss generated at historical conventions by "new left" diplomatic historians. Concentrating mostly on the 20th century, these diplomatic historians have produced a number of reinterpretations, with the principal emphasis on the economics motivations behind American foreign policy decisions. By implication, and occasionally by direct charge, the "new left" diplomatic historians have criticized their colleagues, particularly those in the first and second generation of diplomatic historians, of distortion of the truth and of having an excessively nationalistic view of American foreign policy.

My aim in this discussion is neither an assault on Bailey and Bemis nor the building of a monument in their honor. Rather, it is an effort to point out some of their contributions and, I hope, to demonstrate that some of the assumptions about these two men are inaccurate.

To begin with, both Bailey and Bemis have been taken to task for an allegedly narrow, sometimes nationalistic approach to diplomatic history. In his SHAFR presidential address on "What's Wrong with American Diplomatic History,"* Alexander DeConde noted that the profession suffered from an excessive amount of attention to national attitudes in the writing of diplomatic history. He had in mind, I think, the reliance on government documents and the private correspondence of American policymakers. He called upon his colleagues to broaden their perspective of diplomacy by venturing into the larger world of international politics and by exploiting archival sources in other capitals, not just Washington, D. C.

Certainly, Samuel Flagg Bemis rarely suppressed the nationalistic spirit in his scholarly (and especially in his more popular) publications. The superb biography of John Quincy Adams, the *Diplomacy of the American Revolution*, his books on the Jay and Pinckney treaties, and his presidential address before the AHA are heavily spiced with nationalistic anecdotes and bon mots. I happen to think that *The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation* is one of the most culturally arrogant pieces of literature in the history of the Western hemisphere. Granted, it was written in wartime, but it hardly fitted the spiritual professions of the Good Neighbor policy by its unsubtle claim that the Latin American policy of the United States has been, by and large, beneficial -- especially for Latin Americans.

*December, 1969. Carried in SHAFR Newsletter, May, 1970.

I cannot accept the charge that the scholarship of Thomas A. Bailey is nationalistic, either in tone or intent. Bailey's articles in the 1930's, for instance, dealt with such routine scholarly items as the Lodge corollary or, more significantly, with some famous myths in American history, the historical probing of which could hardly be called an exercise in nationalistic fervor. Bailey *was* very much concerned with the domestic processes that influence foreign policy, but his concentration tended to be on public opinion. Had he focused on the economic foundations of diplomacy, he would doubtless be canonized as the founding father of new left diplomatic history. In recent years, Bailey's scholarship came in for its share of criticism from younger scholars, especially condemnatory after his 1968 OAH presidential address on "The Mythmakers of American History." But in this address, Bailey was trying to point out that some current historiographical trends were accomplishing little more than the substitution of new myths for old ones. One of the few places in Bailey's scholarship where I have discovered interpretations that might be called nationalistic is in *The Man in the Street*. In this work Bailey came down hard on the hyphenates in American history and expressed the view that the dying out of hyphenism would be beneficial for the course of American foreign policy. The book was published in 1948, and its comments on hyphenism would seem inappropriate in today's emphasis on cultural heterogeneity. In *America Faces Russia* Bailey urged Americans to "sell democracy," militantly if necessary, a theme that sounds like Cold War rhetoric, yet, looked at in another way, the same work is somewhat "new left," in the sense it gets across the point that a major problem in Russian-American relations is the prevalence in the United States of several prominent historical myths about the Russian character.

One explanation for the charge of excessive nationalism may lie in the meanings of the words "nationalism" and "national interest." It would probably take a semanticist to deal fully with the matter, but I would contend that in an earlier day "nationalism" and "national interest" went hand in hand. Nowadays we tend to separate the two, even regarding them as contradictory. This latter-day separation came about in large part because of the Cold War, wherein scholars came to look at "nationalism" as a synonym for a kind of anti-communist messianism, and "national interest" as an expression denoting a more "realistic" approach to the problems of a turbulent world. Bemis's biography of John Quincy Adams is regarded as eulogistic and nationalistic, but, on second thought, it may be due to the fact that John Quincy Adams was nationalistic, yet even his detractors, alive and dead, considered his policies as "realistic" and in the "national interest". Moreover, it would be difficult to separate the terms when considering the diplomacy of the American Revolution, for the same reasons. For *The Latin American Policy of the United States*, mentioned earlier, I offer no defense. It belongs with the genre of historical literature characterized by Josiah Strong's *Our Country*.

A second general criticism of the writing of Bailey and Bemis is that their scholarship and especially their texts are biographical and anecdotal. To be more specific, they have been accused of paying too

much attention to the triumphs of the policymaker, and, indeed, justifying questionable foreign policy decisions; or explaining the rationale of American foreign policy with a series of vignettes, embellished with contemporaneous newspaper scuttlebutt and rounded off with a commonsensical observation. Neither one, a young colleague once explained to me, has tried to analyze the *meaning* of American foreign policy by studying the *system*.

While the historical profession has not yet arrived at any consensus on the observation that "history is biography," it is true that Bailey and Bemis did spend a great deal of time focusing on individual policymakers. I have in mind Bemis's two-volume biography of John Quincy Adams and Bailey's two books on Woodrow Wilson and the end of World War I, both of which are considered basic works. Both concentrate on problems and policies, but both also go into great detail on how each of these men interpreted the problems encountered, in the light of American experience and their own personal experiences. Later works on the same topics by younger scholars do not adopt this approach.* Compare, for instance, Bailey's account of Woodrow Wilson's travail with that of N. Gordon Levin or Amo Mayer. In the books of the last two there is much more focusing on what kind of social, political, and economic forces contributed to the attitudes of a man like Wilson.

I would not for a moment argue that either Bailey or Bemis has written the definitive account of the foundations of American foreign policy or the settlement of Versailles. I would argue that the diplomatic historian who disregards personality -- the individual impact on decision-making -- misses a great deal. As a former White House Press Secretary observed, oftentimes a President makes a significant decision by going into isolation, pondering the matter, and emerging later to render it to his advisors. John Quincy Adams was a remarkable man who did leave his mark, and it is conceivable that if he could be ripped from the pages of history, the development of American foreign policy would have been different. Given Wilson's intellectual and emotional makeup, his convictions and prejudices, it is reasonable to assume that a character analysis of the man (and of Henry Cabot Lodge, too) is very much in order. Personality is important, and the study of personality explains part of the story.

A third contribution of Bailey & Bemis was their effort to get across a message. It should be noted here that, the era in which these two men produced their most notable scholarship was from the mid-1920's, when *Jay's Treaty* appeared, to about 1950, when Bailey published *America Faces Russia*. In this 25-year span the American people pondered the message of Wilsonianism, sought measures to outlaw war and secure disarmament, watched the country go to smash, debated American neutrality, entered World War II, accepted the United Nations, and fashioned

*Lloyd C. Gardner's work, Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949. (Quadrangle, Reprint; paperback, 1972), is an exception.

a Cold War foreign policy. These issues left their mark on an older generation of scholars. In recounting the early successes of American diplomacy, Bemis perhaps displayed an unscholarly nationalistic feeling, but he did try to get across the point that an earlier American generation had confronted crises and survived, and if the interwar and postwar generations paid some attention to the hardnosed policies of the Founding Fathers, the 20th century United States might deal more effectively with its modern global crises. To Bemis, there is something more than scholarly interest in studying the accomplishments of American diplomats in a hostile world.

Bailey obviously had the post-World War II settlements in mind when he produced the books on Wilson and Versailles. A committed internationalist, he wanted the United States to avoid the mistakes of Wilson. Indeed, one very remarkable thing about the Wilson books is that Bailey was able to criticize Wilson without rejecting Wilsonianism, an unusual intellectual feat if you think of the numbers of Wilsonian followers who were later deeply disillusioned with the man *and* his goals.

This leads me to my final point: that the scholarship of Bailey and Bemis reflected a depth and breadth that is still impressive, even in this age of microfilm, jet travel, and accessibility to source material. The research that went into Bemis's studies on the Jay and Pinckney treaties, the diplomacy of the American Revolution, and the biography of John Quincy Adams is, I would argue, prodigious; it is multiarchival and multilingual. Bailey's exploitation of newspaper sources, while put down by some as a "stringing together of cute stories," constituted a pioneering effort in the writing of diplomatic history. It is true that Bailey's emphasis on public opinion as a major determining force in foreign policy led him instinctively to write his books with a secondary source background.* It also contributed, I think, to charges that he sought to explain mostly to a non-academic audience and was thus guilty of the most heinous offense, popularity. He has a casual style that irritates other scholars. He makes money from his publications. But he obviously knows what a simple sentence is, and I think he would argue that if historians do not write "popular" history, then journalists will. *The Man in the Street* should be read by every citizen, because the average citizen would be much better off reading *The Man in the Street* or *The Art of Diplomacy* than Walter Lippman's *U. S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*.

Finally, when one considers the *range* of their interests, their claim to stature is reinforced. Bemis was a specialist in several areas -- the Revolution and early national period, biography, and inter-American affairs. Bailey worked on World War I, public opinion, and thought-pieces. He supervised graduate students in diplomatic and early national history. Both wrote texts which underwent numerous revisions. (Ordinarily, I wouldn't include textbooks here, but we should remember that neither had other textbooks to use as source material).

We may not see their kind again in the profession. We'd better.

*But I would contend that Bailey's The Policy of the United States toward the Neutrals, 1917-1918, (Baltimore, 1942), is a model of historical scholarship.

The Concept of Empire in American Diplomatic History

by Thomas A. Bryson*

In recent years American diplomatic historians have sought broad interpretations of American foreign policy. One new concept is that of empire, and the purpose of this essay is to present a brief summary and historiographical appraisal of this concept.

During the past decade the empire concept has been largely associated with William Appleman Williams, one of the most controversial historians in contemporary America. Williams taught at the University of Wisconsin for a number of years, and there, with Fred Harvey Harrington, developed a revisionist interpretation of history which some call the Wisconsin school. This "school" includes not only the students of Williams and Harrington who have produced a creditable body of literature but also a number of younger historians whose views on history have been shaped by Williams and radicalized by the Vietnam war.

Proponents of the empire concept generally view American diplomacy in terms of the creation of an empire, formal or informal, to insure American prosperity. Through the 1850s, their interpretation holds, Americans pursued policies leading to the building of a continental empire. But from the inception of the new nation, they had also begun to engage in efforts to find new overseas markets for American products, efforts that resulted in the realization of an international commercial empire in the 20th century. By the 1960s, say these revisionists, Americans found that their empire had taken on the military qualities of the Roman and British empires.

While other historians have discussed the American empire in terms of continental expansion and economic aggrandizement as separate enterprises, it remained for William Appleman Williams to view continentalism and commercialism as related themes of the American imperial experience. Williams is committed to an economic interpretation of American history, and his *Contours of American History* (1961) and *Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (1962) present a synthesis of American history that has generated much controversy. The writings of his students, Lloyd C. Gardner, Thomas J. McCormick, N. Gordon Levin, Carl P. Parrini, and Ronald Radosh have filled the interstices of Williams' conceptualization.

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In his *Contours* Williams views American history through the mid-19th century in terms of activities leading to territorial and commercial expansion, conditions necessary to the prosperity and welfare of the American people. By mid-century the continental empire was a reality. Following the Civil War a new challenge faced the rising industrial nation, and Williams asserts that the Secretary of State, William H. Seward, had the vision to understand the needs of an industrial economy that required overseas commercial expansion.

Williams' protégé, Walter LaFeber, carried the interpretation a step further. His book *The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion* (1963) delineated Seward's important role in drafting a blueprint for American overseas expansion, a plan that called for subjecting territorial expansion to the needs of achieving overseas markets. By 1890, LaFeber maintains, a consensus had developed in the United States, calling for an accelerated program of overseas economic expansion. While LaFeber only suggests that farmers in the South and West supported commercial expansion, Williams later wrote *The Roots of the Modern American Empire* (1969), a lengthy, well-documented work that demonstrates the role of agrarians in the 1880s in urging upon the government a policy of overseas commercial expansion. Sale of the farm surplus was necessary to the prosperity of Southern and Western farmers. This activity, William concludes, was a major factor in persuading persons in government and the business community in the decade of the 1890s to opt for a program of overseas commercial expansion. LaFeber declares that the activity of the 'nineties -- heightened by expansionist activity that resulted in war with Spain, the annexation of insular possessions, and increased commercial expansion -- was not an aberration in American history, but rather, followed the well-trodden path that Americans had always taken in pursuit of solutions to economic problems. Although a consensus obtained on the strategy of economic expansion, Americans debated the tactical method of empire-building, and LaFeber concludes that it was the "pragmatic expansionists" that carried the day. Persuaded that a formal empire was expensive and bulky, this group calculated that an informal, commercial empire was more efficient and profitable, and could be achieved by limited annexation of island possessions in the Pacific to reach the Far East and the employment of the Open Door policy to penetrate the potentially rich Oriental markets. This group selected a program of anti-colonial, economic expansion that was followed by their successors in government and enabled Americans to create in the 20th century an overseas economic empire of international proportions. The discussion of the tactical debate and its results as briefly treated in LaFeber's *New Empire* and richly described in Williams' *Tragedy*, was the central theme of the *China Market: America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893-1901* (1967) by Thomas J. McCormick.

While originally applied in the modern era to the Far East, the Wisconsin school asserts that Woodrow Wilson incorporated the Open Door into an American world view, one that aimed to create international peace and insure American prosperity. Williams suggests that Wilson envisioned a League of Nations that would deter the Bolsheviks and European imperial powers, the greatest threats to peace. He would then employ the Open Door on an international scale to achieve American economic preeminence and prosperity. The League and the Open Door would insure a liberal-capitalist world order under American leadership. The theme so cogently developed by Williams was enlarged upon by his students, Carl P. Parrini in *Heir to Empire: United States Economic Diplomacy, 1916-1923* (1969); N. Gordon Levin, Jr., in *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution* (1968) and Ronald Radosh in *American Labor and United States Foreign Policy* (1969). Williams views the Senate debate over the League of Nations as one of the tactical not strategical means. Both Republicans and Democrats, he suggests, agreed that peace and economic expansion were necessary to American prosperity. They differed, Williams concludes, over the tactical use of the League to achieve these ends.

Williams maintains that the 1920s were not a period of isolation, but the time of maturation for the Open Door policy which American leaders employed in conjunction with a policy of disarmament to expand the American marketplace overseas. He developed this theme in "The Legend of Isolationism in the 1920s," *Science & Society*, XVIII, (Winter, 1954), 1-20, and it is reflected in Robert Freeman Smith's article, "American Foreign Relations, 1920-1942," in Barton Bernstein, ed., *Towards a New Past: Dissenting Essays in American History* (1967).

The foreign policy of expansion so well begun in the 1920s was continued in the following decade. Thus Franklin D. Roosevelt's foreign policy, claims Williams, was highlighted more by continuity than by novel approaches. This conclusion is central to Lloyd C. Gardner's *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy* (1964). One of Williams' ablest students, Gardner declares that Roosevelt's policies were shaped by older principles such as the Open Door, adherence to which led to American involvement in World War II.

American policy in World War II, claim the Wisconsin revisionists, aimed to restore an open world, a world in which American economic power could be utilized to continue the growth of empire. This thesis is contained in Gardner's *Economic Aspects* and in Gabriel Kolko's lengthy *Politics of War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-45* (1968). These authors demonstrate that aggressive American tactics -- for example, the attempt to open the Persian oil fields to American petroleum interests and the efforts to compel Russian acceptance of the American plan for a liberal-capitalist world in the postwar era -- led to

the Cold War for which the U. S. must bear responsibility.

The Wisconsin school maintains that American policymakers bear the onus for the manner in which the Cold War developed, thus denying the traditional interpretation that it resulted from American defensive responses to Soviet aggression. In the closing pages of his *Tragedy* Williams developed the thesis that American economic expansion was necessary in the postwar era to avert a depression. Russia stood athwart the course leading to American restoration of an open, liberal-capitalist world order. American policymakers sought to coerce Russian acceptance of this world view by terminating lend lease, rejecting a Russian bid for a six billion dollar loan, by withholding reparations from Western Germany, and by use of the atomic bomb as a diplomatic instrument. In so doing, Williams asserts, American leaders denied Russian foreign policy goals related to security and reconstruction. Ironically, these efforts to restore an open world, "closed the door to any result but the Cold War," concludes Williams.

Williams' conclusion influenced the works of Walter LaFeber, in *America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966* (1967); Lloyd Gardner in *Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949* (1970); and Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, *The Limits of Power: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* (1972). The works of Gardner and Kolko differ slightly about American goals in Eastern Europe and about the significance of a major shift in foreign policy from Roosevelt to Truman. But they essentially follow the theme set by Williams, as do Ronald Radosh and Leonard P. Liggio, co-authors of "Henry A. Wallace and the Open Door" in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., *Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years* (1971). They argue convincingly that Henry A. Wallace presented a possible alternative to the American plan of diplomatic coercion of Russia which revisionists see as responsible for the Soviet-American antagonism in the postwar era.

The empire thesis has evoked much controversy. Historians have argued both sides of the question. What follows is a brief resumé of some of the more significant arguments.

In "The 'New Left' and American History: Some Recent Trends in United States Historiography," *American Historical Review*, LXXII (July, 1967), 1237-63, Irwin Unger scores the Wisconsin school for its "present-mindedness." He describes Williams as an "angry dissenter" and asserts that he and the young radicals who follow in his footsteps are "committed to reorienting American society."

While Unger's critique takes the form of a sophisticated polemic, Robert W. Tucker questioned the basic premise of the Wisconsin school. In his *Radical Left and American Foreign Policy* (1971) Tucker faults Williams for "ambiguity," because in his *Tragedy* he "is never quite clear -- whether America's institutions necessitated expansion or whether America has been expansionist out of the mistaken conviction that the continued well-being, if not the very existence, of these institutions required constant expansion."

The concluding chapter of Joseph M. Siracusa's *New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians: The American Revisionists* (1973) presents a lengthy critique of the Wisconsin school by leading historians of the traditional persuasion. The traditionalists chide the New Left for omission of non-economic factors, for an overweening presentist point of view, for seeking to present an exposé, for "unscrupulous" use of sources, for working from a "dubious" hypothesis, for distorting the meaning of documents, and for politicizing their history. Yet the Left is congratulated for its "therapeutic" value to the historical profession by providing provocative interpretations that have led to a reassessment of American diplomatic history.

In a recent review article, "William Appleman Williams and the 'American Empire'," *Journal of American Studies*, 7 (April, 1973), 91-104, J. A. Thompson takes the Wisconsin school to task for its dependence on economic determinism as a single cause of American history. Arguing in a vein frequently followed by critics of economic determinism, Thompson declares that Williams and his students have forgotten that other considerations such as national security, prestige, ideals, race prejudice, religious duty, and emotional attitudes also bear on American foreign policymaking. He also questions the validity of the expansionist thesis in light of the cyclical manner in which Americans have sought foreign markets.

But there has also been support for the concept of empire. Although an older historian who is neither committed to an economic view of history nor a member of the Wisconsin school, Richard W. Van Alstyne in *The Rising American Empire* (1960) offers a thesis supportive of the Williams theme. Van Alstyne asserts that "expansionist impulses" had begun to develop in the American colonies in the 17th century. American history through mid-19th century is largely centered around the creation of a continental empire. Although the latter part of his work is devoted to economic overseas expansion, Van Alstyne was primarily concerned with the activities leading to the creation of a territorial empire prior to mid-century. He did not see this expansion as necessarily motivated by economic considerations.

However, James E. Southerland's essay in "John Forsyth and the Frustrated 1857 Mexican Loan and Land Grab," in *West Georgia College Studies in the Social Sciences*, XI (June, 1972), 18-25, supports Williams' claim that much of American expansion prior to the Civil War was due to "demands for increased trade and commerce." He concludes that John Forsyth, a son of the American Secretary of State and minister to Mexico in the late 1850s, "espoused a policy designed to dominate that country economically and commercially."

That portion of the Wisconsin thesis devoted to the decade of the 1890s has evoked a lively historiographical debate. In "Economics, Emotion, and Expansion: An Emerging Foreign Policy," from *The Gilded Age* (1970), ed. by H. Wayne Morgan, Paul S. Holbo admits that the thesis of economic determinism has "substantial elements of validity," but censures the revisionists for "greatly oversimplifying" economic interpretation, thus undercutting their point of view. He claims that the economic determinants such as the money questions and the tariff were far more complex and not always related to foreign economic expansion. The money problem, Holbo proffers, was often related to domestic politics, while President Grover Cleveland's interest in the tariff was based more on the quest for cheap foreign raw materials than on the need to acquire additional foreign markets. In a subsequent paper presented at the meeting of the Organization of American Historians at New Orleans in 1971, Holbo struck at the central thesis of LaFeber's *New Empire*. Holbo maintained that while many politicians did argue for legislation to promote trade and expansion, "they were out of favor politically, and their dreams were never consummated." Too, substantial differences separated the motives underlying the foreign policymaking of the Harrison, Cleveland, and McKinley administrations.

The revisionist argument that the anti-imperialists in the debate on Philippine annexation were actually more sophisticated imperialists has received much attention. Robert L. Beisner denies in *Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists, 1898-1900* (1968) that the anti-imperialist movement was "at bottom a camouflage campaign for an informal empire." He says that "a large number of leading anti-imperialists gave no thought at all to the economic implications of imperialism." Beisner's conclusion is substantiated in Richard E. Welch's "Motives and Policy Objectives of Anti-Imperialists, 1898," *Mid America*, 51 (Apr., 1969), 119-29. However, William J. Pomeroy in *American Neo-Colonialism: Its Emergence in the Philippines and Asia* (1970) supports the Williams thesis, arguing that the "anti-imperialists, by and large, were not opposed to the expansion of overseas markets and investments." Also supportive of the Williams thesis is John W. Rollins' essay "The Anti-Imperialists and 20th Century American Foreign Policy," *Studies on the Left*, III (1962), 9-24.

Works by Richard D. Challener, Jerry Israel, and Philip S. Foner also support the revisionist thesis on American foreign policy in the 1890s. Challener in *Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy* (1973) sustains the view that the United States sought to acquire insular possessions in the Pacific to help create an economic empire based on Far Eastern markets. He demonstrates that a number of naval officers felt strongly about the effectiveness of the Open Door policy in acquiring new markets. Jerry Israel's essay, " 'For God, For China and for Yale' -- The Open Door in Action," *American Historical Review*, LXXV (Feb., 1970), 796-80, and his subsequent book, *Progressivism and the Open Door: America and China, 1905-1921* (1971), present a variation on the Open Door thesis. A former student of Lloyd Gardner, Israel asserts that economic interests and reform organizations interacted with each other to penetrate China. The Open Door, concludes Israel, depended on the mutual interests of a multiplicity of groups seeking various goals that were interrelated. The first volume of Philip S. Foner's *The Spanish-Cuban-American War and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895-1902* (1972) supports that portion of the Williams thesis that the war with Spain resulted from the desire for foreign markets, but, as its title suggests, it differs from the revisionist claim that American imperialism had its origins in the early days of the nation's history.

The Wisconsin interpretation of Wilsonian internationalism leading to American economic preeminence has been substantiated by three recent studies. Amo J. Mayer's monumental *Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking: Containment and Counterrevolution at Versailles, 1918-1919* (1967) claims that Wilson hoped the League of Nations would help "tame the Bolshevik Revolution" and deter the "right-wing upsurge inside the victor nations" -- aims that would make for American well-being and world peace. Sidney Bell's sketchy *Righteous Conquest: Woodrow Wilson and the Evolution of the New Diplomacy* (1972) presents the same view set forth in N. Gordon Levin's work, but the author neglects to mention the Levin thesis. Jeffrey J. Safford, in "Edward Hurley and American Shipping Policy: An Elaboration on Wilsonian Diplomacy, 1918-1919," *Historian*, XXXV (Aug., 1973), 568-86, also supports Williams' thesis. In his essay on Hurley's activities to strengthen the American merchant fleet to garner new markets for American goods, Safford concludes:

"In sum, Hurley's position appears to have supported in major ways Woodrow Wilson's plan to reconstruct and reorganize the postwar world along lines of a moral and market-oriented capitalistic rationality. Hurley, as W. A. Williams paints Wilson, not only 'did not miss or fail to act on the economic implications of the frontier thesis, . . . he was the very model of Turner's crusading democrat.' In view of revisionist analysis, then, Hurley's shipping policy as it evolved in 1918-1919 follows the grain nicely."

The revisionist critique of American foreign policy in the 1920s has been subjected to criticism. One of the most articulate critics of New Left historiography is Robert James Maddox, whose essay, "Another Look at the Legend of Isolationism in the 1920s," *Mid-America*, 53 (Jan., 1971), 35-43, questions the conclusions of Williams' article, "The Legend of Isolation in the 1920s." Maddox scores Williams for not properly documenting his thesis that the "central theme" of American policy in the 1920s was expansionist. My own essay, "Admiral Mark L. Bristol, An Open Door Diplomat in Turkey," appearing in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, V, (1974), tested the applicability of the Open Door thesis to American foreign policy in the Middle East in the 1920s. Using Bristol, the American High Commissioner to Turkey, as a case study, I concluded that Bristol did not "use the power of his . . . office to implement the Open Door as Williams interprets it -- that is, consciously and aggressively to create the foundation of an American economic empire in the Middle East and to extend American economic and political control to that region." Rather, I concluded that Bristol used the Open Door in the traditional manner to reduce economic control and open the region to American business men.

However, Williams' conclusion that the 1920s was a time of economic expansion received qualified support from Melvyn Leffler. In "The Origins of Republican War Debt Policy, 1921-1923: A Case Study in the Applicability of the Open Door Interpretation," *Journal of American History*, LIX (Dec., 1972), 585-601, Leffler declares that an evaluation of Republican war debt policy indicates that the Open Door thesis applied, because the "search for markets was an important consideration," but "the quest for foreign outlets was counterbalanced by fiscal and and political considerations."

The revisionist critique of American entry into World War II has also received support. Lloyd Gardner's claim in *Economic Aspects of New Deal Diplomacy* (1964) that Roosevelt's aggressive adherence to the Open Door policy in China led to Pearl Harbor, is supported by Bruce M. Russett's *No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of United States Entry into World War II* (1972).

Historians have recently begun to test the applicability of the Open Door thesis to American foreign policy in World War II. In "Lend-Lease and the Open Door: The Temptation of British Opulence, 1937-1942," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXXXVI (June, 1971), 232-59, Warren F. Kimball supports the revisionist thesis that the United States pursued a course in World War II leading to the restoration of an open world. He asserts that American diplomats negotiated a Lend-Lease agreement with Britain that contained a *quid pro quo*, whereby Britain offered to dismantle her system of empire preference in the postwar era so that American business men might share in the markets in the British Empire.

Although Americans "vastly exaggerated the importance of Britain's imperial preference system," Kimball concludes that American policymakers used Lend-Lease as a lever to open the oyster of the British empire. But Alfred E. Eckes, Jr. in "Open Door Expansion Reconsidered: The World War II Experience," *Journal of American History*, LIX (March, 1973), 909-24, suggests that the Wisconsin school has overstated the view that United States policymakers pursued a course during the war leading to economic expansion and thus brought on the Cold War with Russia. He maintains that revisionists have "magnified" the "nightmare of depression" as a means of creating policy and have exaggerated the case for economic expansion. He says that foreign markets were not the only motivations considered by American policymakers in formulating an economic design for peace. Contrary to the revisionist view that Americans opposed collaboration with Russia in the postwar era, Eckes demonstrates that Harry Dexter White and Henry Morgenthau, Jr., were among "the most fervent advocates of postwar political collaboration with Russia"

In projecting the empire concept into the Cold War era, the Wisconsin school has created the greatest amount of controversy. No attempt will be made here to discuss the historiography of the Cold War, the most complete discussion of which is contained in Robert W. Sellen's "Origins of the Cold War: An Historiographical Survey," *West Georgia College Studies in the Social Sciences*, IX (June, 1970), 57-98.

The basic assumptions of the revisionists have received much attention. John Lewis Gaddis in *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (1972) scores them for "employing a single-cause explanation" of the Cold War "that overlooks other causes such as ideology, the psychological-malfunction of Stalin's personality," and the dynamic of the domestic political system in the conduct of foreign affairs. He suggests that the Cold War was an "irrepressible conflict between two diametrically opposed ideologies." Charles S. Maier's essay "Revisionism and the Interpretations of Cold War Origins," in *Perspectives in American History*, IV (1970), also questioned the basic revisionist conceptualization that assumes that international harmony is the "normal state." Maier claims that the revisionists failed to "ask whether conflict might have been totally avoided." He also suggests the inevitability of conflict in postwar Europe, given the "power vacuum in Central Europe." But perhaps the most general and penetrating criticism of the revisionist view of the American role in the Cold War came from Robert James Maddox, whose recent book, *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War* (1973) has stirred up considerable interest. Maddox indicts Williams, Kolko, and Gardner for "pervasive misusages of the source materials" in presenting their cases. Moving to the specific, he also points out that there are glaring differences of interpretation between Gardner and Williams. Contrary to Williams, Gardner claims Ameri-

can capitalists did not consider Eastern European markets essential and he sees no real difference between the foreign policy goals of Roosevelt and Truman. Maddox also scores revisionist claims that the United States used the loan, Lend-Lease, and reparations as tools to coerce Russia to accept the American ideal of a liberal-capitalist world.

Scholars have devoted considerable effort to a discussion of the revisionist claim of economic coercion. Thomas G. Paterson's article, "The Abortive American Loan to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War, 1943-1946," *Journal of American History*, LVI (June, 1969), 76-92, presents a convincing case to support the revisionist interpretation that the American renege on the loan to Russia led to "unsettled and inimical Soviet-American relations." But J. L. Richardson's review article, "Cold War Revision: A Critique," in *World Politics*, 24 (July, 1972), 579-612, claims revisionists failed to consider domestic politics as a factor in the Administration's reluctance to ask Congress for a large loan for Russia. Charles S. Maier takes a different tack. In his essay on Cold War "Revisionism," he says revisionists are inconsistent on the loan question, asserting that Williams' criticism of American failure to make the loan to Russia does not square with Kolko's criticism of the Morgenthau-White proposal for a ten billion dollar loan to the Soviet Union.

Regarding the revisionist claim that reparations was a factor in the American plan of coercion, Bruce Kuklick's recent study, *American Policy and the Division of Germany: The Clash with Russia Over Reparations* (1972), offers a strong argument to sustain the indictment. He claims American diplomats at Potsdam departed from the Yalta agreement on reparations as a diplomatic maneuver to force Russia to accept the American scheme of economic "multilateralism," a term analogous to Williams' Open Door. However, J. L. Richardson says in his review on "Cold War Revisionism," that the American decision on reparations was not based on a desire to coerce Russia but rather on the "desire to avoid economic and social breakdown in the Western zones of Germany, with the accompanying specter of communization." But Maier's article presents the interesting point that New Left views on reparations failed to consider "bureaucratic determinants of policy." Treasury and State Department officials, he declares, differed on reparations, with the former favoring a more lenient policy and the latter favoring limitation. "Foreign policy emerges as the result of competition for feifs within governmental empires," claims Maier, but he warns that "Bureaucratic emphases can produce a neo-Rankean acquiescence in the use of power that is no less deterministic than the revisionist's tendency to make all policies exploitative in a liberal-capitalist order."

Just as Richardson reproved revisionists for failing to consider domestic politics on the loan question, so George C. Herring, Jr., claims that political factors influenced the Truman administration's abrupt

withdrawal of Lend-Lease. In his essay, "Lend-Lease to Russia and the Origins of the Cold War, 1944-1945," *Journal of American History*, LVI, (June, 1969), 93-114, Herring concludes that the "exigencies of domestic politics and Congress' determination that Lend-Lease should be used only to prosecute the war would have necessitated a major change in the Russian aid program once the war in Europe ended. Roosevelt might have made the adjustment more smoothly . . . but the change would have been made."

Barton Bernstein's recent essay "American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War," in his edited work *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (1970) supports the revisionist interpretation that economic coercion was a factor in the origins of the Cold War, and it also sustains the New Left claim that the atomic bomb was a factor in American postwar diplomacy.

The claim advanced by members of the Wisconsin school that American diplomatists used the atomic bomb as a diplomatic instrument to influence Russian policy was elaborated upon by Gar Alperovitz's controversial book, *Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power* (1965). J. L. Richardson claims, however, that Alperovitz stated his case too strongly and suggests that since Washington did not force a "showdown" with the Soviets at Potsdam, that the Truman administration was really "postponing final decisions until the situation was clearer." But Robert Maddox pulled out the stops in critiquing the Williams-Alperovitz thesis regarding the A-Bomb. In his book, *The New Left*, and in a recent essay, "Atomic Diplomacy: A Study in Creative Writing," *Journal of American History*, LIX (March, 1973), 925-34, Maddox asserts that the revisionist bomb thesis is faulty, for it is based on materials used out of context. In the essay Maddox says "Alperovitz's use of evidence throughout *Atomic Diplomacy* raises disturbing questions. That a trained scholar should have resorted to such practices in a book purporting to be a scholarly study is lamentable"

Historians have also addressed themselves to the revisionist view of American diplomacy in the Middle East. In two essays, "Revisionists, Oil, and Cold War Diplomacy," *Iranian Studies*, III (Winter, 1970), 23-33, and "Iran's Role in Cold War Revisionism," *Ibid.*, V (Spring, 1972), 96-111, Justin D. Doenecke concludes that the revisionists make it only too clear that it is no longer intellectually proper simply to characterize American Middle Eastern policy in the Cold War as "defensive." The works of Kolko, Gardner, and LaFeber, he observes, make it apparent that the United States did practice an aggressive diplomacy in Iran in pursuit of petroleum. Richard W. Cottam, a former foreign service officer, replied in the negative on this point. In an essay entitled "The United States, Iran and the Cold War," *Iranian Studies*, III (Winter, 1970),

2-22, Cottam claims that American policy in postwar Iran was defensive in nature and in direct response to Soviet aggression. Oil played no formidable role in American policy until 1954, concludes Cottam. This essay was a brief restatement of a conclusion set forth in his earlier book, *Nationalism in Iran* (1967), a study which denied the charge by Kolko and Gardner that the United States played a part in the 1953 coup d'etat that toppled the anti-Western regime of Premier Mossadegh.

David Green's essay "The Cold War Comes to Latin America" supports the revisionist thesis about the utilization of the Open Door in Latin America. Writing in Barton Bernstein's edited work, *Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration* (1970), Green presents evidence to suggest that the Truman administration's plans for Latin America called for the extension of the Open Door in order to expand the American marketplace, thus maintaining a high standard of living for American people.

While the empire thesis of the Wisconsin school has been subjected to considerable criticism within the historical profession, there is a growing body of literature emanating from persons outside the profession supportive of the empire concept. Amaury de Riencourt's *The American Empire* (1968) gives the fullest treatment to the empire concept from the colonial era to the Cold War, while Claude Julien's *American Empire* (1973) and John M. Swomley's *American Empire: The Political Ethics of Twentieth Century Conquest* (1970) treats only the 20th century manifestations of the empire thesis. Ronald Steel's *Pax Americana* (1967) is primarily concerned with the military facet of the empire concept. Although Sidney Lens' *The Forging of the American Empire* (1971) fits into the category of the other works mentioned in this paragraph, Lens' study supports the Wisconsin thesis on the Cold War. In a lengthy work, generally reflecting the empire concept in its entirety, Lens views the Cold War in terms of Russian reaction to an aggressive American effort to compel Russian acceptance of the American world view.

The dialogue between traditionalists and revisionists is growing. While older traditional historians have tended to answer the younger members of the Wisconsin school only through critical book reviews, younger historians of the traditional view have responded with essays and monographs. While the traditionalists have accused the revisionists for politicizing their history and for misuse of sources, there is every indication that revisionist historiography, which has produced the empire concept, has had a profound impact on the writing and teaching of American diplomatic history. "Texts and Teachings: A Profile of Historians of American Foreign Relations in 1972," a recent essay in the *SHAFR Newsletter*, IV (Sept., 1973), 4-23, by Sandra C. Thomson and Clayton A. Coppin, Jr., indicates the influence of revisionist literature on the teaching of diplomatic history. The authors show that monographs by Williams, LaFeber, and Kolko have shaped the teaching of some 38 of

70 respondents. They also demonstrated that a number of the SHAFR membership used economic determinism as a working hypothesis for their courses. Surprisingly enough, the essay indicated that a number disclaimed acceptance of the revisionist thesis, but found it a useful teaching tool. Also indicative of the growing acceptance of the revisionist critique of diplomatic history is the generally affirmative response to the textbook, *Creation of the American Empire: U. S. Diplomatic History* (1973), a readable, well-organized work by Gardner, LaFeber, and McCormick.

Although historians have raised serious questions about the methodology, purpose, basic premise, and specific interpretations of the revisionist critique of American diplomatic history, there is every indication that this critique has provoked a searching reassessment of the of the discipline and provided a stimulus to research and teaching. Even so, the traditionalist's reply has created for the revisionists a credibility gap. Charles E. Neu's essay, "The Changing Interpretative Structure of American Foreign Policy," in *Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy* (1971) edited by John Braeman, *et al.*, has suggested that unless New Left historians "become more responsive to major trends in American historiography" they run the risk of being "left farther and farther behind" as the developing dynamic of American historiography draws further from the turbulent decade of the 1960s when many historians utilized the writing of history as a means of effecting social, political, and economic change.

Resources for Mexican History in the United States National Archives¹

Kenneth J. Grieb*

The National Archives and Records Service of the United States Government possesses vast amounts of material useful for the study of Mexican History. These resources shed important light on internal Mexican affairs, as well as on Mexican-United States relations, since American representatives kept extensive records during times of turmoil when national officials were fully occupied by civil strife.

The records of the Department of State constitute the largest portion of the resources in the National Archives dealing with Mexico. This vast collection is invaluable, and the Mexican files are among the most voluminous. State Department documents, contained in Record Group 59, are located in the Legislative, Judicial, and Diplomatic Branch of the Archives. Until 1906, the records were divided into four categories:

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Instructions to United States diplomatic and consular representatives, despatches received from these envoys, notes to Foreign Legations and Embassies in the United States, and missives received from these agencies. Using documents from this period is rather cumbersome, since each separate series must be consulted. From 1906 to 1910, a system of subject files was employed. This format is also somewhat cumbersome, as the establishment of files depended upon the foresight of the clerk, resulting in wide variations of length. Since the file numbers were assigned in sequence of creation, they offer no clues to their contents without use of the Department's indices and guides.

In 1910 a new system was adopted, establishing consolidated decimal files organized by nation, with internal subject headings. The two most useful major series are 800 for internal affairs, and 700 for international relations. The remaining digits identify the countries involved, with the decimals signifying the subgroupings. The number for Mexico is 12, and that of the United States is 11. Hence the 812.00 file deals with the Internal Affairs of Mexico, and contains the bulk of the information, while the 711.12 file encompasses relations between Mexico and the United States. Documents are numbered consecutively as slash numbers, for example 812.00/8693. There are also subgroupings for special topics, such as 812.51 for financial affairs in Mexico. During certain periods the 711.12 file contains only routine items, while most of the information relating to Mexican-American affairs is in the 812.00 file. Cross references lead to supplemental files, such as those of the Division of Latin American Affairs, Inter-American Conferences, the various "special agents" detailed to Mexico, and the Department's personnel files. The Post Records in Record Group 84 contain the archives of each station, including the Consulates and the Embassy. They offer insights into local affairs, and contain exchanges between Consulates not transmitted to Washington. Since the United States has maintained a large number of Consulates in Mexico, these files are quite extensive.

State Department records are generally available for study after a 20 year lapse; *i.e.*, at present the portions through 1941 constitute the "open period." Records beyond the "open period," extending through the year of the most recent *Foreign Relations* volume, constitute the "restricted period," currently 1942 through 1946. These are available to qualified researchers by special permission of the State Department, which is normally extended to recognized scholars, subject to a review of note cards.² Documents for years not yet covered in *Foreign Relations* are closed. A 50 year limit applies to personnel files.

Army Department records housed in the Archives also contain vast stores of information regarding Mexico. During the Nineteenth Century separate topical files were maintained. Records from this period useful to Mexicanists include those relating to the acquisitions of Texas and the Mexican War. The files of the Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94, constitute the most valuable portion of Army documents during

the Twentieth Century. Beginning in 1917 they were organized in consolidated decimal files which group information by period, office, and country. These series include such items as reports by military attachés, the archives of the Office of Strategic Services, a section concerning affairs along the Rio Grande frontier, records of Army posts located near the border, and files concerning specific campaigns, such as the Veracruz occupation and the Pershing expedition.

Generally, Army records are readily open through 1939, although items relating to the intelligence division are partially restricted, necessitating a screening process. Post-1939 materials are available only to bona fide researchers who are United States citizens. Their use requires special clearance, and a review of both the notes and the manuscript. Records of the Office of Strategic Services are under the jurisdiction of the State Department, and are subject to its regulations.

Navy Department records in Record Group 40, also contain some information regarding Mexico. The daily reports and logbooks of the commanders of United States snips and squadrons operating in Mexican waters constitute a valuable supplement to the consular files, since the United States normally kept ships on station off the coasts of Mexico, particularly during crisis periods. Nineteenth Century communications were filed in general groups by commanders, alphabetized within each rank, rendering their use difficult. Separate files of reports by Squadron Commanders are also available. Beginning about 1910, the correspondence was grouped according to station and region. Records concerning Mexico can be found in the Caribbean and Central Pacific sections. Subject files were also instituted, with a series containing the reports of "Naval commanders in Mexican waters during the Revolution," 1913-1921.

Other, less voluminous files, containing information about Mexico may be found throughout the records of the various agencies encompassed within the Legislative, Judicial, and Diplomatic Branch. For example, a category of "General Records," contains files dealing with Claims Commissions, Boundary Commissions, and International Conferences. The Department of Justice files contain information regarding investigations of arms smuggling along the Mexican frontier. Records of the Department of the Treasury also deal with this subject, chiefly in the Coast Guard section, and the Daily Reports of Secret Service Agents stationed along the border. The files of Customs Service posts contain useful data regarding commerce and smuggling. Specialized files concerning joint projects may be found in the appropriate Departments. For example, such Departments as Agriculture and Commerce receive information on their specialties gathered by their representatives in Mexico.

The Military and Legislative, Judicial, and Diplomatic Branches of the Archives are open from 8:45 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. Monday through Friday. Records from the open period can be transferred to the Central Search Room, which is open from 8:45 A.M. to 10:00 P.M. Monday through

Friday, and 8:45 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. on Saturdays. Typewriters are allowed, and xeroxing orders are accepted for documents from the open periods. There are ample guides, indices, and finding aides available for all records sections, although there are some variations, reflecting filing procedures. Archival personnel provide highly competent assistance. Admission to the open period records is readily obtainable, requiring only completion of a brief form at the Archives. It is suggested, however, that researchers write in advance to the Director of the appropriate division, giving notice of their intended arrival and details regarding their projects. Dr. Mark G. Eckhoff is Director of the Legislative, Judicial, and Diplomatic Records Division, Dr. Robert W. Krauskopf is Director of the Old Military Records Division, and Dr. Mabel E. Deutrich is Director of Modern Military Records Division. For restricted periods, advance permission from the appropriate agency is necessary. Processing of requests normally requires at least six weeks. The directors of the archival sections will furnish the appropriate information regarding procedures for obtaining such authorizations.

1. This article originally appeared as a chapter in Richard E. Greenleaf and Micheal C. Meyers, eds., Research in Mexican History: Topics, Methodology, Sources, and a Practical Guide to Field Research, (Lincoln: Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1973) pp. 105-108, and is reprinted here by permission of the editors and the publisher. A footnote has been added to report recent changes that have taken place since the original chapter went to press, while preserving the original text intact. Readers interested in information about Mexican archival depositories can find data on these subjects in the aforementioned volume.

2. As the readers of the Newsletter are aware from previous issues, President Nixon recently abolished the restriction period, extending the open period through 1946. During August, 1973 the State Department announced that the records for 1947 had been transferred to the Archives, and were now generally open. In other words, all documents are open up to the point of publication of the Foreign Relations volumes.

Abstracts of Articles Published, or Scholarly Papers Delivered, by Members of SHAFR

Gary R. Hess (Bowling Green State U), "Franklin Roosevelt and Indochina." *Journal of American History*. 1972. 59 (2), 353-368. Franklin Roosevelt took a keen interest in the postwar status of Indochina. From 1943 until his death, Roosevelt advanced the suggestion of an international trusteeship for the French colony. His pursuit of that goal, however, was uneven; he sought Russian and Chinese endorsement, while largely ignoring the French and British. Also Roosevelt failed to coordinate U. S. military and political objectives; he acquiesced in British

occupation of southern Indochina, which provided a basis for the French reoccupation. The trusteeship concept, it appears in retrospect, warranted more serious attention and consideration by Roosevelt and the wartime allies. Its implementation would have provided for a peaceful transition from colonial to independent status. It would also have elevated the Allied cause in the minds of colonial peoples. Finally, it could have built upon the pro-American sentiment cemented by American-Viet Minh contacts in 1944-45.

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Salvatore Prisco, III (U of Alabama), "Hjalmar Schacht and German Economic Nationalism in Latin America, 1934-1937." *South Eastern Latin Americanist*. 1973. 16 (March), 4-7. An analysis of Nazi economic policy in Latin America under German Minister of Economics, Hjalmar Schacht. Schacht's barter arrangements are discussed, and compared to the reciprocal trade approach of the United States. Franklin D. Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy is seen, in part, as a direct response to the economic and political challenge of Nazism in the hemisphere. This made possible greater Pan-American cooperation during World War II.

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Thomas Schoonover (U of Southwest Louisiana), "The Mexican Minister Describes Andrew Johnson's 'Swing Around the Circle.'" *Civil War History*. 1973. 19 (2), 149-161. Consisting largely of translations of dispatches to the Mexican government by the latter's minister, Matias Romero, to the United States during the Reconstruction Era, this paper suggests that Mexican affairs played a secondary but nevertheless significant role in the struggle between President Johnson and the Radical opposition. Romero's observations are very valuable since he accompanied the tour as far as Chicago, the only foreign diplomat who journeyed with the Johnson party. In addition to foreign policy aspects of the tour, he described the relationships between Gen. U. S. Grant, Secretary of State, Wm. H. Seward, and President Johnson. Romero concluded that he was being used by Seward to generate support for Johnson's position against the Radicals.

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Robert W. Sellen (Georgia State U, Atlanta), "Old Assumptions versus New Realities: Lyndon Johnson and Foreign Policy." *International Journal* (Toronto). 1973. 28 (Spring). President L. B. Johnson developed formidable political skills on his way to power, but at the same time he incurred defects of personality, wrong attitudes, and a lack of knowledge in world affairs, all of which caused him to rely upon the Cold War mythology, to be trapped by his advisers, and to ask superficial questions in foreign policy reviews. Hence, his genuine contributions in the area of foreign affairs -- openings to Eastern Europe, the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, etc. -- were obscured by the intervention in the Dominican Republic and the waging of the futile war in Vietnam.

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J. K. Sweeney (South Dakota State U), "The Framework of Luso-American Diplomatic Relations during the Second World War." *Rocky Mountain Social Science Journal*. 1973. 10 (3), 93-100. The framework of Portuguese foreign policy during World War II was established by the character of the dictator, Antonio de O. Salazar, and the peculiar relationship which existed between the pride of the Portuguese and their colonial empire. The Portuguese were, at times, more concerned with the superficial signs of respect by other nations than with the realities of international relations. Nevertheless, Salazar managed to negotiate the seas of neutrality successfully, and the Allies, particularly the United States, avoided rocking the boat too much.

PERSONALS

Several members of SHAFR have been involved in recent appointments to -- or within -- the Historical Office of the Department of State. Designated historians in the Office are the following: Dr. John A. Bernbaum, Dr. Joan Lee Bryniarski, Dr. M. Paul Claussen, Jr. (formerly director of Historiconsultants, Inc.), Dr. N. Stephen Kane (from U of Wisconsin at Oshkosh), Dr. Ronald D. Landa (from College Misericordia, Dallas, Pa.), and Dr. Jane H. Schwar (from Ohio State U). Dr. Homer L. Calkin has been elevated to the post of Chief of the Special Studies Branch in the Historical Office; Dr. Mary Patricia Chapman has become Chief of the Area Studies Branch; and Dr. Frederick Aandahl has been appointed Chief of the Foreign Relations Division.

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Dr. Gary R. Hess has been appointed chairman of the Department of History at Bowling Green State University.

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Dr. Thomas Schoonover, U of Southwestern Louisiana, has just completed a year's leave under a Younger Humanist Fellowship from the National Endowment for the Humanities during which time he did research in Mexico, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Honduras on the topic of United States-Central American relations, 1840-1885.

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Dr. Thomas M. Leonard, formerly at St. Joseph College (Emmitsburg, Md.), is now at the U of North Florida (Jacksonville).

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Dr. Kenneth J. Hagan, formerly at Kansas State U, is now a member of the History Department at the U. S. Naval Academy.

Publications by Members of SHAFR

Dorothy Borg (Columbia) and Shumpei Okamoto, eds., *Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941*. 1973. Columbia U Press. \$25.00. Reviewed in *History*, October, 1973. Among the essays in this volume are those done by the following members of SHAFR: Norman A. Graebner, Asada Sadao, Wayne S. Cole, Ernest R. May, Richard W. Leopold, Lloyd C. Gardner, Russell F. Weigley, and Dorothy Borg.

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Lee H. Burke (Department of State), *Ambassador at Large: Diplomat Extraordinary*. 1972. Martinus Nijhoff, Publisher, The Hague. 30 guilders.

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Richardson Dougall and Mary Patricia Chapman, *United States Chiefs of Mission, 1778-1973*. 1973. U. S. Government Printing Office. Pb. 229pp. \$2.70.

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Lloyd C. Gardner (Rutgers), ed., *The Korean War*. 1972. Quadrangle Books. Pb. \$2.95.

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Joseph L. Grabill (Illinois State U, Normal, Ill.), *Protestant Diplomacy and the Near East: Missionary Influence on American Policy, 1810-1927*. 1971. U of Minnesota Press. \$13.50. This work has won the McKnight Award of the Minnesota Press.

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Kenneth J. Hagan (U. S. Naval Academy), *American Gunboat Diplomacy and the Old Navy, 1877-1899*. 1973. Greenwood Press. \$11.50.

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Gary R. Hess (Bowling Green State U), *America Encounters India, 1941-1947*. 1971. John Hopkins Press. \$9.50. Reviewed in *Journal of American History*, December, 1972, and in *Perspective*, April, 1972.

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Thomas L. Karnes (Arizona State U), ed., *Readings in the Latin American Policy of the United States*. 1972. U of Arizona Press. Pb. \$4.95.

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Richard S. Kirkendall (Executive Secretary, OAH), *The Global Power: The United States since 1941*. 1972. Allyn and Bacon, Inc. Pb. \$3.95. One of a six-volume series with the overall title, *From Colony to Global Power: A History of the United States*.

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Ernest R. May (Harvard) and James C. Thomson, Jr. eds., *American-East Asian Relations*. 1972. Harvard U Press. \$15.00. Reviewed in September, 1973 issue of *Journal of American History*. Of the seventeen essays, covering the era from 1784 to the present, seven are by members of SHAFR; Raymond Esthus, Charles E. Neu, Burton Beers, Roger Dingman, Waldo Heinrichs, Louis Morton, and Robert Dallek.

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Raymond G. O'Connor (U of Miami, Fla), *Force and Diplomacy: Essays Military and Diplomatic*. 1972. U of Miami (Florida) Press. \$10.00. Reviewed in *Perspective*, May, 1972, and in *Journal of American History*, December, 1972.

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Raymond G. O'Connor (U of Miami, Fla.), *Diplomacy for Victory: FDR and Unconditional Surrender*. 1971. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. \$6.50. Reviewed in *Journal of American History*, September, 1972, and in *Perspective*, February, 1972.

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David M. Pletcher (U of Indiana), *The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican War*. 1973. U of Missouri Press. \$20.00.

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Salvatore Prisco, III (U of Alabama), *John Barrett, Progressive Era Diplomat: A Study of a Commercial Expansionist, 1887-1920*. 1973. U of Alabama Press. \$5.75.

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Leslie E. Decker and Robert Seager, II (U of Baltimore), eds., *America's Major Wars: Crusaders, Critics, and Scholars, 1775-1972*. 2 vols. Vol I (1775-1865); Vol. II (1898-1972). 1973. Addison-Wesley, Paperbacks. \$4.95 each volume.

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Daniel M. Smith (U of Colorado), *The American Diplomatic Experience*. 1972. Houghton Mifflin. Pb. \$5.95

MEETINGS

SHAFR will meet with the AHA at the latter's annual convention in San Francisco, December 27-30, with the Hilton Hotel (Mason and O'Farrell Sts.) serving as headquarters. The Council for SHAFR will convene at 7:00 P. M., Thursday, December 27, in the Tamalpais Room of the Hilton.

The next morning, Friday, December 28, at 9:30 in the California Room of the Hilton SHAFR will hold a joint program with the AHA under the general title of AMERICAN NAVAL DIPLOMACY, 1838-1917, with Dr. Kenneth J. Hagan of the U. S. Naval Academy in the chair. Three papers will be read: "The Navy Before Darwinism. Science, Explora-

tion, and Diplomacy, 1838-54," by Geoffrey S. Smith (Queens University, Kingston, Ontario); "The Naval War College and 'America's Outward Thrust,' 1883-98," by Ronald Spector (Center of Military History, Department of the Army), and "Defending the 'New Empire': Naval Strategy and American Diplomacy in the Caribbean, 1900-17," by Richard W. Turk (Allegheny College). Commentator for the occasion will be Prof. David F. Trask (Suny at Stony Brook).

The annual luncheon will follow in the California Room West of the St. Francis Hotel at 12:00. (The St. Francis is approximately 2½ blocks from the Hilton). The vice president, Bradford Perkins, will preside, and Dr. Wayne S. Cole will deliver his presidential address, "A Tale of Two Isolationists -- Told Three Wars Later." The winner of the second Annual Stuart L. Bernath Prize will be announced at this meeting. Tickets for the luncheon are \$8.00 and should be ordered from the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer; the deadline for orders is December 20. A business meeting will follow the announcement of the Bernath award.

The day's activities will conclude with a reception, 5:00-7:00, in Continental Parlor #3 of the Hilton.

(Members of SHAFR should note that there are several changes from the tentative program as announced in the September *Newsletter*. Arrangements at that time were still incomplete; hence, the incorrect, or missing, information).

* * * * *

The first independent national meeting ever of SHAFR will be held in the Washington, D. C. area in August of 1975. All national meetings of SHAFR have thus far been "piggybacks" of the two older and much larger historical organizations, the AHA and the OAH. A separate national gathering will be a milestone in the independence of the Society, signifying an advanced degree of maturity. This projected convocation, therefore, well merits the wholehearted support of the entire membership of SHAFR. Those persons who have suggestions for a session (at least three, and possibly four, will be held) are asked to contact Dr. Armin Rappaport, Chairman for the Program Committee of SHAFR, in the near future.

* * * * *

The Second Annual General Wilburt S. Brown Memorial Military History Conference will be held at the University of Alabama, February 2, 1974. The theme will be "The Role of the Military in Modern World Affairs." Papers will be presented by Stephan Ambrose on Dwight D. Eisenhower, Bell I. Wiley on Jefferson Davis, Clayton James on Douglas MacArthur, and Col. Roger Willock, U. S. M. C. R., on Rafael L. Trujillo.

Results of Election for Officers of SHAFR

Vice President: Amin Rappaport (U of California at San Diego), 85; Forrest C. Pogue (Executive Director, George C. Marshall Research Foundation), 74.

Member of Council (1973-77): John L. Gaddis (Ohio U), 105; Robert F. Smith (Toledo U), 53.

Nominations Committee: Lawrence Gelfand (U of Iowa), 84; Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento State College), 71.

Bradford Perkins (U of Michigan), now vice president, will become the president of SHAFR in 1974.

THE ACADEMIC EXCHANGE

(Acting solely in a service capacity, the *Newsletter* will carry notices of (a) vacancies in various fields which are of interest to U. S. diplomatic historians, and (b) the vitae of members of SHAFR who desire employment. All announcements will be anonymous, unless a user specifically states otherwise. Each notice will be assigned a number, and persons who are interested must mention that number when contacting the editorial office. That office will then supply the name and address which corresponds to that number. When contacting the editor regarding an announcement, please enclose a stamped, addressed envelope for the return. Announcements should not exceed twelve (12) lines in the *Newsletter*. Unless specifically requested to do otherwise, and then subject to the limitations of space and fairness to others, a particular notice will be carried only once a year).

#E-102 Ph. D. (Rutgers, 1969) in U. S. diplomatic and recent American history. Desires an associate or assistant professorship, or editorial position, in the Northeastern U. S. Has had six years of undergraduate and graduate teaching experience. Strong in publications: one book and seven articles. Prepared to teach survey courses in U. S. and world history, U. S. foreign relations, and Sino-American relations. In U. S. diplomacy the applicant's emphasis has been upon the Asian and Latin American areas.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS ARCHIVES

Warren F. Kuehl*

The Historical Collections' Section of the Library of the United Nations at Geneva, Switzerland, contains extensive and exceptionally rich materials on the League of Nations and its activities, 1919-1946. Historians should not assume that the collection deals only with the internal operation and development of the League. The range of topics is exceptional, because the League, through various commissions and committees, explored nearly every area of activity in the world, political and non-political.

The League, for operating purposes, developed Sections, and the materials are arranged according to these. They include the office files of the Secretariat under the Political Section, the Economic and Financial Section, the Section on Administrative Commissions and Minorities Questions, a Legal Section, the Health and Social Questions Section, an Information Section, the Intellectual Cooperation and International Bureaus Section, Communications and Transit Section, Political Section, Mandates Section, Disarmaments Section, and the Refugee Section. Other miscellaneous files exist, including one on the Bureau for Liaison with Latin America. The Collection also includes personal papers of several individuals connected with the League, plus the archives of the International Federation of the League of Nations Societies.

American diplomatic historians will find extensive material on the peace settlement of 1919, on the Allied Commission and the Conference of Ambassadors, and on disarmament efforts of the interwar years. Information on United States contacts with the League's non-political agencies and the concern of the United States over international issues between 1920 and 1941 appears in a wide variety of places. These interests include the Pact of Paris, the Locarno and Geneva treaties, efforts to extend the concept of peaceful settlement of disputes through arbitration and conciliation, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the Manchurian and Ethiopian crises. Much information exists on the cooperation of United States public and private agencies with many of the League's commissions and committees on non-political affairs. This is especially true on health, trade, and social issues involving women, children, and drugs.

The files should be of special interest to students of United States-Latin American relations, since they contain data on attitudes toward the Monroe Doctrine and on the impact of League membership of Latin American states on the development of Pan-Americanism.

*Dr. Kuehl is professor of history at the University of Akron.

Extensive indexes exist for individuals and subjects and a 78 page finding aid, "Guide to the Archives of the League of Nations, 1919-1946" is available in mimeographed form. Persons interested can obtain more information by writing Mr. Sven Weiland, Library of the United Nations, Palais de Nations, Geneva, Switzerland.

THE STUART L. BERNATH PRIZE COMPETITION FOR 1974

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations announces the ending of the 1974 competition for the Stuart L. Bernath Prize on a book dealing with any aspect of American foreign relations. (The 1973 competition closed on May 31 with the prize winner to be announced at the annual luncheon of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the AHR in December, 1973). The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of America's foreign relations.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that was published during 1973. It must be the author's first or second book.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. Robert Beisner, Chairman, Stuart L. Bernath Prize Committee, Department of History, American University, Washington, D. C. 20016. The volumes must be received by December 31, 1973.

AMOUNT: \$500.00. If two (2) or more works are deemed winners, as in 1972, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be in April, 1974, at Denver, Colo.

SHAFR ROSTER & RESEARCH LIST

Please use this form to register your general and current research interests as well as your current address. The complete Roster & Research List will be revised and issued on Dec. 15 of even years. (Supplemental lists will be published in uneven years). In addition to an alphabetical membership roster, names will be grouped according to the subject matter of their current research (or according to their area of general research interest if no specific research project is listed), so please use descriptive titles in registering a project. Unless new data is submitted, previously listed research projects will be repeated in each issue. Submit the form at any time during the year, but before July 15 to be included in that year's listing.

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SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

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Cookeville, Tennessee 38501

ISSUES: March, June, September, and December. All members receive the publication.

DEADLINES: All material must be in the hands of the editor not later than the 1st of the month preceding each issue.

MATERIAL DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, awards), announcements, synopses of scholarly papers delivered upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, lists of accessions of diplomatic materials to libraries, essays of a 'how-to-do-it' nature respecting diplomatic materials in various depositories. Because of space limitations articles and book reviews are unacceptable.

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