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Page

- 1 The Perkins-Bemis Interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine Questioned by Harold E. Bergquist
- 12 Review Essay by Jonathan Nielson
- 26 Across Siberia by Train: Advice for the Scholar/Traveler by Mary Hanneman
- 33 The Bradley University Berlin and Germany Seminar by William Brinker
- 35 Report on the Conference on Soviet-American Relations, 1945-1950 by William Taubman and John Lewis Gaddis
- 38 Announcements
- 43 Publications
- 45 Calendar
- 47 Awards and Prizes

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PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly Newsletter; Diplomatic History, a journal; and the occasional Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects.

THE PERKINS-BEMIS INTERPRETATION
OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE QUESTIONED

by

Harold E. Bergquist
(Winchester, MA)

In referring to the Perkins-Bemis interpretation about the immediate origins of the Monroe Doctrine of December 2, 1823, I essentially mean the interpretations forwarded in Dexter Perkins' book, The Monroe Doctrine 1823-1826, first published in 1927, and the ones expounded in the relevant sections of two works by Samuel Flagg Bemis, namely, in his John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy, first published in 1949, in Bemis' A Short History of American Foreign Policy and Diplomacy, a work completed in the late 1950s that is a condensation of the 4th, or 1955, edition of his Diplomatic History of the United States.

In questioning these two men's interpretations I shall be more concerned with nuances, emphases, and shadings than with their specific treatments, but I shall also deal with the latter as well.

In these works both historians explicitly maintain, or imply, that the Monroe Doctrine was more defensive than offensive in nature; that economic causes had secondary importance in its formulation in comparison to strategic and ideological ones; that the Monroe Doctrine was directed primarily against the Holy Allies and, therefore, to a lesser degree against England; that the Doctrine arose from actual European military threats to the independence of former, or of potential, colonial dependencies in the Americas; and that the Doctrine reaffirmed American isolationism and noninterference in strictly European affairs.

I don't question all these points. I even admit to their partial validity and, for some of them, to their preponderant validity.

I think the possible existence of a military threat to the Americas from the continental European powers was a true and real anxiety in the minds of some major American foreign policy makers in late 1823, when the principles of the Doctrine were formulated and/or proclaimed in President Monroe's State of the Union Message.

This apprehension was inspired mostly from a knowledge in Washington of George Canning's overture in the summer of 1823 to Richard Rush, the American minister to England. England's Foreign Secretary then wanted to issue a joint Anglo-American statement on Latin America which he felt would serve as a warning to the Holy Allies not to interfere by force in Latin America. This concern in Washington was also inspired by France's successful invasion of Spain in 1823 to restore Ferdinand VII to absolute authority, and by two notes from the Russian minister to the United States, one note explaining that Tsar Alexander I would not receive any diplomatic agent from any new Latin American country, and the other praising the success of the French invasion of Spain and the reason for which it was undertaken.

When Monroe wrote to Thomas Jefferson on October 17, 1823, to solicit Jefferson's advice about whether the United States should accede to Canning's proposal, Monroe stated:

I transmit to you two despatches which were received from Mr. Rush....They contain two letters from Mr. Canning, suggesting designs of the Holy Alliance, against the Independence of South America, & proposing a co-operation, between Great Britain & the United States, in support of it, against the members of that alliance.

My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of the British government & to make it known, that we would view an interference on the part of the European powers, and especially an attack on the Colonies, by them, as an attack on ourselves, presuming that, if they succeeded with them, they would extend it to us.

The published journals of John Quincy Adams, then the American Secretary of State, abundantly provide evidence that at least both President Monroe and Secretary of War John C. Calhoun worried about the possibility, or even about the likelihood, of an allied invasion of Latin America, one that we now know was unlikely, due primarily to not only American but especially to British opposition to one, as well as to the mixed or uncertain attitudes among the Holy Allies about one.

Adams wrote in his journal entry for November 13, 1823,

The President is yet altogether unsettled...as to the answer to be given to Mr. Canning's proposal, and alarmed far beyond anything I could conceive possible, with the fear that the Holy Alliance are about to restore immediately all South America to Spain....I never saw more indecision in him.

In Adams' journal for November 15, a day on which there was a cabinet meeting, he wrote, "Calhoun is perfectly moon-struck by the surrender of Cadiz, and says the Holy Allies, with ten thousand men, will restore all Mexico and all South America to the Spanish dominion."

Moreover, it was far from unprecedented for the European powers to send armed expeditions to the Americas for hostile purposes, as Spain was then doing in 1823; as England had done during the Revolutionary War and during the War of 1812; and as the French had done under Napoleon. It should not be unexpected that we should now think that American political leaders in 1823 would really be apprehensive about such a contingency.

So, in 1823, American policy makers and close advisors to the President, apart from at least John Quincy Adams, believed that an actual allied invasion of Latin America was a real possibility, and, that, therefore, the Monroe Doctrine was, in part, a defensive one, as Professors Bemis and Dexter Perkins maintain. The Doctrine was truly a response to a perceived menace.

Yet, the Doctrine was also offensive, and it was that largely, although not entirely, due to the influence of John Quincy Adams, who among Monroe's closest advisors was the one least apprehensive of an allied invasion of Latin America, from knowing England's aversion to one from Rush's despatches, and from knowing the greatness of the importance to England of the newly opened Latin American market. Adams was the major force which resulted in the United States not making the kind of joint statement that Canning had wanted.

But, also, since Adams was Monroe's adviser and the least apprehensive of an invasion, he was also slow to accept the nonintervention principle, that important component of the Monroe Doctrine which states that the United States would regard as an unfriendly act to itself any attempt of the European powers (apart from Spain in her former colonies--and apart from Portugal in Brazil) to interpose themselves by force to oppress the newly independent countries of Latin America.

Adams had come to accept this principle late in November, 1823, not because he thought such an invasion likely but because he thought that if the United States did not come to the aid of Latin America, by public and diplomatic statements, England would remain as the sole non-Latin American defender of Latin America against the Holy Allies.

At a cabinet meeting on November 15 Adams had held, according to his own testimony, that neither the United States, England, nor the Holy Allies had a right to "dispose" of the Latin American countries, but at the final two cabinet meetings before December 2, held on November 25 and 26, he had thought otherwise.

The Monroe administration had also by the end of November, 1823, adopted a policy of unilaterally interfering in Latin American affairs whenever necessary. Rush was instructed then, in Adams' words, that

American affairs, whether of the northern or of the southern continent, can, henceforth, not be

excluded from the interference of the United States. All questions of policy relating to them have a bearing so direct upon the rights and interests of the United States themselves, that they cannot be left at the disposal of European powers, animated and directed, exclusively, by European principles and interests.

Not morality alone, not putting things "to a test of right and wrong," such as Adams had recommended doing at the November fifteenth cabinet meeting, but what seemed to be in the national self-interest of the United States, this too would thereafter determine American policy towards Latin America, even if it meant interfering in its affairs.

One does not find this quotation from Rush's instructions in either Bemis' biography of John Quincy Adams or in Perkins' 1927 book. In his biography, Bemis also does not explain Adams' altered view in November, 1823, about the importance of Latin America to the United States and that Adams had finally thought that Latin America had to be fully, not weakly, included in the American system, from which European influence ought to be excluded as soon as possible, and included not almost entirely through diplomatic notes, however vigorously written. Nor does that biography reveal that Adams, while still not anticipating an invasion, is more concerned with warding off one diplomatically than he was before the end of November, 1823.

By the end of the cabinet discussions in late November, the Monroe administration, including Adams, had also decided to instruct Rush not to urge the English to recognize diplomatically any of the new Latin American nations, the essential precondition which Rush had previously imposed on Canning before agreeing, without instructions, to make the joint declaration Canning had sought, and which Canning had failed to get because he then couldn't agree to this precondition. In late November, 1823, the Monroe administration had decided to take advantage of this British refusal to grant immediate recognition and thereby temporarily to increase its popularity over

the British among the Latin Americans with whom the United States did already have formal diplomatic relations. The removal of this precondition also made easier American cooperation with England, if that too became necessary.

This new American tactic does not seem very defensive. A defensive act is a response to a prior, instigating aggressive, if not hostile, one. But the decision not to urge the British to recognize any of the Latin American countries was not defensive. To do the opposite, to seek British accordance with the American recognition policy, an accordance which the American government knew was inevitable, in order to have a greater guarantee of British support for the defense of Latin American independence, does seem defensive, or, certainly, not to be offensive towards England. The conditional rejection of the British proposal for a joint declaration and the effort to weaken British power in Latin America does not seem defensive. They seem aggressive.

Of course, Rush's instructions and the attempt to weaken British influence and sway in Latin America are not the Monroe Doctrine but they are concomitants of it and reflect the spirit of the administration's thinking at the end of the period of deliberation that resulted in the Doctrine. The noncolonization principle, on the other hand, which is also a major component of the Doctrine, is certainly of an offensive nature.

This principle was not discussed at any of the October-November, 1823, cabinet meetings, having previously emanated in the summer of 1823 from Adams' efforts to deal with the conflicting views of Russia and the United States about their respective limits and rights along the Northwest Coast of North America. This dispute arose in order, from the American side, to keep open that coast for American traders and fishermen, most of whom came from New England.

The linkage between economic interest and the non-colonization principle is quite apparent. Even Dexter Perkins, who unduly deprecates the importance of

economic factors in the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine, wrote in his 1927 book, "He [John Quincy Adams] was thinking...primarily of the commercial interests of the United States....The principle of non-colonization has a certain affinity with the principle of the open door....It was based on immediate economic factors."

But if this principle emanated from a Russo-American disagreement, the principle was stated in such a way that it could apply to all European powers with ambitions to colonize further in the western hemisphere. It stated that no European power--including, by implication, England--and not just Russia, could acquire further colonies in North and South America. It stated, "The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."

It should also be recalled that the 1820s was a period of declining mercantilism, that colonial system of the three preceding centuries which granted a monopoly market to each imperial power in its colonies. The United States sought to destroy this system, so it could expand not only territorially in North America but, through commerce and trade, could enter into former or existing colonial areas. The United States sought to prevent European powers from acquiring such American territories in which they could either monopolize or enjoy commercial advantages and privileges.

However, the motives for the noncolonization principle were not only economic but strategic. Like many offensive acts the noncolonization principle also had a defensive function, that of retarding the expansion of potentially hostile and unsympathetic powers from obtaining new American territories.

Thus, the noncolonization principle had economic causes as well as noneconomic ones. Even the nonintervention principle, which implied, and possibly entailed, military collaboration with England, had

both. Surely it was in the United States's interest to have both friendly countries and free markets in Latin and North America, instead of possibly closed or limited markets and unfriendly neighbors.

So, for both security and economic reasons the Monroe Doctrine in its entirety was directed against all of Europe, including England, even though it had bound within it potential military collaboration with England.

President Monroe wrote to John Quincy Adams on June 9, 1824, that only an actual invasion of the Holy Allies against Latin America could bring about a United States entanglement with Great Britain.

A further insight into Monroe's mind in December, 1823, can be obtained from his letter to ex-President Jefferson, both written and sent shortly after December 2, 1823, a letter which Bemis does not cite in his biography of John Quincy Adams, although Perkins does in his 1927 book. In the letter Monroe explained why he had not agreed to make a joint declaration with England, as both Jefferson and ex-President Madison had previously recommended. Monroe explained that if the United States did make a joint warning statement with England against the Holy Allies, it would be repugnant to the Holy Allies, whose friendship, particularly Russia's, the United States did not want to forsake, and which might happen, if it made such a statement. Monroe further explained that the threat of such an Anglo-American concert might induce Russia to desist from attempting to organize an invasion, owing to Russia's abhorrence of a connection between England and the United States or harmony in policy.

Thus, while the United States shared with England a common interest in preserving Latin American independence, it did so, in large part, for competitive reasons, which made it desirable for the United States to maintain friendly relations with the Holy Allies, and particularly with Russia the Holy Allies' most powerful member, the one which, apart from the conflict of interest along the Northwest

Coast, had virtually no other persistent complaint with the United States, and which, like the United States, had constant and regular run-ins with the British.

Indeed, it would not be too far-fetched to characterize the relationship that existed between Russia and the United States during the period from at least 1803 (when consular relations between the two countries began in St. Petersburg) to 1867 (when Russia sold Alaska to the United States for the sum of 67.2 million) as being one of an entente. The word entente does not suggest a complete absence of conflicts of interest or of diplomatic disputes between two nations and of their central governments. Entente does imply a minimum of both kinds of troubles and also a willingness of both central governments to mitigate and to settle amicably such differences when they do arise, owing largely to their common apprehension of a powerful third power, in this case, England.

Shortly after the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine (which was not then yet called that), Russia concluded a convention with the United States that for ten years quieted the Northwest Coast dispute, and tacitly recognized the validity of the noncolonization principle. This convention tacitly did this in that Russia made no further territorial claims in America after her North American boundaries were fixed--not only by the 1824 convention with the United States but by her 1825 convention with England. In 1825 Tsar Alexander I also forewent encouraging Spain to attempt to recover by force its former Latin American colonies, at the United States's request, and thereby also tacitly recognized the nonintervention principle.

Moreover, Adams' Memoirs and Monroe's correspondence show a strong desire not to offend Tsar Alexander, or not to offend him too greatly, even if, ironically, the Monroe administration was advocating principles and policies contrary to his. A case in point is Monroe's December, 1823, letter to Jefferson already mentioned. Adams, for example, at the November 26th cabinet meeting wrote he then said, "I...,having,

while residing at his Court, witnessed the many acts of friendship for the United States of the Emperor Alexander,...had formed sentiments of high respect for his character, and even a personal attachment to him."

Yet Dexter Perkins, who correctly wrote, "there was really no European power more kindly disposed towards the United States than the great empire of the slavs," also wrote that in the fall of 1823, "Calhoun and Adams and Monroe...were deeply afraid of Alexander." It is difficult to reconcile these last two statements, certainly in regard to Adams, especially since an actual allied invasion of Latin America would have to have been spearheaded by Spain and France and not by Russia.

Bemis too recognized that the friendship of the Russian court for the United States was, as he put it, "inveterate," and he, unlike Perkins, realized that the United States reciprocated that friendship, yet without fully comprehending the effects and consequences of that reciprocation.

For example, in his biography of Adams, Bemis wrote about the 1825 American demarche to end Spain's futile fighting in Latin America in this manner: "In the Old World Clay's [the American Secretary of State's] notes produced only a polite and perfunctory response. The Czar's government leisurely passed on the documents to Spain without much prompting for peace."

This statement is true as far as it goes, but it fails to consider that even this slight act had considerable consequences. It meant that any diplomatic support among the European continental powers for Spain's reconquest of Latin America had vanished forever. For Russia this action represented a great change in policy. When Henry Middleton, the American minister to Russia, had his ceremonial audience with Nicholas I in 1826 during the period of Nicholas' coronation in the Kremlin, Middleton asked Nicholas if he would cause Spain to end its hopeless contest in Latin America. Middleton reported to Washington that Nicholas "replied with vivacity, that after what his brother the late Emperor had done, & knowing his own

opinion upon that subject, I could not doubt of the language he should hold, & he understood that all we wished of him was pacific counsel."

So, the United States obtained benefits from Russo-American friendship, one of which was that the United States could more confidently oppose British imperialism. The Russo-American convention of April, 1824, was merely one of these benefits.

After that convention arrived in Washington in late July, 1824, Monroe wrote to James Madison that Russia had shown great respect for the United States in conceding so many points, particularly on navigation, in spite of his message of the previous December. To Jefferson, Monroe wrote that the convention was "all that we could have asked." And on August 4, 1824, the day the convention was announced, the National Intelligencer, the semi-official administration newspaper, praised the convention and complimented "the prudent policy of our government, which has wisely cultivated for the last ten or twelve years, the good will of the Russian government."

The Soviet scholar, S. B. Okun, has called the 1824 convention the first victory of the noncolonization principle, even if it ultimately failed to prevent Russia from acquiring sovereignty over what is today called Alaska.

England, on the other hand, refused to recognize the noncolonization principle until the end of the 19th century, and, instead, continued to colonize in the western hemisphere as much as she wanted to or could. Nowhere in either the Bemis or Perkins interpretations does one find anti-British tonal emphases. From their accounts of the origins of the Monroe Doctrine, as well as from other examples, one is led to believe that there is in 20th-century American historiography, particularly in that about American foreign relations, a bias of Anglophilia, a bias which, I think, ought to be investigated and documented. This investigation could be a suitable subject for future doctoral dissertations.

The Monroe Doctrine is a highly flexible one, lending itself to many uses, depending on circumstances. The American government in December, 1823, availing itself of the schism in the European alliance system that Canning's overture to Rush had clearly evidenced, increased rather than narrowed its foreign policy options. This was an exploitation that required great diplomatic subtlety and finesse. The Doctrine combined clear-minded self-interest with a moral concern for humanity, as have other great acts in the history of American foreign relations.

In conclusion, I would say that the Perkins-Bemis interpretation of the origins of the Monroe Doctrine emphasizes too much the defensiveness of the Doctrine, downgrades economic factors too greatly, and directs it too strongly against the Holy Allies.

Review Essay

by

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(This is another in the series of reviews of textbooks in diplomatic history. The text being reviewed is American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century by Robert D. Schulzinger (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984) -- editor.)

In his 1976 revision of a pamphlet for the American Historical Association, Professor Alexander DeConde observed that "...historians of foreign relations began questioning with new sophistication a basic assumption of their discipline, that policy makers act with logic and reasonableness..." and he affirmed that diplomatic history "...in its thematic assumptions, its interpretations, and its subject matter, has broken out of its formerly narrow political confines and is now more broadly humane than it has ever been."¹

Since then and especially within the last five years historians of American foreign relations have

confirmed Professor DeConde's appraisal with publication of well written survey histories of American foreign policy in this century. Of these in my view, Professor Robert D. Schulzinger's American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century most acutely questions the logic and reasonableness of the nation's foreign policy and reveals the eclecticism now so prominent in the field.

Robert Schulzinger has given us a discerning history of American foreign relations and diplomacy and his efforts should be applauded by his colleagues and by the informed public. Professional historians in the field will welcome confirmation, to paraphrase Thomas McCormick, that mastery has prevailed over drift, and that "lumping," otherwise known as synthesis, is in Professor Schulzinger's hands neither methodologically backward nor unsophisticated.² The informed public should welcome a discussion and analysis of American foreign relations that is both intellectually engaging and highly readable.

Schulzinger quite impressively transcends description to offer explanation and analysis but does so in an entertaining, evocative style, that skillfully weaves threads of inquiry into engaging narrative fabric. In fourteen chronologically arranged chapters, Schulzinger endeavors to answer questions he judges essential for understanding both the consistencies and the contradictions in American foreign relations between 1898-1983. Who made foreign policy decisions and how were these decisions arrived at? How did the American public and special interests shape and respond to these decisions? And, above all, what consequences derived from the mosaic of calculations, formulations, and perceptions which have comprised foreign policy pronouncements and actions?

No doubt to the relief of many of us, Schulzinger affirms that American foreign policy is not a contradiction in terms; it may be understood and explained with reference to certain fundamental beliefs and assumptions from which have effused America's approach to the world and peoples beyond its borders. Implicit in his approach is his belief that, ambiguities and

all, there exists an overarching framework behind the edifice of American foreign policy which links and places in relation to events and decisions the full range of political, economic, intellectual, bureaucratic, societal, psychological, and personal considerations that comprise the foundations of American foreign relations, and from which flows its conduct. On Schulzinger's stage the cast of characters is diverse and frequently discordant which of course explains much about the higger-mugger and entropy of American foreign policy and diplomacy.

To those familiar with Professor Schulzinger's work, his embracing of interpretive complexities and facility for penetrating judgments comes as no surprise. Professor of diplomatic history at the University of Colorado, Boulder, and Benjamin Cardozo Professor of American History at Yale, where he completed his doctorate with Gaddis Smith, Schulzinger's previous work has focussed on the intricacies of policymaking and the eclectic components embodying foreign affairs. These themes were prominent in The Making of the Diplomatic Mind and The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs, two books which were very well received.³

Of recent years the writing of diplomatic history has assumed considerable attention, invigorated by debates over the explanatory models of "corporatists," New School adherents and "particularists," and the still lively contention between revisionists and orthodox scholars.⁴ Among the eleven or so textbooks currently in print, Schulzinger's book in its tone and interpretation is temperately revisionist. It is probing and critical without being polemic or judgmental, although it is evident that Schulzinger is most approving of enlightened "realism" in the conduct of foreign affairs, and most disparaging of ideological or moral absolutes, what Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has so trenchantly characterized as "dogma."⁵ I found American Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century more disparaging than Norman Graebner's America as a World Power: A Realist Approach from Wilson to Reagan, less forgiving than Gerald A. Combs' The History of American Foreign Policy, but not as

strident, for example, as Stephen E. Ambrose's Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, covering of course a shorter period. In many of its conclusions it compares most closely with the more recent work of Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, and Kenneth J. Hagan, American Foreign Policy: A History, and the older but still important work by Alexander DeConde, A History of American Foreign Policy, Volume II: Global Power.

Readers may find Schulzinger's more consistent analytical framework, stressing American exceptionalism and balance-of-power "struggle for mastery" with Europe's major powers and after 1945 with "international communism" for preeminence and security, more persuasive than Howard Jones' less focussed analysis of the "interplay of idealism and realism" examined in The Course of American Diplomacy (xiii). While both Jones and Schulzinger illuminate the "intimate relationship" between foreign and domestic policy, Schulzinger in my judgment more instructively identifies the external sources of foreign policy generating reactive American political and economic responses at home. It is precisely the nature of American foreign policy that depreciates Professor Jones' apologia that the fundamental chaos of history renders few events "controllable," thus to some extent absolving policy makers from imposing coherence discerned from "patterns" in the historical experience. Therefore, criticism of policy makers for their failure to recognize such patterns amidst the complexity of history is, Jones alleges, "unwarrantable."

That history is complex and "rarely susceptible to simple analysis and ready solution" is well understood. However, Schulzinger confirms that naivete, arrogance, messianic ideology and petulance have persistently combined in the twentieth century to thwart a proactive American foreign policy agenda.⁶

Reference to Schulzinger's extensive and excellent bibliography confirms his command of older standard accounts and recent literature, and suggests his appreciation for revisionist and realist interpre-

tations. Still he is inclusive, noting the important contributions of nationalist (orthodox) historians, and offers throughout a balanced selection in convenient chronological subdivisions. Professionals and students alike will appreciate this historiographical essay which substantiates the vitality of the field and readily identifies its most important theoretical and interpretive currents (pp. 348-369).⁷

In his first chapter, "The Setting of American Foreign Policy," Schulzinger offers analysis of the foreign affairs environment and those proacting and reacting within it which is informed and useful for charting one's course through the invariably confusing if broadly predictable currents of American diplomacy.

Fundamentally, Schulzinger tells us, American foreign policy in this century has been the expression of "mildly prigish" ethnocentric exceptionalism underpinning complementary objectives: excluding foreign influence from the Western hemisphere while expanding American interests there and throughout the world at the expense of others (p. 1). At home and abroad a consistent expansionism (the former fueled by notions of "manifest destiny," the latter propelled by economic, geopolitical, and missionary imperialism) expanded the scope of the Monroe Doctrine to an international moral apologia for American interventionism, incomparable to baser European motives (p. 5).

Management of American foreign policy has never been the exclusive preserve of government or bureaucratic elites. A plethora of voices, querulous and combative, and emanating from a diverse spectrum of power have sought preeminence. From the White House and the State Department; to New York law offices, corporate board rooms and Wall Street; to private foundations, academe, the pulpit, and the press, have come the rhetoric and substance of the nation's foreign affairs.

Yet for all their discordance, these "actors" and "opinion molders" defined the "limits of acceptable or responsible debate over foreign policy in the United States" (p. 10). Public disagreements over ends and

means, conflicts between proponents of internationalism and isolationism, arguments between "idealists" and "realists," obscured but never eclipsed a deeper consistency and near unanimity of opinion on fundamentals. Thus contemplation of foreign affairs as the exclusive province of "mature minds," the myth of American exceptionalism, perceptions of real and always present dangers to "fragile" American security, and a messianic ideology of mission or divine purpose, were distinctively shared intrinsic values (p.11).

Historically from such requisite assumptions, currents of American foreign policy ebbed and flowed, retreating into self-serving isolation, advancing into magnanimous if never quite selfless internationalism. To the quest for advantage abroad, always conditioned by struggles for advantage at home, was added missionary self-righteousness attributable either to "nationalistic exuberance" or to Puritan legacy. Whichever, Americans assumed the right to impose their will on others and "serenely sure of the harmony of their society," their diplomats sought to make America the "balance wheel of the international system" (p. 12).

Withal Americans' ideological perception of their own society and culture bred naivete and arrogance in their relations with others, provoking unexpected anger and distrust. Rejection of self-defined American exceptionalism and the beneficence of Pax Americana by aspirant nationalities induced status quo reactionism and selective accommodation of self-determination. The nation born of revolution came to oppose change not in its own image while in its relations with the major powers of Europe, the United States pursued traditional balance-of-power diplomacy, filtering attitudes "through the prism of the 'special relationship' with Great Britain" (p. 14).

After 1945 the ideological struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union further narrowed myopic American foreign policy, reducing world affairs to an exclusive bi-polar contest for preeminence. The 19th century "great game" of power was now imbued with

darker hues of good and evil, where traditional stakes were overshadowed by the specter of nuclear weapons (p.14). Subsequently the post-war anti-communist consensus was itself a casualty of Vietnam and the flawed logic of international communist conspiracy, shattered with the illusion of America's omnipotence and moral transcendency. Amidst nagging doubts of America's ability to use its power wisely, torn between guilt and fear, Americans pondered an inertia born of confusion (p. 15). If, as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., avowed, "Foreign policy is the face a nation wears to the world," then America's countenance, Schulzinger suggests, has indeed been inscrutable.⁸

Thus, loosely summarized, Professor Schulzinger frames the contours of American foreign policy within the international environment of the twentieth century uniquely shaped by the national experience. In the remaining chapters, participants, issues, ideas, and interpretations are skillfully blended to explain the genesis of principal diplomatic initiatives and the resolution of foreign policy crises which multiplied in proportion to expanding American interests and deepening involvement in the world after 1900. What emerges from this amalgam is the story of remarkable transformation from "aloof neutrality" to impassioned globalism. The designs of this metamorphosis loom from the national experience in the nineteenth century to dominate the twentieth.

The new century witnessed a "catapulting" of the United States to world power and overseas adventurism compelled by a half-century of expansionism. Culminating in the war with Spain in 1898, this great burst of imperialism, whether "sinister conspiracy," "great aberration," or political blunder, "did not occur accidentally" (p. 18). America, Schulzinger affirms, eagerly joined the competitive world of international relations, exhilarated by the rhetoric of the imperialists yet reticent to acquire the traditional "responsibilities of empire." The solution of course was "informal empire," the "fair field and no favor" principle enshrined with promulgation of the "Open Door" in the Far East (p. 21). Condemned by Chinese and Europeans as "self-serving,"

"hypocritical," "jackal diplomacy," the Open Door was expanded by Theodore Roosevelt into a "progressive" foreign policy embracing "nationalism, moralism, racism, social Darwinism, uplift, and social planning" (p. 24). Whether "peacemaker in a bellicose age" or "bombastic nationalist," Roosevelt's grand strategy was to make the United States "A Great Power Everywhere" (p. 35). By interpreting the Monroe Doctrine as universal writ, appointing America "the policeman of the West" in 1904, an "honest broker" in the Far East in 1905, and an interventionist "mediator" in Europe in 1906, Roosevelt embodied America's insatiable ambition. The progression was breathtaking. The design was calculated: creation of an American-dominated "predictable world order" (p. 38).⁹ In the 370 pages which follow, Schulzinger dismantles the edifice of American power erected on this blueprint, revealing where its architects strengthened or weakened their handiwork. From the jumble of its frequently ill-fitted and mis-assembled components, master builders and apprentices alike fashioned a colossus for which form truly followed function, its incongruities notwithstanding. Indeed as Schulzinger demonstrates, the contradictions in American foreign policy have been less compelling than its affirmation.

Wilson, whether an ally of the "Merchants of Death," "excessive legalist," "higher realist," or "liberal-Capitalist-internationalist," changed the course of American foreign policy for the rest of the century and, ironically, stripped away the gloss of American exceptionalism. "Americans were no longer special" (p. 81).¹⁰ Exposed but not chastened, the United States presumed to shape the post-war settlement; Wilson embarked for Paris on a "mission to remake world politics" (p. 104). Once there, however, not only did Wilson's "coarseness of mind" put him at a severe disadvantage in negotiations with Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando, but it soon became clear that the peace would indeed be one of victors and vanquished and retribution (p. 110).

Hoover is portrayed as a man of great managerial skills who failed utterly to manage the "diplomacy of depression" and was overwhelmed by a combination of

international economic collapse, chaos at home, and military crisis in the Far East. The result was "paralysis" (p. 147). The Hoover-Stimson Doctrine was futile. Bryan-Wilson moralism revealed the impuissance of the Washington Treaty System, and the war debt moratorium pronounced with great fanfare by Hoover and allowed to lapse by the incoming Roosevelt administration was moribund (p. 150).

He portrays FDR as a reluctant realist, accomodating economic and strategic arguments of experts like Stanley Hornbeck, for example, to reach a modus vivindi with Stalin.¹⁵ Domestic politics and isolationism merged in the Neutrality Laws of 1935-37, and in FDR's reluctance to involve the United States in the Spanish Civil War, bowing to pressure from the Western democracies and conservative Catholics at home, is revealed the deep ambiguity of his policies.

Careful not to "get in front of public opinion," FDR acted forcefully only upon learning of the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, while at the same time manipulating public opinion by a systematic campaign to undermine "America firsters," and exaggerating the immediate danger to national security to forge a consensus for war (p. 165). From the fall of 1939, FDR inexorably moved the nation toward war through secret diplomacy and overt provocation of Germany in the North Atlantic. By August 1941, he sought only an "incident" by which to justify a declaration of war; the causus belli of course was provided by Japan, not Germany.¹¹

Roosevelt personally assumed control of foreign policy during the war, diplomacy predicated upon American domination of the wartime coalition and presumed "leadership of a stable, predictable postwar world" (p. 186). The latter objective preoccupied FDR beginning in 1943; he patronized Churchill and "befriended" Stalin, to leverage the United States into positions of advantage at the expense of both. Moreover, he prevented Germany's dismemberment by opposing the Morgenthau Plan while at the same time endorsing the Treasury secretary's scheme for the

American-led international monetary order established at Bretton Woods.¹²

Roosevelt's successor, Harry Truman, armed with "a sense of American invincibility" proffered by exclusive possession of the bomb, attempted to intimidate Stalin at Potsdam but only assured that the conference would be the last such meeting of the Grand Alliance; discord became disarray. Subsequently Greece and Turkey provided the "opportunity to throw down the gauntlet to Moscow" (p. 208). The "Truman Doctrine," the policy of containment and the Marshall Plan became principal weapons in "an American-led crusade against revolution" and Soviet expansionism.¹³

By 1947, the United States had reconciled to the reality of a divided continent, conceding Eastern Europe to Soviet control and "linking the fortunes of Western Europe firmly to the United States" (p. 210). To insure public support for American globalism, Truman exploited self-generated fears of communist conspiracy at home to "frighten the public into support for a forward foreign policy" (p. 211).

Dwight Eisenhower took office vowing to "clean up the mess in Washington," selecting a "right-wing...apocalyptic-savoring...sour-tempered...mean-spirited...self-promoter," John Foster Dulles, as his secretary of state (p. 233). However, despite high hopes, the Eisenhower foreign policy bore "few fruits," and only superficially altered Truman's foreign policy agenda.

With promulgation of the "Eisenhower Doctrine," the president moved firmly within the anti-communist consensus "to use fear of the Soviet Union to gain his foreign policy objectives" (p. 252). The 1958 Lebanese civil war provided a "convenient arena" for employing the new doctrine, and United States Marines, not for the last time, waded ashore at Beirut to look for communists, astounding sunbathers but also coercing the new Iraqi government to eschew the UAR and accommodate Western oil interests.

Schulzinger demonstrates how, between 1961 and 1968, "American hopes to shape world events" soared and then

sunk as Democratic administrations applied lavishly global theories without reference to costs, and in the process tore apart the post-war foreign policy consensus and discovered the "limits of American power" (p. 259). The compulsion to take command and replace "lethargy" with vigor, for example, dominated the Kennedy presidency. Assuming the reins of foreign policy, Kennedy turned to "action intellectuals," "hard-headed realists and adoring cold-warrior lieutenants," to apply elaborate strategic and economic strategies, supportive of the president's call for American intervention around the world.

Beginning in 1962, South Vietnam lured American military, government, and academic experts to Southeast Asia to test theories of counterinsurgency and "democratic nation building." Kennedy, obsessed by fears of "losing" another country to communism, eschewed "tough-minded realism" and "indulged in the most insipid sort of wishful thinking" (p. 272).¹⁴

With "deep insecurities" about his grasp of foreign policy and sensitive to Republican criticism, Lyndon Johnson welcomed the Tonkin Gulf incident as pretext for a "dramatic gesture" against enemies at home and abroad, only later confessing that it was "the dumbest thing" he had ever done (p. 274).

President Nixon entered the White House with "no secret plan" to end the war, but he recognized that America's "excessive commitments" in Southeast Asia endangered the NATO alliance, and that withdrawal would offer "greater maneuverability in a competitive world" (p. 290).

The election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 was in part attributable to his pledge to terminate flamboyant, erratic, "Lone Ranger" foreign policy, and to return to principles of morality and multilateralism (p. 314).¹⁵ Carter moved boldly to implement the new style which was, however, more easily pronounced than realized. His advocacy of human rights was "ridden with inconsistencies" and compromised by "old ideas" of national security (p. 318).

Indeed, affirms Schulzinger, the Carter administration, despite its rhetoric about moving beyond irrational fears of communism, escalated confrontational policies toward the Soviets, reflecting principally the imprimatur of National Security Advisor Brzezinski, "'the first Pole in 300 years in a position to stick it to the Russians'" (p. 327). Unimpressed, Republican conservatives and others mocked Carter's "splendid vacillation" and asked if the president was "'capable of walking a dog and returning with the same animal'" (p. 338). The presidential election of 1980 occurred amidst return of the Cold War.

Certain of his compass and direction, Reagan pursued nostalgia on several fronts. Preoccupied with "recapturing a past American predominance which never existed," the Reagan foreign policy suffered from an absence of a "realistic appreciation of the relative decline in the nation's capacity to influence others, the changed economic environment, the cries of the poor for economic adjustment, the dangers of an untrammelled arms race, and the irrelevance of old Cold War themes..." (p. 347). Thus uneasy about their government's intentions and fearful of Soviet nationalism, perplexed Americans warily surveyed a dangerous world, "startled" by assertive peoples and unnerved by a foreign policy endemically reactive and mired in the "Diplomacy of Nostalgia."

Arguably in such selective synthesis distortion is inevitable. However, I have attempted, by discerning reference and by drawing on Professor Schulzinger's conclusions relative to major historical foreign policy issues, to convey the breadth and interpretive tone of American Diplomatic History in the Twentieth Century. Undoubtedly, others will draw their own inferences. One hopes that in a second edition the numerous textual and typographical errors, atypical of Oxford University Press, will be eliminated, and that Professor Schulzinger will expand the narrative to survey more recent events and to offer deeper analysis of the Reagan foreign policy legacy.

ENDNOTES

¹I have made reference in this review essay to recently published or standard works which I have found to be especially useful for corroborating or amplifying selective points of interpretation offered by Schulzinger. These notes are in no way intended to be comprehensive, merely indicative of the literature. Alexander DeConde, American Diplomatic History in Transition, American Historical Association Pamphlet 702 (3d ed., Washington, D.C., 1976), p. 48.

²John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York, 1982), vii; and Thomas J. McCormick, "Drift or Mastery? A Corporatist Synthesis for American Diplomatic History," Reviews in American History 10 (December 1982), pp. 318-30.

³The Making of the Diplomatic Mind: The Training, Outlook, and Style of the American Foreign Service Officers, 1908-1931 (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1975); The Wise Men of Foreign Affairs: The History of the Council on Foreign Affairs (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984).

⁴For example, John Lewis Gaddis, "The Corporate Synthesis: A Skeptical View," and Michael J. Hogan, "Corporatism: A Positive Appraisal," Diplomatic History 10, no. 4 (Fall 1986), pp. 357-62, 363-72; and Jerald A. Combs, Nationalist, Realist, and Radical: The Three Views of American Diplomacy (New York: 1972).

⁵Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Cycles of American History (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1986), pp. 49-86; and from a slightly different but equally compelling perspective, Michael H. Hunt, Ideology and United States Foreign Policy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987). Schulzinger's book will compete for classroom use principally with the late Thomas A. Bailey, Diplomatic History of the American People, 10th ed., (New York: 1980); Jerald A. Combs, The History of American Foreign Policy (New York: 1986); and Thomas G. Paterson, Jr., J. Garry Clifford, and

Kenneth J. Hagan, American Foreign Policy: A History Since 1900, 2d ed., (Lexington, Mass.: 1983).

⁶Howard Jones, The Course of American Diplomacy: From the Revolution to the Present (New York: Franklin Watts, 1985); and Joseph A. Fry, "A Hefty Dose of Realism," SHAFR Newsletter 17, no. 2 (June 1986), pp. 8-11.

⁷Schulzinger's views on revisionism appeared in "Moderation in Pursuit of Truth is No Virtue; Extremism in Defense of Moderation is a Vice," American Quarterly 27, vol. 2 (1975), pp. 222-36.

⁸Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Foreign Policy and the American Character," Foreign Affairs (Fall 1983), p. 1.

⁹Instructive is Walter LeFeber, "The Evolution of the Monroe Doctrine From Monroe to Reagan," in Lloyd C. Gardner, ed., Redefining the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of William Appleman Williams (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 1986), pp. 121-43; and for Roosevelt's approach to statecraft and his ambivalence between "transcendent ideology" and moral relativism see Frank Ninkovich, "Theodore Roosevelt: Civilization as Ideology," Diplomatic History 10, no. 3 (Summer 1986), pp. 221-45.

¹⁰For a different appraisal emphasizing "Cooperation" and analysis that separates cause from purpose, see Calhoun, Power and Principle, pp. 114-51, 155-218.

¹¹Here will be noted substantial disagreement, for example, with Thomas A. Bailey and Paul B. Ryan, Hitler vs. Roosevelt: The Undeclared Naval War (New York: The Free Press, 1979) which contends that FDR nearly succeeded through limited conflict in preventing American intervention and discounts the "subtrafuge" thesis. Supportive of Schulzinger's conclusions, however, is Waldo Heinrichs, "President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Intervention in the Battle of the Atlantic, 1941," Diplomatic History 10, no. 4 (Fall 1986), pp. 311-33.

¹²Schulzinger's assessment largely agrees with that of Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-1945, 2d ed. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1985); and the older but authoritative Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

¹³The course and significance of these events is provocatively analyzed in Richard J. Barnet, The Alliance, America, Europe, and Japan: Makers of the Post War World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 15-58.

¹⁴One may read with profit, William J. Rust, A Prelude to War: Kennedy in Vietnam, American Vietnam Policy, 1960-1963 (New York: Charles Scribner's, 1985).

¹⁵Interesting are the "random reflections" of George Kennan on the subject of morality in foreign policy, "Morality and Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs 64, no. 2 (Winter 1985), pp. 205-19.

ACROSS SIBERIA BY TRAIN: ADVICE FOR THE SCHOLAR/TRAVELER

by

Mary Hanneman

Traveling to Japan for a summer of research, my husband and I decided to seek adventure and avoid at least some of the ups and downs of air travel by taking the Trans Siberian Railroad across the Soviet Union. We had an exciting and fascinating trip, but the ups and downs of travel itself were not to be completely avoided. This article is addressed to the scholar who may also choose this unusual route to Asia.

The Trans Siberian Railroad is an eight day, 5,810 mile route from Moscow to the Japan Sea port of Vladivostok. Completed in the late nineteenth century, it is the only continuous land route

connecting Moscow with the Soviet Far Eastern sea coast. After crossing the Ural Mountains and passing the stone monument marking the divide between Europe and Asia, the train moves into the sparsely settled wilderness of Siberia. Traveling for days through vast birch forests the train ascends the mountains once again, skirting the edge of Lake Baikal (the largest and deepest fresh water lake in the world) on its way to the Soviet Far East. From there, the traveler can continue his journey to China, Japan, or Korea.

The first task in arranging the trip is finding a qualified travel agent, as few travel agencies are familiar with the intricacies of travel planning in the Soviet Union. Intourist, the Soviet travel bureau with several offices in the United States, can provide a list of travel agencies specializing in travel to the Soviet Union. But don't be surprised if a number of those agencies listed no longer arrange travel to the Soviet Union, perhaps because, as we found, making such arrangements is complicated and time-consuming.

Another difficulty is finding a travel agent who can arrange independent travel to the Soviet Union. Quite a few agencies book tours, but independent travel requires more planning and a more specialized knowledge. In fact, for travelers who do not know Russian, and want to minimize the potential for travel problems, a tour seems to be the way to go. Finding a tour that fits one's needs exactly may be difficult; a tour from Moscow, for example, usually ends in Moscow, as well -- obviously not appropriate for an individual wanting to travel through the U.S.S.R. en route to Asia.

Travel for foreigners in the Soviet Union must be completely arranged in advance. Every overnight stop, every train and airplane arrival and departure must be booked and approved by Intourist before the trip begins. This takes time -- six months lead time should be adequate, including getting a visa. Individuals may arrange their own visas, but only after all travel plans have been approved. It is

easier, if slightly more costly, to have the travel agent make visa arrangements.

Payment for the trip must also be made in advance. In return for payment, the traveler will receive vouchers to be exchanged at the Intourist desk (every hotel for foreigners has an Intourist desk) for train tickets, hotel accommodations and so on. Interestingly, our travel agent gave us several xerox copies with our original voucher which were accorded as much validity as the original by the Intourist representatives. Xerox machines are a rare commodity in the Soviet Union.

As a caveat, I should note that the "pay in advance" formula is not without problems, and we encountered a major one. Due to a typographical error in the price figures on our travel voucher, the Intourist agents in our hotel in Moscow informed us that we had not paid the total due them. We replied that we had paid the full amount, and showed receipts and a checkbook record as documentation, assuming that a quick look through Intourist records would corroborate this. But lacking computers (and apparently lacking accessible, accurate records), the Intourist people had no way to check what we had told them, and insisted that we pay another \$700.00 -- payable in cash or traveler's checks, credit cards not accepted. Had we not paid, we would not have been allowed to continue our trip. Eventually, we would have been put on an Aeroflot flight back to the United States (presumably this would be the only instance in which one could pay later). Thus our only recourse was to pay, and take the matter up with our travel agent when we returned to the United States. It was a lesson in the nature of the Soviet bureaucracy.

To avoid such a situation, travelers should check figures on vouchers carefully. Also, ask for separate vouchers for each portion of the trip, as opposed to a single master voucher. Separate vouchers for each night's hotel accommodations, train tickets, and so on, will serve as itemized records, and if a problem is found, it will likely be a smaller portion of the total.

Before this snafu, our week and a half trip in the Soviet Union cost, for two, about \$1500. Hotel accommodations for foreigners are very expensive -- expect to pay between \$100 and \$150 per night for decent, but not luxurious double rooms. First-class tickets for a two-person sleeping compartment on the Trans Siberian Railway are relatively cheap at about \$400 per person. Hotel accommodations include continental breakfast, but other meals and all food on the train must be bought separately. Food, what is available, is generally modest (in both price and quality). Thus, between expensive hotels and cheap transportation and food, the expenses of the trip balance out.

Many prospective travelers to the Soviet Union have probably heard tales of Soviet customs. We flew into Warsaw and crossed the border into the Soviet Union by train, a route we realized few Americans take when the customs officials who boarded the train were unable to find declaration forms in English (but no matter, they helped us fill them out). The first question we were asked was, "Do you have any books?" We did, of course, but only light reading, having mailed our academic materials to Japan already to obviate any danger of having them confiscated by over-zealous customs agents. We had heard stories of that. Because our materials dealt with Japanese and American history having nothing to do with the Soviet Union, there is little chance they would have been confiscated. But it is best to be safe. One American woman we met en route had Hedrick Smith's The Russians confiscated at the border. I had contemplated taking Dr. Zhivago along for the long train ride, having read that Gorbachev, in his program of glasnost, had finally taken the classic off the "dangerous book" list. But I decided not to risk being half-way through the book only to have it taken away from me by an uninformed customs official.

The customs people also asked to look at any cassette or video tapes we might have. Naturally, narcotics and weapons are forbidden. It is advisable to declare any valuables, jewelry, and even wedding bands, as the Soviets are apparently on guard against valuable gifts

being given to their citizens. All money must be declared both entering and leaving the country, and theoretically the traveler is accountable for any discrepancies. Rubles cannot be taken into or out of the country.

Once in the country, whether arriving by train or plane, foreign travelers are met by an Intourist representative who by some inner radar will home in on them and hustle them off to a waiting taxi or tour bus for transport to their hotel. Upon being deposited at the hotel, the "foreign guests" are asked for their passports. The passports are then surrendered for anywhere from two to 48 hours (travelers planning on leaving the next day might politely inform the reception clerks, even though they already know), and can be picked up at a separate desk labelled "passports" before the train trip begins.

Transportation from the hotel to Moscow's Yaroslavsky station, where the Trans Siberian trip begins, is also provided by Intourist. After a few days of sightseeing in Moscow, the Trans Siberian train ride proves very relaxing indeed. Occupying a first-class compartment for two in a car with nine such compartments and a lavatory at either end, we passed the time reading, watching the scenery, and drinking glasses of hot tea that our conductress brought around three times a day.

The unhurried pace of train life provided us with our only real chance for contact with Soviet citizens. Despite the language barrier (neither of us speaks Russian, and outside of the tourist hotels, few Soviets seemed to speak English), on the train we were able to strike up "conversations" that relied heavily on body language and the Russian-English dictionaries we brought along. Recurrent themes in our conversations were that we must be extremely wealthy to be taking such a trip, but also sincere expressions of hope for friendship between our two countries.

Several times a day a person from the dining car came around with a basket of various edibles for purchase, packaged cookies, bottled juices, and sometimes tin

plates of the dining car's latest special (often stroganoff or meat stew). A trip to the dining car, however, was necessary to satisfy nutritional needs as well as one's sense of adventure. The dining car was, in its own way, a microcosm of the realities of the Soviet socialist system at work: Given a menu and allowed ample time to ruminate over the seemingly endless possibilities, the diner makes his selection and is then told what is available that day. Often, it is exactly what everyone else is having (stroganoff anyone?). The lovely full menus are a kind of sweet torture for the hungry diner, promising everything but delivering little. Of course, if one is hungry enough, one will eat anything, and perhaps this is the fundamental truth on which the Soviet government bases its Five-Year Plans.

Obviously then, eating (or not eating) can be a problem on the train. Although we were told that local vendors sold food at the ninety some stops along the way, it was rare to find food for sale on the train platforms. In fact, it was more often the case that locals came to the dining car to buy groceries from the train. One can buy groceries in Moscow before boarding the train, but for someone who does not speak Russian, grocery shopping in the Soviet Union is difficult, requiring special skills and knowledge (not to mention patience). It is advisable, therefore, to do what shopping is possible before arriving in the Soviet Union. (Although one certainly doesn't need to pack around cans of chili con carne like one American traveler we met!) But the romantic notion of being able to pick up gastronomical delights like good sausage, cheese, and bread seems to be just that: a romantic notion.

In Irkutsk, where we stopped for an overnight, the traveler can leave the Trans Siberian Railroad and board a train bound for Peking. But our journey across the Soviet Union ended in Khabarovsk, on the Amur River less than 100 miles from China. The hills of China were visible in the distance. Foreign travelers on the Trans Siberian must break their journey at Khabarovsk for a mandatory overnight. From Khabarovsk, a separate train takes foreigners to the

port of Nahodkha, rather than to Vladivostok which is the eastern terminus for Soviet travelers. Because Vladivostok is a naval installation, it is off-limits to foreigners. Due to scheduling problems, we had from the start decided to fly from Khabarovsk to Niigata, Japan, rather than take the ferry which connects Nahodkha to Yokohama and Hongkong. Niigata, on the Japan Sea coast, was the only Japanese city we could fly to from Khabarovsk. (We also had the option, Intourist brochures told us, of flying to other "major cities of the Far East," Vientiane, Pyongyang, Pnompenh, or Hochiminh City.)

Leaving the U.S.S.R., the only question we were asked by customs agents was what Soviet books we had. We had two paper booklets, both of which we had acquired "with compliments" from the reading rack on the train: "Fighting Side by Side with Spanish Patriots against Fascism," and another, less gripping work entitled, "Living Marxism: Workers of All Countries Unite." Naturally, both of these slim volumes passed muster with our customs official, and we were waved on through, without any inspection of the contents of our suitcases.

After a brief period in the waiting area, where we had a last chance to stock up on more complimentary (pun intended) Soviet literature, we were boarding the plane to Japan, having completed our trek across the Soviet Union. Lenin, in one of his myriad incarnations as a statue, waved farewell.

Suggested Readings

Scott Newby, The Big Red Train Ride, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978)

Elizabeth Pond, From the Yaroslavsky Station: Russia Perceived, (New York: Universe Books, 1984)

Paul Theroux, The Great Railway Bazaar: By Train Through Asia, (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1975)

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THE BRADLEY UNIVERSITY BERLIN AND GERMANY SEMINAR

by

William Brinker

For several summers, Lester Brune of Bradley University has arranged a seminar in Berlin and Germany. I participated in the 1987 session and wish to share some of my thoughts about the experience with SHAFR members.

The 1987 group consisted primarily of people whose interests were German language, history, and/or international relations. Presentations were given in English throughout the tour although the seminar participants ranged from fluency in German to no facility. Of course, the seminar was enriched by acquaintance with the language.

Our group of about twenty-five assembled in West Berlin at Checkpoint Charlie, hastily introduced ourselves, and began the process of crossing the barriers into East Berlin. The atmosphere while traversing those few feet encouraged making friends quickly. Once through, we boarded a bus and travelled to Erfurt. While there, we stayed at a youth hotel which proved adequate. Our travel, hotel, and meal accommodations were pre-arranged through East German officials. A guide and an interpreter accompanied us on group activities throughout East Germany. As a consequence our opportunities to meet informally with East German citizens were somewhat limited, but not impossible. While in Erfurt we toured the city itself and in the surrounding area. Our itinerary included the Wartburg Castle at Eisenach; the National Theatre and Goethe House in Weimar; and lunch at the tiny, former spa of Bad Berka. While touring, we were periodically given presentations by some local official, worker, etc. A lecture by a young man in Erfurt proved to be the most blatant party-line presentation we were to encounter.

From Erfurt we travelled, again by bus, to Dresden where we stayed for three days in the annex of a German hotel. Again, we toured various sites in the

city which still exhibits World War II ruins, most noticeable in the historic central city area. What has been restored--the Semper Opera, parts of the Zwinger museum complex, the Green Vault museum, etc.--are fascinating and elegant. Surprisingly, a lack of adequate maintenance of all but a few buildings, both new and old, is very apparent. Widespread utilization of brown coal and the presence of other air-borne pollutants has caused darkening and crumbling of buildings constructed since 1945.

We visited the Koenigstein fortress, lunched at Hohnstein, and heard presentations from or about anti-fascist resistance fighters (a most common theme in East Germany).

Enroute to East Berlin we stopped at Torgau to visit the memorial to the meeting of Russian and American troops. The mayor of Torgau spoke to the group about his role as administrator. He answered questions about how funds are made available and the role of centralized planning.

Arriving in East Berlin we were the guests of the Economic Hochschule; we stayed in their dormitories, often ate in their facilities, and had various functions there. During our five days in East Berlin we appreciated not only its size but also its color and degree of vitality. We visited historic buildings and sites in and around the city, including the memorial at Sachsenhausen, San Souci and the Cecilienhof in Potsdam, an agricultural cooperative, and a Machine-Tool Enterprise (both in suburban East Berlin). These tours included presentations by local officials. Time was allotted for individual visits to the city's attractions, including the opera, the theatre, concerts, and the various museums such as the Pergamon. For the intrepid, night life was a possibility.

The sponsors of our East German tour arranged two opportunities for us to meet socially with East Berlin academics, TV and print journalists, writers, etc. We found them to be open and helpful (and, as we expected, to be party members).

Following our East Berlin stay, we moved across the Wall to the Europäische Akademie in West Berlin and began the "seminar" portion of the trip. For five days we were treated to an assortment of German politicians, historians, and political scientists. A Hungarian newsman and a Polish foreign ministry official added a further dimension. These sessions typically were presentations by individuals or panels with responses or commentaries offered by the seminar participants.

The presentations at the Academy challenged prior assumptions and popular interpretations regarding the relationships between the two Germanies and the role of the two Germanies in European and international contexts. A West German view of European problems can be markedly different from what passes as informed opinion in the United States. Our stay in Germany was enlivened further by President Reagan's visit to West Berlin, Soviet glasnost initiatives, and the on-going arms reduction discussions.

The group arranged its own transportation from West Berlin to Bonn. At Bonn we visited the foundations (Stiftungen) associated with the various West German political parties. As these do not correspond with United States agencies, we found the visits helpful and enlightening. In general, we found reinforcement for what we discovered in West Berlin. We managed to squeeze in a day trip to Cologne.

The 1987 Bradley seminar proved exciting and rewarding.

CONFERENCE ON SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS, 1945-1950

Moscow, June 16-18, 1987

reported by

William Taubman (Amherst College) and

John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University)

In 1986 representatives of the National Committee of Soviet Historians and the International Research and Exchanges Board of the United States agreed to sponsor

a series of conferences between Soviet and American historians and political scientists on Soviet-American diplomatic relations since 1945. This was the first agreement ever between Soviet and American scholars to undertake a comprehensive joint examination of the post-World War II relationship between their two countries, based on the maximum possible use of archival and oral as well as published source materials.

The first conference in this series, dealing with the 1945-50 period, took place in Moscow on June 16-18, 1987. Ambassador George F. Kennan headed the American delegation, which included M. Steven Fish (representing Alexander George, of Stanford University), George Herring (University of Kentucky), Michael J. Hogan (Ohio State University), David Holloway (Stanford University), Deborah Welch Larson (Columbia University), Vojtech Mastny (Boston University), Ernest R. May (Harvard University), Thomas G. Paterson (University of Connecticut), as well as the two conference organizers, John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University), and William Taubman (Amherst College).

Academician S. L. Tikhvinsky, Chairman of the National Committee of Soviet Historians, headed the Soviet delegation, which included R. G. Bogdanov (Institute of the USA and Canada); A. Yu. Borisov (Moscow State Institute of International Relations); N. I. Egorova, A. M. Filotov, N. S. Ivanov, V. L. Mal'kov, and B. I. Marushkin (all of the Institute of General History); A. I. Schapiro (Institute of World Economy and International Relations); A. I. Utkin (Institute of the USA and Canada); and the Soviet conference organizer, A. O. Chubarian, Vice Chairman of the National Committee of Soviet Historians.

The conference sessions focussed on the following topics, with presentation of a Soviet and an American paper on each of them: World War II cooperation and its legacies; postwar planning; economic reconstruction; military and diplomatic strategies; nuclear weapons; crisis management; Europe as an issue

in Soviet-American relations; and perceptions and misperceptions.

Although the American delegation was most hospitably received and our discussions proceeded in a thoroughly professional manner, it rapidly became clear that substantial differences still remain in the way Soviet and American scholars treat the events of the early Cold War. Despite striking manifestations of glasnost in other areas of contemporary Soviet life, we detected no discernible tendency on the part of Soviet scholars, at least in writing, to criticize any aspect of their country's diplomacy during the period in question: the Cold War remains, for them, very much a one-sided affair, with principal responsibility for it resting almost entirely with the United States and its allies. Oral discussions, particularly when these could take place on an individual basis, produced more balanced assessments, but these have yet to find their way into print. There appear to be several reasons for this:

First, although there is now a considerable amount of discussion among Soviet scholars about the need to fill in what General Secretary Gorbachev has called the "blank pages" in Soviet history, this injunction does not appear to have been extended, as of yet, to include postwar foreign policy.

Second, Soviet scholars still lack access to, or (for those few who have such access) the authority to cite or quote from, their own Foreign Ministry and other state archives for the period in question. They are forced, accordingly, to rely heavily on public statements of policy made at the time, official histories of Soviet foreign policy, and of course the very large volume of material that has been made available from archival sources in the United States and Great Britain.

Third, Soviet scholars do not appear to have exploited, in any systematic way, the use of memoirs or oral history interviews with surviving participants in the events in question. (A significant memoir

literature exists, for example, in the field of Soviet nuclear weapons development.)

It should be emphasized, though, that our Soviet colleagues were frank in acknowledging to us the difficulties under which they work; they are hopeful as well about the possibility that, within the context of reforms now taking place, conditions for research into post-1945 foreign policy issues may soon improve.

Five more conferences in this series are to take place over the next five years, all under the co-sponsorship of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the International Research and Exchanges Board. The second one, which will cover the period 1950-55, will be held in the United States in the fall of 1988.

BONERS

The English had the best claim to the west coast of America because it was based on the marriage of Henry the VIII to Katherine of Oregon.

--Frank Merli, Queens College-CUNY

ANNOUNCEMENTS

IF CHANGING ADDRESS PLEASE NOTIFY SHAFR HEADQUARTERS

Bill Kamman's office has had a fairly large number of copies of DH returned because members did not notify them of address changes. This is costly for SHAFR. If moving please notify Bill at the following address

Professor William Kamman
Department of History
North Texas State University
Denton, TX 762-3

SHAFR LUNCHEON

SHAFR will hold its luncheon at the AHA on December 29 at 12:15 in the Wisconsin Room of the Sheraton Washington Hotel. The luncheon price is \$20.00. Please make your checks payable to SHAFR and mail by December 15 to:

SHAFR

Department of History

P.O. Box 13735

North Texas State University

Denton, TX 76203

BATTLE OF NORMANDY MUSEUM

A museum is now being constructed to memorialize the battle of Normandy and the sacrifices of the citizens of Caen and the Allies. Constructed directly above the underground post of General Richter, the Commander of the German 716th Infantry Division, the Museum will serve as a lasting symbol of Freedom and of Allied cooperation.

A documentation and research center will be built to house original historical materials including films, photographs, oral interviews and written records. This research center will be available to students and scholars from all countries.

Construction began in March 1986 and a ground-breaking ceremony took place on September 10, 1986. Completion of the Memorial and inauguration are planned for June 6, 1988.

In 1985 a non-profit corporation entitled the U.S. Committee for the Battle of Normandy Museum was established in the District of Columbia, whose purposes are:

- to provide support for the establishment, maintenance and operation of the Museum;
- to educate the American public on the military and historical significance of the Battle of Normandy;

- to encourage the establishment of a center within the Museum to provide guidance and assistance to American visitors;
- to help the Museum collect and acquire documents for the Research Center; and
- to initiate American participation at all levels, including special seminars, independent study projects, summer jobs for American college students, and joint lectures with other educational institutions.

OAH CALL FOR PAPERS, 1989

The program committee for the 1989 meeting (St. Louis) has chosen the general theme of "Consciousness and Society," and solicits proposals that address the issue of linking intellectual, cultural, and social history. For example, since 1989 will be the bicentennial of the French Revolution, the committee welcomes proposals on the **significance of the revolutionary tradition for American history.** Likewise, 1898 is a **75th anniversary of the outbreak of World War I and the 50th of the outbreak of World War II.** Proposals addressing these themes are encouraged.

The deadline for proposals is March 1, 1988.

Send two copies of proposals to Richard Fox, Program Chairman, Department of History, Reed College, Portland, OR 97202.

FELLOWSHIPS IN FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES

(This information arrived too late for inclusion in the September issue but members might keep this in mind for the '89 awards. -- editor)

The Committee on Foreign Policy Studies of the Social Science Research Council conducted the third round of competition for Advanced Research Fellowships in Foreign Policy Studies. The deadline was December 1, 1987 for awards to be announced in March 1988.

The fellowships support research which goes beyond the traditional focus on the national security apparatus by enabling scholars from various disciplines to apply the central questions of their fields to the study of the U.S. foreign policy-making process. These studies are intended to broaden an understanding of the complex social forces which influence the making of U.S. foreign policy and to examine trends in the way foreign policy has been and is being made.

The fellowships support one to two years and include an annual stipend as well as limited funds to cover research expenses. The size of the stipend will depend on the fellow's current salary or level of experience, but in no case can the total award exceed \$35,000 per year.

Applications are particularly welcome from scholars whose research is outside the mainstream of foreign policy/international relations studies.

For information, contact the Program in Foreign Policy Studies, Social Science Research Council, 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158, (tel 212 661-0280).

RESEARCH IN QUEBEC

The Quebec Ministry of International Affairs announces its program of financial support to candidates who are in a teaching position at a post-secondary institution in the United States and who are interested in completing a research project in the field of Quebec studies. (These studies can be in the area of social studies.) For information contact:

Ms. Lisette R. Ferera
Quebec Government Office, Suite 1501
230 Peachtree Street N.W.
Atlanta, GA 30303

Applications must be received by January 15, 1988.

NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER FELLOWSHIPS AND GRANTS

(1) Research Chair

The Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, has established the Secretary of the Navy's Research Chair in Naval History. This is a competitive senior fellowship that allows up to three years to research and write a major monograph concerning the history of the U.S. Navy since 1945. Applications are welcomed from specialists in national security affairs, foreign relations, or the history of science and technology, who have an interest in naval history, as well as from diplomatic, military and naval historians.

The award amounts to approximately \$50,000 per year plus allowances, as regulated by the Inter-governmental Personnel Act. This law provides for the exchange of personnel between federal, and state or local governments, and institutions of higher education. Permanent employees of the federal government are not eligible for this position. The application deadline is March 31, 1988.

(2) Postgraduate Grants

The Naval Historical Center will make two postgraduate grants, named in honor of Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, of up to \$2,500 each to individuals undertaking research and writing in the field of U.S. naval history. Applicants should have either the Ph.D. or equivalent credentials, and they must be U.S. citizens. The deadline for submitting applications is March 31, 1988.

(3) Predoctoral Fellowship

The Naval Historical Center will award the Rear Admiral John D. Hayes fellowship of \$7,500 to a predoctoral candidate who is undertaking research and writing on a dissertation in the field of U.S. naval history. Applicants should be U.S. citizens who are enrolled in an accredited graduate school and will have completed all requirements for the Ph.D. except

the dissertation by September 1, 1988. The deadline for applications is March 31, 1988.

Applicants for the research chair, the post-doctoral grants, and the predoctoral fellowship should direct their inquiries to:

Director, Naval Historical Center
Bldg. 57, Washington Navy Yard
Washington, D.C. 30274

PUBLICATIONS

Richard A. Melanson (Kenyon College) and David Mayers eds., Reevaluating Eisenhower: American Foreign Policy in the Fifties. University of Illinois Press. 1987. \$26.95. ISBN 0-252-01340-9.

Edward P. Crapol (College of William and Mary) ed., Women and American Foreign Policy: Lobbyists, Critics, and Insiders. Greenwood Press. March 1987. \$32.95. ISBN 0-313-24636-X.

Joan Challinor and Robert L. Beisner (The American University), eds., Arms at Rest: Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in American History. Greenwood. 1987. ISBN 0-31324-642-4.

James Edward Miller (Historical Office, Dept. of State), The United States and Italy, 1940-1950: The Politics and Diplomacy of Stabilization. University of North Carolina Press. 1987. \$32.50. ISBN 0-80781-673-6.

Michael Hogan (Miami University), The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952. Cambridge University Press. 1987. \$34.50. ISBN 0-52125-140-0.

Lloyd Ambrosius (University of Nebraska), Woodrow Wilson and the American Diplomatic Tradition: The Treaty Fight in Perspective. Cambridge University Press. 1987. \$34.50. ISBN 0-52133-453-5.

Charles S. Maier (Harvard University), In Search of Stability: Explorations in Historical Political Economy. Cambridge University Press. 1987. Paper, \$10.95. ISBN 0-52123-001-2.

Mary Klachko with David F. Trask (Washington, DC), Admiral William Shepherd Benson: First Chief of Naval Operations. Naval Institute Press. 1987. \$24.95. ISBN 0-87021-035-1.

N.N. Bolkhovitinov and J. Dane Hartgrove (National Archives), Russia and the United States: An Analytical Survey of Archival Documents and Historical Studies. M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 1987. Paper, \$16.95. ISBN 0-87332-414-5.

Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth College) and Kenneth R. Stevens (Texas Christian University), eds., The Papers of Daniel Webster: Diplomatic Papers 2: 1850-1852. University Press of New England. 1987. \$85.00. ISBN 0-87451-245-X.

Bruce Kuklick (University of Pennsylvania), Churchmen and Philosophers: From Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey. Yale University Press. 1987. \$13.95. ISBN 0-30003-269-2.

Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers University), ed., Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence. Princeton University Press. 1987. Three-volume boxed set, \$49.50 through Dec. 31, 1987; thereafter, \$65.00. ISBN 0-691-00817-5.

Forrest C. Pogue (Arlington, VA), George C. Marshall: Statesman (1945-1959). Viking Penguin, Inc. 1987. Volume IV. \$29.95. ISBN 0-670-81042-8.

John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University), The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War. Oxford University Press. 1987. \$24.95. ISBN 0-19504-336-7.

Robin W. Winks (Yale University), Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961. Morrow. 1987. \$22.95. ISBN 0-68807-300-X.

Richard E. Turk (Allegheny College), The Ambiguous Relationship: Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan. Greenwood Press. 1987. \$32.95. ISBN 0-31325-644-6.

Nathan Godfried (Hiram College), Bridging the Gap Between Rich and Poor: American Economic Development Policy Toward the Arab East, 1942-1949. 1987. ISBN 0-31325-648-9.

Samuel F. Wells, Jr (Wilson Center) and Robert S. Litwak, eds., Strategic Defenses and Soviet-American Relations. Wilson Center Books. 1987. \$29.95. ISBN 0-88730-147-9.

Robert A. Divine (University of Texas), ed., The Johnson Years, Volume Two: Vietnam, the Environment, and Science. University Press of Kansas. 1987. \$25.00. ISBN 0-7006-0325-1.

CALENDAR

- | | |
|-----------------|--|
| December 27-30 | The 102nd annual meeting of the AHA will be held in Washington at the Sheraton and Shoreham Hotels. See the schedule of events in the Announcements Section. |
| January 1, 1988 | Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR. |
| January 15 | Deadline for the Bernath article award. |
| January 20 | Deadline for the Bernath book award. |

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| February 1 | Deadline, materials for the March <u>Newsletter</u> . |
| March 1 | Nominations for the Bernath lecture prize are due. |
| March 24-27 | The 81st annual meeting of the OAH will be held in Reno with headquarters at Bally's Hotel. (The deadline for submissions has passed.) |
| April 1 | Applications for the W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship are due. |
| May 1 | Deadline, materials for the June <u>Newsletter</u> . |
| June 9-12 | 14th SHAFR Summer Conference at American University. |
| August 1 | Deadline, materials for the September <u>Newsletter</u> . |
| November 1 | Deadline, materials for the December <u>Newsletter</u> . |
| November 1 | Applications due to Bernath Dissertation Fund Committee. |
| November 1-15 | Annual election for SHAFR officers. |

The 1989 meeting of the OAH will be held in St. Louis, MO, at Adam's Mark Hotel, April 6-9. The deadline for proposals is March 15, 1987.

The Program Chair is:

Professor Richard Fox, Department of History,
Reed College, Portland, OR 97202

The 14th annual conference of SHAFR will be held at American University. The Program co-chairs are Nancy Tucker and Robert Beisner.

In 1988 the AHA will meet in Cincinnati.

The Program Chair is:

Konrad Jarausch, Dept. of History, University of
N. Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514

In 1989 the AHA will meet in San Francisco.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize, were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976 respectively, through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition

Description: This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations.

Eligibility: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations, published during 1987. It must be the author's first or second book.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent directly to: Calvin Davis, History Department, Duke University, Durham, NC 27706.

Books may be sent at any time during 1987, but should not arrive later than January 20, 1988.

The award of \$2000.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians, in March, 1988, in Reno.

Previous Winners:

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|------|--|
| 1972 | Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento) |
| | Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth) |
| 1973 | John L. Gaddis (Ohio U) |
| 1974 | Michael H. Hunt (Yale) |
| 1975 | Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire) |
| | Stephen E. Pelz (Massachusetts-Amherst) |
| 1976 | Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton) |
| 1977 | Roger V. Dingman (Southern California) |
| 1978 | James R. Leutze (North Carolina-Chapel Hill) |
| 1979 | Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston) |
| 1980 | Michael Schaller (Arizona) |
| 1981 | Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke) |
| | Hugh DeSantis (Department of State) |
| 1982 | David Reynolds (Cambridge) |
| 1983 | Richard Immerman (Hawaii) |
| 1984 | Michael H. Hunt (North Carolina-Chapel Hill) |
| 1985 | David Wyman (Massachusetts-Amherst) |
| 1986 | Thomas J. Noer (Carthage College) |
| 1987 | Fraser J. Harbutt (Emory) |
| | James Edward Miller (Department of State) |

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

Eligibility: The lecture will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the annual meetings of the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer will address himself not specifically to his own research interests, but to broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy.

Procedures: The Bernath Lecture Committee is soliciting nominations for the lecture from members of the Society. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vita, if available, should reach

the Committee no later than March 1, 1988. The chairman of the committee to whom nominations should be sent is: Dorothy V. Jones, 1213 Main St., Evanston, IL 60202.

The award is \$500.00, with publication in Diplomatic History

Previous Winners

1977	Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
1978	David S. Patterson (Colgate)
1979	Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
1980	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1981	Burton Spivak (Bates College)
1982	Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)
1983	Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt)
1984	Michael J. Hogan (Miami)
1985	Michael Schaller (Arizona)
1986	Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Colgate)
1987	William O. Walker III (Ohio Wesleyan)

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

Eligibility: Prize competition is open to any article on any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1987. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or within 10 years after receiving the Ph.D., at the time of publication. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

Procedures: All articles appearing in Diplomatic History shall be automatically considered without nomination. Other articles may be nominated by the author or by any member of SHAFR or by the editor of any journal publishing articles in American diplomatic history. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted by 15 January 1988 to the chairperson of the committee, who for 1988 is: Sally Marks, Department

of History, University of Rhode Island, Providence, RI 02908.

The award of \$300.00 will be presented at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH in March, 1988, in Reno.

Previous winners:

- 1977 John C.A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)
- 1978 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
- 1979 Brian L. Villa (Ottawa)
- 1980 James I. Matray (New Mexico State)
David A. Rosenberg (Chicago)
- 1981 Douglas Little (Clark)
- 1982 Fred Pollock (Cedar Knolls, NJ)
- 1983 Chester Pach (Texas Tech)
- 1985 Melvyn Leffler (Vanderbilt)
- 1986 Duane Tananbaum (Ohio State)
- 1987 David McLean (Riverina-Murray Institute, NSW)

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Fund

This fund has been established through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath in honor of their late son to help doctoral students defray some of the expenses encountered in the concluding phases of writing their dissertations.

Requirements include:

1. The dissertation must cover some aspect of American foreign relations.
2. An award will help defray:
 - (a) last-minute costs to consult a collection of original materials that has just become available or to obtain photocopies from such sources
 - (b) typing and/or reproducing copies of the manuscript
 - (c) abstracting costs.
3. The award committee presumes that most research and writing of the dissertation has been completed. Awards are not intended for general research or for time to write.

4. Applicants must be members of SHAFR.
5. Deadline for receipt of applications is November 1.
6. The application should include an itemized listing of how the money is to be used; an abstract and a description of the significance of the study; and a projected date of completion.
7. The applicant's supervisor must include a brief statement certifying the accuracy of the applicant's request and report of completion.
8. When the dissertation is finished the recipient must send to the chairman of the committee a copy of the abstract sent to University Microfilms (University of Michigan).
9. Generally an award will not exceed \$500.00, and a minimum, of three awards each year will be made. More awards are possible if the amounts requested are less.

Nominations, with supporting documentation should be sent to Keith Nelson, Department of History, University of California, Irvine, CA 92717. The deadline for applications is December 1, 1987.

Previous winners:

- | | |
|------|------------------------------------|
| 1985 | Jon Nielson (UC-Santa Barbara) |
| 1986 | Valdinia C. Winn (Kansas) |
| | Walter L. Hixon (Colorado) |
| 1987 | Janet M. Manson (Washington State) |
| | Thomas M. Gaskin (Washington) |
| | W. Michael Weis (Ohio State) |
| | Michael Wala (Hamburg) |

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Holt Dissertation Fellowship was established as a memorial to W. Stull Holt, one of that generation of historians which established diplomatic history as a respected field for historical research and teaching.

The award will be \$1500.00.

Applicants must be candidates for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, whose dissertation projects are

directly concerned with the history of United States foreign relations. The award is intended to help defray travel and living expenses connected with the research and/or the writing of the dissertation.

To be qualified, applicants must be candidates in good standing at a doctoral granting graduate school who will have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree (including the general or comprehensive examinations) except for the dissertation before April, 1988.

There is no special application form. Applicants must submit a complete academic transcript of graduate work to date. A prospectus of the dissertation must accompany the application. This should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, and chief source materials. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used.

Three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one letter from the director of the dissertation, should be submitted to the committee.

Deadline for filing applications and supporting letters for this year's award will be April 1, 1988.

Applications should be addressed to the Chairperson of this year's W. Stull Holt Fellowship Committee: Terry Anderson, Department of History, Texas A&M, College Station, TX 77843

Prior winners: 1986 Kurt Shultz (Miami)

1987 David W. McFadden (University of California, Berkeley)

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements

have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

Conditions of the Award:

The Graebner prize will be awarded, beginning in 1986, to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older.

The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

- (a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;

- (b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;

- (c) describes the candidate's teaching career, listing any teaching honors and awards and commenting on the candidate's classroom skills; and

- (d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Chairman of the committee: Edward Bennett, Dept. of History, Washington State, Pullman, WA 99163.

Prior winner: Dorothy Borg (Columbia)

WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

The award will be made every other year at the SHAFR summer conference. The next award will be for books published in 1987 and 1988. Deadline for submissions is February 1, 1989. One copy of each submission should be sent directly to each member of the selection committee.

David Patterson
9011 Montgomery Ave.
Chevy Chase, MD 20815

Robert Accinelli
Dept. of History
University of Toronto
Toronto M5S 1A1
Canada

Harold Josephson
UNCC St. - History
U. of N. Carolina/Charlotte
Charlotte, NC 28223

1987 winner: Harold Josephson (University of North Carolina at Charlotte)

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William J. Brinker, Department of History.

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: Brent York.

ISSUES: The Newsletter is published on the 1st of March, June, September and December.

DEADLINES: All material should be sent to the editor four weeks prior to publication date.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Changes of address should be sent to the Executive Secretary-Treasurer: William Kamman, North Texas State University, Denton, Texas 76203.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of back numbers of the Newsletter may be obtained from the editorial office upon payment of a charge of \$1.00 per copy: for members living abroad, \$2.00.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered--or published--upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, etc.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

1968	Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)
1969	Alexander DeConde (California-Santa Barbara)
1970	Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)
1971	Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)
1972	Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)
1973	Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)
1974	Bradford Perkins (Michigan)
1975	Armin H. Rappaport (California-San Diego)
1976	Robert A. Divine (Texas)
1977	Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)
1978	Akira Iriye (Chicago)
1979	Paul A. Varg (Michigan State)
1980	David M. Pletcher (Indiana)
1981	Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State)
1982	Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa)
1983	Ernest R. May (Harvard)
1984	Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State)
1985	Warren F. Kuehl (Akron)
1986	Betty Unterberger (Texas A&M)