

Passport

The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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Inside...

John Dean and the Watergate Cover-Up
The Role of the CIA's Historical Review Panel
A Roundtable on William Inboden's
Religion and American Foreign Policy
SHAFR Visits Falls Church

...and much more!

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"Candid photo of President Nixon at his desk in the Oval Office," June 23, 1972, photo courtesy of National Archives and Records Administration, WHPO C9461(18).

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John W. Dean III and the Watergate Cover-up, Revisited

Luke A. Nichter

On Super Bowl Sunday—because my wife is from Pittsburgh I remember that otherwise unimportant detail vividly—I picked up the *New York Times* from my driveway and was surprised to find a front-page article about Watergate. After all, this is 2009, not 1974. The article, “John Dean at Issue in Nixon Tapes Feud,” by Patricia Cohen, explored accusations of misrepresentation leveled at a prominent scholar of Watergate,

Stanley Kutler, by historian Peter Klingman. It

quickly set off a heated debate in the blogosphere.¹

Stan Katz of Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School called the *Times* article a

“nonevent.”² John Dean called it the work of “Watergate revisionists.”³ However, acknowledging the by now well-defined lines of demarcation with respect to Watergate, Joan Hoff admonished fellow bloggers that “what this dispute over the Nixon tapes really demonstrates is the need for an authoritative set of transcriptions which the government should have undertaken years ago.”⁴ After all, nowhere in this controversy did actual evidence feature prominently, either in the *Times* article or in the discussion following the article’s publication.

At the heart of the latest installment of a decade-old debate is the work most often cited on the Watergate portion of the Nixon tapes, Kutler’s *Abuse of Power*.⁵ Working in the pre-digital era with difficult analog cassette audiotapes, Kutler

set the standard for Nixon tape transcription. His permanent loss of hearing is the price he paid so that generations could learn from his groundbreaking work. Numerous critics have raised objections—not all of them legitimate—to *Abuse of Power* and to Kutler’s earlier book, *The Wars of Watergate*, but Klingman’s article, which was submitted for publication to the *American Historical Review*, is the most pointed and the most prominent of these critiques.⁶

Working in the pre-digital era with difficult analog cassette audiotapes, Kutler set the standard for Nixon tape transcription. His permanent loss of hearing is the price he paid so that generations could learn from his groundbreaking work.

In it Klingman accuses Kutler of knowingly conflating two tape transcripts from March 16, 1973, both of which contained discussions between President Nixon and Counsel to the President

John Dean about managing the Watergate cover-up. Kutler did indeed append an excerpt from a morning conversation in the Oval Office⁷ to a transcript⁸ that begins with an excerpt from an entirely different telephone conversation from the evening of the same day.⁹ That fact is no longer in dispute, although it is unclear how or why Kutler conflated these conversations. Klingman argues that as a result of Kutler’s conflation and selective editing, Dean appeared to be much less involved in the cover-up than he really was.

Other critics, including Len Colodny (*Silent Coup*), Russ Baker (*Family of Secrets*), and Joan Hoff (*Nixon Reconsidered*) have also accused Kutler of misrepresenting Watergate in *Abuse of Power*. The case they and Klingman make is

complicated, but there are three main charges:

1. The Nixon tapes for the period beginning March 13, 1973 are critical to our understanding of how the White House, including Dean, planned and managed the entire cover-up.¹⁰ This period begins with Nixon first learning on March 13 of White House involvement in the Watergate break-in and ends with the famous “Cancer on the Presidency” conversation on March 21. The “Cancer” conversation is Nixon’s “Rubicon moment,” in that it set Dean on an irreversible path from Nixon’s defender-in-chief to whistleblower-in-chief. Within weeks Dean hired his own criminal defense attorney, was dismissed, and in June began his marathon testimony that expedited the unraveling of the Nixon presidency. In *Abuse of Power*, Kutler leaves out critical Nixon/Dean conversation material from March 13, 17, and 20. All of these conversations, coincidentally or not, were devastating to Dean. They show that not only was Dean one of the original planners of the “intelligence operation” that led to the break-in, but that he hired Liddy in part because of Liddy’s successful break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg’s psychiatrist. In Kutler’s defense, some of these conversations were not part of his lawsuit to force release of the “Abuse of Government Power” Nixon tape segments.

2. As noted in Patricia Cohen’s *New York Times* article, Kutler’s critics claim that he conflates, in *Abuse of Power*, two distinct conversations that occurred nine hours apart on March 16, 1973.

3. Finally, and this is where Kutler's critics move from evidence to speculation, they argue that he deliberately omitted and conflated some conversations and that he harbors some motive for doing so. While this distortion does not change what we know about the break-in and only marginally affects our understanding of the president's role in the cover-up, Kutler's critics argue that Dean's role on the path to "Cancer" has not received a proper exposition and that Kutler's presentation of the critical week leading up to the "Cancer" conversation is skewed. As to allegations that he made Dean appear more benign on the path to "Cancer" than he really was, Kutler admits that he is friends with Dean but notes that the friendship blossomed only after the publication of *Abuse of Power*. Of course, this is the weakest part of the argument made by Kutler's critics. Without evidence of any acts of commission or omission, Kutler must be taken at his word.

The article in the *New York Times* obviously piqued the interest of many scholars, but they have reserved judgment, pending further evidence. Most people, I believe, were as surprised as I was to see this article on the front page of the *Times*, and they simply want to know whether this issue is worth paying attention to and whether there is anything "new" in this long-standing feud. The real story, which has been missed up to this point, is that we now have the technology to create improved transcriptions of the tapes and disseminate them and the original audio recordings widely. It is therefore time for a complete reevaluation of Watergate, and it is to be hoped that the *Times* article will prompt such a reevaluation, focusing in particular on the week of March 13 and the path to "Cancer." This reexamination should do what journalist David Frost was unable to do in the 1970s and what Stanley Kutler was unable to do in the 1990s.

As someone with the necessary background in the Nixon tapes, I felt that I had a responsibility to try to explain the dispute to a wider audience, and when I was asked to

do so, I agreed without reservation. I certainly do not seek to insert myself in a debate that began before I started graduate school. I happen to believe that Klingman's fight against Kutler is misplaced and that the real story is not Kutler, although he plays a role in it. But readers should come to their own conclusions. To help them do that I have assembled all the uncut audio files and conversations from the six Nixon/Dean conversations now under scrutiny from the week of March 13. For reasons of space, I have condensed the hours of audio and hundreds of pages of transcripts here. Much of this material is being made readily available to the public for the first time.

**March 13, 1973, 12:42–2:00 p.m.
Oval Office 878-014; Richard Nixon,
John W. Dean III, H.R. Haldeman¹¹**

Dean informed the president that the week of March 13 might be perhaps the single most important week of the cover-up.¹² The conversation began as a general discussion about why it would not be in the president's interest to allow live testimony of Nixon aides before the Ervin Watergate committee. Nixon and Dean wanted to protect aides Dwight Chapin and Chuck Colson, then in the private sector, because of the likelihood that the investigation would more quickly penetrate the White House. The discussion turned towards other White House vulnerabilities. The Campaign to Re-Elect the President (CREEP) had paid a minor to infiltrate "peace groups," a scheme that had recently unraveled because "he apparently chatted about it around school," Dean surmised. "It's absurd. It really is. He didn't do anything illegal."¹³ Dean also told Nixon that a speech supporting the administration would be planted in Senator Barry Goldwater's office for delivery on the Senate floor. "It's in the mill," Dean said.¹⁴ Nixon asked Dean if he needed any help from the Internal Revenue Service, ostensibly to maintain discipline while managing the cover-up. Dean responded that he already had access to the IRS and had a mechanism

to bypass Commissioner Johnnie Walters.¹⁵ Referring to himself in the third person,¹⁶ Dean informed the president for the first time that Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman had advance knowledge of Donald Segretti's "prankster-type activities."¹⁷ To slow the FBI's investigation, Dean suggested restructuring the FBI¹⁸ and emphasized the need to move the focus of the investigation immediately from the Nixon White House to Democrats and past administrations.¹⁹ After complaining to the president about "dishonest" media reporting that was "out of sequence," Dean explained the convoluted way in which Gordon Liddy received his Watergate break-in funds. Liddy's error, Dean said, was unnecessarily involving a third party in the cashing of checks, which left a traceable record.²⁰ Another problem for the White House was former CREEP treasurer Hugh Sloan. Dean said he was "scared," "weak," and had "a compulsion to cleanse his soul by confession."²¹ Dean also stated his preference to answer all Ervin committee inquiries with "sworn interrogatories" rather than live testimony, since written responses could be "artfully" answered.²² Finally, Dean predicted the direction that the investigation would take.²³ "I don't think the thing will get out of hand," he said, but those in danger included Charles Colson, John Mitchell, George Strachan, Dwight Chapin, and, by extension, H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman. Dean also warned of a "domino situation" if bank records were traced.²⁴ For example, he told the president that bank records would show that the administration had been paying someone to tail Senator Edward Kennedy for "almost two years." The tail began "within six hours" of Chappaquiddick.²⁵ In concluding the conversation, Dean said he would work with aide Richard A. Moore to work out a plan to broaden the focus of the investigation beyond the Nixon White House.²⁶

**March 16, 1973, 10:34–11:10 a.m.
Oval Office 881-003; Richard**

Nixon, John W. Dean III, Ronald L. Ziegler²⁷

Dean reminded the president of the need to get the focus of the investigation off the Nixon White House. "We have to get off the defensive. We have to broaden," Dean said.²⁸ Nixon and Dean agreed that a falsified document that appeared to be an independent assessment of the Watergate cover-up would be helpful. "I have drafted such a document, back in December," Dean stated. Nixon wanted to make sure the document appeared to be "a White House statement, not [a] presidential statement." Dean clarified that he had originally drafted such a statement in an act of contingency planning after the 1972 elections. Dean said that it might be time to recirculate his report again, which was based on "written, sworn affidavits."²⁹ However, Dean warned of the limits of such a report midway through the investigation. "Some questions you can't answer, or if you do, you get people in trouble." Therefore, to avoid perjuring those who have already provided testimony, a new more general falsified document had to be created. Dean stated his preference for the creation of "a good master plan" that would be more comprehensive than his previous report.³⁰

**March 16, 1973, 8:14–8:23 p.m.
White House Telephone 037-134;
Richard Nixon, John W. Dean III³¹**

In a phone call later that same day, President Nixon agreed with Dean's earlier suggestion to work with Richard A. Moore on a new falsified report as discussed earlier that day.³² Dean warned the president that such a report could make perjurers out of some witnesses: it could "open up a new grand jury" and "would cause difficulty for some who've already testified."³³ Dean stated his preference for two reports: the first a written report based on "sworn affidavits" that was "not a total answer" intended for the Ervin committee and the public,³⁴ and a second oral report only for the president to inform him of additional vulnerabilities of which he might

not have been aware.³⁵ Although Dean informed Nixon of White House involvement in the cover-up on March 13, Dean noted that the conclusions of his written report "were based on the fact that there was not a scintilla of evidence in the investigation that led anywhere to the White House."³⁶ Relieved, Dean informed the president that the FBI files that Ervin would receive would not include grand jury minutes, which was a lot more thorough than the FBI had been.³⁷ Dean also recommended that his written report bundle Watergate with the previously disclosed "prankster-type activities" of Segretti.³⁸

**March 17, 1973, 1:25–2:10 p.m.
Oval Office 882-012; Richard Nixon, John W. Dean III, H.R. Haldeman³⁹**

President Nixon reminded Dean that his falsified report should conclude that no one from the White House was involved, based on "Dean's evaluation."⁴⁰ Dean stated that he wanted to go even further than that: Nixon should hold a meeting with Ervin and disclose that CREEP had a legitimate "intelligence operation in place" based on "handwritten," "sworn statements" and that the White House had cut itself off from anything illegal.⁴¹ Dean then revealed that he knew about the "intelligence operation" six months before the Watergate break-in.⁴² The initial meeting that set up the operation was attended by Dean, Mitchell, Jeb Magruder, and Liddy. Dean told Haldeman that the operation should be kept "ten miles" from the White House. Nixon then asked Dean who he thought was presently most vulnerable.⁴³ Dean noted that he himself was, because "I've been all over this thing like a blanket." Colson, Chapin, Mitchell, and Haldeman were also vulnerable. Dean stated that he called break-in planner Liddy the Monday after the break-in for an explanation. According to Dean, Haldeman deputy Strachan pushed campaign aide Magruder to compel Liddy to do the break-in. Dean recommended that Magruder become the scapegoat

and that an official statement to that effect from the White House would be helpful.⁴⁴ "Can't do that," Nixon replied. Dean then switched to using Segretti as a scapegoat, which won more favor with the president.⁴⁵ "It was pranksterism that got out of hand," Dean said. Finally, Dean explained the discovery of the bizarre connection of the investigation to top Nixon aide John Ehrlichman, who had used Liddy in previous operations, including the break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist.⁴⁶ Since Liddy was also caught at the Watergate, he would eventually lead the investigation to Ehrlichman, Dean warned.

**March 20, 1973, Unknown time
between 1:42 and 2:31 p.m.
Oval Office 884-017; Richard Nixon,
John W. Dean III, Richard A. Moore**

Dean and Moore presented a draft of the recently completed falsified report to the president. Dean noted that Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler had concerns that it would raise more questions than it answered. Noting that it was just a draft, Moore stated that "it needs one more go around; we did the best we could." In particular, "of the eight paragraphs, I think there are about three that are troublesome."⁴⁷ Dean and Moore gave a copy of the report to Nixon, who directed various revisions on the spot, including how to rephrase Dean's previous involvement with Strachan and Segretti.

**March 21, 1973, 10:12–11:55 a.m.
Oval Office 886-008; Richard Nixon, John W. Dean III, H.R. Haldeman**

Dean warned Nixon that there was a "cancer" on the presidency,⁴⁸ and he offered for the first time a complete recollection of how the planning for Watergate originated, which started as "an instruction to me from Bob Haldeman."⁴⁹ Dean claimed that Haldeman originally asked Dean to set up a domestic intelligence operation at CREEP. Dean initiated contact with Jack Caulfield, who was Nixon's former bodyguard.⁵⁰ However, Mitchell and

Ehrlichman did not like Caulfield.⁵¹ Dean brought in Liddy instead, who came recommended by White House aide Bud Krogh on the basis of the successful break-in at Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office.⁵² Mitchell approved of Liddy. Next, Magruder invited Dean over to CREEP headquarters to discuss Liddy's intelligence plan. Dean described the plan, which included "black bag operations, kidnapping, providing prostitutes to weaken the opposition, bugging, mugging teams. . . . It was just an incredible thing."⁵³ After the initial meeting, Dean also attended a second meeting to discuss Liddy's plan, which included "bugging, kidnapping, and the like."⁵⁴ Dean, Mitchell, Magruder, and Liddy were present at the meeting. Dean said he did not hear anything about Liddy's plan again after that meeting, so he assumed the more extreme elements would not be carried out.⁵⁵ However, Dean conceded that he and Liddy "had so many other things" going on. Dean said he thought that Haldeman assumed that the Liddy plan was "proper,"⁵⁶ which resulted in Haldeman aide Strachan pushing Magruder, who asked permission from Mitchell, who consented to the Liddy-led Watergate break-in. Dean noted that information gathered from the break-in was used by Strachan and Haldeman.⁵⁷ As the 1972 democratic presidential campaign took shape, Haldeman authorized Liddy to change his target from Senator Muskie to Senator McGovern.⁵⁸ Once again, this message passed through Strachan-Magruder-Liddy. Dean noted that Liddy previously infiltrated Muskie's secretary and chauffeur. "Nothing illegal about that," Dean said. Although he had not heard anything again until the break-in, when Dean learned about it on June 17 he "knew what it was."⁵⁹ Nixon then asked Dean for an update on any perjuries. Dean was not sure if Mitchell had perjured himself, but he was sure that Magruder had, as had Herbert Porter, a Magruder deputy.⁶⁰ Dean claimed they perjured themselves by testifying that they had thought that Liddy was legitimate, and that they did not know anything about

activities related to the Democratic National Committee. After the break-in, Dean "was under instructions not to investigate" and instead worked on containing it "right where it was."⁶¹ All the burglars got counsel immediately and planned to ride out any charges until the 1972 election was over.⁶² However, soon after, the burglars began making demands for money. Dean was present when Mitchell authorized raising cash for them, which was to be funneled through Howard Hunt. Dean noted that not only was it becoming more difficult to meet the burglars' growing needs, but that it was "obstruction of justice," and that Dean, Mitchell, Ehrlichman, and Haldeman were culpable.⁶³ Dean summarized that the biggest problem was a "continual blackmail operation."⁶⁴ Dean also expanded on other vulnerabilities, including a previous plan to do "a second-story job on the Brookings Institute, where they had the Pentagon Papers."⁶⁵ Summarizing, Dean said that would have been too risky. "If the risk is minimal and the gain is fantastic, that's something else, but with a little risk and no gain, it's not worth it." Dean also noted that there were other "soft spots."⁶⁶ The problem of the "continued blackmail," he said, is that "this is the sort of thing mafia people can do." Dean estimated that a million dollars was needed over the next two years. Nixon responded, "I know where it can be gotten." Dean suggested that Mitchell should handle the money, "and get some pros to help him."⁶⁷

These materials should help us see the Watergate cover-up in a new light. If this is "Watergate revisionism," then so be it. Perhaps a little Watergate revisionism is needed, and technology, as is evident in this brief article, can be harnessed in ways that permit us to reconstruct these events and come to new interpretations. The president of the United States is barely moved when his counsel informed him in these conversations that most of the president's top aides were involved in various illegalities. Dean told Nixon on March 13 that Haldeman deputy Strachan knew

there was White House involvement in the Watergate break-in, even while Dean concluded in his falsified report for Senator Ervin and the public that the White House had no such knowledge. John Dean was not only involved in managing the cover-up, but by his own admission was part of the inner core of planners who set up CREEP's "intelligence operation." He stated that he and Haldeman initiated the planning that led to the Watergate break-in. Dean not only hired Gordon Liddy, but did so on the basis of his successful break-in at the office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist. Dean admitted that he began the cover-up shortly after the 1972 election by creating a falsified report that concluded that the White House had nothing to do with the break-in. He conceded that he was present with Mitchell when authorization was given to bribe witnesses. Dean recommended to the president that Mitchell handle the bribes, but that some "pros" should help him. Dean, in his own words, admitted to the president that he was involved in "an obstruction of justice." Most of all, neither Dean nor Nixon did anything to stop this reckless and illegal behavior. Paraphrasing the president's *mea culpa* during the David Frost interviews, Nixon may have "let the country down," but it was the country that had to endure, paraphrasing again, a "long national nightmare." The nightmare is not over yet, not as long as we have still more to learn.

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Notes:

1. Patricia Cohen, "John Dean at Issue in Nixon Tapes Feud," *New York Times*, February 1, 2009, p. A1.
2. See <http://chronicle.com/review/brainstorm/katz/whats-news-in-the-new-york-times>.
3. See <http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-02-04/the-times-has-lost-the-watergate-plot/>.
4. See <http://hnn.us/articles/61197.html#hoff>.
5. Stanley Kutler, *Abuse of Power: The New Nixon Tapes* (New York, 1997).
6. Klingman's manuscript submission to the *American Historical Review* was rejected for being "too narrow in focus" for that particular publication, as well as of insufficient length.

See <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/07/books/07dean.html>.

7. Oval Office 881-003, March 16, 1973, 10:34–11:10 a.m.

8. See Kutler, *Abuse of Power*, pp. 230-32.

9. White House Telephone 037-134, March 16, 1973, 8:14–8:23 p.m.

10. These conversations have never been readily available to the public in one format and location, apart from some disjointed transcripts. A number of the transcripts were imaged using optical character recognition software (OCR) and placed online, but in hundreds of places the text is corrupt, and the transcripts have not undergone any sort of editing or correction since. The audio files are no better: apart from a smattering available on various public and private websites, the analog cassette recordings are available only at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, and they are of generally poor quality.

11. This conversation is not included in *Abuse of Power*.

12. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/878-014_00-06-40.mp3. To avoid the tedium of listening to these (in many cases) long and poor-quality conversations, the relevant clips have been extracted, and the time codes are noted in the file names. In this case, this excerpt can be found at approximately 6 minutes, 40 seconds in conversation 878-014. However, readers are also encouraged to listen to the entire conversations located at <http://nixontapes.org/watergate.htm> in order to gain maximum context.

13. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/878-014_00-04-11.5.mp3.

14. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/878-014_00-05-35.mp3.

15. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/878-014_00-06-22.mp3.

16. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/878-014_00-07-15.5.mp3.

17. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/878-014_00-09-02.mp3.

18. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/878-014_00-27-09.mp3.

19. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/878-014_00-37-47.5.mp3.

20. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/878-014_00-42-00.mp3.

21. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/878-014_00-42-23.mp3.

22. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/878-014_00-46-36.mp3.

23. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/878-014_00-53-13.mp3.

24. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/878-014_01-02-24.mp3.

25. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/878-014_01-05-47.mp3.

26. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/878-014_01-10-03.mp3.

27. This conversation is part B of the transcript that appears in Kutler, *Abuse of Power*, 230-32. This conversation was conflated with the next conversation that occurred on March 16, 1973, from 8:14 to 8:23 p.m.

28. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/881-003_00-11-32.mp3.

29. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/881-003_00-14-24.mp3.

30. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/881-003_00-18-16.5.mp3.

31. This conversation is part A of the transcript

that appears in Kutler, *Abuse of Power*, 230-232. This conversation was conflated with the previous conversation that occurred on March 16, 1973, from 10:34 to 11:10 a.m.

32. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/037-134_00-01-39.mp3.

33. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/037-134_00-03-04.mp3.

34. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/037-134_00-04-07.mp3.

35. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/037-134_00-05-36.mp3.

36. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/037-134_00-06-49.5.mp3.

37. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/037-134_00-07-20.5.mp3.

38. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/037-134_00-08-13.mp3.

39. This conversation is not included in Kutler, *Abuse of Power*.

40. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/882-012a_00-04-59.mp3.

41. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/882-012a_00-05-37.mp3.

42. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/882-012a_00-07-54.mp3.

43. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/882-012b_00-00-07.mp3.

44. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/882-012b_00-04-41.mp3.

45. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/882-012b_00-05-36.mp3.

46. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/882-012b_00-06-00.mp3.

47. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/884-017_00-02-00.5.mp3.

48. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-03-35.5.mp3.

49. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-04-31.mp3.

50. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-04-49.mp3.

51. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-05-07.mp3.

52. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-05-38.5.mp3.

53. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-07-11.mp3.

54. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-07-52.5.mp3.

55. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-08-59.5.mp3.

56. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-11-32.5.mp3.

57. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-12-08.5.mp3.

58. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-13-09.5.mp3.

59. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-13-46.mp3.

60. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-16-02.5.mp3.

61. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-18-37.mp3.

62. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-21-18.mp3.

63. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-22-20.mp3.

64. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-23-38.5.mp3.

65. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-26-42.mp3.

66. http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-29-06.mp3.

67. <http://nixontapes.org/>

[watergate/886-008_00-30-40.mp3](http://nixontapes.org/watergate/886-008_00-30-40.mp3).

68. Tarleton State University-Central Texas will be renamed Texas A&M University in the 2009-2010 academic year. Nichter is also the creator of <http://nixontapes.org>, which is the only website dedicated solely to the scholarly production and dissemination of Nixon transcripts and digitized audio. Nichter and Richard A. Moss digitized virtually the entire Nixon tape collection in 2008, with technical assistance from the National Security Archive.

SHAFR GRANTS AND FELLOWSHIPS REFORMED IN APRIL 2009

A major reform in the administration of SHAFR's grants and fellowships will be implemented in April 2009. The purposes of the reform, approved by Council in 2008, are to streamline the application process for students applying for multiple grants and fellowships; to promote uniformity across all grants and fellowships programs; to promote coordination of awards by SHAFR as an institution; and to utilize electronic means of communication. The reforms will take full effect in time for the 2009-10 award cycle.

The reforms will most significantly affect the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship (GRF), Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant (BDG), W. Stull Holt Fellowship, Michael J. Hogan Fellowship, and Samuel Flagg Bemis Grant. Application procedures and deadlines as well as award administration will change for these programs. The Bemis program will also be divided into two separate programs, one for graduate students that keeps the Bemis name and one for junior faculty to be known as the William Appleman Williams Grants program. More modest changes will also affect the administration of the Dissertation Completion Fellowship and the Myrna Bernath Fellowship.

The reforms apply only to grants and fellowships invested in research-in-progress. The reforms do not apply to prize programs that reward completed work, including the Bernath Book Prize, Bernath Lecture Prize, Bernath Scholarly Article Prize, Myrna F. Bernath Book Award, Ferrell Book Prize, Graebner Award, Link-Kuehl Prize, Unterberger Dissertation Prize, and Oxford Dissertation Prize.

SHAFR members are encouraged to take note of the following reforms taking effect in the 2009-10 cycle:

- An annual **application deadline of October 1** will be established for the following programs:
 - Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship
 - Bernath Dissertation Grant
 - Myrna Bernath Fellowship
 - Holt Fellowship
 - Hogan Fellowship
 - Bemis Dissertation Grant
 - Williams Junior Faculty Grant
- The above seven awards will be announced annually at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association (in January), for expenditure during the same calendar year.
- Applicants for the above seven awards should complete a common application form available on the SHAFR website at http://shafr.org/fellowships_application.rtf. Browsers may also follow prompts under the description of each fellowship/grant posted at <http://www.shafr.org/members/prizes-and-fellowships/>. Directions for electronic submission of applications and letters of recommendation are provided on the application form.
- Applications for the Dissertation Completion Fellowships should use the common application form referenced above. However, the **annual deadline** for such applications will remain **April 1**. Fellowship awards will be decided by around May 1 and will be announced formally during the SHAFR annual meeting in June, with expenditure to be administered during the subsequent academic year.
- The new Williams Junior Faculty Research Grant is designed for untenured faculty and others who are within six years of the Ph.D. and who are working as professional historians, and is limited to scholars working on the *first research monograph*.
- Applicants for all SHAFR grants and fellowships must be members of SHAFR.

The CIA and Declassification: The Role of the Historical Review Panel

Robert Jervis

As current chair of the CIA's Historical Review Panel (HRP), I am glad to have this opportunity to explain what the panel does and note the CIA programs with which it is involved. Members of SHAFR will be familiar with the State Department's Historical Advisory Committee (HAC) and with some of the special commissions that deal with declassifying records on the JFK assassination and Nazi war crimes. However, these groups are rooted in statutes that grant them significant powers and so, much as we might wish it otherwise, are not good models for the HRP. Formed in 1995, the HRP is advisory only. Our "charter" reads as follows:

- Advise the Central Intelligence Agency on systematic and automatic declassification review under the provisions of Executive Order 12958 as amended.
- Assist in developing subjects of historical and scholarly interest for the Intelligence Community declassification review program.
- Advise CIA and the Intelligence Community on declassification issues in which the protection of intelligence sources and methods potentially conflicts with mandated declassification priorities.
- Provide guidance for the historical research and writing programs of the CIA History Staff, and when appropriate, review draft products.
- Advise Information Management Services on its

mandatory and voluntary declassification review initiatives and the Center for the Study of Intelligence on its academic outreach programs.

- At the request of the Director of Central Intelligence Agency, advise on other matters of relevance to the intelligence and academic communities.
- Advise Information Management Services on archival and records management issues.

The current members of the HRP are Melvyn Leffler (Department of History, University of Virginia), Thomas Newcomb (Department of Political Science and Criminal Justice Heidelberg College), Robert Schulzinger (Department of History, University of Colorado), Jeffrey Taliaferro (Department of Political Science, Tufts), Betty Unterberger (Department of History, Texas A&M), and Ruth Wedgewood (Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins). Previous historians who have served include Ernest May and Marc Trachtenberg. Members of the HRP make suggestions for suitable candidates when a vacancy opens up, but the CIA's director and his top assistants are deeply involved in the selection process, which makes sense because unless they have faith in the professional skills and judgment of the members of the HRP, its advice will carry little weight. And what we do is give our advice and judgment. We meet with the director or one of his top assistants after each of our twice-yearly meetings, and we are free to express our individual

and collective views without inhibitions. The discussion is always open and spirited, but as readers of our public statements know, we can explain to our colleagues and the public the subjects we have discussed but not the substance of the recommendations we have made. I know this clashes with the notion of openness, but heads of agencies are entitled to confidential advice, and what is important to historians and members of the general public is what material is released, not what the HRP has urged.

We advise on policies, priorities, and specific issues. Because of the importance of *FRUS*, we spend a large proportion of each meeting on the pending volumes. As SHAFR members know, the compiling and publishing of the volumes rests in the hands of the State Department's Office of the Historian (HO), and in the first stage of the process department historians must select the documents they think should be included. The compilers have access to CIA files through the relevant indexes and listings. In the past, security concerns caused significant problems with access to records, as did the complexity of the CIA's systems, and the HRP spent time trying to help. But I believe that the HO historians and the HAC would agree that although the search for documents is sometimes difficult, the compilers are now able to see what they need to. Searches are rendered easier by the efforts of the "joint historian," who is shared by the CIA and the HO and understands both organizations.

Most of the disputes concern

volumes involving covert actions. The first and most crucial step is for the government to decide whether the covert action can be acknowledged. This is not a CIA decision. It is made by the High Level Panel (HLP), which consists of representatives from State, the CIA, and the National Security Council (NSC). Because covert actions are presidential decisions, the NSC "owns" them, and it is appropriate that the NSC play the central role in decisions about whether or not to acknowledge them because such decisions involve balancing the costs and benefits to the national interest, broadly conceived. It is quite possible that the CIA might have no objection to revealing a particular operation because doing so would not harm its sources, methods, or ability to operate overseas, but the NSC would object because it believed that acknowledgment would significantly hinder foreign policy. The converse can also be true. It is important to realize that the CIA cannot unilaterally keep these transactions out of the historical record.

If the activity is to be acknowledged, the HLP draws up guidelines governing what about it can and cannot be revealed, and these are used to decide which documents can be released, either in their entirety or with parts removed (the infamous "redactions"). The guidelines will resolve most but not all disputes, because they are always ambiguous, and there is room to disagree about whether documents fit inside or outside them. Along with the guidelines, the HLP passes on the "issue statement" that appears in the front of the *FRUS* volume and provides the general context and background for the operation.

The HRP is involved in all stages of the process and goes over the material document by document and often line by line, hearing arguments on why the CIA believes certain material should be withheld. We discuss possible damage and, more important, the historical value of the material in dispute. This, of course, is where our greatest expertise lies. In a number of cases we have felt that materials scheduled to be

redacted were of very high value to the historical record. Since the CIA and the HLP are engaged in a balancing operation, those making the decisions are more than willing to hear arguments about the historical value of the material. When they are convinced that its release would significantly increase scholarly and public understanding, they are willing to be more forthcoming than would otherwise be the case. Disagreements often remain, but the considerations involved are understood by all participants.

This may be the appropriate place to note that HRP members have security clearances that allow us to read all the material that the historians have gathered. We are not in a strong position to judge arguments about the risks and costs of releasing material—although we do vigorously probe CIA arguments about those issues—but we can see and discuss what the CIA wants to withhold as well as what is planned for release.

We also examine the CIA's other historical declassification programs. For *FRUS*, we deal with a relatively small number of documents of the highest value and so proceed with great care (and the expenditure of a great deal of time and effort). On the opposite end of the spectrum are the millions of documents that are scanned electronically each year, examined (largely by retired CIA officers known as annuitants) and put on the CIA Records Search Tool system (CREST) at the National Archives (NARA). I know that many of you have used CREST, because I see footnotes to these documents quite often. Because the annuitants process so many documents, they must make judgments quickly. Their decisions are therefore conservative and lead to more redactions and fewer releases than would be possible if every document could be examined at length. The HRP looks

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at some of the documents on CREST and at a sample of those of that are withheld or redacted and periodically examines the complicated guidelines that are used. These make up a book of about 500 pages that contains both formal policies and precedents that have developed over the years. Of course, we all want more, and the HRP will continue to look at the guidelines, but I think even skeptics agree that the

change brought about by President Clinton's Executive Order 12958 (only slightly modified by President Bush) has been noteworthy.

The HRP also is involved in the CIA's Historical Collections Division (HCD). This part of the operation focuses on sets of documents that are both historically valuable and good candidates for declassification. Most noteworthy have been the release of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on the Soviet Union, the PRC, and the former Yugoslavia. NIEs and other intelligence reports on Vietnam have also been released, and in December 2008 CIA put out a collection of documents provided by the famous spy Ryszard Kuklinski concerning the plans for the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. The best of these documents are included in a printed collection, but all of them are available on a CD-ROM. The HRP advises on priorities for the HCD, although our attempts to act on the principle of "top down, oldest first" enunciated by John Gaddis at the first HRP meeting I attended have proved more difficult than expected because our obvious target—the files of the CIA directors—is difficult to declassify. These files are filled with names, each of which has to be checked to see whether it is releasable. Some of these documents are also less historically valuable than we originally expected, but renewed efforts are underway and the prospects for significant releases in the coming years have improved.

We know that the presidential libraries often have the most important documents and are where most historians begin their research. We have worked with the CIA to see that these collections remain a high priority. Frustrated researchers may be surprised to hear this, but it is important to note that many of the documents contain "equities" from many departments (i.e., are based on materials provided by multiple agencies), and each agency must review them before they can be declassified. This is not only technically challenging, but it also means that the document is held hostage to the slowest agency, which often is not the CIA. Nevertheless, the HRP has supported moving funds from other areas to declassify these materials.

The HRP has been involved in a number of other issues with which SHAFR members will be familiar, one involving the release of budget figures for the intelligence community in general and for specific covert actions, and another being the reclassification of documents. Here too I cannot reveal the positions we took, but we thoroughly explored both issues. For what it is worth, we have spent hours talking to top CIA officials about what damage releasing the overall budget might cause and about providing more details on the spending for particular covert actions. Some of the issues are quite pragmatic, dealing with what foreign intelligence services could learn from such releases; others involve attempts to maintain general principles to guide releases. Although one can argue that CIA is paranoid about slippery slopes, its business does involve and induce a degree of paranoia, and historians do indeed use particular releases to argue that a precedent has been set.

It is to be hoped that the reclassification issue will not return, but it is important to understand that it largely involved the re-review of documents that had not been properly released because they had not been reviewed by all of the relevant agencies. As noted above in connection with the presidential libraries, a number of documents

involve the equities of many agencies, and reviewers from one agency may not recognize this and so incorrectly approve release without referral to all the relevant parties, which is what happened in the recent cases. In any event, if officials did not previously realize that reclassifying documents carries a high cost and should be done only for pressing reasons, they do now, in part because of the bad publicity generated by the earlier episodes.

The mention of other agencies leads to the question of how the establishment of the position of director of national intelligence (DNI) has changed declassification rules and procedures. Many sets of documents that were under the control of the CIA director in his capacity as director of the intelligence community are now "owned" by the DNI. This is true most obviously for NIEs and the Presidential Daily Briefs (PDBs). As members of SHAFR know, the question of whether PDBs are subject to declassification review has been contested in the courts and within the federal declassification bureaucracy. CIA directors have argued that they are privileged deliberation documents and are thus shielded from review and release. We conveyed our views on this issue to several directors at some length, but what is relevant in this context is that the issue is now out of the hands of the CIA. Because of the appeals within the government, the issue is now on the president's desk, although by the time this appears in print we will have a new president and he may have made a decision. But President Bush did not act quickly on this question, and one thing my service has taught me is that much declassification proceeds at a pace that makes a snail seem like a speed demon. We are dealing with large, complex bureaucracies that rarely have declassification high on their agendas, and on issues like the PDBs there are incentives to stall. On the other hand, we should remember that people who are not in academia cannot understand why it takes us so long to publish, reach personnel decisions, or change our programs.

The HRP works closely with the

HAC. We have joint meetings every couple of years, the chair of each committee meets with the other when full joint meetings are impossible, and the HAC chair and I are in frequent contact. Close cooperation is not a magic bullet, but it does help each committee understand how the other sees the issues and sometimes enables us to help work out problems that arise between the CIA and the HO. I also meet with members of other organizations concerned with declassification, especially the National Security Archives.

I have found serving on the HRP both personally and professionally rewarding. My colleagues are interesting, the CIA personnel are dedicated and hard-working, and the opportunity to understand intelligence issues a bit better has helped me and, indirectly, my students. Panel members often have sharp disagreements with CIA personnel, but I want to stress a number of points. First, as far as I can tell, CIA officials have been open and honest with us. Of course, we can never tell what is being hidden successfully, but I think our access is quite good. On only two occasions over the decade have we been subject to underhanded dealings (which never happens in the academic world, of course), one of which would have occasioned my resignation and probably those of my colleagues had it not been remedied. Both problems grew out of disputes within the CIA. Some units went not only behind the HRP's back, but behind the backs of their colleagues. In one of the cases, however, CIA decision-makers stepped in even before we had a chance to raise the issue. I think that even colleagues who joined the HRP with some skepticism believe that they are being well informed and treated with candor.

Second, the use of annuitants for declassification, which at first struck us as having the foxes guard the henhouse, actually works very well. Far from being extremely protective, these people are proud of what they said and did and want to release as much information as possible.

Third, in the thousands of denials and redactions I have seen, I can

think of only two insignificant cases in which material was withheld because its release would be embarrassing. In one case,

a document employed a common national stereotype that would hardly raise eyebrows in conversation but that someone felt would look bad in print. When queried, the officials agreed that redacting it had been a mistake. (The document had already been released, so the redaction will remain until the document is re-reviewed). We can and do argue with CIA officials about the level of detail that should be released and whether information would endanger sources and methods. But while the declassifiers are of course deeply concerned with protecting the CIA's mission, they are not concerned with shielding its reputation. Indeed, on more than one occasion, concern for sources and methods led them to withhold documents that would put the CIA

It is not surprising that where CIA officials and academics differ most is in their assessment of the proper balance between protecting secrets and keeping the public informed.

in a better light, and on many occasions they have not hesitated to release documents or acknowledge actions that almost all of us (including many in the CIA) regret. This is not to say that the record is complete or that releases were as full as many of us would have liked. But gaps and redactions cannot be ascribed to the desire to bury mistakes and disguise misjudgments.

It is not surprising that where CIA officials and academics differ most is in their assessment of the proper balance between protecting secrets and keeping the public informed. Although my colleagues and I are glad (well, willing) to continue to hear views and complaints about this from SHAFR members, the basic decisions are legitimately political, which means they are driven by the values and judgments of the president and Congress. But I should note that the replacement of Clinton by Bush and the increased priority for security after September 11, 2001,

had relatively little impact on CIA declassification, much to my surprise. For years I hesitated to say this lest someone in the vice-president's office were to notice and be alarmed, but I am glad to be able to say it now.

In all immodesty, I think the HRP has done some good, and the fact that we have access to the director and his top assistants means that our voices are heard at the highest levels and that people throughout the organization have to take us at least somewhat seriously. But we are fully aware that we are participating in a game whose rules we have not established. Some may feel that the HRP only serves to legitimize a fatally flawed institution. This view makes some sense, although the existence of the panel in fact does not seem to have produced legitimacy in the eyes of critics. Being a meliorist, however, I serve with an undisturbed conscience.

Robert Jervis is Professor of Political Science in the School of International and Public Affairs, at Columbia University.

Oxford University Press-USA Dissertation Prize in International History

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations and Oxford University Press-USA are very pleased to announce a new dissertation prize in international history. Administered by SHAFR, the Oxford University Press-USA Dissertation Prize in International History will be offered biannually for the best dissertation writing by a rising historian who has completed a research project defined as international history. The research must be multinational in framing and scope, and there will be a preference for works that have a multilingual source base. In endowing this prize, Oxford University Press hopes to recognize the stellar work of junior scholars and to highlight works that have not been the focus of area studies and other regional and national approaches. Winners of the prize will receive \$1,000 and be invited to submit the resulting manuscript to Oxford University Press-USA for a formal reading for possible publication. The authors must be members of SHAFR at the time of submission.

"Even as we are constantly exploring and experimenting with new forms of scholarly communication, OUP honors the deep research of dissertations and the first books they become, which often serve as the anchor for an author's future work, and so we are thrilled to be joining hands with SHAFR to create this award," says Niko Pfund, Vice President and Publisher of Academic and Trade Books at Oxford University Press.

"SHAFR has long encouraged and supported research by graduate students," Peter Hahn, executive director of SHAFR, notes, "and thus we are deeply grateful to Oxford University Press-USA for its generous gift that will enable us to reward the very best achievements in international history among our graduate student members."

The inaugural Oxford University Press-USA Dissertation Prize in International History will be awarded by SHAFR in 2010 for the best dissertation completed in 2008 or 2009. Details on the competition will be advertised on the SHAFR web-site (www.shafir.org).

SHAFR Guide to New Platform Release

On January 1, 2009, all eBook subscriptions to the *Guide to American Foreign Relations since 1600: Third Edition* became accessible through the highly functional ABC-CLIO History Reference Online eBook platform.

Subscriptions now include:

- New advanced search options including synonym, natural language, and phonetic searching
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
When the transition to the new platform took place, all access URLs were automatically redirected to the URL listed below. No actions will be needed to initiate the rollover and there will be no need to make any modifications to OPAC systems or MARC records.

New URL: www.ahro.abc-clio.com/?9781851099504

All questions regarding subscriptions or the new platform should be directed to acsales@abc-clio.com or 800-368-6868 ext. 303.

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SHAFR Visits Falls Church

Frank Costigliola and Paul Kramer

The 2009 SHAFR annual conference at the Fairview Park Marriott in Falls Church, Virginia, is shaping up to be an exciting event. A dynamic and energetic program committee (chaired by Paul Kramer and including Carol Anderson, Dirk Bonker, Anne Foster, Amy Greenberg, Naoko Shibusawa, and Salim Yaqub) issued an especially broad call for papers. Choosing as the conference theme, "The United States in the World/The World in the United States," the committee circulated the call for papers on nearly 60 listservs. SHAFR advertised it in the *OAH Magazine* and in *Perspectives*. The invitation recognized SHAFR's signature and continuing strengths in diplomatic, strategic, and foreign relations history, particularly in the post-1945 period. The call went on to welcome proposals for panels and papers dealing with non-state actors and/or pre-1945 histories or those involving histories of gender and race, cultural history, religious history, transnational history, and histories of migration and borderlands. In keeping with this outreach effort, SHAFR Council in June 2008 inaugurated the Diversity/International Outreach Fellowship program, appropriating \$25,000 for travel and hotel expenses for scholars who can enhance the diversity of the annual meeting. These awards were intended primarily for scholars of international/foreign relations history located outside the United States or representing groups that have been traditionally under-represented at the SHAFR conference. (There will be \$25,000 available for the 2010 conference and the same amount for 2011.) The program committee received 28 applications for these Diversity/International Outreach Fellowships. The committee also received 22 applications for

Robert A. Divine Travel Grants to assist graduate students traveling to the conference. \$2,500 was available for Divine grants.

There was an overwhelming response to this outreach. The program committee received 100 panel proposals plus 41 individual paper applications. This amounts to an increase from previous years of more than 50 percent. In view of SHAFR's commitment to enhancing its scope, we have expanded the annual meeting from the usual 48 or 54 panels to 82 panels. During most time slots there will be 10 concurrent panels. Presenters will include scholars based in 17 countries outside the United States. Roughly 25 percent of the participants will be graduate students, many of them first-timers to SHAFR. The local arrangements committee will publicize the conference for prospective attendees in the DC area. There will be special efforts to reach out to newcomers at the Thursday welcoming reception, the Friday graduate student breakfast, and the Saturday mentoring and networking breakfast. The Friday breakfast will include a workshop on publishing with editors from academic presses. The Saturday breakfast, sponsored by the Women's Committee and the Membership Committee, will be an informal get-together where newcomers can mingle with veterans over coffee and pastries, network, and get advice on a variety of issues that concern our field and our profession.

On Thursday evening, Amy Goodman, radio journalist and host of the radio program *Democracy Now*, will deliver the plenary address. At the Friday luncheon, Frank Costigliola will give a presidential address entitled *After FDR's Death: Dangerous Emotions, Divisive Discourses, and the Abandoned*

Alliance. The Saturday luncheon speaker is Eric Edelman, a former foreign service officer and Defense Department official who has a Ph.D. in history and who has served as ambassador to Finland and to Turkey. His talk is entitled *Diplomat among Warriors (with Apology to Robert Murphy)*.

For an after conference social event, the local arrangements committee (Kristin Ahlberg, Meredith Hindley, and Anna Nelson, assisted by Sara Wilson) is booking a dinner cruise on the Potomac for Saturday night on the *Miss Christin*, which will be reserved for SHAFR's exclusive use. The cruise will travel from Alexandria to Mt. Vernon and back. The cost will be approximately \$80 plus the cost of bus transportation. (As we write this in mid-February, the local arrangements committee is still negotiating with the bus company.) The package will include transportation from the Marriott to the boat, dinner, and transportation back to the Marriott. Because logistics make it too difficult to charge separately for drinks, there will also be an open bar featuring beer, wine, and soft drinks. Space on the boat is limited to 125 persons. By March 1 the exact price will be available on the SHAFR website and registration form. SHAFR will subsidize part of the cost to graduate students.

We're looking forward to seeing you at a conference designed to be intellectually stimulating and welcoming to both SHAFR veterans and newcomers.

Frank Costigliola is Professor of History at the University of Connecticut and President of SHAFR.

Paul Kramer is Associate Professor of History at the University of Iowa and Chair of the 2009 Program Committee.

A Roundtable Discussion of William C. Inboden's *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment*

Lloyd C. Gardner, Laura A. Belmonte, David Zietsma, Seth Jacobs, and William C. Inboden

The Cold War Crusade

Lloyd C. Gardner

As William Inboden sees it, scholars have neglected the crucial role religious beliefs played in America's successful Cold War policies – right from the beginning until the collapse of the Soviet Union. These, it turns out, exploited a fatal flaw in the structure of Communism, and a principal reason for its ultimate failure: the absence of God in its foundation. That is the central argument presented by Inboden, whose subtitle "The Soul of Containment" foreshadows the case he makes for a new assessment of several key players suffused with Christian belief and values. Indeed, he argues, one must understand the Cold War first as a religious war, uniting such diverse figures as Harry Truman, Reinhold Niebuhr, Billy Graham, and Dwight D. Eisenhower under the same banner. As is well-known, the 1950s witnessed an increase in church attendance and membership, in part, he suggests, as a response to the atomic age and the threat of nuclear holocaust.

The Soviet explosion of an atomic device in 1949 naturally heightened such fears, sending people back to church but also into movie theaters to see Godzilla ravage New York or aliens warn earth to stop playing with a-bombs in films such as "The Day the Earth Stood Still." In this telling, the aliens's messenger, Klaatu, with his mighty robot, Gort, land

their spacecraft on Cold War-era Earth just after the end of World War II in an effort to communicate and reconcile humans to a higher entity. It is worth noting that the 1950s was also the decade of the UFO, with similar obsessions coming into play in asserted sightings of spacecraft portending world destruction.

What political leaders did to counteract such fears and take advantage of the moment, aside from identifying bomb shelters, was to use public anxiety as expressed in church going figures to stimulate the idea of moral rearmament as an offensive weapon against the Soviet Union in the war of ideas. But it is a long way from that point to a convincing argument that the Cold War was in its essence, a religious war. Inboden's book will inevitably be used as a guide for understanding the foreign policies of George W. Bush as well those of the now distant Cold War, for he finds (as have many others) a consistent religious strain in American policy going back to McKinley who got down on his knees to ask for God's guidance in the matter of the Philippines, and continuing through Woodrow Wilson who announced that God had apparently spoken to him about an even larger project: "I believe that God planted in us the vision of liberty.... I cannot be deprived of the hope that we are chosen, and prominently chosen, to show the way to the nations of the world how they shall walk in the paths of liberty." (9) Not everyone agreed, of course, that God had chosen the United States

for this mission. At the Paris Peace Conference, French Premier Georges Clemenceau made a dour comment in a moment of frustration with the American president that while God had only ten points Wilson had fourteen.

While American religiosity is often commented upon by foreign observers, Clemenceau's irritation at Wilson's pretensions as a latecomer in the war suggests one of the difficulties an author faces in grappling with the question of motivations of statesmen by emphasizing an over-riding psychological or spiritual force at the root of it all. It is something of a given that nations with large aspirations will invoke destiny or guidance from above to explain the righteousness of their cause. Therefore, the question always arises: Suppose we leave out the religious factor? Would American policies have been any different at Yalta? At Potsdam? Did the Truman Doctrine depend upon the president's conviction that he had to stave off an invasion of non-believers, as compared, say, to his blunt assessment in his memoirs that Stalin wished to fulfill an ancient aspiration of the Tsars?

It is surprising that Inboden makes a partial exception to his collective portrait for Dean Acheson, the single most influential knight at the Cold War roundtable, as many would argue, the essential Cold Warrior. "One searches in vain," he writes, "through the record of Acheson's public life, however, for an extensive conceptualism of the Cold War in

religious terms," at least in the same manner as the others he discusses constructed their views of the essential meaning of the conflict (24). Acheson, he believes, exemplifies the tradition of "proud realism" in American policy. Inboden concludes, nevertheless, that Acheson used a number of occasions to contrast the image of the Christian moral universe with the hate-filled Soviet outlook. "Here again was the basic outline of America's diplomatic theology." (25)

That phrase, "diplomatic theology," does seem to capture an essential aspect of the mindset of American policymakers. Acheson was as capable, for example, as John Foster Dulles in popularizing the agent theory of revolution as an explanation for why other nations succumbed to Communist blandishments or were subverted by deceivers.

The agent theory of revolution was an old one, perhaps as old as the Devil in Massachusetts in Puritan days, for it posited that a small group of individuals operating from some central source, Satan or the Kremlin, were behind all the troubles in the world. It was a little like the situation in the Garden of Eden when the serpent appeared. During the Korean War, for example, Acheson wrote a lengthy answer to the troubled father of an American soldier who wanted to know why the United States had allowed itself to become involved in a seemingly endless struggle with no clear vision of victory? Korea happened, Acheson said, because there existed a source of evil in the Kremlin that distorted lives everywhere. Interrupted by the war, his son's hopes for the future, difficult as that obviously was to accept, hinged upon the favorable outcome of such struggles in such far off and foreboding landscapes.

It was above all the policymaker's duty to mobilize the nation, as Acheson attempted here to do, and, as Harry Truman did in using Myron Taylor as his ambassador-at-large to try to mobilize all Christendom to resist the influence of the Soviet Union. Inboden's discussion of

Taylor's efforts and Truman's constant encouragement of the idea that centuries-old conflicts between Catholic and Protestant beliefs and practices could be overcome in the face of the Communist challenge is enlightening. Truman's determination to press the idea of a Washington conference of religious leaders in the hope that some sort of unity credo would emerge even surpassed his original scheme, for he envisioned sending Taylor to recruit "the top Buddhist and the Grand Lama of Tibet" for such an ecumenical assembly. If he could

That phrase, "diplomatic theology," does seem to capture an essential aspect of the mindset of American policymakers.

mobilize all those people "who believe in a moral world against the Bolshevik materialists...we can win this fight." (140)

In the planning for the conference, Inboden writes, there may have been some diplomatic

theology involved, as the United States desired that the invitation go to a particular candidate Washington favored in the succession to head the Orthodox Church. To what extent American officials directly influenced the selection of the ultimate victor, Archbishop Spyridion, "is unclear," writes Inboden, "or at least not revealed by currently available documents." (141) This tantalizing sentence puts in pretty clear relief the problem of talking about genuine religious belief as opposed to the geopolitics of diplomatic theology. Nevertheless, Inboden moves on to the conclusion, "Truman's campaign reveals a side of him comparatively unknown and under appreciated: the spiritual idealist." (155)

The conference plan failed for a number of reasons, much to Truman's distress, as did his efforts to open up an embassy in the Vatican. The Archbishop of Canterbury wrote the president, for example, "we cannot whole-heartedly claim the Roman Church as a champion of freedom against Communist tyranny." (154) In a way, the archbishop's letter suggests something important about an interpretation of the Cold War as a religious crusade: while American

leaders sought to unify all religions under their guidance, historic theological differences prevented such unity. Does that mean there could be no real mandate from God, in the sense of an all-encompassing mission that went beyond alliance politics?

There seems no reason to doubt Truman's sincere wish to foster a single religious outlook on Cold War issues, an American-led Christian revival, or the depth of his personal beliefs about heaven and hell, whatever they might be. But what were the duties of a believing Christian in terms of making the sacred political? No one struggled with that question more than Reinhold Niebuhr, who practicing realist intellectuals and policymakers sometimes called "the father of us all." Like his discussion of Truman's use of Myron Taylor, Inboden gives us a fresh picture of the theologian's encounter with political realities of the Cold War. Niebuhr disavowed liberal Protestant campaigns for nuclear disarmament, fearing the consequences of passivity would lead, as it had before, to the horrors of World War II and the concentration camps. He was a strong supporter of NATO from the beginning and defended the division of Europe it had helped to create on the grounds that "the spiritual facts correspond to the strategic necessities." More controversially, in an article he wrote for the National Business Committee for NATO, he argued that the East European countries "have been separated from this spiritual community" not only by "the power of Russian arms," but also by their own lack of "the political and cultural prerequisites for the open society." (67)

The 1956 Suez Crisis brought out yet another aspect of Niebuhr's "realism," a strong denunciation of Eisenhower and Dulles for separating themselves from the Anglo-French-Israeli alliance against Nasser's Egypt. Now, obviously, the Egyptian's successful appeal to the Russians for arms gave a decided Cold War slant to the crisis, but Niebuhr's alarm at American policy had a somewhat different

slant. He called for a more assertive Middle Eastern policy, where the most important security issue for Niebuhr was the protection of Israel and opposition to Arab nationalism. "We ought both to guarantee Israel and to prevent the unity of the Arab world under Nasser." And he accused Eisenhower of being a moralist who espoused a "universal benevolence without regard for strategic necessities." As for Dulles, he was guilty of a moral "formalism, which makes simple distinctions between nations which obey the 'moral law' and those which do not." These things added up to a "moral sentimentality" that was dangerous to the well being of "the greatest center of power in the modern world." (298)

In sum, it could be argued, Niebuhr's approach in these early days of the Cold War would be hard to distinguish from the neo-conservative agenda of George W. Bush when it came to the Middle East and supposed threats to American national security. Dulles, in opposing the invasion of Egypt, he argued, had acted from "simple distinctions" about those who obeyed the moral law and those that did not. It was a bit more complicated than that, however, for the United States held its allies at fault for having abandoned an important declaration of 1950 that committed them to protecting the territorial integrity of all the nations in the Middle East. The Niebuhr position seems somewhat akin, as well, to the national defense strategies of the Bush II Administration, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's famous edict that the strategy must dictate the coalition, not the coalition the strategy. But more than these arguable points, we are left to wonder if there can be so many "Christian" points of view, then what is the one true faith?

A final comment on the Eisenhower years: During the 1954 Indochina crisis, Eisenhower wondered why it was not possible to mobilize a Buddhist military opposition to the Communists, and had to be told that Buddhists were pacifists, something that seemed to amaze

him in light of the idea that all religions had a stake in opposing the Vietminh. Inboden understands the dilemma. Niebuhr had married a sentimental attachment to Zionism with a *realpolitik* assessment that defending Israel was the best way to block "Arab nationalism and Soviet expansion." Eisenhower put his money (in this instance) on the other horse. "That both of them drew on the resources of the Protestant tradition for their differing positions was an irony that neither seemed to acknowledge." (298) It is difficult to throw a religious cloak over such differences. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had its own problems in underestimating the power of religion, especially in Eastern Europe, where it was often linked to nationalism. One can argue the priorities, but the truth was the Communists failed at many things, even after calculating the devastation and set-backs of World Wars I and II, and the success of American containment policies. Whatever conclusions one draws about the collapse of the Soviets, the implosion brought about the kind of fragmentation that Russia's allies back in World War I feared would be the case from the collapse of the Tsar's empire even if the atheist Bolsheviks did not succeed in forming a government to rule after the Romanovs. The issue becomes more complicated than the failure of the Communists to include God in this view; it goes as well to the problem of attempting to include many nationalities in an exogenous empire. On the American side, it seems clear – as this book argues – that with all the other advantages it had in the Cold War, religion was a glue that helped to hold together public support for the arms race, and hot wars in Korea and Vietnam. It stuck well for a time, but even before the end of the Cold War, it had loosened all around the corners.

That said, the story of how the Christian right rapidly became the base of the Republican Party will bring many readers to this book in search of answers. Inboden has some of them, especially in his effort to explain a very "odd couple," Billy

Graham and Reinhold Niebuhr, as wings of a particularly American religious creed. Looking at the actions of policymakers through such a lens reveals the way that creed could be useful in the Cold War, in much the way Blaise Pascal suggested the ritual of the church was good both for intellectuals and the common man, humbling the arrogant and lifting up the poor in spirit. Readers may also lie awake at night, however, pondering where belief in a divine Manifest Destiny could take the nation – beyond where it already finds difficulty in defining a strategy for meeting new challenges beyond attempting to do over past mistakes of other empires.

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**Review of William C. Inboden,
*Religion and American Foreign
Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of
Containment***

Laura A. Belmonte

Religion has played a critical role in U.S. foreign policy in the post 9-11 era. A Methodist president championed by evangelicals began a "war on terror" directed at radical Islamists, and religious factionalism complicates American objectives in Iraq. William C. Inboden, senior vice president of the Legatum Institute and former senior director for strategic planning at the National Security Council under George W. Bush, witnessed this fusion of faith and power firsthand. In *Religion and American Foreign Policy*, he places this phenomenon in historic context and illuminates a surprisingly understudied element of U.S. diplomacy in the early Cold War years.

Inboden argues that officials in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations perceived the Cold War as a religious struggle and attempted to forge policies that used Christianity as both a motive for and means of combating communist atheism. Yet he treats spirituality as a

genuine expression of policymakers' deepest convictions, not a tool cynically manipulated for political gain. Although he acknowledges the importance of "balance of power realities, security concerns, and political and economic ideology" in explaining the origins of the Cold War, he believes that these factors alone are "insufficient" because "they ignore God" (4). He asserts that while most Cold War scholars neglect spirituality as a key component of the battle between democratic capitalism and Communism, "Americans in the 1940s and 1950s did not" (4).

Confining his analysis to mainline Protestant elites, Inboden explores their responses to the postwar world in Part I. Determined to maximize their ability to shape public culture at home and abroad, Protestants organized dozens of interdenominational commissions, councils, and conferences aimed at articulating a unified vision for international relations. Groups like the National Council of Churches (NCC), the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs, and the World Council of Churches (WCC) offered varied assessments of the Soviet threat, atomic weapons, China, the United Nations, the Middle East, and other issues. Inboden deftly analyzes how figures such as Reinhold Niebuhr, John Foster Dulles, Swiss theologian Karl Barth, and Czech theologian Josef Hromadka clashed in their views on religion and foreign policy. Dulles' faith in Western Christian civilization, Niebuhr's Christian realism, Barth's rejection of political involvement, and Hromadka's union of Christianity and Communism proved impossible to reconcile, even without including Russian Orthodox or Catholic perspectives in the dialogue. At the same time, neo-evangelical leaders, including Carl F.H. Henry, E.J. Carnell, Charles Fuller, and Billy Graham, challenged the theological and political liberalism of mainstream Protestant leaders. Pairing a strong anticommunism with a desire to prioritize spirituality over material needs, evangelicals voiced suspicions about initiatives such as the United Nations and the Marshall Plan. Yet

they proved no more successful than their mainstream Protestant brethren in articulating a clearly defined political theology. American Protestants were soon voicing three distinct interpretations of U.S. foreign policy. All three factions "contested the right to speak authoritatively to Protestants on questions of public policy, and to speak *for* Protestants in the public square."

All called for a "Christian" foreign policy, but none could agree on what that constituted (93). Such stark internal divisions, Inboden concludes, ensured that Protestant leaders "failed to exercise a significant or determinative influence on the actual formation of American foreign policy" (101).

Although Protestant leaders may have faltered in their efforts to infuse U.S. foreign relations with spiritual perspectives, American political leaders successfully constructed a "diplomatic theology" of containment (191). In Part II, Inboden illustrates how Harry S. Truman, Senator H. Alexander Smith, John Foster Dulles, and Dwight D. Eisenhower linked their religious convictions to their foreign policy objectives.

Beginning with Truman, Inboden asserts that faith played a critical role in initiatives like the Marshall Plan, aid to Greece and Turkey, intervention in Korea, and large defense budgets. Truman's Baptist beliefs, Inboden argues, compelled him to oppose Communism aggressively. Truman not only viewed the Cold War as a battle between "nations who believed in God and morality, and those who did not" but also saw religion as a potent tool for undermining the Soviet system (107). Not a regular churchgoer or an advocate of any particular religious doctrine, Truman espoused Christian ethics in ways that resonated with adherents of other spiritual traditions. Rejecting the anti-Catholicism endemic among Protestant leaders of the era, Truman sought to forge a strong anti-communist alliance with

Pope Pius XII. Although his attempts to establish formal diplomatic relations with the Vatican failed in the face of blistering domestic political opposition, he continued to support the use of spiritual and moral weapons against atheistic Communism.

While Inboden presents ample evidence of Truman's religiosity, one gains little sense of how spirituality ranked among other determinants of U.S. foreign policy. How, for example, did Truman balance economic, security, military, and political imperatives with spiritual factors? Although Inboden acknowledges the

role of non-religious factors, he does not analyze them in conjunction with religion. Nor does he establish any connection between Truman's religious views and those of his advisors, members of Congress, or the Joint Chiefs of Staff, all of whom certainly shaped U.S. policy in the early Cold War. Were Truman's spiritual beliefs echoed or challenged by others in the foreign policymaking establishment? The answer is unclear. Furthermore, the fact that the foreign policy initiative Inboden examines most closely—Truman's efforts to formalize U.S. relations with the Vatican—ultimately failed raises significant questions. Why does this unsuccessful overture receive far more attention than hallmarks of Truman's foreign policy like NATO, the Berlin Airlift, or NSC-68? Did spiritual factors shape these decisions? If so, how?

Inboden discounts the possibility that Truman used religious rhetoric for political gain, but his exclusion of an extended discussion of Truman's decision to recognize Israel complicates this claim. It is well known that the president factored in the possible loss of Jewish-American votes in determining his course of action with the Israelis. One also wonders how Truman responded to the brutal clashes between Muslims and Hindus following the partition

Inboden discounts the possibility that Truman used religious rhetoric for political gain, but his exclusion of an extended discussion of Truman's decision to recognize Israel complicates this claim.

of India in 1947. Throughout much of the volume, Inboden's narrative focuses quite narrowly on how Protestant Americans within political and religious hierarchies interpreted the international role of the United States early in the Cold War. His argument could have benefited from a broader analysis of the myriad ways that religions, religious people, and religious conflicts informed U.S. foreign relations, or it might have been recast as a consideration of how spiritual factors were one element among many in a larger U.S. ideological offensive against Communism.

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Shining Religion's Psychic Light on William Inboden's *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment*

David Zietsma

In August 1947, Reverend Katie Whittemore of the Church of Psychic Light in Los Angeles was arrested for fortune-telling. As an ordained minister in the International General Assembly of Spiritualists, Whittemore believed that "precepts contained in the Bible are scientifically proven by and through mediumship." Outraged at the arrest of Whittemore and other Spiritualist ministers, Reverend Henrietta Young wrote to President Truman, demanding to know "under the Bill of Rights, and the right to practice religious freedom, whether we actually do or do not have the privilege of worshipping God as our Constitution prescribes."¹ Young's perception of religious persecution belied Cold War foreign policy declarations that the United States stood for religious freedom. Unfortunately, William Inboden leaves such contradictions unexamined. Instead, *Religion and American Foreign Policy* reifies a triumphalist narrative in which American political elites presciently defended religious faith and freedom, often using religion itself, against an

atheistic Soviet empire.

To be sure, Inboden should be congratulated for a useful contribution to the growing discussion of religion's significance to United States foreign relations. The book's mountain of documentary evidence ought to finally resolve the skepticism Robert Buzzanco expressed concerning religion's influence on foreign policy creation in his *Diplomatic History* article, "Where's the Beef?" For those conventional meat-eaters who may have been dissatisfied with dishes previously offered by Andrew Rotter, Seth Jacobs, David Foglesong, Ira Chernus, and Walter Hixson, Inboden appears to lay out a New York steak, cooked on the hot coals of traditional empiricism and served without the cultural spices of discourse, race, gender, or identity.²

Religion and American Foreign Policy essentially argues that religion was both "a cause" and "an instrument" of U.S. foreign policy during the early Cold War (2). The worldview of U.S. religious and political leaders centered on the importance of God, religious faith, and America's divine mandate. Inboden maintains that, in addition to the usual menu of Cold War causes, "Americans found it even more ominous that not only were the communists attempting to exterminate religious faith in their own orbit, but they were also seeking to spread their godless materialism around the world" (4). Animating Protestant leaders as well as political elites, this religious interpretation of world affairs, rooted in "faith in God," induced opposition to the U.S.S.R. (22).

In terms of foreign policy, Inboden argues that political figures proved more efficient than religious leaders at forging religion into "an instrument in America's Cold War effort" (5). The first two chapters contend that because Protestants were divided over theological and national issues, they "failed to exercise a significant or determinative influence on the actual formation of American foreign policy" even as they "helped to develop a public vocabulary that spoke of America's world role in spiritual terms" (101-2). The third

chapter shifts to the political front, asserting that President Harry Truman defined "the Cold War as a spiritual conflict," attempted to create an international religious opposition to the U.S.S.R., and "established the religious blueprint that his White House successor largely would follow" (156). Truman's story is followed by chapters tracing religion's influence on political figures such as Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-NJ), Congressman Walter Judd (R-MN), and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, all of whom were also influenced by a general religious worldview as they contemplated world affairs. The book's final chapter argues that President Dwight Eisenhower "refined, expanded, and institutionalized the civil religion" on which the policy of containment rested (261).

While Inboden provides a richly researched narrative that establishes religion as germane to Cold War U.S. foreign policy, the book is narrowly focused on the "great men" of history. Portentously, the book's jacket displays only the cut-out photographs of four white males: Billy Graham, Reinhold Niebuhr, Truman, and Eisenhower. To Inboden, religion's influence seems to involve little more than the religious worldviews of elites and the efforts they make to organize religious leaders and organizations into national and international anti-communist fronts. This narrow focus might account for the curious absence of Seth Jacobs' incisive insights connecting national religious culture to Eisenhower's Cold War foreign policy. Strangely, neither Jacobs' prize-winning book nor his prize-winning article appears in the bibliography.³

The emphasis on elites emerges from the book's methodological bedrock, namely, the theory of empirical inquiry. Inboden infers that the documentary record left by elite figures can simply be arranged to reveal as much as possible about religion's influence. For example, in recounting Truman's efforts to create a united international religious front through Myron Taylor's efforts at the Vatican, Inboden complains that

the story is not knowable at points because "the documentary record . . . is frustratingly thin" (149). In the chapter on H. Alexander Smith, the senator who received direct messages from God, Inboden concludes that because historians cannot know "with certainty one way or the other whether someone like Smith did or did not receive guidance from God" they can only "seek as accurately as possible" to let Smith be heard and interpreted (224-25). By utilizing supplementary theoretical approaches such as discourse analysis, however, Inboden might have mitigated empiricism's limits and answered questions concerning religion's role in shaping cultural identity, meaning, and power.

Inboden's methodological strait-jacket relegates religious doctrine to the sidelines. In the case of Dulles, Inboden informs us that only on "rare occasions" did the secretary of state "notice doctrinal questions" (228). Nevertheless, "for all his dogmatic uncertainty, Dulles maintained a firm resolve in the spiritual stakes of the Cold War" (229). Escaping Inboden's analytical purview is that doctrine shaped the possibility of "spiritual stakes" in the first place, even though political actors may not have been conscious of the doctrinal dynamic. For instance, systematic doctrinal beliefs about the nature of sin shaped "spiritual stakes" in the 1930s—including Dulles's own views—and were reflected in the good-neighbor narrative of the divinely ordained destiny of the United States.⁴

The failure to interrogate linkages between explicit religious language and the discursive construction of American mission leads Inboden to neglect religious doctrine's cultural influence. This is certainly the case with Dulles's transition from advocate of peace internationalism to proponent of the nuclear-based containment of evil. During the World War II intervention debate, neo-orthodox theologian Reinhold Niebuhr's systematic theology of original sin provided the language for a reincarnation of American destiny based on the righteous struggle against evil.⁵ In the postwar period,

Americans migrated to visions of the Soviet Union as original sin's latest earthly embodiment. Despite the efforts of a few theologically liberal Protestants to encourage internationalism, the hegemonic discourse of original sin formed the basis of America's postwar national mission, namely, to contain evil that was "original." Thus, when Dulles "took the strategic architecture of containment and sacralized it" (231), one might suggest that he reflected the shifting discourse of American destiny. In failing to interrogate Dulles's sense of national identity, Inboden interprets Dulles's transition as a prescient response to an objective threat to religious faith and freedom rather than, say, as part of Dulles's absorption of a righteous mission.

To be sure, engaging national identity is difficult because it lies in the "undocumented" psyche. But that is no reason to ignore the issue. After all, anxiety over American identity is rampant among Inboden's cast of elites. Truman believed that Americans needed to "peer into their own soul, and resolve how they would live" (111); Smith had a "tortured spiritual conscience" which "continued to plague him over matters from the epic (the American destiny) to the comic" (201); Dulles was "troubled and provoked" and "issued a dire warning against declining American virtue" (235); Eisenhower believed that "Americans needed to search their own soul" and, in Ike's own words, must "carefully determine what it is that we are trying to protect against the Communist threat" (258). One wonders whether Americans assuaged this uncertainty about America by locating evil, atheistic enemies abroad so that they could construct a righteous national community in opposition to them. But Inboden does not grapple with any such cultural analysis of religious language in his recounting of the documentary record.

Inboden also seems simply to accept as true pervasive claims that the Soviet Union threatened religious faith across the globe. This underlying assumption is curious, since Inboden informs the reader on

several occasions that the communist government had not succeeded in exorcising religion from the Soviet Union. For example, Truman believed that there was even enough independence in the Soviet church to send Myron Taylor on "a covert mission . . . to the Russian Patriarch Alexis" (142). In another instance, Inboden relates that evangelist Billy Graham "received an invitation to preach in the Soviet Union" (244). U.S. Ambassador George Kennan, of course, informed Washington in 1952 that a deep-seated religious fervor persisted among the Russian people.⁶ If the Soviets were unable to destroy religion within their own borders three decades after the revolution, wherein lay the threat to the entire world?

But any hints of ambiguity in the Cold War's moral boundaries suffer Inboden's interpretive wrath. For example, he characterizes liberal Protestant suggestions for cooperative internationalism (a phrase he denigrates by placing it in quotation marks (30)) as "moral obtuseness," "simple-minded moralism," and "moral equivalency" (41, 42, 69). To Inboden, these religious individuals were "incapable of rendering any decisive moral judgments beyond anguished hand-wringing and saccharine paeans to "peace" and "justice" and "reconciliation" (68).

The book's scathing indictments of cooperative internationalism ignore the complex historical context that made such "ambiguity" possible. Some of these "incapable" individuals probably could not easily overlook the recent U.S. terror bombings of Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the violent crushing of organized labor groups in wartime America, the ongoing segregation and lynching of black Americans, the forced sterilization of natives on the Lakota reserve, wartime Japanese-American concentration camps, U.S. support for tyrants such as Vietnam's Diem, or, for that matter, the arrest of Spiritualist ministers seeking to practice their religion.

Inboden's analysis consequently does not go much beyond

cheerleading for the "We Now Know," capital "H" History of the Cold War. For example, without qualification or explanation, he remarks that Dulles's 1958 speech to the National Council of Churches "placed the United States firmly on the side of self-determination" (252). Either Inboden is unfamiliar with U.S. history or he chose to ignore the portion of the documentary record recounting the U.S. overthrow of democratically elected governments in Guatemala and Iran, interventions that occurred on Dulles's and Eisenhower's watch and favored tyrannical despotic regimes. Or perhaps bringing the anti-democratic

installation of dictators to light is the stuff of moral obtuseness.

Although *Religion and American Foreign Policy* effectively demonstrates religion's pervasive presence in U.S. foreign policy, the book falls short in identifying why religion functions so powerfully in policy creation. Inboden ultimately reifies a triumphalist narrative that leaves unexamined the contradictory nature of Cold War claims regarding the defense of religious faith and freedom. The experiences of elected Iranian leaders, Spiritualist pastors, and others marginalized by U.S. Cold War power do not square with these claims. Although the "History" of the

Cold War obscures such historical participants, shining religion's light at a more obtuse angle might make them increasingly visible.


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Notes:

1. Reverend Henrietta Young to Harry Truman, March 13, 1948, Official File 76: Church Matters, Harry S. Truman Papers, Independence, Missouri.
2. Robert Buzzanco, "Where's the Beef? Culture without Power in the Study of U.S. Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History* 24 (Fall 2000): 623-32.
3. Seth Jacobs, *America's Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and*

New SHAFR Website Launched

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) is dedicated to the scholarly study of the history of American foreign relations. As such, it promotes the "the study, advancement and dissemination of a knowledge of American Foreign Relations" through the sponsorship of research, annual meetings, and publications. The new website, www.shafir.org, extends this mission by providing an online forum for people better to understand contemporary foreign relations within a historical framework. Among the new features are the following:



Blogs composed by prominent members of our guild. Our inaugural team of bloggers, representing a diverse range of topical and geographical areas of interest, provide thoughtful, informed, and often provocative historical perspectives on foreign relations issues in the news today;

Op-eds authored by important and knowledgeable experts in our field. In addition to the blogs maintained by our blogging team, shafir.org will both actively solicit and judiciously accept opinion pieces emphasizing historical perspectives and background on specific contemporary issues;

Historical thinking about current foreign relations around the web. Shafir.org will highlight opinion pieces from other online sources that use history to explore contemporary issues in foreign affairs;

Comments on original shafir.org generated content. Visitors can comment on shafir.org blogs and op-eds by registering on the site; and

Subscription to RSS feeds for shafir.org. Visitors can subscribe to RSS feeds that will keep them updated on newly generated content on the site.

In addition to these features, the new website provides all the information about SHAFR that members came to expect from the old site. These new features simply allow shafir.org to serve as a valuable platform through which members can interact with the larger virtual community and from which they can underscore the value of historical thinking and analysis to contemporary international affairs.

www.shafir.org

- U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia, 1950-1957* (Durham, NC, 2004); Seth Jacobs, "'Our System Demands the Supreme Being': The U.S. Religious Revival and the 'Diem Experiment,' 1954-55," *Diplomatic History* 25 (Fall 2001): 589-624.
4. David Zietsma, "Building the Kingdom of God: Religious Discourse, National Identity, and the Good Neighbor Policy, 1930-1938," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 11 (Summer 2008): 179-214.
5. David Zietsma, "'Sin Has No History': Religion, National Identity, and U.S. Intervention, 1937-1941," *Diplomatic History* 31 (June 2007): 531-65.
6. David S. Foglesong, *The American Mission and the "Evil Empire"* (New York, 2007), 115-116.

**Review of William Inboden,
*Religion and American Foreign
Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of
Containment***

Seth Jacobs

A little over a decade ago, when I began work on my dissertation in earnest, I experienced one of those crises that, improperly managed, can torpedo an academic career before it begins. My subject was the "Diem experiment," Washington's commitment to preserve an independent South Vietnam under the premiership of Ngo Dinh Diem. Dissatisfied with standard explanations for this policy—i.e. that it was the result of militant U.S. anticommunism and the absence of other candidates for South Vietnam's highest office—and having fallen under the spell of several works typifying the cultural turn in diplomatic history, I sought to employ then-fashionable categories of analysis like race and gender to determine why the Eisenhower administration chose Diem as its Southeast Asian strongman. Race proved a useful lens; gender, apart from some provocative cables from Edward Lansdale describing Diem as "two-fisted" and praising his willingness to "fight like a man," worked less well. What really struck me as I reviewed government documents, though, was how often policymakers justified their decision to "sink or swim" with Diem on religious grounds. They

repeatedly cited his Catholicism as proof of anticommunism, equated his devotion to the Catholic Church with allegiance to the free world, and insisted that Buddhist, Cao Daiist, and Hoa Haoist South Vietnamese politicians were, by virtue of their faiths, undependable as Cold War allies, regardless of how much administrative experience or public support they had. As I moved out of the archives and explored Eisenhower-era popular culture—movies and television, bestselling fiction and non-fiction books, influential press organs like the *New York Times* and *Life* magazine—I realized that I was researching a period of tremendous religious revival in the United States, an almost unprecedented upsurge of piety that frequently expressed itself in hatred and fear of America's godless geopolitical opponent. It became apparent to me that statesmen like John Foster Dulles were attracted to Diem because he shared their conception of the Cold War as a crusade in which Judeo-Christians needed to band together.

This discovery intrigued me, but I could hear Cassandra howling in the background. I am not, by temperament, a maverick. I was aware, as Andrew Preston has recently pointed out, that "standard historiographical guides to the field of diplomatic history" do not include religion among the recognized "methodological and theoretical schools to explain what drives American foreign policy."¹ Well over thirty, with kids to support, I wanted to finish my dissertation and get out into the job market. I did not relish the prospect of being one of those perpetual graduate students who spend years pursuing iconoclastic theses no one takes seriously. Had my adviser, Michael Sherry, told me to drop religion as a category of analysis, I would have obeyed.

It will come as no surprise to those who know Mike to learn that his counsel ran in the opposite direction. Not only did he encourage me to investigate the relationship between midcentury American statesmen's religious beliefs and their diplomatic behavior, but he directed me to

the work of other historians, in particular Anders Stephanson, who had interpreted U.S. foreign policy as a product of religious attitudes.² The sternness of Mike's commentary on my early chapter drafts pertained to my lack of theoretical clarity, not, as would have been the case with a more orthodox critic, to the presumption that religion has no bearing on policymaking. Urged to systematize what I meant by "religion," and emboldened when Mike seemed pleased with the results, I presented my first paper at a SHAFR conference in 1999, where, as fate would have it, I stumbled upon another mentor. Andrew Rotter found my argument persuasive, offered some suggestions, and, best of all, let me read his soon-to-be-published essay on how religious preconceptions affected U.S. relations with India and Pakistan in the early Cold War period.

That a scholar as distinguished as Rotter would make the case for religion was reassuring, although the response his article elicited in a *Diplomatic History* roundtable gave me cold feet again. Had I not already written half of my dissertation, Robert Buzzanco's "Where's the Beef?" review might have caused me to start over from scratch. Yet one could rationalize the tone of that piece by attributing it to Buzzanco's dislike of cultural approaches to the history of international relations. More troubling was Patricia Hill's reaction. A self-proclaimed "culturalist" who had lauded Rotter's earlier work on gender as "brilliant," Hill insisted that religion "cannot be deployed as a category of analysis in the same way that scholars have wielded gender, class, and race"; it was not a "variable that matters as we now assume race, class, and gender must always be understood as constituents of any society or state." Hill proposed a test: Could historians accustomed to speaking of things as raced, classed, and gendered "imagine the locution 'religioned'?" No, not in 2000, and that answer indicated an "intuitive, linguistic awareness of the distinction between religion and these other structural categories." Rotter's essay

was provocative, Hill concluded, but it was more noteworthy for its risk-taking than its explanatory power. It did not herald the arrival of an important new mode of analysis for historians of U.S. diplomacy.³

Hill would, I suspect, be surprised by the number of religion-themed articles that have appeared in *Diplomatic History* since she issued her verdict. In addition to my piece on Diem, Ira Chernus's reassessment of Operation Candor, and David Zietsma's study of American interventionism in the pre-Pearl

Harbor years, the journal published an extraordinary historiographical essay by Andrew Preston that argues for the "continuing integral role of religion in the formation, execution, and justification of American foreign

policy." Preston's manifesto may one day lead to his being as closely identified with religion as Emily Rosenberg and Kristin Hoganson are with gender. If so, the honor will be well deserved. Drawing on a pool of secondary sources deep enough to convince the most obdurate skeptic, Preston demonstrates that the main difference between religion and more familiar interpretive categories is that the latter have been "formalized and theorized," meaning that they have moved beyond narrative treatments by non-academics like David Halberstam and Merle Miller into the capable hands of Rosenberg, Hoganson, Frank Costigliola, Robert Dean, and other historians who took this mass of "disorganized" biographical and anecdotal material and "provided formal systematization and methodological rigor." Preston advises scholars "using religion" to do likewise. We have all heard the stories about Dulles exasperating foreign heads of state with his sermonizing, Richard Nixon forcing Henry Kissinger to kneel in prayer during the Watergate scandal, and Jimmy Carter

continuing to teach Sunday school after becoming president, but unless we can identify the specific set of theological convictions that Dulles, Nixon, and Carter possessed with respect to God, justice, peace, and the American mission in the world, we cannot make anything but vague assertions about religion's impact on their policymaking. Happily, Preston observes, several recent works—Rotter's *Comrades at Odds* foremost among them—have "beg[un] to unravel the exceedingly complicated . . . relationship between the sacred

Inboden understands religious complexity. He is as much a student of the history of American religion as of U.S. foreign policy, and his expertise in that area keeps him from lapsing into the generalizations that have marred most works dealing with the religious revival of the Truman-Eisenhower years.

and the secular," indicating that religion might take its place among the "rubrics, such as culture or race" that diplomatic historians employ to explain policy formulation.⁴ First-rate monographs by Ira Chernus and David S.

Fogelsong exploring the religious dimension of U.S. policymaking appeared in the wake of Preston's article and seemed to justify his optimism.⁵

No one, however, has risen to the challenge laid down by Preston more ably than William Inboden, whose book will serve as the gold standard for this method of analysis, at least until Preston completes his projected study of the connection between American faith and diplomacy from the colonial era to the present. Inboden has several strengths that make him particularly—perhaps uniquely—qualified to tackle a project of this nature. First, he is a beguiling writer. His argument is entertaining as well as instructive. I marked a number of well-turned phrases, a few of which caused me to laugh out loud. For instance, when addressing the doctrinal squabbles that convulsed American Protestantism in the 1950s, Inboden notes that "if the neo-evangelicals regarded fundamentalism as just an embarrassing eccentric uncle, they saw mainline Protestantism as a veritable wicked stepmother"

(56). He gently rebukes self-important religious conferences on foreign policy for their "letterhead-consuming titles" (65). He summarizes Senator H. Alexander Smith's view of the Mao-Stalin alliance by tweaking a matrimonial invocation: "[W]hat communist atheism brought together, only God could tear apart" (207). The book is full of such felicitous touches, and one puts it down feeling good about the writing skills of this generation of historians.

Second, Inboden understands religious complexity. He is as much a student of the history of American religion as of U.S. foreign policy, and his expertise in that area keeps him from lapsing into the generalizations that have marred most works dealing with the religious revival of the Truman-Eisenhower years. Historians typically portray this revival as monolithic, as though the great mass of Americans—out of fear of atomic attack, or "lonely crowd" anomie, or the need for community in an era of transience—flocked to houses of worship and embraced an indistinct but nonetheless fervent faith, a "civil religion" that Will Herberg dubbed "The American Way of Life." In other words, the revival was a theological concomitant of the broader Age of Consensus.⁶ (I am as guilty of this over-simplification as anyone, having discovered religion's role in policymaking midway through my graduate career and then been obliged to play catch-up.) Inboden does not deny the partial truth of the "civil religion" thesis—in fact, much of his book is devoted to the White House's effort to establish an "[e]arrest yet vague, fervent yet non-dogmatic" public theology that would "enhance national unity and strengthen an anticommunist consensus"—but he also highlights the schisms that made it impossible for American churches to offer an "organized, unified response" to the Soviet threat (259-260, 37). Protestantism, he notes, was "increasingly wracked by internal divisions, as leaders and denominations fractured over theological and political disputes" (19). Reinhold Niebuhr slammed Billy

Graham in the pages of *Christianity and Crisis*; the latter reciprocated in *Christianity Today*. The National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) thought the National Council of Churches (NCC) was soft on Communism; the NCC charged the NAE with isolationism and war-mongering. Some Protestants felt that true Christians should eschew political involvement and place their trust in God alone; others considered this “a quietistic betrayal of the gospel’s social imperatives” (47). While Inboden concurs with standard interpretations of the late 1940s and 1950s as a time of religious enthusiasm in the United States, he demonstrates that this enthusiasm found expression

in different ways, especially among “churchmen” like Niebuhr and Graham.

Religion and American Foreign Policy also benefits from Inboden’s mining of dynamite primary sources, some recently declassified, the rest overlooked for

decades until Inboden blew the dust off them. For selfish reasons, I was delighted to learn that the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), an agency set up by Eisenhower to coordinate departmental execution of national security policies, considered sponsoring a covert mission to Vietnam in 1954 to, in the board’s words, “use the religious factor to intensify local anti-communism.” The mission was conceived by an Episcopalian minister named Charles Wesley Lowry, who enjoyed a friendship with President Eisenhower’s pastor, the Reverend Edward Elson, and who, together with Elson, established the Foundation for Religious Action in the Social and Civil Order (FRASCO) after Eisenhower assumed office. Lowry volunteered the services of several FRASCO members, one a Catholic priest, for a “spiritual offensive movement directed

against communism and for a new democratic order” in South Vietnam. FRASCO’s operatives would slip into the country and, Lowry declared, organize “native Buddhists, Cao Daiists, Catholics, and other men and women of conviction” in support of the Diem government. Apparently, Vice President Richard Nixon was quite taken with this scheme; he lobbied upper-echelon administration figures to endorse it, assuring them of his “high regard for and considerable confidence in Dr. Lowry.” Since other documents relating to Lowry’s plan have yet to be declassified, we do not know if it was implemented, but Inboden is surely right to assert that it “provides a revealing window

Methodologically, traditional diplomatic historians are fond of reminding culture vultures like me that while we may portray the existence of widespread attitudes about race, gender, or religion, we cannot connect those attitudes definitively to deeds. In the end, our approach requires a leap of faith to account for the origin of the behavior we are endeavoring to explain.

into FRASCO’s cooperation with the administration, Nixon’s very early interest in Vietnam, and the ideological uses of religion against communism” (280-281). I wish these papers had been available when I was researching my first book, and

I intend to cite them the next time a colleague minimizes religion’s importance in shaping American diplomacy.

I will moreover refer that colleague to Inboden’s account of the adventures of Myron Taylor, the “quixotic, controversial, and elusive figure” who gave up his job as chief executive of the United States Steel Corporation to serve first as coordinator of American relief efforts in war-torn Italy and then as President Harry Truman’s “chosen agent” in a “grandiose, secretive plan . . . to unite the leaders of the various factions of Christendom in a pan-religious alliance” (119, 122). Taylor has heretofore been almost invisible to historians of the Truman administration. David McCullough does not mention him in his cinderblock-sized biography.⁷ Yet Truman thought Taylor’s mission important enough

to warrant a private channel of communication: Taylor bypassed the State Department and reported to the president directly; his dispatches relating consultations with, among others, Pope Pius XII, the Papal Nuncio in Paris, the Lutheran Bishop of Berlin, and the Archbishop of Canterbury were sent in secret code. Truman believed, as he put it, that “[t]he cause of Communism versus Christianity and Democracy transcends minor differences in Christian creeds,” and he sought to build an anticommunist coalition on values shared among all Christians, regardless of denomination, in Europe and America (121). Indeed, Truman once entertained the possibility of “send[ing Taylor] to see the top Buddhist and the Grand Lama of Tibet” if it would help “mobilize the people who believe in a moral world against the Bolshevik materialists” (139-140). For five years, Taylor engaged in what Inboden calls “spiritual shuttle diplomacy,” navigating a European “religious landscape rife with almost 2,000 years of ecclesiastical controversy” while fending off the brickbats of American Protestants who considered Catholicism and Communism “equally repressive, equally threatening, and therefore equally reprehensible” (124, 129, 128). His initiatives failed, and Truman terminated the campaign in late 1951. Still, the president had articulated an objective that his successor would achieve, not so much by appealing to European and American clerics as by going over their heads and using the “White House pulpit” to promote a doctrinally inclusive faith around which all opponents of Communism could rally.

The most significant primary source Inboden draws upon is Senator H. Alexander Smith’s daily journal, in which the senator recorded, in copious detail, his search for divine counsel on matters routine and world-shaking. This is the kind of archival bonanza scholars dream of, and it comes closer to solving the ubiquitous cause-and-effect problem than any document I have encountered. Methodologically, traditional diplomatic historians are

fond of reminding culture vultures like me that while we may portray the existence of widespread attitudes about race, gender, or religion, we cannot connect those attitudes definitively to deeds. In the end, our approach requires a leap of faith to account for the origin of the behavior we are endeavoring to explain. This is an unavoidable feature of cultural and social history, but, as Inboden notes, Smith's diary provides "incomparable material" for scholars "wrestling" with the issue (191). How can we say with confidence that, for example, Smith's speech on the Senate floor in support of the Truman Doctrine was informed by his prayer life and religious convictions? Because his diary entries for 5 and 7 April 1947 read, in part: "God grant that in these days I may find my truth and speak it into my speech in the Senate on this Greek and Turkish aid bill. . . . I have gotten up early for the inspiration of the morning and God. I am making my notes for this foreign relations speech. It must be God or it will fail. It comes to me that I will be guided. Start now. . . . God will help me in my dictation" (198).

Smith penned similar entries while brooding over how to respond to proposed U.S. membership in NATO, Mao Zedong's victory over the Nationalists in the Chinese Civil War, and the face-off between Eisenhower and Robert Taft for the 1952 Republican nomination. His diary's somber, supplicatory tone remained the same when the topic under review was his own over-fondness for tobacco or Mrs. Smith's temper tantrums. The senator "believ[ed] God to be involved in every one of life's last details," Inboden observes. "His foreign policy was merely an extension of his personal commitments" (201). And Smith's strongest commitment was to the Moral Re-Armament movement (MRA), a "shadowy" organization founded in the 1920s which taught that God gave "unmediated instructions" to those who engaged in a morning ritual called "quiet time." Disciples were told to "pray and then wait attentively for God's 'guidance' for the day's events" (192). Smith performed this ritual every morning

from young adulthood until his death in 1967. For half a century, his conduct was governed by the advice he believed he received during quiet time, and when he wrote his daily "to do" lists, he prefaced each goal with "It comes to me to. . ." This phrase, Inboden notes, "indicat[ed] his unambiguous conviction that God spoke intimately and directly to his daily activities," whether they involved lobbying for Chiang Kai-shek or abstaining from cigars (195).

Repress that smirk. Smith's meditations may strike academics in the twenty-first century as amusing, but he was no "bucolic Fundamentalist yahoo" of the type satirized by H. L. Mencken.⁸ Before entering politics, Smith had been a lawyer in New York City and a professor at Princeton, and he became one of the Senate's authorities on international affairs during the early years of the Cold War. As a longtime member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and occasional chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian Affairs, he was in a position to exercise considerable influence on foreign policy, especially toward Asia. He enjoyed the confidence of Dulles, who hoped he would become chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and he worked with such prestigious legislators as Representative Walter Judd and Senator William Knowland to craft some of the most consequential foreign-policy initiatives of the Truman-Eisenhower era. I actually think Inboden underrates Smith's stature as a policymaker. He might have pointed out that the senator accompanied Dulles to the Manila Conference that established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which, of course, would supply an excuse for a variety of U.S. interventions in Vietnam. Dulles was concerned about obtaining the constitutionally required two-thirds vote for ratification of the SEATO pact in the Senate, and he therefore selected Smith and Mike Mansfield to travel to Manila with him and give the treaty their imprimatur. Mansfield, a former professor of Asian history nicknamed "China

Mike" by his colleagues, was a logical choice, but it was Smith whom Dulles lauded as an "expert on the Far East" when announcing the membership of the U.S. delegation.⁹ We may assume that the "expert" advice that Smith gave Dulles at Manila, like every act in his long career of public service, was religiously infused; it "came to him" as orders from God while he meditated before breakfast. Historians who probe beyond this in search of Smith's "real" motivation are committing the cardinal sin of the discipline: anachronism. Inboden recognizes the need to engage historical figures on their own terms, and the result, especially in his chapter on Smith, is dazzling.

The greatest advantage Inboden possesses over other scholars exploring the interplay between religion and foreign policy is, I submit, his own devoutness. Some may argue that this compromises his objectivity—as though there has ever been a completely objective historian—but I disagree. Because Inboden is himself a Christian, he does not condescend to his subjects. He treats them with a measure of empathy rare among academics. More than rare: it is almost unheard-of. Twenty years have passed since Robert Wuthnow demonstrated the correlation between higher levels of education and lower levels of religiosity in America, a phenomenon Wuthnow labeled the "education gap."¹⁰ This trend is even more pronounced today. A professor openly affirming his or her belief in God and the power of prayer would be anomalous in any history department, including mine—and I teach at a Jesuit university. Yet Inboden makes no bones about the centrality of faith in his life. He told a reporter for *Christianity Today* a while back (I hope he will forgive me for Googling and citing this source) that the reason he enrolled in Yale's history Ph.D. program after working as a staff member in the U.S. Senate was that "I realized I was not equipped with a theoretical framework that would help me approach politics as a Christian." Although barely out of college, the precocious Inboden

was one of the authors of the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act, and the experience of drafting and negotiating passage of that piece of legislation, he recalled, "challenged me to ask what role religion has in foreign policy. When is it right to leverage the kingdom of man for the ends of the kingdom of God?" *CT* editorialized, "These were big questions for a young policy wonk."¹¹ They were also the same questions that Harry Truman, Dwight Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles, and other elite American geopoliticians asked themselves and each other as they led their nation through the first decade and a half of the Cold War. These men were profoundly concerned with the religious component of foreign policy, even if diplomatic historians have, until recently, neglected it. Inboden understands midcentury policymakers' priorities; they are, to a considerable extent, his own.

Thus, when he examines Eisenhower's notorious assertion that "our form of government makes no sense unless it is founded in a deeply felt religious faith, and I don't care what it is," he does not, in the manner of Bancroft Prize-winning historian James Patterson, roll his eyes at the president's fatuity and write off the revival for which Eisenhower was standard-bearer as superficial.¹² Instead, he takes Eisenhower seriously. Viewed in context, he observes, "Eisenhower's sentiment reveals much." The president had just visited with his old comrade from World War II, Soviet General Grigori Zhukov, and he was describing their encounter to a group of journalists, seeking to explain why, despite the warm embraces, there could be no true détente. Eisenhower reminded his audience of the Declaration of Independence's claim that all men "are endowed by their Creator with inalienable rights" and then offered his own interpretation: to wit, that a "deeply felt religious faith" affirming human equality was necessary for democratic government. "With us, of course, it is the Judeo-Christian concept," Eisenhower declared, "but it must be a religion that all men are created equal. So what was the use

of me talking to Zhukov about that? Religion, he had been taught, was the opiate of the people" (259-260).

Eisenhower's remarks, however inelegant, were consistent with his overall effort to use religion as a weapon in combating the Soviet Union. Like Truman, he believed that theological distinctions were trivial in the face of atheistic Communism, and that Americans should unite around the core set of principles common to Protestants, Jews, and Catholics. The United States needed a nonsectarian faith as "deeply felt" as the Soviets' godless creed or the free world was doomed. We can criticize Eisenhower, as some of his contemporaries did, for valuing religion's social utility above its spiritual content, but Inboden has made it much harder for scholars to dismiss religion as a significant force in Eisenhower's policymaking. If anything, it outweighed the holy trinity of race, class, and gender, and may even have trumped familiar explanatory devices like "national security." To Eisenhower, and most government officials of his generation, the Cold War was a holy war. The Truman and Eisenhower administrations worked as hard to fortify America's religious defenses as they did to build up the nation's nuclear arsenal. By restoring this long-ignored feature of U.S. foreign policy to its proper place at the forefront of policymakers' consciousness, William Inboden has made an invaluable contribution to our understanding of the early Cold War era. His book is essential reading.

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Notes:

1. Andrew Preston, "Bridging the Gap between the Sacred and the Secular in the History of American Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History* 30 (November 2006): 791.
2. Anders Stephanson, *Manifest Destiny: American Expansion and the Empire of Right* (New York, 1995).
3. Andrew J. Rotter, "Christians, Muslims, and Hindus: Religion and U.S.-South Asian Relations, 1947-1954," *Diplomatic History* 24 (Fall 2000): 593-613; Robert Buzzanco, "Commentary: Where's the Beef? Culture without Power in the Study of U.S. Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History* 24 (Fall 2000): 623-632; Patricia R. Hill, "Commentary: Religion as a Category of Diplomatic

Analysis," *Diplomatic History* 24 (Fall 2000): 633-640.

4. Seth Jacobs, "'Our System Demands the Supreme Being': The U.S. Religious Revival and the 'Diem Experiment,' 1954-1955," *Diplomatic History* 25 (Fall 2001): 589-624; Ira Chernus, "Operation Candor: Fear, Faith, and Flexibility," *Diplomatic History* 29 (2005): 799-803; David Zietsma, "'Sin Has No History': Religion, National Identity, and U.S. Intervention, 1937-1941," *Diplomatic History* 31 (June 2007): 531-565; Preston, "Bridging the Gap," 783-812; Andrew Rotter, *Comrades at Odds: The United States and India, 1947-1964* (Ithaca, 2000).
5. Ira Chernus, *Apocalypse Management: Eisenhower and the Discourse of National Insecurity* (Stanford, 2008); David S. Fogelson, *The American Mission and the "Evil Empire": The Crusade for a "Free Russia" since 1881* (Cambridge, MA, 2007).
6. Will Herberg, *Protestant, Catholic, Jew: An Essay in American Religious Sociology* (Garden City, NJ, 1955), 77-82. For examples of this tendency, see Douglas Miller and Marion Nowak, *The Fifties: The Way We Really Were* (Garden City, NJ, 1977), 83-104; J. Ronald Oakley, *God's Country: America in the Fifties* (New York, 1986), 311-327; Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, 1996), 77-100.
7. David McCullough, *Truman* (New York, 1993).
8. H. L. Mencken, "In Memoriam: W. J. B.," *The Vintage Mencken*, ed. Alistair Cooke (New York, 1983), 165.
9. "Two Go with Dulles: Senators Smith and Mansfield to be Far East Advisers," *New York Times*, 20 August 1954.
10. Robert Wuthnow, *The Restructuring of American Religion: Society and Faith since World War II* (Princeton, 1988), 168.
11. Lauren F. Winner, "Policy Wonks for Christ," *Christianity Today*, 13 November 2000.
12. James T. Patterson, *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974* (New York, 1996), 329, 332-33.

Author's Response

William Inboden

Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960, appears to have elicited quite an array of responses. I hope their diversity testifies to the potential for continued lines of inquiry into the role of religion in diplomatic history. I will attempt to address what appear to be the reviewers' main points and along the way offer a few further ruminations on approaches to the subject.

Laura Belmonte and Lloyd Gardner each raise in slightly different formulations a common question: How *much* did religion matter in the

early Cold War? Belmonte says that in my book “one gains little sense of how spirituality ranked among other determinants of U.S. foreign policy,” and she asks specifically whether and how religion influenced particular policy initiatives such as NSC-68, NATO, the Berlin Airlift, etc. Gardner puts it this way: “Suppose we leave out the religious factor? Would American policies have been any different at Yalta? At Potsdam?”

On one level, such questions can help discipline and refine an argument by keeping it tethered to actual events. But on another level, they shift the analytical ground too much to a narrower, tactical focus on specific policies without first asking why American leaders believed those policies were necessary. The primary objective of my book is to address broader, strategic issues: Why did the United States even fight the Cold War? How were the boundaries of the conflict (i.e., the boundaries of containment) determined? How were friend and foe defined? Religion forms a significant part of the answer to all these questions.

Thus to Gardner’s question about Yalta and Potsdam I would reply that religion helps solve the historical puzzle of why Yalta and Potsdam are primarily (and correctly) remembered today more for marking the *start* of the Cold War rather than marking the *end* of World War II. To revisit a point made in my book, religion helps explain why the United States and Soviet Union pivoted so quickly from their posture as uneasy allies sitting together to negotiate the end of World War II to a posture as uneasy adversaries sitting across from each other and establishing the boundaries of their own inchoate conflict. Religion also helps illuminate other specific Cold War initiatives—hence my comparison of NSC-68 to a “sermon,” for example, and Bruce Kuklick’s analysis of it as a seminal American civil-religious document.¹ Hence also Reinhold Niebuhr’s description of the “spiritual significance of NATO.” Niebuhr contrasts religious liberty and religious belief in NATO countries with the state-mandated atheism of Warsaw Pact nations and

observes that in NATO “the spiritual facts correspond to the strategic necessities.”²

Belmonte’s questions about “how spirituality ranked among other determinants of U.S. foreign policy” and how Truman balanced “economic, security, military, and political imperatives with spiritual factors” are intriguing but somewhat miscast. Disentangling these factors in the historical record with any precision would be almost impossible. These factors were not even disentangled in Truman’s mind (or Eisenhower’s, for that matter). Nor were they necessarily in competition with each other. Rather, they coalesced and reinforced each other in the basic worldview that governed the way Truman and Eisenhower perceived the Cold War and defined America’s role. They believed that the rights and responsibilities of both people and nations were authored by God and included limited and accountable government (democracy), private property and open markets (capitalism), and the use of force to protect borders and deter threats (security). God in turn ordained that the United States should bear a particular responsibility to protect and advance these values in the world, and He endowed the nation with distinctive military power, economic capacity, and spiritual capital to carry out the task. For Truman and Eisenhower, including a religious dimension in their definition of the Cold War sometimes led to explicitly religious policy initiatives, such as their efforts to unite world religious leaders under a common banner of anticommunism or to launch a world day of prayer. But it also meant that Truman and Eisenhower believed that otherwise secular policy initiatives (such as NATO, the Marshall Plan, Atoms for Peace, Open Skies, etc.) also had a spiritual element by virtue of the fact that they proceeded from a spiritual

understanding of the Cold War.

Curiously, Belmonte avers that “Inboden discounts the possibility that Truman used religious rhetoric for political gain.” Yet my argument is precisely the opposite: Truman (and Eisenhower, Dulles, and most other American leaders) did in fact use religious rhetoric for political gain. The book describes religion, for example, as a “potent tool for strengthening anticommunist resolve at home” and contends that “only by summoning the American people to a religious crusade could U.S. leaders maintain domestic support for the extraordinary measures needed to fight the Cold War.”³ However—and here is the other, crucial half of the argument—they also used religious rhetoric *because they really believed it*. This is hardly incongruous or inconceivable. Given the complexities of human identity and the challenges of political leadership, it should not surprise us that political leaders could sincerely believe something and also employ those beliefs to persuade, manipulate, and/or inspire others.

I want to be careful, however, to avoid reflexively overstating the case. While I think that the documentary evidence and the arguments presented in my book offer a persuasive account of the religious roots of the Cold War, I do not serve either my own credibility or the craft of history by overdetermining the argument. Thus, as the reviewers noted, I also try to present in the book what I regard as constraints on its thesis, such as certain gaps in the archival record or the comparatively limited role of religious conviction in the life of a Cold War lion such as Dean Acheson—though even he embraced a religiously informed definition of the conflict.

The appreciative review by Seth Jacobs is the type that authors dream of, and I am tempted just to type “Amen” (or an appropriate equivalent) and leave it at that. More

The primary objective of my book is to address broader, strategic issues: Why did the United States even fight the Cold War? How were the boundaries of the conflict (i.e., the boundaries of containment) determined? How were friend and foe defined?

seriously, I thank him for his gracious words, particularly given his own path-breaking work in the field. Jacobs' review does touch on a couple of issues that I think merit some further reflection. They are related yet distinct. First, should scholars of diplomatic history treat religion primarily as an issue of identity (alongside race and gender), or ideology, or neither, or both? Second, what role (if any) should a historian's personal identity, including political and religious commitments, play in historical scholarship?

Jacobs and Andrew

Preston, among others, have done some sophisticated thinking about the first of these questions. In considering how religion can influence policy, Jacobs describes the need to "straddle both genres" of diplomatic history and cultural history and engage in "ideological history—or history of the power of ideas" in a way that encompasses a somewhat unorthodox factor such as religion as well as a more theorized factor such as race.⁴ Preston in turn sketches out the beginnings of a framework for how diplomatic historians might engage with religion. While he locates religion primarily in the realm of identity and suggests a similar methodology for studying it ("historians using religion must emulate their counterparts who have already used gender, race, and culture"), he then qualifies that suggestion by declaring that "'religion,' of course, is innately different from 'gender' or 'race,' both as subjects of historical inquiry and as causal explanations of historical developments." He also notes that "religion differs fundamentally" from gender, race, and culture in that it is "both essentially voluntary and escapable."⁵ He is for the most part correct to highlight religion's voluntary and escapable nature, although there are traditions for

which that characterization would have to be modified, such as Judaism, with its ethno-national dimension, or Islam, with its strict constraints on apostasy.⁶

Religion has at least four additional characteristics that make it distinctive as an interpretive category, particularly for diplomatic history. First, religion by its very nature includes a meta-narrative that

exists outside the individual and purports to define the past, present, and future as well as the individual's relationship to a larger community. It addresses not only "who am I?" but also

"what is the reality of the world, and how does it bear on me?" Second, religion makes normative moral demands. It is as much about what ought to be done as who a person is. Related to this is the third characteristic, which is especially relevant for the study of diplomatic history: religion's normative moral obligations and meta-narratives can apply to nations as well as individuals. Religion can help shape an entire nation's belief in its role and purpose in the world. The final characteristic, unique to religion, is its eschatological dimension. Religion attempts to define an eternal reality beyond time and beyond this world. Yet actions that take place in this world are very much influenced by eternal perspectives, whether they be Hindu doctrines of reincarnation, utopian Christian post-millennialism, apocalyptic pre-millennialism, Islamic Shi'ism's hopes for the Hidden Twelfth Imam, or any number of other traditions. Given these factors and others, religion does not seem to fit neatly into a definition of either identity or ideology, and as such poses both unique challenges and opportunities for further scholarly work.

On the question of how a scholar's personal convictions and identity bear on his/her work on history,

Jacobs offers a respectful and nuanced perspective. One of the most helpful aspects of the postmodernist critique of objectivity (or perhaps I should say "objectivity") is that it forces us to interrogate our own identity and beliefs and acknowledge how they invariably shade our reconstructions and interpretations of the past. Identity and personal beliefs are inescapable for any scholar, and in this era of Google they are also much more readily apparent. Sometimes they may help illuminate otherwise opaque historiographical questions and perspectives, while at other times (or even at the same time) they may bias and distort our reading of the past. In my case, on an existential level I understand firsthand what it means to have serious religious commitments. But this does not mean I can or would claim any privileged epistemological insights into the study of history. In other words, I read and try to decipher the same archives and secondary texts that are available to every other historian. And I attempt to respect the proper boundaries between scholarship and partisanship.

To take one example, consider the question of civil religion, described in my book as an instrument for maintaining domestic consensus and support for U. S. Cold War policies. David Zietsma seems to think that I applaud civil religion, and he wishes that I had critiqued it more fiercely. But to do so risks confusing the distinction between scholarship and advocacy. As a historian I find American civil religion interesting and important and tried to describe it as such in my book. Yet as a Christian I find civil religion idolatrous and have said as much in an explicitly partisan/confessional setting, more appropriate for such debates.⁷

Of the four reviewers in this roundtable, Zietsma offers the most sustained critique of my book across several fronts, and I will attempt to give him a more extended response. Some contextualization is in order to frame the thrust of his critique and my reply. Over four hundred years of American history, many Christians across a range of theological traditions have wrestled with the

spiritual identity of America. Much of this hand-wringing can be distilled into a question of biblical typology: Is America the "New Jerusalem" or the "new Babylon"? This vexing question symbolized and summarized the struggle to define America's place in the world and the identity of its people.⁸ Jerusalem represents the Promised Land, the city upon a hill, the light of the world in which the glorious eschaton has arrived. The New Jerusalem is chosen and blessed by God, embodies peace, justice, and liberty, and in its final days will be visited by God Himself. Babylon is the paragon of wickedness and sin, the city of exile and alienation, an oppressor of its own people and a scourge to its neighbours. In the last days it will be visited by God as well, though He will come not in peace but in wrath and righteous judgment.

When political leaders have held America up as the hope of the world, a nation that resists tyranny, advances freedom, and promotes peace, they have spoken of it as extending the promise of the New Jerusalem around the globe. Countless familiar examples could be cited, from John Winthrop to Ronald Reagan. Both evocative and representative is William Henry Seward's assertion that "to the oppressed masses, the United States is the Palestine from which comes . . . political salvation."⁹ But when the United States has oppressed its own people, trafficked in colonialism, supported dictators, or engaged in the killing of innocents, it has been condemned as a latter-day Babylon. Again history offers myriad examples, from William Lloyd Garrison and William Jennings Bryan to Daniel Berrigan, who, channelling the Book of Revelation, bellowed his fierce denunciation of the United States during the Vietnam War as another Babylon "whose very stones ooze with the sweat and blood of victims."¹⁰

Though Zietsma does not explicitly invoke "Jerusalem" or "Babylon," his critique embodies these tropes. For him it seems that in World War II and the Cold War era the United States saw itself as the New Jerusalem but was in fact the new Babylon. The nation that defined

itself as righteousness incarnate, chosen by God to punish evil, in reality oppressed its people at home, supported tyrants abroad, murdered innocents, and pursued a foreign policy of imperial adventurism. In Zietsma's narrative, Americans located "evil, atheistic enemies abroad so that they could construct a righteous national community in opposition to them." But he seems to think that just the opposite was true. The real evil lay in the nation that was guilty of the "terror bombings of Dresden, Tokyo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki, the violent crushing of organized labor groups in wartime America, the ongoing segregation and lynching of black Americans, the forced sterilization of natives on the Lakota reserve, wartime Japanese-American concentration camps, support for tyrants such as Vietnam's Diem, or, for that matter, the arrest of Spiritualist ministers seeking to practice their religion." And for good measure, in the next paragraph Zietsma reminds us of the U.S.-supported coups in Guatemala and Iran. How can such a nation be anything but a latter-day Babylon?

Of course, as potent and religiously evocative as these Jerusalem-or-Babylon typologies can be, they distort more than they reveal. Because of course the United States is neither Jerusalem nor Babylon, but rather a unique amalgam of greatness and squalor, of brilliance and folly, of magnanimity and avarice, of nobility and turpitude, of periodic mediocrity—and yes, of the sacred and the profane. To do justice to the study of the American past is to acknowledge these paradoxes in all their complexity.

Yet Zietsma seems to have little patience for those who do not employ history-as-prophetic-*jeremiad*. In his words, my book "reifies a triumphalist narrative," "is narrowly focused on the 'great men' of history," uses a "methodological strait-jacket," and "does not go much beyond cheerleading." If those comments were not damning enough, he also suggests that the author is either ignorant or guilty of historical malpractice ("either Inboden is unfamiliar with U.S. history or he

chose to ignore the portion of the documentary record").

Well, where to begin? I am by disposition an optimist and so will start with the positive, highlighting at least three meaningful areas in which I believe Zietsma and I are in agreement. First, we both believe religion is an important factor in diplomatic history. Second, we agree that American political and religious leaders constructed a civil religion narrative in part to maintain domestic support for America's Cold War foreign policy posture. Third, we both think history has a moral dimension and believe it is often appropriate (though often precarious, as I suggest in my discussion above on partisanship) for historians to incorporate moral judgments into their work. I have no wish to gloss over our disagreements, but these areas of agreement are not insignificant.

We differ, however, on questions of methodology. Zietsma laments that I rely exclusively on "empirical inquiry" and the "documentary record" while failing to explore the "undocumented" psyche or employ "discourse analysis." It would be tempting at this point to respond that I plead guilty to doing what historians do, which is research in archives. But there are more substantive reasons for my skepticism about the methodology he advocates, at least on the terms in which he describes it. First, for historians to depart from the use of texts and instead engage in speculations (however linked to theory) about the "undocumented psyche" of people and nations seems to subject the past to a standard that we would not want to be subject to ourselves.¹¹ Second, I think it is safe to presume that Zietsma would like his fellow historians to engage his arguments based on the documentary record he has provided, to read the text of the review he has written, assume that the text is closely related to his ideas and intended meaning, and attempt to respond to the specific points he makes. In other words, he would like us to employ empirical inquiry.

In contrast, discourse analysis as Zietsma employs it risks distorting

more than illuminating the past. Specifically, it attempts to flatten out and squeeze the complexities, nuances, and subtleties of historical actors into a rigid ideological template largely contrived by the historian. In other words, if Zietsma dismisses a reliance on archives and texts as being a "methodological straitjacket," then the discourse analysis that he advocates risks being a methodological cookie-cutter, which tries to make diverse figures, events, and ideas look more or less the same.

Zietsma cites his own *Diplomatic History* article, "Sin Has No History," as an example of the approach he thinks I should have taken in exploring how "religious discourse" ostensibly functions in shaping foreign policy, in this case during the years immediately leading up to the American entry into World War II.¹² Some interesting insights notwithstanding, this article reveals in several ways the deficiencies of this approach.

For example, Zietsma bases the thrust of his argument (and even his article title) on a re-casting of Reinhold Niebuhr's articulation of the doctrine of "original sin" as the catalyst for the creation of a "religiously structured narrative of the United States as a just, moral, and good nation standing up against evil enemies."¹³ He makes a virtually identical assertion about the Cold War in his review of my book when he says that "the hegemonic discourse of original sin formed the basis of America's postwar national mission, namely, to contain evil that was 'original'." This is a misreading of Niebuhr and a misunderstanding of the doctrine of original sin. In fact, one of Niebuhr's most consistent themes, constantly intoned throughout his decades in public life, is the pretension, self-righteousness, folly, and yes, sin, of all nations—especially the United States. So too with the doctrine of original sin, which indicts all human beings, all nations, and virtually all actions as tainted in some way by sin. In Niebuhr's own words, through original sin "one may understand that no matter . . . how universal the community which human statecraft

may organize, or how pure the aspirations of the saintliest idealists may be, there is no level of human moral or social achievement in which there is not some corruption of inordinate self-love."¹⁴ Additionally, it is implausible to claim that American political leaders simply appropriated Niebuhr's doctrine to justify their own agendas. First, it is extremely rare to find examples of American politicians at the time even using the term "original sin." Second, Niebuhr's frequent criticisms of America's shortcomings and self-righteousness imposed limits on the degree to which he was embraced by American political leaders, especially at the presidential and cabinet level.

However, the pervasiveness of sin does not obviate the possibility of drawing moral distinctions and, what is equally important, acting on those distinctions. For Niebuhr, the fact that the United States was sinfully flawed did not mean that German Nazism (or later, Soviet Communism) could not be regarded as embodying evil of a greater magnitude or that other nations would not be justified in using (or even compelled to use) force against them.

Related to this inaccurate rendering of Niebuhr and original sin is Zietsma's odd indictment of "neo-orthodox Christian realist discourse" more generally.¹⁵ Here again, Zietsma appears to be flattening out some remarkable complexities and diversities within this theological tradition in order to fit it into his argument and critique. Contrary to Zietsma's rendering of neo-orthodoxy as a crude instrument of American religio-nationalism, it is in fact a tradition of primarily European origin whose main proponents (e.g., Karl Barth and Emil Brunner of Switzerland, Dietrich Bonhoeffer of Germany) included among their concerns the need to insulate the church theologically from the captivating allure of nationalism. In Barth's and Bonhoeffer's case especially this concern was more than academic, as the former led a group of German pastors in establishing the "Confessing Church" in dissent from Nazi control and the latter was executed by the Nazis

for his involvement in an effort to assassinate Adolf Hitler. In the United States, while the Niebuhr brothers were the most visible proponents of neo-orthodox Christian realism in the American context, they had their own significant theological and political differences with each other, and even more so with Barth. For example, Reinhold and H. Richard engaged in a legendary debate in the pages of the *Christian Century* in 1932 over whether the United States should take action against the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, and they later disagreed significantly over American nuclear weapons policy in the Cold War. In the case of Barth, his decades-long theological and political differences with Reinhold Niebuhr erupted most visibly at the founding of the World Council of Churches in Amsterdam in 1948.¹⁶ This clash even made the pages of the *New York Times*.

This short digression into the complexities of neo-orthodoxy is important because it demonstrates how a central tenet of Zietsma's argument and methodology—specifically how a monolithic discourse of religious nationalism allegedly shaped U.S. foreign policy—depends on an oversimplified and inaccurate rendering of both a theological tradition and important historical figures.¹⁷ Similarly, Zietsma's argument is oddly un-tethered from world events. He repeatedly invokes various iterations of the claim that Japanese and German atrocities and aggression "were not the reasons for U.S. intervention" but rather functioned as *ex post facto* rationalizations for self-righteous American bellicosity.¹⁸ This argument depends on an almost conspiratorial rendering of American religious and political leaders employing self-aggrandizing rhetoric to drive their nation to war; it virtually ignores the fact that these American leaders were living amidst geopolitical realities that changed profoundly by the month. Of course, as Zietsma and I and virtually every other historian would agree, the United States has always conceived of itself in spiritual terms as having a providential role to play in the world, and its

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Applicants for any of the three positions should submit a letter of interest, current curriculum vitae or resume, and the names of three references to:

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Mershon Center for International Security Studies
1501 Neil Ave.
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Attn: Melanie Mann

leaders justified or rationalized many policies in this light. Yet it is not implausible that a nation that witnessed, in the span of less than a decade, the Japanese invasion of China, the Rape of Nanking, the *Anschluss*, the annexation of the Sudetenland, *Kristallnacht*, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Germany's invasion of Poland, Germany's invasions of Denmark, Norway, France, and the Low Countries, the Tripartite Pact, the Japanese invasion of Indochina, the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, etc., would interpret these events through a moral, religious, and political framework and shape its words and actions accordingly.¹⁹ It is a question of causality and complexity. Zietsma seems to cast America's belief in its own righteousness as a cynical contrivance, almost divorced from the context of profoundly troubling world developments, but it is perhaps better understood as the outgrowth of an effort by American leaders to draw on their own convictions and their nation's religious and moral traditions to interpret these events and determine how to act.

This interpretation by no means implies agreement with—let alone unapologetic cheerleading for—every aspect of American foreign policy, whether in World War II, the Cold War, or any other era. It is just an attempt to understand the mindsets and motivations of the leaders who shaped the nation's role in the world. So when Zietsma claims that "any hints of ambiguity in the Cold War's moral boundaries suffer Inboden's interpretive wrath," it is tempting to highlight the various sections in my book that in fact do relate the manifest shortcomings of U.S. policy, foreign and domestic, at the time. I point out, for example, that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki violate Christian just-war teaching, and I note the anti-Semitism of Eisenhower and Dulles; Eisenhower's anemic record on civil rights; Truman's lack of theological depth and attempts to coerce religious communities; the vicious anti-Catholicism of American Protestant leaders; the vapid and manipulative tactics of Moral Re-

Armament; the obsequiousness and self-promotion of Edward Elson; and so on.

But there is a larger point here. The main purpose of my book is not to pronounce judgment on winners and losers, but to explore from the American side why the conflict was fought and why it was fought the way it was. This does not mean that I do not have opinions—as a historian, as an American, as a human being—about the moral and geopolitical outcomes of the Cold War. But I do not regard those opinions as the primary domain of this book. Yet at the same time, some moral judgments are inescapable, particularly insofar as they touch on questions of the historical record. On this count, one passage in Zietsma's review is especially puzzling and problematic.

He begins with an indignant recounting of the 1947 arrest by local police of a fortune-telling minister in Los Angeles as an example of religious persecution in the United States. A few pages later, he laments that "Inboden seems simply to accept as true pervasive claims that the Soviet Union threatened religious faith," and he follows that with a rather clumsy attempt at "gotcha" by citing alleged examples from my book about pockets of religious resilience within the USSR. Does Zietsma really mean to make the risible claim that the Soviet Union did not in fact execute or imprison tens of thousands (at least) of religious believers? Unfortunately, he seems to have fallen into the posture of assuming that, just because one fervently disagrees with American foreign policy, it is somehow inappropriate to acknowledge Soviet barbarism. But this is of course a false choice. One does not have to applaud or even agree with U.S. Cold War foreign policy to recognize Soviet Communism's record of brutal oppression and of particular hostility to religious belief.

Finally, a brief comment on Zietsma's complaint that the cover of my book "portentously" displays "four white males." Indeed, Eisenhower, Truman, Niebuhr, and Graham are all white males. But during the immediate postwar years,

they were also four of the most influential political and religious figures in American life. Identifying them only by their race and gender with no regard for their political or theological importance and the differences among them may be, ironically enough, an effective demonstration of the analytical limitations of the use of race and gender categories alone.¹⁹

William Inboden is Senior Vice-President of the Legatum Institute for Global Development.

Notes:

1. William Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment* (New York, 2008), 3.
2. Inboden, *Religion*, 67.
3. Inboden, *Religion*, 5.
4. Seth Jacobs, *America's Miracle Man in Vietnam: Ngo Dinh Diem, Religion, Race, and U.S. Intervention in Southeast Asia, 1950-1957* (Durham, NC, 2004), 5.
5. Andrew Preston, "Bridging the Gap between the Sacred and the Secular in the History of American Foreign Relations," *Diplomatic History* 30 (November 2006), 796, 809.
6. Also worth noting is how the development of individualistic Christianity in the United States likely influences the academic perspective on religion that almost all American scholars have, regardless of faith affiliation. Walter Mead's observation is relevant in this regard: "Christianity in the American context is less and less a matter of family or ethnic identity, more and more a matter of personal choice. . . . Historically, religious identity throughout the world has been largely an aspect of a broader social and ethnic identity. One is Greek Orthodox or Hindu because that is the faith one was born into. The mobility of American religious life, with frequent movement mostly among the major Protestant denominations but also beyond and across these boundaries, combined with the increasingly individualistic nature of American theology and piety, has substantially changed this picture. Religion today is increasingly part of a self-constructed, chosen identity for Americans." Walter Russell Mead, *God and Gold: Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern World* (New York, 2007), 246.
7. William Inboden, "One Cheer for Civil Religion?," *Modern Reformation*, September/October 2005, 23-29.
8. For a theologically and historically informed reflection on this typology, see Richard John Neuhaus, "Our American Babylon," in *First Things*, December 2005.
9. Quoted in Michael Oren, *Power, Faith, and Fantasy: America in the Middle East, 1776 to the Present* (New York, 2007), 231.
10. Quoted in Paul Boyer, *When Time Shall Be No More: Prophecy Belief in Modern American Culture* (Cambridge, MA, 1992), 260.
11. This critique of discourse analysis has, of course, been made more eloquently and in a more sophisticated fashion by many

other scholars. See, for example, the reviews by Bruce Kuklick and Jeffrey Engel in *H-Diplo Roundtable Reviews* volume IX, No. 13, 15 June 2008, 15-24. Also at <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/MythAmericanDiplomacy-Roundtable.pdf>

12. David Zietsma, "'Sin Has No History': Religion, National Identity, and U.S. Intervention, 1937-1941," *Diplomatic History* 31 (June 2007): 531-65.

13. Zietsma, "Sin Has No History," 544.

14. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness* (New York, 1944), 16-17.

15. Zietsma, "Sin Has No History," 534.

16. See John D. Barbour, "Niebuhr versus Niebuhr: The Tragic Nature of History," *The Christian Century* 21 (November 1984), 1096-1099; also Inboden, 47-48, 54.

17. Unfortunately it is not only Niebuhr who gets squeezed into such a box. Zietsma cites various quotations from, among others, a liberal Episcopalian (President Franklin D. Roosevelt), an arch-fundamentalist Protestant (Rev. Carl McIntire), a non-practicing Jew (Justice Felix Frankfurter), and a fervent Catholic (Cardinal Francis Spellman), as examples of jingoistic American self-righteousness. Perhaps so. But Zietsma fails to probe the remarkable religious diversity of these figures, or, more important, to consider the possibility that the facts of world events—specifically growing international aggression by Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan—might lead Americans of various theological traditions to the common conclusion that intervention was warranted.

18. Zietsma, 565; also 554, 562, 564.

19. In a further irony, except for Jeannette Rankin, who makes a cameo appearance at the end, virtually every historical actor cited by Zietsma in his *Diplomatic History* article is a white male.

Promoting International Education: An Academic Vice-President's Approach

Kenneth W. Rea

Travel is fatal to prejudice, bigotry, and narrow-mindedness," Mark Twain wrote. "Broad, wholesome, charitable views of men and things cannot be acquired by vegetating in one little corner of the earth all one's lifetime." For diplomatic historians, travel and international education have long been part of the profession. Today, Twain's words carry even greater meaning for our students.

I have always been a strong supporter of international education. My advocacy originated in a personal journey. I grew up in northern Louisiana, in a very "little corner of the earth." I did not study abroad while I was an undergraduate; my interest in international education came instead from my history and political science professors at Louisiana Tech University (at the time, Louisiana Polytechnic Institute). I especially enjoyed a course on East Asia, and out of that course grew my interest in Chinese and Japanese history. I received my M.A. and Ph.D. in history from the University of Colorado, where I studied with Professors Earl Swisher and Joyce Lebra. Their commitment to international education had a lasting impact on my life and work.

When I became the vice president for academic affairs at Louisiana Tech in 1987, the university had already been a proponent of international education for a long time. However, it did not have a specific plan to promote international education campus-wide. Situated in a rural setting in Ruston, which has a population of 20,000 and is located 70 miles east of Shreveport and about 260 miles north of New Orleans,

Louisiana Tech enrolls approximately 11,000 students, many of whom are the first members of their family to go to college. My overarching objective was to ensure that international education became part of their undergraduate experience. Therefore, with President Dan Reneau's support and that of the academic deans, unit heads, and a campus-wide faculty committee, I launched the Tech International Initiative to promote undergraduate international education.

This initiative had five key parts. The first was the International Education Committee (IEC). By creating the IEC, the university immediately raised the visibility of international education. My role as the IEC's chair is to ensure that it receives the necessary funding to meet its purpose, which is to promote international education throughout the campus. The IEC approves the courses that may be used to satisfy an international education requirement. It also awards summer study-abroad scholarships to undergraduates. The academic units recommend applicants, and the IEC selects recipients based on merit and financial need. Scholarship funds come from the academic deans, the president, and my office.

The second part of the initiative involved expanding study-abroad opportunities. For almost twenty-five years, the university had a successful program in Rome. In 2004, I formed a committee to evaluate the program and the international education needs of our student body. The committee recommended that we end the Rome program and diversify study-abroad choices. In response, the university

joined the Council on International Education Exchange (CIEE) to ensure greater access to study-abroad programs. More important, we began promoting our own discipline-based study-abroad programs. This step led to a Spanish-language program in Costa Rica, a French quarter in Paris for art students, a Tech-London program for theater and English students, a history and architecture program in Florence, and a forestry program in Honduras. College of Education students have traveled to Korea to gain experience as well. Faculty interested in leading a study-abroad group may apply for funding to visit a proposed site before gaining final approval and recruiting students. Other faculty initiatives have resulted in exchange agreements with foreign universities.

The third component of the initiative was the implementation of an international faculty development program. Because faculty development is the key to internationalizing the curriculum, my office sponsors a program that sends faculty abroad during the summer. The faculty may conduct research, but the program is meant to help them develop their international expertise. Those who receive grants are required to take part in the CIEE's summer faculty development seminars. My office covers the cost of the seminar, while the recipient's college or department underwrites the remaining expenses. Since the program has been in place, we have sent an average of three faculty members abroad each summer. On returning to campus, they give a brown bag lecture for the Center for Academic and Professional

Development and another lecture to their academic unit. By the end of the academic year, they must show how they have integrated international content into their courses.

The fourth part of the initiative was the launching of the "Shaping the 21st Century" series. We recognize that most of our students will graduate without studying abroad. Although we continue to try to increase the number of students who do go abroad, we also want to bring an international experience to those who do not. Therefore, we created a lecture and cultural program that we call "Shaping the 21st Century." Each year, the

THANKS!

SHAFR and *Passport* wish to thank

Ed Goedeken
of the
Iowa State University
Library System

for his many years of hard work on behalf of SHAFR members. Ed has compiled the annual list of dissertations relevant to diplomatic history, which ran in the newsletter for many years. The list now appears on the SHAFR website, rather than in print, and can be accessed at:

<http://www.shafr.org/publications/annual-dissertation-list/>

The 2008 list is now available!

IEC selects a nation or region that will have a major influence on our students' lives. It then sponsors a series of events, all open to the public, that begins with a campus assembly featuring a distinguished scholar and goes on to include food, art, photographic exhibitions, films, and lectures by visiting and resident scholars. The Office of Academic Affairs collaborates with the colleges, departments, and the honors program to bring the distinguished speakers to campus. For example, the Department of History and its American Foreign Policy Center underwrote lectures by Jonathan Spence and David Shambaugh in the "Focus on China" series in 2007. Mark Von Hagen and Maria Carlson were among the scholars who took part in the recent "Focus on Russia" series. In addition to China and Russia, the program has focused on the Middle East and India and in the spring of 2009 will focus on Latin America.

Originally a month long, the "Shaping the 21st Century" series now extends through the spring quarter. We have been especially pleased by the popularity of the India art exhibition, which has traveled to several other universities, and by the number of elementary school students who have visited the art and photographic exhibitions. The increased interest in international education on campus has also spread to the community: the local parish library has partnered with the university by hosting faculty lectures and exhibitions.

The final component of the initiative was the convening of a campus-wide conference to promote greater discussion on campus about international education. Academic Affairs and the IEC hosted this conference in the fall of 2007. The one-day event brought together interested students, faculty, and administrators. In the fall quarter of 2009, my office will sponsor the second of these campus-wide conferences.

Louisiana Tech is committed to providing students with study-abroad opportunities and to internationalizing the curriculum,

and we have made substantial progress toward those goals. Universities that want to achieve similar objectives must develop a plan that will be funded, will become institutionalized, and will garner faculty support. Administrators must remain activists and identify faculty leaders who will mentor their colleagues in internationalizing the curriculum. They must also set and evaluate international education goals, while recognizing that the response from each college within the university will be different. Some colleges move quickly; others need prompting. Increasingly, accreditation agencies are helping in the development of international education programs. However, presidents, chancellors and chief academic officers must take every opportunity to stress international education and to fund campus-wide efforts. In doing so, they send a clear message to their faculty and administrators that international education is important.

To end on a historical note, I have found that being a proponent of international education is a little like being a Protestant missionary in mid-nineteenth century China. The task is daunting, but if one is committed to the cause, one cannot afford to become discouraged.

Kenneth W. Rea is Vice President for Academic Affairs and Professor of History at Louisiana Tech University. He serves on the Louisiana Board of Regents' International Education Committee.

SHAFR Council Meeting

Sunday, January 4, 2009
8:00-11:00 am
Hilton Harlem Suite
New York, New York

Present: Kristin Ahlberg, Frank Costigliola (presiding), Jeffrey Engel, Brian Etheridge, Catherine Forslund, Peter Hahn, David Herschler, Mark Lawrence, Erin Mahan, Robert McMahon, Kenneth Osgood, Jaideep Prabhu, Andrew Rotter, Chapin Rydingsward, Thomas Schwartz, Katherine Sibley, Jeremi Suri, Randall Woods, Thomas Zeiler.

Costigliola called the meeting to order at 8:00 A.M. and thanked everyone for attending.

1. Discussion of SHAFR representation on State Department Historical Advisory Committee (HAC)

Costigliola welcomed David Herschler and Kristin Ahlberg of the State Department's Office of the Historian (HO). Herschler highlighted the HO's statutory obligation to cooperate with the Historical Advisory Committee (HAC); expressed gratitude for the advice and criticism provided by the HAC; and emphasized that the HO will continue to work with the HAC and by extension the SHAFR community and Council members. He concluded by requesting that in light of the internal review panel recently appointed by the Secretary of State, Council refrain from taking action beyond the text of the draft resolution that had been circulated prior to the meeting. Costigliola thanked Herschler for his report.

Costigliola moved Council into Executive Session. Mahan recused herself from the discussion. Council heard a lengthy report from Robert McMahon, SHAFR representative to the HAC, and Katie Sibley, former Council member and at-large member of HAC, on recent controversy involving the HO and its relationship with HAC. After lengthy discussion, a consensus emerged around the following motion:

The SHAFR Council believes that the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series is crucial to transparency in democratic governance and to informed citizenship. In light of recent problems in the State Department's Office of the Historian (HO) that may affect the future of the FRUS series, SHAFR expresses its strong support for the Secretary of State's decision to name an outside Review Team to assess the situation in the HO. SHAFR looks forward to a public report and to the HO's maintaining its mission of producing accurate, reliable FRUS volumes in a timely manner. Given the concerns expressed by the Historical Advisory Committee (HAC), SHAFR Council will continue to monitor this situation.

Mahan and Schwartz recused themselves from the vote. The motion passed unanimously.

Discussion ensued regarding a second resolution conveying SHAFR's support for the work of the HAC and its concern with developments therein. A consensus emerged around the following motion:

We affirm our support for the work of the Historical Advisory Committee (HAC), its independence, and its integrity. We express concern over the recent resignations of two members of HAC and the abrupt non-renewal of a third member. External oversight is fundamental to the successful operation of the Historian's Office and part of its Congressional mandate. We look forward to the Department's continuing attention to this matter.

Schwartz recused himself from the vote. The motion passed unanimously.

2. Resolutions of thanks to retiring Council members

Costigliola introduced a resolution thanking retiring Council members Stephen Rabe, Mark Lawrence, David Anderson, and Craig Daigle for their valuable service. The resolution passed unanimously.

3. Recap of motions passed by e-mail vote

Costigliola reported on the five motions approved by Council via e-mail since the June Council meeting. Council approved of a resolution on FOIA proposed by the National Security Archive; increased the annual stipend to executive director; agreed to sponsor the graduate student breakfast at the 2009 OAH meeting; approved the establishment of the Oxford University Press Dissertation Prize; and signed on as co-plaintiff in a lawsuit filed by Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW) against the Vice President of the United States over records retention.

4. Motion to accept 2008 financial report

Hahn presented written and oral reports on SHAFR's finances. He pointed out that while the SHAFR endowment had lost 28% of its value between November 30, 2007 and November 20, 2008, the endowment gained modest value in December 2008. It was noted that SHAFR was able to cover its operating expenses without withdrawing any funds from the endowment.

Hahn highlighted certain revenues and expenditures in 2008. He noted that new revenues enabled SHAFR to double spending on fellowships and establish the Summer Institute, the dissertation completion fellowships, the web editor, and the director of secondary education in 2008. Hahn invited Council members to examine the detailed written report and

indicated that he would answer questions at any time.

Osgood asked if Council needed to be more conservative in the future since increased spending in 2008 was intended to utilize the dividend funds generated by the endowment. Hahn replied that after recent conversations involving with SHAFR's CPA, David Kirkey, and SHAFR's endowment managers in New York, SHAFR is on relatively solid financial ground given that its recent expenditures were not directly dependent on Endowment revenues. Hahn also noted that Wiley-Blackwell representatives had assured him that the revenues stream remained healthy despite the economic recession. Hahn recommended that Council maintain the current level of spending but that it should proceed cautiously and avoid any major new initiatives. Although there is a risk of running a deficit in 2009, Hahn emphasized that alternative funds were available to cover it. He noted that the Society finished 2008 with a net gain of \$36,500. Costigliola supported Hahn's recommendation and also pointed out that the guaranteed minimum revenue from major revenue source would increase in 2009 over 2008.

Council unanimously passed a motion to accept the 2008 financial report.

5. Motion to raise annual subsidy to *Diplomatic History*

A motion to raise the annual *Diplomatic History* subsidy by 5% (from \$40,000 to \$42,000) in 2009 passed unanimously.

6. Motion to set disbursement amount for Bemis Research Grants in 2009

Hahn briefly summarized the Bemis Research Grant program, which was created in part to protect SHAFR's public charity status. Council allocated \$35,000 in 2007 and \$32,000 in 2008 for Bemis Grants. The Ways & Means Committee recommended that Council allocate \$32,000 in 2009. The motion passed unanimously.

7. Discussion of action plan to reform graduate student grants and fellowships

Hahn and Osgood discussed the plan approved in June to reorganize the structure of the graduate student grants and fellowships. As directed, Osgood, Etheridge, and Hahn devised a strategy to create a single committee to administer the awards. They also recommended that the proposed committee be composed of 3-5 members. After discussion, Council indicated approval of a committee with 3-5 members.

Hahn asked Council to define "junior faculty" as it pertains to the guidelines of Bemis Faculty Grants. Woods and Osgood suggested that Bemis awards should be limited to those working on first books. Forslund noted that scholars teaching at "teaching" colleges and universities generally needed access to research funds for second books. Schwartz suggested that the Ways & Means Committee could contemplate establishing a separate award for scholars at such institutions. Council approved an amendment to include "scholars working on their first monograph" to the definition of the Bemis Junior Faculty Grant. Osgood suggested a later discussion of renaming the faculty awards to avoid confusion with the graduate student awards.

Costigliola moved to approve the proposed package as amended. The motion passed unanimously.

8. Discussion of travel funds for Council members

Costigliola instructed Council to devise a clear policy regarding travel funds for Council members attending Council meetings in January and June. A consensus emerged that SHAFR should provide travel funds to include airfare (or its equivalent in mileage), hotel accommodations for 2-3 nights (3 in cases where the member is also presenting a paper scheduled to necessitate the third night stay), and a per diem based on federal rates for all Council members attending such Council meetings who are unable to obtain financial support from their home institutions. If the home institution provides partial reimbursement, then SHAFR would cover only the unreimbursed portion of expenses. A motion so directing passed unanimously.

9. Motion from Ways & Means Committee

Schwartz informed Council that the Ways & Means Committee recommended \$200 per year for three years in a new allocation to the Southern California Network for Historians of Foreign Relations. The network would use the funds to create an electronic network of students and scholars in the field in southern California and facilitate occasional meetings of the group. The allocation would be contingent on cash or in-kind expenditure of the same amount by the Network and the Network would be asked to report annually on its involvement of graduate students and ability to procure matching funds. Woods suggested that Network use SHAFR funding to leverage ongoing funding from state-level sources. A motion supporting the proposal passed unanimously.

10. Motion to elevate ad hoc committee on women in SHAFR to permanent status

Costigliola introduced a motion to elevate the ad hoc committee on women in SHAFR to permanent status. The motion passed unanimously.

11. Discussion of venue for 2012 annual meeting

Costigliola recognized Rotter as acting chair. Rotter proposed holding the 2012 SHAFR conference in Connecticut, sponsored by the University of Connecticut. Costigliola noted that UConn President Michael Hogan had offered \$5,000 to subsidize such a meeting. Costigliola explained that the conference would be based in Hartford and a plenary session and other SHAFR events would take place on the university campus in Storrs. He highlighted Thomas Paterson's papers housed at the University of Connecticut and the archival at nearby Yale and Harvard Universities; he also noted that the FDR Library is within driving distance. Woods moved to accept the proposal to hold the 2012 meeting in Connecticut. The motion carried unanimously. Costigliola resumed the chair.

12. 2009 annual meeting

Paul Kramer reported that the 2009 meeting is scheduled for June 25-28 at the Fairview Park Marriott in Falls Church, Virginia. At the June meeting, Costigliola called for a concerted effort to broaden the audience and participant pool for the 2009 conference. In response, the conference committee (Paul Kramer, Chair, Carole Anderson, Dirk Bonker, Anne Foster, Amy Greenberg, Naoko Shibusawa, and Salim Yaqub) drafted a call for papers that appealed to scholars interested in the interplay between foreign relations and immigration, cultural, and gender history. The CFP had been widely publicized in print journals as well as on sixty H-Net listservs.

In response to its outreach, the committee received an unprecedented number of proposals including 99 for panels and 45 for individual papers. High quality proposals were also received from overseas.

Given the high quality of the applicant pool combined with SHAFR's desire to reach out to a broader and more diverse audience, the 2009 conference committee recommended increasing the number of panels from 48 panels to 80. Discussion ensued. It noted that expanding the conference in this manner would minimize any potential backlash that might result from increased competition between the new recruits and SHAFR's traditional constituency. Kramer also introduced the idea of a cocktail hour to welcome first-time attendees.

After some discussion a consensus emerged in favor of expanding the 2009 conference. Woods expressed support for the cocktail hour. Costigliola noted that the potential benefits in terms of outreach would be well worth the costs of expansion. Kramer pointed out that the completed results of the enlarged program would be publicized on the listservs. Schwartz supported the idea of expansion but recommended gathering information during the conference to evaluate potential issues. It was suggested that panel chairs could be directed to record and submit turnout numbers to gauge the potential drop in average panel attendance. Schwartz added that the Ways & Means Committee supports offering reduced membership rates to unsuccessful applicants.

12. Report of the 2009 Local Arrangements Committee

Ahlberg reported that the 2009 Local Arrangements Committee is planning a SHAFR cruise on the Potomac after the formal wrap-up of the conference. The LAC will recommend that SHAFR subsidize a portion of trip to lower the cost to graduate students. The LAC will also issue a local activities and dining guide.

13. Oxford Dissertation Prize

Hahn reported that the Oxford University Press-USA Dissertation Prize is now operational and that the first prize will be awarded in 2010. The prize originated in a \$25,000 gift from OUP to SHAFR.

14. SHAFR website re-launch

Etheridge reported that shafr.org has been successfully reformatted and is now live. The information on the previous site has been reorganized and several new features added, including blogs, op-eds, and RSS feeds. Etheridge was happy to report that Bob Buzzanco, William Stueck, and George White Jr., have joined the inaugural team of bloggers, but reported difficulties in recruiting scholars to write op-eds. Osgood raised the possibility of funding an annual prize for the best op-ed published on shafr.org. Etheridge also noted that an undergraduate teaching page as well as a research tab with links to resources and available funding has also been added to the site. Etheridge highlighted the potential for the expanded website to serve as a platform connecting the SHAFR community to the broader public while underscoring the value historical thinking to current affairs and foreign policy issues. The new website will be publicized in *Passport* and H-Diplo.

15. 2009 Summer Institute

Costigliola reported that Suri and Logevall will chair the 2009 Summer Institute in Madison, Wisconsin. Schwartz emphasized the need to issue a call for the 2010 Institute. He also reported that the Oversight Committee recommends that Council extend funding for the Institute to 2012. Others supported the idea of holding the institute in future years in the host city of the SHAFR conference. Woods moved that Council extend its funding of the Summer Institute to 2012. The motion passed unanimously.

16. Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship

Forslund reported that the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship would be awarded to Candace Sobers at the University

of Toronto and that an Honorable Mention would be granted to Tao Wang of Georgetown and Yveline Alexis at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst.

17. Bernath Dissertation Grant

Forslund reported that the Bernath Dissertation Grant would be awarded to Christopher Dietrich from the University of Texas-Austin and that an Honorable Mention would be granted to Kevin Arlych at New York University and to Kelly Shannon of Temple University.

18. Link-Kuehl Prize

Hahn on behalf of Ted Keefer announced that the Link-Kuehl Prize would be awarded to David C. Geyer and Douglas E. Selvage for their edited volume *Soviet-American Relations: the Détente Years, 1969-1972*; and that an Honorable Mention would be awarded to Richard Breitman, Barbara MacDonald Steward, and Severin Hochberg, eds., *Advocate for the Doomed: the Diary of James G. MacDonald*.

Council adjourned at 10:55 am.

Respectfully submitted,

Peter L. Hahn
Executive Director

PLH/cr

CALL FOR APPLICATIONS

SHAFR SUMMER INSTITUTE 2010


The Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations is soliciting applications from members interested in hosting the SHAFR Summer Institute in 2010. The Institute, which runs for one week either before or after the SHAFR annual conference, is designed for college and university faculty or advanced graduate students, with priority given to each group in alternating years. The 2010 Institute will offer priority to college or university faculty.

The first SHAFR Institute, hosted at The Ohio State University by Robert McMahon and Peter Hahn, was held in June 2008. The second Institute, hosted at the University of Wisconsin by Jeremi Suri and Fred Logevall, will be run June 29-July 3, 2009. Information on the workshops and their topics can be found on the SHAFR website.

Members interested in hosting the Institute should submit a two- to four-page proposal indicating a theme of the Institute. The application should also include the CVs of the organizers and information about the local arrangements for the Workshop.

Questions may be directed to Thomas Schwartz, chair of the Summer Institute Oversight Committee, at thomas.a.schwartz@Vanderbilt.Edu. Applications should be submitted by June 1, 2009 to Peter Hahn, Executive Director of SHAFR, at shafr@osu.edu.

The Diplomatic Pouch



1. Personal and Professional Notes

Jessica Gienow-Hecht has accepted a tenured position in the History Department at the University of Cologne.

Eric Manela (Harvard) has been awarded an American Academy of Arts and Sciences' Visiting Scholars Program fellowship for 2009.

2. Research Notes

Reagan, Gorbachev and Bush at Governor's Island

Previously secret Soviet documentation shows that Mikhail Gorbachev was prepared for rapid arms control progress leading towards nuclear abolition at the time of his last official meeting with President Reagan, at Governor's Island, New York in December 1988; but President-elect George H. W. Bush, who also attended the meeting, said "he would need a little time to review the issues" and lost at least a year of dramatic arms reductions that were possible had there been a more forthcoming U.S. position.

The new documentation posted by the National Security Archive at George Washington University includes highest-level memos from Gorbachev advisors leading up to Gorbachev's famous speech at the United Nations during the New York visit, notes of Politburo discussions before and after the speech and the Reagan-Bush meeting, CIA estimates before and after the speech showing how surprised American officials had been and how reluctant the new Bush administration was to meet Gorbachev even half-way, and the declassified U.S. transcript of the private meeting between Reagan, Bush and Gorbachev.

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Jan Palach Week, 1989: The Beginning of the End for Czechoslovak Communism

The brutal suppression by Czechoslovak Communist authorities of commemorative ceremonies for "Palach Week" 20 years ago marked the beginning of the end of the regime in 1989, according to secret police, Communist Party, and dissident documents posted on the Web by the Czechoslovak Documentation Centre (Prague) and the National Security Archive at George Washington University.

Various independent civic initiatives (also known in the official Communist press as "anti-state" and "anti-socialist forces") had planned to lay wreaths at the site in Prague's main Wenceslas Square where the student Jan Palach in January 1969 had burned himself to death in protest against the repression that followed the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Also planned was a pilgrimage to the rural cemetery where Palach's ashes were interred. But the Communist secret police cracked down with beatings, tear gas, and mass arrests, including the dissident playwright and future Czechoslovak president Václav Havel. The repression occurred at the exact moment in January 1989 that the signatory countries to the Helsinki Final Act (the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or CSCE) were meeting in Vienna, and drew widespread protests from abroad, including from U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz, leading Soviet dissident Andrei Sakharov, and perhaps most eloquently, American playwright Arthur Miller.

This web posting includes never-before-published documents from Czechoslovak archives, including the secret police reports on the demonstrations in January 1989 and the internal Communist Party briefings and instructions (the Party line) to cadres about the events of January. Also included are key Charter 77 and other dissident and samizdat statements, and several international protests of the time.

The posting republishes the detailed chronology of events in January and February 1989, originally written by the Czechoslovak Documentation Centre for its quarterly publication *Acta* (Vol. 3, No. 9-12), compiled and edited by Jan Vladislav in collaboration with Vilém Prečan, titled "Czechoslovakia: Heat in January 1989" and ultimately printed in December 1989 just as the "velvet revolution" toppled the Communist regime and put former prisoner Havel in the

presidential office in Prague Castle.

For more information contact:

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Czechoslovak Documentation Centre
<http://www.csds.cz>



CWIHP Working Paper #57: *A Chance for Peace? The Soviet Campaign to End the Cold War, 1953-1955*

CWIHP announces the publication of the latest addition to the CWIHP Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 57, *A Chance for Peace? The Soviet Campaign to End the Cold War, 1953-1955* by Geoffrey Roberts. In his paper, Roberts suggests that the "'chance for peace' after Stalin's death was actually a prolonged process rather than a momentary opportunity." Drawing heavily upon documents from the *Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsi* (AVPRF), the *Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishei Istorii* (RGANI), and the *Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial'no-Politicheskoi Istorii* (RGASPI), Roberts argues that between 1953 and 1955, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov put forth several good-faith proposals to unify the divided Germany, and to "replace the Cold War blocs with pan-European collective security structures." Greeted with skepticism in the West, these proposals were initially rejected as propaganda, and it was not until late 1955 that "the Western powers themselves proposed pan-European collective security arrangements in exchange for all-German elections leading to German unity." Prospects for an early end to the Cold War faded, however, when "Khrushchev, supported by the rest of the Soviet leadership, blocked any deal involving a trade-off of German unity for pan-European collective security."

Download the paper at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/WP57_WebFinal.pdf.



The Nuclear Emergency Search Team, 1974-1996: Declassified Documents Depict Creation, Capabilities, and Activities of Once-Secret Nuclear Counterterrorism Unit

The U.S. government's secret nuclear bomb squad evaluated more than 100 nuclear extortion threats and incidents between 1974 and 1996 but only a dozen required actual deployments (the others were hoaxes), according to the new book *Defusing Armageddon*, and key primary sources posted in the National Security Archive's "Nuclear Vault" by Archive senior fellow Jeffrey T. Richelson.

The Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST) had the capacity in 1996 of deploying up to 600 people and over 150 tons of equipment to an incident site, but all deployments to that point had been much smaller (a maximum of 45 people), according to the documents. A subsequent Web posting will cover the NEST from 1997 through the present. Managed by the Nevada Operations Office of the Department of Energy (and its predecessors), NEST drew personnel from key national laboratories--Los Alamos, Sandia, Livermore--and their contractors. On an everyday basis NEST personnel worked in a multitude of areas--including weapons design, diagnostics, health physics, and information technology--and were called into action for exercises or actual deployments.

This posting of twenty-four documents includes, but is not limited to: national intelligence estimates on the threat of clandestine attack, the directive resulting in the creation of NEST, examples of extortion letters and the psycholinguistic analysis of such letters, accounts of NEST participation in the effort to locate the remains of a Soviet nuclear-powered satellite that crashed into the Canadian wilderness in 1978, documents concerning the controversial 1994 MIRAGE GOLD exercise and its aftermath, and briefing material concerning NEST's mission as well as its human and technical capabilities.

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"We can Bomb the Bejesus out of them all over North Vietnam": Comprehensive Collection of Kissinger "Telcons" Provides Inside View of Government Decision-Making

Amidst a massive bombing campaign over North Vietnam, Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon candidly shared their evident satisfaction at the "shock treatment" of American B-52s, according to a declassified transcript of their telephone conversation published for the first time by the National Security Archive. "They dropped a million pounds of bombs," Kissinger briefed Nixon. "A million pounds of bombs," Nixon exclaimed. "Goddamn, that must have been a good

strike." The conversation, secretly recorded by both Kissinger and Nixon without the other's knowledge, reveals that the President and his national security advisor shared a belief in 1972 that the war could still be won. "That shock treatment [is] cracking them," Nixon declared. "I tell you the thing to do is pour it in there every place we can... just bomb the hell out of them." Kissinger optimistically predicted that, if the South Vietnamese government didn't collapse, the U.S. would eventually prevail: "I mean if as a country we keep our nerves, we are going to make it."

The transcript of the April 15, 1972, phone conversation is one of over 15,500 documents in a unique, comprehensively-indexed set of the telephone conversations (telcons) of Henry A. Kissinger--perhaps the most famous and controversial U.S. official of the second half of the 20th century. Unbeknownst to the rest of the U.S. government, Kissinger secretly taped his incoming and outgoing phone conversations and had his secretary transcribe them. After destroying the tapes, Kissinger took the transcripts with him when he left office in January 1977, claiming they were "private papers." In 2001, the National Security Archive initiated legal proceedings to force the government to recover the telcons, and used the Freedom of Information Act to obtain the declassification of most of them. After a three-year project to catalogue and index the transcripts, which total over 30,000 pages, this on-line collection has now been published by the Digital National Security Archive (ProQuest).

The documents shed light on every aspect of Nixon-Ford diplomacy, including U.S.-Soviet détente, the wars in Southeast Asia, the 1969 Biafra crisis, the 1971 South Asian crisis, the October 1973 Middle East War, and the 1974 Cyprus Crisis, among many other developments. Kissinger's dozens of interlocutors include political and policy figures, such as Presidents Nixon and Ford, Secretary of State William Rogers, Governor Nelson Rockefeller, Robert S. McNamara, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin; journalists and publishers, such as Ted Koppel, James Reston, and Katherine Graham; and such show business friends as Frank Sinatra. Besides the telcons, the *Kissinger Telephone Conversations: A Verbatim Record of U.S. Diplomacy, 1969-1977* includes audio tape of Kissinger's telephone conversations with Richard Nixon that were recorded automatically by the secret White House taping system, some of which Kissinger's aides were unable to transcribe.

For more information contact:

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New FRUS Volume on the Middle East


The Department of State has released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969-1972; Jordan, September 1970*. In this volume, the editors present documentation that explains and illuminates the major foreign policy decisions of President Richard M. Nixon on the Middle East region, the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula, and Jordan during the crisis of September 1970, and represents the counsel of his key foreign policy advisers. The volume focuses on U.S. regional policy in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. It also has chapters on U.S. bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and the smaller Persian Gulf states. The documents used in the Middle East regional part of the volume include memoranda, records of discussions, cables, and papers that set forth policy issues and options and show decisions or actions taken. The Jordan crisis section of the volume uses similar documentation and also relies heavily on transcripts of crucial telephone conversations.

Middle East Region. This section focuses largely on events in Washington; however, it also covers events and developments in the Middle East region and the Indian Ocean as they affected the policy process. The themes of this section are framed by the Nixon administration's efforts to replace the political and military structure left by the former British Empire with a newer structure that met America's cold war needs. The United States worked with the British to restructure the region militarily and politically, and this required diplomatic contact with Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the various sheikdoms that eventually made up the United Arab Emirates, as well as with Qatar and Bahrain. Other themes merged after Britain's political and military departure from the region, including the Nixon administration's efforts to articulate a grand strategy toward the Middle East region through arms sales and military modernization for its regional allies, enlarging the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean through negotiations with the British over Diego Garcia, and preventing Ceylonese and Soviet efforts to demilitarize the Indian Ocean. Additional themes include competition between Kissinger and Rogers for dominance in policymaking and the reluctance of Nixon and Kissinger to be involved in regional issues, unless the Shah of Iran or King Faisal of Saudi Arabia demanded their personal attention.

The Jordan Crisis. This chapter documents the September 1970 crisis in Jordan. The crisis confronted the Nixon administration with the possibility that the monarchy of King Hussein, a major U.S. ally in the Middle East, would not survive. Although conflict existed between King Hussein and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the months preceding and following September 1970, this chapter focuses on the key 4-week period that defined the most intense phase of the conflict. It opens with the hijacking of four commercial airliners by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. These hijackings led to intense fighting between the PLO and the Jordanian Arab Army. The chapter emphasizes Nixon's and Kissinger's close involvement in the day-to-day developments and the final resolution of the crisis.

The volume and this press release are available on the Office of the Historian website at <http://www.history.state.gov>. Copies of the volume can be purchased from the U.S. Government Printing Office online at <http://bookstore.gpo.gov> (GPO S/N 044-000-02615-5; ISBN 978-0-16-079992-1), or by calling toll-free 1-866-512-1800 (D.C. area 202-512-1800).

For further information contact history@state.gov.



"Body Count Mentalities": Colombia's "False Positives" Scandal, Declassified


The CIA and senior U.S. diplomats were aware as early as 1994 that U.S.-backed Colombian security forces engaged in "death squad tactics," cooperated with drug-running paramilitary groups, and encouraged a "body count syndrome," according to declassified documents published on the Web by the National Security Archive. These records shed light on a policy--recently examined in a still-undisclosed Colombian Army report--that influenced the behavior of Colombian military officers for years, leading to extrajudicial executions and collaboration with paramilitary drug traffickers. The secret report has led to the dismissal of 30 Army officers and the resignation of Gen. Mario Montoya Uribe, the Colombian Army Commander who had long promoted the idea of using body counts to measure progress against guerrillas.

Highlights from the posting include:

- * A 1994 report from U.S. Ambassador Myles Frechette decrying "body count mentalities" among Colombian Army officers seeking to advance through the ranks.
- * A CIA intelligence report from 1994 finding that the Colombian security forces "employ death squad tactics in their counterinsurgency campaign" and had "a history of assassinating leftwing civilians in guerrilla areas, cooperating with narcotics-related paramilitary groups in attacks against suspected guerrilla sympathizers, and killing captured combatants."
- * A Colombian Army colonel's comments in 1997 that there was a "body count syndrome" in the Colombian Army that "tends to fuel human rights abuses by well-meaning soldiers trying to get their quota to impress superiors" and a "cavalier, or at least passive, approach when it comes to allowing the paramilitaries to serve as proxies ... for the COLAR in contributing to the guerrilla body count."
- * A declassified U.S. Embassy cable describing a February 2000 false positives operation in which both the ACCU paramilitaries and the Colombian Army almost simultaneously claimed credit for having killed two long-demobilized guerrillas near Medellin. Ambassador Curtis Kamman called it "a clear case of Army-paramilitary complicity," adding that it was "difficult to conclude anything other than that the paramilitary and Army members simply failed to get their stories straight in advance."

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U.S.-Iran Nuclear Negotiations in 1970s Featured Shah's Nationalism and U.S. Weapons Worries

During the 1970s the Shah of Iran argued, like current Iranian leaders today, for a nuclear energy capability on the basis of national "rights," while the Ford and Carter administrations worried about nuclear weapons possibilities, according to newly declassified documents published by the National Security Archive. The documents, obtained by the Archive through a mandatory review request, show that two U.S. presidents dealing with the Shah of Iran, Ford and Carter, put concerns over proliferation and the Shah's possible desire to build a nuclear bomb front and center when they approved negotiating positions for a deal to sell nuclear reactors to Iran. While Iranian officials argued then, as they do today, that Iran had "rights" under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to develop nuclear technology, the U.S. government successfully sought an agreement that put nonproliferation controls over U.S.-supplied nuclear material.

The 1979 Iranian Revolution derailed the agreement, but the approach that the Ford and Carter administrations took shows significant continuity with contemporary U.S. and world policy, which holds that Iran must not use its technological capabilities to produce nuclear weapons. The documents contradict the 2005 claim by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that non-proliferation was not an issue in the 1970s negotiations.

Among the disclosures in the new documents:

- * In 1974 Department of State officials wrote that if the Shah's dictatorship collapsed and Iran became unstable, "domestic dissidents or foreign terrorists might easily be able to seize any special nuclear material stored in Iran for use in bombs." Moreover, "an aggressive successor to the Shah might consider nuclear weapons the final item needed to establish Iran's complete military dominance of the region."
- * According to national security adviser Brent Scowcroft, the Ford administration hoped that the Shah would commit himself to a "major act of nuclear statesmanship: namely, to set a world example by foregoing national reprocessing."
- * When officials from Oak Ridge National Laboratory received briefings on the planned Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTEC), they concluded that the "bears watching" because "unusually large" size of the facility "makes it theoretically possible to produce weapons-grade material (plutonium)" and the ENTEC plans include a "large hot lab," the first step toward reprocessing.
- * Questioning U.S. efforts to restrict Tehran's freedom of action, Iranian officials argued that "Iran should have full right to decide whether to reprocess" and the "right to effective control of the management and operation of reprocessing facilities."
- * By the summer of 1978, Tehran and Washington had overcome differences and agreed to a nuclear pact that met U.S. concerns and the Shah's interest in buying reactors, but the agreement closely restricted Iran's ability to produce plutonium or any other nuclear weapons fuel using U.S. supplied material without Washington's "agreement."

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New Kuklinski Documents On Martial Law In Poland Released

The Central Intelligence Agency has released documents relating to one of the most significant espionage cases of the Cold War, the case of Polish Army Col. Ryszard Kuklinski. A senior officer on the Polish General Staff and aide to Polish prime minister and communist party chief (and later president) Wojciech Jaruzelski, Kuklinski had volunteered his services to the United States Army during a sailing trip to northern Germany in 1972. For over nine years, Kuklinski provided the CIA with more than 40,000 pages of documents regarding the innermost secrets of the Warsaw Pact, "the secrets of the kitchen" (Jaruzelski), including war plans--intelligence that was deemed of "truly great strategic significance" by Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser. Much of the documentation photographed by Kuklinski at great personal risk (with the door to his office unlocked) was passed to the CIA through clandestine exchanges during boat trips, some 63 moving car exchanges and also through dead drops.

During the 1980-81 Polish Crisis he continued to provide information on Warsaw Pact planning, internal Polish developments and Soviet pressures. From the initial outbreak of labor unrest and the rise of the independent trade union "Solidarnosc" (Solidarity) to the declaration of martial law on December 12-13, 1981, Kuklinski provided period reporting and commentary on the chaotic progression of events. His reporting focused on the refinement of the plans for introducing martial law (with which, much to his frustration he was tasked), internal debates within the party and military leadership, and the constant pressure from Moscow on the Polish communist regime to contain and destroy the labor union.

The documents released include a 1977 document outlining governmental tasks in the event of a threat to national security; 18 reports by Kuklinski on information and impressions gained from his close contacts on the Polish General Staff and from contact with Soviet officers; 42 reports relating martial law planning documents, 16 reports based on Kuklinski information disseminated after the declaration of martial law on December 13, 1981, as well as one 1983 report prepared by Kuklinski after his (and his family's) extraction to the United States.

Current and earlier releases related to this case can be found at the web page of the Cold War International History Project at <http://www.wilsoncenter.org>.



Soviet Strategic Forces Went on Alert Three Times during September-October 1962 because of Apprehension over Cuban Situation


In 1962, a month before the Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet leaders put their strategic forces on their "highest readiness stage since the beginning of the Cold War," according to a newly declassified internal history of the National Security Agency published for the first time by the National Security Archive. Possibly responding to President Kennedy's call for reserves, perhaps worried that the White House had discovered Moscow's plans to deploy missiles on Cuba, the Kremlin kept forces on alert for 10 days, beginning on September 11, 1962.

The NSA's signals intelligence (SIGINT) history also discloses that, a month later, on October 15th, the Soviets initiated a "precautionary, preliminary" alert, perhaps because Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev feared that U.S. intelligence had discovered the missiles. After President Kennedy's speech on October 22, 1962, announcing the "quarantine" (blockade) of Cuba, the Kremlin put military forces, especially air defense forces, on an "extraordinarily high state of alert." Significantly, "offensive forces avoided assuming the highest readiness stage, as if to insure that Kennedy understood that the USSR would not launch first."

In response to a declassification request by the National Security Archive, the secretive National Security Agency has declassified large portions of a four-part "top-secret Umbra" study, *American Cryptology during the Cold War*. Despite major redactions, this history discloses much new information about the agency's history and the role of SIGINT and communications intelligence (COMINT) during the Cold War. Researched and written by NSA historian Thomas Johnson, the three parts released so far provide a frank assessment of the history of the Agency and its forerunners, warts-and-all.

For more information, contact:

Matthew Aid
202-994-7000
<http://www.nsarchive.org>



New Evidence On North Korea's *Chollima* Movement and First Five-Year Plan

CWIHP is pleased to announce a new publication from the Wilson Center's North Korea International Documentation Project, *New Evidence on North Korea's Chollima Movement and First Five-Year Plan (1957-1961)*. The collection was specially prepared for a joint NKIDP-United States Institute of Peace conference, "New DPRK Revolutionary Upsurge—A Blast from the Past or a New Path?" and contains newly obtained documentary evidence on North Korean political and economic developments in the late 1950s from Polish, (East) German, Chinese, and Czech archives. The 25 documents contained in the reader shed new light on the events surrounding the launch of the *Chollima* movement, a campaign designed to increase production and to subordinate individual thoughts and actions to the needs of the collective. The *Chollima* movement took its name from a mythical winged horse that could travel 1,000 li, or 400 km, in one day, and exhorted the North Korea people to work as hard as the legendary horse. The documents place recent government efforts to revive the *Chollima* movement into a broader historical context.

New Evidence on North Korea's Chollima Movement is available for download free of charge at <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp>.



National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 272

Twenty years ago, the commander of the Soviet Limited Contingent in Afghanistan Boris Gromov crossed the Termez Bridge out of Afghanistan, thus marking the end of the Soviet war which lasted almost ten years and cost tens of thousands of Soviet and Afghan lives. As a tribute and memorial to the late Russian historian, General Alexander Antonovich Lyakhovskiy, the National Security Archive has posted on the Web (www.nsarchive.org) a series of previously secret Soviet documents including Politburo and diary notes published here in English for the first time. The documents suggest that the Soviet decision to withdraw occurred as early as 1985, but the process of implementing that decision was excruciatingly slow, in part because the Soviet-backed Afghan regime was never able to achieve the necessary domestic support and legitimacy, a key problem even today for the current U.S. and NATO-supported government in Kabul.

The Soviet documents show that ending the war in Afghanistan, which Soviet general secretary Mikhail Gorbachev called "the bleeding wound," was among his highest priorities from the moment he assumed power in 1985, a point he made clear to then-Afghan Communist leader Babrak Karmal in their first conversation on March 14, 1985. Already in 1985, according to the documents, the Soviet Politburo was discussing ways of disengaging from Afghanistan, and actually reached the decision in principle on October 17, 1985.

For more information, contact:

National Security Archive
202-994-7000
<http://www.nsarchive.org>.

3. Announcements:



CFP: "70 Years Later: The Global Impact of the Holocaust"

Holy Family University, Philadelphia, PA, November 7-8, 2009

At the next anniversary of *Kristallnacht*, the Graduate Programs of the School of Arts and Sciences at Holy Family University will present a two-day interdisciplinary conference entitled "70 Years Later: The Global Impact of the Holocaust," to be held on November 7-8, 2009. Panels, presentations, and poster sessions will be accepted from all disciplines.

Each proposal must include the following information: title of presentation and topic area; name, highest educational degree, e-mail address of person delivering presentation (principal author); complete mailing address, telephone number, fax number, and institution/business information (department, school, agency, or company) of principal author; names of co-authors, their highest educational degrees, and their institution/business information; preference for presentation in a poster, panel, or paper session; and a 250-300 word abstract of the paper, poster, or presentation topic. Submission deadline is April 30, 2009.

Please submit abstracts to:

Dr. Leanne Owen
Holy Family University
9801 Frankford Avenue
Philadelphia, PA 19114



CFP: 8th Annual Transatlantic Studies Association Conference
Canterbury Christ Church University, Canterbury, UK, July 13-16 2009


The Transatlantic Studies Association welcomes proposals by individuals, full panels of three speakers or a series of related panels focusing on a particular theme or topic. Please direct any initial questions to Alan Dobson at alan.dobson@transatlanticstudies.com or the relevant panel coordinator listed below. We welcome early submission of proposals and panels.

For History, Security Studies and IR, please contact David Ryan at david.ryan@ucc.ie and Alan Dobson at a.p.dobson@dundee.ac.uk.

For Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Transatlantic Relations, please contact Priscilla Roberts at proberts@hkucc.hku.hk and Taylor Stoermer at stoermer@virginia.edu.

Please submit proposals with a 300-word abstract to the appropriate panel leaders by the Deadline of May 1, 2009.

For further information see: www.transatlanticstudies.com



Eisenhower Foundation Travel Grants

The Eisenhower Presidential Library Abilene Travel Grants Program assists scholars' research of primary sources in such fields as history, government, economics, communications, and international affairs so they may provide informed leadership in our national life. The grants program is funded and administered by the Eisenhower Foundation in Abilene, Kansas.

Grants are awarded to individual researchers on a competitive basis to cover a portion of expenses while in Abilene, Kansas using the presidential library. The size of the grant (not to exceed \$1,000) is dependent upon the distance traveled and duration of stay in Abilene. Grants are not retroactive and travel must occur within one year of award.


Applications must be received no later than February 28th for Spring reviews, and September 30th for Fall reviews and include the following:

- A letter from the Eisenhower Library providing information on the availability of relevant materials in the Library's archives. Please address inquiries to: Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, 200 S.E. 4th, Abilene, KS 67410 and request permission to use the holdings of the Library. An archivist at the Library will respond with a letter detailing collections that are pertinent to your research topic.
- A curriculum vitae including academic experience and a list of any publications.
- A detailed summary (not to exceed five pages) of the subject and scope of your research. Funding priority will be given to well-developed proposals that will rely significantly on the resources in the Eisenhower Library.
- Tentative timetable for visiting Abilene (including duration of stay in Abilene) and for completing project.
- A ten- to fifteen-page writing sample.
- A proposed budget. For information on lodging, food and travel costs please visit the Abilene Tourism and Convention Bureau website at <http://www.abilenekansas.org>.
- Information as to any other grant received or being pursued for the project.
- Two or three supporting letters from academic advisors or professional colleagues.
- Intended publication or other use of the product of your research.

A selection panel reviews application packages. All applicants will be informed in writing of the selection panel's decision approximately six weeks after the application deadline. Once a grantee has firm travel plans, the grantee will be issued two checks. One check in the amount of half the award will be mailed to the grantee immediately prior to the research trip to the Library, while the second will be held by the Library for presentation upon arrival.

Applicants should provide these materials to:

Abilene Travel Grants Program
Eisenhower Foundation
P.O. Box 295
200 S.E. 4th Street
Abilene, KS 67410



Gerald Ford Library Research Grants Programs


Two grant programs are available to support research in the holdings of the Gerald R. Ford Library. These holdings focus on federal policies, U.S. foreign relations, and national politics in the 1960s and 1970s.

The Gerald R. Ford Foundation awards several Research Travel Grants of up to \$2,000 each in support of research in the holdings of the Gerald R. Ford Library. A grant defrays travel, living, and photocopy expenses of a research trip to the

Ford Library. Grants are awarded twice a year with application deadlines of March 15 and September 15.

The "Gerald R. Ford Scholar Award (Dissertation Award) in Honor of Robert Teeter" in the amount of \$5,000 is given annually to one individual to support dissertation research on an aspect of the U.S. political process during the latter part of the twentieth century.

Information about both of these grants can be found on the Library web page at <http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/hpgrants.asp>.



Cold War Prize Competition


For the fifth year, the John A. Adams Center at the Virginia Military Institute will award prizes for the best unpublished papers dealing with the United States military in the Cold War era (1945-1991). Any aspect of the Cold War is eligible, with papers on war planning, intelligence, logistics, and mobilization especially welcome. Please note that essays which relate aspects of the Korean and Southeast Asian conflicts to the larger Cold War are also open for consideration.

Prizes: First place will earn a plaque and a cash award of \$2,000; second place, \$1,000 and a plaque; and third place, \$500 and a plaque.

Procedures: Entries should be tendered to the Adams Center at VMI by June 15, 2009. Please make your submission in Microsoft Word and limit your entry to a maximum of twenty-five pages of double-spaced text, exclusive of documentation and bibliography. A panel of judges will, over the summer, examine all papers and the Adams Center will announce its top three rankings early in the fall of 2009. The *Journal of Military History* will be happy to consider those award winners for publication.

Please direct submissions and questions to:

Professor Malcolm Muir, Jr., Director
John A. Adams '71 Center for Military History and Strategic Analysis
Department of History
Virginia Military Institute
Lexington, VA 24450
muirm@vmi.edu
540-464-7447 / 7338
Fax: 540-464-7246



2009 Edwin H. Sherman Family Prize for Undergraduate Scholarship in Force and Diplomacy

Temple University's Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy <<http://www.temple.edu/cenfad/>> seeks submissions for its annual Edwin H. Sherman Prize for Undergraduate Scholarship in Force and Diplomacy. The recipient of the Edwin Sherman Prize will receive a \$1,000 award along with a certificate. Any paper written by an undergraduate student in the 2008 calendar year, submitted by either the student or a faculty member at the student's college or university is eligible. The paper must address an issue, contemporary or historical, that demonstrates the intersection of force and diplomacy in international affairs. Although electronic submissions are preferred, hard-copy submissions will be accepted. Papers must be emailed or postmarked no later than Friday, April 1, 2008.

Send electronic submissions to Benjamin Brandenburg, bbb@temple.edu.

Send hard copy submissions to:

The Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy
History Department
Gladfelter 913
Temple University
1115 W. Berks Street
Philadelphia, PA 19122-6089



4. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines:

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant

The Bernath Dissertation Grant of up to \$4,000 is intended to help graduate students defray expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. The grant is awarded annually at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SHAFR web page at <http://www.shafr.org/>. To be considered for the 2010 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by October 1, 2009. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



The Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship


The Michael J. Hogan Foreign language Fellowship was established to honor Michael J. Hogan, long-time editor of *Diplomatic History*.

The Hogan Fellowship of up to \$4,000 is intended to promote research in foreign language sources by graduate students. The fellowship is intended to defray the costs of studying foreign languages needed for research. It is announced at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Applicants must be graduate students researching some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SHAFR web page at <http://www.shafr.org/>. To be considered for the 2010 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by October 1, 2009. Submit materials to hogan-fellowships@shafr.org.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.




The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship

The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship of up to \$4,000 is intended to defray the costs of travel necessary to conduct research on a significant dissertation project. The fellowship is awarded annually at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SHAFR web page at <http://www.shafr.org/>. To be considered for the 2010 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by October 1, 2009. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.




The Lawrence Gelfand - Armin Rappaport Dissertation Fellowship

SHAFR established this fellowship to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*.

The Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship of up to \$4,000 is intended to defray the costs of dissertation research travel. The fellowship is awarded annually at SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SHAFR web page at <http://www.shafr.org/>. To be considered for the 2010 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by October 1, 2009. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org.



Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grants


The Samuel F. Bemis Research Grants are intended to promote dissertation research by graduate students. A limited number of grants of varying amounts (generally, up to \$2,000) will be awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects.

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history.

Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SHAFR web page at <http://www.shafr.org/>. To be considered for the 2010 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by October 1, 2009. Submit materials to fellowships@shafr.org.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.




William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants

The William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants are intended to promote scholarly research by untenured college and university faculty and others who are within six years of the Ph.D. and who are working as professional historians. Grants are limited to scholars working on the first research monograph. A limited number of grants of varying amounts (generally, up to \$2,000) will be awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application found on the SHAFR web page at <http://www.shafr.org/>. To be considered for the 2010 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by October 1, 2009. Submit materials to williams-fellowships@shafr.org.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



6. Recent Publications of Interest

- Appelbaum, Patricia, *Kingdom to Commune: Protestant Pacifist Culture between World War I and the Vietnam Era* (North Carolina, 2009).
- Bakalian, Anny, and Mehdi Bozorgmehr, *Backlash 9/11: Middle Eastern and Muslim Americans Respond* (California, 2009).
- Blanco, John D., *Frontier Constitutions: Christianity and Colonial Empire in the Nineteenth-Century Philippines* (California, 2009).
- Blumenthal, David, and James A. Morone, *The Heart of Power: Health and Politics in the Oval Office* (California, 2009).
- Brewer, Susan, *Why America Fights: Patriotism and War Propaganda from the Philippines to Iraq* (Oxford, 2009).
- Brown, Archie, *Seven Years that Changed the World: Perestroika in Perspective* (Oxford, 2009).
- Burke-Gaffney, Brian, *The Nagasaki Foreign Settlement: A Short History* (Hawai'i, 2009).
- Call, Steve, *Selling Air Power: Military Aviation and American Popular Culture After World War II* (Texas A&M, 2009).
- Casey, Shaun, *The Making of a Catholic President: Kennedy vs. Nixon 1960* (Oxford, 2008).
- Chin, Ko-lin, *The Golden Triangle: Inside Southeast Asia's Drug Trade* (Cornell, 2009).
- Contreras, Joseph, *In the Shadow of the Giant The Americanization of Modern Mexico* (Rutgers, 2009).
- Csordas, Thomas J., ed., *Transnational Transcendence: Essays on Religion and Globalization* (California, 2009).
- Daaler, Ivo H., and I. M. Destler, *In the Shadow of the Oval Office: Profiles of the National Security Advisers and the Presidents They Served--From JFK to George W. Bush* (Simon & Schuster, 2009).
- Derby, Lauren, *The Dictator's Seduction: Politics and the Popular Imagination in the Era of Trujillo* (Duke, 2009).
- Devji, Faisal, *The Terrorist in Search of Humanity: Militant Islam and Global Politics* (Columbia, 2009).
- Dunn, Timothy J., *Blockading the Border and Human Rights: The El Paso Operation that Remade Immigration Enforcement* (Texas, 2009).
- Franco, Massimo, *Parallel Empires: The Vatican and the United States--Two Centuries of Alliance and Conflict* (Random House, 2009).
- Gage, Beverly, *The Day Wall Street Exploded: A Story of America in its First Age of Terror* (Oxford, 2008).
- Gunn, Giles, and Carl Gutiérrez-Jones, eds., *America and the Misshaping of a New World Order* (California, 2009).
- Gunn, T. Jeremy, *Spiritual Weapons: The Cold War and the Forging of an American National Religion* (Praeger, 2008).
- Hagopian, Patrick, *The Vietnam War in American Memory: Veterans, Memorials, and the Politics of Healing* (Massachusetts, 2009).
- Hamerow, Theodore S., *Why We Watched: Europe, America, and the Holocaust* (W. W. Norton, 2008).
- Hodgson, Godfrey, *The Myth of American Exceptionalism* (Yale, 2009).

- Honigsberg, Peter Jan, *Our Nation Unhinged: The Human Consequences of the War on Terror* (California, 2009).
- Horne, Alistair, *Kissinger: 1973, the Crucial Year* (Simon & Schuster, 2009).
- Khalidi, Rashid, *Sowing Crisis: The Cold War and American Hegemony in the Middle East* (Beacon, 2009).
- Khlevniuk, Oleg V., trans. Nora Seligman Favorov, *Master of the House: Stalin and His Inner Circle* (Yale, 2009).
- Kimmage, Michael, *The Conservative Turn: Lionel Trilling, Whittaker Chambers, and the Lessons of Anti-Communism* (Harvard, 2009).
- Kudo, Akira, ed. *Japan and Germany: Two Latecomers on the World Stage, 1890–1945* (Hawai'i, 2009).
- Mann, James, *The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War* (Viking, 2009).
- McCrossen, Alexis, *Land of Necessity: Consumer Culture in the United States-Mexico Borderlands* (Duke, 2009).
- Miller, James Edward, *The United States and the Making of Modern Greece: History and Power, 1950-1974* (North Carolina, 2009).
- Murphy, Andrew R., *Prodigal Nation: Moral Decline and Divine Punishment from New England to 9/11* (Oxford, 2008).
- Nance, Susan, *How the Arabian Nights Inspired the American Dream, 1790-1935* (North Carolina, 2009).
- O'Connor, Peter, *The English-Language Press Networks of East Asia, 1918-45* (Hawai'i, 2009).
- Olmsted, Kathryn S., *Real Enemies: Conspiracy Theories and American Democracy, World War I to 9/11* (Oxford, 2009).
- O'Sullivan, Christopher D., *Sumner Welles, Postwar Planning, and the Quest for a New World Order, 1937-1943* (Columbia, 2008).
- Radosh, Ronald, and Allis Radosh, *A Safe Haven: Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel* (Harper, 2009).
- Roberts, Priscilla H., and Richard S. Roberts. *Thomas Barclay (1728-1793): Consul in France, Diplomat in Barbary* (Lehigh, 2008).
- Rodman, Peter W., *Presidential Command: Power, Leadership, and the Making of Foreign Policy from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush* (Random House, 2009).
- Rougeau, Vincent D., *Christians in the American Empire: Faith and Citizenship in the New World Order* (Oxford, 2008).
- Rovner, Eduardo Sáenz, *The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking, Smuggling, and Gambling in Cuba from the 1920s to the Revolution* (North Carolina, 2009).
- Sasgen, Peter, *Stalking the Red Bear: The True Story of a U.S. Cold War Submarine's Covert Operations Against the Soviet Union* (St. Martin's, 2009).
- Schoultz, Lars, *That Infernal Little Cuban Republic: The United States and the Cuban Revolution* (North Carolina, 2009).
- Schwenkel, Christina, *The American War in Contemporary Vietnam: Transnational Remembrance and Representation* (Indiana, 2009).
- Sloan, John W., *FDR and Reagan: Transformative Presidents with Clashing Visions* (Kansas, 2008).
- Stokke, Olav, *The UN and Development: From Aid to Cooperation* (Indiana, 2009).
- Tanaka, Yuki, and Marilyn B. Young, eds., *Bombing Civilians: A Twentieth-Century History* (New Press, 2008).
- Tyler, Patrick, *A World of Trouble: The White House and the Middle East--from the Cold War to the War on Terror* (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008).
- West, Elliott, *The Last Indian War: The Nez Perce Story* (Oxford, 2009).
- Wuthnow, Robert, *Boundless Faith: The Global Outreach of American Churches* (California, 2009).

The Last Word


As I write these words in February 2009, the daily newspapers are reporting evidence of doom and gloom in the U.S. economy. For about five weeks straight, it seems that the business section of my local paper, the *Columbus Dispatch*, has printed the same sad headline: X CORPORATION SHEDS Y JOBS, with only the X and Y changing, and with Y followed by a comma and three zeroes. My university is discussing *possible* budget cuts, which is alarming enough, but I also hear from friends around the country that I am among the fortunate ones who have not yet experienced actual cuts.

In this climate of doom and gloom, I am very pleased to be able to say that SHAFR is weathering the storm in decent shape. While our investment portfolio has taken a huge hit in the last 15 months, falling by some 30 percent in actual value, we have also dramatically increased our revenue sources in that same time period and thus have been able to launch a series of new initiatives designed to expand our membership, broaden our reach into public discourse and education, and continue our long legacy of promoting excellence in research, especially by graduate students. At its meeting in New York in January, Council decided that we were in a position to maintain the new programs even in times of economic malaise.

Some highlights:

→ In 2008-9, SHAFR launched two new, year-long dissertation fellowships valued at \$20,000 each. This program enables two fellows to devote the academic year to completion of their doctoral degrees without the pressure of teaching or other employment. This program will continue in 2009-10, with the winners notified on approximately May 1 and announced at the SHAFR conference in June.

→ In 2008, we launched the annual Summer Institute, a week-long workshop on a significant topic in U.S. foreign relations history. Bob McMahon and I were fortunate



to co-host the 2008 Institute, focusing on Vietnam and Iraq in comparative perspective and including 12 engaged and thoughtful participants. Jeremi Suri and Fredrik Logevall will co-host the 2009 program on the theme of "Turning Points in the Cold War." Council voted to extend this program through 2012 and appointed a committee to solicit applications from prospective hosts for the 2010, 2011, 2012 Institutes.


→ Council also launched a bold and ambitious effort to boost the membership and diversify the scope of research in the field by generously subsidizing travel to the next three annual meetings by scholars who would add diversity to the program and who have not previously attended SHAFR conferences. Consequently, the 2009 Program Committee, chaired by Paul Kramer, received a record number of session and paper proposals and is planning a record-setting meeting in June 2009.

→ Under the leadership of our new Web Editor Brian Etheridge (Louisiana Tech), SHAFR's web-site was reconceptualized and redesigned from top to bottom in January 2009. The site now features blogs and op-ed essays designed to provide commentary on current events in historical perspective and to introduce interested readers to our Society. Early data on "hits" and "unique visitors" suggests that the initiative is giving SHAFR a collective voice in the shaping of public discourse on vital issues of our day. On a related note, our Director of Secondary Education, John Tully (Central Connecticut), is soliciting teaching plans on select topics in our field and making them freely available to secondary school teachers around the world.

The vibrancy of SHAFR continues to gratify, even in the hard times through which many of us seem to be sliding.

Peter L. Hahn is Executive Director of SHAFR and Professor of History at The Ohio State University.

Save the Date!



SHAFR ANNUAL MEETING

June 25-27, 2009

Fairview Park Marriott

Falls Church, Virginia

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International Security Studies
The Ohio State University
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Columbus, OH 43201
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