

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

NEWSLETTER

Volume 21

No. 3

September 1990

Page

- 1 A Documentary Footnote: The William Adger
Moffett Papers
by Paolo E. Coletta
- 7 Poor Mail Service as a Factor in Early Franco-
American Relations
by Peter P. Hill
- 19 The Political Art of Ambiguity and the Central
American Policies of the Reagan Administration
by Chace Anderson
- 28 Philippine Material in Presidential Libraries: A
Preliminary Inventory
by Milton W. Meyer
- 34 "Only Ninety-six Years:" Humor in the Government
by David A. Langbart
- 41 Report on the Third Krefeld Symposium
by Ed Crapol
- 44 Sheldon Kryss letter and William Slany article
concerning the Foreign Relations series
- 50 Publications
- 52 Announcements
- 59 Personals
- 63 Calendar
- 65 Awards and Prizes

ISSN 0740-6169

SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

FOUNDED IN 1967. CHARTERED IN 1972.

PRESIDENT: Michael Hunt, History, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514.

VICE PRESIDENT: Gary Hess, History, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY-TREASURER: Allan Spetter, History, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

CO-CHAIR, PROGRAM COMMITTEE: Sandra Taylor, University of Utah and William Becker, George Washington University.

CHAIR, MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE: Ralph E. Weber, History, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI 53233.

CHAIR, NOMINATIONS COMMITTEE: Arnold Offner, History, Boston University, Boston, MA 02215

CHAIR, GOVERNMENT RELATIONS COMMITTEE: Milton O. Gustafson, Diplomatic Branch 5E, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 20408.

MEMBERSHIP: Annual dues are \$20.00, payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Student fees—\$7.00, retired members—\$9.00, life memberships—\$250.00. In the case of membership by husband and wife, dues for one of them shall be one-half of the regular price. For those wishing only the *SHAFR Newsletter* the cost is \$10.00. Institutions wishing *Diplomatic History* should contact Scholarly Resources.

MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in the summer. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in March or April.

PRIZES: The Society administers several awards. Four of them honor the late Stuart L. Bernath, and are financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California. Awards also honor Laura and Norman Graebner, the late W. Stull Holt, the late Warren Kuehl, and Arthur Link. Details of each of these awards are to be found under the appropriate headings in each *Newsletter*.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly *Newsletter*; *Diplomatic History*, a journal; and the occasional *Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects*.

A DOCUMENTARY FOOTNOTE THE WILLIAM ADGER MOFFETT PAPERS

by
Paolo E. Coletta
(U.S. Naval Academy—retired)

"This has been a bizarre and almost unbelievable episode."
Rear Adm. Ernest M. Eller, USN (Ret.).

"That SOB Antel."
Claude Bailey (Moffett's Naval Academy roommate.)

The Moffett Papers are invaluable for naval/diplomatic historians interested in the 1920s and 1930s. Moffett (U.S. Naval Academy class of 1890), first saw aircraft operate during fleet exercises held in Guantanamo Bay in 1912. In April 1914 he saw Patrick N.L. Bellinger fly reconnaissance missions during the American intervention at Veracruz, Mexico. Soon thereafter, as commander of the Great Lakes Naval Training Station, Illinois, among others he trained aviation personnel. In late 1918 he commanded the *Mississippi*, the second battleship fitted with catapults and aircraft and one of the twelve modern battleships transferred to the Pacific after it appeared that Japan was the prime potential enemy of the United States. Given the runaround by the bureaus and Office of Chief of Naval Operations when he sought information about catapults, he determined to create a Bureau of Aeronautics and become its chief. Successful, he served as Chief of BuAer from its inception in 1921 until his death in the crash of the dirigible *Akron* on 4 April 1933.

For his first seven years as Chief of BuAer Moffett fought for more aircraft and aircraft carriers while maintaining a running fight over the proper status of aviation in the national defense with BGEN William Mitchell. As an advisor to the U.S. delegation to the Washington Conference of 1921-1922, he demanded the retention of two battle cruiser hulls for conversion into fleet aircraft carriers. The 135,000 tons of carriers allotted the United States and Great Britain in the

Five Power Naval Disarmament Treaty did more to promote than to retard carrier development. Further, Moffett saw that carriers could be used for power projection against Japan and so overcome the (in)famous Article XIX that proscribed British defenses east of Singapore and American defenses west of Hawaii. In addition, he chaired a subcommittee that concluded that aircraft could not be limited.

Moffett's demands for a five-year naval aircraft building program that would produce a thousand operating planes and two large rigid dirigibles voiced before the Coolidge (Dwight Morrow) Aircraft Board in 1925 was answered by Congress in 1926. The aircraft carried by the dirigibles *Akron* and *Macon* greatly enlarged reconnaissance range—a singularly important desideratum for the vast Pacific. He completed his program a year early and at great saving. Meanwhile he helped defeat Mitchell's demands for a department of defense and for a united air service.

Moffett's last venture into diplomacy occurred while he served as a technical advisor to the U.S. delegation to the London Naval Conference of 1930. In London, as he had earlier in Washington, he sought to prevent the emasculation of U.S. naval power. Although some additional scrapping of capital ships was called for and auxiliaries were limited, the carrier tonnage of the powers remained unchanged. At his behest, moreover, some cruisers could be fitted to carry aircraft—the flying deck cruisers that never were built but in part led to the escort carriers of World War II. As a naval officer, then, Moffett succeeded in building up U.S. naval air power and as a naval diplomat succeeded in part in halting the destruction of its surface strength.

Now for the Moffett Papers.

That the Moffett Papers are available for research is due primarily to Moffett's namesake, the retired Rear Admiral William Adger Moffett, Jr. (hereafter Bill), and retired Commander Eugene E. Wilson, who loved the elder Admiral Moffett dearly. The following account about them has been derived from the Wilson Collection, Special Collections, Nimitz Library, U.S. Naval Academy, correspondence and interview with Bill Moffett, and an interview with Rear Admiral Ernest M. Eller, USN (Ret.). The late Prof. Vernon

D. Tate, retired Archivist of the Naval Academy, kindly provided his recollections of the events described. Captain William S. Busik, USN (Ret.) Executive Director of the U.S. Naval Academy Alumni Association, confirmed the span of years during which the Wilson Trust Fund remained with his organization.

After his father's death in April 1933 Bill obtained his papers. Upon learning that Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal had asked Wilson, a close adviser during and following World War II, to take care of the papers, in 1964 or 1965 Bill agreed to turn them over to Wilson on condition that they be deposited at the Naval Academy. Money was no problem for Wilson, who had plenty of it, and Mrs. Wilson had her own "pile of chips." In 1957 Wilson had established a trust fund of \$100,000 with which he hoped to create an Air-Sea Power Library at the Naval Academy. He would start with the Moffett Papers and his own numerous publications, many of these produced by a non-profit publishing house, the Literary Investment Guild (L.I.G.), of Palm Beach, Florida, one of the several properties of Captain A. Winfield Chapin, USNR (Ret.). Though an astute businessman—he was retired as president of United Aircraft—Wilson would be duped.

Wilson deposited his and Moffett's papers at the Naval Academy in 1965. In 1967, frustrated by the first academic dean at the Academy in the matter of custodial arrangements for the papers during the superintendency of Admiral William Smedberg, Wilson was able through Captain Sheldon Kinney to speak with the new Superintendent, Rear Admiral Draper L. Kauffman. As it turned out, Dr. Tate, the Librarian there, became the Academy's first Archivist and by serving on its Governing Board helped to administer the Wilson Trust Fund. Upon the recommendation of Captain Chapin, in 1967 Wilson hired Francis P. Antel, President of L.I.G., to begin classifying, cataloging, and indexing Wilson's papers while Moffett's remained secure in steel lockers. In late 1968 Wilson told Bill Moffett, lately added to the Board of Control of the Wilson Trust Fund, that everything was "on the beam," only to learn that a new librarian who knew nothing about the project had been appointed at the Academy and that he himself had been "left

adrift in a musty, dusty old basement." In the fall of 1968 he therefore asked for the temporary return of the papers he had deposited at the Academy and took them on his yacht to Palm Beach for processing by the L.I.G.

Meanwhile, Dr. Tate had the Moffett Papers microfilmed and provided copies to at least the Naval Academy and the Naval History Division. Supporting him were the Director of Naval History from 1956 to 1970, Admiral Eller, and Rear Admiral William F. Fitzgerald, Executive Director of the Naval Academy Alumni Association.

In late 1969, Wilson wrote Bill Moffett that "our project appears to be grinding to a close." Thanks to "Judge" Eller (so nicknamed as a young officer because he got things done), Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, the Chief of Naval Operations, "has written a wonderful letter which more than compensates us for all the wear and tear." In early 1970 he had obtained the collection and arranged to have it delivered to the Naval History Division, only to learn that "our project was complicated by skullduggery on the part of the L.I.G., now in the hands of the courts." In April 1971, having used much of it to produce and distribute his own books, he disestablished the trust fund at the Alumni Association.

On 24 June 1972, when Wilson was in his early eighties, he told Bill Moffett that Antel had turned out to be a "bad egg." Left in charge at Palm Beach, Antel had "seized [the collection] in our absence and held us off with threats of gunplay!" That Antel sought Wilson's good graces is clear from his publishing in 1967 a twelve-page booklet entitled *Profile of an Aviation Aircraftsman: The Struggle to Create Air and Space Doctrine out of Chaos*. However, in 1972 Antel sued Wilson for a large sum of money for work he had allegedly done on the Wilson Collection. At the request of Bill Moffett, the Office of the Judge Advocate in Norfolk searched the files of the Secretary of the Navy and learned that Secretary John Warner had indeed accepted Wilson's documents for the Navy in February 1973. Warner thereupon told Wilson that they would be turned over to the Academy. On 19 March 1976, the Office of Chief of Naval Operations confirmed to Wilson that this had been done. However, the Judge Advocate General at the Academy discovered that

valuable portions of the collection were missing. The result, per Wilson, was that "we went to court and won our case. Thereupon [Antel] appealed to another court and the matter hangs in limbo! Our attorneys appear confident of a favorable outcome any day but I fear that the court may be afraid to act for fear of violent reprisal." He was therefore unable to deliver the collection, of which the Moffett Papers were the heart. How highly Wilson evaluated the latter is clear from his telling Bill Moffett that they contained "unusual, interesting correspondence documenting your father's unique leadership in passing the Air Corps Act of 1926 in the face of 'insurmountable' obstacles, thereby affording the only hope of survival of 'homo sapiens.' This, in my book, constitutes the single greatest demonstration of Statecraft in the history of Man!" (Wilson was in error about the Air Corps Act of 1926; what he had in mind was the legislation fulfilling the elder Moffett's call for a five-year, thousand-plane naval aircraft building program that also included two huge rigid airships.) However, he asked Bill Moffett not to pass judgment on his father's papers "until after a professional has looked them over. A biographer might well see values which are not apparent to others." In Dr. Tate he found "that rare combination of a scholar and administrator which I needed to make my papers a source of inspiration to the Naval Service instead of a monument gathering dust in the archives."

This brief account has excluded much about Antel. A detective agency Wilson hired to learn about his background reported that he had four aliases, passed bad checks, failed to pay for a rented car and in another case failed to return one. The two latter cases were nol-prossed. A middle-aged bachelor, he mesmerized women. Both men and women visited his apartment, but he let no caller in until he recognized him as he looked through a peephole and one-sided mirror in his door. His maid discarded many empty liquor bottles; when asked for the \$500 he owed her, he replied that she would be paid when he got \$100,000 out of Wilson.

A timekeeper in a warehouse until 1968, as a free lance reporter thereafter Antel had written a book about the stealing of a valuable ruby—with Wilson suspecting that he was the

fence in the case and that he ran a prostitution ring and fenced for a New York City robbery ring. According to Dr. Tate, he was known locally as "Murph the Surf." By 1970, Wilson had fought the good fight for the Moffett Papers for twenty-five years at a cost of \$44,500 plus interest and in addition met the costs of legal fees and of medical fees "for expenses incident to harassment by the defendant." Fearful of violence on Antel's part, he rented a house in a northern part of Palm Beach and did not list his telephone number. In 1972, Antel sued Wilson and "hijacked" the Wilson Collection. In 1973, although he delivered some papers to the Naval Academy, portions of the Wilson Papers and Moffett Papers were missing. At Wilson's request, in April 1969 Judge Eller had visited Chapin and Antel. he found Antel to be "a comer—suave, smooth, and convincing"—but a large scrapbook containing some Moffett Papers shown to him proved to him that Antel had done little work on the collection. After Wilson died; Antel had the gall to offer the Wilson Collection, estimated to be worth between \$350,000 and \$500,000, to Captain Grover Walker, Director, Naval Aviation Museum, NAS Pensacola, for \$300,000—or else he would sell it to an unspecified private party. Walker alerted the Naval History Division and Bill Moffett. In addition, Antel became very angry when Wilson donated his yacht to a Florida college for oceanographic research rather than to him as payment for the services he had rendered to the Wilson Trust Fund.

It had taken Wilson, his attorneys, and the intervention of the Special Counsel for Litigation in the Judge Advocate General's Office, superintendents of the Naval Academy, Judge Eller, Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper, Eller's successor, and Secretary of the Navy Warner, and two court cases before the matter was settled.

POOR MAIL SERVICE AS A FACTOR IN EARLY FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

by

Peter P. Hill

(George Washington University)

Unreliable mail service between Paris and Philadelphia offers one of the few as yet unexamined explanations for the weaknesses and periodic failures of French diplomacy in this country in the 1780s and 1790s. While historians have ascribed such failures to other, more obvious, disjunctures in the Franco-American relationship (political, commercial, cultural and ideological), they have largely ignored what French diplomats themselves said about the damage done to their missions by the slowness and irregularity of transatlantic correspondence.

That French envoys to this country repeatedly clamored for specific instructions—and rarely got them, or got them too late—is amply documented by the dispatches. From the record, however, the historian's problem is to determine whether the French foreign office was simply guilty of gross negligence (a view shared by most of its emissaries), or whether the mail service was to blame. The latter possibility, while difficult to separate from the evidence of neglect, is worth examining.

For whichever reason, lack of instructions figured prominently in the complaints of four of the five French ministers posted here between 1788 and 1797. Being uninstructed sometimes excused failure; other times, it meant missed opportunities. Thus, the Comte de Moustier, foreseeing a unique but fleeting opportunity to secure new commercial advantages for France from the first Federal Congress, pleaded in vain with Paris to tell him what concessions to ask for. To his chagrin, Congress when it met for the first time promptly enacted trade legislation that gave no special preference to France.¹

Four years later, Moustier's successor, Jean Ternant, found himself at a loss when, France having gone to war with Britain, he was handed a copy of Washington's neutrality proclamation. Even though the French consul general in New York had two years earlier warned that, in the event of a European war, Americans would do everything possible to avoid their commitments to the French alliance, Paris had done nothing to prepare its emissary. To Washington's proclamation Ternant reported having responded as best as "the nature of things and the absolute lack of instructions on this point would permit."³

Alone among French envoys of the era, Edmond Genet seemed least troubled by lapses in transatlantic communication, perhaps because his mission was short-lived, more likely because he felt no need to badger the foreign office for supplemental instructions. Those he came with were enough to keep him busy, and his implementation of them sufficed ultimately to elicit a demand for his recall. Though he often sought approval, the self-confident Genet rarely asked for advice.

Not so his successor, Joseph Fauchet, who later wrote that lack of "an exact correspondence" had been "one of the principal causes of all our misfortunes."⁴ Fauchet's particular misfortune was to realize, albeit belatedly, that he might have forestalled the outcome of John Jay's mission to London had he been able to negotiate a new Franco-American treaty of commerce. Put to a choice of treaties, between the one Jay was negotiating and a re-worked treaty with France, the U.S. Senate, he believed, would have opted for refurbishing its ties with its wartime ally. Stymied at first by Secretary of State Randolph's refusal to talk about a new treaty in generalities, Fauchet ultimately berated his own government for its failure to furnish him with the kind of detailed instructions he needed to enter into serious treaty negotiations.⁵

Finally, Pierre Adet, the last of the revolutionary envoys, exploded angrily when, arriving in Philadelphia on the eve of the Senate's consideration of Jay's Treaty, he found no mention in his instructions that such a treaty had even been negotiated. "By what fatality," he wrote, "did you not receive before my departure the dispatches my predecessor sent you

concerning the conduct of the American government toward us, and the too fully justified fears he felt concerning John Jay's negotiation?"⁶

While French envoys clearly intended to pin on Paris a fair share of responsibility for the major failures of their missions, they also cited persistent problems in the government-run mail service to explain how French interests suffered in a more general way. Those problems surfaced soon after the war when French warships leaving American waters created a shortage of reliable carriers. A navy-run packet service filled the need for a year or two, but regular mail service began to suffer when, in 1785, the navy cut its sailings from once a month to once every two months. Even at the modest level of six round-trips a year, the navy's delivery record remained spotty. In February, 1789, shortly before it collapsed, the *ancien regime* took the drastic step of "privatizing" its mail service. It let a contract to a St. Malo shipowner who promised to send six packets a year to New York. Thereafter, until France and Britain went to war in 1793, packets sometimes arrived on schedule, more often did not. Predictably, Britain's wartime surveillance in the north Atlantic made French mail carriage even chancier, a condition that continued to prevail despite another major effort in 1794 to restore regular sailings.⁷

Just how costly poor mail service was to French interests became clear when France suffered grain shortages in the fall of 1788. The Comte de Moustier, writing to Paris the following February, believed the shortage could have been alleviated had American grain suppliers known earlier of the need. Only in mid-February had the news arrived that France was offering a premium on grain imports. Had there been a packet arriving in November, American suppliers would have responded so abundantly that the French government would not have had to offer the premium. As it was, he continued, the ice in Delaware Bay would now delay shipments or divert their export through Chesapeake Bay at greater cost. Cutting back on the packet service, he concluded, had proven to be "an infinitely onerous economy."⁸

Sure and steady means of communication also related to France's perceived need to maintain the momentum of

goodwill built on her earlier role in aiding Americans to win their independence. French observers soon noted, however, how relentlessly Americans seemed to be reverting to old ties with Great Britain. Just as America's postwar commerce was seen flooding back into familiar British trade-lanes, so too French officials suspected Americans of hankering for a return to British ways of looking at the world in general. In this respect, they despaired when they considered Britain's propaganda advantages: the sharing of a common language and tradition, but also the frequency of British ship-arrivals bringing with them the latest gazettes from London. A French estimate, made in 1791, put the volume of British shipping at twenty times that of French tonnage.⁹ Moreover, the British navy operated a packet service out of Portsmouth with regular sailings the first Wednesday of each month. Clearly, the advantage of access lay with Britain.

French charge d'affaires Louis Otto told how the British exploited the advantage. Even in the peacetime year 1785, Otto warned, no French official could entrust mail to a British carrier. "The English," he wrote, "will always be masters at intercepting our letters and keeping those which seem too favorable to our ties with America."¹⁰ While they fumed at this sort of random censorship, French officials saw even greater danger in Britain's near-monopoly of news from the continent. News accounts filtering through the British press usually showed an anti-French bias.¹¹ Officials felt this was particularly true of British reports on the French Revolution. Besides giving Americans a negative impression of the great events in Paris, such bias had material consequences as well. By 1792 the French consul in Charleston was reporting an adverse effect on French commerce. False news items emanating obviously from British sources had pictured a France so disrupted by revolution as to frighten American shipmasters away from French ports. Until Paris sent him word to the contrary, he had no way to reassure them.¹² Likewise that fall, Minister Ternant confirmed the virtual news blackout from French sources. No French vessel had arrived for six weeks, he wrote, and the Paris news items he had gathered from British gazettes "appear as exaggerated as they are obscure."¹³

Problems of communications worsened after 1793 when, with France and Britain once more at war, the only reasonably safe way to send mail was aboard a French warship. The Republic's first envoy here, Edmond Genet, fortunately had enough naval vessels at his disposal to meet his needs. But when the main French squadron left New York that fall, his successors were left with a briefly-revived but less than reliable packet service. Joseph Fauchet, who headed the post-Genet diplomatic mission, wrote in November 1794 how pleased he and his fellow commissioners were to learn of the Committee of Public Safety's decision to order three sloops to make regular passage. The commissioners, however, registered a number of complaints. Because the first of these sloops had arrived in Baltimore, not New York, they chided the Navy for giving its captain a choice of ports. New York was to be preferred, they pointed out, both for its superiority as a communications center and because the upper reaches of the Chesapeake were not always ice-free. Worse, the sloop had departed France apparently without the knowledge of the foreign office. As a result, the commissioners had not received replies to their urgent requests for instructions, despite the fact that their own aviso, *Lascajas*, had arrived at Brest fifty-five days before the Navy's dispatch sloop had left that port. Clearly, not all the communications problems were in the north Atlantic. To the extent that they were, however, the commissioners warned the Navy Commission not to announce the sailing dates of its packets lest they be made that much easier prey to British interception.¹⁴

The last suggestion met with a conflict of priorities. While security suggested that packets sail unannounced, the Jacobin regime's Navy Commission, like its predecessors, wanted its packets to show a profit. Because these Navy vessels traditionally carried privately-owned cargoes as well as mail, would-be exporters needed to know when they would sail. Against Fauchet's urging the Navy made clear it would continue to post departure dates. Paris was, however, willing to consider New York rather than Baltimore as the designated terminal, an issue that resolved itself when, little

more than a year later, the consulate in Baltimore was closed down as an economy measure.¹⁵

By 1795-96 British interdictions, increasingly effective, coincided with the worsening of Franco-American relations caused by Jay's treaty. The latter, because it put a patch on U.S. relations with Britain, inevitably brought cries of betrayal from Paris. To what extent Jay's treaty actually conflicted with our engagements to France is still a matter of debate. The intensity of French resentment, however, needs no documentation. In mid-1796, on hearing that Jay's treaty had passed its final hurdle, France struck back. Under a series of retaliatory maritime decrees, French warships and privateers were given leave to plunder the American merchant fleet virtually at will. Simultaneously, the foreign office instructed its minister, Pierre Adet, to threaten even harsher reprisals should Americans not renounce the hated treaty.¹⁶

Unfortunately, at a time when mounting political crises called for swifter and surer communication between foreign office and legation, the travel time between Philadelphia and Paris lengthened dramatically. A sample of 13 diplomatic mailings in 1793 indicates that dispatches from Ternant and Genet averaged 55 days per crossing. Three years later, fifteen of Adet's dispatches took an average of 119 days.¹⁷ One can only speculate on the impact of the relative isolation which poor mail service forced on Adet's mission, but this time-distance factor offers at least one explanation of why the so-called Quasi-War with France could be ended only by sending American diplomatic missions directly to Paris. There was no way Adet could keep abreast of, or play a part in, the serpentine diplomacy by which the Directorial government of France in the mid and late '90s wound its way in and out of hostilities with the United States.

Communication problems also beset the French consular establishment in the country. Though not "diplomats" in a formal sense, consuls nonetheless did more than oversee various commercial and naval activities. They were also important gatherers of political intelligence, a role Paris recognized in 1793 when it directed the half dozen or so who were stationed in the U.S. to report to the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs as well as to the Navy.¹⁸ Like the diplomatic corps, consular officials also needed reliable carriers for their dispatches. And although naval vessels seemed likeliest, a consul named Rozier explained why using French warships instead of private carriers was "often as dangerous and always more costly." He had a French corvette at his disposal, but the vessel had been blockaded in New York harbor for the past five months, and at a cost to the consulate of 18,000 livres for support services.¹⁹

Rozier also wrote of the uncertainties of sending mail aboard U.S. vessels, even when packaged in small bundles and entrusted to supposedly reliable captains. The latter would throw it overboard if they spotted even the "smallest British warship." To improve his chances he planned to send dispatches on very small boats laden with tobacco or "some other article as little suspect."²⁰

Other consuls spoke of similar difficulties. Mozard in Boston warned the foreign office not to send official letters in U.S.-flag vessels. If their captains did not deep-six them at first sight of a British cruiser, a British boarding party would seize them as a matter of course. The following spring Mozard repeated his belief that "Americans throw overboard everything that is entrusted to them for fear of being visited by the English, and condemned when they are found to be carriers for any public official of the Republic." He seemed to suggest that shipmasters did not even wait for a hostile approach but jettisoned official packets as soon as they sailed.²¹

From Charleston, Consul Victor Dupont confirmed that American sea captains routinely threw mail overboard whenever they sighted a British frigate. They particularly did not want to be caught carrying official correspondence. Eight months later Dupont reported having sent dispatches by three U.S. carriers, adding his hope that their captains "will hold to the promise they made to me to hide my packages and not throw them into the sea as they usually do."²² Contemporaneously, a consul in Baltimore named Duhail thought it ironic that Americans should have their vessels so often waylaid and searched by a power with whom they had ostensibly effected a rapprochement. Jay's treaty, he

observed, "cannot guarantee that any dispatch sent by an American captain will not be thrown overboard at the first glimpse of a British warship, such confidence has been established by the contracting parties."²³

While outgoing mail often met a watery end, official mail from Paris was merely long in transit. Prevailing westerlies doubtless accounted for lengthier passages, but also because the foreign office relied exclusively on public carriers, its correspondence had to await the departure of a naval vessel. Such conveyances proved to be safer but they sailed at irregular intervals. Thus, whether for Ternant in peacetime or for Adet in time of war, the time-stretch between a Paris deadline and a minister's date of acknowledgement remained about the same, roughly 15 weeks.²⁴ This compared with an average eight- to ten-week crossing for privately-owned merchantmen.

Besides the inordinate time-lag, what infuriated ministers and consuls alike was their inability to get Paris to respond to explicit inquiries and requests for instructions. Here their complaint spoke to the perception, mentioned earlier, that Paris officials were inexplicably neglectful, and not just hampered by slow mail service. For whichever reason (or both), French envoys reacted with varying degrees of frustration. The even-tempered Ternant, acknowledging receipt of a letter Montmorin had posted nine months earlier, noted without rancor that it was "the only response I have received to 60 letters addressed to the government."²⁵ Fauchet and his fellow commissioners, also pressing Paris for answers to questions, expressed the forgiving view that the foreign office doubtless had more pressing matters to attend to.²⁶ Not so, Pierre Adet. Three weeks after he arrived in Philadelphia, Adet asked testily whether he could expect the same sort of neglect Paris had inflicted on his predecessors and whether, like them, he would have to hear news of France from extracts of British gazettes published in American newspapers. If so, he told the Committee of Public Safety, he would resign. Meanwhile, he intended to hire an American captain "to carry my dispatches and to bring back to me your orders." Nor would he ask permission to do this because the need was so obvious. Adet was as good as his

word. On 5 August 1795 he sent a note that said simply: "Citizen Representatives: I notify you that the packet bearing my dispatches is the Pell, captain Kelly. He will wait at Le Havre for your orders which I beg you to hasten as soon as it will be possible."²⁷

To the foreign office two weeks later Adet spoke of the frustration he and the consuls repeatedly experienced in their day-to-day efforts to serve those of their countrymen who turned to them for assistance in legal matters. Indeed, no more frequent complaint appeared in the dispatches of French consuls than that of being unable to function for want of copies of recently-enacted French laws and regulations. Though none of the great Franco-American crises or misunderstandings of the era would likely have been alleviated by a more lavish "papering" of French officials, Adet put his finger on the absurdity of the government's exclusive reliance on naval vessels to transport even such routine, non-confidential documents as the *Bulletin des Lois*. Rather than "fatten their archives with such items," he wrote sarcastically, port officials charged with forwarding them should "take advantage of the sailings of all neutral vessels."²⁸

Delays, whether deliberate or mail-related, remained a recurrent theme among French diplomats. On his return to Paris, Fauchet calculated that Jean Ternant had languished eight months without an answer to a dispatch, Edmond Genet nine months, and he (Fauchet) a whole year. As a result, he wrote, France has missed three opportunities for major diplomatic initiatives.²⁹ More thoughtfully, Pierre Adet put the cost in perceptual terms. French envoys, he observed, not only felt abandoned, but were also perceived to have been abandoned. Greeted warmly when they first arrived, they quickly lost credibility as American officials came to realize how meagerly Paris was instructing them. Perhaps, he suggested, the very cordiality which attended the beginning of each mission had lulled Paris into believing that all was well. But when French interests began to suffer in a rapidly changing diplomatic arena, ministerial notes of protest had been taken lightly because the envoys were known to be isolated from the centers of French decision-making.³⁰

In conclusion, the historian seems entitled to ask: Had French regimes of the era been prepared to respond more decisively to diplomatic crises, would a more efficient mail service have made a difference? The record suggests that it might have.

NOTES

- ¹See Moustier to Ministre des Affaires Etrangeres (hereinafter MAE), No. 3, New York, 4 February 1789, Archives des Affaires Etrangeres, Correspondance Politique, Etats-Unis (hereinafter AECPE-U), 34: 22; same to same, No. 8, New York, 29 March 1789, "Correspondence of the Comte de Moustier with the Comte de Montmorin," *American Historical Review* 9 (1903), 96; and same to same, No. 10, New York, 21 April 1789, *ibid.*, 8: 726.
- ²The consul general was Antoine Delaforest, writing to the Ministre de la Marine et des Colonies at the time of the Nootka Sound crisis. See *Depeches des consuls aux Ministres de la Marine, puis des Relations Exterieures*, AECPE-U, Tome 5, 1^{re} serie (1790-1813), 12-21.
- ³To MAE, No. 75, Philadelphia, 1 May 1793, in Frederick J Turner, ed., "Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791-1797," *The Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1903* (hereinafter CFM), 196.
- ⁴"Memoire sur les Etats Unis d'Amerique" (1796) in *The Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1936*, p. 118.
- ⁵For a recent overview of Fauchet's frustrated dealings with both Randolph and his own foreign office, see the author's *French Perceptions of the Early American Republic, 1783-1793* (American Philosophical Society, 1988), 130-36.
- ⁶To Comite de Salut Public, No. 1, Philadelphia, 7 messidor, an 3 (25 June 1795), CFM, 735.
- ⁷The mail-carrying enterprise of shipowner Benjamin Dubois can be traced through letters exchanged by the heads of the navy, foreign office, and postal establishments, scattered through volumes 34 and 35 of AECPE-U.
- ⁸To MAE, No. 4, New York, 12 February 1789, *ibid.*, 34: 24-25vo.
- ⁹Otto to MAE, No. 52, New York, 6 January 1791, *ibid.*, 35: 262-64.
- ¹⁰To MAE, No. 22, New York, 18 November 1785, *ibid.*, 30: 415-15vo.

- ¹¹See Margaret M. O'Dwyer, "Louis Guillaume Otto in America (1779-91)," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1954), 15-16.
- ¹²Michel Mangourit to Ministre de la Marine et des Colonies, No. 9, Charleston, 26 November 1792, Correspondance Consulaire (hereinafter CC), Vol. 372: 412-12vo. serie B¹, Archives des Affaires Etrangères. Note: consular dispatches dated prior to 1792 and bearing the same B¹ designation are housed in the Archives Nationales.
- ¹³To MAE, No. 59, Philadelphia, 5 November 1792, CFM, 163-64.
- ¹⁴Fauchet and the Commissioners to Commission de la Marine et des Colonies, Philadelphia, 21 brumaire, an 3 (11 November 1794), Archives Nationales (Marine), serie BB³, dossier 64: 150-51.
- ¹⁵Commission de la Marine et des Colonies to the Commissioners, Paris, 10 pluviôse, an 3 (29 January 1795), Archives Nationales (Marine), serie BB², dossier 25: 17-17vo.
- ¹⁶For one of the best and most detailed accounts of the Jay treaty crisis, see Albert H. Bowman, *The Struggle for Neutrality: Franco-American Diplomacy During the Federalist Era* (University of Tennessee Press, 1974).
- ¹⁷Calculating the elapsed time between the date a minister wrote a dispatch and the date the foreign office noted its receipt is subject to several variables. Dispatches bearing sequential dates were sent off in bundles whenever a sailing occurred. Thus, for example, all of Genet's dispatches dated 15 August through 19 September, 1793, arrived in Paris on 13 November. If, as seemed likely, this bundle left on or shortly after the day of the last-dated dispatch, the elapsed time was 55 days. Crossing times are more difficult to track for the Fauchet mission (1794 through mid-1795) because the foreign office often neglected to record the dates of receipt. For example, Fauchet sent 32 pieces of correspondence to France between 6 February and 4 May, 1795, not one of which was marked "received" at the Paris end. Calculating the much longer transit for Adet's dispatches is somewhat flawed statistically by the foreign office practice of omitting the date of receipt in favor of recording the date it made an extract of the dispatch for presentation to the Executive Directory. Typically, the Directory received the extracts three or four days later. Sources used for estimating the foregoing passage times include F. J. Turner's meticulously annotated "Correspondence of the French Minister's," and serie AF III, carton 64, dossiers 259-64, Archives Nationales (Marine).

- ¹⁸See chapter 7 in Frederic Masson, *Le departement des affaires etrangeres pendant la revolution, 1787-1804* (Paris 1877).
- ¹⁹To Ministre des Relations Exterieures, No. 4, New York, 1 germinal, an 4 (21 March 1796), CC(New York), Tome 4: 148.
- ²⁰*Ibid.*
- ²¹Cf., his dispatches No. 4 to Commission des Relations Exterieures, Boston, 2 brumaire, an 4 (24 October 1795), and to Ministre des Relations Exterieures, also No. 4, Boston, 11 floreal, an 4 (30 April 1796), in CC(Boston), Tome 3: 347vo and 370, respectively.
- ²²Cf., two dispatches, Nos. 1 and 6, to the Ministre des Relations Exterieures, one of 15 frimaire, an 4 (6 December 1795), the other of 30 thermidor, an 4 (17 August 1796), CC(Charleston), Tome 2: 259 and 278vo, respectively.
- ²³To Commission des Relations Exterieures, No. 1, Baltimore, 10 vendemiaire, an 4 (2 October 1795), CC(Baltimore), Tome 1: 134.
- ²⁴East-to-west passage can be measured precisely only when the envoy wrote back to the foreign office telling what day he had received its letter. But even when respondents did not note the date of a letter's arrival, they usually hastened to acknowledge its receipt lest they be thought derelict. Thus, the date of the acknowledging letter can be used as a fairly reliable measure of the elapsed time.
- ²⁵No. 56, Philadelphia, 11 October 1792, CFM, 161.
- ²⁶To Commission des Relations Exterieures, No. 42, Philadelphia, 6 pluviouse, an 3 (25 January 1795), *ibid.*, 547.
- ²⁷Two dispatches, Nos. 2 and 12, to the Comite de Salut Public, one of 10 messidor an 3 (28 June 1795), the other of 18 thermidor, an 3 (5 August 1795), *ibid.*, 739-40 and 768, respectively.
- ²⁸To Commission des Relations Exterieures, No. 2, Philadelphia, 1 fructidor, an 3 (18 August 1795), *ibid.*, 768-69.
- ²⁹See his "Memoire sur les Etats Unis," p. 118.
- ³⁰To Comite de Salut Public, No. 2, Philadelphia, 10 messidor, an 3 (28 June 1795), CFM, 739-40.

THE POLITICAL ART OF AMBIGUITY AND THE CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICIES OF THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

by
Chace Anderson
(Charlottesville, Va.)

"There are...two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests."

James Madison, "Number 10," in *The Federalist Papers*

President Reagan's policies toward Central America are as passionately debated among scholars today as they were among the general citizenry of America at the time they were being pursued. If there is any intellectual consensus, it resides in a widespread belief that the administration's policies ended in failure. Yet the causes that lie behind the debacle are hotly contested. The emerging literature on the subject gives three different causes for this failure: the administration's mismanagement of foreign policy, the fanaticism of right-wing ideologues, and the people's lack of support for Reagan's policies. There are elements of truth in each of these explanations. What lies behind the lack of consensus of these new studies is the authors' inability to fully comprehend the subtle and deft use of ambiguity by President Reagan.

One school of thought, best exemplified in the work of journalist Roy Gutman, holds that nobody was in control of the Central America policy. Gutman maintains that "the administration more or less drifted into the commitment" to back the Contras and overrun the Sandinistas. "It was the fruit of seven years of a policymaking process that was as inept as it was politicized." He places responsibility for this chaotic foreign policy structure on the president's unwillingness to "choose between competing strategies or impose discipline on his subordinates."¹ The president was so far removed from the foreign policy process, Gutman argues,

that right-wing ideologues were able to fill the power vacuum.

"The eyewitness historian," writes Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "tends to preserve the felt texture of events and to recognize the role of such elements as confusion, ignorance, chance, and sheer stupidity."² Herein lie the major strengths and weaknesses of Gutman's sequential account of the myriad of actors and their changing positions from 1981 through 1987.

A second interpretation as vivid and dramatic as Gutman's contends that while there was unavoidably a high degree of confusion, inefficiency, and infighting in Reagan's foreign policy process, two deliberate different policies were promoted. During the first administration, the White House began a policy to interdict the arms flow from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran rebels, while it held out the carrot of economic aid to lure the Sandinistas into negotiations that would resolve Washington's national security concerns. By 1984, Reagan was intent on removing the Sandinistas from power. This interpretation generally fails to account for the stark contrast between rhetoric and actions during the first administration.³

According to Robert Pastor, a staff member of President Jimmy Carter's National Security Council, "the original goals of the Reagan Administration's policy toward Nicaragua were to end the Nicaraguan support for Salvadoran guerrillas, reduce Nicaragua's dependence of the Soviet Union and Cuba, and increase the prospects for democracy."⁴ Pastor's account is sympathetic to the torment policymakers went through as they sifted through the constant inflow of memoranda which discussed the rapidly changing world situation.

For Frank McNeil, career officer and former Ambassador to Costa Rica under President Carter and President Reagan's first term, the first administration was a battlefield between "the pragmatists willing to accept the revolution in Nicaragua so long as the Sandinistas abstained from a strategic alliance with the Soviet Union, and the hard liners intent upon rolling back the Nicaraguan revolution no matter what."⁵ McNeil places special emphasis on the continual conflict within the government between "illusionists" and "realists." The clearest

example of the former was Elliott Abrams, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs after July 1985, whom McNeil calls an anti-diplomat. (In fact, his book is, in part, an attack on what he calls Abrams' "McCarthyism.") McNeil believes that "illusionists" decry the realists because they shake up the "reality" the illusionists have created for themselves. Realists simply state the facts. McNeil sees himself following in this tradition. Indeed, his book is a passionate argument for dispassionate analysis.⁶

A third interpretation sees the administration as maintaining a consistently militant policy toward the Sandinistas. Peter Kornbluh, for instance, states that by 1981 Reagan had decided on a Contra army and the economic strangulation of Nicaragua. In order to enhance the circumstances that would lead to the fall of the Sandinistas, the first administration sought a way to break free from "the political constraints on sending U.S. troops into a Central American quagmire." In his second term, Reagan dropped the interdiction argument and made his objectives known. Kornbluh asserts that Reagan's policy of intervention "reflected Washington's determination to wage a war without end in Nicaragua, spreading ever more death and destruction over a country that the administration claimed to want to save."⁷

Kornbluh effectively uses newspaper sources to chronicle both Reagan's war from its covert to its overt stages, and the president's ability to manipulate events and images to keep his war alive.⁸ Reagan's public addresses glorified the Contras as a cohesive group of "freedom fighters" struggling for the virtues of democracy and liberal-capitalism, that the Nicaraguan people supposedly supported. He attempted to use America's victory in Grenada to pump the idea of American power and virtue into the hearts and minds of Americans. When support did not materialize, the president embarked on a campaign based on misleading White House papers, planned White House leaks, pro-Contra advertising funded by the administration's proxies, and reliance on Contra victories (or defeats) to persuade Americans to support the war against the Nicaraguan government.⁹

Kornbluh raises a critical question: if the first administration really had intended to use the carrot (aid) and stick (Contras) tactics, why did it take the carrot away so soon? Shortly after Reagan entered the White House, Secretary of State Alexander Haig announced that if the Sandinistas did not stop the weapon supply line to the Salvadoran rebels, the administration would not resume the \$15 million in economic aid and the \$10 million in wheat. In April of 1981, the Department of State announced that little or no hard evidence could be found showing that the Nicaraguans transferred arms to the Salvadoran rebels. Yet the administration, to the consternation of U.S. Ambassador Lawrence Pezzullo in Nicaragua, refused to resume the aid. Just a month prior to this report, Reagan had asked Congress for funds to bolster CIA activity in the region.¹⁰ Whether or not the Sandinistas would respond to America's carrot, Reagan meant to swing the stick.

Gutman's account of the inner workings of the administration is thorough. There is a problem, however, with the way he tells the story. Following the events as they happen leads him to accept them on a *prima facie* basis. Being in the midst of a historical episode can lead the historian to commit the fallacy of *post hoc, propter hoc*, i.e., if 'B' occurred after 'A,' then 'A' caused 'B,' or the fallacy of *pro hoc, propter hoc*, i.e., placing the effect before the cause. Being "in the thick" of history often allows the historian to grasp that special essence which is lost over time, but he lacks a vantage point, and analytical distance.¹¹

Kornbluh focuses on the broad picture, on the underlying direction of policy; Gutman, Pastor, and McNeil concentrate on the inter- and intra- departmental conflicts, on the details. And the irony is that we learn a great deal more from them about Reagan and his policies than we do from Kornbluh. He offers us a sense of moral outrage rather than political insight. For example, Kornbluh proudly stated that "public opposition restrained Reagan from escalating the war on Nicaragua in an overt military assault."¹² He does not ask why the president needed this support. Why did the military invade Grenada but not Nicaragua? Did the military oppose Reagan's objective of removing the Sandinistas from power?

Did the Pentagon and the White House have a different understanding of what constituted a national security threat? In other words, Kornbluh treats the pluralistic and democratic context within which American foreign policy is hammered out as an outside force that impinges on the president's will. Gutman, Pastor, and McNeil place that context at the forefront of their accounts.

Lloyd Gardner has recently pointed out that "American leaders have had a 'domestic' foreign policy and a 'foreign' foreign policy."¹³ In the twentieth century, and especially after World War II, America's role in world affairs has become more involved and complex. Because of America's unwillingness to become entangled in the domestic affairs of other nations, and due to its own democratic need for public consent, policymakers have often had to garner the people's support by subtly reframing the foreign policy issues. With regards to Central America, writes Eldon Kenworthy, "[n]o matter how the U.S. public is characterized—as privatistic and isolationist, or as pluralist and tolerant—it is hard to square quintessential American values with the mentality needed to sustain [an] empire."¹⁴ American leaders have had to form a consensus to support foreign policy tactics and objectives by threading together America's shared ideological, political, and economic beliefs with the historical circumstance, especially when foreign policy objectives and tactics are in conflict with those values.

To his dismay, the president found that a consensus for his militant policies toward Central America did not exist. Anti-communism, democracy, and world order, once the key issues behind such a consensus, failed to gain the support of the public in the 1980s. Congress, inherently composed of factions, often proved intractable. The president's stouter position *vis-a-vis* Central America appealed little to an ensconced Department of State that had carefully implemented an Inter-American system of liberal-capitalism. And the Pentagon was scarcely inclined to become the butt of public scorn. Vietnam had left the military apprehensive of protracted conflicts when national security issues were not clearly at stake.¹⁵ Without sufficient political and public support, the military could not be prodded into war.

If America's democracy was continually getting in Reagan's way, a deeper truth lies in the president's skillful use of the democratic institutions of America to try to get his way. For Reagan, the myriad of views and options that Gutman so thoroughly details were hardly a confusing power vacuum that undermined policy. They were, instead, a necessary public discourse through which the White House could maintain the consistent and militant designs that Kornbluh so clearly perceives. The "illusionists" promoted the multiple views that the "realists" argued about and sought to implement.

Had the president reigned in his subordinates and been able to eliminate all positions contrary to his own, his war-like intent would have stood alone, naked to the public eye. Reagan needed democracy. He promoted those who advocated peace through negotiations. And he understood that it was only worth talking about peace and negotiations as long as these enhanced his long-term interest in waging war. Peace, after all, meant the survival of the Sandinistas. Peace meant failure.

Every time a negotiated settlement was at hand, the administration sabotaged it. When it looked as if Reagan's apparent national security concerns could have been hammered out in the Arias peace plan by American negotiator Philip Habib in the summer of 1986, Reagan refused to let him go to Central America and negotiate. He then replaced him with someone much less competent. Elliott Abrams, the "anti-diplomat" who seemed always to be in tune with Reagan's thinking, understood that the absence of a consensus obliged the government to keep alive as many options as possible. Gutman quotes the controversial Assistant Secretary of State to the effect that Habib "failed to realize that he was just a symbol." He had "wanted to get something negotiated. That is what his supporters liked, and that is what his opponents feared." His replacement, "an honest and able envoy who was not exceptionally vigorous," meant that "all elements of the administration [could] maintain their ambiguity," and their "ambiguity allowed all views in the administration to coexist."¹⁶

Reagan knew that ultimately, in democratic America, he had to get the public on his side. He needed conflicts from within the order to be able to talk credibly to the people. At the same time, these conflicts forced him to find a new consensus in government from without. He attempted to do so, time and again, by addressing the American people, directly and emotionally, reaching above government and beyond the Washington Beltway.

But Reagan could not speak his mind. Instead, he spoke ambiguously, saying one thing, seeking that his listeners understand another: Nicaragua was a "totalitarian dungeon;" the Sandinistas, spearheading the world Communist revolution, were bent on taking Harlingen, Texas, and undermining the Western Hemisphere; the Contras were the "moral equivalent" of the founding fathers; and, of course, represented peace and order. He spoke of peace, but meant war. Rhetoric supplanted reality.

Reagan clouded his facts and stretched his words in a vain attempt to give "to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests." But unable to come right out and say what he meant in democratic America, Reagan's ambiguous discourse rose to hyperbole during the first administration, afterward the people could no longer believe him.

Ambiguity is a part of America's political system. Reagan stretched both the art and the system to the limits. But what are those limits? As citizens, we must consider the subtle differences between the art of ambiguity and a contempt for democracy.

NOTES

¹Roy Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy: The Making of American Policy in Nicaragua, 1981-1987*, (New York: Touchstone, 1988), quotes found respectively on pp. 83, 357, 236.

²Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Historian as Participant," in Felix Gilbert and Stephen R. Graubard, eds., *Historical Studies Today*, (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), p. 408.

³For a contemporary essay on this contrast see Mary Vanderlaan, "The Dual Strategy Myth in Central American Policy," a 1984 article

reprinted in Bruce D. Larkin, ed., *Vital Interests: The Soviet Issue in U.S. Central American Policy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1988), pp. 169-90.

- ⁴Robert Pastor, *Condemned to Repetition: The United States and Nicaragua*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 256.
- ⁵Frank McNeil, *War and Peace in Central America*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1988), p. 120; for similar views see Robert E. Osgood, "The Revitalization of Containment," in William G. Hyland, ed., *The Reagan Foreign Policy*, (New York: New American Library, 1987), p. 40; William M. LeoGrande, "Rollback or Containment? The United States, Nicaragua, and the Search for Peace in Central America," *International Security* 11 (Fall 1986): 109.
- ⁶McNeil, *War and Peace in Central America*, pp. 17, 40; McNeil, like Pastor, argues that a combination of factors must be considered before the U.S.-Nicaraguan crisis can be resolved. Boiled down they amount to understanding Latin American history, aiding development, working within the Contradora process, and enforcing a containment of Nicaragua's revolution.
- ⁷Peter Kornbluh, *Nicaragua: The Price of Intervention—Reagan's Wars Against the Sandinistas*, (D.C.: Institute for Policy Studies, 1987), p. 9; *idem*, "The Covert War," in Thomas W. Walker, ed., *Reagan Versus the Sandinistas: The Undeclared War on Nicaragua*, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), the quotes can be found on pp. 22, 35 respectively; some scholars who agree with Kornbluh are Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America*, expanded edition (New York: W. W. Norton, 1983); Noam Chomsky, *Turning the Tide: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Struggle for Peace*, (Boston: South End Press, 1985); *idem*, *On Power and Ideology: The Managua Lectures*, (Boston: South End Press, 1987).
- ⁸Also see Betsy Cohn and Patricia Hynds, "The Manipulation of the Religion Issue," pp. 97-122, and Eldon Kenworthy, "Selling the Policy," pp. 159-81 in Walker, ed., *Reagan Versus the Sandinistas*.
- ⁹Kornbluh, *Nicaragua*, pp. 25, 34-35, 134-35.
- ¹⁰Kornbluh, "The Covert War," pp. 23-24; LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions*, p. 294; Dennis Gilbert, *Sandinistas: The Party and the Revolution*, (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 164.
- ¹¹David Hackett Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought*, (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1970), pp. 166-67, 169-72.
- ¹²Kornbluh, *Nicaragua*, p. 159.

¹³Lloyd C. Gardner, "Lost Empire," *Diplomatic History* 13 (Winter 1989): 5.

¹⁴Kenworthy, "Selling the Policy," p. 161.

¹⁵Lilia Bermudez, *Guerra De Baja Intensidad: Reagan contra Centroamerica*, (Mexico: Siglo Veintiuno editores, 1987), ch. 2.

¹⁶Gutman, *Banana Diplomacy*, p. 353.

BONERS

"These (stab-in-the-back) theorists also agree that the U.S. should take a large role in international affairs, they believe that they were correct when they went to Vietnam to fight against communist aggression and if they hadn't gone they might not have stopped the Domino Theory from falling all over Asia."

"The only action that LBJ fell short of was dropping (sic) a nuclear boom (sic) which would have realistically been rather foolishish (sic)."

"...the knife is the best killing medium and the fighter boomer (sic) is the worst medium..."

Geoff Smith

PHILIPPINE MATERIAL IN PRESIDENTIAL LIBRARIES: A PRELIMINARY INVENTORY

by

Milton W. Meyer

(California State University, Los Angeles)

In the fall of 1989, I undertook a three-month car trip (9000 miles, 30 states) structured around visits to eight presidential libraries (Hoover's through Carter's) to gather inventories, principally bibliographic, of materials relating to the Philippines and Philippine-American affairs. All have helpful published pamphlets, entitled "Historical Material in the ... Presidential Library," excepting Carter's, which issues short mimeo lists of acquisitions as they become available for use. In view of time and interest restrictions, eschewing extensive oral histories and visual aids holdings, I concerned myself chiefly with material relating to periods of presidential tenure; however, some relevant accrued private papers were also consulted. All archival material was well indexed. After citing the particular entry in the "Historical Materials," the researcher refers to individual extended indexes that outline more precisely and in greater detail relevant contents of the desired boxes.

In these off-season months, without advance arrangements, but as a scholar with serious intent, I was cordially received by librarians. Immediate access to desired material was provided as well as instant photocopying of desired documentation in reasonable quantities. I found all archivists knowledgeable, although their backgrounds ranged from experienced librarians with PhDs and publication track records to what seemed to be recent university graduates. Disappointing but understandable, however, was the fact that most material was photocopied. Only on rare occasion was the original document available. (The existence of both original and duplicates must inflate the shelf space required.)

I offer the following preliminary inventories on Philippine references.

1) Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, dedicated 1962, West Branch, Iowa.

Except for those portions relating to Hoover's World War I relief activities, 1918-1923, held at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, all material is located here. Upon request, the staff duplicated a copy of a helpful five-page guide on available Philippine material. Listed in the presidential period files for 1929-1933 were five boxes, of which the most extensive were numbers 972, 973, and 974, totalling 1519 pages, entitled "States Files—Philippines and Philippine Independence, General Correspondence." Other boxes pertained to rubber and sugar, two Philippine export commodities. Post-presidential boxes contained correspondence relating to Manuel Quezon and Carlos Romulo. A further listing of 59 individuals indicated their references to the Philippines.

Most intriguing was Hoover's diary of his 1946 global trip. President Truman dispatched the ex-president, with a task force of half-a-dozen individuals, on a fact-finding famine emergency mission (Post-Presidential Subject File, boxes 147, 148, 149). A candid Hoover recorded free-wheeling impressions on some world figures. In New Delhi, after three conversations and dinner with Viceroy Viscount Lord Wavell, Hoover wrote, "Lord Wavell is not a surpassing intelligence. I could not make out how he reached so great a position except by continuous kicks upstairs." In Nanking, General George Marshall, in his politically impossible mission of trying to reconcile irreconcilable interests, was pronounced "absolutely ignorant of ideological matters, somewhat dumb on everything but logistics and totally unfitted for our situation in China." In Tokyo, Hoover found a bitter MacArthur who let loose on a "vindictive" Roosevelt, complained about a perceived neglect of his Southwest Pacific Command, and indicated disinterest in a 1948 presidential candidacy.

2) Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, established 1939 (the earliest), Hyde Park, New York.

My research concentrated on two of seven titles in the manuscript collection, "Roosevelt, Franklin D.: Papers as President, 1933-1945." In the one, "Official File," were eight boxes relating to "Appointments-Philippines"; here Box 400 was most useful. The designation "Appointments" was misleading, since the subject encompassed matters other than appointments. Item: a 27-page draft of the proposed Philippine constitution forwarded by Secretary of War Dern on February 19, 1935, to the President, who enjoined the Secretary to "please give me not more than a three page summary." Item: Commonwealth President Quezon requested a twenty-one gun salute; FDR gave him 19, to be on a par with that accorded state governors. Item: FDR agreed with Secretary of Interior Ickes that the Philippine request for his image on a postage stamp be denied since it was the US practice not to depict living presidents on stamps. Informative were the quarterly reports of the High Commissioner to Roosevelt; these detailed the rising estimated costs of building the official Manila residence on filled-in land on Dewey Boulevard.

In the second of seven titles, "Papers as President, President's Secretary's File, 1933-1945," what would have probably yielded the most revealing reports were of the most limited access: the "Safe File" (7 boxes), "Confidential File" (12 boxes), and "Diplomatic Correspondence" and a "Subject File" that contained no separate Philippine box but one relating to the OSS interest there. General William Donovan, with direct access to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President, bombarded FDR with daily memos as the Philippines fell and suggested the possible creation of an OSS-supported guerrilla operation there. It was disappointing that, at least in a morning's exploratory work, a substantial corps of material relevant to the prewar and wartime Philippines did not surface.

3) Harry S. Truman Library, established 1957, Independence, Missouri.

I appeared at the Library on a Saturday, when the Library was not fully staffed and services were curtailed. Truman's Presidential file indexes were not consulted but contents were noted of donated private papers of three Philippine-related

officials: John F. Melby, State Department, Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (35 boxes, of which Box 6 included the "Philippine File"); Frank A. Waring, Chairman of the Philippine War Damage Commission, 1945-1951 (4 boxes); and Myron M. Cowan, Ambassador to the Philippines, 1949-1951 (earlier to Australia, 1948-1949, later to Belgium, 1952-1953), 24 boxes, with Philippine material scattered throughout the boxes. The "Historical Materials" guide also noted the relevant manuscript collections of Dean Acheson; John M. Allison, US Foreign Service Officer, 1930-1960; and the "Records" of the U.S. Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines, 1950.

4) Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, dedicated 1962, Abilene, Kansas.

The Library is one of five buildings in the Eisenhower Center, a campus-like quadrangle that encompasses also the Visitor Center, his boyhood home, the museum, and the chapel where he and Mamie are buried. I registered a favorable impression of both the general layout and the abundance of documentation in the Library, the first one of the eight I visited. As it turned out, all consulted material related to Eisenhower's prewar tour of duty, 1935-1939, in Manila under MacArthur.

The first years, 1935-1938, of Eisenhower's "Diaries" reveal his ambivalence in working in Manila with the general who was military advisor to Commonwealth President Quezon; his respect for Philippine military counterparts; his simultaneous frustration in the inability of "getting things done." The "Diaries" have been edited by Robert H. Ferrell (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1981), in which Chapter I relates to Eisenhower's duty in prewar Philippines. Supplementary and parallel material exists in the "Pre-Presidential Papers, 1916-1952," where, in Box 74, are more Eisenhower-MacArthur items, including the latter's 1936 "Report on National Reforms in the Philippines" to Quezon. Relevant prewar collections were those of Eisenhower associate Kevin McCann, "Papers, 1918-1981," and the Marcos G. Solivan Collection. The latter is of little use because of the reduced xeroxed pages, dark photos, and blurred news clippings photostats.

Other pertinent manuscript collections included those of Lewis H. Brereton, Commander, Far East Air Forces, Philippines, 1941; John Foster Dulles; Thurman C. Erickson, a businessman interned by the Japanese in Manila; Christian Herter, Secretary of State, 1959-1961; William Lecel Lee, Organizer, Philippine Air Force under MacArthur, 1935-1938; and Arthur S. Nevins, Chief of Staff, Operations, Philippine Department, U.S. Army, 1936-1938.

5) John F. Kennedy Library, dedicated 1979, Columbia Point, Boston, Massachusetts.

After Eisenhower, the volume and substance of material relating to the Philippines appeared to decline precipitously. In Kennedy's "President's Office Files (POF), 1961-1963," Box 123a included the heading of "Philippines-general" for the years 1961, 1962, and 1963, but most inclusions bordered on frippery: acknowledging birthday greetings, commenting innocuously on ambassadorial appointments in both directions. The "Security, 1962-63" File was naturally closed. Box 3 of the papers of Roger Hillsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, noted President Macapagal's visit, November 1963, to the United States, but in it the annual meeting of the U.S. Ambassadors to Far Eastern countries, held at Baguio, March 1962, was classified, as well as those of other years in the papers of James C. Thomson, Jr., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, 1960-1966.

6) Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, dedicated 1971, University of Texas Campus, Austin.

The archivist on duty made available a one-page list (as of November 6, 1979) of materials on the Philippines in the White House Files of the Johnson Administration, 1963-1969 that noted:

a) Two White House Central Files: "Countries" - 235 (Philippines); and "Trips" (Manila Conference, 10/17/66-11/2/66);

b) Two White House Central Files: "Confidential Files";

c) Two National Security Files: "Country File-Philippines," and "Head of State Correspondence File";

d) A President's Staff File: "Head of State Correspondence File-Philippines."

In each category many items were either closed or unprocessed.

7) Gerald R. Ford Library, opened 1981, University of Michigan North Campus, Ann Arbor.

The Ford Library in Ann Arbor (the Museum is in Grand Rapids), according to the "Historical Materials" guide, has no listing directly relevant to the Philippines. But, as in the case of the Johnson Library, the archivist provided me with an on-the-spot three-page computer printout that included Philippines items in the White House Central Files (Subject), the White House Special Files (Unit Files), and the Presidential Handwriting Files, as well as from the private papers of David R. Gergen, Special Counsel to the President, Office of Communications: Files, 1976; John O. Marsh, Counsellor to the President: Files, 1974-1977; James M. Wilson, State Department Official: Papers (1952), 1958-1977; and Robert K. Wolthuis, Special Assistant to the President: Files, 1974-1977.

8) Jimmy Carter Library, first material opened 1987, Atlanta, Georgia.

In the absence of the standard "Historical Materials" guide, the Library periodically issues lists of material opened for use (4 lists, 1987-1989). Additionally, the archivist made available, in the absence of one specifically on the Philippines, a list on "Asia" references for materials opened through 7/17/89. In the "White House Central File (WHCF), Subject File, Countries," the Philippines appears as CO 125 in Box CO-49.

In perspective, a preliminary inventory—"research on the run"—would indicate that, short of an exhaustive and exhausting endeavor fully to examine scattered and varied documentation, the presidential archives arguably could add little in Philippine-American affairs in terms of a substantive nature, interpretive analysis, or original material that could not be gleaned from readily available published sources: *Public Papers* of the presidents, the Department of State *Bulletin*, the *Foreign Relations* and *Current Documents* series, congressional *Hearings*, researched articles in professional journals, and newspaper reportage.

"ONLY NINETY-SIX YEARS:" HUMOR IN THE GOVERNMENT

by
David A. Langbart
(*National Archives*)

Many works of history and political science remark that bureaucracies, particularly the U.S. Government, move slowly. They also note that bureaucracies, again, particularly the U.S. Government, do not have a sense of humor. A curious 1924 event involving the Department of State and the Massachusetts Historical Society demonstrates that while the first axiom may be true, the second is false, at least occasionally. The people making up bureaucracies are human and have a sense of humor. It is just a matter of being able to locate documentation reflecting this fact.¹

From time to time the Department of State has borrowed material from private individuals or repositories for use in legal or other official proceedings. In 1828, the Department borrowed six maps from the Massachusetts Historical Society for use during settlement of the boundary between the United States and Canada. Upon completion of the negotiations, the Department of State failed to return several of the maps. Ninety-six years later, two of them came to play a part in unique exchanges of correspondence between the Department of State and the society and the Secretary of State and the President. The first map dated from 1776 and showed the "province of Quebec, according to the Royal Proclamation of the 7th of October 1763;" the second was a 1774 "Map of the British Empire in North America."

These maps remained, unknown, in the possession of the Department of State until 1924. Late in the year, Harrison G. Dwight, chief of the Division of Publications, found the maps during the course of some other work. He immediately returned them to Julius H. Tuttle, librarian of the Massachusetts Historical Society (Document I) with apologies and thanks. Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes thought that President Calvin Coolidge might be

interested as he was from Massachusetts and sent him a copy of the letter to Tuttle (Document II). Coolidge and Tuttle both responded although the latter failed to join the spirit of the exchange (Documents III and IV). The correspondence was closed out by Hughes who responded to certain of Coolidge's comments (Document V). Not only do these documents detail the return of the maps, but they also shed some light on the attitudes of the President and the Secretary of State toward the Congress. Eventually carbon copies of all five of these documents circulated among the Department of State much as Xerographic copies of humorous and unusual documents are sometimes routed today.²

DOCUMENT I³

December 18, 1924

Julius Herbert Tuttle, Esquire,
Librarian, Massachusetts Historical Society,
1154 Boylston Street,
Boston, Massachusetts.

Sir:

It is said of Republics that they are ungrateful. It has likewise been rumored of them that their official processes are mysterious and long drawn out. But that they are not in the end unworthy of the high hopes entertained of them, let this communication bear modest witness.

A few days ago it befell the undersigned, as Editor of the Department of State and custodian of an important section of its archives, to make certain investigations in a little-frequented vault of the building which houses the premier Department of this Government. During the course of these investigations a certain dusty case was opened, which proved to contain a collection of objects too miscellaneous to be catalogued here. Among those objects, however, were discovered two maps antedating the Revolution. One was "a New Map of the Province of Quebec, according to the Royal

Proclamation of the 7th of October 1763, from the French Surveys connected with those made after the war, by Captain Carver, and other officers, in his MAJESTY'S Service" (London, 1776). The other was "a Map of the British Empire in North America, by Samuel Dunn, Mathematician" (London, 1774). And on the back of each was found the following inscription:

"This map is the property of the Massachusetts Historical Society and is⁴ loaned to the United States on the express condition of being safely returned.

"Boston, Novr. 11, 1828 - J.N.(?) Davis, Presdt.
M.H.S. James Bowdoin, Committee"

Sir, the United States cannot but regret that the members of the Massachusetts Historical Society have for ninety-six years been deprived of the study of these interesting and valuable specimens of the cartographer's art. Yet scarcely can the humble servant of the United States who now pens these lines find it in him to regret that it should remain for the day of Calvin Coolidge, of Massachusetts, to honor the terms of a loan made in that of John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts. I therefore hasten—if a word be not denied me which to the ear of the zealous curator might have, perhaps, the ring of irony—I hasten, Sir, to return to you under separate cover, and through you to their rightful owner the Massachusetts Historical Society, with the compliments, with the apologies, and with the hearty thanks of the Department of State of the United States of America, these two somewhat time-worn testimonials of a faith which after all has not been betrayed.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
For the Secretary of State:
/s/ Harrison Griswold Dwight
Chief, Division of Publications

DOCUMENT II⁵

December 20, 1924

My dear Mr. President:

You may be interested in giving a glance at the enclosed letter written by the Chief of the Division of Publications in the Department of State and containing appropriate apologies to the Massachusetts Historical Society. We have all learned to have faith in Massachusetts but it is important that Massachusetts should have faith in the United States. This acknowledgement may aid her in this effort.

Faithfully yours,
/s/ Charles E. Hughes
Enclosure

The President,
The White House

DOCUMENT III⁶

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1924

My dear Mr. Secretary:

Your note of December 20th and accompanying papers bring me a reminder of that splendid fidelity for which our Department of State has always been so distinguished. It is, however, even more impressive in its suggestion of the promptness and despatch with which the official duties of your eminent branch of the Government are so uniformly discharged.

In view of the record achieved by the State Department in returning these maps, after a lapse of only ninety-six years, I am moved to make a special appeal to you, as one obviously expert in the facilitation of public business, for suggestions in regard to another matter. You will recall in the Annual

Message to Congress, I ventured the suggestion that the French Spoliation Claims might properly receive the attention of the Congress. These claims have been awaiting final settlement for now considerably more than a century, and the recent acceleration of performance which your Department has so impressively achieved, leads me to the hope that you may be able to suggest some procedure by which, within say the next two or three centuries, it might be possible to secure a final adjustment of them.

Awaiting with the utmost interest any constructive proposals which you may wish to advance, I am

Most sincerely yours,
/s/ Calvin Coolidge

Hon. Charles E. Hughes,
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

DOCUMENT IV⁷

MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY FENWAY BOSTON

December 24, 1924

The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

This society returns grateful thanks for the two maps returned yesterday after a lapse of ninety-six years, having been borrowed in connection with the running of the line of the Northeast Boundary on November 11, 1928: one, a "New Map of the Province of Quebec, according to the Royal Proclamation of the 7th of October 1763, from the French Surveys connected with those made after the War, by Captain Carver, and other officers, in His MAJESTY'S Service" (London, 1776); the other, a "Map of the British Empire in North America, by Samuel Dunn, Mathematician" (London, 1774).

These two maps complete the return of the six then borrowed by the Government, with the exception of D.F. Sottzman's Map of Maine (Hamburgh, 1798), which I hope some day you may be able to find in some little-frequented part of your building. The Society very much appreciates the interest you have taken in the matter.⁸

Very respectfully,
/s/ Julius H. Tuttle
Librarian

DOCUMENT V⁹

December 26, 1924

My dear Mr. President:

I am greatly pleased to receive your note of the twenty-third and to have your strong commendation of the work of the department of State in clearing up its arrears and being able after a lapse of only ninety-six years to effect the return of the maps to which I referred in my previous letter. I beg leave to point out that this extraordinary efficiency is doubtless largely due to the fact that the Department was unhampered by solicitations, interference or budgetary requirements.

In the case of the French Spoliation Claims, in which the Department of State is deeply interested, it is compelled to await the cooperation of Congress, and I fear that it may be necessary to allow, as you suggest, two or three centuries for their final adjustment. Possibly they could be taken up after the Isle of Pines Treaty has been approved.¹⁰

Faithfully yours,
/s/ Charles E. Hughes

The President,
The White House.

NOTES

- ¹For another example of governmental humor see: David A. Langbart, "Yuletide Greetings From Abroad." *Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Newsletter*, vol. 14, no. 4, December 1983, p. 28-29.
- ²See General correspondence of the Counselor/Under Secretary of State 000-2406, Record Group 59, National Archives.
- ³Source: 1910-29 Central Decimal File 811.412/164a, Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives (hereafter RG 59, NA). Drafted by Harrison Griswold Dwight.
- ⁴The following footnote appears in the original letter: The two words are lacking in one inscription.
- ⁵Source: 811.412/165 RG 59, NA. Drafted by Charles Evans Hughes.
- ⁶Source: 811.412/166, RG 59, NA. Received on December 23, 1924. This document is also noted to file 411.051 which covers the French spoliation claims.
- ⁷Source: 811.412/165. Received on December 26, 1924.
- ⁸Another letter in the files indicates that the Department of State found the third map in January 1925. See Tyler Dennett, Chief, Division of Publications to Julius Herbert Tuttle, January 19, 1925, 811.412/165, RG 59, NA.
- ⁹Source: 811.412/166. Drafted by Charles Evans Hughes.
- ¹⁰The Isle of Pines Treaty ceded the Isle of Pines to Cuba. The treaty was concluded in 1904, but the Senate refused to take any action at that time and for the next 21 years. Action and approval came in 1925, soon after this exchange of correspondence.

**REPORT ON THE THIRD KREFELD GERMAN-AMERICAN HISTORICAL SYMPOSIUM:
"GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE
ERA OF WORLD WAR I, 1900-1924."**

May 24-27, 1990
Krefeld, West Germany

**I. THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN
SYSTEM OF POWERS**

Chair: Hans-Jurgen Schroder, University of
Giessen

Ragnhild Fiebig-Von Hase, University of Cologne:
"The United States and Germany in the World Arena, 1900-
1917"

Edward E. Hannigan, Suffolk University:
"Continentalism and *Mitteleuropa* as Points of Departure for
Comparison of American and German Foreign Relations in
the Early Twentieth Century"

Commentators:

Raimund Lammersdorf, Free University of Berlin
Wolfgang Mommsen, University of Dusseldorf
Peter Theiner, University of Dusseldorf

II. CULTURAL RELATIONS IN DECLINE

Chair: Hartmut Lehmann, German Historical
Institute

Frank Trommler, University of Pennsylvania: "Years
of Estrangement, German-American Cultural Relations,
1900-1917"

Reinhard R. Doerries, University of Erlangen-
Nurnberg: "Promoting Kaiser and Reich: Imperial German
Propaganda in the U.S. during World War I"

Paul Finkelman SUNY at Binghamton: "German
Victims and American Oppressors, 1917-1925"

Commentators:

Elliot Shore, Princeton University
Jorg Nagler, German Historical Institute

III. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHANGE UNDER DURESS

Chair: Knut Borchardt, University of Munich

Gerald D. Feldman, University of California, Berkeley:
"War Economy and Controlled Economy: The Discrediting
of 'Socialism'"

David M. Kennedy, Stanford University: "The
Transformation of a Laissez-Faire Society in Pursuit of
Victory: The United States in World War I"

Commentors

Norbert Finzsch, German Historical Institute

Gerd Hardach, University of Marburg

Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich, Free University of Berlin

IV. IMPERIALISM AND REVOLUTION

Chair: Werner Link, University of Cologne

Lloyd C. Gardner, Rutgers University: "The United States,
the German Peril, and a Revolutionary World: The
Inconsistencies of World Order and National Self-
Determination"

Lana Garces, Washington, D.C.: "The German Challenge to
the Monroe Doctrine in Mexico, 1917"

Georges Soutou, Sorbonne, Paris: "German Economic War
Aims Reconsidered: The American Perspective"

Peter Kruger, University of Marburg: "German Disap-
pointment and Anti-Western Resentment"

Commentors:

Lloyd E. Ambrosius, University of Nebraska

Klaus Schwabe, University of Aachen

V. ISOLATION OR RECONSTRUCTION?

Chair: Joan Hoff-Wilson, Indiana University

Elisabeth Glaser-Schmidt, University of Cologne:
"German-American Planning in Restoring a Liberal World
Trade System"

Stephen A. Schuker, Brandeis University: "Origins of
American Stabilization Policy; The Financial Dimension"

Commentators:

Michael Behnen, University of Gottingen

Manfred Berg, Free University of Berlin

For further details, including information concerning plans for publication of the conference proceedings, please contact:

Hans-Jurgen Schroder
Historisches Institut
Otto-Behaghel Str. 10
6300 Giessen 1
West Germany
Phone (0)641-7025485 or /86 (office)

THE ON-GOING ISSUE OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS SERIES

The members of the SHAFR Council, meeting in August at the University of Maryland, decided that the letter of Sheldon Krys in the *New York Times* and the essay by William Slany which appeared in *The Federalist* should be included in the SHAFR Newsletter.

To the Editor (of N.Y. Times):

The record of the Department of State in making information available to the public is excellent, contrary to the impression conveyed by Prof. Warren I. Cohen (Op-Ed, May 8) and your May 16 editorial. As the person responsible for the records systems of the department, I am aware of the extent and variety of our efforts. Most governments in the free world have far more stringent controls on release of classified documents. The documentation released through the Foreign Relations of the United States series and the hundreds of thousands of pages of information released annually through the Freedom of Information and systematic review processes provide richness and detail about United States foreign policy to historians, political scientists and interested citizens unmatched by any other government.

In the last four years, for example, the department has published 31 volumes in the Foreign Relations of the United States series, a 50 percent increase over the previous four years. In the fiscal year ended last Sept. 30, we released half a million pages under the Freedom of Information Act. As the result of our systematic review program, we have annually reviewed and turned over to the National Archives 300,000 to 500,000 additional pages. There has also been increased allocation of resources at a time of budgetary stringencies imposed by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation.

We continue to search for better technology to meet our responsibilities. The Historical Advisory Committee has been asked specifically for recommendations on improving the

department's historical works to reflect changing conditions in foreign relations in the last 30 years.

Even after 30 years, many foreign-policy issues remain remarkably alive and tied to present activities, as can be seen in the interest in the Foreign Relations of the United States series. This continuity is also apparent in our daily conduct of relations with other countries. We are made constantly aware of the connection between past and the present and that releasing sensitive information—even from decades ago—may adversely affect our ability to do business with these countries and to advance our national interests. Congress, recognizing this, has provided a legal exception to all of the Central Intelligence Agency's operational files from the Freedom of Information Act.

Sheldon J. Kryz
Assistant Secretary of State
for Diplomatic Security
Washington, May 25, 1990

THE FOREIGN RELATIONS SERIES: CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE

by
William Z. Slany,
Chief Historian (U.S. Dept of State)

The Department of State's historical documentary series has been published almost continuously for over 138 years. During its first 40 years, the record was published at the end of the year covered or early the following year. With the emergence of the United States as a great power, policymakers began to scrutinize the record increasingly carefully, withholding documents if they complicated ongoing negotiations. The process of compiling and reviewing each year's record took longer and publication was often delayed. The modern *Foreign Relations* series began in the late 1920s with the recruitment of a professional historical staff and a directive from Secretary of State Frank Kellogg that still is the basic guideline for compiling and publishing the official historical foreign affairs record. The systematic review of selected documents for current policy sensitivity and the securing of permissions to print foreign government documents dates from the late 1920s. After World War II, the development of an ever more effective and elaborate information security system still further complicated the task of the Department's historians.

The Department has published 175 volumes in the series since 1945 and succeeded in maintaining the highest scholarly standards, but by the 1970s the volumes were more than 30 years behind the events. The Department historians have continuously modified and updated procedures in order to assure the integrity of the published volumes. The scholarly community, through the Department's Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, was an active party in these persistent efforts at self reform. It was, however, difficult for the Department to change its documentary editing principles and procedures rapidly enough to keep up with the growing size and complexity of the record.

Concerns in the professional scholarly community, the media, and the Congress regarding the ability of the *Foreign Relations* series to maintain the traditional level of completeness of its volumes reached a peak this spring. Many of the 75 or so volumes dealing with the Eisenhower administration's foreign policy have been published, and several of them reflected particularly vividly the limitations within which historical documentary editing and publishing must now operate. A 700-page volume on relations with South Asia in the mid-1950's appeared to lack the rich variety of documents published in earlier volumes on the subject. Volumes on relations with Iran for 1951-1954 (published in 1989) and with Latin America for 1952-1954 (published in 1984) included only incomplete fragments of the official record regarding U.S. policy toward the violent changes of government in Iran in 1953 and in Guatemala in 1954. Important high-level documents were published in volumes dealing with Asia with key portions omitted.

These incidents confirmed the fears among some in the academic community that a pattern of incompleteness was emerging in the documentation printed in the series, depriving *Foreign Relations* of its reputation for accuracy and comprehensiveness. The professional societies, the media, and the Congress have asked the Department to remedy the perceived problems and restore their confidence in the series.

The Department of State has reviewed in great detail its own methodologies and identified several areas of special concern. The most serious problem by far is gaining access for Department historians to the historical files of the many Federal agencies which have had major roles in the preparation or conduct of foreign affairs. Some agencies have no historical records program or procedures, and some do not have the resources available to assist Department historians in their research efforts.

Other restraints on access are caused by the need to protect national security information and by the resource implications of reviewing and researching diverse collections of files. The declassification procedure, mandated by the terms of Executive Order 12356 of 1982, is necessarily

detailed, careful, and sometimes time-consuming. The system generally works well. State secrets have been properly protected, and no inadvertent disclosures of protected material have occurred in the pages of the *Foreign Relations* volumes. Overall, five percent or less of the documents selected for *Foreign Relations* book manuscripts have been deleted in the declassification process. These deletions do not often compromise the accuracy of the published record. If the declassification process errs in the direction of excessive protection or if some critical body of information is withheld, decisions must be appealed until an accurate record can be assembled for publication. This can result in serious postponement of the publication of volumes.

The Department's Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation not only provides Department historians with invaluable advice on the design and editing of the series, it also provides private sector evaluation of the scholarly standards applied to the preparation of volumes. The Committee has made clear to the Department its inability to determine whether the lack of historical completeness of some recently published volumes was the consequence of the principles of selection being used by Department historians or was the result of deletions in the declassification of the original manuscript. Michigan State University professor Warren Cohen, who resigned as chairman in February 1990, wanted access to the documents denied declassification in order to assess whether their deletion compromised the accuracy of the remaining record proposed for a *Foreign Relations* volume.

Despite the complexities and constraints imposed upon the preparation and publication of the *Foreign Relations* series, an authoritative, accurate historical documentary record of American foreign policy is possible, but only if policymakers, historians, records managers, archivists, and declassification experts throughout the government work closely and cooperatively with one another within the requirements of national security information procedures. The steps outlined below provide the outline of an action plan that can assure compilation and publication of an accurate and comprehensive foreign policy record.

First, it will be necessary to expand the scope of research for the *Foreign Relations* series to all government agencies and assure that priority is provided to such research. Special attention will have to be paid to providing a sound record of the relationship between foreign policy and intelligence.

Second, the declassification process will have to be refined and facilitated in order to assure the full disclosure of an accurate historical record that is consonant with the laws and executive directives regulating the protection of national security information. The objective of such a retuning is not any fundamental revision of the present procedures but an assurance that declassification decisions are made with full information about the issues and their historical context and that appeals are carried out expeditiously.

Third, readers of the *Foreign Relations* volumes will be better informed about the methodologies of compilation and the significance of omissions of important bodies of information. The Department's historians have already begun, in the most recently published volumes, to provide a precise account of the extent of omissions of documents or portions of documents because of their continued classification.

Fourth, the Department of State will call upon its Historical Advisory Committee to provide better advice and recommendations for maintaining the scholarly quality of the *Foreign Relations* volumes. The Department will develop procedures for providing the Advisory Committee with adequate access to still-classified information in order for the Committee to evaluate the impact on the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the volumes of deletions required by the declassification review process. The Advisory Committee can support the Department's ongoing efforts to modernize and accelerate the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series by broadening the Committee's program for prepublication review of volumes and expanding its advice on the planning of new volumes.

The *Foreign Relations* series had earned, over the years, its reputation for integrity in publishing the historical record. The Department's historians are certain that the series will continue to do so in the future.

PUBLICATIONS

- Edward M. Bennett (Washington State University), *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Victory: American-Soviet Relations, 1939-1945*. Scholarly Resources, 1990. ISBN 0-8420-2365-8, \$13.95
- Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies*. Yale Univ. Press, 1990. Hardcover: ISBN 0-3000-4445-3, \$50.00; paper: ISBN 0-3000-4446-1, \$19.95
- Justus D. Doenecke, ed., *In Danger Undaunted: The Anti-Interventionist Movement of 1940-1941 as Revealed in the Papers of the America First Committee*. Hoover Institution Press, 1990. Hardcover: ISBN 0-8179-8841-6, \$35.95; paper: ISBN 0-8179-8842-4, \$25.95
- James L. Gormly (Washington and Jefferson College), *From Potsdam to the Cold War: Big Three Diplomacy, 1945-1947*. Scholarly Resources, 1990. Paper, ISBN 0-8420-2335-6, \$13.95
- Kenneth J. Hagan (U.S. Naval Academy), *This People's Navy: The Making of American Sea Power*. The Free Press, 1990. ISBN 0-02-913470-6, \$27.95.
- Patrick J. Hearden, ed., *Vietnam: Four American Perspectives*. Purdue University Press, 1990. Cloth: ISBN 1-55753-002-5, \$17.50; paper: ISBN 1-55753-003-3, \$9.95
- Robert C. Hilderbrand (University of South Carolina), *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security*. Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1990. ISBN 0-8078-1894-1, \$39.95
- Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State University), et. al., eds., *NATO After Forty Years*. Scholarly Resources, 1990. Paper, ISBN 0-8420-2367-4, \$13.95
- Francis Loewenheim, Harold Langley (Smithsonian), and Manfred Jonas (Union), *Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence*. DaCapo Press, 1990. ISBN 0-306-80390-9, \$17.95

Amikam Nachamani (Hebrew University), *International Intervention in the Greek Civil War: The United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans, 1947-1952*. Praeger Publishers, 1990. ISBN 0-2759-3367-9, \$45.00

Richard B. Speed, III (Hercules, California), *Prisoners, Diplomats, and the Great War: A Study in the Diplomacy of Captivity*. Greenwood Press, 1990. ISBN 0-3132-6729-4, \$45.00

Randall Bennett Woods (Univ. of Arkansas), *A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations, 1941-1946*. Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1990. ISBN 0-8078-1877-1.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

SHAFR CALL FOR PAPERS

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations will hold its annual meeting June 19-21, 1991, at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C.

The Program Committee for SHAFR 1991 wishes to announce a call for papers. We welcome standard research papers in all fields of American Foreign Relations, and especially that relate to the theme of the 1991 conference, "Making War, Making Peace." In addition, the committee would like to experiment with some different types of sessions. We hope to offer at least one panel featuring provocative "think pieces" of approximately twenty minutes, appropriately documented. The following topics were suggested by committee members as potential sessions: (1) Challenges to the Conventional Wisdom; (2) Comparative Studies of Presidential Leadership in Times of Crisis; (3) How the US regarded the world, and was in turn regarded by the world, in 1791, 1891, and 1991; (4) The Peace Record of Generals as opposed to Civilians in the White House; (5) The Republican vs. the Democratic Record on War and Peace; (6) A Reevaluation of Classic Works in American Diplomatic History (for example, William A. Williams' *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*.)

The deadline is December 15, 1990.

Please send a brief vita and a one-page abstract of your paper and/or panel to:

Sandra C. Taylor
Department of History
University of Utah
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112

NATIONAL ARCHIVES PRIMARY CONTACT LIST

To assist researchers in their preparation for research visits to the National Archives in Washington, a primary contact list with names and phone numbers for over 100 subjects is available from the Textual Reference Division, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 20408.

WORLD WAR II - A 50 YEAR PERSPECTIVE

Siena College is sponsoring its sixth annual *multidisciplinary* conference on the 50th anniversary of World War II. The focus for 1991 will be 1941-though papers dealing with broad issues of earlier years will be welcomed. Topics welcome include: Fascism and Nazism; the War in Asia; Literature; Art; Film; Diplomatic; Political and Military History; Popular Culture and Women's and Jewish Studies dealing with the era. Asian, African, Latin American and Near Eastern topics of relevance are solicited. Obviously, collaboration and collaborationist regimes, the events in Greece, Yugoslavia and the Balkans in general, as well as North Africa, the invasion of Russia, Pearl Harbor, etc. will be of particular relevance.

The deadline for submissions is December 15, 1990.

Send replies and inquiries to:

Professor Thomas O. Kelly, II
Department of History
Siena College
Loudonville, NY 12211

THE UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT FOREIGN POLICY SEMINAR

In the fall semester 1990, the seminar will hear two historians on Asian topics. On October 5 Professor Akira Iriye of Harvard University will discuss postwar Japanese-American relations, the subject of a forthcoming work. On November 30 Professor Edmund S. Wehrle of the University of Connecticut will explore the Marshall Mission to China, the subject of his next book.

In the spring semester, Robert Estabrook, formerly of the *Washington Post*, will present a memoir/history of the 1960s: "Journalists and Foreign Policy." He will address the seminar on February 8, 1991.

The seminar especially welcomes for an evening of conversation and friendship instructors and graduate students in New England who work in the history of foreign relations, foreign policy analysis, area studies, and international studies in general. Presentations are followed by discussion, reception, and dinner. Summaries of each session are prepared and distributed.

For notices of meetings and information, please contact:

Professor Thomas G. Paterson
Department of History
241 Glenbrook Road
University of Connecticut
Storrs, CT 06269-2013

S.S.I. MEMBERSHIP DRIVE

The Society for the Study of Internationalism (SSI) is launching a membership drive aimed at social scientists, historians, and others with a scholarly interest in internationalism.

Founded in the early eighties, this SSI aims to bring together scholars with common interests. We publicize our research, jointly sponsor sessions with groups like the ISA and SHAFR, lobby for increased access to official research collections, and generally promote study in the field of internationalism and international organization. Our Newsletter appears twice each year. Among its features are articles listing new work in the field. Beginning in 1990, the Newsletter will review books of special importance.

Our rejuvenated group is among the few genuinely interdisciplinary organizations addressing internationalist themes. Dues are modest: only \$10 for two years.

Those interested in joining (or in getting further information) should contact:

Dr. Joseph Baratta, Executive Secretary
S.S.I.
P.O. Box 244
Cambridge, MA 02141

SEMINAR ON RESEARCH ABOUT INTELLIGENCE

A two-week seminar for scholars with research interests in intelligence and its interrelationship with international relations, history, law, politics, sociology and related disciplines is scheduled for August 1991. The seminar is sponsored by the International Studies Association's Intelligence Studies Section (ISS) and the Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (CSI).

Applications are invited from: (i) young scholars (ABD and beyond) conducting research in intelligence studies; and (ii) experienced scholars seeking to incorporate intelligence issues into their research activities. Applicants will be asked to submit a detailed research proposal or drafts of work in progress.

At the seminar, participants' proposals and preliminary findings will be discussed with specialists from academia and government as well as the other participants. The seminar will also focus on archival resources and research methods dealing with intelligence materials.

Applications will be reviewed beginning in December 1990. The final deadline for applications is February 1, 1991. Approximately 25 applicants will be selected. Round trip travel as well as room and board at the seminar will be provided. Funding for the program is being provided solely by grants from private U.S. foundations.

For application forms contact:

Dr. Roy Godson
Consortium for the Study of Intelligence
1730 Rhode Island Ave., NW Suite 601
Washington, DC 20036
Telephone: (202) 429-0129

CALL FOR PAPERS

The International Society for the Comparative Study of Civilizations will hold its 20th Annual Meeting, May 30—June 2, 1991, Santo Domingo (The Dominican Republic).

The ISCSC seeks to provide a forum for scholarly inquiry and exchange of ideas along a number of lines: the comparison of whole civilizations; the development of theories or methods especially useful in comparative civilizational perspective; specific comparison across cultural axes; interdisciplinary and other approaches to issues in civilizational studies.

The "Comparative Civilizational Perspective" which the Society advocates is designed to shed new light either on the processes, structures and texts of single civilizations or on the problems of interpreting and comparing civilizations with methods from both the humanities and the social sciences.

Deadline for abstracts is November 1, 1990. Send inquiries and abstracts to:

Professor Elpodio Laguna-Diaz,
Program Chair
1991 ISCSC Meeting
Hispanic Civilization and Language
Studies Program
Rutgers University
Conklin Hall-175 University Avenue
Newark, New Jersey 07102

CONTRIBUTORS SOUGHT

Anne Cipriano Venzon, Ph.D., seeks contributors to *The Encyclopedia of the First World War*, one of eight volumes in Garland Publishing's forthcoming series *Encyclopedia of American Wars*. The volume will include diplomatic topics, as well as biographies of key individuals.

For further information, prospective participants can write

Dr. Anne Venzon
14509 Triple Crown Place
Darnestown, Maryland 20878

FOURTH SOVIET-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM

The 4th U.S.-Soviet symposium on World War II will be held 16-18 October, 1990 at Rutgers University. Ted Wilson (Wilson Center) and Warren Kimball (Rutgers) are leading the U.S. side and G. N. Sevost'ianov is head of the Soviet delegation. For further information contact Warren Kimball.

MOSCOW CONFERENCE

The Soviet Coordinating Committee for the Eisenhower Centennial will hold a conference in Moscow, November 12-17, 1990. For further information contact the Eisenhower Institute, 918 16th St. NW Suite 401, Washington, DC 20006. Telephone (202) 223-6710.

BRADLEY'S BERLIN SEMINAR

June 7-26, 1991

Seminar for College Faculty on German Politics and History conducted by German faculty in English Language. Visits to Weimar, Dresden, Bonn, as well as Berlin. Apply early, invitations sent in Fall, 1990. Write to:

Lester H. Brune
History Department
Bradley University
Peoria, IL 61625

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY CONFERENCE

The Center for the Study of the Presidency announces its twenty-first annual leadership conference, "Congress and the Presidency of the 1950s and the 1990s," to be held at the Marriott at the Capitol, Austin, Texas, October 26-28, 1990. This will be the Center's primary observance of the Centennial of the birth of Dwight David Eisenhower, who inspired this Center's founding.

IKE'S AMERICA CONFERENCE

On October 4-6, 1990, the University of Kansas will sponsor a conference celebrating the centennial of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's birth. The following SHAFR members plan to participate.

Stephen Ambrose	Dennis Merrill
Jeffrey G. Barlow	Anna K. Nelson
Gunter Bischof	Cathal J. Nolan
H.W. Brands	Chester J. Pach, Jr.
Douglas Brinkley	Ronald W. Pruessen
Jeff Broadwater	Stephen J. Randall
Edward W. Chester	David Reynolds
Alexander S. Cochran	John Rossi
Lynn Dunn	John P. Ryan
Karen Garner	Michael Schaller
Thomas M. Gaskin	Frederick H. Schapsmeier
Peter L. Hahn	Sayuri Shimizu
Daniel F. Harrington	James F. Siekmeier
Travis Beal Jacobs	Jonathan M. Soffer
Naoki Kamimura	Elizabeth L. Steele
Theresa L. Kraus	Duane Tananbaum
Lorraine M. Lees	Martin M. Teasley
Edward J. Marolda	Theodore A. Wilson
Wendell R. Mauter	Randall B. Woods
Robert J. McMahon	Thomas Zoumaras

PERSONALS

Tadashi Aruga (Higashi-Kurume, Japan) has attended a conference in Hawaii dealing with the Amerasians in Hawaii and on the US mainland.

Paolo E. Coletta (retired Professor of History, U.S. Naval Academy), during April 1990 offered a seminar in U.S. Naval History at the University of Genoa, Italy. He was the recipient of an Academic Specialist Grant tendered by the U.S. Information Agency.

Richard A. Harrison (Pomona College) has been promoted to full professor.

Michael Hunt (North Carolina) is spending the year, '90-'91, at the Wilson Center researching Chinese Communists' relations with the United States.

Robert McMahon (University of Florida) has been awarded a grant by the Kennedy Library Foundation for work on the Kennedy Administration's approach to the neutralist or non-aligned countries.

Charles S. Maier (Harvard) opened the program of the March 9th, John F. Kennedy Library sponsored conference "1990/Europe" with the keynote address, "Historical Perspectives: The Marshall Plan and 1992."

Frederick Marks (Forest Hills) addressed the "Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern America Conference" at Hofstra University, April 21, 1990. The title of his talk was "Theodore Roosevelt, American Foreign Policy, and the Lessons of History."

Henry E. Mattox of Chapel Hill, N.C., has been awarded a Fulbright grant to lecture in Nigeria. He will teach courses in American history and U.S. foreign policy during the 1990-91 Academic year.

Ann Miller Morin (Washington D.C.) was recently awarded a Public Service Grant by the American Association of University Women and has also received financial assistance from the State Historical Societies of Minnesota, Texas and New Jersey to help with the expenses of transcribing oral histories of U.S. women chiefs of diplomatic missions.

Thomas Noer (Carthage College) had been awarded a research grant by the Gerald R. Ford Foundation for a study of "The Ford Administration and Southern Africa."

Cathal J. Nolan has taken a position in International Relations and American Foreign Policy at Miami University (Ohio).

Barney J. Rickmann III has joined the faculty at Valdosta State.

Klaus Schwabe (University of Technology, Aachen, West Germany) has been awarded the Konrad-Adenauer-chair at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. He will teach the history of international relations in the 20th century for the academic year 1990-91.

Ronald H. Spector will become professor of history and international relations at George Washington University in the fall of 1990.

SHAFR members Susan E. Kennedy, Alexander S. Cochran, Jr., Theresa L. Kraus, Peter L. Hahn, and Joseph O'Grady participated in the Siena College conference titled "World War II: 1940—A 50 Year Perspective," May 31-June 1, 1990.

SHAFR members Jeffery Livingston, Sandra Taylor, Terry Anderson, Robert Schulzinger, Jonathan Goldstein, Steve Potts, Robert J. McMahon, Jeffrey Kimball, Scott L. Bills, Geoffrey S. Smith, Roberto Rabel, William Berman, Randall B. Woods, and David Anderson participated in the "Vietnam Antiwar Movement Conference—The Charles DeBenedetti Memorial Conference"—May 4-5, 1990 sponsored by the University of Toledo and the Council on Peace Research in History.

Regina



Books

SPECIAL SHAFR DISCOUNT

**AMERICAN-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS,
1770s-1990s** James K. Libbey

Libbey has succeeded in summarizing the basic economic activities in the long commercial relationship between the United States and Russia.

"It strikes me that we don't have anything like it."

Lloyd Gardner, Rutgers University.

"I think it is very good—informative, balanced, thoughtful...."

Raymond L. Garthoff, Brookings Institution.

1989 \$21.95 cloth [ISBN 0-941690-35-0], \$12.95 paper [ISBN 0-941690-36-9], \$9.95 text **SHAFR Discount \$7.00**

**AMERICA SEES RED: Anti-Communism in America,
1890s to 1980s. A Guide to Issues & References** Peter H.
Buckingham.

"I was greatly impressed by the thoroughness of the author's survey of issues, especially in the post-World War II period."—

—Professor Robert Griffith, University of Massachusetts at Amherst

220 pages (1987) \$21.95 cloth [ISBN 0-941690-23-7] \$12.95 pbk [ISBN 0-941690-22-9] \$9.95 text **SHAFR Discount \$7.00**

**EMPIRE ON THE PACIFIC: A Study in American
Continental Expansion** Norman A. Graebner.

Graebner contends that Texas, California, and Oregon were acquired so that eastern merchants could gain control of the harbors at San Diego, San Francisco, and Puget Sound—and thereby increase their lucrative trade with the Far East.

LCCN 82-22680. Reprint ed. with updated bibliography. 278 pages.
(1983) \$19.95 cloth [ISBN 0-87436-033-1], \$11.95 pbk, \$9.95 text
SHAFR Discount \$7.00

Offer expires December 15, 1990

Individuals only, please

THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES. Raymond R. Esthus. The story of Roosevelt's role as a pragmatic diplomat, employing secret diplomacy to placate rivalries without involving his country in commitments abroad. This account deals both with TR's involvement in European and East Asian controversies. Bibliography, index.

165 pages. (1971, 1982) \$8.95 text **SHAFR Discount \$6.00**

THE MISSILE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1962: A Review of Issues and References. Lester Brune.

"Brune skillfully...scrutinizes the origins of the major issues and analyses the reaction and response of Washington and Moscow, relating them to domestic politics and international affairs....Highly recommended as a brief, analytical review of the crisis situation." —*Choice* (April 1986)

165 pages (1985) \$ 7.95 text **SHAFR Discount \$6.00**

Libbey. <i>Economics</i>	discount \$7.00	_____
Buckingham. <i>America Sees Red</i>	discount \$7.00	_____
Graebner <i>Empire on Pacific...</i>	discount \$7.00	_____
Esthus. <i>Theodore Roosevelt</i>	discount \$6.00	_____
Brune. <i>Missle Crisis</i>	discount \$6.00	_____

Offer limited to *individuals* only. All orders must be pre-paid (a personal check is fine): Regina Books will pay the postage of orders of 3 or more books. California orders, please add 6% sales tax.

sub-total _____

postage (\$1 per title) _____

TOTAL _____

Ship to:

Name: _____

Address _____

Send to: Regina Books, Box 280, Claremont, Ca. 91711

CALENDAR

1990

- November 1 Deadline, materials for the December *Newsletter*.
- November 1-15 Annual election for SHAFR officers.
- November 1 Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.
- December 27-30 The 105th annual meeting of the AHA will be held in New York. The deadline for submissions has passed.

1991

- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
- January 15 Deadline for the 1990 Bernath article award.
- January 15 Deadline for submissions for 1991 Summer SHAFR panels and proposals.
- January 20 Deadline for the 1990 Bernath book award.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for the March *Newsletter*.
- February 1 Submissions for Warren Kuehl Award are due.
- March 1 Nominations for the Bernath lecture prize are due.
- April 1 Applications for the H. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.

- April 11-14 The 84th meeting of the Organization of American Historians will take place in Louisville with headquarters at the Galt House.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June *Newsletter*.
- June 19-22 The 17th annual meeting of SHAFR will take place at the University of Maryland. Sandra Taylor and William Becker are in charge of the program and the arrangements, respectively.
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September *Newsletter*.

The OAH will meet in Chicago in 1992. The program co-chairs are Alan Brinkley, CUNY Graduate School, 33 West 42nd Street, New York, NY 10036, and Maeva Marcus, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, DC 20543.

The OAH will meet April 15-18, 1993 in Anaheim; April 14-17, 1994 in Atlanta; and March 30-April 2, 1995 in Washington.

The AHA schedule for the next several years is:

December 27-30, 1991—Chicago Hilton

December 27-30, 1992—Washington DC Sheraton and Omni Shoreham hotels.

THERE WILL BE NO DECEMBER 1993 AHA MEETING! The next AHA will be held in January 1994 in a yet-to-be-designated-city. Starting in January 1994 the AHA will meet the first Thursday through Saturday after New Year's Day.

AWARDS AND PRIZES

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976 respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and the late Myrna F. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITION

Description: This is a competition for a book which is a history of international relations, which is meant to include biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works which are representative of social science disciplines other than history are *not* eligible. The prize is to be awarded to a first monograph by a young scholar.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent directly to: Mark Stoler, Dept. of History, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT 05401.

Books may be sent at any time during 1990, but should not arrive later than February 1, 1991.

The award of \$2,000.00 will be announced at the March 1991 luncheon of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians in 1991 in Louisville.

Previous Winners:

1972	Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
	Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
1973	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1974	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1975	Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
	Stephen E. Pelz (Massachusetts-Amherst)
1976	Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
1977	Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)

1978	James R. Leutze (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1979	Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston)
1980	Michael Schaller (Arizona)
1981	Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke) Hugh DeSantis (Department of State)
1982	David Reynolds (Cambridge)
1983	Richard Immerman (Hawaii)
1984	Michael H. Hunt (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1985	David Wyman (Massachusetts-Amherst)
1986	Thomas J. Noer (Carthage College)
1987	Fraser J. Harbutt (Emory) James Edward Miller (Department of State)
1988	Michael Hogan (Ohio State)
1989	Stephen G. Rabe (Texas-Dallas)
1990	Walter Hixson (Akron) Anders Stephanson (Rutgers-Newark)

THE STUART L. BERNATH LECTURE PRIZE

Eligibility: The lecture will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the annual meetings of the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer will address himself not specifically to his own research interests, but to broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy.

Procedures: The Bernath Lecture Committee is soliciting nominations for the lecture from members of the Society. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and *curriculum vita*, if available, should reach the Committee no later than March 1, 1991. Nominations should be sent to: Keith Olson, Department of History, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.

The award is \$500.00, with publication in *Diplomatic History*.
Previous Winners

1977	Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
1978	David S. Patterson (Colgate)
1979	Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
1980	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1981	Burton Spivak (Bates College)
1982	Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)
1983	Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt)
1984	Michael J. Hogan (Miami)

- 1985 Michael Schaller (Arizona)
- 1986 William Stueck (Georgia)
- 1987 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Colgate)
- 1988 William O. Walker III (Ohio Wesleyan)
- 1989 Stephen G. Rabe (Texas at Dallas)
- 1990 Richard Immerman (Hawaii)

THE STUART L. BERNATH SCHOLARLY ARTICLE PRIZE

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

Eligibility: Prize competition is open to any article on any topic in United States foreign relations that is published during 1990. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or within 10 years after receiving the Ph.D., at the time of publication. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

Procedures: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* shall be automatically considered without nomination. Other articles may be nominated by the author or by any member of SHAFR or by the editor of any journal publishing articles in American diplomatic history. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted by 15 January 1991 to the chairperson of the committee: Richard Immerman, Department of History, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, HI 96822.

The award of \$300.00 will be presented at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH in 1991 in Louisville.

Previous winners:

- 1977 John C.A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)
- 1978 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
- 1979 Brian L. Villa (Ottawa)
- 1980 James I. Matray (New Mexico State)
David A. Rosenberg (Chicago)
- 1981 Douglas Little (Clark)
- 1982 Fred Pollock (Cedar Knolls, NJ)
- 1983 Chester Pach (Texas Tech)
- 1985 Melvyn Leffler (Vanderbilt)
- 1986 Duane Tananbaum (Ohio State)
- 1987 David McLean (R.M.I.H.E., Australia)
- 1988 Dennis Merrill (Missouri-Kansas City)
- 1989 Robert J. McMahon (Florida)
- 1990 Lester Foltos (Seattle)

THE STUART L. BERNATH DISSERTATION FUND

This prize has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some of the expenses encountered in the concluding phases of writing their dissertations.

Requirements include:

1. The dissertation must deal with some aspect of American foreign relations.
2. Awards are given to help defray costs involved in:
 - (a) consulting original manuscripts that have just become available or obtaining photocopies from such sources,
 - (b) typing, printing, and/or reproducing copies of the dissertation,
 - (c) abstracting the dissertation.
3. Most of the research and writing of the dissertation must be completed at the time application is made. Awards are *not* intended to pay for time to write.
4. Applications must include:
 - (a) A one page curriculum vitae of the applicant, a table of contents for the dissertation, and a substantial synopsis *or* a completed chapter of the dissertation,
 - (b) a paragraph regarding the original sources that have been consulted,
 - (c) a statement regarding the projected date of completion,
 - (d) an explanation of why the money is needed and how, specifically, it will be used, and
 - (e) a letter from the applicant's supervising professor commenting upon the appropriateness of the applicant's request. (This should be sent separately.)
5. One or more awards may be given. Generally awards will not exceed \$500.
6. The successful applicant must file a brief report on how the funds were spent not later than eight months following the presentation of the award (i.e., normally by the following September). In addition, when the dissertation is finished, the awardee should submit to the committee a copy of the abstract sent to University Microfilms (University of Michigan).

Applications should be sent to David Schmitz, Department of History, Whitman College, Walla Walla, WA 99362. The deadline is November 1, 1990.

Previous winners:

- 1985 Jon Nielson (UC-Santa Barbara)
- 1986 Valdinia C. Winn (Kansas) & Walter L. Hixson (Colorado)
- 1987 Janet M. Manson (Washington State), Thomas M. Gaskin (Washington), W. Michael Weis (Ohio State) & Michael Wala (Hamburg)
- 1988 Elizabeth Cobbs (Stanford) & Madhu Bhalla (Queen's, Ontario)
- 1989 Thomas Zeiler (Massachusetts-Amherst) & Russel Van Wyk (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
- 1990 David McFadden (UC-Berkeley)

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Holt Dissertation Fellowship was established as a memorial to W. Stull Holt, one of that generation of historians which established diplomatic history as a respected field for historical research and teaching.

The award will be \$1,500.00.

Applicants must be candidates for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, whose dissertation projects are directly concerned with the history of United States foreign relations. The award is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Qualified applicants will have satisfactorily completed comprehensive doctoral examinations before April 1991, leaving only the dissertation as the sole, remaining requirement for the doctoral degree.

Applicants should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The prospectus should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, and chief source materials. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date should accompany the application and prospectus of the dissertation. In addition, three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one letter from the director of the dissertation, are required.

At the end of the fellowship year the recipient of the fellowship will be required to report to the Committee relating how the fellowship was used.

Applications and supporting papers should be sent before April 1, 1991 to: Frank Costigliola, Department of History, University of Rhode Island, Kingston, RI 02881.

Announcement of the recipient of the Holt Memorial Fellowship will be made at the Society's annual summer meeting.

Prior winners:

1986 Kurt Schultz (Ohio State University)

1987 David W. McFadden (University of California, Berkeley)

1988 Mary Ann Heiss (Ohio State University)

1989 Katherine A.S. Siegel (University of California at Santa Barbara)

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

Conditions of the Award:

The Graebner prize will be awarded, beginning in 1986, to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older.

The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

- (a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;
- (b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;
- (c) describes the candidate's teaching career, listing teaching honors and awards and commenting on the candidate's classroom skills; and
- (d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Chairman of the committee: Lloyd Ambrosius, Dept. of History, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, NE 68588.

Previous winners:

1986 Dorothy Borg (Columbia)

1988 Alexander DeConde (University of California at Santa Barbara)

WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

The award will be made every other year at the SHAFR summer conference. The next award will be for books published in 1989 and 1990. Deadline for submissions is February 1, 1991. One copy of each submission should be sent directly to each member of the selection committee.

Robert Accinelli
Dept. of History
University of Toronto
Toronto M5S 1A
Canada

Harold Josephson
Department of History
U. of N. Carolina/Charlotte
Charlotte, NC 2822

Previous winners:

1987 Harold Josephson (University of North Carolina at Charlotte)

1989 Melvin Small (Wayne State University)

ARTHUR LINK PRIZE FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) proudly announces the establishment of the **Arthur S. Link Prize For Documentary Editing**. The inaugural prize will be awarded at the American Historical Association meeting in December 1991. The prize will be offered thereafter whenever appropriate but no more often than every three years. Eligibility is defined by the following excerpt from the prize rules:

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. Nominations may be made by any person or publisher.

Prize \$500 plus travel expenses to the professional meeting where it is presented.

For all rules and details contact the committee chair. One copy of each entry should be sent directly to each member of the committee.

W. F. Kimball, Chair
19 Larsen Road
Somerset, NJ 08873
Phone: 201-648-5410

M. Giunta, Acting Dir.
NHRPC
Washington, DC
20408

G. C. Herring
Dept. of History
Univ. of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William J. Brinker, Department of History. **EDITORIAL**

ASSISTANTS: Brent York and Tanya Mitchell.

ISSUES: The *Newsletter* is published quarterly.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Changes of address should be sent to:

Executive Secretary-Treasurer: Allan Spetter, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of most back numbers of the *Newsletter* may be obtained from the editorial office upon payment of a charge of \$1.00 per copy: for members living abroad the charge is \$2.00.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered—or published—upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, etc.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

- 1968 Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)
 - 1969 Alexander DeConde (California-Santa Barbara)
 - 1970 Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)
 - 1971 Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)
 - 1972 Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)
 - 1973 Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)
 - 1974 Bradford Perkins (Michigan)
 - 1975 Armin H. Rappaport (California-San Diego)
 - 1976 Robert A. Divine (Texas)
 - 1977 Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)
 - 1978 Akira Iriye (Chicago)
 - 1979 Paul A. Varg (Michigan State)
 - 1980 David M. Pletcher (Indiana)
 - 1981 Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State)
 - 1982 Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa)
 - 1983 Ernest R. May (Harvard)
 - 1984 Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State)
 - 1985 Warren F. Kuehl (Akron)
 - 1986 Betty Unterberger (Texas A&M)
 - 1987 Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut)
 - 1988 Lloyd Gardner (Rutgers)
 - 1989 George Herring (Kentucky)
-