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PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly Newsletter; Diplomatic History, a journal; and the occasional Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects.

ASIAN ART AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

by

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This essay is a preliminary report on an investigation of one dimension of international relations, namely, the role of visual art objects in forming impressions of an alien people. Different cultures usually generate distinctive art styles, and art constitutes a method of communication that eliminates the intermediary, those whose reports on foreign lands tend to be colored by their own preconceptions or interests. Perceptions and attitudes can be important and, at times, decisive in determining relations between and among nations and peoples. The objects produced by the various societies have had repercussions of far reaching consequences and have contributed to the misconceptions leading to misunderstanding and eventual conflict. My investigations have embraced the spectrum of Non-Western art and its impact on opinion in diverse culture groups. Today my speculations will be confined to the Asian visual output, for it possesses certain characteristics that differ from art originating in other parts of the globe.

The most common methods of intercultural contact have been trade, warfare, exploration and inadvertence. Inadvertence, the lost mariner, may have been responsible for the transmission of Asian art to a portion of what became known as the "Western World," a transmission that is said to have occurred some three thousand years ago. Basing his contention primarily on trait or motive similarities between Chinese and pre-Columbian art, Paul Shao, in two huge volumes, maintains that Shang Chinese voyagers visited Meso-America as early as the beginning of the Olmec culture, around 1200 B.C. Embracing the trans-Pacific diffusionist interpretation of the transmission of art styles, Shao also finds correlations in the art of China and that of the Mayans, from about the third to the ninth centuries A.D.¹ Imitation may be the ultimate in flattery, although similarities of visual images are not conclusive evidence of outside

influence. Academics have thrived on the argument over whether human beings at certain stages of development tend to create similar art forms and myths, or whether they are borrowed from some other group, a single source as it were. But indigenous visual products were an early method of communicating what was unique in one society to another. The language barrier was overcome.²

Assuming that the trans-Pacific diffusionist theory is valid, any regular trade between these distant countries is unlikely, given the state of ocean transport and the instruments of navigation. But trade was the great stimulus for contacts between Europe and Asia, trade in beautiful objects and eagerly sought condiments. Alexander's foray into India may not have been inspired by such crass motives, and the major impact of this venture may have been to provoke the creation of "graven images" of Hindu and Buddhist deities, with the prime example of Western influence being the Graeco-Roman Ghandaran sculptures of Buddha.³ According to one source, "The ancients [sic] made a notable distinction of [art] styles, into Laconic [an early Greek entity] and Asiatic," and "Orient" meant nations lying east of the Roman Empire.⁴ Thus early categorizations and terms were conceived to reflect perspectives and torment subsequent classifiers of geographical space.

The first significant infusion of East Asian art into Europe apparently occurred in the first and second centuries A.D., when Rome at its height sought the elegant silks of China. Transported by caravan from Chang'an to Antioch on the Mediterranean along the tortuous "Silk Road," these fabrics appealed to the luxury appetites of the elite, and even some iron items were included in the cargo. On one occasion, the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius sent emissaries to the Chinese court. Trade between Rome and India was considerable but imports consisted largely of raw materials.⁵ The effect of these interchanges on the attitudes of the respective civilizations toward each other is not clear. The lack of direct contact, except for a few possible encounters, and with trade conducted by intermediaries, makes unlikely any consequential perceptions.

The land route between Europe and the Far East was virtually severed from the seventh to the eighteenth centuries by Islamic militant expansion. Arab seafarers mastered the sea route to China, sailing from ports in the Persian Gulf and hugging the coasts of what are now Iran, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Sumatra, and passing through the Strait of Malacca before reaching Canton. Arab visitors to China were awed by its art. A ninth century Arab merchant wrote that "the Chinese may be counted among those of God's creatures to whom he hath granted, in the highest degree, skill of hand in drawing and in the arts of manufacture," and a fourteenth century Arab visitor thought "The people of China of all mankind have the greatest skill and taste in the arts." He concluded, "As regards painting, indeed, no nation, whether of Christians or others, can come up to the Chinese, and their talent for this art is something extraordinary."⁶ Such praise reflected admiration for at least one dimension of Chinese civilization and revealed a degree of objectivity, for Muslim art was eclectic. It emerged as an amalgam of the styles that prevailed in the conquered countries, and the folk crafts of those people who embraced the faith. But Islamic art came to have an identifiable character of its own which was imposed on many lands.⁷

The subcontinent of India fell prey to this cultural invasion with the Islamic occupation that began in the eighth century and burgeoned in the eleventh to the sixteenth centuries. India had long had contacts with the Middle East, from Iran to Egypt and Mesopotamia, due to favorable winds that simplified seaborne commerce.⁸ Indian products included bronze and brass items, silks, cottons and leatherwork, and some transshipment occurred.⁹ The Mogul Empire that ruled much of India for centuries not only introduced Muslim styles in art and architecture but destroyed much Hindu and Buddhist sculpture and painting, for depicting religious figures was anathema to the Muslim faith.¹⁰ This destruction of indigenous art forms, forms that were symbols of existing religions, made this collision of cultures even more humiliating to the subjected Indians, and resulting perceptions continue to this day.

In East Asia the spread of Chinese art to Korea and Japan began before Buddhism came to those countries. Evidently the art of China was well received in both countries and created a favorable impression of the originating nation. This popularity and commonality of art styles aided in the unification of Korea and Japan by providing a bond to overcome factional rivalry and improved relations with their formidable neighbor.¹¹ The Three Kingdoms in Korea (57 B.C.-668 A.D.) gave tribute to Chinese rulers and imported religion as well as the arts and crafts of China.¹² One authority points out, however, that while some have considered Korean art merely a "provincial variation of Chinese art," the Korean "insistence upon communication by other than verbal, or written, means has tended to load the art forms with more than ordinary significance."¹³ Although this "more than ordinary significance" may have been lost on many outside viewers, it projected a version of the Korean ethos and esthetics that helped foreign observers distinguish these peoples from those of other East Asian cultures.

The full impact of Chinese and Korean art on Japan coincided with the introduction of Buddhism to that country in the sixth century when scriptures and Korean Buddhist images were presented to the Imperial Court. Coming at a time when Japan was being unified, the government welcomed and supported this infusion of culture, which further enhanced relations among the three East Asian nations. "Among the reasons Buddhism was accepted [in Japan] was its novel visual appeal," one writer contends, for "Shinto lacked the philosophy to formulate an anthropomorphic art."¹⁴ Parenthetically, when I visited Japan during the occupation and entered the then Imperial Museum, a notice on the wall in impeccable Spencerian English script asserted that there was no indigenous art of Japan, that all of its art forms were borrowed. The notice has long since disappeared, and the confession has been refuted by evidence displayed in the now Tokyo National Museum and elsewhere.

Korean and Japanese ready acceptance of Chinese art styles and symbols indicated a respect and admiration for what were regarded as manifestations of a higher

civilization, and promoted closer ties among these nations. Yet Japan continued to have a virtual "love-hate" attitude toward Chinese culture, a somewhat dialectical relationship associated in part with the language.¹⁵ Although some Japanese art is difficult to distinguish from that of China, Japanese artists and craftsmen have made substantive modifications of foreign work and have created new media of expression. The visual art of Japan well conveys its unique life and culture, and the Zen images, often in the abstract, combine with the calligraphy to express a non-Western spirit and way of thinking.¹⁶

The spread of Chinese art and Buddhism throughout East Asia produced a similarity of art styles which, to Westerners, reflected what seemed to be one culture pattern and, therefore, one classification of peoples. The art forms accompanying the introduction of Buddhism into China, Korea, Japan, and other Asian countries, offered a visual image of an alien culture that written, oral, or doctrinal communication could not provide. Chinese merchants continued to distribute wares abroad, as they had since at least the Han period (206 B.C.-220 A.D.), by land and by sea. Consisting primarily of silks and porcelains, they were carried as far as the Philippines, where Sung items have been found. A Chinese vessel sunk off the coast of Korea in the thirteenth or fourteenth century contained more than 13,000 ceramic pieces.¹⁷

"Through the medium of the Chinese written language," one writer claims, "Chinese culture has extended beyond China to other East Asian countries--Korea, Japan, Vietnam--and has deeply influenced them, particularly but not exclusively at the level of high culture."¹⁸ The esthetic quality of Chinese calligraphy had a great appeal even when the meaning of the characters was not known. The almost infinite variety of the various scripts permitted the calligrapher considerable latitude in self expression, and work of the masters was readily acknowledged and easily recognized. The "classical period" of Chinese calligraphy came during the "internationalist" T'ang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.), whose rulers adopted the doctrine of "the empire is open to all" over that of "the empire belongs to one family," and relations with

foreign lands and peoples were encouraged.¹⁹ In 806 A.D. the monk Kukai brought esoteric Buddhism to Japan from T'ang China and founded the Shingon School, whose teachings were revealed in the mandalas, sculptures, temple implements and paintings.²⁰

But the enthusiastic reception of Indian and Chinese art by other Asian countries, and the consequent impact on relations among them, was not repeated by Westerners. Most Europeans were contemptuous of the native cultures of Asia, for the art did not meet their esthetic standards. The Jesuit Father Matteo Ricci, in China c. 1600, noted: "The Chinese use pictures extensively, even in the crafts, but in the production of these and especially in the making of statuary and cast images they have not at all acquired the skill of Europeans." Ricci concluded, "They know nothing of the art of painting in oil or of the use of perspective in their pictures, with the result that their productions are lacking any vitality."²¹ Much of the Asian subject matter, usually representing "heathen" religious concepts, was repugnant to Europeans. The erotic Hindu sculptures, especially those of the Shiva "cult," offended Western sensibilities. The sexual act as a manifestation of ecstatic religious experience, as portrayed in Tantric Buddhism as well as in Hinduism, violated Christian precepts and, to Westerners, seemed to reveal a depraved, almost subhuman nature. The profound beliefs expressed by the artists and craftsmen through these visual objects were lost on the foreigners, who saw only the superficial and the obvious, without an awareness of, or even an interest in, the iconography. Europeans were not offended by the portrayal of religious figures as such, as were the Muslims. But they were offended by what was depicted as religious and divine by this "pagan" society. Further, Europeans were confused by what they saw as worship of "idolatrous" images instead of the gods themselves.²² Confronted by displays of what they considered immoral and superstitious, Europeans questioned whether Asians could be treated as equals in the world community.

The first direct contacts between Europe and Asia took place in the thirteenth century when China, under the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1260-1368 A.D.), opened its doors

to the outside world. Until then, the Near or Middle East had been "the meeting point of western preconceptions and actual observations" of the Far East.²³ But the reports of the first European travelers to China itself tended to reflect the purpose of their particular mission. Friar John de Plano Carpini and Friar William Rubruck, sent by the Pope in the thirteenth century to investigate prospects for conversion to Christianity, reported that conditions were favorable although they provided little additional information. The Venetian Marco Polo, who followed, was a trader, and while he did describe the opulent court of Kublai Khan, the people, and the countryside, his primary emphasis was on commercial opportunities.²⁴

No significant exchange followed these preliminary contacts, for when the Yuan dynasty was succeeded by the Ming in 1368 China resumed a xenophobic stance. Increasing hostility between the rising Ottoman Empire and Christian Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries further interrupted European trade with the Far East and prompted a desire to reach the "riches of Cathay" by sea. Inspired by a variety of motives and aided by new technology, European oceanic enterprise found the route and exploited this source of goods and condiments not available at home. The first seaborne Chinese porcelains to come directly to Europe in any quantity were brought by Vasco da Gama on his return from his epochal voyage (1497-1499). The Portuguese then enjoyed a monopoly of this trade until replaced by the Dutch East India Company, which carried porcelain to Europe in huge quantities, as did the later British East India Company.²⁵ The nobility and the rising middle class of Europe were avid consumers of the elaborate ceramics and lavish silks that filled the holds of company vessels. The image of Asia in the minds of these elites--those who could afford the commodities and who controlled the governments and economies of the more powerful European states--was formed by these visual objects from the mysterious East that adorned the homes of the old and the new aristocracy.

Western customers began sending sketches of designs to be depicted on their porcelains, and the often quaint

and childlike portrayals of Europeans and other Western-inspired subjects which came back from China titillated the Western gentry, who often made fun of them. Recently one authority wrote that "Among the most curious and interesting objects to be found in Chinese export porcelain are some amusingly naive figures depicting Europeans in costumes of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries."²⁶ Actually, terra cotta caricatures of foreigners had appeared as early as the T'ang Dynasty and in no way indicated a lack of skill, merely a bit of humor lost on the Westerners.

Europeans and Americans did not share the Asian love of ceramics as a major art form--as not merely pretty and functional objects, but as a medium for conveying ideas and emotions, of expressing the ultimate in creativity by transforming clay through fire with skill and esthetic sensibility into a masterpiece to be caressed and enjoyed with ecstasy.²⁷ A seventeenth century Englishman wrote of seeing "prints of landskips, of their idols, saints, pagoods, of most ougly, serpentine, monstrous and hideous shapes to which they paie devotion: pictures of men, and countries, rarely painted on a sort of gumm'd calico transparant as glasse; also flowers, trees, beasts, birds &c; excellently wrought on a kind of sleve-silk very naturall."²⁸ While acknowledging technique of execution, this Englishman found some of the subject matter repellent and saw it as a reflection of a primitive society dominated by superstition. Moreover, the ethereal atmosphere, spatial relationships, and subtlety of line in Chinese painting, especially in the landscapes, was beyond Western comprehension. Conditioned by the lushness of the representational convention featured by the various continental schools, Westerners viewed this artistic output as mere sketches by untutored dabblers.

The products of East Asia first reached the Americas by what has been called "The longest uninterrupted commercial navigation line in history," the route plied by Spanish galleons from Manila to Acapulco that continued from 1573 until 1815. The Philippines were the entrepot where Asian and Spanish traders met, and

silver became the medium of exchange for goods of the Orient.²⁹ Many of these items were transshipped from Mexico to Spain and helped form the European impression of East Asia, as well as having an impact in the New World.

The exotic nature of Chinese or pseudo-Chinese objects appealed to Europeans and became the vogue in the eighteenth century. Known as "Chinoiserie," it spread from household items to architecture, and the fad reached the eastern portion of the United States where it developed fully in the early nineteenth century as sort of an "esthetic colonialism." American colonists received their first impressions of Asia from England, and the upper classes, especially those of New England and the middle colonies, copied the Chinoiserie fashion. After the colonies gained independence, American ships ventured to the Far East without British restrictions. Carrying ginseng, furs from the Pacific Northwest, sandalwood from the Hawaiian Islands, and, later, opium from Turkey as mediums of exchange, American vessels brought home cargoes of Chinese products that found a ready market among all social classes. This direct exposure to the visual art and crafts of China gave Americans their first and, for many, their only knowledge of that distant land.³⁰ The image formed was one of a fantastic, uncivilized nation of strange people who lived on the opposite side of the globe, a fitting location for such a weird society.

Western perceptions of Asia were augmented by new art forms when Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry and his "black ships" opened Japan to the world in 1854. Perhaps the first significant impression on Americans was made six years later when a Japanese delegation visited the United States to sign the Treaty of Amity and Commerce. Dressed in their elaborate robes and wearing swords--both examples of Japan's finest art work--the delegates exemplified the fantasy that parochial Americans associated with Asia.³¹ But one Japanese art medium was received with enthusiasm by European avant garde painters, namely, the colorful woodblock prints, "ukiyo-e," often used for packing objects sent to the West. Public enthusiasm extended to Japanese decorative arts, and the term "Japonisme"

joined Chinoiserie to designate the rage for Asian art that swept the Western world in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.³²

Many Westerners found certain Japanese objects repulsive. The grotesque temple guardian figures, the hideous Bugaku and Noh masks, and the esthetic veneration of the Samurai sword, gave the impression of a fierce, warlike society which seemed to glorify brutality and armed conflict. Much of Japanese painting, like the Chinese, distorted reality, and the bright colors of woodblock prints did not compensate for some of its subject matter. As James Michener observed, "No art of which we have record produced more sex pictures than ukiyo-e."³³ Obscenity, depravity, and fighting were characteristics many observers found in the art of Japan, characteristics that coupled with the "heathen" religious sculptures to reveal a nation with beliefs and aspirations wholly incompatible with those of the West. Public showings of Japanese and Chinese art at exhibits and international fairs that began in the mid-nineteenth century provided direct exposure to authentic examples of Asian creativity, although whether it evoked an understanding or even an interest in these countries is questionable. But a wider audience did view these visual objects first hand, and people of diverse classes in Europe and America were able to see evidence of these ancient civilizations. Reactions varied from a fascination with the objects representing these exotic lands to contempt and cultural condescension.

The nineteenth century Western interest in the novelty of Asian Art was accompanied by a devotion among collectors, connoisseurs, and museum curators to Asian art for its own intrinsic qualities. The scholarly study of the techniques, objectives, and iconography of the art forms in authentic pieces, rather than the commercial export items, brought a new appreciation of these visual objects if not of the societies that produced them. Lavishly illustrated "coffee table" books appeared to interpret this strange art to the cognoscenti and bring its esoteric message to the cultural aristocracy. Old Chinese bronzes became the ultimate of collecting snobbery, and the sensuous

appeal of exquisite jade pieces made them, along with the customary ceramics, highly prized in auction lots.

World War II brought Asia into Western perspective in a greater and more dramatic way than ever before. Subsequent political and economic developments have emphasized the role that Asian countries have played and continue to play in world affairs. Recent decades have seen the West hosting glamorous exhibits of art from Asian nations, at considerable expense to the host institution, to be witnessed by a substantial number of attendees. No doubt the motives of attendees were varied, as would be their reactions. Were they spurred by curiosity or understanding, a desire to make the inscrutable East more scrutable? Were they both fascinated and repelled, as had been earlier Westerners? And would viewing the ancient art of these countries provide clues to contemporary behavior? Cultural exchanges are designed to bring nations closer together, and art has been a factor in the dialogue between the cultures of East and West. But such exchanges may provoke a negative reaction. Art can express what words cannot, and these "images of the mind," so different from those of the Western world, reflect clashes in beliefs, values, and practices that, perhaps, can never be reconciled. The criteria for judging are simply antithetical.

This paper has tried to deal with one of the many factors responsible for creating an image of an alien people and the perceptions that emerged. Tentatively, it appears that Asian art has proved beneficial to relations between and among Asian countries. But the conceptualization of Asia through its art by the Western conditioned mind and eye has proven detrimental to relations between the two worlds of the East and the West.

FOOTNOTES

¹Paul Shao, Asiatic Influences in Pre-Columbian American Art (Ames, Iowa, 1976); Paul Shao, The Origin of Ancient American Cultures (Ames, Iowa, 1983). See also Audrey McBain, "Reflections of Bronze

Age China in Pre-Columbian American Art," Arts of Asia (May-June 1984), 88-96.

²Paul Tolstoy, "Diffusion: As Explanation and as Event," in Early Chinese Art and Its Possible Influence in the Pacific Basin, ed. Noel Barnard (3 vols, New York, 1972), III, Oceania and The Americas, 823-841. Tolstoy mentions "a contact inferred between cultures." 823.

³G. B. Sansom, The Western World and Japan: A Study in the Interaction of European and Asiatic Cultures (New York, 1951), 12; Dietrich Seckel, The Art of Buddhism, translated by Ann E. Keep (New York, 1968), 29; David L. Snellgrove, ed., The Image of the Buddha (Paris, 1978), 47. For Gandhara see pp. 59-76.

⁴Oxford English Dictionary, "style," quoting Chambers Encyclopedia, 1752 ed.; and entry "Orient."; John Onians, Art and Thought in the Hellenistic Age: The Greek World View, 350-50 B.C. (London, 1979); Robin Lane Fox, Alexander the Great (New York, 1974), 429; Plutarch, The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans (New York, nd), 848.

⁵Robert Erick Mortimer Wheeler, Rome Beyond the Imperial Frontiers (New York, 1954), 115-175; Michele Pirassoli-t'Serstevens, The Han Dynasty, translated by Janet Seligman (New York, 1982), 126-7, 161; E. H. Warmington, The Commerce Between the Roman Empire and India (2nd ed., London, 1974). Among the imports listed by Warmington are animals and animal products, plants, minerals, and steel swords.

⁶Quoted in Michael Sullivan, The Meeting of Eastern and Western Art From the Sixteenth Century to the Present Day (New York, 1973), 46.

⁷M. S. Dimand, A Handbook of Mohammanadan Art (2nd ed., New York, 1944), 7, 20.

⁸Heinrich Zimmer, The Art of Indian Asia, compiled and edited by Joseph Campbell (2 vols, 2nd ed., Princeton, 1970), I, 42.

- ⁹Richard Ettinghausen, "The Man-Made Setting: Islamic Art and Architecture," in Bernard Lewis, ed., The World of Islam: Faith, People, Culture (London, 1976), 60.
- ¹⁰Basil Gray, ed., The Arts of India (Ithaca, NY, 1981), 95-189; Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India (New York, 1977), 104-125.
- ¹¹Namio Egami, et al, The Beginnings of Japanese Art (New York, 1973), 62-63; "Introduction," Art Treasures From Japan: Catalogue of Exhibit in the United States, 1965-1966 (NP, ND), 19.
- ¹²Takashi Hatada, A History of Korea, translated and edited by Warren W. Smith, Jr., and Benjamin H. Hazard (Santa Barbara, CA, 1969), 23; Robert E. Fisher, "The Buddha Image in Korea," in Pratadapaditya Pal, et al, Light of Asia: Buddha Sakyamuni in Asian Art (Los Angeles, 1984), 175.
- ¹³Evelyn McCune, The Arts of Korea: An Illustrated History (Rutland, Vermont, 1962), 19, 24.
- ¹⁴J. Edward Kidder, Jr., The Art of Japan (New York, 1985), 42; Amy G. Poster, "The Buddha Image in Japan," in Pal, et al, Light of Asia: Buddha Sakyamuni in Asian Art, 183.
- ¹⁵David Pollack, The Fracture of Meaning: Japan's Synthesis of China From the Eighth Through the Eighteenth Centuries (Princeton, 1986).
- ¹⁶Tasuichi Awakawa, Zen Painting, translated by John Bestor (Tokyo, 1970), 9, 17.
- ¹⁷Chung Yango-mo, "Ceramic Wares Recovered Off the Coast of Korea," Arts of Asia, 11 (July-August 1981), 105.
- ¹⁸E. G. Pulleyblank, "The Chinese and Their Neighbors in Prehistoric and Early Historic Times," in David N. Keightley, ed., The Origins of Chinese Civilization (Berkeley, 1983), 411.

¹⁹Howard J. Wechsler, Offerings of Jade and Silk: Ritual and Symbol in the Legitimation of the T'ang Dynasty (New Haven, 1985).

²⁰Pierre Rambach, The Secret Message of Tantric Buddhism (New York, 1979), 29.

²¹Quoted in Sullivan, The Meeting of Eastern and Western Art From the Sixteenth Century to the Present Day, 48.

²²"In the early period of European explorations of Asia, travellers saw Hindu sacred images as infernal creatures and diabolic multiple-limbed monsters." Partha Mitter, Much Maligned Monsters: History of European Reactions to Indian Art (Oxford, 1977), vii. "The motive of a couple, often engaged in an overt sexual act, was employed freely on the external walls of a temple and is still regarded as an auspicious symbol." Pratapaditya Pal, The Sensuous Immortals: A Selection of Sculptures From the Pan-Asian Collection (Los Angeles, 1978), 81; "Tantra is a cult of ecstasy, focused on a vision of cosmic sexuality." Philip Rawson, The Art of Tantra (rev. ed., New York, 1978), 7. Nor was eroticism absent in China. "The oldest manuals on Taoist sexual methods date from the Han period (206 B.C. - A.D. 220)." Michel Beurdeley, et al, Chinese Erotic Art, translated from the French by Diana Imber (New York, 1969), 7.

²³June Taboroff, "Orientalists," Aramco World Magazine (November-December 1984), 27.

²⁴Leonardo Olschki, Marco Polo's Precursors (Baltimore, 1943), 6, 38-39; The Travels of Marco Polo, The Venetian, revised from Marsden's Translation and Edited with Introduction by Manuel Komroff (New York, 1926).

²⁵Jorge Graca, "The Portuguese Porcelain Trade With China," Arts of Asia, 7 (November-December 1977), 45; Elinor Gordon, "Concerning a Number of Apprehensions," in Elinor Gordon, ed., Chinese Export Porcelain: An Historical Survey (New York, 1977), 13-14.

²⁶Joseph T. Butler, "Chinese Porcelain Figures of Westerners," in Gordon, ed., Chinese Export Porcelain: An Historical Survey, 90.

²⁷Cecile and Michel Beurdeley, A Connoisseur's Guide to Chinese Ceramics, translated by Katherine Watson (New York, ND), 6-7. The Jesuit Father Joao Rodrigues wrote incredulously of "a kind of earthenware bowls...which is prized beyond all belief" by the Japanese. Quoted in They Came to Japan: An Anthology of European Reports on Japan, 1543-1640, Compiled and Annotated by Michael Cooper (Berkeley, 1965), 261.

²⁸P. J. Marshall and Glyndwr Williams, The Great Map of Mankind: Perceptions of New Worlds in the Age of Enlightenment (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), quote on p. 86. See pp. 86-87, 172-173 also for English perceptions.

²⁹Patricia Justiniani McReynolds, "Asian Ivories in Mexico and the Galleon Trade," Arts of Asia, 13, (July-August 1983), 100-103.

³⁰George H. Danton, The Culture Contacts of the United States and China: The Earliest Sino-American Culture Contacts, 1784-1844 (New York, 1931). See especially pp. 18 and 29.

³¹The cultural myopia was reciprocated. See Masao Miyoshi, As We Saw Them: The First Japanese Embassy to the United States, 1860 (Berkeley, 1979).

³²Siegfried Wichmann, Japonisme: The Japanese Influence on Western Art in the 19th and 20th Centuries (New York, 1981), 6, 8.

³³James A. Michener, The Floating World (New York, 1954), 202. "Japanese mythology is surprisingly rich in the number of its references to acts of creation, courtship, sexual intercourse, defloration, and feats of magic." Michael Czaja, Gods of Myth and Stone: Phallicism in Japanese Folk Religion (New York, 1974), 205. "Right-minded Europe at that moment only saw it [erotic Ukiyo-e] as a demonstration of sin which braved taboos and smacked of heresy, whereas it was not at all out of the ordinary for the Japanese."

Gabriele Mandel, Shunga: Erotic Figures in Japanese Art, translated by Alison L'Eplattenier (New York, 1983), 5.

³⁴The Glass Curtain Between Asia and Europe, ed. Raghavan Iyer (London, 1965), Geoffrey Hudson, "The Historical Context of Encounters Between Asia and Europe," 60-61; "Incomprehension reaches tragic proportions in the confrontation of the Western tradition with the civilizations of Asia." Introduction to Orientalism and History, ed. Denis Sinor (2nd ed, Bloomington, Ind., 1970), xv.

NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN COERCIVE DIPLOMACY WASHINGTON, MOSCOW AND BEIJING, 1957-72

by
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Program)

INTRODUCTION

During much of the Cold War era, there has been a tendency on the part of the United States to overestimate the ability of direct military intervention to achieve political aims, while underestimating the influence which latent US power has on other actors in the international arena. This article is intended to show how US nuclear supremacy directly contributed to the opening of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and the resultant breakdown of monolithic international communism.

The deterrence value of nuclear weapons has long been central to the international security policies of the "nuclear club" nations, and there is a considerable body of scholarly work in the loosely defined category of deterrence theory. What this study explores is the broader arena of the role of nuclear weapons in foreign policy. When does the possession of nuclear weapons make a major impact on policy formulation in adversary nations? More specifically, what happens

when a nation has a clear nuclear superiority? Does a "sufficient" deterrent negate political benefits of a superior nuclear adversary or does the imbalance still provide leverage to the stronger power? The empirical base for the study is the period of U.S. nuclear superiority through the conclusion of SALT I and the impact of that supremacy on its major communist power rivals.

Nuclear weapons are often described as "unusable." Mao Zedong was one of the first to make such an argument a mere three years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In order to justify his "leaning to one side" (i.e. toward the U.S.S.R.) Mao had to convince many of his comrades that the U.S. was merely a "paper tiger." He had to make the case that the monopoly on nuclear weapons at that time did not threaten the emergence of a revolutionary China, and that China could obtain from Russia any security guarantees it might need. What Mao then failed to understand, or chose to ignore, is that nuclear weapons do not have to be used. Possession alone confers political power. An imbalanced nuclear superiority provides an immense advantage to the stronger over the weaker power. Indeed, it was America's "paper tiger" which to a considerable degree ruined Mao's carefully cultivated Sino-Soviet alliance.

Dealing from Weakness; Communist Bloc Deterrence in the 1950s

The USSR had tested its first nuclear device only a few months before Mao arrived in Moscow for the negotiations which led to the 1950 military alliance between the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC). The Soviets had few warheads in the early 1950s and, much worse, virtually no delivery system since they had no long range bomber fleet except for a few poor quality copies of America's B-29 WWII bomber. Such aircraft had no chance at all of reaching US airspace and would have had immense difficulty reaching targets in Western Europe or Japan defended by jet fighter aircraft. Despite the militarily ineffectual nature of the Soviet nuclear forces, they had real security value for both Moscow and Beijing. This was demonstrated within a few years

in the Korean War. In that conflict, the US was deterred from mounting direct air attacks on Manchuria lest the Sino-Soviet alliance be invoked and the conflict escalate into nuclear war.¹

By 1951, the PRC had de facto conceded the political value of nuclear weapons when it publicly argued in favor of nuclear proliferation, particularly among socialist nations, as a means of war avoidance.² This political utility of even a weak nuclear arsenal may well have contributed to the PRC decision of 1955 to develop that capability. Unresolved in this initial decision was the extent to which the PRC should rely on the USSR in the development, deployment, and deterrent use of such weaponry. Most of the leadership favored developing indigenous nuclear technologies over time and relying on the Soviet nuclear umbrella in the interim. The General Staff Department favored buying nuclear weapons from the USSR in order to rapidly attain a nuclear deterrent.³ In October 1957, the first of those two positions prevailed when Defense Minister Peng Dehuai signed an agreement with Nikita Khrushchev. As the world was to learn several years later, the terms provided for the USSR to make available nuclear weapons technology, fissionable materials production, and training of Chinese nuclear scientific and technical personnel. It also included modern delivery systems, i.e. medium range ballistic missiles, a missile firing submarine, and medium jet bombers. The only portion of the agreement which was not implemented at all was the Soviet pledge to give China a sample atomic bomb. In 1959, its delivery was cancelled by Khrushchev at the last moment.⁴

Meantime, in 1958, the PRC leadership took their nuclear ambition to its next logical step. They decided to have an independent nuclear force, not integrated with that of the USSR. Naturally, the Soviets saw this as inimical, if not threatening, to their own security interests. That PRC decision undoubtedly contributed to Khrushchev's 1959 non-delivery of the atomic bomb--an action which effectively terminated the bilateral arrangement. The collapse of the nuclear sharing agreement slowed PRC nuclear development, but Beijing was still able to

test its first atomic bomb five years later in 1964. This chronicle of the failure of nuclear sharing raises two fundamental issues. First, why did the USSR agree to the concept in the first place, and secondly what were the factors which doomed it to collapse after only a few short years.

Soviet Motives I: Why Share with China?

There is no mystery at all as to why China would want to acquire nuclear weapons. It was part of the process which Mao called "standing up," i.e. returning sovereignty, power and international status to China much as had been her due in earlier centuries. But why should the Soviets be willing to enter into such an arrangement? On the face of it, the decision would seem quite amazing. The Soviets did not have political control and military presence in China as they had in East Europe. Nor did they first obtain guarantees of joint command and control before initiating the sharing arrangement. There is no evidence that the Soviet leadership ever contemplated sharing nuclear weapons with any of their East European bloc allies, so why provide such strategic weaponry and technology where there was no control over its eventual end use? There has been remarkably little Western scholarship on this question and the USSR has hardly been forthcoming on the topic. The only exception is the work of Walter Clemens.

Clemens posits several possible explanations, rejecting most and concluding that Khrushchev agreed to the deal primarily because he was just "muddling through" the contradictory demands of East-West nuclear diplomacy and the great power aspirations of the PRC.⁵ This answer is certainly less than adequate as Clemens himself would be the first to admit. Still, it is a major advance on even the current conventional wisdom. The most commonly reiterated explanation is that the deal was a quid pro quo. The PRC backed the USSR in re-establishing their control over Eastern Europe after the Poland and Hungarian crises of 1956, and further acceded to the principle of Moscow's bloc leadership. In return, Khrushchev gives the PRC a strategic weapons arsenal of its own. This explanation fails even preliminary tests. The

Chinese support to the Soviets came late in the game, after Mao first sided with the Poles, so the USSR must have been suspicious of the depth of China's commitment to its bloc leadership. Secondly, the Hungarian imbroglio was all over by the end of 1956 and the sharing agreement was not reached until 10 months later. Why repay past kindness with such lavish and dangerous gifts?

Rather than seeking the explanation in Moscow, it might be wise to first look at Washington D.C. This was the heyday of the Eisenhower administration. Moscow was facing the "rollback" strategy of attempting to free nations under communist control. Poland and especially Hungary were seen as test cases. Even more alarming to the Soviets, this confrontational policy was supported by nuclear brinksmanship, the Strategic Air Command and the doctrine of massive retaliation. General Curtis LeMay, the "father" of SAC, was reputed to have said: "Communism is best handled from 50,000 feet." The Soviets had a weak air defense system, especially in view of the huge frontier they would have to protect in time of war, they had no defense against the medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles which the U.S. had deployed in Europe and Turkey, and their own offensive striking force was still pitifully weak. They had two heavy bomber types, the turbo-prop "Bear" and the jet "Bison", but the former was slow and the latter performed so badly that only a few were produced through 1957. Still worse, Soviet deceptive efforts to make their bomber fleet look large and awesome had failed by the beginning of 1957. The "bomber gap" had disappeared from the anxiety closet of the Eisenhower administration.⁶ Moscow had mounted an all out effort to develop ICBMs but it was impossible to predict in 1957 how long it would take to make those into reliable weapons systems. Perhaps the best explanation is the simplest. Moscow entered into a nuclear sharing agreement with China because it feared the growing US nuclear superiority. Once China had an arsenal of its own, the Sino-Soviet alliance would be transformed into an additional nuclear deterrent for Moscow. Previously the treaty had imposed the burden on the USSR of carrying the nuclear umbrella for China while receiving no strategic arms

benefits in return. In 1957, there was no way that Khrushchev could foresee the collapse of the alliance, much less its devolution into a military confrontation. Foreign policy differences had thus far been relatively minor: the PRC had just completed a highly successful First Five Year Plan of economic development in conjunction with Soviet economic and technical assistance; China had no one else it could turn to since it was subject to a Western economic embargo and a policy of diplomatic non-recognition since being branded an aggressor nation in the Korean War. Thus Nikita Khrushchev could rationally have calculated that the dangers inherent in nuclear sharing without firm joint control guarantees were less hazardous than pitting the Soviet arsenal alone and unaided against those of the US and Great Britain. Such a sharing arrangement with East European nations would have done little to increase the deterrent effect and could even have lessened it. The most logical response of the US and NATO to Soviet nuclear sharing with Czechoslovakia for example, would be to share the West's strategic arsenal with West Germany. Such an eventuality would hardly make Moscow feel more secure.

Soviet Motives II: Why End Nuclear Sharing in 1959?

The American factor again played a significant role in ending the Sino-Soviet nuclear sharing pact. China's 1958 Great Leap Forward challenged the ideological leadership of the USSR and clearly announced that the period of economic dependence was over. The same year saw the Taiwan Straits Crisis in which the US used nuclear "gunboat diplomacy," almost daring the Chinese to fire on our naval vessels so that we would have the right to retaliate with any arsenal we saw fit to use. Mao also became more critical of peaceful coexistence and more open in his demands that the communist bloc should support "just" wars of liberation and anti-imperialism. These circumstances meant that the USSR could find itself in a Chinese or other local conflict escalating toward nuclear confrontation with the US. It was not at all clear that a nuclear arsenal would cause the PRC to adopt a more moderate and less confrontational line. We must assume that Khrushchev attempted secret negotiations to resolve the growing

differences, and that would explain the delay until 1959 for the de facto cancellation of the nuclear sharing agreement.

In this same 1956-58 time frame, Khrushchev was pursuing his famous peaceful coexistence strategy with the US and revising Marxian theory on the inevitability of war between capitalist and communist forces. He was seeking arms control and a nuclear test ban with the US as well as a solution to the growing Berlin crisis. (East Germany was bleeding to death through the open manpower artery of West Berlin). Thus in a number of ways, Khrushchev was seeking to stabilize East-West relations and prevent the eruption of crises which might lead to nuclear confrontation. Of course it would not do to appear an appeaser. He also needed to maximize his nuclear deterrent in the short run. Khrushchev's means of doing that was the famous "missile gap." He convinced the US for about three years at the end of the decade that the USSR had an active inventory of ICBM's and that it was producing hundreds more each year. In fact, his first generation missile was so unreliable, dangerous and inaccurate that none were deployed until 1961.⁷

Apparently, in addition to convincing the US, he also convinced Mao. The Chinese leader expected that the alleged Soviet nuclear superiority would make it possible to use the arsenal for political purposes. Why shouldn't the USSR stare down the US in the Taiwan Straits Crisis and be willing to support "just" local wars? Khrushchev could not play brinksmanship with the Eisenhower administration armed only with a poker player's bluff. His best hope was a limited detente with the US which would buy time for the USSR. This was achieved at Camp David in 1959.

To Khrushchev (and his successors), national security concerns relating to West Europe and the US outweighed considerations relative to China. From mid-1959 on, as the bilateral relations worsened, Khrushchev was ever more inclined to sacrifice Beijing on the altar of improved relations with others. Even India came to outweigh it in Moscow's scales of relative importance. From the foregoing, one might conclude that a root

cause in the opening of the Sino-Soviet dispute was U.S. nuclear superiority. It was Soviet impotence against a potential nuclear attack which made Moscow ignore Beijing's interests in favor of detente with the West. The same fear destroyed the nuclear sharing agreement and the viability of the defense treaty.

Khrushchev's Last Years:

Efforts to Weaken the Growth of PRC Strategic Power, 1960-64

By 1960, Sino-Soviet polemics were becoming heated and international communist party conferences convened to resolve the differences had all failed. That summer, Khrushchev suddenly called back to the USSR all Soviet technicians, engineers, scientists and military advisors then in China, requiring that they bring with them their plans, blueprints and other technical data. The impact was great on the economy as a whole and especially damaging to the defense industry, e.g. it set back jet aircraft production by five years and held up completion of the gaseous diffusion plant, (used for creating bomb grade uranium), for about three years. Russia also began demanding repayment of loans and credits extended to China during the Korean War and First Five Year Plan period. This placed an immense burden on the Chinese economy at a time when it was already prostrate from the devastating failures of the Great Leap Forward. Through these measures, Khrushchev may have been attempting to punish China and set back its economic and military development, or he could have been trying to force the PRC back into the Soviet bloc through economic warfare. However, in his last two to three years in office, he clearly had given up on returning the black sheep to the flock and his efforts were solely directed at weakening his rival to the East.

The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962

The events of the crisis are too well known to require repeating here. The focus will instead be on Khrushchev's motives and objectives for putting the IRBMs in Cuba in the first place. It was clearly a dangerous and provocative course of action. There was a high risk that the missiles would be discovered

before they were operational. So why did he do it? The conventional wisdom answers the question by citing the missile gap. The US had embarked on its "Minuteman" ICBM program which, by the end of 1964, would see almost 1000 high accuracy, solid fuel rockets aimed at the USSR. We were developing a "first strike" capability enabling us to destroy the USSR at will and prevent any effective retaliation. Meanwhile, the Soviet ICBM force was still pitifully small, vulnerable, unreliable and inaccurate. Thus, Khrushchev deployed the missiles to Cuba to interfere with the US achieving a first strike capability. Taking the conventional wisdom to its logical conclusion, Khrushchev was attempting to use Cuba in 1962 just as he had China in 1957--as a means of increasing deterrence against a potential US attack.

This argument is cogent and will not be disputed here. However, it should be added that the IRBMs in Cuba would be very vulnerable to low-level, conventional air attack from fighter bombers based in southern Florida. In a brinksmanship nuclear confrontation, the IRBMs would have to be fired first or they would almost certainly be lost altogether. In today's argot, they were destabilizing "use or lose" weapons which might serve to increase the likelihood of a Soviet-American nuclear exchange rather than deter it.

There is a second, more elegant explanation for Khrushchev's high risk gamble. It is developed by Adam Ulam in his classic work, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-73. He suggests that the missiles were placed in Cuba to be used as a bargaining chip. Khrushchev had requested time at the United Nations to make a personal presentation in November 1962--when the missiles would have been fully operational. Ulam hypothesizes that Khrushchev intended to announce the existence of the missiles and then offer to withdraw them if the US would agree to three conditions. First, drop the "multi-lateral force" idea of nuclear sharing with NATO. From the Soviet standpoint, the proposal was especially dangerous since West Germany would have access to nuclear arms. Secondly, the Soviet leader might have demanded a "German solution"--i.e. an understanding on the question of West Berlin and a

German-Soviet peace treaty. Thirdly, Khrushchev sought a US commitment to a nuclear free zone in the Far East--a proposal which he had already made public. Ulam feels that this was Khrushchev's last ditch effort to prevent China from obtaining its own indigenous nuclear capacity. If the American nuclear threat could be removed from the PRC, it would have little justification for pursuing an expensive atomic program, especially since its economy was still in a shambles from the effects of the Great Leap Forward.⁸ The discovery of the missiles led to the cancellation of Khrushchev's UN speech, so Professor Ulam's plausible theory cannot be verified, but neither can it be refuted.

The 1963 Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty

As mentioned above, the Soviets began pursuing a test ban with the US in 1956. The PRC initially cooperated with the efforts to negotiate, but by January 1960, it declared its total independence in the nuclear field by proclaiming that it would not be bound by arms control agreements made by other nations. A week after the Soviet-American test ban treaty was formalized on July 25, 1963, Beijing proposed the total nuclear disarmament of all nations--a negotiating position which it has espoused ever since. On October 16, 1964, (ironically the very day on which the USSR announced Khrushchev's dismissal), the PRC tested its first atomic device. Beijing immediately declared "no first use" of nuclear weapons and called for an international conference of all nuclear powers to commit themselves to a similar pledge.⁹

The test ban/arms control topic is of interest here because of its impact on Mao Zedong's foreign policy. It should be said at the outset that the test ban negotiations did not cause Moscow to lose control of China's strategic and international security policies. Those events had already occurred as described above. The actual effect was equally profound and far reaching. Mao became convinced that the PRC could no longer benefit from the bipolar system of international relations. His requirements for an independent foreign policy would inevitably arouse the hostility of both superpowers.¹⁰

In August 1963, after the signing of the limited test ban treaty, Mao gave an interview to a group of Japanese socialists. He described the USSR as an imperialist state and called for Moscow to return the "Northern Territories" to Japan.¹¹ Chinese propaganda began attacking the Soviet Union directly rather than through indirect references such as Yugoslav revisionism. Some months later in 1964, Mao fully formulated his new foreign policy of a "united front against imperialism" and began considering the inclusion of France and Japan in the struggles against US and Soviet imperialism. Thus, once again, Soviet strategic arms policies provoked a hostile Chinese reaction. This time the consequences went well beyond intra-bloc competition and fragmentation. Beijing began looking abroad to create new international alignments which would challenge the underpinnings of Soviet, as well as US, national security policies.

Emergence of Sino-Soviet Military Confrontation, 1966-1969

With Khrushchev's ouster in 1964, there was a momentary hope that relations might be improved. Exploratory talks, however, produced no progress and the stage was set for the devolution of the dispute into military confrontation. The Leonid Brezhnev leadership decided to strengthen the disposition of forces stationed in Central Asia and the Soviet Far East. There had been a large number of small scale border incidents, and minority peoples in Xinjiang were restive. But above all, Brezhnev's decision was probably prompted by Mao's claims to vast areas in Soviet Central Asia and Siberia. Now that China had joined the nuclear club, Moscow could not rely merely on the single option of nuclear blackmail to protect its territory. The huge size the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) was quite enough to cause a reassessment of the Soviet posture in the region.

The forces were initially expanded from 12 up to 15 divisions, but there was an apparent reluctance to increase such forces much further without theater nuclear support. In 1966 the Soviets reached a new defense agreement with Mongolia enabling them to station both conventional and nuclear forces in that

nation. By the end of that year, the first SS-6 missiles had been deployed against the PRC and tactical nuclear weapons were not far behind, (e.g. the nuclear capable Scud rockets).

As the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) gathered momentum in 1967, so too did the Soviet troop buildup. Estimates differ, by early 1969, the USSR had deployed approximately 27 divisions on their territory and two in Mongolia.¹² By the early 1970s, the figure had risen to a total of about 40. The rate of reinforcement escalated drastically after the Chen Bao (Damansky) Island clashes of March 1969, and by the early 1970s, there were about 40 divisions confronting the PRC.¹³ Thomas Robinson points out one significant effect of this massive Soviet theater nuclear superiority. It caused Beijing to drop its development program for an ICBM and move instead toward rapid deployment of more MRBMs and new IRBMs. They also concentrated on medium-range bomber production and continuously shuffled many of the 100 or so in the inventory among 200 bases within striking range of Soviet targets.¹⁴ ICBM development apparently did not resume until the mid-1970s at a new test facility rather more distant from the Soviet border than the former site in Inner Mongolia.

The Sword of Damocles, 1969-73

Beijing had every right to feel imminent threat and to maximize its theater nuclear forces as rapidly as possible. In the aftermath of the Chen Bao Island clashes, the USSR was seriously considering using its nuclear arsenal against the PRC. At the time the CIA Director, Richard Helms, publicly predicted the outbreak of a Sino-Soviet war. In later memoirs, both Henry Kissinger and President Nixon referred to Soviet queries regarding US reaction to a pre-emptive strike against PRC nuclear facilities. By far the most vivid and detailed account is given in the autobiographical account of Arkady Shevchenko, a high level Soviet defector. He states that the Defense Minister, Marshal Grechko, advocated a strong nuclear attack on China's industrial centers to get rid of the Chinese threat "for once and for all." Others proposed "surgical strikes" limited to conventional bombs and

still others proposed the avoidance of hostilities altogether. The resultant deadlock of the Politburo was what prompted the feelers to the US policy makers, and their negative response was largely responsible for killing the various military options. Brezhnev opposed the direct military options. He favored increasing the threat potential by stationing additional forces in Central Asia and Siberia with ample theater and tactical nuclear weapons. This would place the USSR in a favorable posture for later negotiations.¹⁵ The Chinese were well aware of the precariousness of their situation, as initially reflected in the immensely expensive "war preparations campaign" which consisted mostly of building bomb and fall-out shelters all over China--many of them highly elaborate. Of course the most important outcome of this confrontation with the USSR was Beijing's decision to seek detente with the US. When a nation faces nuclear Armageddon, questions of ideology, territorial disputes, revanchism and the interests of one's allies are shed like autumn leaves.

The Emergence of the Strategic Triangle

The Soviet decision not to attack China meant that the PRC would get stronger. Military action would almost certainly have resulted in the formation of a Beijing-Washington axis, but it was not clear that Brezhnev's restraint would prevent its eventual formation. In 1973 the Soviet leader personally warned Henry Kissinger that something must be done about China's growing nuclear arsenal, and he threatened the Secretary of State that any US military assistance to the Chinese would lead to war, though he did not say what kind of war or with whom.¹⁶ As late as 1980, Brezhnev was still giving private warnings to Western governments regarding the potential of a Soviet nuclear strike against the PRC. He was quoted as having told the President of the French National Assembly: "Believe me, after the destruction of China's nuclear sites by our missiles, there will not be much time for the Americans to decide between the defense of their Chinese allies and peaceful coexistence with us."¹⁷ This sabre rattling was in direct response to the post-Afghanistan visit of Defense Secretary Harold Brown to Beijing and his

offer to sell military equipment to the PRC on a case by case basis. Brezhnev's own anti-Chinese paranoia may have become worse over time rather than better. When Margaret Thatcher visited him prior to the invasion of Afghanistan and the Polish crisis, she commented that there were no serious issues confronting the two governments. Brezhnev replied, "Madam, there is only one important question facing us, and that is the question whether the white race will survive."¹⁸

In reality, by the late 1970s, it was too late for the USSR to consider seriously a pre-emptive strike against China. By 1983 between 200-250 Chinese missiles had been deployed, with the great majority of them targeted against the USSR. Nearly all were concealed and relatively well protected by mountainous terrain. China completed its prototype SLBM early in this decade and a fleet of eight should be operational by 1990.¹⁹ Of course the Soviet nuclear arsenal has grown even more rapidly, but that does not vitiate a modest second strike capability by the PRC. It is difficult to conceive of an issue so vital to the USSR that they would be willing to sacrifice Vladivostok, Chita, Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, and the Trans-Siberian R.R. Enough Chinese striking power would certainly survive to accomplish the destruction of at least those targets. In a few years time, the combination of SLBMs and the new ICBMs will also threaten metropolitan Russia with "assured mutual destruction" in the case of a Soviet pre-emptive attack. Thus China's deterrent is "sufficient" and growing more credible with every passing year. It may, however, not be totally coincidental that as the weak side of the strategic triangle, China has adopted foreign policies which resemble those of Nikita Khrushchev in the 1960s. Meanwhile the USSR, having achieved nuclear parity with the US, has adopted the policies which Mao was urging on it in the late 1950s, i.e. support for liberation and anti-colonial struggles in the Third World. The Chinese have only a "defensive nuclear deterrent", entailing acceptance of nuclear inferiority. It is credible only when vital interests are at stake. The "offensive" deterrents of the US and USSR can prevent enemy resistance to some intended course of action or prevent the enemy from

implementing threatening actions.²⁰ But even a defensive deterrent has political value beyond issues of national survival. Would the US have been willing to forge even a loose strategic partnership with the PRC if China had had no nuclear deterrent of its own? Would China have been willing to do so under those circumstances? No deterrent would have meant much greater responsibility on Washington and far greater risks for Beijing.

Conclusion

This overview of the triangular relations among Moscow, Beijing and Washington clearly has the Soviets on the losing side. US nuclear superiority in the 1950s forced Khrushchev to adopt policies which were inimical to Chinese interests, thus directly undermining the alliance. Brezhnev's use of nuclear blackmail and the threat of pre-emptive attack against China served to forge the links of Sino-American detente. As the Chinese side of the nuclear triangle grows in the 1980s and 1990s, such nuclear threat diplomacy has become less feasible because none of the three powers wish to heighten cooperation and friendship of the other two through ineffectual scare tactics. Thus both Washington and Beijing have benefitted from their uses of nuclear diplomacy and those benefits have been primarily at the expense of Moscow.

If there is a generalized lesson to be drawn from this chronicle, it is found in the dynamics of the strategic triangle. When the US had massive nuclear superiority over both of its opponents, the effect was to change the international situation in its favor, even without conscious planning on the part of the policy makers in Washington D.C. When the Soviets had a massive nuclear superiority over China, but faced an offensive deterrent from the US, they were unable to convert their strategic advantage over Beijing into political results. Currently, none of the actors can engage in the nuclear diplomacy game without counterproductive results. The political utility of nuclear weapons may be on the decline, at least in terms of dealing with other nuclear powers.

President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative could radically change this stabilized multi-polar system. Unless the technology and capabilities were shared with the other actors in the nuclear club, the US would be returned to its 1950s position of a nuclear superiority which could and would be converted into coercive diplomacy. The USSR, in turn, would be forced into dangerous, high risk gambles similar to the nuclear sharing agreement and the placement of missiles in Cuba. It may be as we move from deterrence and toward defense that the multilateral nuclear equilibrium of the 1970s and 1980s will appear as an oasis in a desert of nuclear instability.

Notes

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THE OPENING OF RESEARCH MATERIAL AT THE CARTER LIBRARY

by

Martin Elzy

(Supervisory Archivist, Jimmy Carter Library)

The March, 1987, issue of the SHAFR Newsletter contained a brief notice of the opening of research material at the Carter Library. The staff of the Carter Library appreciates the notice.

Bill Brinker approached me several years ago suggesting that I write something for the Newsletter concerning the holdings of the Carter Library. At that time the Library's collections were still housed in primitive temporary facilities. Although Bill's diligence in behalf of his readership is commendable, the Carter Library staff was reluctant to tantalize potential researchers when the opening of any material was still far in the future.

But that distant future has arrived, and the Carter Library staff is now welcoming scholars to the Carter Library Research Room. Of approximately twenty-seven million pages of material moved from the Carter White House to Atlanta, about six million pages are now available for research. Not included are approximately one and one-half million pages of the files of Zbigniew Brzezinski and his assistants, material of paramount importance to the readers of the SHAFR Newsletter. Because of the high percentage and level of security classification of the Brzezinski staff files, we expect it will be several years before processing begins on this material.

The open material, listed at the end of this brief note, does contain material concerning foreign policy matters. Although the open material is usually not of a sensitive nature, there may be information that satisfies some research needs. Furthermore, our staff is continually processing and opening more material.

We recommend that a researcher who is contemplating a research visit to the Carter Library first write to the Library (One Copenhill Avenue, Atlanta, Georgia

30307) or call (404-331-3942) to get a rough estimate of the amount of material available on a particular topic.

JIMMY CARTER LIBRARY

MATERIAL OPENED ON JANUARY 28, 1987

Carter Presidential Papers:

Press Office: Jody Powell and Rex Granum files (158')

Domestic Policy Staff: (235')

Stuart Eizenstat files

Al Stern and Jeffrey Farrow (Special Projects Cluster)

Kathryne Bernick and Rick Neustadt (Government Reform Cluster)

Hugh Carter and White House Administration files (110') (except Correspondence Unit)

Gerald Rafshoon and other Communication Office files (34')

Sarah Weddington and other Women's Affairs Office files (45')

Appointments/Scheduling/Advance: (50')

Presidential Diary Office files

White House Central File:

Subject File (534')

Name File (1600')

Correspondence Tracking (120')

Chronological File (7')

Weekly Presidential Mail Sample (1' 6")

White House Staff Photographers' Contact Sheets (900,000 images)

Federal Records:

National Commission on Neighborhoods (21')

White House Conference on Balanced National Growth and Economic Development (10')

President's Commission for a National Agenda for the Eighties (4')

Presidential Commission on Mental Health (11')

OF BETTY UNTERBERGER AND WOODROW WILSON

by

Ephraim Schulman
(Valdosta, GA)

The article by Ms Unterberger in the Spring 1987 issue of Diplomatic History is an example of story telling that would make Lewis Carrol blush with envy. The single minded tenacity which she has devoted to reconciling Woodrow Wilson's deeds with his words would be more productive if instead she spent her time squaring the circle.

She refers to Wilson's Fourteen Points Address of January 8, 1918 which included Point Six which stated among other things, no interference in the internal affairs of Russia. But Ms Unterberger knows that Wilson had already imposed a U.S. embargo on the Soviets. Of course, to be facetious, one might say this is certainly noninterference. However Wilson then participates in the Allied blockade of the Soviets, which say what you will, is recognized as an act of war. And then of course there was the actual intervention--which he really did not want. The sacrifices one has to endure for "coalition diplomacy"! By what moral principles does one country invite another country to invade a third country. All this to protect Russia against the Japanese. So how many Japanese were in Archangel? Well there we have a different set of excuses.

Wilson told the American people that the intervention in Russia was necessary to help the Czechoslovakian troops and also protect war supplies from falling into the hands of Germany. Well, the war was over in 1918 but U. S. forces did not leave until 1920. As regards the Czechs, when they reached Vladivostok, there weren't any ships to evacuate them. Were they supposed to swim? The fact is there never was any intention to evacuate the Czech forces until the Bolsheviks were overthrown.

In January 1919 the Czechs pleaded with the Allies to remove them from Russia in order to at least protect their good name. They realized that being associated with the worst cutthroats imaginable connected with Admiral Kolchak would bode no good for their future. The U. S. then got into a squabble with England as to who was to pay for the passage of the Czech troops. In any case no ships were made available. But an offer was made by the U. S. to the Czechs. If part of the Czech troops would reverse themselves and fight on to Archangel then the balance of the Czechs would be evacuated from Vladivostok. It would be hard to imagine a more cynical offer, which the Czechs refused. Whereas the Czechs were trying to get out of Russia and not to be associated with the Kolchak cutthroats, the U. S. was offering instead that they should act as the spearhead of the very forces they were trying to disassociate from.

The U. S. had no compunction in identifying with Admiral Kolchak. Wilson did everything he could to supply him with arms and money, even in violation of U. S. laws. In fact the current investigation of Oliver North and the \$30,000,000 seems like small potatoes compared to the plan hatched by Wilson and Secretary Lansing on December 12, 1917. Since they could not lend money to a government they did not recognize it was decided they would lend the money to the French and British and let them dish it out to every anti Bolshevik they could dig up. All this of course in line with Point Six. By the way, there has never been any investigation as to the disbursement of this largesse--as a start, \$450,000,000 in real dollars not the current inflated variety. Ms Unterberger mentions Maxim Litvinoff's waiver of any

claims from the Soviets as a result of the Siberian invasion. Did it ever occur to her that this might have been as a result of the "constraints of expediency"? After all there is some significance to the date, November 16, 1933. A more accurate feeling of the Russians would be to refer to the protests Foreign Commissar Chicherin made at the time. To digress a moment, since Ms Unterberger brought up the waiver of claims against the U. S. by Litvinoff one might note that after all some Russians did die, some damage was done to the economy of the Russians as a result of the U. S. invasion, so that the waiver was really very generous. Certainly when you consider the bill that the U. S. will present to the Iraq government as a result of the Stark attack, one will appreciate how generous. The one inescapable fact concerning the Wilson "nonintervention" in the internal affairs of the Russian people was, wherever the U. S. troops were stationed the Bolsheviks were removed and were lucky to escape with their lives.

One would however have to give Wilson credit for practicing Wilsonian Internationalism. This he did with a vengeance. Sending troops into Central America, Mexico and of course the Russian expeditions. One of course should not overlook his campaign oratory, "he kept us out of war". The only thing was, that he no sooner was inaugurated than we were right in the war "he kept us out of".

Another example of the "constraints of diplomacy" which Wilson labored under, was his proposal and acceptance of a trusteeship over Armenia and the Black Sea Straits. These proposals were so wide ranging that it would make Stalin seem like a piker in his demands of 1945. And can one imagine, in the spirit of Point Six, what relations would have been like in the ensuing years to have the U. S. sitting at the door step of the Soviet Union and controlling ingress and egress to the Black Sea? Wilson's actions reminds one of the story of the farmer's pregnant daughter "protesting" the shotgun marriage with the visiting salesman. Last but not least, in the Versailles Armistice agreement the Germans were required to remain where they were in Russia. Would Ms Unterberger care to square this with Point Six? Let

us not forget the policy of nonrecognition instituted by Wilson.

When you consider our allies' observations of how U. S. politicians cover up their predatory acts with a high moral purpose that should not be surprising, but when an historian tries to give credibility to the incredible that is not history.

**MINUTES: SHAFR COUNCIL
UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY
ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND
25 JUNE 1987**

SHAFR Council met at 8:15 a.m. in the conference room of the United States Naval Academy History Department (Sampson Hall). President Thomas G. Paterson presided. Council members present were: Richard Dean Burns, Waldo Heinrichs, Gary Hess, Melvyn Leffler, Betty Unterberger, and William Kamman. Also present were David Anderson, Robert Beisner, Daniel Helmstadter, Ralph Weber, Richard B. Parker, and H. Eugene Bovis.

1. Richard B. Parker, president, and H. Eugene Bovis, executive secretary, of The Association for Diplomatic Studies met with Council to describe the Association's activities. In 1986, friends of the Foreign Service Institute established the Association for Diplomatic Studies, a non-profit, tax-exempt organization to help the Institute take full advantage of a new campus to be built at Arlington Hall Station near the Pentagon. The Association wants to enhance the training of foreign affairs personnel and to instill in the public a greater appreciation of American diplomatic history. The Association's activities will include a historical collection, a scholars-in-residence program, and a library and research (including oral history) program. The Association's address is 1400 Key Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22209. Thomas Paterson asked Mr. Parker to consider writing an article for the SHAFR Newsletter describing his association's goals and programs.

2. Thomas Paterson announced the appointment of Wayne Cole (term through 1989) and Frank Costigliola (term through 1990) to the Holt Prize Committee and Stephen G. Rabe (term through 1990) to the Bernath Dissertation Award Committee.

3. Council received a report from Theodore Wilson, chairman of a SHAFR subcommittee to study a proposal from Lewis Hanke to sponsor the updating of his Guide to the Study of America Outside the United States. Wilson noted that The Guide is most immediately of value to persons and scholars in the field of American studies. If the guiding assumption is that SHAFR support scholarly activities that are of direct benefit to its membership, he questioned the use of SHAFR resources for this project. Council approved Wilson's report. Thomas Paterson will notify Professor Hanke of Council's decision not to support the project.

4. Council received a report from the Bernath Dissertation Fund Committee (Keith L. Nelson, chair; Harriet Schwar; Stephen G. Rabe; and Dennis Bozyk, past chair). A copy of the report is attached as an addendum to the minutes. Council approved the committee's recommendation that SHAFR continue to use Bernath Supplementary Discretionary Funds to provide grants to advanced graduate students of American diplomatic history who need special assistance to complete the dissertation. Council approved the Committee's recommendation that additional materials be requested from applicants (see page 2 of the addendum to the minutes) and approved the committee's recommendations as printed in Council minutes of December 27, 1986. These are:

1. Last date for applications to be received should be November 1.
2. Committee should emphasize that report is due on September 1 from recipient on his/her work done under grant.
3. The applications should include an itemized listing of how money is to be used.

4. Applications should include an abstract and a description of significance of the study.
5. When dissertation is finished have the recipient send to the chairman of the committee a copy of the abstract sent to University Microfilms (University of Michigan).
6. Applications should include projected date of completion of the dissertation from student and from major professor.

The remainder of the committee's report was received with Council's appreciation and a request for more detail for future consideration.

In discussion of Bernath Supplementary Discretionary Funds for dissertation grants there was also discussion of support of a copy editor for Diplomatic History. Council resolved that in principle SHAFR's position is that operating costs of Diplomatic History should be supported by the organization or the host institution and that Bernath funds should be used only in an emergency.

5. Council approved the following statement regarding the Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize:

(The approved wording appears toward the end of this issue of the Newsletter and the editor takes the liberty of omitting it here in the Minutes.)

Thomas Paterson will ask Sally Marks to write to editors of appropriate journals to announce this prize.

6. Robert Beisner, co-chairperson of the 1988 SHAFR summer conference, reported that the conference would be at American University in Washington, D.C., on June 9 - 12, 1988. Professor Beisner noted that university housing would be available for a few days before and after the conference as well as during the meeting. The program committee is planning a State Department tour for June 10.

7. Council discussed the question of having more diplomatic history sessions at the annual conferences of the American Historical Association and Organization of American Historians. It was suggested that the SHAFR Newsletter remind members to submit session proposals and that program deadlines be included in the reminder. Council passed a resolution that a member of SHAFR's program committee act as a liaison with the OAH and the AHA in proposing diplomatic history sessions.

8. The first winner of the Warren F. Kuehl Book Prize is Harold Josephson of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte for his Biographical Dictionary of Modern Peace Leaders. William C. Widenor, chairman of the Kuehl Prize Committee, will make the presentation at the SHAFR banquet on Thursday evening, June 25.

9. William Kamman reported on the response of Joseph G. Svoboda, University Archivist of the University of Nebraska, to SHAFR's inquiry about depositing Diplomatic History records at the University of Nebraska. Mr. Svoboda raised questions about the ownership of the records once accessioned and the holding of the copyright. He also noted that Nebraska would need to consider space and labor costs connected with accomodation of such external archives. Council instructed Kamman to express SHAFR's continued interest and to find out what the standard procedures are in regard to the above questions. It was also suggested that SHAFR should ask about the arrangement of the Journal of American History with Nebraska.

10. Council considered SHAFR's need for liability insurance. There were several questions about legal services and personal liability. Council wants to pursue the question further.

11. Kamman announced that David W. McFadden, graduate student in history at the University of California, Berkeley was the 1987 winner of SHAFR's W. Stull Holt Memorial Dissertation Fellowship Award. The Holt Committee included: Bernard V. Burke, chair; Michael Hogan; and Terry Anderson.

12. SHAFR nominations for the State Department Advisory Committee will be made later.

13. Thomas Paterson will appoint a committee to consider a proposed SHAFR prize for documentary editing.

14. Council passed a resolution expressing its appreciation for the excellent work of the 1987 program committee--Blanche Wiesen Cook, Joyce Goldberg, Robert McMahon, and especially co-chairpersons George Herring and Robert Love. Council also wishes to thank Rear Admiral Ronald Maryott, Superintendent of the Naval Academy; Carl Lamb, Academic Dean; Fred Harrod, Chairman of the History Department; Ensign Mary Kelly; and Lt. Commander Don T. Sine for their cooperation and help in making the conference a success.

15. Council indicated an interest in sending copies of Diplomatic History to foreign libraries. Council asked DH editor, Michael Hogan, to bring a proposal with estimated cost to the next meeting.

16. Council passed a resolution authorizing the executive secretary-treasurer to send a letter verifying the authority of Lawrence S. Kaplan and Susan Shah acting jointly on behalf of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations to request a withdrawal of interest from the following accounts to cover expenses of prizes provided for in each account. The accounts were: Bernath Supplement, SHAFR Endowment, SHAFR Graebner, SHAFR Kuehl, and SHAFR Holt.

17. Council passed a resolution designating Lawrence S. Kaplan and Susan L. Shah as persons authorized to have access to SHAFR's safety deposit box at the First National Bank of Ohio.

Council adjourned at 9:50 a.m.

25 June 1987

To: Thomas Paterson
President, SHAFR
From: Bernath Dissertation Fund Committee
Re: Your inquiry of January 7

In January you asked the Bernath Dissertation Fund Committee to give serious thought to what might be done to attract young scholars (especially minorities and women) to our organization and discipline, and having applied itself to this question, the committee is pleased to submit the report below.

As a preliminary to this, however, the committee wishes to comment briefly with regard to its existing assignment, i.e. the work that it has carried out on behalf of SHAFR since the committee was established over three years ago. We do not wish any misconception to develop about our commitment to our present task, that of providing moderately-sized grants to advanced graduate students within our field who need special assistance to complete the dissertation, for example, because of important materials having been recently released or because of unusual financial need. We remain convinced that it is useful and important for SHAFR to have such a fund as ours in existence.

That is not to say that we are without suggestions and plans to improve the process. One of our problems heretofore has been that we have had too little information about our applicants. In our desire to keep matters simple, we have asked only for a letter of explanation from the applicant and a letter of support from the adviser, with the result that in the end we have not felt justified in doing more than cutting up the pie in equal shares, reducing in the process the size of the awards.

In the future we would like to ask for a number of additional materials. Beyond the letters, we also need, as a standard item, a curriculum vitae for the applicant, a table of contents and synopsis of the dissertation, and perhaps a chapter from the completed

portion. Moreover, we need to see at least a preliminary bibliography for the dissertation, so that it is possible to judge in what way, for example, a last minute research trip or microfilming of documents are really important in bringing the work to completion. Finally, if the request is simply for money to pay for typing costs or the like, we believe that there ought also to be a statement by the student about his or her financial situation. Given such information as the above, the committee is persuaded that it can effectively perform a useful service in assisting proven graduate students who are genuinely in need of a final push to get a good dissertation across the finish line.

But let us turn to the report at hand and to answering the query that you as President (and, through you, the 5 December report of the Finance Committee) put to us last January. What can SHAFR do to attract more women and minorities into the ranks of the scholars who do the history of international relations? This is a significant and difficult question, and there may well be no consensus within our discipline as to its answer. What is more, our committee, despite having consulted a considerable number of knowledgeable individuals inside and outside our sub-discipline, cannot in any sense claim to have done a comprehensive survey either of the problem or of opinion about the problem. What we have done, working from our personal experience, a sampling of opinion, and considerable intuition, is simply to identify a number of constructive things that might be undertaken.

Of utmost importance, of course, is the recognition that the problem of group under-representation is in no way limited to our particular field. Indeed, a recent report of the University of California, which has the highest overall proportion of minority faculty of any of the nation's major research institutions, shows that only 4.4% of its tenured faculty and 7.9% of its non-tenured faculty were members of under-represented minority groups. The proportion of women at the University of California, which was average for women at major institutions, was 10.1% of its tenured faculty and 28.6% of its non-tenured. Thus, the problem is a general one, although there are some

obvious quirks to the distributions: there are apparently somewhat more women in the humanities than in the sciences, more ethnic minorities in the sciences than in the humanities, more Asian minorities in academia than Blacks or Browns, and so on. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that there are relatively fewer women in foreign relations and in military studies than in many other fields of history. Add to this the fact that the proportion that makes it into academic ranks is invariably smaller than the proportion that completes the dissertation. The "Doctoral Dissertations in Foreign Affairs" published in the spring 1987 issue of Diplomatic History lists approximately 25% of its authors as female, but the percentage of women who will get teaching positions in the field is far below that figure.

A second important point, which is clearer to the committee now than it was before our investigations and discussions, is that the challenge of attracting more women and minorities is not something that can necessarily be dealt with by what appears to be the shortest and most direct approach. It is not just a question of making lucrative scholarships available and limiting them to female or Black or Chicano doctoral candidates, for example. In fact, we found an intense opposition among the under-represented groups themselves to the creation of such scholarships -- an opposition grounded on the belief that such a direct "pitch" and non-competitive procedure would be demeaning to the individuals concerned. No, the task is more complicated than simply offering money to young people, since it ultimately involves, in addition to institutional factors, the whole question of our sub-discipline's image and even its very nature. We must face the fact that part of the reason the field of foreign relations does not draw more women and minorities into its midst is that there is a definite aroma of "maleness" (and the dominant culture) attached to the subject matter itself. The cultural stereotype of foreign relations in the United States, both as an activity and field of study, is heavily associated with war, military preparedness, governmental power-brokering, and other "macho" behavior with which white American males, not females, have found it traditional to identify. Moreover, the

reality is probably not far behind the image -- as practiced by historians of the past, "diplomatic history" has tended to focus on those aspects of international relations that are most military, most political, and most oriented toward the possible use of force in defense of the status quo among nations. Thus if we are to attract to our ranks representatives of those groups which traditionally have not been impressed with the necessity for or advantages of violence, and if we are to improve our own sophistication as scholars, we are called upon to refashion our image and our substance in the direction of diversity -- i.e. to enlarge our very definition of foreign relations.

This leads logically into a further point that has become clearer as the result of our deliberations, namely, that, if we truly wish to change things with regard to women and minorities in our discipline, it will be desirable to offer professional consultation and financial assistance at a much earlier stage in students' careers than, for example, does the present Bernath Dissertation Fund committee when it makes money available in the last dissertation year. The crucial time -- that moment at which a woman or minority person is going to decide whether or not to undertake a career as a scholar in foreign relations -- will often occur as early as the first year of an individual's study in graduate school and hardly ever later than the second. The truth is, however, that even intervention during these years may be largely too late. The greatest chance to effect an important change in career flow may well be in the junior and senior years of undergraduate status, and we can hardly overemphasize how important we believe it is for us, both as an organization and as individuals, to encourage the finest female and minority undergraduate students to consider going to graduate school and devoting themselves to work in this profession. For this reason we urge SHAFR to do everything it can to help outstanding female and minority students (indeed, all undergraduate honors students) to attend its various conferences and activities, where they can be exposed to the human relationships and professional accomplishments of our membership. We offer more details about our suggestions below.

Finally, it is necessary to say a word about funding. Early in our discussions our committee was forced to confront the fact that our own resources (approximately \$1500 a year in income from the Bernath discretionary fund), even if reallocated entirely to the work of increasing the presence of the under-represented, hardly constitute a "drop in the bucket" of what is needed. As a result we have proceeded to deal with the challenge assigned us without worrying too much about the financial costs involved, preferring to get clear first as to what we feel should be done. We assume that, after devising a comprehensive program to achieve the end in view, SHAFR will approach a national foundation (or a very wealthy philanthropist) with the intention of obtaining a grant that will enable it to initiate an effort to increase the diversity of its membership and its academic sub-discipline. In accord with our present thinking, this grant might appropriately be in the neighborhood of at least \$10,000 a year for a period of ten years.

But, to draw our thoughts together and to justify such a request, let us spell out more precisely what we are proposing. Our conviction is that it is important and desirable to bring more women and minority persons into our profession but that, in order to achieve this in any reasonable length of time, our organization will have to attack the necessary changes consciously, vigorously, and on a number of fronts.

The first and perhaps most crucial step, in our opinion, is for our society and its leadership to commit themselves explicitly to the end in view, realizing full well that in order to achieve it we must embark on a voyage of redefining ourselves and even our subject matter. In the process we must recognize that the most critical role will be played by the individual members of SHAFR who take the time in future years to try to interest gifted students in the importance of our discipline and profession.

A second step, also important, is to obtain funding that will be adequate to those tasks which the organization can undertake to expedite the process. We believe that the sums necessary will be several

times what is available to the Bernath Dissertation Fund Committee, even if its funds were entirely diverted (a step we do not recommend), and we therefore suggest that SHAFR, after devising a coherent and comprehensive program, should apply to a philanthropic agency (such as the MacArthur Foundation) for an extended grant it could use for this purpose.

Such a "coherent and comprehensive" program might, for example, provide two \$5,000 SHAFR "diversity" scholarships designed for the support of talented second and third year graduate students who intend to specialize in foreign relations and because of their personal qualities, background, and/or dissertation plans would tend effectively to broaden the nature of the field. Awards of this kind, by the way, just as other SHAFR honors, should be publicized more widely in the professional and semi-professional historical literature than we publicize our awards at present. Their very existence would help to transform the image of the field from that of a WASPish, male preserve to something more interesting and democratic.

The SHAFR program should also include a well-defined set of plans for incorporating the very best junior and senior undergraduates -- individuals on the verge of making career decisions -- into the activities of the society. Perhaps it would be possible to enlist the help of Phi Alpha Theta or comparable groups in making money available so that a qualified student could travel to and attend the sessions that SHAFR holds jointly with the AHA and OAH or the SHAFR summer conference. Perhaps undergraduates could compete for the privilege of giving papers themselves at the SHAFR summer conference. In each instance an effort could be made to see that the representation and competition is as broad as possible.

On the professional level, SHAFR could make a very important contribution to its own diversification if it would work more closely with organizations and conferences which have a direct tie to the study of minority of women's history. It could profit immensely, for example, from arranging joint sessions or panel discussions with groups like the Berkshire

Conference on Women's Studies. Such meetings would not only interest established historians in what we are doing but would reach female and minority graduate students and even undergraduates who might become future converts to our field.

Finally, as a useful adjunct to its program of broadening itself, SHAFR could select outstanding women and minority persons from its own membership to represent the organization on lecture tours of American universities and colleges. These could be arranged in much the same way that Phi Beta Kappa currently conducts its visiting scholars program, making sure that the touring professionals have ample time to talk to students. Their presence on a campus would help to counteract the widespread impression that the history of foreign relations has to be narrow, traditional, and dominated by white males.

These, then, are just a few ways in which SHAFR could attempt to attract a broader "mix" of people to the task of writing the history of American foreign relations. We make no claim for the exhaustiveness of our suggestions. But we are persuaded both that something can be done and that something must be done. We therefore urge the SHAFR council to appoint a working committee to prepare and submit implementing legislation for these and other relevant proposals.

Harriet D. Schwar
Stephen G. Rabe
Keith L. Nelson, Chair
The Bernath Dissertation Fund Committee

Note: This report was prepared with the assistance of a number of generous consultants, including Betty Unterberger, Carol Petillo, and Nancy Tucker.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

SHAFR ARRANGEMENTS FOR AHA MEETING IN WASHINGTON

Council Meeting December 27, 1987 8-11 p.m.
Truman Room, Sheraton Hotel

Reception December 28, 1987 5-7 p.m.
Washington Ballroom Balcony, Sheraton Hotel

Luncheon December 29, 1987 12:15-2 p.m.
Wisconsin Room, Sheraton Hotel

WHERE WILL THE 1989 SHAFR SUMMER MEETING BE HELD? A CALL FOR APPLICATIONS

The 1988 SHAFR annual meeting will be held in early June at American University, and Nancy Tucker and Robert Beisner and their Program Committee are already at work making arrangements and planning panels.

We now need to look ahead to a site for the 1989 meeting. Please send your proposals with supporting information about accommodations, transportation, rooms, food, etc. to Professor Thomas G. Paterson, SHAFR President, Department of History, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06268.

HELP! SHAFR, THE OAH, AND AHA: THE PROGRAMS

Several members of SHAFR have expressed dismay over the paucity of panels on diplomatic topics at recent American Historical Association and Organization of American Historians annual meetings. In response, as SHAFR President, I inquired about the reasons. The problem lies with diplomatic historians, not with the OAH or AHA. Although their program committees have not always included a diplomatic historian, there is

no evidence of AHA or OAH discrimination against our field of study. The fact is that we are simply not submitting proposals for panels. The OAH Program Committee just completed its work for the 1988 meeting in Reno, and the chair indicates that of 185 session and paper proposals, only six were in the area of foreign relations.

Help! Let's start sending in proposals for panels again. The OAH and AHA program committees welcome proposals which are complete: chair, speakers, and commentators.

The OAH Program Committee chair for the 1989 meeting in St. Louis is Professor Richard W. Fox, Department of History, Reed College, Portland, Oregon 97202. See the OAH Newsletter for deadlines.

The AHA Program Committee chair for the 1988 meeting in Cincinnati is Professor Konrad Jarausch, Department of History, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514. See AHA Perspectives for deadlines.

Start working with your SHAFR colleagues now to form some panels, so that diplomatic history is well represented at forthcoming meetings.

Thanks.

-- Thomas Paterson

HOUSING OPPORTUNITY CONNECTED WITH SHAFR SUMMER CONFERENCE

The American University intends to make dormitory housing available next June not only during the SHAFR conference (June 9-11), but several days in advance (June 5-8) and afterward (June 12-17) as well. Other conferences and activities will compete for available university housing, however, making it essential to offer AU officials an estimate as soon as possible on the likely demand for dormitory housing in the June 5-8 and June 12-17 periods. If you think it likely that you will wish to take advantage of this housing opportunity, please write Robert L. Beisner, Dept. of History, The American University, 4400 Mass. Ave.,

NW, Washington, D.C. 20016 no later than 1 October 1987, with details as to dates, duration of stay, etc. You will not, at this time, be making any kind of commitment; what is needed is a reasonably accurate estimate.

Charges for rooms will be in the \$25-\$35 per evening range at Centennial Hall (new; non-smoking) and \$21-\$27 at Anderson Hall (smoking allowed), depending on whether you want a single or double room. Exact costs will be available in September. Guaranteed dormitory housing during the conference itself will have to be confirmed by 1 April 1988, but by 15 January 1988 for housing before and after the conference. If you have any questions, please write Robert Beisner at the address above or call at (202) 885-2401.

**USMA SYMPOSIUM, APRIL 13-15, 1988
"THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AMERICAN
NATIONAL SECURITY, 1960-1968"**

The United States Military Academy, with the generous support of the National Endowment for the Humanities, will sponsor a history symposium entitled "The Theory and Practice of American National Security, 1960-1968" at West Point, New York, April 13-15, 1988. Historians and political scientists (including several SHAFR members) will present papers on political, strategic, economic, and other aspects of American National Security Policy during the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson administrations. For further information contact: Lieutenant Colonel Charles F. Brower, Department of History, USMA, West Point, New York, 10996.

ASSOCIATION FOR DIPLOMATIC STUDIES

Members of SHAFR will be interested to learn of the creation of the Association for Diplomatic Studies, a private, 501(c)(3) organization established in 1986 to enhance the programs of the Foreign Service Institute,

the Department of State's training facility. The Association is housed in the Institute but is a separate entity. The members of its board are largely career and non-career former chiefs of mission. It is a membership organization, open to the public. Regular membership dues are \$25.00 per year.

The Association has embarked on three projects of historical interest:

a) An oral history program. At this writing, the Association is sponsoring three different oral history projects: one on former senior officials, one on women ambassadors, and one on foreign service families.

b) A diplomatic history research center. The Association envisages creation of a facility which will be available to historians and which will include: the most complete diplomatic history reference collection in Washington (outside the Library of Congress); the oral histories produced under its auspices, as well as transcripts of oral histories of relevance to diplomatic history held in other collections; and the personal papers and writings of foreign affairs personnel. This facility will be located on the new campus which the FSI is scheduled to occupy in 1991 at what is now Arlington

c) The historical collection. The association plans to create what will in effect be an open museum of objects, documents, photographs, maps, portraits, uniforms etc. illustrating the history of American foreign relations, to be displayed in the reception areas and hallways of the Institute's new plant. Anyone knowing of diplomatic memorabilia needing a worthy home is urged to write to the Association at 1400 Boulevard, Arlington, Virginia 22209. The telephone number is (703) 235-8757.

Members of SHAFR are cordially invited to become members of the Association.

JOHN CARTER BROWN LIBRARY RESEARCH FELLOWSHIPS

The John Carter Brown Library, an independently managed research institution at Brown University,

offers approximately fifteen short-term fellowships each year, extending from one to four months. These fellowships are open to foreign nationals as well as Americans, and to scholars engaged in pre- or post-doctoral, or independent, research related to the resources of the Library. The monthly stipend for these short-term fellowships is \$800.

In addition, the Library offers NEH-sponsored long-term fellowships, extending from six months to a year, with an annual stipend of \$27,500 or a six-month stipend of \$13,750. NEH fellowships are restricted to scholars engaged in post-doctoral research who are United States citizens or are foreign nationals who have lived in the U.S. for three years immediately preceding the award.

Recipients of all Fellowships are expected to be in regular residence at the Library and to participate in the intellectual life of Brown University. The Library is particularly strong in printed materials, both European and American, related to the discovery, exploration, settlement, and development of North and South America before 1830. The deadline for applications is January 15. Announcement of awards is made in March. For further information and application forms, write to the Director, John Carter Brown Library, Box 1894, Providence, RI 02912.

IGCC CONFERENCE

In February 1987, the University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation sponsored a conference in San Diego with the title, "Historical Perspectives on Global Conflict and Cooperation." Since the purpose of the conference was to bring historians together in workshop-sized groups to discuss what contribution their discipline could make to the better understanding of global peace and security issues, the IGCC believes its conclusions may be of interest to all historians, but particularly to those interested in diplomatic history and foreign relations. Copies of a thirty-four page report may be obtained upon request and without charge from:

Helen Hawkins, Publications Office, IGCC,Q-060, UC San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093.

TINKER FOUNDATION FELLOWSHIPS

The John Carter Brown Library will award two Research and Teaching Fellowships in 1988-1989, and 1989-1990 to scholars from Latin America. One Fellow each year must be from Brazil; the other may be from any Latin American country. The Fellowships will extend for ten months (approximately August 1st to May 31st). Each includes a stipend of \$25,000, plus support for travel costs. Application forms may be obtained from: Director, Tinker Fellows Program, The John Carter Brown Library, Box 1894, Providence, Rhode Island, 02912. Nominations should be sent to the same address. The deadline for the receipt of completed applications for the 1988-1989 Fellowships is December 1, 1987.

MARSHALL PAPERS

The George C. Marshall Foundation announces the publication of George C. Marshall Papers, 1932-1960; A Guide. The 164-page publication gives a comprehensive overview of the 115 linear feet of General of the Army Marshall's personal papers. The guide sells for \$5.54 which includes book rate postage. Virginia residents, please add 4.5% sales tax (\$0.23). Address orders to: The Museum Shop, The George C. Marshall Foundation, P.O. Box 1600, Lexington, Virginia 24450.

PEACE ARCHIVES: A GUIDE TO LIBRARY COLLECTIONS OF THE PAPERS OF AMERICAN PEACE ORGANIZATIONS AND OF LEADERS IN THE PUBLIC EFFORT FOR PEACE

Published in 1986 by the World Without War Council, this 80-page directory identifies substantial organizational archives in some 30 major repositories and lists over 70 individual collections. It also

contains special sections explaining the standards of record keeping and identifying the process of archiving employed by major peace organizations. [A grant from the New York Friends Group provides free copies for qualified research organizations and institutions.]

AN INVITATION: ASSESSING THE PUBLIC EFFORT FOR PEACE IN AMERICA, 1984-1987

For the past seven years the World Without War Council has maintained an overview of the public effort for peace in America. Beginning with a National Endowment for the Humanities grant covering the period 1930-1980, the Council has conducted subsequent triennial assessments. They are designed to record and evaluate the ideas and work strategies which defined the public effort for peace in each three-year period. Assessment seminars and conferences bring distinguished historians, political scientists and specialists into dialogue with organizational leaders. The project's purpose is to evaluate past action and to point the way to wise and more effective work for the non-violent resolution of international conflict by American organizations. For information contact:

Marguerite Green, World Without War Council, 1730
Martin L. King, Jr. Way, Berkeley, CA 94709

THE CHINESE ASSOCIATION OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (CAHIR)

CAHIR, an academic body for the study of the history of international relations in the People's Republic of China, was founded in Guangzhou (Canton) in December 1980. Upholding the principle of "letting a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend," CAHIR aims at promoting teaching and research in the history of international relations by sponsoring various academic activities and exchanges.

Its main tasks are:

1. To encourage and help its members in the teaching of and research on the history of international relations;
2. To facilitate exchanges and joint projects with foreign academic bodies, institutions and scholars in the same field;
3. To organize symposiums, seminars, lectures and information exchanges;
4. To keep members informed about relevant research programmes going on in various parts of the country and sponsor cooperative efforts in selected research projects;
5. To sponsor the editing, translation and/or publication of periodic or non-periodic journals, materials and collections of academic papers; and
6. To collect and exchange materials and information about history of international relations.

In order to facilitate regular discussions on important research topics and promote exchanges of experience in teaching and research, branch associations are set up where there is a fair number of members and conditions are mature. So far institutions for international studies have been set up in Shanghai and Dalian. A branch association has been established in the Beijing area. Two more branch associations will shortly be launched in the mid-southern and north-eastern regions of China.

According to its constitution, CAHIR holds a national conference once every three years. The first conference was held in Guangzhou in December 1980, the second in Nanjing in December 1982 and the third in Beijing in July 1985. At the last conference the Third Council of CAHIR was elected, which comprises 39 members (including one place reserved for Taiwan Province).

CAHIR has set up a special committee for the compilation and publication of a multi-volume History of International Relations academic and a book series on the history of international relations.

CAHIR wishes to establish ties with foreign colleagues for the promotion of academic exchanges such as organizing seminars, exchanging information, books, materials and publications, providing assistance to scholars in their researches, facilitating academic visits, etc.

CAHIR is located in the Foreign Affairs College, 24 Zhan Lan Road, Beijing, China.

CALENDAR

November 1	Deadline, materials for the December <u>Newsletter</u> .
November 1	Applications due to Bernath Dissertation Fund Committee.
November 1-15	Annual election for SHAFR officers.
December 27-30	The 102nd annual meeting of the AHA will be held in Washington at the Sheraton and Shoreham Hotels. The deadline for proposals has passed.
January 1, 1988	Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
January 15	Deadlines for the 1987 Bernath article award and the Bernath book award.
February 1	Deadline, materials for the March <u>Newsletter</u> .
March 1	Nominations for the Bernath lecture prize are due.

- March 24-27 The 81st annual meeting of the OAH will be held in Reno with headquarters at Bally's Hotel. (The deadline for submissions has passed.)
- April 1 Applications for the W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship are due.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June Newsletter.
- June 9-12 14th SHAFR Summer Conference at American University.
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September Newsletter.

The 1989 meeting of the OAH will be held in St. Louis, MO, at Adam's Mark Hotel, April 6-9.

The Program Chair is:

Professor Richard Fox, Department of History,
Reed College, Portland, OR 97202

The deadline for proposals is March 15, 1987.

The 14th annual conference of SHAFR will be held at American University. The Program co-chairs are Nancy Tucker and Robert Beisner. See notices elsewhere in this Newsletter relating to the conference.

In 1988 the AHA will meet in Cincinnati.

The Program Chair is:

Konrad Jarausch, Dept. of History, University of
N. Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514

In 1989 the AHA will meet in San Francisco.

AN OBITUARY

Joseph May died on march 18, 1987 at his home in Warren, Ohio. Joe May had been the U.S. diplomatic historian at Youngstown State University since 1968. Joe was active in a number of professional associations; he had organized, given papers, and served as commentator at a number of meetings of the AHA and the Ohio Academy of history. He bequeathed his research notes and photocopies of documents on the European Defense Community and on the Bricker Amendment for use by Kent State University graduate students. The History Department of Youngstown State has set up a memorial prize in his name.

PERSONALS

Walter Lafeber (Cornell University) has been elected to the American Academy of Arts of Sciences. Congratulations!

Thomas J. Noer (Carthage College) received a \$6600.00 grant from the Spencer foundation of Chicago for an oral history of the Peace Corps.

Chester J. Pach, Jr. will be a Visiting Assistant Professor of History at the University of Kansas for 1987-88.

Reinhard R. Doerries (University of Kassel) has been elected President of the German Society for American Studies (Deutsche Gesellschaft fuer Amerikastudien). Professor Doerries has also taken over the chair for British and American Studies at the University of Kassel.

Michael A. Barnhart (SUNY-Stony Brook) has been awarded a grant from the Naval Historical Center for research on "American Military Strategy and the Acquisition of Overseas Bases, 1941-1959."

Lloyd Gardner (Rutgers) has been elected to the Executive Board of the OAH.

BONERS

Nazi-Soviet Pact. "It was a friendly non-aggression pact signed between Germany and Russia. But all the information and agreements were kept secret from each other."

-- Hal Elliott Wert (Kansas City Art Institute)

"Communism in some places was like a disease, taking care of the needy until they were in power."

"The Soviet-American partnership broke down [at the end of World War II] because the North Vietnamese had allied ties with the South Vietnamese, which America was attacking."

-- Chester Pach, Jr. (University of Kansas)

"The U.S. Exploded a bomb in the Los Alamos dessert."

-- Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana University)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize, were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976 respectively, through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition

Description: This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations.

Eligibility: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations, published during 1987. It must be the author's first or second book.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent directly to: Calvin Davis, History Department, Duke University, Durham, NC 27706.

Books may be sent at any time during 1987, but should not arrive later than January 20, 1988.

The award of \$2000.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians, in March, 1988, in Reno.

Previous Winners:

1972	Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
	Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
1973	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1974	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1975	Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
	Stephen E. Pelz (Massachusetts-Amherst)
1976	Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
1977	Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
1978	James R. Leutze (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1979	Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston)
1980	Michael Schaller (Arizona)
1981	Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke)
	Hugh DeSantis (Department of State)
1982	David Reynolds (Cambridge)
1983	Richard Immerman (Hawaii)
1984	Michael H. Hunt (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1985	David Wyman (Massachusetts-Amherst)
1986	Thomas J. Noer (Carthage College)
1987	Fraser J. Harbutt (Emory)
	James Edward Miller (Department of State)

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

Eligibility: The lecture will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the annual meetings of the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer will address himself not specifically to his own research interests, but to broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy.

Procedures: The Bernath Lecture Committee is soliciting nominations for the lecture from members of the Society. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vita, if available, should reach the Committee no later than March 1, 1988. The chairman of the committee to whom nominations should be sent is: Dorothy V. Jones, 1213 Main St., Evanston, IL 60202.

The award is \$500.00, with publication in Diplomatic History

Previous Winners

1977	Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
1978	David S. Patterson (Colgate)
1979	Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
1980	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1981	Burton Spivak (Bates College)
1982	Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)
1983	Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt)
1984	Michael J. Hogan (Miami)
1985	Michael Schaller (Arizona)
1986	Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Colgate)
1987	William O. Walker III (Ohio Wesleyan)

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

Eligibility: Prize competition is open to any article on any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1987. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or within 10 years after receiving the Ph.D., at the time of publication. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

Procedures: All articles appearing in Diplomatic History shall be automatically considered without nomination. Other articles may be nominated by the author or by any member of SHAFR or by the editor of any journal publishing articles in American diplomatic history. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted by 15 January 1988 to the chairperson of the committee, who for 1988 is: Sally Marks, Department of History, University of Rhode Island, Providence, RI 02908.

The award of \$300.00 will be presented at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH in March, 1988, in Reno.

Previous winners:

- 1977 John C.A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)
- 1978 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
- 1979 Brian L. Villa (Ottawa)
- 1980 James I. Matray (New Mexico State)
David A. Rosenberg (Chicago)
- 1981 Douglas Little (Clark)
- 1982 Fred Pollock (Cedar Knolls, NJ)
- 1983 Chester Pach (Texas Tech)
- 1985 Melvyn Leffler (Vanderbilt)
- 1986 Duane Tananbaum (Ohio State)
- 1987 David McLean (Riverina-Murray Institute, NSW)

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Fund

This fund has been established through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath in honor of their late son to help doctoral students defray some of the expenses encountered in the concluding phases of writing their dissertations.

Requirements include:

1. The dissertation must cover some aspect of American foreign relations.
2. An award will help defray:
 - (a) last-minute costs to consult a collection of original materials that has just become available or to obtain photocopies from such sources
 - (b) typing and/or reproducing copies of the manuscript
 - (c) abstracting costs.
3. The award committee presumes that most research and writing of the dissertation has been completed. Awards are not intended for general research or for time to write.
4. Applicants must be members of SHAFR.
5. Deadline for receipt of applications is November 1.
6. The application should include an itemized listing of how the money is to be used; an abstract and a description of the significance of the study; and a projected date of completion.
7. The applicant's supervisor must include a brief statement certifying the accuracy of the applicant's request and report of completion.
8. When the dissertation is finished the recipient must send to the chairman of the committee a copy of the abstract sent to University Microfilms (University of Michigan).
9. Generally an award will not exceed \$500.00, and a minimum, of three awards each year will be made. More awards are possible if the amounts requested are less.

Nominations, with supporting documentation should be sent to Keith Nelson, Department of History, University of California, Irvine, CA 92717. The deadline for applications is December 1, 1987.

Previous winners:

- | | |
|------|------------------------------------|
| 1985 | Jon Nielson (UC-Santa Barbara) |
| 1986 | Valdina C. Winn (Kansas) |
| | Walter L. Hixon (Colorado) |
| 1987 | Janet M. Manson (Washington State) |
| | Thomas M. Gaskin (Washington) |
| | W. Michael Weis (Ohio State) |
| | Michael Wala (Hamburg) |

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Holt Dissertation Fellowship was established as a memorial to W. Stull Holt, one of that generation of historians which established diplomatic history as a respected field for historical research and teaching.

The award will be \$1500.00.

Applicants must be candidates for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, whose dissertation projects are directly concerned with the history of United States foreign relations. The award is intended to help defray travel and living expenses connected with the research and/or the writing of the dissertation.

To be qualified, applicants must be candidates in good standing at a doctoral granting graduate school who will have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree (including the general or comprehensive examinations) except for the dissertation before April, 1988.

There is no special application form. Applicants must submit a complete academic transcript of graduate work to date. A prospectus of the dissertation must accompany the application. This should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, and chief source materials. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used.

Three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one letter from the director of the dissertation, should be submitted to the committee.

Deadline for filing applications and supporting letters for this year's award will be April 1, 1988.

Applications should be addressed to the Chairperson of this year's W. Stull Holt Fellowship Committee: Terry Anderson, Department of History, Texas A&M, College Station, TX 77843

Prior winners: 1986 Kurt Shultz (Miami)
1987 David W. McFadden (University of
California, Berkeley)

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

Conditions of the Award:

The Graebner prize will be awarded, beginning in 1986, to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older.

The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

- (a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;
- (b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;
- (c) describes the candidate's teaching career, listing any teaching honors and awards and commenting on the candidate's classroom skills; and
- (d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organi-

zations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Chairman of the committee: Edward Bennett, Dept. of History, Washington State, Pullman, WA 99163.

Prior winner: Dorothy Borg (Columbia)

WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

The award will be made every other year at the SHAFR summer conference. Deadline for submissions is March 1, 1989. Submissions and questions should be directed to the chairman of the selection committee:

David Patterson
Office of the Historian
Department of State
Washington, DC 20520

1987 winner: Harold Josephson (University of North Carolina at Charlotte)

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University,
Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William J. Brinker, Department of History.

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: Jay Fain.

ISSUES: The Newsletter is published on the 1st of
March, June, September and December.

DEADLINES: All material should be sent to the editor
four weeks prior to publication date.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Changes of address should be sent to
the Executive Secretary-Treasurer: William
Kamman, North Texas State University, Denton,
Texas 76203.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of back numbers of the Newsletter
may be obtained from the editorial office upon
payment of a charge of \$1.00 per copy: for
members living abroad, \$2.00.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals, announcements,
abstracts of scholarly papers and articles
delivered--or published--upon diplomatic sub-
jects, bibliographical or historiographical
essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, infor-
mation about foreign depositories, biographies,
autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the
field, jokes, etc.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

- 1968 Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)
- 1969 Alexander DeConde (California-Santa Barbara)
- 1970 Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)
- 1971 Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)
- 1972 Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)
- 1973 Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)
- 1974 Bradford Perkins (Michigan)
- 1975 Armin H. Rappaport (California-San Diego)
- 1976 Robert A. Divine (Texas)
- 1977 Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)
- 1978 Akira Iriye (Chicago)
- 1979 Paul A. Varg (Michigan State)
- 1980 David M. Pletcher (Indiana)
- 1981 Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State)
- 1982 Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa)
- 1983 Ernest R. May (Harvard)
- 1984 Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State)
- 1985 Warren F. Kuehl (Akron)
- 1986 Betty Unterberger (Texas A&M)