

Passport

The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Volume 39, Issue 2, September 2008



Inside...

A Roundtable on Melvyn Leffler's *For the Soul of Mankind*
The New Literature about Henry Kissinger
The Non-Academic Value of Academic Scholarship
Teaching with the White House Tapes

...and much more!

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President Nixon, Henry Kissinger and Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, meeting in the Oval Office, 03/01/1973, ARC Identifier 194491, Item from Collection NS-WHPO: White House Photo Office Collection, 01/20/1969 - 08/09/1974.

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Debating the New Henry Kissinger Literature

Jeremi Suri, Thomas Alan Schwartz, Jussi Hanhimäki,

Edward C. Keefer, and William Glenn Gray

Henry Kissinger in Historical Context: War, Democracy, and Jewish Identity

Jeremi Suri

Henry Kissinger's career was a product of broad political, diplomatic, and cultural currents in the twentieth century. Kissinger was a self-conscious outsider in American society who depended on procuring the support of people who were suspicious of his personal, ideological, and ethnic background. His actions and his policies reflected his need to please powerful and prejudiced state figures. They also reflected the demands of these figures and many of their constituents. In this sense, Kissinger was neither a strategic genius nor a war criminal. He was a man made by the Second World War and the Cold War. He was less an innovator than a synthesizer of trends around him.

This is the main argument of my new book, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century*.¹ I attempt to explain why Kissinger did what he did, connecting his actions throughout his career to his circumstances in an effort to historicize him and to uncover the deeper meaning of his career for the development of American society, and the international system as a whole, since the early 1930s.

Democratic Weakness

Germany in the 1920s was one of the most vibrant, sophisticated, and diverse societies in Europe. It boasted the best minds of the era. It

also had a wealth of political parties representing a wide spectrum of opinion. Weimar Germany embodied the democratic and modern hopes of upwardly mobile families like the Kissingers, who resided in the Bavarian town of Fürth.

The rise to power of a genocidal Nazi regime, and the scarcity of resistance to it, exposed the hollowness of these hopes. Sophisticated citizens supported hatred and violence. Good democrats failed to resist brutal dictatorship. Foreign societies pledged to humane principles of government failed to act against the Nazi onslaught before it was too late for millions of the regime's victims.

Witnessing these events first hand, Henry Kissinger could only conclude that democracies were weak and ineffective at combating destructive enemies. They were too slow to act, too divided to mount a strong defense, and too idealistic to make tough decisions about the use of force. This was the central lesson of appeasement—the appeasement of the Nazi party within the Weimar system, the appeasement of Nazi Germany within the international system. Democracies needed decisive leaders, and they needed protections against themselves. The solution was not to jettison democracy as a whole, but to build space for charismatic, forward-looking leaders and undemocratic decision-making in government. This was precisely the route that Great Britain and the United States took when they finally went to war with fascism. This was precisely the model of heroic politics for Kissinger and many others of his generation.

The United States was a savior—a “haven,” in Kissinger's words²—not because it was a democracy, but because it possessed enormous power that it was willing to deploy, if belatedly, for the defense of humanity. Although American society was filled with prejudice, violence, and injustice, it valued basic freedoms that fascism denied. For Kissinger and many other Europeans, the United States was a necessary protector, not an idealistic beacon. It had a mandate to destroy dangerous threats, not to remake the world in its image.

Kissinger came of age with a generation that defined growing American power in terms that challenged bedrock democratic beliefs. Calling upon the United States to “temper its missionary spirit,” Kissinger emphasized the limits on ideals in the Cold War. Based on his own personal experience in Weimar Germany, he warned that “righteousness is the parent of fanaticism and intolerance.”³

Jewish Cosmopolitanism

The end of the Second World War and the emergence of the Cold War marked a transformation in the social and political status of Jewish citizens. In the United States and other countries before the 1930s only a very small number of Jews attended elite universities, directed public corporations, or made government policy. These walls of Jewish exclusion crumbled in the decades after the horrors of the Holocaust. By the 1960s Jews had achieved extraordinary success in mainstream society, with a powerful presence

in universities, corporations, and government offices. They continued *to face prejudice and exclusion*, but Jews were now prominent international actors.⁴

Henry Kissinger was part of this story. His career reflected major shifts in popular attitudes and professional needs that not only allowed Jewish mobility, but often encouraged it for instrumental purposes. Kissinger's German-Jewish identity limited his opportunities for becoming a doctor in the U.S. Army, but it facilitated his ascent into counterintelligence, his return to Germany in American uniform, and his assumption of high-level occupation duties. Desperate to manage the vast territory it held in Europe at the end of the Second World War, the Army privileged Kissinger's German language skills and his knowledge of European society. Despite his own short time in the United States, Kissinger's Jewish background ensured that he would not sympathize with the Nazi enemy.

This pattern of combined exclusion and privilege continued throughout Kissinger's career. He gained admission to Harvard University after the Second World War when American higher education sought to accommodate military veterans and showcase the openness of a free society. Students like Kissinger displayed the country's commitment to "Judeo-Christian" values, a commitment that stood in contrast to the anti-Semitism of Nazi Germany and the atheism of the Soviet Union. Jews became symbols of more worldly, open, and policy-relevant universities. The U.S. government underwrote this effort to expand educational opportunities through the G.I. Bill and new infusions of funding to academic institutions.

Kissinger, however, was never a "Harvard man." He and other Jews of his generation lived separate lives from other students. They did not have access to the elite social clubs, and they were not fully accepted among their peers. Instead, they gravitated to fields—including international affairs—where they had skills and experiences valued by powerful academic figures on campus, as well as policymakers

in Washington. Jewish immigrants, like Kissinger, had knowledge of *foreign societies that the United States* needed as it prepared for a wider global presence. They had *foreign networks that could help build American influence overseas*. Most significant, they felt a deep commitment to assuring American power as a necessary bulwark against the violence and hatred they had experienced in their native lands. Jewish immigrants were cosmopolitans and patriots at the same time—an essential combination for successful policy in the Cold War.

Kissinger and other Jews rose through tradition-bound institutions because their attributes as outsiders were valued by specific insiders. They gained enormous power through informal channels of influence, including new programs at universities, new international exchanges sponsored by various governments, new links between the campus and the White House, and new policymaking bodies. Influence, however, did not buy acceptance. For all his fame and power, Kissinger remained an outsider to mainstream American society. He and other Jews depended on personal patronage from non-Jews, and they remained targets of anti-Semitic suspicion, often from the very men who promoted them. Kissinger's experiences as a German-Jewish policy advisor shaped his exercise of power.

Foreign Policymaking after 1968

In the shadow of the Tet Offensive and widespread domestic upheavals after January 1968, Kissinger feared a return to the violence, chaos, and collapse of Weimar Germany with "the turmoil surely ahead of us." "The next Presidency is likely to be tragic," he predicted. "Nothing suggests that any of the prospective candidates can unify the country or restore America's position in the world. The next four years are likely to witness mounting crises—disorder at home, increasing tension abroad."⁵

Kissinger's experiences as a German Jew in the 1930s deeply affected his thinking. He had

witnessed the collapse of civilization at the hands of frightened and *frustrated citizens*. *He had suffered* the pain of heightened violence and prejudice amidst upheaval. *Like many other figures from* similar backgrounds, Kissinger was profoundly skeptical about the prospects for democratic deliberation during a time of crisis. Efforts at political compromise and public persuasion were not enough. The global unrest of the late 1960s demanded a fundamental redirection of policy. The heroic statesman had to channel the energies and emotions of citizens into a new framework for political thought, with a revised set of expectations.

Kissinger clearly recognized that Richard Nixon was not a heroic statesman. His relationship with Nixon did not arise out of common beliefs, affections, or a patron-client arrangement, as all of Kissinger's other professional relationships did. Despite their claims concerning the importance of grand strategy, there is no evidence they ever had a heart-to-heart conversation about their shared hopes for the future. They ranted about their perceived enemies—political insiders, liberal intellectuals, and the media—but they never outlined a vision of the future. How did they want to change the world? What was their desired legacy? Kissinger thought extensively about these matters alone, but he and the president never broached such subjects together with any documented seriousness.

Theirs was not a collaboration for higher purposes. It was a marriage of convenience, filled with all of the suspicion, hostility, and jealousy that accompanies these dysfunctional alliances. Nixon and Kissinger respected and resented each other at the same time. They worked closely together, but remained strangers to one another. Looking back on his time in the White House, Kissinger remains amazed at how personally distant he was from the president who gave him so much power.⁶

Fears of democratic chaos and anxieties about pervasive threats: these were the anchors for Nixon and Kissinger's working relationship.

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Fears of democratic chaos and anxieties about pervasive threats: these were the anchors for Nixon and Kissinger's working relationship.

They always had adversaries, particularly within the United States, to bring them together. They always had schemes, both domestic and foreign, to outmaneuver their enemies. Nixon and Kissinger were emotionally bound by a strong desire to protect the imperiled institutions of the United States that made their careers possible. They would "stick it" to those citizens and leaders who condescended to them. In a time of crisis, their relationship inverted political tradition, placing the outsiders who had operated on the fringes of power in the driver's seat.

Nixon and Kissinger had a dark view of human nature and democratic society, born of their own experiences with social prejudice. Nixon never confronted the anti-Semitic virulence of Nazi Germany, but he faced the disdain of East Coast elites for a hard-working man from rural America without polish or prestigious connections. He and Kissinger had to scrape and struggle for their advancement, and they viewed life accordingly. They did not believe that an expansion of freedoms would naturally make for a better society. Free citizens were often hateful and destructive, as the urban riots of the late 1960s seemed to prove once again. For Nixon and Kissinger, social improvement required firm national leadership to limit human excesses and restrict human hatreds. The same applied to the international system, where competitive states would pummel one another to death without the force of imposed order from a superior power. Nixon and Kissinger saw themselves as benevolent strong men rather than Jeffersonian democrats.

In his daily behavior and rhetoric, Nixon acted more like a gangster than a statesman. He told Kissinger that in confronting critics, including the mainstream American press, "you can't fight . . . with gentlemanly gloves." He ordered his aides to reject standard inhibitions about decency and civility. When confronting an adversary they should "kick him" and "keep whacking, whacking, and whacking." "Scare the shit out of them."⁷

Insecurity and vulnerability

pervaded the government. Nixon's distrust of the diplomatic elite in various offices led him to centralize foreign policy power in the White House. He intended to direct the details of strategy more than any of his predecessors. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy had begun the process of converting the National Security Council (NSC), created in 1947 as an administrative organ, into a policymaking body. Nixon extended this process, using the NSC as his personal creature, often excluding the departments of State and Defense from key deliberations.⁸

This personalization of policy led Nixon to empower his NSC advisor as the dominant day-to-day overseer of foreign activities. The president had too many responsibilities; he could not follow the details of even the most important issues. By necessity more than design, Nixon turned to Kissinger as the preeminent foreign policy figure in the administration. As Richard Allen, William F. Buckley, and others attested, Kissinger had the brains and ambition to play this role.⁹ He was a renowned scholar with extraordinary political access, but he was also an outsider to the clubby establishment elite. Nixon recognized, as Nelson Rockefeller had before, that he could use Kissinger's talents and control him at the same time. The NSC advisor would take on numerous responsibilities, but he would remain dependent on the president for his continued power. He would not have the prestige conferred by the State Department (at least not until 1973), nor would he benefit from a broad constituency within the administration. "Kissinger's power derived from Nixon," the president's longtime speechwriter, William Safire, observed. In the first year of the administration, Safire recalled, "Kissinger was more organizer and codifier than stimulant to Nixon, because a sense of bringing order out of chaos was what the President

needed most."¹⁰

The NSC advisor served the president as the skilled business manager served his gangster boss. Nixon barked orders and Kissinger dutifully listened. He then had to interpret the chief's intemperate remarks in ways that would serve intended purposes and address neglected issues. This was a tricky undertaking that could incur the wrath of the president if his unwise remarks were followed too closely or his deeply considered statements were ignored. In his memoirs Kissinger recounts how he and other presidential advisors "learned to discount much of what he said

Like all gangsters, Nixon refused to respect the boundaries of his servant's personal space. Kissinger worked for a man who demanded that he remain "on call" at all hours, ever ready to bear the brunt of his boss's angry outbursts and bolster his fragile self-esteem.

and filter out many assertions made under stress. We were expected, we believed, to delay implementing more exuberant directives, giving our President the opportunity to live out his fantasies and yet to act, through us, with the calculation that his other image of himself prescribed."¹¹

Like all gangsters, Nixon refused to respect the boundaries of his servant's personal space. Kissinger worked for a man who demanded that he remain "on call" at all hours, ever ready to bear the brunt of his boss's angry outbursts and bolster his fragile self-esteem. One such telephone conversation occurred a few minutes before midnight on 17 April 1973, when Nixon called Kissinger to lament the mounting pressures surrounding the Watergate scandal:

Nixon: Some of these people will even piss on the President if they think it will help them. It's pretty hard... Maybe we'll even consider the possibility of, frankly, just throwing myself on the sword...

Kissinger: That is out of the question, with all due respect, Mr. President. That cannot be considered. The personality, what it would do to the presidency, and the historical injustice of

it. Why should you do it, and what good would it do? Whom would it help? It wouldn't help the country. It wouldn't help any individual involved... You have saved this country, Mr. President. The history books will show that, when no one will know what Watergate means.¹²

This conversation captures the dysfunctional nature of the president's relationship with his advisor. Nixon's words are filled with anger and self-pity, and he demands sycophantic validation from his subordinate. Late at night, Kissinger finds himself forced to assess his volatile boss, prove his loyalty, and also contain any further eruption. Kissinger has to allay and affirm Nixon at the same time. He has to separate the posturing from the purposeful and quickly discern how the president's words affected pressing policy decisions. Nixon was an imposing boss whom Kissinger had to manage from a position of weakness.

Kissinger had confronted anti-Semitic attitudes in all of his professional activities, but coming from Nixon these prejudices were particularly grating. Nixon frequently lashed out against Jewish conspiracies. He identified Jewish enemies in the media, business, academia, and the state of Israel. They were untrustworthy, secretly organized, and un-American in their attacks on the president. When Nixon learned that Mark Felt — the second-highest-ranking FBI official and the man later identified as "deep throat" — was leaking damaging information, he immediately focused on Felt's background: "It could be the Jewish thing. I don't know. It's always a possibility." Nixon generalized about the treachery of Jews and the need to isolate them from political power: "We've been trying to run this town by avoiding the Jews in the government, because there were very serious questions.... Because there were leaks in the government itself." Nixon surrounded himself with men whom he believed would not be "soft on the Jews." He subjected Jewish critics to

the same rough, gangster-like tactics reserved for other enemies.¹³

Nixon, of course, recognized that he was investing enormous foreign policy power in a German Jew. His belief in the supreme capabilities of Jews, especially for intrigue, surely encouraged this decision. It also fed his profound suspicion of Kissinger. The NSC advisor was an ally and adversary at the same time. Fearing that Kissinger was collaborating with Nixon's Jewish critics in the media, the president ordered close surveillance of his telephone conversations. Referring to Max Frankel, an editor at the *New York Times*, Nixon explained: "Henry is compulsive on Frankel. He's Jewish... Henry — the *New York Times*, see if he talked to Frankel." Kissinger did share information with the press, but the attribution of this to a Jewish conspiracy highlighted the depths of the president's prejudices.¹⁴

Kissinger confronted Nixon's anti-Semitism on a variety of issues, particularly policy toward Israel. When Kissinger received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973 for his role in the Vietnam negotiations, a jealous Nixon called with advice about how he should donate the award money. Without warning, the president thundered: "I would not put any in for Israel." Taken aback, Kissinger responded: "Absolutely not. That would be out of the question. I never give to Israel." "You should not," Nixon repeated. "No. That is out of the question," Kissinger confirmed. The sting of this dialogue remained with Kissinger more than three decades later, when he published the transcript of the conversation but excluded the material illustrating the president's suspicion about his aide's excessive loyalty to Israel.¹⁵

Leonard Garment, another Jew who served Nixon as a domestic policy advisor and later legal counsel, recounts that Kissinger privately complained about the "goddamn anti-Semites" in the administration. Garment explains that "Kissinger was treated at the White House as an exotic wunderkind — a character, an outsider. His colleagues' regard for him was genuine, but so were the endless gibes at his accent and

style, and so were the railings against Jewish power that were part of the casual conversation among Nixon's inner circle." "[J]ust as a black man can never change his skin," Garment observed, "Kissinger could never — in fact, would never — shed his Jewishness."¹⁶

Kissinger worked hard to anticipate and diffuse potential accusations about a worldwide Jewish conspiracy. He was in a permanently defensive position on this topic, ever fearful of the suspicion emanating from the Oval Office and other parts of society. In October 1973, when Kissinger (now secretary of state as well as NSC advisor) prepared to present a list of appointees to the U.S. Senate for confirmation, he noticed an overwhelming preponderance of Jewish names:

Kissinger: I've got to reserve one position for a WASP on this. I know it takes 10 in the Jewish religion for a prayer service but I can't have them all on the 7th floor [of the State Department]. One Wasp. Am I entitled to that for Congressional reasons?

Assistant Secretary of State David Abshire: I'm trying. I've just come up with the wrong names.

Kissinger: Well you got me [Joseph] Sisco, can you imagine the line up on the 7th floor, Kissinger, Sisco, [Helmut] Sonnenfeldt, [Henry] Wallich?

Abshire: You want people to keep a sense of humor.

Kissinger: It's a talented country, but there is a limit. And maybe a Negro...

Abshire: I'm going to the Baptist church to look around.¹⁷

Serving a president who expressed anti-Semitic sentiments, Kissinger had to emphasize his Jewishness in some settings to prevent its exploitation in others. The reference to African-Americans in this context also shows that Kissinger felt pressure not just from those

who distrusted Jews, but also from activists who sought to diversify foreign policy by limiting the number of people in office who looked like Kissinger, at least in terms of perceived skin color. Confronted with calls for more black appointees, he responded: "I feel embarrassed being Jewish—I know how it feels to be discriminated against. I feel embarrassed to say we have hired more black ambassadors—more deputy assistant secretaries—I think it sounds patronizing."¹⁸

Kissinger found himself in a very precarious position. He had to deflect popular presumptions about Jewish treachery. He also had to address growing criticisms of insufficient minority representation in the U.S. Foreign Service. Nixon's appeals to the anti-Semitic and racist attitudes within the "silent majority" encouraged attention to these issues. In this context, Kissinger could not sidestep the emerging ethnic group politics of the 1970s. For an outsider who had climbed to power by avoiding direct discussion of his background, an explicit defense of Jewish loyalty was painful, despite its obvious correctness. For an immigrant who benefited from the privileging of German Jews following the Second World War, building bridges with other minority groups sounded good in theory but proved unworkable in practice. Kissinger's experiences emphasized vertical mobility, ascending the ladder of American society by appealing to mainstream white figures like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., McGeorge Bundy, and Nelson Rockefeller. He avoided horizontal links to less successful outsider groups, especially African-Americans. Kissinger had neither the experience nor the disposition to bring foreign policy into line with the transformed landscape of American politics after the Civil Rights movement. The president's personal prejudices and political manipulations only deepened Kissinger's difficulties.

Nixon and Kissinger became mutual dependents. They needed each other, despite their contrary inclinations. Nixon relied on his brilliant and energetic aide

to manage his foreign policies. Kissinger required a strong president to give him the power to pursue controversial initiatives. Their relationship was built on fear and frustration. Their policies were built on obsessions with toughness and secrecy. This environment left little room for statesmanship, as defined by Kissinger. It reflected the political, diplomatic, and cultural constraints on policy in the late decades of the Cold War.

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Notes:

1. Jeremi Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge, MA, 2007).
2. Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York, 1999), 1071.
3. Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, 1074-75.
4. Despite decades of quotas and other forms of exclusion, after 1945 Jews became, in the words of one historian, "the most educated of all Americans." Looking at their aggregate accomplishments, one could easily forget that Jews comprised less than three percent of the American population. Yuri Slezkine, *The Jewish Century* (Princeton, 2004), 368. See also David A. Hollinger, *Cosmopolitanism and Solidarity: Studies in Ethnoracial, Religious, and Professional Affiliation in the United States* (Madison, WI, 2006), 135-65. I understand why many Jews, including Kissinger, fear that a discussion of their achievements as a group will inflame racist tropes about a world Jewish "conspiracy." As a Jew myself, I firmly believe intentional silence about Jewish accomplishments only gives ammunition to those who condemn alleged secret and illegitimate powers. We need to address the social and political circumstances that encouraged and distorted Jewish achievements. We need to demystify Jewish accomplishments, not pretend to ignore them. Kissinger and I have discussed these issues at length, but he has asked that I refrain from quoting our conversations on this specific subject.
5. Handwritten letter from Henry Kissinger to Nelson Rockefeller, 30 December 1968, Folder 245, Box 10, Series P: Ann C. Whitman - Politics, Record Group 4, Nelson A. Rockefeller Papers [hereafter NAR], Personal, Rockefeller Archive Center, Pocantico Hills, New York [hereafter RAC]; Kissinger to Rockefeller, 20 August 1968, Folder 110, Box 7, Series 35, Record Group 15, NAR, Gubernatorial, RAC. See also Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York, 2004), 17-31.
6. Author's interview with Henry Kissinger, 27 July 2004; Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York, 1999), 54-63. My analysis here differs from the emphasis on psychological disorders at the center of Robert Dallek's assessment of the Nixon-Kissinger relationship. See Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (New York, 2007), esp. 89-103.

7. Transcript of the audio recording from Nixon's conversation with Haldeman and Kissinger, 1 July 1971; Transcript of the audio recording from Nixon's conversation with Haldeman and Ehrlichman, 3 August 1972, in Stanley I. Kutler, ed., *Abuse of Power: The New Nixon Tapes* (New York, 1997), 9, 113-15.
8. See Robert Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy* (New York, 1989), 23-28; David Rothkopf, *Running the World: The Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power* (New York, 2005), 108-56.
9. William F. Buckley to Henry Kissinger, August 1969, Folder: White House (1969) - Kissinger, Henry A., Box 67; Handwritten notes of telephone conversation between Buckley and Kissinger, August 1968, Folder: Kissinger, Henry A., Box 51, William F. Buckley Papers, Yale University Library, Manuscripts and Archives, New Haven, Conn.; Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger*, 23; Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (New York, 1992), 134-39.
10. William Safire, *Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House* (Garden City, NY, 1975), 164-65.
11. Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston, 1982), 73-74, 1182.
12. Transcript of the audio recording from Nixon's telephone conversation with Kissinger, 17-18 April 1973, in Kutler, ed., *Abuse of Power*, 321-22.
13. Transcript of the audio recording from Nixon's meeting with Haldeman, 20 October 1972; transcript of the audio recording from Nixon's meeting with John Ehrlichman, 29 March 1973; transcript of the audio recording from Nixon's meeting with Ehrlichman, 13 August 1972, in Kutler, ed., *Abuse of Power*, 172, 288-89, 129.
14. Transcript of the audio recording from Nixon's meeting with Charles Colson, 1 January 1973, in Kutler, ed., *Abuse of Power*, 191. For more on Kissinger's "background" briefings for the press, see Isaacson, *Kissinger*, 573-86.
15. Transcript of Kissinger's telephone conversation with Nixon, 16 October 1973, available through the U.S. Department of State's Freedom of Information Act website: <http://foia.state.gov/SearchColls/CollsSearch.asp> (accessed 31 July 2006.) For Kissinger's incomplete published version of this transcript see *Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises* (New York, 2003), 268.
16. Leonard Garment, *Crazy Rhythm: My Journey from Brooklyn, Jazz, and Wall Street to Nixon's White House, Watergate, and Beyond...* (New York, 1997), 186-87. Before serving in the White House, Garment was Nixon's law partner in New York. Garment's account of the anti-Semitism in the Nixon administration is particularly credible because he expresses a generally favorable judgment of Nixon. Garment is not recounting the anti-Semitism of the Nixon White House to condemn the president.
17. Transcript of Kissinger's telephone conversation with David Abshire, 3 October 1973, available through the U.S. Department of State's Freedom of Information Act website: <http://foia.state.gov/SearchColls/CollsSearch.asp> (accessed 31 July 2006.) The term "Wasp" was an acronym for members of the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant Establishment. In this

conversation, Kissinger was mistaken in his assumption that Joseph Sisco was Jewish. Sisco was the child of Italian immigrants, from a non-Jewish background. See his obituary in the *Washington Post* (24 November 2004), B07.

18. Transcript of Kissinger's telephone conversation with Secretary of Transportation William Coleman, 3 August 1976, available through the U.S. Department of State's Freedom of Information Act website: <http://foia.state.gov/SearchColls/CollsSearch.asp> (accessed 31 July 2006.) It is not clear that the Nixon administration hired more African-American Foreign Service personnel than its predecessor.

New Approaches to the Foreign Policy of Nixon and Kissinger: In the Shadow of Iraq?

Thomas Alan Schwartz

When Mitch Lerner asked me to participate in this forum, I felt that I would be at a disadvantage. Both of my fellow contributors, Jussi Hanhimäki and Jeremi Suri, whom I respect and admire enormously as scholars and friends, have written thoughtful and incisive books on the foreign policy of Nixon and Kissinger, whereas my manuscript still resides largely on my hard drive and in the deep recesses of my often distracted brain. Yet not having published a book on this topic may be an advantage, in that I don't have to worry about contradicting anything I have written and can still change my mind on some of the issues. So with that caveat, let me offer some tentative thoughts on why we should reconsider the Nixon-Kissinger era and its larger implications for the history of American foreign relations.

First, let me say what is not new. To scholars and the historically aware public, the rivalries, nastiness, pettiness, bigotry, and occasional moments of cooperation that marked the Nixon White House are not big news. I yield to no one in my fascination with both the White House tapes of this era and the extraordinarily rich documentation on Henry Kissinger, especially his telephone calls and the memoranda of his conversations. But I think we are in danger of overemphasizing the personality quirks of both Nixon and Kissinger, as important as they might seem. We need to step back from

some of what Suri rightly calls the "ugliness of power" and recognize that it is not the full story. Yes, these were two men who displayed enough paranoia and insecurities to keep a Dr. Melfi busy for years. They both wasted hours in political gossip and took pleasure in disparaging political opponents, journalists, and even Nixon's own Cabinet. And we know that Henry Kissinger could flatter to the point of nausea. Kissinger's habit of calling the president after every major speech to offer fulsome praise has already been skewered enough. I recently came across Nixon giving Kissinger this advice in April 1972 on how to deal with the Russians, and it was, as my teenage daughter might put it, a lol moment: "Hey look, you might as well use flattery. You know the Russians use flattery. They're horrible that way. And also they're susceptible to it."

What will change, in my opinion, is our perspective on these years. Future approaches to the Nixon-Kissinger era will be influenced by what has happened and will happen in Iraq. Historians will analyze Nixon and Kissinger's foreign policy from a vantage point that includes another American war against a powerful insurgency, a war whose growing unpopularity has created sharp divisions about the future direction of American foreign policy. For all the differences between the Middle East and Southeast Asia, it is impossible not to see haunting similarities between the Iraq War and the war in Vietnam, especially in the domestic debates they engendered. In 1972 a perceptive British journalist, Anthony Hartley, wrote that "military failure is traditionally the most brutal of shocks for any governing class." He believed Vietnam had constituted such a shock for America's best and brightest, and like many foreign observers he was very worried about what defeat would mean for the United States. He argued that "the future, after all, will depend not so much on American power, which is certain, as on the ability of Americans to use that power. It is this ability which is called in question by the present mood." He was making a prescient reference to what would later be

called the "Vietnam syndrome," the unwillingness to use military force that gripped American leaders after Vietnam. This is the same "Vietnam syndrome" that George Bush's father thought was ended by victory in the Gulf War but seems likely to reappear in the aftermath of Iraq. Whether or not Iraq will be as severe a military and political failure as Vietnam is still not clear, although I recognize that many in our profession are certain it will be. Pessimism appears to be the dominant sentiment in Washington, especially within the Democratic Party, which is poised to retake the White House in 2009.

In addition to reviving doubts about America's future willingness to use force, the current Iraq debate illuminates more clearly the context within which Nixon and Kissinger made foreign policy. Charles Kupchan and Peter Trubowitz, in their recent call for a new "grand strategy" in the wake of the Iraq War, resurrected Walter Lippmann's formulation that a "nation must maintain its objectives and its power in equilibrium, its purposes within its means and its means equal to its purposes." Kupchan and Trubowitz argue that a "critical gap has opened up between the United States' global commitments and its political appetite for sustaining them." This is, of course, the same type of challenge that Nixon and Kissinger faced, albeit, I would argue, under considerably more adverse circumstances. The Cold War was a much more significant factor in American life in 1969 and had defined the international system for a much longer time than the "war on terror." Thousands of nuclear weapons made the Soviet Union a far more meaningful and potentially destructive adversary than Al Qaeda. In 1969 the United States was also entering an era of slower economic growth. Business was becoming less competitive, and the dollar had weakened. Americans wanted a smaller defense budget and more spending on domestic needs. The whole thrust of the Nixon administration's policies has to be understood in terms of the real limits and constraints that affected nearly

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2009 Conference of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Call for Papers

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) invites proposals for panels and individual papers at its annual conference, June 25-27, 2009, to be held at the Fairview Park Marriott Hotel in Falls Church, Virginia. Although proposals for individual papers will be considered, proposals for complete or nearly complete panels are encouraged and will receive preference. In order to receive full consideration, proposals should be submitted no later than December 1, 2008.

The Program Committee welcomes panels and paper proposals that deal with the history of United States' role in the world in the broadest sense. In order to complement SHAFR's signature and continuing strengths in diplomatic, strategic, and foreign relations history, particularly for the post-1945 period, the Committee especially encourages proposals that deal with non-state actors and/or pre-1945 histories, as well as proposals that involve histories of gender and race, cultural history, religious history, environmental history, transnational history, and histories of migration and borderlands. The Committee also invites applications from scholars working in areas other than U. S. history, and panels that include work by such scholars. Finally, the Committee welcomes panels dealing with issues such as pedagogy and professionalization.

Panels can follow either of the following formats: (1) three or four papers, chair, and commentator or (2) a roundtable with a chair and participants. The committee also welcomes panels using innovative procedures, such as the circulation of papers prior to the conference to any interested conference attendees.

Panel submissions should total no more than three pages and must include the following information:

- 1) the name of each panelist as she/he would like it to appear on the program should the panel be accepted (please check the proper spelling of everyone's name)
- 2) each participant's institutional affiliation and status (graduate student, assistant professor, lecturer, professor, etc.);
- 3) the role of each panelist (presenter, chair, commentator, etc.);
- 4) contact information, including a working e-mail address and phone number for each participant;
- 5) some indication of each panelist who has not previously attended or who has attended but not previously presented a paper at a SHAFR meeting.

Each proposal should include a brief rationale, the title of each paper, and a short description of the work to be presented. Each panelist should include a brief biographical statement. Please adhere to the limit of three pages. One member of each proposed session should be designated as the contact person.

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Electronic submissions are strongly encouraged, but paper submissions will also be accepted. If submitting electronically, please send a copy of your application as a single Word or WordPerfect file attachment to Paul Kramer, program chair, at paul-kramer@uiowa.edu. If submitting a paper copy of your application, please mark "SHAFR 2009 Proposal" on the front of the envelope, and mail it to Paul Kramer, Department of History, 280 Schaeffer Hall, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242

Graduate Student Travel Grants

This year SHAFR will offer several Robert A. and Barbara Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants to assist graduate students who present papers at the conference. The following stipulations apply: 1) no award will exceed \$300 per student; 2) priority will be given to graduate students who receive no or limited funds from their home institutions; and 3) expenses will be reimbursed by the SHAFR Business Office upon submission of receipts. The Program Committee will make the decision regarding all awards. A graduate student requesting travel funds must make a request when submitting the paper/panel proposal. (Funding requests will have no bearing on the committee's decisions on panels). Requests must be accompanied by a letter from the graduate advisor confirming the unavailability of departmental funds to cover travel to the conference.

SHAFR Diversity and International Outreach Fellowship Program

This year, SHAFR inaugurates a competition for fellowships that will cover travel and lodging expenses for the 2009 annual meeting. The competition is aimed at scholars whose participation in the annual meeting would add to the diversity of the Society. Preference will be given to persons who have not previously presented at SHAFR annual meetings. The awards are intended for scholars who represent groups historically under-represented at SHAFR meetings, scholars who offer intellectual approaches that may be fruitful to SHAFR but are under-represented at annual meetings, and scholars from outside the United States. "Scholars" includes faculty, graduate students, and independent researchers. To further acquaint the winners with SHAFR, they will also be awarded a one-year membership in the organization, which includes subscriptions to *Diplomatic History* and *Passport*. For application instructions, contact diversityprogram@shafr.org. Application deadline: December 1, 2008.

every dimension of the formulation of American foreign policy. One consequence of these constraints was a greater reliance on relatively low-cost covert operations, most tragically in the case of Chile. Another was the Nixon Doctrine, first enunciated on Guam during the president's trip to east Asia in July 1969. The Nixon Doctrine was an attempt to redefine the terms of America's support for its allies. The United States would provide military and economic aid to its non-European allies but would avoid committing its own forces. The search for such regional surrogates for American power, originally designed as an intellectual cover for Vietnamization, led to the strengthening of countries like Iran, which, Nixon and Kissinger believed, could provide a source for stability in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East as a whole. As Suri summarizes the Nixon Doctrine, "A pragmatic focus on pliable agents assumed priority over ideological rigidity."

Obviously this choice had dramatic and unintended consequences, and those consequences should certainly lead us to recognize that Kupchan and

Trubowitz's advice that the United States "should use its power and good offices to catalyze greater self-reliance in various regions" may have some of the same unintended results for the next administration.

In a similar vein, the most impressive achievement of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy, the opening to China, was also, at least in part, a response to the pressure to reduce American commitments. Just as critics of the Bush administration have urged it to talk to "rogue states" like Iran and Syria and to shed a monolithic characterization of the enemy in the "global war on terror," the Nixon-Kissinger move to reopen relations with the radical "Red Chinese" seriously undermined the Cold War's ideological cast, taking advantage of the Sino-Soviet split in a way that previous Democratic presidents had considered political

"poison." President Kennedy had once characterized the internal communist divisions as arguments over who would bury us first, and the perception of China as a fanatical, anti-American enemy had even led to some consideration of joint action with the Soviets against Chinese nuclear facilities. Nixon and Kissinger's dramatic change in policy, helped along by China's own perception of its vulnerability and isolation, was a bold stroke that brought China into the balance of power equation as a de facto ally of the United States—an ally that Kissinger often only half jokingly characterized as one of the "soundest" members of NATO. Indeed, as Marc Trachtenberg has recently argued, the Nixon administration "was not really interested in balancing between the Soviet Union and China. It was interested instead in balancing

against the USSR, by helping China build up its power and by entering into a 'tacit alliance' with the PRC."

Of course this was not how the American public understood the policy at the time. Trachtenberg

maintains that Nixon and Kissinger believed that this policy could not be executed in a "straightforward way" in large measure because of the "semi-isolationist mood" of the American people. Therefore they frequently adopted the rhetoric of their critics, especially about détente, while being, as Kissinger loved to say, "quite cold-bloodedly" skeptical about dealing with the Soviets and hoping to keep the Soviet Union from launching an attack on China. As Kissinger told French President Georges Pompidou, he and Nixon were out to "gain time, to paralyze the USSR." Through détente they could buy time for the United States to develop its relationship with the PRC. Trachtenberg doesn't argue this, but his analysis of the Nixon-Kissinger approach illuminates a similar facet of the famous "decent interval" in the Vietnam settlement.

The "decent interval" was also designed to buy time for the United States, with the objective being to enable the country to extract itself from a losing commitment and avoid a precipitous defeat to a Soviet ally that would damage its credibility. Although signing the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973 did enable the administration to claim success for its policy, and did win a Nobel Peace Prize for Kissinger, Saigon's ultimate fate in April 1975 was still a blow to American power at a time when Soviet power certainly seemed on the rise. The parallels with today's situation are inexact, but Bush's successor will undoubtedly face a real challenge in "cleaning up the mess in Iraq," as Barack Obama has put it, without damaging the ability of the United States to pursue a constructive foreign policy. A Democratic victory in 2008 will likely produce the expectation of a rapid end to the war, and the American public will be in an even stronger "semi-isolationist mood." Recent polls show that 52 percent of all Americans believe that the United States "should mind its own business internationally." As Kupchan and Trubowitz point out, only 36 percent of Americans felt that way in the aftermath of Vietnam. It may well be that we will observe the next president trying to use a different rhetoric from that of the Bush administration—one designed to conceal elements of continuity with Bush's policies. Whether he or she will be successful in that effort is another question.

One other aspect of the Nixon-Kissinger era bears eerie similarities to the Bush era—namely, the emphasis on executive power and secrecy. George W. Bush's team has probably had the most expansive understanding of the powers of the presidency since Richard Nixon himself argued that on issues of national security, if the president authorizes it, then it must be legal. In many ways the seven years of the Bush administration have seemed like a highly condensed history of the same executive-legislative struggle that unfolded during the first thirty years of the Cold

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War. The first Cold War decades saw an expansion of presidential prerogatives and authority and then a serious challenge to the “imperial presidency” because of Vietnam and Watergate. This same sequence seems to have unfolded even more quickly over the last few years, fueled by both the deterioration in Iraq and scandals like Abu Ghraib, the CIA practice of rendition, and the use of Guantanamo as an extraterritorial prison. In the absence of any earthshaking revelations, George Bush will not face the same ignominious departure from Washington that Nixon did, and Bush’s successor will not be another unelected Gerald Ford. Nevertheless, as even one of Bush’s legal advisers put it recently, Bush “weakened the presidency he was so determined to strengthen.”

Despite my own history as a student of Ernest May, I have not meant to add to the blossoming debate about historical analogies that the Bush administration has created. I do confess to seeing many things that bring home the truth of the oft-told Mark Twain saying: “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme a lot.” But my basic point in taking a fresh look at Nixon and Kissinger is this: just as historians writing about the Great War in the 1930s tended to paint a very different picture from those who wrote about World War I in the 1950s and 1960s, I think historians grappling with the Nixon years will be affected by the still-uncertain outcome of the Iraq War. They will have to consider the ways that inheriting an unsuccessful and unpopular war of choice affected the range of possibilities open to Nixon and Kissinger. Those considerations may lead them to recognize and analyze certain patterns in the exercise of American power, as well as certain inherent, even structural, dilemmas that come from the exercise of that power, both at home and abroad. They may lead to tougher and more critical assessments of the policies of these years, although they could also lead to more sympathetic portrayals of both men. Deciding to define limits, cut losses, reduce commitments, and restrict funds entails making hard

choices, and Nixon and Kissinger had to implement their decisions amidst a changing international system and within a tumultuous domestic climate. I believe that Henry Kissinger himself, toward the end of his time in office, divined some critical lessons from the Vietnam experience that could also apply to Iraq: “Today we find that—like most other nations in history—we can neither escape from the world nor dominate it. Today we must conduct diplomacy with subtlety, flexibility, maneuver, and imagination in the pursuit of our interests. We must be thoughtful in defining our interests.... For Americans, then, the question is not whether our values should affect our foreign policy but how. The issue is whether we have the courage to face complexity and the inner conviction to deal with ambiguity, whether we look behind easy slogans and recognize that great goals can only be reached by patience and in imperfect stages.” My own conclusion is that regardless of what your assessment of Kissinger might be, the next American president would benefit from taking these words to heart.

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Searching for Context: Kissingerology Revived (Again)

Jussi M. Hanhimäki

More than three decades after he left office, Henry Kissinger continues to command the attention of scholars, policy makers, and the general public. The former secretary of state still influences policymaking through his links to Republican policymakers and his frequent, and always noted, media appearances and editorials. The third volume of his memoirs (1999) and his book *Does America Need A Foreign Policy?* (2001) both received wide attention and critical acclaim and were quickly followed by Kissinger’s accounts of his role in ending the Vietnam War and dealing with the 1973 Middle East war.¹ At the age of 84, the man who

“opened” China, negotiated the American withdrawal (if not a peace) in Vietnam, orchestrated détente with the Soviet Union, and coined the term “shuttle diplomacy” with his frequent forays into the Middle East, remains an American icon. His successors as national security advisor and secretary of state are without fail compared to Kissinger; they have consistently received lower marks for the influence they yielded (even when they get higher marks for performance and/or substance). In short, Kissinger—the Harvard professor, national security advisor, secretary of state, Nobel Peace Prize winner, memoirist, opinion-maker, chairman of a multimillion-dollar consulting company, and media celebrity—remains in a class of his own.

Kissinger is also unique in the amount of controversy he attracts. Few care about the doings of more recent secretaries of state (i.e., Warren Christopher, Madeleine Albright or even Colin Powell). But Kissinger can still arouse passions. Christopher Hitchens’s vitriolic *Trial of Henry Kissinger* (2001) portrayed the former national security advisor and secretary of state as nothing less than a war criminal. Hitchens and many others contend that Henry Kissinger pushed for the 1969 secret bombing and subsequent 1970 invasion of Cambodia, was implicated in the overthrow and assassination of Chile’s President Salvador Allende,¹ and probably gave the green light to the Indonesian crackdown on East Timor in 1975-76. It is almost common knowledge, they claim, that Kissinger helped Nixon steal the 1968 election from Hubert Humphrey by passing sensitive information about the Vietnam peace negotiations to the Republicans. Indeed, the dichotomy between “Dr. Kissinger”—the prince of *realpolitik* who put his remarkable insights to the service of a nation in deep trouble—and “Mr. Henry”—the power-hungry bureaucratic schemer bent on self-aggrandizement—will remain a central part of the reassessments of Kissinger.²

There is little new about the controversy. In the passionate debate about Kissinger and Nixon,

their foreign policy achievements and setbacks, and the style of their diplomacy, the opinions that have already been expressed are so wide-ranging that there would seem to be little room for new arguments or interpretations. Most judgments on the pursuit of an end to the Vietnam War, for example, will in all likelihood reflect the well-known debate about whether the 1973 Paris Agreements represented at least a chance for "a peace with honor" or simply "a decent interval." In general, the debate about Kissinger's achievements and reputation will most certainly remain tainted by theoretical predispositions and partisanship. Realists and neo-realists will never cease to defend him, while liberals and neo-liberals will have no use for his Machiavellian manipulations.

Yet despite all this baggage, the historiography of the Kissinger years—Kissingerology, for short—is undergoing a massive overhaul. Due to the recent opening of masses of archival materials, reassessments (and re-reassessments) of Kissinger's policies are likely to remain prominent in the study of the history of U.S. foreign policy for years to come. Nor is the field simply being re-invigorated due to the opening of American archival materials. Our understanding of the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of détente and triangular diplomacy—not to mention American efforts to end the Vietnam War—have begun to benefit increasingly from the emergence of new international cold war history. For the first time it is possible to sketch a view of the late 1960s and early 1970s as more than the court history of the Nixon administration's secret machinations. Indeed, the two major works that Kissinger himself published in the 1990s—the 1994 best-seller *Diplomacy* and the much-awaited, if to most reviewers disappointing, concluding volume of Kissinger's memoirs in 1999—were probably in part aimed at preempting some of the attacks that would inevitably result from enhanced access to archival

materials.³

In the new millennium, works on Kissinger or studies in which he plays a prominent role are already legion. William Bundy and I have published full-length works on the diplomacy of the Kissinger years; although Bundy's book, published in 1998, stops at Nixon's resignation and is not based on the newly released archival sources.⁴

Jeffrey Kimball, Larry Berman, Robert Schulzinger, and Pierre Asselin have written monographs and edited document collections on the Vietnam War.⁵ The opening to China is the subject of Margaret Macmillan's recent work *Nixon and Mao* and features prominently in the slightly older books by James Mann and Patrick Tyler.⁶ The number of articles and Ph.D. dissertations recently completed or currently being researched on the Kissinger era is too great to contemplate.

But are we learning something new? Are we getting away from the old "war criminal or master diplomat" debates? If the title of one of the most popular meetings of the 2007 annual SHAFR meeting is anything to go by, this is hardly the case. The panel, in which this author participated, was called "Henry Kissinger: Cold War Villain, International War Criminal, or Conventional Cold War Statesman?"

In a 2003 essay I suggested that the reinvigorated Kissingerology was likely to have two central themes.⁷ The first would involve questions of personal responsibility—even criminality; the dangers inherent when policymaking is confined to a narrow circle, as it was in the Nixon administration, will remain at the forefront. In short, I anticipated—no great insight was needed!—an ongoing debate over the "dark side" of Kissinger's career. Second, I predicted that the Kissinger years would become raw material for scholars interested in exploring some other enduring questions about the conduct of American foreign policy. Did Kissinger act like the realist most thought he was? Did he have any

use for what in today's parlance is called "soft power"? Did he believe in unilateralism or multilateralism? What role did Kissinger's particular intellectual makeup play in the success or failure of his policies? What was the role of domestic politics in dictating the contours of Kissinger's foreign policy?

Based on a reading of two of the most recent works that bear upon the topic, it seems that these rather modest predictions were not entirely off the mark.

Take Robert Dallek's *Nixon and Kissinger*, a heavy tome of more than six hundred pages.⁸ It covers all the key issues in the Nixon administration's foreign policy from 1969 to 1974 and relies upon recently declassified materials, including a selection of the infamous White House Tapes as well as transcripts of many of Kissinger's telephone conversations. Despite the wealth of new documentation, however, Dallek acknowledges at the outset that "we know almost all of what they did during their five and a half years in the White House; their major initiatives were and remain landmarks in the history of American foreign policy."

So why write such a lengthy exposé? Dallek argues that what truly interested him are questions about why and how; he wants to know more about the motivations and modus operandi of Nixon and Kissinger's foreign policy initiatives. The bulk of the book is, as he puts it, an effort to "cast fresh light on who they [Nixon and Kissinger] were and how they collaborated in their use and abuse of power."

To a large extent Dallek succeeds. His book is a worthwhile and entertaining read. What emerges is a disturbing portrait of how pettiness—in the form of personal ambition or a sheer desire for public praise—was as (if not more) important in driving policy than grand geopolitical stratagems or sophisticated analyses of international relations. One is reminded repeatedly that despite the façade they tried to build, Nixon and Kissinger were but two men vying for personal glory, and that desire often made them not only partners but

competitors.

The trouble with the book is that it rarely rises above the condemnation of the obvious pettiness that too often was the central characteristic of life inside the Nixon White House. But was this somehow unique to this particular administration, to these particular men? Is power not by definition something that corrupts? Were the men who worked inside the Kennedy and Johnson or Carter and Reagan administrations somehow less bent on achieving personal glory?

Answering such questions might make *Nixon and Kissinger* a more compelling analysis, although it would undoubtedly take something away from the endless appeal of the backbiting and infighting that defines almost any presidential administration, or any large bureaucracy for that matter. Without such an effort, though, Dallek's book does not succeed in advancing Kissinger-Nixon scholarship in a meaningful way. It remains, to a large extent, a missed opportunity for a truly accomplished diplomatic historian.

In contrast to Dallek's work, Jeremi Suri's *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* does not revisit the major episodes of American foreign policy during Kissinger's time in office.⁹ The author has set himself a rather different task: to place Henry Kissinger in the many different contexts in which he operated. Thus, the reader is introduced to the less-known settings of Kissinger's life: the German-Jewish milieu into which he was born and which was so dramatically destroyed in the 1930's; the immigrant community in New York in the late 1930s; the U.S. Army during World War II; the postwar world of Jewish intellectuals. The book makes use of some interesting new evidence (e.g., interviews with Kissinger and select others). However, this is not a book based on archival revelations, and its appeal to potential readers will not be in laying out a series of smoking guns. Rather it is a book that offers a broad synthesis of the intersection between Kissinger's personal history and the broader historical forces that defined the American Century.

In general, Suri does an impressive job in weaving together the personal and the general. Naturally, the paucity of information on certain periods of Kissinger's life—particularly the early years in Germany—means that some of the book is more a description of the milieu than the man. Particularly in the early chapters, a number of judgments are based on general accounts about Jewish life in Weimar Germany, about the impact of Nazi rule in Bavaria, and about the experiences of Jewish immigrants in 1930s New York or other orthodox Jews in the U.S. Army. There is nothing wrong in this, but it seems worth stressing that some of the book's judgments do not reflect any explicit knowledge of how Kissinger *himself* felt or how he experienced certain events. Rather, they are grounded in works describing the collective experience of those in similar circumstances. Indeed, we probably will never know how Henry Kissinger truly felt when he crossed the streets to avoid being assaulted by Nazi youth gangs or when he first landed in America.

The one significant singular achievement of this book is Suri's bold attempt to bring out the Jewishness in Kissinger's experience. As the author rightly points out, it is something that previous scholars (including the present reviewer and Robert Dallek) have not dared to explore because of the fear of being castigated as either overly simplistic or deeply anti-Semitic. Yet, as Suri maintains, "We need to find the language for discussing the relationship between Jewish identity and international power." *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* will hardly be the last word on this difficult connection. But it is a bold effort to open the debate on the subject and one of the most original contributions on the former secretary

of state to have appeared in a decade.

Which way is Kissinger scholarship heading next? What will the numerous assessments and reassessments of the various controversies of the early 1970s add to the hundreds of assessments and reassessments already in print?

I would like to make two predictions. First, I believe that as scholars peruse the masses of newly available documents they will undoubtedly hone in on the many failures and shortsighted decisions of the 1970s, for that is what we do, almost unconsciously. Kissinger will always be vilified; there is no way around that.

Second, I expect that a growing number of scholars will attempt to place Kissinger's record within the broader context in which he operated. In other words, many of the next generation of scholars are likely to move beyond the "Doctor Kissinger"—"Mr. Henry" dichotomy when exploring the history of U.S. foreign policy between

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1969 and 1977. Such an approach ultimately remains an unsatisfactory way of exploring any historical figure and will do serious injustice to the context—the constraints and predispositions, the pressures and needs, the allies and adversaries, the domestic and international structures—in which he operated.

In the end, the period between 1969 and 1977 was naturally about much more than Henry Kissinger (or Richard Nixon for that matter). Most scholars are beginning to realize that Kissinger was not the all-powerful conspirator and manipulator that his detractors claim he was. But at the same time it remains virtually impossible to describe him as the wise practitioner of *realpolitik*. Indeed, the true challenge of the new Kissinger scholarship—a challenge that is to some degree met in Suri's book but sorely missed in Dallek's—

is simple: to place him in context.

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Notes:

1. Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (New York, 1999); Kissinger, *Does America Need A Foreign Policy?* (New York, 2001); Kissinger, *Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises* (New York, 2003). For an example of the continued comparisons between Kissinger and his successors, see Nicholas Lemann, "Without a Doubt. Has Condoleezza Rice Changed George W. Bush, or Has He Changed Her?" *The New Yorker*, October 14, 2002, 164-179.
2. For a realist appraisal see Robert Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War* (New York, 2000), 127-155; Christopher Hitchens, *The Trial of Henry Kissinger* (London, 2001).
3. Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York, 1994); Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*. For a sample of the new Cold War history that decentralizes the role of the United States and the Soviet Union, see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge, 2005).
4. William Bundy, *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Administration* (New York, 1998); Jussi M. Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York, 2004).
5. Pierre Asselin, *A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement* (Chapel Hill, 2002); Larry Berman, *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam* (New York, 2001); Jeffrey Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War* (Lawrence, KS, 1998); Kimball, ed., *The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon Era Strategy* (Lawrence, KS, 2003); Robert Schulzinger, *A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941-1975* (New York, 1998).
6. James Mann, *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton* (New York, 1998); Patrick Tyler, *A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China* (New York, 1998); Margaret Macmillan, *Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World* (New York, 2007).
7. Hanhimäki, "Kissingerology: Thirty Years and Counting," *Diplomatic History* 27:5 (November 2003), 637-676.
8. Robert Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (New York, 2007).
9. Jeremi Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge, MA, 2007).

The Many Roles of Henry Kissinger

Edward C. Keefer

It is now more than three decades since Secretary of State Henry Kissinger packed up his desk on the seventh floor of the Department of State and became a private citizen once again. The Nixon Project at the National Archives, the Ford Library, and the Department of State have released an avalanche of paper documents from the administrations he served, with much more still to come. Kissinger himself has made the transcripts of his telephone conversations as assistant to the president for national security affairs available to scholars, and the Department of State has done the same for many of his telephone conversations as secretary of state. Then there are 3700 hours of Nixon tapes, many of which capture Kissinger in conversations with the president and other administration officials. It is not surprising that historians are looking at Henry Kissinger afresh, providing new insights into his background and his foreign policy and offering new suggestions about how he will be viewed in the future.

Three such new assessments of Kissinger are presented here by Jeremi Suri, Jussi Hanhimäki, and Thomas Schwartz. Suri concentrates on placing Kissinger within the context of his time and argues, as he does in his book *Henry Kissinger and the American Century*, that Kissinger was the "self-conscious outsider" who teamed up with another "outsider," Richard Nixon, to help him dominate foreign policy from the White House. To Suri, Kissinger is not so much the realpolitik innovator of new strategies, but a synthesizer of the basic concepts of the Cold War. In his essay, Hanhimäki maintains that Kissinger was a "flawed architect," as he did in his 2004 book by the same

name, because of his failure to see beyond the Cold War, but he tempers his criticism by acknowledging that compared to those who followed Kissinger as national security advisor and secretary of state, he is in a "class of his own." Nevertheless, Hanhimäki does not retreat from his basic conclusion that Kissinger was shortsighted and too focused on triangular diplomacy with the Soviet Union and China at the expense of new developments that were changing the international scene. Schwartz postulates an intriguing and controversial premise: that future scholars will look at the record of Kissinger and Nixon not through the prism of the Vietnam War, as they have done for decades, but in light of the current conflict in Iraq, now threatening to become

America's longest war. Schwartz seems to imply that this change of viewpoint may ultimately lead scholars to view Nixon and Kissinger in a more favorable light.

Suri's new look at Kissinger's background, Hanhamäki's

qualified acknowledgment of Kissinger's place in history, and Schwartz's theory of how Kissinger will be viewed in the future hardly constitute a revisionist surge towards a positive reassessment of Nixon's and Kissinger's foreign policy, but these three insightful and original assessments by leading scholars of international history provide valuable context for open-minded scholars who wish to reexamine foreign policy between 1969 and 1973. The availability of new sources for Nixon/Kissinger foreign policy is enticing. Alone among Cold War historical figures, Nixon and Kissinger left accounts of virtually all their business telephone conversations, as well as their meetings in the oval and executive office building, that are mostly available to scholars. Of course, no one can read these telephone transcripts or listen to a good

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portion of the tapes without finding prejudice, sycophancy, posturing, and a myriad of other human flaws. But as they used to say, “No man is a hero to his valet,” and scholars need only imagine having all their own calls and office conversations recorded or transcribed. As Suri, Hanhimäki, and Schwartz suggest, it is time to “get over it”; Nixon and Kissinger were human.

While acknowledging but not excusing Nixon’s and Kissinger’s less attractive human frailties, these three historians bring new perspectives to Henry Kissinger as a person and a policymaker. To say that Kissinger’s thinking and strategy were a product of his time and prevailing attitudes, as Suri does, is a good corrective to the claims in Kissinger’s and Nixon’s memoirs that their foreign policy was no less than a revolution. All three historians agree that détente with the Soviet Union and the openings to China were the obvious but necessary response to deterioration in the relative military strength of the United States compared to the Soviet Union. There was no going back to the Eisenhower administration, with its dream of rolling back Communism, or even the Kennedy administration, which had strategic superiority when it faced down the Kremlin in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. After 1969 the Soviet Union had military parity and even superiority in size and number of nuclear launchers. America still had a technological lead – more precise targeting, more submarine launchers, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, cruise missiles, and strategic bombers – but the basic balance of power necessitated détente with the Soviet Union. The opening to China, as dramatic as it was from an old China-baiter like Nixon, was the logical way to put pressure on Moscow to make détente work.

Hanhimäki is more critical of Kissinger than Suri and Schwartz are. He acknowledges Kissinger’s successes, such as détente, triangular diplomacy, and the partial resolution of the Middle East War of 1973, but he questions Kissinger’s methods – his penchant for secrecy, backchannels, and centralization of power – and

argues that they were ultimately counterproductive. There is no doubt that the Nixon White House was a poisonous place. Perhaps a more open atmosphere could have exposed the president to a broader range of advice. But do personal style and exclusionary bureaucratic methods necessarily impair results? Would a nicer, gentler, more open Kissinger have been any more effective? These are questions that Hanhimäki’s critique raises but does not answer. Another of Hanhimäki’s major criticisms is that Kissinger and Nixon saw regional conflicts only in terms of great power conflict. Certainly some of the regional experts in the foreign affairs bureaucracy might have helped Nixon and Kissinger look beyond their great power bias, but would Kissinger and Nixon have listened? They both considered themselves foreign policy experts. While faulting Kissinger for shortsightedness in failing to see that existing Cold War divisions might not be permanent, Hanhimäki admits that most of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s generation also failed to show such foresight. It was a rare statesman who in the mid-1970s could look beyond the Cold War.

Schwartz’s essay poses an intriguing question: will scholars assess Nixon and Kissinger differently in light of the current war in Iraq? Obviously, a lot depends on the eventual resolution of the conflict, as Schwartz concedes. In Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger sought a “decent interval” to allow South Vietnam, with U.S. air and logistical support, to withstand the next North Vietnamese offensive, thus convincing the politburo in Hanoi that a coalition government was the best strategy for eventual reunification. Unlike Iraq, South Vietnam was not in danger of breaking into warring parts or, even worse, chaos. Unification with Hanoi was the only real alternative. The real parallel between Vietnam and

Iraq lies in the war for hearts and minds, which was fought in South Vietnam by the joint U.S. civilian-military force called CORDS (Civilian Operations and Revolutionary Development Support). Only time will tell whether the United States will be able to launch a successful CORDS-like effort in Iraq. How America’s success or failure in Iraq will impact Nixon’s and Kissinger’s reputations is an interesting but at this point unanswerable question.

There is another way of looking at Henry Kissinger that is not emphasized in these three excellent essays. That approach involves examining the changing roles played by Kissinger during the eight years that he dominated foreign policy, first as President Nixon’s assistant for national security, then as secretary of state (while remaining assistant for national security affairs) to a Watergate-wounded president no longer able to focus on foreign policy, and finally as secretary of state to a president whose expertise in international affairs was minimal. Kissinger prides himself on the consistency of his conduct of foreign policy and his strategy. Nevertheless,

his role changed dramatically during the Nixon-Ford years.

When Kissinger first became the assistant to the president for national security affairs, it was not a forgone conclusion that he could use his position and

his relationship with the president to dominate foreign policy. Previous holders of Kissinger’s job, such as the establishment figure McGeorge Bundy under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson and (briefly) Robert Komer and then Walt Rostow under LBJ, have claimed their role was to present the president with a fair assessment of the relevant agencies’ policy positions, not to analyze all incoming information and action memoranda and to superimpose the White House position on them. There was no model for the kind of control

Initially Kissinger saw himself as a bureaucratic infighter trying to protect the president’s authority over foreign policy formulation and implementation against massive entrenched bureaucracies at Foggy Bottom and the Pentagon.

Kissinger and Nixon contemplated wielding over the bureaucracy. Even before he assumed office, Kissinger realized that to take charge of the policy process he would have to bury the Johnson administration's senior interdepartmental group headed by the undersecretary of state and replace it with an NSC-centered system. Kissinger won the bureaucratic battle by ensuring that Nixon appointed him chairman of all NSC

subgroups as well as the committee responsible for presidential approval of major covert operations. It was unprecedented, and it was possible

only because of Nixon's deep suspicions about the loyalty of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. As Nixon told his domestic assistant, John Ehrlichman, most of Secretary of State William Rogers's new ambassadorial and principal officer appointments at State were "either careerists or at best pro Rockefeller types." Nixon wanted "RN people," but he never really got them.

Initially, Kissinger saw himself as a bureaucratic infighter trying to protect the president's authority over foreign policy formulation and implementation against massive entrenched bureaucracies at Foggy Bottom and the Pentagon. The deterioration of the relationships between Kissinger and Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and the tension between the NSC staff and the state and defense bureaucracies was due in good part to Kissinger's view, no matter how different it looks in retrospect, that he was in an underdog role.

Although he was never personally close to the president before or after he joined the Nixon team, Kissinger spent countless hours discussing foreign policy issues with him. Kissinger was doomed in these rambling conversations to engage in long discussions of personalities, to hear Nixon's often flawed historical analogies, to listen to rants about

firing insubordinate subordinates, and to shore up presidential insecurities—all part of the necessary cultivation of his boss and the White House inner circle. The White House tapes often reveal Kissinger in a less than favorable light, saying what the president wanted to hear and playing to his need for constant reinforcement. This is not surprising. It is a rare presidential appointee who tells his president that a speech

was a bust or a decision was a mistake. Kissinger, as a White House insider, had the misfortune to be saddled with a boss who resented anyone, including

Kissinger, as a White House insider, had the misfortune to be saddled with a boss who resented anyone, including Kissinger, who received credit for foreign policy achievements.

Kissinger, who received credit for foreign policy achievements. There was always tension between them, which could turn ugly when Nixon lapsed into anti-Semitism. Nixon also nurtured a longstanding grudge against the Eastern establishment and always felt that the long shadow of John F. Kennedy dimmed perceptions of his accomplishments. Kissinger would play to these prejudices to reinforce his second role as a White House insider.

When Watergate forced Nixon to circle the wagons around the White House and he became increasingly ensnared in the scandal, Kissinger became, as far as foreign policy was concerned, virtually acting president. This was a frustrating time for Kissinger because a weakened president meant a weakened United States, but in many respects less contact with the president and more responsibility must have been a welcome change. He took on even greater responsibility in September 1973, when, as Watergate unfolded, he became secretary of state, while still retaining the job of assistant to the president for national security affairs. In October, Secretary of State Kissinger faced one of the most serious challenges to the United States since the Cuban missile crisis: the Middle East War of October 1973. Kissinger was able to use his negotiating skills to re-supply Israel and still broker a viable ceasefire. He

then engaged in shuttle diplomacy, demonstrating again his skills as a negotiator and facilitator, and was able to develop a rapport with Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Hafez al-Asad of Syria and still remain on correct, if not warm, terms with the Israeli leadership. The eventual Egyptian-Israeli and Syrian-Israeli disengagement agreements were the result. It was Kissinger in his doctor-of-dazzling-diplomacy role.

As Kissinger became comfortable as secretary of state, his attitude changed, and with it the role he played in foreign policy administration. As assistant for national security affairs, Kissinger had bureaucratic power; as secretary of state he also had the trappings of power. There was a story (perhaps apocryphal) going around in September 1973 that when Kissinger saw his new offices on the seventh floor of the State Department he said, "I had no idea the secretary of state was such an august person." While he brought a number of his NSC staffers to State and gave them key jobs, he also promoted more Foreign Service officers to key positions and relied increasingly on key department notables such as Philip Habib and U. Alexis Johnson. The State bureaucracy was no longer the enemy, but an available resource. Kissinger worked the Department of State's personnel hard and was hardly a warm and fuzzy boss—one need only read the verbatim accounts of staff meetings with his principal officers to confirm this—but the general feeling among department officials was that the secretary of state was once again at the center of foreign policy formulation and they were part of the action. This is Henry Kissinger as head of the traditional foreign policy agency with its Foreign Service officer corps at his disposal.

When Nixon resigned in August 1974, Kissinger took on a new role: foreign policy mentor to Gerald Ford, a well-liked and relatively unambitious former congressman from Michigan. Ford became vice president after Spiro Agnew's resignation in October 1973, and with Nixon's resignation in August 1974 he found himself in the Oval

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Office. Ford had no pretensions to being a foreign policy expert, but he did know Congress. For his part, Kissinger, who never had good contacts with Capitol Hill, always viewed Congress as a hostile alternative power base. Ford's congressional expertise and Kissinger's foreign policy prowess complemented each other. To read the accounts of their meetings is to get a glimpse of how the relationship between foreign policy adviser and presidential "decider" can work. Admittedly there are no White House tapes for Ford, but had there been tapes they no doubt would have been far different from those of the Nixon years.

The Ford-Kissinger relationship was not idyllic. Towards the end of his term in 1976, Ford faced a challenge for the Republican presidential nomination from Ronald Reagan and the Republican right. Détente became a non-word, and Kissinger's influence waned as Ford sought to distance himself from Nixon-Kissinger policies. Relations with China cooled appreciably with the death of Chou En-lai and Mao Zedong. The connection to

the aging Soviet leadership was no longer as close. Kissinger also had his share of foreign policy disappointments. He failed to convince the Ford administration and the Soviet leadership to sign a SALT II agreement that deferred the unresolved issues of U.S. cruise missiles and Soviet Backfire bombers. He was unable to resolve the Cyprus crisis in 1974-76. Then, of course, there was the dénouement of the war in Southeast Asia, as North Vietnamese tanks rolled into Saigon and smashed through the gates of the presidential palace in Saigon.

If one looks at Kissinger in the context of his changing roles and the assessments by Suri (Kissinger's thinking grew out of a broad consensus about the Cold War), Hanhimäki (Kissinger was a brilliant strategist who was unable to see beyond the Cold War), and Schwartz (Kissinger's role may be viewed differently in the future because of Iraq), it is clear that his accomplishments during his eight-year run as the leading foreign policy adviser in Washington outweigh his failures. To those who see Kissinger as a "war criminal," a charge that Hanhimäki effectively demolishes in his essay, Kissinger's successes will never compensate for the supposed harm he did. All of these roundtable discussants' assessments of Kissinger are more nuanced and more understanding of the difficulties he faced and more appreciative of the success that he had. The extraordinary nature of the primary documentation on the Kissinger-Nixon years and to a lesser extent the Kissinger-Ford period, along with the complexity of the Nixon and Kissinger relationship, suggests that Kissinger's foreign policy record will remain a focus of what should be exciting and stimulating scholarly research and writing for years to come. These three excellent essays are part of the opening salvo.

Edward C. Keefer is General Editor of the Foreign Relations of the United States series.

The views expressed in this essay are the author's own and do not necessarily

represent those of the Department of State or U.S. Government. This essay is entirely based on declassified sources.

Does a "Grand Strategy" Do Any Good?

William Glenn Gray

It may sound like a truism, but the way we write history about a given period is often shaped by the qualities of the people we are writing about. That is especially the case with diplomatic and international history, which requires us to "get inside the head" of our protagonists. The hours we spend analyzing the press teas of Konrad Adenauer or the early books of Henry Kissinger do not just teach us how these individuals viewed the world; they can also shape the very analytical tools that we wield when interpreting international relations more generally.¹

It is thus no coincidence that the advent of serious historical study on the Nixon-Kissinger years has yielded so many rich foundational texts, starting with the reconceptualized *Foreign Relations* series itself. The fact that Nixon and Kissinger articulated something resembling a "grand strategy" — a set of guiding principles that tied together the major strands of their foreign policy — led the *FRUS* editors to compile a first-of-its-kind volume on the assumptions behind foreign policy.² Other volumes have demonstrated a heightened attention to global issues such as environmental policy and drug trafficking; more recently, yet another volume focused on a relational view of détente from both American and Soviet perspectives.³ One should, of course, give proper credit to the staff of the State Department's Office of the Historian for conceptualizing and publishing these innovative collections. Yet one could argue that the editors were, in part, responding to the character of the sources themselves, since it was Nixon's Washington that began edging toward a broader view of what constituted foreign policy (one that extended considerably beyond the

nineteenth century framework often applied by Kissinger himself).

The early entrants in the scholarly literature on the Nixon-Kissinger years have been strikingly successful in developing strong, compelling interpretations of Kissinger's diplomacy on a global scale. Jussi Hanhimäki and Jeremi Suri have bypassed the regional fragmentation that is endemic in the field of U. S. diplomatic history and staked out clear positions that will long shape the agenda of dissertators conducting more detailed research on the ground level. Tom Schwartz is in the process of defining a similarly pronounced interpretation. The three authors differ in how they characterize Kissinger's grand strategy, and they differ even more in assessing the relative success of that strategy. Only a lengthy review essay could do justice to their specific arguments. But even a cursory comparison of their perspectives offers three contrasting and illuminating answers to a fundamental question about statecraft: is it helpful or counter-productive to conduct foreign policy with some larger scheme in mind?

Hanhimäki concludes that the global breadth of Kissinger's vision did not yield a wider perspective. On the contrary, viewing every local conflict through Cold War lenses resulted in a series of drawn-out and unnecessary proxy wars in the Third World. Ordinarily, the question of who controlled Angola should not have occasioned high-level anxiety in Washington. Yet Kissinger felt it necessary to demonstrate firmness of intention to Moscow in the wake of America's humiliation at abandoning the Saigon embassy in April 1975.⁴ In Hanhimäki's rendering, such reasoning was not at all a necessary by-product of some Cold War chess tournament. Washington might have chosen not to construct linkages between distant conflicts. Doing so brought only disadvantages, making the NSC more nervous and trigger-happy than it should have

been. Even where no covert action ensued, Kissinger's grand strategy yielded startling misjudgments in response to regional flare-ups such as the East Pakistan crisis of 1970-71.⁵

This critique is, by implication, constructivist in nature.⁶ Hanhimäki emphasizes not merely contingency in the narrow sense, as any historian would. He presents Kissinger's entire world view as an act of volition, albeit one with tangible consequences for third parties. Many contemporaries agreed. Michel Jobert, French foreign minister in 1973-74, complained that Kissinger's "Year of Europe" speech was "a grand plan, a picture of the world, that he obviously wanted to shape according to his own conceptions."⁷ One might well object that shaping the world is what all truly ambitious leaders want to do and, furthermore, that Kissinger did not invent the rules of the global Cold War that the Soviets and earlier American policy makers also played by.⁸ But there is a natural constructivist reply: rather than perpetuating and (arguably) perfecting the zero-sum Cold War game, Kissinger might have worked to narrow the conflict's geographic scope, just as he helped to manage other, more direct facets of the U.S.-Soviet competition. The rules may not have been arbitrary. They may well have been the product of a decades-long learning process between Washington and Moscow. However, that did not render them immutable.

If the thrust of Hanhimäki's interpretation is constructivist, Suri posits a clash between Kissinger's subjective world view and the changing realities of the international system. He stresses two basic problems with Kissinger's attempt to implement a worldwide strategy. First, the complexities of the international system defied the powers of any one individual, no matter how gifted, to order rationally. Second, the very terms that Kissinger used to comprehend international politics were conventional, state-centered, and generationally

specific, rendering him incapable of responding adequately to seismic shifts such as the youth rebellion of 1968 or the human rights revolution.⁹ Suri does not explicitly dismiss the idea of a grand strategy as such. But by stressing the biographical specificity of Kissinger's intellectual development, he underscores the limitations that any philosopher-king would bring to the task.

Schwartz, in his *Passport* essay, is surely right to suggest that the Bush years are having an impact on our evaluation of the 1970s. Suspicion of grand strategies, if not master narratives, is riding high in the wake of the ill-conceived "war on terror" that formed an implausibly narrow basis for a worldwide diplomatic agenda and rendered many of us nostalgic for the Clintonian drift that preceded it. Schwartz's own nascent interpretation, as revealed here and in his "Kissinger" entry in the *Encyclopedia of the Cold War*, invokes certain advantages accruing from Kissinger's sober assessment of the limits of American power. Having a grand strategy proved particularly useful in managing American decline; after all, one can hardly imagine an administration in drift successfully brokering the opening to China in 1971-72.¹⁰

On the other hand, backing regional strongmen in places like Argentina, Indonesia, and Iran did little for America's moral standing, a point also stressed by Suri and Hanhimäki. Was this deliberate delegation of power — Kissinger's embrace of distasteful and bloody authoritarians in furtherance of a grand strategy of American restraint — preferable to (a) complaining ineffectually about their human rights abuses or (b) acting forcefully (and at great cost) to restrain them? This is, to be sure, a highly schematic rendering of America's choices, but one provisional observation may be that even Kissinger's strategy of managed decline invited criticism, whereas other countries with more limited agendas (say, Western European allies) were able simply to duck responsibility. Which brings us back to the question of constructivism: was America's global visibility an

objective product of the distribution of international power or was it a construct reflecting, to a large extent, the sum of ambitions articulated by Roosevelt, Truman, and Kissinger, to name but a few pronounced shapers of American grand strategy?

In terms of international relations theory, Schwartz's rendering appears to be realist in two respects. He regards Kissinger as a conscious practitioner of *Realpolitik*, and he evaluates the national security adviser's successes and failures in realist terms.¹¹ Hanhimäki would appear to take the opposite view on both counts, treating Kissinger's grand strategy as a construct and its failure as a self-generated, almost dialectical product of the flaws in that construct. Suri's version is balanced between an ideological understanding of Kissinger's world view and a realist explanation of its shortcomings. The authors might dispute these attributions, but it is undoubtedly worthwhile trying to tease out the theoretical assumptions behind significant interpretations in our field. The devastating regional costs of Kissinger's "elusive grand design" (to take Hanhimäki's latest description) might, after all, be supplemented by a still more thoroughgoing constructivist analysis of the Kissinger years.¹² If Kissinger was a revolutionary, as Suri often asserts, what were the systemic, long-term results of this revolution? Thanks to Suri's skillful and perceptive biography, we now have a much greater understanding of the world that made Henry Kissinger. But what do we know of the world that Kissinger made?

In the meantime, historians'

critiques of Kissinger will likely do nothing to slake the public thirst for future grand strategies. Authors writing in other contexts appear more prone to lament the *absence* of a grand strategy.¹³ And perhaps there is good reason for this: who wants to forego the prospect, however misguided, of effecting a transformative change in the wider world? A policy of drift, or of avoiding responsibility, may do less perceptible damage in the short run, yet it also represents foregone opportunities. Europeans do not seem to mind. But Americans will long be impatient to improve the world somehow.

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Notes:

1. This, incidentally, is one reason why diplomatic historians need at least a basic grounding in international relations theory; it can help to increase one's analytical distance from the thinking of the historical figures under investigation.
2. Louis J. Smith and David H. Herschler, eds., *FRUS 1969-1976, Vol. I: Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969-1972* (Washington, 2003).
3. *Soviet-American Relations: The Détente Years, 1969-1972*, ed. Edward Keefer, David Geyer, and Douglas Selva (Washington, 2007).
4. Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York, 2004), 408-12.
5. This is rapidly becoming a consensus in the field. See Gary R. Hess, "Grand Strategy and Regional Conflict: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Crisis in South Asia," *Diplomatic History* 31, 5 (November 2007): 959-963; Robert J. McMahon, "The Danger of Geopolitical Fantasies: Nixon, Kissinger, and the South Asia Crisis of 1971," in *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977*, ed. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (New York, 2008), 249-268; and the presentation at the 2008 SHAFR conference by Tanvi Madan, a doctoral student at the University of Texas at Austin.
6. There are many varieties of constructivism,

but here I am using the term as elaborated in Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (New York, 1999).

7. Conversation between Walter Scheel and Michel Jobert, March 1, 1974, in *Akten zur Auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland [Documents on the Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany]* 1974 (Munich, 2005), Vol. I, 255.

8. My favorite example of unwarranted linkages is Robert S. McNamara's statement to the Germans in 1964 that "the defense of Berlin starts at the Mekong." It is worth noting, however, that this was a moment of salesmanship that did not necessarily reflect McNamara's deeper beliefs about the Cold War. US Bonn (Kidd) A-2002, May 11, 1964, secret: LBJL, NSF, Files of Robert W. Komer, Box 20. See also Alexander Troche, "*Berlin wird am Mekong verteidigt.*" *Die Asienpolitik der Bundesrepublik in China, Taiwan und Süd-Vietnam 1954-1966* (Düsseldorf, 2001).

9. Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge, MA, 2007), 192-95, 242-46. At times Suri seems to waver between depicting Kissinger's grand strategy as a long-term product of his biographical experiences, or as a response to the immediate context of the late 1960s. Naturally, both could be true. Suri, "Henry Kissinger and American Grand Strategy," in *Nixon in the World*, 67-84, esp. 75, 80.

10. Schwartz, "Kissinger, Henry," in *Encyclopedia of the Cold War*, ed. Ruud van Dijk et al. (London and New York, 2008), 515-19.

11. The emphasis here is on realism, not the more narrow "neorealism" of Kenneth Waltz. Schwartz's presidential address at the 2008 SHAFR Conference made plain that he is taking full account of the domestic political context of the Nixon-Kissinger years, in contrast to the pronounced indifference to internal politics displayed by strict neorealists. 12. Hanhimäki, "An Elusive Grand Design," in *Nixon in the World*, 25-44.

13. Steve A. Yefiv, *The Absence of Grand Strategy: The United States in the Persian Gulf, 1972-2005* (Baltimore, 2008); Robert J. Art, *A Grand Strategy for America* (Ithaca, 2004); Gary Hart, *The Fourth Power: A Grand Strategy for the United States in the Twenty-First Century* (New York, 2004).



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
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
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A Roundtable Discussion of Melvyn Leffler's *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War*

Anna Kasten Nelson, Bruce Cumings, Vojtech Mastny, and Melvyn Leffler

For the Soul of Mankind

Anna Kasten Nelson

In many ways this book is vintage Melvyn Leffler. It includes seventy-five pages of notes illustrative of the extent of his thorough research in American sources. In addition, he searched for every document, memoir and conference paper that has emerged from Russian sources in order to tell that side of the story. The book is well organized and offers a serious prose style that, with a few exceptions largely to introduce chapters, eschews anecdotal history. This time, however, Leffler has given us a different kind of book.

In his introduction, Leffler tells us that his book is devoted to five "moments" in the history of the Cold War when "tension and hostility" might have been "modulated," a very careful word (7). He does not go so far as to say that any of the moments, including the last one, might have brought the Cold War to an end but indicates that each could have relaxed tensions. The book, he writes, is about "human agency" (7) and therefore concentrates almost exclusively on the policymakers in the United States and Soviet Union and the way in which ideology and historical memory influenced their thinking and actions within the constraints of international events. In every case, however, he notes that ideology and memory function within turbulent international events. In his brief accounts of international history, it is clear that Leffler assumes his readers know the historical facts

of the Cold War. This book is not a history of the Cold War.

The question, then, is whether Leffler achieves his own goals. Is he successful in presenting his cast of characters, Harry S Truman and Joseph Stalin, Dwight D. Eisenhower and Georgi Malenkov, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson and Nikita Khrushchev, Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev, and finally Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, as men blinded by ideology and memory? Given the domestic political world and the international circumstances within which they worked, is he correct in emphasizing ideology and historical memory as defining their responses?

Leffler's choice of the five "moments" bears some examination. Few would quibble with his choice of Truman and Stalin as well as Reagan and Gorbachev, since they form the logical bookends to the period. Of the three in between, historians have long suggested that after the death of Stalin, Malenkov cracked open a door that Eisenhower failed to enter. But both presidents of the 1960s, along with Carter, seem peculiar choices, especially since the biggest push for détente as well as its temporary demise came during the Nixon administration. Carter's attempt at resuscitation was barely noticeable even before he abandoned it after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.

Leffler begins with a chapter on Truman and Stalin. Neither man wanted a Cold War, he writes, but neither could escape his ideology and memory. When faced with the turmoil of the post World War II world, they both succumbed, Stalin to

"the lure of future victories in distant lands," Truman to the "fear of losses there" (83). Although the conclusion is only implied, the reader is left with the arguable view that the Cold War was inevitable.

Beginning with Eisenhower, all the "moments" seem to illustrate that the Soviets were the suitors and the United States the recalcitrant partner. Malenkov gave conciliatory speeches as the Eisenhower administration remained mute. There were discussions about cutting the arms budget and making peaceful overtures, but fearful world conditions kept getting in the way. Issues surrounding Germany, revolutionary nationalism in Iran and at our borders in Guatemala, which created situations ripe for communist exploitation, made it imperative to continue Cold War policy. Leffler points out that neither Eisenhower nor Secretary of State John Foster Dulles could "imagine satisfactory terms of peace" (133) with the fanatical men in the Kremlin and furthermore did not trust them to carry through on negotiations without taking advantage of the United States. So in spite of Malenkov's speeches, the United States did not respond. As Leffler concludes, rather than seek a relaxation in tension, Eisenhower and Dulles chose to use the U.S. position of strength to meet their objectives in Western Europe. The chance for peace passed.

To Leffler that missed opportunity was an example of the way "ideological presuppositions shaped the two sides' perceptions of threat and opportunity in a dynamic

international system" (149-50). He does not make as strong a case here for the "ideological presuppositions" as he does in his chapter on Truman and Stalin. Just from reading *The Soul of Mankind* it seems clear that Eisenhower was more concerned with curbing revolutionary nationalism because it conflicted with America's national interest than because of ideological conflicts.

Without denying that Eisenhower was basically imbued with American values (or ideology) or that Dulles repeatedly contrasted the freedom of the West with the slavery of the communist world, Leffler stresses that Eisenhower's priorities lay with geopolitical and strategic efforts to preserve American interest in the world.

Kennedy's fight for the soul of mankind is even more problematic. Kennedy actually seemed just as concerned with the balance of power and the Cold War paradigm (a Soviet gain is a U.S. loss). Leffler states that "prudence demanded that the United States not allow the Kremlin to make gains in the third world" (176), and points to Kennedy's concern with "losing" Vietnam. In June 1963, after two years in office, Kennedy gave his American University address proposing a nuclear test ban and the revival of disarmament talks. In Leffler's words, Kennedy was ready to take a chance on peace. Although he offers little proof, he sees him on the brink of real détente which his assassination brought to an end.

Leffler's admiration for Kennedy, however, does not extend to Lyndon Johnson. His dislike of Johnson is almost palpable. He describes him as obsessed with the 1964 election and domestic concerns and unconcerned about foreign policy. (Is there any president who is not concerned with an upcoming election?) Although Johnson was willing to pursue détente, he, too, was more concerned with fighting revolutionary nationalism, which he was certain would lead to communist governments. As a result, he dropped

the earlier moves toward peace.

Meanwhile, there was new leadership in the Soviet Union. Brezhnev and Kosygin, who had engineered the overthrow of Khrushchev, were now in charge. On the one hand they faced pressure from the military and hardliners to stiffen resistance to the United States. On the other hand, they faced

Leffler deliberately passes over Nixon's foreign policy, even though Nixon and Kissinger eagerly responded to Brezhnev's call for détente.

dissatisfaction among their Eastern European clients and their own restive population, which wanted better living standards.

To improve life for their citizens, they needed an arms control agreement. Although discussions related to armaments were under way, détente collapsed as Russian troops entered Prague and napalm entered the international vocabulary.

Once again Leffler sees ideology and historical memory at work. Historical memory in this instance seems to have had special importance. The Soviets could never negotiate away the fear of Germany. Johnson, meanwhile, was haunted by the "loss" of China and the Chinese intervention in Korea. But when was the lost moment in the 1960s? Was it when Kennedy was assassinated? Kennedy seems a weak reed on which to rest this assumption. Was it Johnson's failure to respond to Brezhnev? I don't think Leffler resolves the confusion here.

Leffler deliberately passes over Nixon's foreign policy, even though Nixon and Kissinger eagerly responded to Brezhnev's call for détente. Barely mentioning either man, Leffler concentrates on the Soviet side of the equation, particularly the man who was most eager for détente and an end to the arms race, Leonid Brezhnev. He mentions the 1972 Moscow summit meeting and the signing of the interim SALT I treaty but minimizes Brezhnev's anger over the U.S. denial of most-favored-nation status. Brezhnev wanted equality with all U.S. trading partners, but in spite of his promises, Kissinger could not

deliver MFN status. The Jackson-Vanik amendment to the trade act tied MFN status to free emigration for Soviet Jews and others who desired to leave. The Soviets decried this attempt to interfere in what they regarded as internal affairs. Meanwhile, a discredited Nixon resigned and détente was briefly placed on ice once again.

A quickly arranged meeting in Vladivostok with the new president, Gerald Ford, led to the Helsinki Final Act, which seemed to mark the pinnacle of détente. The Soviets accepted the provisions on human rights that were essential for U.S. acceptance, while the United States and West European nations recognized the existing European borders. This provision marked the end of German "revanchism." But according to Leffler, who devotes many pages to Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet leader regarded Helsinki as only a start. He wanted to proceed to arms limitation and SALT II.

Although he mentions Kissinger once, Leffler emphasizes the Ford-Brezhnev relationship, much as he did the Nixon-Brezhnev meetings. Henry Kissinger, of course, will never forgive Leffler for writing about this era without paying much attention to his dominating personality. In fact, given the author's interest in human agency, it is not entirely clear why Leffler ignores Kissinger's influence.

The fourth "moment" came during the presidency of Jimmy Carter, who was inexperienced and untried in foreign policy, but who agreed with Brezhnev and included arms control within his other foreign policy goals. Leffler's subdued treatment of Carter does not extend to his national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who stood firm in his suspicions of the Soviets and discouraged the president's instinctive moves toward the relaxation of tension. Of Leffler's cast of characters, Carter and Brzezinski are among the most ideological. Certainly, Brzezinski saw himself fighting for the "soul of mankind." Both men had an ideological view of America's role, although they came to it from different perspectives. Brzezinski, given his Polish background, disliked

the Russians as well as communism. Carter, on the other hand, was originally ready to work with the Russians but wanted to make the promotion of human rights an integral part of his policy. Whatever their desires, Carter, Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance were faced with some intractable problems that were not of their making. OPEC's decision to raise its prices caused economic disarray in the United States and other industrialized countries, while the problem of Cuban troops in the horn of Africa and revolutionary nationalism closer to home in Nicaragua plagued Carter officials even before they made their fateful decision concerning the Shah of Iran.

Leffler concludes that Brezhnev killed détente when he made the decision to invade Afghanistan, but it seems to have slowly begun to die after Helsinki. He notes that Brezhnev was unhappy with the failure to progress on SALT II and Carter's emphasis on human rights. Brezhnev also resented Carter's unilateral negotiations at Camp David because he assumed that he would participate equally in Middle East negotiations. He may have felt that he had nothing more to gain, so he decided to protect his borders and send the army into Afghanistan.

Given the failures of the Soviet and American leaders Leffler discusses, why were Reagan and Gorbachev successful in their efforts? Although Reagan is given his due, Gorbachev is the hero of this story.

In the eyes of the Americans who met him, Mikhail Gorbachev was an entirely different Soviet leader — open, talkative, well-traveled through Europe, and in the words of Andrei Gromyko, a man with “a deep and sharp mind” (366). Gorbachev clearly saw that people in the West lived much better than those under the Soviet system. He understood that the greatest danger to his country was not military invasion, but internal decay. To finance a successful domestic program, it was essential to move forward on arms control and relax tension between the two great powers. Gorbachev set out to save his country domestically by convincing

the United States and its allies that the USSR was no longer a military threat.

Reagan emerges from this book as a supremely ideological man who never doubted that the United States was the greatest nation in the world, where men and women “could determine their own destiny . . . and determine their fate in life” (341-2). Leffler points out that in spite of his rhetoric and defense budget, Reagan wanted to negotiate and was not the “coldest of cold warriors” (339). Indeed, in Leffler's view, Reagan's ideological stance was in line with those of his predecessors, starting with Truman. What was unique about Reagan was that he was willing to deal with men he disliked, who were representing a system he hated. When Gorbachev emerged eager and anxious for negotiations, Reagan, in Leffler's words, had found a negotiating partner.

Negotiations were neither quick nor easy. President Reagan insisted on being allowed to proceed with his Strategic Defense Initiative. Indeed, he offered the new technology, which was yet to be developed, to the Russians to show his good will. Reagan held on to his vision of SDI, which was quickly dubbed Star Wars, and refused to negotiate its demise, much to the frustration of the Soviets.

Negotiations were ultimately successful because Reagan knew he was negotiating from strength while Gorbachev was negotiating from need. To Leffler, Gorbachev was the agent of change, the person most responsible for ending the Cold War.

As noted above, the thrust of Leffler's argument is that throughout the Cold War there were missed opportunities for “peace.” Opposing ideologies, historical memory and dangers in the international world always intruded. What interests him most are ideology and memory. There is no doubt that the ideologies held by the Soviets and the Americans were powerful forces and colored some historical memory. This book is important because it explores those ideas and ideologies. But I am not convinced that ideology and historical memory always mattered more than political-strategic

motives. Were the six presidents he discusses uniformly pre-occupied with ideology at the expense of what they would deem national security interests? I doubt it.

There are some other interesting insights in this book that Leffler does not especially emphasize but that emerge from evidence gathered through his research. First, in each of Leffler's examples, the Soviets were more eager for negotiations than the Americans. Malenkov, Brezhnev and even Khrushchev and certainly Gorbachev pushed for discussions that would lead to a relaxation of tensions. In every instance, the Americans were loath to proceed.

Second, when the United States did negotiate it was from what it regarded as a position of strength. Even SALT I did not touch the “forward bases.” The Soviets remained encircled, which increased the U.S. sense of superiority. Reagan supporters could argue that his major military build-up was the source of his willingness to negotiate.

Without denying the importance of ideology and historical memory, there were intractable problems and political assumptions that handicapped U.S.-Soviet relations. Germany immediately comes to mind. Soviet fears of U.S. meddling in its border states and U.S. assumptions about the communist monolith eager to subvert countries around the world certainly colored the first twenty years of the Cold War. China was a problem to both countries for quite different reasons. Jockeying for influence in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East soured relationships. It seems to me that the reader is left with a final question. Could these volatile, almost intractable issues have been laid to rest even if the Soviet and American policymakers were not bound by their ideology and memory?

In Washington, DC, a massive building named for Ronald Reagan sits on Pennsylvania Avenue between the White House and the Capitol. One of its heavily guarded entrances is known as the Berlin Wall door. To one side of the door is a piece of that wall and a plaque with Reagan's words urging Mr. Gorbachev to tear

it down. While both men weakened it, neither Gorbachev nor Reagan really tore it down. Sometimes, while leaders negotiate, the people act.

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**Comments on Melvyn P. Leffler,
*For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War***

Bruce Cumings

This book is a remarkable combination of the new and the old – instead of the halt leading the blind, the innovative and penetrating lead the familiar and the bland. Mel Leffler's portraits of American presidents from Truman to Reagan rarely say anything we haven't heard before. They gloss over what we do know about any number of crises, and when there is something novel, it is usually a paean to Ike's brilliance or Reagan's nuanced grasp of world politics. Maybe because we all know so much by now about the sources of American conduct in the Cold War it is tough to say something new. But why then does Mel Leffler seem to bend over backwards to be fair to Republican presidents – Ike and Reagan in particular? Of course, no American president comes off badly here: they are all fine men trying their damndest to do the right thing, however conflicted and equivocating they may be. (However, if George W. Bush had been thrown into this pantheon of Republican heroes, methinks Leffler's laudatory narrative would have come to a grinding halt.)

Soviet leaders, by contrast, are repeatedly cast in a new and illuminating light – the light of human frailty and indecision, torn conscience, and the limits of power. Soviet leaders were captured not so much by Leninist-Stalinist ideology or their sclerotic communist system, as one might think, but by the realities and limits of the bipolar global structure. Leffler makes their high-level decision-making appear

entirely believable, as he breaks new ground by showing how vexed Soviet leaders were over whether to intervene in Afghanistan. They recognized clearly that installing communism in Afghanistan was like saddling up a wild boar; the perils of local warlords, fundamentalist Islam, and a largely illiterate population were as palpable to them in 1979 as they are to Americans trying to salvage a modicum of success in Afghanistan today.

What is the reason for the disparity in these portraits of Soviet and American leaders? Facts would be a good place to start. Leffler has made excellent use of post-Soviet documents – not to grind an anti-communist axe, which was the mode throughout the 1990s, but to fathom how Soviet leaders made critical decisions, usually with an eye to what Washington was doing or might do, while struggling with (often very) imperfect knowledge. There is surprisingly little evidence of their presumed ideological prism or "master plan" for global domination. This book gives very little comfort to the prevailing conceptions of Kremlin goals in the vast bulk of American Cold War literature published between 1947 and, say, the present. If any perspective gains more credence through his narrative, it would be the best of Cold War "revisionism" as exemplified by Gabriel Kolko in his *Politics of War*. Kolko viewed Stalin as wary, conservative, distrustful of independent communists and leftists, and contemptuous of leaders like Tito who thought the British or the Americans would sit by and allow communist guerrillas to come to power in Greece – "leftist infatuations," Stalin called them (p. 72).]

A multitude of other examples abound in this book that run counter to the general tendencies of orthodox, "post-revisionist" and post-Cold War triumphalist accounts of Soviet behavior. But chalking up points on

Soviet leaders, by contrast, are repeatedly cast in a new and illuminating light – the light of human frailty and indecision, torn conscience, and the limits of power.

one side of some political ledger is the last thing that interests Leffler. His analysis is driven by the evidence, by new primary sources that he deploys deftly and wisely and that taken as a whole will make it very hard for people to sustain the old ideological arguments about Soviet leaders. Meanwhile, his depiction of the American side of this equation breaks little new ground, while falling into something close to hero worship.

The records of the Eisenhower National Security Council make it clear that the shrewdest person in the room was the president. But we knew that. Eisenhower was also the last occupant of the Oval Office to question seriously the newly risen national security state and the global archipelago of U.S. military bases (102,125), but Leffler passes over this quickly and without much comment. We knew Ike was the "hidden hand" president: but does he really merit this panegyric: "Skilled in diplomacy, a master of human relations . . . determined, disciplined, organized, supportive, and self-confident" (95)? The chapter on "The Chance for Peace, 1953-1954" nicely illustrates the genuine desires of Stalin's successors for a reduction of tensions, but it ends on a negative note because the world in 1954 "seemed

too frightening" for a relaxation. This is curious because the unification of Austria came the following year – a stark counterpoint to the sharp conflicts of the Cold War, but one unmentioned here.

Leffler

acknowledges that Jimmy Carter "had no real background in foreign policy" but describes him as "disciplined, curious, industrious, and, yes, tenacious." Not tenacious enough, though, to prevent Zbigniew Brzezinski from becoming the czar of national security. No more provocative and reckless a foreign policy advisor existed until Dick Cheney darkened the doorways of the White House. Brzezinski secretly encouraged Deng Xiaoping to invade Vietnam in 1979, leading to a near

war between China and the USSR; he worked feverishly behind the scenes to bring about a military coup as the Shah's reign ended in Iran; as Chalmers Johnson has shown, he was pleased to do everything he could to enable the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which ultimately unleashed a golem into the world that we are still dealing with; and he was pleased as punch to let a minor conflict in the horn of Africa torpedo the SALT II treaty and détente: "SALT

lies buried in the sand of the Ogaden," he crowed. All of this is mentioned in Leffler's account, but none of it is weighed to assess the Carter presidency or the degree to which Brzezinski paved the way for the hard-line agenda of the early Reagan administration. Instead we turn the page and find "Morning in America."

President Carter was a good man and an idealist, but he was also a naïf, buffeted this way and that until Brzezinski grabbed control of – and twisted and warped – his foreign policy hopes and dreams.

By contrast, the analysis of Soviet leaders from Stalin to Gorbachev is fascinating, well judged, and path-breaking. Leffler's full and nuanced portrait of Stalin shows how a dictator long dismissed as evil incarnate could also be the shrewdest of the World War II leaders. Harry Truman seems inadvertently to have been much reduced; overshadowed by Stalin, he falls by the wayside in this account of the two early Cold War leaders. Even Lavrenty Beria, Stalin's menacing but capable secret police henchman, can be understood in his fullness as a clever wretch, thanks to new documentation and the memoirs of his son. It is somehow amusing to see Beria, drenched in

the blood of innocent Russians, interrogating the Hungarian leader Matyas Rakosi on how it is possible, in a country of 9.5 million people, that "persecutions were initiated against 1,500,000 people" (115). The new material on the invasion of Afghanistan is also stunning; while Brzezinski hoped to inveigle the Russians into invading, the Kremlin leadership was torn and uncertain. Yuri Andropov rightly noted that the economy of Afghanistan was

backward, most of the population was illiterate, and "Islamic religion predominates." His conclusion: an invasion was "utterly inadmissible. We cannot take such a risk" (110). The passage on Mikhail Gorbachev is full and convincing. Gorbachev was a complicated man who, as Leffler rightly says, grabbed hold of history and ended the Cold War almost

singlehandedly (Republican fantasies notwithstanding).

When I first put this book down I was disappointed with everything but Leffler's adroit depiction of Soviet behavior. I gagged on the American narrative, wondered where the Third World had gone (given the prominent role it played in his magisterial *Preponderance of Power*, mainly as an arena of American policy failure), and didn't like the analytical presentation at the beginning: ideas, agency, contingency – fine. But what about structure? Well, there is the "international environment" within which American and Russian leaders operated, but that structure is rarely specified, perhaps because Cold War bipolarity corresponded rather well to theories of realism, which Leffler doesn't like. (In fact, by his own evidence, Soviet leaders seemed time and again to operate within a *realpolitik* framework.) How about

When I first put this book down I was disappointed with everything but Leffler's adroit depiction of Soviet behavior. I gagged on the American narrative, wondered where the Third World had gone (given the prominent role it played in his magisterial *Preponderance of Power*, mainly as an arena of American policy failure), and didn't like the analytical presentation at the beginning: ideas, agency, contingency – fine. But what about structure?...As I read back over and thought about this book, however, I came to think of it as a major achievement.

other structures – the world economy for example, which had crashed in the 1930s and which was the central postwar focus of American statesmen like Dean Acheson; the domestic social structures that were in utter crisis in most European and East Asian countries at the end of World War II and that shaped an essentially socialist response (democratic or communist) throughout both regions; the structure of subordination in the colonial world, which was also at the center of world affairs for three decades after 1945 and which mightily vexed both Washington and Moscow; and finally, the corporatist structure of political economy that Roosevelt built in the 1930s and 1940s, yielding a winning and long-lasting free-trade coalition for the first time in American history.

As I read back over and thought about this book, however, I came to think of it as a major achievement. Many diplomatic historians and most policymakers are not interested in the kinds of theory or structural analysis mentioned above; that is why they react with mute incomprehension to a book like Robert Latham's *The Liberal Moment*, which is the best analysis of agency, contingency and structure in the American making of the Cold War world. It seems to me that Leffler's careful analysis of Soviet decision-making is unmatched in the literature in its knowing comprehension, its solid grounding in unimpeachable primary sources, and the deft way it interrelates Russian and American behavior. It should be thoroughly digested and taken to heart by historians, political scientists, and people who would make policy in Washington. Since many other scholars have had access to these same materials for some time, it appears that something else is also at work here: a thorough knowledge of the issues that animated the Cold War, a finely honed sense of history, and the hardest kind of human knowledge to come by: wisdom.

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Vojtech Mastny

Anyone familiar with what Winston Churchill called the “baboonery” of communism, as well as with the dreariness of “anti-communism,” may approach with trepidation a book about the Cold War bearing the lofty title, *For the Soul of Mankind*. The reader will be reassured, however, as soon as he starts reading Leffler’s enlightening introduction to his sophisticated analysis of the conflict. That remarkable description of his intellectual journey is not only the clue to the account that follows under such a peculiar heading but also the clue, as it were, to his soul as a historian. Beyond this, the book is an invitation for other Cold War historians to save their souls by starting to look at their topics differently than they have been accustomed to doing thus far.

Leffler’s journey has been as impressive as it has been surprising. He has been admirable in his constant readiness to learn, with a wide-open mind, from critics of his work, which is always based on prodigious amounts of research and does not neglect the mounting evidence from “the other side.” He has weighed the mountainous evidence on increasingly sensitive scales, respecting his critics and gaining their respect in return. In assessing the different schools of thought, he found something to be said for all of them, though not enough, so he has absorbed them all, without making himself beholden to any one of them. In the process, he has moved from being seen as a quintessential “revisionist” to sometimes being seen — wrongly — as a scholar who espouses positions that have converged with those of his long-time antagonist, John L. Gaddis, often identified, also wrongly, as the avatar of the “traditional” school. Indeed, figuring out the Cold War is not any less complicated than waging it was.

For the Soul of Mankind, though billed modestly by its author as a mere “examination of five ‘moments’” at the critical turning

points of the forty-year stand-off, is in fact its history on a grand scale, written from a particular angle. That angle appeals to all of us who believe with Leffler in the importance of the “human agency” and thus the difference that ideas of men and women who wield political power can make in an unpredictable world where accidents do happen. His account comes as a breath of fresh air in the gloomy halls of determinism, where impersonal forces lurk in the mist, often fashionably dressed in unappealing academic jargon.

This is emphatically not the case with Leffler’s book. Far from being written for an elite of the convinced, his is a vibrant narrative, elegantly written for people to read, learn from, and think about. In this, it is reassuringly old-fashioned. Even specialists who know the story well will benefit from the author’s empathy for sources, his erudite use of evidence, his power of analysis. Knowing some of those sources, the reader might sometimes welcome more irreverence for their progenitors and a healthier dose of skepticism about their claims. This applies to such sources as all the ghostwritten U.S. presidential memoirs as well as the self-serving memoirs of Soviet potentates, Gorbachev not exempted. Singling out those instances where the author may have taken his sources too much at face value, however, would be nitpicking.

Serious critics should look at the final picture. There is more than a touch of post-modernist relativism in Leffler’s narrative. One has to worry about his willingness to give the protagonists so much benefit of the doubt because of the authenticity of their respective visions of the world that inspired their different policies. When reading that “the men in the Kremlin” — even such different ones as Gorbachev and Stalin — “sincerely believed they were reconfiguring human society and eradicating human exploitation,” one shudders at the thought that someone might come and invoke sincerity in trying to explain the deeds of such social visionaries as Adolf Hitler or Pol Pot. Nothing would be more insulting to the sincerity of Leffler’s humanism.

When one reads the narrative, with all its caveats, qualifications, and allowances, one gets almost nostalgic for the certitude of the younger Leffler, lambasting the U.S. “national security state” and blaming the Cold War on the greed of American capitalism rather than the security needs of a Soviet despot. The “softer and gentler” Leffler is prepared to credit both adversaries with “struggling for the soul of mankind,” though “in their quest for salvation and vindication” making “decisions that even by their own calculations perpetuated an often self-defeating conflict.” Truman, Eisenhower, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, not to mention Stalin, might feel flattered, but would they recognize themselves?

The overarching theme of the book is that of missed opportunities. It permeates the interpretation of why the Cold War started, lasted as long as it did, and ended unexpectedly the way it did. Leffler cites the abundant evidence showing that neither side desired or expected the kind of conflict that came. Yet, saying that the “Cold War came because conditions in the international system created risks that Truman and Stalin could not accept and opportunities they could not resist” appears a bit convoluted and, with all due respect for the commanders-in-chief, seems to leave something essential out of the picture.

If the Cold War was a war, where are the soldiers, including the officers, the battlefields, the civilians on the “domestic front,” caught in the middle, and the inevitable outsiders always to be taken into account, not to mention those tired of it all? They are all in the narrative, to be sure — the two alliances, each with its own troublesome allies, the prosperous Western part of Europe and its penurious Eastern counterpart, the conflict extending into the Third World, with the superpowers meddling in natives’ quarrels, and the China factor calculated in, as well as the dissidents. But all this, however thoughtfully discussed, provides merely the necessary background against which Leffler shows the foolishness of the

superpower protagonists glaring and their occasional wisdom shining.

A snooty foreign critic might sneer at a book about the Cold War whose sources are all in English. That would be grossly unfair. Leffler is thoroughly familiar with all the important evidence on hand, most of which is accessible in English, and there is not that much more of substance to be learned from what has been published in other languages. For all its "America-centrism," made worse by linguistic illiteracy, American scholarship about the Cold War is still by far the best in the world, and this book is yet another example of it. If, nevertheless, knowing the way other peoples express themselves in their own languages is important, it is because linguists acquire a feel for other peoples' way of thinking that helps them understand it, form the right opinion about it, and react properly to it. How important that "feel" is in the study of the Cold War may be explained in an illustrative example.

Once researchers capable of reading "Sovietspeak" in the original delved into the former Soviet archives, many of them were struck by how much ideological junk they had to dig through before getting to the nuggets. That experience is lost in translation, but it has not been lost on Leffler, even though he personally has not gone through it. The knowledge of it, however, was enough to reinforce his conviction that ideas in people's heads, however wrong-headed they may be, matter enormously. He writes that "ideology shaped perceptions—this is one of the great lessons of the Cold War—accentuating fears, highlighting opportunities, and warping rational assessments of interests in Washington and Moscow." This is as true as it can be—but what exactly is the lesson?

Historians have different kinds of souls. One kind believes in drawing lessons; the other considers this none of a historian's business. The former explains the past by looking into the

past, which can be satisfying and even exhilarating. The other explains the past while trying to look into the future, which is always risky, but worthwhile. It may come as a surprise to find Leffler fitting more into the former and Gaddis into the latter category of Cold War historians.

For the Soul of Mankind ends with a celebration of Gorbachev and Reagan for bringing the confrontation to a happy end. Even those inclined to consider them rather mediocre statesmen must be impressed by their

ability to surpass their mediocrity at decisive moments. Gorbachev proved it because of what he did not do: namely, resort to force to prop up the Soviet empire

when trying to do so would have created unimaginable havoc before the empire would have come down anyway. Reagan's main achievement was in giving the leader of the "evil empire" the critical benefit of the doubt to reinforce his disposition to desist. All this was extraordinary, fortunate, amazing, and fascinating—but what more can we say?

For an answer, we have to go to Gaddis, whose historical soul is of the other kind, and read the conclusion to his "new" history of the Cold War entitled *The View Back*—from 2005, that is, when the view was taken. It is really the view forward from the Cold War, the view that is missing in Leffler's account. We may find some of Gaddis's conclusions already dated, but they are still eminently conducive to our own conclusions.

All good historians are products of their time rather than another, and their accounts are not "definitive," regardless of what publishers may say. This is as true of Gaddis as it is of Leffler. Their respective views of the Cold War—Gaddis's of the post-9/11 illusion of American omnipotence, Leffler's of the realization of its limits—could not escape being molded by the agonies of the America of the Bush administration. In trying to draw conclusions for the future while presenting a "triumphalist" view of the Cold War, Gaddis came to be seen as an acolyte of that

disastrous administration and was savaged for his pains by his friends on the pages of *Cold War History*. Leffler, not similarly committed and better attuned to the unpredictability of events, is unlikely to suffer such a fate on these pages. But he is unlikely to escape the judgment of the future either.

This would not necessarily be because his own judgments about the Cold War would all be proven wrong but rather that they would happily become obsolete as historians' perceptions of the conflict change. It is a safe prediction that the main topics of interest to future historians will be different. In trying to estimate how different, it is necessary only to look into the perhaps not so distant future and ask some of the pertinent questions.

Can we expect that, as an exceptional kind of conflict such as the Cold War recedes deeper into the past, whatever real or imaginary opportunities its superpower managers may have lost will no longer seem such a burning issue?

Can we assume that, with one of the superpowers extinct and the other chastised, decisions will be diffused among many powers, less personal and more institutional, multilateral rather than national, thus diminishing the relevance of the kind of competition that defined the Cold War?

Can we envisage that self-styled saviors of mankind have been sufficiently discredited to allow security to be defined in human terms rather than in terms of *raison d'état*, thus calling attention to the origins of this development during the Cold War?

Can we hope that the paralyzing fear of a possible nuclear disaster that was such a hallmark of the Cold War will be superseded by the stark but inspiring reality of a coming environmental disaster that will overshadow all the traditional concerns of power politics and also transform the historians' agenda beyond recognition?

Can we believe that all this might happen? "Yes, we can."

A snooty foreign critic might sneer at a book about the Cold War whose sources are all in English. That would be grossly unfair.

Roundtable Response

Melvyn P. Leffler

I want to thank the editors of *Passport* for selecting my book for a roundtable. I am delighted to have the opportunity to respond to the comments of Vojtech Mastny, Bruce Cumings, and Anna Nelson.

Mastny and Cumings have been critics of my work in the past and I am pleased that they find much to admire in my present book. Of course, it would be impossible to satisfy them both totally because their criticisms usually come from different perspectives. Mastny is right when he says that I have learned from them (and other critics). He also says that learning does not mean imitating. In this volume I tried to come to terms with some of the more trenchant observations that they and others leveled at my other books and articles on the early Cold War. My work, however, always has been archive-based. My major challenge has been to make sense out of the evidence. To do this I have tried to think deeply about the different theoretical approaches and interpretive perspectives that have done so much to enrich Cold War scholarship. My book, I hope, illuminates key issues fundamental to understanding the Cold War dynamic.

Why did I give my book such an odd and lofty title, Mastny inquires. Did policymakers in Washington and Moscow really see themselves waging a battle for the soul of mankind? The answer is yes, and the title of the book, as I explain in the introduction, comes directly from a quotation by President George H. W. Bush. Throughout the volume, I provide ample evidence to demonstrate that leaders in the United States and the Soviet Union really did think they were waging a struggle over a way of life, a struggle between democratic capitalism and communism. By eliminating private property and a marketplace economy,

the men in the Kremlin thought they "could supplant human greed as the driving force behind human progress. Planning would replace the anarchy of the marketplace. Workers would no longer be at the mercy of their employers, and oppressed peoples would no longer be subject to imperial domination." In contrast, officials in Washington wanted peoples to be free and markets to be open. "Individual rights and private property were the keys to human advancement and personal opportunity." God, they liked to say, intended people to be free (*For the Soul of Mankind*, 452-53).

In this context, my interpretive framework overlaps considerably with that of Odd Arne Westad when he argues that leaders in the United States and the Soviet Union conceived of themselves (and were conceived by others) as representing contrasting models of advancing modernity. Officials in Washington and Moscow, he writes, needed to change the world "in order to prove the universal applicability of their ideologies" (Westad, *The Global Cold War*, 4). The Cold War was indeed a struggle over ways of shaping human existence. And that meant, as Westad

and so many others have shown, that both governments often did horrendous things in the name of their ideals and ideology.

But this commitment to ideology does not mean that the Cold War was simply an ideological struggle, as Anna Nelson suggests I argue. Repeatedly, she says that I stress the roles of ideology and memory, and she implies that I overlook the salience of "interest." Eisenhower and Dulles, for example, may have been imbued with American values, but their priorities, Nelson writes, "lay with geopolitical and strategic efforts to preserve American interests in the world." Actually, I do not disagree with her stress on interests. What I seek to do in my book is to blot out the false binaries between ideology and interest, between

idealism and realism. What I try to show is how inextricably interrelated were ideology and interest, how intellectually bankrupt it is to separate discussions of the "system," whether it be the world capitalist system or the distribution of power in the international system, from analyses of ideology and memory. The key to understanding the Cold War, I argue, is to appreciate developments going on in the international system and the world political economy—for example, the socio-economic turmoil at the end of World War II, the vacuums of power left by the defeat of Germany and Japan, the cycles of revolutionary nationalism in the Third World, and the stagflation of Western capitalism in the 1970s. But I also argue that officials at the time saw these developments through their own prisms. Beliefs, memories, and individual experiences shaped their constructions of reality, accentuating fears, highlighting opportunities, and sometimes warping rational assessments of interests. My emphasis is on the interconnectedness of all these things: my book is about ideology and memory, but also about structure and agency (*For the Soul of Mankind*, 8, 458).

Thus Cumings is simply wrong when he says that I ignore the Third World and the world economy. Ironically, after previously critiquing *A Preponderance of Power*, he now says it was "magisterial," and he takes me to task for not doing as good a job with the Third World in this book as I did in my previous work. With time and another reading of this volume, I feel certain that Cumings will come to see that I assign enormous importance to developments in the Third World. One of the overriding themes of the book is that it is impossible to comprehend the continuation of the Cold War, especially after the 1950s, without understanding the ramifications of decolonization and revolutionary nationalism. No one, I write in the introduction, can understand the Cold War "without recognizing the disillusionment Europeans felt after decades of war, depression, and genocide; without

Did policymakers in Washington and Moscow really see themselves waging a battle for the soul of mankind? The answer is yes.

realizing the fears that the possibility of German recovery inspired; without grasping the aspirations of Asian, African, and Latin American peoples for autonomy, modernization, and national advancement" (*For the Soul of Mankind*, 9). In chapter after chapter, I discuss at considerable length how developments in the Third World perpetuated the Cold War.

And rather than glorify Eisenhower, I actually show how this Republican president linked concerns about the world political economy and the distribution of power in the international system (as did Democrats). Eisenhower and his advisers could not ignore developments in Indochina and elsewhere because they deemed the resources and raw materials of Southeast Asia and the Middle East indispensable to the economic health and political vitality of Japan and Western Europe. Without Third World markets and raw materials, Western Europe and Japan might be slowly sucked into the Kremlin's orbit, and the balance of power in the world would move in the direction of the Soviet Union. Such developments, I argue in this book, as I argued in *A Preponderance of Power*, would have grave implications for America's own political economy of freedom. In other words, Truman and Eisenhower, Acheson and Dulles saw the configuration of power in the international system and the openness of the world political economy as having a profound bearing on free enterprise and individual rights inside the United States. Acknowledging their awareness of that influence does not mean that I am embracing (or rejecting) a corporatist or world systems analysis; it means that we must, once again, break down our artificially constructed categories of analysis and see the intimate connections between the structure of the world economy, the evolution of power in the international system, and the memories and ideological dispositions of world leaders.

To appreciate how policymakers in Washington saw these interconnections does not mean that I am labeling them as brilliant,

as Cumings says I am; nor do I consider them foolish (for missing opportunities to relax tensions), as Mastny suggests I do. Rather than deeming policymakers wise or foolish or prudent, as I did in my previous book, in this volume I focus more on explaining the world as they saw it. I am delighted that Cumings thinks I do this so well with regard to Soviet leaders and I am disappointed that he thinks I do this so poorly with regard to U.S. leaders. Actually, my portraits of American as well as Soviet leaders are quite textured and nuanced.

There is no hero-worshipping of U.S. presidents in my book; there are no "paeans to Ike's brilliance or Reagan's grasp of world politics." Yes, I do say that Eisenhower was an able leader of men, skilled in diplomacy, etc., but my larger

point in the chapter on Eisenhower (and Malenkov) is that Ike was not able to overcome his fears or shelve his quest for victory in the Cold War. In other words, he refused to take big chances for peace. And although I treat Reagan kindly, it is not because of his grasp of world politics, as Cumings asserts. Indeed, I give a fairly full account of the shortcomings of Reagan's decision-making processes and stress his ignorance of facts and detail, but I also emphasize his personal charm, his calculating mindset, his inner convictions, and his capacity to change and come to appreciate some of the fears of his adversaries. "What was unique about Reagan," I write, "was his willingness to reach out to a leadership he abhorred, men whose values he detested; to appreciate the concerns of his adversary; and to learn from experience" (*For the Soul of Mankind*, 341). Why, once again, do we have to portray leaders in black and white? Why can't we see people as they are, with strengths and weaknesses, with fears and hopes, with sensibilities and prejudices born of experience and reified by memory? Why, after all, do we need to see Stalin as Gabriel Kolko sees him —

Cumings's preference — or as Robert Conquest or R. C. Raack depict him? Why can't we see Stalin as vicious, brutal, paranoid, calculating, devious, and untrustworthy, as I see him, and at the same time acknowledge, as I also try to do, that he could sometimes act defensively, prudently, conservatively, indecisively? Indeed, that is much the way Mastny portrays him in his monograph, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*.

My book is partly about lost opportunities, but opportunities were lost not because leaders were foolish. They were lost because leaders could not overcome their fears and anxieties or set aside their hopes and

dreams. My commentators do not dwell on this point, but one of the significant aspects of my book is highlighting

My book is partly about lost opportunities, but opportunities were lost not because leaders were foolish. They were lost because leaders could not overcome their fears and anxieties or set aside their hopes and dreams.

how experiences and memories shaped Cold War policies. The memory of World War II haunted world leaders. The Soviets, in particular, could not forget the brutality of war and the hardships of occupation. I show, as does Vladislav Zubok in *A Failed Empire*, his excellent new book on Soviet officials during the Cold War, how deeply affected Brezhnev was by the experiences of war. His pursuit of détente is explicable only in those terms. And even Gorbachev, representative of a new generation not yet born during the revolution of 1917, could not escape the legacy and memory of World War II. "I was fourteen when the war ended," he wrote in his memoir. "Our generation is the generation of wartime children. It has burned us, leaving its mark both on our characters and our view of the world" (quoted in *For the Soul of Mankind*, 367).

My book is episodic, as Anna Nelson explains. It is about five "moments" in the Cold War when, I argue (on the basis of much new evidence), leaders in Moscow and Washington saw the possibility of avoiding or relaxing tensions and focusing on issues of mutual

interest but failed to do so. There were many such “moments” during the Cold War, but my book dwells on only five of them. If leaders on both sides recognized the benefits and advantages of avoiding or modulating a Cold War, why did they not act accordingly? To grapple with this question – the essential question for figuring out why the Cold War lasted so long – I look at several of the most salient explanatory variables that have emerged in the literatures on the Cold War: the configuration of power in the international system; the roles of ideology and memory; the influence of allies and clients; the impact of domestic public opinion, pressure groups, and bureaucracies; and the importance of human agency. In the first four “moments,” which involve Truman and Stalin (1945-48), Eisenhower and Malenkov (1953-54), Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Johnson (1962-65), and Brezhnev and Carter (1975-80), I show how and why leaders were unable to break through the constraints that circumscribed their ability to avoid or reduce tensions. I argue that systemic developments (like the trajectory of German power and the cycles of decolonization), ideology and memory, and human agency were more important than the role of allies and clients or domestic opinion, although I also illuminate how all these variables intersected in complex ways.

Nelson wants to know why I chose to write about Kennedy and Johnson from 1962 to 1965 and not about Kissinger and Nixon during the early 1970s. After the Cuban missile crisis, Khrushchev wrote a series of letters and made overtures that signified a desire to relax tensions. He realized that avoiding another nuclear showdown, shifting resources to domestic priorities, and modulating conflict on the periphery would serve Soviet interests and enable him to strengthen his system at home. After equivocating, Kennedy gave his famous speech at American University saying that Americans should rethink the Cold War; it would serve U.S. interests to do so. Here again was another example of leaders saying they wanted

to modulate competition. And although I show that they tried to act accordingly – by signing the Limited Test Ban Treaty, for example – I am not nearly as complimentary of Kennedy as Nelson suggests I am. I see him yearning to move ahead but also immensely conflicted. Nonetheless, Nelson summarizes my analysis correctly when she says that I am much more critical of Johnson. I end the chapter in the early months of 1965 precisely because I argue that Johnson’s decisions to bomb North Vietnam and then to deploy combat troops to South Vietnam thwarted the prospects for détente in the mid-1960s. I show how Khrushchev’s successors in the Kremlin – Brezhnev and Kosygin – regarded Johnson’s actions. They felt they could not move ahead while the United States was ratcheting up the war (much as Reagan in the 1980s said he could not move ahead unless the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan). Of course, there would be renewed attempts at détente during Johnson’s last two years in office, as there always were, but for heuristic purposes it made sense to show how LBJ’s actions in the first few months of 1965 – actions that were far from inevitable – put an end to another promising “moment” and perpetuated the overall Cold War.

Why, then, not also focus on Nixon and Kissinger, the real progenitors of détente? Here I made a calculated decision in the architecture of my book. Since I was more interested in why efforts at détente failed than in why détente occurred, I decided to focus on Carter, Vance, and Brzezinski rather than Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford. I could have written a chapter that showed that détente was already floundering in 1975-76; it was! But I was also deeply impressed by two facts: first, that Brezhnev had an ongoing attachment to détente, and, second, that Carter wanted to revive his version of détente. Given that my overriding goal was to explain the decisions that perpetuated the Cold War, I thought a lot more could be learned by focusing on the failed efforts to sustain détente between 1977 and 1979. Moreover, this decision allowed me to examine

some of the most fascinating new documents of the entire Cold War on Soviet decision-making, the ones that Cumings rightly sees as especially revealing of the *mentalité* of Soviet leaders. In short, pressures for ending détente were certainly accruing in Moscow and Washington during the mid-1970s, but Brezhnev and Carter wanted to sustain détente. Their failure to do so helps explain why the Cold War lasted as long as it did, which is one of the central questions of my book.

The “moments” I chose were also related to my desire to explore human agency. Mastny correctly stresses that human agency is one of the defining aspects of my book. But to say that I am interested in human agency does not necessarily mean, as Nelson thinks it does, that I am making a case for human agency. I wanted to explore the importance of key leaders in the context of all the pressures that enveloped them. Given the dynamics in the international environment, the salience of ideology, the constraints imposed by allies and clients, and the pressures of domestic constituents, could leaders make a difference? I am not sure that I satisfactorily answer this question in the first four chapters of my book. I certainly show that leaders knew they had choices, that they could have chosen to pursue other options, that alternative courses had their own logic and were perceived as serving their nations’ interests. But all these leaders – Stalin and Truman, Malenkov and Eisenhower, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Johnson, Brezhnev and Carter – knowingly opted to perpetuate the Cold War when they could have made choices to modulate it (if not necessarily to end it). I conclude that “leaders were trapped by their ideas and ideals and beleaguered by the dangers and opportunities that lurked in the international system. . . . Leaders in both countries often glimpsed the mutuality of their interests but became hostages to their ideas and constituents rather than agents of change” (*For the Soul of Mankind*, 452).

On the other hand, Reagan and Gorbachev did become agents of change. I make it clear that

both international and domestic circumstances made change more likely in the mid- and late 1980s. But I also think that Reagan and Gorbachev were critically important, especially Gorbachev. He altered his mindset and shifted priorities without abandoning his ideological convictions, as he understood them. It is hard to imagine other Soviet leaders acting as he did. And although it is true, as Nelson concludes, that ordinary people, not leaders, tore down the Berlin Wall, they were able to act as they did only because they had been given the space to act, only because Gorbachev already had made a series of decisions that had transformed the political and geopolitical environment within Eastern Europe. Once again, I would suggest that we do away with binaries—constructs that would dictate that either the people act or leaders lead. In reality, people and leaders remain in a complicated nexus. I hope my book allows students and scholars to evaluate just how important leaders were. I do not presume to offer final judgments; readers should and will dispute my assessments.

Mastny asks at the end of his remarks whether in the long run scholars will be raising the same questions and seeing the same trends. "It is a safe prediction," he writes, "that the main topics of interest to future historians will be different." I think he is right to suggest that in the future the Cold War will loom less important than contemporaries thought it was. Already we can see that some of our brightest colleagues are switching the focus of their interests to issues of demography, disease, migration, modernization, and environmental disaster. They

claim, probably rightly, that these topics will assume more importance in the history of humanity than the Soviet-American conflict. But my book does not seek to make the argument that the Cold War was the most significant event of the latter half of the twentieth century. Rather, it seeks to understand the Cold War within the context of its times and to address why it began, why it lasted for almost half a century, and why it ended when it did. Given those questions, I do think that the variables I illuminate—the evolution of the international system, the postwar socio-economic turmoil in Western Europe, the trajectory of German power, the upsurge of revolutionary nationalism in Asia and Africa, the rise of Sino-Soviet antagonism, the role of ideology and memory, the influence of allies and clients, the salience of domestic constituencies, and the importance of leaders—will remain of central importance. Scholars will assign different degrees of significance to these factors and will explain their interactions in different ways than I do, but I believe they are likely to remain at the center of debates about the Cold War.

While the Cold War may seem less important in future discussions about the international history of the late twentieth century, we should not forget some salient lessons, the most important being that if the Cold War had become a hot war between the two central contestants, our way of life and their way of life would have ended. Leaders in both Moscow and Washington grasped this reality, and we are lucky that they did. But they also understood something else. They believed they were waging a contest about how to

ameliorate the lives of their people, about how to create polities and systems of political economy that would serve their citizens, garner adherents abroad, and augment their nations' power. These were complicated, overlapping, and sometimes contradictory objectives. And in the end, what I stress, and what none of the commentators mentioned, was that the Soviet Union lost because Soviet leaders failed to make their system work as they promised it would. The Cold War, I write, "tested the capacity of two alternative systems of governance and political economy to deal with the challenges of a postcolonial and postindustrial age" (*For the Soul of Mankind*, 465). The most important lesson of the Cold War, therefore, may not relate to strategy, military capabilities, or even to foreign policy; it may have to do with the capacity of systems of governance to respond to people's wishes for decent living conditions, nutritious food, a secure environment, and opportunities for education, free expression, entertainment, religious piety, and individual advancement. After World War II it was far from certain that democratic capitalism would have the capacity to avoid another depression, modulate the business cycle, sustain the peace, overcome racism and bigotry, provide equality of opportunity, and satisfy the yearnings of Africans, Asians, and Latin Americans for autonomy and self-determination. These challenges remain, even after the Cold War.

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Public History and Public Audiences: The U.S. Department of State and Its Historical Advisory Committee

Kristin L. Ahlberg and Thomas W. Zeiler

Federal history programs must serve both the client agency and a larger public constituency. Such a dichotomy demands openness, accountability, and the highest standards of professionalism. Federal history offices engage in a variety of historical activities designed to support the mission of their agencies, educate and inform the general public, and provide scholars with new documentation. The Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State serves as a unique example of a historical program able to meet the demands placed upon it, especially in the area of public accountability.

The department's congressionally mandated Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation (commonly known as the Historical Advisory Committee or HAC), comprised of leading scholars, plays an important oversight role in the declassification and dissemination of the official foreign policy record. The relationship between the Office of the Historian and the Advisory Committee is a collaborative one, dedicated to a greater public and academic good.

The Department of State has published the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series (FRUS), the official historical record of diplomatic activity and foreign policy decisions, continuously since 1861. Initially known as *Papers Relating to Foreign Affairs*, the first volume in the series was published in December 1861 and contained Secretary of State William H. Seward's instructions to American diplomats in London and Paris, as well as the Lincoln administration's war aims. During the first 50 years of the series, State Department clerks selected and

edited diplomatic correspondence for each year under the supervision of an assistant secretary of state. The first professionally trained historians charged with preparing *Foreign Relations* volumes joined the department in 1918. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg further professionalized the series by promulgating editorial standards for FRUS volumes, including document selection and editing, which exist to this day. The Department of State also expanded the number of volumes for each year, given the increasing global responsibilities the United States had assumed during the early 20th century.

Widening the scope of the *Foreign Relations* series necessitated the recruitment of additional historians. To that end, several professional organizations, including the American Historical Association (AHA) and the American Society for International Law (ASIL), lobbied Congress to increase the State Department's publication program, asserting that they had the "responsibility to press the government for the release of information."¹ Congressional funding allowed the department to produce, during the 1940s and 1950s, not only the *Foreign Relations* series but also a variety of policy-supportive studies for Department principals.

Such lobbying efforts presaged a relationship between the professional organizations and the federal government and, importantly, between academic historians and public historians. Nowhere was this more evident than in the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Relations in 1956. During the early 1950s, the Republican leadership of the Senate

requested that the Department of State publish the documentation of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences, and subsequently pressed for publication of the complete record of wartime conferences, stretching from 1941 to 1945. The Historical Division created a special research team in order to prioritize this assignment. In addition, the Department leadership tasked the Historical Division with the preparation of volumes detailing U.S.-China relations during the 1941-1949 period, in part, to provide a comprehensive record of U.S. decision-making. The fact that the wartime and China volumes developed in a politicized context, made evident by the department's premature release of the Yalta galley proofs to *The New York Times* in 1955, raised concerns among academics as to the methodology and integrity of the *Foreign Relations* series. The AHA, in response to members' concerns, proposed that the organization's Committee on the Historian and the Federal Government assist in the creation of an advisory committee, comprised of leading scholars in the history, political science, archival, and legal fields, to monitor the production of *Foreign Relations* volumes and press for timely declassification of federal diplomatic records.²

During the changing political climate of the late 1960s and early 1970s, the *Foreign Relations* series served as a lightning rod for criticism of government secrecy. Tensions developed between those historians who conducted research in the field of diplomatic history and the federal agencies and employees responsible for maintenance and declassification of federal records. The Office of the Historian, plagued

by staff attrition and retirement, became caught in the middle of the controversy. Executive Order 11652, issued by President Richard Nixon in March 1972, lessened the tension by mandating declassification of government records according to a prescribed schedule. By the mid 1970s, however, the series was more than 20 years behind currency. The gap would continue to widen throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Incomplete coverage of coups in Guatemala in 1954 (volume published in 1983) and Iran in 1953 (volume published in

1989) elicited a public outcry over the series. The Advisory Committee chair Warren Cohen resigned in protest. This public castigation of the series led Congress to establish a statutory requirement in the fall of 1991 – the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (PL 102-138) – which required the Office of the Historian to publish a “thorough, accurate, and reliable record” of foreign policy and diplomatic activity 30 years after the events. The concepts of transparency and openness as suggested by this mandate prompted Congress to

establish the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, also known as the Historical Advisory Committee (HAC). Replacing the earlier committee, the HAC carries a congressional mandate to oversee the opening of diplomatic records in a timely and thorough fashion. The committee’s membership consists of nine members nominated by the AHA, the American Society of International Law, the American Political Science Association, the Organization of American Historians, the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and the Society of American Archivists. These historians, political scientists, archivists, and lawyers hold the necessary security clearances to enable them to examine documents and advocate for their release.

The committee convenes in two-day quarterly meetings to carry out its dual responsibilities: to ensure the preparation and timely publication of the *Foreign Relations* series and to facilitate public access to Department of State records that are 25 years or older from the date of issue. The *FRUS* editorial review process spans from the conceptualization of the volumes to their delivery in print or electronic form. Committee members read documents in the compilation stage, advising on historical issues and the release of classified material under consideration. Even when a *Foreign Relations* volume is completed, the committee reviews and critiques the volume to determine if it meets scholarly expectations. Regarding declassification, the scholars examine the Department of State’s guidelines for opening records and, by random sampling, peruse documents representative of all departmental materials still classified after 30 years. Most notably, the committee hears from a host of constituent agencies involved with the *Foreign Relations* process – the National Archives, the Library of Congress, presidential libraries, and executive branch departments – about their efforts to meet the 30-year rule. For instance, representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) regularly report to the Committee. The committee also presses for timely and fair treatment of requests for

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
The History of American Foreign Policy

Third Edition

Jerald A. Combs,
San Francisco State University

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A certain tension is inherent between the Historian's Office and the Committee. Documentation must be comprehensive; but it must also be published within 30 years of the date of the original records. Under the provisions of Executive Order 12958 (as amended by the George W. Bush administration) documents older than 25 years must be declassified and made accessible to the public; records that might pose a risk to the security of the United States must remain classified. A directive from the White House after 9/11, and issues of control over former presidents' files, have slowed or prevented the release of key presidential papers, creating a delay in the release of certain documentation. The problem of meeting the *Foreign Relations* series' 30-year requirement is no less acute, and due to declassification delays, the series is currently behind schedule, and has been for some years. The committee's focus continues to be upon bringing the series into full compliance with the law, and progress is being made in that direction. A bright spot was the release in 2006 of eleven *Foreign Relations* volumes, the majority of which documented key events during

the Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford administrations.

The committee's *raison d'être* is to serve the public interest. Thus, one afternoon of each meeting is open to interested observers; participants have included the National Security Archive (NSA) and the National Coalition for History (NCH). The committee has also dealt with controversies, such as a formal protest in 2006 over the Bush administration's reclassification of documents. In addition, luncheons and special sessions involve guests ranging from senior administration officials (including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Archivist of the United States Allen Weinstein) to historical organization representatives. Moreover, the committee performs its duty to the public by submitting a required annual report to the Secretary of State that sets forth its findings regarding both the progress and limitations of the editorial and declassification processes of the *Foreign Relations* series, as well as the declassification and opening of Department of State records. The watchdog committee, then, is designed to assure the Historian's Office, Congress, and the public that the declassification process and publication of the *Foreign Relations* series is on the right track toward greater transparency.

Kristin L. Ahlberg is a Historian in the Europe and Global Issues Division, Office of the Historian, U.S. Department of State.

Thomas W. Zeiler is Professor of History at the University of Colorado-Boulder and a member of the Historical Advisory Committee.

Notes:

1. William Sheppard, "The Plight of 'Foreign Relations': A Plea for Action," *American Historical Association Newsletter*, Vol. IX, No. 5, November 1971, 24.
2. The original members of the committee included: Thomas Bailey (Stanford Univ.); Clarence Berdahl (Univ. of Illinois); Leland Goodrich (Columbia Univ.); Richard Leopold (Northwestern Univ.); Dexter Perkins (Cornell Univ.); Philip Thayer (Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies); and Edgar Turlington (Washington, D.C. lawyer). See the "Report of the Advisory Committee on *Foreign Relations* to the Historical Division of the Department of State," *The American Journal of International Law*, 52:3 (July 1958), 510. Leopold provides an excellent overview of the committee's founding in "The Foreign Relations Series: A Centennial Estimate," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 49:4 (March 1963).

Editors Note: This article first appeared in the Public History column of the January 2008 issue of Perspectives on History. It is reprinted here with the gracious permission of the American Historical Association.

SHAFR urges its membership to consider proposing panels for the 2010 Conference of the Organization of American Historians.

The conference will take place April 7-10, 2010 in Washington, D. C.

The deadline for proposals will be in February 2009.

For more information, visit the OAH webpage at:

<http://www.oah.org/>

2008 SHAFR Summer Institute

SHAFR's inaugural Summer Institute was held at Ohio State University on June 21-26, 2008. Peter Hahn and Bob McMahon co-facilitated the program, which involved twelve faculty from colleges and universities across the United States and abroad. The 2008 Institute, organized on the theme "War & Foreign Policy: America's Conflicts in Vietnam and Iraq in Historical Perspective," involved in-depth discussions of the literature on the U.S. experiences in Vietnam and Iraq and of strategies for presenting such research in the classroom.

In 2009, Jeremi Suri and Fred Logevall will co-host another Summer Institute at the University of Wisconsin. Planning is underway to organize two additional institutes, in 2010 and 2011, at places to be determined.



Participants in the 2008 SHAFR Summer Institute are shown above, on the Oval of the Ohio State University campus.

Front Row (L-R): Peter Hahn, Ohio State University; Matt Jacobs, University of Florida; Sandra Scanlon, University College Dublin; Robert McMahon, Ohio State University; Qiang Zhai, Auburn University, Montgomery; Sayuri Shimizu, Michigan State University.

Back row (L-R): Michaela Hoenicke Moore, University of Iowa; Jeffrey Engel, Texas A&M University; Chris Jespersen, North Georgia College; Fabian Hilfrich, University of Edinburgh; Andrew Johns, Brigham Young University; Thomas Zoumaras, Truman State University; Thomas Gaskin, Everett Community College; Molly Wood, Wittenberg University.

“Now, Is This Your Own Work, Or...?”

Reflections on the Value of History

J. Samuel Walker

Thirty years ago, at SHAFR's 1978 annual meeting, I had a brief and revealing conversation with a past president of SHAFR about how the value of history should be regarded by the non-academic public. At that time, Congress was considering slashing the State Department's budget for the *Foreign Relations* series, and diplomatic historians were understandably concerned. At the same time, Congress was being criticized for funding programs that many saw as wasteful, including a well-publicized study of prostitution in South America. The former SHAFR president wondered aloud how Congress could support a study of prostitution while threatening the budget for *Foreign Relations*. I ventured to say that the key to obtaining funds from Congress was not to denigrate the value of other projects but to highlight the value of *Foreign Relations* for historians, the State Department, and general public. The former president curtly responded that the importance of *Foreign Relations*, unlike silly studies of prostitution, should be obvious to everyone.

Fortunately, *Foreign Relations* survived the crisis of 1978 and continues to provide invaluable documentation for scholars. But what the former SHAFR president regarded as self-evident is not necessarily apparent to most of the population. And more importantly, the value of historical scholarship for the non-academic public is not necessarily the same as it is for academics. Although the need for careful, thorough, and accurate historical research and writing is essential in any context, some academic historians, even after

decades of a strong and effective public history movement, seem clueless about the value of history beyond their own boundaries. For most academic historians, I suspect, the primary purpose of historical research is to make a contribution to knowledge, hopefully a “significant contribution,” and to inform and enrich the historiography of a given subject. Those are noble goals, but they have limited application beyond academic circles. Historians outside academe try to reach audiences whose interests might differ from those of the academic community but who nevertheless recognize the benefits of understanding the past.

I base this judgment on a long career as a public historian. After studying American diplomatic history in graduate school, I worked for a few years at the National Archives and then joined the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as one of two staff historians. Since 1986, I have been the sole historian of the NRC, where my job is to publish scholarly histories of the regulation of commercial nuclear power (the NRC has no role in atomic weapons programs). To date, I have published four books as NRC historian, all with the University of California Press. The most recent volume, a history of the Three Mile Island (TMI) accident, came out in 2004 and received what I regarded as very favorable reviews in popular media and scholarly journals. I made appearances on

Historians outside academe try to reach audiences whose interests might differ from those of the academic community but who nevertheless recognize the benefits of understanding the past.

NBC News, CNN, Book TV, C-Span, NPR, and other television and radio programs. The book met the norms of scholarly publishing, including 41 pages of footnotes, but, to my gratification, reached and seemed to impress an audience well beyond the scholarly community.

The Three Mile Island book underscores the purposes of the NRC history program. The NRC does not expect me to glorify the history of the agency, and Three Mile Island was not exactly a glorious moment. Rather, the agency supports the history program because it recognizes the need to know and understand its own past, warts and all. When the TMI book came out, I was asked to give a lecture to the entire agency to increase the staff's knowledge of the causes and consequences of the accident. The NRC, and the federal government as a whole, is currently promoting a major effort for “knowledge management.” This is an awkward term for a worthy objective--the collection and transfer of important information from senior staff to newer employees. Like my colleagues in history offices throughout the government, I have been involved in “knowledge management” throughout my career, though we usually call it “history.”

Academic historians often seem to assume that a government historian's sworn duty simply to make the employing agency look good. Some seem oblivious to the fact that history that meets high professional standards has enormous benefits in a rich variety of contexts beyond teaching students and contributing to historiographical debates. In that respect they undervalue the importance of their own profession. By failing to recognize the utility

of professional history for the functioning of an institution, too many academic historians, I'm afraid, assume that the only reason agencies hire historians is to produce "court history."

Despite the fact that some of the most favorable reviews of my Three Mile Island book were written by experts who have criticized nuclear power and the NRC, I encounter skepticism from some academic scholars about the integrity of my work. It is always a disheartening experience to attend professional meetings and be asked by colleagues of whatever project I am working on, "Now is this your own work, or . . . ?" They never complete the question but the implication is clear. When I try to explain that the NRC does not interfere with the way I do my job and places no restrictions on my scholarship, I am usually met with yawns of disbelief.

In the case of SHAFR, the question seems to apply to my book *Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bomb against Japan* (University of North Carolina Press, 1997, 2004), since I doubt that many of my SHAFR colleagues have read my books on nuclear regulation. I wrote *Prompt and Utter Destruction* "on my own time" during evenings and weekends; it was not an NRC project. I draw the distinction between NRC projects and my work on the atomic bomb for two reasons. The first is that I wish to make clear that my views on Truman's decision do not represent a policy position of the NRC or any other government agency. The second is that I can

By failing to recognize the utility of professional history for the functioning of an institution, too many academic historians, I'm afraid, assume that the only reason agencies hire historians is to produce "court history."

accept royalties on books I write "on my own time." I now have a contract to write a book on college basketball "on my own time." In neither my book on the bomb nor my work on college basketball did the NRC interfere, just as it does not interfere with the books and articles I publish on nuclear regulation as the agency historian. In the case of the basketball book, and only the basketball book, however, I readily admit to being a "court historian."

Prompt and Utter Destruction has gone into nine printings and received kind reviews from many leading scholars. Nevertheless, at least a few historians seem to believe that the NRC influenced my writing on Truman's decision in a pernicious way and that I have tailored my views accordingly. Their evidence for this appears to be that I have been more critical of revisionist scholarship in my book and my historiographical article in the April 2005 issue of *Diplomatic History* than I was in my 1990 historiographical article in the same journal. Contrary to those opinions, my evolving views are not based on any sort of demands or pressures from my agency. They are a result of my examination of an abundance of primary sources since I began research on my book in 1995

and of the recent findings of other scholars. In my judgment, neither the sources nor the new studies offer much support for the pivotal revisionist claims that Japan was ready to surrender before Hiroshima and that the Truman administration knew it.

As I approach the end of my government career, I make two fundamental appeals to my academic colleagues. First, judge the scholarship of non-academic historians in the same way as any other historians—by what is written on the page and not where it is written. Second, and much more important, recognize that history has great value and importance far beyond the halls of academe. My experience proves to me that although government agencies and other institutions care little about the fine points of historiographical debates, they appreciate honest, readable, and accurate history that helps them understand the issues they face. They seem to recognize, perhaps more clearly than some members of our profession, that historians have training, skills, and knowledge that are unique and exceedingly useful.

Along with many of my colleagues in federal agencies, I can affirm that there are jobs for historians in the government and elsewhere that are challenging, rewarding, and (dare I say it?) fun. Historians apply their professional training in a variety of ways without sacrificing their professional integrity. The former SHAFR president was quite correct that the value of historical scholarship should be obvious, even to laypersons. But the problem, of course, is that often it is not. As a profession, one important means of alleviating the problem is to do sound historical work in a public setting and in that manner demonstrate to a non-academic audience the practical value of historical literacy.

J. Samuel Walker is Historian for the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

In the Next Issue of *Passport*

A roundtable on Walter Hixson's
The Myth of American Diplomacy

Exploring the Library of Congress

An Introduction to the Clinton Presidential
Library

...And Much More!

Accessing Records at Modern Presidential Libraries

Robert Holzweiss

The National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) operates twelve presidential libraries that house the artifacts, photographs, videos, and documents of presidents from Herbert Hoover to William J. Clinton. Visitors to these libraries often remark that the character of each president is reflected in the architecture of the library building and the design of the museum exhibit. Less well known is how each library differs when it comes to accessing presidential records.

The archival staff at each library makes every effort to provide researchers with records that speak to their topics. However, the process for providing these records varies. At the newer libraries (Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, William J. Clinton), access is governed by the Presidential Records Act (PRA); at the older libraries (Hoover through Carter), access is authorized by a deed of gift. Although there are significant differences between PRA and deed-of-gift libraries, the goal of all the libraries remains the same — ready access to historical records.

Although accessing records at both deed-of-gift and PRA libraries can be a frustrating experience, each system has advantages and disadvantages. Understanding these advantages and disadvantages at PRA libraries will reduce frustration and may speed the research process.

Deed-of-gift libraries normally review records and make them available in a systematic manner, so entire collections and series are organized and available for research. Therefore, researchers interested in examining a staff member with specific portfolio (subject area expertise) or even entire offices

within the White House will find a broad range of records available. Although researchers cannot demand access if the desired records are not available, they should express their interest to the archives staff, who may provide a timetable for processing and releasing the records.

In contrast, PRA libraries are required by law to respond to requests made under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Although the FOIA allows researchers to demand access to specific records, such requests result in the release of a highly concentrated selection of records. Thus, researchers at PRA libraries — the George Bush Library included — can expect comprehensive coverage of specific subjects but will not get the broader coverage of particular individuals or offices found at deed-of-gift libraries. For example, one request to the George Bush Library for records on the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany produced thousands of pages of responsive records from the files of more than thirty staff members working in a dozen White House offices. Rather than comprehensively review all the records for each staff member, archivists reviewed only those records relevant to the subject of the request. In practice, this means that they may have reviewed only one folder of material from a particular staff member, even if that individual's portfolio included Eastern Europe and Germany.

Because searching for responsive records may yield a significant amount of peripheral material, we at the Bush Library encourage prospective researchers to discuss their FOIA requests with us prior to filing. At a minimum, we will

conduct a preliminary search for responsive records and discuss the results. In addition, we often direct researchers to records already available for research. If an FOIA is required to access unprocessed records, we will place it in one of our processing queues. At the Bush Library, FOIA requests for unclassified records totaling less than a thousand pages and for classified records totaling less than five hundred pages are processed fairly quickly. The balance of the requests are placed in the security classified queue (more than 50 percent of the records are classified) or the unclassified queue.

Because of the complexity of FOIA review and the high demand for records, FOIA requests may remain in the queue for a long time. When we prepare to review an FOIA request that is more than six months old, we will contact the requester to make sure the material is still wanted. If it is, we will begin the process of reviewing the records for FOIA exemptions and PRA restrictions (if applicable).

It is important to note that while the PRA governs access to most records at PRA libraries, researchers should expect a slightly different research experience at each facility. Under the PRA, archivists must apply the designated restrictions to all applicable records for a period of twelve years from the end of a president's administration. However, each president can elect to apply all, some, or none of the PRA restrictions to his records for this period. Presidents may also ease the application of restrictions during the twelve-year period. Therefore, each library may release different types of documents. For example, President

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Reagan eased PRA restriction P2 relating to appointments to federal office (44 U.S.C. Chapter 22 § 2204(a) (2)), while President George H.W. Bush requested that library archivists restrict that information for the full twelve-year period. For George Bush Presidential Records and Dan Quayle Vice Presidential Records, the PRA restrictions expired on January 20, 2005. On that day, archivists began the process of returning formerly restricted materials to the open file. A list of formerly restricted documents can be found on the Bush Library website at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/released_docs.php.

As Bush Library archivists review FOIA requests for restricted (PRA) and exempted (FOIA) records, they create withdrawal sheets that explain the reasons for the removal or redaction of restricted or exempted documents. These sheets are placed in the folder as place holders to mark the location of withdrawn records. When archivists complete the initial review of an FOIA request, the PRA requires the archives staff to notify the former and incumbent president of our intent to release the records. In addition, Executive Order 13233 provides that the incumbent and former presidents must agree to release the records before we are authorized to make them available for research. When we are advised that we may release the records, we notify the original requester in writing that the requested documents are available. After the records are released, all researchers may review the open records and withdrawal sheets. However, only the original requester is granted certain appeal rights under the Freedom of Information Act.

Unfortunately, FOIA filers are often frustrated when they review their requests immediately after they are released. Requests for large bodies of classified material contain many withdrawal sheets identifying records exempted from release because they contain national security (classified) information. In most cases, these are the very records that have the greatest research interest. To gain access to these records, it is best to plan an initial visit to the library with

the understanding that a second visit may be required.

The first visit will permit the review of all the available records that did not fall within the exempted categories of the Freedom of Information Act or the restricted categories of the PRA. If the PRA restrictions have expired (i.e., if the twelve-year period is over), this review may yield substantive (but unclassified) records. In addition, researching the records provides an opportunity to review the withdrawal sheets. Researchers can use the information on the withdrawal sheets to request a current classification review (also known as a declassification review or mandatory review) for documents of interest. The mandatory review (MR) request is an application for a declassification review of a particular document. The archives staff will then send the document(s) for review to the relevant equity agencies—the Department of Defense, for example, or the State Department. When the equity agencies return the document(s) and notify the library that their reviews are complete, we will let the requester know whether declassification of the document(s) was denied, partially granted (with redactions), or fully granted (total declassification). As a large body of declassified records becomes available for research, a second visit may be warranted, as these newly released documents will yield a substantial amount of additional information. Please note that once records are released under the FOIA or declassified through the MR process, the records are available to all researchers.

Developing a two-trip research plan for PRA libraries helps the library staff manage researchers' expectations, particularly during their initial research visits. It also enables researchers to request documents that speak directly to their research projects without needlessly filling the declassification system with documents of no immediate interest.

Declassification policy at the George Bush Library has evolved since our presidential and vice presidential records became

subject to the FOIA on January 20, 1998. Initially, we sent all exempted (classified) records for a declassification review automatically, because we assumed that FOIA requesters desired access to all records related to their requests, including all classified records. After ten years of referring all classified records for review—a process called agency referral—we realized that most requesters are not interested in every classified document. In addition, the administrative work required to track each document, together with the enormous volume of records referred to agencies, significantly delayed the declassification process. Therefore, beginning in April 2007, the Bush Library no longer automatically referred all exempted (classified) records for declassification at the conclusion of the initial FOIA review. As previously stated, we now encourage researchers to file mandatory review requests for specific documents. The change in policy has reduced the administrative workload and increased the speed of the declassification process.

Of course, the move to declassification through the mandatory review process increased the size of the MR queues. To be fair to all researchers, we treat MR requests in the same way that we treat FOIA requests: first in, first out. We also created two queues: a short queue to expedite MR requests of less than fifty pages or five individual documents and a long queue for all other requests. Researchers seem to be pleased with the change in the declassification process and have filed hundreds of MR requests for records of interest. To facilitate the MR process, we are pleased to assist researchers with their requests by searching the inventory of exempted records to locate specific documents of interest.

Although researchers filing new mandatory review requests may still encounter delays in receiving their records, Bush Library researchers interested in subjects reviewed between seven and ten years ago will find a wealth of declassified records in the open file. Of particular

interest are records concerning the First Persian Gulf War, Bosnia and Yugoslavia, Operation Just Cause (Panama), and Operation Restore Hope (Somalia). The library also has a number of smaller foreign policy FOIA requests available for research, including economic summits in Paris (1989), London (1991), and Munich (1992); NATO summits; bilateral summits with various world leaders; and a number of requests for specific countries including Bahrain, Peru, Rwanda, South Africa and Taiwan. Please contact us for a comprehensive list of available requests or view our FOIA finding aids on the Bush Library website at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/finding_aids/foia.php.

Documents currently in the declassification pipeline include all records related to the fall of the Berlin

Wall and German reunification and a substantial body of records on the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the coup against Mikhail Gorbachev and the creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Unclassified records concerning these topics are already available for review. Declassified materials will be returned to the open file as they are released. If you would like to be notified when declassified records are returned to the open file for these or any other FOIA requests, please contact us.

Although the FOIA and mandatory review processes are complex, skilled researchers with a sound understanding of the procedures at each PRA library can use these laws to gain access to documents detailing decision-making at the highest levels of government. The archives staff

at each presidential library is ready to assist you with planning for your research. Each library also funds selected research projects. Please consult individual library web pages for funding availability. You may find contact information for each library at <http://archives.gov/presidential-libraries/>. If you are planning to research the presidential or vice presidential papers of George Bush or the vice presidential papers of Dan Quayle, please feel free to contact the George Bush Library at (979) 691-4041, email us at Library.Bush@nara.gov, or visit our website at <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/>.

Robert Holzweiss is Supervisory Archivist at the George H.W. Bush Presidential Library.



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George Bush Presidential Library Research Grants

The Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at the Bush School of Government & Public Service wishes to announce two research grant programs to assist research at the George Bush Presidential Library. The Peter and Edith O'Donnell Research Grant supports research in any field using holdings from the Bush Library. The Korea Grant Program, made possible by the Korea Foundation, focuses on Asia, particularly Korea, also using records available at the Bush Library.

Awards are open to researchers at all stages of projects, and range from \$500 to \$2,500.

Applications are due November 1, 2008 for use during the 2009 calendar year. Further information, including an application, can be found at the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs Website: <http://bush.tamu.edu/scowcroft/grants/>.

Interested parties are strongly encouraged to contact the George Bush Presidential Library archival staff to discuss research proposals before submitting an application. Contact information can be found at: <http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/faq.php>.

Teaching New Media: A Class on the White House Tapes

Jeff Woods

The editors of Passport would like to thank the SHAFR Teaching Committee for soliciting the following essay. Like other teaching-related articles that have appeared in Passport, this one may also be found on the SHAFR website, under "Teaching Services."

In 2002, I taught a class on the White House tapes at Arkansas Tech University. My decision to teach the class had less to do with content than methodology. Over the years I had taught many classes covering post-World War II political and diplomatic history that incorporated "new media" audio and video resources along with traditional textual material, but I was never able to devote the time to non-textual sources that I would have liked. When a large number of the White House tapes became available on the Internet, I took the opportunity to make this new medium the central focus of a class and see how students might learn from it.

The idea first took root while I was in graduate school in the early 1990s. Although portions of the White House tapes had been trickling out of the National Archives and presidential libraries since the 1970s, the systematic release of the Nixon, Kennedy, and Johnson tapes started while I was a student. For those of us studying Cold War history, the tapes offered a new source of information that might unlock the cutting-edge interpretations that our dissertation committees wanted to see. Their release also coincided with the height of the dot-com explosion. Video and audio were beginning the mass migration to digital formats. The Internet was expanding, and e-mail had just become the communication medium of choice.

I was inspired by the potential that computers offered a new generation of contemporary historians and took seriously the chance to expand the craft to incorporate recording and presentation mediums based in magnetic tape, film, electrons, and cathode ray tubes rather than just paper and ink.

Ohio University's Contemporary History Institute (CHI), where I took graduate classes and worked, was an ideal place to explore new media. I had access to computers, some funding, and a group of professors and students who shared my interests. I took a job moderating discussions on the infant H-Diplo listserv, learned to code html, and volunteered to help maintain the CHI website. In CHI lectures I was exposed to chaos and complexity theorists' use of computers in modeling complex adaptive systems and rational choice theorists' use of computers in modeling human decision-making. Eventually, I collaborated with two of my classmates, Ray Haberski and Marc Selverstone, to found The TimeStreams Group to attract investment capital for projects that digitized textual and non-textual sources, like the tapes, and developed computer simulations for use in history classrooms.

The TimeStreams Group's bubble burst in the late 1990s when the dot-coms crashed, but my desire to experiment with digital formats persisted. At Arkansas Tech University, where I went to work in 2000, I helped found the Arkansas Digital History Institute (ADHI) to continue experimenting with new media. In building a foundation for ADHI, I proposed to teach experimental classes that

demonstrated the impact that digital formats could have on the historian's craft. In the fall semester of 2002, I was approved to teach an upper division undergraduate seminar focusing on the White House tapes.

At the time I was using the Kennedy and Johnson tapes for my own research on Richard Russell. In addition, my father, historian Randall Woods, knew the LBJ tapes as well as anybody, since he was working on a biography of Lyndon Johnson, and Marc Selverstone, my friend and colleague from the TimeStreams Group, had gone on to work on the Kennedy tapes at the University of Virginia's Miller Center. With their help and a quick review of the published literature making use of the tapes, I developed a syllabus. Finding a textbook was difficult. I needed recordings of some key conversations with at least brief annotations. I ended up using John Prados's *The White House Tapes*. I also used selected chapters and articles from books and journals, and I relied heavily on the Internet. The National Archives website, the presidential library websites, and the Miller Center's collection of White House tape recordings online were absolutely invaluable.

That fall I had ten students, and we met for an hour, three days a week, for fifteen weeks. I taught the class with a computer rather than a chalkboard. I had an LCD projector connected to a laptop from which I could access the course website, download audio from the Miller Center, or play excerpts from the audio CDs that were included with the Prados book. Class meetings were a combination of lecture and discussion. In the lectures I outlined technology, transcription, and

contextual issues for each set of tapes from the Franklin Roosevelt to the Reagan administrations, pausing from time to time to talk about a special group of tapes (the “smoking gun” discussions in the Watergate debacle, for example). Of course, given the hundreds of hours of conversations from the Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon collections, we spent more of our time focusing on those. Class discussions drew on reading and listening assignments I gave students each week.

In the first six class periods, I talked extensively about technology, transcription and interpretation skills, and the tapes’ duplication and release to the public by the National Archives and presidential libraries. I started with the basics, showing the students how to download conversations from the Internet, listen to the recordings on computers, and find published transcripts and background material. I then compared the different standards researchers apply to address problems they encounter as they transcribe tapes, including inaudible phrases, speaker identification, obscure references, and quirky speech patterns. Other lectures were devoted to recording mechanics and reproduction technology. Recording sound onto Roosevelt- and Eisenhower-era wax disks was very different from recording onto the magnetic tape used during the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon eras, for example, and each president had a different process for turning his machine on and off. I also discussed the moral and legal implications involved in recording people without their knowledge or consent. Finally, I explored the differences between analog and digital recording devices. Each has advantages and disadvantages. A great deal of raw sound is lost in the transfer to digital mediums, and archivists disagree about the processes’ value. Witness the difference between the Miller Center, which reproduces tapes in a digital format in order to clean out background noise, and the LBJ Library, which insists that magnetic tape reproductions are needed to preserve as much of the original sound as possible.

I also spent some lecture time talking about the legal issues involved in the tapes’ release. During Watergate, the Nixon tapes were seized by the government. The procedures for processing and releasing them were thus much different from the ones used for the Kennedy and Johnson tapes, which were originally part of the privately owned estates of those presidents. The tapes, of course, are also subject to a labyrinth of declassification procedures.

These basics out of the way, we started in on the tapes themselves. I selected groups of tapes on particular topics like the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Ole Miss riots, or the “decent interval” strategy for lecture and discussion each week. We followed a roughly chronological order from the Roosevelt through the Reagan administrations. I would provide some basic background in lectures, about an hour a week, but students were required to read transcripts and supporting articles and listen to tapes in preparation for classroom discussions. The most common threads of debate throughout the semester involved challenges to previously conceived notions about the presidents and those around them. For example, students who had conceived of John F. Kennedy as a vacillating or weak head of state found a leader who sounded calm and assertive in his conversations with advisors during the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Ole Miss riots. Students who thought of Lyndon Johnson as a power-obsessed bully found him caring, thoughtful, emotional, and even gentle in his discussions with Jackie Kennedy after JFK’s assassination as well as in his frequent expressions of frustration over the war in Vietnam. In Nixon they found an even more nervous and self-conscious man than they had expected. Nixon’s insensitive remarks about Jews and his sometimes angry use of profanity changed many students’ opinions about him. The seminar also returned frequently to the array of secondary characters. Students were surprised that Richard Russell successfully manipulated and cajoled Lyndon Johnson as much as

Johnson manipulated and cajoled Russell. They were aghast as Ross Barnett and James Eastland defended the white South against outside racial agitators. Jaws dropped at Henry Kissinger’s callous comments about the American withdrawal from Vietnam.

Students completed four projects during the semester. The first involved the transcription of a conversation and a short paper discussing that conversation in historical context. The idea was to get the students used to working with the technology and making concrete connections to the tapes’ significance in the historical record. The second assignment asked the students to choose and interpret a series of conversations, seeking a pattern of thought or action revealed in them. Here I wanted to add a level of analysis and explore some techniques of biography. The third project was a more traditional paper that demanded an understanding of relevant historiographical debates. The students cited conversations that they thought provided some new insights or historical interpretations. The fourth and final project was the most adventurous. I asked students to storyboard and script a documentary film or multimedia website that made use of a series of conversations. The students then had to pitch their idea to the class. Here, of course, I was embracing the vision set out by The TimeStreams Group and the ADHI. I wanted students to explore the past through sight and sound and develop presentation methods that went beyond the written word.

The students did as expected on the first three assignments. As with all undergraduates, they varied in their writing, research and analytical skills. However, they performed well in accurately and honestly transcribing even poor quality conversations. They did not do as well as I expected on the final assignment. In class I provided the students with several examples of text, film and multimedia presentations that used the tapes. Together we read Beschloss, Prados, Zelikow, Kutler, and Doyle, saw PBS’s “Frontline” and “American Experience,” and dissected the Miller

Center's virtual exhibits. They were free to mimic those, but I encouraged them to find even more creative ways to present the non-textual material. Apart from one woman who actually incorporated dance into her presentation, the students did not even aspire to match the examples they had seen and heard in class. Many of their websites were laid out like pages in standard history textbooks, with a narrative that block-quoted transcriptions and occasionally brought up a map or photograph. The film storyboards showed little concern for the potential impact that the creative juxtaposition of sight, sound, and motion could have on an audience. Like the websites, they seemed to be modeled after textbooks.

Despite the somewhat disappointing final projects, the class was a great success. Most important, from my perspective, was that the seminar took a step toward broadening the research and presentation methods that students are taught in history classrooms. The class embraced the new tools offered by digital platforms and directly addressed the need for contemporary historians to incorporate non-textual audio and video records in their work. The students seemed to appreciate this. Course evaluations suggested that they achieved a greater emotional connection with the historical characters they heard

in the tapes and, in turn, found a greater appreciation for the historical actors' humanity. Hearing the people rather than just reading about them seems to have made a difference. They *empathized* and thus found the key to a greater understanding of history. The students also expressed an appreciation for the uniqueness of the course. They had not heard of a class like this one before, and they believed they were getting a special educational experience. The technology offered the bells and whistles they were accustomed to in their lives outside the classroom, and they were clearly used to and good at viewing audio and video sources critically. The greater sense of empathy they claimed to have achieved seemed not to have compromised their objectivity.

The main problem with the course stemmed from the students' inability to find creative ways to express their new understanding of history. They were unprepared to take what they saw as entertainment mediums and use them in academic work. Accustomed to thinking of the work of the historian in a particular way, they had a hard time conceiving of the library, Internet, and TV screen as mutually reinforcing repositories of historical knowledge and wisdom. They were so used to standard written essays, timelines, and linear cause-and-effect analyses that they defaulted to those techniques. Their

final presentations thus failed to transfer to others the empathy, emotion, and appreciation for nuance that they felt they had gained in listening to the tapes. Ironically, the new-media generation was better at expressing itself in words than in sounds or images. Students will increasingly need to find flexible, complex, and useful forms of communication that include the written word but also go beyond it. With broadband Internet, YouTube, podcasts, and the like already at hand, learning the tools of non-textual expression will be essential for a new generation of scholars if they are to record and represent the history of their own lives in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.¹

Jeff Woods is Associate Professor of History at Arkansas Tech University.

Notes:

1. Though not in a formal setting like the White House Tapes class, over the past few years I have been working with small groups of students in digital editing techniques at ADHI. They have learned a little from me and much more on their own and have produced some very interesting short documentaries for the institute. You can see some of those films at <<http://adhi.atu.edu/>>. My syllabus for the White House Tapes class and links to some of the resources I used for it can be found at <<http://lfa.atu.edu/ssphil/people/ssjw/whitehouse/syl.htm>>.

SHAFR @ the AHA

SHAFR is planning two major events at the AHA Conference in New York, NY in January 2008. Please plan to attend:

Luncheon on Saturday, January 3, 12:15-1:45 p.m.

Reception (cash bar) on Saturday, January 3, 5:30-7:30 p.m.

The luncheon will be held in the Hilton conference center. Vincent Warren, Executive Director of the Center for Constitutional Rights, will deliver a keynote address entitled "The First 100 Days: Putting the Constitution Back Together Again." The Bernath Dissertation Grant and the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship will be awarded.

Tickets (\$35) must be purchased in advance. Mail a check (payable to SHAFR) by December 15, 2008 to SHAFR Business Office, Department of History, Ohio State University, 106 Dulles Hall, 230 West 17th Avenue, Columbus OH 43210. Inquiries may be directed to shafr@osu.edu.

Bureaucracy or Censorship? An Experience with the FBI

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones

In the very year of its centennial, the FBI appears to have tried to censor my book, *The FBI: A History*. I invite discussion of the circumstances, and debate about how academic freedom can best be protected.

Yale University Press (YUP) published the book in hardback in the Fall of 2007, and I was pleased that they also arranged an audio edition, another in large print, and several translations. Then on March 20, 2008, I heard from my editor Chris Rogers. The FBI had written to YUP saying they had no right to use the Bureau's logo on the book's cover. Although YUP had used the logo in the belief that it was in the public domain, the Press now assumed that Justice Department lawyers must know their stuff, and took a pragmatic approach. Reasoning that returns were coming in from the stores and that hardback sales may have peaked, it withdrew 2,500 books from sale and the book's image from the web, including Amazon.com. The plan was to issue a logo-less paperback by stripping the pages from the withdrawn books and re-binding them. Meantime, the book was effectively out of print just six months after publication. Chris concluded his email: "Let's hope we are out of the woods with the FBI."

On March 21, I emailed YUP stating my view that the logo issue was a case of "harassment and political interference by the FBI." In doing so, I was aware that the case by no means compares with that of Max Lowenthal, who was savagely persecuted over his critical study *The Federal Bureau of Investigation* (1950). Nevertheless, I thought the FBI was engaging in bullying behavior. It was not evident that the FBI's enforcement policy was even-handed.

I asked YUP to pursue the matter.

Also, I wrote to three authors who had previously used the FBI logo on their book jackets. Ronald Kessler replied on April 21 that he had deployed it on no fewer than three covers. He told the Bureau that his use of its logo was "protected by the First Amendment." He saw no distinction between the (frequent) use of the logo in the media and on the cover of a book, and, in the case of *The Bureau* (2002) simply told the FBI that he did not need their permission. There were no repercussions on that occasion. Anthony Summers said he had encountered no problems with *Official and Confidential* (1993), and Henry Holden (*FBI 100 Years*, 2008) did not reply.

YUP decided to go ahead with the paperback edition without the logo. Explaining the background to this decision in an email of June 23, Laura Davulis of YUP's editorial staff told me that she had spoken with the FBI's general counsel: "He said that in order to use the logo we would have to have the book reviewed by them for accuracy, and that this could take them 6 months or more." Complying with the FBI's wishes would mean the book could not be re-issued in time for the FBI's centennial on July 26. YUP President John Donatich emailed me the next day: "General Counsel advises me that they [the FBI] are simply in the right regarding the usage of the photograph, regardless of what motivated their policing of the image." After in-house discussion, the YUP view was that no bullying had taken place, and no injustice done. The episode was rather "a trial of bureaucracy," but Mr. Donatich added that the Press would not impede me, should I embark on an independent campaign.

I agree with YUP's practical decision to go back into print without the logo rather than have a six-month review take place, but disagree with the FBI's approach to the publication of an independent history of the Bureau on the eve of its centennial. It seems to me that three issues are at stake. The first is, does the FBI have a special dispensation to insist on logo copyright -- as distinct from, say, the CIA, or the U.S. government in the case of Old Glory? The CIA logo and Stars and Stripes are much in evidence on book jackets, and I have yet to hear about publishers getting into trouble on that account. A second issue is, should the FBI apply its sanctions in a selective and possibly discriminatory manner? Finally, does the FBI have the prerogative to check on the "accuracy" of a book? By asserting that prerogative, as well as through a possibly discriminatory application of the logo rule, is it making an attempt at censorship, in violation of the right of free speech?

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones is Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Edinburgh.

Editor's note: The FBI's Office of Public Affairs has been invited to reply. The editors anticipate publishing their response in the next issue of Passport.

Recent Bernath Awards

Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee:

Seth Jacobs (Chair), Michael Krenn, Paul Kramer

The Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee has selected Brian Delay's "Independent Indians and the U.S.-Mexican War" as the best article published in the field of U.S. foreign relations. This piece, which appeared in the February 2007 issue of the *American Historical Review*, offers a bold new interpretation of the conflict that saw the United States absorb half of Mexico in the 1840s. Delay contends that the autonomous native peoples of the borderland – Apache, Comanche, Kiowa, Navajo, and others – influenced the origins and outcome of the war by ravaging Mexico's northern countryside, dividing and enfeebling the Mexican people, and providing Washington with a justification for its seizure of territory. Whereas traditional, state-centric accounts of the Mexican War ignore or marginalize the Indians' role, Delay draws on English- and Spanish-language sources to demonstrate that these stateless actors figured centrally in how Americans and Mexicans viewed each other: successful Indian attacks on northern Mexican settlements led U.S. policymakers to see Mexico as weak and ripe for conquest, while Mexicans regarded the Indian raiders as proxies for a grasping Uncle Sam. Although the committee was not persuaded by some of Delay's arguments, such as his claim that the Battle of Buena Vista might have turned out differently if thousands of Mexican soldiers had not been tied up fighting Indians in the north, we applaud his seamless integration of ethnohistory and military/geopolitical history, graceful writing style, and willingness to tackle a mid-nineteenth-century topic at a time when the field is dominated by studies of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War. Delay's article, one committee member noted during deliberations, is "the only genuinely transformative work among this year's nominees." We are proud to award it the prize.

—Seth Jacobs

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Committee:

Joseph (Andy) Fry, Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, and Walter Hixson

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Committee has selected Paul A. Kramer to deliver the 2009 Bernath Lecture. Kramer earned his Ph.D. from Princeton University in 1998 and is currently associate professor of history at the University of Iowa. He has previously taught at Johns Hopkins University and the University of Michigan. Former students praised him as a "model scholar-teacher who set an example I am aspiring" to emulate and described his seminar as "a vibrant intellectual gathering." His book, *The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States and the Philippines* (2006), won both the SHAFR Bernath Book Prize and the OAH Rawley Book Prize, and he is currently at work on an ambitious study of race and empire in US-Asia relations during the twentieth century. In summary, after considering an exceptionally strong field of nominees, the committee determined that Kramer best met the Bernath Prize's stated intention "to recognize and encourage excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars."

—Andy Fry

Testimony of Dr. Martin J. Sherwin Representing the National Coalition for History

Oversight of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) & the National Historical Publications and Records Commission (NHPRC) Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, Federal Services and International Security

May 14, 2008

Prepared by Martin Sherwin and Lee White

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Coburn and Members of the Subcommittee;

My name is Martin J. Sherwin, University Professor of History at George Mason University and I am here today representing the National Coalition for History (NCH).

NCH is a consortium of over 60 organizations that advocates on federal legislative and regulatory issues affecting historians, archivists, teachers, researchers, and other stakeholders. As historians, researchers, and conservators of American history and culture, we care deeply about the programs and activities of the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and the National Historical Publications and Records Commission (NHPRC). Thank you for the opportunity to present our views on the National Archives today.

First, on behalf of the constituency I represent, I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. To our knowledge, this is the first oversight hearing on the National Archives in well over a decade. The archives are the repository of our nation's heritage and while we have faced many pressing domestic and international concerns during this period, I submit that we stand in danger of undermining our

democratic institutions when we neglect the institutions that provide the American people with the opportunity to understand their history.

The Stakes for Democracy and Presidential Records

At the dedication of his presidential library in 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt made it clear why the National Archives, and its Presidential Library System, are so vital to our nation's citizens.

It seems to me [he said] that the dedication of a library is in itself an act of faith. To bring together the records of the past and to house them in buildings where they will be preserved for the use of men and women in the future, a Nation must believe in three things. It must believe in the past. It must believe in the future.

It must, above all, believe in the capacity of its own people so to learn from the past that they can gain in judgment in creating their own future.

Forty-six years ago I was a young Ltjg in the U.S. Navy trying to decide whether to study law, business or history. In October 1962 I participated in the Cuban Missile Crisis and my experiences during that extraordinary event led me to

dedicate my career to understanding the principles, assumptions, and details of American politics and foreign policy. I turned to studying US history because I realized, when I reflected on that crisis, how profoundly our politics and our policies influence the behavior of other nations. Only through the careful historical investigation of our government's policy making process can we understand the truth about policy formation. It is in the nature of the political process of any government that much of what we know about contemporary decisions will be revealed by historical research – by a review of the documents – to be incorrect, or at best partially correct. I submit that our democracy cannot remain robust without this constant historical auditing of our government's behavior. Just as the press is the fourth estate of our democracy, it seems to me that President Franklin Roosevelt was making the point in 1941 that history is its fifth, and equally essential, estate.

Ominously, the current administration does not appear to share President Roosevelt's view that sustaining our way of life depends in important ways on our access to history. Under the Presidential Records Act of 1978, presidential records are supposed to be released

to historians and the public 12 years after the end of a presidential administration. In November 2001, however, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order (EO) 13233 that overturned an executive order issued by President Reagan and gave current and former presidents, their heirs or designees and former vice presidents broad authority to withhold presidential records or delay their release.

I consider this an outrage, nothing less than a frontal assault on the principle of open government that sustains our democracy. The president and vice president are public servants, elected to office to serve our nation, not as dictators, not as they define their service, but as our laws, our traditions and our institutions have defined them. After their tenure has expired, it is the public's right to know in a timely manner the details of how they went about fulfilling their responsibilities. Their actions are not a privileged secret that they and their families have the right to control. That is how dictatorships operate. That is how totalitarian societies function. That is a certain recipe for corruption. Does Congress not care enough about sustaining the future of our democracy to assure that the 1978 presidential records act is restored?

The history of the struggle to overturn executive order 13233 is instructive.

On October 1, a federal district court judge gave open government advocates a partial, but significant victory in a lawsuit they filed in 2001 questioning the legality of EO 13233. The judge struck down the section of the EO that allows a former president to indefinitely delay the release of records. However, it left intact other dangerous provisions.

The court held that the core provisions of the Executive Order are not "ripe" for judicial review, and will not be until the veto over the release of records is exercised. Until then, the threat of withholding presidential records will remain intact, and when records are ultimately withheld, more years of litigation will be needed to overcome the effects of EO 13233. By contrast,

passage of legislation to nullify EO 13233 would immediately correct the distortion of the Presidential Records Act that the Executive Order has created. On behalf of the organizations I am representing, I strongly recommend the prompt passage of such legislation.

On March 14, 2007, by a vote of 333-93, the U.S. House of Representatives approved H.R. 1255, the "Presidential Records Act Amendments of 2007," a bill that would revoke EO 13233. 104 Republicans joined 229 Democrats to support the bill despite a threatened White House veto.

On June 20, 2007, the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs reported out H.R. 1255 and its companion bill (S. 886) by voice vote. Twice since then, Majority Leader Harry Reid has sought to bring the bill to the Senate floor under unanimous consent.

Last September, Senator Jim Bunning (R-KY) blocked a vote in the Senate on the bill, preventing floor action throughout the fall. On December 18, 2007, Senator Bunning lifted his hold. On January 22, 2008, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) once again brought the "Presidential Records Act Amendments of 2007" to the floor under the Senate's unanimous consent rule. However, this time Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL) publicly put a hold on the bill and blocked floor consideration. I would be interested to hear Senators Bunning and Sessions explain how their actions promote our nation's democratic institutions.

This pro-transparency bill is non-partisan and applies equally to former presidents of both parties. Hypothetically, were Senator Clinton to be elected, and then re-elected, the Bush and Clinton families could conceivably have control of the release of records dating from as far back as 1981, George H.W. Bush's first term as vice president, up to 2017, or the end of Hillary Clinton's second term. To allow a former president's heirs to shape their parent's legacy by controlling access to their records makes an objective historical assessment nearly impossible and, I submit, undermines the foundations

of our democratic institutions.

At a time when our nation's citizens are cynical about excessive government secrecy, this is one area where Congress has the ability to contribute to bolster the public's confidence in its government. A president's papers are the property of the American people. Historians should have the greatest possible access to these records to present to future generations the most accurate account possible of our nation's past, wars and all.

Chairman Lieberman has worked tirelessly to get this bill to the floor to no avail. It has broad bi-partisan support. We strongly urge you to work with your colleagues on both sides of the aisle to pass this legislation before the upcoming presidential election. The new president, no matter which party is elected, should start with a clean slate with regard to the preservation of presidential records.

Presidential Transition and Missing White House E-mails

As you know, there has been ongoing controversy, and litigation, over millions of White House e-mails that are either missing or have been destroyed. In court documents filed last week, the White House admitted that it has no computer back-up tapes with data written before May 23, 2003, and that it cannot track the history of missing e-mails created between March and May 2003.

This three-month gap includes the historically critical period from when the United States invaded Iraq in March 2003, and the May 1, 2003 announcement by President Bush that major combat operations had ended in Iraq. If these records are indeed lost, imagine the difficulties that future historians of the Iraq War will have in presenting a full picture of the decisions that led us into this conflict. A nation inflicted by a White House-induced case of historical Alzheimer's disease cannot expect to face future international challenges with the added wisdom that historical understanding contributes.

The end of President Bush's term is now less than nine months away,

but no firm recovery plan for these missing or lost e-mails has emerged from meetings on this issue between the White House and NARA. If these hundreds of days of e-mails are truly missing, and not destroyed, the question becomes where is the \$15 million or more estimated by the White House's Office of Administration to recover these presidential records going to come from?

When a similar situation concerning missing e-mails occurred at the end of the Clinton administration, the White House's Office of Administration was forced by Congress to absorb the cost of recovery. We strongly urge you to follow the Clinton administration precedent and mandate that whatever funds are necessary to recover the missing e-mails come out of the OA's budget and not that of NARA.

Resources

Any report on the state of the National Archives and Records Administration of necessity must include a discussion of resources, financial and human. NARA faces enormous challenges not only processing and preserving traditional paper records, but also in making the transition to managing electronic records as well. As the production of records from all types of media continues to grow exponentially, NARA is constantly challenged to do more with already strained resources.

I have been told, and I have no reason to think otherwise, that Archivist Weinstein has done an excellent job of getting the most out of every federal dollar and leveraging the use of NARA's funds. However, in recent years, because of the lack of funds, Dr. Weinstein has been left in the unenviable position of having to perform triage on his agency. For example, in 2006 NARA was forced to severely curtail public research hours at its facilities because of budget difficulties. It was only because House and Senate appropriators last year provided specifically allocated funds to NARA that it was able to restore these vital public services.

We understand that Congress

continues to face enormous fiscal challenges in crafting the federal budget for fiscal year 2009. We are encouraged that as it did in this current fiscal year, NARA would again receive increased funding under the President's proposed FY 2009 budget. However, this funding is not in reality so much an increase as an attempt to rectify years of chronic under-funding of NARA. These modest funding increases are not a down payment on NARA's future, but rather back payments for years of neglect.

At a recent hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee on completion of the Founding Fathers projects that receive support from the NHPRC, historian David McCullough said "you can tell a lot about a society by how it spends its money. Here is our chance, and it's long overdue, to show what we care about, what we value, and what we're proud to pay for."

When your constituents elected each of you, they entrusted you with great responsibilities. Obviously, we rely on you to make wise decisions about our nation's future. But you are also the stewards of America's past. Decisions you make about funding NARA and NHPRC, and ensuring preservation and access to federal and presidential records, directly effect whether our democratic institutions will be reinforced by a robust historical understanding, or weakened by a shallow, superficial historical awareness.

National Historical Publications and Records Commission (NHPRC)

I am sure that many of you drive past the National Archives building on your way home from your day here in the Senate. I'm sure you have noticed it is not unusual to see long queues of people stretching down the block and around the building in the evening for a chance to gaze briefly upon the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. However, the National Archives is much more than the keeper of the Charters of Freedom. Through the development of its many on-line services, NARA's

records are now readily accessible to all Americans, not just those who come to visit Washington.

However, for the fourth consecutive year, the President has proposed zero funding for the NHPRC. We strongly oppose this irresponsible recommendation and request Congress to appropriate FY 2009 funding at the fully authorized level – \$10 million for the NHPRC national grants program and an additional \$2 million for staffing and related program administration.

In fiscal year 2008, Congress saved the NHPRC from elimination, and provided \$7.5 million for grants, a \$2 million increase from the previous fiscal year. However, the NHPRC has not received its fully authorized amount of \$10 million since FY 2004. In the following three fiscal years the NHPRC only received only half that amount, or approximately \$5 million per-fiscal year.

The NHPRC leverages every federal dollar with private sector contributions at a level approaching 50%. As a consequence, the Commission has been able to fund a wide variety of programs by combining private sector funds with a small federal investment. However, the annual uncertainty over the survival of the NHPRC and an unpredictable funding level makes it difficult to attract private capital. NHPRC grants are the linchpins for the funding structure of most projects. Loss of the NHPRC's funding will have a domino effect causing funding from other sources to be withdrawn or reduced.

Without critical NHPRC funding, award-winning biographies of American presidents and the founding fathers from such noted historians as David McCullough, James Patterson, Joseph Ellis, and others might never have been written. Without such funding Kai Bird and I could not have written, *American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert Oppenheimer*, which won the 2006 Pulitzer Prize and National Book Critics Circle Award.

Beyond its annual funding challenges, the NHPRC faces an uncertain future, for reasons that I find totally indefensible. This funding

is oxygen for our democratic blood and to cut it off threatens to create an anemic national history.

NHPRC's current authorization expires in FY 2009. As we have seen, even with an authorization, the NHPRC has been under siege. Without congressional reauthorization, we fear that NHPRC would be even more vulnerable in the future.

A bill (H.R. 5582) to reauthorize the National Historical Publications and Records Commission (NHPRC) was recently introduced in the House by Representative Wm. Lacy Clay (D-MO). The bill would reauthorize the NHPRC at an annual level of \$20 million for fiscal years (FY) 2010 - 2014.

We urge you, Chairman Carper and Ranking Member Coburn, to work together to introduce a companion bill in the Senate and to ensure that it passes before the current reauthorization expires next year.

The Need for Additional Archival Staff

The recent controversy over the release of Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton's papers from the Clinton Presidential Library covering her time as First Lady brought to public attention the need for additional archival staff not only at the presidential libraries but also throughout NARA. The lengthy time it took to release Senator Clinton's records fostered an appearance of impropriety and an inaccurate public perception of NARA somehow conspiring with the Clintons to keep these records from the public. The truth is that delays in responding to public requests at all of the presidential libraries have been exacerbated by both the lack of archival staff and the impact of Executive Order 13233. It is an ominous occurrence that historians and American citizens must resort to litigation in order to expedite the release of records.

We were pleased to see that the President's request for the coming fiscal [year] includes an additional \$1.6 million to add 15 archivist positions to the Presidential Library system to begin to reduce the enormous backlog

of materials that need to be processed. If appropriated, these additional funds, along with the \$800,000 in funding Congress added last fiscal year to hire additional archivists, will begin to address the problem of under-staffing at NARA.

Unfortunately, the reality is that NARA's archival staffing level has remained stagnant for many years while the number of records that need to be processed has continued to grow exponentially as the use of electronic records has proliferated. While it is unrealistic to think that the staff shortage will be solved in a single fiscal year, we are encouraged by the fact that the problem has been recognized and is being incrementally addressed. We hope that additional funding will be provided over the next few years to continue to remedy NARA's archival staff shortage.

Repairs & Restoration

We are distraught to see the dramatic \$20 million cut in NARA's FY 2009 proposed budget for Repairs and Restoration down to a level of \$9.2 million. Report language to the FY 2008 appropriation for NARA states:

NARA is directed to update its comprehensive capital needs assessment for its entire infrastructure of presidential libraries and records facilities. The fiscal year 2008 President's Budget provided funding for ongoing repairs only to records facilities, leaving presidential libraries-some of which are in major disrepair-sorely in need of support and at risk for flooding and other potential dangers. The Appropriations Committees urge that the fiscal year 2009 President's Budget include funding for both records facilities and presidential libraries.

Despite this clear mandate from the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, the Administration has chosen to cut funding for the restoration of facilities already in the Presidential Library system while at the same time expending funds elsewhere in NARA's budget to prepare for the George W. Bush Presidential Library, a "library," that

will be more like a presidential vault, if EO13233 is not nullified.

A perfect example of the maintenance needs faced by some presidential libraries is the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum in Hyde Park, New York. The FDR presidential library was the first, and is the oldest, in the presidential library system. Much of the library's infrastructure such as heating and air conditioning, as well as fire safety and security systems are dangerously out-moded and violate industry standards for the preservation of archival materials. The electrical wiring dates back to the library's opening in 1941, the basement often floods due to an ancient septic system and leaks frequently appear in the roof and flashing.

As NARA's overseers, I urge this Subcommittee to do all it can to ensure the presidential libraries that are already in the system are maintained adequately.

Recommendations for Expediting Research at NARA Facilities

None of the legislative or funding recommendations that I have urged you to act upon will realize their full potential if researchers are not able to expeditiously access the records that they are entitled to read. I therefore have created a list of recommendations based upon my experiences, and the experiences of several other historians, that will promote a broader and more efficient distribution of the information.

1. Digitizing collections: The goal must be to digitize all the collections in the national archive system and upload them on the web as expeditiously as possible. The example set by the National Security Archive at George Washington University is an excellent model to emulate. For the National Archives and Presidential Libraries, this is an enormous long-term undertaking, but the goal of achieving it should be clearly stated and vigorously promoted.

In the meantime, there are some simple steps that can be taken immediately that will improve research access:

Congratulations!

Congratulations to recent winners of SHAFR Prizes and Fellowships:

Norman and Laura Graebner Award:
Thomas G. Paterson

Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize:
James F. Goode, *Negotiating for the Past: Archaeology, Nationalism, and Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1919-1941*

Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize:
Erez Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment: Self-Determination and the International Origins of Anticolonial Nationalism*

Myrna F. Bernath Book Award:
Barbara Keys, *Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s*

Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize:
Brian Delay, University of Colorado

Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize:
Paul A. Kramer, University of Iowa

Michael J. Hogan Fellowship:
Barin Kayaoghu, University of Virginia

W. Stull Holt Fellowship:
Ryan Irwin, The Ohio State University

SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowships:
Min Song, University of Georgia
and
Vanessa Mongey, University of Pennsylvania

a) All of the inventories of the archives' Record Groups finding aids and descriptions should be digitized and made available on-line which, among other advantages, would allow researchers to order records for use 24 hours ahead of time via the web. This will save time for both archivists and researchers and allow researchers who can only visit the archives on Saturdays to have records pulled for their use.

b) Archivist Weinstein should convene a Digital Records Advisory Committee composed of a diverse group of historians who would set priorities for the order in which the national archives' collections would be digitized, and recommend other actions to promote this process.

2. Declassification: The declassification of records continues to be a serious problem. For example, a researcher working in the Eastern Europe collection has informed me that RG 59 (SD) is declassified only through 1974 in spite of the 30 year rule. Many documents are pulled out from already declassified boxes including from the 1940s and 50s. There are no documents in those collections that originated from secretaries, assistant and deputy secretaries in the 1960s making it difficult to figure out how policy was made. This is one specific example intended to highlight a general problem.

CIA: Allen Dulles' papers were cleared for declassification in 1992, but only released to Princeton University's Mudd Library last year - in the form of excised PDF files. Even OSS material is heavily excised and very patchy. It's easy to see that most of it is still withheld. This researcher reports that the Hungarian archives have been far more forthcoming.

3. Wireless Access: I would also recommend that wireless access to the web be installed in all archives and presidential library reading rooms in order to enable researchers to look use the web to supplement and expedite their research.

Again, thank you for the opportunity to provide this testimony regarding NARA's budget for FY 2009, and for your past strong support for its mission of preserving our Nation's history.

I will be happy at this time to respond to any questions you may have.

SHAFR Council News

At its meeting during the late June conference at Ohio State University, the SHAFR Council adopted several important measures.

1) Establishing A Ways & Means Committee

Council passed a motion from the Endowment Committee to broaden the committee's structure and membership and rename it the Ways & Means Committee. Because the motion involves a change to the By-Laws, it will be subject to approval of the membership in a referendum in the Fall.

The motion was intended to arrange stable management of SHAFR's financial resources and programs in a time of growing resources. In 2006, Council authorized an ad hoc Steering Committee to evaluate SHAFR's new sources of revenue and recommend new programs to invest those revenues to further SHAFR's missions. That Steering Committee recommended several new programs (including the Summer Institute, the Dissertation Completion Fellowships, employment of a webmaster and director of secondary education, and doubling of all graduate student fellowships), which Council approved in June 2007.

Council subsequently directed the Endowment Committee to assume ongoing responsibility for monitoring the new programs and evaluating suggestions for other programs in light of the Society's evolving financial status. While performing this service in early 2008, the Endowment Committee proposed reform of the committee into the Ways & Means Committee with the enumerated responsibilities. The committee also recommended a broadening of its membership to include two additional members-

at-large, appointed to reflect the breadth of the Society's interests and membership.

The motion passed in June specifically proposed amendment of Article 5, Section 3 of the By-Laws as follows:

Section 3: The Endowment Committee Ways & Means Committee shall have responsibility for (1) recommending investment management and policy to Council; (2) serving as SHAFR's advisory board to the investment management firm approved by Council; (3) monitoring the endowment investments; (4) reporting regularly (at least twice a year) to Council on the status of the endowment investments; **(5) monitoring and evaluating all ongoing programs; (6) soliciting and assessing proposals for new programs; (7) making recommendations to Council regarding funding and programs; and (8) consulting with the SHAFR accountant as necessary.** The membership of the Committee will be three members appointed by the President (each serving three-year rotating terms, with the senior member normally Chair) and the Executive Director as an ex officio member. **consist of the immediate past president (chair), the president, the vice president, and two members-at-large. The President shall appoint the two at-large members to reflect the breadth of the Society's interests and membership, and they shall serve staggered, three-year terms. The Endowment Liaison and the Executive Director shall serve ex officio.**

2) Priorities for Allocating SHAFR Resources

Council passed a motion directing the Endowment Committee (or Ways & Means Committee) to make

decisions and recommendations regarding programming on the basis of the following general guidelines:

1) The Committee should develop and achieve SHAFR's identity and vibrancy. It will support proposals that help SHAFR remain vital in terms of intellectual developments and globalizing trends, welcoming new and diverse modes of scholarship, and helping the organization develop more of an international presence.

2) Among the priorities for funding should be:

a) Support for programs that attract and assist graduate students, especially graduate students from traditionally underrepresented groups.

b) Support for programs that address the issues of membership: How to keep up and increase the number of members, how to attract scholars working in international relations who may not think of SHAFR as part of their intellectual network, and how to enhance and improve the satisfaction of current members with the organization.

c) Support for programs to increase the membership and active participation of non-U.S. scholars in SHAFR.

d) Support for programs that encourage the dissemination to a wider public of knowledge and research in the history of U.S. foreign relations both nationally and internationally.

3) SHAFR Diversity and International Outreach Fellowship Program

Council inaugurated a new competition for fellowships that will cover travel and lodging expenses for the 2009 annual meeting. The competition is aimed at scholars whose participation in the annual meeting would add to the diversity of the Society. Preference will be

given to persons who have not previously presented at SHAFR annual meetings. The awards are intended for scholars who represent groups historically under-represented at SHAFR meetings, scholars who offer intellectual approaches that may be fruitful to SHAFR but are under-represented at annual meetings, and scholars from outside the United States. "Scholars" includes faculty, graduate students, and independent researchers. To further acquaint the winners with SHAFR, they will also be awarded a one-year membership in the organization, which includes subscriptions to *Diplomatic History* and *Passport*.

4) SHAFR Summer Institute

Following the successful conclusion of the inaugural Institute at Ohio State University in June, Council, having previously authorized a second institute at Wisconsin in 2009, extended the program for summers 2010 and 2011.

5) Administration of Prizes and Fellowships

Council approved a sweeping reform of the administration of prizes and fellowships. Changes will be implemented gradually and will take full effect by 2009.

One important change is that most fellowship committees will be consolidated into a single "super-committee" that will solicit common applications from graduate students for all available awards. Thus a graduate student applying for multiple awards will be able to do with a single application. Second, fellowships generally will be awarded at the annual AHA meeting in January, and prizes will be awarded at the OAH meeting in the spring. Finally, a system will be constructed to allow the posting of applications to a secure web-site rather than relying on e-mail submissions. SHAFR membership will be required for all awards.

2008 Bemis Award Winners

Samuel Flagg Bemis Research Grants: Graduate Students

Rod Coeller, American University, Adviser: Max Paul Friedman (\$2000)

Kevin Coleman, Indiana University, Adviser: Jeffrey Gould (\$2000)

Giuliana Chamedes, Columbia University, Adviser: Victoria de Grazia (\$2000)

Catlin Fitz, Yale University, Adviser: John Mack Faragher (\$2000)

Rebecca Friedman, New York University, Adviser: Linda Gordon (\$2000)

Tiffany Hamelin, Howard University, Adviser: Alan McPherson (\$2000)

Ryan Irwin, The Ohio State University, Adviser: Peter Hahn (\$2000)

Reo Matsuzaki, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Adviser: Christopher Capozzola (\$2000)

Giacomo Mazzei, University of Maryland, Adviser: Saverio Giovacchini (\$2000)

Jaideep Prabhu, Vanderbilt University, Adviser: Thomas Schwartz (\$2000)

Eric Weber, Duke University, Adviser: Sarah Deutch (\$2000)

Harish Mehta, McMaster University, Adviser: Steven Streeter (\$1000)

Seth Offenbach, SUNY-Stony Brook, Adviser: Michael Barnhart (\$1000)

Samuel Flagg Bemis Research Grants: Faculty

Jessica Chapman, University of California-Santa Barbara (\$2000)

Gregory Krauss, Brown University (\$2000)

Werner Lippert, Indiana University of Pennsylvania (\$2000)

Jason Parker, Texas A & M University (\$2000)

SHAFR Council Meeting

Thursday, June 26, 2008
Blackwell Inn Board Room
Columbus, Ohio

Present: David Anderson, Frank Costigliola, Catherine Forslund, Peter Hahn, Richard Immerman, David Kirkey (guest), Mark Lawrence, Mitch Lerner, James Matray, Ken Osgood, Meredith Oyen, Stephen Rabe, Chapin Rydingsward, Thomas Schwartz (presiding), Sara Wilson, Jonathan Winkler, Tom Zeiler

Schwartz called the meeting to order at 8:30 A.M. and thanked everyone for attending.

Business Items

(1) SHAFR endowment and non-profit status.

Hahn introduced David Kirkey, SHAFR's CPA. Kirkey was invited to brief Council on SHAFR's non-profit status.

Kirkey distributed an outline reviewing requirements and tax classifications for Public Charities and for Public Foundations. He pointed out that if an organization receives more than 33.33% of its support from gross investment income, then it fails to qualify as a publicly supported organization under IRC Section 509(a)(2). If it fails to support this test for two consecutive years, then it loses its public charity status and becomes a private foundation. He stated that given the dramatic increase in the percentage of investment income, resulting mainly from substantial capital gains recognized in 2006 (\$96,360) and 2007 (\$177,970), SHAFR will be treated as a Private Foundation rather than a Public Charity, as of January 1, 2008.

Kirkey discussed the ramifications of becoming a private foundation. First, SHAFR's governing instruments and documents must contain special provisions in addition to those that apply to all 501(c)(3) organizations documents. As a result, SHAFR's documents will need to be reviewed and amended, if necessary. Second, SHAFR will be subject to an excise tax on net investment income (IRC 4940(a)). The 2 percent tax is based on the excess of investment income over investment expenses. Investment expenses include expenses directly related to production of investment income and a portion of other operating expenses allocable to investment income. Kirkey noted that if the tax had applied in 2007, the amount due would have been approximately \$3,200.

Kirkey also advised Council of a 30% excise tax on failure to distribute income (IRC 4942). Distributable income – also known as the minimum investment return – is defined as 5% of the fair market value of the foundation's assets less the tax on net investment income. In general, qualifying distributions include contributions to other 501(c)(3) organizations, gifts, and grants paid. In addition, program-related and administrative expenses may also be included to the extent they exceed investment income. In order to avoid the excise tax on failure to distribute income, qualifying distributions equal to or greater than the minimum investment return must be made by December 31, 2008 (and by the same date in subsequent years). To comply with this rule, a projected tax return will have to be completed late in each tax year while still allowing enough time to make any required distributions. If SHAFR fails to do this, it will be subject to a 30% tax on the amount of funds it failed to distribute.

Lastly, Kirkey discussed the rules for returning to public charity status. To pursue this, SHAFR would have to notify the IRS of its intention to revert from private foundation to public charity status and then meet the public support test during the following 60 months.

Discussion ensued. Immerman pointed out that SHAFR's new status should not be viewed in a purely negative light. He emphasized that SHAFR's modified status was a sign of healthy financial growth that has enabled it better to pursue its mission. He advised that SHAFR use this opportunity to continue funding the programs it has developed to further the organization's mission. He also noted that because the funds generated by the Blackwell contract are not considered investment funds they will not inflate the amount of money SHAFR, as a public foundation, will be required to spend on an annual basis.

Kirkey informed Council that distributable income includes both the endowment and investment funds. It was also noted that if SHAFR wants to modify its private foundation status, it could advise its investment manager that the organization is concerned about excessive capital gains. He also pointed out, however, that the practice of triggering losses could be counterproductive and have unintended consequences.

Immerman advised against a mindset in which SHAFR would be more concerned about avoiding taxes than promoting healthy financial growth and asked Kirkey about the possible ramifications of failure to meet the public charity requirements after having notified the IRS of its intention to do so. Kirkey responded that he would look into the issue and submit his response in the near future.

Matray advised Council to consider whether it wants to return to its original public charity status. Osgood and Schwartz shared Immerman's appraisal of SHAFR's new status and supported the notion that SHAFR use this as an opportunity to continue funding programs that furthered its organizational mission. Schwartz noted that 5 percent is a conservative estimate for annual investment growth and noted that SHAFR should not be overly concerned with the excise tax applied to private foundations.

After a further discussion a consensus emerged regarding SHAFR's status as a private foundation. Rabe motioned that SHAFR accepts its Private Foundation status and affirms its continued commitment to funding programs to further the SHAFR mission. The motion passed unanimously.

(2) Motions from Endowment Committee to restructure Endowment Committee

Schwartz recalled that Council has created an ad hoc Steering Committee in 2006-7 to bring proposals to Council for investing resources in new programs. In 2007, authority in this area was assigned to the Endowment Committee. That Committee considered reforms of its own structure to create a better mechanism for monitoring SHAFR programs.

Schwartz asked Council to discuss the following motion:

The By-Laws will be amended so that the Endowment Committee is replaced by the Ways & Means Committee, which will have broader responsibilities. Article V, Section 3 of the By-laws will be amended as indicated below. Pending Council approval, this amendment will be submitted to the membership for ratification during the 2008 election.

Section 3: The ~~Endowment Committee~~ **Ways & Means Committee** shall have responsibility for (1) recommending investment management and policy to Council; (2) serving as SHAFR's advisory board to the investment management firm approved by Council; (3) monitoring the endowment investments; (4) reporting regularly (at least twice a year) to Council on the status of the endowment investments; **(5) monitoring and evaluating all ongoing programs; (6) soliciting and assessing proposals for new programs; and (7) making recommendations to Council regarding funding and programs.** The membership of the Committee will be ~~three members appointed by the President (each serving three-year rotating terms, with the senior member normally Chair) and the Executive Director as an ex officio member.~~ **consist of the immediate past president (chair), the president, the vice president, and two members-at-large. The President shall appoint the two at-large members to reflect the breadth of the Society's interests and membership, and they shall serve staggered, three-year terms. The Endowment Liaison and the Executive Director shall serve ex officio.**

Council discussed the above motion. Zeiler stressed the advantage of drawing from both senior and non-senior SHAFR members when filling the two at-large positions. Anderson suggested calibrating the committee's responsibilities with the financial needs of the organization. Hahn responded by suggesting an amendment as item (8) reading "consulting with the SHAFR accountant as necessary"

Rabe moved that Council accept motion as amended. The motion passed unanimously.

Schwartz asked Council to discuss the following motion:

Council directs the Endowment Committee (or Ways & Means Committee) to make decisions and recommendations on the basis of the following general guidelines:

- 1) The Committee should seek to enhance SHAFR's identity and vibrancy. It will support proposals that help SHAFR remain vital in terms of intellectual developments and globalizing trends, welcoming new and diverse modes of scholarship, and helping the organization develop more of an international presence.
- 2) Among the priorities for funding should be:
 - a) Support for programs that attract and assist graduate students, especially graduate students from traditionally underrepresented groups.

b) Support for programs that address the issues of membership: How to keep up and increase the number of members, how to attract scholars working in international relations who may not think of SHAFR as part of their intellectual network, and how to enhance and improve the satisfaction of current members with the organization.

c) Support for programs to increase the membership and active participation of non-U.S. scholars in SHAFR.

d) Support for programs that encourage the dissemination to a wider public of knowledge and research in the history of U.S. foreign relations.

Discussion ensued. Immerman moved that guideline (1) should read “develop and achieve” rather than “seek to enhance.” Rabe moved that priority (2D) include a final clause reading “both nationally and internationally.” He also took note of the strategic value of encouraging and facilitating SHAFR members to teach abroad.

Rabe moved that Council accept the motion as amended. The motion passed unanimously.

(3) Motions from Endowment Committee for new expenditures

Hahn reported on SHAFR’s financial status in writing and orally. He noted that the spike in revenues was due to the high royalties. Hahn invited Council to examine the financial report. Matray reported on SHAFR’s investment package. He noted that the high point of investment was November 2007 and that in the last seven months the endowment had lost 6.8%. During the last year the endowment grew to June 1 and that the annual loss was \$31,000. He anticipated further losses during the next quarter. Immerman noted that SHAFR’s long-term financial health is not threatened by these developments and that the steering committee has been very conservative in allocating funds.

Schwartz turned Council’s attention to the following motions from the Endowment Committee:

- A) Motion to fund diversity enhancement at annual meetings
- B) Motion to subsidize Teaching Committee grad student travel
- C) Motion to authorize 2009 Program Committee to spend \$2,400 on advertising
- D) Motion to increase annual subsidy to National Coalition for History from \$5,000 to \$6,500
- E) Motion to extend SHAFR Summer Institute program for two additional years (2010 and 2011)

Costigliola explained the rationale for (A) and (C). Costigliola highlighted two long-range issues of concern. First, white males still largely dominate the organization. He noted that women constitute 19 percent of SHAFR membership while that number is significantly higher among comparable organizations. The second concern was with promoting overall growth of SHAFR membership. Proposals (A) and (C) were designed to address these concerns.

Zeiler recommended including language in the diversity enhancement program to emphasize SHAFR’s commitment to the internationalization of its membership. He also supported increasing funds to \$25,000 in light of the high cost of international travel. Anderson addressed the need to publicize the outreach initiative to highlight the amount of money that SHAFR will be making available. Immerman directed current and future program committees to take note of the importance of this initiative.

After much discussion, a consensus emerged in support of changing motion (A) to read as follows:

Council authorizes the Program Committee of the SHAFR annual conferences in 2009, 2010, and 2011 to spend up to \$25,000 per year to fund the travel and lodging expenses of persons, both from the United States and from outside the United States, whose participation in the annual meeting would add to the diversity of the Society. Preference will be given to persons who have not previously presented at SHAFR annual meetings. The awards are intended for scholars who represent groups historically under-represented at SHAFR meetings, scholars who offer intellectual approaches that may be fruitful to SHAFR but are under-represented at annual meetings, and scholars from outside the United States. “Scholars” includes faculty, graduate students, and independent researchers. To further acquaint the winners with SHAFR, they will also be awarded a one-year membership in the organization.

Council also supported renaming the initiative “The SHAFR Diversity and International Outreach Program.”

Discussion then moved to the Summer Institute. Hahn reported that the Institute held earlier in the week in Columbus was a great success. There were a large number of applications representing a diverse set of backgrounds and nationalities. In approaching the selection process it was decided to invite 10-13 individuals who together would

represent diversity in the broadest sense of the word. It was reported that of the twelve participants, some were non-SHAFR members. At least one of those individuals has recently become a member. It was also noted that the participants were of one mind with regard to both the Institute's intellectual value and the desirability of continuing the program in future years. Hahn reported that given the high rate of applications only faculty were selected for the 2008 institute with the expectation that next year's institute, as discussed at the Council meeting last year, will be comprised of graduate students only. At the suggestion of Lerner, the Council agreed that the Summer Institute Oversight Committee should solicit input from the Teaching Committee when assessing proposals for the Summer Institute that intend to focus on teaching.

Schwartz called a vote on the package as amended. The amended package passed unanimously. Schwartz then moved that Council acknowledge and thank Hahn and Bob McMahon for their work in organizing and managing the recent Summer Institute. The motion passed unanimously.

(4) Motion to reform administration of prizes and fellowships

Osgood briefly discussed his concerns with the current structure and administration of the prize and fellowship committees. In a written report, he highlighted the following recommendations:

1. Create standardized application and cover sheet for all awards
2. Modify award criteria
 - a. Require SHAFR membership for all the awards
 - b. Graduate Research Awards
 - i. Standardize requirements for all award
 - ii. Excise language privileging foreign travel
 - iii. Excise requirement for PhD to not limit applicants to post generals.
 - iv. Change prize values to "up to \$4,000" to give flexibility of committee members.
 - v. Consolidate the whole process
 1. One application for one committee for three prizes (Holt-Gelfand-Rappaport)
 - c. Bemis Award
 - i. Convert to Bemis Jr faculty grant
 - ii. And possibly increase number of Holt award
3. Restructuring Award committees.
 - a. Graduate Student Research Grant Committee
 - i. Holt, Gelfand-Rappaport, and Bernath Dissertation Grants
 - b. Faculty/Bemis Research Grant Committee
 - c. SHAFR Dissertation Grant Committee
 - d. Myrna Bernath Committee
 - e. Hogan/Foreign Language Committee
4. Implementation
 - a. Implement new application as soon as possible
 - b. Implement new award and committee structure for following year
5. Bernath Lecture Award
 - a. Increase to \$750 or \$1000.

Council discussed the above recommendations. Matray noted that the Bemis grants were originally increased to protect SHAFR's public charity status. Costigliola thanked Osgood and guided discussion toward the issue of converting the Bemis Award into a Bemis Junior Faculty Award. Schwartz asked about the student to faculty ratio of 2008 Bemis awardees. Osgood reported that there were approximately 10 student and 4 faculty awards granted. He also noted that the number of faculty applications has been low and that the wording of the call for applications could be adjusted accordingly.

Hahn supported the reforms but voiced some concerns. He noted that some funds were given with deeds of gifts and that SHAFR must abide by any restrictions they might entail. He also noted that while the reorganization of the committee will promote efficiency it might reduce the representative nature of the composition and structure of the committees. Hahn also encouraged Council to think about and clarify its position with regard to maintaining two award cycles. The creation of two award cycles was intended to offer students two opportunities to apply and to publicize the awards at the OAH. Osgood pointed out that if one "super committee" for evaluating all graduate student grants is created one cycle would be preferable. Hahn noted that an October 1st deadline would enable the awards to be announced at the AHA and suggested a dichotomy that would allow announcing fellowships at the AHA and prizes at the OAH.

Forsland suggested splitting the awards into those sponsoring international travel and domestic travel. Schwartz voiced his concern with the possibility of violating the deeds of gift. Hahn said that an amendment could be added to address this issue. After a brief discussion a consensus emerged in support of requiring SHAFR membership for all applicants.

Osgood asked Council if it supports converting the Bemis Awards into a Junior Faculty Award or if it would prefer partitioning the award into one faculty and one student award. Immerman emphasized the need to preserve a certain number of Bemis awards for students.

Matray voiced concern that perhaps graduate student research is now funded sufficiently while junior faculty research is not. After further discussion, Council decided that two separate Bemis Awards should be created: one for students and one for junior faculty. Council also supported increasing the Bernath Lecture Prize to \$1,000.

Costigliola moved to approve the package as amended. The motion passed unanimously.

(5) Security for Friday evening plenary

Schwartz asked Council to discuss the issue of security at the Friday evening plenary. After discussion, it was decided to hire one uniformed security guard for four hours coinciding with the session and to require presentation of a registration badge for admission to the event.

(6) Motion to authorize financial review in 2008

Hahn informed Council that in 2003, Council had arranged a financial review of SHAFR's records for 2001-3. The review found no problems with those records. Hahn noted that Council had, in 2003, recommended that such a review be conducted every five years. That recommendation was not binding, and the membership of Council had since turned over completely. For planning purposes only, Hahn had secured estimates from a local firm of \$3,500 per year for a financial review and \$5,000 per year for a formal audit. Immerman moved to defer consideration of this issue indefinitely. The motion passed by majority voice vote.

(7) Motion to appoint Director of Secondary Education and Webmaster

Schwartz noted that he had received five applications for the two positions recently advertised. He and Frank Costigliola evaluated these applications and recommended the appointments of Brian Etheridge (Webmaster) and John Tully (Director of Secondary Education). Schwartz noted that both individuals had submitted outstanding applications. Immerman moved that SHAFR hire both applicants. The motion passed unanimously.

Reports

(8) *Passport*

Lerner reported that *Passport* is having a fine year. He reported that the Mershon Center at Ohio State had renewed its grant for next year but cautioned, as at previous meetings, that this source of funding is not guaranteed in future years. Last year *Passport* cost SHAFR approximately \$2,000. That figure might increase to between \$5,000 and \$10,000 in future years. It was additionally noted that in order for Blackwell to bundle the mailing with *Diplomatic History*, *Passport* will be switching to an April-September- January schedule. Schwartz recognized and thanked Lerner for his important and valuable work as editor.

(9) *Diplomatic History*

Zeiler reported that *Diplomatic History* is doing very well. There is a backlog of book reviews and both article submissions and electronic downloads are up. The editorial board has made an effort to promote diversity and to that end has welcomed two female members to the board. Anderson noted that a significant number of SHAFR members have not entered or updated their personal information and research interests on Blackwell's membership services webpage. It was noted that this service is potentially very useful for publication management and planning, but that it cannot function as such without high participation among the membership. In response to this issue, Council directed the new SHAFR Webmaster to devise a plan to increase the percentage of members using this service. Immerman recommended an email to all SHAFR members, stressing the importance of participation and containing the appropriate links.

(10) 2008 annual meeting

Wilson reported that the local arrangements and program committee have done very well. She noted that there have been

306 registrants for the 2008 conference, which is more than expected. The average number of registrants in non-DC years is 270. Hahn reported that 11 of the 12 summer institute participants are attending the conference. Wilson estimated that the conference would cost SHAFR between \$7,000 and \$10,000. Council expressed its gratitude to Wilson and to the local arrangements and program committees.

(11) 2009 annual meeting

Schwartz reported that the 2009 conference will be held on June 25-27 at the Fairview Park Marriott in Falls Church, VA. The hotel is near a Metro station and all sessions will be on site. Costigliola noted that the program committee is up and running.

(12) 2010 annual meeting

Costigliola reported that the 2010 conference will be held in at the University of Wisconsin's Pyle center on Lake Mendota, in Madison, WI. There have been suggestions that one of the plenary sessions be dedicated to the 50th anniversary of William Appleman Williams's *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. Jeremi Suri will head the local arrangements committee.

(13) Graebner Prize

Hahn reported that the 2008 Graebner Prize will be presented to Thomas G. Paterson, formerly of the University of Connecticut.

(14) Dissertation Completion Fellowships

Hahn reported that the first two \$20,000 fellowships have been awarded to Min Song of the University of Georgia and Vanessa Mongey of the University of Pennsylvania.

Other Business

(15) Membership committee proposals

Schwartz asked Council to examine and discuss the tentative proposals submitted by the membership committee. He drew attention to the overseas symposia and the professional guide proposals as two possible ways of augmenting membership, both in raw numbers and in the range of people joining.

Osgood voiced particular concern with SHAFR's lack of visibility overseas. He also suggested that one way to further reward SHAFR members would be to devise a program for discounted hotel rates for members. Immerman and Rabe suggested that SHAFR seek to utilize and promote the Fulbright teaching program among its membership in order to promote the organization's presence and visibility overseas. Lawrence raised a concern that SHAFR may be losing members who find other organizations and conferences to be more suitable for interests that run beyond traditional diplomatic history.

Council also took note of the need to retain recognized scholars whose membership has lapsed in recent years.

Schwartz concluded the meeting by thanking everyone for attending. The meeting adjourned at 12:45 pm.

Respectfully submitted,
Peter L. Hahn
Executive Director

PLH/cr

The Diplomatic Pouch



1. Personal and Professional Notes

Carol Anderson has accepted a position as associate professor in the African American Studies Department at Emory University.

Ryan Irwin (Ohio State) and **Paul Chamberlain** (Ohio State) have been awarded International Security Studies Fellowships at Yale University.

Alan McPherson has accepted the ConocoPhillips chair in Latin American Studies at the School of International and Area Studies at the University of Oklahoma.

Wilson Miscamble (Notre Dame) won the Harry S. Truman Book Award for *From Roosevelt to Truman: Potsdam, Hiroshima, and the Cold War* (Cambridge, 2007).

Dustin Walcher has accepted a tenure track position in the History Department at the University of Southern Oregon.



2. Research Notes

Cold War International History Project Bulletin 16, *Inside China's Cold War*

The CWIHP announces the publication of CWIHP Bulletin 16 "Inside China's Cold War." This new edition of the Bulletin features declassified documents on the 1954 Geneva Conference from the PRC's newly opened Foreign Ministry Archive, as well as sections on Mao Zedong's 1949 trip to Moscow to meet with Stalin; Albania; Mongolia; Vietnam's role in the Sino-Soviet Split; Romania and the Sino-American rapprochement; new evidence on North Korea, and more. Copies of the Bulletin can be downloaded from the CWIHP web site at: www.cwihp.org.



Cold War International History Project Working Paper #56: *Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1964-1989*


The CWIHP announces the publication of Working Paper #56, *Hope and Reality: Poland and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 1964-1989*, by Wanda Jarzabek. Drawing on new documents from Polish archives, Jarzabek explores Polish attitudes towards the CSCE and the Helsinki Final Act from the preparations for the negotiations in the mid 1960s through 1989. The Paper can be downloaded from the CWIHP web site at: www.cwihp.org.



Cold War International History Project, e-Dossier No. 18, *Khrushchev at his Most Khrushchevian*

The CWIHP announces the publication of the latest addition to the CWIHP e-Dossier Series: "Khrushchev at his Most Khrushchevian," by William Taubman. This Dossier introduces a collection of documents that span Nikita S. Khrushchev's time as first secretary of the Soviet Communist party and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. While these documents relate to only a few highlights of Khrushchev's career, it is remarkable how many general features of his approach to domestic and foreign policy they capture and reflect. In his introduction to the collection, Taubman extracts and analyzes those passages that reveal Khrushchev at his most "Khrushchevian."

The Dossier can be downloaded from the CWIHP web site at: www.cwihp.org.



Cold War International History Project, e-Dossier No.16: *Assessing the Damage: The June 1967 Czech Delegation to Egypt*

The Cold War International History Project announces the publication of *Assessing the Damage: The June 1967 Czech Delegation to Egypt*, by Guy Laron. This Dossier introduces a document obtained from the National Czech Archive in Prague that provides new insights into Czech perceptions of Egypt's defeat in the June 1967 Six Day War with Israel. Following Egypt's defeat, high-level delegations from all over the Eastern bloc hurried to Cairo to support Gamal Abd al-Nasser's pro-Soviet regime. Because of Czechoslovakia's strong connections with the Egyptian army, the Czechoslovak delegation attempted to learn how the Egyptians—supplied and trained by the Soviet Union—had been so easily defeated by the Israelis. Laron's commentary explores their report from a historical perspective, and shows how this new evidence fits into, and even alters, the current historiography of the June 1967 War.

The Dossier can be downloaded from the CWIHP web site at: www.cwihp.org.

New FRUS Volume on China, 1973-1976

The Department of State has released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976*. This volume documents fluctuations in Sino-American relations, ranging from the euphoria lingering from President Nixon's visit to China in 1972, to the practical challenges of normalizing diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing.

Like all recent *Foreign Relations* volumes in the Nixon-Ford subseries, the emphasis of this volume is on policy formulation rather than the implementation of policy or day-to-day diplomacy. Influence on major U.S. foreign policy decisions was generally restricted to a small circle including the President, Henry Kissinger, and some influential officials they trusted. During this period, control over China policy shifted from the White House to the Department of State as a result of the Watergate crisis, the appointment of Kissinger as Secretary of State, the resignation of Nixon as President, and Kissinger's involuntary resignation as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The chapters of this volume integrate documents about U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China and with Taiwan, reflecting the fact that the former government received much more attention from high-level American policymakers than did the latter. The central theme of the volume is the effort to strengthen and formalize the U.S.-PRC relationship, which had been established during 1971 and 1972 after decades of bitter estrangement, and the concurrent disestablishment of formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, a task that remained unfinished at the end of the Ford Administration. The primary means of improving relations during these years were long conversations between U.S. and PRC leaders, recorded in memoranda of conversation, which were supposed to initiate—but at this time generally substituted for—a more developed and institutionalized relationship.

The volume is divided into five chapters. The first chapter, from January until May 1973, documents the establishment of unofficial liaison offices in Washington and Beijing, the most concrete achievement of the 1973-1976 period. The second chapter, containing documents from June 1973 until August 1974, indicates that domestic politics in both countries threatened the still-fragile Sino-American relationship. In China, aftershocks from the Cultural Revolution and the death of Lin Biao, as well as the aging of China's leadership, raised doubts about the stability of Chinese foreign policy. This chapter also reveals U.S. efforts to reassure Chinese leaders baffled by Watergate and fearful that American policy would become erratic. In addition, China was dissatisfied with the pace of U.S. disengagement from formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

The third chapter, with documents from September 1974 until July 1975, covers the Sino-American effort to re-establish the momentum toward normalization. Along these lines, the United States attempted to reconcile the improvement of Sino-American relations with the preservation of Taiwanese security through such policies as a careful diminution of U.S.-Taiwanese military links. Nonetheless, the United States and China continued to bicker over the subjects of détente and Cambodia. The fourth chapter, which covers the period from August to December 1975, includes the planning for Ford's trip to Beijing, and the details of the actual trip itself. The final chapter, containing documents from January 1976 until January 1977, reveals how domestic political developments in both countries distracted policy makers from the Sino-American relationship. By January 1977, the change of leadership in both countries had been so dramatic that there seemed little doubt that the Sino-American relationship was entering a new era. During these years, relations between the United States and China were conducted at the highest political level, which meant that incapacitation of the top leadership tended to bring progress to a standstill. More than most volumes in the series, this one documents the influence of domestic politics on foreign policy. However, despite numerous obstacles and failures, each country's troubled relationship with the Soviet Union produced a continual impetus to improve the Sino-American relationship.

The volume and this press release are available on the Office of the Historian website at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xviii>. Copies of the volume will be available for purchase from the U.S. Government Printing Office online at <http://bookstore.gpo.gov>, or by calling toll-free 1-866-512-1800 (D.C. area 202-512-1800). For further information contact Edward Keefer, General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, at (202) 663-1131 or by e-mail to history@state.gov.



New FRUS Volume on Eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, 1969-1976

The Department of State has released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969-1972*. The volume is split almost equally between Eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean. The Eastern Europe portion begins with a general chapter that covers the entire Soviet bloc region and deals almost exclusively with U.S. efforts to liberalize and expand trade with Eastern Europe. The second chapter, also a general one, deals with U.S. Government policy and the bureaucratic debate about—and ultimately, the decision on how to fund—Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. The remainder of the Eastern Europe section of the volume comprises eight chapters on U.S. bilateral relations with Soviet bloc Eastern European countries, as well as with Austria and Finland, neither of which are part of Eastern Europe, but are published here to provide additional coverage of European events. As the documents reveal, bilateral relations with Eastern Europe were limited and generally carried out at the Department of State level, but there was a considerable amount of interest by the White House—and on the part of President Nixon—in certain Eastern Europe countries. Although not always prominently documented, there is evidence in this volume that the Nixon administration's relations with Eastern Europe were motivated in part by domestic political considerations, essentially the voting power of Polish-American and other Eastern European ethnic Americans, who made up a significant part of the population of the Midwest.

The countries covered in the three chapters on the Eastern Mediterranean—Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey—generally had a higher profile among Washington policymakers than Eastern Europe. This is particularly true for Greece. When President Nixon took office in 1969, he ordered a review of U.S. policy, and he subsequently sent to Athens a new Ambassador, Henry Tasca, to reassess relations with Greece, an important NATO ally. Tasca reported that the military

junta that overthrew the elected government in Greece was there to stay for the immediate future and that the symbolic U.S. suspension of military aid and sales was undermining Greece's security. The result was a Presidential decision to lift the suspension on aid and an understanding that Tasca would use this concession to the junta to push it towards constitutional reform and eventual democratic elections. The role of Vice President Spiro Agnew and businessman Tom Pappas in helping to shape U.S. policy toward Greece is documented in this chapter, especially through use of the White House tapes.

The Cyprus chapter is a continuation of the *Foreign Relations* series' long-standing coverage of the ongoing dispute on that island between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which was overlaid with tensions among the governments in Nicosia, Athens, and Ankara. The chapter also covers the attempted assassination of Cypriot President Archbishop Makarios in March 1970, and the crisis that ensued when Makarios purchased a substantial quantity of arms and ammunition from Czechoslovakia in February 1972. The final chapter of the volume on Turkey covers the whole range of U.S.-Turkish bilateral relations, but U.S. efforts to discourage Turkish narcotics production is a main theme.

The volume and this press release are available on the Office of the Historian website at <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xxix>. Copies of the volume will be available for purchase from the U.S. Government Printing Office online at <http://bookstore.gpo.gov>, or by calling toll-free 1-866-512-1800 (D.C. area 202-512-1800). For further information, contact Edward Keefer, General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, at (202) 663-1131 or by e-mail to history@state.gov.



National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 251, *The Moscow Summit 20 Years Later: From The Secret U.S. and Soviet Files*

Twenty years ago, President Ronald Reagan declared the end of the Cold War while walking through Red Square and the Kremlin in Moscow during a summit meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev that was friendly and largely ceremonial, according to previously secret summit transcripts published on the Web by the National Security Archive. Asked by a reporter on the Kremlin grounds about the famous "evil empire" speech of 1983, Reagan responded, "I was talking about another time, another era." The underlying documents from the summit, obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests in the U.S. and from the Gorbachev Foundation in Moscow, also show that Gorbachev was thwarted in his efforts for rapid arms control progress by lack of trust on the U.S. side, and that the 'human factor' reflected in Reagan's comments was the most important outcome of the summit.

The documents, which were compiled and edited by Thomas Blanton and Svetlana Savranskaya, include the official U.S. transcripts of the face-to-face meetings in Moscow between Reagan and Gorbachev, the President's briefing book for the summit (prepared by the State Department), notes from Soviet Politburo sessions before and after the summit (taken by Gorbachev aide Anatoly Chernyaev), the U.S. National Security Decision Directives leading up to the summit, and the talking points sent to U.S. embassies around the world after the summit.

For more information, contact the Archive at 202-994-7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu.



Rosenberg Grand Jury Records Released

Responding to petitions filed by the National Security Archive and several leading U.S. historical associations for the release of grand jury records from the 1951 indictment of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, federal prosecutors in New York conceded that a substantial portion of the grand jury materials could be made public after more than 55 years.

In a court filing, the government said it would not oppose the release of transcripts and other materials for 35 of the 45 witnesses who testified before the grand jury that in 1951 indicted the Rosenbergs, who were accused of running an espionage ring that passed American atomic secrets to the Soviet Union, convicted of spying, and executed in 1953. In its filing, the government agreed that the Rosenberg case is of "significant historical importance" and therefore the materials are covered by a special exception to the longstanding rule that grand jury records must remain secret indefinitely.

Visit the web site of the National Security Archive at <http://www.nsarchive.org> for more information about this posting, or contact: Tom Blanton or Meredith Fuchs: 202-994-7000, or David Vladeck: 202-662-9540.



Declassified Studies from Cheney Pentagon Show Push for U.S. Military Predominance and a Strategy to "Prevent the Reemergence of a New Rival"

The United States should use its power to "prevent the reemergence of a new rival" either on former Soviet territory or elsewhere, declared a controversial February 18, 1992 draft of the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) prepared by then Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney's Pentagon and leaked to *The New York Times* in March 1992. Published in declassified form for the first time on the National Security Archive Web site, this draft, along with related working papers, shows how defense officials during the administration of George H. W. Bush, and under the direction of Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Resources I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, tried to develop a strategy for maintaining U.S. predominance in the new post-Cold War, post-Soviet era.

Remarkably, these new releases censor a half dozen large sections of text that *The New York Times* printed on March 8, 1992, as well as a number of phrases that were officially published in January 1993 when Cheney released the public

version of the guidance. The language that the *Times* publicized can be seen side-by-side with the relevant portions of the February 18, 1992 draft that was the subject of the leak. In response to the Archive's original mandatory review request, the Department of Defense exempted from declassification all of the documents on the grounds that they were "pre-decisional" in nature. On appeal of the denials, the Archive sent copies of *The New York Times* coverage of the leaked DPG, including the extensive excerpts from the February 18, 1992 draft. The appeal was successful because the Defense Department released considerable material on the Guidance; nevertheless, Pentagon officials blacked out much of the information that the *Times* had already published.

For more information, visit the web site of the National Security Archive at <http://www.nsarchive.org>, or contact William Burr at 202-994-7032, or by email at wburr@gwu.edu.



Air Force Histories Reveal CIA Role in Laos, CIA Air Strike Missions, New Evidence on Nuclear Weapons, Air Force Policy Disputes During Vietnam War Years

Previously secret U.S. Air Force official histories of the Vietnam War published by the National Security Archive disclose for the first time that Central Intelligence Agency contract employees had a direct role in combat air attacks when they flew Laotian government aircraft on strike missions and that the Air Force actively considered nuclear weapons options during the 1959 Laos crisis. Today's posting also includes analysis and commentary by noted Vietnam scholar and Archive senior fellow John Prados.

The newly declassified histories, which were released through Freedom of Information Act litigation, include the Air Force's detailed official history of the war in northern Laos, written during the 1990s but hidden in classified form for years. Also declassified were Air Force historical studies on specific years of the Vietnam War, documenting in great detail the Air Force's role in planning and implementing the air war in North and South Vietnam.

Among other significant disclosures in these histories are:

- * Air Force interest in nuclear options during at least two flash points in the Southeast Asian conflict: Laos in 1959 and in 1968 during the battle of Khe Sanh.
- * CIA operational commitments for the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion hampered the Agency's ability to carry out Kennedy administration policy in Laos.
- * CIA proprietary Air America directed search and rescue missions in Laos in addition to its role in combat operations.
- * The U.S. ambassador in Laos served as the field commander of the so-called "secret war" there, a role that has been largely undocumented.

For more information, visit the web site of the National Security Archive at <http://www.nsarchive.org>, or contact John Prados at (301) 565-0564.



The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev: 1987-1988

The National Security Archive has published its third installment of the diary of one of the main supporters of Mikhail Gorbachev and strongest proponents of *glasnost* during the *perestroika* period in the Soviet Union -- Anatoly Sergeevich Chernyaev. This section of the diary, covering two key years of history, is being published in English for the first time. These diary entries cover the two most successful years of Soviet *perestroika* -- the years when Gorbachev enjoyed immense popularity both at home and especially in the West, and before the conservative opposition to reform began to coalesce, leading eventually to the coup of August 1991. Beneath the surface, however, these processes were already beginning to rock the reformers' boat, and Chernyaev, subtly but precisely, notes the first signs of this agitation in these pages.

For more information, visit the web site of the National Security Archive at <http://www.nsarchive.org> or contact Svetlana Savranskaya at: 202-994-7000.



National Security Archive launches Guatemala Project Web Site

The National Security Archive has launched a new web page for The Guatemala Project, with links to information, analysis, and declassified documents relating to all the Archive's Guatemala work over the past 14 years. After decades of civil war and genocide, Guatemala has become a virtual laboratory of international and transitional justice, with a genocide case underway in a Spanish court, another about a Guatemalan Army death squad logbook before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, and teams of researchers combing through the dilapidated archives of the former Guatemalan National Police for evidence of human rights violations committed during the internal conflict.

The new site includes information on:

- * The Genocide Case, with summaries of testimonies given this year to the Spanish judge.
- * The Death Squad Dossier: Military logbook of the disappeared.
- * The Guatemalan National Police Archives.

- * Drugs and the Guatemalan Military.
- * The CIA and plans for assassinations during the 1954 coup.

Visit the new Guatemala Project page to read original declassified documents, check out photographs of the recovery of the National Police files, watch videotaped testimony given in the "death squad dossier" case before the Inter-American Human Rights Commission last October, and more.

For more information, visit the web page at: <http://www.nsarchive.org/guatemala>, or contact Project Director Kate Doyle, kadoyle@gwu.edu.



Air Force Histories Show Cautious Presidents Overruling Air Force Plans for Early Use of Nuclear Weapons

The U.S. Air Force expected to use nuclear weapons against China during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958, but President Eisenhower required the Air Force to plan initially to use conventional bombs against Chinese forces if the crisis escalated, according to a previously secret Air Force history obtained from a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit and posted by the National Security Archive. Eisenhower's instructions astounded the Air Force leadership, but according to Bernard Nalty, the author of one of the studies, U.S. policymakers recognized that atomic strikes had "inherent disadvantages" because of the fall-out danger in the region as well as the risk of escalation.

The ten formerly Secret and Top Secret histories obtained from the FOIA lawsuit shed new light on the Air Force's role in developing and deploying the massively destructive nuclear arsenal that thermonuclear weapons made possible. They cover key phases of the U.S. nuclear weapons program: nuclear tests, producing and deploying nuclear delivery systems, developing strategic concepts for nuclear weapons use, participating in command and control systems, executing nuclear threats during crises, and civilian control over the use of nuclear weapons, including repeated presidential caution.

These histories trace:

- * The story of the deployment of the Minuteman ICBM which, over forty years later, remains an integral part of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
- * Debates between Air Force leaders and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara over how many Minuteman ICBMs were necessary for a deterrent force that could threaten the destruction of Soviet society.
- * The development and deployment of the multiple-independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and their initial counterforce mission, that have been deployed on Minuteman III, whose MK 12 nose-cone assemblies were inadvertently sent to Taiwan in 2006.
- * The high-level Air Force interest, beginning in the 1950s, in ideas of preemptive nuclear options in the event of war with the Soviet Union.
- * Successful Air Force opposition to the Navy and Army's "finite deterrence" proposals which, in reaction to the Air Force's nuclear "overkill", proposed to reduce nuclear forces to the minimum needed to deter a Soviet attack.
- * The story of Air Force "atomic cloud sampling" missions to collect radioactive debris from atmospheric nuclear tests to help measure the effectiveness of nuclear weapons.
- * Air Force operations during five crises: Lebanon (1958), Taiwan Strait (1958), Congo (1960), Cuba (1962), and the Dominican Republic (1965).

For more information, visit the web site of the National Security Archive at: <http://www.nsarchive.org>, or contact William Burr at 202-994-7032



3. Announcements:

CFP: The United States in the World/The World in the United States 2009 Conference of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations June 25-27, 2009, Falls Church Virginia

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) invites proposals for panels and individual papers at its annual conference, June 25-27, 2009, to be held at the Fairview Park Marriott Hotel in Falls Church, Virginia. Although proposals for individual papers will be considered, proposals for complete or nearly complete panels are encouraged and will receive preference. In order to receive full consideration, proposals should be submitted no later than December 1, 2008.

The Program Committee welcomes panels and paper proposals that deal with the history of United States' role in the world in the broadest sense. In order to complement SHAFR's signature and continuing strengths in diplomatic, strategic, and foreign relations history, particularly for the post-1945 period, the Committee especially encourages proposals that deal with non-state actors and/or pre-1945 histories, as well as proposals that involve histories of gender and race, cultural history, religious history, environmental history, transnational history, and histories of migration and borderlands. The Committee also invites applications from scholars working in areas other than U. S. history, and panels that include work by such scholars. Finally, the Committee welcomes panels dealing with issues such as pedagogy and professionalization.

Panels can follow either of the following formats: (1) three or four papers, chair, and commentator or (2) a roundtable with a chair and participants. The committee also welcomes panels using innovative procedures, such as the circulation of papers prior to the conference to any interested conference attendees.

Panel submissions should total no more than three pages and must include the following information:

- 1) the name of each panelist as she/he would like it to appear on the program should the panel be accepted (please check the proper spelling of everyone's name)
- 2) each participant's institutional affiliation and status (graduate student, assistant professor, lecturer, professor, etc.);
- 3) the role of each panelist (presenter, chair, commentator, etc.);
- 4) contact information, including a working e-mail address and phone number for each participant;
- 5) some indication of each panelist who has not previously attended or who has attended but not previously presented a paper at a SHAFR meeting.

Each proposal should include a brief rationale, the title of each paper, and a short description of the work to be presented. Each panelist should include a brief bio. Please adhere to the limit of three pages. One member of each proposed session should be designated as the contact person.

Electronic submissions are strongly encouraged, but paper submissions will also be accepted. If submitting electronically, please send a copy of your application as a single Word or WordPerfect file attachment to Paul Kramer, program chair, at paul-kramer@uiowa.edu. If submitting a paper copy of your application, please mark "SHAFR 2009 Proposal" on the front of the envelope, and mail it to Paul Kramer, Department of History, 280 Schaeffer Hall, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242

This year SHAFR will offer several Robert A. and Barbara Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants to assist graduate students who present papers at the conference. The following stipulations apply: 1) no award will exceed \$300 per student; 2) priority will be given to graduate students who receive no or limited funds from their home institutions; and 3) expenses will be reimbursed by the SHAFR Business Office upon submission of receipts. The Program Committee will make the decision regarding all awards. A graduate student requesting travel funds must make a request when submitting the paper/panel proposal. (Funding requests will have no bearing on the committee's decisions on panels). Requests must be accompanied by a letter from the graduate advisor confirming the unavailability of departmental funds to cover travel to the conference.

This year, SHAFR inaugurates a Diversity and International Outreach Fellowship Program. This program will offer competitive fellowships that will cover travel and lodging expenses for the 2009 annual meeting. The competition is aimed at scholars whose participation in the annual meeting would add to the diversity of the Society. Preference will be given to persons who have not previously presented at SHAFR annual meetings. The awards are intended for scholars who represent groups historically under-represented at SHAFR meetings, scholars who offer intellectual approaches that may be fruitful to SHAFR but are under-represented at annual meetings, and scholars from outside the United States. "Scholars" includes faculty, graduate students, and independent researchers. To further acquaint the winners with SHAFR, they will also be awarded a one-year membership in the organization, which includes subscriptions to *Diplomatic History* and *Passport*. For application instructions, contact diversityprogram@shafr.org. Application deadline: December 1, 2008.



CFP: *European Journal of American Studies* (EJAS)

Special Issue: "We Are All Undesirables: May 68 and the Legacy of the 1960s"

Inspired by the 40th anniversary of May 68, the editors of EJAS welcome submissions for a special issue on the impact of the 1960s on US politics, society, and culture, and the connections between similar developments on both sides of the Atlantic. Articles already commissioned cover Cold War social science, the many legacies of Vietnam, the rise of the gay movement in the US, and the New Left and the rise of Neoconservatism.

For enquiries and information about submitting articles, send e-mail to: rsc@zeeland.nl


Due to the flexibilities of being an online journal, all deadlines are negotiable. Please enquire with the editors for further details.



Call for Contributors: *Advancing Military History*

ABC-CLIO, award-winning publisher of historical reference works including recently published multivolume encyclopedias of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Cold War, is currently developing a wide-ranging and definitive project on U.S. military history. This scholarly, comprehensive project consists of authoritative encyclopedic entries centered on the major wars of American history, including the current conflicts in the Middle East. It covers not only the military aspects of the conflicts, but also the political, social, economic, and technological developments that impacted or were impacted by the conflicts.

ABC-CLIO has assembled a team of top historians to work on this groundbreaking project, and is currently seeking additional qualified contributors to give this study the depth and broad interpretation that it deserves. For more information, including a project description, list of entries for this year, compensation information, and sample entries, please email Dr. Paul Pierpaoli, ABC-CLIO Fellow of Military History and Diplomatic History, at ppierpaoli@abc-clio.com. When contacting Dr. Pierpaoli, please indicate your affiliation, areas of interest, and attach a copy of your curriculum vitae.



CFP: Southern Africa in the Cold War Era
Working Expert Seminar, May 8 -9 2009, Lisbon, Portugal

This seminar, sponsored by The Cold War Studies Centre/IDEAS, the London School of Economics and The Institute for International Relations, Lisbon, will bring together both established and new scholars in the field of Southern African studies in the 1970s and 1980s – an era in which the sub-continent became a cauldron of the Cold War. Drawing upon individual current research projects, it will address Portuguese/British relations over the long-running Rhodesian UDI crisis; the Angolan civil war; the Namibian independence struggle; Soviet, American and South African involvement in the regional liberation wars; as well as the Cuban agenda and contribution to the anti-imperialist struggle on the African continent. We are looking for papers based on multi-archival research on other aspects of the Cold War in Southern Africa in the 1970s, addressing both structure and agency. Topics might include: intelligence/military operational studies; propaganda and media manipulation; the role of multinational corporations and NGOs; non-alignment; migrations and the diaspora; gender studies (the role and impact of armed struggle); the role of leadership; religion, and liberation movements; mobilization and organization; the role of white minorities/settler communities (in the context of Portuguese decolonization in Angola and Mozambique).


Papers from post-graduate researchers are particularly welcome. Please send abstracts of proposals (250-300 words) to Dr Sue Onslow (s.onslow@lse.ac.uk) by December 1, 2008.



CFP: 2009 Vietnam Center Conference: "Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand and the Vietnam War"
March 13-14, 2009, Lubbock, TX

Most historical examinations of the Vietnam War tend to focus on the effects of the war on the principal participants, including the Republic of Vietnam, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and the United States. The events that took place in Vietnam from 1955 through 1975, however, had a tremendous impact on the entire region. The purpose of the 2009 Vietnam Center Conference will be to examine the effects of the war on the neighboring nations of Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand. The Vietnam Center invites both individual paper proposals as well as complete panels that will examine a wide range of topics to include the effects of the war within these nations either individually or collectively; specific events and activities that took place within each of these nations; the participation of US and other military, diplomatic, and civilian organizations within these countries, issues of regional and international diplomacy and diplomatic relations; the participation of these nations' military, diplomatic, and civilian organizations within Vietnam and each other, postwar issues for each nation, etc. Persons interested in participating should provide a proposal as soon as possible. Please format proposals to resemble an abstract to include the author's name, title, and affiliation, contact information, along with a 500 word abstract. Complete panel proposals should include brief biographies of each speaker, their contact information, as well as a 500 word abstract that describes the theme and purpose for the panel. Please submit proposals to: Stephen Maxner, PhD., Director, Vietnam Center Texas Tech University Lubbock, TX 79409-1041. You may also submit proposals via email to steve.maxner@ttu.edu. If you make a submission but do not receive notification of receipt within 14 days, please call 806-742-9010. The deadline for submitting proposals is October 1, 2008. This event will take place at the Holiday Inn Park Plaza in Lubbock, Texas.

Stephen Maxner, PhD
Director, Vietnam Center
Texas Tech University
Lubbock, TX 79409-1041
806-742-9010
steve.maxner@ttu.edu



CFP: *Radical History Review*: "Taking Sides: The Role of Visual Culture in War, Occupation and Resistance"

The *Radical History Review* solicits contributions for a special issue on visual culture in war, occupation, and resistance. Artists have often taken sides in ideological conflicts and in actual conflagrations. In terms of visual culture and resistance, the literature and music of the South African struggle, the murals of Belfast and Derry in Ireland and the poetry of the many Latin American movements for change are relatively well documented. Less analysis is available on the role of artists on one side or another of recent conflicts. Wars of Liberation and popular revolts such as those in Angola, Algeria, Iran and the Basque Country spring to mind. Despite the scale and impact of the Vietnam War, little knowledge is available in terms of the role of visual culture in the mass mobilizations against both the French and US occupations. Approaching five years into the occupation of Iraq and with numerous groups engaged in resistance, what form does visual culture play in demarcating opposing political positions? How have artists in colonized or oppressed nations viewed themselves and their work in terms of the largely western models that shape what is commonly defined as 'art' (the gallery, theater etc)? What has been the role of visual culture in support of imperialism or colonial expansion, as well as officially 'state sanctioned' cultural production?

Radical History Review solicits article proposals from scholars working in all historical periods and across all disciplines, including art history, history, anthropology, religious studies, media studies, sociology, philosophy, political science, gender, and cultural studies. Submissions are not restricted to traditional scholarly articles. We welcome short essays, documents, photo essays, art and illustrations, teaching resources, including syllabi, and reviews of books and exhibitions.

Submissions are due by November 15, 2008 and should be submitted electronically, as an attachment, to rrh@igc.org with "Issue 106 submission" in the subject line. For artwork, please send images as high-resolution digital files (each image as

a separate file). For preliminary e-mail inquiries, please include "Issue 106" in the subject line. Those articles selected for publication after the peer review process will be included in issue 106 of the *Radical History Review*, scheduled to appear in Winter 2009.

Radical History Review
rhr@igc.org



Postdoctoral Fellowships at Penn Humanities Forum

Five Andrew W. Mellon Postdoctoral Fellowships in the Humanities are available for the 2009-2010 academic year from the Penn Humanities Forum of the University of Pennsylvania for untenured junior scholars who are no more than eight years out of their doctorates.

The programs of the Penn Humanities Forum are conceived through yearly topics that invite broad interdisciplinary collaboration. The Forum has set CONNECTIONS as the topic for the 2009-2010 academic year. Research proposals on this topic are invited from a variety of theoretical perspectives in all areas of humanistic study except educational curriculum-building and the performing arts. Candidates from all humanistic disciplines are eligible, as well as those in allied areas such as Anthropology and History of Science.

Fellows teach one undergraduate course each of two terms in addition to conducting research. Stipend: \$46,500, plus health insurance. The fellowship is open to all scholars, national and international, who meet eligibility criteria. Full fellowship guidelines, topic description, and downloadable application are available online only: <http://www.phf.upenn.edu>.

For more information, contact:

Jennifer Conway
Associate Director
Penn Humanities Forum
University of Pennsylvania
3619 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6213
215.898.8220
phf@sas.upenn.edu



Fellowships, New York Public Library Center for the Humanities, Center for Scholars and Writers

Deadline: September 28, 2008

Amount: \$50,000 Fellows will receive a stipend of \$50,000 and, when necessary, a housing allowance. The center will assist fellows in locating housing.

Eligibility: Fellowships are open to scholars, non-academic research professionals, scientists engaged in the humanities, and creative writers of demonstrated achievement, regardless of nationality, whose proposed subjects will benefit directly from access to the collections of the library's Center for the Humanities. Fellows may hold other grants with the knowledge and permission of the grantors and the Center for Scholars and Writers. Fellowships will not be granted to those doing research leading directly to degrees. Fellows are expected to be conversant in English.

Abstract: The New York Public Library's Center for Scholars and Writers invites applications for its fellowship program. Fellows will be chosen from a broad spectrum of the humanities and will include creative writer. The center provides opportunities for fellows to explore the rich and diverse collections of the New York Public Library's Center for the Humanities. It will also serve as a forum for the exchange of ideas among the fellows, invited guests, the wider academic and cultural communities, and the interested public.

Fellows will be required to participate as much as possible in center activities including daily lunches, readings, lectures, colloquia, symposia, and conferences. Each fellow will be responsible for one public presentation of publishable quality such as a reading, a paper, or a lecture.

For more information, visit the web page at: <http://www.nypl.org/research/chss/scholars/fellowship.html>.



Fellowships, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Deadline: October 1, 2008

Amount: \$85,000. The center awards approximately 20-25 residential fellowships annually. The center tries to ensure that the stipend provided under the fellowship, together with the fellow's other sources of funding (e.g., grants secured by the applicant and sabbatical allowances), approximate a fellow's regular salary. Stipends provided in recent years have ranged from \$26,000 to \$85,000 (the maximum possible in 2008-09). Stipends include round trip travel for fellows. If spouses or dependent children will reside with the fellow for the entire fellowship period, money for their travel will also be included in the stipend. In addition to stipends, the center provides 75 percent of health insurance premiums for fellows who elect center coverage and for their accompanying family members.

Fellows are expected to be in residence for the entire U.S. academic year (early September through May, i.e., nine months),

although a few fellowships are occasionally awarded for shorter periods with a minimum of four months. The center does not award fellowships for the summer months (June, July, August). Fellowships cannot be deferred, and extensions into the summer months have not been possible in recent years.

Eligibility: Eligibility criteria is as follows:

- Citizens or permanent residents from any country (foreign nationals must be able to hold a valid passport and obtain a J1 Visa)
- Men and women with outstanding capabilities and experience from a wide variety of backgrounds (including government, the corporate world, professions, as well as academia)
- Academic candidates holding a Ph.D. (Ph.D. must be received by the application deadline of October 2)
- Academic candidates demonstrating scholarly achievement by publications beyond their doctoral dissertations
- Practitioners or policymakers with an equivalent level of professional achievement
- English proficiency, as the center is designed to encourage the exchange of ideas among its fellows

Applicants do not need an institutional affiliation to apply. For most academic candidates, a book or monograph is required. Scholars and practitioners who previously held research awards or fellowships at the Wilson Center are not precluded from applying for a fellowship. However, the nature and recency of the prior award may be among the factors considered during the selection process, and by the fellowships committee of the board of trustees.

Abstract: The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars awards residential fellowships annually to individuals with outstanding project proposals in a broad range of the social sciences and humanities on national or international issues. Topics and scholarship should relate to key public policy challenges or provide the historical or cultural framework to illumine policy issues of contemporary importance.

The center devotes significant attention to the exploration of broad thematic areas. Primary themes are

1. governance, including such issues as the key features of the development of democratic institutions, democratic society, civil society, and citizen participation;
2. the U.S. role in the world and issues of partnership and leadership - military, political, and economic dimensions; and
3. key long-term future challenges confronting the United States and the world.

While the center does not engage in formulating actual policy, priority will be given to proposals related to these themes and intersecting with crucial public policy issues. Within this framework, the center also welcomes projects that provide the historical or cultural context for some of today's significant public policy debates.

For more information, visit the webpage at: <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=fellowships.welcome>.



Postdoctoral Fellowships in the Humanities and Arts, Sciences and Professions, University of Michigan

Deadline: October 1, 2008

Amount: \$49,689

Amount Note: Each year the Society selects four or five outstanding applicants for appointment to three-year fellowships.

Eligibility: The society invites applications from qualified candidates who are at the beginning of their academic careers, having received the Ph.D. or comparable professional or artistic degree between June 1, 2005, and September 1, 2008.

Abstract: The Michigan Society of Fellows, under the auspices of the Rackham Graduate School, was established in 1970 with endowment grants from the Ford Foundation and the Horace H. and Mary Rackham Funds. The most distinctive aspect of the society is a multidisciplinary emphasis that gives the fellows an opportunity to interact across disciplines and to expand their horizons and knowledge. While their own scholarship is enriched, the fellows also enrich the University of Michigan through teaching during their residency and bringing new insights to other faculty members.

The society selects applicants for appointment to fellowships in the arts and humanities, in the social, physical, and life sciences, and in the professional schools.

Fellows are appointed as assistant professors in appropriate departments at the University of Michigan and as postdoctoral scholars in the Michigan Society of Fellows. They are expected to be in residence during the academic years of the fellowship, to teach for the equivalent of one academic year, to participate in the informal intellectual life of the society, and to devote time to their independent research.

For more information visit the web page at: <http://www.rackham.umich.edu/Faculty/society.html>.



Radcliffe Institute Fellowships, Radcliffe College, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Studies

Deadline: October 1, 2008

Amount Note: Stipends are funded up to \$70,000 for one year with additional funds for project expenses. Some support for relocation expenses is provided where relevant. Fellows receive office or studio space and access to libraries and other resources of Harvard University during the fellowship year, which extends from early September 2009 through June 30, 2010.

Eligibility: Women and men from across the United States and throughout the world, including developing countries, are

encouraged to apply. Eligibility guidelines are as follows:

1. Humanists and Social Scientists - Scholars in any field with a doctorate or appropriate terminal degree at least two years prior to appointment (by December 2007) in the area of the proposed project are eligible to apply. Only scholars who have published at least two articles in journals or edited collections or one refereed journal are eligible to apply.
2. Creative Artists - Applicants in creative arts cannot be students in doctoral or master's programs at the time of application submission. Applicants in creative arts cannot apply in consecutive years; those applicants may apply after waiting two complete application cycles. For example, creative arts applicants who applied in the fall of 2006 must wait until the fall of 2009 to apply again; those who applied in the fall of 2007 must wait until the fall of 2010 to apply again.

Former fellows of the Radcliffe Institute (1999 to present) are not eligible to apply.

Abstract: The Radcliffe Institute Fellowship Program is a scholarly community where individuals pursue advanced work across a wide range of academic disciplines, professions, and creative arts. Fellowships are designed to support scholars, scientists, artists, and writers of exceptional promise and demonstrated accomplishment who wish to pursue work in academic and professional fields and in the creative arts.

In recognition of Radcliffe's historic contributions to the education of women and to the study of issues related to women, the Radcliffe Institute sustains a continuing commitment to the study of women, gender, and society. Applicants' projects need not focus on gender, however. In addition, because of collaboration with the Harvard Stem Cell Institute, topics related to research in this area are of particular interest.

For more information: visit the web page at: <http://www.radcliffe.edu/fellowships/83.aspx>.



4. Letters to the Editor

May 6, 2006

Dear Editor:

In the "Last Word" column in the April 2008 issue, Professor Brad Simpson reports that a petition is circulating to withdraw the speaking invitation to Prof. John Yoo. Simpson argues that "some discussions lie beyond the pale of responsible and civil discourse" and that his views are shared by "duly horrified foreign colleagues."

Who decides which discussions lie beyond the pale? Yoo argues that the President has great constitutional power in wartime, including the power to order torture. Personally, I do not know whether the President has such powers or not—but is it harmful to have an open discussion on the subject? And why compare a law professor who holds a minority view, to a genocidal Central American dictator? If you dislike an idea, is it really better to effectively suppress it (which a "disinvitation" at this point would certainly do) than to bring it out into the open? Would it not be better to remind our "horrified foreign colleagues" that this country was founded on a commitment to the marketplace of ideas? Which countries are healthier for human rights—those that honor the marketplace of ideas, or those that do not?

Prof. Simpson believes that we need to hear from "voices that might challenge us." I agree with him. The frequency of criticisms of the Bush administration in the pages of *Diplomatic History* suggests that many SHAFR members will indeed be challenged. This is all to the good.

Best regards,

Hubert P. Van Tuyl

Professor and Chair
Augusta State University



23 June 2008

SHAFR Business Office
Department of History
Ohio State University
106 Dulles Hall
230 West 17th Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210

Dear Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations,

I am writing to thank SHAFR for generously supporting the research for my book manuscript, tentatively titled *Race and Asian American Citizenship from World War II to the Movement*. The Samuel Flagg Bemis Research Grant enabled me to travel to Honolulu for one week in May 2008, where I visited both the State Archives of Hawaii and University of Hawaii-Manoa Hamilton Library Special Collections.

More specifically, the goal of my trip was to research the role of race and Cold War diplomacy in the Hawaiian statehood debates of the 1940s and 1950s, the subject of the final chapter of my book. At the State Archives of Hawaii, I utilized the records of the Hawaii Statehood Commission, the body charged by the Territory's Legislature to conduct a wide-reaching,

formalized campaign for admission during the post-World War II years. The Hawaii Statehood Commission papers were quite extensive and proved to be a rich source of primary materials the connection between race, foreign policy, and the statehood issue. For example, the administrators of the Commission maintained extensive files of clippings from periodicals of varying circulation from around the nation, suggesting that many Americans were deeply concerned with the implications of Hawaii's status for international relations (particularly in the Pacific region), given that the islands' Asian-majority population. At UH-Manoa, I took the opportunity to read through the entire run of three rare Asian American publications, including Hawaii Chinese Journal, Hawaii Chinese Weekly, and Nisei In Hawaii and the Pacific. These newspapers shed important light on the ways in which Asian American communities understood the significance of Hawaiian statehood in the context of the Cold War for their race and citizenship standing during the mid-twentieth century.

Many thanks again to SHAFR and the donors for the Bemis award for facilitating my research! The funds are indeed a great help to those of us at the beginning stages of our careers.

With much appreciation,

Ellen D. Wu

wue@indiana.edu
Assistant Professor, Department of History
Indiana University-Bloomington



March 12, 2008

Dear Professor Hahn:

Last year, SHAFR awarded me a Bemis research fellowship for my dissertation on the Cold War and Latin America. During the spring, summer, and fall of 2007, I put these funds toward my research in the United States, Canada, Europe, and nine Latin American countries. In the United States, my work took place largely in the recently opened archival collections at the Ford, Carter, and Reagan presidential libraries, as well as the Nixon Presidential Materials Project at the National Archives. Over the past several years, a large amount of material pertaining to U.S. policy toward Latin America has been opened, including the notes of Henry Kissinger's meetings with his staff, and substantial portions of the National Security Council files at the Reagan and Carter libraries. Declassification has proceeded particularly speedily at the Reagan library, and researchers can now consult documents pertaining to the U.S. response to the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, the civil wars in Guatemala and El Salvador, the invasion of Grenada, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and Latin American debt and economic issues.


In Europe, of particular interest were the files of *Bundesarchiv* in Potsdam, Germany. The German Democratic Republic maintained close ties to Castro's Cuba, Daniel Ortega's Nicaragua, Salvador Allende's Chile, Maurice Bishop's Grenada, and communist parties and other leftist organizations throughout Latin America. I viewed memoranda of conversations between GDR officials and many of these Latin American leaders, as well as analyses of Latin American affairs written by GDR intelligence operatives.

In Latin America, the availability of archival documents varies by country and by collection. In Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, and Uruguay, access to government archives is structured by rules not unlike the 30-year rule that pertains in the United Kingdom and various European countries. As a result, researchers can work in collections that bear on at least part of the period of my study, which reaches from the late 1950s through the early 1990s. I should add the substantial caveat, however, that in many of these cases documents related to sensitive subjects (Mexico's relations with Cuba, for instance, as well as many others) have been removed from the files. In other countries, such as Nicaragua, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Argentina, the rules of access are less well established, and the degree of openness varies widely. Overall, though, the archivists I encountered tended to appreciate persistence. Combined with the documents available in privately-run archives such as Guatemala's Centro de Investigaciones Regionales y Centroamericanas, the files available in Latin America's public archives do provide considerable insight into government policy as well as social, economic, and political conditions in Latin America during the second half of the twentieth century.

Overall, the Bemis fellowship allowed me to make considerable progress on my dissertation. I have now concluded all but a very small portion of the archival research, writing is well under way, and I anticipate finishing the dissertation by the close of academic year 2008-09. Accordingly, I would like to thank SHAFR very much for this award.

Best,

Hal Brands



5. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines:

The Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded annually to an author for his or her first book on any aspect of the history of American foreign relations.

Eligibility: The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works that

represent social science disciplines other than history are not eligible.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contributions to scholarship. Winning books should have exceptional interpretative and analytical qualities. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should display careful organization and distinguished writing. Five copies of each book must be submitted with a letter of nomination.

The award will be announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the selection committee. The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition which meets the standards of excellence established for the prize.

To nominate a book published in 2008, send five copies of the book and a letter of nomination to Christopher Endy, Department of History, Martin Luther King Hall C 4065, California State University, 5151 State University Dr., Los Angeles CA 90032-8223 (email: candy@calstatela.edu). Books may be sent at any time during 2008, but must arrive by December 1, 2008.



The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize recognizes and encourages excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The prize of \$500 is awarded annually.

Eligibility: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the PhD whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or of any other established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

Procedures: Nominations, in the form of a letter and the nominee's c.v., should be sent to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter should discuss evidence of the nominee's excellence in teaching and research.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH). The winner of the prize will deliver a lecture during the SHAFR luncheon at the next year's OAH annual meeting. The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to a SHAFR presidential address and should address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The lecturer is awarded \$500 plus up to \$500 in travel expenses to the OAH, and his or her lecture is published in *Diplomatic History*.

To be considered for the 2009 award, nominations must be received by February 28, 2009. Nominations should be sent to Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, San Diego State University, History Department, 5500 Campanile Dr., San Diego, CA 92182-6050, ehoffman@mail.sdsu.edu.



The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. The prize of \$1,000 is awarded annually to the author of a distinguished article appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations.

Eligibility: The author must be under forty-one years of age or within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of the article's acceptance for publication. The article must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award or the Myrna F. Bernath Book Award are ineligible.

Procedures: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* will be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations may be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

To nominate an article published in 2008, send three copies of the article and a letter of nomination to Michael Krenn, History Department, Appalachian State University, Boone, NC 28608 (email: krennml@appstate.edu). Deadline for nominations is February 1, 2009.



The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Grant

The Bernath Dissertation Grant of \$4,000 is intended to help doctoral candidates defray expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. The grant is awarded annually at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a dissertation prospectus including a paragraph or two on how funds would be expended (8-12 pages), a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant's dissertation adviser must write a letter of recommendation, to be submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail. Applicants for the Bernath Dissertation Grant will also be considered for the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship. Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in . The deadline for



SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship

SHAFR invites applications for its dissertation completion fellowship. SHAFR will make two, year-long awards, in the amount of \$20,000 each, to support the writing and completion of the doctoral dissertation in the academic year 2008-09. These highly competitive fellowships will support the most promising doctoral candidates in the final phase of completing their dissertations.

Applicants should be candidates for the PhD in a humanities or social science doctoral program (most likely history), must have been admitted to candidacy, and must be at the writing stage, with all substantial research completed by the time of the award. Applicants should be working on a topic in the field of U.S. foreign relations history or international history, broadly defined, and must be current members of SHAFR. Because successful applicants are expected to finish writing the dissertation during the tenure of the fellowship, they should not engage in teaching opportunities or extensive paid work, except at the discretion of the Fellowship Committee. At the termination of the award period, recipients must provide a one page (250-word) report to the SHAFR Council on the use of the fellowship, to be considered for publication in *Passport*, the society newsletter.

The submission packet should include: a one page application letter describing the project's significance, the applicant's status, other support received or applied for and the prospects for completion within the year; a three page (750 word) statement of the research; a curriculum vitae; a letter of recommendation from the primary doctoral advisor. Applications should be sent by electronic mail to the chair of the Dissertation Completion Fellowship committee, Professor Emily S. Rosenberg, at erosenbe@uci.edu. The subject line should clearly indicate LAST NAME: SHAFR DISSERTATION COMPLETION FELLOWSHIP. The deadline for submissions is 1 April 2008. Applicants will receive notification about the outcome by 1 May 2008. The names of the winners will be announced at the annual meeting in June.



The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship

The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship was established by the Bernath family to promote scholarship in U.S. foreign relations history by women. The Myrna Bernath Fellowship of \$5,000 is intended to defray the costs of scholarly research by women. It is awarded biannually (in odd years) and announced at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

Applications are welcomed from women at U.S. universities as well as women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and those within five years of completion of their Ph.D.s. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a prospectus including a paragraph or two on how funds would be expended (8-12 pages), a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant must also arrange to have a letter of recommendation submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail. Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*. The deadline for applications for the 2009 Fellowship is December 1, 2008. Send applications to Darlene Rivas, Pepperdine University, at: Darlene.Rivas@pepperdine.edu.



Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize

This prize is designed to reward distinguished scholarship in the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded annually. The Ferrell Prize was established to honor Robert H. Ferrell, professor of diplomatic history at Indiana University from 1961 to 1990, by his former students.

Eligibility: The Ferrell Prize recognizes any book beyond the first monograph by the author. To be considered, a book must deal with the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of SHAFR. Three copies of the book must be submitted.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

The deadline for nominating books published in 2008 is December 15, 2008. Submit books to Robert J. McMahon, Department of History, Ohio State University, 106 Dulles Hall, 230 West 17th Avenue, Columbus OH 43210 (email: mcmahon.121@osu.edu).



The Michael J. Hogan Fellowship

The Michael J. Hogan Fellowship was established to honor Michael J. Hogan, long-time editor of *Diplomatic History*. The Hogan Fellowship of \$4,000 is intended to promote research in foreign language sources by graduate students. The fellowship is intended to defray the costs of studying foreign languages needed for research. It is announced at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. Applicants must be graduate students researching some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a detailed plan for using the fellowship to achieve the purposes of the program (5-7 pages); a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant's graduate adviser must write a letter of recommendation, to be submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail. Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*. To be considered for the 2009 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by February 1, 2009. Submit materials to: Kenneth Osgood, Florida Atlantic University, kosgood@fau.edu.



The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship

The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship of \$4,000 is intended to defray the costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to conduct research on a significant dissertation project. The fellowship is awarded annually at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a dissertation prospectus including a paragraph or two on how funds would be expended (8-12 pages), a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant's dissertation adviser must write a letter of recommendation, to be submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail. Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*. To be considered for the 2009 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by February 1, 2009. Submit materials to: Kenneth Osgood, Florida Atlantic University, kosgood@fau.edu.



Samuel Flagg Bemis Research Grants

The Samuel F. Bemis Research Grants are intended to promote research by doctoral candidates, by untenured faculty members, and by those within six years of the Ph.D. and working as professional historians. A limited number of grants of varying amounts (generally, up to \$2,000) will be awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects.

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations or post-doctoral research projects dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation or must hold the Ph.D. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Graduate students should apply for the Holt Fellowship, under the guidelines above, as applicants for that fellowship will be considered automatically for Samuel F. Bemis Research Grants. Untenured faculty members and recent Ph.D.s working as professional historians should submit applications modeled on the Holt Fellowship application, making clear their professional status, substituting a research prospectus for a dissertation prospectus, and arranging a letter of recommendation from any referee. Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*. To be considered for the 2009 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by February 1, 2009. Submit materials to: Kenneth Osgood, Florida Atlantic University, kosgood@fau.edu.



The Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize

The Betty M. Unterberger Prize is intended to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by graduate students in the field of diplomatic history. The Prize of \$1,000 is awarded biannually (in odd years) to the author of a dissertation, completed during the previous two calendar years, on any topic in United States foreign relations history. The Prize is announced at the annual SHAFR conference.

The Prize was established in 2004 to honor Betty Miller Unterberger, a founder of SHAFR and long-time professor of diplomatic history at Texas A&M University.

Procedures: A dissertation may be submitted for consideration by the author or by the author's advisor. Three copies of the dissertation should be submitted, along with a cover letter explaining why the dissertation deserves consideration.

To be considered for the 2009 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by February 28, 2009. Submit materials to SHAFR Unterberger Prize Committee, Department of History, Ohio State University, 106 Dulles Hall, 230 West 17th Avenue, Columbus OH 43210.



The Lawrence Gelfand - Armin Rappaport Fellowship

SHAFR established this fellowship to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*. The Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship of \$4,000 is intended to defray the costs of dissertation research travel. The fellowship is awarded annually at SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of United States foreign relations history. Applicants must have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree except the dissertation. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Applications must include: a dissertation prospectus including a paragraph or two on how funds would be expended (8-12 pages), a concise c.v. (1-2 pages), and a budget (1 page). Each applicant's dissertation adviser must write a letter of recommendation, to be submitted separately. All applications and letters must be submitted via e-mail. Applicants for the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship will also be considered for the Bernath Dissertation Grant. Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*. The deadline for applications for the 2009 grant is October 15, 2008. Application materials should be sent to Catherine Forslund, Rockford College, CForslund@Rockford.edu.



Arthur S. Link-Warren F. Kuehl Prize for Documentary Editing

The Link-Kuehl Prize is awarded for outstanding collections of primary source materials in the fields of international or diplomatic history, especially those distinguished by the inclusion of commentary designed to interpret the documents and set them within their historical context. Published works as well as electronic collections and audio-visual compilations are eligible. The prize is not limited to works on American foreign policy, but is open to works on the history of international, multi-archival, and/or American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. The award of \$1,000 is presented biannually (odd years) to the best work published during the preceding two calendar years. The award is announced at the SHAFR luncheon during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Procedures: Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. Send three copies of the book or other work with letter of nomination to Edward C. Keefer, Chair, Link-Kuehl Prize Committee, General Editor, *FRUS*, PA/HO, Rm L-409, SA-1, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520 (e-mail: keeferec@state.gov). To be considered for the 2009 prize, nominations must be received by November 15, 2008.



6. Recent Publications of Interest

Adib-Moghaddam, Arshin, *Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic*, Columbia, \$32.50.

Alfredson, Lisa S., *Creating Human Rights: How Noncitizens Made Sex Persecution Matter to the World*, Pennsylvania, \$69.95.

Allison, William Thomas, *The Tet Offensive: A Brief History with Documents*, Routledge, \$24.95.

Andrews, David M., ed., *Orderly Change: International Monetary Relations since Bretton Woods*, Cornell, \$49.95.

Belmonte, Laura A., *Selling the American Way: U.S. Propaganda and the Cold War*, Pennsylvania, \$47.50.

Blackford, Mansel G., *The Rise of Modern Business: Great Britain, the United States, Germany, Japan, and China*, North Carolina, \$59.95.

Bothwell, Robert, *Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984*, Washington, \$93.95.

Bradley, Mark Philip, and Marilyn B. Young, eds., *Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives*, Oxford, \$74.00.

Braisted, William Reynolds, *Diplomats in Blue: U.S. Naval Officers in China, 1922-1933*, Florida, \$75.00.

Breitman, Richard, Barbara McDonald Stewart, and Severin Hochberg, eds., *Refugees and Rescue: The Diaries and Papers of James G. McDonald, 1935-1945*, Indiana, \$29.95.

Brocheux, Pierre, *The Mekong Delta: Ecology, Economy, and Revolution, 1860-1960*, Wisconsin, \$26.95.

Burgat, François, trans. Patrick Hutchinson, *Islamism in the Shadow of al-Qaeda*, Texas, \$45.00.

Cirincione, Joseph, *Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons*, Columbia, \$18.95.

Cogan, Doloris Coulter, *We Fought the Navy and Won: Guam's Quest for Democracy*, Hawai'i, \$24.00.

Davidann, Jon Thares, *Hawaii at the Crossroads of the U.S. and Japan before the Pacific War*, Hawai'i, \$49.00.

Dobbs, Michael, *One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War*, Knopf, \$28.95.

Dudden, Alexis, *Troubled Apologies Among Japan, Korea, and the United States*, Columbia, \$40.00.

Faure, Guy, and Laurent Schwab, *Japan and Vietnam: A Relation under Influences*, Hawai'i, \$22.00.

Gallagher, Charles R. *Vatican Secret Diplomacy: Joseph P. Hurley and Pope Pius XII*, Yale, \$40.00.

Gardner, Lloyd C., and Marilyn B. Young, eds., *Iraq and the Lessons of Vietnam: Or, How Not to Learn from the Past*, New Press, \$16.95.

Go, Julian, *American Empire and the Politics of Meaning: Elite Political Cultures in the Philippines and Puerto Rico during U.S. Colonialism*, Duke, \$84.95.

Gunning, Jeroen, *Hamis in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence*, Columbia, \$34.50.

Hill, Christopher, *National History and the World of Nations: Capital, State, and the Rhetoric of History in Japan, France, and the United States*, Duke, \$89.95.

Howland, Douglas, and Luise White, eds., *The State of Sovereignty: Territories, Laws, Populations*, Indiana, \$65.00.

Huebner, Andrew J., *The Warrior Image: Soldiers in American Culture from the Second World War to the Vietnam Era*, North Carolina, \$65.00.

Isenstadt, Sandy, and Kishwar Rizvi, *Modernism and the Middle East: Architecture and Politics in the Twentieth Century*, Washington, \$80.00.

Jones, Howard, *The Bay of Pigs*, Oxford, \$24.95.

Juergensmeyer, Mark, *Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State, from Christian Militias to al Qaeda*, California, \$27.50.

Kautzer, Chad, and Eduardo Mendieta, eds., *Pragmatism, Nation, and Race: Community in the Age of Empire*, Indiana, \$65.00.

Keller, Fritz, and Andreas Hoferl, *Fighting for Public Services: Better Lives, A Better World*, Michigan, \$42.50.

Kepel, Gilles, and Jean-Pierre Milelli, eds., Pascale Ghazaleh, trans., *Al Qaeda in Its Own Words*, Harvard, \$27.95.

Kudo, Akira, ed., *Japan and Germany: Two Latecomers on the World Stage, 1890-1945*, Hawai'i, \$295.00.

Latimer, Jon, *1812: War with America*, Harvard, \$35.00.

Logevall, Fredrik, and Andrew Preston, eds., *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977*, Oxford, \$21.95.

Luis-Brown, David, *Waves of Decolonization: Discourses of Race and Hemispheric Citizenship in Cuba, Mexico, and the United States*, Duke, \$89.95.

Mansoor, Peter R., *Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq*, Yale, \$28.00.

Moltz, James Clay, *The Politics of Space Security: Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests*, Stanford, \$70.00.

Mutua, Makau, ed., *Human Rights NGOs in East Africa: Political and Normative Tensions*, Pennsylvania, \$79.95.

Nugent, Walter, *Habits of Empire: A History of American Expansion*, Knopf, \$30.00.

O'Connor, Peter, *The English-Language Press Networks of East Asia, 1918-45*, Hawai'i, \$95.00.

Olmsted, Kathryn S., *Real Enemies: Conspiracy Theories and American Democracy, World War I to 9/11*, Oxford, \$29.95.

Payne, Stanley G., *Franco and Hitler: Spain, Germany, and World War II*, Yale, \$30.00.

Pérez, Louis A., Jr., *Cuba in the American Imagination: Metaphor and the Imperial Ethos*, North Carolina, \$34.95.

Rosen, Fred, *Empire and Dissent: The United States and Latin America*, Duke, \$79.95.

Rovner, Eduardo Sáenz, *The Cuban Connection: Drug Trafficking, Smuggling, and Gambling in Cuba from the 1920s to the Revolution*, North Carolina, \$35.00.

Sagafi-nejad, Tagi, with John H. Dunning, *The UN and Transnational Corporations: From Code of Conduct to Global Compact*, Indiana, \$65.00.

Sagarin, Raphael D., and Terence Taylor, eds., *Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World*, California, \$49.95.

Saideman, Stephen M., and R. William Ayres, *For Kin or Country: Xenophobia, Nationalism, and War*, Columbia, \$35.00.

Schwenkel, Christina, *The American War in Contemporary Vietnam: Transnational Remembrance and Representation*, Indiana, \$65.00.

Seng, Tan See, and Amitav Acharya, *Bandung Revisited*, Hawai'i, \$25.00.

Sinno, Abdulkader H., ed., *Muslims in Western Politics*, Indiana, \$65.00.

Starks, Tricia, *The Body Soviet: Propaganda, Hygiene, and the Revolutionary State*, Wisconsin, \$65.00.

Stokke, Olav, *The UN and Development: From Aid to Cooperation*, Indiana, \$85.00.

Thomas, William H., Jr., *Unsafe for Democracy: World War I and the U.S. Justice Department's Covert Campaign to Suppress Dissent*, Wisconsin, \$34.95.

Toussaint, Eric, *The World Bank: A Critical Primer*, Michigan, \$90.00.

Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf, ed., *Dangerous Strait: The U.S.-Taiwan-China Crisis*, Columbia, \$24.50.

Tzouliadis, Tim, *The Forsaken: An American Tragedy in Stalin's Russia*, Penguin, \$29.95.

Ungerer, Carl, *Australian Foreign Policy in the Age of Terror*, Washington, \$35.00.

Weiner, Tim, *Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA*, Anchor, \$16.95.

Winchell, Meghan K., *Good Girls, Good Food, Good Fun: The Story of USO Hostesses during World War II*, North Carolina, \$30.00.

In Memoriam: Roger R. Trask

History lost a friend and well-respected colleague with the death of Roger Trask on April 18, 2008, in Bradenton, Florida. Roger was the rare historian who leaves important legacies as an academic and public practitioner. He had a distinguished academic career before joining the federal government in 1977. With an AB from Thiel College and an MA and Ph.D. from Pennsylvania State University, he taught at Thiel and Upsala College before moving first to Macalester College (1964-1974) and then to the University of South Florida (1974-1980). He was chairperson at both institutions. Roger's publications reflected his special interests in Turkish-American and Latin-American history. These included *United States Response to Turkish Nationalism and Reform, 1919-1939* (1971).

With his brother, David, he edited *A Bibliography of United States-Latin American Relations since 1910*. An active member of SHAFR, Roger contributed to *Diplomatic History*, and served on committees, notably chairing the Program Committee in the summer of 1977.

He began his federal career as the Chief Historian of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (1977-1978), moved to the Historical Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) as its

Deputy Chief Historian (1980-1987), and served as Chief Historian at the General Accounting Office (1987-1993). After he retired Roger returned as a consultant in the Historical Office at OSD until 2004. He produced several scholarly works while in government service. Among them were *Defender of the Public Interest: the General Accounting Office, 1921-1996* (1996); and with Alfred Goldberg, *The Department of Defense, 1947-1997: Organizations and Leaders* (1997). At OSD, he conducted oral history interviews with many of the leading figures in the agency.

Roger was influential in the affairs of the Society for History in the Federal Government (SFHG) from its earliest days. He served on many committees, was president of the organization in 1990-1991, and editor of the SHFG's *Occasional Papers* from 1996 to 2001. A believer in history as an important function of government he dedicated his GAO history to "his close friends and colleagues in the Society for History in the Federal Government." He will be sorely missed by his many friends in SHAFR and SHFG.

George T. Mazuzan
Lawrence S. Kaplan

The Last Word


Andrew L. Johns

Walking out of the plenary session in Columbus in which John Yoo and David Cole spent ninety minutes discussing one of the most controversial issues in contemporary politics, I was struck by the overwhelmingly positive reaction to the event by the audience. At dinner afterwards, Peter Hahn described it as “perhaps the best plenary session in SHAFR’s history, and one of our finest moments,” a sentiment echoed by many that evening and for the rest of the conference.

What made these comments so interesting was the fact that this had been an audience which had gone into the session with expectations ranging from a palpable sense of skepticism to outright outrage. The distribution of copies of the “Petition against Torture” along with information about the “torture memo” and comments about Yoo and his legal arguments reflected some of the consternation felt by SHAFR members. Indeed, Cole’s participation derived directly from the original outcry over Yoo’s invitation. Yet a rumored effort at disruption did not occur—I will admit to a morbid disappointment that nothing exciting happened; one attendee demonstrated his displeasure by wearing a Guantanamo-esque orange jump suit, and a number of our colleagues chose not to attend the session as a way of protesting the event. By my inexact count over 150 members of SHAFR did attend, including at least a dozen who signed the petition, interested in what might transpire between the two law professors.

Those who did attend observed an entertaining example of academic debate in the best sense of the idea. Yoo and Cole contested major issues of public policy, providing keen insights into the mind-set and rationale of the Bush administration and its opponents respectfully and with unquestionable passion. Maybe the obvious congeniality and respect between Yoo and Cole prevented the kind of knockdown discussion that some hoped to see, but that does not change the import of the exchange. The questions from the audience, while direct and pointed, remained civil and reflected both a concern over the policies being discussed and a genuine curiosity about the views of both men. To be sure, few (if any) were swayed by Yoo’s arguments and self-deprecating remarks, and Cole skillfully demolished the justification and legal reasoning in the decisions made by the administration based largely on Yoo’s interpretation of the Constitution and the law. By nearly any metric, Cole prevailed in the debate, but the real winners were the attendees. This glimpse into the inner-workings of a controversial presidency and its policies was well worth the time, effort, and honoraria expended by the program committee and SHAFR President Tom Schwartz.

In his contribution to this page in the April 2008 issue, Brad Simpson criticized Tom Schwartz’s invitation to Professor Yoo, suggesting that “some discussions lie beyond the pale of responsible and civil discourse.” Simpson also argued that the decision to invite the former Justice Department official to speak at the plenary “diminishes us as scholars and SHAFR as an organization.” I would respectfully but strenuously disagree with



both sentiments. What could be more responsible than to civilly debate contentious issues facing us as a society? As scholars of American foreign relations, we have an opportunity and responsibility to comment on and—occasionally, if we’re lucky—influence the way the United States interacts with other nations and peoples. Should we accomplish this by cloistering ourselves in the ivory tower, sure of our moral rectitude? Should we reflexively react as David Horowitz and others of his ilk would predict given their assessment and dismissal of “dangerous academics” and doctrinaire liberals? Or should we engage policymakers, the media, and the public in a conversation, a dialogue that could have

the effect of sharing our expertise, speaking truth to power, and (perhaps) changing policies with which we disagree? I would contend that confronting views with which we do not agree, even—perhaps especially—those we vehemently oppose with moral reprehension, is precisely what we, as scholars, and SHAFR, as an organization, should be doing more.

Plenary sessions provide the opportunity for SHAFR to confront issues of broad interest to its members—historiographical debates, panels reflecting the conference theme, and even retrospectives on dorm rooms we’ve known and loved. But it also gives us the chance to interact with current and past policy (and policymakers) in an effort to better understand the process of making decisions and how we, as historians, view, analyze, and interpret those decisions. We may even learn something about ourselves in the process. For example, John Yoo made a great point in his observation and implied criticism of SHAFR for not paying more attention to Congress and its role in foreign policy decision-making. Perhaps it is good to occasionally have someone—a policymaker, a historian with a different specialty, someone from another discipline altogether—to come in and to force us to confront our collective myopia—a condition we all suffer from individually and collectively on occasion.

The session began with Amy Sayward quoting from Samuel Eliot Morrison’s 1950 presidential address to the AHA. In the same presentation, Morrison warned that “every historian should be wary of his preconceptions;” the historian’s task is to “understand the motives and objects of individuals and groups, even those that he personally dislikes, and to point out mistakes as well as achievements by persons and movements, even by those that he loves. In a word, he must preserve *balance*.” By inviting John Yoo and David Cole to address us at the plenary session in June, SHAFR heeded Morrison’s advice. Here’s hoping that next year’s program committee, chaired by Paul Kramer, and the incoming SHAFR president, Frank Costigliola, will consider a similarly provocative event next year in northern Virginia.

Andrew L. Johns is assistant professor of history at Brigham Young University and the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies