

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

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The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

Founded in 1967

Chartered in 1972

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MEMBERSHIP: Annual dues are \$20.00 for regular members, \$7.00 for students, and \$9.00 for retired members. A life membership in SHAFR is \$250.00. In the case of membership by husband and wife, dues for one of them shall be one-half of the regular price. Dues are payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. For those wishing only to receive the SHAFR *Newsletter* the cost is \$10.00. Overseas members wishing to receive the *Newsletter* by air mail should remit an additional \$10 per year to the *Newsletter's* editorial offices. Institutions wishing to receive *Diplomatic History* should contact Scholarly Resources.

MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in the summer. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in March or April.

PRIZES: The Society administers several awards. Four of them honor the late Stuart L. Bernath and two others honor the late Myrna L. Bernath; these are financed through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California. Awards also honor Laura and Norman Graebner, the late W. Stull Holt, the late Warren Kuehl, and Arthur Link. Details of each of these awards are to be found under the appropriate headings in each *Newsletter*.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly *Newsletter*; *Diplomatic History*, a journal; and the occasional *Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects*.

SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENT

Dear SHAFR Colleagues:

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations will hold its usual functions at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians in Louisville, KY, April 11-14. They are:

Council Meeting — Thursday, April 11, 8:00-11:00 p.m.
Galt House, Kings Head Room

SHAFR Reception — Friday, April 12, 5:00-7:00 p.m.
Galt House, Water Poet Room

SHAFR Luncheon — Saturday, April 13, 12:00-2:00 p.m.
Galt House, Water Poet Room

Luncheon tickets cost \$15.00 and should be purchased ahead of time through the OAH. The hotel requires a 48-hour guarantee and there will be limited opportunity to purchase tickets at the conference.

— Allan Spetter

THE USE OF COUNTERFACTUALS IN HISTORY: A LOOK AT THE LITERATURE

by
Philip Nash*

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"Who can say what might have been?" So the reader is lured into the paperback edition of Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s *Robert Kennedy and His Times*.¹ This type of historical marketing is not surprising, because for many of us, our interest in what happened in the past stems in part from our fascination with what did not. As much seems true, at least, for the consumers of history. But the producers of history — the historians — have tended to neglect or reject counterfactuals. Most historians would probably support E. H. Carr, who dismisses counterfactual inquiry as a "parlour game" which does not have "anything to do with history,"² and M. M. Postan, who writes that the "might-have-beens of history are not a profitable subject of discussion."³

David Hackett Fischer acknowledges that "fictional questions can...be heuristically useful to historians, somewhat in the manner of metaphors and analogies, for the ideas and inferences which they help to suggest." But he savages the

*Originally prepared for the History, Social Sciences and International Security Affairs Workshop, "Nuclear History and the Use of Counterfactuals," Cambridge, Massachusetts, 12-13 October 1989. The author gratefully acknowledges the comments of John Lewis Gaddis.

¹(New York: Ballantine, 1978 [3rd printing, 1985]), cover.

²*What is History?*, (New York: Vintage, 1961), 127.

³Quoted in J. D. Gould, "Hypothetical History," *The Economic History Review* 22 (2), August 1969, 195.

"fallacy of fictional questions" because they "prove nothing," and the results of fusing counterfactuals with empirical quantification (a tool of economic historians, see below) "are not merely false but absurd" because it is "simply impossible for a singular statement to be *both* counterfactual and factual at the same time."⁴ Despite the problems and limitations of counterfactuals, though, many critics of their use argue by instinct and assertion. "[T]he question of what would have happened 'if,' is non-permissible," writes Fritz Redlich, and "not really history at all."⁵

But counterfactual analysis, best defined as "[i]nquiry that utilizes counterfactual propositions, i.e., premises (explicit or tacit) that are at least in part contrary to fact,"⁶ has been employed, discussed, and even advocated for some time now. Tacitus uses a counterfactual on at least one occasion,⁷ and an entire collection of counterfactual essays was published in 1931, in which, among others, Winston Churchill examines Lee's victory at Gettysburg.⁸ "[A]ll practical activity

⁴David Hackett Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies: Toward a Logic of Historical Thought*, (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 15, 16, emphasis in original.

⁵"Potentialities and Pitfalls in Economic History," in Ralph L. Andreano, ed., *The New Economic History: Recent Papers on Methodology*, (New York: , 1968), 91. Note, however, that both Redlich, 92, and Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies*, 16n, qualify their otherwise spirited assaults. See also Redlich's "'New' and Traditional Approaches to Economic History and Their Interdependence," *Journal of Economic History* 25 (4), December 1965, 480-95.

⁶Harry Ritter, *Dictionary of Concepts in History*, (New York: Greenwood, 1986), 70. I have relied heavily on Ritter's excellent bibliography.

⁷Gould, "Hypothetical History," 195.

⁸Philip Guedalla, et al, *If, or History Rewritten*, (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat, 1931).

involves weighing the consequences of alternatives only one of which is realized," Morris Cohen wrote in 1942. "Indeed we cannot grasp the full significance of what happened unless we have some idea of what the situation would have been otherwise."⁹

In 1960, H. Stuart Hughes argued in a more refined way toward a now-standard assertion, to the effect that counterfactuals are important if not indispensable to the determination of causality (in a monocausal relationship) or relative causal significance (in a multicausal relationship).¹⁰ "[T]he most satisfactory type of causal explanation in history," Hughes writes, "simply tries to locate the factor which, when removed, would make the decisive difference in a given sequence of events — that is, the factor which, if thought away, would render the events in question inconceivable." Hughes acknowledges the drawbacks of counterfactuals, "but if rigorously carried out," counterfactual analysis "offers more precision than any other type of causal explanation in common use among historians."¹¹

Two generalizations about the literature are abundantly clear: it has been primarily written by economic historians, and the great bulk of it appeared between the mid-1960s and the end of the 1970s. These two characteristics may very well

⁹"Causation and Its Application to History," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 3 (1), January 1942, 20. Note Cohen's use of the sweeping term "significance" rather than "causal significance."

¹⁰For a good discussion of the role of counterfactuals in the precise determination of causal relationships, see T. A. Climo and P. G. A. Howells, "Possible Worlds in Historical Explanation," *History and Theory* 15 (1), 1976, 1-20, and C. Hurst, "A Comment on the Possible Worlds of Climo and Howells," *History and Theory* 18 (1), 1979, 52-60.

¹¹H. Stuart Hughes, "The Historian and the Social Scientist," *American Historical Review* 66 (1), October 1960, 29.

be linked. If the discussion is as dependent on economic historians as it seems to be, and if the "new economic history" which really breathed life into counterfactuals is less of an issue now than it was earlier, then the apparent drop-off in publication is understandable. Philosophers and logicians have continued to publish quite a bit on counterfactuals,¹² but recently, amongst even economic historians the silence is thunderous. Eloquent testimony to this lack of interest may lie in the fact that one of the few (if not one of only two) historical articles to appear since 1980 is a satire.¹³ Another is Stuart Thorson and Donald Sylvan's look at the Cuban missile crisis. Using a computer model, the authors conclude among other things that tighter time constraints perceived by the Kennedy administration might have led to a more drastic U.S. military response.¹⁴

But why economic historians and not others? J. D. Gould provides the best answer. "[A]nalytical economics is a discipline largely concerned with alternatives, with 'opportunity cost,' with the gains or losses to be made or incurred by doing something somewhat differently," Gould

¹²The most important philosophical treatment appears to be David Lewis, *Counterfactuals*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973). For a good, brief introduction to the philosophical discussion, see "Contrary-to-Fact Conditional," in Paul Edwards, ed., *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* 1, (New York: Macmillan, reprint ed. 1972), 212-16.

¹³R. Preston McAfee, "American Economic Growth and the Voyage of Columbus," *American Economic Review* 83 (4), September 1983, 735-40.

¹⁴"Counterfactuals and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *International Studies Quarterly* 26 (4), December 1982, 539-71. For a recent, detailed discussion of counterfactuals in political science, see James D. Fearon, "Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science," unpublished paper, University of California at Berkeley, 1990, forthcoming in *World Politics*. I am grateful to S. David Broscious for bringing it to my attention.

writes. And "to measure 'effects' [and] 'contributions'...in terms of feasible alternatives," he continues, "naturally involves supposing that something might have been different from what it was in fact."¹⁵ It may also be that to the extent that economic historians are economists, counterfactual analysis comes more easily because making assumptions is their bread and butter. In any case, one might do well to ask what differences there are, if any, between economic history and other types of history that might affect the use of counterfactuals.

A "magnificent example of the opportunity-cost concept harnessed to historical purposes,"¹⁶ and in any case the most famous application of counterfactual analysis, is Robert Fogel's *Railroads and American Economic Growth: Essays in Econometric History* (1964). This book triggered much of the debate over counterfactuals; many relevant articles are either responses to Fogel or responses to those responses.¹⁷

William Todd puts an interesting twist on the discussion by arguing that "wherever there is ethical evaluation there must also be counterfactual statements," because the historian "has to say not only that another policy would have had different consequences, but he has to specify those other consequences enough so that they can be seen to be preferable to what actually took place." Todd also argues that one's attitude

¹⁵Gould, "Hypothetical History," 206.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷A good brief critique of Fogel is found in Fischer, *Historians' Fallacies*, 16-19. There have been many other historical applications of counterfactuals, some of which are treated in Jon Elster, *Logic and Society: Contradictions and Possible Worlds*, (New York: John Wiley, 1978), 192-218. A recent history that relies heavily on counterfactual arguments is McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988).

toward counterfactuals is influenced by one's view of the world's "causal structure." One view states there are "a few causal laws which are very basic...and a very few *kinds* of uniformity in nature...." Thus "the alteration of one event would either destroy these uniformities, or it would force us to change a great part of the history of the world." Alternatively, another view would involve "less basic and more numerous" causal laws, and thus any one counterfactual would *not* upset "the whole causal structure."¹⁸

A similar point is made by Jon Elster in *Logic and Society* (1978), probably the best "guide" to the use of counterfactuals. First, Elster holds that the use of counterfactuals must presuppose a "branching" theory rather than a "parallel" theory, that is, that to change one fact or event is not thereby to change all of past reality.¹⁹ Otherwise, the counterfactual exercise degenerates into idle speculation. But it does not seem unreasonable to reject the notion of history as a "seamless web;" as the late Sidney Hook puts it, "can one seriously believe that if my dog whose name is 'Trailer' had been called 'Tiger' everything else in the world would necessarily have been affected?"²⁰

Second, to Elster a counterfactual must be "legitimate." That is, it must represent an option considered but rejected, it must be "rational" or "probable," and it must enjoy close temporal "proximity" to the point of departure from historical

¹⁸William Todd, *History as Applied Science: A Philosophical Study*, (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1972), 122, 218-19, emphasis in original; see also 132. Todd appears to support the second view.

¹⁹Elster, *Logic and Society*, 177-78.

²⁰*The Hero in History: A Study in Limitation and Possibility*, (New York: John Day, 1943), 121. Hook's relevant chapter, "'If' in History," 119-36, is largely a critique of the applications in Guedalla's *If, or History Rewritten*.

reality.²¹ Sidney Hook and Charles Beard saw the importance of probability in 1946. In maintaining that causation is established through "historical comparison" and "hypothetical construction," they wrote that the "degree of probability marks the difference between wild speculation and well grounded likelihood."²² Hook also recognized the need for close proximity: "the line of inference" must not be "drawn too far into the future" because to do so is to "disregard the increasing possibilities of alternate developments as more and more elements enter the story."²³

Finally, Elster sees some sort of theory as necessary because it "permits us to conclude from the hypothetical antecedent to the hypothetical consequent" and "serves as a filter for the acceptance or rejection of the antecedent itself." This creates a paradox, for the "stronger" or "more deterministic" the theory,

the better grounded is the conclusion from antecedent to consequent, but the more vulnerable is also the legitimacy of the antecedent. With a weak theory many antecedents are permitted by the filter, but it may be impossible to prove the assertability of the conditional. Thus for a successful counterfactual analysis a delicate balance must be struck: the theory must be weak enough to admit the counterfactual assumption, and also strong enough to permit a clear-

²¹Elster, *Logic and Society*, 184-91.

²²"Problems of Terminology in Historical Writing," in *Theory and Practice in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiography*, (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1946), 113.

²³*The Hero in History*, 131. Alexander Gerschenkron also makes this point in "The Discipline and I," *The Journal of Economic History* 27 (4), December 1967, 457.

cut conclusion.

For example, "when evaluating the consequences of a non-railroad economy in 19th-century America," the heart of Fogel's book,

we can hardly ask whether the internal combustion engine would have been invented before it actually was, for this would require a theory of technical change that might prevent the non-railroad assumption itself from being meaningful. The problem is not that it is difficult to know whether the internal combustion engine would have been invented, but rather that if it were possible to answer this question, it should not have been put in the first place.²⁴

Several authors have held theory to be crucial; indeed, for Lance Davis, theory figures prominently in his definition of the four methodological steps in the "new economic history:"

- (1) operational definitions
- (2) explicit theory leading to explicit counterfactual states
- (3) careful specification of that theory to conform with the actual initial conditions and
- (4) measurement leading to a comparison of the actual world with the deduced counterfactual world.²⁵

²⁴Elster, *Logic and Society*, 184-85. For a discussion of Elster, see Steven Lukes, "Elster on Counterfactuals," Stanley L. Engermann, "Counterfactuals and the New Economic History," and Elster, "Reply to Comments," *Inquiry* 23 (2), June 1980, 145-55, 157-72, 220-26.

²⁵"Specification, Quantification and Analysis in Economic History," in George Rogers Taylor and Lucius F. Elsworth, eds., *Approaches to American Economic History*, (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1971), 112-13.

Elster's first two criteria, a "branching" theory and "legitimacy," would distinguish Barbara Tuchman's "If Mao Had Come to Washington" (1972)²⁶ from Saturday Night Live's "What if Napoleon had a B-52 at Waterloo?" The Mao visit was a considered but rejected option — and thus relatively realistic. A Napoleonic strategic capability, while it makes for great TV, is both radically improbable and "parallel" — it implies an open-ended counterfactual chain reaction which prevents a "re-intersection" with the actual world.

As Gould points out, it is also important to avoid "the ambiguity arising from the inadequate specification offered by the counterfactual as to what changes are called for in related beliefs." To illustrate, he presents two facts: Bizet was French; Verdi was Italian. The counterfactual that begins "If Bizet and Verdi were compatriots..." is a poor one, because the way it is (un)specified prevents one from determining which is a more valid conclusion — "...then Bizet would have been Italian" or "...then Verdi would have been French."²⁷

Gould brings this pitfall into sharper focus with the example, "If the Industrial Revolution had not occurred, the British standard of living in the early nineteenth century would have been lower than it was." To Gould, the problem is that

we cannot decide what we must *subtract* from the real past along with the Industrial Revolution.... In order to know what would have happened to income per head had the Industrial Revolution not occurred we need to know, amongst other things, what in such circumstances would have happened to population.

²⁶Reprinted in her *Practicing History: Selected Essays*, (New York: Knopf, 1981), 188-207.

²⁷Gould, "Hypothetical History," 201.

But to know what, in those same circumstances, would have happened to population we need to know, amongst other things, what would have happened to income per head.²⁸

It is truly, as Gould calls it, a "vicious circle," one which underscores the need for careful pre-selection of counterfactuals; they are decidedly not all created equal.

Finally, just as Elster sees "weak" and "strong" theories, so does Gould usefully distinguish between "weak" and "strong" counterfactuals. "If A, then B" is "weak" because it says nothing about the possibility that something other than A also caused B. "If not A, then not B," however, is "strong" because A is now isolated as the sufficient, rather than just a necessary, cause of B. Gould's example: "If Napoleon's army had been equipped with atomic weapons, he would have won the battle of Waterloo" is weak, because we cannot infer from this that "Napoleon lost the battle of Waterloo because he did not have atomic weapons."²⁹ Gould would thus argue, as have others, that counterfactual *subtraction* of a historical element is preferable to counterfactual *addition*.

To conclude more broadly, the authors sampled form a spectrum of opinion on the use of counterfactual analysis in history. At one end are those such as Redlich, who reject counterfactuals out of hand as having no legitimate role to play. At the other end are those like Cohen, who see history, beyond the simple regurgitation of facts, as impossible without counterfactuals. And in the middle are Gould and others, who acknowledge counterfactuals' drawbacks and potential for abuse, but also ascribe to them a real, even unique value. If one prefers this middle ground, which certainly seems the

²⁸*Ibid.*

²⁹*Ibid.*, 204-05.

most defensible, then the next questions follow naturally: *when* should counterfactuals be used, and *how* can they be used responsibly? Whatever the answers, if counterfactuals are unavoidable or just useful in a particular case, far better they be explicit and “regulated” than remain implicit and risk undermining the larger analysis altogether.

THE SOVIET-GERMAN PACT OF AUGUST 23, 1939: WAS THE WAR INEVITABLE?

by

O. A. Rzheshovsky

INSTITUTE OF GENERAL HISTORY, MOSCOW, USSR

[Ed. note: This paper was delivered to the *Newsletter* by Warren F. Kimball, who added the following comments.

"[This paper is] from one of the Soviet scholars who attended the fourth of our Soviet-American Colloquia on World War II. He delivered it during a session at which I also presented a paper during the XVII Congress of the Historical Sciences in Madrid last August.... My sense is that, while it repeats much that we know, and tells us little that we don't (certainly there's not much indication of new Soviet archival materials), it does provide an insight into the current Soviet 'orthodoxy,' namely that a selfish interpretation (by the USSR as well as the UK and France) of national interests (the lure of territory for the USSR) prevented collective security against Hitler. Other Soviet historians are presently arguing that ideology (in the USSR and the UK) also blocked effective action. It might provoke some comment and response."]

The analysis of any historical event — irrespective of its emotional interpretation afterwards — is possible only when its historical context is taken into account. This is quite true for the 1939 Soviet-German pact. It can be interpreted only in the general context of the pre-war political crisis in Europe, which was the direct result of the Munich agreement, concluded by Britain, France, Germany, and Italy in September 1938. As a result of this treaty Czechoslovakia was surrendered to the Nazis, who had already committed a

number of aggressive acts.

The Munich agreement crucially changed the situation in Europe, substantially strengthened Germany's position, ruined the then-forming security system (USSR-Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia-France, France-USSR), and opened the door for aggression of a European scale. This was a continuation of the political line, formed by the Treaty of Locarno (1925) and the "Four Power Pact" (1933), by which the British and French hoped to draw the danger away from their countries and direct it to the East. The smaller countries of Europe had to face an extremely hard situation. As their governments began to doubt the readiness of Britain and France to resist Nazi aggression, some of these countries showed a tendency towards orientation on Germany.

The USSR found itself in isolation. Moreover, bearing in mind the support of Munich by the USA, the direct participation of Poland and Hungary in the division of Czechoslovak territory, and the approval of the agreement by Japan, Soviet leadership could not avoid considering the danger of a potential anti-Soviet coalition.

Analysis of diplomatic and other documents including those previously unknown shows that the Soviet policy of collective security and prevention of war was in the main consistent. Soviet intelligence worked effectively. For instance, generally accurate information about the meetings between Chamberlain and Hitler in Berchtesgaden on September 15 and at Godesberg on September 22, 1938, was transmitted to the Soviet leadership the day after. However, not all the possibilities for restraining Hitler had been exploited before the crisis in 1939. In 1936 the initiative of the French prime minister L. Blum proposing a visit to the USSR and a meeting with Stalin was not pursued, although Blum's own position had been inconsistent and sometimes tended against Franco-Soviet cooperation. The Soviets were not persistent enough in contemplating together with Czechoslovakia of the precise

military instruments of its defence against German aggression. The question of the passage of Soviet land forces through the Polish and Rumanian territory to assist Czechoslovakia was left unsettled. Though the main responsibility for this situation rested with Britain and France, the lack of Soviet support was one of the factors which made it difficult for the Czechoslovak government to make the decision to resist German aggression. Stalin's purges, which had undermined the international prestige of the Soviet state and raised doubts about the capabilities of its armed forces, constituted another factor.

There were other obstacles to the coordinated Anglo-Franco-Soviet deterrent policy against German aggression. Western governments were afraid of the left-wing alternatives inside their countries, especially in connection with the Soviet assistance to the Spanish republic. Suspicions raised by the duality of the Soviet policy (the controversy between the Comintern line towards world revolution and the concept of peaceful coexistence) also were not wholly unfounded.

The illusions of the appeasers were short-lived. In March 1939, when Germany occupied Czechoslovakia, Britain and France pretended that in Munich they had not guaranteed the Czechoslovak borders. In his speech in the House of Commons Chamberlain used the proclamation of Slovakia's "independence." "The effect of this declaration," he explained, "put an end by internal disruption to the state whose frontier we had proposed to guarantee. His Majesty's government cannot accordingly hold themselves any longer bound by this obligation."¹

Such statements contributed to Hitler's assurance that there would be no real resistance to his plans. The aggressors acted

¹W. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich*. New York, 1962, p. 451

quickly and boldly. On March 23 Germany occupied Memel and in the same days proclaimed its territorial claims to Poland. On April 7 Italy occupied Albania. It was clear that the appeasement policy failed completely. Europe moved towards war.

In this situation every European country faced the problem of national security. For the USSR in that period the main task was to prevent the country's involvement into the approaching war. The situation worsened when Japan, in the beginning of June, started a war against a Soviet ally, the Mongolian People's Republic, which constituted a menace to the Soviet borders in the Far East.

In 1939 several main variants lay before the Soviet foreign policy:

- to persist in pursuing an alliance, between the USSR, Britain, and France, which could stop the aggressor;
- to maintain an understanding with the neighboring countries, which were also menaced by aggressors;
- if it would be impossible to avert war, to try and avoid a two-front war — in the West and in the Far East.

The official action on the first variant started in March-April 1939, when the USSR tried to reach agreement with the Western powers for preventing aggression; the second one — during the visits of V. Potemkin, deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs to Poland and Turkey (April-May 1939) and the diplomatic actions (in March 1939) designed to show the governments of Latvia and Estonia that the USSR was anxious to prevent the domination of the aggressor in the Baltic region.

The question of normalization of relations with Germany was still open. No indications of any Soviet inclination towards that path were found in the Soviet diplomatic documents of 1937-1938. But from the beginning of 1939 Germany started to explore the possibilities of improving relations with the USSR, to "stage a new Rapallo period," as

Hitler called it. This was indicated by the talk between Hitler and A. Merekalov at a reception in January 1939, the resumption of the Soviet-German economic talks, and the termination of anti-Soviet propaganda in German press (from April 1939).

After Hitler's decision in the end of 1938 to make the first strike in the West (the aggression against the USSR needed "thorough preparation") he and his entourage thought it necessary to start the aggression by the liquidation of Poland, an ally of Britain and France, to prevent "the blow in the back." This made it necessary to isolate Poland from the East and the West.

At the same time Great Britain and France took measures to preserve their traditional spheres of interests and evade involvement in war. In March and April the British and French governments gave guarantees to Poland, Romania, and several other countries, took a number of steps to strengthen their defence in an attempt to show Hitler that in the event of German aggression against these countries he would have to deal with England and France, and so make him return into the limits of the Munich agreement.

The most farsighted politicians in England and France (W. Churchill, D. Lloyd George, E. Herriot, P. Cot, and others) were in favour of the close cooperation with the Soviet Union. It seemed that the British cabinet was also reconsidering its policy towards the USSR. There were some encouraging signals: on March 15, N. Chamberlain visited the Soviet embassy. On March 2,² in connection with German threats to Romania, the British ambassador in Moscow, W. Seeds, handed to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. Litvinov, a draft declaration of Britain, USSR, France, and

²Год кризиса 1938-1939. Документы и материалы. Т. I. М., 1990. с. 130. /Далее: "Год кризиса..."/

Poland which read that in the case of a "danger to the political independence of any European state," the four governments would "undertake immediate consultations about the measures which must be taken for common resistance to such actions." On March 23 the Soviet government replied that, though it considered the declaration not effective enough, it nevertheless agreed to sign it.³ But the initiative was not put into effect because Poland had refused to take part in a public declaration signed by a Soviet representative, and Britain did not insist. In a private letter of March 26 Chamberlain wrote: "I must confess to the most profound distrust of Russia. I have no belief whatever in her ability to maintain an effective offensive even if she wanted to."⁴

On March 27 the foreign policy committee of the British cabinet agreed that "insistence to associate with Soviet Russia would destroy any chance of building up a solid and united front against German aggression."⁵ The governments of Poland, Romania, Finland, a number of other European countries, regarded by Chamberlain as allies, adopted the same attitude.

On April 17 the Soviet governments took a step of principal importance: it suggested that the USSR, Britain, and France should conclude a mutual assistance treaty and a military convention. There was also a provision concerning the support of the countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea against aggression.⁶

As the protocols of the British cabinet show, the Soviet

³Архив внешней политики СССР /АВП СССР/. Ф. 059, оп. I, п. 313. Д. 2153. Л. 162-163.

⁴Feiling K., *The Life of Neville Chamberlain*. L., 1946, p. 403.

⁵PRO. Cab. 27.624, p. 201.

⁶Год кризиса..., с. 386-387.

initiative was regarded by the government as a very uncomfortable one.⁷ Considering it impossible to refuse directly, the British government tried to persuade the Soviets to take unilateral obligations of assistance to Poland and Romania. Britain was not inclined to conclude a mutual assistance treaty with the Soviet Union, i.e., take obligations to support the USSR against aggression. Characterising the position of the British government, L. Collier, head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office, stated that it wanted not to ally itself with the USSR but "to give Germany the opportunity to spread aggression in the East at the expense of Russia."⁸

London and Paris did not pay sufficient attention to the repeated Soviet warnings that they cannot ignore the USSR eternally. And such warnings indeed were made. In the report of the Central Committee of the VKP (b) to the XVIII Congress on March 10, Stalin said that the Western countries were pushing Germany in the Eastern direction, promising it easy prey and saying, "You just start a war against the Bolsheviks and everything will be all right." J. Davies, the US ambassador, commented on Stalin's speech in his diary on March 11, regarding it as an open warning to the British and French governments that the Soviets were getting tired of their "unreal opposition" to Germany.⁹

⁷PRO.FO. 371/23064, p. 74.

⁸Niedhart, G., *Großbritannien und die Sowjetunion 1934-1939*. München, 1972, s. 411.

⁹Davies, J., *Mission to Moscow*. L., 1942, p. 437-439. Some historians think that this was an invitation to start a dialogue with Hitler, basing it on Molotov's toast at the banquet on the night of 24 August 1939: "It was Stalin who changed political relations completely by his speech in March, which was correctly understood in Germany." But to the same extent it was also a warning to the West.

London and Paris still hoped that the measures taken were sufficient to bring Hitler to reason.

But the attempts of Chamberlain and Daladier to intimidate the Third Reich by guarantees to some European states failed. On April 28 Hitler denounced the non-aggression treaty with Poland of 1934, a day before the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935, and on May 22 concluded the "Pact of Steel" with Mussolini. All this indicated that Germany was not inclined to change its policy and was preparing for a war against Poland. On April 11 Hitler approved the plan of attack against Poland (the "Weiss" Plan). In April and May the German staffs completed work on the plans of concentration and deployment of forces. On June 15 the directive for strategic deployment of troops was signed. The "Weiss" Plan provided also for an aggression against the Baltic countries. These events, which became known to the Western democracies, and the pressure of the public (more than 80% of the British were in favour of an alliance with the USSR) force the Chamberlain government to start discussion of the mutual assistance treaty between the USSR, England, and France. But their agreement was substituted by reservations, which nullified the significance of the treaty.

In the diary of A. Cadogan, the permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, there is a following note dated May 20: "The prime minister said that he would rather resign than sign an alliance with the Soviets."¹⁰

In such an atmosphere the Anglo-Franco-Soviet (Moscow) negotiations started. Their result was to determine the fate of peace in Europe. The duality, vagueness, and controversies of the Western position, deep mutual mistrust of the participants haunted the talks from the beginning. From the Soviet side the talks were conducted by V. Molotov, People's

¹⁰The diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, 1938-1945. L., 1971, p. 182.

Comissar for Foreign Affairs. Britain and France were represented by their ambassadors in Moscow, W. Seeds and P. Naggiar.

This was also a period of active Anglo-German contacts. The idea of a new four-power pact (between England, France, Germany, and Italy) or a bilateral Anglo-German agreement (which London preferred in secret from France) lay in the basis of the possible compromise. In the event of the profitable deal with Germany,¹¹ England was ready to terminate negotiations with the USSR, renounce its guaranties to Poland and other countries, and even sacrifice the interests of France, its closest ally. This combination showed that the division of the world between British and German spheres of influence was contemplated. The basin of the Baltic and Eastern and South Eastern Europe were related to the sphere of "traditional German interests." This was supported by a specific English proposal of cooperation with Germany in the colonial questions and the exploitation of the markets of the British Empire, China, and Russia.¹² The German diplomats encouraged Chamberlain's hopes for the possibility of an Anglo-German settlement. The same tactics were used by Hitler and especially by Göring. But the top priority task was to neutralize Britain when Germany would attack Poland. Nevertheless the door was kept open for an Anglo-German agreement on a "broad basis" as well.

Meanwhile, both groups of powers struggled for the

¹¹A prominent figure in the Conservative party, Drummond-Wolf, talking on May 14 to Rüther from the German Foreign Ministry, said that "Britain is now ready for political combinations providing for allotment to Germany of a 'fairly belonging to it' field for economic activity in the whole world, especially in the East and in the Balkans." (ADAP. Ser. D. Bd. 6. S. 407.)

¹²*Ibid.*, p. 827.

involvement of the Soviet Union in their combinations, but their aims were different. Traditional British strategy demanded in the event of war to acquire strong allies on the Continent, who would bear the burden of the bloody combat on land. France was such an ally. At the same time both England and France wanted to have the USSR as a powerful ally in the East who, like the Russian Empire during World War One, would draw the bulk of the German forces and turn the Eastern front into the crucial one. But the second aim of the Western powers was even more significant — to make Russia and Germany clash in a deadly fight and use their mutual exhaustion in the interests of the West. In one of the memoranda for the British government this aim was expressed clearly: "It would seem desirable to conclude some agreement whereby the Soviet Union would come to our assistance if we were attacked in the West, not only in order to ensure that Germany would have to fight a war on two fronts, but also perhaps for the reason, admitted by the Turkish Minister for foreign affairs to General Weygand, that it was essential, if there must be a war, to try to involve the Soviet Union in it."¹³

The new phase of the tripartite political negotiations started on June 15, when W. Strang, the British official representative, arrived in Moscow.¹⁴ By mid-July the talks with his participation were led into a deadlock. Though in words the British and French delegations agreed to the principle of mutuality, in fact they were putting obstacles to any concrete measures for bringing it into effect. The draft agreement proposed by Britain lacked the main principle of mutual assistance treaties — the mutuality of obligations. According to the British draft the USSR was to assist Britain

¹³DBFP. 3 Ser. Vol. V, p. 646.

¹⁴Halifax evaded the invitation.

and France automatically in the event of a German attack against Belgium, Greece, Poland, Romania, and Turkey, whose independence had been guaranteed by Britain and France. But in the event of a German attack against the Baltic countries (a variant highly probable and most dangerous from the Soviet point of view), there was no provision for immediate assistance from Britain and France. Assistance would be given only if by mutual consultations Germany's actions would be considered a menace to the sovereignty and neutrality of the Baltic states, the security of the USSR. From the Soviet point of view, such a vague formula gave the Western powers an opportunity to delay the consultations and sabotage real military assistance. One should also remember that in June Germany concluded non-aggression pacts with Latvia and Estonia, and the secret negotiations for occupation of the Baltic region by German forces were held.¹⁵

Britain and France also objected to the spreading of the guaranties to make them cover the so-called "indirect aggression," i.e., the case of Hitler's supporters coming to power in these countries, thus being able to make their peoples take part in a German aggression against the USSR. During the talks with the British and French ambassadors, Molotov made it clear that it would be possible to draft a satisfying formula. "The most important — the Comissar said — is to sign the treaty as soon as possible." But Halifax instructed the British representatives to adopt a firm line in the question of the "indirect aggression."¹⁶

Informing the Soviet ambassadors in London and Paris about the negotiations, Molotov commented, "We think that the English and French...do not want a serious treaty, based

¹⁵ADAP. Ser. D. Bd. V. S. 384.

¹⁶DBFP. 3 Ser. Vol. Vi, p. 521-525.

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¹⁵ADAP. Ser. D. Bd. V. S. 384.

¹⁶DBFP. 3 Ser. Vol. Vi, p. 521-525.

on the principles of mutuality and equality of obligations."¹⁷ This point of view can be confirmed by Halifax's proposals on the meeting of the Foreign Policy Committee on July 4, when he informed his colleagues of the two possible lines of action: to break the negotiations off or to conclude a limited treaty in order to prevent the rapprochement between the USSR and Germany.¹⁸ "There will be no great progress on the staff conversations," he remarked on July 10.¹⁹

As to the Soviet position, even Chamberlain thought that "the Soviet government intended to make an agreement with us...."²⁰

On July 12 the British government decided to agree "in the last resort" to the Soviet proposal that the political and military agreements should come into operation simultaneously, if the Soviet government in its turn would accept the British formula of indirect aggression.

By the end of July, 1939, thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union and partly France, the text of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet political treaty was on the whole ready, but there still existed the differences over the formula of indirect aggression, which was to apply primarily to the Baltic countries and was of principal significance both for these countries and the USSR. Hitler's conversations with the Foreign Minister of Latvia and the Estonian minister in Berlin show that Germany indeed had far-reaching plans in the Baltic region. It wanted to tie the region itself by economic links and, above all, to isolate it from the USSR. The aim was to use the territory of these

¹⁷СССР в борьбе за мир накануне войны. М., 1971. С. 453.

¹⁸PRO. Cab. 27.625, p. 236-237.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 268.

²⁰PRO. Cab. 23.100, p. 148.

countries as a future base for the attack against the Soviet Union (the information provided by I. Fleischauer).

On August 3 H. Wilson, Chamberlain's closest adviser, met with H. Dirksen, the German ambassador in London. As a result of their conversation the German ambassador came to the conclusion that the links between Britain and other states, established in the preceding months, were "just a reserve instrument for real reconciliation with Germany and that these links will be severed as soon as the only important and worthy aim — the agreement with Germany — will be really achieved."²¹

These Anglo-French plans were supported by some of the American representatives in Europe. The US ambassador in London, J. Kennedy, was sure that the Poles should be left to face their fate alone and the Nazis should be given the opportunity to fulfill their aims in the East: a conflict between the USSR and Germany would be very advantageous for the West.²²

On August 7 a secret meeting took place between Göring and a group of British industrialists, who had Chamberlain's sanction for such a conversation. The plan of a new conference of the "Munich Powers" was discussed on this meeting. On August 11, talking to C. Burkhardt, the High Commissioner of the League of Nations in Danzig, Hitler made it clear that he was ready to reach an agreement with Britain if Germany would be given a free hand in the East, and warned that the possible pact with the USSR would not alter his plans "to turn all his forces against the Soviet

²¹Документы и материалы кануна второй мировой войны. Т. 2. М., 1981. С. 198.

²²Langer, W., Gleason, S. E., *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940*. New York, 1952, p. 76.

Russia.”²³ Burkhardt agreed to inform the British government about Hitler’s readiness to meet their representative.

On July 25 Britain and France accepted the Soviet proposal to start military conversations, though it did not mean that their position had changed.

On August 14 the General Staff of the Red Army worked out detailed “Considerations for the negotiations with England and France,” envisaging the active participation of the Soviet troops in different variants of actions against Germany — the “principle aggressor.”²⁴ The Soviet delegation, headed by K. E. Voroshilov, the Commissar for Defence was empowered to hold the negotiations with Britain and France and to sign the military convention against German aggression. The British and French delegations consisted of persons of minor importance: the British mission was headed by the King’s aide, Admiral R. Drax;²⁵ the French, by a member of the military council, General J. Doumenc. They had no power to sign the military agreement, and Drax received his powers as negotiator from London only on August 15. The British delegation was instructed to avoid entangling Britain by definite obligations. The instruction read that “the British government doesn’t want to be drawn into any definite obligation which could tie its hands in any circumstances.”²⁶ The French mission was recommended to conduct the negotiations very slowly and to drag them until autumn.

The first days of the staff conversations, which had started

²³Burkhardt, C., *Meine Danzigen Mission, 1938-1939*. München, 1960, s. 372.

²⁴АВП СССР. Ф. 06. Оп. I6. П. 2. Д. 5. Л. 22-32.

²⁵Drax had been a member of the British delegation received by Nicolas II and had been awarded the Order of St. Stanislav.

²⁶Документы и материалы... Т. 2. С. 168-169.

on Aug. 12, produced no real results. According to their instructions, the British and French missions avoided concrete questions, preferring the "discussion of principles." The situation complicated even more when the Soviet mission had received no answer to its "cardinal question" about the passage of the Soviet troops through Polish territory in the event of German aggression.

All this strengthened the assurance of the Soviet government that the Western powers in the event of war would prefer to place the USSR under the blow of the German armies, without binding themselves with obligations of real assistance. The prominent British historian D. C. Watt writes in his book, *How War Came*, "Nothing had happened to allay his [Stalin's] suspicions about an Anglo-German deal."²⁷

The situation on the Moscow negotiations was influenced by the knowledge both by the Western powers and the USSR that each side was exploiting alternative variants. Much had been written in the historical literature of Soviet intelligence informing Moscow about the Anglo-German talks, and the British, French, and American informants disclosing the Soviet-German contacts to their governments. Berlin, in its turn, was aware of the progress on the negotiations in Moscow. According to some recent information, W. Strang, who had visited Schulenburg before his departure from Moscow, had been among German informants.

Trying to prevent the conclusion of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet agreement, and thereby their coordinated actions in defence of Poland, German diplomacy accelerated its efforts for normalization of Soviet-German relations. The Soviet reaction to their initiatives had been very watchful. Before August 1939 the German probes for an economic, and then for a

²⁷Watt, D. C., *How War Came: Immediate Origins of the Second World War, 1938-1939*. New York, 1989, p. 449.

political settlement, which had started in April, had been rejected or left without a definite answer. The details of these contacts were fully described in the literature.

Officially the Soviet-German conversations started on August 15, when F. Schulenburg informed Moscow that Ribbentrop was ready to arrive in Moscow to spell out the German proposals.²⁸ By that time the Soviet governments had come to the conclusion that the position of the West left no chance for success on the Moscow staff conversations. On August 17 Germany proposed a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union. The Soviet government expressed its readiness to sign such a pact or to reaffirm the neutrality pact of 1926 with the simultaneous adoption of a special protocol concerning the interests of the contracting parties in connection with different foreign policy questions. The protocol was to constitute an integral part of the pact.²⁹ (The first proposal concerning the secret political protocol as an enclosure to the credit agreement had been made by the Germans on August 3, but then the Soviet Union had rejected it.) The specific Soviet demands were as follows: the protocol should include mutual guaranties of neutrality of the Baltic countries and Germany had to exercise influence on Japan for normalization of Soviet-Japanese relations.

On the same day of August 17, when Schulenburg proposed to Molotov to conclude a non-aggression pact, Drax sent Voroshilov a letter, asking him to adjourn the next meeting of the delegation until August 23. The Soviet government had also received information that on August 23 Göring was to fly to England to meet with the members of the British government (the terms of a possible compromise are still hidden in the British archives). All these events were taking

²⁸ABII CCCP. Ф. 0745. Оп. 15. Д. 8. Л. 122-128.

²⁹ABII CCCP. Ф. 0745. Оп. 19. Д. 4. Л. 122-128.

place when a few days were left before the German attack against Poland. Even in this situation the Polish government was against any cooperation with the USSR. (On August 20 the Polish foreign minister, J. Beck, said, "We have not got a military agreement with the USSR. We do not want one." General Stakhievic, the Chief of Poland's General Staff said on the same day that "in no case would the admission of Soviet troops into Poland be agreed to."³⁰) The Western powers were not persistent enough to change this position.

We must note that the Soviet side also had not done everything possible to remove this obstacle, and had not proposed to invite an official Polish representative to take part in the Moscow negotiations. Their motives can be understood from the conversation between Molotov, Voroshilov, Drax, and Seeds, which had taken place after the signing of the Soviet-German pact. According to Seeds' notes, Marshall Voroshilov said, "During the whole of the conversations, the Polish press and people were saying that they did not want the help of the Soviets; were we to have to conquer Poland in order to offer our help or were we to go on our knees and beg her to accept our help?"³¹

Meanwhile Germany was proposing a treaty which could help the USSR avoid involvement in the approaching war and ensure its national security interests, i.e., the same results that it in vain tried to obtain from England and France. It also made possible a settlement of the Soviet-Japanese relations. No alternative to such a treaty had arisen in August 1939.

The Soviet leadership nevertheless did not exclude the possibility of reaching an agreement with Britain and France "in the last minute."

³⁰Shirer, W., *Op. cit.*, p. 537.

³¹W. Seeds to E. Halifax, September 11, 1939. British Documents on Foreign Affairs. Ser. A. Vol. 15. L., 1986, p. 170.

Indeed, there are some indications in French documents that the Soviet side had let their partners know that the conclusion of a Soviet-French mutual assistance treaty was possible even in the changed situation.³² We must admit that the calculations of that sort were already quite unrealistic.

All these events were taking place within a severe political time limit and the accelerating approach of war in Europe. The process of involvement of one state after another into the war had been developing for a long time, since the beginning of the thirties. Local wars, growing into regional conflicts had started in the Far East (Japanese occupation of Manchuria), in Africa (Italian aggression against Ethiopia), and in Europe (the civil war and Italo-German aggression in Spain).

With the expansion of the Japanese aggression in China and the attack of Japanese troops against a Soviet ally — the Mongolian People's Republic — in summer of 1939, giving the military confrontation in the Far East a regional dimension. At the same time, the danger of a regional war in Europe increased sharply.

As far as the USSR was concerned, the conclusion of the non-aggression pact on August 23, 1939, in the extreme circumstances of the approaching war was a forced but necessary decision. The German diplomatic documents show that the agreement of August 23 safeguarded the line which the German troops could not cross, which was necessary for the security of the USSR and the best possible (in those circumstances) defence of the border countries and territories from Nazi occupation. According to the secret protocol the Soviet sphere of interests included Finland, Estonia, Latvia Lithuania, Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia, and Bessarabia.

³²DDF. Ser. 2. T. 18, p. 326-328.

We can presume that the Soviet government, concluding the non-aggression pact with Germany, took into consideration the results of the inevitable defeat of Poland in the war with Germany, and thought it necessary in such occasion to prevent the Wehrmacht from reaching the Soviet borders and the involvement of the USSR in the war.

This was the only optimal decision left, and it gave the USSR certain guaranties of national security and inviolability of its western borders, as well as temporary neutrality in the coming war. But there were also the inevitable results of a compromise with the aggressive Nazi regime — the negative factors of political, ideological, and military character. These factors were later aggravated by demonstrations of “friendship” with Germany and by the lawless actions of the Soviet leadership during the liberation of Western Ukraine and Byelorussia, and then in the Baltic countries.

One must also remember that in the summer and autumn of 1939 the USSR and MPR were fighting against Japanese invaders in the Far East. Therefore the danger of a two-front war, and, in the worst case, a war against other capitalist countries also, was a hard reality.

This allows us to formulate some conclusions.

In the situation of 1939 war became inevitable, due to a number of circumstances:

- German political doctrine was aimed at conquest by means of armed violence in Europe, and later in the world.
- The militarized German economy had turned into a self-sufficing factor, demanding “the Jump into a war.”
- In the military-technical sphere the Wehrmacht had left the Western powers far behind.

An alliance between the USSR, Britain, and France was the only instrument to avert war, but the following conditions were necessary for its conclusion:

- the realization that the Nazi regime and aggression

constituted a global danger;

- mutual confidence and assurance that all the partners would fulfill their obligations, the readiness of the contracting parties not only to stop the aggressors, but also to defeat the Nazi Reich and its satellites in an armed conflict; and
- the support of a possible alliance of Britain, France, and the USSR by the smaller European states and the USA.

Such circumstances did not appear. The underestimation of the Nazi danger, the incapability and unwillingness of the non-aggressive countries to sacrifice their selfishly understood national interests for the common task to defeat fascism, and their aspirations to settle their problems at the expense of other states and peoples made it possible for the aggressor to start the war in the most favourable situation.

BONERS

**"The United States interred WWII in 1941." — Linda Killen
(Radford University)**

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION

As the reader will undoubtedly have noticed, the *Newsletter* has undergone great changes in format over the past year. The following *Guidelines for Submission* of essays, personals, announcements, *et al.*, are offered in an effort to provide some assistance to those who wish to have material printed. An abbreviated form of these *Guidelines* appears inside the back cover of each issue of the *Newsletter*.

The *Newsletter* solicits the submission of personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered or published on diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, *et al.* Material intended for publication in a given issue should be submitted to the editor at least four weeks prior to the date of publication of the issue. These publication dates fall on the first of March, June, September, and December of each year.

The submission of short personal notes (for the *Personals* section) concerning awards or prizes received, positions attained, or other activities undertaken is encouraged by the *Newsletter*. Many members of SHAFR rely on such announcements in these pages to stay current on the activities of acquaintances in the Society.

Members are also urged to drop a postcard or short note to the *Newsletter* announcing the recent or upcoming publication of books they have written or edited. While the editor makes every attempt to include all recent publications by SHAFR members in the *Publications* section, inevitably some books will be missed. For a member to be assured that his work will appear, he should notify the editor of the work's publication. Submissions for the *Publications* section should follow the format used in that section in the latest issue of the *Newsletter*, including all information such as ISBN, publisher, and suggested price.

Jokes and "Boners" are gladly accepted by the *Newsletter*. A "Boner" is an excerpt from an essay written by a student which completely misinterprets or muddles historical facts in a humorous manner.

Announcements of upcoming conferences or of other events of import to the Society are also requested.

The *Newsletter* also encourages the submission of abstracts of published articles or papers delivered on diplomatic subjects. These abstracts should be typed, double-spaced, and should follow the format used in the *Abstracts* section of the most recent *Newsletter*.

Papers submitted for publication must be typed, double-spaced, with footnotes in standard MLA style. Length should generally not exceed 3,000 words (about eleven *Newsletter* pages). The *Newsletter* now accepts submissions on IBM-formatted, low- or high-density, 5¼" or 3½" diskettes. Submitting a paper on magnetic media helps eliminate typographical errors when the work is published. A paper so submitted must be in one of the following formats: WordPerfect (version 4.2 or later), WordStar 3.3, MultiMate, Word 4.0, DisplayWrite, Navy DIF Standard, or IBM DCA format. A hardcopy of your paper should be included with the diskette.

Submissions, as well as any questions concerning these *Guidelines*, should be sent to:

William J. Brinker, Editor

SHAFR Newsletter

Box 5154

Tennessee Technological University

Cookeville, TN 38505

MINUTES OF SHAFR COUNCIL MEETING

27 December 1990

New York Hilton, Suite 537

Michael Hunt presiding

The meeting opened at 8 p.m. Council members present were Michael Hunt, John Gimbel, Thomas Paterson, Robert Schulzinger, and Allan Spetter. Others present were Kinley Brauer, Daniel Helmstadter, Michael Hogan, Page Miller, Anna Nelson, David Schmitz, Thomas Schoonover, Mark Stoler, Sandra Taylor, and William Walker.

1. Page Putnam Miller, director of the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History, brought Council up to date on pending legislation dealing with the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series. The Senate passed the legislation in October, but the House did not consider the bill before adjournment. However, Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-NY) introduced similar legislation in the House before adjournment. The legislation would give considerable review authority to the Advisory Committee of outside scholars, would put the series on a thirty-year timetable, and introduces for the first time in legislation the principle of automatic declassification after thirty years.

2. Anna Nelson, chair of the Committee on Documentation, reported to Council about ongoing discussions with representatives of the National Archives on declassification of government documents. She felt that at last there was some progress being made.

3. Sandra Taylor, chair of the program committee for the 1991 summer conference, reported to Council that she had

received more than thirty proposals for panels.

4. Council discussed the small number of panels on American foreign relation at recent AHA and OAH meetings. Both organizations have insisted that the problem is a lack of proposals, not an unwillingness to consider such proposals.

5. President Hunt informed Council that representatives of the FDR Library have invited SHAFR to hold the 1992 summer conference at that location. He did not ask Council to vote on the question at this time.

6. David Schmitz, chair of the Bernath Dissertation Committee, reported to Council that there were no applications for the award. President Hunt asked Schmitz if his committee would rewrite the wording of the application for the award. Schmitz agreed to undertake the task and to report to the Council at the OAH meeting.

7. President Hunt reported for Warren Kimball, chair of the Link Award committee. Hunt said that Kimball is confident the committee will present the first award in 1991.

8. President Hunt reported for Joan Hoff-Wilson, chair of the committee which will present the awards in honor of the late Mrs. Myrna F. Bernath. Hunt said that Hoff-Wilson believes the committee could make the first award in 1991, or in 1992 at the latest.

9. President Hunt informed Council that he had made the following appointments to committees: Graebner Award (Leon Boothe) and Holt Award (Wilton Fowler). Emily Rosenberg will join the State Department Advisory Committee as the SHAFR representative.

10. Daniel Helmstadter, president of Scholarly Resources, commented on the continuing relationship between SR and SHAFR. He informed Council of various efforts which will be undertaken by SR to attempt to increase institutional subscriptions to *Diplomatic History*.

11. Michael Hogan, editor of *Diplomatic History*, asked Council to approve the appointment of three new members of the editorial board: Lloyd Ambrosius, Anna Nelson, and William Stueck. Council endorsed the three appointments.

12. Hogan then presented his Annual Report to Council and asked Council to approve two proposals: that SHAFR increase the amount available to pay for copyediting from \$2,500 to \$4,400; that SHAFR agree to pay the additional cost involved in printing either 640 pages or 672 pages annually. Council approved the additional amount for copyediting and an annual length of 640 pages.

13. Executive Secretary-Treasurer Allan Spetter presented his Annual Report, including the financial figures for 1990 and the proposed budget for 1991.

14. President Michael Hunt encouraged Council to work on establishing financial priorities for SHAFR, based on the following considerations: a significant increase in the endowment in the past year due to the continuing generosity of the Bernath family; a possible deficit in operating funds due to the increasing costs of various SHAFR activities, including publication of *Diplomatic History*.

15. Allan Spetter presented the results of the 1990 SHAFR elections: the new president is Gary Hess; the new vice president is John Gaddis; the two new Council members are Linda Killen and Robert McMahon; the new member of the

Nominating Committee is Mark Stoler.

16. Council passed a Resolution of Appreciation for Dr. Gerald Bernath.

The meeting adjourned at 11 p.m.

**RESOLUTION OF APPRECIATION
FOR GERALD BERNATH**

**Approved at SHAFR Council Meeting
27 December 1990**

The membership of SHAFR wants Jerry Bernath to know its gratitude for the many contributions he and Myrna Bernath made to the Society in memory of their son Stuart and for the recent establishment of a memorial to Myrna. Their gifts and concerns have helped over the years to make SHAFR a vital professional organization distinguished not least for promoting the work of younger historians. We hope that this expression of our gratitude will serve to lighten the period of ill health through which Jerry, a warm and caring friend of diplomatic historians, is now passing.

PROPOSED SHAFR BUDGET FOR 1991

SHAFR's anticipated revenue sources for 1991 are as follows:

Membership dues from 1,000 regular members	\$20,000
Membership dues from 200 student members	2,700
Membership dues from 100 institutional, retired, and unemployed members	900
Interest on Regular and Money Market checking accounts	1,500
Sales of Guides and Mailing Labels	1,500
	<hr/>
	\$26,600

SHAFR's anticipated expenditures for 1991 are as follows:

<i>Diplomatic History</i> (Scholarly Resources)	\$15,925
Copy Editor for <i>Diplomatic History</i>	4,400
General operating (postage, stationery, supplies, telephone, xeroxing, secretary-treasurer expenses)	2,500
Contribution to National Coordinating Committee	2,000
Convention expenses (AHA, OAH)	1,000
Susan Shah (to manage endowment accounts, pay expenses)	1,100
Tax preparation	500
Printing labels	500
	<hr/>
	\$27,925

FINANCIAL REPORT FOR SHAFR
December 16, 1989 to December 15, 1990

CARRYOVER FROM 1989

Checking Account	\$7,081.14
Money Market Account	24,553.58
	<hr/>
	\$31,634.72

RECEIPTS

AHA Luncheons, 1989-1990	\$1,037.00
Bernath Awards, Expenses Reimbursement	3,669.00
Bernath Student Subsidy	1,495.00
Bernath Trust Reimbursement	1,900.00
Dues	19,544.00
Endowment Contributions	2,776.00
Guides Sold	630.00
Holt Award Reimbursement	1,500.00
Interest	1,662.70
Mailing Labels Sold	1,150.00
Roster and Research List Advertisement	250.00
Summer 1990 Conference	7,375.00
	<hr/>
	\$74,623.42

DISBURSEMENTS

AHA, 1989-1990	\$1,969.17
Bernath Awards, Expenses	3,724.55
Bernath Trust	1,900.00
CPA	500.00
<i>Diplomatic History</i> , Copy Editor	2,500.00
<i>Diplomatic History</i> , Index	500.00
<i>Diplomatic History</i> , Supplies	211.60
Endowment	2,764.00
Guide, Expenses	805.00
Holt Award	1,500.00
Mailing Labels	657.89
Miscellaneous (including returned checks)	44.20
National Coordinating Committee	2,000.00
Nominating Committee, Expenses	41.74
Operating Expenses (WSU)	1,030.00
OAH, 1990	352.68
Roster and Research List	1,513.90
Scholarly Resources (<i>Diplomatic History</i>)	13,227.50
Susan Shah, Expenses	1,087.38
Summer Conference, 1990	6,692.40

CASH ON HAND

Checking Account, Citizens Federal	3,230.12
Money Market Account, Citizens Federal	28,371.29
	<hr/>
	\$74,623.42

1990 SHAFR/BERNATH ACCOUNTS

INTERIM STATEMENT ON PORTFOLIOS

11/30/90

Bernath Article/Speaker

ACCOUNT TOTAL

Bank Balance and Portfolio as of last activity \$6,631.77

Established for \$500 Speaker/Lecturer; \$300 Article Prizes

Bernath Book Award

Bank Balance and Portfolio as of last activity \$9,647.65

Established for \$2,000 Book Prize

Bernath Charitable Remainder Annuity

(earns \$1,900 trust interest that is sent to Dr. Bernath)

Portfolio as of last activity \$20,000.00

Bernath Family Account

Bank Balance and Portfolio as of last activity \$48,320.86

Established for Bernath Family Account

Myrna Bernath Prize Account

Bank Balance and Portfolio as of last activity \$56,461.62

Established for Myrna L. Bernath Book Prize of \$2,500 every two years;

Myrna L. Bernath Research Fellowship of \$2,500 every two years

Bernath Supplement

Bank Balance and Portfolio as of last activity \$83,101.99

75% of the fund supplements balance of awarded SHAFR and Bernath prizes; 25% of fund pays student subsidies and dissertation award

SHAFR Endowment

Bank Balance and Portfolio as of last activity \$65,949.68

Also receives contributions to general endowment and life memberships as well as assorted special funds (1990 contributions to: Bailey, \$37.66; Link, \$1,465.00; A. Rappaport, \$0; and Guide Royalty, \$270.32)

SHAFR Graebner Fund

Bank Balance and Portfolio as of last activity \$13,521.37

Established for \$1,000 Graebner Prize on alternate years with Kuehl Prize

SHAFR Holt Fund

Bank Balance and Portfolio as of last activity \$20,618.06

Also receives general contributions to Holt Fund

Established for \$1,500 Holt Prize

SHAFR Kuehl Endowment

Bank Balance and Portfolio as of last activity \$9,839.16

Also receives general contributions to Kuehl Endowment

Established for \$1,000 Kuehl Prize on alternate years with Graebner Prize

TOTAL FUND BALANCE AS OF 12/31/89 \$270,589.85

TOTAL FUND BALANCE AS OF 11/30/90 \$334,092.16

ABSTRACTS

Nicholas O. Berry (Ursinus College), "Three Theses on Eisenhower's New Look: Too Many Enemies and Too Few Friends." Eisenhower Symposium, Gettysburg College, October 10-13, 1990.

Two general foreign policy orientations shaped U.S. policy in the Cold War. They hinged on two different views of deterrence and can be found in Paul Nitze's NSC 68 with its military emphasis and in Eisenhower's New Look with its political-economic emphasis. The first of the three theses argues that Eisenhower was able to sustain the policies associated with the New Look against a vast political-military array of interests but that his orientation was opposed by his successor. The second thesis argues that Nixon's detente was a repackaging of the New Look after an NSC-68 based foreign policy failed in Vietnam. Detente was also defeated by its enemies (and by Nixon's Watergate delegitimization). The third thesis speculatively argues that a New-Look oriented

U.S. foreign policy would have ended the Cold War far earlier than one based on NSC 68.

Peter L. Hahn (Penn State), "Eisenhower's Search for Stability in the Middle East." Eisenhower Symposium, University of Kansas, October, 1990.

This paper argues that Dwight Eisenhower's Middle East policy involved a quest for stability, meaning a region at peace, governed by leaders friendly to the West, open to western economic opportunities, and free of Soviet influence. Based in part on recently declassified documents, the paper analyzes Eisenhower's covert overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh, whose revolutionary agenda threatened to ruin western economic interests and to open Iran to Communist influence. It discusses Washington's establishment of the Baghdad Pact, an anti-Soviet military and political alliance along the region's northern tier. It evaluates the Alpha peace plan, the first American effort to pacify the Arab-Israeli dispute, which made progress toward settlement in 1953-54 but ultimately failed to achieve a lasting peace. Eisenhower's diplomacy during the Suez crisis, especially his decision to censure British aggression against Egypt, is assessed. The paper also explains reasons for the declaration and implementation of the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957-58, an initiative that committed American military power to the preservation of Middle East stability.

Jeffery J. Roberts (Ohio State University), "The Eisenhower Administration and American Policy Toward Afghanistan." Eisenhower Symposium, Gettysburg College, October 10-13, 1990.

Prior to the 1979 Soviet invasion, little was written on American relations with Afghanistan. This paper attempts to redress this imbalance in part. In so doing, it demonstrates the tremendous importance of the Eisenhower administration's policy. It also offers new insight on administration policy toward Asian "neutrality," heretofore dominated and skewed by studies of relations with India.

The paper is the product of more than four years of research on American (and British) policy toward Afghanistan. The paper makes use of many government records, most of which were obtained at the National Archives. British records, examined at the India Office Library and the Public Record Office in London, provide an interesting and informed third-party perspective.

The paper can be divided into two sections. The first half explores administration policy through 1956. Economic and military policies are examined, with emphasis on Afghanistan's role (or lack thereof) in post-war containment policy. Though the United States would in time move to the support of Pakistan and Iran, the administration proved generally disinterested in Afghanistan, since that nation possessed neither strong conventional military forces, strategic facilities, nor vital resources, yet was dangerously exposed to Soviet encroachment. Over time, the failure of the lone American-sponsored development enterprise, coupled with rejections of Afghan requests for arms assistance and partisan support for Pakistan, lessened Afghan faith in the United States, until, in 1956, a frustrated Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud accepted Soviet offers of economic assistance and consigned the Afghan military to Soviet tutelage.

The paper is at times a criticism, for to ignore the many problems of Afghan-American relations during President Eisenhower's first term would simply be dishonest, yet it also renders due credit for subsequent policy. The second half of the paper analyses the Eisenhower administration's response

to the Afghan-Soviet agreement, and its efforts to restore the balance lost in 1956. American commitments to Afghanistan grew markedly. President Eisenhower himself visited Kabul in 1959, becoming the first (and thus far, the only) American president to visit the Afghan capital. The nation became in many ways a frontispiece of the new policy of peaceful coexistence. Had the administration's policies and attitudes remained in place through the ensuing decades, they could have continued to offset Soviet domination within Afghanistan, and may have prevented invasion.

Michael Wala (Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg), "A Sort of Education in Foreign Affairs for the Future President: Dwight D. Eisenhower at the Council on Foreign Relations." Eisenhower Symposium, Gettysburg College, October 10-13, 1990.

Future President Dwight D. Eisenhower, while president of Columbia University, led a Council on Foreign Relations study group to research political and military implications of the Marshall Plan from January 1949 until December 1950. "Whatever General Eisenhower knows about economics," one member of the "Aid to Europe" group later claimed, "he has learned at the study group meetings." The Rockefeller Foundation, sponsoring the program, went even further to suggest the study group had "served as a sort of education in foreign affairs for the future president of the United States."

These claims are certainly exaggerated. At the Council, Eisenhower clearly dominated the discussions on military aspects — this was his field of expertise and at times his fellow Council members were a captive audience. But at the same time, he attended discussions illustrating the interdependency of military and economic, political, and even psychological factors in international relations, discussions that

at times were very confusing to the General. But he may have learned that such was part, if not the essence, of a non-military world.

All evidence available suggests that Eisenhower had a great capacity to understand and utilize information provided in the group meetings — if they were not too technical. In summary, it is quite likely that his two year stint at the Council on Foreign Relations helped in the education in foreign affairs and preparation of Dwight D. Eisenhower for the presidency of the United States.

PUBLICATIONS

Nicholas O. Berry (Ursinus College), *Foreign Policy and the Press: An Analysis of the New York Times' Coverage of U.S. Foreign Policy*. Greenwood Press, 1990. Paper: ISBN 0-313-27419-3.

H. W. Brands (Texas A & M Univ.), *India and the United States: The Cold Peace*. Twayne, 1990. Cloth: ISBN 0-8057-7915-9, \$26.95; paper: ISBN 0-8057-9207-4, \$12.95

Justus D. Doenecke (New College of the Univ. of South Florida) and John E. Wilz (Indiana Univ.), *From Isolation to War, 1931-1941*, 2nd ed. Harlan Davidson, 1991. Paper: ISBN 0-882-95876-3, \$9.95

Peter L. Hahn (Penn State), *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: Strategy and Diplomacy in the Early Cold War*. Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1991. ISBN 0-807-81942-5.

Patrick J. Hearden (Purdue Univ.), *The Tragedy of Vietnam*. HarperCollins, 1991. Paper: ISBN 0-673-52126-5.

Gary R. Hess (Bowling Green State Univ.), *Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War*. Twayne, 1990. Cloth: ISBN 0-8057-7907-8, \$26.95; paper: ISBN 0-8057-9208-2, \$12.95

Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State Univ.), ed., *American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance*. Kent State U., 1991. Cloth: ISBN 0-87338-431-8, \$27.00; paper: ISBN 0-87338-438-5, \$14.50

- Linda R. Killen (Radford Univ.), *The Soviet Union and the United States: A New Look at the Cold War*. Twayne, 1988. Cloth: ISBN 0-8057-7913-2, \$26.95; paper: ISBN 0-8057-9203-1, \$12.95
- Walter LaFeber (Cornell Univ.), *America, Russia, and the Cold War*, 6th ed. McGraw Hill, 1991. ISBN 0-075-57557-4, \$11.95
- Lester D. Langley (Univ. of Georgia), *Mexico and the United States: The Fragile Relationship*. Twayne, 1991. Cloth: ISBN 0-8057-7912-4, \$27.95; paper: ISBN 0-8057-9209-0, \$13.95
- Charles S. Maier (Harvard Univ.), *The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity*. Harvard Univ. Press, 1988. Now in paper: ISBN 0-674-92975-6, \$9.95
- Richard A. Melanson (Brown Univ. and Kenyon College), *Reconstructing Consensus: American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War*. St. Martin's Press, 1990. ISBN 0-312-04651-0.
- Allan R. Millett (Ohio State Univ.), *Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps*, revised and expanded edition. Free Press, 1991. ISBN: 0-02-921595-1, \$35.00
- Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford (both of Univ. of Connecticut), and Kenneth J. Hagan (U.S. Naval Academy), *American Foreign Policy: A History*, 3rd ed., Newly Revised Vol. II: *Since 1900*. Heath, 1991. Paper: ISBN 0-669-24678-6.
- Joseph Smith (Univ. of Exeter), *The Cold War, 1945-1965*. Basil Blackwell, 1989. ISBN 0-631-15816-2, \$7.95
- _____, ed., *The Origins of NATO*. Exeter Univ. Press, 1990. ISBN 0-85989-352-9, £6.95
- Joseph S. Tulchin (Univ. of North Carolina — Chapel Hill), *Argentina and the United States: A Conflicted Relationship*. Twayne, 1990. Cloth: ISBN 0-8057-7900-0, \$26.95; paper: ISBN 0-8057-9204-X, \$12.95
- Russell F. Weigley (Temple Univ.), *Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaigns of France and Germany, 1944-45*. Indiana Univ. Press, 1981. Now in paper: \$9.95
- Randall B. Woods (Univ. of Arkansas) and Howard Jones (Univ. of Alabama), *Dawning of the Cold War: The United States' Quest for Order*. Univ. of Georgia Press, 1991. Paper: ISBN 0-820-31265-7, \$14.95

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Put *Diplomatic History* on Library Shelves

As SHAFR has grown, so has its journal. *Diplomatic History* has evolved into a superb quarterly that has become required reading for diplomatic historians, students, government officials, and interested individuals.

Diplomatic History should be on the shelves of all academic libraries. Sadly, this is not the case, and we could use your help to rectify the situation. You will find a library subscription card in issue 1 of volume 15; issue 2 will contain one, as well. If your library does not subscribe, please give a card to your serials librarian along with your endorsement of the journal. Scholarly Resources, as publisher of *Diplomatic History*, will gladly send a sample issue to any librarian who requests one.

--Daniel C. Helmstadter
President, Scholarly Resources

Foreign Air Mail Rates for *Newsletter*

For the convenience of the international membership, the *Newsletter* now makes available the possibility of receipt by air mail — for an additional fee of \$10 US per year, payable to: SHAFR, Box 5154, Cookeville, TN 38505.

Charles DeBenedetti Prize in Peace History

The Council on Peace Research in History has established the Charles DeBenedetti Prize in Peace History to be awarded every other year. The prize will be given to the author or

authors of an outstanding journal article published in English which deals with peace history. This may include articles focusing on the history of peace movements, the responses of individuals to peace and war issues, the relationship between peace movements and other reform activities, comparative analyses, and quantitative studies. The first award was given for the best article published in 1987 or 1988; the second will be given for the best article published in 1989 or 1990. Articles must be submitted by May 31, 1991, to the chair of the DeBenedetti Prize committee: Carole Fink, Department of History, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN 37235.

National Archives Plans OSS Conference: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II

On July 11 and 12, 1991, the National Archives will host the first major scholarly conference on the role of the World War II intelligence agency, the Office of Strategic Services. It was on July 11, 1941, that President Franklin Roosevelt appointed New York attorney William J. Donovan as the Coordinator of Information. This office became the Office of Strategic Services in 1942 with Donovan remaining at the helm during the entire war.

This two-day meeting will be held at the National Archives in Washington, DC, and will feature prominent historian, members of Donovan's organization, and students of military and intelligence policy. Participants will include Walt Rostow, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., the Countess of Romanones, Robin Winks, and William Colby, as well as several foreign scholars.

In conjunction with the conference the National Archives will feature a film series on intelligence and an exhibit illustrating the OSS. Plans are underway to publish the conference proceedings. Registration for the two-day

conference and reception will be \$150 with special rates for full-time students. Registration will open on April 1 and be on a first-come basis. For further information, contact Conference Director George C. Chalou at the National Archives (202-501-6000).

News from the National Coordinating Committee: Legislation on *Foreign Relations* Series and Declassification

Legislation on the State Department's historical documentary series and declassification policies, which passed the Senate last October but failed to come before the House for a vote, is expected to be introduced soon as a part of the State Department's reauthorization legislation. During the fall the State Department had claimed that the issues raised in the legislation could be handled internally, without legislation; however, to date no corrective measures have been instituted.

U.S. Navy Prize in Naval History

The Naval Historical Center and the Naval Historical Foundation announce the opening of the sixth annual competition for the U.S. Navy Prize in Naval History, to be awarded to the author of the best scholarly article on U.S. naval history published during 1990. The prize consists of a \$500 cash award to encourage the research and writing of American naval history.

Nominations for articles published during 1990 should be sent to: Director of Naval History, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, Bldg. 57, Washington, DC 20374-0571. All nominations must be received by June 30, 1991.

John Carter Brown Library Conference

"America in European Consciousness, 1493 to 1750: The Intellectual Consequences of the Discovery of the New World," an international, multi-disciplinary conference organized by the John Carter Brown Library, will be held June 5-9, 1991. For a copy of the program and registration information, write to: Mr. Ray Douglas, JCBL, Box 1894, Providence, RI 02912.

Dissertation Travel Grants Available from the George C. Marshall Foundation

The George C. Marshall Foundation of Lexington, Virginia, in order to encourage the use of its scholarly resources, will award five grants during the 1991 calendar year to persons engaged in research on dissertations who propose to visit the Marshall Library and Archives. The grant will *reimburse* researchers for travel from their schools or residences to and from Lexington, Virginia, and expenses of \$50 per day while residing in Lexington for the purpose of research at the Marshall Library, up to a maximum of \$1000. To apply for a grant, send a brief resume, a description of the research subjects, an indication of the Marshall Archives sources likely to be used, and a note of the approximate dates of the trip to: Glenn S. Cook, Archivist George C. Marshall Foundation, P.O. Drawer 1600, Lexington, VA 24450.

Recent SHAFR Contributors

Those who have contributed to the endowment and/or to one of the SHAFR funds include: Fredrick Aandahl, Bruce Alsup, Martin Cramer, Vincent DeSantis, Howard Duff, Nolan Fowler, Lawrence Gelfland, Rebecca Goodman, David Hirst, Michael Hopkins, J. Kenneth McDonald, and Delber McKee.

SHAFR Life Members

New SHAFR life members are James Anderson, Verena Botzenhart-Viehe, Frank Chalk, and Sung-Hack Kang.

Calls for Papers

The Atlantic Charter: Its Making and Its Consequences

This conference, to be held at Memorial University of Newfoundland on August 11-13, 1991, will commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the Atlantic Charter. The conference is co-sponsored by Memorial University and the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute. For further information, contact: Atlantic Charter Conference, Dept. of History, Memorial University of Newfoundland, St. John's, Canada A1C 5S7.

1992 Annual Meeting of the American Military Institute

The 1992 annual meeting of the American Military Institute will be hosted by the Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia (35 miles south of Washington, D.C.), April 10-11, 1992. The theme of the conference will be "Joint, Combined, Amphibious, and Expeditionary Operations." This focus is all-inclusive, i.e., irrespective of era, nationality, culture, location, etc. Proposals for individual papers and for complete sessions are solicited. Scholars and graduate students who are commencing work on a new research project are encouraged to submit proposals for "works-in-progress" sessions. Send proposals by October 5, 1991, to Dr. Donald F. Bittner, A.M.I. Program Chairman, P.O. Box 307, Quantico, Virginia 22134-0307. Telephone inquiries to the Program Chairman are encouraged at (703) 640-2746.

PERSONALS

Alexander S. Cochran has taken a position as Professor of Military History at the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Richard A. Melanson is Acting Director of the International Relations Program at Brown University and Professor of Political Science at Kenyon College.

The Cold War Romance of Lillian Hellman and John Melby (Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1989), by Robert P. Newman (University of Pittsburgh), has been named Outstanding Book on Human Rights by the Gustavus Myers Center for the Study of Human Rights in the United States, 1990.

Melvin Small (Wayne State University) was elected president of the Council on Peace Research in History and Jeffrey Kimball (Miami — Ohio) was elected secretary-treasurer.

Joseph Smith (University of Exeter) has been awarded a Fulbright grant to spend the 1990-91 academic year at the University of Colorado at Denver.

United States Expansionism and British North America, 1775-1871 (Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1988), by Reginald C. Stuart (Mount Saint Vincent University), won the 1990 Albert Corey Prize awarded by the AHA and CHA for the best book on Canadian-American relations.

Eugene Trani has become president of Virginia Commonwealth University.

Donald R. Whitnah (University of Northern Iowa) has been awarded the Commander's Cross of the Order of Merit of the Republic of Austria. He is on research leave this academic year with a sabbatical and the Distinguished Scholar Award from his university to complete a book on Americans in Salzburg, 1945-1955.

On August 23, John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University), George Herring (University of Kentucky), and Gaddis Smith (Yale University), served on a panel of expert consultants to advise the Central Intelligence Agency on the management of its Historical Review Program.

The Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute has announced grants to Mark Bradley (Harvard University) for work on "The Center and the Field: Vietnam Policy in the Roosevelt White House," and Thomas M. Leonard (University of North Florida), *Impact of World War II on Central America*.

CALENDAR

1991

April 1

Applications for the W. Stull Holt dissertation fellowship are due.

April 11-14

The 84th meeting of the Organization of American Historians will take place in Louisville with headquarters at the Galt House.

May 1 **Deadline, materials for the June Newsletter.**

June 19-22 **The 17th annual meeting of SHAFR will take place at the George Washington University. Sandra Taylor and William Becker are in charge of the program and the arrangements, respectively. The deadline for proposals has passed.**

August 1 **Deadline, materials for the September Newsletter.**

November 1 **Deadline, materials for the December Newsletter.**

November 1-15 **Annual election for SHAFR officers.**

November 1 **Applications for Bernath dissertation fund awards are due.**

December 27-30 **The 106th annual meeting of the AHA will be held in Chicago.**

1992

January 1 **Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.**

January 15 **Deadline for the 1991 Bernath article award.**

January 15 **Deadline for submissions for 1992 Summer SHAFR panels and proposals.**

- | | |
|------------|---|
| February 1 | Deadline for the 1991 Bernath book award. |
| February 1 | Deadline, materials for the March <i>Newsletter</i> . |
| February 1 | Submissions for Warren Kuehl Award are due. |
| March 1 | Nominations for the Bernath lecture prize are due. |

The OAH will meet in Chicago in 1992. The program co-chairs are Alan Brinkley, CUNY Graduate School, 33 West 42nd Street, New York, NY 10036, and Maeva Marcus, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, DC 20543.

The OAH will meet April 15-18, 1993, in Anaheim; April 14-17, 1994, in Atlanta; and March 30-April 2, 1995, in Washington.

The AHA schedule for next year is:

December 27-30, 1992 -- Washington DC Sheraton and Omni Shoreham hotels.

There will be no December 1993 meeting! The next AHA meeting will be held in January 1994 in a yet-to-be-designated-city. Starting in January 1994 the AHA will meet the first Thursday through Saturday after New Year's Day.

Regina



Books

SPECIAL SHAFR DISCOUNT

AMERICAN-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 1770s-1990s James K. Libbey

Libbey has succeeded in summarizing the basic economic activities in the long commercial relationship between the United States and Russia.

"It strikes me that we don't have anything like it."

Lloyd Gardner, Rutgers University.

"I think it is very good—informative, balanced, thoughtful...."

Raymond L Garthoff, Brookings Institution.

1989 \$21.95 cloth [ISBN 0-941690-35-0], \$12.95 paper [ISBN 0-941690-36-9], \$9.95 text **SHAFR Discount \$7.00**

AMERICA SEES RED: Anti-Communism in America, 1890s to 1980s. A Guide to Issues & References Peter H. Buckingham.

"I was greatly impressed by the thoroughness of the author's survey of issues, especially in the post-World War II period."—

—Professor Robert Griffith, University of Massachusetts at Amherst

220 pages (1987) \$21.95 cloth [ISBN 0-941690-23-7] \$12.95 pbk [ISBN 0-941690-22-9] \$9.95 text **SHAFR Discount \$7.00**

EMPIRE ON THE PACIFIC: A Study in American Continental Expansion Norman A. Graebner.

Graebner contends that Texas, California, and Oregon were acquired so that eastern merchants could gain control of the harbors at San Diego, San Francisco, and Puget Sound—and thereby increase their lucrative trade with the Far East.

LCCN 82-22680. Reprint ed. with updated bibliography. 278 pages. (1983) \$19.95 cloth [ISBN 0-87436-033-1], \$11.95 pbk, \$9.95 text **SHAFR Discount \$7.00**

Offer expires June 15, 1991

Individuals only, please

THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND THE INTERNATIONAL RIVALRIES. Raymond R. Esthus. The story of Roosevelt's role as a pragmatic diplomat, employing secret diplomacy to placate rivalries without involving his country in commitments abroad. This account deals both with TR's involvement in European and East Asian controversies. Bibliography, index.

165 pages. (1971, 1982) \$8.95 text SHAFR Discount \$6.00

THE MISSILE CRISIS OF OCTOBER 1962: A Review of Issues and References. Lester Brune.

"Brune skillfully...scrutinizes the origins of the major issues and analyses the reaction and response of Washington and Moscow, relating them to domestic politics and international affairs....Highly recommended as a brief, analytical review of the crisis situation." —*Choice* (April 1986)

165 pages (1985) \$ 7.95 text SHAFR Discount \$6.00

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Buckingham. <i>America Sees Red</i>	discount \$7.00	_____
Graebner <i>Empire on Pacific...</i>	discount \$7.00	_____
Esthus. <i>Theodore Roosevelt</i>	discount \$6.00	_____
Brune. <i>Missle Crisis</i>	discount \$6.00	_____

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1991 SHAFR SUMMER CONFERENCE

Sandra Taylor, program chair for 1991, has asked the *Newsletter* to include the following preliminary program information.

SHAFR Program Schedule

Wed. 6/19: Plenary: Pearl Harbor 7-9 p.m.

Reception: 9-11:00 p.m.

Thur.	Panel 18:	Panel 17: Round	Panel 7: Wilson,	Panel 29:
8:30	The US and	Table: Why did	journalists and	Private
to	China	the Cold War End?	the Mexican Rev.	Interests & US
10:30				Foreign Policy

Coffee Break

Thur.	Panel 23:	Panel 2: Imper-	Panel 24: Domes-	Panel 9: German
11:00	Korean War	ialism Revisited:	tic Issues and	Occupation to
to	Revisionism:	the Spanish-	Vietnam War	Alliance
1:00	Bruce Cumings	Am. War		

SHAFR Luncheon 1:00 - 2:30 Morton Kondracke, speaker

Thur.	Panel 19:	Panel 3: New	Panel 12: Round	Panel 21: Latin
2:45	China Role in	Views on the	Table: Ending	Amer-US Rels
to	Korean War	Harrison Admin.	World War II	in WWII
4:45				

Film 7:00 p.m. "Berkeley in the 1960s"

Fri.	Panel 25:	Panel 4: WW I,	Panel 11:	Panel 13: Early
8:30	Vietnamese &	the Bolsheviks,	Churchill,	Cold War
to	Vietnam War	and Wilson	Stalin, and	
10:30	Vietnam War		Kennan	

Coffee Break

Fri.	Panel 5: US,	Panel 31:	Panel 16:	Panel 15: Round
11:00	Soviets, and	Secrecy &	Europe in	Table: The In-
to	the "Red	Scholarship	the 1990s	fluence of the
1:00	Menace"			Peace Mvt. on
				the Cold War

Luncheon 1:00 - 2:00 p.m.

Plenary Session 2:00-3:00 p.m. CPRH/AMI Richard Ned Lebow, Eliot Cohen

Fri.	Panel 24:	Panel 14: Ike	Panel 10:	Panel 30: New
3:15	Domestic	and Dulles	Wartime	Perspectives
to	Issues and the	Reappraised	Diplomacy in	on Wilsonian
5:15	Vietnam War		Europe	Diplomacy

AMI Reception 5:30 - 7:30 p.m.

Sat.	Panel 27:	Panel 22: US	Panel 1: 18th	Panel 28:
9:00	Persian Gulf	and the Middle	and Early 19th	Ending of 3rd
to	Conflict &	East	Century Diplo.	Indochina War
11:00	Lessons of			
	Vietnam War			

Sat.	Panel 26:	Panel 20:	Panel 8:	Panel 6:
1:00	Military	Sumner Welles	Between War	Limitations
to	History &		and Peace: US	of Naval
3:00	Vietnam War		and Germany,	Power
	the "Lessons"		1944-46	
	of Vietnam			

1991 SHAFR SUMMER CONFERENCE

Proposed Panels - SHAFR 1991

Plenary Session: **Pearl Harbor after Fifty Years**

Chair: Howard Schonberger, Univ. of Maine

1. "The American Angle." Waldo Heinrichs, Temple University.
2. "The Japanese Angle." Michael Barnhart, SUNY Stony Brook
3. "The German Angle." Gerhard Weinberg, Air Force Academy

Commentators:

Stephen Pelz, Univ. of Massachusetts, Amherst

Ikuhiko Hata, Tokyo

Richard Brightman, American University

1. Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century American Conflicts

Chair: Reginald C. Stuart, Mt. Saint Vincent Univ., Halifax, Nova Scotia

1. "The Origins of the French and Indian War: a European Perspective." Jonathan R. Dull, Benj. Franklin Papers
2. "An Unfree Press: The Structure of the Press in the Early Nation and the Origins of the War of 1812." Howard Mahan, Univ. of South Alabama.
3. "Why did it end so soon? British and American War Plans for 1815 and Beyond." Frederick Drake, Brock Univ., St. Catherines, Ontario, Canada.

Commentators:

Ronald Hatzenbuehler, Idaho State University, Pocatello

John C.A. Stagg, The James Madison Papers, Alderman Library, Univ. of Virginia

2. Imperialism Revisited: Spanish Wars

Chair: Joseph A. Fry, Univ. of Nevada, Las Vegas

1. "Completing the Spanish American Treaty of Paris in 1898: The British Connection." John L. Offner, Shippensburg Univ., Shippensburg, PA.
2. "Countering Counter-Revisionism: The Fraudulent Legend of American Non-Imperialism at the Turn of the 19th Century in Recent Historiography." Serge Ricard, Université Paul-Valéry, France

Comment: Joseph A. Fry

Paul Holbo, Univ. of Oregon

3. American Diplomacy a Century Ago: The Harrison Administration Reconsidered

Chair: Kinley Brauer, Univ. of Minnesota, Minneapolis

Proposed Panelists:

1. "Benjamin Harrison Reconsidered." Allan Spetter, Wright State University.
2. "John Foster as Diplomat." Michael Devine, Illinois Historical Preservation Society
3. "James Blaine." R. Hal Williams, Southern Methodist Univ.

Comment:

Kinley Brauer, Minnesota

Joyce Goldberg, Univ. of Texas, Arlington

4. World War I, The Bolsheviks, and Woodrow Wilson

Chair: Betty M. Unterberger, Texas A and M

1. "Wilson, Commerce and Statesmanship in Siberia: The Political Economy of American Economic Assistance to Revolutionary Russia, Spring 1918 - fall 1919." Leo J. Bacino, Northern Illinois Univ.
2. "Searching for Alternatives: A New Look at Bolshevik-American Relations, 1918-1919." David W. McFadden, Fairfield University, Connecticut

Comment: Lloyd Ambrosius, Nebraska

Linda Killen, Radford University, Virginia

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5. The US and the Soviets in the Interwar Era

Chair: Robert Maddux, Penn State

1. "Diplomacy of a Confidence Trick: The US and the Far Eastern Republic." Christine White, Pennsylvania State Univ.

2. "'A Landmine under Soviet-American Trade': The Campaign to Embargo Soviet Lumber, 1929-31." Kurt S. Schultz, Dept. of History, Ohio State Univ.

3. "U.S.-Soviet Diplomatic Relations at the Brink: The Machine-Tool Export Crisis of 1940." William Wolff, Ohio State

4. "Redefining the Enemy: American Interpretations of the Red Menace and US-Argentine Relations, 1917-1929," David Scheinin, Institute of Latin American Studies, Univ. of London.

Commentator:

Thomas R. Maddux, Calif. State University, Northridge

Thomas Leonard, North Florida

6. Admirals, Diplomats, and the Limitations of Naval Power

Chair: R. Fanning, Western Washington Univ., Bellingham

1. "From Geneva to London: American Naval Opinion and the Search for a Cruiser Policy, 1927-1930." Gregory C. Kennedy, Royal Military College of Canada.

2. "'A Certain Irritation': The White House, The State Department, and the Desire for a Naval Settlement with Great Britain, 1927-1930." B.J.C. McKercher, Royal Military College of Canada

3. "US Business Interests in Naval Disarmament, 1920-22." James Nolt, Pol. Sci., Univ. of Chicago

Commentators:

R. Fanning, Western Washington

Raymond G. O'Connor, Univ. of Miami emeritus, Aptos, California

7. Wilson, American Journalists and the Mexican Revolution

Chair: Mark Gildernus, Colorado State

1. "Jingo Journalism and the Mexican Revolution: The 1914 Occupation of Veracruz." John A. Britton, Francis Marion College

2. "John Reed, Max Eastman, and the Education of Woodrow Wilson: A Socialist Perspective on Veracruz." Thomas J. Knock, Southern Methodist University.

Comment: Kendrick A. Clements, University of South Carolina

William O. Walker III, Ohio Wesleyan

8. From War to Peace: German-American Relations, 1944-46

Chair: Christopher Simpson, American University

1. "Germany and the Bomb: Decline and Failure of New Deal Liberals, 1944-46." Dr. Bernd Greiner, Institute for Social Research, Hamburg

2. "Roll Over Beethoven: The Influence of American Popular Culture on West German Youths after 1945." Dr. Kaspar Maase, Institute for Social Research, Hamburg.

3. "German Science and Nazi Ideology: Geographers and the Execution of the Lebensraum Policy." Mechthild Rossler, University of Hamburg.

Comment: Don Whitnah, Northern Iowa

Robert Herzstein, So. Carolina

9. The United States and Germany: From Occupation to Alliance

Chair: Michael J. Hogan, Ohio State University

1. "Explosion in the Offing: James B. Conant, US-German Relations, and German Rearmament, 1953-55." James B. Herschberg, Tufts University.

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2. "The Role of Lucius Clay." Dr. Wolfgang Krieger, University of Munich

3. "'Dual Containment:' John J. McCloy and the Federal Republic of Germany." Thomas A. Schwartz, Vanderbilt Univ.

Commentators: Frank Ninkovich, St. Johns University
Klaus Schwabe, Aachen

10. Wartime Diplomacy in Europe

Chair: Mark Stoler, Vermont

1. "Franklin Roosevelt, Sir Arthur Salter, and American Merchant Shipping Assistance to Britain, 1941." Kevin Smith, International Security Program, Yale

2. "Creating the Special Relationship: British Propaganda in the United States, 1942-45." Susan A. Brewer, Univ. of Wisconsin, Stevens Point.

3. "Yalta Revisited: An Update on the Diplomacy of FDR and his Wartime Summit Partners." Charles G. Stefan, Foreign Service (retired), Gainesville, Florida

Commentators: Mark Stoler, Vermont

Duane Tanabaum, Lehman College, CUNY

11. Churchill, Stalin, and Kennan: A New Look at Familiar Players

Chair: Melvyn Leffler, Virginia

1. "Churchill's Statecraft, 1944-46: From Tragedy to Triumph." Fraser Harbutt, Emory Univ.

2. "Stalin: The View from the Kremlin." Albert Resis, Northern Illinois University.

3. "Kennan: the View from the US Embassy, Moscow." David Mayers, Boston University.

Commentators: Melvyn Leffler

Wilson Miscamble, Notre Dame

12. Round Table: Hiroshima and the End of World War II

Co-Chairs: J. Samuel Walker, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Gar Alperovitz, Washington, D.C.

Discussants: Barton J. Bernstein, Stanford University

Kai Bird, Washington, D.C.

Stanley Goldberg, University of Maryland

William Lanouette, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Robert Messer, Univ. of Illinois at Chicago

Leon V. Sigal, New York Times

13. The Early Cold War

Chair: Anna Nelson, American University

1. The US, the UN, and the Cold War, 1945-50." Fumiko Nishizaki, Seikei University, Tokyo.

2. "Beyond the Numbers Game: A Reinterpretation of Cold War Economic Policies." Tor Egil Forland, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, Norway.

3. "Harry Truman and the Problem of Poland." Mark White, Rutgers. Thomas Zeiler, Colorado

14. John Foster Dulles and American Foreign Policy

Chair: Chester Pach, Univ. of Kansas

1. "Dulles: the Man and the Myth." Frederick Marks, Forest Hills, NY

2. "Eisenhower, Dulles, and Col. Edward Lansdale: Reappraising the Decision to Commit to Ngo Dinh Diem." Daniel Greene, Old Dominion Univ.

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3. "Massive Retaliation Reappraised." Alan Luxemburg, Foreign Policy Research Institute

Comment: H.W. Brands, Texas A & M Univ.

Peter L. Hahn, Penn State, Erie

15. The Impact of the Peace Movement on the Cold War (A Round Table)

(Sponsored by CPRH)

Chair: Jo Ann Robinson, Morgan State University

Ralph Levering, Davidson College

David Cortright, International Institute for Peace Studies,
Notre Dame

Dee Garrison, Rutgers

Sanford Gottlieb, Center for Defense Information

16. Europe in the 90's: When the Cold War was Over

Chair: Osvaldo L.G. Croci, Concordia University, Montreal

1. "A New Germany, A New World: The Challenge for James Baker and his Successors." Manfred Jonas, Union College.

2. "The Impact of German Unification on NATO." Lawrence Kaplan, Kent State Univ.

3. "Soviet New Political Thinking: A Comparative Analysis of American Scholars' Views." Dr. Simon J. Appatov, Odessa University, USSR.

Comment: Randall Woods, Arkansas

17. Why did the Cold War End? (A Round Table)

Chair: Wesley Wark, University of Toronto

Panelists: Raymond Garthoff, Brookings Institute

Norman Graebner, Emeritus, University of Virginia

Robert Abbott, CIA

Boris Mihailov, Soviet Academy of Social Sciences, Division for
U.S. and Canadian Affairs, Moscow

Robert Thurston, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio

Geoffrey S. Smith, Queens University, Canada

18. The United States and China during the Cold War

Chair: Noel Pugach, University of New Mexico

1. "China and the Geneva Conference of 1954." Zhai Qiang, Ohio University

2. "Ending the State of War between China and the United States: Sino-American Negotiations in the Eisenhower and Nixon Eras." Rosemary Foot, Senior Research Fellow, St. Antony's College, Oxford.

3. "China's Relations with Korea since 1953 and its Impact on U.S.

Foreign Policy." Joel Campbell, Miami Univ. of Ohio

Comment: Michael Schaller, University of Arizona

Noel Pugach

19. China's Role in the Korean War

Chair: J. Kent Morrison, University of Rhode Island

1. "A Historical Note to the American-Chinese Confrontation in Korea: The American and Chinese Policies toward Korea during World War II." Xiaoyuan Liu, University of Chicago.

2. "China's Changing Aims during the Korean War." Chen Jian, SUNY, Geneseo.

3. "Why China went to war in Korea but not in Vietnam." Shehong Chen, Institute of International Relations, Beijing.

Comment: William Stueck, University of Georgia

Michael Hunt, Univ. of North Carolina

20. The Role of Sumner Welles

Chair: Robert Freeman Smith, University of Toledo

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"The Downfall of Sumner Welles, 1942-43." Irwin Gellman, Corona del Mar, CA.

Comment: Wayne Cole, Univ. of Maryland

Jonathan Utley, Univ. of Tennessee

J. Gary Clifford, Univ. of Connecticut

21. United States - Latin American Relations During World War II

Chair: Wayne Cole, Univ. of Maryland

1. "The U.S. and Brazil during World War II: Apogee of the Special Relationship?" Stanley Hilton, Louisiana State Univ., Baton Rouge.

2. "World War II: A Watershed for U.S. Regional Policies." Gerald K. Haines, NSA

Comment: audience.

22. The United States and the Middle East: Cold War Conundrums

Chair: Mark Lytle, Bard College

1. "From Honest Broker to British Partner: The Evolution of U.S. Policy on the Nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company." Mary Ann Heiss, Ohio State Univ.

2. "An Iranian Triumvirate: The Shah, Razmara, and Max Thornburg."

Linda W. Qaim-Maquami, American Univ.

3. "American Policy toward Afghanistan in the Post-war Period." Jeffery J. Roberts, Ohio State Univ.

Comment: James Goode, Grand Valley State University

David Painter, Georgetown Univ.

23. Korean War Revisionism: A Discussion of Bruce Cumings' 'The Origins of the Korean War: Vol. II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950.'

Chair: William Borden, Lambertsville, NJ

Discussants: Roger Dingman, University of Southern California

John Merrill, The Department of State

Bruce Cumings, University of Chicago

and the audience

24. Domestic Issues and the Vietnam War

Chair: Jeffrey Kimball, Miami University of Ohio

1. "The Vietnam War and American Racism." David Anderson, Univ. of Indianapolis

2. "Contending with Domestic Enemies: Nixon and the War at Home."

Melvin Small, Wayne State University.

Comment: Jeffrey Kimball

Joan Hoff-Wilson, Indiana University

25. The Vietnamese and the War in Vietnam

Chair: Edward Keefer, Historian's Office, Dept. of State

1. "Perception and Policy: Reexamining Vietnamese-American Relations during World War II." Mark Bradley, Harvard

2. "Cautious Allies: The Viet Minh and the OSS, 1945." Robert K. Brigham, Univ. of Kentucky

3. "Accepting the 'Bao Dai' Solution in 1950: A Critical Turning Point in the Vietnam War." S. David Broschious, Ohio Univ.

Comment: Marilyn Young, NYU

Edward Keefer

26. Military History and the Vietnam War

Chair: Robert Schulzinger, Univ. of Colorado

1. "Herman Kahn's Theory of Escalation and Vietnam, 1964." Edwin E. Moise, Clemson Univ.

2. "The Outbreak of the 'Big-Unit' War in Vietnam." James J. Wirtz,

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Naval Postgraduate School.

3. "Prisoner of War: The Military Captivity of US Policy in Vietnam, 1963-1969." Larry Cable, University of North Carolina.

Comment: Robert Schulzinger

William Hammond, US Army Center for Military History

27. The Persian Gulf Conflict and the "Lessons" of Vietnam

Moderator: James Nathan, Auburn University

Participants: Grant Hammond, Air War College

Rob Bressler, Penn State, Philadelphia

Ken Campbell, Univ. of Delaware

Robert MacMahon, Univ. of Florida

Melanie Billings-Yun, CISSM, University of Maryland

28. America and the Ending of the Third Indochina War

Chair: Jonathan Goldstein, W. Georgia College

1. "Cambodia and the Ending of the War." Ben Kiernan, Yale University

2. "China, Vietnam, and the Ending of the War." Brantly Womack, Northern Illinois University.

3. "Malaysia, ASEAN, and the Ending of the Conflict." Pamela Sodhy, University of Malaysia

4. "Vietnam and the Ending of the Conflict." Ngo Vinh Long, Univ. of Maine

Comment: Gary Hess, Bowling Green State University

Edward D. Crapol, College of William and Mary

29. Private Interests and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Cold War

Chair: John Prados, Takoma Park, MD.

1. "The Political Economy of Intervention in the Congo Crisis, 1960-63." David Gibbs.

2. "The Business of Strategy: The Political Economy of Detente, 1945-75." Jerri-Lynn Scofield, Balliol College, Oxford and Harvard Law School.

3. "Grenada: The Threat of a Good Example." Stephen Zunes, Whitman College

Comment: John Prados

30. New Perspectives on Wilsonian Diplomacy

Chair: N. Gordon Levin, Amherst College

1. "German Naval Policy in Latin America: the Challenge to Woodrow Wilson." Nancy Mitchell, SAIS, Johns Hopkins.

2. "President Wilson's German and Mexican Policies: Two Crises, One War." Michael Lutzker, New York University

3. "Woodrow Wilson and the Revisionists." David Esposito, Penn State

Comment: N. Gordon Levin

John Little, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Princeton University

31. Declassification: "Secrecy and Scholarship: Documenting the official Foreign Affairs Record." Panel Discussion

Norman Graebner, Moderator

1. William Slany, The Historian, Department of State

2. Steven Garfinckel, Director, U.S. Information Security Oversight Office

3. J. Kenneth MacDonald, Chief Historian, CIA

4. Prof. Emily Rosenberg, MacAlester College

Other Events

June 19: SHAFR Reception, 9-11 p.m.

June 20: SHAFR Luncheon, Faculty Club.

Presiding: Gary Hess, President, SHAFR

Speaker: Morton Kondrake, The New Republic

"George Bush's Foreign Policy"

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Film: 7 p.m. "Berkeley in the 1960s."

June 21: CPRH-AMI Luncheon

Chair: James Nathan, Auburn University

"The 'Hawks' vs. the 'Doves' on the Persian Gulf War."

Richard Ned Lebow, Director, Cornell Peace Studies Program

Eliot A. Cohen, Director of Strategic Studies, The Paul Nitze School
of Advanced International Studies.

1991 SHAFR SUMMER CONFERENCE

**Limited Dormitory Housing for the SHAFR Conference, 19-22 June 1991
at The George Washington University**

Limited on-campus housing is available on a first-come, first-served basis. Strong Hall dormitory, 21st and G Sts., N.W. offers single and double rooms. Single-occupancy is \$35.00 per night. Double-occupancy is \$23.00 per person, per night. Please indicate your preference below:

I would like double-occupancy accommodations for:

_____ Wednesday, 19 June for \$23.00

_____ Thursday, 20 June for \$46.00

_____ Friday, 21 June for \$69.00

Please find a check enclosed (payable to History Department, GWU)/

OR

I would like single-occupancy accommodations for:

_____ Wednesday, 19 June for \$35.00

_____ Thursday, 20 June for \$70.00

_____ Friday, 21 June for \$105.00

If we cannot meet your request for single-occupancy, we will return your check and send you a second application "form" offering double occupancy. Double rooms will be assigned on a random basis unless you specify otherwise

Please note on your envelope "SHAFR ROOM RESERVATION" and mail this reservation and your check to:

Professor William H. Becker
Department of History
The George Washington University
Washington, DC 20052

To confirm your reservation, please enter your name and address below and include a self-addressed, stamped envelope:

1991 SHAFR SUMMER CONFERENCE

17TH ANNUAL SHAFR CONFERENCE REGISTRATION, JUNE 19-22, 1991

Name: _____

Address: _____

City: _____ State _____ Zip _____

Home Phone: _____ Office _____

Affiliation: _____

Signature: _____

Registration Fee (\$30.00; \$10.00 for students) \$ _____

Thursday SHAFR Luncheon (\$14.25) \$ _____

Friday AMI/CPRH Luncheon (\$12.75) \$ _____

Total \$ _____

Charges include service and tax. Please make check payable to SHAFR. Send this completed form and payment to:

Sandra C. Taylor - SHAFR
Department of History
University of Utah
211 Carlson Hall
Salt Lake City, Utah 84112

AWARDS, PRIZES, AND FUNDS

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976 respectively, through the generosity of Dr. Gerald J. and the late Myrna F. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition

DESCRIPTION: This is a competition for a book which is a history of international relations, which is meant to include biographies of statesmen and diplomats. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works which are representative of social science disciplines other than history are *not* eligible. The prize is to be awarded to a first monograph by a young scholar.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent directly to: Mark Stoler, Dept. of History, University of Vermont, Burlington, VT 05401.

Books may be sent at any time during 1990, but should not arrive later than February 1, 1991.

The 1990 award of \$2,000.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians in 1991 in Louisville.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

- 1972 Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
- Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
- 1973 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)

- 1974 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1975 Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
Stephen E. Pelz (Massachusetts-Amherst)
1976 Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
1977 Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
1978 James R. Leutze (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1979 Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston)
1980 Michael Schaller (Arizona)
1981 Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke)
Hugh DeSantis (Department of State)
1982 David Reynolds (Cambridge)
1983 Richard Immerman (Hawaii)
1984 Michael H. Hunt (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
1985 David Wyman (Massachusetts-Amherst)
1986 Thomas J. Noer (Carthage College)
1987 Fraser J. Harbutt (Emory)
James Edward Miller (Department of State)
1988 Michael Hogan (Ohio State)
1989 Stephen G. Rabe (Texas-Dallas)
1990 Walter Hixson (Akron)
Anders Stephanson (Rutgers-Newark)

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

ELIGIBILITY: The lecture will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the annual meetings of the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer will address himself not specifically to his own research interests, but to broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy.

PROCEDURES: The Bernath Lecture Committee is soliciting nominations for the lecture from members of the Society. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and *curriculum vita*, if available, should reach the Committee no later than March 1, 1991. Nominations should be sent to: Keith Olson, Department of History, University of Maryland, College Park, MD 20742.

The award is \$500.00, with publication in *Diplomatic History*.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

- 1977 Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
- 1978 David S. Patterson (Colgate)
- 1979 Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
- 1980 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
- 1981 Burton Spivak (Bates College)
- 1982 Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)
- 1983 Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt)
- 1984 Michael J. Hogan (Miami)
- 1985 Michael Schaller (Arizona)
- 1986 William Stueck (Georgia)
- 1987 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Colgate)
- 1988 William O. Walker III (Ohio Wesleyan)
- 1989 Stephen G. Rabe (Texas at Dallas)
- 1990 Richard Immerman (Hawaii)

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to any article, or essay appearing in an edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations that is published during 1990. The author must not be over 40 years of age, or, if more than 40 years of age, must be within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of acceptance for publication. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

PROCEDURES: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* shall be automatically considered without nomination. Other articles may be nominated by the author or by any member of SHAFR or by the editor of any journal publishing articles in American diplomatic history. Three (3) copies of the article shall be submitted by 15 January 1992 to the chairperson of the committee: Duane Tananbaum, Department of History, Lehman College, Bronx, NY 10468.

The 1991 award of \$300.00 will be presented at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH in Louisville.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

- 1977 John C.A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)
- 1978 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
- 1979 Brian L. Villa (Ottawa)
- 1980 James I. Matray (New Mexico State)
David A. Rosenberg (Chicago)
- 1981 Douglas Little (Clark)
- 1982 Fred Pollock (Cedar Knolls, NJ)
- 1983 Chester Pach (Texas Tech)
- 1985 Melvyn Leffler (Vanderbilt)
- 1986 Duane Tananbaum (Ohio State)
- 1987 David McLean (R.M.I.H.E., Australia)
- 1988 Dennis Merrill (Missouri-Kansas City)
- 1989 Robert J. McMahon (Florida)
- 1990 Lester Foltos (Seattle)

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Prize

This prize has been established to help doctoral students who are members of SHAFR defray some of the expenses encountered in the concluding phases of writing their dissertations.

Requirements include:

1. The dissertation must deal with some aspect of American foreign relations.
2. Awards are given to help defray costs involved in:
 - (a) consulting original manuscripts that have just become available or obtaining photocopies from such sources,
 - (b) typing, printing, and/or reproducing copies of the dissertation,
 - (c) abstracting the dissertation.
3. Most of the research and writing of the dissertation must be completed at the time application is made. Awards are *not* intended to pay for time to write.
4. Applications must include:
 - (a) A one page curriculum vitae of the applicant, a table of contents for the dissertation, and a substantial synopsis *or* a completed chapter of the dissertation,
 - (b) a paragraph regarding the original sources that have been consulted,

- (c) a statement regarding the projected date of completion,
 - (d) an explanation of why the money is needed and how, specifically, it will be used, and
 - (e) a letter from the applicant's supervising professor commenting upon the appropriateness of the applicant's request. (This should be sent separately.)
5. One or more awards may be given. Generally awards will not exceed \$500.
6. The successful applicant must file a brief report on how the funds were spent not later than eight months following the presentation of the award (i.e., normally by the following September). In addition, when the dissertation is finished, the awardee should submit to the committee a copy of the abstract sent to University Microfilms (University of Michigan).

Applications should be sent to David Schmitz, Department of History, Whitman College, Walla Walla, WA 99362. The deadline is November 1, 1991.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

- 1985 Jon Nielson (UC-Santa Barbara)
- 1986 Valdinia C. Winn (Kansas)
Walter L. Hixson (Colorado)
- 1987 Janet M. Manson (Washington State)
Thomas M. Gaskin (Washington)
W. Michael Weis (Ohio State)
Michael Wala (Hamburg)
- 1988 Elizabeth Cobbs (Stanford)
Madhu Bhalla (Queen's, Ontario)
- 1989 Thomas Zeiler (Massachusetts-Amherst)
Russel Van Wyk (North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
- 1990 David McFadden (UC-Berkeley)

The Myrna L. Bernath Book Prize

A prize award of \$2,500.00 to be offered every two years for the best book by a woman in the areas of United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Details will be forthcoming.

The Myrna L. Bernath Research Fellowship

A \$2,500.00 research fellowship awarded every two years for a woman to do historically-based research abroad or for a female citizen from a foreign country to do historically-based research in the United States on United States foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Whenever possible preference will be given to a graduate student. Details will be forthcoming.

THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP

The Holt Dissertation Fellowship was established as a memorial to W. Stull Holt, one of that generation of historians which established diplomatic history as a respected field for historical research and teaching.

The award will be \$1,500.00.

Applicants must be candidates for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, whose dissertation projects are directly concerned with the history of United States foreign relations. The award is intended to help defray costs of travel, preferably foreign travel, necessary to the pursuit of research on a significant dissertation project. Qualified applicants will have satisfactorily completed comprehensive doctoral examinations before April 1991, leaving only the dissertation as the sole, remaining requirement for the doctoral degree.

Applicants should include a prospectus of the dissertation, indicating work already completed as well as contemplated research. The prospectus should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, and chief source materials. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used. An academic transcript showing all graduate work taken to date should accompany the application and prospectus of the dissertation. In addition, three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one letter from the director of the dissertation, are required.

At the end of the fellowship year the recipient of the fellowship will be required to report to the Committee relating how the fellowship was used.

Applications and supporting papers should be sent before April 1, 1991 to: William Stueck, Dept. of History, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602.

Announcement of the recipient of the Holt Memorial Fellowship will be made at the Society's annual summer meeting.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

- 1984 Louis Gomolak (University of Texas)
- 1986 Kurt Schultz (Ohio State University)
- 1987 David W. McFadden (University of California, Berkeley)
- 1988 Mary Ann Heiss (Ohio State University)

THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

The Graebner Award is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD: The Graebner prize will be awarded, beginning in 1986, to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older.

The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

- (a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and

awards and honors received;

- (b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;
- (c) describes the candidate's teaching career, listing any teaching honors and awards and commenting on the candidate's classroom skills; and
- (d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

Chairman of the committee: Waldo Heinrichs, Dept. of History, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122.

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

- 1986 Dorothy Borg (Columbia)
- 1988 Alexander DeConde (University of California at Santa Barbara)
- 1990 Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern University)

THE WARREN F. KUEHL AWARD

The Society will award the Warren F. Kuehl Prize to the author or authors of an outstanding book dealing with the history of internationalism and/or the history of peace movements. The subject may include biographies of prominent internationalists or peace leaders. Also eligible are works on American foreign relations that examine United States diplomacy from a world perspective and which are in accord with Kuehl's 1985 presidential address to SHAFR. That address voiced an "appeal for scholarly breadth, for a wider perspective on how foreign relations of the United States fits into the global picture."

The award will be made every other year at the SHAFR summer conference. The next award will be for books published in 1989 and 1990. Deadline for submissions is February 1, 1991. One copy of each submission should be sent directly to each member of the selection committee:

Robert Accinelli
Dept. of History
University of Toronto
Toronto M5S 1A1
Canada

Harold Josephson
UNCC St. - History
U. of N. Carolina/Charlotte
Charlotte, NC 28223

Lester D. Langley
Dept. of History
University of Georgia
Athens, GA 30602

PREVIOUS WINNERS:

- 1987 Harold Josephson (University of North Carolina at Charlotte)
- 1989 Melvin Small (Wayne State University)

**ARTHUR LINK PRIZE
FOR DOCUMENTARY EDITING**

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) proudly announces the establishment of the Arthur S. Link Prize For Documentary Editing. The inaugural prize will be awarded at the American Historical Association meeting in December 1991. The prize will be offered thereafter whenever appropriate but no more often than every three years. Eligibility is defined by the following excerpt from the prize rules.

The prize will recognize and encourage analytical scholarly editing of documents, in appropriate published form, relevant to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy. By "analytical" is meant the inclusion (in headnotes, footnotes, essays, etc.) of both appropriate historical background needed to establish the context of the documents, and interpretive historical commentaries based on scholarly research. The competition is open to the editor/author(s) of any collection of documents published after 1984 that is devoted primarily to sources relating to the history of American foreign relations, policy, and/or diplomacy; and that incorporates sufficient historical analysis and interpretation of those documents to constitute a contribution to knowledge and scholarship. Nominations may be made by any person or publisher.

PRIZE: \$500 plus travel expenses to the professional meeting where the prize is presented.

For all rules and details contact the committee chair. One copy of each entry should be sent directly to each member of the committee.

W. F. Kimball, Chair
19 Larsen Road
Somerset, NJ 08873
tel: 201-648-5410

G. C. Herring
Dept. of History
Univ. of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

M. Giunta, Acting Dir.
NHRPC
Washington, DC 20408

THE ARMIN RAPPAPORT FUND

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations established this fund in 1990 to honor Armin Rappaport, the founding editor of the Society's journal, *Diplomatic History*. The fund will support the professional work of the journal's editorial office. It was initiated by Michael J. Hogan and Thomas G. Paterson, who donated earnings from their book, *Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations*, and by the authors of essays in this book, who waived fees. Further donations are invited from authors, SHAFR members, and friends. Please send contributions in any amount to Professor Allan Spetter, SHAFR Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Department of History, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

The SHAFR Newsletter

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William J. Brinker, Department of History.

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: Brent W. York.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Send changes of address to the Executive Secretary-Treasurer: Allan Spetter, Wright State University, Dayton, OH 45435.

BACK ISSUES: The *Newsletter* was published annually from 1969 to 1972, and has been published quarterly since 1973. Copies of most back numbers of the *Newsletter* may be obtained from the editorial office for \$1.00 per copy (for members living abroad, the charge is \$2.00).

GUIDELINES FOR SUBMISSION: The *Newsletter* solicits the submission of personals, announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered or published upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, information about foreign depositories, biographies, autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field, jokes, *et al.* Short submissions should be typed or handwritten legibly, and the author's name and full address should be noted clearly on the submission; a note of any current institutional affiliation is also appreciated. Papers submitted for publication must be typed, double-spaced, with footnotes in standard MLA style; again, the author's name, address, and affiliation should be clearly indicated. The *Newsletter* accepts submissions on IBM-formatted 5 1/4" or 3 1/2" diskettes; submitting a paper on magnetic media helps eliminate typographical errors when the work is published. A paper so submitted must be in one of the following formats: WordPerfect (version 4.2 or later), WordStar 3.3, MultiMate, Word 4.0, DisplayWrite, Navy DIF Standard, or IBM DCA format. A hardcopy of the paper should be included with the diskette. The *Newsletter* is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December; all material submitted for publication should be sent to the editor at least four weeks prior to the publication date.

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