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FROM INTERNATIONALISM TO NEO-ISOLATIONISM: SENATOR FORREST C. DONNELL OF MISSOURI AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1945-1951

by
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Forrest C. Donnell of Missouri is regarded as a strong critic of President Harry S. Truman's foreign policy during his tenure as a Republican senator (1945-1951). Suffice it to say that this politician, the only senator of the Grand Old Party to be defeated in the legislative election of 1950,¹ was one of the few members of the upper house to oppose the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949. His attitude toward NATO inspired Secretary of State Dean Acheson's later comment: "[Forrest] Donnell was not my favorite senator."²

This article aims to examine and analyze Forrest Donnell's views on foreign policy. It will address questions such as the following: What was Donnell's perception of Truman's containment policy? Why did he oppose the North Atlantic Treaty? To what extent does he deserve the label "neo-isolationist"? Did his electoral defeat of 1950 appear related to his attitude in foreign policy?

I would like to thank John Spychka and my colleague Donald Fyson (Laval University, Quebec City, Quebec) for their precious help in preparing this article. I am also grateful to historians Fred Adams (Drake University, Des Moines, Iowa) and Renéo Lukic (Laval University) who made insightful comments on my initial text.

¹Eleanora W. Schoenebaum, ed., *Political Profiles: The Truman Years* (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1978), 133.

²Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), 281.

Seen through the prism of the 1990s, marked by an evident resurgence of U.S. isolationism and more recently by several critics about NATO enlargement,³ a study of Forrest Donnell during the Truman years appears interesting for many reasons. In addition to shedding some light on the postwar isolationist community and also revealing the importance of the internationalist sentiment in Missouri, it examines a colorful politician with a somewhat contradictory attitude. In fact, before he appeared as "one of the sharpest critics of the Administration's foreign policy,"⁴ Donnell had endorsed every major postwar foreign policy initiative.

Surprisingly, the historical literature relating to Forrest Donnell's position on foreign policy is not extensive. For instance, well-known monographs such as Justus Doenecke's *Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era*⁵ and Thomas Paterson's *Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years* make no reference to the Missouri senator.⁶ Only Ted Carpenter's doctoral dissertation *The Dissenters: American Isolationists and Foreign Policy, 1945-1954* as well as Joan Bryniarski's *Against the Tide: Senate Opposition to the Internationalist Foreign Policy of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, 1943-1949* address a few aspects of Donnell's views on foreign policy in some depth.⁷ However, both authors focus only on his attitude during 1949, and neither consulted Donnell's papers. Therefore,

³Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "America and the World: Isolationism Resurgent?" *Ethics & International Affairs* 10 (1996):149-163; *New York Times*, July 9, 1997, A8; *Globe and Mail*, September 22, 1997, A1.

⁴*New York Times*, November 8, 1950, 4.

⁵Justus D. Doenecke, *Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era* (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1979). On page 11 the author states in his preface that he omitted discussion of Forrest Donnell since the latter appeared on Capitol Hill only after 1941.

⁶Thomas G. Paterson, ed., *Cold War Critics: Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971).

⁷Ted G. Carpenter, "The Dissenters: American Isolationists and Foreign Policy, 1945-1954" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas at Austin, 1980); Joan L. Bryniarski, "Against the Tide: Senate Opposition to the Internationalist Foreign Policy of Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, 1943-1949" (Ph.D. diss., University of Maryland, 1972).

this article, which is partly based on an examination of the said papers, seeks to reveal some seldom acknowledged yet essential facets of the Missourian.

But before reviewing Donnell's stance on foreign policy, some biographical information and a brief look at his domestic record during the Truman era will provide relevant background material to better understand his viewpoint.

A Conservative Record

Forrest C. Donnell, the son of a storekeeper, was born in Quitman, Missouri, in 1884. He graduated from the University of Missouri at Columbia in 1904, from its law school in 1907, and was admitted to the bar during this same year.⁸ Over the next three decades, Donnell practiced law in St. Louis and was active in Republican politics. He was also active outside the law and political arenas which increased his popularity in Missouri. Among other activities, he served during this period as chairman of the board of managers of the Missouri State School for the Blind and was president of the St. Louis City Evangelization Union of the Methodist Episcopal Church. He also rose in the ranks of the Masons to the position of Grand Master of the Grand Lodge of Missouri.⁹

In 1940, Donnell was elected governor; his slim victory over Democratic candidate Lawrence McDaniel made him the only member of the Grand Old Party to gain state office in Missouri that year. However, this election was not without controversy. Indeed, the Democrats charged that several irregularities had given the governor's race to the opposing party. The Missouri Supreme Court's decision in February 1941 confirming Donnell's victory did not stop their protest: "[The Democrats] set up a legislative committee to judge the election results. A recount was held, and

⁸*Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1971* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971).

⁹Anna Rothe, ed., *Current Biography: Who's News and Why - 1949* (New York: H. W. Wilson Company, 1950), 164-165.

somewhat embarrassingly for them, Donnell increased his vote total."¹⁰ Four years later, Donnell won another narrow election, this time to the Senate, by a margin of less than 2,000 votes.¹¹ He became what Margaret Truman labeled "the Republican who had replaced Dad as senator from Missouri."¹²

In the upper house, Forrest Donnell was associated with the Republican right wing and established a conservative record, opposing federal aid to education and endorsing measures to curb organized labor. On this last issue, for instance, he proposed amendments to toughen the anti-labor Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.¹³ Frequently described as the most persistent member of the Senate,¹⁴ Donnell was also deeply involved in the debates over national health care¹⁵ and displaced persons. On the refugee issue, Donnell, who toured European DP camps in 1947 as a member of a Senate Judiciary subcommittee,¹⁶ adopted an unequivocally restrictionist stance, praising the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 on the grounds that it guaranteed "that neither the interests of American labor would be injured nor would the people who came to our country from foreign shores find themselves without housing or jobs."¹⁷ In the same vein, he denigrated the

¹⁰William E. Parrish, Charles T. Jones, Jr. and Lawrence O. Christensen, *Missouri: The Heart of the Nation* (St. Louis: Forum Press, 1980), 322.

¹¹Schoenebaum, ed., *Political Profiles*, 132.

¹²Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman* (New York: Pocket Books, 1974), 277.

¹³Eleanora W. Schoenebaum, ed., *Political Profiles*, 132.

¹⁴Rothe, ed., *Current Biography*, 164.

¹⁵In 1947, as a member of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee, he sponsored a bill to counter a proposal for national health insurance made by Democratic Senator James Murray of Montana. Donnell's measure, on which no action was taken, provided for equal medical cost contributions by state and federal governments for those unable to pay (Schoenebaum, ed., *Political Profiles*, 133).

¹⁶Leonard Dinnerstein, *America and the Survivors of the Holocaust* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 154.

¹⁷June 23, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 8185.

liberal refugee bill (H.R. 4567) introduced by New York Congressman Emanuel Celler in 1949.¹⁸ That certainly explains why historian Alonzo Hamby has used the label "reactionary" in depicting the Missourian.¹⁹

After leaving the Senate in January 1951, Donnell, praised a few months earlier by Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy as a "star-spangled American,"²⁰ returned to his law practice. He continued to practice law until his death on March 3, 1980.²¹

Two Forrest Donnells

Forrest Donnell was unquestionably not indifferent to issues of foreign policy during his senatorial years. Interestingly enough, a closer examination of his position on these issues reveals that the Missouri politician initially supported and then subsequently decried President Truman's foreign policy.

The original position, sanction of Truman's foreign policy, appeared most evident between 1945 and the beginning of 1949. First, in 1945, Donnell advocated the Senate's ratification of the Charter of the United Nations. For him, such a charter was meritorious even if it did not constitute a panacea: "The Charter does not...assure that war will never again occur. No agreement that can be devised by man can conclusively guarantee to effect that result. This proposed organization does, however, constitute such a plan toward the prevention of war as reasonably prudent men will

¹⁸October 15, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 14678-14683. For the bill H.R. 4567, see Bernard Lemelin, "Emanuel Celler of Brooklyn: Leading Advocate of Liberal Immigration Policy, 1945-52," *Canadian Review of American Studies* 24 (Winter 1994):91-92.

¹⁹Alonzo L. Hamby, *Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), 421.

²⁰Richard S. Kirkendall, *A History of Missouri*, vol. V: 1919 to 1953 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1986), 350.

²¹*Who was Who in America with World Notables*, vol. VII: 1977-1981 (Chicago: Marquis Who's Who, Inc., 1981), 159.

generally agree is sensible, equitable.”²² As he elaborated: “Under the General Assembly are given valuable functions of discussion...and the right to call the attention of the Security Council to situations which are likely to endanger international peace....Nothing in the Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements...for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.”²³

Second, the Missourian, contrary to several of his Republican colleagues in the Senate,²⁴ viewed favorably the granting of a substantial loan (\$3.75 billion) in 1946 to the United Kingdom, which Truman had recommended.²⁵ According to Donnell, such an agreement was particularly sound since “the proposed loan will...tend strongly toward both the restrengthening of Great Britain and the enlargement of the foreign trade of our Nation.”²⁶

At the time of the Eightieth Congress, Forrest Donnell, an admirer of the internationalist Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan,²⁷ also approved containment policies such as the Truman Doctrine and the Inter-

²²July 27, 1945, *Congressional Record*, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 8101.

²³*Ibid.*

²⁴The opposition concerning the British loan resolution consisted of 18 Republicans, 15 Democrats and one Progressive. Incidentally, only 47 senators approved this measure (Carpenter, *Dissenters*, 119).

²⁵This presidential recommendation was related to the fact that “the end of Lend-Lease had left the British in dire shape financially” [Robert J. Donovan, *Conflict and Crisis: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1977), 185-186].

²⁶May 10, 1946, *Congressional Record*, 79th Cong., 2d sess., 4795.

²⁷March 30, 1948, *Congressional Record*, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 3769. The Missourian also supported Vandenberg’s famous resolution (Senate Resolution 239) of June 1948, which laid the groundwork for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, since it “would still leave it open to this country to determine whether or not it would enter into further commitments” (March 25, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 3168).

American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance²⁸ (the so-called "Rio Pact"). As for the European Recovery Program, Donnell's position was supportive even though events made it impossible for him to express concretely his endorsement by a vote. As he tersely explained on April 1, 1949: "I was called to Missouri by reason of the death of my mother, which occurred on March 9 of last year. On the way back, I stopped for 1 day in St. Louis. Consequently, I was not here at the time when the vote was taken on the Marshall plan. But I telephoned from Webster Groves, Mo., where my daughter has her home, to the effect that were I here, I should vote for ERP."²⁹ A few days later, in a discussion with Senator William Fulbright of Arkansas, Donnell reiterated his support for the Marshall Plan, saying that the nations which had benefited from it "have made an amazing recovery in many instances, and in some of them, their production is even greater than it was before the war."³⁰

The other Forrest Donnell, the detractor of Truman's foreign policy, began to emerge at the beginning of 1949 with the debate over the proposed North Atlantic Security Pact. On February 14, Donnell cited a newspaper report affirming that the Secretary of State Dean Acheson had promised Norway's Foreign Minister that the United States would accept a moral commitment to go to war under the treaty.³¹ It is noteworthy that Donnell's intervention marked the beginning of the debate in the Senate over this question.³² The Missouri Republican was particularly concerned by the fact that such a moral commitment to fight could bypass the constitutional provision with respect to the declaration of war: "I want to protest...against our country being made subject to any moral commitment which...would in the ultimate effect require Congress to go ahead and

²⁸March 24, 1948, *Congressional Record*, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 3350; December 8, 1947, *Congressional Record*, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 11137.

²⁹April 1, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 3659.

³⁰April 5, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 3883. Incidentally, Donnell later used the adjective "meritorious" to depict Truman's Point Four Program which was directed toward helping the inhabitants of economically undeveloped areas (May 25, 1950, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 7723).

³¹February 14, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1163.

³²Bryniarski, "Against the Tide", 253.

declare war sometime, even though Congress has the constitutional power to determine whether or not war should be declared.... A legal commitment to fight would be, in effect, a promise to declare war.... I want the power left in Congress to declare war or not to declare war."³³ Added Donnell: "In my judgment it would be premature for me today to express an opinion as to whether I shall or shall not be in favor of the entry of the United States into the pact. But it is not premature...to my judgment, for me to express today...strong dissent against any and all proposals to involve our Nation...in any moral commitment to fight."³⁴ Convinced that the issue of the North Atlantic Pact represented "a subject...more important than any other subject which has been before the Senate during the approximately 4 years I have had the honor to be a Member of this great body,"³⁵ he expressed more worries at the end of March. Donnell, who insisted that the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate should not act too quickly on this proposition,³⁶ criticized article 5 of the pact, which stated that an attack against any one or more of the signatories to the treaty would be considered an attack on all. In fact, for him, such a provision would give America's archrival the power to determine the time when the United States would have to go to war:

If Russia should find us some day involved...in a political campaign..., or when the Congress was not in session, or when a grave national emergency had presented itself locally in our Nation, and Russia should think that then was the time when our country was the weakest, that then was the time when our country should be forced to go to war with Russia, or that then was the time when Russia was the strongest and we were the weakest; what would Russia have to do? All Russia would have to do would be to send troops into any one of the signatory countries.³⁷

³³February 14, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 1164, 1167.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 1168.

³⁵March 21, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 2849.

³⁶*Ibid.*

³⁷*Ibid.*, 2852.

For this reason, the Republican senator, depicted at that time as “the leading critic of the proposed North Atlantic treaty,”³⁸ declared at this stage that his vote on the subject of whether there would be a ratification of the treaty would be a negative one.³⁹ He also expressed doubt that the United States would receive valuable assistance from European nations if a war was fought entirely on American soil,⁴⁰ and conveyed his particular concern that there was no provision by which any party could voluntarily withdraw from the proposed North Atlantic Treaty within 20 years.⁴¹

In July 1949, during the final debate over NATO in the Senate, Donnell added a new argument justifying his rigid stance against such an alliance: that such a pact would include a country such as Portugal which was not really founded on the principles of democracy.⁴² According to him, such an inclusion was inconsistent with the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty, which stated that the signatories “are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.”⁴³

The Republican senator did not lack grievances when he undertook his most exhaustive speech on NATO in the upper house, on July 7. On that

³⁸*Kansas City Star*, March 26, 1949, 10.

³⁹March 21, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 2853.

⁴⁰March 25, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 3168.

⁴¹In fact, Donnell reacted against article 13, which stipulated that “after the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation” (Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO and the United States: The Enduring Alliance* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), 192). On March 25, the Missourian declared: “In my judgment this Nation has vastly less security if we go into this pact as it is written than if we remain out of it. I think we are opening ourselves for a period of 20 long years to a series of contingencies under which if any one of 12 or more nations shall be attacked we shall be immediately and automatically at war against the aggressor who shall attack that nation” (March 25, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 3158).

⁴²July 5, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 8820.

⁴³*Ibid.*

day, the senator from Missouri expressed, not surprisingly, that he had arrived at the conclusion that the Senate should not consent to ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty. As he elaborated: "The reasons for my conclusion are found in those certain obligations to which the United States of America would find itself in articles 2, 3, and 5 of the treaty."⁴⁴ Donnell's disaccord on article 5 has been discussed previously. Regarding article 2, which stated that the parties would seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies,⁴⁵ Donnell deplored its vagueness and its possible consequences for the nation: "American capital and American labor might find it difficult to refute the contention that by the treaty the United States is obligated to strike down all tariff barriers, international trade agreements, and international labor agreements, and to make changes in immigration laws or monetary legislation."⁴⁶ Concerning article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which prescribed that the parties would maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack,⁴⁷ Donnell feared, as did Ohio Senator Robert Taft,⁴⁸ that it would probably impose vast obligations on the country: "Since the United States has the largest productive capacity of any of the signatories to the treaty, and since the European countries are located closer to Russia — which is the presently most likely aggressor — it would seem clear that the United States, by article 3..., if the treaty is ratified, would be obligated to contribute a substantial amount of military aid to the European signatories."⁴⁹ In the same vein, the Republican senator was not convinced that this treaty would act as a deterrent to the Soviet Union. Indeed, according to him, such a pact would result in an arms race without

⁴⁴July 7, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 9024.

⁴⁵June 30, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 8744.

⁴⁶July 7, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 9029.

⁴⁷June 30, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 8744.

⁴⁸Bryniarski, "Against the Tide", 281.

⁴⁹July 7, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 9026. A few days later, Donnell added that an eventual military assistance program might contribute to perpetuate colonialism since countries like France and the Netherlands could use equipment which the United States might furnish under the North Atlantic Treaty for wars with their own colonies (July 12, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 9261).

precedent in the history of the world.⁵⁰ He supported his viewpoint by quoting an excerpt from the book *Twenty-five Years, 1892 to 1916*, written by former British Foreign Minister Edward Grey, which referred to the conditions in Europe preceding World War I, saying that "preparations for war had produced fear, and fear predisposes to violence and catastrophe."⁵¹

In another speech, Donnell expressed his dislike of the designation "North Atlantic Treaty", considering the inclusion of a Mediterranean country like Italy.⁵² Furthermore, to justify his anti-NATO stance, he invoked the American tradition in foreign policy dating from George Washington's famous Farewell Address of 1796. As Donnell explained: "It seems to me appropriate that we should not deviate from the principles laid down by Washington, Jefferson...and other great leaders of the past, and should not entangle ourselves in international agreements. If we ratify the treaty, from then on, for 20 long years, in every cloud which crosses the political sky in Europe..., we shall feel concern, and, I dare say, we shall be sorry, many times, because of the fact that we shall no longer occupy the position which we now occupy."⁵³

However, the warnings of Senator Donnell were not sufficient since the Senate, aware of the "apathetic response of public opinion to the arguments of the pact's enemies,"⁵⁴ massively decided to ratify the treaty on July 21, 1949. Only twelve other members of the upper house, mostly from the Republican party, joined the Missourian.⁵⁵

⁵⁰July 7, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 9030.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, 9031.

⁵²July 18, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 9643.

⁵³*Ibid.*, 9649.

⁵⁴Lawrence A. Kaplan, "The United States and the Origins of NATO, 1946-1949," *Review of Politics* 31 (April 1969):222.

⁵⁵July 21, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 9916.

After the debate over NATO, Forrest Donnell remained a detractor of Truman's decisions even though he did timidly endorse the president's initial stance on the Korean conflict.⁵⁶ Thus, he opposed the appointment of General George Marshall as Secretary of Defense on the grounds that the National Security Act of 1947 stipulated that the Secretary of Defense should be appointed from civilian life.⁵⁷ Donnell also criticized Truman's public statement on January 31, 1950, announcing the decision to go ahead with the hydrogen bomb. However, his criticism dealt more with the unilateral tone of the message than with the decision itself: "I may say...that I am not disagreeing at all with the view taken by the President that the hydrogen bomb should be developed. But, as I understand the action taken by the President,...he did not purport to act by reason of the legal duty cast on him by the act of Congress, but upon what he considered to be his constitutional duty as Commander in Chief of the armed forces."⁵⁸ As Donnell put it: "The ultimate power of providing the funds, if any, with which to carry forward this project...is vested not in the executive department but in the Congress of the United States."⁵⁹

Consequently, it is not surprising that President Truman, by early 1950, considered that both senators from his home state, Forrest Donnell and another Republican James Kem (who also voted against the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty),⁶⁰ were among the worst office holders in the upper house. As the Chief Executive told Missouri Governor Forrest Smith: "It is disgraceful to have two such men in the Senate as Missouri now has. My only hope is to send a couple of men to the Senate to take

⁵⁶Forrest Donnell to Mrs. Ruth Gresham, August 2, 1950, Forrest Donnell Papers, Folder F.7666, Western Historical Manuscript Collection, Ellis Library, University of Missouri at Columbia, Columbia, Missouri.

⁵⁷September 15, 1950, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 14927.

⁵⁸February 2, 1950, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 2d sess., 1342.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 1343.

⁶⁰July 21, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 9916.

their places who understand the welfare of the Nation and the magnitude of our position in the world.”⁶¹

“The most ‘anti-Atlantic pact’ state in the Union”?

Having presented the Missourian’s positions on foreign policy and the “official justifications” underlying them, we can now turn to explaining in depth the views expressed by what we have called the two Forrest Donnels who emerged during the Truman era. A further assessment of Donnell’s electoral defeat of 1950 from a diplomatic standpoint will also be examined.

On the one hand, the first Donnell supported Truman’s containment policies in the immediate postwar period. This is not really surprising considering the prevalence of internationalist sentiment,⁶² his admiration for Senator Arthur Vandenberg, the remarkable consensus on foreign policy established in the Republican-controlled 80th Congress⁶³ and the fact that these measures were not necessarily as radical as the North Atlantic Treaty which represented “a drastic departure from tradition,”⁶⁴ “the first instance of American participation in a peacetime alliance since the days of George Washington.”⁶⁵ On this last aspect, Forrest Donnell, in mid-July 1949, declared to his colleagues of the upper house that they were “considering what is conceded to be the most momentous change in our foreign policy, certainly the most momentous since the time of the

⁶¹Robert H. Ferrell, ed., *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Penguin Books, 1980), 172.

⁶²Suffice it to say that even the staunchly conservative Senator William Jenner of Indiana endorsed the European Recovery Program [Robert D. Schulzinger, *American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 210]. On the triumph of internationalism, see Robert A. Divine, *Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America during World War II* (New York: Atheneum, 1967), 371 pages.

⁶³Susan M. Hartmann, *Truman and the 80th Congress* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1971), 185.

⁶⁴Carpenter, “Dissenters,” 215.

⁶⁵Gary W. Reichard, *Politics as Usual: The Age of Truman and Eisenhower* (Arlington Heights: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1988), 23.

enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, and possibly since the beginning of the Republic.”⁶⁶

On the other hand, the second Donnell, in spite of his support for the Vandenberg Resolution (see footnote 27), opposed the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty;⁶⁷ and though he clearly justified his position in the Senate, his reversal of opinion can also be explained by three main factors.

First, there is little doubt that the political context of 1949-50 encouraged the dissent of Republican members in Congress concerning the manner in which the Administration handled foreign policy: these years marked the demise of bipartisanship, namely the agreement among the leaders of the two major parties not to bother the public with foreign policy disputes after World War II. Whatever the reasons underlying the erosion of bipartisanship,⁶⁸ Donnell was therefore tempted, in addition to being extremely scrupulous about the use of congressional powers, to join his Republican colleagues of the upper house in the late 1940's in denouncing the Democratic president's conduct in the field of foreign policy.

Second, there were Donnell's antecedents. It must be noted that after World War I the politician from Missouri opposed the League of Nations, labeling it “a dubious contract.”⁶⁹ In 1949, this incited a *Kansas City Star* journalist to write that “Donnell's position of opposing ‘entangling

⁶⁶July 15, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 9534.

⁶⁷Donnell was not the only supporter of the Vandenberg Resolution in the upper house to vote against the North Atlantic Treaty: five other senators acted similarly [Richard H. Heindel, Thorsten V. Kalijarvi and Francis O. Wilcox, “The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate,” *American Journal of International Law* 43 (October 1949):635].

⁶⁸One of the major causes of the demise of bipartisanship was the belief, among numerous politicians of the Grand Old Party, that America had “lost” China [Robert A. Divine, *Since 1945: Politics and Diplomacy in Recent American History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), 27]. However, according to historian Gary Reichard, Truman's stunning victory in the 1948 election was another basic factor: “As their party suffered its fourth consecutive defeat in a presidential election, many Republicans drew the moral that cooperation with the Democrats — a ‘me too’ approach, as conservatives called it — was unwise” (Reichard, *Politics as Usual*, 44).

⁶⁹Rothe, ed., *Current Biography*, 164.

alliances' is a consistent one."⁷⁰ Moreover, the Missourian expressed some reservations on the Rio Pact before giving it approval.⁷¹ Thus, his advocacy of the principles laid down by George Washington and other great leaders of the past was not new in 1949.

Third, Forrest C. Donnell came from the Middle West, an area where the isolationist tradition was particularly strong,⁷² and a region that historian Ray Allen Billington depicted in 1945 as "more conservative than the rest of the nation."⁷³ Accordingly, in the late 1940's, America's "heartland" "continued to account for the bulk of isolationist membership."⁷⁴ Not surprisingly, Donnell received numerous anti-NATO letters, as he indicated in July 1949: "The mail which has come to my office...is very much

⁷⁰*Kansas City Star*, March 26, 1949, 10.

⁷¹December 8, 1947, *Congressional Record*, 80th Cong., 1st sess., 11129.

⁷²Scholar William G. Carleton has contended that it was during the First World War that the term "isolationist" really began to be applied to this region since "the majority for war was less in the Middle West than in any other section of the country" [William G. Carleton, "Isolationism and the Middle West," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 33 (December 1946):380]. Various factors may explain this phenomenon, as Ted Carpenter has suggested: "The region's geographic insularity coupled with its relative lack of dependence on foreign commerce allegedly created intense support for a noninterventionist foreign policy. Other writers note the presence of large numbers of ethnic groups, especially Germans, who embraced isolationism in order to avoid situations that might provoke war between their adopted country and their former homeland. Another view sees the Midwestern preference for nonentanglement rooted in long-standing agrarian and populist hostility toward Eastern finance capitalists and their European allies. Still other scholars stress that isolationism has been primarily Republican party dogma and is closely related to ruralism and domestic conservatism" (Carpenter, "Dissenters," 2-3). Interestingly enough, large numbers of German settlers, attracted by the low cost of land and the accessibility by navigable rivers, came to Missouri between 1830 and 1850 with the result that "by 1870 people of German birth or parentage composed more than 20 percent of Osage, Franklin, Warren, St. Charles, and St. Louis counties" [Milton D. Rafferty, *Missouri: A Geography* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), 68].

⁷³Ray Allen Billington, "The Origins of Middle Western Isolationism," *Political Science Quarterly* 60 (1945):64.

⁷⁴Carpenter, "Dissenters," 18. For instance, quite a few North Atlantic Treaty opponents in the Senate came from the Middle West: among others, William Jenner (Indiana), William Langer and Milton Young (North Dakota), Kenneth Wherry (Nebraska) and naturally Robert Taft (Ohio), (July 21, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 9916).

more opposed to the pa[c]t than for it.”⁷⁵ As early as March 1949, for example, a constituent from the small town of Doniphan contended that the North Atlantic Treaty could hardly succeed as an exclusively military alliance.⁷⁶ A few weeks later, a veteran from Columbia, a city in central Missouri, urged the politician to take a stand against NATO, proclaiming that “our State Department, if left to their own devices, would entangle us in affairs for which we have no appetite.”⁷⁷ Moreover, in a letter dated April 20, 1949, a woman from St. Louis reminded Donnell that the North Atlantic Pact constituted a triple menace: “Its threatened emasculation of the United Nations, its dangerous commitment of the United States to military intervention[,] its menace to world economy of an extensive re-armament program here and abroad: all these factors make us hope that you will exercise your influence against it.”⁷⁸ The General Secretary of the Missouri Council of Churches, from Kirkwood, echoed similar arguments on July 12: “The Atlantic Pact does much to weaken the United Nations. Re-arming Europe would not only be a great drain upon our economy, but would do much toward inviting another war.”⁷⁹ In short, by lending an attentive ear to such constituents in the debate over NATO, the Republican senator shows that he deserves the label “neo-isolationist.” Indeed, Donnell, who was among the most vocal North Atlantic Treaty opponents, acted no differently than other leaders in the 1940’s who approved force to maintain the international status quo against Communism, but who wanted to do it alone contrary to the internationalists who wanted to do it collectively.⁸⁰

If isolationist sentiment was present in different parts of Missouri during the postwar period, the depth of the internationalist creed must not be underestimated. On the contrary. For instance, Winston Churchill’s

⁷⁵July 18, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 9650.

⁷⁶Dorothy C. Aylward to Forrest Donnell, April 19, 1949, Donnell Papers, Folder F.7854.

⁷⁷Arnold Alperstein to Forrest Donnell, April 4, 1949, Donnell Papers, Folder F.7853.

⁷⁸Marie Bliss to Forrest Donnell, April 20, 1949, Donnell Papers, Folder F.7856.

⁷⁹H. W. Becker to Forrest Donnell, July 12, 1949, Donnell Papers, Folder F.7855.

⁸⁰Alexander DeConde, ed., *Isolation and Security: Ideas and Interests in Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1957), 29-30.

famous "iron curtain" speech in March 1946 at Fulton, which condemned Soviet domination in Eastern Europe and advocated an Anglo-American military pact, apparently generated much support in the "Show Me" State, as revealed by the following excerpt of a letter written by Truman to the former British prime minister a few days after his speech: "The people in Missouri...were highly pleased with your visit and enjoyed what you had to say."⁸¹ Furthermore, with the ominous European developments of 1948 in particular, a year which saw Czechoslovakia fall prey to a Communist coup and the Soviet Union blockade Berlin, many Missourians were strengthened in their conviction of the unrealistic nature of an isolationist approach. An examination of Donnell's correspondence in 1949 imparts that the Republican politician received almost as many letters from NATO supporters in his own state than from anti-NATO advocates. Thus, constituents such as Carolyn Brushwood of Columbia,⁸² Mountain Grove's R. L. Berry of the Church of God Evangelistic Board of Missouri,⁸³ H. L. Cobb of the St. Louis Christian Peper Tobacco Company⁸⁴ and Kansas City's Marvin Buersmeyer of the General American Life Insurance Company⁸⁵ urged Donnell during the spring of the same year to vote for the ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty. The latter, incidentally, contended that Donnell's leanings toward isolationism were outmoded: "You must remember that we no longer live in [George] Washington's day, and hence his advice for our continued well-being is not applicable today. The recent war was the cost thrust upon us by our denial of international obligations through failure to support the League of

⁸¹Francis L. Loewenheim, "Winston S. Churchill," in Richard S. Kirkendall, ed., *The Harry S. Truman Encyclopedia* (Boston: G. K. Hall & Co., 1989), 52.

⁸²Carolyn N. Brushwood to Forrest Donnell, June 1, 1949, Donnell Papers, Folder F.7860.

⁸³R. L. Berry to Forrest Donnell, March ?, 1949, Donnell Papers, Folder F.7855. According to this constituent: "If Russia starts a war we will be in it sooner or later. It is cheaper and better to prevent a war than to get into it and win it....It will be cheaper in all categories to prevent war than to have one, so let us do it that way. And the only argument the Russians understand is force. Let us join the Atlantic Pact gladly as a preventative of war." (Ibid.)

⁸⁴H. L. Cobb to Forrest Donnell, June 9, 1949, Donnell Papers, Folder F.7862.

⁸⁵Marvin J. Buersmeyer to Forrest Donnell, March 30, 1949, Donnell Papers, Folder F.7860.

Nations.”⁸⁶ In addition, the Executive Committee of the Missouri Department of the American Legion unanimously passed, at its Jefferson City meeting on April 3, a resolution exhorting both state senators to cast their vote for ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty, considering that it “provides the United States with substantial additional security from attack by aggressive armed foes.”⁸⁷ Interestingly enough, in July, a Missourian supporter of Donnell acknowledged that his stand on the Atlantic Pact was all the more praiseworthy since “the tide of opinion seems to be running in the other direction”⁸⁸ while another partisan, taking cognizance of reactions in the state, admitted at the end of the month that his vote “may sound unpopular.”⁸⁹ Therefore, it is understandable that a newspaper such as the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, which applauded NATO⁹⁰ — as did the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*⁹¹ — refused to believe, during the same crucial month, that Forrest Donnell and James Kem were representative of the foreign policy views of most Missourians. As the editor of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* declared: “We do not believe for a minute that this opposition of both of Missouri’s Senators reflects sentiment in this state. We do not believe that Missouri is the most ‘anti-Atlantic pact’ state in the Union....Senators Donnell and Kem may be voting their own convictions on this matter. They certainly are not speaking for the great majority of citizens.”⁹²

⁸⁶Ibid. Such an argument was similar to the one expressed a few months later by a citizen from Webster Groves: “Times, man, war, and a lot of other things have changed since Washington made his Farewell Address. It is correct to honor him for what he did, but there is no sense in making him a saint of some kind or other who should still have a hand in shaping our country’s future, when he very definitely belongs to our proud, but dead, past.” (*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, July 31, 1949, 2D)

⁸⁷Jerry F. Duggan to Forrest Donnell, April 11, 1949, Donnell Papers, Folder F.7868.

⁸⁸L. D. Haigh to Forrest Donnell, July 11, 1949, Donnell Papers, Folder F.7874.

⁸⁹William P. Elmer to Forrest Donnell, July 29, 1949, Donnell Papers, Folder F.7868.

⁹⁰Julian S. Rammelkamp, “St. Louis Post-Dispatch,” in Kirkendall, ed., *Truman Encyclopedia*, 319.

⁹¹July 18, 1949, *Congressional Record*, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 9639.

⁹²*St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, July 19, 1949, 2B.

Consequently, Forrest Donnell's dismal electoral defeat in November 1950 — he lost by a 93,000-vote margin to St. Louis Democrat Thomas C. Hennings Jr.⁹³ — was virtually unavoidable; it was all the more inevitable in that Missouri "always has been proud of Mr. Truman"⁹⁴ and most of its citizens approved Hennings' attacks on McCarthyism.⁹⁵ In fact, Donnell, who based his campaign on emphasizing "the Truman Administration's 'bungling' of foreign policy,"⁹⁶ appears to have underestimated the popularity of the collective security concept and the growing strength of internationalist sentiment in his own state, which was already perceptible in the 1947 debate over the Truman doctrine.⁹⁷ He also seems to have wrongly assessed the irresistible appeal for internationalism inside the Grand Old Party, a "mistake" that was noticed by a constituent in July 1949: "I strongly endorse your position of the Taft-Hartley Law and most domestic issues, but I cannot support your position of opposition to the Atlantic Pact. I am writing because I feel that you should know that there are many loyal Republicans like myself, who support the Administration in some of its present foreign policies."⁹⁸ Another constituent was more scathing: "Although I voted for you in the past, I find that we disagree on most important issues. Avoiding 'entangling foreign alliances' was fine a hundred and fifty years ago but this is 1949. Armies move in airplanes now — not sailboats."⁹⁹ What

⁹³*New York Times*, November 9, 1950, 23.

⁹⁴*Ibid.* As the *New York Times* declared: "Loyalty to the President was regarded as a prime factor in Senator Donnell's defeat." (*Ibid.*)

⁹⁵Donald J. Kemper, *Decade of Fear: Senator Hennings and Civil Liberties* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1965), 30.

⁹⁶*New York Times*, November 8, 1950, 15.

⁹⁷For instance, a constituent from Webster Groves declared: "It is my opinion that we should give or lend money to both Greece and Turkey, and otherwise act with or without troops in such a way as to stabilize the political and economic position of the countries. This opinion...is one generally held by friends of mine....We realize that we are asking the United States to assume its full responsibilities which accrue to a world power." (A. T. Beauregard to Forrest Donnell, March 19, 1947, Donnell Papers, Folder F.6316).

⁹⁸James R. Cowan to Forrest Donnell, July 19, 1949, Donnell Papers, Folder F.7864.

⁹⁹Jack M. Gilbert to Forrest Donnell, March 22, 1949, Donnell Papers, Folder F.7872.

was particularly striking in Donnell's 1950 electoral defeat was the fact that his Democratic opponent gathered more votes than expected in rural areas, "regarded as Senator Donnell's provinces",¹⁰⁰ and which were generally more prone to isolationism. To attribute this disappointing performance of the Grand Old Party in outstate Missouri solely to considerations of foreign policy would certainly be an exaggeration, since farmers of the area, in the late 1940's, also expressed concerns that Republicans would destroy federal farm programs.¹⁰¹ However, the erosion of rural Missouri, illustrated by the fact that the state's farm population declined approximately 25 % in the 1940s,¹⁰² was very real during the Truman era and, undoubtedly, this factor contributed to discredit isolationism.¹⁰³

All things considered, Forrest Donnell seemed to forget that the isolationist views of Missouri Senator Bennett Champ Clark played a significant role in his defeat in the Democratic primary of 1944.¹⁰⁴ Apparently, he also failed to recollect that "a politician who embraced isolationism in post-World War II America incurred a substantial political risk."¹⁰⁵ The senator from Missouri seemed to disregard, for instance, the fate of his Middle West colleague Henrik Shipstead who paid greatly for his July 1945 vote against American adherence to the United Nations Charter: he was turned out of office in the 1946 Minnesota GOP primary¹⁰⁶, and he

¹⁰⁰*New York Times*, November 8, 1950, 15.

¹⁰¹Thomas F. Soapes, "Outstate Missouri," in Kirkendall, ed., *Truman Encyclopedia*, 267.

¹⁰²*Ibid.*

¹⁰³Among other factors which contributed to the weakening of isolationism during these years, historian Wayne Cole has noted "the challenges to peace and security from...Communist Russia, the development of nuclear weapons and effective delivery systems, the growth of cities and their accompanying industrial and financial capacities,...and the power of the presidency under Truman." (Wayne S. Cole, "Isolationism," in Kirkendall, ed., *Truman Encyclopedia*, 180)

¹⁰⁴Kirkendall, *History of Missouri*, 288.

¹⁰⁵Carpenter, "Dissenters," 21.

¹⁰⁶Wayne S. Cole, "Isolationism," in Kirkendall, ed., *Truman Encyclopedia*, 179.

later admitted that his famous vote "did a great deal to defeat me."¹⁰⁷ Equally revealing was the fact that senatorial opponents of the North Atlantic Treaty, such as Democrat Glen Taylor of Idaho and James Kem, were unsuccessful in seeking reelection in 1950 and 1952.¹⁰⁸ Incidentally, although an adversary of NATO such as Ohio Senator Robert Taft was more successful in the 1950 election, it remains that his negative vote in July 1949 appeared unpopular in his own state and that his win had little to do with his isolationist stance.¹⁰⁹

Finally, if Donnell's impact on foreign policy appears to have been limited during the Truman presidency, as was the case for most cold war critics,¹¹⁰ an examination of his attitude toward NATO permits an exploration of the particular views of an active participant in one of the most important debates in American diplomatic history. Such an examination also reveals someone who was not without a certain prescience, since President Truman sent to Congress the Mutual Defense Assistance Bill, requesting a one-year appropriation of approximately \$1.5 billion for European military aid, on July 25, 1949, just four days after ratification of the NATO Treaty...¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷Henrik Shipstead to Harry F. Klinefelter, March 28, 1953, Henrik Shipstead Papers, Box 15, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minnesota.

¹⁰⁸Schoenebaum, ed., *Political Profiles*, 539; *Biographical Directory*, 1221. For scholar Mary Atwell, Kem's defeat in Missouri by Democratic candidate Stuart Symington appears hardly surprising since foreign policy was unquestionably "a primary issue in the 1952 election" (Mary W. Atwell, "A Conservative Response to the Cold War: Senator James P. Kem and Foreign Aid," *Capitol Studies* 4 (1976):54).

¹⁰⁹Carpenter, "Dissenters," 42; Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965), 153.

¹¹⁰Paterson, ed., *Cold War Critics*, 14-15.

¹¹¹*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States - Harry S. Truman, 1949* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), 399.

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— editor]

IT'S NOT A JUNGLE OUT THERE:
USING FOREIGN ARCHIVES IN FOREIGN RELATIONS
RESEARCH

by
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“Is it too late to cancel your trip?” These words, coming from a specialist in Ecuadorian history, seemed to throw cold water on my plan to produce a thorough and balanced dissertation by conducting research in several Latin American archives last winter. My study of the little-known round-up and internment in United States camps of thousands of German civilians from Latin America during World War II involves more than fifteen countries. Without the resources to visit them all, I was seeking nevertheless to avoid the flaw inherent in too many works of diplomatic history, in which scholars who restrict themselves to sources available in Washington wind up writing from a Washington point of view. Phrased as it is in the subtitle of this article, the importance of using foreign archives seems self-evident, and is becoming more widely accepted in our

field after some debate.¹ But for me the issue was quite simple: I wanted to see what all sides had to say.

While the historians I consulted before my trip to Ecuador, Colombia, and Costa Rica admired this goal and were generous with their assistance, they were full of warnings about the difficulties inherent in working in third world countries. "This isn't the PRO [British Public Records Office]," said one. "Forget about organization." Tales abounded of spoiled or missing documents, uncatalogued collections, and bureaucrats arbitrarily denying access to researchers. In the Ecuadorian case, I had unwittingly stepped onto forbidden turf: my topic coincided chronologically with the war between Ecuador and Peru in which Ecuador lost half its territory; national sensitivity to that era remains such that all diplomatic correspondence from those years was apparently forever classified.

It was not the first time I had been warned about the perils of research abroad. Before travelling to Europe in 1996, I was told that there was practically no documentation still in existence on wartime German-Latin American relations: the corner of the Foreign Ministry building where such material was kept was destroyed in an Allied air raid, and what little remained was in the possession of unfriendly German archivists.

¹See Sally Marks, "The World According to Washington," *Diplomatic History* 11 (1987): 265-82; Charles S. Maier, "Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations," in Michael Kammen, ed., *The Past Before Us* (Ithaca, NY, 1980), 355-56; Michael McGerr, "The Price of the 'New' Transnational History," *American Historical Review* 96 (October 1991): 1056-67; Akira Iriye, "The Internationalization of History," *AHR* 94 (February 1989): 4ff.; Thomas Paterson et. al., "Writing the History of US Foreign Relations: A Symposium," *DH* 14 (1990); Melvyn Leffler, "New Approaches, Old Interpretations, and Prospective Reconfigurations," *DH* 19 (1995): 175-77.

I knew more than one person who had been bawled right out the door by French archivists who believed their professional responsibilities consisted of defending "their" collections from the public. And I have a colleague at Berkeley who waited three months to enter a Russian archive before finally gaining access with the help of a well-placed gift of two bottles of vodka.

But in spite of all the horror stories out there, my experience using foreign archives has been uniformly positive. Over the past two years, with the assistance of a Holt Fellowship from SHAFR and several other grants, I travelled to seven countries to obtain information and perspective unavailable from US sources. Looking back, there are several practices that seemed to smooth the way.

Well before each trip, I wrote to the director of each archive I planned to visit to explain my project, list the sources for which I already had citations, if any, and ask for guidance and rules of access. The answers I received ranged from detailed advice on shelf lists and the names of specialized local researchers to polite invitations to come and do the hunting myself. Both kinds of letters were useful for getting in the door and as a basis for initial conversations with archivists upon arrival. This was also how I found out in advance that I needed a letter of introduction from the cultural attaché at the US embassy, not just my university, for admittance to the German Foreign Ministry archives. Other institutions with limited desk space required a reservation, and I sometimes received helpful information about holiday closures and the like.

Letters of introduction, rarely used in this country nowadays, proved to be very important abroad. I brought letters from my department chair, both in English and the local language, on archival visits in Europe and Latin America, where they were specifically requested and carefully examined. The university letterhead and shiny gold seal demonstrated my institutional backing and had the effect of transforming me from a "student" into a "scholar." Business cards worked wonders too. (The American

Historical Association also provides letters of introduction for its members, including independent scholars without university affiliation.)

Formalities aside, I always made a point of sitting down with the archivists and taking the time not only to explain my project but to ask them about their own work. Archivists are the great unsung heroes of our enterprise, the keepers of the keys, and are often highly-trained specialists themselves. Some of them privately expressed frustration at being treated as little more than waiters by visiting scholars who don't even bother to learn their names; this complaint seemed especially significant in the Latin American context, mirroring as it does an all-too-familiar pattern in diplomatic and business relations between North Americans and Latin Americans.

Getting on the good side of an archivist can bring all sorts of tangible benefits. Rather than the faceless rule-following bureaucrats I had been told to expect in Germany, I met courteous scholars who were eager to share ideas over lunch, wanted to hear about academic developments in the States, and pointed me to collections I hadn't known about. When I went looking for figures on Nazi Party membership in Latin America, one archivist at the Bundesarchiv in Berlin pulled from his desk a chart he himself had prepared from the many disparate official German records. When I languished on the waitlist to use one of the two desks at the German Foreign Ministry where laptops are permitted, the staff arranged for me to use the office of a vacationing colleague.

The horror stories I had heard about the Colombian Foreign Ministry archives (AMRE) are partly true. Located in a part of Bogotá so dodgy that some taxi drivers refuse to go there, the archive was neglected for many years. It is now under a capable director who is trying to repair the damage done in the past, but the first impression still comes as a shock: stacks of crumbling documents heaped up all over the floor in no apparent order, the leaky ceiling coming down in patches, an unpleasant odor wafting

from the broken toilets in the back of the room. In this inauspicious setting, after exchanging pleasantries and accepting the first of endless cups of the world's best coffee, I tentatively asked whether it would be possible to locate the correspondence between the chancellery and the US embassy from the 1940s. "Right this way," said the director, cheerfully threading her way through the heaps to one particular pile of documents. And there they were. She also found the Colombian police investigations of the local Nazi party, complete with photographs I was allowed to reproduce. The materials are being gradually preserved, organized, catalogued, and moved into modern facilities at the Archivo General de la Nación; in the meantime, if AMRE ever loses its director, Colombia will lose much of its patrimony.

At the Archivo Histórico de Quito (AHQ), which houses the records of the Ecuadorian Foreign Ministry and has a tiny staff of four people, I spent the first afternoon chatting with the archivists about different approaches to the study of US-Latin American relations, comparing university experiences, and asking them what I should do as a tourist in my off-hours. The second day I officially received permission to use the unclassified material from the 1940s, which was pretty thin, but I turned through the pages anyway to show my interest and found a few useful items. Within a week I was offered the classified material I was looking for, was invited to stay for a birthday party after work, was asked to give a talk at a history workshop run by one of the archivists, and joined another archivist for a weekend trip to a nature preserve in the Amazonian jungle! The classified correspondence revealed two issues of importance: Embassy reliance on informants of questionable validity to identify suspected dangerous Germans, and the efforts of the Ecuadorian government to defend some of its respected local Germans from a commercial blacklist created by US officials. This was in contrast to the reports filed by US diplomats, available at the National Archives in College Park, that had described the entire German community as suspect.

That personal relationships can be more important than official rules is true even when conducting research in the United States, as anyone knows who has befriended a Freedom of Information Act officer with the power of declassifying documents. Collegiality and mutual regard can be their own reward, but my effort to be amiable brought further dividends. Through the contacts I made at the AHQ, I was invited to return for the bi-annual Ecuadorian National History Congress, where I will be able to present my findings before an audience uniquely qualified to evaluate them. And months after my return to the States, I received an e-mail message from one of the archivists in Quito alerting me to their acquisition of six new sets of records relevant to my investigation, information I would probably never have known about were it not for his initiative.

In the Costa Rican National Archive, known to locals as “the flying saucer” for its unique architecture, I examined the records of the Junta de Custodia (Alien Property Custodial Board), the body created to administer confiscated German property during the war. It became clear from these documents that the Costa Rican government benefitted enormously from the expropriation of the property of Germans who were sent to the United States. Their farms were seized, assets sold off and liquid assets converted into defense bonds and municipal bonds that essentially transferred private wealth into government coffers. In addition, I was able to document how the two wartime Costa Rican presidents, Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia and Teodoro Picado, obtained the appointment of their friends as administrators of the confiscated German properties — positions from which it was easy to line one’s pockets. This research altered my conclusions, because on the basis of US government records alone, I had had the impression that the deportation program was imposed on reluctant Latin American countries. Now I have a more nuanced understanding of how the program was eventually welcomed in Costa Rica because of the opportunity it gave Costa Rican elites to enrich themselves at the expense of the departing Germans.

In addition to the archival work, I also sought out and interviewed aging German deportees who returned to Latin America after the war, and other members of the German and Jewish communities from that era. These conversations provided me with eyewitness testimony about the extent of nazification of the German communities in each country, the conditions in the internment camps in the United States, and the reception awaiting those deportees who were sent on to Germany during the war. I might have obtained some of this information from correspondence or telephone interviews, but especially when dealing with people over eighty years old who are remembering a sensitive time in their past, there was no substitute for the face-to-face contact made possible by travelling.

Since my return, I have often been asked about the problems involved in taking a laptop computer on such trips. I found every archive willing to accommodate laptop users, and the practice can be especially useful for foreign travel. Some researchers prefer to do extensive photocopying, but that is not always permitted or easy, and those heavy boxes of paper quickly become a burden when travelling. I prefer to take notes directly from the documents into a database on my computer. There are several advantages to this method. I don't have to read the copies a second time when I get home. I can make regular backup diskettes and not worry that the post office or airline will lose my only set of hard-earned photocopies or handwritten notes. Many database programs allow for keyword searching and automatic bibliography and footnote preparation that speed up the writing process; additionally, when I came across something in an archive in, say, San José, that reminded me of something I had read a year before in Switzerland, I could search my computerized notes for the earlier reference in seconds right there in the archive, instead of waiting until I got back to Berkeley to wade through my files. With my trusty computer along, I wrote several papers and grant applications on the road, and kept in touch with friends and family via e-mail to sustain my morale during the inevitable lonely periods of field work.

But foreign travel does pose some extra hazards for computer users. I had to make sure that my computer could run on the local electrical current, and learned the hard way that I had to buy a surge suppressor locally to protect my machine from power spikes. (American 110 volt surge suppressors won't work in Europe, where they try to suppress half the 220 volt current and blow out.) For long stays I brought along a portable printer, selecting a model with an international power supply; on shorter trips I would pay a few dollars to fax the document I wished to print out directly from my laptop to a fax machine at a copy shop or hotel using standard fax software. Telephone adapter plugs were always locally available to fit my US modem cable into a European jack. Backing up one's data and buying insurance, whether as part of a homeowner's or renter's property policy or a special computer policy available through laptop retailers, are always good ideas, and a must when travelling. I took sets of backup diskettes and pre-addressed disk mailers to Latin America with me to send home every week, sometimes asking returning Americans to mail them for me from the US if the local postal system was unreliable. I used a computer lock to secure my laptop to furniture during archive lunch breaks, and carried a regular bookbag rather than a laptop case to avoid attracting unnecessary attention on the street. When my laptop was stolen in Costa Rica near the end of my travels, with two years of research notes on the hard drive, I received compensation from my insurance policy for the machine and transferred my data from backup disks to a new computer without losing any work.

Conducting research at foreign archives does entail some complications, but they are not insuperable. The main obstacle, given that one has the necessary languages, remains the expense involved in getting oneself to the records. As a compulsive grant writer, I have seen more and more sources of funding specifically targeted toward the use of foreign archives each year, as academic institutions recognize the importance of broadening our source base beyond the water's edge. The Holt Fellowship is SHAFR's expression of its commitment to this goal. Diplomatic historians who avail themselves of these opportunities and exercise some

cultural sensitivity will benefit personally and professionally from the experience, and the study of foreign relations will be richer as a consequence.

PLUMBERS AND PRESIDENTS: LABOR SOURCES FOR DIPLOMATIC HISTORIANS

by

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Those surveying current trends in American diplomatic history are almost unanimous in calling for broader studies that embrace an international perspective and move beyond a narrow focus on elite decision-makers centered in the White House, the military, and State Department. For those in search of avenues toward these broader viewpoints, a series of recent openings of materials relating to organized labor's involvement in foreign affairs warrants attention. In particular, the Cold War-era records of the AFL, CIO, and AFL-CIO are now open to researchers. These materials, held at various repositories, reveal a far-reaching engagement in international affairs that serves as a dramatic reminder that foreign policy — especially during the Cold War era — was made on many levels and had many unexpected dimensions.

Organized labor's deep involvement in foreign affairs, of course, dates back to the activities of Samuel Gompers, the first president of the AFL, an immigrant, deeply interested in international issues. Gompers journeyed with Woodrow Wilson to Paris in 1919, where he was instrumental in organizing the International Labor Organization (ILO), attached to the League of Nations. Gompers then spent the last years of his life vigorously attacking the Bolshevik revolution. Gompers' papers are currently the subject of

a major editing project centered at the University of Maryland at College Park. As the editors move into the World War I era, their focus will shift decidedly from that of domestic labor to international affairs.¹

While Gompers made policy for the centralized AFL, foreign affairs frequently consumed labor at the grass-roots. Elizabeth McKillen's recent study of the Chicago Federation of Labor during World War I found significant resistance to Gompers' internationalism, especially on the question of Irish independence.² Rich deposits of local union records of the sort that McKillen mined, including newspapers, proceedings, and office records, can be found throughout the country. If the Chicago records are any indication, international issues, while rarely the sole focus of attention, were often matters of urgent interest to unionists.

As Gompers sought to mobilize the AFL against international communism, Jay Lovestone, later the primary shaper of labor's Cold War foreign policy, led the opposition as the leading proponent and general secretary of the American communist party. Lovestone's break with the Soviet-style communism came in 1929, when — in a legendary encounter with Stalin — he dared suggest that a unique set of circumstances existed in the United States, requiring a unique set of communist tactics. Stalin angrily repudiated Lovestone, who barely escaped Russia alive. Returning to his home in New York City, Lovestone began a rival communist party, which clashed frequently and ferociously with the mainstream Stalinists. Gradually Lovestone forged an alliance with the

¹See Stuart Kaufman et al. ed., *The Samuel Gompers Papers: The American Federation of Labor and the Rise of Progressivism, 1902-1906*, (Urbana, IL, 1996), for the latest installment in the Gompers papers.

²Elizabeth McKillen, *Chicago Labor and the Quest for a Democratic Diplomacy, 1914-1924*, (Ithaca, NY, 1996). Also see Simon Larson, *Labor and Foreign Policy: The AFL and the First World War, 1914-1918*, (Cranbury, NJ, 1975).

International Ladies Garment Workers Union, which was waging its own battle against communist infiltration.³ As of 1933, Lovestone helped organize labor's boycott of Nazi goods, and set about loudly equating fascism with Stalin's communism. By the late 1930s, Lovestone was working with the AFL, and had struck up an unlikely friendship with rising AFL leader and ardent anti-communist George Meany. As the plumber from the Bronx gained ascendancy within the AFL, Lovestone's star also rose. During World War II, Lovestone worked closely with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)'s labor office, under Arthur Goldberg, future secretary of labor, and Supreme Court justice.

Following the war, as organized labor's fortunes peaked, Lovestone and Meany threw their efforts into countering communist designs upon Western Europe's "free" labor movements. Much of their work was directed through the semi-autonomous Free Trade Union Committee. Strong supporters of the Marshall Plan and military spending — which not only provided relief for Europe but also jobs for Americans — the CIO, led by its European agent, Victor Reuther, and the AFL took full advantage of U.S. government funding, including CIA money, to further their European agenda. The work of Carolyn Eisenberg and a few others have begun to unravel the complexities of labor's work in post-war Europe.⁴

By 1950, the anti-communist crusade of the AFL and CIO, combined with the Marshall Plan, halted communist advances on

³For the latest revelations regarding Lovestone's communist activities see John Haynes, Harvey Klehr, Kyrill B. Anderson, *The Soviet World of American Communism*, (New Haven, 1998), 137, 142-3, 170.

⁴Carolyn Eisenberg, "Working-class Politics and the Cold War: American Intervention the German Labor Movement, 1945-1949," *Diplomatic History* 7 (Fall, 1983). Also see Denis MacShane, *International Labour and the Origins of the Cold War*. Oxford, 1992; Tony Carew, *Labour Under the Marshall Plan*, (Detroit, 1987); and Peter Weiler, *British Labour and the Cold War*, (Stanford, 1988).

European unions. Hardly content, both the AFL and CIO — soon to be united into the AFL-CIO — continued their work in Europe and set their sights on the developing battle for the Third World. The AFL's energetic European agent, Irving Brown, became an aggressive and unabashed force in the shaping of organized labor in post-colonial Africa. Meanwhile other agents such as Richard Deverall and Harry Goldberg focused their work in Asia. Serafino Romualdi, an Italian-born socialist, operated out of Latin America. By the 1960s, with Kennedy and Johnson's introduction and expansion of the Agency for International Development (AID), the AFL-CIO inaugurated three semi-autonomous bodies, funded primarily by AID dollars, to further its agenda in the Third World: the American Institute for Free Labor Development, the African Labor College, and the Asian-American-Free Labor Institute. All three organizations continued to operate vigorously until the mid-1990s, when the newly-elected AFL-CIO administration chose to curtail their activities.

By the 1970s, the AFL-CIO's brand of virulent anti-communism came into increasingly ill-repute. But an aging George Meany remained a vocal and unrepentant Cold Warrior. American defeat in Vietnam — where the AFL-CIO had dedicated significant resources to supporting an organized labor movement of several hundred thousand rural and urban workers — failed to deter the organization. By the late 1970s, the federation set its sights on the emerging labor movement in Poland. An early and active supporter of Solidarity, the AFL-CIO, according to reports, worked in conjunction with the CIA and Reagan administration, to funnel support to the vulnerable Polish labor organization.⁵

Abundant materials detailing labor's international work are now available. Gompers' papers can be found at the Wisconsin

⁵On the AFL-CIO's intense work on behalf of Poland's Solidarity movement see Carl Bernstein and Marco Politi, *His Holiness: John Paul II and the Hidden History of Our Time*, (New York, 1996), 264, and Carl Bernstein, "Holy Alliance," *Time*, 24 February 1992.

Historical Society, the Library of Congress, and Duke University. The papers of the internationally-active International Ladies Garment Workers are located at the Kheel Center for Labor-Management Documentation at Cornell University. Lovestone's papers are scattered between three collections at the Hoover Institute on War, Peace, and Revolution, Cornell's Kheel Center, and the AFL-CIO's George Meany Memorial Archives in Silver Spring, Maryland. The former communist's papers are rich with useful information and loaded with gossip. As fits such a fascinating and complex figure, he will soon be the subject of a major biography by Ted Morgan. Materials on the labor bureau of the OSS, which have never been researched in any in-depth manner, are located at the National Archives. The motherlode of materials relating to labor and foreign policy can be found in the Meany Archives in Maryland. There — alongside the Lovestone papers — is a small but illuminating series of CIO foreign policy documents in the Michael Ross collection, as well as the papers of Irving Brown, which contain voluminous records pertaining to the AFL and AFL-CIO's activities in both Europe, Africa, and Asia.⁶ But of greatest utility to the researcher seeking a quick sense of labor's activities in a certain region or country, are the International Affairs Country Files. Each country is listed alphabetically, and folders under a particular country feature material ranging from a few pamphlets to several boxes of memoranda, correspondence, clippings, and reports, all filed chronologically. The files are extraordinarily well processed, and the Meany archives are accessible and comfortable.

Significant records pertaining to both American and international organized labor were also kept by the U.S. government. Beginning in the post-war period, all major American embassies had special

⁶Several affiliated unions also had international departments, monitoring and seeking to influence foreign affairs. The United Auto Workers (UAW), for instance, had an active International Affairs Department, run by Victor Reuther through most of the Cold War era. UAW records can be found at the Walter Reuther Library at Wayne State University in Detroit, Michigan.

attaches — generally chosen from the ranks of organized labor — who would report on and occasionally seek to influence labor relations. A major effort is now underway to compile an oral history of the labor attaches' work.⁷

In researching my dissertation on the AFL-CIO's efforts to sustain an organized labor movement in South Vietnam in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, I used all of the above repositories.⁸ Examining the Vietnam War from the perspective of organized labor offered me insights into the bitter domestic impact of the war, as well as the often tense relations between the Americans and their South Vietnamese allies. Other countries and regions offer equally fruitful possibilities for research. With Indonesia in the current headlines, I decided to briefly survey in the AFL-CIO country files materials relating to this troubled nation. There, lay the outlines of a fascinating story. Almost immediately following independence (1949), the AFL sent agent Harry Goldberg to Indonesia to help cultivate anti-communist unionists. The CIO likewise dispatched its own agent, Frank Wallick. Neither Goldberg nor Wallick had much success in stemming the rise of the communist-leaning All-Indonesian Central Labor Organization. Goldberg appears to have been thrown out of the country by the late 1950s. The AFL-CIO continued to keep a close watch on Indonesian affairs, as frequent communications with the U.S. labor attache in Jakarta attest. At home, the AFL-CIO lobbied against Sukarno, whom it viewed as a communist sympathizer. Following Sukarno's ouster in 1965, the AFL-CIO threw itself into a campaign to support the new anti-communist All-Indonesian Labor Federation (GASBIINDO). Yet in

⁷The Labor Diplomacy Oral History Project is being conducted by the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. The oral histories produced have been deposited for researchers in the Georgetown Oral History Program.

⁸Edmund F. Wehrle, "Reprehensible Repercussions": The AFL-CIO, Free Trade Unionism, and the Vietnam War, 1947-1975," (PhD Dissertation, University of Maryland at College Park, 1998).

the years that followed, the AFL-CIO frequently clashed with the Indonesian government over its aid efforts. A full telling of this story will reveal much about development and democracy in this important area of the world.

Historians of American foreign policy no doubt will continue to focus primary attention on diplomats, generals, and presidents. But one might hope that future diplomatic historians will include a stop at the George Meany Memorial Archives when visiting the National Archives. And perhaps they will recognize, as I have come to, that plumbers as well as presidents also make foreign policy.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

**“The Legacy of World War I and the Paris Peace Conference:
A Conference in Commemoration of the 80th Anniversary of
the Paris Peace Conference, 1919”**

The March 26th, 1999 conference will re-examine the significance of World War I and its Peace Conference for the 20th century world. Contact: Janet D. Stone, History Dept., Armstrong Atlantic State University, 11935 Abercorn Street, Savannah, GA 31419-1997; Fax: 912/921-5581.

Recent Openings: Jimmy Carter Library

On September 28, 1998, the Carter Library opened for research:

— An oral history with international trade lawyer Eugene L. Stewart, interviewed in September, 1996, by Alfred E. Eckes on behalf of the International Trade Commission Historical Society.

— Papers of Jimmy Carter, White House Staff Office Files of the National Security Adviser, 1977-81 (54 cubic feet added to the 269 cubic feet previously available on request; file totals about 750 cubic feet). The most recent opening provides researchers a folder title list of the Europe, USSR, and East/West File (29 cubic feet) and the General Odom File (25 cubic feet). The folder title list for over forty percent of the files of National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and his staff has been made available to researchers so that they may request the processing of folders of interest. Carter Library staff will then open what can be opened from these folders and submit the security-classified documents for mandatory declassification review. Due to demand, lengthy delays may occur in the processing of folders requested.

SHAFR Guide Available

A few copies of the *SHAFR Guide to American Foreign Relations since 1700* are available at a cost of \$30 from Allan Spetter, History Dept., Wright State U., Dayton, Ohio.

OAH Solicits SHAFR Proposals

Bruce Laurie (U-Mass at Amherst) co-chair for Program has contacted SHAFR and invites proposals from SHAFR members for the 2000 meeting in St. Louis. More information is found at the bottom of the **Calendar section**.

Letters

To the Editor:

In his recent letter (*Newsletter*, September 1998), Robert Maddox makes personal and other charges which, quite frankly, are so distorted a representation of what I wrote as to be unworthy of detailed response. Let me, accordingly, deal with only one example by way of illustration:

Nowhere in my brief report of information recently sent to me by Professor Emeritus Carl Leiden (*Newsletter*, June 1998) do I claim that the new evidence demonstrates that President Harry Truman used the atomic bomb in part or entirely because he wished to threaten the Russians (as Maddox implies). What I wrote was simply that the new evidence Leiden offers, together with other information cited, suggests that Truman may have privately believed that the use of the atomic bomb was a mistake. If so, this is important information. I suggested quite simply — and rather cautiously — that historians should be on the lookout for further information that sheds light on the issue.

Since Maddox has chosen to impugn my personal motives, let me also deal with only one point of evidence related to this matter — again, simply by way of illustration: Maddox writes — asserts! — that the reason I left discussion of General George C. Marshall's views out of my brief note was that this would have "demolished" my contention concerning the views of U.S. military leaders. His impugning of motives aside, the reasons I left it out are obvious: First, that is not what the note was about. Second, and most important — as I'm sure Maddox must know — there is a very full account of the views of all the top U.S. military officials concerning

Hiroshima in my book, *The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb* (Knopf, 1995). It is well known that Eisenhower and Leahy — and, indeed, MacArthur, Halsey, LeMay, Nimitz and many others — stated in different ways and at different times, both publicly and privately, that they did not believe the use of the atomic bomb was necessary. (See *The Decision*, pp. 319-371, for a review of the many statements, the variations among them, and the complexity of the evidence in certain cases.)

Without rehearsing all this evidence, let me simply point out that in this same account I take up Marshall's views in great detail. Maddox cites one after-the-fact statement made in an interview with Forrest Pogue (a statement which is also quoted in my long account). He does not cite other after-the-fact or second-hand reports, some from the 1945 period — also cited in *The Decision* — that suggest that Marshall did not believe the bomb was the only reasonable option at the time. We know, for instance, that well before the bomb was used Marshall urged that the terms concerning the Emperor be changed to facilitate surrender. (When he lost this critical battle, as I wrote, then use of the "shock" of the bomb obviously became much more important — because once the option of giving assurances to the Emperor was eliminated, the Japanese were certain to keep fighting.) Prior to the bomb's use — and prior to the President's decision not to offer the Emperor assurances — we know something else about Marshall's general views. Here is an excerpt from a well-known May 29, 1945 memorandum written by Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy after a meeting with Marshall and Secretary of War Stimson:

General Marshall said he thought these weapons might first be used against straight military objectives such as a large naval installation and then if no complete result was derived from the effect of that, he thought we ought to

designate a number of large manufacturing areas from which the people would be warned to leave — telling the Japanese that we intend to destroy such centers.... Every effort should be made to keep our record of warning clear. We must offset by such warning methods the opprobrium which might follow from an ill-considered employment of such force.

Two after-the-fact reports by McCloy also state that Marshall did not feel the decision to use the bomb was a military question, and in one of these McCloy again makes clear that Marshall favored a warning to the Japanese. There are also suggestions by John Eisenhower that although he was not in a position to say, he was quite sure that Marshall felt as his father did, that “the bomb did not need to be used because the Japs were licked.”

None of this is definitive, nor did I claim it was. As I wrote, our understanding of Marshall’s real views must remain somewhat “iffy” until further evidence is discovered. Other historians have gone further. Barton Bernstein, for instance, in a recent article (*Journal of Military History*, July 1998, p. 570) states on the basis of his reading of the evidence that although Marshall may not have pleaded his case with Truman, he “would have chosen not to use the bomb on noncombatants...”

I also noted in my report that Margaret Truman has refused to respond to inquiries on these issues from many historians (including Bernstein and myself) — a point Mr. Maddox believes to be irrelevant. On the contrary: Certain passages in books written by Ms. Truman on the basis of information that she alone possesses suggest that questions were raised about whether use of the atomic bomb was necessary by General Arnold. We do not know what, precisely, the

documents show, or if other views are also reported in them. But if the materials Ms. Truman possesses are totally supportive of her father and of the traditional view, it is more than reasonable to ask why they have not been made available to scholars concerned with these matters long ago.

Gar Alperovitz

PERSONALS

H.W. Brands (Texas A&M) has been named the Ralph R. Thomas '21 Professor of Liberal Arts.

Douglas Brinkley (U. of New Orleans) was awarded an honorary doctorate from Trinity College, Hartford CT for outstanding history education. Brinkley was recently named contributing editor to both *Newsweek* and *American Heritage*.

Priscilla Roberts (Hong Kong) was co-winner of the British Association of American Studies' Arthur Miller Prize for the best British article in American studies. Ms. Roberts' article, "The Anglo-American Theme" was published in the 1997 summer issue of *DH*.

Lawrence Wittner (SUNY/Albany) has received a grant from the Nonprofit Sector Research Fund of the Aspen Institute to fund research on volume III of his trilogy, *The Struggle Against the Bomb*.

PUBLICATIONS

Terry Anderson (Texas A&M), *The Sixties*. Addison Wesley Longman, 1998. ISBN 0-321-01128-7.

H. W. Brands (Texas A&M), *What America Owes the World: The Struggle for the Soul of Foreign Policy*. Cambridge, 1998. Cloth: ISBN \$54.95; paper: ISBN 0521639689, \$17.95.

Robert Buzzanco (Houston), *Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era*. Cambridge, 1998. ISBN 0-521-480466-9, \$34.95

Antonio Donno (Lecce), in collaboration with Daniel De Luca e Paola Olimpo, eds., *Ombre di guerra fredda: Gli Stati Uniti nel Medio Oriente durante gli anni de Eisenhower (1953-1961) [Cold War Shadows: The United States in the Middle East during the Eisenhower Years, 1953-1961]*, Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1998.

Carolyn Eisenberg (Hofstra), *Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944-1949*. Cambridge, 1998. Now in paper: ISBN 0-521-62717-6, \$19.95.

John Ernst (Morehead State), *Forging a Fateful Alliance: Michigan State University and the Vietnam War*. Michigan State, 1998. ISBN 0-87013478-7, \$24.95.

Michael Hogan (Ohio State), *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State*. Cambridge, 1998. ISBN 0-52164044-X, \$34.95.

Richard H. Immerman (Temple), *John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism, and Power in U.S. Foreign Relations*. Scholarly Resources, 1998. Cloth: ISBN 0-8420-2600, \$50.00; paper: ISBN 0-8420-2601, \$17.95.

Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State), *Thomas Jefferson: Westward the Course of Empire*. Scholarly Resources, 1998. Cloth: ISBN 0-8420-2529-0, \$50.00; paper: ISBN 0-8420-2530, \$17.95.

James E. Lewis, Jr. (Louisiana State), *The American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood: The United States and the Collapse of the Spanish Empire, 1783-1829*. North Carolina, 1998. Cloth: ISBN 0-8078-2429-1, \$49.95; paper ISBN 0-88078-4736-4. \$18.95.

Robert McMahon (Florida) and Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut), eds. *The Origins of the Cold War*. Houghton Mifflin, 4th ed., 1999. ISBN 0-395-90430-7.

Norman L. and Emily S. Rosenberg (Mcalester), *In Our Times: America since World War II*. Sixth edition. Prentice Hall, 1999. ISBN 0-13-911082-8, \$33.33.

Orrin Schwab (Purdue Calumet), *Defending the Free World: John F. Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and the Vietnam War, 1961-1965*. Greenwood, 1998. ISBN 0-275-96279-2, \$59.95.

Hubert P. van Tuyll (Augusta College). *America's Strategic Future: A Blueprint for National Survival in the New Millennium*. Greenwood, 1998. ISBN 0-313-30674-5, \$47.95.

Ralph E. Weber (Marquette) ed., *Spymasters" Ten CIA Officers in Their Own Words*. Scholarly Resources, 1998. Cloth: ISBN 0842027149, \$55.00; paper: ISBN 084202715-7, \$19.95.

Mark J. White (Eastern Illinois), *Kennedy: The New Frontier Revisited*. New York U. Press, 1998. ISBN 0-8147-0340-1, \$50.00. [Published by Macmillan in the UK: ISBN 0-333-65941-4, £50.]

Mark White, *Missiles in Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro and the 1962 Crisis*. Ivan Dee, 1998. New in paper: ISBN 1566631564, \$12.95.

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CALENDAR

1999

- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main St., Malden MA 02148.
- January 7-10 The 113th annual meeting of the AHA will take place in Washington. Program chair: John Voll, History, Georgetown U.
- January 15 Deadline for the Bernath Article Award.
- February 1 Submissions due for Warren Kuehl Award, deadlines for the Bernath Book Award, the *March Newsletter*, and for Ferrell Prize.
- February 15 Deadline for the Bernath lecture prize.
- March 1 Deadline for Graebner Prize nominations.
- April 1 Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.
- April 22-25 The 92nd meeting of the OAH will take place at the Sheraton Centre Toronto.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
- June 24-27 SHAFR's 24th annual conference will meet at Princeton. Local Arrangements chair: Eileen Scully, Princeton.
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.
- November 1 Deadline, materials for December *Newsletter*.
- November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
- November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
- November 15 Deadline for SHAFR summer conference proposals.
- November 15 Deadline for Myrna F. Bernath research fellowship proposals.

2000

- January 6-9 114th annual meeting of the AHA in Chicago.

Mail four copies of complete AHA 2000 proposals to: Claire Moses, 2102 Woods Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742-4525. The deadline for submissions is **February 15, 1999**. Materials can be found on the web: click on "annual meeting" at <http://chnm.gmu.edu/aha>

The AHA will meet in Boston, January 4-7, 2001.

The Adam's Mark Hotel in St. Louis will be the site for the March 30-April 2, 2000 OAH. A model for the cover sheet required for all submissions is found on page 10 of the August 1998 *OAH Newsletter*. There is no address included but the Program Committee co-chairs are: Donna Gabaccia, University of North Carolina at Charlotte and Bruce Laurie, University of Massachusetts at Amherst. The deadline for program submissions is **January 15, 1999**.

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976, respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and Myrna F. Bernath, in memory of their son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

DESCRIPTION: This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of the history of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations.

ELIGIBILITY: The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are

included. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works which are representative of social science disciplines other than history are *not* eligible.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contribution to scholarship. Winning books should have interpretative and analytical qualities of high levels. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should be examples of careful organization and distinguished writing. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination and should be sent to: David Wilson, Department of History, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale IL 62901-4519.

Books may be sent at any time during 1998, but should not arrive later than February 1, 1999.

The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the committee. The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition which meets the standards of excellence established for the prize. The 1998 award of \$2,000.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians' annual meeting in Spring, 1999.

RECENT WINNERS:

1993 Elizabeth Cobbs	1996 Robert Buzzanco
1994 Tim Borstelmann	1997 Carolyn Eisenberg
1995 James Hershberg	
Reinhold Wagnleitner	

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

DESCRIPTION: The Bernath Lecture Prize seeks to recognize and encourage excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. Prize-winners normally deliver their lecture at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH. The lecture is to be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address and is to address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The award is \$500, with publication of the lecture in *Diplomatic History*.

ELIGIBILITY: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or any other member of any established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

PROCEDURES: Nominations, in the form of a short letter and *curriculum vita*, should be sent directly to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter requires evidence of excellence in teaching and research and must reach the Committee no later than 15 February 1999. The Chairperson of the Committee is: Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, History, San Diego State U., 5500 Campanile Dr., San Diego, CA 92182-8147.

RECENT WINNERS:

1992 H.W. Brands
1993 Larry Berman
1994 Diane Kunz

1995 Thomas Schwartz
1996 Douglas Brinkley
1997 Elizabeth Cobbs

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to any article or essay appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations that is published during 1998. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or, if more than 40 years of age, must be within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of acceptance for publication. The article or essay must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

PROCEDURES: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* shall be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR by January 15, 1999. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted to the chairperson of the committee: Gordon Chang, Department of History, Stanford University, Stanford CA, 94305-2024. The award is given at the SHAFR luncheon held in conjunction with the OAH annual meeting.

RECENT WINNERS:

1992 Marc Gallicchio
1993 Daniel P. O'C. Greene
1994 Frederick Logevall

1995 Heike Bungert
1996 David Fitzsimons
1997 Robert Vitalis

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

This grant has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some of the expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations.

Requirements are as follows:

1. The dissertation must deal with some aspect of United States foreign relations.
2. Awards are given to help defray costs for dissertation research.
3. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all other requirements for the doctoral degree.
4. Applications, in triplicate, must include:
 - (a) applicant's vita;
 - (b) a brief dissertation prospectus focusing on the significance of the thesis (2-4 pages will suffice);
 - (c) a paragraph regarding the sources to be consulted and their value;
 - (d) an explanation of why the money is needed and how, specifically, it will be used; and
 - (e) a letter from the applicant's supervising professor commenting upon the appropriateness of the applicant's request. (This should be sent separately to the selection committee chair.)
5. One or more awards may be given. Generally awards will not exceed \$1000.
6. The successful applicant must file a brief report on how the funds were spent not later than eight months following the presentation of the award (i.e., normally by the following September).

Applications should be sent to: Frederick W. Marks III, 112-20 72nd Drive, Forest Hills, NY 11375. The deadline is November 1, 1998.

RECENT WINNERS:

1993 R. Tyler Priest
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1995 Amy L.S. Staples
1996 David Fitzsimons
1997 D'Arcy M. Brissman

The Myrna F. Bernath Book and Fellowship Awards

A prize award of \$2,500.00 to be offered every two years (apply in odd-numbered years) for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Books published in 1998 and 1999 will be considered

in 2000. Submission deadline is November 15, 1999. Five copies of each book (or page proofs) must accompany a letter of application. Contact: Katherine Sibley, History Dept., St. Joseph's University, 5600 City Ave., Philadelphia, PA 19131.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

1991 Diane Kunz and Betty Unterberger
1996 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker

An award of \$2500 (apply in even-numbered years), to research the study of foreign relations among women scholars. The grants are intended for women at U.S. universities as well as for women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and newly finished Ph.D's. The subject-matter *should be historically based* and concern American foreign relations or aspects of international history, as broadly conceived. Work on purely domestic topics will not be considered. Applications should include a letter of intent and three copies of a detailed research proposal of no more than 2000 words. Send applications to: Katherine Sibley, Department of History, St. Joseph's University, Philadelphia, PA 19131. Submission deadline is November 15, 2000.

RECENT WINNERS:

1992	Shannon Smith	1997	Deborah Kisatsky
1994	Regina Gramer		Mary Elise Savotte
	Jaclyn Stanke		
	Christine Skwiot		

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Society of Historians for American Foreign Relations is pleased to invite applications from qualified doctoral candidates whose dissertations are in the field of the history of American foreign relations. This fellowship is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Qualified applicants will have satisfactorily completed comprehensive doctoral examinations before April 1999, leaving only the dissertation as the sole, remaining requirement for the doctoral degree.

Applicants should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The prospectus (8-12 pages, double

spaced) should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, chief source materials, and historiographical significance of the project. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date is required. as well as three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one from the director of the applicant's dissertation.

Applications and supporting papers should be sent before April 15, 1999 to: Elizabeth McKillen, History Dept., 5774 Stevens Hall, University of Maine, Orono ME 04469-5774.

Holt Memorial Fellowships carry awards of \$2000, \$1500, and \$1000. Announcements of the recipients will be made at the Society's annual summer meeting. At the end of the fellowship year the recipient of the fellowships will be required to report to the Committee relating how the fellowship was used. A version of the report of the first-place winner will subsequently be published in the *SHAFR Newsletter*.

RECENT WINNERS:

1994 Christian Ostermann	1998 (1st) Christopher Endy
1995 John Dwyer	(2nd) Richard Wiggers
1996 Philip E. Catton	(3rd) Xiaodong Wang
1997 Max Friedman	

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD: The Graebner prize will be awarded to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older. The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

- (a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;
- (b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;
- (c) describes the candidate's career, lists any teaching honors and awards, and comments on the candidate's classroom skills; and
- (d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Chairman: Chester Pach, History Department, Ohio University, Athens OH 45701.
The deadline for nominations is March 1, 1999.

RECENT WINNERS:

1988 Alexander DeConde
1990 Richard W. Leopold
1992 Bradford Perkins

1994 Wayne Cole
1996 Walter LaFeber
1998 Robert Ferrell

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

The award will be made every other year at the SHAFR summer conference. The next award will be for books published in 1997 and 1998. Deadline for submissions is February 1, 1999. Current Chairperson: David F. Schmitz, Department of History, Whitman College, Walla Walla WA 99362.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1987 Harold Josephson
1988 Melvin Small
1991 Charles DeBenedetti and
Charles Chatfield

1993 Thomas Knock
1995 Lawrence S. Witner

**ARTHUR LINK PRIZE
FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING**

The inaugural Arthur S. Link Prize For Documentary Editing was awarded at the American Historical Association meeting in December 1991. The prize will be offered hereafter whenever appropriate but no more often than every three years. Eligibility is defined by the following excerpt from the prize rules.

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. The award is \$500 plus travel expenses to the professional meeting where the prize is presented. For all rules and details contact the committee chair. One copy of each entry should be sent directly to each member of the committee. Current Chairperson: Mary Giunta, NHPRC - Room 300, National Archives, Washington DC 20408.

PREVIOUS WINNERS 1991 Justus Doenecke
 1996 John C.A. Stagg

THE LAWRENCE GELFAND - ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office. Contact: Professor Allan Spetter, SHAFR Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Department of History, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

ROBERT H. FERRELL BOOK PRIZE

This is competition for a book, published in 1998, which is a history of American Foreign Relations, broadly defined, and includes biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents

are not eligible. The prize of \$1,000 is to be awarded as a senior book award; that is, any book beyond the first monograph by the author. The deadline for submission of books is February 1, 1999.

Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Current chairperson: James E. Miller, 132 13th St. SE., Washington DC 20003.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

1992 David Anderson and Diane Kunz	1996 Norman Saul
1994 Mel Leffler	1997 Robert Schulzinger
1995 John L. Harper	

NATIONAL HISTORY DAY AWARD

SHAFR has established an award to recognize students who participate in the National History Day (NHD) program in the area of United States diplomatic history. The purpose of the award is to recognize research, writing, and relations to encourage a better understanding of peaceful interactions between nations. The award may be given in any of the NHD categories. For information contact: Cathy Gorn, Executive Director, National History Day, 0119 Cecil Hall, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742

The SHAFR Newsletter

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

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EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS: Heather White and Sara Wilkerson.

BACK ISSUES: The *Newsletter* was published annually from 1969 to 1972, and has been published quarterly since 1973. Copies of many back numbers of the *Newsletter* may be obtained from the editorial office for \$2.00 per copy (for members living abroad, the charge is \$3.00).

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION: The *Newsletter* solicits the submission of personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered or published upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, *et al.* Papers and other submissions should be typed and the author's name and full address should be noted. The *Newsletter* accepts and encourages submissions on IBM-formatted 3½" diskettes. A paper submitted in WordPerfect is preferred. A hardcopy of the paper should be included with the diskette. The *Newsletter* goes to the printer on the 1st of March, June, September, and December; all material submitted for publication should arrive at least four weeks prior.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

1968 Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)	1983 Ernest R. May (Harvard)
1969 Alexander DeConde (CA-Santa Barbara)	1984 Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State)
1970 Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)	1985 Warren F. Kuehl (Akron)
1971 Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)	1986 Betty Unterberger (Texas A&M)
1972 Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)	1987 Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut)
1973 Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)	1988 Lloyd Gardner (Rutgers)
1974 Bradford Perkins (Michigan)	1989 George Herring (Kentucky)
1975 Armin H. Rappaport (CA-San Diego)	1990 Michael Hunt (North Carolina)
1976 Robert A. Divine (Texas)	1991 Gary Hess (Bowling Green)
1977 Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)	1992 John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio)
1978 Akira Iriye (Chicago)	1993 Warren Kimball (Rutgers-Newark)
1979 Paul A. Varg (Michigan State)	1994 Melvyn Leffler (Virginia)
1980 David M. Pletcher (Indiana)	1995 Robert Dallek (UCLA)
1981 Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State)	1996 Mark Gilderhus (Colorado State)
1982 Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa)	1997 Emily Rosenberg (Macalester)