

Volume 42, Number 2, September 2011

# Passport



*The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review*



## Inside...

The Long Crisis in U.S. Diplomatic History

A Roundtable Discussion on Michaela Hoenicke-Moore's

*Know Your Enemy*

SHAFR Looks at the Arab Spring

...and much more!

# Passport

*The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review*

## Editorial Office:

Mershon Center for International Security Studies  
1501 Neil Avenue  
Columbus OH 43201  
passport@osu.edu  
614-292-1681 (phone)  
614-292-2407 (fax)

## Executive Director

Peter L. Hahn, The Ohio State University

## Editor

Mitchell Lerner, The Ohio State University-Newark

## Production Editor

Julie Rojewski, Michigan State University

## Editorial Assistant

David Hadley, The Ohio State University

## Editorial Advisory Board and Terms of Appointment

Elizabeth Kelly Gray, Towson University (2009-2011)

Robert Brigham, Vassar College (2010-2012)

George White, Jr., York College/CUNY (2011-2013)

*Passport* is published three times per year (April, September, January), by the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and is distributed to all members of the Society. Submissions should be sent to the attention of the editor, and are acceptable in all formats, although electronic copy by email to [passport@osu.edu](mailto:passport@osu.edu) is preferred. Submissions should follow the guidelines articulated in the *Chicago Manual of Style*. Manuscripts accepted for publication will be edited to conform to *Passport* style, space limitations, and other requirements. The author is responsible for accuracy and for obtaining all permissions necessary for publication. Manuscripts will not be returned. Interested advertisers can find relevant information on the web at: <http://www.shafr.org/newsletter/passportrates.htm>, or can contact the editor. The opinions expressed in *Passport* do not necessarily reflect the opinions of SHAFR or of The Ohio State University.

The editors of *Passport* wish to acknowledge the generous support of The Ohio State University, The Ohio State University—Newark, and the Mershon Center for International Security Studies.

© 2011 SHAFR

# Passport

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review

Volume 42, Number 2, September 2011

## In This Issue

- 4    **SHAFR in the World**  
Matthew Connelley, Robert J. McMahon, Katherine A.S. Sibley,  
Thomas Borstelmann, Nathan Citino, and Kristin Hoganson
- 17    **SHAFR Looks at the Arab Spring**  
James Goode, Weldon C. Matthews, Clea Bunch, and  
Paul Thomas Chamberlin
- 26    **A Roundtable Discussion of Michaela Hoenicke-Moore's *Know Your Enemy: The American Debate on Nazism, 1933-1945***  
Gunter Bischof, Lloyd Ambrosius, Cora Sol Goldstein,  
Brian Etheridge, and Michaela Hoenicke-Moore
- 38    **The Attack on Higher Education**  
John T. McNay
- 42    **Debating the Anglo-Celtic Divide**  
Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Thomas A. Breslin
- 45    **Bad Policies: Nigerians' Perceptions of the United States**  
S.U. Fwatshak
- 50    **Kennedy Library Launches Digital Archives**  
Erica Boudreau
- 52    **The 2010 Report of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation**
- 54    **The Diplomatic Pouch**
- 66    **In Memoriam: Lawrence E. Gelfand (1926-2011)**
- 67    **The Last Word**  
Mitchell Lerner

# SHAFR in the World

*Matthew Connelly, Robert J. McMahon, Katherine A.S. Sibley, Thomas Borstelmann, Nathan Citino, and Kristin Hoganson*

*Editor's Note: Matthew Connelly's piece, "SHAFR in the World," was originally delivered at the 2010 OAH Conference in Washington, D.C. as part of a plenary session, "The United States and the World." It appears here in a slightly altered form. Dr. Connelly was the only panelist contacted by Passport who agreed to participate in this roundtable.*

## SHAFR in the World

*Matthew Connelly*

When I started graduate school almost twenty years ago, it would have been hard to imagine that a plenary session on "The United States in the World" could fill a ballroom at the annual Organization of American Historians conference. So many scholars are now pursuing international and transnational approaches to the history of the United States that the subject has actually become fashionable. But for people like me, training to become diplomatic historians in the 1990s, working outside the conventional frame of national history was not just a choice. It seemed like the only way to survive.

The long crisis in U.S. diplomatic history began decades earlier, when leading scholars called for a more international approach to the study of American foreign relations. There were compelling intellectual arguments: Christopher Thorne, Charles Maier, and Sally Marks pointed out that it was impossible to understand the impact the United States had in the world without doing research abroad. They also called for giving greater attention to "structures," i.e., the underlying factors that can shape inter-state relations.

But these arguments were largely ignored, as many U.S. diplomatic historians continued to study U.S. foreign relations using only official U.S. archives. When I went on the job market, leading departments

were opting not to replace retiring diplomatic historians. And when there were important initiatives to internationalize U.S. history, such as those featured in the 1992 *Journal of American History* and at the 1997 La Pietra conference, diplomatic historians were not in the lead. In fact, aside from a few standouts like Akira Iriye, they were largely absent—absent from the pages of the *JAH* and the *AHR* and absent from national conference programs, to the point that diplomatic historians began to organize protests and complain to the media.

I well remember one story that eventually appeared in the *Chronicle of Higher Education*. I heard about it because the reporter contacted the chairman of my department at the University of Michigan to ask why they had decided not to hire a diplomatic historian. I had to explain that the demise of diplomatic history in Ann Arbor had been greatly exaggerated, though I could not explain to my chair why senior historians in the field did not consider me one of their own.

Some diplomatic historians insisted that they were uniquely concerned with power. I think that what they really meant was that they were the only ones who cared about presidential decision-making in war and diplomacy. They had a point—one I have often repeated to colleagues at Michigan and later at Columbia. After all, how many wars will this country have to wage before some of our biggest departments recognize that military and diplomatic history are worthy of attention?

But it is not true that other fields of history ignore power. They study the power of patriarchy, the power of racism, and all the relations of power that are enshrined in law and enforced in courts, expressed through new technologies, manifested in the management of land and resources, and so on. I would argue that identifying our field as uniquely concerned with power but powerless to influence our profession is not only mistaken, it is self-defeating.

The problem begins with defining foreign relations as a small and shrinking sub-field of U.S. history. That definition never made sense intellectually (who were we relating to, after all, if not the rest of the world?) and certainly not politically, if we cared about recruiting graduate students and communicating our research to colleagues. Why, after all, would anyone want to join a group that insisted it was a persecuted minority?

To say that U.S. diplomatic historians see themselves as a persecuted minority might seem like an exaggeration. But consider the results of a poll conducted by *H-Diplo* in the period preceding the 2009 annual conference. Diplomatic historians were asked whether SHAFR should change its name to reflect the fact that an increasing number of its members work in transnational history. They rejected the idea by more than three to one, with one respondent explaining that, if the NAACP kept its name, why shouldn't SHAFR?

It is a curious comparison. SHAFR's membership is overwhelmingly white and male, after all. The organization does not keep figures on minority membership, but fewer than twenty percent are women. When I asked one former SHAFR president whether the lack of women and minorities is a problem, he pointed out that scholars of African-American history are mainly African-American—as if SHAFR was a society for the history of white American men, not all of those concerned with the history of the United States in the world.

Many people are working within SHAFR to promote a more inclusive vision. They are not just trying to change the name; they are trying to promote women to leadership positions and offer students financial support to encourage a more diverse membership. And SHAFR conferences and the pages of *Diplomatic History* are featuring truly exciting and innovative multi-archival international research on

many subjects besides war and diplomacy.

But to bring about fundamental change, we need to do more. As long as U.S. diplomatic historians define themselves as a sub-field of U.S. history, they will face the thankless task of persuading other Americanists that foreign policy is no less important than newer subjects that seem fresh and exciting, such as gender and sexuality, the environment and material culture, or science and technology. Why should we expect them to cede space in conference programs and journals or give up faculty lines or share Ph.D. fellowships? "It is difficult," as Upton Sinclair once observed, "to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it."

Rather than continue to see diplomatic history as a subfield of U.S. history or any national history, I think we need to recognize that diplomatic history is instead a subfield of the larger and still expanding fields of international and transnational history. It is international in the sense that, even when working on U.S. foreign relations, historians will work in multiple countries. And it is transnational, because they will explore all of the ways Americans are connected to the rest of the world, whether through migration, new media, religious movements, environmental change, or epidemic disease. In this way, diplomatic historians can count themselves as part of the global community of scholars interested not just in war and diplomacy, but also international and non-governmental organizations, trade and monetary policy, scientific and technological innovation, and countless other subjects that connect different countries or transcend the boundaries between them.

There have always been powerful arguments for this broader vision, but recent history has made it irresistible. The study of world politics has long been motivated by contemporary concerns. Twenty years after the end of the Cold War, we need to explore the many ways the world has been changing, and not just through inter-state diplomacy. And we should also recognize that, in the longer sweep of history, the era in which nation-states ran the world may be exceptional, as global politics once again becomes more pluralistic, with many more and different kinds of actors jostling for power.

There have been many inspiring calls for international and transnational history. For some time, it was not clear whether they

would actually lead to compelling new work, work that would connect different parts of the world while still attending to the context and particularity of each place. But over the last decade, historians have begun to meet this challenge: consider, for example, Margaret MacMillan on the diplomacy of Versailles, Erez Manela on the international impact of Wilson's call for self-determination, Barbara Keys on national rivalries and international sport, Jeremi Suri on the global 1968 and the diplomacy of détente, Piero Gleijeses on Castro's support for revolution in Africa, Arne Westad's study of the superpowers and proxy wars, and Mary Sarotte's account of the reunification of Germany.

In my own work I have been gradually shifting from international to transnational history. It started with a study of how the Algerian National Liberation Front gained independence by isolating France from its allies and winning international recognition. My last book was a global history of the population control movement. And I am now embarking on a history of forecasting, projections, and future scenarios, studying how a transnational network of futurologists made claims to prevision a key tool of global governance.

There are now many more works on transnational social movements, such as Cemil Aydin's comparative and connected history of Pan-Asianism and Pan-Islamism and Nick Cullather's new history of the green revolution. And there are even more in the pipeline, such as Alison Bashford's work on geopoliticians and population scientists in Australasia, Mark Bradley's exploration of the human rights revolutions of the twentieth century, Daniel Sargent's study of how Americans responded to globalization in the 1970s, and Brad Simpson's project on how Suharto used international and non-governmental organizations to rule Indonesia.

A more global and transnational perspective reveals that, long before the end of the Cold War, demographic growth and movement, environmental change, new means of mass communication, interdependent capital markets, and international and transnational organizations were combining to cause dramatic change of a recognizably new kind. This broader vision has not only revealed the origins of the contemporary era, it is also restoring the study of world politics to the forefront of historical inquiry. Research on the regulation of migration, science and philanthropy,

public health and epidemic disease, international sport and tourism, communications networks, multinational corporations, and consumer culture can connect global processes to local and even intimate experiences, such as how we shop, count calories, and use contraception.

These are not all new subjects, but this new generation brings to bear multi-archival international research as well as a larger vision of how their work can add up to a new history of the world. Challenges to state sovereignty, the changing significance of territory, the growing salience of biopolitics, and the increasing density of cross-border transactions have come to define a deeper understanding of the recent past. This new history does not make artificial distinctions between internal and external affairs, and it is not limited to the level of inter-state relations. Students of international and transnational history are proving that it is not just a fad. We are beginning to see a body of work that shows not just promise or potential but real accomplishments.

Along with the success of international and transnational history come new challenges. To begin with the obvious, we need to recognize our limitations. The term transnational means little and the term international means nothing in periods and places devoid of nations, which is to say most of world history. It was only in the last three centuries that nations came to displace other kinds of polities—empires, city states, etc. It is only then that we can begin to speak of international history, and contrast it with the history that transcended or subverted national boundaries.

Chris Bayly has argued that we are all global historians now, whether we realize it or not. If you read his magnum opus, *The Birth of the Modern World*, you realize that one cannot assume that topics in history can be studied in isolation without reference to larger processes and patterns. In some ways this broader focus would appear to provincialize U.S. history. In the realm of foreign relations, allowing for the agency of others may mean, for instance, questioning the idea that the CIA overthrew Mossadegh in Iran and Arbenz in Guatemala, as if other Iranians and other Guatemalans did not also have parts to play. But in other ways an international and global frame will highlight the outsized impact that the United States had even before it became a world power. See, for example, Sven Beckert's work on how the Civil War changed cotton cultivation worldwide, or Marilyn

Lake and Henry Reynolds on how the disenfranchisement of African Americans served as a model for racially discriminatory immigration policies in South Africa and Australia.

And yet a lot of history is local and national. Not every topic will reward a larger frame of analysis. This point came home to me recently when I was talking with a prospective Ph.D. student. He was deciding between Columbia and another history department. I tried to persuade him by describing all the ways that, over the last decade, Columbia has been building a program in international, transnational, and even global history. He said that he was told at the other department that *everyone* was doing international, transnational, or global history.

If this was actually true, it would be absurd. Why should everyone abandon national or local history? And if, instead, the terms international and transnational history are being applied to everything, they will soon mean nothing. It makes me wonder whether some historians are calling for a more cosmopolitan approach to history for the wrong reasons: not because it can help answer important but otherwise perplexing historical questions, but because of how it makes them feel. Especially over the last decade, international history became a way of positioning oneself outside—and in opposition to—national history, which was seen as intrinsically nationalistic. But if we study subjects like international organizations and transnational social movements, it should not be to celebrate them, but to understand them.

Perhaps because Columbia is in New York and we can't help but notice the UN headquarters on the other side of town, my colleagues and I have been publishing a series of new, more critical histories of international norms and international organizations. Adam McKeown's *Melancholy Order* examined how the spread of universal suffrage helped justify an inter-state system that would sharply curtail freedom of movement. Susan Pedersen is writing a history of the League of Nations mandate system that will show how it aimed to internationalize imperialism. Mark Mazower's new

book, *No Enchanted Palace*, describes the UN as designed and built to defend empires and adapt them to a more nationalistic era. Sam Moyn's *The Last Utopia* argues that the very idea of human rights was all but

irrelevant to the UN in its first quarter century. My earlier work showed how the UN eventually became a forum for national liberation movements to protest against imperial repression. But my more recent history of the population control movement seeks to explain how a global campaign ostensibly dedicated to women's rights and environmental protection turned into a war on the poor.

It may be too much to claim that there is now a Columbia school of international and transnational history that is dedicated to more empirical and critical studies of international organizations and transnational social movements. But we are creating a program that will train students to carry on this kind of work in their own way. Each year about twenty students, chosen from an applicant pool of over 140, enroll in our dual masters program with the London School of Economics in international and world history. We also have eighteen students pursuing our Ph.D. track in international and global history. This year we launched a new summer program, the Hertog Global Strategy Initiative, which has created a kind of laboratory in which teams of undergraduate and graduate students use new information technology to research the origins of contemporary challenges in world politics, from nuclear proliferation to global pandemics. And Adam McKeown and I edit a series for Columbia University Press that is meant to showcase some of the most innovative new scholarship.

All along, we have been mindful of how other universities (among them Berkeley, Chicago, Cornell, Harvard, Princeton, Temple, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin) are also building programs in international, transnational, and global history. Other university presses are also creating series for new work in these fields. In each case, historians of U.S. foreign relations have been at the forefront of these new initiatives. The study of U.S. diplomacy has a secure place in the historical profession, *but*

*only because it is now just part of a much larger project.*

For that very reason, those of us working in these fields should think harder about the place of the historical profession in the United States and the United States in the world. We are facing a catastrophic job market for new Ph.D.s. There is also a protracted and worsening crisis in academic publishing. And there is little evidence that historians are having much influence in major national decisions or even in relatively minor decisions that have a big impact on our own profession, such as the leadership of the National Archives. Therefore we cannot be complacent. We must think not only about how these new fields of research might carve out a place in the profession, but also how they might help the profession reestablish its place in the United States and reestablish the place of the United States in the world.

Alas, I have grown discouraged about SHAFR's potential for playing a leading role in this endeavor. I have made many of these arguments before, such as at the 2009 conference in Falls Church, VA. On that occasion, Emily Rosenberg offered the very sensible suggestion—seemingly with the support of a large audience—that we change the name of our journal to *Diplomatic and Transnational History*. While it is only a name, identifying our work in a more inclusive way would serve as an invitation to prospective members who do not think of themselves as doing diplomatic history. We were told at the time that the leadership would take up this proposal. But then nothing happened.

Not long ago there was another proposal, this one to shift the date of SHAFR's annual meeting away from the middle of summer, when many scholars are traveling abroad for their research. That is why other organizations with members who do research abroad, such as the Association of Asian Studies, the Association of African Studies, the Middle East Studies Association, and the Council for European Studies, meet over a long weekend in the fall or spring. But a crushing majority of SHAFR members voted down the idea. As long as SHAFR meets in late June in places like Madison and Columbus—expensive and onerous destinations for many traveling from abroad—it will remain much smaller and less international than it could be. And there will also be far fewer women, since the disproportionate number who have primary childcare responsibility find summer recess a particularly inconvenient time to get

away.

Of course, that may be the way some SHAFR members like it. After all, most would not have joined SHAFR if they were not happy with it the way it is. How then can we expect a majority will ever vote to change it? Yet my hope is that many members have not fully considered how much more SHAFR could be if it opened its doors—even a little—to a larger and more diverse membership. They may not even be aware of the structural barriers to entry that keep it isolated. The next time they vote, they may be persuaded to vote not just for themselves, but for friends and colleagues who would be eager to join if it were a different kind of society. As long as SHAFR remains isolated, I have no doubt there will be more such opportunities. Members will continue asking themselves whether they should change SHAFR's name or change its conference or change the title of its journal, when what is really required is a new and more expansive worldview.

Dwight Eisenhower once said that if a problem cannot be solved, it should be enlarged. Instead of waiting for SHAFR to change, we might instead change the context in which it operates. We could create a federation of associations for international and transnational history in which SHAFR would be the U.S. affiliate. International congresses could alternate with national meetings, beginning with a gathering of all those historians around the world interested in the study of world politics. We can only benefit from sharing our work with scholars from the places we study. But we can also work together to advance a common agenda, such as comparing and coordinating strategies for promoting our work, building international alliances to strengthen our position in our departments and universities, and creating support networks for both junior and senior scholars when they travel abroad for archival research and interviews.

It is time, high time, that SHAFR members stop being isolationists. Large crowds now turn out at annual conferences, curious about the nature and potential of international and transnational approaches. Leading scholarly journals regularly feature articles and forums that showcase the results. There is also a large and growing popular audience for work that can explain the changing nature of international relations. The number of U.S. residents born abroad is approaching a new high. And more and more universities are attempting

to reposition themselves as global universities, building satellite campuses and alliances with peer institutions overseas.

Given these developments, the question SHAFR members should be asking themselves is not why they still survive despite the dire predictions of so many in our field. Considering the great and growing interest in U.S. foreign relations, even a less interesting collection of historians with less capable leadership would have prospered. SHAFR members should instead ask themselves why they have not already seized the opportunity to lead the historical profession into this new era—an era in which the impact of the United States is evident everywhere in the world, and the world is everywhere in the United States. So where in the world is SHAFR?

*Matthew Connelly is Professor of History at Columbia University.*

### **“SHAFR in the World”: A Response to Matthew Connelly**

*Robert J. McMahon*

In an essay that is one part critical description of an area of study, one part angry indictment of a scholarly society, and another part prescriptive advice about how to fix both, Matthew Connelly makes a heartfelt plea for foreign relations historians to embrace international and transnational approaches to their subject. By itself, so unremarkable a plea would not likely generate much controversy. The half-truths and mischaracterizations within which it is packaged, however, along with the straw men Connelly seeks to slay en route, virtually guarantee that these musings will rankle more than a few toilers in our common field of inquiry—as it has this one.

Historians of U.S. foreign relations as well as SHAFR as an organizational entity have, after all, endorsed such approaches with considerable warmth and enthusiasm. Many of the articles featured in the pages of our flagship journal, *Diplomatic History*, attest

unmistakably to that basic fact. The growing numbers of internationally and transnationally focused papers presented at our annual meetings provide further evidence of SHAFR's embrace of the internationalist turn. In addition, and perhaps most tellingly, the organization's most prestigious book, article, and dissertation prizes have in recent years been conferred with regularity on precisely the kind of broadly based, internationally framed, multiarchivally researched studies that Connelly advocates. Thomas Zeiler's recent state-of-the-field survey for the *Journal of American History* nicely captures the pervasiveness of this trend in U.S. foreign relations scholarship.

What then has prompted Connelly's throwback jeremiad about the supposedly woeful state of our field? For the author of this provocative and surprisingly presumptuous piece, one suspects that the problem lies with the not-yet-total triumph of the internationalists. Apparently nothing less than the conversion of all specialists in the history of U.S. foreign relations into international/transnational historians would satisfy Connelly—together with the absorption of SHAFR by some as yet unformed society of international and transnational historians, a renaming of *Diplomatic*

*History* to reflect that change, and a rebranding of the society itself so as to banish the term “American.” Only then, with the proverbial stake driven into the heart of any remaining form of non-internationalist diplomatic histories of the United States, would the agenda outlined here be realized.

An element of silliness pervades a core aspect of this vision in that

To condemn the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations for devoting too much attention to American foreign relations is like condemning the Society for the Study of Ancient Egypt for devoting too much attention to Ancient Egypt or berating the Society for the Study of Trees for devoting too much attention to trees.

Connelly is criticizing a professional society for focusing too much attention on the very subject it was formed to study. To condemn the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations for devoting too much attention to American foreign relations is like condemning the Society for the Study of Ancient Egypt for devoting too much attention to Ancient Egypt or berating the Society for the Study of Trees for devoting too much attention to trees. If an object of study possesses

sufficient importance to warrant an organization of scholars committed to its investigation, then it strikes me as curious in the extreme to attack it for not investigating a different subject. Would we blast African American historians for neglecting U.S. business history? Or biologists for not being economists? Examining the external behavior and interactions of a country that for much of the past century has been the world's most powerful and influential nation surely constitutes an intellectual enterprise of sufficient value and complexity that one need not have to apologize for undertaking it.

To compound the confusion, or perhaps just to vary the line of attack, Connelly also indicts SHAFR and the field of American foreign relations history that it represents for lacking diversity.

Too few women and minorities study diplomatic history, he complains. One ex-SHAFR president, cited in his essay, denied that a lack of diversity was a problem. The analogy that the unnamed person offered was that those scholars who studied African American history were primarily African Americans, implying, at least in Connelly's rendition of this conversation, that "SHAFR was a society for the history of white American men, and not [for] all of those concerned with the history of the U.S. and the world." Talk about a straw man! I would be astonished if anyone in our society actually held such a view. Many within SHAFR, as Connelly himself notes, have been working hard to increase the diversity of SHAFR's membership. Moreover, the percentage of non-American members of SHAFR—an especially critical measure of diversity given the subject matter of our sub-discipline—has risen in recent years to approximately 20 percent.

But as important as the issue of diversity might be on organizational and other grounds—and many of us consider it to be of great significance to the vitality of our society—the question of *who* studies a subject should not be conflated with *what* that subject is or with *how*

best to study it. Physicists might rightly concern themselves with the overwhelming percentage of males in their discipline, or occupational therapists with the overwhelming percentage of females, but those concerns should have no bearing on the objects of study within those fields or with the research problems, methods, and theories most pertinent to their advancement.

Behind Connelly's lamentations about our field lurk the same status anxieties that have been reflected in the published essays, conference papers, and private conversations of a multitude of diplomatic historians for more than three decades now. For the past generation or more, social and cultural history paradigms have of course dominated the professional landscape within the discipline of history; the study of elites, the state, and traditional structures of economic and political power—the warp and woof of foreign relations history—have long been relegated to the margins.

would be greater professional visibility for foreign affairs historians and a leadership position for a reconstituted SHAFR within what Connelly considers an especially innovative and exciting mode of historical scholarship. On one level, his is an appealing vision. Who can fail to appreciate the significant insights about America's interaction with and impact on the wider world yielded by the internationalist turn in foreign relations scholarship? Opposing that exciting trend would be akin to opposing motherhood.

But Connelly's zealotry goes too far, in my view, since he is advocating a one-size-fits-all model for diplomatic historians that, if adopted, would weaken rather than strengthen the field, both intellectually and professionally. His praise for the internationalist and transnationalist wave is attenuated by a puzzling disparagement of studies of U.S. foreign relations that explore the internal sources of America's external behavior. As I have argued elsewhere, the study of foreign relations is by its very nature Janus-faced: the field looks both outward and inward for explanations of a nation's international actions. Many of the most important questions about America's interaction with

Those latter issues, of course, comprise the heart of Connelly's critique. He insists that the most appropriate way to study America's role in the world—indeed, the *only* proper way—is from an international or transnational perspective. A wholesale adoption of such enlarged frames of analysis would force a much needed intellectual transformation of our field, according to this vision. Presumed ancillary benefits

the wider world simply cannot be addressed satisfactorily through a lens trained just on the international realm. Fundamental issues such as war, peace, threat perception, diplomacy, alliance formation, economic need, and trade often hinge on matters *internal* to the United States—matters that bring us into the realms of culture, ideology, identity, interest group activity, or domestic politics. Those searching for the most significant factors behind the George W. Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq in 2003, or the establishment of a national security state in early cold war America, or the persistence of the special relationship between Israel and the United States, to take just a few examples, would almost certainly find internal explanations and perspectives more salient than international ones. Connelly would have us lop off that arm of our field in a full-bodied embrace of his preferred mode of analysis. Why, we should ask, would such a move represent an advance?

Fortunately, we do not face a stark either/or choice. Instead, historians of American foreign relations can fruitfully follow a more pluralistic approach to their subject. Doing so makes more sense intellectually and makes good sense professionally. Given the centrality of America's international role to *both* the domestic history of the United States and the history of the world community as a whole, U.S. foreign relations historians are exceptionally well positioned to circulate in and contribute to a range of professional societies and scholarly debates. Have we taken full advantage of those opportunities? Probably not. Here I agree with Connelly, and some of his constructive suggestions for how we might do so more effectively in the future deserve our careful attention. Yet consciously dropping one of the forms of identification that many SHAFR members use—that of historians of the United States—would be neither a wise nor an efficacious strategy. There would be something fundamentally awry with a society devoted to the study of American foreign relations if its member-scholars defaulted on their intellectual responsibilities for contributing in substantive ways to key issues concerning the American historical experience writ large.

Behind Connelly's lamentations about our field lurk the same status anxieties that have been reflected in the published essays, conference papers, and private conversations of a multitude of diplomatic historians for more than three decades now. For the past generation or more, social

and cultural history paradigms have of course dominated the professional landscape within the discipline of history; the study of elites, the state, and traditional structures of economic and political power—the warp and woof of foreign relations history—have long been relegated to the margins. At the same OAH meeting that provided the initial venue for Connelly’s critique, a packed-to-the-rafters session featured four prominent scholars assessing the current state of cultural and social history. One of them brashly proclaimed that the battle was over; cultural history had won the day and all other subfields now fell within its ever-expanding domain.

Connelly would like to reverse that trend, restoring diplomatic history to a more central position in the discipline. International and transnational modes of analysis offer, in his view, the surest path toward renewed prestige, respect, and vigor for foreign relations historians. That assessment derives in part from his observation that such approaches are currently fashionable, even—perhaps especially—among some non-diplomatic historians. Connelly quotes one historian who boasted that in his department “everyone was doing international, transnational, or global history.” He calls this “absurd,” rightly wondering if some scholars were “invoking the idea of international and transnational history for the wrong reasons—not because it can help answer important but otherwise perplexing historical questions, but because of how it can make us feel about ourselves.” Cutting through the hype, he hits upon a crucial point: “Especially over the last decade, it has become a way of positioning oneself outside of—and in opposition to—national history as intrinsically nationalistic.”

Perhaps political instincts and agendas similar to those that turned historians away from the powerful and toward ordinary folks a generation ago are now turning them away from nation-states and toward the transnational and global. If that move leads more historians to explore the questions and issues that have long animated our field, SHAFR warmly welcomes it. But intellectual fashions and political correctness aside, what remain most durable in scholarship are the identification of important historical questions and the pursuit of compelling answers to them. So long as SHAFR and its members continue to do that, while maintaining an admirably big tent and a tolerance for intellectual and methodological diversity, we will be fine.

Robert J. McMahon is Ralph D. Mershon Professor of History at The Ohio State University.

### Pass the Glue

Katharine A. S. Sibley

Professor Matthew Connelly’s clarion call for an internationalization of our field is a continuing refrain in our organization. A panel at the 2009 SHAFR meeting, he reminds us, drew a capacity audience to discuss the topic of changing the organization’s identity from the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations, with its quaintly titled journal, *Diplomatic History*, to something of a more global scope. Connelly recalls from that gathering Emily Rosenberg’s eminently reasonable suggestion for our journal’s new title: *Diplomatic and Transnational History*. Other names for the society were proposed, too, under banners like the Association of Historians of International Topics, United in New Approaches (AHI-TUNA . . . okay, that is a fish story). Other, more obscure initials were intimidated, too, by colleagues who shall remain anonymous, but ultimately the proposals went nowhere, and SHAFR and its journal seem to have remained secure within their 1967 borders.

Yet as Connelly’s provocative and lively article indicates, the debate is far from over. Accordingly, he jabs diplomatic historians for being isolationists who prefer the provincial capitals of Madison and Columbus in sweltering mid-summer, to more internationally oriented cities as well as cooler ones (and not only in temperature) on the East or West coasts. He slams this organization further for excluding women, holding its conferences during summer vacations when mothers might want to be home with their children. Although childcare is no doubt

a concern for some, it is likely as equally difficult to find on spring or fall weekends, and certainly the best solution would be on-site babysitting at any time of year—something that seems to be lacking at most scholarly meetings, not just SHAFR’s. Also, women *have* been joining SHAFR in increasing numbers; when I became a member in the late 1980s, the majority of women in attendance were wives, but no longer, and the organization has not changed its time or venue significantly in that period. Twenty percent is of course still too small a portion of the membership, but from what I have seen, it seems more likely that the lack of women in our ranks or in our journal reflects female scholars’ interests rather than it does the organization’s repressive practices. Of greater concern is the much larger gap in minority representation, male and female, and here certainly SHAFR could be doing more outreach.

But Connelly’s chief fire is focused on the field itself. “Rather than continue to see diplomatic history as a subfield of U.S. history, or any

**Bold words, but what do they signify, really? One could just as easily say that the history of American slavery is really another branch of the history of human bondage throughout the world, and surely it is, but that approach does exactly what he wants to avoid, privileging transnational approaches without offering a compensatory examination of the particularly different and illuminating qualities of the local. While we cannot fully understand human bondage in the United States without reckoning with the international circumstances that brought it about, what is unique to the American milieu is probably more pertinent to understanding the development and pernicious effects of slavery here.**

national history . . . we need to recognize that diplomatic history is instead a subfield of the larger and still expanding fields of international and transnational history,” he writes. Bold words, but what do they signify, really? One could just as easily say that the history of American slavery is really another branch of the history of human bondage throughout the world, and surely it is, but that approach does exactly

what he wants to avoid, privileging transnational approaches without offering a compensatory examination of the particularly different and illuminating qualities of the local. While we cannot fully understand human bondage in the United States without reckoning with the international circumstances that brought it about, what is unique to the American milieu is probably more pertinent to understanding the development and pernicious effects

of slavery here. And in the field of foreign relations, the situation is no different; indeed, what many of our membership and contributors find most compelling and are most eager to address and possibly redress in their work are American misdeeds, tragedies, foibles, and occasionally, successes.

The current blogs on SHAFR's website are a measure of how persistent interest in the American approach is. Masood Raja's entry on the "Immunity Paradigm," which uses medical metaphors to discuss American foreign policy, is largely America-centric in its argument. In a commentary on Washington's approach to Afghanistan and Pakistan, Raja writes that "the discourse of immunization has always run through the course of [the] US biopolitical regime in varied connotations. During the cold war . . . Communism itself was posited as a degenerative contagion . . . against which the school system and the larger culture were instrumentalized to defend," while today, he notes, Oklahoma fights the "infection" of Sharia law. Similarly America-focused is Mary Dudziak's "An Age Without Surrender Ceremonies," which deals with the rather anticlimactic ending to U.S. hostilities in Iraq (an ending that leaves 50,000 soldiers behind, of course). Is this story, like Raja's, an international story? Of course. But the comparisons that Dudziak draws here about our "age" are not with the end of Britain's Falklands war or the Serbian war with Kosovo (although she might have turned to those conflicts for parallels) but instead with the end of the U.S. role in Vietnam. Dudziak's age, like Raja's paradigm, is an American one.<sup>1</sup> There is nothing wrong, of course, with making the history of American foreign relations writ large a subfield of international history. But how does doing so help illuminate the trends that so many of us follow--trends that are stemming from Washington or other American influences?

But perhaps blogs are an inaccurate indication of our field, shaped as they can be by current events like Wikileaks and the latest pronouncements from the White House. What about *Diplomatic History* itself? The last issue addressed topics such as the Hohenzollerns and the Wilson administration; Japanese cinema and U.S. popular culture; and Jimmy Carter's Namibia policy. These topics are all distinctly international, certainly, but all had an American link. Indeed, every article, every review, on characters ranging from Kissinger to LBJ, concerned American history in some fashion (with the

exception of a review of a book about Canada!). At the same time, these works seem to reflect exactly what Connelly wants to promote: they are studies that increase our understanding of the past *and* demonstrate the changing interests of our field, with discussions of human rights, developments in Cuba and Africa, and anthropology. Diplomatic historians are indeed already working deeply in international history, even as American history remains the glue that holds them together.

Professor Connelly also writes in his brief that even when telling the story of U.S. foreign relations, American historians work in multiple countries, and their international range is another reason for placing us in a new field. Those working in Columbia's global history program may do multiarchival research in foreign countries, but outside those hallowed halls of Harlem scholars do not always research abroad. A good number of the monographs submitted to SHAFR's Stuart Bernath prize committee, on which I have served for the last three years, did *not* draw from international archives--a deficiency that in fact has led to heated debate on our committee in the past. Must Bernath Prize winners use at least one international archive? Some of us said yes; others disagreed. The prize description itself is silent on the subject; determining its importance is left to the discretion of the committee, which changes each year. Whatever the merits of international research, a cause I am happy to promote, a number of highly compelling books on American foreign relations are published annually that study American individuals, firms, bureaucracies, or other entities "related" to other countries in some fashion but tell their stories without reference to the archives of those countries. Perhaps the archives were not available or were not considered relevant. Of course, some authors have less justifiable reasons for their omission.

Most important, as the topics of such books, as well as the aforementioned blogs, articles, and reviews all indicate, SHAFR members are and very much want to be part of, as Connelly puts it, a "global community of scholars interested not just in war and diplomacy, but also international and non-governmental organizations, trade and monetary policy, scientific and technological innovation, and countless other subjects that connect different countries or transcend the boundaries between them." Yet at the same time, to quote *Diplomatic History* editor

Bob Schulzinger, "as long as the United States continues to play a predominant role in world affairs, the origins, development, consequences, and alternatives of that role are bound to attract serious attention."<sup>2</sup> In the world we currently inhabit, submerging those affairs under the banner of international history might seem like the politically correct stance against the "nationalistic" approach, which Connelly himself rightly finds very shallow, but it does not necessarily enable any deeper wrestling with the issues so many of us care passionately about.

*Katherine A. S. Sibley is Professor of History at Saint Joseph's University.*

Notes:

1. SHAFR blogs on [www.shafir.org](http://www.shafir.org), accessed November 2010.
2. Robert Schulzinger, ed., *A Companion to American Foreign Relations* (Malden, MA, 2003, 2006), xiii.

### Connelly Roundtable

*Thomas Borstelmann*

Let me show my cards. I am partially responsible for this interchange, since I had the pleasure of chairing the program committee for the 2010 OAH annual meeting and organizing the plenary session on "The United States and the World" at which Matt Connelly first delivered this paper. I invited him because I knew he would be insightful and I hoped he would be provocative. The audience and I were not disappointed on either count. I have been an enthusiastic (though not uncritical!) fan of Matt's work for a long time.

I am a bit older than Matt and have watched the same changes he describes. I began graduate school in the 1980s at Duke University, when there were still *two* diplomatic historians in that department, Bill Scott (a Europeanist) and Calvin Davis (an Americanist).<sup>2</sup> After their retirements, neither was replaced. Social history dominated the landscape, with cultural history sweeping up fast behind it. Duke kept its position in military history, at least, thereby blunting some of the decidedly appropriate criticism of declining attention to diplomatic history, in a nation of unusual international influence and repeated military engagements abroad.

Those social historians taught me a great deal, particularly about power and democracy. I did not train as a historian of U.S. foreign relations in a typical way—I had no fellow

graduate students in the field—but Peter Wood, Bill Chafe, Larry Goodwyn, and others gave me an angle of vision onto U.S. international history perhaps different from that more commonly available in other institutions. Their attention to social change and the uses of power on a local level in the United States grounded my own more international research interests. Such a grounding might become still more unusual if our field—whatever we call it—were to position itself primarily, following Matt’s suggestion, as a subsection of international and transnational history.

I am not especially worried about loosening our links to domestic social history, however. Ours is a mighty big pasture, expanding all the time. We can gauge its breadth from the vitality of SHAFR’s annual meetings and the diversity of the articles published in *Diplomatic History*, as Matt notes. I think of us as the hinge between domestic U.S. history and world history: we function like a traditional Western barroom door, swinging both ways, and doing so easily, readily, continuously. Sure, there are a few dust-ups and briefly raised voices on each side of the door, and sometimes it feels more like *Blazing Saddles* (1974) than *Unforgiven* (1992). But connecting the American past to the global past is a crucial business, one that requires a solid foundation on each side of the door.

We do this in an awful lot of different ways. Some SHAFR folks have written brilliantly on the domestic roots of American international power, which was the subject, after all, of much of the thrust of cold war revisionism in its various forms. How Americans think about and understand the world beyond their borders remains a matter intimately connected to domestic developments in the United States—to daily life on farms in California’s central valley, in school classrooms in small-town Minnesota, on streets in south Florida, in churches along Colorado’s Front Range, in fast-food joints in urban Houston, in retail outlets in the suburbs of Philadelphia, in college classrooms from Seattle to southwest Georgia. Productive work in the big SHAFR pasture includes attention to culture, regionalism, economics, ideology, and a myriad of other features of the sometimes peculiar American landscape. Our field, whatever we call it, is not subsumed by U.S. history. We are not limited to U.S. history. But we are deeply embedded in U.S. history. We cannot float free of that very particular past into some larger sphere of international or

transnational history without a very real loss of historical understanding.<sup>3</sup> Matt acknowledges the enduring importance of local and national history in his wise warning against internationalist chic.

Our door swings the other way, too. We need more—much more—transnational research and research in archives abroad. International research is hardly new in SHAFR, where area specialists have long led the way with their unusually rich knowledge of the histories and archives of other nations and regions.<sup>4</sup> But we need more of it. We will also benefit from the perspectives of world history, an integrating and transnational field whose growth in the past twenty years can be tracked in the membership lists of the World History Association and the pages of the *Journal of World History*, established in 1990.<sup>5</sup> World history not only broadens our view but also tends to lengthen its chronology, saving us from being too focused on the twentieth century. We should certainly shed any remnants of defensiveness about our position in the broad discipline of History or the sub-discipline of U.S. history and exercise genuine leadership in the ongoing and multifaceted project of the repositioning of U.S. history within world history.

One way to imagine how U.S. history fits in the broader sweep of world and transnational history is to think in terms of connections and comparisons. Connections are everywhere; they are the bread and butter of our field, the most obvious “relations” in foreign relations. But comparisons offer another form of relations, one that is particularly helpful in engaging students and readers in a political culture still pervaded by assumptions of American exceptionalism. Just what is and what is not distinctive about the United States, including how it relates to the rest of the world, is a question that can be answered only through careful engagement with the histories of other nations, empires, cultures, and regions. In our increasingly globally conscious era, it will no longer do to analyze the American Revolution, American slavery, the Civil War, or U.S. imperialism as though they were phenomena unique to these shores. They were not.

SHAFR members and leadership will do well, at every opportunity, to combine their expertise on connections between the United States and the rest of the world with the growing work of comparativists, who are placing U.S. history within the broad sweep of a global past.

One central figure in this effort is Tom Bender, whose book *A Nation Among Nations* offers perhaps the best synthesis to date of U.S. history and world history and who served as the chair of the OAH plenary session at which Matt Connelly delivered the original version of this paper.<sup>6</sup> Whatever its name and the name of its journal, SHAFR should be at the very forefront of both U.S. history and global history, for we are now in an era for which our field is peculiarly well placed to provide leadership. In history departments everywhere, SHAFR members should be the most curious, the most engaged, and the most widely read participants, building links in all directions and shaping the future of the historical profession.

Thomas (“Tim”) Borstelmann is the E.N. and Katherine Thompson Professor of Modern World History at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.

#### Notes:

1. For example, Connelly’s remarkable global history, *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Cambridge, MA, 2008) does not to my mind adequately engage the enormous and probably dire consequences of population growth across the past two centuries. This increase in world population is at the center of John McNeill’s brilliant *Something New Under The Sun: An Environmental History of the Twentieth-Century World* (New York, 2000).
2. I did not work closely with either one of them, choosing instead an alternative path to a doctorate, SHAFR membership, a long stint at Cornell, and an eventual position in world history at Nebraska.
3. My own commitment in this direction is evident in the courses I teach, ranging from world history to U.S. history, and in a U.S. history textbook I coauthored, along with Jacqueline Jones, Peter Wood, Elaine Tyler May, and Vicki Ruiz: *Created Equal: A Social and Political History of the United States*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed. (New York, 2008).
4. A particularly distinguished and now fairly senior group of area specialists in East Asia comes immediately to mind, including Michael Hunt on China, John Dower on Japan, and Bruce Cumings on Korea.
5. I have a forthcoming historiographical essay on this topic. See “A Worldly Tale: Global Influences on the Historiography of U.S. Foreign Relations,” in Michael J. Hogan and Frank Costigliola, eds., *America in the World: The Historiography of American Foreign Relations since 1941* (New York, 2011).
6. Thomas Bender, *A Nation Among Nations: America’s Place in World History* (New York, 2006). See also Bender, ed., *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley, 2002). My own next contribution in this direction will be *More Equal, Less Equal: A New History of the 1970s* (Princeton, 2011).

## Rediscovering America

Nathan J. Citino

With his OAH paper, Matt Connelly has given SHAFR members a useful opportunity to reflect on the “long crisis in U.S. diplomatic history.”<sup>1</sup> He notes that international and transnational approaches to studying the U.S. have “actually become fashionable,” as evidenced by recent literature that includes his own award-winning scholarship. Nevertheless, Connelly laments that SHAFR has not played the leading role it should in rethinking American history in a global context. While urging the society to change its name and that of its journal to reclaim this role, Connelly criticizes U.S. diplomatic historians more fundamentally for “defining foreign relations as a small and shrinking sub-field of U.S. history.” So long as they continue to do so, he argues, they will exclude themselves from this generation’s most significant historiographical trend. By adopting a global approach they could return the field to relevance and finally bring the long crisis to closure.

Connelly appears to set up a dichotomous choice for SHAFR’s future: remain preoccupied with U.S. history—particularly with official policy and presidential studies—or embrace international/transnational history. Leaving aside arguments in favor of a “big tent,” this essay considers how SHAFR should position itself with respect to other scholarly communities, using Middle East studies as an example. While Connelly argues that diplomatic history should be seen as part of the “still expanding fields of international and transnational history,” he does not explain how SHAFR should relate to the established area studies fields that are home to experts in regional languages and sources. He indicates his hope that SHAFR will emulate the Middle East Studies Association and other groups focused on overseas research. Yet it remains to be seen how a SHAFR rededicated to international/transnational scholarship would fit into the historical profession’s prevailing regional division of labor.

Middle East studies is arguably the most important of the fields with which SHAFR must reckon in the near future. Given that the Middle East is the current focus of U.S. diplomacy, the next generation of research will emphasize that region just as the present one has featured Vietnam. For their part, Middle East historians have lately taken a serious

interest in U.S. history, indicating a growing demand for scholarship that can explain the domestic roots of American policies. At the same time, historians of American diplomacy in the Middle East have carved out their own niche, demonstrating new facility with regional languages and literatures while featuring reinterpretations of U.S. politics and society as their special contribution. Both of these trends call into question the argument that SHAFR should move away from U.S. history.

The attacks of September 11, 2001, and the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have helped to renew interest in the international context for U.S. history and to redefine diplomatic history as “America in the World.” University presses that now publish series based on this theme or that feature transnational approaches include Duke, Cornell, and Princeton, in addition to the one that Connelly co-edits at Columbia. But America’s recent forays into the Middle East have also fostered a convergence between American foreign relations and Middle Eastern history, a melding of diplomatic and area studies that has also occurred for other regions. This convergence has happened because Middle East historians have begun considering the regional role of the United States in the way that they have long studied the influence of British and French imperialism.

More U.S. diplomatic historians than ever before have also received training in Middle Eastern historiography and languages. The result is that as scholars have sought to understand the U.S. role in the Middle East, they have looked to America’s domestic experience to explain its behavior. In other words, one aspect of internationalizing research on America and the Middle East has been a renewed focus on U.S. history.

Middle East studies has discovered America. This discovery is apparent in the way that senior scholars such as Rashid Khalidi and Juan Cole have taken up that mainstay of SHAFR conference panels, U.S. cold war diplomacy.<sup>2</sup> More important is the emphasis that new transnational studies place on domestic American history.

More U.S. diplomatic historians than ever before have also received training in Middle Eastern historiography and languages. The result is that as scholars have sought to understand the U.S. role in the Middle East, they have looked to America’s domestic experience to explain its behavior. In other words, one aspect of internationalizing research on America and the Middle East has been a renewed focus on U.S. history.

Ussama Makdisi’s *Artillery of Heaven*, about U.S. missionaries in Ottoman Lebanon, is grounded in discussions of Cotton Mather and the Indian Removal Act.<sup>3</sup> Makdisi’s most recent book, *Faith Misplaced*, argues that through its support for Israel, the United States squandered the relatively positive image it had earned among Arabs by virtue of educational activities and Wilsonian values. Just as significant is Makdisi’s chapter on “The Arab Discovery of America,” which explores what nineteenth- and twentieth-century America meant to Arab immigrants, authors, and travelers.<sup>4</sup> In *America’s Kingdom*, a book based partly on a *Diplomatic History* article, Robert Vitalis traces the racial segregation of Aramco oil camps in Saudi Arabia to the nineteenth-century mining industry in America’s desert southwest. Vitalis reconceptualizes Middle Eastern labor history by invoking African American civil rights and the competing strategies of Booker T. Washington and W.E.B. DuBois.<sup>5</sup> John Calvert, in a new biography of Egyptian Islamist Sayyid Qutb, stresses how American

society influenced his subject’s conception of Islam as a total modernizing system. On a tour that took him from New York to Greeley, Colorado, and San Francisco, Qutb recoiled not only from the consumerism and racial discrimination of cold war

America but also from the public roles that women succeeded in carving out during the era of postwar domesticity.<sup>6</sup> Middle East scholars have come to regard U.S. history as crucial for understanding the region they study.

For U.S. diplomatic historians studying the Middle East, the use of regional languages has gone hand-in-hand with a re-examination of the American experience. Research by Peter Hahn in Hebrew and Salim Yaqub in Arabic has helped to internationalize the study of U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and shed light on the domestic politics surrounding that issue.<sup>7</sup> Paul Chamberlin’s comparative and transnational approach links attempts by Anwar Sadat and Richard Nixon to mobilize religious

legitimacy as a domestic political strategy.<sup>8</sup> By studying Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, Chamberlin has provided new perspective on the rise of Christian conservatives, an emerging sub-field of U.S. history in its own right. My work attempts to show what America's liberal development policies in the Middle East owed to the New Deal, as well as to attempts at reforming Arab lands by Ottoman statesmen a century before the cold war.<sup>9</sup> I am also interested in how American and Arab modernizers commonly invoked U.S. history, but in sharply contrasting ways and for different purposes. As U.S. diplomatic historians' research has taken them deeper into Middle Eastern sources, American history has taken on new meanings and importance. Through their use of Middle Eastern languages and literatures, historians of American foreign relations have begun to earn respect from those with regional expertise. These U.S. diplomatic historians "work in multiple countries," but they contribute a special knowledge of American politics and society to an emerging dialogue with Middle East experts.

Connelly is right to say that SHAFR needs to rethink its place in the scholarly universe as international/transnational historical approaches grow in significance. Indeed, it is not likely that the broad community of Americanists will have a road-to-Damascus experience regarding the relevance of U.S. foreign relations and suddenly discover a need for more tenure-track lines. As historical studies increasingly focus on global exchanges—"migration, new media, religious movements, environmental change, or epidemic disease"—SHAFR members must develop more cosmopolitan, less state-centric ways of studying America's place in the world. But the argument that SHAFR's U.S. history orientation imposes a liability in its relations with other disciplines is not borne out by the developments described in this brief historiographical essay. In this set of circumstances, keeping SHAFR anchored in U.S. history is beneficial not because our expertise in that field gives us something in common with fellow Americanists, but because it constitutes what we have to offer scholars studying global exchanges from other perspectives.

Nathan J. Citino is Associate Professor of History at Colorado State University.

Notes:

1. See Michael H. Hunt, "The Long Crisis

in U.S. Diplomatic History: Coming to Closure," *Diplomatic History* 16 (January 1992): 115-40.

2. Rashid Khalidi, *Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Dominance in the Middle East* (Boston, 2009); and Juan Cole, *Engaging the Muslim World* (New York, 2009).

3. Ussama Makdisi, *Artillery of Heaven: American Missionaries and the Failed Conversion of the Middle East* (Ithaca, NY, 2008).

4. Ussama Makdisi, *Faith Misplaced: The Broken Promise of U.S.-Arab Relations, 1820-2001* (New York, 2010), 55-102.

5. Robert Vitalis, *America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier* (Palo Alto, CA, 2007).

6. John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism* (New York, 2010).

7. Peter L. Hahn, *Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2004); and Salim Yaqub, *Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East* (Chapel Hill, NC, 2004).

8. Paul Chamberlin, "A World Restored: Religion, Counterrevolution, and the Search for Order in the Middle East," *Diplomatic History* 32 (June 2008): 441-69.

9. Nathan J. Citino, "The Ottoman Legacy in Cold War Modernization," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 40 (November 2008): 579-97.

### Where the National and the Global Converge

Kristin Hoganson

The invitation to participate in this conversation brought to mind the recent round table on diplomatic history in the *Journal of American History* (March 2009). Like Thomas Zeiler's lead essay in that forum, Connelly's essay speaks to the theme of identity politics—that is, the identity of diplomatic historians, who, having succeeded in what appeared to be a struggle for survival in the 1990s, are now eager for professional leadership. The novelty of Connelly's remarks lies mainly in his claim that U.S. diplomatic historians should not regard themselves as Americanists. Instead, they should identify as international and transnational historians. "As long as U.S. diplomatic historians define themselves as a sub-field of U.S. history, they will face the thankless task of persuading other Americanists that foreign policy remains important, no less than newer subjects that seem fresh and exciting." He goes on to ask why diplomatic historians should expect others "to cede space in conference programs and journals, or give up faculty lines, or share Ph.D. fellowships." (Or pack ballrooms as they did at the OAH when Connelly presented his paper as part of a plenary roundtable on "The United

States in the World.") The solution? Secession. That will show them.

It is nice to think that diplomatic historians only have to go global (though curiously, Connelly does not mention world history as a potential umbrella field), and they will no longer need to persuade anybody of the importance of their work. Oh, what a happy day it will be when we can gather in a tropical resort or major metropolis (far from the wastelands of Madison and Columbus) to assume the leadership role rightfully due to us as the multiarchival researchers and experts on state power that we are! Book me on the first flight out.

But wait—who is the us and the them there? I have been a card-carrying (or at least a journal-subscribing) member of SHAFR since 1998, but that is not my only professional affiliation. The other organizations to which I belong don't seem so distracted by a thirst for professional leadership. Not even the Men's Studies Association or Society for Military History have seemed bent on that. Of course these organizations would welcome money, members, and acclaim, but their strategy for obtaining wealth and fame seems to be to engage other fields rather than to sever ties with them if denied a spot in the sun (or more strangely, if overwhelmed by the crowds at plenary sessions).

The more I think about it, the less I know whether I am part of the "us" that Connelly refers to or the "them," since his essay seems aimed at diplomatic historians (count his references to "diplomatic" and "diplomacy") rather than foreign relations historians in general. I must confess that I have served on several conference program committees besides SHAFR's, other editorial boards besides *Diplomatic History's*, and various fellowship committees. Based on these experiences, I will admit that it can be hard for gatekeepers to set aside their own fields and disciplinary preferences fully. However, I have seen cases in which familiarity with a field led to higher expectations. Furthermore, I think it is worth noting that editorial boards, conference committee members, and fellowship selectors typically sign off on work that falls outside their areas of expertise. The most important thing I have learned in my dealings with the ominous "them" is that a major criterion for success is the ability to speak to audiences outside one's narrow field—to explain to others (sometimes in completely separate disciplines) why the work matters. No one is going to "cede" anything to "us" if

we cannot make a case for it. That goes for wider publics, too.

So where should that case be made? I am all in favor of Connelly's calls to regard diplomatic history as part of international and transnational history. I would like to echo his endorsement of Emily Rosenberg's idea to add "Transnational" to our journal's name. I hope Connelly follows through on his vision of a federation of associations for international and transnational history by working to form such a group. I can only applaud efforts to build support networks for scholars traveling abroad for research. And I agree with Connelly's point that SHAFR members could learn much from attending more international congresses. Although I have not yet attended a World History Association meeting (<http://www.thewha.org>) or a Global Studies Conference (the Global Studies website, at <http://onglobalisation.com/>, has intriguing references to virtual papers), the calls I have seen for such meetings (not to mention those for area studies gatherings) reveal significant points of intersection with SHAFR members' interests. The more we get out and mingle, the better. And while we are at it, let's continue to extend a welcoming mat in our conferences and publications (both print and electronic) to scholars whose work does not center on the United States.

But should we all burn our Organization of American Historians (OAH) membership cards? And what about the American Studies Association (ASA) cards so recently acquired by some old-time SHAFR members but so long valued by some of SHAFR's newer members? What would it mean to discard those? Would SHAFR lose its relatively small but growing community of colonial, postcolonial, migration, diaspora, cultures-of-empire, and borderlands historians, many of whom are interested in the blurry lines between domestic and foreign affairs?

Indeed, doesn't everybody who studies topics with a U.S. component—including even diplomacy, presidential decision-making, the exercise of military power, trade relations, and global governance—have good reasons to keep abreast of, say, U.S. political,

cultural, and labor histories pertaining to their subjects? Connelly sets up the issue as a choice between international and transnational history on the one hand and national and local history on the other. But as his own remarks on the importance of local and national specificity suggest, place still matters, even to would-be global histories. Let me provide a cautionary tale on the dangers of thinking it doesn't.

My story centers on a large public university that I will diplomatically keep anonymous. This university, beset by budget woes, is trying to "right-size" its faculty, using student course enrollments as one of the main benchmarks. In recent years its Global Studies program, a unit with no tenure-track faculty lines of its own, has been gaining majors while History has been working hard to keep its classes full. When the instructor of the large U.S. foreign relations history survey on that campus asked to have it listed as worthy of Global Studies credit, the dean in charge thought it might be inappropriate. The reason?

Connelly sets up the issue as a choice between international and transnational history on the one hand and national and local history on the other. But as his own remarks on the importance of local and national specificity suggest, place still matters, even to would-be global histories.

Even though the course covers topics such as fascist aggression, anticolonial nationalism, collective security, competing modernization strategies, and the Bretton Woods system, its emphasis on the United States as a

major player in the twentieth-century world rendered it of questionable suitability for a major that "attempts to promote an understanding of core global/international processes/systems from a range of non-local/regional perspectives, leaving the regionally-focused work for students' Language and Area Studies requirement." In other words, a U.S. foreign relations history class might not belong in Global Studies, regardless of its consideration of non-U.S. actors such as Churchill, Stalin, Castro, and Mao, because any class that devotes significant attention to the United States really belongs to area studies.

I am thankful that this case was successfully appealed, for I do think that twentieth-century U.S. foreign relations history deserves a place—however humble—in a major that aims to help students understand the making and politics of our own global moment. Nevertheless, the case has some lessons for those of us who are tempted to see global

studies as ripe for conquest. Our associates in global studies, like those in world history, transnational history, translocal history, and area studies fields, have good reasons to be wary of Americanists marching in expecting ample attention and deferential treatment. Having thought quite a bit about empire, our colleagues in these fields can be wary of its many instantiations.

That leaves international history. Might that offer a more welcoming tent? There may be some who regard international history as a new way to frame U.S. foreign relations history, but it would be wrong to conflate the two. Nevertheless, given that a number of those who are beginning to identify themselves as international historians have had ties to SHAFR, I would anticipate a warm, family-reunion-style welcome. I would also expect a pretty nice tent, given international historians' apparent success in attracting financial backers. (Take a second to Google Roger Hertog, the investor behind the Global Strategy Initiatives that Connelly mentions in his talk.) But just how big is the tent? Is it circus-sized or mere pup?

It would seem that international history has tremendous growth potential, due to its geographic sweep. But it is not clear whether all SHAFR members, much less the far wider pool of border-crossing and empire studies historians who have hesitated to join SHAFR, will feel they fit in. Taken literally, "international" is a far narrower rubric than world history, for it refers specifically to relations between nations. Hence historians who embrace other units of analysis such as ethnic groups, corporations, commodities, convictions, and viruses might wonder whether the state-to-state emphasis implied by international history would always suit them well. They might even ask whether a move to international history should be construed as a kind of regrouping in response to ballrooms grown too crowded and unruly. Do not get me wrong. As someone interested in the history of the United States in world context, I heartily welcome efforts to connect with world history and its various subfields—among them transnational and international history. But I doubt that severing our ties to the U.S. history field will magnify our presence in either the profession or in the public eye.

Indeed, if our goal is to advance understanding of U.S. foreign relations history by bringing those who are interested in the topic together and by providing platforms,

recognition, and support for their scholarship, we should be working to *enhance* our relations with the wider U.S. field. We should be reaching out to the many border-crossing and cultures-of-empire historians who are not active in SHAFR—to the people who came to the ballroom to hear Connelly's fellow panelists, Melani McAlister, Mae M. Ngai, and Nan Enstad, and the panel chair, Tom Bender. *Passport* should be publishing what they had to say about the "The United States in the World" and soliciting responses to the views that they expressed in that panel.

If I had to place SHAFR on a disciplinary map, I would put it at the place where U.S. history and its subfields intersect with world history and its subfields. That placement would imply stretching ourselves in multiple directions and fitting ourselves to both the smaller and larger scales that Bender has discussed.<sup>1</sup> Such re-mapping might necessitate more attention to the historicity of the nation. It might even mean reconsidering our geographies of globalization by exploring whether areas like the Midwest should be seen as places with meaningful histories of contact, colonialism, circulation, and exchange—indeed, as places we need not spurn in picking our conference venues.

Although my ongoing research contributes to such a spatial turn by tackling the myth of the nationally circumscribed heartland, I can understand why some might think that part of the appeal of going global is no more conferences in the corn belt. And, setting aside the issue of room rates, I can appreciate Connelly's calls to reduce transportation expenses so that more non-U.S. based scholars can participate in our discussions.

Yet non-U.S. scholars are not the only ones on tight budgets. Many of us who are U.S. graduate students, non-tenure-track faculty, and employees of cash-strapped institutions can't easily afford conferences in distant U.S. cities, not to mention those on faraway continents or islands. I was able to go to the conferences in Columbus and Madison because it didn't cost much to get there. An extra bonus was that I could offer students rides. Yes, by all means, let's attend professional gatherings outside the United States, but let's keep our annual meetings too.

And please, let's keep them in June, a slot that still leaves ample time for summer research expeditions and reduces the likelihood of scheduling conflicts with the area studies associations that meet in the

fall and early spring. Knowing that this might strike some as a sinister anti-feminist plot, I should insist that my goal is not to keep women (or other underrepresented groups) out. To the contrary, I suspect that women are among the "crushing majority" of SHAFR members who can barely find time to exhale during the school year, much less travel. If the real goal is to make SHAFR more family friendly, then why not experiment with a children's program, like the Tepoztlán Institute has done?

"Where in the world is SHAFR?" Connelly asks in closing. I am open to the "everywhere" implied by the question. But I would add to that "somewhere" lest we also end up nowhere in particular.

*Kristin Hoganson is Professor of History at the University of Illinois.*

Note:

1. Thomas Bender, "Historians, the Nation, and the Plenitude of Narratives," in *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, ed. Thomas Bender (Berkeley, 2002), 1-21, 8.

## Where Do We Go From Here?

*Matt Connelly*

I want to thank *Passport* for affording me this opportunity and my respondents for taking on my arguments with such gusto. In their enthusiasm, I fear they have pilloried some ideas that were not in my essay. Lest readers believe I am calling on everyone to burn their OAH membership cards and ignore the splendors of the American heartland, please allow me to clarify.

Nathan Citino and Tim Borstelmann pose extremely thoughtful questions about how scholars connect to and learn from one another. I agree that Americanists can make incredibly valuable contributions to the study of every part of the world. To my mind, the whole point of international and transnational history is to make such connections, and I agree that a deep knowledge of the United States is, in many instances, precisely what scholars in other fields and in other countries want to connect to. Unless one is grounded in the history of a particular place, one cannot even begin to branch out. Going on to gain real expertise in the history of other places and to show how these histories change when we link them together is both the hardest challenge and the greatest opportunity these alternative approaches have to offer.

The challenge seems to me

so great, and the potential for productive engagement so tremendous, that I want to join forces with every historian working on world politics. Some of my respondents suspect I have other motives. For Kristin Hoganson, my arguments evidence "a thirst for professional leadership." Katherine Sibley calls them "politically correct." Robert McMahon finds not only political correctness, but also "status anxiety." It is true that I believe the members of SHAFR should be—and in fact already are—playing a leading role in the development of these new fields of research. But would I keep pressing such an unpopular agenda if I aspired to be elected to anything? And even if I really am politically correct, anxious about my status, and thirsty for leadership, I might still be right in arguing that SHAFR needs to internationalize.

I understood from the outset that I would not win friends with this essay, even when I made a small point about whether it is a good idea to hold SHAFR conferences in places like Columbus and Madison. My point had nothing to do with the Cornbelt—for or against—and everything to do with airfares and connections. It applies equally to the site for the 2012 meeting in Hartford and Storrs. Travelers from abroad—not to mention those coming from Athens and Austin—would have an easier time getting to Chicago or Minneapolis and getting around town once they arrived. Here again, even if I really am a latte-drinking East Coast snob, I might still be right in arguing that it is harder to find cheap direct flights to small regional airports.

If we can put my character and motives aside, it will be easier to address the more important questions. McMahon accuses me of silliness, half-truths, and mischaracterizations. He tries to make his own case with a series of analogies. But reasoning through analogies is a flawed method for proving or disproving any proposition. To begin with, we might draw opposite conclusions from the same analogy. Why, for instance, would one study Ancient Egypt without using evidence from contemporary civilizations, especially if the focus is foreign relations? It is well known that archeological evidence from Babylon and Assyria often provides a very different version of how Egypt interacted with its neighbors, and relying only on Egypt's records would create a distorted view. And what would we make of a "Society for the Study of Trees"—or one species of tree, or one

tree, to make the analogy exact—that ignored soil, climate, and the other forms of life that make up the larger ecosystem? We might call it “The Society for Missing the Forest for the Trees.”

Analogies can not only lead to opposite conclusions, when they are poorly chosen they can lead to precisely the wrong conclusion, as in the case of the former SHAFR president who drew an analogy between our society and one dedicated to the study of African-American history. It is not that he or any other member would actually say that SHAFR should be a society for the history of white American men. But the analogy, which he used to argue that we should not be concerned about the lack of diversity in our ranks, only holds if he assumes that SHAFR’s composition reflects its intellectual agenda.

Nor is SHAFR analogous to a society for the study of physics. Masculinity and whiteness do not matter when one is trying to explain the origins and nature of the universe, after all, as opposed to the origin and nature of U.S. foreign relations. Even so, scientists are making a tremendous effort to recruit underrepresented groups because they recognize that they are not drawing on all the available talent. A lack of diversity assumes even greater importance when we recognize that—and this is not the case in physics—some of the best work in our field is done by people who do not identify with our field because of the way it is now constituted and defined.

While analogies can provoke useful questions, they do not provide an answer to the most important question: where do we go from here? Citino is rightly wary of the notion that we face a dichotomous choice—as Hoganson describes it, a “choice between international and transnational history on the one hand and national and local history on the other.” I can only repeat that local and national history is no less important than international and transnational history and that imposing a larger frame of analysis can be distorting. My respondents have identified several excellent works that analyze U.S. foreign relations based on U.S. sources, and I could add many others. I would not deny any book a Bernath prize simply because it included only U.S. sources. But as Tim Borstelmann argues, no book should begin with an assumption of American uniqueness. Rather, it is a question to be explored and a problem to be explained. And those who are mainly interested in America’s power must realize that they will not be able to establish its

impact if they never leave American shores.

The best work begins with a simple principle: the nature of a historical question or problem should determine the sources and methods the scholar uses to grapple with it, not the other way around. But there is a crucial distinction to be made between how individual scholars choose to pursue their own research and how a scholarly community chooses to define and defend itself. My idea is not that every member of SHAFR would do international research, but rather that we would redefine our community (and rename it) to include everyone interested in the history of world politics. Members would continue to have multiple scholarly identities and multiple membership cards. Most (including myself) would doubtless retain a core interest in the United States. But those who work on American foreign relations using American sources would have more opportunities to engage a whole world of scholars who do not see themselves as Americanists but are nonetheless interested in international relations, including U.S. foreign relations. Linked to other associations in other countries and regions, SHAFR would become a crucial entrepot in the global exchange of ideas.

I would like to think that this is a hopeful vision (note the acronym for the proposed Federation of Associations for International and Transnational History). I don’t know why responses to it should be filled with so much fear and anxiety. Hoganson worries that after “severing our ties to the U.S. history field,” SHAFR members won’t “fit in.” International and global historians won’t accept their courses and, according to Sibley, will impose litmus tests and deny prizes. McMahon warns that all of this will drive a stake through the heart of an old and venerable tradition. If only we can fend them off, he concludes, “we will be fine.”

I think that the contributors to this forum will be fine whether or not SHAFR changes. Those who have the most at stake in its future are younger scholars who do not have jobs or tenure. There is no denying that there are real consequences in the competition of ideas, and diplomatic history suffered many losses when it failed to challenge and engage other fields and disciplines productively. But that is all the more reason why, in considering SHAFR’s future, and especially the future of its younger members, we should use logic and evidence and not play on their fears.

I wrote this essay because I wanted to help ensure that there is a place in the profession for historians who take up such crucial problems as war and peace, global poverty and wealth, nationalism and internationalism. But I am also concerned about the place of the historical profession in American life and about America’s place in the world. It is not clear whether Washington will retain preeminence in world politics. The United States faces tremendous problems, not all of its own making, and Americans will not be able to address them entirely by themselves. Historians are uniquely placed to explain our current predicament, especially the many challenges to a U.S.-centered international system, as well as long-term changes in the very nature of international relations. Conversely, historians have a crucial role in explaining U.S. foreign relations to the rest of the world. Is it too much to ask that, in fulfilling this mission, we read scholarship on our chosen subjects even when it is not written in English? And should we not be ready to research the history of other countries when it can help us understand our own?

Members of SHAFR, if ours were *not* an association of scholars dedicated to exploring the world, why would the newsletter you hold in your hands be called *Passport*? So let us begin to realize our organization’s full potential. Let us join with our counterparts in other fields and in other countries and create a global community of historians. I believe it will be better than fine. It will be great.

*Matthew Connelly is Professor of History at Columbia University.*

# SHAFR Looks at the Arab Spring

*James Goode, Weldon C. Mathews, Clea Bunch, Paul Thomas Chamberlain*

## Some Thoughts on the Arab Uprisings and American Policy in the Middle East

*James Goode*

The situation in the Middle East has been evolving rapidly since January. Once the regional uprisings spread from Tunisia to neighboring Egypt, the media began to refer to an “Arab Spring” and an “Arab Awakening,” terms reminiscent perhaps of an earlier age and of venerable works by nationalists such as Najib Azuri (*The Awakening of the Arab Nation*, 1905) and George Antonius (*The Arab Awakening*, 1938). More problematically, many journalists and pundits continue to characterize these developments as “revolutions.” Here, surely, they have gone too far. We have to be clear about the nature of the changes taking place in the Middle East today. There really is nothing very revolutionary about what has happened—at least not yet.

Egypt provides a good example. Despite all the youthful enthusiasm and activity of recent months, senior military officers seem to be firmly in control. In fact, some observers have argued that the removal of President Hosni Mubarak fit well with the military’s own objectives, for they were decidedly opposed to a Mubarak dynasty, especially one headed by heir-apparent Gamal Mubarak, who had no ties to the army. Since the 1952 revolution, all three Egyptian presidents have come from the ranks of the armed services.

What lies ahead, we have to wonder, now that all those in Tahrir Square who have been advocating for major reforms—certainly long overdue—realize that the army has co-opted their movement? It is difficult not to be pessimistic. The fall elections for parliament and president may clarify the situation, but even then we can be confident that without revolutionary measures, the armed forces will continue to exercise

preponderant influence in Cairo.

In their recent history, Egyptians have often looked to Turkey for guidance. They did so in the 1930s under Ataturk and again after the 1952 revolution. Anwar Sadat even brought a few Turkish political scientists to Cairo to advise him. In Ankara, of course, at least until Turkey sought admission to the European Union, the military leaders took a central role in affairs of state, intervening on numerous occasions to unseat the government of the day in order to maintain the integrity of Ataturk’s secular republic. If this is the model the Egyptian generals plan to emulate, there could be much strife ahead.

One of the greatest challenges facing all Middle Eastern regimes is that their populations are growing rapidly. Young people make up a much larger percentage of the population than in the United States or the nations of Europe. Forty-six percent of Yemen’s population is under age 15, and 31.8 percent of Egypt’s is under age 14; by comparison, only 27.3 percent of the U.S. population is under age 20. Many of the Middle Eastern economies have not provided adequate employment opportunities, and this signal failure has helped to fuel much of the recent unrest. Millions of Egyptians, Yemenis, and Lebanese have routinely been forced to go abroad, especially to the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf, to provide for themselves and their families at home. This set of problems will only worsen, at least in the short run, as popular unrest disrupts normal economic activity.

Iran has also been troubled by high unemployment. When I visited there in the summer of 2003, I was surprised at the number of young people who were looking for opportunities to go abroad for education and employment. The reformist president, Muhammad Khatami (1997-2005), was still in power then, and most of these

individuals did not express strong anti-regime views. They only wanted more opportunity than was available at home. This critical issue must become a priority if there is to be long-term stability in the region.

It is common these days to view the nations of the Middle East as dominoes, one falling after another in what might seem an inevitable process. These nations are, of course, similar to each other, especially when we consider the nature of their regimes and the longevity of their rulers. Yet we would do well to remember that these are really very different political entities and that what befalls one may not provide much guidance as to what will happen to its neighbor. This is as true for the Middle East today as it was for Southeast Asia fifty years ago. A Lebanese colleague bristles whenever he hears the phrase “the Arab street,” which he considers a Western term that conflates a variety of situations in many different countries. It is too tempting to suggest a single explanation for all instead of analyzing each state in its own right, looking at the distinctive features that make it unique rather than only those that cast it almost as a clone of surrounding nations. The factors spurring unrest in the monarchies of Jordan and Bahrain, for example, or in the republics of Egypt and Syria, are at least as different as they are alike.

How has American policy contributed to these recent happenings? One can make a strong argument (as Andrew Bacevich did recently in the *Los Angeles Times*) that the disturbances throughout the region have come about because local peoples have taken matters into their own hands, determined to change their lives for the better, that they have not needed direction and prompting from abroad. It should be a humbling experience for American policymakers to realize that after years of warfare and extensive costs in lives and resources, events are

moving in a progressive fashion rather independently of Washington's orchestration.

Historians, too, should take note. There was a time in the 1960s and early 1970s when scholars paid little attention to the role of Islam in the lives of Middle Easterners, believing perhaps that understanding Islam would add few insights to the larger objective of examining regional societies. Anyone searching library shelves (or databases) for books on Islam published before the Iranian Revolution will find very few serious studies. With few exceptions, Western scholars had put Islam on the back burner or dismissed it entirely, concluding that such knowledge had become almost irrelevant to the task of analyzing modern, secular societies.

There were, of course, many important developments taking place out of public view. I remember well a conversation with my Persian teacher, who was also a close friend, in the early 1970s. I was living in Mashhad, an Iranian city of pilgrimage, site of the tomb of the eighth Imam, Ali ar-Riza. I had just finished reading Edward G. Browne's history of the first Iranian revolution, *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909*, in which he described in considerable detail the religious activism taking place in the early years of the twentieth century. Why, I asked innocently, was there no such activity today. He told me that I was mistaken. Meetings, discussions, and debates were taking place regularly among members of the ulama and pious Iranians of all classes. Such events, he assured me, would be largely invisible to a foreigner such as myself. A few years later came the revolutionary turmoil for which, I have to admit, I was not much better prepared than most Americans.

Since that time, the focus of scholarship has shifted dramatically. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of books have appeared, many of them essentializing the role of religion in Middle Eastern societies. Now the prevailing arguments suggest that nothing can be understood without reference to Islam or, in some cases, that religion is all that needs to be studied.

Recent events may contribute to a clearer perspective, which is important as we consider how radical Islamists are likely to impact the future of the region. Much of American policy since 2001 has been designed to contribute to the defeat and destruction of al-Qaeda, our arch-enemy in the post-Cold War world and a suitable successor to the former Soviet Union. And yet radical

Islam appears to have been caught off guard by these recent developments. It is almost as if that older movement has become decidedly irrelevant to younger generations. This is one recent trend that calls for careful monitoring in the coming months.

Fearmongers would have us believe that the shadow of radical Islam looms menacingly over the Arab Middle East today. Yet it seems to me that the Muslim community is handling al-Qaeda as it has handled such outbreaks of extremism over the past fourteen centuries; it has marginalized them and destroyed them if they persisted. No group advocating violence as the only solution has been able to survive for long at the center of the Islamic community.

What is the United States to do? Policymakers can assess each national movement in its own right and take a quietly supportive role where that seems appropriate. At the moment the United States faces two especially challenging situations at opposite ends of the Middle East. In Libya the United States has intervened to save lives, much as it did in Kosovo in 1995. Unfortunately, there is no Boris Yeltsin-like figure to assist the United States in coaxing Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi from power in Tripoli. But the United States can afford to be patient in this case. Qadhafi's resources and power will weaken over the coming weeks. We can afford to wait him out while the opposition builds its strength and organization.

Regarding Bahrain, that tiny island-nation in the Persian Gulf, Washington has spoken very softly about the heavy-handed response of Saudi Arabia and the al-Khalifa family toward local Shi'a opposition. Clearly, more important U.S. interests are at stake here than in other parts of the region, namely access to oil and an American naval base. But there is also concern over Iran, which lies not many miles across the Persian Gulf and which has remained a principal antagonist of American policymakers—and the American public, too—for more than thirty years.

How serious a threat is the regime in Tehran? It has its own considerable internal problems; we may have contributed to its outsized reputation as a regional giant. Although its soft power can be formidable, especially in places like Iraq, Lebanon, and Bahrain, each with sizable Shi'a populations, its military power has serious limitations. According to a recent report, "Iran spends less on its military than do most of its individual Gulf counterparts, and its weapons are technologically inferior"

(*Upheaval: U.S. Policy Toward Iran in a Changing Middle East*, June 2011). We should be wary of embracing the concept of a threatening "Shi'a crescent," extending from Iran to Lebanon. Subscribing to this idea may serve the interests of other nations more than our own. Whatever the truth about Iranian objectives and capabilities, the Obama administration would do well to engage the Islamic republic whenever it can, rather than continuing to isolate it.

Finally, when all these other crises have been moved toward resolution, even those in Yemen and Syria, U.S. policymakers will still face the most important challenge in the region: the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Here there has been very little progress. Whatever goodwill, if any, the United States may be able to garner from current policies in different parts of the Middle East, this one issue will remain as a litmus test of American commitment to justice.

The Obama administration began its tenure committed to reaching a settlement, but its initiative failed, and even former Senator George Mitchell abandoned the enterprise. As the White House prepares for the 2012 presidential election, it has fallen into the pattern of its predecessors. Only a president with a strong mandate has the leverage to make progress on this complex issue. Lame ducks can do little. The president's eleventh-hour intervention in May served only to antagonize—and embolden—Israel's supporters.

These recent events have reminded us that the White House faces some significant challenges in Congress concerning its Middle East policy, and not only from Republicans. After the president's testy meeting with the Israeli prime minister, congressmen and senators from both parties fawned over Benjamin Netanyahu when he appeared in the House chamber. These same legislators have introduced measures that if approved would place far more stringent sanctions on Iran than the administration thinks appropriate.

Should he win a second term, will a reenergized Obama engage this issue as he promised so eloquently in Cairo in June 2009? Or—and this is the more likely alternative—will he become distracted and leave the problem to his successor? Whatever he chooses to do, conditions are changing, with or without the United States. Many Palestinians are abandoning the quest for a two-state solution, opting instead for a single, unitary state. Changing demographics make a single state more plausible than it might at

first appear, for the number of Palestinians and Jews in Israel and the Occupied Territories will soon be equal. Washington's delay will bring little benefit to its longtime ally in Tel Aviv.

*James Goode is Professor of History and Coordinator of the Middle East Studies Program at Grand Valley State University.*

## The Long View on the Arab Spring

*Weldon C. Matthews*

This year's protests and uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain have so far produced starkly different results, but they have all expressed rage at the authoritarianism, corruption, and economic failures of these countries' governments. American diplomacy is now being compelled to respond to the changes taking place at the regional level as well as in individual Arab states. At one end of the spectrum of change is Libya. Protests there have become a civil war, resembling in some ways the recent ethnic conflicts and resource wars of sub-Saharan Africa. The United States and its NATO allies have become party to the civil war for reasons that they have not well explained. At the other end of the spectrum is Tunisia. Its protests have taken the country in a very different direction since the former president, Zine el-Abidine Ben 'Ali, fled the country. Tunisia seems, at least for now, to be progressing toward a more effective administration with more representative institutions. The United States and European countries are promising economic aid to secure its political reforms. Tunisia has never been a force in inter-Arab affairs or a primary concern for U.S. policymakers. Egypt, though, has historically been a trendsetter in the Arab world, and its former president, Hosni Mubarak, had been among the most important of America's clients.

The Tahrir Square protests, which achieved Mubarak's removal from Egypt's presidency, were not spontaneous. They were the outcome of the April 6 Movement's careful planning and organization, extending back at least three years to its first attempt at organizing protests of Egyptian textile workers to demand better pay and conditions. The movement studied other democracy movements in the Middle East and Europe, seeking advice from their organizers as well as from American advisers. The Egyptian organizers also closely observed the protests

against the sham 2009 elections in Iran and the world's response to them.

The young, technologically adept Egyptian political activists recognized that they needed to harness the international news media to their cause and to communicate with each other to coordinate their activities. One organizer told his trainees, "Your cell phone is your Molotov cocktail." The activists consequently developed techniques to bypass the Egyptian government's monitoring and blocking of electronic communications. Although the demonstrations that the activists had planned in anticipation of rigged parliamentary elections in 2010 did not materialize, the April 6 Movement was prepared to lead when Egyptians, inspired by the mass protests in Tunisia, took to the streets early this year.<sup>1</sup>

Nothing so far indicates, however, that Egypt is on the cusp of becoming a democracy. The secretive Military Council exercises ultimate authority in the state, the government hampers the organization of further protests, and the scheduling of elections for September allows little time for political parties to organize campaigns. Nonetheless, the April 6 Movement and its affiliates have proven that they can mobilize the Egyptian public to an extent that has significantly diminished the arbitrary power of the regime over the people. The regime might well successfully adopt new strategies to control dissent, but the Egyptian pro-democracy organizers cannot be expected to stop innovating, learning from other movements, and sharing their experience with other opposition organizations in the Middle East.

Diversification of media and expanding access to it in the form of satellite television, Internet, and social media are increasingly restricting the ability of Arab authoritarian regimes to maintain the atomization of their citizens beyond state-controlled associations. The failure of these regimes to otherwise contain opposition increases their propensity to resort to violence, which will strain the loyalty of their militaries and security forces as they are called upon to brutalize their fellow citizens. In this regard, it is doubtful that Bahrain invited in Saudi security forces last February simply because it lacked the numbers of security personnel to deal with the crowds in Manama. It is no surprise that Libyan President Qadhafi is relying on hired fighters from sub-Saharan Africa, and the United Arab Emirates has turned to Erik Prince,

the former CEO of Blackwater, to organize its foreign mercenary force.<sup>2</sup>

The Mubarak and Ben 'Ali regimes were less confident in their abilities to deploy violence against their dissidents while sustaining the elemental legitimacy necessary for their regimes to endure. As the Egyptian and Tunisian oppositions lost their fear of their respective regimes, the regimes became at once weaker and more inclined to resort to force. The use of force brought upon them U.S. and international criticism, which in turn signaled to the protesters the regimes' vulnerability. It is hard to imagine that activists in other states and in the Palestinian territories did not watch this cycle of protest, repression, and censure and consider the prospects of replicating it.

The civil society activists and opposition groups in the Arab world have demonstrated their intentions of testing the limits to which the authoritarian regimes will go to suppress dissent. The erosion of the capacity of these regimes to deny their publics' access to the political realm is unlikely to follow a smooth trajectory. A period of quiescence following the current wave of protests will not mean that the regimes have secured their futures. On the contrary, the example of the 1979 revolution in Iran suggests that a long period of sporadic and seemingly futile opposition could culminate in the sudden and nearly unforeseen collapse of some of these regimes.

To the extent that these processes continue and intensify, the United States will be less able to ignore the Arab publics or to impose its will in the region through client dictators and monarchs. The roles of Tunisian and Egyptian labor organizers in the democracy movements also suggest that the United States might face difficulty in convincing Arab publics that they have benefited from American-sponsored neoliberal economic policies.

Inasmuch as America's traditional Arab client regimes are compelled to become more responsive to their publics, the U.S. relationship with Israel will come under strain. The Egyptian opposition and democratic activists, for example, demand statehood for Palestinians. The Arab activists will view the independence of their governments' foreign policies from American direction as a test of these governments' responsiveness to the aspirations of their people. Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu was fundamentally wrong when he stood before Congress in May and, referring to the protesters in the Arab

world, said that, "we share the hopes of these young people throughout the Middle East." Had he read the web site of the April 6 Movement he would know that its hopes really are not his. It demands opening Egypt's border with Gaza, ending sales of Egyptian natural gas to Israel, and supporting the Palestinians' Nakba Day protests of May 15 at the 1949 armistice lines (the so-called 1967 "borders"). The movement's slogan is "We shall return to Palestine."

President Obama stood before AIPAC a few days before Prime Minister Netanyahu's address to Congress and observed that "a new generation of Arabs is reshaping the region. A just and lasting peace can

no longer be forged with one or two Arab leaders. Going forward, millions of Arab citizens have to see that peace is possible for that peace to be sustained." Any administration that takes this dictum seriously will be forced to reconsider the United States' traditional policy of studied

ambiguity in the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. Such ambiguity characterized the land-for-peace formula of the 1967 United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which was intended to produce a peace process, not define its outcome. It left the question of how much land Israel would yield and to whom to future negotiations between Israel and the Arab states. The resolution referred to the Palestinians only obliquely in the phrase "the refugee problem." American peace initiatives since then have ginned up process without taking the considerable risks entailed in pressuring the parties to define an outcome that addressed Palestinian statelessness.

In 1977 President Carter briefly floated the idea of a "Palestinian homeland," hoping to entice the Palestine Liberation Organization into the diplomatic process and thereby ease the way to negotiations with Israel for the Arab confrontation states. Carter did not use the term "Palestinian state," and the PLO had not then accepted the principle of a Palestinian state existing alongside

Israel. Even if the PLO had, a proposal for a state would have been irreconcilable with the rejection by Israeli Prime Minister Begin's Likud Party of the existence of any state other than Israel between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea. The bilateral peace treaty Carter brokered between Egypt and Israel in 1979 offered only more process for the Palestinians through an associated document, the Framework for Peace in the Middle East. Its proposal of autonomy for Palestinians in the territories during a five-year transitional period also did not promise a Palestinian state at the end. A similar formula was revived in the 1993 Oslo agreement, which

To the degree that the Arab protesters can force more openness on their governments in places such as Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen, it will also become more difficult for the United States to maintain its relationship with their security services. That relationship had tightened even before 9/11, as the United States partnered with these countries in the campaign against jihadist organizations. U.S. access to regional military bases is also likely to be less tolerated by people who do not perceive that their security is increased by American facilities on their soil.

produced elements of autonomy for the Palestinians in the territories but no promise of statehood. Its autonomy-without-sovereignty arrangements resembled what Begin and the Likud had planned for the Palestinians in 1977 and resulted in a Palestinian uprising against the Israeli occupation in 2000. It cannot have been lost on the Palestinians that President Clinton's January

2001 public proposal of a Palestinian state alongside Israel came only in the final weeks of his two-term presidency and after four months of the uprising.

The ambiguity continues, however. Prime Minister Netanyahu told Congress that Israel envisions peace with a future Palestinian state, but he rejected the 1949 armistice lines as an approximation of its borders. Congress displayed nothing but approval of the prime minister's speech. Arab publics will not be impressed with American diplomacy if the term "Palestinian state" turns out to mean a few enclaves in the Gaza Strip and West Bank that fly Palestinian flags but do not control their borders, airspace, or aquifer. Arabs are likely to ask how President Obama could tell AIPAC that "every state has the right to self-defense, and Israel must be able to defend itself—by itself" and at the same time declare that the future Palestinian state must be "non-militarized."

To the degree that the Arab protesters can force more openness on their governments in places

such as Egypt, Bahrain, and Yemen, it will also become more difficult for the United States to maintain its relationship with their security services. That relationship had tightened even before 9/11, as the United States partnered with these countries in the campaign against jihadist organizations. U.S. access to regional military bases is also likely to be less tolerated by people who do not perceive that their security is increased by American facilities on their soil.

We should not presume, though, that less American involvement with regional security agencies or more limited use of bases will be entirely harmful to U.S. security in the long run. As Americans lose their enthusiasm for state-building and counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it might be possible for U.S. policymakers to consider the question of whether the United States has fallen into the security dilemma. That is, they might ask if the United States, by seeking absolute security through an intrusive Middle East policy and repeated recourse to massive force, has presented itself as a threat that produces regional counter-threats. They might also wonder whether the close U.S. military and intelligence cooperation with Israel and Arab authoritarian states has itself been a radicalizing force in the Arab world. It is also worth recalling that although the jihadist organizations have taken refuge in failed states and weak states, they also frequently established themselves in authoritarian states, some of them supported by the United States. Arab societies in which governments can better accommodate dissent and can allow the functioning of a liberal opposition might well be less conducive towards the radicalization of the political opposition.

Some observers have claimed that the weakening of authoritarian Arab regimes will redound to the benefit of Islamist movements, and by extension to Iran, and will necessarily harm American security. There can be little doubt that policymakers in the Islamic Republic welcomed the fall of such a stalwart American client as Mubarak. The Iranian leadership must delight even more in the protests in Bahrain, headquarters to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, which controls the waters off Iran's coast and monitors its airspace and communications. But the protests in the Arab world are hardly an unalloyed blessing for Iran. Its own democracy activists are certainly watching events in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere, drawing lessons about how to bring about

more political freedom in Iran. Iran's problems also in some ways mirror those of the United States: the nationwide protests in Syria are directed against Iran's main regional ally. Even if the regime in Damascus does not collapse, the more resources it must dedicate to remaining in power, the less effectively it can serve as Tehran's client and exert pressure on Israel through Lebanon.

The recent popular mobilizations of Arab opposition movements, the activists' deployment of new media, and the erosion of the arbitrary power of Arab governments (and by extension the power of their foreign backers) are all part of an uneven process that has been evident over the course of a century. In the interwar period, popular mobilizations undermined the bargain between collaborating indigenous elites and colonial authorities in the Arab Middle East. Educated Egyptian youths in 1935, expressing their demands through print media, mobilized urban populations and confronted the Egyptian army to achieve the restoration of the Egyptian constitution and a new treaty with Great Britain that advanced Egypt's independence. Soon after, in Syria, young activists launched nationwide demonstrations and strikes in defiance of the French colonial administration's efforts to suppress them and brought about the dismissal of a collaborating Syrian government and French promises to negotiate a treaty with Syria. At the same time, young Palestinian activists, among them journalists and labor organizers, undertook to emulate the protests in Syria and coordinate their own protests with them. The Palestinians' efforts were the outcome of several episodes of popular political mobilization over the previous five years and resulted in an extended general strike, followed by a three-year armed insurrection against British control of the country and Zionist colonization.

Although Great Britain's counterinsurgency campaign in Palestine was militarily successful, British policymakers ultimately felt compelled to end Britain's policy of ambiguity toward Zionism in an attempt to preserve its regional hegemony. During World War I, they had simultaneously built relationships with Arab nationalists and Zionists to achieve their strategic goals. The vagueness of the Balfour Declaration's support for "a national home for the Jewish people" in Palestine, as opposed to a Jewish state, could not reconcile the contradiction inherent in simultaneously backing Zionism

and Arab nationalism. The British soon realized that the political leadership of Egypt, Transjordan, and Iraq, which had treaties with Great Britain and British bases on their soil, cared about what happened to the Palestinian Arabs, in part because their publics did. In 1937, during the Palestinian Arab revolt, British officials recommended the partition of Palestine into a Jewish and Arab state, then backed away from it and two years later declared that Palestine should become a single independent state of Jews and Arabs.

The efforts of the British to resolve the conflict in Palestine ended badly for them and just as badly for some of their Arab client politicians and kings. Within ten years of the 1948 Palestine War, military coups—"revolutions," as their leaders called them—swept from power the Arab mediating elites with whom Great Britain had constructed a security system in Egypt and Iraq. British military bases and economic prerogatives went with the old elites, whose sorry performance during the Palestine crisis was a significant factor in their demise. Those elites had also failed in a new style of politics in which recently urbanized lower classes and powerless but educated middle classes demanded that the state address their needs and aspirations.

The populist authoritarian regimes that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s presented themselves as defenders of their people against imperialism, monopoly capitalism, and feudalism. They promised that political democracy would follow revolutionary change. Long before, in 1867, the Tunisian liberal reformer Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi reflected on modern European history and its meaning for the Muslim world. He wrote that sometimes a dictator "would be accepted by the people for the purpose of extinguishing [national] helplessness, delivering the kingdom from danger, and making her conditions viable by smoothing out the people's rough spots and straightening their crookedness. However," he added, "the people usually do not get what they hoped for."<sup>3</sup> Arab publics are now making it clear that they have not.

*Weldon C. Matthews is Associate Professor of History at Oakland University.*

Notes:

1. Maryam Ishani, "The Hopeful Network," *Foreign Policy*, 7 February 2011, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/07/the\\_hopeful\\_network](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/07/the_hopeful_network).

2. Mark Mazzetti and Emily Hager, "Secret Desert Force Set Up By Blackwater's Founder," *The New York Times*, 14 May 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/15/world/middleeast/15prince.html>.

3. Leon Carl Brown, *The Surest Path: The Political Treatise of a Nineteenth Century Muslim Statesman* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), 177.

## Living in Interesting Times

*Clea Bunch*

The spring semester of 2011 was a busy time for scholars who study the Middle East. In January, after the fall of the Tunisian government, I gave five public talks in the span of ten days. A few weeks later, I watched the fall of Hosni Mubarak's government while sitting at my home computer in pajamas (it was a rare Arkansas snow day). As I alternated between coverage on the BBC and Al-Jazeera websites, my students and I chatted on Facebook with excited anticipation, and we commiserated online when Mubarak initially refused to step down. Within the span of a month I gave talks on diverse subjects from radical political Islam to oil prices, and I answered questions from conservative talk radio hosts, Arkansas politicians, and financial executives.

When I ventured into my career path as a Middle East historian in the early 1990s, I certainly did not anticipate that my chosen profession would be quite so lively or of interest to anyone beyond my own small cohort of nerdy specialists. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the atmosphere in this profession dramatically and created a national obsession with the Middle East, its people and its history. Almost ten years later, the revolutionary events of the "Arab Spring" have captivated the American public and media. While the demand for information about the Middle East increased dramatically between 9/11 and the Arab Spring, it is interesting to see how little has changed in terms of public perceptions. The following observations review some Middle East history and consider how current events intersect with the profession.

**We've been waiting for the Arab Spring.** 2011 marks the culmination of an important phase in the history of the Middle East. By the late 1990s, many Middle Eastern leaders, including Hafez Assad of Syria, King Hussein of Jordan, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and Saddam Hussein of Iraq, were entering their twilight

years, and their countries faced uncertain succession. That generation of leaders provided the Middle East with a modicum of stability—at least in terms of leadership—during the end of the Cold War, but it was unclear whether their regimes would survive without the drive, charisma, or (in some cases) ruthlessness of their personalities. In addition, as the populations of Arab countries became increasingly well-educated, it seemed highly unlikely that they would continue to tolerate corruption and abuse in their governments. I visited Egypt in July 2010, and it was apparent that Egyptians were not prepared to accept the leadership of Mubarak's son, Gamal.

**I do not own a crystal ball.**

Historians of the Middle East have been waiting for the "Arab Spring" to materialize for many years, but it should be emphasized that no historian, political scientist, area specialist, or policymaker can foretell the future. The term "unknown unknowns" coined by Donald Rumsfeld was subjected to

a substantial amount of ridicule; however, there are indeed many "unknown unknowns" in the Middle East. How could U.S. officials anticipate that several revolutions would be sparked by the actions of one angry Tunisian man? Should the CIA be closely monitoring the moods of vegetable vendors? It is possible to read the general political climate and to make analogies from past to present, but as historians we need to admit to ourselves and to the public that some events are beyond prediction. Diplomatic historians are often asked to forecast the future with an accuracy that is unrealistic. We can give educated guesses about events, but we should resist the temptation to speak with an authoritative voice beyond our capacity. Repeat after me: "I don't know."

**The United States will not determine the fate of the Middle East.** Historical accounts of U.S.–Middle East relations often include the phrase "missed opportunities." I confess that my writing has been peppered with a fair share of scolding

directed at American leaders. Yet the notion that the United States can direct the future of the Arab world is false. President George W. Bush committed the United States to a war that he and other policymakers hoped would cause a domino effect, spreading democracy throughout the region, but despite the sacrifice of thousands of lives and millions of dollars, the United States did not inspire a widespread democratic movement. Reform in the Middle East is taking place at its own pace and is directed by local leadership; it cannot be controlled by external parties.

The image of an all-powerful United States was abused by Middle Eastern potentates for several decades: they blamed the ills of their societies on the actions of U.S. leaders and thus avoided accountability for their own corruption and ineffectiveness. The policies of the United States have undoubtedly affected the Middle East in profound ways, but the futures of nascent democracies in the region will be determined by their citizens. In

### JFK Library Announcement

Due to the need to update its archival storage areas, the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library will provide restricted access to its textual archival collections starting in late summer and extending into the fall of 2011. During that time period, currently estimated to last from August 12 through Nov. 15, 2011, only a select number of collections will be physically available to researchers and to Archives staff members. These include:

- the National Security Files;
- the Ernest Hemingway Papers; and
- the Audiovisual collections (still images, moving images, and audio recordings).

All other collections will be unavailable for research during the approximately 12-week period and research visits should be planned, accordingly. Without access to materials for research, Archives staff members will be limited in their ability to respond to offsite requests during this period, as well. Please note that all digitized collections, including the President's Office Files, the John F. Kennedy Oral History Collection, and the White House Photographs, will remain accessible via our website: [www.jfklibrary.org](http://www.jfklibrary.org).

We urge all researchers to contact the JFK Library's research room before planning on-site visits: 617.514.1629 or [Kennedy.Library@nara.gov](mailto:Kennedy.Library@nara.gov).

We apologize for the inconvenience and appreciate your cooperation during this period of restricted access.

Sincerely,  
Karen Adler Abramson  
Chief Archivist  
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library

fact, the United States will have even less influence in democratic societies than in dictatorships and monarchies. As historians, we need to be cautious about prescriptive counterfactuals that assign too much power and influence to the United States. Certainly, there have been missed opportunities, but the United States—as a superpower—has been surprisingly powerless to shape the outcome of events in the Middle East.

**Our knowledge is still very limited.** In the United States, our lack of knowledge about the Middle East stems primarily from a language deficit, which became highly visible when it was revealed that the State Department employed only a few individuals who were fluent in Arabic prior to the tragedy of 9/11. Arabic is a long-term commitment and is not a typical offering in most U.S. high schools and universities (although it is becoming more common). Furthermore, many students abandon the study of Arabic after one or two years, which is barely enough time to learn the basic structure of the language. Adding to a student's natural frustration with a difficult language is the fact that formal Arabic—which is commonly taught in basic Arabic courses—is fairly useless on the streets of Cairo, Amman, or Baghdad; residents speak local dialects that almost seem unrelated to the formal language studied in colleges. There are also practical difficulties involved in studying the language in college. When I attended graduate school, my fellowship required that I carry a full load of history courses, take six hours of Arabic each semester, and teach two full sections (120 students) of Western Civilization; there was no recognition by the administration that learning Arabic would require significant extra time from graduate students. Needless to say, historians need to cultivate a more positive environment for language acquisition in graduate and undergraduate programs. Scholars need to encourage students as they struggle with Arabic, which is acknowledged to be an extremely difficult language for native English speakers, and ensure that programs of study permit them to dedicate sufficient time to language acquisition. Aid from sources such as the SHAFR Hogan fellowship, which provides money specifically for language studies, is very helpful in this regard; however, the small number of applicants for such aid indicates that many historians still view language acquisition as a luxury, not

a necessity.

Adding to linguistic barriers are negative perceptions of the Middle East. Americans in particular tend to be fearful and suspicious of the region. There is a widespread perception that the entire Middle East is a hazardous region filled with suicide bombers and kidnappers. Although conflict zones in the Middle East are dangerous, I am very confident that traffic accidents, not terrorist attacks, are the main threat to my health when I travel in Jordan or Egypt. It is critical that diplomatic historians travel to Middle Eastern countries, learn the languages, conduct interviews, search for documents of historical significance, and expand their understanding of the region. Many areas of the world pose hazards or challenges to historians; unfortunately, perceptions of threats in the Middle East have become inflated to the point where they impede scholarship.

**Appearances matter.** Because of limited interaction between Middle Eastern and Western societies, perceptions shaped by the media and high-level contacts become particularly significant. Specifically, words used by leaders in both societies are viewed by the public as having special power and relevance. The use of the term “crusade” by President George W. Bush is one example of the way that impressions can be shaped by language (in that case negatively). As historians, we need to investigate the deeper meanings of language and images and recognize that there are significant cultural barriers to acknowledge and deconstruct. President Obama has walked a very fine line in vocalizing his support for various democratic movements in the Middle East; he is attempting to encourage reform without undermining stability—a difficult task indeed. His Cairo address and his May policy speech on the Middle East have done much to redeem the image of the United States in the Arab world.

**The Arab Spring revealed the primary flaw in U.S. policy.** On the one hand, Americans tend to support the spread of democracy, believing that democratic societies will inevitably become peaceful, prosperous allies. On the other hand, U.S. leaders have sought stability in the Middle East because it is an area of key strategic importance and economic necessity. It is time for the American public and policymakers alike to recognize that these two goals embody an organic

contradiction: democratic societies are not necessarily stable, nor will they behave in a manner that always favors American policy. Until we acknowledge that this tension exists, American policies will continue to be comprised of a hodgepodge of expensive ad hoc interventions. In the past, naked self-interest has trumped any desire to encourage reform in the Middle East, and despite presidential language to the contrary, dictators and kings were the chief American allies. It is important for historians to understand that these contradictions exist and to point them out when necessary so that students can begin to recognize the unarticulated aspects of U.S. policy in the Middle East. For example, discussions of women's rights or religious freedom often elide problems that exist in Saudi Arabia or Israel specifically because they are key U.S. allies in the region. The Arab Spring invites historians to discuss the wider debates of U.S. national interests and how they may conflict with deeply prized democratic values and human rights abroad.

**Be prepared for turbulence.** As dictatorships fall in the Middle East, we must be prepared for an unstable future. Historians are granted the gift of a long-term perspective, and we know that continuity is the norm in most societies. We cannot expect that democratic transitions in the Middle East will be neat, tidy, or linear. It took centuries of violence, widespread warfare, and millions of deaths for Europeans to sift their tangled mess of ethnic and religious groups into stable, peaceful nations. Should we expect better from the Middle East? Although the Middle East is often perceived as an area of brutality and warfare, it has suffered nothing close to the violence of Europe during the twentieth century. It will take time for abused citizens to trust in their new freedoms of religion and the press; ethnic and religious conflicts are likely to become more pronounced, not less, in free societies.

In terms of U.S. regional policy, it is critical that Israel come to a settlement with the Palestinians. In the past, numerous dictators have used the issue of the Palestinians to deflect criticism from their own corruption and abuse. If Palestinians and Israelis arrive at an amicable settlement, it will remove a powerful weapon from the arsenal of extremists.

I am cautiously optimistic about the future of the Middle East; if not for a sense of hope, it would be difficult to work in this field. 2011 is proving to be an eventful year,

ripe with possibilities, but darkened by violence in Syria, Yemen, Libya, and Bahrain. It is possible that the Arab spring will lead to more access for historians as previously closed archives become open and new sources become available. Unfortunately, Syria and Yemen are now essentially inaccessible to scholars. Historians who focus on the Middle East will continue to face numerous challenges as the area enters a new era, but public hunger for information about the region will continue to drive the profession in the near future.

*Clea Bunch is Assistant Professor of History and Chair of Middle East Studies at the University of Arkansas, Little Rock.*

### **Revolution and Democracy in the Middle East, 1917-2011<sup>1</sup>**

*Paul Thomas Chamberlin*

**W**e have all watched the dramatic events unfolding in the Arab world with a mixture of hope and trepidation. To their credit, the students in my U.S.–Middle East Relations class at the University of Kentucky waited patiently as we moved through lectures on long-forgotten decades like the 1950s and 1960s for a chance to discuss the most recent reports of the events taking place in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria. I began teaching my course on the United States and the Middle East on January 12. Two days later, Tunisia's Zine El Abidine Ben 'Ali, who had ruled the country since 1987, stepped down. On May 2, some sixteen weeks and twenty-six lectures later, my students sat down to take their final exam only hours after learning that Osama Bin Laden had been killed by U.S. Special Forces. Imagine their dismay at having to write an essay on ancient topics like Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy when much more interesting headlines were stretched across the front page of the student newspaper, the *Kentucky Kernel*!

One of the sentiments that my students expressed—and no doubt picked up from the press—was the notion that what is happening in the Arab world is “unprecedented.” Commentators have drawn optimistic comparisons with Eastern Europe in 1989 and issued dire warnings about Iran in 1979 as a way to understand exactly what it is we are witnessing. The sentiment that the Arab world has, for the *first* time, come forward to demand greater freedom and democracy seems to pervade public

discussions of these recent events. For decades, some experts tell us, the peoples of the Middle East have rejected “freedom” and “democracy,” choosing instead a life of oppression at the hands of tyrannical rulers. Finally, we are told, “people power” of the kind we saw in 1989 has at long last come to the Middle East. This interpretation, it seems to me, is a vestige of traditional orientalist depictions of the Middle East as backward, unchanging, and prone to despotism. The allusion to 1989, at the same time, seems to suggest that it could be Western influence, rather than indigenous forces, that might be pointing the way toward a new, democratic modernity. In the following paragraphs, I will try to historicize this “Arab Spring” and argue that the demonstrations of 2011, while certainly historic, are not exactly the first to have swept through the Arab world and the wider Middle East. Indeed, the region has seen as much “people power” as nearly any other in recent history.

The late-1910s and 1920s were years of ferment throughout the Arab world. The destruction of the Ottoman Empire in 1919, part of the global conflagration of World War I, opened the door to the creation of an entirely new regional order. Immersed in the rising tides of nationalism, the many peoples of the region—or at least the vanguard of intellectuals in the major cities—looked forward to a chance to exercise this new nationalist sentiment in the form of independent nation-states. Europe's great powers had other ideas, however. In 1918, Saad Zaghloul requested permission from the British High Commissioner in Cairo to send a delegation to the Paris Peace Conference to call for the international community's support for an independent Egyptian state. When his request was denied, Zaghloul appealed directly to the Egyptian people, who enthusiastically supported him. British authorities recognized Zaghloul and the newly formed Wafd Party as a threat to their interests in Egypt—namely, control of the Suez Canal—and exiled him to Malta in 1919. The move sparked a popular uprising that coalesced into the Egyptian Revolution of 1919. Unrest continued in Egypt until 1922, when the British granted nominal independence to a new Egyptian government. This concession was illusory, however, as it contained provisions that allowed for continued British control of much of the Egyptian system.

The situation was even more complicated in the Levant. The

land that was to become the British Mandate for Palestine was the focus of two competing nationalisms, one Arab and one Jewish. On the basis of the 1917 Balfour Declaration, the British took up the paradoxical and ultimately disastrous task of establishing in Palestine a “national home for the Jewish people” without “prejudicing the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.” One of the earliest naysayers in this pursuit was the American-dispatched King-Crane Commission, which found that a majority of the local inhabitants opposed the formation of a Jewish state. The commission concluded that the only way that such a state could survive would be through a reliance on armed force. The British soon found themselves in an impossible situation, as “people power” manifested itself in the form of a series of demonstrations fueled by ethnic tensions: in Jaffa in 1920–21, at the Western Wall in Jerusalem in 1929, and in a massive mandate-wide uprising over the course of 1936–39. After World War II ended, the Jewish population of Palestine would launch its own revolt against the British authorities, who had restricted immigration to Palestine during the height of the Holocaust.

To the north of Palestine in the Mandate of Syria and Lebanon, the French were faring no better. The Great Syrian Revolt, which lasted from 1925 to 1927, was an outpouring of “people power” that elicited a harsh response from French imperial authorities. Thousands of Syrians were killed in the French crackdown, and parts of Damascus were reduced to rubble. To this day the metal roof over Damascus's Souq al-Hamidiya is riddled with bullet holes from French aircraft firing at crowds (or, some argue, from the crowds themselves firing upward). These uprisings came largely in response to the impact of European rule under the mandate system. But like the uprisings of 2011, those of the 1920s were largely spontaneous demonstrations of desire for greater civil sovereignty. The European powers subjected these uprisings to harsh crackdowns in order to regain immediate control of the situation and then introduced political reforms—some token, some more substantial.

The situation began to change with the termination of the British and French mandates in the late 1940s. As Western imperialism receded around the globe, two major forces emerged in its wake: the postcolonial world and the Cold War. The former represented the newest generation of anti-colonialists, who were intent

on wiping away the vestiges of European imperialism and bringing the “modern” state to the formerly colonized world. While most of these emerging states were far from the socialist or democratic utopias that in theory they aspired to be, they paid homage to the mass political movements of earlier generations and gained momentum from popular demands for greater sovereignty and self-determination. The postcolonial world faced a rising threat, however, from the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union. Many feared that these superpowers would replace the old system of European colonialism with a new Cold War imperialism. The new postcolonial states needed foreign aid, however, to support economic and social development projects and to create functioning military forces to provide for national security. In many cases, national security entailed defending the contested frontiers left over from colonial regimes.

These post-mandate states of the Arab world faced an added challenge: how to address the situation in Palestine. Britain’s flirtation with rival nationalisms in their mandate had generated a nightmare scenario in which two peoples with claims to one land would engage in what many feared, especially in the wake of the recent European horrors, might become another genocide. While the Jewish inhabitants of Palestine prepared to defend their last best hope for a state they could call their own, the Arab inhabitants struggled to hold on to the land on which they had lived for centuries. When the British finally left in 1948 and Jewish leaders announced the creation of Israel, the independent Arab states had little choice but to do what they believed they had to do: rush to the defense of their fellow Palestinian Arabs. To do otherwise would have meant an unprecedented surrender and the abandonment of their compatriots, which would likely have destabilized the regimes in Cairo, Beirut, Amman, and Damascus. What followed was a monumental disaster that challenged the credibility of these post-mandate regimes and became a rallying cry for a new generation of Arabs.

Indeed, Gamal Abdel Nasser’s rise to power in the early 1950s was driven in part by a desire to rectify the shame of 1948. The revolutionary regime in Cairo would garner enthusiastic support from the so-called Arab street in Egypt and throughout much of the wider Arab world. This outpouring of “people power” was a response to Nasser’s Arab nationalist promises

to continue the struggle against colonialism and neo-imperialism and to assert Arab sovereignty in the international system. Nasser won admirers around the world and fervent support in the region. So strong was this tide of support that it appeared, at least for a moment, that Arab nationalist elements might seize power in both Lebanon and Iraq in 1958. U.S. military intervention in Lebanon helped to save the regime in Beirut, but the “people power” of the Arab street would become an ongoing concern for the regimes of the Arab world and the superpowers in the coming decades. Historians of U.S. foreign relations already know what happened in Iran, which is on the frontiers of the Arab world but still within the greater Middle East: Muhammad Mossadegh rode a wave of popular support to power in Tehran only to be overthrown by British and U.S. intelligence operatives in 1953.

Significant unrest was also present in the late 1960s and through the 1970s. Massive—and “unprecedented”—protests in Cairo in 1967 followed Nasser’s announcement that he would resign. While this outpouring of “people power” was again in *support* of the regime, it grew out of the popular memory of Nasser’s record of asserting Egyptian sovereignty and independence on the world stage. When thousands of students and workers demonstrated in Cairo, Alexandria, and other cities across the country the following year, their demands took the form of calls for greater political freedom in Egyptian society. Large uprisings would continue in Egypt into the 1970s, driven both by discontented youth reacting to Egypt’s economic malaise and by the resurgent power of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In January 1977, hundreds of thousands of Egyptians took to the streets to protest Anwar Sadat’s decision, mandated by the World Bank and the IMF, to end the regime’s subsidies on flour, rice, and cooking oil. So strong were these demonstrations that Sadat elected to reverse his decision and restore the state subsidies on basic foodstuffs. While the protestors were driven by the need for access to basic necessities, their anger can be read, in part, as a local rejection of the U.S. model of economic globalization. The 1979 Revolution in Iran, which is likely to be remembered as one of the great revolutions of the twentieth century for the theocratic character that it unexpectedly adopted, is yet another example of a mass popular uprising in the greater Middle East, if not the Arab world itself.

The 1980s saw another wave of uprisings fueled by Arab “people power.” The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood had been waging a guerilla campaign against Hafiz al-Asad’s regime in Damascus since 1976. Tensions came to a head in 1982, when the regime moved to destroy the Brotherhood’s stronghold in the city of Hama. In a siege that lasted three weeks, Syrian armor and artillery leveled large portions of the city, killing thousands and breaking the back of the Brotherhood’s insurgency. “People power” also surged in the West Bank and Gaza in 1987, when Palestinians who had lived under Israeli occupation for twenty years unleashed their desire for self-determination in a spontaneous mass uprising. As Palestinian youths threw stones and burned tires, Israeli forces battled to restore control, and Yasir Arafat, along with the rest of the PLO leadership far away in Tunisia, scrambled to claim ownership of the uprising. This first *Intifada* accomplished what years of superpower diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli conflict could not: it led Arafat to deliver a speech explicitly affirming Israel’s right to exist and renouncing “terrorism,” thus paving the way for direct negotiations between Israel and the PLO in the 1990s. The first *Intifada* also opened the door for a new force in Palestinian politics, Hamas, an offshoot of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood.

This Arab “people power” was alive and well at the beginning of the twenty-first century. The second *Intifada* in Palestine broke out in September 2000 and proved far more violent than its predecessor. This uprising symbolized the people’s opposition to the Oslo peace process and a general dissatisfaction with the Palestinian Authority and the PLO leadership. During my first summer in Cairo in 2005, another “unprecedented” wave of demonstrations was gripping the city as members of the *Kefaya* movement used cell phone text messages to coordinate some of the largest protests the city had seen beneath the radar of the Egyptian secret police. Five and a half years later Mubarak’s regime had learned its lesson and managed to shut Cairo’s cell phone network down, but the demonstrations continued nonetheless. Months later, I visited the site in Beirut where Lebanon’s Rafiq Hariri was killed in by a car bomb allegedly planted by Syrian agents. Hariri’s assassination sparked a mass uprising, the Cedar Revolution, in which demonstrators demanded the end of Syria’s

military presence in Lebanon. In April, the last uniformed Syrian military units left Lebanon, ending a partial occupation that had lasted since 1976. The following summer, after witnessing the 2006 war in Lebanon amidst a flood of wealthy refugees from Beirut in Damascus, I watched Egyptian protesters battle a detachment of Mubarak's riot-gear clad police in front of Ayman Nur's political offices in downtown Cairo. I was back in Beirut in the summer of 2007 to watch as Lebanese Security Forces laid siege to *Nahr al-Bared*, the Palestinian refugee camp outside of Tripoli, in an attempt to capture or kill members of the militant group Fatah al-Islam.

My point here is to suggest that we ought not to look at civil unrest gripping the Arab world in 2011 as "unprecedented." As these examples (and there are many more) suggest, the peoples of the Middle East have not existed in some sort of complacent stupor in the face of regional despotism. It could be argued, in fact, that tensions between the "West" and the Arab world are the result not of the Arabs' acquiescence to authoritarian rule but of their consistent demands for greater independence and self-determination in international affairs. Whether motivated by a thirst for democracy, an anti-imperialist impulse, a desire to control natural resources and strategic waterways, or an urge to defend the Palestinian people (or at least give the appearance of doing so), many of the peoples and states of the Middle East have insisted on their ability to function independently of Western power in the region and on the international stage. At the same time, many of the region's authoritarian regimes—from the Hashemite and Saudi monarchies and the Shah to Mubarak—owe no small debt to Western support, involvement, and intervention in the Middle East, often in opposition to demands for greater democracy. Let us not forget the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, which resulted in a victory for Hamas, or for that matter the 1951 election of Muhammad Mossadegh in the Iranian Majlis. When given an opportunity to express their own political will, the peoples of the Middle East and North Africa have not always chosen a course that pleased observers in the United States.

I would argue that if there is an unprecedented dimension to these uprisings, it is not a desire for greater freedom on the part of the peoples

of the Middle East, but rather the failure of government security forces or outside powers to smother these demands. Indeed, these types of demonstrations have historically been crushed: by the British and French in the 1920s and 1930s, by the CIA in the 1950s, or by local governments in more recent decades. What struck me as surprising was not a desire for greater democracy on the part of the Egyptian people, but Hosni Mubarak's decision to allow the protests in Tahrir Square to continue. To be sure, it seems as if that moment is now past. Mu'ammarr Gaddafi's brutal counterattack on the rebellion in Libya demonstrated the continued relevance of military force against "people power." The mounting bloodbath in Syria is starting to look more like a replay of Hama in 1982 than East Berlin in 1989.

That said, I suspect that we are indeed witnessing something of a watershed in the Middle East. In the coming months and years, as the precise nature of the revolution in Egypt becomes clear, we will have a better picture of the legacy of the 2011 Arab Spring, for it is Egypt, the largest and most powerful country in the Arab world, that is likely to set the historical agenda. It was Nasser, not the Syrian or Iraqi Ba'ath, who captured the spotlight in the heyday of Arab nationalism. It was Sadat, with his decision to expel Soviet advisors in 1972 and realign Cairo with Washington during the 1970s, who signaled the beginning of a new era. I would argue that it was Mubarak, and not outliers like Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden, who became the most representative visage of the generation of Middle Eastern autocrats in the post-Cold War era. Thus, I would venture a guess that whoever takes the seat of power in Cairo, be it another general or military junta, an opposition figure like El-Baradei, one of the Muslim Brothers, or some other unexpected figure, is likely to be remembered decades from now as the face of the post-2011 Arab world. In the long run, I suspect that as Cairo goes, so goes the majority of the Arab world. However, had I given a prognosis on Mubarak's regime in early February, I would have guessed that it would still be in power. In the end, I am convinced that we shall just have to wait and see. However, at least two things are clear. First, far from being unprecedented, the 2011 Arab Spring is ultimately just the latest manifestation of a decades-long struggle for self-determination and

greater democracy taking place in the Middle East. Second, I will be writing at least one new lecture to finish my U.S.–Middle East course for 2012. I think my students will be pleased.

*Paul Thomas Chamberlin is Assistant Professor of History at the University of Kentucky.*

Note:

1. I would like to thank Chapin Rydingsward and Maurice LaBelle for their comments on this essay.

# A Roundtable Discussion of Michaela Hoenicke-Moore's *Know Your Enemy: The American Debate on Nazism, 1933-1945*

*Gunter Bischof, Lloyd Ambrosius, Cora Sol Goldstein, Brian Etheridge,  
and Michaela Hoenicke-Moore*

**Review of Michaela  
Hoenicke-Moore. *Know Your Enemy:  
The American Debate on Nazism,  
1933-1945***

*Gunter Bischof*

This is a very Teutonic book. Deeply and exhaustively researched, clearly (and somewhat repetitively) argued, it is at times overburdened by the pedantry of its documentation. Footnotes are sometimes longer than the text on a page—a not uncommon occurrence in obsessive German academic writing. One begins to wonder, for example, whether the author had to cite every article on “the German character” written in American magazines during World War II. Could she have been more selective? Fascinating debates on the roots of National Socialism in German history are recounted in interminably long footnotes (248), and one wishes the author had made her arguments in the text rather than in the small print of footnotes that are relentless in their attention to obscure references. However, no one will be able to make the argument that Michaela Hoenicke-Moore did not do her homework.

*Know Your Enemy* is a brilliant intellectual history of American thinking about National Socialist Germany. It is also a political history of the deep roots of American postwar planning in vigorous prewar and wartime debates about the nature of the Nazi regime, the culpability of the German people in the Nazi project of occupation and exploitation of much of Europe, and the mass murder of millions of people based on a racist ideology. Hoenicke-Moore has probed every significant account

written by American journalists about the rise of Nazism and Hitler's unleashing of war in Europe. She has read every government document penned during World War II in Washington offices and planning groups about ideas of how to treat the Germans after their defeat. She expounds in great detail on the endless debates in wartime America over the nature of the Nazi regime and the special path (*Sonderweg*) Germany took from Frederic the Great to Hitler in its aggressive and expansionist designs. She also artfully connects American thinking about Germany during World War I and the historical memory of that thinking in the United States during World War II. In the process she makes it clear that a structured comparison of American perceptions of Germany and the Germans during World War I and World War II would merit a separate study.

The strength of Hoenicke-Moore's exposition is her analysis of the ambiguity of American wartime thinking about the essence of Nazi Germany and the character of the German people. Americans never reached a consensus during the war about how to think about the Germans and how to treat them after the war. American academics and intellectuals offered their advice, and German émigré academics voiced their opinions and wielded considerable influence in wartime Washington. Roosevelt himself had an ambiguous view of the Germans; reports from American journalists in Germany conflicted with each other; and Roosevelt's Cabinet was deeply divided over the treatment of Germany. This basic ambivalence had its roots in the “Janus-faced” character of the Germans as both a brutal and highly cultured people

(xv, 51). Starting with the journalists covering German politics in the 1930s, Americans could never make up their minds about whether it was the mass of German people who supported Hitler and were responsible for the crimes committed by Nazism (William L. Shirer) or just a small band of “Nazi gangsters,” a popular image that originated with the journalist John Gunther in the 1930s (50).

Hoenicke-Moore rightly argues that traditional “conservative right” vs. “progressive left” arguments do not do justice to the subtlety of the American great debate on Nazism. Conservatives like the influential journalist Dorothy Thompson (the “American Cassandra” [52]) recognized a deeply undemocratic, authoritarian, aggressive, and militaristic German character (53ff.) before the war but rallied support for a “democratic revolution” in postwar Germany during the war (190). The influential theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, a progressive, found himself in Thompson's camp. He reasoned that humans had a “universal” capability to do evil and therefore argued for a mild policy of reeducation to lead the Germans towards democracy. One should punish the guilty Nazi tyrants after the war while acknowledging “the profound guilt of the German people which is too deep to be reached by our punishment” (211).

Hoenicke-Moore sees the roots of the ambiguity of American wartime thinking about Germany in prewar debates about the nature of the Versailles Treaty and its influence on the rise of National Socialism. Americans were already deeply divided about the rise of the Nazis and the involvement of the German people in Nazism before

the war. Out of this came a deep division between isolationists (the “divisionists” among them wanted the Nazis to fight the Communists [110]) and internationalists about the extent of American involvement in Europe. The arch-isolationist press of the American heartland, controlled by Robert McCormick and William Randolph Hearst, saw the principal threat in communism. They “normalized” the Third Reich to blast Roosevelt and the New Deal (“Jew Deal” [62]) and maneuvered deftly to keep the United States out of war. The American public at large did not follow the newspapers that were sounding the alarm, and they were reluctant to identify Germany as a threat (69). Maybe as many as half of Americans were anti-Semites and never recognized the seriousness of the prewar Nazi persecution of the Jews and later “the dimensions of the Nazis’ atrocities against the Jews of Europe” (72).

With the coming of the war in Europe, President Roosevelt raised the specter of the Nazi conspiracy at home (in subversive elements such as the *Bund*) and warned of their territorial ambitions in the Americas. The president repeatedly used the metaphor of the Nazi “gangsters” who were enslaving the German people to heighten the public’s awareness of the Nazi threat. His personal view was akin to that of the prominent British anti-Nazi Lord Vansittart, who directly blamed the German people for supporting Hitler (118). But the isolationists attacked the president for wanting to pull the United States into the war in far away Europe; they felt that America was “invulnerable” and hemispheric defense would be sufficient for American national security. It was a tall order to educate Americans on the Nazi threat, since 82 percent did not hate the Germans and did not want to fight them in 1942 (105n2). Seventy-four percent of Americans felt the country was not at war with the German people but with their government (134), and 67 percent believed the United States would get along with Germans after the war (154). The fight against “ill-informed” American public opinion (110) on Nazi Germany turned into a principal battleground.

After Pearl Harbor, Americans wanted to fight the Japanese, whom they hated, not the Nazis. Once American GIs began to fight the German Wehrmacht in North Africa, the president saw an increased need “to narrow the public psychological distance from the war” (120). The “unconditional surrender” doctrine adopted in Casablanca in early

1943 was an important step in that direction; with it the president committed the United States to fight the war to the end without any compromises with the Nazis. Given FDR’s view that the German people had chosen dictatorship, the United States wanted a *tabula rasa* in Germany after the war so that German society could be completely restructured and the wayward German people successfully reeducated.

In May 1942 Roosevelt established the Office of War Information (OWI) to lead the propaganda effort and convince the home front of the true nature of the German enemy. The trouble was that the liberal New Dealers in the OWI failed to come up with an unambiguous image of the German enemy; like FDR they worked with the notion that the Nazi clique had enslaved the German people (140). While the Germans were fighting a racial war, the OWI followed American popular opinion that the United States was not fighting the German people in “racial war” (142). Was this a case of the blind leading the blind? In the end the OWI saw its core mission as mobilizing American citizens by educating them about how *their* daily lives would change under Nazi control and by inviting them to identify with the many victims of Nazi-occupied Europe (145ff.). The OWI’s exculpation of the German people also led to a virtual negation of the roots of Nazism in German history (149). Even though the OWI followed public opinion more than it educated the public, it was still terminated in mid-1943 by Congress. Harkening back to World War I, many Americans felt that government propaganda about German atrocities (such as the eradication of the Czech village of Lidice) were lies.

The War Department had more success in educating soldiers about the nature of the German threat with its *Why We Fight* films. Based on scripts by Shirer and Gunther, the Capra series projected a clear enemy image based on the popular notion promoted by American journalists and some émigré academics of the long *Sonderweg* of aggression and expansion in German history. These War Department films proffered the theme that the German people eagerly supported Hitler, and the Nazi *Herrenvolk* wanted to rule the world. They were premised on the idea, which most scholars would agree with today, that Hitler’s plan of world conquest was based on Haushofer’s geopolitics.<sup>1</sup> The war against Germany was thus a struggle between “the free and the slave

world” (158), an idea the president subscribed to as well. The State Department also weighed in on the debate with its view that National Socialism had deep roots in German culture (168). Under the weight of this government onslaught, American public opinion began to shift slowly towards recognizing the culpability of the German people and rejecting the possibility of a negotiated peace, even though a majority of Americans never came to hate the Germans.

As the end of the war and German defeat drew nearer, the debate intensified, especially among intellectuals, about how to cure the Germans of their “disease” of aggression and racism and divert them from the destructive path of their history. Hoenicke-Moore is especially astute in summarizing the heated debate by intellectuals between 1943 and 1945 about how to deal with Germany (the subtle “Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde” debates [177-216]). She rightly stresses that the traditional historiographical divide between harsh wartime indictments of collective guilt vs. the more moderate tendency to blame only the “Nazi gangster” does “justice neither to the reality of the Third Reich nor to the complexity of American thinking about National Socialism” (180). Journalists, academics, and émigrés engaged in this great debate, which still largely downplayed the Holocaust, found the accumulating evidence of German atrocities, especially in Eastern Europe, beyond belief. “Disease” and “Nazi-gangsterism” remained the prevalent metaphors both in assessing the German enemy and thinking about the postwar peace settlement. The medical profession added its weight to the notions of mental disease. Psychiatrists felt that the Nazis were the symptom of the “paranoid core of German culture” (223). They were particularly concerned about the long-range consequences of a generation of Hitler Youth indoctrinated in the Nazi spirit and felt that it might take a generation to undo the mental map of young Germans.

*Know Your Enemy* does a first rate job of exhaustively summarizing and classifying these American debates about Nazism and German guilt and linking them with the legacies of World War I on American notions during World War II; the influence of these debates on postwar historiographical discourses is also part of Hoenicke-Moore’s long trajectory of American thinking about Germany. Her chapter on “Vansittartism” in the American debate is particularly rewarding

(241ff.). Lord Vansittart's views of the deeply rooted aggressiveness of the German character, summarized in his pamphlet *Black Record* (1941), led him to urge the British to give up their illusions about "good Germans"; those were hard to find. Vansittart charged the Germans early on with the mass murder of the Jews and pleaded for sympathy with the German victims. Vansittart was a gifted polemicist. Hoenicke-Moore traces Vansittartian views of guilty Germans through the German-Swiss émigré historian Emil Ludwig directly to President Roosevelt (256ff.) as well as War Department films such as *Your Job in Germany* ("your enemy is German history" [262]). In her archeology of Vansittart's *Sonderweg*-trajectories of German history she ends with Daniel Goldhagen's recent bestseller, *Hitler's Willing Executioners*, which also indicts the German people (267).

In her chapters on American plans for postwar Germany Hoenicke-Moore launches a passionate defense of Secretary of Treasury Henry Morgenthau's ideas, which, by conjuring up notions of "Jewish revenge," served as rich fodder for Goebbels' propaganda machine and fed postwar German self pity so well (310ff.). She contextualizes Morgenthau's well-informed ideas in the 1944 American planning debate on postwar Germany and insists that they never amounted to a "plan" for an "agrarian" postwar Germany. His core ideas were dismemberment of the Reich and deindustrialization of certain areas of German war production. These ideas were firmly rooted in American wartime debates about safeguarding against the kind of resurgence that Germany achieved after World War I. Morgenthau's major opponent was Secretary of War Henry Stimson, who wanted quickly to rehabilitate Germany and integrate it into postwar Europe. Hoenicke-Moore reminds us that Morgenthau operated in the long progressive and New Deal tradition of "trust-busting"—taking apart the cartels of huge state industrial combines. Morgenthau also foreshadowed a postwar historiographical school that did indeed see German heavy industry as a vital motor of German aggression (300). His German policies were not an "aberration." To the contrary, they reflected the strain of the American wartime debate that felt international security required "restructuring of the German economy" (300). Unlike many liberal idealists in the tradition of Lord Keynes and Lord Vansittart, Morgenthau did not think the Versailles Treaty was too harsh.

In her rehabilitation of Morgenthau, however, Hoenicke-Moore ignores some of his more extreme statements. On August 24 he pondered in this diary "the possibility of removing all industry from Germany and simply reducing them to an agricultural population of small land owners." On September 4 he wrote that American engineers should be sent to the Ruhr to strip its machinery, flood its mines, dynamite its factories, and thereby turn it into an area of "ghost towns."<sup>2</sup> Morgenthau's more extreme statements seem to point beyond mere "trust-busting." In the end, Churchill's vision of a "fat but important" Germany seems to come closest to what happened after the war: namely, allowing for an economic reconstruction of Germany but eliminating the nation as a military power.<sup>3</sup>

The problem in wartime Washington was that President Roosevelt, the self-appointed "expert" on Germany (based on a short pre-World War I study trip to that country), could never make up his mind about the nature of the German enemy. He tended to burden the German people with responsibility for their support of Hitler (saying, for example, that the Allies had to make the Germans understand that their "whole nation" had been waging "a lawless conspiracy against the decencies of modern civilization"<sup>4</sup>). But given that some 40 percent of the American population claimed some degree of German heritage and that the American public never came to hate the Germans, Roosevelt the politician did not publicly advocate this harsher view much. He did insist that unconditional surrender did not mean "the destruction of the German people." In the 1944 debate in his cabinet he sided first with Morgenthau and then with Stimson. He remained ambivalent about the "German enemy" to the end of the war. Warren Kimball created the popular image of Roosevelt as "the juggler"<sup>5</sup>; Hoenicke-Moore presents much evidence to indicate that "the waffler" (or "the great fence-sitter") might be a more appropriate term.

Stimson confided to his diary that Roosevelt was "the poorest administrator I have worked under."<sup>6</sup> This statement gives us a clue about the workings of wartime Washington that would explain much of the confusion about Germany. Unlike Whitehall, Washington exhibited "a lack of clear policy guidelines at the highest level" of the decision-making process. Cabinet departments did not share information; Washington

did not keep important planning bodies like the European Advisory Commission informed about basic planning, etc. Hoenicke-Moore recognizes the basic problem in Washington as "a proliferation of plans [my emphasis]" about postwar Germany. As with so many important insights, she hides this one in a lengthy footnote (297n12).

Hoenicke-Moore also points her finger at another problem in Washington's wartime decision making, a problem even more basic than the indeterminacy of the Roosevelt administration: namely, the complex nature of foreign policy decision making in a democracy. Ernest R. May mused a long time ago about the fact that beyond the small segment of American elites that are interested in foreign policy, only 15 percent of the American public have a general interest in public affairs and foreign policy. The rest of the "inattentive" (*dice ignorant*) public follow their leaders.<sup>7</sup> If May's model of American public opinion formation is correct, why then did American leaders follow the public during World War II on the nature of the German enemy, as Hoenicke-Moore suggests? How could the "ill-informed" public pull its craven leaders by the nose? Was the Roosevelt administration cowed by the big German-American voting bloc? Had World War I government propaganda soured the public on following their leaders again on the nature of the German enemy? Was the Jewish American leader Morgenthau the only man with the courage of his convictions? Michaela Hoenicke-Moore has written a rich and fascinating book, and like any good book it raises as many questions as it answers.

*Gunter Bischof is the Marshall Plan Professor of History and Director of Center Austria at the University of New Orleans.*

#### Notes:

1. See the brief description of Hitler's geopolitical vision in Gerhard L. Weinberg, *Visions of Victory: The Hopes of Eight World War II Leaders* (Cambridge, 2005), 5-38.
2. These diary entries are cited in a dense chapter on American postwar planning for Germany, where the influence of State Department planning is stressed. See Patrick Hearden, *Architects of Globalism: Building a New Order during World War II* (Fayetteville, AR, 2002), 229-256 (here 242, 244). Hoenicke-Moore ignores Hearden and Michael Beschloss's *The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941-1945* (New York, 2002). While Hearden places American planning for postwar Germany in a larger European and global context and within

the framework of American national security requirements, Beschloss's book is a study of personalities, adding great detail to the workings of the Roosevelt White House and illuminating the many rivalries among Washington elites in the making and undoing of the Morgenthau "plan."

3. Weinberg, *Visions of Victory*, 150.
4. Beschloss, *The Conquerors*, 96.
5. Warren F. Kimball, *The Juggler: Franklin D. Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman* (Princeton, 1991).
6. Beschloss, *The Conquerors*, 88.
7. Ernest R. May's classic exposition of American public opinion formation in times of crisis is *American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay* (Boston, 1968, repr. Chicago: Imprint Publications 1991); for a summary and update of his ideas on public opinion, see his chapter "The News Media and Diplomacy," in Gordon A. Craig and Francis L. Loewenheim, *The Diplomats, 1939-1979* (Princeton, 1994), repr. in Akira Iriye, ed., *Rethinking International Relations: Ernest R. May and the Study of World Affairs* (Chicago, 1998), 145-177 (here 157).

### Know Your Enemy—And Yourself

Lloyd Ambrosius

In this excellent study of the American debate on Nazism, Michaela Hoenicke-Moore analyzes a broad range of issues in the history and historiography of Adolf Hitler's Germany and in the public and official reactions of Americans. She notes that various American interpretations and recommendations for dealing with Hitler's domestic and foreign policies reflected the perspectives of those making the assessments and proposing the appropriate responses by the United States. Her work "identifies and traces the emergence of the main explanatory models and narratives that Americans formulated to characterize the Nazi regime" and, equally important, considers "the governmental effort to focus these views" and describes "the problems it encountered" (2). Thus she deals with both the public debate and the U.S. government's role in it.

Hoenicke-Moore focuses on the intellectual dimensions of America's various responses to internal affairs in Nazi Germany and to its external aggression and war against its neighbors. A broad study of ideas as expressed by American journalists, scholars, films, and government officials and as recorded in public opinion polls, this book approaches the history of U.S. foreign relations from a different perspective. It is not a traditional diplomatic or international history of America's

relations with Nazi Germany during Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidency. It contributes, nevertheless, new insights into his administration's policymaking process before and during the Second World War and its ambiguous plans for postwar peacemaking.

As Americans sought to know their enemy, they also revealed who they were, Hoenicke-Moore clearly demonstrates. She uses the evidence of public and elite opinion not only to clarify the diverse reactions of Americans to Nazi Germany but also to disclose their multicultural national identity. She aims, "by examining representative examples of American official and public understandings of the Third Reich," to "elucidate the political and cultural underpinnings of how Americans saw themselves, their nation's role on the world stage, and, of course, the country that was to become their main adversary" (4). Through remarkably extensive research in primary sources and mastery of secondary literature on both German and American history, she has fulfilled this task.

Hoenicke-Moore shows that American attitudes toward the Germans before and even after the United States entered the war were relatively favorable—and definitely more favorable than their views of the Japanese. Some Americans contrasted the evil Nazi government and the good German people, seeing them as Hitler's victims too. Others, even while recognizing the widespread support for Hitler among the Germans, refrained from seeing them as inherently evil or barbaric and therefore incapable of democratic reform. Almost without exception, Americans rejected the view that Germans were unable to change because of an essentially flawed racial or national character. Still others hesitated to believe the news about Nazi wartime atrocities, especially about what was later named the Holocaust, because they discounted the incredible reports as likely propaganda similar to that of World War I. Hoenicke-Moore rejects the division of American attitudes toward Nazi Germany as either harsh or soft, arguing that this dualism failed to grasp the complexity of official and public opinion. While some views tended more toward one or the other alternative, Americans more typically qualified their views with greater nuance and changed them over time as they received new information.

Favorable public attitudes toward the Germans, which Hoenicke-Moore

documents in considerable detail, limited FDR's ability to adopt a harder line toward Nazi Germany prior to Pearl Harbor and later furnished the cultural foundation for American plans to rehabilitate postwar Germany as a member of the international community. Although a crusade against Nazi Germany might have seemed more justifiable during World War II than President Woodrow Wilson's campaign against Imperial Germany during World War I, neither the Roosevelt administration nor the general public favored that option. This restraint expressed the lessons they had drawn from their own nation's history during the previous war as well as their views of Germany and its history. Although one might have anticipated that Americans would have created a very hostile wartime image of Nazi Germany, this was not the case.

In her analysis of the memories of World War I, Hoenicke-Moore focuses on FDR. She denies that he was shallow or opportunistic, as some critics allege. Yet she acknowledges that he sometimes gave that impression to contemporaries and later historians because he "never formulated a comprehensive view of Germany" (21). During the war he adopted a harder line toward the enemy than many others, including some members of his cabinet, such as Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, but he also believed that the Germans might be restored—or restore themselves—to a respected place in Western civilization and the international community.

FDR's ambiguous understanding of Germany shaped his wartime decisions. Hoenicke-Moore concludes that "his basic belief in democracy, in human decency, and in his country's international vulnerability and its international responsibility all became apparent in his policies toward Nazi Germany. But it is true that Roosevelt was very flexible, open to change, and deceptive in his tactics" (22). He mostly avoided the Manichaeian view of the world that Wilson held during World War I, although occasionally his rhetoric suggested that the United States was engaged in a crusade. He sometimes spoke about a universal conflict between slavery and freedom or between Nazi paganism and Christianity. In general, however, he concentrated on Germany's threat to the United States, especially in the Western Hemisphere. He drew two lessons from Wilson's failure: he thought that Wilson and the Allies

should have required Germany to accept unconditional surrender rather than an armistice in 1918, and he believed they should have offered a more equitable peace that would have enabled the Weimar Republic to reenter the international order sooner. In other words, he combined views about peacemaking that might be characterized as both harsh and soft.

The news from Germany during the 1930s after Hitler and the Nazis seized power, as Hoenicke-Moore recounts, evoked conflicting interpretations and took on contested meanings. She shows the range of views from different journalists, including notably Edgar A. Mowrer, John Gunther, William L. Shirer, and Dorothy Thompson. Overall their reporting was quite good, even as they struggled to make sense out of the radically new character of Nazi leadership. Back home, Americans filtered the reports from Germany through their own perspectives, which sometimes led them to discount the journalists' accounts because of their own anticommunist, anti-Roosevelt, or antiwar attitudes. Racial prejudice in the United States, including the white South's preference for maintaining the Jim Crow system of segregation and inequality, also influenced receptivity to reports about Nazi claims to Aryan racial superiority over Jews. Outside the South, other Americans also shared anti-Semitic and anti-African American biases. These internal factors shaped the American debate on Nazism more than the news about what was happening in Germany or Hitler's hostile actions against neighboring countries, she concludes.

Unlike most Americans during the 1930s, FDR perceived the danger that Nazi Germany represented and comprehended the seriousness of news from Europe. Hoenicke-Moore argues that "the president had few illusions about the dictatorship that Hitler and the Nazi party installed in 1933. Roosevelt understood the fundamental differences between Imperial Germany and the Third Reich, and he recognized the threat posed by the Nazis' utopian project. More important than previous experience and insight was the news he received from official and informal sources on conditions inside Nazi Germany" (79). The president used the metaphors of disease and gangsterism to characterize Hitler's regime. He sought to shape public opinion by alerting Americans to Nazi ambitions in the Western Hemisphere, including the threat of domestic subversion in the United States. He recognized the prospect of war and endeavored to prepare the

nation for it.

Once Japan bombed Pearl Harbor and Nazi Germany declared war against the United States, the Roosevelt administration launched an all-out effort to mobilize the American people. This effort required the shaping of American public opinion, which was not as negative toward Germany as toward Japan. The president and his advisers, in contrast to most Americans, regarded Nazi Germany as the principal enemy. FDR sought to create domestic unity behind the war effort with propaganda from the Office of War Information, the War Department, and the State Department, as well as his own speeches. In his January 1942 State of the Union address, he depicted a global struggle between a Christian world of freedom and a godless world of slavery. In this war, as he announced at Casablanca a year later, the enemy's unconditional surrender was the only acceptable outcome. But as Hoenicke-Moore argues, the president's critique of Nazi Germany and his pursuit of its unconditional surrender did not rule out a better outcome for the Germans in the future than they had experienced so far in the twentieth century. "In Roosevelt's view," she emphasizes, "the goals of unconditional surrender and the eventual inclusion of the defeated enemy into a new world order were not contradictory" (127). He wanted, in other words, to avoid the mistakes that Wilson and the Allies had made during peacemaking after World War I.

Hoenicke-Moore observes that some of this American propaganda, including even FDR's, affirmed the continuity in German history--its exceptionalism or *Sonderweg*--that culminated in Hitler and Nazi Germany, but that mostly it allowed for change. It rejected the idea of a racial war against the Germans but instead called for the eradication of Nazi leadership and ideology. This official orientation opened the prospect for a reformed or democratic Germany to take its rightful place in the new postwar order. Although some of the roots of Nazism might be traced in German history, the Germans could reclaim other aspects

of their history--such as those FDR recalled fondly from his childhood experiences in Imperial Germany--and create a new Germany without Hitler and Nazism in the future.

The public debate on Germany during World War II expressed the efforts by various Americans to comprehend Nazism and its place in German history and among the Germans. Hoenicke-Moore notes that some Americans employed the distinction between Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde to explain what they saw as two different kinds of behavior by the Germans. This distinction might explain news about the murder of Jews and others, which at first appeared beyond belief. Some Americans who grasped the Holocaust's terrible dimensions, such as Protestant theologian Reinhold Niebuhr, recognized the evil of Nazism, but still held out hope that the good side of Germans--as of all God's people--might still prevail under the circumstances of postwar peace and democracy. Other Americans developed the metaphors of disease and gangsterism, which suggested that the German people were victims of an illness or a crime. This analysis opened the possibility of curing the disease or punishing the criminals, thereby enabling Germany to overcome Nazism.

Finally, Hoenicke-Moore notes the implications of the wartime debate for postwar plans. She explains that "just as the multiple arguments that characterized the American debate on Nazi Germany never merged into a unified enemy image, the many proposals put forward for dealing with defeated Germany did not yield a coherent government plan" (271). Roosevelt affirmed both the liberal-democratic

The public debate on Germany during World War II expressed the efforts by various Americans to comprehend Nazism and its place in German history and among the Germans. Hoenicke-Moore notes that some Americans employed the distinction between Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde to explain what they saw as two different kinds of behavior by the Germans. This distinction might explain news about the murder of Jews and others, which at first appeared beyond belief.

ideals of the Atlantic Charter and the insistence on Germany's unconditional surrender and elimination of Nazism. To prevent World War III, he supported the Morgenthau Plan for eliminating Germany's capacity for war even as he

and Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau anticipated Germany's eventual restoration as a reformed nation without Nazism. Hoenicke-Moore emphasizes that "Roosevelt hated

above all the Nazi ideology of racial superiority and the militaristic arrogance of 'might makes right' and did not tire of juxtaposing it with Christian values and other religious commandments" (319). He understood, however, that the Germans themselves would have to create their own democratic future because the United States could not do it for them. "But what this study has shown is that--for better or worse--the American war effort against Nazi Germany, however appealing as a model or moral touchstone in the decades since 1945, was anything but a single-minded crusade" (341-42).

Lloyd Ambrosius is the Samuel Clark Waugh Distinguished Professor of International Relations and Professor of History at the University of Nebraska--Lincoln.

**Review of Michaela Hoenicke-Moore's *Know Your Enemy: The American Debate on Nazism, 1933-1945***

Cora Sol Goldstein

Michaela Hoenicke-Moore's *Know Your Enemy* is a comprehensive overview of the debates on Nazism and Germany that took place in the United States in the 1930s and 1940s. The book covers both the polemics surrounding the nature of Nazism and the disagreements within the Roosevelt administration concerning the American postwar plans for Germany, and it offers a detailed compilation of the various currents of opinion about the "German problem" before, during, and immediately after World War II. After the unconditional surrender of Germany, the Nazis "became an archetypal representation of evil." But the author shows that this was not always so. She explains that "the prewar and wartime American discourse on the Third Reich was fluid and contradictory" (17).

*Know Your Enemy* is divided into four parts. Part One, "Prelude to War," consists of three chapters. The first chapter covers Franklin D. Roosevelt's thoughts about World War I and the German "character." The second deals with the contrasting accounts of Nazism offered by American foreign correspondents in Germany from 1933 to 1940. Some expressed outright condemnation of the Third Reich and others proposed "to give the regime a chance" (44). The third chapter covers the evolving and clashing interpretation of Nazism in the Roosevelt administration

and delves into the American government's evaluation of the prospects of a new war against Germany during the period 1933-1941. Part Two, "Mobilizing the American Home Front, 1942-1943," consists of three chapters dealing with American public opinion and the mobilization for war. In this section, Hoenicke-Moore covers the FDR administration's initiatives in propaganda and public opinion research as well as the creation of the Office of War Information and Frank Capra's *Why We Fight* film series. Part Three, "The Public Debate on Germany, 1942-1945," reflects the national debate on "what to do with Germany" and chronicles the shifts in American public opinion on Nazism. The author contrasts the two main interpretations of Nazism prevalent at the time: one postulating that Nazism was a social disease amenable to social therapy (and therefore curable) and the second claiming that the Nazi Party was a criminal gang whose leaders needed to be captured, tried, and punished. Hoenicke-Moore also introduces Sir Robert Vansittart's theories on Germany and explores how they were received, criticized, and used in the American wartime debate. Part Four, "The Governmental Debate on Postwar Plans, 1943-1945," analyzes the conflicts among the Office of Strategic Services, the Department of State, and the Department of the Treasury.

Hoenicke-Moore succeeds in showing that "during World War II, the United States never achieved a politically coherent consensus on whether the enemy was the Nazi regime or the German nation as a whole" (341). The extent of Nazi criminality became evident only in retrospect, and she is correct in asserting that "the very model that is cited as America's most successful intervention was hotly contested at the time" (342). In what is perhaps the most original insight of the book, Hoenicke-Moore posits that by 1946 the American understandings of Nazi rule and ideology were projected upon and used to characterize the Soviet Union. "The vocabulary the liberals of the Roosevelt administration created to describe an ideological enemy ended up being applied more consistently and more successfully after 1945 to a very different opponent in a very different type of war" (349).

Parts Three and Four and the conclusion are the most interesting of the book. In spite of their repetitiveness, the last sections of *Know Your Enemy* successfully describe the evolution of the elite

discourse concerning how the United States should reshape postwar Germany after the unconditional surrender of the Third Reich. Moreover, Hoenicke-Moore's work makes it clear that "the war effort emerges almost as the countermodel to the lessons of moral righteousness, resolute certainty, and ideological commitment that are derived from it" (350). Although Hoenicke-Moore does not touch on the issue of just war, *Know Your Enemy* could be used to refute many of the arguments used by the just war theorists to discuss the morality or the lack of morality of contemporary wars. Just war theorists, following Michael Walzer, assume that the Allies met the criteria of just cause when they entered World War II. In contrast to Vietnam, the paradigmatic unjust war, World War II emerges as the great example of a just war in modern times. In *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, Walzer argues that the Nazis were the "absolute evil," an "unmeasurable evil."

For Nazism lies at the outer limit of exigency, at a point where we are likely to find ourselves united in fear and abhorrence. . . . Nazism was an ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives, an ideology and a practice of domination so murderous, so degrading, even to those who might survive, that the consequences of its final victory were literally beyond calculation, immeasurably awful. [Nazism was] evil objectified in the world, and in a form so potent and apparent that there could never have been anything to do but to fight against it. . . . Here was a threat to human values, so radical that its imminence would surely constitute a supreme emergency.<sup>1</sup>

*Know Your Enemy* shows that in the 1940s the "supreme emergency" was not so obvious; it was just one of the many rival perspectives on Nazism prevalent at the time.

Many of the facts presented in *Know Your Enemy* are known among Germanists and historians of American intervention in World War II. Hoenicke-Moore provides more documentation to stress the ignorance of the American public about Germany, Nazism, and the political tensions in Europe, and she

offers more statistical data to show how widespread anti-Semitism was in American society. It is surprising, however, that the author writes that “contrary to commonly held beliefs, even after Americans had entered the war against Nazi Germany, popular views of that country did not coalesce into a well-focused image of the enemy” (1). Whose commonly held beliefs is she referring to? Certainly not those of contemporary experts on American-German relations in the 1930s and 1940s, or those of scholars interested in American propaganda (including film) during the period in question. It is true, of course, that after many decades of propaganda constructing World War II as the quintessential “good war” fought for all the right reasons (including the defense of the Jews), American popular culture ignores the mixed messages concerning Nazism and Germany before, during, and immediately after World War II. Hoenicke-Moore’s book is the ideal text to fill this gap in popular awareness and introduce the uninitiated reader to the public and governmental debates on “the nature of the enemy” that took place in the United States between 1933 and 1945 (250).

This is a long and carefully documented book, but certain omissions are worth noting. The author examines “representative examples of American official and public understandings of the Third Reich” (4) to delineate “the intellectual side of the American war effort” and show how the enemy, Nazi Germany, was imagined. “How was it portrayed by foreign correspondents, by the president, and by American propagandists? How was it understood by a wider audience?” (3) Yet her selection of the “intellectual side of the American war effort” seems rather arbitrary and needs stronger justification. As it is, the book leaves important categories out of the discussion, namely the Jewish community and the military. The Jewish community was also fragmented in its understanding of the Nazi phenomenon, often along partisan lines. The military was essentially dominated by American Nativists, obsessively preoccupied with anti-Communism and virulently anti-Semitic. It is hard to understand why Hoenicke-Moore does not make use of the work of Joseph Bendersky and Peter Novick. Another notable absence in the bibliography is George Kennan, who had quite distinctive and critical views on the German problem.

For Hoenicke-Moore, the fact that there was not one single and coherent

understanding of Nazism in the United States is a consequence of the very nature of American democracy.

The tension and conflict in explaining and understanding the Third Reich reveal the . . . diverse and compound nature of American society and the administration’s problems, but also deliberate restraint, in trying to impose unity. Thus, whereas Nazi Germany aimed for racial purification and Germans were deprived of the freedom of information and expression, Americans used this freedom to form their own opinion of events in Germany and in the process came up with narratives, topoi, and explanations, some of which turned into enduring interpretations of Nazi Germany (11).

It is undoubtedly true that F.D.R.’s America was a democracy, but to extol the freedom of information in the United States immediately before and during World War II seems excessive. The Roosevelt administration exerted an enormous degree of control over public information. That control is well documented in the literature. Consider, for example, the work of George H. Roeder, whom Hoenicke-Moore does not include in her bibliography.

Although Hoenicke-Moore’s book reflects her extensive reading of secondary sources, she often ignores the political context in which her actors develop their ideas and agendas. By doing so, she deprives her narrative of political depth and misses the opportunity to discover unearthed links and motivations. The people she quotes—American and foreign intellectuals, politicians, and journalists—are mostly mentioned without biographical comments, leaving the reader unsure of who they are and how they fit into the complicated political landscape of their times. For instance, it would be helpful to know more about the people who expressed particularly interesting (and often surprising) views on Germany, such as Samuel R. Fuller (82-83), Ernest Klein (85), John T. Flynn (99), Lieutenant Colonel Murray C. Bernays (237), Malcolm Cowley (249), Albert Salomon (253-255), and Homer E. Capehart (312). A good example of the lack of political context is the reference to Bertolt Brecht’s 1941 play “The Stoppable Rise of Arturo Ui” (240).

Hoenicke-Moore gives a summary of the play, but she describes Brecht simply as a “German émigré playwright,” ignoring his important and complicated political connections with Soviet intelligence. The United States during the World War II period was a hotbed of espionage, and competing intelligence services were vying for influence on the Roosevelt administration. It is highly likely, in fact, that many of the people quoted by Hoenicke-Moore had definite political agendas.

I plan to assign *Know Your Enemy* in my course on politics and culture because it provides a nuanced and detailed account of the ideological battles concerning the nature of Nazism in prewar and wartime America. Hoenicke-Moore’s book presents a much needed overview of one of the most fascinating periods in American political history, and I certainly hope that it will serve as a stepping stone for a new generation of critical historiography on American policy during WWII.

*Cora Sol Goldstein is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at California State University at Long Beach.*

Note:

1. Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York, 2006), 253.

### Review of *Know Your Enemy*

Brian Etheridge

In *Know Your Enemy*, Michaela Hoenicke-Moore offers a comprehensive treatment of the varied ways in which Americans understood and responded to Nazi Germany. As a work of both diplomatic and intellectual history, her book attempts to wrestle with how people at different levels of society, from everyday Americans to policymakers (including President Roosevelt), perceived Germany and how their perceptions interacted with one another. In that sense, it does not limit itself to understanding just the impact of American public opinion on presidential policymaking. Nor is the author interested solely in how the Roosevelt administration sought to shape American attitudes toward Germany. She understands the process as something much more organic and complex. Along the way, she engages in numerous historiographical debates that are occurring on both sides of the

Atlantic. Ambitious and wide-ranging, her book is an impressive *tour de force* that will easily become the standard work in this area.

The book is divided into four parts and organized in loose chronological fashion. The first part discusses American attitudes and reactions to Germany before American entry into the war. The other three overlap and address the war period in different ways. The titles of the three sections on the war reflect the three levels of analysis—those of popular culture and discourse; elite, opinion-making discourse; and policymaking discourse (focusing particularly on FDR and, later, Henry Morgenthau)—that structure the whole work. The organizational framework is significant; in a work as ambitious and sprawling as this it drives the analysis and the connections that are made. Throughout the book it is clear that these three levels of analysis are interwoven and interrelated, but, as shall be noted later, it is not always exactly clear how.

Hoenicke-Moore begins her narrative by discussing American perceptions of Germany in the years leading up to the war. She points out that in the nineteenth century, when the United States was more highly stratified, Americans often encountered and conceptualized Germany in ways that reflected their class standing. Many working-class Americans experienced Germany primarily through their contact with German-Americans, many of whom enjoyed a great deal of respect in American society. These encounters led to the proliferation of positive stereotypes of Germans as “hard-working, productive, thrifty, and reliable,” stereotypes that would prove to be remarkably deep and enduring (18). Elites praised German intellectual and cultural accomplishments but worried about perceived deficiencies in democracy and political stability. A small group of liberals championed progressive Prussian policies, such as Bismarck’s efforts at social insurance. As both the United States and Germany emerged as world powers, they engaged in intermittent conflict that minimized these positive images. During the Great War positive stereotypes were drowned out almost completely by negative ones promoted by the United States government

that stressed autocratic rule and bloodthirsty soldiers. Ironically, the bitter reaction of many Americans to the disappointing results of the war in the 1920s and 1930s fostered a stubborn antipathy to these negative views and encouraged a resurgence of the positive elements of the German image.

Layered on top of this broad narrative is FDR’s own encounter with and understanding of Germany. Arguing that FDR was the “key player in shaping the American response to Germany in the 1930s and 1940s,” Hoenicke-Moore wades into the deep and turbulent historiography on the president and emerges as a staunch defender of Roosevelt, describing him as a true democrat dedicated to decency, common humanity, and international responsibility (17).

Hoenicke-Moore wades into the deep and turbulent historiography on the president and emerges as a staunch defender of Roosevelt, describing him as a true democrat dedicated to decency, common humanity, and international responsibility.

Acknowledging the plethora of issues plaguing attempts by historians to triangulate Roosevelt’s true position on anything, she nevertheless attempts to trace his attitudes toward Germany in his early public career and asserts that he developed and adhered to a version of the *Sonderweg* thesis only after Hitler came to power in 1933. Like other Americans who based their impressions of Hitler’s regime on reports from foreign correspondents, Roosevelt’s views on the Third Reich were formed by a steady diet of bad news from official sources stationed in Europe. All of these reports, from both official and non-official sources, presented conflicting interpretations of the nature of the regime and the German people’s support for it. For his part, FDR had to voice his opinions carefully; despite his own “more realistic view of German support for the Nazi regime,” he had to stay in line with mainstream opinion that the Germans themselves were not to blame for their government (87). He gravitated toward the usage of two metaphors to explain the relationship. The first was the metaphor of mental disease, which suggested that Nazism was an affliction that infected the German body politic. The second cast Nazi leaders as gangsters and suggested that Germans only supported the regime, if they supported it at all, out of fear. These metaphors, she argues, served a number of different functions: (1) they helped paint Germans as victims, (2) they offered

historical continuity by connecting Nazism back to traditional German elites (Junkers), and (3) they offered a universalist view of Nazism that allowed FDR to portray American political opponents as dupes of the Nazi regime or unwitting fifth-column stooges. FDR used media elites such as the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, the Century Group, and the Fight for Freedom Committee to disseminate these narratives and build support for preparedness and eventual involvement.

Hoenicke-Moore’s support for FDR becomes more evident when she discusses his efforts to mobilize the American people. First, she confronts critics who contend that Roosevelt trumped up an inauthentic threat assessment from Germany to rally support for involvement. She cites current scholarship on Hitler’s war planning to demonstrate that this assessment was valid and prescient. Second, she defends FDR against critics who allege that he was too cautious in promoting support for the war after Pearl Harbor. She argues that mobilization needed to be carried out carefully. At the time, there were still significant reservations about the war among so-called “divisionists”—some wanted a negotiated peace, many saw the Japanese as the primary enemy, and still others feared communism more than Nazism. Because of these critical groups, FDR could not prosecute an ideological war without threatening the fragile unity he was trying to forge for a long-term commitment. Third, she counters those who claim that his insistence on unconditional surrender hampered the war effort. She contends that unconditional surrender was necessary because of the extensive support among Germans for Hitler and the relative weakness of the German resistance.

President Roosevelt was not the only policymaker who had difficulty articulating the war to the American people; the difficulty in defining and representing the war was also evident in bureaucratic debates about mobilization. The Office of War Information, the State Department, and the War Department all involved themselves in educating Americans about the Nazi threat, but they could not agree about the best way to do so. Through its *Why We Fight* series, the War Department promulgated the harshest view of the German people. Sensitive to public opinion, policymakers in the OWI worried about getting too far outside the mainstream. They also disagreed about the nature of the enemy (the German government or the German

people), so they opted for a nuanced approach that focused on an abstract enemy and the effect that the enemy's victory would have on everyday American life. The effect of this strategy, as Hoenicke-Moore points out, was to encourage Americans to think of Germans as the first victims of Hitler and to minimize the Jewishness of the Third Reich's racial and political murder campaign.

After the United States entered the war, public debate shifted almost immediately to questions of the postwar world. According to Hoenicke-Moore, the different ways that Americans conceived the war and the prescriptions that naturally flowed from those assumptions defied easy categorization. Interpretations

cut across class and political lines. Nevertheless, she gamely attempts to synthesize the disparate range of interpretations into some loose organizing themes. She describes the first overarching way of understanding Germany in terms of Sebastian Haffner's metaphor of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. According to this narrative, the German people were essentially nice and jovial people who unfortunately were easily misled and brainwashed. Conceiving of the Germans as Janus-faced helped reconcile their seemingly contradictory qualities—*Gemütlichkeit* and a disturbing propensity for militarism—and encouraged Americans to envision German soldiers and supporters as automatons. This interpretation was particularly evident in discussions of Hitler Youth and the Holocaust. If salvation for Germany essentially rested with the people themselves, proponents of this interpretation suggested, then eliminating the leadership and empowering democratic forces in Germany was the appropriate solution (with varying amounts of effort and supervision prescribed).

Another popular metaphor for understanding the German problem in elite American discourse was mental disease. The disease metaphor was popular, according to the author, because many Americans concluded that German behavior was so extreme and so far outside the norm that it

could only be explained by some mental disease or dysfunction. Often invoking science or pseudoscience to diagnose the German condition, this approach to the German problem took a variety of forms. Some analysts looked at individual Nazis (mainly Hitler), while others focused on

broader structures, such as the nature of the German family, child-rearing practices, or manners and values, and saw them as contributing to a mass psychological need.

The most popular interpretation was offered by Richard Brickner in a series of books and talks that used psychiatry to explain the behavior of Germans and suggest solutions. Although these observers agreed on a similar way to understand the

problem, they differed over the extent to which average Germans had become infected and hence the degree to which they needed to be treated. A third major category for understanding Germany was gangsterism, which was informed in part by the experience of Americans with gangsters in the 1930s. Whereas the disease metaphor naturally led to discussions about "cures" for the body politic, conceptualizing the German problem in terms of gangsters encouraged solutions related to punishment and supervision.

But the interpretation to which she devotes the most time, at both the popular and official level, is what was derisively known during the war as Vansittartism. Here the book really crackles with life as she engages in a bare-knuckled, bring-on-all-comers defense of these intellectuals and policymakers who were excoriated by their contemporaries for advocating fantastical, overly punitive, or downright racist policies. She argues that British diplomat Robert Vansittart and his American allies have been vindicated by time and recent historical research. Moreover, she alleges that Vansittartists were unfairly impugned, claiming that they were far more mainstream in their prescriptions than is widely believed. She contends that even the German boogeyman Henry Morgenthau, the American secretary of the treasury, was solidly

But the interpretation to which she devotes the most time, at both the popular and official level, is what was derisively known during the war as Vansittartism. Here the book really crackles with life as she engages in a bare-knuckled, bring-on-all-comers defense of these intellectuals and policymakers who were excoriated by their contemporaries for advocating fantastical, overly punitive, or downright racist policies.

within the realm of respectable, mainstream official debate. What differentiated the Morgenthau plan from others, she argues, was its dramatic suggestions for the German economy. Morgenthau advocated the dismantling and transferring of German industry to its neighbors, a solution, she stresses, that was firmly in line with the trust-busting tradition of the United States. However, as she takes pains to underscore, he did not believe in or agitate for the complete deindustrialization of Germany: that myth, she argues, is a product of Goebbels's propaganda. Most important, she applauds Morgenthau's emphasis on providing for Germany's victims over the Germans themselves.

Her broad sweep demonstrates a strong command of both the history and historiography. She has conducted research in the papers of all of the major players, and her extensive footnotes are a treasure trove for other scholars of the period. Her knowledge of and engagement in historiographical debates on both sides of the Atlantic are illuminating, especially for scholars on this side who may not be familiar with how the issues have been framed in the German context. But her impressive grasp of the material and willingness to mix it up sometimes threaten to lead her astray. Mirroring the reality that the book attempts to chronicle, the issues are so complex that they sometimes defy easy categorization and compartmentalization. As a result, some chapters, such as the one on the Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde metaphor, bulge at the seams. In other places, such as the end of chapter 9, where she is dealing with the Goldhagen thesis, discussions (while always enlightening) can seem awkwardly appended or out of place. The overall impression is that of a scholar who has full mastery of the issues, has crafted well-informed and consistent opinions about many of them, and in the end is reluctant to leave any of them on the cutting-room floor (for which the reader is grateful in almost all cases).

Similarly, her method for organizing and presenting the narrative offers clear benefits. By juxtaposing different kinds of cultural products, she is able to establish a cultural milieu and enable some of her themes to merge. For example, in chapter 10 she brackets a discussion of official American postwar planning with analyses of Hitchcock's film *Lifeboat* and a *March of Time* newsreel in order to illustrate the issues and ambivalence present in the process. In another chapter, she discusses the "automaton" image of Germans by

analyzing a Disney short and the observations of American journalists based in Germany. At the same time, however, flattening these products and placing them all on the same plane can obscure other kinds of connections. A film and a policy memorandum are very different kinds of cultural products that have very different processes. Is there a causal relationship between the two? Is it possible to draw any hard and fast conclusions about cultural production and influence? (Other authors have tried: for example, Steven Casey's *Cautious Crusade* dedicates itself to trying to untangle the relationship between presidential decision making and public opinion during this time period.) What, for example, is the relationship between FDR's use of the disease and gangster metaphors and the general public's use of them? The book talks about cultural production with the Office of War Information and other government agencies and shows the fruit of specific initiatives, but it is not always clear what influence these organizations had on others actors (their internal carping and complaining about products notwithstanding). I think those connections are here, but sometimes the way that the information is sliced and presented makes it harder for them to come through.

In a related vein, Hoenicke-Moore's use of the literature on enemy images provides her with a broad unifying framework that lends coherence to her eclectic source base. But some cultural critics might contend that it is not specific enough and that her work is "undertheorized." More specifically, they might quibble with the absence of ideas from scholars like Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes, and Stanley Fish. They might find her efforts at settling old historiographical scores jarring in a work that seeks to contextualize knowledge production and dissemination and show how these processes shifted as circumstances changed.

But this might be an unfair criticism. It is clear that the author sees a greater purpose in her work than engaging in just scholarly debates. She seeks to address big issues regarding German identity that stem from the World War II period. In particular, she sets out to puncture some of the old myths regarding the conflict. No, she charges, Roosevelt was not a weak or devious ruler. No, Vansittartists were not an irrational, vengeful lot; nor were they off-base in focusing on justice for Germany's victims. No, Henry Morgenthau was not an inexperienced, vindictive Jew.

No, the Germans were not Hitler's first victims. No, most Germans were not ignorant about the camps. A case can be made that engaging in these kinds of public-sphere debates, and especially *this* debate in *this* context, is what historians need to do more of, not the cautious temporizing that can characterize some work in cultural history. Hoenicke-Moore has written a forceful, convincing account that challenges scholars to revisit how Americans understood Germany during the World War II period and what those ideas could mean for how we understand ourselves and our world today.

*Brian Etheridge is Associate Professor of History and Director of the Helen P. Denit Honors Program at the University of Baltimore.*

### Even a Teuton can't tell it all . . .

*Michaela Hoenicke-Moore*

I am honored that the editors of SHAFR's *Passport* chose my book for a roundtable discussion and I am grateful to my four colleagues for their close reading and thoughtful comments. The wide range of expertise they bring to this task make their commendation and criticism all the more significant. The reviewers appreciate the premise and main achievements of my book and raise questions that deserve further attention both from this historian and other scholars. The reviews suggest that students of U.S. international relations, of World War II, and of German and American political and cultural history might find value in different aspects of this book.

Lloyd Ambrosius' work on Wilsonianism has profoundly shaped our understanding of this enduring American foreign policy ideology, and I am glad he found my book worth reading. As he notes, one of my objectives has been to integrate the multifaceted public debates with the government's responses and policies—in other words, to analyze the broader political culture in which the military and political campaigns against Nazi Germany were formulated and carried out. For this purpose I had to cast my net widely across three levels: popular culture and opinion, elite and opinion-making circles, and governmental debates. The Roosevelt administration and an array of mainly liberal internationalists defined Nazi ideology as antithetical to American values and Hitler's foreign policy aims as a threat to

American national security and interests. But their mobilization campaign was hampered by a set of powerful racial, cultural, and political factors that worked in favor of the German enemy and obscured the true nature of the Nazi regime in American public perception. Prominent American opinion-makers struggled intellectually to keep the Germans in the fold of a shared civilization—even as the latter engaged in a "break with civilization"—because to think of them collectively as a barbarous people, so the argument went, would amount to an "anti-German race theory" comparable to the Nazi view of Jews (251). Large sections of the public extended to the Germans a morally problematic, ethnically based solidarity. These arguments and sentiments were resolutely challenged by an outspoken group of commentators and politicians, decried as "Vansittartists," who urged Americans to take the Nazis at their word and judge the Germans by their deeds. For a broader public the fight against Nazi Germany lacked the urgency and moral clarity it has gained in hindsight.

My esteemed Austrian colleague Gunter Bischof, who has written on many aspects of war and transatlantic relations in the twentieth century, raises the important question of the role of the public in a democracy with a globalist foreign policy. It seems to me, however, that Ernest May's paradigm of the "ignorant" public has been challenged by Ole Holsti, Miroslav Nincic, Melvin Small, Ralph Levering, and especially Tony Kushner, with his work on Anglo-American discourse about the Third Reich. There is much evidence that a majority of Americans were surprisingly well informed about events in Nazi Germany (e.g., 75, 137), and as Deborah Lipstadt has shown, they were certainly well served by American media coverage. But they were not quite sure what it all meant and what relevance it had for their country. To many Americans the reality of the Third Reich was confusing, somewhat threatening and offensive, yet distant. The apparent failure of Wilson's earlier crusade undermined the notion that the United States had to fulfil a historical mission in the world by intervening militarily in Europe; the idea of humanitarian intervention was not yet on the horizon.

Interpretations making sense of this reality and explaining what it meant for the United States varied considerably, feeding a complex and unresolved debate. In line with the Vansittartists,

*SHAFR Summer Institute*  
*June 22-27, 2012*

**Does Culture Matter?  
The Emotions, the Senses, and Other  
New Approaches to the History of U.S.  
Foreign/International Relations**

**Call for Applications**

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations will hold its fifth annual Summer Institute in Storrs, Connecticut, June 22-27, 2012.

Designed for advanced graduate students or early career college teachers interested in exploring the cultural approach, broadly defined, to the history of U.S. foreign/international relations, the program will invite participants to enhance their own training and preferences for new ways of thinking about the field, or to entertain such ways of thinking for the first time.

The Institute will feature wide-ranging conversation about assigned readings and the presentation and discussion of the work of each seminar member. Our hope is to nudge participants toward fresh ways of thinking about standard topics or toward new topics altogether, now or in the future. Sessions will also help prepare participants for the job market and offer hints about publication in scholarly journals and with academic presses.

The Institute co-directors are Frank Costigliola of the University of Connecticut and Andrew Rotter of Colgate University. Costigliola has recently finished a book on emotions, World War II, and the origins of the Cold War; Rotter is at work on a project concerning the American and British empires and the five senses. Both historians have in the past explored the influence on U.S. foreign relations of gender, race, religion, language, and other factors that could be understood as being shaped by culture. Several leading historians have tentatively agreed to speak at Institute sessions. The program will also include free time for research and at least one off-campus excursion. Each participant will be reimbursed for travel, be provided free accommodation in air-conditioned University of Connecticut housing, and receive an honorarium of \$500.

The Institute schedule is designed to enable participants to remain in Connecticut for the 2012 SHAFR conference, to be held in Hartford and Storrs on June 28-30. The deadline for applications is February 1, 2012. Applicants should submit a curriculum vitae along with a one-page (single spaced) letter describing how participation in the Institute would benefit their scholarship and career, to Rachel Traficanti at [rachel.traficanti@uconn.edu](mailto:rachel.traficanti@uconn.edu). Send questions to Rachel, Frank Costigliola <[frank.costigliola@uconn.edu](mailto:frank.costigliola@uconn.edu)>, or Andrew Rotter <[arotter@colgate.edu](mailto:arotter@colgate.edu)>. Preference for admission to the Institute will be given to members of SHAFR.

traditional political elites oriented towards Great Britain revived a First World War-derived enemy image based on a deterministic cultural understanding that limited the problem to Germany. Among journalists, refugees, and intellectuals with personal ties or intellectual affinities to German culture, a very different interpretation emerged that saw in German aggression, racism, and antidemocratic populism the West's own ignored dark side. What deserves to be underscored is the sincerity and urgency with which many commentators and politicians strove to grasp the enormity of Nazi ideology and German policies and to put forward appropriate responses.

The challenge that arises for the diplomatic historian is how to evaluate the evidence of intermittent American popular reluctance to go to war against

Nazi Germany. It is easy—even satisfying—to expose the political and moral misjudgment of opinion leaders, many of them on the right, who pleaded extenuating circumstances and found things to admire in the Third Reich. But what about someone like the popular historian William Durant? He did not sweep Nazi brutalities under the rug, but he did argue in 1938 that “cowardly cruelty represents not the soul of Germany but a neurotic reacting against defeat, suffering and fear [of Bolshevism]” and that going to war would only produce “another Versailles, another decade of disorder, another Hitler.” In a formulation that is especially disorienting to read after the wars in Vietnam and Iraq, Durant maintained that the United States “shall preserve democracy, not by fighting battles abroad to force it upon peoples that show no eagerness or aptitude for it, but by making it function more successfully than dictatorship” (63f). One can see how one of the non-interventionists’ strongest arguments against messianic-missionary-universalist crusades was seemingly forever discredited by having been used against Nazi Germany and why “isolationism” was so easily turned into a slanderous term.<sup>1</sup>

The contest over the meaning of

One first has to acknowledge the fundamental difference between American societal prejudice and the murderous anti-Semitism of the Germans. But it is also important to recognize how the former kept Americans from fully appreciating the seriousness of prewar persecution and understanding the genocide. Antisemitism in America significantly shaped public responses to events in Germany, as did, to an even greater degree, political fear of such prejudice.

Nazism and World War II continued after the war, as Brian Etheridge’s award-winning scholarship on German-American postwar memory diplomacy shows. Etheridge, whose study is in some ways the sequel to my book, highlights the multiple and malleable functions that the three central metaphors of the Third Reich—disease, gangsterism, and Dr. Jekyll-Mr. Hyde—fulfilled. Each was omnipresent in public and official discourse, in movies and magazine roundtables, in government-

sponsored social science conferences and as part of the preparations for the Nuremberg Trials. The fact that these images did *not* have a stable, coherent meaning made them effective and useful for official rhetoric. While those who underscored the continuities in German militarism and anti-democratic political culture used the term

“disease” to indict and “essentialize” a politically and ideologically “sick” nation, others, including the president, emphasized for pragmatic political reasons Germany’s curability and potential for change. Similarly, the gangster metaphor was employed by the government as a conceptual hinge reconciling two contrary understandings of the “German problem.” Both the official and the Vansittartist view focused on the criminal nature of German policies, including the conspiratorial preparation for war and mass murder as illustrated in the 1944 movie *The Hitler Gang*, which showed Hitler and his henchmen soon after 1918, dressed in trench coats, meeting in backrooms and plotting to overthrow Western civilization. For a wider public, however, the question of guilt and responsibility was safely limited to Germany’s leaders; the German people were exonerated. Finally, the notion of the Janus-faced, dual nature of the German people and their history and culture (which, thanks to Emil Ludwig, dominated lesson plans at military training camps) could accommodate a range of interpretations: from remnants of the nineteenth-century notion of the Germans as politically immature cultural overachievers to the stark warnings of the 1945 post-liberation

films to remember the death camps and not be fooled again by the pleasant surface of a clean and seemingly friendly country.

One last comment on the subject of presidential leadership, which Bischof and Goldstein both raise but come to contrary conclusions on. In a democracy, as in a dictatorship, intent and tone can be set at the highest level. As Ambrosius and Etheridge note, I credit Roosevelt with adequate leadership and political astuteness, and I do not share Bischof’s alarm over “the waffler.” There is a certain amount of historical evidence for Philip Roth’s fantasy in *The Plot Against America*.

Cora Goldstein, who has written an important study on the U.S. military occupation of Germany (as well as a host of insightful articles commenting on the occupation of Iraq), is most interested in how the wartime debates foreshadowed the ideological conflicts of the Cold War and finds two groups in particular, the U.S. Army and American Jews, not sufficiently taken into account. She is right to wonder about the absence of Joseph Bendersky’s *The Jewish Threat* and Peter Novick’s *The Holocaust and Collective Memory*. These are two key studies to which, I hope, my work can provide a complement. Bendersky’s description of the pervasiveness of anti-Semitic attitudes in the officer corps is further evidence of the obstacles that the administration and liberal interventionists had to overcome—and, at times, appeased. The most heart-wrenching stories in this regard are those of anti-Nazi activists, both Jewish and gentile, who suppressed their own insights into the centrality of German racism and camouflaged their messages so as not to appear engaged in “special pleading” (57-60, 72, 310f). One first has to acknowledge the fundamental difference between American societal prejudice and the murderous anti-Semitism of the Germans. But it is also important to recognize how the former kept Americans from fully appreciating the seriousness of prewar persecution and understanding the genocide. Antisemitism in America significantly shaped public responses to events in Germany, as did, to an even greater degree, political fear of such prejudice.

Any discussion of American anti-Semitism in and outside state institutions has to be balanced by recognition of the countless Jewish and non-Jewish advocates, journalists, government officials, and private citizens, who, having learned about and accepted the

evidence from Nazi-occupied Europe, were catapulted into action, warned and wrote about the genocide, and planned and carried out rescue efforts. Scholars like Shlomo Aronson and Richard Breitman have shown how very limited those rescue opportunities were and, because of the nature of the German design, how tragically perverse. The single-minded Nazi determination to realize a racial utopia and the pragmatic Allied coalition war effort requiring domestic mobilization of a large democracy were a terrible mismatch.

I am a bit puzzled by Goldstein's comment that I don't provide sufficient introduction and background to the many key, mid-level and even minor voices in these debates. Precisely because of my interest in showing the complexity of America's domestic debates over key foreign policy themes, I take great pains to sketch the political background and agenda of many of my protagonists. But it is true that I also demonstrate that those individual agendas often did not carry the day. As Bischof and Etheridge point out, interpretations cut across political, ideological, and partisan lines.

Finally, Goldstein draws attention to my conclusion that the liberal intellectual war effort against the Third Reich left a blueprint for an ideological enemy that was much

more successfully used in the Cold War against the Soviet Union and even against political Islamism in the "War on Terror." This point deserves further attention, even beyond Marc Selverstone's excellent study on *Constructing the Monolith*. What made Nazism so readily available as an easily transferable enemy image for mobilization purposes was precisely the early effort to separate Germans from Nazis. Subsequently, references to Nazism as some kind of outlandish ideology that kept showing up in different incarnations (totalitarianism, islamofascism) over the next sixty years contributed to removing Nazism from its proper, specific historical context. How we understand "what actually happened" matters greatly in this case.

The year 1945 marked an internationalist and multilateralist moment in American consciousness. Calls for American leadership in setting up organizations and standards for the promotion of human rights and peaceful cooperation tapped into a newly accepted sense of the nation's international responsibility and, equally important, its citizens' newly gained cosmopolitan outlook. But this version of internationalism was soon supplanted by a new patriotic orthodoxy, seemingly sweeping aside the deep political divisions

that had hampered the Rooseveltian mobilization effort. A carefully crafted blend of anti-communism and lessons drawn from the fight against the Axis shaped a new nationalist ideology in significant ways— increasing reliance on and ennobling military means, for example. For American foreign policy discourse the war provided a prescriptive model in the guise of lessons from history, the most important being the Munich analogy, ruling out appeasement, at times even discounting diplomacy itself. These Cold War lessons reinforced a memory of World War II as a Manichean struggle, a memory that displaced other much more profound insights and conclusions. The disparate implications of the debate on Nazism for American foreign policy during and after World War II deserve further study.

Again, my thanks to the editors and to the four reviewers for their critical reading of my book and their valuable comments.

*Michaela Hoenicke-Moore is Associate Professor of History at the University of Iowa.*

Note:

1. On this point see also Robert Westbrook, "Isolationism Reconsidered," *Raritan* (Fall 2010): 4-36.

## Host the 2014 SHAFR Annual Conference

Every other year, SHAFR holds its annual meeting in a location other than the Washington, D.C. area. The SHAFR Council would like to hear from members interested in hosting the conference at their institutions in 2014.

The Council requires a brief statement of purpose. Please submit a document of no more than two pages with the following information:

1. The location and its attractiveness as a tourist destination – size and diversity of attractions (in town and regionally), dining and accommodation, transportation facilities, research venues in the area, etc.
2. The institution – quality of the institution (departments, personnel, etc.), programs of interest to SHAFR, institutional support for a conference (accommodations, including variety of hotels, dorms, etc.), conference venue facilities, enthusiasm of administration, funding support, etc.
3. Leadership – explain who you are and who might help you host at your institution, including graduate students and other staff.

All finalists will be asked to provide more details in each of these sections, including cost estimates. Please note that SHAFR is not looking for a fancy marketing scheme but simply an expression of interest and some basic information with some explanation. Council will consider proposals for ALL locations, including west of the Mississippi and foreign destinations.

Please send proposals by JANUARY 1, 2012 to: Peter L. Hahn, Executive Director, at [shafr@osu.edu](mailto:shafr@osu.edu).

# The Attack on Higher Education

John T. McNay

In the wake of last year's sweeping Republican victories in statehouses across the country, waves of legislation hostile to both academic unions and universities have spread across many states in recent months. The most prominent cases are in Ohio and Wisconsin, but nationwide, according to the National Conference of State Legislators, 820 bills have been introduced that would limit or eliminate the collective bargaining rights of public workers, including university faculty.

In Ohio, Senate Bill 5 would drastically limit the ability of all public unions (police, firefighters, state workers, school teachers, and university professors, among others) to negotiate for salary, benefits, and work conditions. As a Republican senator who testified against the bill said, it is a collective bargaining bill that does not allow for collective bargaining. It moved rapidly through the state legislature, with over a hundred pages of amendments introduced just hours before the bill was approved. Among the amendments was a clause that specifically targeted university professors. Faculty who participate in service activities such as search committees, promotion and tenure committees, or the Faculty Senate, would be defined as "managers" and would thus be ineligible for union membership. Implementation of the bill is on hold for now, as a petition campaign is underway to overturn it in a referendum vote in November.

In Wisconsin, Democratic politicians fled the state to prevent a quorum, but after weeks of protest a state senate committee convened on March 9, in what is now widely seen as an illegal meeting, and passed legislation that would end collective bargaining in the state for most state employees. The case is now moving through the courts, where a judge put a hold on implementation of the bill and later ruled it invalid because Wisconsin's open meetings law was violated. Meanwhile, several campaigns are underway to recall politicians

responsible for the legislation.

In the wake of the battles in Ohio and Wisconsin, anti-union legislation in other states is taking shape as well. It would be a mistake to believe that what is going on is random or not especially relevant to academia.

History Professor William Cronon of the University of Wisconsin, who is incoming president of the AHA, moved briefly to center stage in this struggle when he began to research what he felt was behind the legislation in his state. He posted a blog entry on March 15 entitled "Who's Really Behind Recent Legislation in Wisconsin and Elsewhere? (Hint: It Didn't Start Here)" and wrote a *New York Times* op-ed piece, "Wisconsin's Radical Break." In these writings he revealed the role of the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) in disseminating this legislation. ALEC is a right-wing group funded by wealthy conservative activists and corporations whose agenda is clearly to undermine labor unions. The group expressed particular objections to the way universities operate.

Shortly after Cronon's revelations, the Wisconsin Republican Party issued an open records request to search the professor's email for evidence of political activities. They were looking for emails containing words such as "union" or "rally." The UW administration rightly defined the search very narrowly and, not surprisingly, nothing of relevance was found. But since April 1, Cronon has not posted on his blog or written another op-ed.

In his op-ed in the *New York Times* on March 21, Cronon wrote that "Republicans in Wisconsin are seeking to reverse civic traditions that for more than a century have been among the most celebrated achievements not just of their state, but of their own party as well." While not all states have the strong traditions that Wisconsin does, the civic traditions in many states are being challenged by new and radical legislation. Much of it, as Cronon reports, is not home-grown; it is

boilerplate legislation developed by ALEC. The organization's members hope that by introducing these radical bills across the nation at the state level in a shotgun approach, they will make incremental progress toward their goals. They note that only 12 to 15 percent of the hundreds of bills introduced in state legislatures each year pass into law, but over time these laws promise to have a huge impact.

Further, using a political strategy that writer Naomi Klein has recently dubbed "shock and awe," the proponents of this legislation have often helped to create the conditions that foster crisis atmospheres; they then use the pressures of those crises to push through their "reforms." In Wisconsin, for example, Gov. Scott Walker was elected with a surplus but quickly funded several new conservative projects and thereby helped bring on the budget crisis. Similarly, at least half of Ohio's \$8 billion deficit was generated by sweeping tax cuts, including a 21 percent reduction in the state's progressive income tax.

The barring of collective bargaining is not the only change being proposed. One of the most widespread legislative efforts involves creating "charter" universities or private or semi-private institutions. The basic principle is that, in exchange for "deregulation," states will provide less public money to support universities. This strategy has been around for more than thirty years, as some universities have tried to portray themselves as "entrepreneurial" or "enterprise" institutions—the terms used to distance the concept from charter schools, which are now widely seen as failures.

In Virginia, the oft-touted exemplar of states that have undertaken university deregulation, the University of Virginia has just announced an 8.9 percent tuition hike, after an increase of more than 50 percent since 2006. In 2010, tuition shot up 24 percent at Virginia Commonwealth University.

In Texas, tuition has increased an astonishing 63 percent since the state universities were partly deregulated in 2003. In Washington state, the University of Washington may be seeking as much as a 16 percent hike in each of the next two years.

Not only are charter universities expensive, but increasingly they are failing to serve their states' own citizens. Out-of-state students and foreign students must pay much more for tuition, so places that might have been reserved for in-state students are increasingly reserved for those who come from outside the state. The University of Virginia, for example, despite setting a cap at 35 percent, has averaged 40 percent out-of-state students in recent years. Abandoned financially and otherwise by state legislatures, "entrepreneurial" universities must inevitably chase the cash that out-of-state students bring. While legislators may be happy with cutting the cost of supporting the university, all that has really happened is that the cost has been transferred to students.

The University of Oregon, in a plan known as the "New Partnership," is undertaking a new funding structure that would freeze state funding at \$65 million a year for the next thirty years. In exchange, the legislature would use a \$1 billion bond sale to finance the university. When the bonds mature in thirty years, the state would no longer need to provide basic financing for the university, as the transition to a semi-private institution would have taken place.

The University of Wisconsin, meanwhile, is considering the "New Badger Partnership," under which UW-Madison would become a "public authority" and thereby receive the "flexibility" to set tuition and retain revenues. As in the Oregon plan, UW would detach itself from the rest of the state system and move toward becoming a semi-private institution.

Louisiana's appropriations for its system of higher education have been cut by more than 20 percent in that last two years, but these cuts have been accompanied by a movement toward institutional "flexibility" in setting tuition rates. The recently-formed Louisiana Flagship Coalition is advocating that the main campus of LSU be given the freedom to run its own affairs and set its own tuition.

In California, continual deep budget cuts and sharp tuition hikes are generating widespread discussion about the possibility that private or semi-private institutions are being created. With \$500 million in cuts coming this year, the University of

California is planning an 8 percent tuition increase, although if a planned tax extension is not passed by the legislature, that increase could be 32 percent. The UC-Berkeley chancellor has suggested that each campus be free to charge its own tuition rate. The CSU system is facing similarly dire financial problems.

In Ohio, a charter university proposal is expected from the chancellor's office in mid-August, and many of the state's university presidents have expressed great interest. Ohio State University President Gordon Gee has embraced the idea. "It is an idea whose time has come," Gee told the *Columbus Dispatch* in March. In a letter to Gov. John Kasich, University of Cincinnati President Gregory Williams expressed support for the charter university concept, and he cited some of the advantages that would accrue to universities, including the right of eminent domain, the ability to limit responses to public records requests and reports to boards of regents, and relief from "burdens" such as civil service and collective bargaining.

In Texas, there are several new proposals to measure faculty "productivity." They include ideas such as separating research and teaching budgets and determining whether faculty actually "earn" their salaries. Meanwhile, research would be measured on its "value," with the assumption that some research is simply not valuable. Proposals would also provide professors large cash rewards based solely on student evaluations. The metrics proposed by the Texas Public Policy Foundation, a Texas-based clone of ALEC, would gauge faculty productivity by the number of students in seats.

Other legislation in various states, while not directly affecting higher education, nonetheless constitutes an attack on the values that those in academia traditionally support. Several states are enacting voter suppression laws, and many are slashing funding to K-12 schools, legislation that ensures that even more students who are poorly prepared and politically disengaged will get to college.

Not surprisingly, much of the resistance to these dramatic changes affecting public employees and public universities is coming from faculty unions. Many SHAFR members are also members of faculty unions and most of us are public employees. In Ohio, some of us are in leadership positions in the AAUP. I am president of the University of Cincinnati chapter; Walter Hixson is president of the University of Akron chapter. The California Faculty Association

has spearheaded the creation of the Campaign For The Future of Higher Education, a coalition of faculty unions and groups that aims to create a national opposition to the sweeping changes to higher ed being proposed across the country.

A primary focus of any faculty union is academic freedom and shared governance—twin issues that have been particular targets of the conservative movement. Faculty unions have been expanding in Ohio and elsewhere, largely in response to university budget decisions that have taken place without faculty input and without regard for the instructional mission of the universities. Just last summer, Bowling Green State University won a hard-fought certification election against determined administration opposition and will become an AAUP collective bargaining chapter (if SB 5 is defeated). And just months ago, faculty at the University of Illinois at Chicago won a certification election and will form a joint AFT-AAUP faculty union. Questionable resource allocation by university administrations was a key motivating factor in both the BGSU and UIC certification drives.

Public universities seeking greater autonomy have cited the need for greater "flexibility." But the combination of union-busting and the semi-privatization of public universities makes it likely that the institutions created will have little academic integrity. Furthermore, there is little evidence that this flexibility is designed to benefit students. Nor will it benefit the citizens who have for many decades invested their tax dollars in public universities with the promise that they will benefit from those universities' activities in teaching, research, and service.

*John McNay is Professor of History at the University of Cincinnati—Raymond Walters College.*

# Debating the Anglo-Celtic Divide

*Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Thomas A. Breslin*

Professor Thomas A. Breslin's essay "The Great Anglo-Celtic Divide in the History of American Foreign Relations" (*Passport*, April 2011) advances a rash and indefensible hypothesis about the ethnic backgrounds of presidents. It is unlikely that it will pose an effective challenge to more credible explanations of foreign relations. Those explanations include both the studies of the role of "international political dynamics" that he thinks should take second place to the Anglo-Celtic factor and the overarching interpretations and approaches that he refrains from mentioning, such as those offered by William Appleman Williams and Michael Hunt. Furthermore, while the personalities and beliefs of presidents offer a fascinating and fruitful issue for discussion, the Great Man Theory of History, debatable at the best of times, is of limited credibility in the case of a nation with America's checks-and-balances constitution.

To offer a rebuttal such as the one that follows might seem quixotic or gratuitous, but the exercise is worthwhile as a defense of the reputation of those scholars who take more cautious and methodologically sound approaches to the problem of ethnicity and foreign policy. Their contributions to our understanding of U.S. foreign policy may be more modest in scope, but they will be more enduring.

Let's begin with Breslin's use of terms deriving from the name of one of the Germanic peoples who invaded post-Roman Britain, the Angles. Can one speak, as Breslin does, of a single English or "Anglo" identity that has imposed a uniform stamp on America? What role did other invaders—Saxons, Jutes, Vikings, Normans, and many less sanguinary arrivals since—play in shaping that nation of immigrants, England? What about the residual influence of the original Celtic inhabitants? Even more important is the pluralistic nature of English society, not just in terms of ethnicity

but in terms of class, region, religion, and ideology. There were several very distinctive strands in the English influence on America.

Furthermore, with reference to the political and diplomatic entity north of France to which Breslin refers, why not use the term "British" instead of the term "English"? Celtic peoples are not part of the English nation and the English are aware of that, but Breslin persists with his misleading nomenclature. Those living in Celtic countries will find his

**Breslin is either fudging his definitions to enhance his hypothesis, or he does not fully understand what a Celt is. He is right to think of the term as a cultural rather than a racial construct, but he gives the impression of being unaware of a cultural diversity within Celtic nations that complements the variegated nature of England and indeed most other countries.**

diction offensive. Long ago, ignorant people applied the term "English" to immigrants from the British Isles who could not even speak the language, but there is no excuse for historians doing so. America did not fight "England" in 1812, nor did it side with "England" in 1917.

Breslin is either fudging his definitions to enhance his hypothesis, or he does not fully understand what a Celt is. He is right to think of the term as a cultural rather than a racial construct, but he gives the impression of being unaware of a cultural diversity within Celtic nations that complements the variegated nature of England and indeed most other countries. What is more, he shows no awareness of the broad linguistic divide between the "P-Celts" and the "Q-Celts." The latter spoke Irish, Scots Gaelic, and Manx, in the Goidelic language group. The former spoke Welsh (once spoken over much of mainland Britain and the only Celtic language surviving on a large

scale today), Cumbrian, Cornish, and Breton. Their Brythonic language group gave rise to the term "Britain."

Though his essay reads like an exercise in polyfiliopietism, Breslin has not only forgotten about the bitterly contested cultural (and religious) differences between the Goidelic speakers and their fellow countrymen in Ireland and Scotland, he has also overlooked entirely the Brythonic speakers and with them the genesis of the concept of being British. The omission has even led him to miss a trick in advancing his own dubious viewpoint: the Welsh strand in filiopietism that applies the homeopathic principle and claims that the genius of Thomas Jefferson and numerous other presidents and notables stemmed from their ancestry in the land west of Offa's Dyke.

Methodology, definition, and logic are all poor in the Breslin essay. Even a short interpretive essay lacks credibility if it does not lay down its ground rules. If Breslin prefers culture to the counting of drops of ancestral blood, how does he treat memory? Do his Celtic and Anglo presidents remember and talk about their cultural heritage and say it explains their foreign policies? Or does he rely on the premise that memories do not have to be articulated? If so, does he argue that culture produces mores without memory, proceeding on the assumption that common backgrounds yield similar outcomes? We need to know.

How does Breslin measure the degree and nature of European ethnic consciousness in a particular president and what are the uniform signifiers that permit him to make comparisons and distinctions? Breslin has written previously about America and China, but in his contribution to *Passport* he does not explain why "Anglo" presidents take an interest in China, while "Celtic" presidents look to Latin America. In the unlikely event that he can sustain his Anglo-Celtic cultural definitions of presidents, what logic can he advance to explain this postulated

regional variation? In arguing that Celtic-American presidents opposed socialism because of their cultural tradition, is he aware of the strong left-wing tradition in all the main Celtic nations?

Breslin's strange judgments on particular issues no doubt arise from an effort to force wide-ranging facts into the straightjacket of an overworked hypothesis. For example, his references to "England's Celtic allies" feeling "abused by their overlords," while vague, seem to apply to events occurring prior to American independence (and thus before the phenomenon of American presidents). He may be thinking of atrocities committed in Ireland by the forces of Oliver Cromwell, or the forced colonization of much of Ulster by Scottish Presbyterians. Certainly there is an Irish feel to his essay, as indicated by his preference for the Irish spelling of "whiskey" (Scottish, "whisky").

But his instincts for Irish and Irish-American history are erratic. Breslin's Andrew Jackson was "the hero of the Celtic-Americans." But Jackson would have been no hero to the Corkite and other Irish Catholic immigrants laboring on the construction of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal on January 29, 1834. On that day, the president ordered federal troops to (take your pick) restore order or crush the strike by the predominantly Irish-American workforce. It was the White House's first deployment of U.S. troops for this purpose and is thus not an inconspicuous event. Breslin might categorize it as an instance of what he calls Celtic-American presidents' "occasional bouts of anti-Catholicism," which were, according to him, characteristic of that group. But this point is meaningless, because Jackson was of *Scotch-Irish* ancestry and thus, certainly in the eyes of his critics, *anti-Celtic*. To be sure, Woodrow Wilson's grandfather hailed from County Tyrone. But if President Wilson was a "Celtic American" in cultural terms, we need an explanation of his snobbery towards Irish Americans and of his reluctance to endorse Irish independence in the wake of the Irish pro-independence election result of 1918. And where does the famously Irish Catholic John F. Kennedy fit in? A characterization that allows for too many exceptions fails.

Beyond the Irish question, Breslin's essay is on even more parlous ground. If he is of the oppressed Celts persuasion, he should at least confess that he is taking sides in the great debate about the union of England and

Scotland in 1707: did it hammer the Scots or favor them by, for example, giving them access to trade with America? Has he succumbed to the romantic mythology of the 1715 and 1745 rebellions, regarding them as Scottish nationalist risings whereas in reality they were religious? As he cleaves to the principle of avoiding the Brythonic Celts, perhaps he is unaware that in 1485 Henry Tudor and his Welsh army defeated England's Richard III in battle, that Henry's son Henry VIII united England and Wales, and that as a result the Welsh were enthusiastically royalist even after the Stuart succession of 1603, and supportive of government from London. Nationalists regret and deplore that long phase in Welsh history, which lasted well into the twentieth century, but it did happen. Historians should try to deal with the truth.

Breslin has missed another trick in the case of Barack Obama. There is no need to subscribe to the claim in the humorous song "There Is No One As Irish As Barack O'Bama," but it is clear that on his mother's side Obama, like so many Americans, can claim Irish descent. Except as a light-hearted political theme, this affinity is probably meaningless. But the onus is on Breslin to show exactly why it is meaningless in the case of Obama, but not in other cases on his list.

What does Breslin mean when he asserts that Obama the non-Celt, non-Anglo, may be "just another . . . Eisenhower"? In suggesting that Ike was a foreign policy lightweight, he is swimming against the historiographical tide. And when he says that Obama started his presidency as a "foreign policy novice," he should remember that most incoming presidents are. Furthermore, anyone familiar with the literary output of the pre-presidential Obama must agree that he was unusually well informed about the world beyond America's shores.

There have been English, Scottish, Scotch-Irish, Irish, Welsh, Cornish, and Breton influences on America. They range from ideology to cuisine, from imported sectarianism to cultural diversity. There are many fascinating ways in which the heritage can be studied. It does have some significance, of a modest nature, for foreign policy. But there is no place for an overarching hypothesis like Breslin's. He has invited the fate of Icarus.

*Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones is Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Edinburgh.*

## Breslin Response

*Thomas A. Breslin*

Prof. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones bases his critique of my hypothesis on the fundamentally flawed claim that "the Great Man Theory of History, debatable at the best of times, is of limited credibility in the case of a nation with America's checks –and balances constitution." In American foreign affairs, however, the president is both a theoretical and a practical Great Man. As Elmer Plischke notes, "legally, politically, and practically the president is not only the manager in chief of U.S. foreign affairs... but also, in those circumstances in which he chooses, he is diplomat in chief, and sometimes even his own secretary of state or his own ambassador."<sup>1</sup>

American presidents have been able to confound constitutional checks and balances and be historical Great Men who make large-scale differences in history. Jefferson's unauthorized Louisiana Purchase changed American history. Polk's congressionally unauthorized action provoked a war with Mexico and changed the course of American history. Theodore Roosevelt's publicly boasted, "I took the Canal Zone, and let Congress debate, and while the debate goes on the canal does also."

Presidents embraced an imperial role. Before his election, Kennedy told the National Press Club that the next President "must be prepared to exercise the fullest powers of his office—all that are specified and some that are not . . . the President is alone at the top." He quoted Woodrow Wilson's dictum that "the President is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can . . . His office is anything he has the sagacity and the force to make it. . . . His capacity will set the limit."<sup>2</sup>

It bothers Jeffreys-Jones that I have lumped the invaders of the Celtic Isles together. In my forthcoming work,<sup>3</sup> following David Hackett Fischer's *Albion's Seed*, I do differentiate among the English and their Anglo-American cousins. Anglo-Saxons and other Germanic types, whom I term the English, dominated the Celtic Isles and their various Celtic inhabitants following much fighting over several centuries. To do so they used one Celtic group against another and defeated Scottish and Irish ties to Spain and France.

The English also brought their mutual antagonisms to North America, as Puritan New Englanders, Middle Atlantic Quakers, and South

Atlantic Coast Cavaliers. Similarly, in North America Anglo-Americans both struggled against and used Celts and Celtic-Americans. At first, the North American Celts were mostly Scots-Irish and later mostly Irish. Other Celtic sub-cultures were not consequential in American presidential history. There was no love lost, however, between Scots-Irish and Irish. Thus Wilson, but arguably not Jackson, continued a Scots-Irish versus Irish antagonism across the sea. Accordingly, Jeffreys-Jones' term of choice, "British," derived from the Brythonic language group is too narrow to include either the two Celtic groups consequential in American presidential history or all those in the home islands. Thus I use the inclusive term, "Celtic."


Some presidents have been very conscious of their ancestry. Wilson boasted, "I am one of those who are of the seed of that indomitable blood, planted in so many parts of the United States, which makes good fighting stuff, --the Scotch-Irish. The beauty about a Scotch-Irishman is that he not only thinks he is right, but knows he is right. And I have not departed from the faith of my ancestors."<sup>4</sup> As noted originally, Grant identified with his English ancestors. Others were less conscious of ancestral culture. But as one historian reminds us, "The relatively remote past is apt to constrain our thought and actions more, because we understand it less well than we do our recent past, or at least recall it less clearly, and it has cut deeper grooves of custom in our minds."<sup>5</sup> As for Obama, whom I describe as having "an unprecedented mix of ethnic backgrounds," I have not claimed, pace Jeffreys-Jones, that any part of Obama's cultural heritage is meaningless. It remains to be seen what he does in foreign affairs and also what part of his cultural background he most identifies with.

Thomas A. Breslin is Professor of History at Florida International University

Notes:

1. Elmer Plischke, *Diplomat In Chief: The President at the Summit* (New York: Praeger, 1986), 488.
2. Tom Wicker, *JFK and LBJ: The Influence of Personality Upon Politics* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969), 25.
3. Thomas A. Breslin, *The Great Anglo-Celtic Divide in the History of American Foreign Relations* (Santa Barbara: ABC-Clio/Praeger, forthcoming).
4. Edwin A. Weinstein, *Woodrow Wilson: A Medical and Psychological Biography* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), 178.

5. Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), xx.



## Confronting the Bomb: A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement

Lawrence S. Wittner

(an abbreviated version of the classic, award-winning scholarly trilogy, *The Struggle Against the Bomb*)

### From reviews of *The Struggle Against the Bomb*

"Wittner's impressively researched, clearly written, and balanced assessment of the antinuclear-weapons movement belongs on the shelf not only of every serious student of the nuclear arms race but also of everyone who is concerned about the safety of humanity."

– *American Historical Review*

"Wittner's outstanding book employs massive research . . . to show how concerned citizens . . . have altered the course of history. . . . Monumental."

– *Journal of American History*

"[A] substantial, meticulously researched and sympathetic history of the disarmament movement."

– *Foreign Affairs*

"Groundbreaking. . . . An encyclopedic account of a diverse . . . transnational movement at work. . . . Deserves a wide audience."

– *Diplomatic History*

Paper \$21.95  
Cloth \$50.00  
271 pp

Stanford University Press  
800-621-2736  
www.sup.org

## *The View from Overseas*

# Bad Policies: Nigerians' Perceptions of the United States

*S.U. Fwatshak*

*The following essay is part of the Passport series, "The View from Overseas," which features short pieces written by someone outside of the United States, examining the views held by the people and government in their country about the United States. SHAFR members who are living abroad, even temporarily, or who have contacts abroad that might be well-positioned to write such pieces are encouraged to contact the editor at [passport@osu.edu](mailto:passport@osu.edu).*

When Professor Toyin Falola linked me up with Mitch Lerner, who had requested a Nigerian to volunteer an essay on how Nigerians perceive the United States, I was delighted. However, I soon realized that my task would not be an easy one. Nigeria, Africa's demographic giant, is a diverse nation of over a hundred million people. Those people have different ethnic, linguistic, cultural and religious backgrounds, and individuals from various regions differ widely in educational achievements and in politics.

Three ethnic groups make up the majority of the people: the Hausa, the Igbo, and the Yoruba. More than four hundred other ethnic groups are scattered across the nation. General Sani Abacha, who was head of state from 1993 to 1998, divided the country into six geopolitical zones: the Southwest, which is largely Yoruba; the South-south, where various minorities live in the oil-rich Niger Delta; the Southeast, which is largely Igbo-speaking; the North-central (popularly called the Middle Belt), which is inhabited by various minority groups; the Northeast, where the Kanuri make up the single largest group but are outnumbered by the total population of other minority groups; and the Northwest, which is largely Hausa but also has significant minority populations.

Islam and Christianity are the two major religions. Islam dominates in the Northeast and Northwest; the

population is split nearly 50-50 in the Southwest. Christianity is dominant in the Southeast, South-south and North-central regions, but Islam has a significant population in the North-central area. There are also various religious minorities, such as those who practice "indigenous" religions. There are no accurate figures to show which of the two major religions has the higher figures nationwide.

Because of the early influence of Christian missions, the southern region is educationally more advanced and has a more educated elite (in the Western sense) than the northern region (especially the Islamic-dominated Northeast and Northwest); it has more schools, including tertiary institutions, many of which are privately owned. Although generally the citizens are poor, a few, especially political officeholders, are rich. According to statistics of the early 2000s, poverty is higher in the Northeast and Northwest—the regions threatened by desertification—and skills development is low; the population is rising because birth control measures are being rejected. These circumstances have strong influences on the worldviews of individuals and groups.

There is little consensus among Nigerians, except when the national soccer team is playing an international match. Thus when I asked people about their perceptions of the United States, their responses strongly reflected their diversity. I tried to get the opinions of a few individuals from various ethnic, religious, zonal, and educational backgrounds. Those who volunteered information included educated Muslims from the Southwest (Yoruba), educated Christians from the Southeast (Igbo), and educated and uneducated Muslims and Christians from the North-central region (Christian minorities) and Northwest (Hausa). The non-Hausa volunteers sent me their responses by email and text messages, but I

interviewed the Hausa Muslims personally for over two hours. The two persons interviewed differed in educational status: one is a graduate in mass communication; the other completed only primary education but was in his early 30s and was married with children. They differed in the details of their individual perceptions, with the less educated one more vocal in his elaboration of the negative issues pertaining to the United States, but they agreed on many of the basics. What they told me reflected views commonly held by the Hausa Muslims, some of which they shared but some of which they did not agree with. They both pleaded that their views remain anonymous.

What is presented here is a summary of the various shades of opinion I heard. Many of the persons who volunteered their opinions had both positive and negative perceptions of the United States. Although it is difficult to get what could be regarded as a national opinion that reflects the views of all, it is not impossible to get a fair view of how Nigerians of different backgrounds view the United States.

### **Perspectives of educated elites (mainly university professors) across regions, religions, and cultures:**

1. The United States is a highly advanced democracy, and it promotes the democratic system of government globally. But while it has exported worthy ideals to other societies (e.g., democratic rule, evangelical missions), it has also exported the most depraved debauchery in the guise of cultural values.

2. It has engendered true patriotism in its citizens, who are dedicated and committed to their country, but it is arrogant in its feeling of military might and reckless in its military adventures. It usually uses its military power excessively and sometimes wrongly against other nations.

3. A country of opportunities, it is genuinely interested in harnessing individual potential. Its motives are often suspect, however.

4. It is a free and orderly society, committed to the ideal of individual freedom (sometimes to a fault!). One Professor stated his views about freedom in the USA in the following words: "In my perception America is a wonderful country where the dignity of citizens is uncomparably with anything. Freedom in almost everything is indubitable." However, while it is receptive to foreigners, it is hostile in its dealings with non-natives.

5. It is a nation that readily recognizes and rewards merit and hard work. Hardworking individuals can get to the top of their careers. But it dominates the world economy and politics, and it arrogates to itself the right to aspire and to lead the world in all spheres of human endeavor except soccer, without regard to how other nations feel.

6. It is a military and economic giant, a superpower, a big brother policing world affairs. Without its interventions, rogue regimes in some regions would overrun and annex their weaker neighbors. But it has caused political and economic problems in many parts of the world because it pursues its economic and political interests by any means. It does not care about the lives of citizens of other countries as much as it does protecting its own interests.

7. It is a very literate society in which education is held in high esteem and most citizens are educated. However, it is draining away some of Nigeria's skilled personnel through its lottery programs.

8. The United States loves her citizens and protects their interests wherever they may be in the world. Its practice of ensuring that its citizens are evacuated when they find themselves in difficulties abroad is much appreciated. But it has continued to treat people from other nations, particularly black people, as second-class citizens. They suffer from certain restrictions.

9. It promotes education across the globe by ensuring that different professional courses are mounted for people of various nations; it has programs for the exchange of scholars, like the Fulbright Program, and programs for staff development for LDCs that help build individual and institutional capacities. However, Republicans are not friendly to Africa or the world. They are hostile to Obama and this hostility is affecting the American economy.

10. It provides military

training for military personnel of different nations.

11. It assists in a unique way different peoples and countries in distress.

12. Its citizens are very determined and will achieve anything they aspire to.

13. Obama's policy of discussing matters one-on-one with leaders of other countries (especially the Arab states) has diminished the perception that the United States has a superiority complex and has improved its international image.

#### **Perspectives of Hausa Muslims of Northern Nigeria:**

1. The United States is anti-Islam. For example, it attacked Ghaddafi but not the Ivory Coast president, Laurent Gbagbo. Saddam Hussein was killed on *Arafat* day, when Muslims commemorate the substitution of a ram for Ishmael, an action that symbolizes ransom. The killing is seen by Muslims as a humiliation of Islam.

2. The United States stereotypes Muslims as terrorists.

3. Muslims do not trust the United States, and goods from that country, including health-related items like food and drugs, are not acceptable to Muslims, who see them as a means of Christianizing them. Foods and drugs—including vaccines—are believed to have contraceptives hidden in them to prevent child-bearing and decrease Muslim population growth. The rejection of polio vaccines by the Northern Nigeria government of Kano state under Governor Ibrahim Shekarau confirms the prevalence of this attitude. (The two Hausa Muslim interviewees do not personally share this view.)

4. The United States does not have regard for religion, but religion is very dear to Muslims. One educated Muslim who sent his response to me by email however disagreed with the point that the U.S. has no regard for religion by stating that, "It was in America that I first prayed as a Muslim in a Chapel and lot more."

5. Some Muslims view clothes, cable TV, and films from the United States and Europe as indecent and un-Islamic and ban them from their homes in order to prevent the pollution of Islam. (The two Hausa Muslim interviewees do not personally share this view.)

6. Many Hausa Muslims do not distinguish between the United States, Europe, Jews, and Israel. To them, all represent one and the same thing: the

protection and/or propagation of Christianity. UN agencies are seen in the same light. (The graduate Hausa Muslim interviewee knows much about the differences.)

7. Democrats are more friendly to LDCs, including Islamic countries, than Republicans, who are regarded as belligerent.

8. The failure of the United States to intervene in the Nigerian People's Democratic Party (PDP) constitutional crisis about the rotation of the presidency is seen as anti-Islam. Muslims believe that if President Goodluck Jonathan were a Muslim, the United States would have intervened to force the PDP to respect its zoning principle. (The less educated Hausa Muslim emphasized this belief; the graduate did not share it.)

9. Americans are liars. They brought fertilizers to Nigeria but now they are saying that manure is better. It is difficult to know which one to use. The point about Americans supplying fertilizers to Nigeria confirms the inability of the less-educated Hausa to distinguish between Americans and Europeans.

10. The Child Rights Act promoted by the United States is un-Islamic because a girl can mature at age nine, depending on her physique, and Muslims believe it is better for a girl to be deflowered by her husband because he would be the only one she knew in her early marital life and she would love him more. The marriage of Senator Ahmed Sani to a thirteen-year-old Egyptian girl confirms this belief. (The educated interviewee did not hold this opinion personally.)

11. The United States prevents other countries from acquiring nuclear capabilities by destroying their efforts in that direction.

12. Under the pretext of human rights, the United States prevents the killing of murderers. Sparing murderers is un-Islamic; in Islam, one who kills another should also be killed.

13. The United States mistakenly believes all Hausa-speakers are Muslims and every problem in Nigeria is associated with Hausa-speakers.

14. The United States operates on the principle of citizenship and not indigeneship for its occupants, but in other countries it does not promote citizenship. Instead, it causes people to fight. (This reference by the less educated Hausa Muslim was to the so-called indigeneship-settlership crises in Plateau state.)

15. The United States is a nation of thieves. They fight in other countries like Iraq and Libya to access those countries' oil resources.

16. International Radio Media from Europe have Hausa programs in which *Mallams* (Islamic preachers) air their views about the United States. Those views, which are largely negative, shape public opinion about the United States among the Hausa people (the majority of whom are Muslims) because the Hausa people listen to radio a lot.

17. The United States does not have a good culture. Many Hausa people that train in that country return to Nigeria behaving disrespectfully in their manner of speech (using vulgar language), in the way they dress (indecently by Hausa standards), in how they relate to people (they see themselves as superior to others), and in their attitude toward local customs and cultures.

18. The United States does not make goods that benefit the masses. Their cars consume a lot of fuel, unlike those of the Japanese. Therefore, the country is anti-poor people.

19. Americans are too individualistic and too independent; Hausa/Muslim people believe in following their leaders. Among Hausa Muslims generally, when

two or more people are going on a journey, they first choose a leader who must be deferred to during the course of the journey as the group takes decisions and relates to other people.

20. In a general sense, Hausa Muslims regard the United States as a very bad country. Whatever it does is seen as bad.

#### **Perspectives of Uneducated Christians:**

The few contacts I made among un-educated Christians did not yield any results. The volunteers said they did not know anything about the United States; they only knew about white people in general.


In sum, the educated elite find that the United States has some positive attributes. They cite economic, educational, and military achievements; citizen determination and patriotism; and democracy and freedom. To this extent, the educated elite across regions, religions, and cultures perceives of the United States as great nation. The Hausa Muslims' information showed that Hausa Muslims generally do not see anything good in the United States.

To them, it is a bad nation; it is anti-Islam, uncultured, anti-others. But the sometimes divergent opinions of the educated interviewee and the less educated one suggest that all Hausa Muslims may not hold views that are as completely negative as these; such negativity may be largely limited to the less educated. Still, everyone who volunteered information attributed many negative traits to the United States. These included the arrogance that drives it to dominate the world and to pursue American interests by any means, even if others are hurt.

In order to formulate and implement a viable Nigeria policy, the United States would require a more careful, in-depth, systematic collection of data that reflects the diversity of Nigeria, and it would have to analyze that data thoroughly. But this short survey may be taken as a starting point. It indicates that the United States has a great deal of work to do if it wishes to win hearts and minds in Nigeria.

*Sati Umaru Fwatshak is Associate Professor of History, Department of History and International Studies, University of Jos, Nigeria.*

## 2011 SHAFR Election



SHAFR has contracted this year with Vote-Now.com to conduct its annual membership election. This summer, each member will receive an e-mail and/or a postcard from Vote-Now.com inviting him or her to vote on-line for the election of officers and for a short referendum on the by-laws. The mailer will include a link to a secure website where votes can be cast. Access codes will be provided. Any member unable to cast an on-line vote may request a paper ballot by notifying the SHAFR Business Office. Questions about the ballot may be directed to the SHAFR Business Office (shafr@osu.edu); questions about technical aspects of voting should be directed to Vote-Now.com. Deadline for on-line voting will remain, as usual, October 31.

From left: Marilyn Young, Andrew J. Bacevich, Peter Hahn



From left: Laura Belmonte, Richard Immerman, Anna Nelson



# SHAFR

Annual Meeting, June 2011

*in Alexandria, Virginia*



View from the SHAFR clam bake

Katie Sibley (left) and Carol Jackson Adams



Molly Wood (left) and Jennifer Walton



Martin Folly (left) and Darlene Rivas

SHAFR President Marilyn B. Young wishes to express her heartfelt thanks to the Program Committee for the splendid 2011 conference they put together: program chairs Petra Goedde and Brad Simpson and committee members Dirk Bonker, Jason Colby, Salim Yaqub, Amy S. Greenberg, Sheyda Jahanbani, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Nicole Phelps. Special thanks also goes out to conference coordinator Jennifer Walton. *Photos: Geoff Smith.*



Marilyn Young



Michael Hopkins (left) and Warren Kimball

# Kennedy Library Launches Digital Archives

*Erica Boudreau*

The John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, like other presidential libraries, has long been an important research destination for students and scholars of diplomatic history. Housed there are archival materials and museum objects documenting some of the most important events and international developments of the second half of the twentieth century: the creation of the Peace Corps, the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Berlin crisis, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, increasing tensions in Laos and Vietnam, independence movements in Africa, and the creation of the Alliance for Progress. Access to these unique materials, though free of charge and open to anyone engaged in scholarly research, was, until recently, limited to the library's research room in Boston.

Now, with the launch of the JFK Library's Digital Archive in January 2011, anyone with an internet connection can view entire collections of digitized documents, photographs, audio recordings, moving images, oral histories, and museum artifacts that have heretofore been available only to researchers with the time and means to travel to the library. "Access to a Legacy," as the initiative is called, is a public-private partnership between the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum and the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation. Its objectives are to digitize, index, and store permanently millions of presidential documents, photographs, and audiovisual recordings; provide online accessibility to a worldwide audience; search collections using metadata; protect historical assets through remote replication; and minimize wear and tear on irreplaceable physical assets.

Thus far, Kennedy Library staff have digitized, described, and made available several archival collections in their entirety: the President's Office Files, which include the working files of President Kennedy as maintained in the Oval Office of

the White House by his personal secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, as well as audio recordings of his telephone conversations; the White House Central Chronological Files, which consist of carbon copies of the president's outgoing correspondence; the John F. Kennedy Personal Papers, which include childhood letters, diaries, correspondence, academic records and notebooks, Navy records, medical records, manuscript drafts, and presidential doodles; and the White House Audio Collection, which consists of White House Communications Agency recordings of President Kennedy's speeches and other public remarks. Also found in the Digital Archives are images and descriptions of almost 300 museum artifacts from the State Gifts Collection; over 400 oral history interview transcripts from the John F. Kennedy and Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Collections; materials related to civil rights from the White House Central Subject Files; over 1,500 photographs from the White House Photograph Collection; and over 100 moving image files from various collections at the library. The search interface for the Digital Archives provides access not only to digitized content, but to descriptions of and finding aids for all of the library's as yet undigitized holdings.

There is a great deal of material in the Digital Archives that will be of interest to diplomatic historians. The library uses a controlled list of subject headings when cataloging archival material, and included in that list is the heading "Diplomatic and consular service," defined as material related to diplomatic and consular service in general, as well as materials belonging or related to specific diplomats and consular employees, including United States ambassadors to foreign countries. A search for all records that have been assigned this subject heading returns five basic categories of material, as well as abstracts and finding aids for collections that are not yet digitized:

- Oral history records, which include interviews with the Kennedy administration's ambassadors to France, Guinea, the United Arab Republic, Malaysia, Cameroon, Israel, Australia, Ecuador, Denmark, Laos, Honduras, Chile, the United Kingdom, Canada, Poland, Romania, Uruguay, and Gabon, as well as ambassadors to the United States from Tunisia and Brazil. Among subjects discussed are the president's relationship with foreign leaders, including Charles de Gaulle, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Harold H. Macmillan; Kennedy's foreign policy in Africa; various foreign relations crises, including the Bay of Pigs invasion, war in Laos, and the Cuban Missile Crisis; Kennedy's influence on the stature of diplomats from Third World nations; reactions to the Alliance for Progress from Latin American leaders; and negotiations with the Soviet Union
- Photographs, including those related to diplomatic and consular service, document meetings with ambassadors to and from the United States; meetings with heads of state, foreign ministers, and other representatives of foreign countries; and receptions for the Diplomatic Corps
- Related sound recordings, including President Kennedy's remarks at U.S. embassies in Canada, England, Venezuela, Mexico, Costa Rica, Germany, and Italy; his speeches at ambassadors' swearing-in ceremonies; and his remarks to Foreign Service students and officers
- Textual material related to diplomacy, found primarily in the President's Office Files. The Countries series includes material concerning the diplomatic and consular representation of foreign nations to the United States, including biographical

information on ambassadors and other representatives; folders about individual countries, including letters of credence and other formal documents relating to ambassadors; and correspondence between President Kennedy and foreign leaders, including Charles de Gaulle and the Shah of Iran. The Staff Memoranda series includes correspondence about ambassadorial appointments, foreign trips, foreign aid, and relations with colonial powers that were confronting African independence movements. The State Department materials in the Departments and Agencies series relate to appointments to the Foreign Service; the performance of individual U.S. ambassadors; the death of Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba of the Republic of Congo; disarmament; negotiations between India and Pakistan; and staff reports to the president summarizing various international issues. The Human Rights series of the White House Central Subject Files may also be of interest, as it includes reports, memoranda, and correspondence between President John F. Kennedy, Chief of Protocol Angier Biddle Duke, Special Assistant to the President Frederick G. Dutton, and various state and local politicians concerning the treatment of visiting African diplomats, with specific emphasis on incidents of discriminatory housing practices and prohibited use of public facilities

- Museum artifacts records from the State Gifts Collection, which document the gifts presented to President Kennedy and First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy from dignitaries and heads of state from all over the world, including a tea set given to Mrs. Kennedy by Premier and Mrs. Khrushchev and a sculpture given to President Kennedy by President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia

In addition to these digitized materials, the application of controlled subject headings across all of the library's archival material allows for the discovery of several undigitized collections that relate to diplomatic history. Among these are the Ralph A. Dungan Personal Papers (Ambassador to Chile), the Joseph P. Kennedy Personal Papers (Ambassador to Great Britain), the William K. Leonhart Personal Papers (Chief of Mission, Tokyo, Japan [1959–62]; Ambassador to Tanganyika (later Tanzania) [1962–

65]; Ambassador to Yugoslavia [1969–72]); and the R. Sargent Shriver Personal Papers (Ambassador to France, 1968–1970). Other headings likely to yield materials of interest include "Heads of State," defined as material related to the heads of state of foreign nations, and "International Relations," defined as material relating to the plans, policies, procedures, and programs regarding foreign countries or governments, including material concerning the relationship between the United States and foreign countries or governments as well as relationships between other foreign countries or governments.

The library uses EMC's Documentum software as its digital asset management system (DAMS). Documentum creates and manages multiple renditions of the library's digital assets—high quality preservation masters, print-quality renditions used to fill reference requests, and lower resolution renditions appropriate for web delivery. Documentum also provides an interface for the capture of the administrative, descriptive, and technical metadata that is generated by library staff. Digital assets and their associated metadata are published from Documentum to the Digital Archives portal on the library's newly redesigned website, where they are fully searchable and viewable by the public.

Documents are described at the file unit (folder) level. Choosing this level of description provides a practical compromise between broad, collection-level description and the time-consuming practice of item-level description: library staff is able to digitally process materials more quickly while still providing rich metadata at a granular level. File-level access in the digital world also replicates the JFK Library research room experience, where researchers access materials at the box and folder level. The essential experience of looking through a folder of archival materials is maintained, as is the context of the materials. Within each file unit, the full text of the documents is searchable, though it must be noted that this search uses unedited text extracted from the scanned Tagged Image File Format (TIFF) images using Optical Character Recognition (OCR), which is not one hundred percent accurate (and does not pick up handwritten text at all). All audiovisual items and museum artifacts in our collections are described at the item level.

Wherever possible, library catalogers made virtual connections among content related to the same

event or subject using the Related Records field; for example, the record for "Kashmiri Girl," a painting of a young girl from Kashmir, informs the user that the painting was presented to First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy by President Muhammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan during his July 1961 visit to the United States. However, it also includes a link to the Security Briefing book found in the President's Office Files that prepared President Kennedy for President Ayub's visit. Similarly, the record for a photograph of President John F. Kennedy meeting with the ambassador of Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba Jr., lists as a related record a folder from the President's Office Files titled "Tunisia: General, January 1959–April 1961."

Though only a small percentage of the library's collection has been digitized thus far, work is ongoing, and more content is added to the digital archives on a weekly basis. Collections that are in the planning stages for digitization include recordings of President Kennedy's meetings, portions of the Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis Papers that relate to her role as First Lady, portions of the National Security Files, the 1960 Presidential Campaign Files, and the White House Staff Files of various administration members.

Explore the Digital Archives at <http://www.jfklibrary.org/Research/Search-the-Digital-Archives.aspx>.

*Erica C. Boudreau is Digital Archivist at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.*

# The 2010 Report of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

April 6, 2011

By public law and by tradition, the Historical Advisory Committee to the Department of State (HAC) embraces two principal responsibilities. The first is to oversee the preparation and timely publication of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series. The second is to facilitate public access to records that are 25 or more years older than the date of issue.

The Foreign Relations Statute of 1991 (Public Law 102-138 [105 Stat. 647, codified in relevant part at 22 U.S.C. § 4351 et seq.]) mandates the first of these responsibilities. It calls for a “thorough, accurate, and reliable” documentary record of United States foreign policy. That statute evolved from the public controversy triggered by the *Foreign Relations* volumes published in 1983 and 1989 that covered the events surrounding U.S. interventions in Guatemala in 1954 and in Iran in 1953, respectively. Both volumes omitted documentation on U.S. covert activities that either was not made available to the Office of the Historian (HO) researchers or was not cleared for publication. Knowledgeable scholars rightly criticized the two volumes—and the series—for falling short of the standard of accuracy and thoroughness, dealing a serious blow to its credibility and stature.

Over the two decades that have passed since the *Foreign Relations* Statute of 1991 became law, the HO has sought with good faith to compile volumes that are as “thorough, reliable, and accurate” as possible. Our committee appreciates that the this standard is an exceedingly challenging and complex one for the HO to meet in view of the explosion of important government documents pertaining to foreign relations for the decades of the 1960s, 1970s, and after and in view of the parallel requirement that volumes be published no later than 30 years after the events they document. HO has struggled to meet these complementary obligations, finding much greater success in achieving the *quality* objective than in achieving the goal of *timeliness*. As the HO’s inability to close the gap between its publication of the *Foreign Relations* volumes and the 30-year target has become manifest, our committee’s concerns have intensified.

The HAC’s second statutory obligation is to monitor and advise on the declassification and opening of the Department of State’s records, which in large measure involves the Department’s implementation of the operative Executive Order governing the classification and declassification of government records. E.O. 12958, issued in 1995, and later amended by E.O. 13292 of 2003, mandated the declassification of records over 25 years old—unless valid and significant reasons could be specified for not releasing them. Those orders were supplanted, in December 2009, by a new Executive Order (E.O. 13526).

## Publications of the *Foreign Relations* Series

During 2010, the Office of the Historian published six volumes in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series.

Those were:

1. 1969-1976, VII, Vietnam, July 1970-January 1973
2. 1969-1976, VIII, Vietnam, January 1972-October 1972
3. 1969-1976, IX, Vietnam, October 1972-January 1973
4. 1969-1976, X, Vietnam, January 1973-July 1975
5. 1969-1976, XIX, Part I, Korea, 1969-1972
6. 1969-1976, Salt I, 1969-1973

This is twice the number of volumes published the previous year, reflecting the stabilization of HO following several years of managerial disruption and internal tumult. The HAC congratulates the HO on this accomplishment, and remains impressed by the uniformly high quality of the published volumes. Nevertheless, the improvement in the rate of production should not be exaggerated. The three volumes published in 2009 is an unacceptably low number. Further, no progress has been made toward bringing the series into compliance with the statutory requirement that volumes be published 30 years after the events they document. Indeed, the 6 volumes published in 2010 did not even meet the target set by the Office in 2009. This record reinforces the disappointment HAC has expressed in prior reports.

Especially because significant steps have been taken to resolve the internal turmoil, staff turnover, and managerial disruption that plagued the HO in 2008 and 2009, the Committee assesses the 2010 record of publication of the *Foreign Relations* series as discouraging. It is particularly concerned that the Office lacks the sense of urgency required to fulfill its statutory obligations.

## The Challenge of the 30 Year Rule

The HAC is acutely aware of the challenges to publishing the *Foreign Relations* volumes in a sufficiently timely manner to begin to close the gap. The most salient current obstacle, ironically, stems from the 1991 legislation. That statute, and a subsequent memorandum of understanding between the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency, mandated and greatly facilitated research in intelligence files and the incorporation of intelligence documentation in *Foreign Relations* volumes. An interagency committee established in the late 1990s, known as the “High-Level Panel” (HLP), provides guidelines for the publication in the *Foreign Relations* series of documentation relating to covert actions and other sensitive intelligence activities that had a major impact on U.S. foreign policy. That more than 40 covert intelligence activities have now been acknowledged is evidence of the success of the HLP. The *Foreign Relations* series serves as the primary venue for publishing documentation on the role of intelligence activities in U.S. foreign relations. Hence, the series has become renowned internationally for openness, which has well served the national interest.

This invaluable barometer of openness has, however, created substantial delays in the declassification and publication processes. The HO estimates that any volume

with an HLP issue will spend at least one additional year, and often more, in the declassification pipeline than will a volume which does not contain an intelligence issue which requires consideration, the drafting of guidelines, and clearance by that inter-agency panel. Appealing negative decisions about documents is a time-consuming process, and on occasion the CIA has reclassified previously released documents. Further, the CIA's resistance to declassifying documents that are already in the public domain presents a severe challenge for the HO to publish volumes that meet the standard of a "thorough, accurate, and reliable" documentary record of United States foreign policy. CIA, we must emphasize, is but one of multiple agencies with equities in sensitive intelligence related issues.

The failure of agencies to meet the 120-day deadline, set by statute, for reviewing documents chosen for inclusion in *Foreign Relations* volumes has exacerbated this problem and frustrated the HO and HAC. Indeed, the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Justice (including the FBI) have often been as if not more culpable than the CIA for the delays. The Historical Advisory Committee is encouraged by recent evidence of improvement. Seeming small measures, such as regular informal meetings between the HO and CIA, for example, have had salutary effects. Still, the time and effort required to gain release of documents deemed vital to producing a thorough, accurate, and reliable history of U.S. foreign relations continues to constitute a serious roadblock to publication.

These issues will intensify the challenge of meeting the 30-year rule as the HO seeks to hasten publication of the volumes covering the Carter and Reagan administrations. With the recent additions to its historical staff, the Office has now assigned each volume for the 1977-80 quadrennium. The HO estimates that at least half of these volumes will require resolution of HLP issues. The Reagan administration records contain approximately 8.5 million classified pages, and changes in the filing system will likely complicate historians' ability to ensure that they have identified and located every potentially useful record in the National Security collection.

#### **Declassification Issues and the Transfer of Department of State Records to the National Archives**

During 2010, the committee continued to review the State Department's classification guidelines and to monitor the application of those guidelines to further the declassification process. It also monitored the transfer of the Department's records—electronic as well as paper—to the National Archives and Records Administration. We are pleased to note that notwithstanding the increased number of documents that required review, the Department's Systematic Review Program achieved its core annual goal of completing the declassification review of 25-year old records. Nevertheless, some of these records remain classified because of the equities of other agencies and departments.

In addition, the committee continued to engage in extensive discussion with National Archives personnel relating to its National Declassification Initiative and the progress of the Public Interest Declassification Board. It also met with the newly appointed director of the National Declassification Center. (NDC) In these discussions it provided recommendations on the priorities for the declassification reviews. The HAC strongly supports the NDC, which should promote a more rational and streamlined approach to the declassification and availability of governmental records pertaining to foreign

affairs.

To voice its concerns about the ways in which the current declassification system affects the timely production of *Foreign Relations* volumes, the committee met quarterly with the director or other representatives of the Information Security Oversight Office. It also met with representatives of the Office of Presidential Libraries to discuss its declassification efforts and the Remote Archive Capture program, which operates under the National Declassification Center.

#### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Notwithstanding the challenges that HO confronts, the Historical Advisory Committee is convinced that the Office can and must address its statutory responsibilities with a more effective strategy and a greater sense of urgency. It is preparing 28 volumes for the Carter administration. Of these only four have been fully compiled, reviewed, revised, and entered into the declassification process. The Office has yet to begin its research in the Reagan administration records (1981-88). It may experience further delays, moreover, as the Office moves to a new location this year.


The HAC is working closely with HO to accelerate the rate of publication by focusing on those aspects of the process over which HO can exercise control. It has gained the concurrence of the Office's management to establish and enforce a two-year ceiling on the time required to compile a volume. It has also recommended that HO take multiple measures to expedite publication. These range from formulating a policy that recognizes the need to balance thoroughness and timeliness to revising its review and publication processes. Indeed, HO should be able to publish volumes more efficiently if it relies principally on an electronic format, reserving printed volumes for presentation to foreign countries and similar ceremonial occasions. The Committee has also recommended that the Office postpone work on those volumes which face intractable declassification issues so that it can concentrate on less problematic ones, and that, as it did last year, it publish volumes online as soon as it determines they are reliable even if some documents remain classified. The HAC will gladly assist in making this determination. Another possibility is for the HO temporarily to shift personnel from Special Projects to *Foreign Relations* to meet what HAC considers an urgent situation.

The HAC is pessimistic about HO's prospects for meeting its statutory obligations if its current performance continues. It nevertheless appreciates the HO's commitment and capabilities and is confident that by adopting more efficient strategies for publishing despite the obstacles to declassification, a determined office can serve the national interest by reaching the 30-year line of publication within a decade. It must making doing so its highest priority.

Richard H. Immerman  
Chair, Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

#### **Committee Members:**

Carol Anderson	Laura Belmonte
James McAllister	Robert McMahan
Trudy Peterson	Katherine Sibley
Peter Spiro	Thomas Zeiler



## 1. Personal and Professional Notes

**Jessica Chapman** (Williams), **Nathan Citino** (Colorado State), and **Kristin Hoganson** (Illinois) have won fellowships from the American Council of Learned Societies.

**Kenneth Osgood** has become the Director of the McBride Honors Program in Public Affairs and Associate Professor of Liberal Arts and International Studies at the Colorado School of Mines

**Jeremi Suri** has accepted the position of Mack Brown Distinguished Chair for Leadership in Global Affairs at the Robert S. Strauss Center for International Security and Law at the University of Texas.



## 2. Research Notes

### The Diary of Anatoly Chernyaev, 1991

Marking the 90th birthday of former top Gorbachev advisor Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev, the National Security Archive has published on the Web the latest installment of the unique and invaluable Chernyaev diary, covering the final fateful year of the Soviet Union, 1991.

Chief foreign policy aide to Gorbachev from 1986 through 1991 and a leading architect of *perestroika* and “new thinking,” Anatoly Sergeevich remains a champion of *glasnost*, sharing his notes, documents, and first-hand insights with scholars trying to understand the peaceful end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 2004, he donated the originals of his detailed diaries, covering the years from 1972 through 1991, to the National Security Archive in order to ensure permanent public access to this record -- beyond the reach of political uncertainties in contemporary Russia.

Translated into English for the first time by Anna Melyakova and edited by Svetlana Savranskaya of the Archive’s Russia/Eurasia program, this posting on the year 1991 is the sixth installment of the Archive’s publication of the Chernyaev diary, now covering all of the crucial Gorbachev years, 1985 through 1991.

For more information, contact:  
Svetlana Savranskaya  
202-994-7000  
svetlana@gwu.edu  
<http://www.nsarchive.org>



### CWIHP Announces the Publication of Two New Documents on the History of the Warsaw Pact

The CWIHP announces the publication of two new documents related to the Warsaw Pact. The first sheds new light on how the Warsaw Pact trained for war at sea during the late 1970s. The second, a speech by Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Akhromeev delivered to the Polish General Staff on the new, revolutionary, defense-oriented Soviet/Warsaw Pact military doctrine of the late 1980s, explains in detail how the Warsaw Pact planned to defend itself against NATO in the waning days of the Cold War.

These documents were obtained from the Polish Institute for National Remembrance (IPN) as part of an ongoing partnership between IPN and CWIHP.

To access the documents, visit the CWIHP virtual archive at the web page at: <http://www.cwihp.org/>



### CWIHP Working Paper #63: *The Interkit Story: A Window into the Final Decades of the Sino-Soviet Relationship*

CWIHP is pleased to announce the publication of the latest addition to the CWIHP Working Papers Series, Working Paper #63: *The Interkit Story: A Window into the Final Decades of the Sino-Soviet Relationship*, by James Hershberg, Sergey Radchenko, Peter Vamos, and David Wolff.

Based on newly available documents from the Russian and East-Central European archives, the paper explores the

largely untold story of the Sino-Soviet rivalry and relationship during the latter decades of the Cold War through the activities of "Interkit," an organization set up by the Kremlin to coordinate Soviet-bloc analysis of and policy toward China from 1967 until the mid-1980s. Containing an appendix of 25 newly translated archival materials, the paper documents Interkit's shadowy existence through the records of the periodic meetings of China experts from the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies to consider the political, economic, ideological, cultural, and other dimensions of dealing with their problematic former ally.

To download the paper, visit the webpage at: <http://www.cwihp.org/>



### **The American Role in the French Nuclear Bomb**

The U.S. government secretly helped France develop its nuclear weapons and ballistic missile program, and much earlier than previously realized, according to declassified documents compiled and edited by National Security Archive senior analyst William Burr and published jointly with the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, an Archive partner.

Declassified documents indicate that:

- \* The French made the first move in December 1969, when the Armaments Ministry asked the Pentagon for assistance with the ballistic missile program.
- \* A key moment was a February 1970 meeting between President Nixon and French president Georges Pompidou when the two tacitly agreed on the possibility of "nuclear cooperation" which led Nixon to make a "decision to be forthcoming" to French requests.
- \* Reflecting internal controversy within the U.S. government, in 1971 the Nixon administration made a decision on "minimal" aid: besides assistance with nuclear safety and computer exports, the United States would help France improve the reliability of existing missiles, but not develop new ones.
- \* The French valued U.S. assistance on ballistic missile technology (propulsion, quality control, reliability), but during 1972 and early 1973 they stepped up pressure for more information, including warhead miniaturization and "physics package" and submarine-launched ballistic missile technology, so they could move into the "next generation" of ballistic missiles.
- \* To make France's case for more advanced technology, during mid-1973 defense minister Robert Galley met secretly twice with senior U.S. officials, including national security adviser Henry Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger.
- \* A key issue in these discussions was the possibility of "negative guidance" which Kissinger said would allow Washington to "critique what you are doing. We can say, 'That's the wrong way.'"
- \* Seeking to manipulate France for his European diplomacy, Kissinger wanted to whet Galley's appetite for more information--to make him "drool"--but "negative guidance" was controversial and it is not clear when it actually became available.
- \* In June 1975, President Gerald Ford, continuing Nixon's efforts to improve relations with Paris, updated the 1971 guidance by authorizing aid to decrease the vulnerability of French missiles, including reentry vehicles, missile hardening, and information on multiple reentry vehicle technology.

To access the documents, visit the web page at: <http://www.cwihp.org/>

For more information, contact:  
William Burr  
202-994-7000  
[wburr@gwu.edu](mailto:wburr@gwu.edu)



### **New Evidence on the Soviet-Led Invasion of Czechoslovakia, 1968**

CWIHP is pleased to announce the publication of eleven new documents on Operation Danube, the Polish component of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Released as part of a joint effort with the Polish Institute of National Remembrance, these documents shed new light on Poland's role in the 1968 invasion.

These documents were obtained, translated, and published thanks to a generous donation from John A. Adams and the John A. Adams Center for Military History and Strategic Analysis at the Virginia Military Institute.

To view these new documents, visit the CWIHP Virtual Archive at the Wilson Center webpage at: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/>



## The Chiquita Papers

Confidential internal memos from Chiquita Brands International reveal that the banana giant benefited from its payments to Colombian paramilitary and guerrilla groups, contradicting the company's 2007 plea agreement with U.S. prosecutors, which claimed that the company had never received "any actual security services or actual security equipment in exchange for the payments." Chiquita had characterized the payments as "extortion."

These documents are among thousands that Chiquita turned over to the U.S. Justice Department as part of a sentencing deal in which the company admitted to years of illegal payments to the paramilitary United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC)--a State Department-designated foreign terrorist organization--and agreed to pay a \$25 million fine.

The Archive has obtained more than 5,500 pages of Chiquita's internal documents from the Justice Department under the Freedom of Information Act and has published the entire set online. Key documents from the Chiquita Papers are included in the recently-published document collection, *Colombia and the United States: Political Violence, Narcotics, and Human Rights, 1948-2010*, now available as part of the Digital National Security Archive from ProQuest.

The documents provide evidence of mutually-beneficial "transactions" between Chiquita's Colombian subsidiaries and several illegal armed groups in Colombia and shed light on more than a decade of security-related payments to guerrillas, paramilitaries, Colombian security forces, and government-sponsored Convivir militia groups. The collection also details the company's efforts to conceal the so-called "sensitive payments" in the expense accounts of company managers and through other accounting tricks.

New evidence indicating that Chiquita benefited from the illicit payments may increase the company's exposure to lawsuits representing victims of Colombia's illegal armed groups. The collection is the result of an Archive collaboration with George Washington University Law School's International Human Rights and Public Justice Advocacy Clinics and has been used in support of a civil suit brought against Chiquita led by Earth Rights International on behalf of hundreds of Colombian victims of paramilitary violence.

The Chiquita Papers also highlight the role of the Colombian military in pressuring the company to finance the AUC through the Convivir groups and in facilitating the illegal payments. The documents also provide evidence of the company's payments to Colombian politicians, including former president Alvaro Uribe, who received a substantial donation during his run for governor of Antioquia.

More information about the new collection, along with the complete set of Chiquita Papers, is available on the web site of the National Security Archive.

For more information contact:  
Michael Evans  
mevans@gwu.edu  
<http://www.nsarchive.org>



### 3. Announcements:

#### **CFP: Conference on Policy History** *June 2012* *Richmond, Virginia*

The Institute for Political History, the *Journal of Policy History*, and the Miller Center for Public Affairs at the University of Virginia are hosting the seventh biennial Conference on Policy History at the Marriott in downtown Richmond, Virginia from Wednesday, June 6 to Saturday, June 9, 2012. We are currently accepting panel and paper proposals on all topics regarding American political and policy history, political development, and comparative historical analysis. Complete sessions are encouraged, and individual paper proposals are welcome. The deadline for submission is December 2, 2011.

Proposals must be submitted online and must include:

1. Name
2. Institutional Affiliation
3. Status (ABD, Doctoral Student, Associate Professor, etc.)
4. Email address
5. Mailing Address
6. Paper title
7. 150 word abstract
8. 75 word description of educational background, publications, and awards or fellowships

Please submit these materials to: <http://www.slu.edu/departments/jph/2012%20CFP.html>

**For more information, contact:**  
[policyhistoryconference@gmail.com](mailto:policyhistoryconference@gmail.com)  
<http://www.slu.edu/departments/jph/2012%20About.html>



**CFP: Making Sense of Catastrophe: Postcolonial Approaches to Postsocialist Experiences**  
February 2012  
Cambridge, UK

Moving from adolescence to adulthood, the postsocialist world is undergoing multi-directional transformations that would have seemed unbelievable twenty years ago. Bustling economic development combines with corruption, violence, and cynicism, which reign over the postsocialist space. Three causal schemes compete to explain this large-scale process. One derives the postsocialist present from the legacies of the Soviet past. Another ascribes responsibility to the global crisis of the traditional West. A third episteme draws on analogies and contrasts between postsocialist and postcolonial transformations, both of which have shaped the 21st century as we experience it.

With this workshop, we intend to consolidate a new research agenda that combines three independently developed fields, Postcolonial Studies, Postsocialist Studies, and Memory Studies, in their application to Eastern Europe and Northern Eurasia. Is the terror in places like Katyn or Kolyma, as in Auschwitz, unrepresentable, or have art and history learned how to represent these events? How do we need to revise postcolonial categories such as orientalism, hegemony, or the subaltern when referring to places such as Belarus or Kazakhstan? How are people across the postsocialist world making sense of its serial catastrophes? What does the memory of the past teach us about power and culture in the present and in the future?

We invite both theoretical and empirical contributions to these and related questions. We wish to establish a dialogue between experts who specialize in different parts of the planet. Interested scholars from the postcolonial and postsocialist worlds are equally welcome.

Proposals shall consist of an abstract of 300-500 words and a short CV. Please send your applications to Jill Gather by October 1, 2011. Please also inform us if you wish help with financing your travel to Cambridge. We will provide participants with accommodation from February 23-26 2012. The reimbursement for travel expenses will be negotiated on an individual basis.

For more information, contact:  
Jill Gather  
Memory at War project  
Slavonic Studies MML  
Sidgwick Site  
Cambridge CB3 9DA  
UK  
jg611@cam.ac.uk  
<http://www.memoryatwar.org/events>



**CFP: St. Antony's International Review**

The *St Antony's International Review* invites authors to submit original research manuscripts on topics of contemporary relevance in international affairs. Submissions from the fields of political science, international relations, area studies, international economics, development studies, and international history will be considered. Articles may take either a theoretical or a policy-oriented approach. STAIR has a broad readership and prizes accessibility of language and content. We are accepting papers for our two issues in 2012, the deadline for the first issue is September 1 and December 1 for the second.

STAIR is the only peer-reviewed journal of international affairs at the University of Oxford. Set up by graduate students of St Antony's College in 2005, the Review has carved out a distinctive niche as a cross-disciplinary outlet for research on the most pressing contemporary global issues, providing a forum in which emerging scholars can publish their work alongside established academics and policymakers. Distinguished past contributors include John Baylis, Valerie J. Bunce, Robert O. Keohane, James N. Rosenau, and Alfred Stepan. Please see the attached call for papers, our website <http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/ext/stair/> or contact Nina Hall ([Nina.Hall@sant.ox.ac.uk](mailto:Nina.Hall@sant.ox.ac.uk)) for more information.



**The Office of the Historian Announces that the Proceedings of "Foreign Economic Policy 1973-1976" are Available Online**

The Department of State's Office of the Historian in the Bureau of Public Affairs convened a conference on March 7, 2011, co-hosted by the George Mason University School of Public Policy, which focused on the Foreign Economic Policy, 1973-1976 volume of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* (FRUS) series. The keynote address was delivered by Under Secretary of State for Economic, Energy, and Agricultural Affairs Robert Hormats, who authored several key documents in the *Foreign Economic Policy, 1973-1976* volume. Transcripts and audio recordings may be accessed on the Office of the Historian website at <http://history.state.gov/conferences/2011-foreign-economic-policy/audio-transcripts>.

*Foreign Economic Policy, 1973-1976* examines U.S. policy during a time of great global economic change, focusing on issues such as the end of the fixed exchange rate system envisioned at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference and the transition to flexible exchange rates; the creation of the G-7 economic summit; the passage of the Trade Act of 1974; the launch of the Tokyo Round of GATT negotiations; and North/South relations and commodity policy in a post-1973 oil embargo

world. The significance of the volume and the lessons gleaned from this period by panelists at the conference provided many interesting parallels between the mid-1970s and the present, which are instructive for policy makers, historians, economists, journalists, and the general public alike.

**For more information, contact:**

Lindsay Sarah Krasnoff, PhD  
Historian, Special Projects  
Office of the Historian  
U.S. Department of State  
Washington, D.C.  
Phone: (202) 663-1942  
[www.history.state.gov](http://www.history.state.gov)



**The Office of the Historian Announces that the Proceedings of “The American Experience in Southeast Asia, 1946-1975” are Available Online**

The Department of State’s Office of the Historian in the Bureau of Public Affairs convened a conference September 29-30, 2010, on U.S. policy and the war in Southeast Asia, 1946-1975, with special emphasis on the years of greatest American involvement in the conflict in Vietnam. Featured speakers at the conference included Secretary of State Hillary R. Clinton, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger and Ambassador John D. Negroponte, participants in the Vietnam policy process, and the late Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke. The conference showcased and commemorated the completion of the Indochina/Vietnam War documentary histories prepared by the Office of the Historian in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series. Transcripts and videos can be found on the Office of the Historian website at: <http://history.state.gov/conferences/2010-southeast-asia/videos-transcripts>.

Dr. Kissinger defended the Nixon Administration’s Vietnam War policy, stating that “most of what went wrong in Vietnam we did to ourselves” and that he was “absolutely unreconstructed” on this point. Ever the realist, he argued that a key lesson from the war must be that when the United States goes to war it must do so as a united country and with a “global strategic analysis that explains to us what the significance of this [going to war] is.” He called the conference “an extraordinary, moving experience in my life.”

Ambassador John D. Negroponte, similar to the other speakers, focused on lessons learned from the war. The central one, he concluded, “really goes to the question of Iraq and Afghanistan and many subsequent experiences for me, but I guess it’s pretty simple. Be careful before you take the first step, because once you get in, then you just - you lose a little bit of control about the next ones and the consequences. And it becomes harder to decide to disengage.”

Ambassador Holbrooke’s career started in Vietnam - his first posting as a Foreign Service Officer - and was an experience that influenced his thinking throughout his career. In Holbrooke’s speech, he reflected on this experience, concluding that “our goals in Vietnam did not justify the immense costs of the war. Nor do I believe that success was denied to us because of domestic events and lack of patience on the part of the American public.” In short, “success [in Vietnam] was not achievable. Those who advocated more escalation or something called, ‘staying the course,’ were advocating something that would have led only to a greater and more costly disaster afterwards.”

The program included a panel on the role of the media on the Vietnam War to explore the impact of the press on public opinion and United States policy. Marvin Kalb moderated the panel, which consisted of journalists Morley Safer, William Beecher, and Edith Lederer, all of whom reported from Vietnam or about the Vietnam War, as well as the late Barry Zorthian, former Director of Media Relations at U.S. Embassy Saigon. Succinctly summing up the subject, moderator Marvin Kalb said: “I think that you have to have lived on Mars to have missed the central role that the media played during the Vietnam War.”

Other panels featured thought-provoking presentations by leading American and international scholars on topics such as force and diplomacy, counterinsurgency and pacification, the United States and its allies, and the war at home.

Aided by the recollections of participants in the policy process such as Dr. Kissinger and Ambassadors Holbrooke and Negroponte, by documents in the *Foreign Relations* series, and by presentations of the most recent research by scholars, this conference provided a special opportunity to re-examine the formation, development, and consequences of United States policy in Indochina and the Vietnam War for America and the world. Those in attendance broadened and deepened their knowledge and understanding of the war in Southeast Asia, as will those who read and study these videos and transcripts online at the Office of the Historian website, <http://history.state.gov/conferences/2010-southeast-asia/videos-transcripts>.

For more information, contact:

**For more information, contact:**

Lindsay Sarah Krasnoff, PhD  
Historian, Special Projects  
Office of the Historian  
U.S. Department of State  
Washington, D.C.  
Phone: (202) 663-1942  
[www.history.state.gov](http://www.history.state.gov)



## Richard W. Leopold Prize

The Richard W. Leopold Prize was designed to improve contacts and interrelationships within the historical profession where an increasing number of history-trained scholars hold distinguished positions in governmental agencies. This prize recognizes the significant historical work being done by historians outside academe. The Leopold Prize is given by the Organization of American Historians every two years for the best book on foreign policy, military affairs, the historical activities of the federal government or biography by a government historian. These subjects cover the concerns and the historical fields of activity of the late Professor Leopold, who was President of the Organization of American Historians 1976-1977.

The winner must have been employed in a government position for at least five years. If the author has accepted an academic position, the book must have been published within two years from the time of the change. Verification of current or past employment with the government must be included with each entry.

Each entry must be published during the two-year period January 1, 2010 through December 31, 2011. The award will be presented at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the OAH in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, April 19-22.

One copy of each entry, clearly labeled "2012 Richard W. Leopold Prize," must be mailed directly to the committee members listed below. Each committee member must receive all submissions by October 1, 2011.

Bound page proofs may be used for books to be published after October 1, 2011 and before January 1, 2012. If a bound page proof is submitted, a bound copy of the book must be received no later than January 7, 2012.

If a book carries a copyright date that is different from the publication date, but the actual publication date falls during the correct timeframe making it eligible, please include a letter of explanation from the publisher with each copy of the book sent to the committee members.

The final decision will be made by the Richard W. Leopold Prize Committee by February 1, 2012. The winner will be provided with details regarding the OAH Annual Meeting and awards presentation, where s/he will receive a cash award and a plaque.



## CFP: 79th Annual Meeting of the Society for Military History

*Arlington, VA, May 10-13, 2012*

The conference theme is "The Politics of War," highlighting the transition from war to peace, civil-military relations, the dynamics of coalition warfare and the problems of military government and occupation. We encourage a diverse group of participants and especially encourage junior scholars to present their work and to serve on panels. As always, the program committee will consider all panel and paper proposals dealing with important questions of military history.

Panel proposals must include a panel title, contact information for all panelists, a brief description of the purpose and theme of the panel, a one-paragraph abstract of each of the papers, a one-page curriculum vita of each panelist, including commentator and chair, and contact information. All presenters, chairs, and commentators must be SMH members at the time of the 2012 meeting. Proposals for individual papers are welcome and should include a brief abstract, a one-page curriculum vita, and contact information. Proposals must be submitted electronically to the conference coordinator, Mr. Matt Seelinger ([matt.seelinger@armyhistory.org](mailto:matt.seelinger@armyhistory.org)). Deadline for proposals is 1 November 2011.

The meeting will be held in the Hyatt Regency Crystal City Hotel in Arlington, Virginia. It is easily accessible by Metro and from Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. More information on registration and hotel reservations can be found at: [www.armyhistory.org](http://www.armyhistory.org).



## CFP: Diaspora and Migration: Rethinking African Development in the 21st Century.

The Editors of *African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal* announce the Call for Papers on Diaspora and Migration: Rethinking African Development in the 21st Century.

The 20th century witnessed the large-scale displacement and dispersal of populations across the world as a result of major political upheavals, among them the two European wars, decolonization and the Cold war. Following on these, globalization, spurred by free trade and increased mobility of capital, and new technologies of communication, information, and travel, has accelerated the movement of people, commodities, ideas, and cultures across the world. Diaspora is regarded not as a singular phenomenon but as historically varied dynamic and heterogeneous. While transnational mobility of people may be the result of forced or voluntary migration, of self-exile or expulsion and refugees, people in transit, and are the products of wars, ethnic conflicts and natural calamities.

Under the generalized rubric of diaspora and migration, the Editors seek submissions that explore the intersection between diaspora, migration and the discourse of development in Africa in the 21st century. Over the last four decades, the number of worldwide international migrants has almost doubled, from 76 million to 150 million. As migration increased, flows in the form of personal and collective remittances, investments, information and knowledge, tourism and trade have continued to grow at unprecedented rates. Increasingly, multilateral agencies, the World Bank, the IMF

and national governments have focused on the nexus between 'migration and development' as a major development policy issue. While the focus of macro-economic impact of migration is designed to facilitate and channel remittances into formal channels of development, other dimensions of policy have not been adequately addressed such as 'brain drain', increasing social and economic inequality, support for warring parties in the origin-country, the role of transnational institutions as well as the particularities of postcolonial African states. We encourage contributions that interrogate the full dimension of diaspora and migration and their relationship to African development, the discourse of 'diaspora engagement', new models of citizenship and transnationalism in the histories of contemporary African migrations within Africa and beyond, the affective dimensions of migration and diaspora (homesickness, memory, nostalgia, melancholy) and the ways in which these ideas permeate African development in the 21 century.

Prospective contributors are invited to send proposals for articles in the form of a 200-word abstract by October 31, 2011. Authors of accepted proposals will be asked to submit articles in final form (in English) by April 30, 2012.

All communication regarding the special edition should be directed to Dr. Fassil Demissie (Department of Public Policy), by e-mail: femissie@depaul.edu



#### 4. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines:

##### The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded annually to an author for his or her first book on any aspect of the history of American foreign relations.

**Eligibility:** The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works that represent social science disciplines other than history are not eligible.

**Procedures:** Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contributions to scholarship. Winning books should have exceptional interpretative and analytical qualities. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should display careful organization and distinguished writing. Five copies of each book must be submitted with a letter of nomination.

The award will be announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the selection committee. The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition which meets the standards of excellence established for the prize.

To nominate a book published in 2011 for the 2012 prize, send five copies of the book and a letter of nomination to Professor David F. Schmitz, Whitman College, Department of History, 345 Boyer Ave. Walla Walla, WA 99362. Books may be sent at any time during 2011, but must arrive by December 1, 2011.



##### The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize recognizes and encourages excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The prize of \$1000 is awarded annually.

**Eligibility:** The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the Ph.D. whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or of any other established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

**Procedures:** Nominations, in the form of a letter and the nominee's c.v., should be sent to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter should discuss evidence of the nominee's excellence in teaching and research.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH). The winner of the prize will deliver a lecture during the SHAFR luncheon at the next year's OAH annual meeting. The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to a SHAFR presidential address and should address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The lecturer is awarded \$1,000 plus up to \$500 in travel expenses to the OAH, and his or her lecture is published in *Diplomatic History*.

To be considered for the 2012 award, nominations must be received by February 28, 2012. Nominations should be sent to Professor Robert Dean, Eastern Washington University, 200 Patterson Hall, Cheney, WA 99004-2496 (email: rdean@ewu.edu)



### The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. The prize of \$1,000 is awarded annually to the author of a distinguished article appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations.

**Eligibility:** The author must be under forty-one years of age or within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of the article's acceptance for publication. The article must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award or the Myrna F. Bernath Book Award are ineligible.

**Procedures:** All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* will be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations may be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. To nominate an article published in 2011 for the 2012 prize, send three copies of the article and a letter of nomination to Professor William Stueck, Department of History, University of Georgia, 232 LeConte Hall, Athens, GA 30602-1602 (e-mail: wstueck@uga.edu). Deadline for nominations is February 1, 2012.



### The Myrna F. Bernath Book Award

The purpose of this award is to encourage scholarship by women in U.S. foreign relations history. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded biannually (even years) to the author of the best book written by a woman in the field and published during the preceding two calendar years.

**Eligibility:** Nominees should be women who have published distinguished books in U.S. foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Membership in SHAFR is required.

**Procedures:** Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of SHAFR. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contribution to scholarship. Three copies of each book (or page proofs) must be submitted with a letter of nomination.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. The deadline for nominations for the 2012 prize is December 1, 2011. Submit required materials to Professor Mary Elise Sarotte, School of International Relations, University of Southern California, 3518 Trousdale Parkway, VKS Center 330, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0043 (e-mail: sarotte@usc.edu).



### The Norman And Laura Graebner Award

The Graebner Award is a lifetime achievement award intended to recognize a senior historian of United States foreign relations who has significantly contributed to the development of the field, through scholarship, teaching, and/or service, over his or her career. The award of \$2,000 is awarded biannually. The Graebner Award was established by the former students of Norman A. Graebner, professor of diplomatic history at the University of Illinois and the University of Virginia, to honor Norman and his wife Laura for their years of devotion to teaching and research in the field.

**Eligibility:** The Graebner prize will be awarded to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic or international affairs. The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

**Procedures:** Letters of nomination, submitted in triplicate, should (a) provide a brief biography of the nominee, including educational background, academic or other positions held, and awards and honors received; (b) list the nominee's major scholarly works and discuss the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs; (c) describe the candidate's career, note any teaching honors and awards, and comment on the candidate's classroom skills; and (d) detail the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices and discussing particular activities. Self-nominations are accepted.

Graebner awards are announced at SHAFR's annual meeting. The next deadline for nominations is March 1, 2012. Submit materials to Gunter Bischof, University of New Orleans, Department of History, Liberal Arts Building Rm. 135, University of New Orleans, New Orleans, LA 70148 (e-mail: gjbischo@uno.edu).



### The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant

The Bernath Dissertation Grant of up to \$4,000 is intended to help graduate students defray expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Holt, Gelfand-Rappaport, and Bemis grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

**Procedures:** Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SHAFR web page. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to [fellowships@shafr.org](mailto:fellowships@shafr.org). The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



### The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship

The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship of up to \$4,000 is intended to defray the costs of travel necessary to conduct research on a significant dissertation project. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Stuart L. Bernath, Gelfand-Rappaport, and Bemis grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

**Procedures:** Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SHAFR web page. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to [fellowships@shafr.org](mailto:fellowships@shafr.org). The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



### The Lawrence Gelfand – Armin Rappaport Dissertation Fellowship

The Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship of up to \$4,000 is intended to defray the costs of dissertation research travel. The fellowship is awarded annually at SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Stuart L. Bernath, Holt, and Bemis grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

**Procedures:** Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found here. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to [fellowships@shafr.org](mailto:fellowships@shafr.org). The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



### Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grants

The Samuel F. Bemis Research Grants are intended to promote dissertation research by graduate students. A limited number of grants of varying amounts (generally, up to \$2,000) will be awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Stuart L. Bernath, Holt, and Gelfand-Rappaport grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

**Procedures:** Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found at the SHAFR webpage. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to [fellowships@shafr.org](mailto:fellowships@shafr.org). The subject line of the

email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



### The Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship

The Michael J. Hogan Foreign language Fellowship was established to honor Michael J. Hogan, long-time editor of *Diplomatic History*.

The Hogan Fellowship of up to \$4,000 is intended to promote research in foreign language sources by graduate students. The fellowship is intended to defray the costs of studying foreign languages needed for research. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. Applicants must be graduate students researching some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

**Procedures:** Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found at the SHAFR web page. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to hogan-fellowships@shafir.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



### William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants

The William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants are intended to promote scholarly research by untenured college and university faculty and others who are within six years of the Ph.D. and who are working as professional historians. Grants are limited to scholars working on the *first research monograph*. A limited number of grants of varying amounts (generally, up to \$2,000) will be awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. Membership in SHAFR is required.

**Procedures:** Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found at the SHAFR web page. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**. Submit materials to williams-fellowships@shafir.org. The subject line of the email should contain the LAST NAME OF APPLICANT only.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



### 5. Recent Publications of Interest

Anderson, Terry H. *Bush's Wars* (Oxford, 2011).

Auslin, Michael R. *Pacific Cosmopolitans: A Cultural History of U.S.-Japan Relations* (Harvard, 2011).

Barnett, Michael. *Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism* (Cornell, 2011).

Bird, Tim and Alex Marshall. *Afghanistan: How the West Lost its Way* (Yale, 2011).

Blang, Eugenie. *Allies at Odds: America, Europe, and Vietnam, 1961-1968* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2011).

Brogi, Alessandro. *Confronting America: The Cold War between the United States and the Communists in France and Italy* (North Carolina, 2011).

Cabera, Luis, ed. *Global Governance, Global Environment: Institutional Visions for an Evolving World System* (SUNY, 2011).

Clark, Ian. *Hegemony in International Society* (Oxford, 2011).

Doenecke, Justus D. *Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America's Entry into World War I* (Kentucky, 2011).

Dunn, Charles, ed. *The Presidency in the Twenty-first Century* (Kentucky, 2011).

Feldman, Jay. *Manufacturing Hysteria: A History of Scapegoating, Surveillance, and Secrecy in Modern America* (Random House, 2011).

Foreman, Amanda. *A World on Fire: Britain's Crucial Role in the American Civil War* (Random House, 2011).

Glain, Stephen. *State vs. Defense: The Battle of Define America's Empire* (Random House, 2011).

Harper, John L. *The Cold War* (Oxford, 2011).

Hanson, Peer Henrik. *Second to None: US Intelligence Activities in Northern Europe, 1943-1946* (Republic of Letters, 2011).

Hasanli, Jamil. *Stalin and the Turkish Crisis of the Cold War, 1945-53* (Lexington, 2011)

Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. *The Cold War in East Asia, 1945-1991* (Stanford, 2011).

Hayes, Romain. *Subhas Chandra Bose in Nazi Germany: Politics, Intelligence, and Propaganda, 1941-43* (Columbia, 2011).

Heiferman, Ronald. *The Cairo Conference of 1943: Roosevelt, Churchill, Chiang Kai-Shek and Madame Chiang* (McFarland, 2011).

Henderson, Thomas J. *Beyond Borders: A History of Mexican Migration to the United States* (Wiley, 2011).

Ikenberry, G. John. *Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order* (Princeton, 2011).

Illing, Robert F. *America and the Vatican: Trading Information after WWII* (History Publishing, 2011).

Iokibe, Makoto, Caroline Rose, Junko Tomaru, and John Weste, eds. *Japanese Diplomacy in the 1950s: From Isolation to Integration* (Routledge, 2011).

Junker, Detlef. *The United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War* (Cambridge, 2011).

Kalinovsky, Artemy M. *A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan* (Harvard, 2011).

Keeley, Robert V. *The Colonels' Coup and the American Embassy: A Diplomat's View of the Breakdown of Democracy in Cold War Greece* (Penn State, 2011).

Kempe, Frederick. *Berlin 1961* (Putnam, 2011).

Kissinger, Henry. *On China* (Penguin, 2011).

Kitamura, Hiroshi. *Screening Enlightenment: Hollywood and the Cultural Reconstruction of Defeated Japan* (Cornell, 2011).

Kretchik, Walter E. *U.S. Army Doctrine: From the American Revolution to the War on Terror* (Kansas, 2011).

Larson, Erik. *In the Garden of Beasts: Love, Terror, and an American Family in Hitler's Berlin* (Random House, 2011).

Leffler, Melvyn P. and Legro, Jeffrey W., eds. *In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy after the Berlin and 9/11* (Cornell, 2011).

Lesch, David W. *The Middle East and the United States: History, Politics, and Ideologies* (Westview, 2011).

Leustean, Lucian. *Eastern Christianity and the Cold War, 1945-91* (Routledge, 2011).

Li, Jing. *China's America: The Chinese View the United States, 1900-2000* (SUNY, 2011).

Mauch, Peter. *Sailor Diplomat: Nomura Kichisaburo and the Japanese-American War* (Harvard, 2011).

Morgan, William Michael. *Pacific Gibraltar: U.S.-Japanese Rivalry Over the Annexation of Hawai'i, 1885-1898* (Naval Institute Press, 2011).

Neiberg, Michael S. *Dance of the Furies: Europe and the Outbreak of World War I* (Belknap, 2011).

Nichols, Christopher McKnight. *Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age* (Harvard, 2011).

Peterson, Christian. *Globalizing Human Rights: Private Citizens, the Soviet Union, and the West* (Routledge, 2011).

Pollack, Kenneth M., Raad Alkadiri, J. Scott Carpenter, Frederick W. Kagan, and Sean Kane. *Unfinished Business: An American Strategy for Iraq Moving Forward* (Brookings, 2011).

Rabe, Stephen G. *The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America* (Oxford, 2011).

Satow, Ernest. *A Guide to Diplomatic Practice, volumes 1 and 2* (Cambridge, 2011).

Saunders, Elizabeth. *Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions* (Cornell, 2011).

Schneider, Dorothee. *Crossing Borders: Migration and Citizenship in the Twentieth-Century United States* (Harvard, 2011).

Shen, Zhihua and Li, Danhui. *After Leaning to One Side: China and its Allies in the Cold War* (Stanford, 2011).

Siekmeier, James F. *The Bolivian Revolution and the United States, 1952 to the Present* (Penn State, 2011).

Small, Mel. *A Companion to Richard M. Nixon* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011).

Solomon, Daniel F. *Breaking Up with Cuba: The Dissolution of Friendly Relations Between Washington and Havana, 1956-1961* (McFarland, 2011).

Stoddard, Brooke C. *World in the Balance: The Perilous Months of June-October 1940* (Potomac, 2011).

Storey, Ian. *Southeast Asia and the Rise of China: The Search for Security* (Routledge, 2011).

Thomas, Joan Maria. *Roosevelt, France, and the End of the Second World War* (Palgrave Macmillan).

Tillery, Alvin B. *Between Homeland and Motherland: Africa, U.S. Foreign Policy, and Black Leadership in America* (Cornell, 2011).

Walker, William O. *Opium and Foreign Policy: The Anglo-American Search for Order in Asia, 1912-1954* (North Carolina, 2011).

Warrick, Joby. *The Triple Agent: The al-Qaeda Mole who Infiltrated the CIA* (Random House, 2011).

Zanotti, Laura. *Governing Disorder: UN Peace Operations, International Security, and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era* (Penn State, 2011).

# In Memoriam: Lawrence E. (Larry) Gelfand

(1926-2011)

Lawrence Gelfand, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Iowa, passed away on November 30, 2010 in Irvine, California. The cause of death was heart failure. He was 84.

Born in Cleveland, Ohio in 1926, Gelfand attended public schools in Cleveland Heights. He served in the U.S. Army (Infantry) and the Military Police in 1944-1946 before returning to his education at (Case) Western Reserve University, where he received his BA in 1949 and his MA in 1950. He completed his PhD at the University of Washington in 1958, where he worked with W. Stull Holt. His doctoral dissertation, published as *The Inquiry: American Preparations for Peace, 1917-1919* (Yale University Press, 1963), excavated the fascinating—and until that point little-known—story of the American preparatory commission, a group of scholars empanelled by Woodrow Wilson to lay the groundwork for the peace.

Gelfand began his academic career at the University of Hawaii in 1956 and taught at the University of Washington (1958-1959) and the University of Wyoming (1959-1962) before settling at the University of Iowa in 1962. He taught at Iowa for 32 years before his retirement in 1994. During that time, he had stints as a visiting professor at the University of Oregon (1966), the University of Montana (1970), the University of Washington (1974), and—a year of which he was particularly fond—as the Mary Ball Washington Distinguished Fulbright Professor of American History at University College Dublin (1987-1988).

At Iowa, Gelfand taught many courses but his bread-and-butter was the immensely popular two-semester survey on the U.S. in World Affairs and an equally popular course on World War II. His early research had also left him with a deep and continuing interest in the history of planning, and in 1984 he and his colleague Ellis Hawley taught an NEH Seminar for College Teachers on “The New Rationality: Planners and Politicians in Wartime and Interwar America, 1917-1945.” He was also active in Iowa’s graduate program, directing more than 60 MA theses and more than 20 doctoral dissertations. In addition, his career at Iowa included service as Department Chair, and a term as President of the University’s Faculty Senate. He played a significant leadership role in the State Historical Society of Iowa at a critical period of its development and actively supported the professional work of Iowa Teachers of College History. His contributions to public history also included service on the board of the Harry S Truman Presidential Library.

Gelfand was one of the leading diplomatic historians of his generation. He was a driving force behind the development of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), and served as its President



in 1982. His leadership in SHAFR is recognized by the annual Lawrence Gelfand-Armin Rappaport Dissertation Fellowship. In addition to *The Inquiry*, he published numerous articles and *A Diplomat Looks Back* (Yale, 1968), an edition of the memoirs of Lewis Einstein. But Gelfand’s research interests extended well beyond diplomatic history and included work on migration, political, and Iowa history. In 1979 he edited *Herbert Hoover: The Great War and Its Aftermath*, a volume growing out of the Hoover Centennial Seminars. And the breadth of his interests is well captured in his work (alongside Ellis

Hawley) with Iowa’s Center for the Study of the Recent History of the United States, a center he helped to found in 1975 and of which he was director from 1981 to 1994. In this role, he edited or co-edited *The New Deal Viewed from Fifty Years* (1984), *Changing Patterns in American Federal-State Relations* (1985), *Agricultural Distress in the Midwest* (1986), and *Constitutional Issues of the Twentieth Century of Special Interest to Iowans* (1989). Gelfand retired from teaching in 1994, but not from his research. He had just completed a manuscript, “Democracy and Tyranny,” surveying American relations with dictatorial regimes in the middle years of the twentieth century. He was a prolific author of book reviews.

Students who had the good fortune to work with him know well the personal kindness and protective devotion he showed to them. Nor will they forget his love of research, especially archival research, his tolerance of opposing points of view, and his willingness to be helpful long after they had launched careers of their own. Indeed, he seemed to take more pride in their success than he did in his own many accomplishments.

Gelfand is fondly remembered as a scholar, a teacher, and a colleague. He is survived by his wife Miriam, daughter Julia, sons Daniel and Ronald, grandson Benjamin, and sisters Betty (Forcheimer) and Eileen (Manning).

Colin Gordon  
Michael Hogan  
Linda Kerber

*This obituary first appeared in the April 2011 issue of Perspectives on History. It is reprinted here with the kind permission of the editors.*

# The Last Word

Mitchell Lerner

Of all the issues of *Passport* that have been published during my eight years as editor, this one has been the hardest to compile. The difficulties have come not from the content or the authors but from one simple fact that has hovered in the back of my mind throughout the production process: this will be my last issue as *Passport* editor. For a number of reasons, I have decided that the time has come for me to step down. It has been my honor and privilege to have served SHAFR in this capacity for so long. Andrew Johns at BYU will replace me on January 1, 2012. Andrew and I have had many conversations about the transition, and I am confident that *Passport* will be in excellent hands in the future.

Although there are many people whose contributions to *Passport* need to be acknowledged, one name stands clearly at the front of the list: Peter Hahn. It was Peter who put together the proposal to move *Passport* (then called "The SHAFR Newsletter") to Ohio State almost a decade ago. It was Peter who oversaw the transition (even choosing our new name), and it was Peter who suggested me as editor. And over the last eight years he has paid every bill, maintained every record, and proofread every word of every issue. *Passport*, much like SHAFR itself, would simply not be the same without him. Truly, Peter was "present at the creation."

Others have provided invaluable assistance. Eight years ago, I convinced myself that since the actual layout and design of *Passport* would be easy, I could save SHAFR some money by doing that task myself. After a few weeks of my best efforts, the cover page looked like something my two-year-old son might have done if he were blindfolded, handcuffed, and channeling the spirit of Salvador Dali. Fortunately, Julie Rojewski, who was then my friend and colleague at the Mershon Center, stepped in at the last moment to save me from myself. Julie designed the first issue, and although she is no longer my colleague, she remains my friend; thankfully, she also remains in charge of layout. Allison Sweeney has gone above and beyond the call of duty as our copyeditor, as have a number of excellent OSU graduate students who have assisted in various capacities, including Brian Kennedy, David Hadley, and Ryan Irwin. Bob Schulzinger and Tom Zeiler at *Diplomatic History* have been supportive, enthusiastic, and even inspirational; *Passport* can only aspire to follow the path of excellence that they have blazed in our society. To the extent that we have followed this path, it is in no small part because Bill Brinker, the former editor at Tennessee Tech, put us there so many years ago. And of course, *Passport* could not be what it is without the active participation of the SHAFR membership. My job is remarkably easy because of the high number, and even higher quality, of the submissions that regularly arrive in my mailbox.

For eight years, I have been lucky enough to not only read these submissions, but also to get feedback from SHAFR members about *Passport*, and sometimes about SHAFR in general. That puts me, I believe, in a good position to offer a few concluding thoughts based on my years of service. First, I would reiterate what most already know: SHAFR is an incredibly vibrant, brilliant, and methodologically diverse organization (we are also really tall. Has anyone else noticed this? I think I pulled a neck muscle in Alexandria, looking up at everyone). Literally every issue that we have published contains at least one piece, and usually more than one, that challenges me to re-think my assumptions or to re-conceptualize that which I thought I understood. The input that I receive from people in other disciplines who get exposed to *Passport* in one way or another is almost uniformly positive, as is the feedback I get from SHAFR members who are also affiliated



with other societies. We should, I think, be very proud of who we are and what we stand for.

And yet there remains, I think, a bit of an inferiority complex that hangs undeservedly over SHAFR. Our membership seems to try hard, almost too hard, to ingratiate itself with the larger community of professional historians by justifying our work as being more than what others might think it is. "I am a diplomatic historian but my work is really (insert trendy buzzword here)," seems to be the common refrain, one that we start saying as graduate students and that seems to echo in the hallways of the AHA conference and beyond. SHAFR

seems to be on a constant quest to find the Next Big Thing, in order to ensure that this time it is recognized as being at the vanguard of change, instead of leading the resistance.

This is not meant as criticism of the Next Big Thing. Few would argue that the influence of the cultural turn in our field has not been beneficial; in fact, I think it so self-evident at this point that we should probably stop fighting about it. Ditto for the transnational approach described (and practiced) so well by Matt Connelly in this very issue, and for the more multi-archival, internationalist work that dots the landscape, and for so many other approaches that open new windows into our discipline. It is, in fact this very breadth of historical approaches that makes SHAFR so exciting, and which bodes so well for the future of our field.

I worry, however, that this pursuit of the Next Big Thing can come at the expense of the Really Good Old Thing. The description of the very plenary session at the 2010 OAH conference that gave us Matthew Connelly's article in this very issue of *Passport* notes approvingly that "the narrow older diplomatic history has grown into a wide new sub-discipline of U.S. international and transnational history," which is described as "one of American history's most creative and important salients," in obvious contrast to the "top-down political history" that preceded it. Newer methodologies have certainly fleshed out our understanding of American diplomacy in invaluable ways but that understanding is still only complete, I would submit, when the state remains a central component of the discussion. American officials still matter a great deal. American domestic politics still matter a great deal. American military exigencies still matter a great deal. And I would simply urge SHAFR members to not try so hard to run to the future that in doing so they completely run away from the past.

And speaking of running away from the past, I will now commence doing so, effective almost immediately, and I leave the future of *Passport* to Andrew Johns and the SHAFR membership. I hope it gives you all as much pleasure as it has given me.

Mitchell Lerner will soon be the former editor of *Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review*.

**Passport**  
Mershon Center  
for International Security Studies  
The Ohio State University  
1501 Neil Avenue  
Columbus, OH 43201  
passport@osu.edu

NON-PROFIT ORG.  
U.S. POSTAGE  
PAID  
HANOVER, PA 17331  
Permit No. 4

*For more SHAFR information, visit us on the web at [www.shafr.org](http://www.shafr.org)*