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A TALE OF TWO ISOLATIONISTS—TOLD THREE WARS LATER*

by

Wayne S. Cole

During more than a quarter of a century, most of my research and writing has focused on United States foreign affairs before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. In particular I have concentrated on "isolationist" opposition to American entry into World War II. Consequently, in my comments today I shall draw together some of my thoughts and observations on that general subject. I shall use for my illustrations two major prewar noninterventionists, Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh and Senator Gerald P. Nye.¹ I shall analyze their views and performances from perspectives provided by United States military involvement in World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. I participated in World War II, wrote my book on the America First Committee during the Korean War, and was writing a volume on Charles A. Lindbergh when American military involvement in Vietnam ended.

Before I turn to Lindbergh and Nye, however, I should like to dispel three legends or myths about "isolationism." First, I should like to challenge the legend or myth that isolationism was a legend or myth—that it did not really exist. Of course, if one were to define the term literally, then it was a legend or myth. No prewar noninterventionist wanted literally to cut the United States off from the rest of the world. The China Wall imagery provides a misleading conception of their views. The image of "head-in-sand" is as inaccurate for the isolationists as it is in describing ostriches. Rather than a literally accurate description of noninterventionist views, "isolationism" was a pejorative term used by internationalists and interventionists to discredit noninterventionists. Prewar isolationists did not like the term and wished they could free themselves from its damaging effects. When they reluctantly acquiesced in the label, they were careful to define it in terms consistent with their own particular foreign policy views rather than in the literal meaning of the word.²

In 1940, for example, Senator Nye wrote: "I do not believe that we must take the United States off the planet, to cut off commercial intercourse with other nations or to be entirely indifferent to the political, moral and social problems of other nations. I do not believe in the theory of the Chinese Wall. If that is what some mean by isolation, I am not an isolationist. That is not what the term means to those of us who have been labeled as isolationist and who, for want of a better, accept the label.

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*This paper was delivered as the presidential address at the luncheon of SHAFR, December 28, 1973, during the annual convention of the AHA in San Francisco. Dr. Cole is professor of history at the University of Maryland.

"I maintain that we isolationists—and here I definitely accept the term—are first of all realists. We desire to base our action on an honest estimate of our national physical strength, on an honest weighing of the gains and losses to us and to other peoples of each practical measure suggested as a means of righting any particular trouble or discord in which we have, or are said to have, interest. . . . we are selfish in our interest in America and for that which may be good for America.

"It is obvious that the United States has not the physical strength to make itself the guardian of international virtue. . . . I want no part of Europe's wars. . . . Our power is not evenly distributed over the earth but localized sharply in this hemisphere, where there is a job big enough for us to do.

"Let Europe resolve its own difficulties. Let us recognize that we cannot hope to solve them and that our attempts to do so result only in cost to ourselves without gain for Europe. . . . I am unwilling to enter into commitments that we have not the power either to keep or to enforce."³

Rather than "isolationism," Charles A. Lindbergh preferred the phrase "independent destiny" to describe the policies he favored for the United States. In May, 1941, Lindbergh told an America First rally: "We believe in an independent destiny for America. Such a destiny does not mean that we will build a wall around our country and isolate ourselves from all contact with the rest of the world. But it does mean that the future of America will not be tied to those eternal wars in Europe. It means that American boys will not be sent across the ocean to die so that England or Germany or France or Spain may dominate the other nations.

"An independent American destiny means, on the one hand, that our soldiers will not have to fight everybody in the world who prefers some other system of life to ours. On the other hand, it means that we will fight anybody and everybody who attempts to interfere with our hemisphere, and that we will do so with all the resources of our nation. It means that we rely on our own strength, our own ability, and our own courage, to preserve this nation and to defeat anyone who is rash enough to attack us."⁴

One should not define "isolationism" by some dictionary definition. One should, instead, define the term by examining the views that those so-called "isolationists" actually advanced. Isolationists before Pearl Harbor opposed involvement in European wars. They opposed efforts to have the United States police the world or remake the world in its own image. They were not pacifists. They believed the United States at that time could successfully defend itself in the Western Hemisphere. They believed the United States should concentrate on building freedom, democracy, and the good life at home. They thought America could lead more effectively by example than it could through military involvement abroad. And they feared that massive involvement in European wars could destroy American freedom and democracy.

Nevertheless, before and after American entry into World War II the

term "isolationist" was applied almost universally to the nonpacifists who opposed American entry into the conflict. The term stuck. The label was applied historically to certain individuals who advanced certain foreign policy views. And historically the pejorative connotations of that term helped to discredit and defeat prewar noninterventionists. No historian is justified in pretending that that manifestly important part of the past did not exist.

A second related legend or myth about isolationism is that the foreign policy debate between isolationists and interventionists before Pearl Harbor was not really important, that the significant developments controlling America's role in foreign affairs were independent of that foreign policy debate. Ironically, some of the same people who see that earlier debate as almost irrelevant, urged and participated in comparable debates and political actions in opposition to American foreign policies in the Cold War and in Vietnam.

It is true, of course, that there were fundamental, impersonal, influences operating both at home and abroad that moved the United States toward involvement in World War II. In the circumstances that prevailed before Pearl Harbor (and in circumstances anywhere at any time) there were practical limits to the control people had over their course in world affairs.

Nevertheless, insofar as it was possible for the political processes to operate in foreign affairs, that "Great Debate" between isolationists and interventionists before Pearl Harbor was a part of democracy in action. Literally millions of Americans all over the country in all political parties in all walks of life participated. That debate was not always conducted according to political Marquis of Queensberry rules. Experts on "dirty tricks" in our own time might have learned more tricks if they had studied the tactics used to destroy pre-Pearl Harbor isolationism. Both isolationists and interventionists felt frustrations in their efforts to accomplish their goals for America through conventional democratic processes. But they tried. And to their credit partisans on both sides before Pearl Harbor avoided the use of domestic violence that some, a generation later, resorted to in the controversies over America's policies in Southeast Asia. American foreign policies did not perfectly mirror the wishes of the American people, but insofar as democracy and the political processes could operate in foreign affairs in those years, that "Great Debate" was a vehicle for them. Few debates have had such important long term consequences for the United States and the world. With American involvement in World War II, there was no turning back. In that sense Pearl Harbor was something of a watershed in the history of American foreign affairs.

After Pearl Harbor prewar isolationists were discouraged and disappointed. But most were proud of their earnest efforts to use the democratic processes to battle for foreign policies they believed were wiser than the alternatives provided by interventionists and the Roosevelt Administration. Then and since they have been excoriated by most shapers of American opinion. But if one believes that democratic processes should operate in the determination of American foreign policies (as I believe, and as most people believed who criticized America's

Vietnam policies), then one should applaud both the isolationists and the interventionists for their efforts to make democracy work in foreign affairs before the United States entered World War II.

The third legend or myth I wish to challenge is that President Roosevelt exaggerated the strength of isolationist opposition, and unnecessarily allowed a noisy handful to obstruct his foreign policies. Despite public opinion polls, this particular matter is not easy to resolve with certainty. Each participant and each scholar may have a skewed view rooted in his own particular set of experiences and observations. My own middle western origins and my research in many thousands of isolationist documents and letters may give me an exaggerated impression of the numbers and strength of prewar isolationists. At the same time, however, the backgrounds of many politicians and interventionists before Pearl Harbor, and the personal and research experiences of many scholars since, may have given them an exaggerated impression of the interventionist consensus and may have caused them to underestimate isolationist strength. For example, Roosevelt's Republican Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson of New York, had parochial perspectives of the United States both geographically and socially. Like John Jay and Alexander Hamilton nearly a century and a half earlier, Stimson's conception of the United States never got very far west or south of New York City, nor very far outside the elitist circles in which he moved. Similarly, some historians such as William L. Langer and Samuel Eliot Morison may have had a conception of America that exaggerated the importance of the urban Northeast and may have attached insufficient weight to those many tens of millions of Americans living west of the Hudson or the Appalachians.

President Roosevelt, however, had a national political perspective. He realized that neither the Hudson River nor the Appalachian Mountains constituted the western boundary of the United States. He knew that press opinion did not begin and end with the **New York Times** and the **Washington Post**. He realized that the **New York Herald Tribune** did not provide an entirely representative view of Republican foreign policy attitudes. His was a national rather than a parochial view,⁵ and in my judgment he was more nearly correct in his analysis of American public opinion before Pearl Harbor than his interventionist critics were at the time.

But let me move on to a discussion of the two isolationists, Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh and Senator Gerald P. Nye. They illustrate both diversity and common strands within isolationist ranks. Both were born and reared in the upper Mississippi Valley. Nye was born in the small town of Hortonville, Wisconsin in 1892, and was reared in nearby Wittenberg; Lindbergh was born a decade later in his mother's home city of Detroit, Michigan, and reared on a farm near Little Falls, Minnesota. Neither could trace his ancestry to any of the Axis countries. Each had British and Scandinavian ancestors. Though both were born in Protestant Christian families, organized religion did not play conspicuous roles in the public lives of either of them. Neither excelled in school. Nye graduated from Wittenberg high school in 1911, but he never attended college. Lindbergh graduated from Little Falls high school in 1918,

and studied engineering for three semesters at the University of Wisconsin, but he never graduated. Lindbergh was brighter than Nye, but he had little interest in his studies.

Through their fathers, both were exposed to political activism and agrarian progressivism in the Republican Party. Nye's father edited small town newspapers, participated in local politics, and followed Wisconsin's Robert M. LaFollette, Sr., in the paths of progressivism. Lindbergh's father was a lawyer and served ten years as a progressive Republican Congressman from Minnesota. He shared earlier Populist views, became involved in the agrarian radical Nonpartisan League, and battled against the "Money Trust" on both domestic and foreign affairs. He vigorously opposed American entry into World War I.⁶ The elder Nye and Lindbergh were both independent, outspoken, and courageous. The sons respected their fathers and both were influenced by their examples.

Gerald P. Nye followed his father's footsteps as a small town newspaper editor first in Wisconsin, and later in Iowa and in the Great Plains state of North Dakota. Young Nye was more aggressive, more political, and more radical than his father had been. Though he supported Woodrow Wilson's Administration on most domestic and foreign policy issues, acute agricultural difficulties in North Dakota and the protests by the Nonpartisan League moved Nye to agrarian radical political activism. Appointed to the United States Senate as a progressive Republican from North Dakota in 1925, he served nearly twenty years in the Senate until retired by the voters in 1945 near the close of World War II. In the Senate he was an insurgent Republican, an agrarian progressive, a "son of the wild jackasses," and an isolationist. On both domestic and foreign policy issues he worked with other western progressives including Hiram W. Johnson of California, William E. Borah of Idaho, George W. Norris of Nebraska, Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., of Wisconsin, and Henrik Shipstead of Minnesota.

Charles Lindbergh shared his father's independence, integrity, and courage; he loved farming and the out-of-doors; throughout his life he retained values rooted in the soil from which he had emerged. But in contrast to Nye, young Lindbergh disliked politics and never became the agrarian radical his father had been. In common with his mother and her family, Lindbergh found fascination in science and machines. His magnificent obsession became aviation and flying. He had his first airplane ride in 1922, after he left the University of Wisconsin. He bought his first airplane—a World War I Jenny—in 1923, and barnstormed through the South and Middle West. In 1924, he enlisted in the Army Air Service, and as an aviation cadet trained as a military pilot in Texas. In 1925, he graduated at the top of his class as a pursuit pilot with a commission in the Reserves. He flew air mail between St. Louis and Chicago, and in May, 1927, burst upon the world's headlines with his solo flight from New York to Paris in his single-engine **Spirit of St. Louis**.⁷

At 6'2½", Lindbergh was four inches taller than Nye. In personality each was earnest, direct, even-tempered, and considerate. Neither was devious nor a dissembler. Each had abundant energy and plen-

ty of courage. Each won public acclaim, Lindbergh much more than Nye. And each recognized the benefits to be derived from publicity.

In their relations with the public, however, their styles and approaches differed. Senator Nye enjoyed the crowds and attention; he thrived on them. For Lindbergh the acclaim went to poisonous extremes. From May, 1927, onward he found it difficult to have any private life at all. Newsmen, photographers, hero-worshippers, curiosity-seekers, and crackpots hounded him wherever he went. He tried to separate his public activities from his private life, but the public would not honor the distinction. Initially he tried to get along with the members of the press, but increasingly he resented and resisted their intrusions. The excesses of publicity produced tragedy with the kidnapping and murder of the Lindbergh baby in 1932. Harassed by newsmen and threatened by crackpots, the Lindberghs could not live anything approaching a normal life in the United States. Consequently, in December, 1935, they fled America and sought temporary refuge in England and later in France. Lindbergh's feud with the press was an important element in the later destruction of his cause and his reputation.

Both Nye and Lindbergh tried to shape their foreign policy views wisely and advance them effectively. But Senator Nye, a talented politician and a powerful orator, not only moved his constituents and listeners, he was attuned to them and moved by them. Lindbergh earnestly sought data, tested theories, and groped for truth and wisdom in the alarming international situation. In his noninterventionist speeches and articles he tried to explain the realities as he saw them. He took great care in selecting just the right words to express his thoughts accurately. But Lindbergh's primary concern was with truth rather than with effect.

In their backgrounds and experiences, then, Nye and Lindbergh represented certain common strands in the noninterventionist movement. Despite those similarities, however, the two men pursued somewhat different paths in reaching their noninterventionist positions. Senator Gerald P. Nye's foreign policy views grew directly out of his agrarian radicalism and his opposition to dominance by urban industry and finance. Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh's foreign policy views grew out of his analysis of the impact of air power, geography, and national character on international affairs and on America's place in world affairs. As the United States under the leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt drew closer to involvement in the European war, Nye and Lindbergh shared in warning against excessive presidential power, secrecy, and deception in foreign affairs.

Traditionally the western farmer put a premium on self-reliance and hard work. But from the farmer's frame of reference nature on the one hand and "special interests" on the other robbed him of the fruits of his labor. In coping with drought, grasshoppers, and winter storms, the farmer supplemented his labors by turning to his God and to Lady Luck. But in contending with the "special interests," he increasingly turned to political action. Financiers who held the mortgage on his farm, industrialists who manufactured his equipment, railroads that carried

supplies to the farmer and his products to the market, and merchants who distributed his produce, all seemed, in the farmer's view, to take an unconscionably large part of the returns from his labor. And the farmer identified those "special interests" with cities—whether those cities were as nearby as Fargo, St. Paul, and Chicago, or as remote as New York and London. The farmer saw those eastern urban business interests as selfish, exploitive, and evil. They reaped where they had not sown; they enriched themselves at the expense of the farmer. And the farmer often saw the government as serving those "selfish interests" by showering special privileges upon them.

Western farmers and their political spokesmen generally did not want government ownership of the means of production and distribution. Most at that time did not even want subsidies for agriculture. But they wanted to end the special privileges of their urban exploiters. They wanted the government to restrain abuses by urban industry, railroads, and creditors so that the farmer would be charged fair prices for their services. As young Nye phrased it early in his North Dakota political career, the government should "Give equal privileges to all; or take them away from those specially privileged now." Those were the circumstances and attitudes that spawned the Populist movement in the 1890s, the Nonpartisan League during and after World War I, and agrarian progressivism. In the depression decade of the 1930s, they supplemented other interests in sustaining President Roosevelt's New Deal.

But those agrarian considerations did not stop at the three-mile limit. When projected into foreign affairs those same attitudes became variations of American isolationism. Most farmers realized that they were affected by foreign markets and foreign suppliers. But they objected to foreign policies they believed were inspired by the same "selfish" urban interests that exploited them on the domestic scene. They objected to being taxed to pay for expensive battleships whose purpose was not so much to defend America as to subsidize eastern steel manufacturers and shipbuilders. They opposed sending those high-priced ships to distant lands to defend the investments and businesses of eastern financiers. They opposed imperialism that seemed not so much for spreading democracy and freedom as for guarding the investments and loans of Wall Street financiers. They opposed involvement in foreign wars that, in their judgment, were not essential for national security but were, instead, designed to further enrich eastern urban financiers, munitions makers, and shippers. And they resisted war propaganda that used patriotic appeals to arouse support for ventures abroad that were more essential to urban business interests than to American national security and freedom.

Gerald P. Nye of North Dakota fully shared those general attitudes on both domestic and foreign affairs during his nearly twenty years as a progressive Republican in the United States Senate. Those attitudes moved him to battle against pro-business policies of the Republican Coolidge and Hoover Administrations. They led him to support much of Roosevelt's New Deal, while at the same time criticizing pro-business actions of the National Recovery Administration. And those attitudes provided the perfect vehicle for projecting him into the national limelight as chairman of the Senate Special Committee Investigating the

Munitions Industry, 1934–1936. Many urban liberals, socialists, and pacifists also supported the munitions probe. But Senator Nye's attacks on Wall Street's House of Morgan, on the du Ponts and other munitions makers, and on shipbuilders were consistent with his own agrarian radicalism and with that of the rural and small town constituents he represented. Furthermore, it was logical that the neutrality legislation he proposed in the 1930s would have placed no direct restraints on farmers, but would have restricted the economic activities of urban financiers, manufacturers, and shippers. The isolationist movement was by no means exclusively rural and small town. But Gerald P. Nye and most of the leading Senate isolationists reflected in various forms those agrarian values on both domestic and foreign affairs.

Charles A. Lindbergh followed a different path in reaching his non-interventionist position. Despite his father's example, Colonel Lindbergh was never an agrarian radical. He admired his father, respected his qualities of character, and shared remnants of his views. But he did not consciously follow his example in opposing American entry into World War II. Despite occasional references, Lindbergh did not focus on economic aspects of foreign affairs. Indeed, in 1929, he had married into the so-called "Money Trust" when he wed the daughter of a former partner of J. P. Morgan and Company. Through his wife, Lindbergh met, liked, and respected many New York financiers.

In certain respects Lindbergh's analysis of international affairs had much in common with that of the later Hans J. Morgenthau–George F. Kennan "Realists." His position grew out of his concerns about the impact of air power and national character. As he summarized it in the title of his first article on foreign affairs, in the fall of 1939, Lindbergh was concerned with the impact of "Aviation, Geography, and Race" on the future of Western Civilization.⁸

In 1936, the American military attache' in Berlin, Major Truman Smith, invited Colonel Lindbergh to visit Germany to inspect aviation developments there. Major Smith arranged that invitation for the specific purpose of gaining information for the United States armed forces about military aviation in Nazi Germany. Altogether Colonel Lindbergh made three major visits and three briefer visits to Germany before the war. His findings were reported to the highest levels in American, British, and French political and military leadership. Those reports included information on all the major types of combat airplanes that the Luftwaffe used in the early years of World War II. In addition, Lindbergh inspected aviation developments in France, the Soviet Union, and Czechoslovakia. All of those visits were made in cooperation with United States diplomatic and military officials in those countries, and resulted in reports to American and Western leaders.⁹

As a result of those experiences, Lindbergh became convinced that Germany was the natural air power in Europe, that German air power surpassed that of all other European states, and that if it continued its rate of progress it could overtake the United States in aviation technology. Those observations were reinforced in his mind by patterns he saw in national character. He found the British slow, inefficient, and complacent; he thought their qualities suited for the age of sea power

but inadequate for the age of air power. In France he was disturbed by the divisiveness, low morale, and lack of leadership. He was troubled by the contrast between the decadence in England and France, and the spirit and efficiency he found in Germany. Lindbergh was never pro-Nazi; he did not like Hitler's totalitarianism; and he was shocked by Nazi persecution of the Jews. He urged Britain, France, and the United States to step up their air power preparations. But by the latter part of the 1930s he believed Britain and France were not capable of defeating Germany in war, that any attempt to do so would result in defeat, and that even if they could crush Germany the result would be such death and devastation that it could destroy Western Civilization. The only real victors in such a war, he feared, might be Communist Russia and Japan. And he worried about the menace of Asiatic hordes for the future of Western Civilization.

With war approaching in Europe, Colonel Lindbergh returned to the United States in the spring of 1939. Serving with the Army Air Corps for several months, he helped speed American air power preparations. And in September, 1939, after the outbreak of war in Europe, Lindbergh began his active opposition to American entry into World War II. In his speeches and articles he used many of the same arguments that Senator Nye and other isolationists advanced. But he spoke with greatest conviction and authority when he analyzed the impact of air power on international affairs and on American defense.

In 1939–1941, Colonel Lindbergh insisted that air power and geography strengthened American defense in the Western Hemisphere. In his words, "The air defense of America is as simple as the attack is difficult." He conceded that it was possible even then to build bombers that could fly nonstop from Europe to America and return. But he pointed out that no air force in the world had any squadrons of airplanes capable of doing so at that time. And if they were built the cost would be high, the losses heavy, and the military effectiveness negligible. He asserted that the United States could not be invaded by air alone; armies would have to be transported by sea. No fleets could successfully land and supply armies in America without control of the air. And with proper preparations American military planes could prevent control of its skies by any European state. Lindbergh had no confidence in Hitler's promises, but he believed that Nazi Germany could not successfully attack a prepared America. He opposed aid short of war, believing it added to the bloodshed abroad, would not change the course of the war there, and weakened American defenses at home. He urged a negotiated peace in Europe. He advised the United States to prepare its military defenses, stay out of the European war, and perfect its own way of life at home.

Lindbergh had long believed that war between Nazi Germany and Communist Russia was virtually inevitable. When that war began on June 22, 1941, Lindbergh and Nye saw it as one more reason for staying out of the European war. They preferred to let the two dictatorships destroy each other. If the Soviet Union had not absorbed so much of Nazi Germany's might, and if it had not expended so much of its manpower and materiel in checking Hitler's forces, the losses and consequences for

the United States and the West in World War II might have been vastly greater than they were. Without the Russo-German War, Lindbergh's fearful prognostications about the consequences of American entry into World War II might have been shockingly accurate.

Though Senator Nye and Colonel Lindbergh arrived at their isolationist positions by different paths, they nonetheless found common ground in opposition to interventionist propaganda in general and to what they saw as warmaking tactics by President Roosevelt in particular. Throughout their noninterventionist activities both Nye and Lindbergh inveighed against war propaganda and propagandists. Senator Nye warned against emotional patriotic appeals used to enshroud war moves of munitions makers and financiers. In 1941, Nye initiated a probe of war propaganda in motion pictures and radio. Both Nye and Lindbergh warned against interventionist newspaper columnists and commentators. Both attacked foreign propaganda, particularly from Great Britain. On September 11, 1941, in Des Moines, Iowa, in his most controversial and criticized public address, Lindbergh asked, "Who Are the War Agitators?" The answer he provided in that speech was that "The three most important groups who have been pressing this country toward war are the British, the Jewish and the Roosevelt administration." The ensuing uproar focused largely on his reference to Jewish interventionists, but that was his only public mention of Jews. In contrast, by 1941 both Lindbergh and Nye increasingly berated President Roosevelt for leading the country to war while professing to be working for peace. Each charged that the President was using dictatorial methods on the pretext of fighting dictatorships, that in fighting for the "Four Freedoms" abroad Americans were losing their freedoms at home. They objected to excessive presidential power in foreign affairs, to secrecy and deception, and to what Lindbergh called "Government by Subterfuge." The language that Lindbergh and Nye used in criticizing Roosevelt's tactics before Pearl Harbor was much like that used a generation later by liberal internationalists in denouncing Presidents Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon during and after the Vietnam War.

Rarely in American history have any movements or public figures been more thoroughly discredited than were isolationism and the isolationists. Even before Pearl Harbor, Lindbergh and Nye were seen as naive, partisan, un-American, anti-Semitic, fifth columnists, and little better than Nazis. After Pearl Harbor, wartime hatreds and the need for unity in the conduct of the war provided even less tolerance of them. Efforts to assure American participation in the United Nations at the close of World War II further discredited the isolationism that had helped keep the United States out of the League of Nations after World War I. The White House and internationalists from the urban Northeast played powerful behind-the-scenes roles in helping to defeat prewar noninterventionists in their bids for reelection. Those efforts contributed to the defeat of Senator Nye in 1944 and 1946. Prewar isolationists fared badly in the decade of the 1940s.

Professional historians shared in discrediting noninterventionists in their histories of American entry into World War II. Charles A. Beard, Harry Elmer Barnes, Charles C. Tansill, and others wrote revisionist volumes that were essentially historical restatements of the earlier non-

interventionist arguments. In the final pages of his last book, Beard analyzed the potential consequences of the excesses and abuses of presidential power in foreign affairs; one may find his analysis a bit disturbing when reread in the light of developments in the early 1970s. But those revisionist scholars were as discredited as Lindbergh and Nye; their histories won no status in respectable scholarly circles. Most historians after World War II wrote and taught from perspectives that assumed the general soundness of internationalist-interventionist analyses and the general wrongness of prewar noninterventionists.¹⁰

In 1949–1950, bipartisan unity in the United States collapsed, with the triumph of Mao Tse-tung's Communists in China and with the outbreak of the Korean War. Former President Herbert Hoover called for a "Fortress America." Critics lashed out at President Roosevelt's wartime policies and at President Truman's postwar policies. Senator Joseph R. McCarthy of Wisconsin viciously attacked Democratic Administrations and liberal internationalists with charges of "twenty years of treason." He identified them with the menace of world communism. The Eisenhower–Dulles emphasis on "Massive Retaliation" did not repudiate internationalism, but it attached relatively more emphasis on America's own strategic air power and relatively less to multilateral collective security.

Nevertheless, though the breakdown of bipartisan unity reopened certain issues on the national scene, it did not do so in so-called establishment circles. America's traumatic experiences in the early 1950s further strengthened internationalists in their convictions that prewar isolationists and their successors during the Korean War were both wrong and dangerous. In associating his victims with totalitarian communism in China and the Soviet Union, McCarthy was using essentially the same guilt-by-association methods that interventionists before Pearl Harbor had used in associating isolationists with the menace of Nazi Germany. Liberal internationalists in the 1950s rightly objected to McCarthy's guilt-by-association methods and sympathized with his victims. But they saw no parallels to the methods they had used against isolationists a decade earlier, felt no regrets about their own use of those methods, and felt no sympathy for the prewar isolationists whose careers and reputations had been destroyed by those methods. Instead, the breakdown of bipartisanship, the renewal of a "Great Debate" in foreign affairs, and the rise and fall of McCarthyism further confirmed national political leaders, scholars, and the urban media in their images of those whose foreign policy views did not conform to the bipartisan consensus.

In the latter part of the 1960s and on into the 1970s there was growing dissent from Administration policies, particularly in Vietnam and Southeast Asia. Critics of American involvement in Vietnam used many of the same arguments that isolationists had used in attacking President Roosevelt and his policies before Pearl Harbor. They objected to excessive presidential power in foreign affairs, to presidential secrecy and deception, to military actions without congressional authorization, to government propaganda arousing popular emotions and deceiving the American people, to campaign speeches for peace followed by warlike actions after election victories, and to the failure of Congress to exercise its constitutional authority in restraining the President and the

military in foreign affairs. Critics denied that the United States could and should attempt to remake the world in its own image. They insisted that America's vital interests were not at stake in Southeast Asia. They complained of the financial burdens involved in fighting that unpopular war. They regretted the neglect of pressing problems at home and the damaging divisiveness involvement in Vietnam caused in America. They urged withdrawal from that bloody war and refocus on solving urgent social and economic problems within the United States.

There was speculation about possible resurgence of isolationism in America. In a tiny book published in 1972, Bruce M. Russett questioned the necessity for American entry into World War II to guard national interests and security.¹¹ That same year Robert W. Tucker of Johns Hopkins wrote a little book arguing the case for a new isolationism in guarding American interests.¹² In 1971, not long before his death, Senator Nye addressed one of my diplomatic history classes. He was highly critical of American entry into World War II, but he also criticized American involvement in Vietnam. At the time he spoke his youngest son was serving as an Air Force pilot in Southeast Asia, and another of his sons was recovering from serious wounds he had suffered in combat in Vietnam. The students received Nye well—partly out of courtesy to an old man, partly because he was still a moving orator, and partly because they could identify with more of what he was saying than students might have ten, twenty, or thirty years earlier. Despite his personal regard for Barry M. Goldwater, Charles A. Lindbergh voted for Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964 against the more militant Republican presidential nominee. In 1970, Lindbergh published a thick volume of his wartime journals, including portions treating his noninterventionist activities.¹³ Perhaps at long last the vindication that Lindbergh, Nye, and other prewar isolationists had hoped for was to be forthcoming.

But not so. Initially the criticism of America's policies in Vietnam drew heavily upon so-called "anti-Establishment" sources, from radicals on the Left and from so-called "neo-isolationists" on the Right. New Left scholars used economic analyses in their attacks on the military-industrial complex and on America's imperialistic war in Vietnam. But the assassination of President John F. Kennedy in 1963 began to transfer control of the White House and foreign affairs out of the hands of the Eastern-urban-liberal-internationalist Establishment. Urban liberals objected to excessive presidential power in the hands of Lyndon B. Johnson from Texas, Richard M. Nixon from California, or even Harry S. Truman from Missouri—but not when the President was an acceptable Establishment liberal such as Franklin D. Roosevelt from New York or John F. Kennedy from Massachusetts. Secrecy, deception, and wire taps were justified for Roosevelt in coping with dangerous opposition from Lindbergh and Nye in warring against Nazi Germany; they were not justified for Johnson or Nixon in contesting with liberal internationalists in warring in Vietnam. Congressional actions on foreign affairs in the 1930s were seen as irresponsible; in the 1970s liberals considered such actions as democratic and constructive. In the environment of Establishment dissent during the Vietnam War, three distinguished Harvard scholars provided historical sanction in a book on dissent in earlier American wars. But their essays focused approvingly on dissent in three nine—

teenth century was generally opposed by the urban Northeast; the little volume passed over in silence the less acceptable dissenters from American involvement in World Wars I and II.¹⁴ In his latest book, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., berated excessive presidential power in the hands of Presidents Truman, Johnson, and Nixon, but he did not extend his indictment to Roosevelt and Kennedy.¹⁵ It is not unreasonable to assume that when the Eastern urban Establishment regains control of the White House we will be reading and hearing much less about the necessity for legislative restraints on presidential powers in foreign affairs.

The question of who was most nearly right before Pearl Harbor could only be answered with certainty by comparing the consequences of alternative courses of action. One can know, of course, that American military involvement in World War II, Korea, and Vietnam cost the United States a million and a half military casualties, including the lives of nearly a half million young Americans. But one cannot run controlled experiments to determine the possible effects of isolationist policies since their proposals were rejected at nearly every point after the European war began. In at least one fundamental sense, however, Lindbergh and Nye were right; World War II and its aftermath, including Korea and Vietnam, have helped destroy the civilization they knew and treasured. America will never return to the rural, small town environment and values that produced Nye and Lindbergh. And it will not return to the isolationist foreign policy projections of that older, simpler, individualistic America. Given mankind's feeble capacities for empathy with those who are different, that older America and its approaches to foreign affairs are unlikely to obtain sympathetic hearing in urban America. Small towns are being gobbled up by suburbia. The farm life that Lindbergh knew and loved as a teenager is fast yielding to corporate farms cultivated with sophisticated equipment. Wisconsin streams that young Nye fished are now poisoned. In recent years General Lindbergh has devoted much time to conservation and ecology. But the skies he loved are polluted, and the airplanes he piloted are giving way to high performance jets regulated by a huge federal bureaucracy and manipulated by nameless controllers staring at computerized radar screens. Man's already terrifying capacities to kill and destroy in World War II have multiplied many times over; by 1973 the oceans that barred the Luftwaffe provide no barrier to missiles with thermonuclear warheads. If humanity in the urban-industrialized-computerized-thermonuclear era does not destroy itself or go increasingly mad, it is nonetheless certain to move further and further from what Gerald P. Nye and Charles A. Lindbergh would have considered the good life. They could not stop or reverse those patterns at home or abroad; most in the urban world today would not do so if they could. Whatever the future may hold at home or abroad, the patterns will not be those that Nye or Lindbergh would have chosen; they may not even be those that Roosevelt would have preferred. But with good fortune humanity may survive a bit longer. And with the dreams and traditions of the old, combined with the ideals and energies of the young, conceivably life could prove to be better than either Nye or Lindbergh had envisaged. The Senator and the Colonel would most fervently have wished it to be so, whatever verdicts Clio renders on their places in American history.

1 For fuller accounts see: Wayne S. Cole, **Senator Gerald P. Nye and American Foreign Relations** (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1962); and Wayne S. Cole, **Charles A. Lindbergh and the Battle Against American Intervention in World War II** (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1974).

2 For an exhaustive bibliography on isolationism see: Justus D. Doenecke, **The Literature of Isolationism: A Guide to Non-Interventionist Scholarship, 1930-1972** (Colorado Springs: Ralph Myles, Publisher, 1972).

3 **New York Times Magazine**, January 14, 1940, pp. 1-2.

4 Charles A. Lindbergh, "Election Promises Should Be Kept," **Vital Speeches of the Day**, VII (June 1, 1941, p. 482.)

5 For example see: Franklin D. Roosevelt to James P. Warburg, May 23, 1934, President's Personal File 540, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, New York.

6 Bruce L. Larson, **Lindbergh of Minnesota: A Political Biography** (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc, 1973), *passim*.

7 Charles A. Lindbergh, **The Spirit of St. Louis** (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), *passim*; and Charles A. Lindbergh, **Boyhood on the Upper Mississippi: A Reminiscent Letter** (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1972), *passim*.

8 Charles A. Lindbergh, "Aviation, Geography, and Race," **Reader's Digest**, XXXV (November, 1939), 64-67.

9 Colonel Truman Smith, "Air Intelligence Activities: Office of the Military Attache, American Embassy, Berlin, Germany, August 1935 - April 1939 with Special Reference to the Services of Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, Air Corps (Res.);" (Unpublished manuscript in Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, 1956).

10 Wayne S. Cole, "American Entry into World War II: A Historical Appraisal," **Mississippi Valley Historical Review**, XLIII (March, 1957), 596-617, Charles A. Beard, **President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941** (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), chapter XVIII, and especially pp. 580-98.

11 Bruce M. Russett, **No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the U. S. Entry into World War II** (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972).

12 Robert W. Tucker, **A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise?** (New York: Universe Books, 1972).

13 **The Wartime Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh** (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970), pp. 253–561.

14 Samuel Eliot Morison, Frederick Merk, and Frank Freidel, **Dissent in Three American Wars** (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).

15 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., **The Imperial Presidency** (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973).

Minutes of Meeting, SHAFR Council,
Tamalpais Room, Hotel Hilton, San Francisco
December 27, 1973, 7:00–10:30 P. M.

Present: Wayne S. Cole (president), Bradford Perkins (vice president), Armin Rappaport (chairman, Program Committee), Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath (donors of the Stuart L. Bernath Prize), Warren F. Kimball (editor, SHAFR **Roster and Research List**), Richard W. Leopold, David F. Trask, and Robert H. Ferrell (members of Council), and Nolan Fowler (editor, SHAFR **Newsletter**).

President Cole's initial remarks concerned the Bernath Prize. The winner, announced publicly at the annual banquet the next day, was John L. Gaddis (Ohio U) for his **The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1947** (1972). Dr. Perkins who chaired the Prize Committee said the decision of that body, reached after surveying an entry list of some thirty books, was unanimous.

Dr. Cole disclosed that after some two years of negotiations with the Internal Revenue Service SHAFR now had an official tax-exempt status, and that consequently any further contributions to the Stuart L. Bernath Prize fund would be spared taxation. At this point Dr. Bernath stated that he and his wife wished to change their method of supporting the award. Thus far they had written a check of \$500 each time the prize had been given. Now they proposed to provide for permanent funding of the prize by purchasing in the immediate future a non-callable, lengthy-tenured federal bond of \$10,000 in the name of the Society, with the proceeds earmarked to finance the yearly award. Since the bond would probably yield more than the amount necessary to fund the annual award Dr. Bernath thought that SHAFR should name a committee to decide the best use of that excess yield. President Cole urged that the Bernaths themselves draw up a list of rules restricting the Society in the use of those funds. This proposal met with the approval of all present. Dr. Bernath also suggested that the retiring chairman of the Bernath Prize Committee draw up a set of instructions to guide his successors with regard to procedures and on the allocation of the five copies of each book that are submitted for the prize.

Dr. Bernath asked for, and was readily granted, permission to address the members of SHAFR at the banquet the next day. (His relatively short address upon the morrow dealt with the prevalence of cancer, a form of which had been responsible for the premature death of his son in whose name the annual award had been established, and pleaded with the membership to battle strongly for greater federal appropriations in order that this killer might be curbed).

Dr. Armin Rappaport, retiring chairman of the Program Committee and vice president-elect of the Society, revealed plans for the first separate meeting of the organization. (Thus far all gatherings of the Society have been held in conjunction with the AHA and the OAH). In so doing he paid tribute to Dr. Joseph P. O'Grady, executive secretary-treasurer of SHAFR, and to Dr. Jules Davids, director, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown U, for their efforts upon this project. The meeting will be a two-day affair, and will be held at the latter's institution near the end of August, 1975. Four full-length sessions, two each day, were contemplated. Additionally there would be a couple of luncheons and one or two dinners—with a formal paper being delivered at each.

Dr. Rappaport said that although three notices regarding this projected meeting had appeared in the **Newsletter** (June, September, and December, 1973) he had had few responses to date. The assemblage was of the opinion that the reason for this lack of response was the fact that the proposed meeting was well in the future. Some time was spent discussing whether it would be better to commission papers for this meeting rather than to rely upon ideas from the members-at-large, but no decision was reached upon this topic.

Dr. Leopold inquired whether it was settled that the national meeting in 1975 should become an annual affair. Dr. Rappaport answered in the negative. If it were well supported, then it would be held annually. He thought that the Society's best efforts should be directed toward making the annual meeting a success so that SHAFR would not be so dependent upon joint gatherings with the AHA and the OAH.

At his juncture the Council considered what the attitude of the Society should be towards the trend of both the AHA and the OAH to discontinue joint meetings with smaller organizations. The Council had recently received a communication from Prof. Sandi F. Cooper (Richmond College, CUNY), council member of the Conference on Peace Research in History, asking that SHAFR join the latter body in protesting the new policy of the AHA, limiting the program participation of affiliated organizations at the former's annual meetings to once every two years. The Council decided that SHAFR was not interested in joint sessions *per se* with either the AHA or the OAH, but did wish strongly to retain the privilege of holding luncheons at both of these convocations. It was felt that luncheons and/or dinners were great occasions for the membership to know each other better, they furthered an **esprit de corps**, and they helped in the dissemination of organizational information.

The Council next concerned itself with the allied question of SHAFR's policy on holding joint meetings with other specialized organi-

zations. Before Council was a specific proposal from a member of the board of the Southern section of the International Studies Association, suggesting that SHAFR, or at least its members in the South, join with the ISA in a convocation to be held next October at the U of Kentucky. The Council unanimously opposed the idea of official joint meetings, but agreed that notices of gatherings of sister organizations should be carried in the **Newsletter** so that those members of the Society who were interested might attend upon an individual basis. Also, the Council had no objection if such scholarly organizations were to send notices of its meeting to those on the SHAFR membership list.

The Council spent much time in a discussion of the perennial question of whether the Society should initiate a journal. President Cole pointed out that there was an overwhelming mandate from the membership, based upon a recent poll (**Newsletter**, June, 1973), to take affirmative action in this area. The Council considered the oft-debated question of whether there was an actual need for another professional journal in the field of American history. Professor Leopold stated that he had made a fairly extensive compilation upon this topic, and his investigations showed the lack of a need. "For instance," he said, "the **Journal of American History** for December, 1973, listed recent articles in the area of foreign policy. This list contained articles from sixty-four professional journals. In addition, there are some fifty to sixty additional journals which in the past have carried articles dealing with United States foreign policy but which were not included in the foregoing sixty-four." But Professor Trask, a member of the editorial board of the OAH, said he was convinced there were many good articles "out there" which were never published because of the paucity of outlets, plus the high rejection rate.

The Council agreed upon two points: (a) No institution had thus far come forward with a firm offer of adequate financial assistance and competent editorialship, both of which would be necessary for getting a journal "off the ground." Until this was done, the question of a journal would be academic. (b) When and if a journal should be established, it would be solely for the purpose of publishing articles—at least for the first few years; book reviews would not be included.

The editor of the **Newsletter** was invited to speak, and he presented several questions which had arisen in discharging his task. Several members, he said, had expressed to him the conviction that the publication was more than a mere newsletter, although it was less than a full-fledged journal. Should the name of it then be changed so that it would be more in consonance with its contents? (The editor offered a tentative title—"Joumalette"). The decision, after a brief discussion, was in favor of retaining the present title.

Should the contents of the **Newsletter** be copyrighted as the newsletter of the AHA is? The Council decided that the problem was not pressing since this was the first time it had arisen, and, therefore, the publication would not be copyrighted. If any person who submitted an article to the **Newsletter** wished its contents to be protected, he would be advised to secure a copyright upon his own.

Was the **Newsletter** solely a "house organ," that is, did it exist only for the membership, and were its features (publication of essays, notices of book publications, printing of abstracts of articles and of scholarly papers, and so on) open to none but the members? The editor had been proceeding upon this assumption, but lately he had been urged from various sources to make the **Newsletter** an "open publication." The Council affirmed the policy of the editor, although there was some sentiment to make the publication open in some respects and closed in others.

Should abstracts of dissertations done in the field of United States diplomatic history be carried in the **Newsletter**? The decision was in the negative—titles, yes; abstracts, no. Some members pointed out that abstracts of most dissertations done in this country were being published already in a copyright form by University Microfilms (U of Michigan). Thus, if this were done by the **Newsletter** there would be a needless duplication, not to speak of the copyright barrier.

President Cole announced that he was in receipt of a letter from Dr. Lawrence Gelfand (U of Iowa) in which he stated that he was trying to line up editors and financial backing for the project which he is superintending, the replacement of the outdated Bemis—Griffin bibliography in U. S. foreign relations. The new one would be a computerized, multi-volumed, and comprehensive publication.

The Council considered a letter from Prof. Gordon H. Warren (Central Washington State College) in which he pointed out the longtime absence of a volume from the **Foreign Relations** series—the one for 1869. Warren thought this gap to be unfortunate, and wondered whether a volume of 500–600 pages, containing a representative collection of the correspondence of Secretaries Wm. H. Seward and Hamilton Fish for that year, could not be assembled under the joint sponsorship of SHAFR and the State Department with the U. S. Government Printing Office perhaps assuming the cost of publication. Some of the members of Council thought the idea of compiling the missing volume in the **Foreign Relations** series was a good one, but no one thought it had any basis of practicality. One member ventured the view that "There is not the slightest possibility that the State Department would sponsor jointly with our Society the project; there is even less likelihood that the Government Printing Office would assume the cost of publication." The members felt that a far greater need existed with respect to this series—to get the voluminous materials of the post-World War II era selected, cleared, edited, and published. The latter period had a greater relevance to scholars and to the general public alike, and the best efforts of SHAFR should be directed towards effecting this result.

The Council pondered the problem of establishing branches of the Society in other countries. The question arose as the consequence of a letter from Dr. Joseph M. Siracusa, Lecturer in American history at the University of Queensland, Australia, in which he offered to be the liaison man in setting up such a branch in that part of the world. Some members, however, cited the experience of the AHA and the OAH, both with

far larger memberships than SHAFR and with a healthy number of those members residing abroad. Those bodies had not seen fit to set up foreign branches. Historians in other lands who were interested in U. S. diplomatic history should be invited to become members of the Society. Individuals from other countries could also be added to the SHAFR Membership Committee. Additionally, it would be good, when convenient, for those members to hold meetings of a professional nature in consultation with the Society's Program Committee. The Council, however, considered it inadvisable at this stage of the organization's development to establish overseas—or even domestic—branches.

Dr. Warren F. Kimball, editor of the SHAFR **Roster and Research List**, was commended highly by President Cole for his valuable work. In reply, Dr. Kimball stated that the supplemental list, giving changes and additions over the last year, should be in the hands of all members shortly. Next year, as in 1972, there would be the publication of the full membership list with the addresses of all members and their research topics. He particularly appealed to the members to be conscientious about updating their topics of research. Some members, lamentably and inexcusably, were still listing the same titles which they had posted when SHAFR was created in 1967!

Prof. Leon E. Boothe (George Mason U), chairman of the Membership Committee, was not present, but President Cole said he had been in frequent touch with him and spoke highly of the success of his Committee in obtaining new members for the Society. The editor of the **Newsletter** echoed the president's statement, declaring that it had been a rare week in the last several months when he had not received notice of the enrollment of a new member. The editor, relaying a communication from Dr. Boothe, asked whether it would be desirable to print the names of new members in each issue of the **Newsletter**. The decision was against initiating this practice since it was not one followed by most professional organizations.

In executive session the Council carefully surveyed all the applications for the post of Executive Secretary—Treasurer, now being vacated by Dr. Joseph P. O'Grady (La Salle College) following some seven years of time-consuming and very worthwhile service to the Society. The Council and officers present voted unanimously to appoint Professors Warren F. Kuehl (U of Akron) and Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State U) jointly to the position. The two had detailed how they would divide the duties, and they had submitted a tentative budget of a little over \$4,000 which would be underwritten by the two sponsoring (and neighboring) institutions, Akron and Kent State. Professors Kuehl and Kaplan had evinced a willingness and readiness to undertake their duties with the advent of 1974. The Council agreed, therefore, that the duo should be invested with all the responsibilities and privileges of the post just as quickly as the details of the transfer of authority could be consummated.

At the business meeting of the Society—at—large the next day (fol—

lowing the luncheon and presidential address) two resolutions were approved by acclamation:

"Resolved: That this society does express to Joseph P. O'Grady, our outgoing Executive Secretary—Treasurer, its deepest appreciation for his indispensable contributions over many years to its development. His Madisonian labors have had much to do with what the Society has come to be, and what it may achieve in future years." (Offered by Dr. David F. Trask).

"Resolved: That the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations at its annual business session in San Francisco on December 28, 1973, does hereby express its profound gratitude to Tennessee Technological University and to its president, Dr. Everett Derryberry, for their generous support of the Society's quarterly **Newsletter**, now being so capably edited by Professor Nolan Fowler of the aforementioned University." (Offered by Dr. Richard W. Leopold).

In closing the business meeting on December 28, President Cole warmly thanked Professor Leopold, whose tenure upon the Council ended with this meeting, for his four years of service upon that body, and particularly for the contributions which he had made during the year 1973. President Cole also commended Dr. Jerald A. Combs (San Francisco State College) for his work in handling the local arrangements for the meeting of the Society in San Francisco.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The **Roster and Research List** of SHAFR is revised and issued in a complete form in even years with supplements being done in the odd years. As a consequence, the editor of the **List**, Dr. Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers U, Newark), and his associate, Mary Jo Lemaldi, will be preparing this compilation for publication in a few months and they would like to have all relevant information from the membership as soon as feasible. All members, and especially those of some years standing, should, therefore, carefully review their current entries upon the **List** and make all changes that are necessary to bring them into conformity with present conditions. This **List** is a valuable one for all those who are working in the area of U. S. diplomatic history, and its thorough revision well deserves the active support of all members of SHAFR. (The form to be used in complying with this request will be found on page 28 of this issue of the **Newsletter**).

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The first independent national meeting ever of SHAFR is scheduled to be held at Georgetown U, Washington, D. C., during the latter part of August in 1975. All national meetings of SHAFR have thus far been held in conjunction with the two older and much larger historical organ—

izations, the AHA and the OAH. A separate national gathering will be a milestone in the independence of the Society, indicating an advanced degree of maturity. This meeting will, hopefully, become an annual event, but the materialization of this hope will depend greatly upon the reaction of the membership to this initial convention. All members of the Society should then "lay it upon their hearts" to include this convocation among their "musts" for 1975. The assemblage will be for two days with two full-length sessions each day. A couple of luncheons and one or two dinners are also contemplated, at each of which formal papers will be presented. Individuals who have ideas concerning the sessions, or who are willing to present papers, should contact the Program Chairman of the Society (Dr. Thomas Paterson, Department of History, U of Connecticut, Storrs, Conn. 06268) at once.

MEETINGS

SHAFR will meet with the OAH at the latter's annual convention in Denver, Colorado, April 17-20, with the Denver Hilton Hotel (1550 Court Place) serving as the headquarters. The Council for SHAFR will convene at 4:00 P. M., Wednesday, April 17, in the Aspen Room of the Hilton.

At 7:30 P. M., Wednesday, April 17, Norman Graebner (U of Virginia and former president of SHAFR) will chair a panel in the Denver Room whose topic will be "Three Views on America and the World in an Era of Neutrality, 1935-41." The panelists and their topics are: Lester H. Brune (Bradley U), "The View from Washington: William E. Borah and Western Hemispheric Defense," Michael S. Blayney (Illinois State U), "The View from Europe; Herbert C. Pell and the Power Balance;" Edward Bennett (Washington State U), "The View from Tokyo: Joseph C. Grew and Accommodation with Japan." Interaction will take this pattern: Brune will speak on "How Borah Might View Grew and Pell," Blayney on "How Pell Might View Borah and Grew," and Bennett on "How Grew Might View Pell and Borah."

The Society's luncheon will be held at 12:00 noon, Thursday, April 18, in the Gold Room of the Hilton. (Tickets for the occasion are \$8.00 each and may be procured from the Executive Sec'y-Tr's'r, Dr. Warren F. Kuehl, Akron U, Akron, Ohio 44304). Chairman for the event will be Daniel M. Smith (U of Colorado). The address, "The Decline of a Nation," will be delivered by the veteran diplomatic historian, Richard W. Van Alstyne (U of the Pacific). The naming of the winner of the Stuart L. Bernath Prize for 1974 will be the feature of the business session which will follow the address. The day's activities will conclude with a reception, 5:00-7:00, in the Silver Room of the Hilton.

Several other programs in foreign affairs at the Convention will involve members of the Society. On Wednesday, April 17, at 8:30 P. M.,

24—26, at the University of Texas, El Paso. Richard S. Hargesheimer (U of Montana) will read a paper titled "Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American Foreign Service: The Appointment of Chiefs-of-Missions, 1933—1939," and Clifford L. Egan (U of Houston) will present a study, "Jefferson, Madison, and the Appointment of Diplomatic Personnel: The French Model, 1801—1814."

PERSONALS

Thomas Schoonover (U of Southwestern Louisiana) has been named assistant editor of **The Americas: A Quarterly Review of Inter-American Cultural History**.

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George C. Herring has been elevated to the post of chairman of the Department of History at the U of Kentucky.

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Nina J. Noring has been appointed diplomatic historian in the Historical Office of the Department of State.

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Robert A. Divine (U of Texas, Austin), who is the current chairman of the Nominating Committee for the OAH, has been named to the Advisory Committee on the publication of the **Foreign Relations** papers of the United States. A fellow member of that Committee is Armin H. Rapaport (U of California, San Diego), the vice president of SHAFR.

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John Chay has been promoted to professor at Pembroke State U, N. C.

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Lloyd Ambrosius has been made associate professor at the U of Nebraska, Lincoln.

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SHAFR is well represented upon the various committees of the OAH. Alexander DeConde (U of California, Santa Barbara), the first president of SHAFR, is a member of the Executive Board; Daniel M. Smith (U of Colorado) is on the Nominating Committee; Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (U of North Carolina, Chapel Hill) serves upon the Program Committee; Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr. (U of Illinois, Urbana) works with the Frederick Jackson Turner Award group; Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento State College) is on the Committee, Status of Women in the Historical Profession; and five members of the Society represent their states upon the Membership Committee: Peter M. Buzanski (San Jose State), California; Carl Ryant (U of Louisville), Kentucky; Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth), New Hampshire; Warren F. Kuehl (U of Akron), Ohio; and Paul S. Holbo (U of Oregon), Oregon.

PUBLICATIONS BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

Thomas M. Campbell (Florida State U), **Masquerade Peace: America's UN Policy, 1944-1945**. 1973. Florida State U Press. \$12.00. Reviewed in **History**, November/December, 1973.

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Wayne S. Cole (U of Maryland), **An Interpretive History of American Foreign Relations**. Rev. ed. 1973. The Dorsey Press. \$6.95.

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James W. Cortada (Florida State U), **United States-Spanish Relations, Wolfram and World War II**. 1971. International Scholarly Book Services, Portland, Ore. \$6.00. Reviewed in **Journal of American History**, December, 1973.

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Ralph F. De Bedts (Old Dominion U), **Recent American History**. 2 vols. Vol. I: **1933 Through World War II**. Vol. II: **1945 to the Present**. 1973. The Dorsey Press. Pb. \$5.95 per volume.

Lloyd C. Gardner (Rutgers U), ed., **The Great Nixon Turnaround: America's New Foreign Policy in the Post-Liberal Era**. 1973. New Viewpoints, N. Y. C. Pb. \$3.95. Reviewed in **Perspective**, November, 1973.

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Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers U, Newark), ed., **Franklin D. Roosevelt and the World Crisis, 1937-1945**. 1973. D. C. Heath and Co. Pb. \$2.95. A volume in The Problems in American Civilization Series.

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Jamie W. Moore (The Citadel), **The New Deal and East Asia: The Basis of American Policy**. 1973. The Citadel, Charleston, S. C. Pb. \$1.50.

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Geoffrey S. Smith (Queen's U, Ontario, Canada), **To Save a Nation: American Countersubversives, the New Deal, and the Coming of World War II**. 1973. Basic Books, Inc. \$10.00. Reviewed in **History**, January, 1974.

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Geoffrey S. Smith (Queen's U, Ontario, Canada), "The Diplomat as Hostage: Some Reflections on Power and Violence in Latin America," in David H. Pollock and R. M. Ritter, eds., **Latin American Prospects for the 1970's: What Kinds of Revolutions?** 1973. Praeger Publishers, Inc. \$18.50.

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Russell F. Weigley (Temple U), **The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy**. 1973. Macmillan \$12.95. A volume in the Macmillan Wars of the United States Series. Favorably reviewed in the **Journal of Southern History**, November, 1973, and in **Perspective**, September, 1973.

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Richard E. Welch, Jr. (Lafayette Col), ed., **Imperialists Versus Anti-Imperialists: The Debate over Expansionism in the 1890's**. 1972. F. E. Peacock Publishers, Inc. Pb. \$2.95.

THE ACADEMIC EXCHANGE

(Acting solely in a service capacity, the **Newsletter** will carry notices of (a) vacancies in various fields which are of interest to U. S. diplomatic historians, and (b) the vitae of members of SHAFR who desire employment. All announcements will be anonymous, unless a user specifically states otherwise. Each notice will be assigned a number, and persons who are interested must mention that number when contacting the editorial office. That office will then supply the name and address which corresponds to that number. When contacting the editor regarding an announcement, please enclose a stamped, addressed envelope for the return. Announcements should not exceed twelve (12) lines in the **Newsletter**. Unless specifically requested to do otherwise, and then subject to the limitations of space and fairness to others, a particular notice will be carried only once a year).

#E-101 Ph.D. (1972) in American and modern Chinese history. Prefers a teaching position, but has had editorial and archival experience, and has demonstrated administrative ability. Experienced teacher. Familiar with multi-disciplinary approaches. Prepared to teach survey courses. Especially strong in U. S. diplomatic and modern Chinese history. Danforth and AHA fellow. Has done research in the Far East. Reads five languages and speaks two, in addition to his mother tongue, English. Revised version of dissertation under consideration by a publisher.

#E-102 Ph. D. (Rutgers, 1969) in U. S. diplomatic and recent American history. Desires an associate or assistant professorship, or editorial position, in the Northeastern U. S. Has had six years of undergraduate and graduate teaching experience. Strong in publications: one book and seven articles. Prepared to teach survey courses in U. S. and world history, U. S. foreign relations, and Sino-American relations. In U. S. diplomacy the applicant's emphasis has been upon the Asian and Latin American areas.

THE STUART L. BERNATH PRIZE COMPETITION FOR 1975

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations announces that the 1975 competition for the Stuart L. Bernath Prize upon a book dealing with any aspect of American foreign relations is now open. (The 1974 competition closed on December 31 with the winner to be announced at the luncheon of SHAFR, held at the meeting with the OAH, April, 1974, in Denver). The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of American foreign relations.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that was published during 1974. It must be the author's first or second book.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. Theodore A. Wilson, Chairman, Stuart L. Bernath Prize Committee, Department of History, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas 66044. The volumes must be received not later than December 31, 1974.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$500.00. If two (2) or more works are deemed winners, as in 1972, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be in April, 1975, at Boston, Mass.

SHAFR ROSTER AND RESEARCH LIST

Please use this form to register your general and current research interests as well as your address. This **List** is stored upon computer tapes so that information may be quickly retrieved. In order for the system to work, though, two things are necessary from the members: (a) simple, concise, obvious titles should be used in describing projects; (b) a key word should be specified for each project. It would be quite helpful if members would send revised information to the editor whenever new data is available, since it will be much easier to keep the files up to date and avoid a rush in the fall. If a form is not available, a short memo will suffice. Changes which pertain only to addresses should be sent to the Executive Secretary, and he will pass them on to the editors of the **List** and the **Newsletter**. Unless new data is submitted, previously listed research projects will be repeated.

Name: _____ Title: _____

Address _____

State: _____ Zip Code _____ Institutional Affiliation

(if different from address) _____

General area of research interest: _____

_____ Key word _____

Current research project(s): _____

_____ Key word(s) _____

If this is pre-doctoral work, check here _____

Mail to: Dr. W. F. Kimball, editor
SHAFR R & R List
Department of History
Rutgers University, Newark
Newark, New Jersey 07102

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: Nolan Fowler, Department of History, Tennessee Tech, Cookeville, Tennessee 38501.

ISSUES: The **Newsletter** is published on the 15th of March, June, and September, and on the 1st of December. All members receive the publication.

DEADLINES: All material must be in the office of the editor not later than six (6) weeks prior to the publication date.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication. Copies of the **Newsletter** which are returned because of faulty addresses will be forwarded only upon the payment of a fee of 50¢.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of all back numbers of the **Newsletter** are available and may be obtained from the editorial office upon the payment of a service charge of 35¢ per number. If the purchaser lives abroad, the charge is 50¢ per number.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, honors, awards), announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered—or published—upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, lists of accessions of diplomatic materials to libraries, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting diplomatic materials in various depositories. Because of space limitations, "straight" articles and book reviews are unacceptable.

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