



The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

NEWSLETTER

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SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Founded in 1967. Chartered in 1972.

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MEMBERSHIP: Anyone interested in U.S. diplomatic history is invited to become a member. Annual dues are \$5.00, payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Membership fees for retired members and for students are \$3.00 per year, while institutional affiliations are \$10.00. Life memberships are \$75.00.

MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in August. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZE: The Stuart L. Bernath Prize of \$500.00 is awarded each year at the spring meeting of the Society to that person whose first or second book in U.S. diplomatic history is adjudged the best for the previous year.

ROSTER: A complete listing of the members with addresses and their current research projects is issued in even years to all members. (A supplemental list is mailed in odd years). Editor of the **Roster & Research List** is Warren F. Kimball, Department of History, Rutgers University (Newark), Newark, New Jersey 07102.

A NEW AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY*

by

Armin Rappaport

This eighth decade of the twentieth century, like the final decade of the nineteenth century, is one of transition and transformation in our foreign policy. It is a time of change and marks the end of one era and the beginning of another. The old era which began at the close of the Second World War and during which the United States played a dominant role in international affairs, acting as the free world's policeman, banker, and guarantor, is being replaced by something quite different. Exactly what the new era will be like is impossible to say but different it will surely be. It has been characterized in various ways. William P. Rogers, while secretary of state in 1970, thought it would be a time when the United States would play an active rather than a preponderant role in world affairs. Richard M. Nixon talked of it in terms of "shared responsibility." James Reston described it as a period when America would follow the rule "half-speed astern" instead of "full speed ahead." And Carol Laise, when an assistant secretary of State in 1974, predicted that the new foreign policy would see the United States moving from "a paternal mission for others to a co-operating mission with others." However the new era is expressed, it adds up to what seems to be a foreign policy more moderate, more temperate, more restrained, less aggressive, less impetuous, and less involved.

A comparison of the language of the Truman Doctrine of 1947 with the Nixon Doctrine of 1969 graphically illustrates the difference between the old and the new. "I believe," said President Harry S. Truman, "that it must be the policy of the United States to support peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by armed pressures. I believe we must assist free peoples to work out their own destinies in their own way . . . the free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their freedoms." How different is the central thesis of the Nixon Doctrine! "America," said Nixon, "cannot--and will not--conceive **all** the plans, design **all** the programs, execute **all** the decisions, and undertake **all** the defenses of the free world."

Similarly, a reading of the Kennedy inaugural of 1961 and Nixon's second inaugural in 1973 reveal the extent of the transformation in our foreign policy. On January 20, 1961, a newly-elected John F. Kennedy affirmed "Let every nation know, whether it wish us well or ill, that

*This paper was delivered as the presidential address at the luncheon of SHAFR, December 28, 1975, during the annual convention of the AHA in Atlanta. Dr. Rappaport is professor of history at the University of California (San Diego).

we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardships, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty." On January 21, 1973, Richard M. Nixon pledged, "We shall do our share in defending peace and freedom in the world. But we shall expect others to do their share. The time has passed when America will make every other nation's conflict our own, or make every other nation's future our responsibility or presume to tell the people of other nations how to manage their own affairs."

Whatever one may think of Richard Nixon, and despite his renewal of the bombing of North Vietnam and his extending the war to Cambodia, it was he who took major steps to inaugurate the new foreign policy--disengagement from the Vietnam war in 1973, opening relations with mainland China and removing American objections to that country's admission to the United Nations, and the accommodation with the Soviet Union leading to a trade agreement, to limitation of strategic arms, and to opening a dialogue for a mutual reduction of forces in Europe. There is no doubt that the Ford Administration continues the policy of its predecessor as evidenced by the signing of the Helsinki agreement and the visit to mainland China. Further evidence may be adduced from the President's dismissal of Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger who has been the prime advocate of a tougher position towards the Communist bloc and from Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger's Detroit speech in November of 1975. Kissinger observed in his address that the Soviet intervention in Angola menaced **detente** but nowhere was there a threat or even a hint of American military retaliation. (I consider the pouring of clandestine funds into Angola by the CIA to be an aberration soon to be terminated by Congress).

The Congress, also, has reflected the transformation in a variety of ways. There are the numerous resolutions in the last few years to end the Vietnam war, to reduce the number of American troops in Europe, to diminish our contribution to the United Nations, and to pare the appropriations for foreign aid. Even so stalwart a defender of the old order as Senator J. Strom Thurmond said in February of 1975 that "we should approach future aid with a definite phase-down point." And the Administration's request for 300 million dollars in supplementary aid to Vietnam and 222 million for Cambodia for 1975 was not seriously considered by Congress. Significant, too, is the increasing resistance to, and critical questioning of, the Pentagon's budget for military expenditures for ourselves and our allies. A hearing in February of this year by the House Armed Services Committee on the military budget for 1976 is revealing. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger defended increased demands with the observation that "Western European nations are small and medium-sized states and are no longer able to stand up against super-powers. We will have to serve as the backbone of the alliance." To which the chairman, Representative Melvin Price of Illinois (whose recent selection as chairman to replace the hawk F. Edward Hébert is in itself a reflection of the transformation) responded with the warning that funds truly necessary for national defense would be provided but that there would

be no approval for programs which were not fully and adequately justified. And on the Senate side, there was the colloquy in the same month between Schlesinger and Senator John C. Culver of Iowa. Schlesinger claimed a huge defense budget indispensable "if we are going to protect the kind of world we have had since 1945." To which Culver replied, "We may have gotten to the crossroads where the United States does not have to be first in every respect in defense." And one must not lose sight of the fact that the defense share of the Federal budget has been reduced by Congress--from 41.5% in 1966 to 26.9% for 1976; from 7.7% of the GNP to 5.8%.

Nor must it be forgotten that Congress enacted a series of crucial measures which further reflected the transformation--the Nunn-Jackson amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 which provided for a reduction of American forces in Europe if the Europeans did not increase their share of the cost of defending that continent; Section 30 of the same act which prohibited the use of funds for military operations in or over Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia; and the War Powers Act of 1973 which curtailed the presidential capability to wage war without Congressional consent. Nor was it merely coincidental that Senator Edmund S. Muskie resigned in January of 1975 from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in order to concentrate on his chairmanship of the new Senate Budget Committee. Secretary of State Kissinger tried to get him to change his mind, stressing the primacy of foreign affairs, but Muskie refused and the Washington **Post** called the refusal symptomatic of the new era.

Why after 30 years of playing the dominant role in world politics and acting as the leader of the free world would the United States choose to "lower its profile" is a question which will be one of the chief preoccupations of future diplomatic historians. They will, of course, have the advantage of data and perspective denied to the scholar of today. Nonetheless the contemporary student may essay some judgments, albeit with more reticence than confidence.

One is that the transformation of American policy is the consequence of a realization by executive, legislative, and public that the world has undergone vast changes and that the policies and the vocabulary created 25 years ago are no longer applicable; they do not suit the shape of current events. The world of the 1970's is not the world of the 1950's and 1960's. That world was dominated by two super-powers, each master of a portion of the globe and unchallenged by the nations in their spheres who depended upon them for military and economic support. The people in Europe whom we considered our friends and allies were under threat of attack from the people we considered our enemies. Their way of life--freedom and democracy--was thought to be menaced by the forces of communism. And our friends were weak and vulnerable as a result of wartime destruction and devastation while our enemies, despite their suffering by war and revolution, were considered capable of achieving their aggressive designs. The United Nations consisted of 51 member states and it was very much dominated by the United States which could count on most of the 20 Latin American

votes plus its loyal European and Asian allies.

How different is the world today! How the global relationships have been radically altered! President Nixon, in his annual report to Congress entitled **A Foreign Policy for the 1970's** which he began in 1970 and ended somewhat abruptly in 1973, stressed some of the changes as the basis for the transformation of American foreign policy. He noted the tremendously increased strength and capability of our friends and allies which render them less vulnerable to attack than in earlier times. He talked of the replacement of the bipolar world by multiple centers of power and influence--to the Soviet Union and the United States must be added mainland China, Japan, and the European community as makeweights in the international balance. And he mentioned the hostility and rivalry of China and the Soviet Union which has fragmented the once-solid Stalinese bloc and diminished the menace of military invasion from those nations.

It is true, of course, that neither China nor the Soviet Union pose the same threat to our friends and allies which they once did. The Soviet leaders seem no longer interested in launching an attack on the West or of extending their territory by conquest. They have new aims. They are interested in legalizing the territorial gains made on the battlefield and at the conference table between 1941 and 1945. They and their Warsaw Pact allies wish to effect a mutual balanced reduction of military forces in Central Europe to ease tensions and end the risk of a clash of arms. They want to avail themselves of western technology so necessary for their industrial progress. Hence their agreement with West Germany on Poland's western frontier. Hence, their passionate insistence on bringing to a close the Conference on European Security and Cooperation which opened at Helsinki in 1973, with a multilateral treaty signed by the 32 European nations, the Vatican, Canada, and the United States which would make permanent the **status quo** in Europe. Hence their acceptance of the existence of the European Economic Community and their trade negotiations with it and with the United States. Hence the accord on Berlin, the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, and the partial test ban understanding.

There is no better indication of the new Soviet direction than the reaction of the leadership to the economic difficulties the West is undergoing. While gloating publicly over the recession, over unemployment, over falling industrial output and ascribing them to typically bourgeoisie capitalist causes, no attempt has been made to take advantage of the situation even at the risk of displeasing the Communist parties of western Europe. The reasons seem clear enough. Subversion, strikes, or other dislocations by indigenous Communist parties might jeopardize the flow of western goods and technology so crucial to the Soviet Union. Secondly, there is the fear that a collapse of the western nations would result in right-wing takeovers which might lead to a restoration of the darkest days of the Cold War. It is noteworthy, too, that at the parade in Moscow on November

7, 1975, celebrating the 58th anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, the display of weaponry was much more modest than in the past.

As with the Soviet Union, so with mainland China. Once viewed as a wildly belligerent country bent on exporting revolution and forcing communism on its neighbors by conquest with the support of its "elder brother" in the communist international movement, China must now be considered in a different light. Sobered by a wide range of domestic difficulties, uncertain as to the succession of leadership, faced by Soviet hostility, weakened by the cultural revolution, the recent judgment of Edwin O. Reischauer seems correct. "The threat of a unitary world communism sweeping Asia," he wrote, "has largely faded and the menace of Chinese domination--if it ever was a real menace in the military sense--is growing weaker."

In his **Report**, President Nixon took notice of new nations "that have found identity and self-confidence and are acting autonomously on the world stage." He had in mind those states created since the second world war who have virtually seized control of the United Nations. There are 87 of them, carved out of former western colonial territory in Asia and Africa, and they constitute what has come to be known as the "new majority." On several occasions they have demonstrated their power and their independence of the traditional leadership of the U.N. It was they who proposed and shepherded to a successful vote the resolution in October of 1971 to seat mainland China and expel Taiwan. It was they who were responsible in November 1974 for permitting Yasir Arafat, head of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to address the General Assembly and for providing him with the special armchair reserved for visiting heads of states. It was they who, in conjunction with the Arab states, pushed across in November of 1975 the resolution equating Zionism with racism. And it was the same "new majority" which instead of arranging for the celebration in 1975 of the 30th anniversary of the world organization, called for a revision of the charter to reflect the fundamental changes in global relationships.

But it is not only the new nations which have charted independent courses. Old ones, as well, have exhibited a remarkable defiance of the great powers. One need only scan the daily press to conclude that the satellites and clients of the United States and the Soviet Union are no longer docile and subservient followers. Indeed, it may well be that the most important change in the international order has been the fact that the two giants are no longer supreme and unchallenged in their spheres. Despite the Brezhnev Doctrine, the nations of eastern Europe go much their own way. Their trade with the West increases every year. They sell more and more of their best products to the capitalist countries for hard currency and clamor to make the best trade deals with the West irrespective of the wishes of the Soviet Union. Rumania, in fact, has recently promised to ease restrictions on emigration to gain the favorable trade terms stipulated under the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974. In view of the Soviet refusal to accept the conditions of the amendment, the

Rumanian action is all the more impressive. Impressive, too, was the Rumanian call, in November of 1971, for an end to the stationing of foreign troops on the soil of any country, the announcement in April of 1975 of the joint development with Yugoslavia of fighter aircraft powered by Rolls-Royce engines, the rejection, in November of 1975, of a Soviet call for a world congress of communist parties, and the vote, in the same month in the United Nations, against the Zionist-racist resolution which the Soviet Union ardently supported. When in March of 1975, Brezhnev journeyed to Budapest to address a party congress and endorsed the economic and cultural liberalization set in motion by the Hungarian Communists, he was accurately reflecting the new order. Nor can one overlook the declaration in November of 1975 by the leaders of the French and Italian Communist parties that they would seek to gain power in their respective countries by the electoral system--a declaration made without prior consultation with Moscow.

Equally significant is the weakening of the American hold on its allies. The evidence of the erosion of United States influence and the diminution of its hegemony is overwhelming and global. Take Japan, for example. In October of 1971, Tokyo co-sponsored an American resolution in the United Nations which would have made more difficult the expelling of Taiwan but with the greatest reluctance and only half-heartedly. At the same time moves were undertaken to strengthen political and economic ties with Moscow and Peking which culminated in the dispatch in January of 1975 of envoys to those capitols to negotiate peace treaties ending the Second World War. And in the same month, in a speech in Parliament, Prime Minister Miki Takeo clearly diverged from the American Middle Eastern policy by announcing that the Israel-Arab question was inseparable from the oil issue which point Kissinger had vigorously been denying. Diplomatic eyebrows were hardly raised when in May of this year, a spokesman of the Japanese Foreign Office told a group of reporters that "Japan must rectify her position of having relied excessively on the United States." Other Asian allies have similarly manifested their independence of Washington. Thailand, long an acquiescent satellite, is ridding her soil of American military personnel and equipment while the Philippine republic in May of 1975 refused to permit high ranking Vietnamese officials fleeing their country to remain in the American air base outside Manila lest the new Communist masters in Saigon take offense. And in July, President Ferdinand E. Marcos called for a revision of the arrangement by which the United States kept forces in that country and practised extraterritoriality. Of importance, too, was his reply to a greeting by Mao Tse-tung at the time of his five day visit to Peking in June. "All subtle forms of foreign intervention," he said, "must disappear in the new era dawning in Asia."

As for our traditional and safe preserve in Latin America, 12 of the countries voted in November of 1974 at the OAS meeting in Quito to lift sanctions against Cuba, contrary to American wishes and, although it was two short of the two-thirds majority required, several of them went on to establish economic and diplomatic relations with the Castro regime. Several of them, also, refused to par-

ticipate in a hemispheric conference scheduled for the spring of 1975 in retaliation against the United States Trade Act of 1974 which they considered to be discriminatory. And the seizure of several American tuna boats and the levying of stiff fines on their owners by Ecuador earlier this year for violating that nation's self-proclaimed territorial waters reflected not only the growing sense of nationalism and strength of a small country enriched by its oil reserves but also a startling defiance of the Colossus of the North. It should be noted, too, that in recent years, there has been a tendency by the Latin-American nations to set up regional groupings outside the DAS for the purpose either of excluding the United States or of including Cuba. Of immense significance is the increasing identification of Latin America with the Third World. It was in Lima where 80 developing nations held their world congress in August of 1975 under the chairmanship of Peru's foreign minister. And it was Mexico's president who on a visit to Cuba in the same month called for the unity of the developing nations in their dealings with the rest of the world. It was he, also, who in an address to the United Nations General Assembly in October of 1975, talked not the language of the "good neighbor" but rather that of the Third World. In the Zionist-racist resolution, Third World sympathy was reflected in that three Latin American states (Brazil, Mexico, Cuba) voted for the resolution while seven (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru) abstained.

Europe is another case in point. Despite NATO's continued reliance upon the American nuclear capability for protection, the European members of the alliance are no longer the acquiescent junior partners. Witness their conduct at the time of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. When confronted with a choice of pleasing the Arab states or the United States, they chose the former. Italy refused permission to American planes carrying supplies to Israel to fly over its territory, West Germany would not let its ports be used by American ships on the same mission, while the British denied Americans the use of air bases on their soil as staging areas for the airlift to Israel. Five months later, the nine nations of the European Community unanimously agreed to extend broad economic and technical aid to the twenty Arab states, a move which the French premier heralded as "the affirmation of an authentic European personality independent of its world partners." And earlier this year, Italian bankers headed by Guido Carli, governor of the Bank of Italy, frankly urged their government to make the best deal possible with the Arabs independently of the United States.

Then there was the European reception of Henry Kissinger's call for a new Atlantic Charter in April, 1973. Kissinger had in mind a statement linking economics to defense; that is, to connect the American military presence in Europe with the means for paying for it. But Europe ignored the secretary's suggestion and two separate documents were drawn up. As Jens Otto Krag, the Danish head of the community's delegation in Washington noted, the linkage was impossible. Europe was not going to make trade concessions as blackmail to insure the American presence.

Similarly rebuffed was Kissinger's position on the nature of the Atlantic partnership. He envisaged ten representatives--one from each of the nine members of the community and one American--conferring on common problems and then arriving at a policy position; the community had a quite different view. There would be a discussion of common problems, to be sure, but between two representatives--one American and one European, the latter armed with a policy already agreed to by the nine.

Kissinger's now famous interview in **Business Week** of January, 1975, generated a reaction symptomatic of the decline of American leadership. When he threatened the possibility of intervention in the oil crisis, the European allies drew back; they had no intention of following America's lead. Helmut Schmidt, in an interview in **Der Spiegel**, made clear that West Germany was not interested in the use of force and would certainly not be dragged into a war against her will. Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in August 1974 and her resumption of poppy cultivation in July of 1974 as well as Greece's withdrawal of her troops from NATO and the refusal to permit the Sixth Fleet to continue using Athens as a home base offer additional evidence of America's changed international position.

Three matters in the United Nations are significant in assessing the waning of American influence. One was on the question of Chinese representation. Not only did the United States go down to defeat on the expulsion of Taiwan; its best friends and allies voted on the other side and its representatives had to sit in silent humiliation while large numbers of delegates cheered and clapped in glee at the discomfiture of the fallen giant. Second was the vote on the Palestine Liberation Organization--105 in favor, 4 against, 20 abstentions. The United States was one of the four opposed along with Israel, Bolivia, and the Dominican Republic. Among the abstentions were Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, West Germany, Britain, the Netherlands--nations which at one time could be relied upon. Finally, there was the resolution on Zionism and racism which found the United States unable to exert sufficient pressure to get the resolution tabled. The Philippine Foreign Minister, Carlos Romulo, put the matter bluntly when he said, on December 3, 1975, after attending a General Assembly meeting, "Americans must realize that they can no longer run it [the UN] as they used to. . . ."

So has the world undergone change and so must the nation's foreign policy. In the former world, it was perfectly proper and wise to play the role of free world leader but in the new situation, the role is neither desirable nor necessary. "In the era of American preponderance," said President Nixon in his 1971 **Report**, "we resorted to American prescriptions as well as resources. In the new era . . . partnership . . . is physically and psychologically imperative." But even had world conditions not changed, even if our role of free world leader were still necessary, it seems likely that the transformation would have taken place for purely domestic and internal reasons. It

takes no sophisticated analysis or analyst, but only a casual perusal of the remarks of ordinary people in the daily and periodical press and of statements by public officials to discern that the American people have had enough of the position of pre-eminence. They have carried the burden for too long. Senator Russell B. Long, on returning from the Senate's Easter recess in April of 1975, remarked, "A number of presidents felt they could pursue the high-minded policy of making the United States the policeman for the entire world. But the American people are simply not willing to support that policy anymore. The nation is overextended and overcommitted. The American people feel overused." And President Nixon expressed an almost universal American sentiment in his second inaugural with the words, "We have lived too long with the consequences of attempting to gather all power and responsibility in Washington." Henry Kissinger, not normally sensitive to public sentiment, did grasp its essential quality when he noted at an Associated Press luncheon on April 23, 1973, "In the United States, decades of global burdens have fostered . . . a reluctance to sustain global involvement on the basis of predominate American responsibility." Such a position is fatiguing and expensive and it should surprise no one that the American people are eager to lay the burden aside. They are aware that for too long too many grave domestic problems have been neglected because of the distractions and expenses of global involvement. Senator W. Stuart Symington in an interview in February of 1945 recalled with approval a point Walter Lippmann made shortly before his death. "It's about time," he had said, "we stopped worrying about the problems of the people of other lands and started worrying about the problems of the people of the United States."

Central to the whole question of the transformation of our foreign policy is the experience of the war in Vietnam. That experience more than any other factor has caused the American people and their leaders to seek to abandon the role of pre-eminence for a more modest position of partnership and to put an end to the desire to order the universe. It was the decisive watershed in our post-World War II history in that it signalled "the culmination of our post-war policy of maximum intervention abroad." For the American people, the failure to achieve victory in Vietnam and to effect political arrangements there after a decade of fighting, the expenditure of billions of dollars, and the staggering toll of 50,000 dead, and 300,000 wounded, left only a legacy of bitterness and disillusionment and a conviction that it shall not happen again. A high-ranking U.S. army officer who chose to remain anonymous was quoted earlier this year as saying, apropos of Secretary Kissinger's threat to use force in the Middle east, "We could do it alright but would the country stand for it? I doubt it. The 'no more-Vietnams' trauma is still very powerful."

So the United States stands on the threshold of a new era in its foreign policy. It does not presage, as some have claimed, a withdrawal into "Fortress America" or a policy of "going it alone" or a "new isolationism." Nor does it mean, as some of our allies fear,

a repudiation of our commitments. Such a possibility is, as Senator Michael J. Mansfield has said, "an impossibility in this shrunken world." It may be true, as Representative Abner J. Mikva of Illinois noted, that the American people would like to "pull the oceans down over their heads" but they and their leaders are certainly not clamoring to turn their backs on their friends. All the evidence is to the contrary. President Ford in news conferences, speeches, and private conversations has assured our partners that the United States would honor its treaty obligations. Secretary Kissinger, addressing a meeting of the Japan Society in New York on June 18, 1975, pledged that the United States would "permit no question to arise about the firmness of our treaty commitments." Senator Walter F. Mondale has let it be known that his opposition to the Vietnam war should not be interpreted as support for isolationism. Senator Sam Nunn did not, as he had planned, propose reducing American forces in Korea while Senator Mansfield did not, for the first time since 1966, introduce a resolution to withdraw the bulk of our troops from Europe. Further, in May of 1975, the House of Representatives rejected, 311-95, a motion by Representative Ronald V. Dellums of California to reduce by 70,000 the number of American troops overseas, an act which was widely interpreted as a clear indication to our allies of the firmness of the American commitment. And Senator Stuart Symington and Representative Les Aspin garnered 51 co-sponsors in May of 1975 for a round-robin resolution re-affirming America's intent to stand by its international engagements. In the course of a three-day debate in June of 1975 on the first post-Vietnam defense appropriation bill, there was questioning of the amount requested by the Defense Department but no great cutback was voted by the Congress lest, as Senator Alan Cranston noted, "It might give the impression that the United States was on the run and turning isolationist." The position of the Administration and of the Congress was an accurate reflection of the public mood which a panel of eight of the leading conductors of public opinion polls meeting in Washington in September of 1975 assessed as definitely not isolationist.

The new foreign policy does mean greater selectivity in our commitments and a more realistic appraisal of our true interests as against transitory and ephemeral ones. It means not getting involved in every international convulsion, not making every cause our own, and not playing the "role of automatic protector of any regime that calls itself the enemy of communism." It means no longer "investigating every political mugging and every ideological altercation on every block." It means, too, not providing "a massive dose of self-righteousness to answer every crisis." Above all, I hope it means an end to the practice of attempting to fashion other nations in our image and to export our brand of democracy to places which cannot use it and to peoples who do not want it and a return to the original concept of the American mission: to spread liberty and democracy by example; to be a "city upon a hill;" so to perfect our democracy at home as to cause other nations to wish to emulate us; that is, replacing the credo of John L. O'Sullivan with that of John Winthrop. It is fitting at the time

of the Bicentennial that we return to "what the founders and pioneers always believed to be America's task: to make the new world a place where the ancient faith can flourish anew and its eternal promise at last be redeemed."

Minutes of SHAFR Council

12 Oaks, Marriott Inn, Atlanta Georgia

December 27, 1975, 7:45-11:15 P.M.

Council members present were Armin Rappaport, president, Robert Divine, vice-president, John Gaddis, Norman Graebner, and David Trask. Also attending were William Slany, representing the Historical Division of the State Department, Jules Davids, Alfred Eckes, Robert Ferrell, Nolan Fowler, Larry Gelfand, Frank Merli, Marvin Zahniser, and Warren Kuehl.

The reports of the Joint Secretary-Treasurer were received. These included a general statement for the 1975 general operating budget, a summary of all accounts, and a proposed budget for 1976. Council specifically approved the transfer of an additional \$300 to the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award Memorial Fund in order to strengthen that account.

Frank Merli reported for the Program Committee, noting that plans for the summer session of SHAFR in Columbus, Ohio, are proceeding well, and that a workshop on the ownership of manuscripts by public officials other than presidents is planned for the OAH meeting. He expressed concern that members have not been submitting topics for papers, and it was suggested that he place another call in the **Newsletter**. He was also asked to explore the wisdom of setting up dissertation sessions at one of the large meetings in which authors of recently-completed studies would report on their findings and research.

A summary of the results of the Membership Committee's work showed 171 new members with 47 persons not renewing in 1975 for a net gain of 124 and a total membership of 571.

Lawrence Gelfand painted a discouraging picture respecting a revision of the Bemis and Griffin **Guide**. He reviewed attempts to receive funding for various proposals which he had submitted to the NEH and then asked to withdraw as chairman of the committee so that other perspectives might be explored by someone else. Council members agreed that this was a vital subject for the Society to continue to pursue and placed the matter in the incoming president's hands.

Nolan Fowler observed that the contract with Tennessee Technological University for the **Newsletter** had one more year to run and that he would reach retirement age in three years. Council members agreed that the **Newsletter** served an excellent purpose and requested Dr. Fowler to see if Tennessee Technological University would be interested in renewing the contract for another two-year period. Council also agreed that future speakers who are asked to address SHAFR meetings and whose expenses are to be paid by the Society are to be informed that it is expected that the **Newsletter** will carry their speeches. This will apply to the SHA meeting in November, 1976, for the first time.

Robert Ferrell gave information upon discussions regarding a journal, and Jules Davids presented the latest proposal upon this topic from Michael Glazier of Scholarly Resources, Inc. Council voted to accept the general features of the proposal, subject to clarification of terms and the negotiation of a final contract. It was formally voted that the **Newsletter** should continue as a separate publication because it meets a distinctive need. The Council also authorized the president-elect to appoint an editorial board for the journal and this body in turn would seek an editor. President Rappaport expressed the sentiments of everyone when he observed that this was "a monumental step in the history of the Society."

Marvin Zahniser and Alfred Eckes discussed the plans for the SHAFR annual conference in Columbus, August 13-14. They were requested to prepare a final notice with regard to the conference and to furnish details of the program for inclusion in the March issue of the **Newsletter**. (See p. 33).

Warren Kuehl stated that on instruction from Council he had investigated the requirements for membership by SHAFR in the American Council of Learned Societies. The Council agreed that a membership fee of \$300 was too expensive for the Society.

Under the heading of new business, John Gaddis, chairman, spoke on behalf of the committee (the other members were Michael Hunt, Frank D. McCann, and Geoffrey S. Smith) which was established to make recommendations for the use of income from the second Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Fund. The committee set forth the options available, and Council voted to transmit the committee's preferred recommendation to Gerald and Myrna Bernath for their comment.

The ad hoc committee on the second Bernath Memorial Fund, by correspondence and long distance calls, has considered all the suggestions received on how SHAFR might best use the earnings from the additional funds which the Bernaths have generously provided, and has arrived at the following conclusions:

Our recommendation is that the additional income (we are assuming funds in the amount of \$500 per year) be split as follows:

(a) \$300 as an honorarium for an annual Stuart L. Bernath lecture, to be delivered before the SHAFR luncheon at either the OAH or annual SHAFR meeting. This lecture would be comparable in style and scope to the annual SHAFR presidential address, delivered at the AHA, but would be restricted to younger scholars with outstanding reputations for teaching and research. The lecturer would be expected to address himself, not specifically to his own research, but to broad issues of concern to students of American foreign relations. Publication of the lecture would be assured, either in the **Newsletter** or, if established, the SHAFR journal. The lecturer would be chosen by the Program Committee, after soliciting nominations from the membership.

(b) \$200 as a prize for the best published article on any aspect of American foreign relations during the preceding year. Criteria for selection would be the same as for the existing Bernath book prize (except that the article chosen would be among the author's first five). Selection would be made by the existing book prize committee, with the award to be announced simultaneously with the book award.

A suggestion from Tom Paterson that SHAFR explore with the Eleanor Roosevelt Institute the possibility of a prize for the best article or book on the foreign policy of the Roosevelt years was referred to the president-elect for action.

The proposal from the Joint Secretary-Treasurer that SHAFR consider broadening its scope to include all historians of foreign relations rather than only those of United States diplomacy was discussed together with the suggestion that scholars in political science, especially international relations, could also be included. Council members noted that since this would constitute a significant change in the original intent of the Society the subject should be reintroduced at the OAH meeting in April and that a poll of the membership might be wise.

Council next considered a letter from Theodore A. Wilson regarding a visiting professorship in American history at University College, Dublin. He suggested that SHAFR might wish to provide a means of nominating candidates. Council proposed that Professor Wilson be asked whether SHAFR could nominate individuals to a selection committee.

A brief discussion on attempts by the House of Representatives to transform the Madison Building in Washington, D.C. from its original purpose as an adjunct of the Library of Congress to office space for some members of the House led to an agreement that SHAFR as a scholarly organization should express itself vigorously if the subject arose again.

The meeting closed with instructions to the Joint Secretary-Treasurer to write a letter of thanks to Melvin W. Ecke for helping with local arrangements.

Following the luncheon on December 28, President Rappaport presided over a short business meeting wherein he reported on developments regarding the journal and then asked for any additional business. In response to a statement that reproduction in the **Newsletter** of the annual report by the Joint Advisory Committee upon the publication of the **Foreign Relations** series seemed to imply approval of that document, President Rappaport responded by noting that the item was carried simply as a service to SHAFR members. No other intent was implied. He then turned the meeting over to the new President, Robert A. Divine.

Council members reconvened following the business meeting to discuss terms of the journal contract with Scholarly Resources, Inc. President Divine disclosed the substance of a telephone conversation which he had had with Michael Glazier that morning, thus providing some insight into what costs might be charged to SHAFR members for the journal. Council instructed the President to continue negotiations and authorized an increase in dues for regular members from \$5 to \$10 a year, depending upon final arrangements concerning the publication of the proposed journal.

THE GREAT DOCUMENTS DELUGE

Thomas H. Etzold*

(Editor's note: Professor Etzold has in the following article discussed in a candid fashion a problem which has distressed many in the field of history. He has said some things which needed badly to be said. Dr. Etzold would probably be the first, though, to admit that there is another side-or sides-to the problem. The editor believes that an exchange of opinions upon this topic would be a healthy thing for the Society, and will, therefore, be happy to receive in writing opinions which are at variance with Dr. Etzold's point of view - or which support it. As far as space permits, the **Newsletter** will publish the most cogent of the epistles).

Upon reading the recent edition of the FDR-Churchill correspondence, edited by Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Man-

*Dr. Etzold is professor of history at Miami University (Oxford, Ohio), but for two years now he has been a visiting instructor in the Department of Strategy at the Naval War College.

fred Jonas, one may be reminded of the third hoariest joke about modern art.¹ Two people are standing in front of a canvas of splotchy abstractions, and one of them says quizzically to the other, "Yes, but is it art?" (The second hoariest joke contains variations but always the same punch line: "I may not know much about art but I know what I like." The number-one joke of course is, "It's upside down!")

The reader of documentary volumes finds himself impelled to similar queries when confronted with hundreds of pages of annotated letters, cables, memoranda, notes, instructions, and the like. Is it scholarship? And does publishing such huge compilations make financial sense at a time when individuals and institutions are feeling not merely a pinch but a squeeze?

Is editing documents for publication really scholarship? The question is more difficult than it may seem. Admittedly there is something to be said for editing as scholarship. There is at least **prima facie** evidence. For it is now possible for graduate students in American universities to receive a Ph.D. for editing manuscripts or collections of documents instead of preparing the usual dissertation. Institutions which have consented to such arrangements sponsor history programs of varying size, from small departments such as Rice University to the large one at Yale University. Presumably the willingness of these institutions to award degrees in these circumstances means that their faculties consider editing a demonstration of scholarly attainment.

It is also true that even the most traditional approach to editing--a simple selection of material and annotation--requires time, knowledge of the context of documents, and familiarity with secondary literature and reference works.

In support of editing as scholarship there is the fact that it offers to a student the ideal progression of experience from manuscripts onward to ordering and interpretation. The edition of the letters of Theodore Roosevelt by Elting E. Morison, John M. Blum, and John J. Buckley provides a good illustration. Work on that collection resulted in Blum's book on **The Republican Roosevelt**. Over the years the small group of historians who prepared TR's papers for publication has demonstrated the role such work can play in the development of scholarship.

Editing of documents seems to be going forward partly because of the use of such materials as teaching devices. For some years now many American college and university teachers have argued that students should have documents placed into their hands at the earliest practicable moment. Documents are being used at every level of social science education, beginning with junior high school--or middle school as it is now called. Countless volumes intended for classroom use contain such documents, from the sermons of Jonathan Edwards to

the newspaper columns of Finley Peter Dunne, often with illustrations, annotations, headnotes, endnotes, discussion questions. For the teacher who happened to have begun teaching before the documents deluge, there are manuals complete with hints on leading discussions and "sample" examinations.

What is good for the students, one might argue, is good for the teachers, and downright necessary for that small proportion which aspires to publication. For students--graduate students and their teachers today--there are almost innumerable volumes of documents and almost as many variations in the way such documents are prepared for publication. There are several dozen volumes of presidential papers, and hundreds of volumes of papers selected from among the writings and correspondence of greater and lesser American political, social, economic, and intellectual figures.

Yet there is some reason to question the proposition that editing documents constitutes scholarship. Such work certainly differs from the scholarly endeavor that has been the model for several generations of students and teachers. For years scholars have learned to strive for analysis and synthesis of material drawn from documentary or other sources. Presentation of an occasional document, or small group of documents, with annotation or explanatory text, has had a place in modern European scholarship more than in American practice, at least insofar as journals reflect current standards and practices. But both in Europe and America such treatment traditionally has been reserved for documents of extraordinary character, unique, or startling items. To accumulate information, so it has been taught, is not as difficult as to use it. The traditional distinction between editors who publish evidence and scholars who present ideas supported by evidence is perhaps artificial, and yet one must suspect that there are levels of knowledge here, and that there is not much doubt as to which is the more difficult. To borrow yet another jest about modern art and apply it to editing: "There is less here than meets the eye".

Apart from the issue of scholarship in relation to the editing of documents, there are issues of cost. Public money supports many of the projects for annotation and publication of historical material. Many projects receive a direct subsidy from the federal government. The National Historical Publications Commission bears a large portion of the cost of some 20 large documentary projects located at libraries and universities around the country. State historical societies, some of them with public funds, also give direct support to projects. Both state and federal money has long been paying for the microfilm publication--often with annotation--of lesser collections of papers, a phenomenon which one historian criticized a few years ago on the grounds that microfilm publication was consuming money that should go to support scholars doing research in the large depositories of records and papers.² Many editions of documentary collections also receive grants from public funds, from the National Endowment for the Human-

ities or, in the last year or so, federal or state bicentennial commissions and committees.

In another way public money supports editing and publishing documents, for most of the individuals doing such work are members of faculties of publicly-supported institutions. Their salaries, facilities, often their secretaries, and all of the other items an accountant could include in overhead costs from library use to office space, come out of public funds. When this kind of publication counts as scholarship it becomes the basis for promotions which in turn mean salary increases and often more perquisites, again out of the public purse.

The two principal means of obtaining public support for editing and publishing historical materials, federal or state grants and the regular support given to faculty members at colleges and universities, often do not suffice and sometimes a third way of obtaining money may be required. Costly projects run into financial difficulty even with grants, subsidies, salaries, and facilities. Editors and sponsors then appeal for donations from other people in the academic community, sometimes from private foundations and organizations. The donations are of course private money. But when portions of them end up as deductions on federal income tax returns, the public has paid again.

Financial support for editing and publishing documents does not end at the completion of a project with some combination of funds, for every project goes forward on the assumption that once the edition is in print some hundreds of libraries and fewer hundreds of individual scholars will pay the asking price. What individual scholars may do with their book-buying dollars is perhaps of little concern in the larger context. It is on sales to libraries that publishers rely when they bring out an edition of documents.

Reliance on library purchase of documents has created acute problems for scholarship in the United States. Perhaps the most important of these is the effect on library holdings. Under the financial stringency which prevails in most libraries, college and university, and for that matter all public libraries, the issue of what to acquire in a time of rising prices and more varied user demands becomes a difficult one indeed to resolve. Unfortunately too little recognition has been accorded to the influence of recent trends in university education on this important problem of library acquisitions. Far too often the library receives consideration only in terms of gross budget or facilities such as reading rooms, snack bars, traffic patterns, lighting, and the like. Or perhaps observers attach importance to the number of volumes and items, total holdings including every film and microfiche, or the ratio of holdings in subjects to the size of the academic departments or the size of departmental enrollments or numbers of majors. The measures mentioned above mask the more serious difficulties which characterize library acquisitions in times of stringency. In the last decade or so the same striving for status and revenue that

led many universities to establish Ph.D. programs has distorted library acquisitions. Everyone from faculty members through department heads, university administrators, even accreditation committees realizes that library holdings affect graduate work. The perniciousness comes when, in addition to the measures of library operations noted above, individual faculty members, or other people with voices in library acquisitions suggest or demand that the library acquire more "primary source material" for faculty and graduate students to use in research. Institutions with small libraries cannot afford such acquisitions. When funds are limited, such acquisitions mean that the library becomes less able to acquire the published literature of analysis and synthesis with which every researcher must begin. Amid skyrocketing costs, libraries are buying documentary materials, published or in microform, at the very time that they are "pruning" periodicals (what a marvelous euphemism that is!), cutting off new book acquisitions two-thirds of the way through the academic year or sooner, and refusing to buy multiple copies of books for class assignments.

Documents projects during the past fifteen or twenty years have consumed resources at such a rate that many of them have ceased to make sense. Consider the project at Indiana University, domiciled in that institution's department of English, for editing the writings of William Dean Howells. This American author became well-known in literary circles as a realist. Historians perhaps remember him, less well, as the author of a campaign biography of Abraham Lincoln, published in 1864. As readers are aware these days, campaign biographies and realism are not necessarily the same thing. But the biography must have been a good job, for Lincoln rewarded Howells with an appointment as consul at Venice. In the old days such appointments were extremely remunerative sinecures; Howells had plenty of time to write, and hence there are more than ninety entries under his name in the current edition of **Books in Print**. Many of the books now in print are reprints of earlier editions of novels. There are ten separate reprints of **The Rise of Silas Lapham**, and three of **Years of My Youth**. In a slightly different category but an even more pointed illustration of excessive publishing and republishing are the two volumes of the **Life and Letters of William Dean Howells**, edited by Mildred Howells and published in 1928, the year after the author's death. The 1928 edition has been reprinted by no fewer than three publishers. Why should there be an edition of Howells' writings at Indiana University? The idea is that whatever editions of the writings of Howells presently in print, they contain occasional printing errors which should come out. The definitive Indiana edition proposes to have a critical apparatus for each volume--introductory essay, notes on variant printings and the author's changes of mind. Moreover, Indiana proposes to bring some of the out-of-print works back into print, though not all of them, for Howells often wrote for newspapers and no one is quite sure how much he published in one form or another. And some of his work, to be sure, is not worth republishing. In any event Indiana proposes to publish (or republish) forty or fifty books. The high quality of the Indiana volumes, when published, presumably would drive the presently published versions of Howells' works out of print.

So far, Indiana has published a half dozen volumes. The Howells project will go on for some years, perhaps ten or twenty. That is, it will go on if the Indiana University Press can stand the strain. One of the consequences of the new editions of works by literary writers or public figures appears in the strain on publishers' resources, especially when university presses are involved. For reasons mentioned already, such laboriously-produced volumes are not money-makers. Yet time after time, people have begun such projects, made them a departmental fixture at some university, received a long-term commitment from the university press, and let themselves be carried away in a very expensive demonstration of the inertia of motion. The projects go on, and at intervals volumes appear ready for press. The university press, which every year skates perilously close to financial ruin, must once again invest money in hope that the subsidy from the project's backers will cover the costs. Costs increase. The Indiana University Press published a volume of the Howells series in 1968 at the price of \$10.95. The latest (1975) volume is available at the not-so-modest price of \$20. These volumes stay in print for many years. Where to store the volumes, so that the silverfish don't get them? Again, more money.

It would be easy for historians to be smug about their situation as regards editing and publishing manuscripts, and say that it is the people in the English departments who have made the large mistakes about publishing collections of papers. But consider the situation that presently obtains for making available to scholars the writings of Benjamin Franklin. The Franklin papers are being edited at Yale, and are in the hands of the historians. Yale has published 17 volumes so far, at \$20 each, plus another edition of the **Autobiography** when there are 10 other editions in print. All the while there is still available the Haskell reprint of Franklin's papers in a 1906 edition, in ten volumes. Alexander Hamilton has received due attention from historians, Harold Syrett and Jacob Cooke having edited 20 volumes for the Columbia University Press (\$17.50). And if anyone is wondering whether Henry Cabot Lodge's edition of Hamilton's papers, published in 1904 in 12 volumes is still available the answer is yes; there are two separate reprintings of the Lodge edition, one at \$225 and the other at \$250. The papers of Woodrow Wilson keep coming out under the editorship of Arthur S. Link and associates, with volume 18 on the way and no end in sight (\$22.50 per volume, Princeton University Press). Julian P. Boyd has edited some 20 volumes of the papers of Thomas Jefferson, the price ranging from \$16 to \$22, with three additional index volumes thus far for sale (Princeton University Press).

Now comes the volume of FDR-Churchill correspondence. It is a small project by comparison, yet in this instance there is going to be competition. The Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas edition is not the only one which readers, researchers, and libraries may expect. The more than 1,700 messages and letters at the Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park became available for scholarly use in 1972, and almost immediately the historian Warren Kimball had the happy idea of publishing a complete edition. The Princeton University Press considered it a

felicitous thought and contracted with Kimball for three volumes, with full scholarly apparatus. It is now clear that Loewenheim, Langley, Jonas, and their publisher, E.P. Dutton, hastened to bring out a shorter publication, divided the work among three editors to speed completion, and produced an edition with heavy advertising and attractive pronouncements on the dust jacket (James McGregor Burns praises the editors' "judicial" selection of documents; doubtless he or Dutton meant to say "judicious"). What will the Princeton University Press and Kimball do? They can abandon the project or they can hope that enough individuals and institutions will prefer a complete edition so that the Princeton Press will not lose a bundle on what is bound to be an extremely expensive three-volume set. It seems safe to say that the principal distinction of the Loewenheim, Langley and Jonas edition of this correspondence, once it is no longer the only edition, will be that it was the first.

What is one to conclude about the business of editing and publishing documents? Librarians probably will feel that they are trapped. Their funds are insufficient, are going to remain so or become more so, and yet user demands are going to increase. What can they do except say "We may not know much about solving these problems, but we do know how to make the library look good to an accrediting team," or, if they are in a library not connected with an academic institution, they know how to please the board of trustees or a benefactor.

Publishers are trapped, though perhaps less hopelessly. University presses have committed themselves to bringing out volumes in such series as those mentioned above; even with subsidies the books often drain a press's resources. Commercial publishers have commitments of another kind, less often obligations to bring out volumes but some corporate relation or financial arrangement that requires them to give attention to overhead costs. Companies such as Little, Brown, owned by Time-Life, are charged heavily by their parent corporations, on a flat percentage. They cannot afford to take up a manuscript that might sell three to five thousand copies, a once respectable figure for an academic book. Commercial publishers will shy away from any documentary publication that will not make money, which means practically all of them. They will say, with unctiousness, that such worthy projects deserve the funds and attention of university presses which are nonprofit operations.

Finally there are the academic scholars, the specialists in history and literature. One could argue that they too are trapped, by the professional environment which incautiously approved of documentary projects. Many members of college and university faculties today also may wish to seize an opportunity to get something into print--edited, compiled, or whatever--so they can receive the promotions and salary increments which will bring recognition and more comfortable living.

Yet the only opportunity to halt the great documents deluge lies in the hope that academicians will return to reason. As they gaze at the

rows of documents books bought and unbought, at the comfortable offices of colleagues who are editors, at the shrinking budgets of their institutions' libraries, perhaps they will turn back from their delusions of scholarship and of money. In an era of Vietnam and Watergate when people, even academic people, have not hesitated to take stands, there will be no harm done in one more stand. If institutions of scholarship would only refuse to reward editing in the same way and to the same extent that they have rewarded more traditional activities! **Ecrasez les documents!** Or, rather, the documents books. At one stroke the primary motive, the moving force, for this kind of work then can be eliminated. Libraries would find funds for new books and periodicals. Publishers would have more resources to devote to publication of interesting new studies. Faculty members and students would find more institutional support for travel and research. Too much to hope for? Too attractive a picture? Yes, of course. But it would be good art.

NOTES

1. **Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence.** New York: 1975.

2. Robert H. Ferrell, "United States Relations with Europe in the Twentieth Century," in Milton O. Gustafson, editor, **The National Archives and Foreign Relations Research** (Conferences of the National Archives Series). Columbus, Ohio: 1975, pp. 167-174, especially pp. 172, 193.

PERSONALS

The following members of SHAFR have been awarded grants under the Fulbright-Hays Act to lecture in American history at foreign universities during the academic year, 1975-76: Wesley M. Bagby (West Virginia) at Tamkang U and at Fu Jen Catholic U, Taiwan; Frank R. Chalk (Sir George Williams U, Canada) at the U of Ibadan, Nigeria; and Lloyd C. Gardner (Rutgers) at the U of Birmingham, England.

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E. Charles Chatfield (Wittenberg U) has been named director of international education at his institution.

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The Andrew W. Mellon Foundation has taken cognizance of the problem of lessened job opportunities for those persons acquiring the doctorate in the humanities, and has made a grant of \$350,000 for a two-year study of this subject. The administrative center for this project will be the Education Research Institute of Los Angeles, and among the four leaders of the research-study will be Ernest R. May (Harvard) who is presently concluding his term as chairman of the Bernath Prize Committee.

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Kenton J. Clymer (U of Texas at El Paso) has been elevated to the post of associate professor.

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Four members of SHAFR participated in the Mars Hill College (N.C.) History Symposium, titled "European Security in the Locarno Era," October 16-18, 1975. Warren F. Kuehl (U of Akron and Executive Secretary-Treasurer of SHAFR), Charles DeBenedetti (U of Toledo), and Sally Marks (Rhode Island College) delivered papers; Jamie W. Moore (The Citadel) chaired a session, and K. Paul Jones (U of Tennessee-Martin) was a commentator.

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Thomas H. Hartig who had formerly served in the Archives-Library Division of the Ohio Historical Society was appointed last summer to the position of full-time editor of **Ohio History**. Dr. Hartig reports that this publication has expanded its geographic scope and the editorial staff is now "interested in considering articles dealing with all aspects of Midwestern history."

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Norman A. Graebner (U of Virginia and the fourth president of SHAFR) is on leave to Penn State for the current year, where he is the director of Pennsylvania's Bicentennial project. Titled "Freedom Then, Now, and Tomorrow," the project is funded by the Bell Telephone Company and the National Endowment for the Humanities.

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Joan Hoff Wilson (California State U-Sacramento, and chairwoman of SHAFR Nominations Committee) has a research grant from the N.E.H. for the academic year, 1975-76. Her research, which involves extensive travel upon the Atlantic Coast area, is concerned with the impact of the American Revolution upon the legal status of women. One dividend of this still-to-be-completed research is an essay, "Illusion of Change: Women in the American Revolution," which was published in the anthology, **The American Revolution**, edited by Alfred Young.

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The editor regrets that he was "sleeping at the switch" when he compiled the list of SHAFR participants at the recent AHA convention in Atlanta for the December issue of the **Newsletter**. The names of these members were, unfortunately, omitted. James W. Harper (Texas Tech) read a paper, titled "General Hugh Lenox Scott and United States Diplomacy Toward the Mexican Revolution, 1914-1916," at the International Conference of Phi Alpha Theta. Richard A. Hunt (Center of Military History, Department of the Army) delivered a paper, titled "Measured Retaliation: The Johnson Administration's Search for a Vietnam Strategy." Dr. David H. Culbert (Louisiana State) gave a paper upon a non-diplomatic topic, "The Infinite Variety of Mass Experience: The Great Depression, W.P.A. Interviews, and Student Family History Projects."

THE ACADEMIC EXCHANGE

(Acting solely in a service capacity, the **Newsletter** will carry notices of (a) vacancies in various fields which are of interest to U.S. diplomatic historians, and (b) the vitae of members of SHAFR who desire employment. All announcements will be anonymous, unless a user specifically states otherwise. Each notice will be assigned a number, and persons who are interested must mention that number when contacting the editorial office. That office will then supply the name and address which corresponds to that number. When contacting the editor regarding an announcement, please enclose a stamped, addressed envelope for the return. Announcements should not exceed twelve (12) lines in the **Newsletter**. Unless specifically requested to do otherwise, and then subject to the limitations of space and fairness to others, a particular notice will be carried only once a year).

#E-103 Ph. D. granted in January, 1976, in American diplomatic and modern Middle Eastern history. Laid off after three years, as assistant professor in large state college. Prefers teaching position in Northeast. Also capable as administrator, researcher, and writer. Experienced teacher, in mid-thirties, with high recommendations. Has taught survey courses in U.S. History and Western Civilization; also courses on American diplomatic, economic, and immigration history, Middle Eastern history and modern Jewish history. Reads four languages, has four published articles; dissertation being considered for publication.

ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED, OR SCHOLARLY PAPERS

DELIVERED, BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

(Please limit abstracts to a total of fifteen (15) lines of **Newsletter** space. The overriding problem of space, plus the wish to accommodate as many contributors as possible, makes this restriction necessary. Don't send lengthy summaries to the editor with the request that he cut as he sees fit. Go over abstracts carefully before mailing. If words are omitted, or statements are vague, the editor in attempting to make needed changes may do violence to the meaning of the article or paper. Do not send abstracts until a paper has actually been delivered, or an article has actually appeared in print. For abstracts, of articles, please supply the date, the volume, the number within the volume, and the pages. Double space all abstracts).

Barton J. Bernstein (Stanford), "Courage and Commitment: The Missiles of October," **Foreign Service Journal**, LII (Dec., 1975), 9-11, 24-27. This analysis of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, based upon recently-declassified documents, stresses that the MRBMs in Cuba were operational by October 22, the date of JFK's televised speech, that the Administration should have tried private diplomacy before a public confrontation with the Soviet Union, that Charles E. Bohlen and others advised this course, and that their advice failed because the Administration was worried about the coming Congressional elections and wanted to persuade various "constituencies"--the Soviets, U.S. allies abroad, and Americans--of its (and especially JFK's) "courage and commitment." The article concludes that the Administration manipulated the press, that it may have erred in rejecting a summit during the crisis, and asserts that it should have accepted the Soviet offer of the 27th, even though it included an additional condition (beyond the 26th)--withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey.

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Barton J. Bernstein (Stanford), "Doomsday II," **New York Times Magazine**, July 27, 1975. This article analyzes the combat utilization of atomic bombs against Japan in World War II and concludes that the use of the second bomb "was probably unnecessary" in bringing about that country's offer of surrender in mid-August, 1945. The dropping of the first bomb and the Soviet Union's entry into the war were the critical events in propelling the Emperor, Premier Suzuki, Foreign Minister Togo, and Privy Seal Kido--the leaders of the "peace" forces--to push ardently for an end of hostilities with only one condition (guarantee of the position of the Emperor). The news of the Nagasaki bombing may have made it easier for them to act, but it did not embolden them. And the bombing of Nagasaki did not overcome the military's opposition to peace with only one condition. The Emperor's intervention, not the second bombing, compelled the military to shift. This study also disclosed that the Nagasaki bomb, as the American military had suspected, killed some allied POWs.

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Barton J. Bernstein (Stanford), "Hiroshima Reconsidered-- Thirty Years Later," **Foreign Service Journal**, LII (Aug., 1975), 8-13, 32-34; revised as "Shatterer of Worlds: Hiroshima and Nagasaki," **Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists**, XXI (Dec., 1975), 12-22, and abridged as "Triumph and Tragedy: Hiroshima and Nagasaki--Thirty Years Later," **Intellect**, CIV (Dec., 1975), 257-263. F.D. Roosevelt left H.S. Truman the dual legacy that (a) the atomic bomb was a legitimate weapon, and that (b) it should not be shared with the Soviets without a quid pro quo, if at all. The new president remained comfortably loyal to this heritage. The atomic bomb did not raise any moral issues with him or most of his advisers, and they believed that use of the weapon against Japan would make the Soviet Union tractable and thereby assist the United States in securing her aims in the postwar world. There was, then, no effort by the Administration to avoid the combat use of the atomic bomb, and various advantages (including retribution) seemed likely by utilizing it.

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Justus D. Doenecke (New College of the U of South Florida), "A New Look at the Lone Eagle," **Historical Aviation Album**, XIV, (September, 1975), 279-281. A review essay dealing with the recently-published **Wartime Journals of Charles A. Lindbergh**, it argues that these diaries reveal the controversial colonel's deep love of the land, help explain much of his Germanophilism, account for much of his motivation in leading the isolationist crusade, and show his emotional attitude towards the world conflict itself. Particularly revealing are "Lindy's" attitudes respecting mechanized violence. The essay points out areas that need further research: Lindbergh's involvement with the No Foreign War Committee, his definition of the "Asian" threat, the conflict over his Des Moines speech and the Order of the German Eagle, the role of Southern conservatives, a possible mission to rescue European Jews, and the possibility of an appointment by FDR as Secretary of Air.

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James W. Harper (Texas Tech U), "General Hugh Lenox Scott and United States Diplomacy Toward the Mexican Revolution: 1914-1916." Paper delivered at the International Conference of Phi Alpha Theta, Atlanta, December, 1975. The activities of Hugh Scott, Chief of Staff of the Army and a frequent negotiator on the Mexican Border, offer fresh insight into the first response of the United States to twentieth century revolutionary nationalism. Scott, in serving as an advisor on Mexican policy, worked to win support for the faction of Pancho Villa and represented the United States during several negotiations with Villa. Scott opposed military intervention, believing the United States should limit itself to preventing threats to Americans and their property and fighting which might spill across the Border. He demurred from Wilson's desire to direct the revolution into a liberal capitalist mold. Scott's position suggests the need for further study of the alternatives to "the diplomacy of imperialism."

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E. James Hindman (Sul Ross State U, Alpine, Texas), "¿Confusión o conspiración?--Estados Unidos frente a Obregón," **Historia Mexicana**, XXV, 98 (Octubre-Diciembre 1975), 271-301. Studies of United States-Mexican diplomacy during the early years of the Revolution of 1910 frequently focus upon Venustiano Carranza and Francisco Villa, neglecting the role of Alvaro Obregón. Long before Obregón became President of Mexico, the following controversies plagued his relations with the United States: Obregón's radical behavior in Mexico City during 1915; the Wilson Administration's pro-Villa stance and efforts to divide Carranza and Obregón; the Scott-Obregón Juarez Conference following Villa's Columbus raid; and Obregón's alleged pro-German attitudes during World War I. Relations with Obregón were complicated by the intrigues of a pro-Villa group which included James R. Garfield, General Hugh L. Scott, George Carothers, Nelson Rhoades, and Felix Sommerfeld. An inquiry into the influence on American foreign policy by lower echelon officials and additional information regarding Villa's raid on Columbus N.M., are included.

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Richard G. Hunt (U.S. Army Center of Military History), "The Johnson Administration's Search for a Vietnam Strategy." Paper delivered at annual meeting of AHA, Atlanta, Ga., Dec. 29, 1975. The problem of Vietnam plagued American strategists and policymakers for almost two decades. From the Geneva Convention of 1954 to the defeat of the Thieu government in 1975 the United States employed a panoply of military and political plans and programs to shore up successive South Vietnamese governments. Right or wrong, the constant American goal was an independent, non-communist South Vietnam. This paper treated the interplay of institutional and public pressure with the changes the Johnson administration made in the strategy followed on the ground in South Vietnam. Developed to prevent the military collapse of South Vietnam, the strategy of attrition pursued by the US Army came under increasing criticism and pressure for results from the Administration and the public. Yet the re-emphasis in 1967 of pacification, as counter-insurgency was rather loosely known, and signs of continued progress in the conventional war were inadequate to overcome the public's rejection of the war after the Tet offensive of 1968 seemed to show the futility of the US effort.

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Howard Jones (U of Alabama), "The Attempt to Impeach Daniel Webster," **Capitol Studies**, III (Fall, 1975), 31-44. The attempt to bring about the retroactive impeachment of Daniel Webster in 1846 was one of the most bizarre episodes in American history. Four years earlier, while he was Secretary of State, the now Massachusetts Senator had been instrumental in securing an end to a long list of Anglo-American difficulties which included resolution of the northeastern boundary. The Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, however, has been subject of criticisms from its ratification to the present day. Anglophobes set the

pace during the 1840s by assailing the compromise as a giveaway to the British. Finally, in 1846, Charles J. Ingersoll, Democratic Representative from Pennsylvania and longtime enemy of Webster's, brought charges of misconduct in office stemming from the earlier negotiations in Washington with the British envoy, Lord Ashburton. Drawing on circumstantial "evidence" procured from the State Department's secret archives, Ingersoll accused Webster of promoting federal interference with the Alexander McLeod case of 1841, "corrupting" the party press in New England by sponsoring newspaper editorials urging an unfair boundary settlement, supporting the above efforts by illegally-obtained finances from the president's secret service fund, and leaving the State Department in default of some of the money. The tale of intrigue which unfolded in the ensuing House investigation (including the appearance of former President John Tyler) was of much interest, but it failed to prove any of Ingersoll's allegations.

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Howard Jones (U of Alabama), "The Peculiar Institution and National Honor: The Case of the **Creole** Slave Revolt," **Civil War History**, XXI, 1 (March, 1975), 28-50. The **Creole** slave revolt of 1841 was significant because it shows the intricate interrelationship between both its foreign and domestic ramifications. The case raised issues of national honor which at a different time and under different circumstances could have provoked a major confrontation between the governments of the United States and Great Britain. Contrary to many accounts of the incident, the Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, did not demand the return of the slaves who were eventually set free by British authorities in Nassau. Instead, he adopted a sound legal stance based on the principle of "comity"--albeit one which the British ministry of Sir Robert Peel chose to disregard. The revolt also caused Southern slaveowners to worry that an international debate over slavery might encourage more slave insurrections. Evidence shows that some members of the Southern press publicly argued for maritime rights and national honor when actually their real concern was the welfare of the peculiar institution. The negotiations which led to the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842 were instrumental in closing the **Creole** affair by suggesting vague assurances against future British interference with similar incidents.

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William D. Raat (SUNY at Fredonia), "The Diplomacy of Suppression: 'Los Revoltosos,' Mexico, and the United States, 1906-1911." A paper delivered at the annual meeting of the SHA, Washington, D.C., Nov. 14, 1975. This paper was a study in counterrevolution as practiced by private individuals and governmental agents in Mexico and the United States prior to the Mexican Revolution of 1911. A binational police and espionage structure was the machinery for eliminating radicalism and containing revolutionary nationalism. This study focused upon the domestic dimensions of U.S. foreign policy, surveying the activities of private detectives, Secret Service agents, labor spies,

Bureau of Investigation agents, and the consular staffs of both countries. Research was conducted in major national and regional archives in Mexico and the U.S.

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Stephen G. Rabe (U of Connecticut), "Inter-American Military Cooperation, 1944-1951," **World Affairs**, CXXXVII (Fall, 1974), 132-149. During the first years of the Cold War, United States policy makers perceived little need for comprehensive programs in Latin America; it appeared to be a secure and stable area in a turbulent world. Only in the field of military cooperation and planning did the United States display more than just a perfunctory interest in its postwar relations with Latin America. Beginning in mid-1945, United States officials sought to induce the Latin American nations to adopt, as standard, United States arms and military doctrine. They hoped this arms program would, in lieu of economic aid, keep Latin America politically aligned with the United States. In addition, the program would aid the American arms industries. Influential Americans, both within and without the government, opposed, however, an armaments program for Latin America, and for several years they blocked the formal enactment of such a measure. With the Korean War-inspired Mutual Security Act of 1951, the Truman administration finally won the right to arm United States' southern neighbors.

PUBLICATIONS IN U. S. DIPLOMACY BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

Barton J. Bernstein (Stanford), ed., **The Atomic Bomb; the Critical Issues**. 1976. Little, Brown. \$4.95.

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Barton J. Bernstein (Stanford), **Hiroshima and Nagasaki Reconsidered: The Atomic Bombings of Japan and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1945**. 1975. General Learning Press. 30pp. \$2.00.

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Edward W. Chester (U of Texas--Arlington), **Sectionalism, Politics, and American Diplomacy**. 1975. The Scarecrow Press. \$12.50. Reviewed in **History**, November/December, 1975.

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John K. Fairbank (Harvard), **China Perceived: Images and Policies in Chinese-American Relations**. 1974. Alfred A. Knopf. \$7.95. A compilation of eighteen articles and speeches. Reviewed in **Pacific Historical Review** of November, 1975.

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John K. Fairbank (Harvard), **Chinese-American Interactions: a Historical Summary**. 1975. Rutgers U Press. \$6.50. This work comprises the Brown-Hale Lectures (three in number) delivered at the U of Puget Sound in 1974.

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Detlef Junker (U of Heidelberg, West Germany), **Der unteilbare Weltmarkt: Das ökonomische Interesse in der Aussenpolitik der USA, 1933-1941**. 1975. Klett Verlag, 307 S., Stuttgart, W. Germany. 76 D.M.

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Thomas C. Kennedy (Wyoming), **Charles A. Beard and American Foreign Policy**. 1975. University Presses of Florida. \$8.50.

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Lester D. Langley (U of Georgia), **Struggle for the American Mediterranean: United States-European Rivalry in the Gulf-Caribbean, 1776-1904**. 1975. U of Georgia Press. \$10.00.

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Ernest R. May (Harvard), **The Making of the Monroe Doctrine**. 1975. Harvard U. Press. \$12.50.

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Ernest R. May (Harvard), **The Truman Administration and China, 1945-1949**. 1975. J.B. Lippincott Co. \$2.75. America's Alternatives Series.

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Robert Seager II (U of Baltimore) and Doris D. Maguire, eds., **Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan**. 1975. 3 vols. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. \$95.00.

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Joseph M. Siracusa (U of Queensland, Australia), ed., **The American Diplomatic Revolution: A Documentary History of the Cold War, 1941-1947**. 1975. Sydney and London: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, \$8.95 (Australian money).

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Lawrence S. Wittner (SUNY at Albany), **Cold War America: from Hiroshima to Watergate**. 1974. Praeger's. Cl. \$12.50; pb. \$6.95. Reviewed in **Perspective**, January/February, 1975, and in **History**, February, 1975.

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ADDITIONAL PUBLICATIONS BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

Martin L. Fausold (SUNY at Geneseo), **James L. Wadsworth, Jr., the Gentleman from New York**. 1975. Syracuse U Press. \$17.50. Favorably reviewed in **History**, January, 1976.

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David W. Hirst (Associate editor, Papers of Woodrow Wilson), **Woodrow Wilson**. 1975. Barron's Educational Series, Inc. Pb. \$2.95. In Shapers of History Series.

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Schapsmeier, Edward L., and Frederick H. Schapsmeier (U of Wisconsin-Oshkosh), eds., **Encyclopedia of American Agricultural History**. 1975. Greenwood. \$25.00.

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Schapsmeier, Edward L., and Frederick H. Schapsmeier (U of Wisconsin-Oshkosh), **Ezra Taft Benson and the Politics of Agriculture; the Eisenhower Years, 1953-1961**. 1975. Danville, Ill.: The Interstate Printers and Publishers. \$6.50. Reviewed in **History**, May/June, 1975, and in **Journal of American History**, December, 1975.

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Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (Graduate Center, CUNY) and Roger A. Bruns, eds., **Congress Investigates; a Documented History, 1792-1974**. 1975. 5 vols. Chelsea House-R.R. Bowker Co. \$150.00.

 ANNOUNCEMENTS

The OAH will hold its annual meeting in St. Louis, Missouri, April 7-10, with the Chase-Park Plaza Hotel as the headquarters. As usual, SHAFR will sponsor a number of activities at this convention. The Council will meet, 7:30-10:00 P.M., Wednesday, April 7, in Stockholm Room 57 of the host hotel. A reception will be held in the Swedish Room, same hotel, 5:00-7:00 P.M., Thursday, April 8. The SHAFR luncheon will take place at 12:00 noon, Friday, April 9, in the Colonial Room, 1 and 2, 3rd floor of the Chase-Park Plaza. Richard B. Morris, Columbia U and president of the AHA, will address the assemblage on the topic, "The Diplomacy of the American Revolution from the Outside and the Inside." The feature of the following business session will be the awarding of the Stuart L. Bernath Prize for 1976. Tickets for the luncheon, payable at the National Office of the OAH, are \$7.00 each.

Members of SHAFR will, as usual, figure prominently in the various sessions at the OAH. Paul S. Holbo (Oregon), Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana), Richard S. Kirkendall (Indiana and Executive Secretary-Treasurer of OAH), Bradford Perkins (Michigan), Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut), Robert A. Divine (Texas and president of SHAFR), Albert H. Bowman (U of Tennessee-Chattanooga), and Betty M. Unterberger (Texas A&M) will be acting in a presiding capacity at meetings. Robert L. Beisner (American U), Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa), Thomas H. Etzold (Miami U and the Naval War College), Alan K. Henrikson (Fletcher School, Tufts), Thomas N. Guinsburg (U of Western Ontario), Keith L. Nelson (U of California-Irvine), and Thomas H. Buckley (Tulsa) will be presenting papers. Robert Dallek (UCLA), Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane and vice-president of SHAFR), David F. Trask (SUNY at Stony Brook), Waldo H. Heinrichs (Temple), Manfred Jonas (Union College), Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State and Joint Executive Secretary-Treasurer of SHAFR), Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt), Lloyd E. Ambrosius (Nebraska), Joan H. Wilson (California State U--Sacramento) and Raymond G. O'Connor (U of Miami) will serve as commentators. One member, Thomas Schoonover (U of Southwestern La.), will participate upon a panel. Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern and former president of SHAFR) will preside, Thursday, April 8, 8:30 P.M., when Frank Freidel (Harvard), current president of OAH, delivers his presidential address.

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Of considerable interest to those diplomatic historians who are contemplating research in the countries of Western Europe is the recent publication (1975), of the second edition of the authoritative work, **The New Guide to the Diplomatic Archives of Western Europe**, edited by

Daniel H. Thomas and Lynn M. Case. Twenty-two historians and archivists have provided a comprehensive coverage of the diplomatic archives of 16 countries, plus the Vatican, United Nations, League of Nations, ILO, ITU, and UNESCO. The work is available from the U of Pennsylvania Press at \$10.00 per copy.

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The AHA has recently listed the following publications as being for sale at its office, 400 A Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003. Payment must accompany all orders.

The **Recently Published Articles** is now a separate publication listing article length literature in all fields of history. It is issued in February, June and October. AHA members may subscribe to the RPA for \$5.00 per year, non-members for \$8.00, and institutions for \$7.00.

The **Guide to Departments of History** gives information on history programs, areas of specialization and faculty at approximately 250 U.S. and Canadian departments of history and research institutions. The **Guide** may be purchased by AHA members for \$3.00, by non-members for \$6.00.

Fellowships and Grants of Interest to Historians contain information on approximately one hundred different programs of aid to historians at the graduate and postdoctoral levels. The guide is available for \$1.00 for members and \$2.00 for non-members.

The **Directory of Women Historians** with information on the educational background, experience, publications, and research interests of approximately 1,200 women historians may be purchased by members for \$4.00 and by non-members for \$6.00.

A Survival Manual for Women (and Other) Historians, prepared by the AHA's Committee on Women Historians, gives practical information on various aspects of professional life. Copies are available for \$1.00 each for AHA members, \$2.00 for non-members.

SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF SHAFR

Three prominent U.S. diplomatic historians will address the theme—"Lessons of the Past for American Diplomacy"—in keynote presentations to the second annual meeting of SHAFR at Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, August 13-14, 1976.

The historians are Robert A. Divine (the University of Texas at Austin and current president of SHAFR), David F. Trask (SUNY-Stony Brook), and William A. Williams (Oregon State University). It is anticipated that two or three other prominent individuals with experiences in the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government will also speak upon the conference theme from their own perspectives.

In addition, the SHAFR program committee announces that there will be five panels on various aspects of the central theme: (1) Governmental Uses of History in Foreign Policy; (2) The American Response to Foreign Revolutions; (3) Foreign Responses to a Revolutionary America; (4) Economic and Natural-Resource Dimensions of U.S. Foreign Policy; (5) The Media and Foreign Policy. Participants will include professional scholars as well as a number of policy makers in the U.S. government.

At the request of supporting agencies, including the Ohio Program for the Humanities and the George Gund Foundation of Cleveland, all sessions will be open to the general public.

The program organizers indicate that there will be two unusual features respecting procedures at this Conference. First, there will be no registration fee; and second, each speaker will receive a small honorarium.

Complete information respecting housing and eating arrangements for the conference will be sent to all members from the National Office about April 1. In the meantime, one of the coordinators for the gathering, Dr. Alfred E. Eckes, Jr., Department of History, Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio 43210, may be contacted for further information concerning the meeting.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE COMPETITION FOR 1977

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations announces that the 1977 competition for the Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Prize upon a book dealing with any aspect of American foreign affairs is open. The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of U.S. diplomatic relations.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1976. It must be the author's first or second book.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. John L. Gaddis, Chairman, Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Prize Committee, Department of History, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio 45701. The works must be received not later than December 31, 1976.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$500.00. If two (2) or more works are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be April, 1977, at Atlanta, Georgia.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

1972	Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento) Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
1973	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1974	Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire) Stephen E. Pelz (U of Massachusetts - Amherst)

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 George Mason University
 Fairfax, Virginia 22030

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 Naval Historical Center
 Washington Navy Yard
 Washington, D.C. 20374

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 Department of History
 University of Puget Sound
 Tacoma, Washington 98416

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 Department of History
 University of Tennessee
 Chattanooga, Tenn. 37401

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 Dept. of History & Political Science
 Nassau Community College
 Garden City, N.Y. 11530

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 St. John's College
 University of Manitoba
 Winnipeg 19, CANADA

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 Southern Connecticut State College
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 Lexington, Kentucky 40506

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 Bowling Green, Ohio 43403

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 Department of History
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 Department of History
 Texas A&M University
 College Station, Texas 77843

Dr. Ralph E. Weber
 Department of History
 Marquette University
 Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233

Dr. Gerald E. Wheeler, Chairman
 Department of History
 San Jose State University
 San Jose, Ca., 95192

SHAHR MEMBERSHIP GAINS AND LOSSES

	New 1975	Pre 1975	Total
Regular	116	343	459
Students and Emeriti	38	20	58
Life	4	11	15
Regular Non-U.S.	12	16	28
Students Non-U.S.	1	0	1
Institutions		10	10
TOTAL	171	400	571

47 persons did not renew their membership in 1975.

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: Nolan Fowler, Department of History, Tennessee Tech, Cookeville, Tennessee 38501.

ISSUES: The **Newsletter** is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December. All members receive the publication.

DEADLINES: All material must be in the office of the editor not later than four (4) weeks prior to the date of publication.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication. Copies of the **Newsletter** which are returned because of faulty addresses will be forwarded only upon the payment of a fee of 50¢.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of all back numbers of the **Newsletter** are available and may be obtained from the editorial office upon the payment of a service charge of 50¢ per number. If the purchaser lives abroad, the charge is 75¢ per number.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, honors, awards), announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered—or published—upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, lists of accessions of diplomatic materials to libraries, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting diplomatic materials in various depositories. Because of space limitations, "straight" articles and book reviews are unacceptable.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

1968	Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)
1969	Alexander De Conde (U of California - Santa Barbara)
1970	Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)
1971	Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)
1972	Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)
1973	Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)
1974	Bradford Perkins (Michigan)
1975	Amin H. Rappaport (U of California - San Diego)

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