

David Patterson

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SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

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MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in August. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZE: The Stuart L. Bernath Prize of \$500.00 is awarded each year at the spring meeting of the Society to that person whose first or second book in U. S. diplomatic history is adjudged the best for the previous year.

ROSTER: A complete listing of the members with addresses and their current research projects is issued in even years to all members. (A supplemental list is mailed in odd years). Editor of the **Roster & Research List** is Warren F. Kimball, Department of History, Rutgers University (Newark), Newark, New Jersey 07102.

S. EVERETT GLEASON

by

Richardson Dougall*

S. Everett Gleason, who was known at least by reputation to the entire Society, died of lung cancer at Washington on November 20, 1974, at the age of 69.

Brooklyn-born, of a line descended from a now-well-known New England pewterer, Gleason was Harvard-trained (A.B., A.M., Ph.D.) and Cambridge-oriented. He specialized first in medieval history and his first book, **An Ecclesiastical Barony of the Middle Ages**, is still considered an important contribution to medieval studies. Gleason's first career, as a teacher, began at Harvard while he was still working on his doctorate; in 1938 he joined the history faculty at Amherst.

World War II took Gleason to Washington for what turned out to be his second and longer career--Government service--which began in the OSS. Leaving his wartime assignment with the rank of lieutenant colonel, Gleason spent the next several years working with William L. Langer under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations on the classic two-volume study of American foreign policy before Pearl Harbor, **The Challenge to Isolation and The Undeclared War**, for which the authors were awarded the Bancroft Prize. Gleason then returned to Government for a nine-year stint as deputy executive secretary of the National Security Council, followed by a tour of duty in the American Embassy at London, where as cultural officer he was notably successful in increasing interest in American history among British academicians. He returned to the United States (among other things) a confirmed Anglophile, a sidesman-emeritus of his London parish church, and an enthusiastic admirer of the historical novels of Georgette Heyer.

Gleason then spent a decade, from 1963 until his retirement in 1972, as chief of the **Foreign Relations** Division in the Historical Office of the Department of State, where he directed the compilation of forty volumes of American diplomatic papers covering the years 1946-1950, about half of which have now been published. After he retired, he worked for Common Cause, responsible for liaison with local organizations in Rhode Island, Alabama, and Nebraska (which of course he could never pronounce like a native).

Everett Gleason was a man of high historical standards. He was meticulous; blessed with humor, ideals, faith, wide interests, and warmth of personality. His colleagues found their lives and work enriched by his friendship.

*Richardson Dougall, a Nebraskan, was editor of the **Foreign Relations** volumes on the Quebec and Potsdam conferences. He recently retired as deputy director of the Historical Office in the Department of State.

"WHAT'S GOOD FOR THE UNITED STATES IS GOOD FOR THE WORLD,
AND VICE VERSA:" REFLECTIONS OF A DIPLOMATIC HISTORIAN*

by

Bradford Perkins

In our guild today, the liveliest scholarly debate is over the determinants of American policy rather than the interaction of that policy with those of other countries. Traditionalists bewail what they take to be an abandonment of our primary task although, as I shall suggest, the picture may not be as bleak as they believe. Still, the most noticed recent writings have been on policy-making and in particular on the themes of economic interest and what may be called ideological or cultural influences.

These themes are often considered opposed to one another; insofar as one emphasizes economic aspirations, one must downplay the importance of ideals. I consider this an inaccurate formulation. When Charles E. Wilson, President Eisenhower's nominee for Secretary of Defense and a former automobile executive, expressed an opinion that "what was good for our country was good for General Motors, and vice versa," he expressed in microcosm my main theme. Statesmen, politicians and the people generally have assumed that what served the country's interests also served the broader interests of the world. There is no good reason to believe that on the whole this concept has been hypocritical or selfish, a mask for grasping economic policies or a simple lust for power, egocentric or culture-bound or simply miscalculated though it has been.

As I said a moment ago, some bewail a decline in transnational research. As recently as 1962, optimism reigned. Ernest R. May, whose own book, *The World War and American Isolation*, is a most distinguished example of polyarchival research, concluded, "... the multiarchival approach . . . [is] on the rise . . . Studies endeavoring . . . to describe what happened on the several sides [have] been steadily increasing."¹ However, in the first presidential address delivered to this Society, only seven years after May's assessment, Alexander De Conde deplored declining research in foreign archives, particularly those outside the English language.²

For such a decline, if one exists, there are certain obvious reasons. Historians still lack sufficient training in foreign languages, particularly those of countries outside of Western Europe. Foreign archives are, by and large, less available than those of this country, although our own record is by no means as liberal as it should be. For example,

*This paper was delivered as the presidential address at the luncheon of SHAFR, December 28, 1974, during the annual convention of the AHA in Chicago. Dr. Perkins is professor of history at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor).

the mind searches in vain for a rational reason why Mexican authorities refused the files to David M. Pletcher, working on the 1840s. Could Justin H. Smith have been right, way back in 1919? Could Santa Anna have been planning his own **Barbarossa**?

Finally, there is the climate in which we work. John Higham, who discerns a decline in diplomatic history in the 1930s, ascribes it to the isolationist disillusion of the time; "... a fixation on the mistakes and shortcomings of our diplomacy," he writes, "conditioned much of the writings that American specialists did in this field."³ Much the same is true of current endeavors, influenced by excesses of the Cold War and above all Viet Nam. Not only has the recent past, as a consequence, been subjected to introspective scrutiny. So, too, has been diplomacy from the time of Alexander Hamilton through James G. Blaine to Woodrow Wilson and Franklin D. Roosevelt. The urge to self-examination, perhaps to self-flagellation, is an understandable consequence of recent history.

Still, May and De Conde may both be wrong. My own view, based upon an examination of notices in the **American Historical Review** and the **Journal of American History** as well as a fallible memory, is that the number of books based upon multiarchival, transnational research has not substantially changed in recent years. The proportion has always been low.

Let me make this point through an autobiographical observation. In 1953 I began research on the origins of the War of 1812, certainly a subject diplomatic historians had not neglected. I soon confirmed what I had suspected: no one since Henry Adams had made extensive use of unpublished British materials, certainly nonofficial ones. I confess to some irritation that, though others have since supported my conclusions, textbooks continue to suggest that an imperialist urge for Canada played a major part in the coming of the war. But this is to go beyond the key point: even in the presumed heyday of multiarchival research, none engaged in it while studying one of the most controversial episodes in our diplomacy.

The reverse of this argument is equally true. Such research, when undertaken, still produces remarkable contributions. About a decade ago, after work in two dozen repositories in nine countries, a spectacular accomplishment, Richard B. Morris published **The Peacemakers**, a major contribution in the field of Revolutionary diplomacy. Only slightly less ambitious works have followed. Perhaps the most impressive recent work is David M. Pletcher's **The Diplomacy of Annexation**, the first treatment of the entire sweep of expansion in the 1840s based upon broad research in foreign archives. Multiarchival research has neither been abandoned nor proved to be unproductive.

The critical point is that, today, the greatest **réclame** is given to works emphasizing the formulation of American policy. Commenting on Cold War revisionists, Walter Laqueur observes, "About Europe, about Russia, about other parts of the world they know little and often seem

not to care."⁴ Regarding the Cold War and other periods as well, this often appears only too true of readers and reviewers. In the past, on the other hand, more evenly balanced treatments of international relations received the most scholarly attention. Whether the current emphasis is a temporary phenomenon, one cannot say, but certainly a change is unlikely until the nation recovers from its current masochism.

If, over the years, there appears little change in the proportion of studies written in the classic style, there surely have been other changes. For his renowned study of Jay's treaty, Samuel Flagg Bemis used few private manuscripts; Jerald A. Combs, writing nearly half a century later, in 1970, examined nearly forty collections in this country and others in Britain, in addition to the archives. This example, which could easily be multiplied (compare the sources used by Julius W. Pratt and Roger H. Brown, for example), should not be taken as a commentary upon the comparative stature of Bemis and Combs. (That Bemis once complimented me by saying that he and I were the only two surviving Federalists would, in any case, deter me from criticism.) Still, it is obvious that the discipline has changed, and on the whole the change has been salutary.

The widening of research largely reflects a more sophisticated consideration of policy development, whether the inquirer looks at one, two, or more countries. Commenting on the Bemis style, Charles E. Neu has observed, ". . . it was multiarchival rather than multinational--grounded too much on government archives and too little on a broader understanding of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy."⁵ Recently, domestic considerations, and particularly economic and ideological ones, have attracted special attention.

From the outset, of course, diplomatic historians have been aware of the economic dimension. Bemis, after all, subtitled his volume on Jay's treaty "a study in commerce and diplomacy," and Pratt, emphasizing, erroneously in my opinion, the Western desire for Canada and Southern designs on Florida in 1812, stressed economic concerns of another sort. Still, a time-tested monograph on the Monroe Doctrine went to some lengths to downplay economic factors: ". . . there is little evidence of the working of economic interest."⁶ Dealing with events at the end of the same century, early historians of John Hay's Open Door notes tended to emphasize political factors rather than commercial motives.

Similarly, the ideological component has until recently been given too little importance. In writing my early lectures, I borrowed from a few works on particular episodes or personalities but especially from Albert K. Weinberg's **Manifest Destiny**, a study which traces, and reflects negatively upon, certain reiterated arguments for expansion without connecting them to policy. I also pillaged, then and later, Henry Nash Smith's **Virgin Land** and David M. Potter's **People of Plenty**, wrenching out of context what was useful in these studies of national character. Little else existed.

Recently, of course, both ideological and economic aspects have won much attention. A great deal of the work on economic influences comes from scholars who proclaim their disapproval of the growth of a capitalist colossus which--at least until the oil countries asserted their power--bestrode the globe. Many are concerned about the exploitation of less advanced nations; when this reading back of contemporary themes cannot, for whatever reasons, be developed, many such historians tend to look elsewhere.

Let us take Asian policy as an example. In 1951, Charles S. Campbell, one who did not write from a **parti pri**, published an unobtrusive little book, **Special Business Interests and the Open Door**. Since that time, many others have subjected economic considerations in the Far East from about 1895 to 1920 to rigorous, often critical scrutiny. With few exceptions, chiefly parts of books rather than whole ones, other periods have been largely ignored. Policy when the United States was still an aspiring power has not been reassessed, nor has sufficient attention been given to the decade before Pearl Harbor: did the "great China market" still bemuse businessmen and their allies? what, if any, was the effect of an interest in the much larger flow of goods to Japan?

Similar comments can be made about Latin American policy. No one has recently tested Dexter Perkins' old assertion about the absence of economic considerations in the period of the Monroe Doctrine. Developments later in the century, particularly involvement in Cuba and relations with post-Diaz Mexico, have received more attention, although much of it seems to disprove rather than to demonstrate the primacy of economic considerations, certainly narrowly national ones, in the period before 1920, both as to Cuba and as to Mexico. In a larger sense, revisionists have not seriously challenged Dana G. Munro's downgrading of economic considerations or, specifically, his assertion that "Dollar Diplomacy [S] . . . purpose, under Taft as well as Wilson, was purely political."⁷ Washington intervened to restore order and end civil strife, and policymakers well knew that, among other things, domestic and foreign business would benefit. But these interventions were not directed against movements planning to challenge foreign interests. As Richard M. Abrams has observed, until the Mexican civil war, " . . . Latin American revolutions had little or nothing to do with social change, and American intervention had little to do with preventing it."⁸ A few challenges, in my opinion ineffective, have been mounted against such views, but it is surprising that more has not been done.

Moreover, those who discern a nexus between economic interests and national policy often close their eyes to other factors or press evidence farther than it goes. It seems ridiculous to argue, for example, that William Jennings Bryan failed to carry the day in 1896 because he " . . . neglected to buttress his promise of remonetization [of silver] with other proposals for overseas commercial expansion,"⁹ as if the silver issue were only one of a number of issues of roughly equal importance in a campaign dominated by rival theories of commercial

empire. It seems equally dubious to argue, as one author has done, that because Benjamin Harrison mentioned foreign trade expansion in two of seventy-nine campaign addresses in 1888, this demonstrated a major concern.

The driving vision of Gabriel and Joyce Kolko produces a laser beam which seeks to destroy all in its narrow path but fails to illuminate that which lies outside. The result is ahistorical. Two examples will have to suffice. First, Kolko's treatment of economic policy toward Britain during World War II is so one-dimensional that it is a much less effective criticism of American shortcomings and selfishness than Richard N. Gardner's much subtler evaluation. Second, the Kolkos argue that a drive for overseas markets was the mainspring of policy in the years surrounding the end of World War II, even asserting that the Marshall Plan was essentially a device to subsidize exports. As Alfred E. Eckes has shown, neither business leaders nor statesmen worried much about export markets, rightly anticipating that the pent-up demand in the United States would absorb the war-stimulated increase in output. In the end, by exaggeration, the Kolkos convert an understandable interest for a few into an unbelievable motive for all.

To point to extravagances and blank spaces--and some of the latter have gone unmentioned, notably the failure to analyze economic penetration of Canada, where success was greatest--is not to make light of all that has been accomplished. Our understanding of policy toward the Far East and Mexico, the Soviet Union during the period of nonrecognition, international commercial bodies--toward policy as a whole--has been influenced by recent work. Only the most unimaginative will not have had their views modified as a consequence of the evidence presented, if not the conclusions sometimes so extravagantly drawn.

In particular, we must wrestle with such large concepts as William A. Williams' "Open Door imperialism." When **The Tragedy of American Diplomacy** appeared in 1959, I was, to put it mildly, unconvinced, and I still think the argument overdrawn. However, this argument, as I rephrase and modify it, now appears to provide a useful interpretive tool: interested in foreign trade, confident of its superior economic vitality, the United States sought an open commercial world. Working in that direction, the nation could serve its interests just as rewardingly, even selfishly, as by following a traditional imperial policy.

Often considered an economic determinist, Williams really provides a bridge between the two new emphases, upon economic factors and ideological ones. If not in **The Tragedy**, then in **The Roots of the Modern American Empire** he is--perhaps I bring to this book my own preconceptions--more interested in depicting what he calls the national **weltanschauung** than in showing the correlation between economic interests and governmental policy. He elucidates, sometimes in wearisome detail, the American way of viewing things, the devotion to market capitalism and, although he makes little of this point, the related

political phenomenon of republicanism. Although Williams does not endorse this **weltanschauung**, indeed deplores it, he forces us to remember the cultural ideology of American policy.

Williams' contemporary at Wisconsin, Walter F. LaFeber, has developed in a somewhat similar fashion. LaFeber's first work, **The New Empire**, dealing with policy before 1898, presents an uncompromising but often unconvincing economic argument. On the other hand, his justly acclaimed study of the Cold War emphasizes the role of ideology. Reinhold Niebuhr, a Protestant theologian innocent of economic sophistication, is repeatedly used as the exemplar of American opinion, and on the whole cultural factors, many of them unpleasant, are emphasized.

In addition to the Williams-LaFeber kind of approach, we have recently been offered examinations of the national elite during the American Revolution, of important individuals, or rival political philosophies. Once again, we have learned much from such writings.

However, like works which stress economic dimensions, these can be dangerous when considered in isolation. The former suggest that only one kind of considerations matters, the latter that often imprecise clusters of ideas determine reactions to events. Neither can be assimilated without a firm grasp of the more general or, if you will, the more traditional treatments. Gabriel Kolko only makes the reading of, say, Herbert Feis more necessary; indeed, reading Kolko's first volume, one might conclude that victory over Hitler was an inconsequential motive in Washington. The new studies are best understood as commentaries upon, rather than replacements for, works in the older style. They do, however, challenge us to rethink old stereotypes.

The recent contributions which, almost by definition, avoid the dangers of excess are those which combine both of the strains we have been discussing, the economic and the ideological. Three examples, each in its own way perhaps flawed but at the same time exciting, illustrate the point. Each, though devoted to a particular period in American history, casts light upon a broader sweep of time.

Felix Gilbert's **To the Farewell Address** is now more than a decade old, and many chapters are reprints of articles dating back as far as 1944. Moreover, if Gilbert is not an hagiographer, he certainly tends to empathize with the Founding Fathers. Still, his book seems impressively "modern" and also insufficiently appreciated, in particular because it shows how ideological motives and self-interest reinforce one another without asserting the supremacy of one over the other.

Take, for example, Gilbert's examination of the famous Model Treaty offered to France. In 1776 a longstanding interest in commerce and the need for assistance in the fight for independence both argued for close ties with Europe. The desire to establish a **novus ordo seculorum** counseled as little involvement as possible in European politics. By the Model Treaty, American leaders neatly boxed the circle.

This **projet** offered trivial political concessions to France, inducements so small that in the end the actual negotiators of an alliance had to exceed them. Thus far, the ideological emphasis was preserved. On the other hand, the Continental Congress offered to throw open commerce upon extremely liberal principles, even to stipulate that French and American traders should be treated, in effect, as citizens of one country. Congress expected this scheme to benefit Americans--thus meeting the economic aspiration--but also to be sufficiently tempting to France so that Paris would, accepting it, also accept the near certainty of war with Britain.

At the same time, members of Congress looked upon the treaty as a model, not only for relations between the fledgling United States and other powers, but also for those between all trading nations. In their view, commercial rivalries led to political dislocations and wars. One could serve the interests of the United States while at the same time indicating the path to world peace.

Finally, recognizing that for some time they would be unable to defend their neutral commerce in time of war, the Americans proposed that, insofar as France and the United States were concerned, neutral trade should be treated with uncommon tenderness. Again they hoped a Franco-American agreement would set a pattern, and again the mingling of interest and ideology is impossible to disentangle. Americans would benefit, ambitious as they were to extend their commerce, but so would other nations. All would gain if belligerents were not free to carry on their sanguinary efforts at the expense of those who wished to remain spectators, albeit profiteering ones.

"The Model Treaty," Gilbert says, was ". . . designed to keep America out of European struggles and to secure for her peace and freedom by making all European powers interested partners in American trade." But--and this is equally important--the Americans also ". . . felt that they were setting a pattern which the rest of the world would follow."¹⁰ In such a pattern, who is to decide whether selfish or philosophical influences predominated? Is it not likely that, in 1776 as on other occasions, the two interests reinforced one another?

In essence, the plan of the Model Treaty closely resembles "Open Door imperialism." The setting is different: during the Revolutionary era the Americans were weak, whereas by the end of the Nineteenth Century they had overwhelming economic power. The prescription is similar: let competition take place on the economic level and the success of the United States is assured, as is the advance of the world.

Let us turn next to Jerry Israel's study of relations with China, **Progressivism and the Open Door**, the argument of which is encapsulated in an article, "For God, For China and For Yale," published a year earlier, in 1970. Israel's spirit, sardonic and critical, differs markedly from Gilbert's, but his conclusions lead in the same direction. Israel agrees with those who maintain that the government responded to pressures for overseas markets, particularly to the fear of overproduction

in the United States. In his view, however, there was also, at least within a very few years, another side to the question.

If only to make the China market a reality, Americans believed that land must be induced to modernize, for a backward nation could never absorb a great volume of imports. Modernization--political, religious, educational, economic--would also produce immense advantages for the Chinese people. As Israel puts it, "Reforming cultures, making profits, and saving souls were not incompatible goals, or so it was felt."¹¹ Americans considered their own model--republican, capitalist, Christian--obviously superior to the Chinese, as it was to all others. They also believed that "... China needed saving and that the United States was the only country qualified to do it."¹² However arrogant this view, it was not insincere. Modernization would serve both Chinese and American interests.

As matters turned out, the anticipated rewards almost entirely escaped the United States, at least in part because Washington's policy was forceless and inept. In 1917 China's share of American exports was less than three percent, and investments scarcely existed. Nor did China's development proceed apace, as such things were then tested by Americans, although the overthrow of the Manchus briefly aroused great hopes. The lack of success does not disprove the central contention: the two interests were not considered incompatible but, rather, reinforcing.

Felix Gilbert discussed an America which lacked the potential for empire. Jerry Israel explored a time when "third world" stirrings were limited to ineffective Chinese boycotts of American goods. In **Woodrow Wilson and World Politics**, N. Gordon Levin examines the behavior of a leading American in a period when serious challenges to the capitalist order were emerging and when, too, the nation's power had become nearly sufficient to mold the world to its desires, if it had the will. His study, turgid and repetitive though it is, suggests a great deal about Wilson and, by extension, about the general American outlook.

Levin, who acknowledges his intellectual debts to Arno J. Mayer and William A. Williams, two revisionists, also borrows heavily, and profitably, from Louis Hartz, whom no one has accused of radicalism. In **The Liberal Tradition in America**, Hartz contrasts American and foreign views of the natural, proper functioning of society. The American rebels were "born free" in the sense that they did not have to meet a challenge faced by others, the need to overthrow feudal encrustations. Thus they could afford a "liberal"--that is to say, essentially conservative or at least moderate--line of development, condemning extreme solutions.

Levin sees Wilson as the product of this "liberal tradition." Aware of American faults, the President was nevertheless convinced that the broad outlines had been positive, and in his foreign policy he sought to internationalize that approach. As Levin puts it, the "... ultimate Wilsonian goal may be defined as the attainment of a peaceful

liberal capitalist world . . . , safe both from traditional imperialism and revolutionary socialism, within whose stable . . . confines America could find moral and economic pre-eminence."¹³ Despite a perhaps sneering tone, this is an accurate summation. Woodrow Wilson did seek a stable world, and he did seek leadership in that world. He also believed, on the basis of the American experience, that such a world would serve mankind. For him, ". . . the national interest became merged with liberal ideology."¹⁴

Today, many stress the antirevolutionary and commercially selfish aspects of Wilsonian policy. Thus the use of American power, especially through the withholding of food, to bring down Bela Kun's Communist regime in Hungary receives more attention than Wilson's resistance, described by Levin, to French efforts to install a reactionary regime. Thus too little is made of the fact that Wilson's intervention in Russia was reluctant and half-hearted, although it seriously affected Soviet-American relations for years. Liberal American that he was, the President could not believe that the Russian people would long tolerate a regime which denied liberal values, and this conviction made a full-scale anti-Bolshevik intervention seem supererogatory. Levin exposes, sometimes reluctantly, these points.

Like other writers, Levin stresses Wilsonian efforts to stimulate foreign trade. He points, for example, to a provision in the Underwood tariff of 1913 which for the first time authorized American banks to open foreign branches, an important stimulus to commerce. Still, the administration's policy was at best confused and incomplete. As Burton I. Kaufman has commented, ". . . a lack of cooperation within the business world and between business and the government . . . was still clearly evident."¹⁵ Kaufman was commenting upon Latin America, but the same remark could be made with respect to commercial policy in Asia and other parts of the world.

More important, those who find something questionable in the quest for trade assume a contest in which, if one side gains, the other must lose. They assume, even more fundamentally, that leaders like Wilson knew this to be the case. While terms of international trade may be, indeed often are, exploitative, there is no reason why this must be so. Commerce can, and usually does, benefit both sides. So, at least, Wilson emphatically believed: the interchange of goods furthered progress and prosperity. His views, like those of most of his generation, were simplistic. He failed, for example, to see the inevitable inequity when a commercially powerful state undertook trade with feeble ones. The sincerity of his belief in the mutuality of benefits, expressed in private correspondence and conversation as well as official statements, is, however, beyond challenge.

Wilson also saw capitalism and republicanism as inextricably linked, another widely held American belief. Speaking to a group of businessmen, he once said, "Let your thoughts and your imagination run abroad throughout the world, and with the inspiration of the thought that you are Americans and are meant to carry liberty and justice and

the principles of humanity wherever you go, go out and sell goods that will make the world more comfortable and more happy, and convert them to principles of America."¹⁶ As Levin demonstrates, the linkage between these two themes was so strong that it is vain to try to separate them.

Like many American views, Wilson's was immensely arrogant. The President did seek to Americanize the world, and he did fail to see that democratic capitalism might not solve all the world's ills. There is a good deal to Levin's complaint that, although Wilson's vision was defeated in 1919-1920, his concepts lived and came to have "... their complete triumph in the bi-partisan Cold War consensus."¹⁷ Only today are we beginning to accept what Robert Heilbroner told us long ago: the "great ascent" may be neither democratic nor capitalist, if indeed it can be achieved. Only now are we beginning to drift away from the utopianism George F. Kennan has long bewailed. Even today, however, Woodrow Wilson's ideas are, as they so long have been, a decisive part of the American outlook.

To single out works by Gilbert, Israel and Levin is not to argue that they are perfect examples of their kind. I have both criticized them and drawn lessons which may not be those the authors intended. Nor is it to argue that only one kind of diplomatic history should be written. We need more multiarchival work, many biographical studies of leading figures and lesser ones. We need examinations of the interplay of policy and economics, as long as they are not, to borrow a minatory phrase from Joan Hoff Wilson, "economically reductionist."¹⁸ We need studies, both critical and understanding, of ideology, for example the attitude toward revolutionary movements.

Still, studies connecting interests and ideas can be remarkably stimulating. Economic drives are an important part of any nation's policy, but such motives are seldom sufficient, by themselves, to determine major departures. On the other hand, ideology is too often treated in a virtual vacuum or as the artificial creation of an elite. At least in the United States, Franz Schurman is certainly correct in asserting, "All ideology ultimately springs from popular social forces."¹⁹ Among the most important "social forces" have been economic ones, the forms and practices of capitalism. Long ago, Americans came to believe that their economic and political systems were the world's most perfect. They also came to believe that these systems, like goods themselves, should be an exportable commodity.

The correctness of this view is not at issue. Many American views have been arrogant, ethnocentric and unimaginative. We may have been, in the broadest sense, imperialist. But Americans believed in the past, as they still believe, that they were struggling--as symbols, as actors or as dictators--to establish a world in which, because of the essential harmony between our interests and those of mankind, peace and prosperity for the United States was peace and prosperity for all. "What's good for America is good for the world, and vice versa." "Engine Charlie" Wilson had much in common with his countrymen.

NOTES

¹ John Higham, ed., **The Reconstruction of American History** (New York, 1962), p. 196.

² Alexander De Conde, "What's Wrong with American Diplomatic History," **SHAHR Newsletter**, vol. 1, (1970), no. 2, pp. 2-11.

³ John Higham et al, **History** (Englewood Cliffs, 1965), p. 189.

⁴ Walter Laqueur, "Rewriting History," **Commentary**, vol. XLV (1973), no. 3, p. 60.

⁵ John Braeman, Robert M. Bremner, and David Brody, eds., **Twentieth Century American Foreign Policy** (Columbus, 1971), p. 19.

⁶ Dexter Perkins, **The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-1826** (Cambridge, 1927), p. 40.

⁷ Dana G. Munro, **Intervention and Dollar Diplomacy in the Caribbean** (Princeton, 1964), p. 537.

⁸ Richard M. Abrams, "United States Intervention Abroad," **American Historical Review**, LXXIX (1974), 88.

⁹ Edward P. Crapol, **America for Americans** (Westport, 1973), p. 213.

¹⁰ Felix Gilbert, **To the Farewell Address** (Princeton, 1961), p. 55.

¹¹ Jerry Israel, "For God, For China and For Yale," **American Historical Review**, LXXV (1970), 807.

¹² Jerry Israel, **Progressivism and the Open Door** (Pittsburgh, 1971), p. 12.

¹³ N. Gordon Levin, **Woodrow Wilson and World Politics** (New York, 1968), p. vii.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

¹⁵ Burton I. Kaufman, "United States Trade and Latin America: the Wilson Years," **Journal of American History**, LVIII (1971-72), 344.

¹⁶ Frank J. Merli and Theodore A. Wilson, eds., **Makers of American Diplomacy** (New York, 1974), pp. 365-66.

¹⁷ Levin, **Wilson and World Politics**, p. 260.

¹⁸ Joan Hoff Wilson, **Ideology and Economics: U.S. Relations with the Soviet Union, 1918-1933** (Columbia, Mo., 1974), p. 141.

¹⁹ Franz Schurman, **The Logic of World Power** (New York, 1974), p. 45.

Annual Report (1974) of Advisory Committee
 "Foreign Relations of the United States"

Since 1861 **Foreign Relations of the United States** has been distinguished for its thoroughness and honesty in presenting the record of American diplomacy. The State Department's Historical Office has rightly been praised for its work in editing and publishing the volumes.

But the **Foreign Relations** series is now in grave danger. The President's memorandum of March 8, 1972 requested that the time gap in the series be reduced from twenty-five-years to a twenty-year period. Instead, the series is now being published twenty-six-years after the events chronicled in the volumes. Declassification of documents is becoming more difficult. Scholars' access to the unpublished files has been retarded. Finally, serious consideration is now being given to cutting the published material by as much as one-third.

The Secretary of State, the Historical Office, and interested scholars must move rapidly to correct these problems; otherwise both the Department of State and the academic community will be faced with the continued deterioration of this invaluable series.

I

The fundamental problem is the failure of governmental agencies, and especially the National Security Council, to declassify documents. One volume in the series for 1948 has been held up for nearly three years because of clearance problems. Other volumes have been delayed for more than a year. Until this problem is corrected, the Historical Office will have no chance of reducing the time gap to twenty-years or less. The Interagency Classification Review Committee has the power to overrule other agencies in order to release documents. This pivotal committee, however, has been largely ineffective in using its power.

(1) **Recommended:** The Secretary of State must intervene if necessary to ensure that other government agencies, and the National Security Council in particular, expedite the release of documents needed for the reduction of the time gap in **Foreign Relations** to twenty years or less.

(2) **Recommended:** The personnel of the Interagency Classification Review Committee should be changed so that the Committee can effectively carry out its functions as outlined in Executive Order No. 11652. The scholarly community must closely watch the activities of this Committee. A new Advisory Committee to the Interagency Classification Review Committee should be established. This Advisory Committee should include members from the American Society of International Law, the American Historical Association, and the American Political Science Association. These members should be nominated by the associations and appointed by the President of the United States.

(3) **Recommended:** If documents older than twenty years are not promptly cleared (and such cases of non-clearance should be extremely rare), the Historical Office should have discretion to accelerate publication of the series by placing in the **Foreign Relations** volume the essence of the policy as obtained from other documents. A footnote in the volume should identify the document omitted (so that scholars can later easily obtain it), and the agency which refused to release it. The Department of State should meanwhile continue to request the release of the document. Supplementary volumes which include such documents could be published later.

II

Current procedure dictates that in general the files for a given year cannot be opened to scholars until all the **Foreign Relations** volumes covering that year can be published. This procedure means that since one classified document can hold up publication of one volume, the opening of the diplomatic files can be delayed indefinitely. Such delay has already plagued scholars in regard to the 1948 files and threatens to recur in the case of the vital 1950 documents. For proper understanding of the following recommendation, it should be explained that publication of documents now occurs some time after compilation and clearance of the material. Access to files is granted only after all volumes of a single year are published. If the following recommendation were now in effect, many of the 1951 files would be open to scholars and a twenty-year access rule, implicitly mandated in the 1972 Presidential memorandum, would finally be within reach.

(4) **Recommended:** Specific files for any year should be opened to scholars after manuscript compilation and clearance for the volumes covering those files have been completed. After compilation and clearance are completed in specific files, the files for that year (or years) should be sent to the National Archives for scholarly use or for any further work by the Historical Office. When compilation and clearance are completed and the files sent to the National Archives, proper announcement should be made in **Prologue** and other appropriate scholarly journals. If this recommendation is followed, the opening of most files for a given year will no longer have to wait for the opening of all files for that year.

(5) **Recommended:** An Archivist should be appointed in the Historical Office to help staff and also to assist scholars who must use newly-opened files in the Department of State building.

III

Under the Freedom of Information Act and Executive Order No. 11652, the Department of State is now declassifying some documents of the post-1948 years when requested to do so by individual scholars. Nearly 35,000 pages of such documents have been opened to individuals. This means, of course, that this material is being made available

ahead of the published **Foreign Relations** volumes. At present, however, no mechanism exists for the public announcement of which documents are being released. This can mean that such documents can be held and used by some scholars but not by others who are unaware that such material has been released. A similar situation recently created serious legal and public relations problems for a Presidential Library. Such problems must not be allowed to plague the Department of State.

(6) **Recommended:** When Department of State documents are released in years later than the years covered by the **Foreign Relations** volumes, announcement of the documents released should immediately be made through **Prologue** and other appropriate scholarly publications.

IV

In order to close the twenty-six-year gap to twenty years, the Historical Office has drawn up a "Triennial Plan" which proposes dropping the present procedure of publishing seven volumes for each year and, instead, publishing fourteen volumes covering three years. The plan would begin with the volumes containing the 1952-1954 documents. One rationale advanced for the plan is that it would hopefully speed up publication of documents.

Scholars and the interested public should be aware of the plan's implications. First, instead of the present twenty-one volumes (that is, seven volumes each year for any three year period), only fourteen volumes will be published. Thus the published material can be cut by as much as one-third. This reduction would work hardship on those unable to travel to Washington to use the files, or on those who, because of dwindling academic resources, will be unable to order quantities of materials microfilmed or photocopied. For many important purposes, moreover, microfilmed or photocopied documents cannot replace the relatively inexpensive and well-edited **Foreign Relations** volumes. The proposed cutback will also hinder the many teachers who depend upon **Foreign Relations** for classroom purposes. Second, the present volumes are valuable in part because they present a range of materials from which policy-makers had to choose. Cutting this material could lead to the mere presentation of final policy decisions; at this point **Foreign Relations** could become too much like an official "White Paper." Third, the Triennial Plan, it is argued, will accelerate clearance of documents by allowing agencies to deal with three years of material at once. This procedure, however, could backfire. If the 1952-1954 volume on Korea, for example, was delayed because 1954 material could not be cleared, publication of 1952-1954 materials in the remaining sections of the volume could also be delayed. The plan could therefore worsen the clearance problem. Fourth, most of the present **Foreign Relations** volumes are organized around the traditional geographic divisions (Western Europe, Far East, etc.), but in the post-1947 era the importance of the Political, Economic, Social, and UN divisions rose dramatically. Given this development, future **Foreign Relations** volumes should contain more, not less, material, so that the non-geographic divisions receive proper treatment.

In summary, no internal, non-scholarly criteria should force changes which could severely damage the quality, reputation and usefulness of **Foreign Relations**.

(7) **Recommended:** Materials for the volumes could be compiled in three-year periods in order to expedite compilation, clearance, and access to the files. But the publication rate should remain at the present level of at least seven volumes for each year. For this reason, the Historical Office should return to its schedule of November, 1973 which sought to compile materials on a seven-volume-per-year basis through 1953 by early 1975. With this schedule, the twenty-six-year gap could quickly be closed to twenty-years.

V

In order to understand better the consequences of its annual report and the problems of the series, the Advisory Committee on **Foreign Relations** should hold another meeting during the year.

(8) **Recommended:** The Advisory Committee members who meet in November should reconvene in Washington the following April for a brief meeting.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert A. Divine
Professor of History
University of Texas

Covey T. Oliver
Professor of Law
University of Pennsylvania

Richard C. Snyder
Director, Mershon Center
Ohio State University

Alwyn V. Freeman
Board of Editors
**The American Journal of
International Law**

Armin H. Rappaport
Professor of History
University of California - La Jolla

H. Bradford Westerfield
Professor of Political Science
Yale University

Walter LaFeber
Professor of History
Cornell University
Chairman, Advisory Committee on
Foreign Relations of the United States

ON THE QUESTION OF THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR: A REMINDER

Simon Jay Ellison*

With some notable exceptions, in the historiography dealing with the mid-20th century most historians seem to take for granted that the Cold War, marking the unusually abnormal relationships obtaining between the USA and the USSR, burst upon the world scene as a post-World War II phenomenon, and they treat it as such. These historians put into play whatever schemata of analysis they employ in dealing with the Cold War within that context and within the delimited framework of the post-World War II era.

Excluding those notable exceptions who, for some strange reason, were promptly referred to as "the revisionists", and the increasing number of historians who are beginning to push the origins of the Cold War era backwards little by little into the recesses of the course and the various stages of World War II itself (should they then be called the "quasi-revisionists"?), few have dared to confront the glaring reality that the Cold War might have had its inception in the turbulent events of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and picked up momentum in the years that followed by way of a series of the most unusual and continuously applied abnormal modes of international behavior, rarely obtained in the relationships of nation-states. If ever there were a case of uniqueness, here it was, at least until the People's Republic of China appeared upon the world scene in 1949.

I became very much aware of this strange relationship which eventually became a way of life for those of us who lived during the non-isolationist 1920's and the internationally turbulent 1930's. The abnormal international behavior patterns continued. They were then not referred to as "The Cold War." This name was belatedly put to use after World War II just as the term "Open Door" had been belatedly put to use in the early years of the 20th century as a descriptive of our policy line toward East Asia and China. I was not alone. Many of my generation were aware of the US-Soviet "cold war" relationships long before they were formally dubbed "The Cold War", well before our direct involvement in World War II in 1941, and well before the outbreak of World War II in 1939. I became more than ever conscious of the prevalence of such relationships during my active military service here and abroad from 1942 to 1946 during which time my diary and my correspondence served to record my highly sensitized observations relative to such international phenomena.

My records have served dramatically to refresh my recollections. They may perchance do so for others who should remember but who may have forgotten. One cannot escape the realities thus recalled:

***Prof. Ellison, a recent retiree from Bayside High School in New York City, has for many years been heavily involved in the Advanced Placement Program in the public school system of that city.**

The Cold War was very much with us even during our wartime alliance and well before the Cold War was supposed to have begun. And what is more significant, those abnormal relationships during the war which persisted on new levels of conduct after the war were merely wartime continuations of relationships which had begun long before the recognition of the USSR in 1933 which, although it marked a formal change in pre-existing relationships, did not end the basic abnormalities obtaining in those relationships. For those of us who lived consciously through the 1920's, the 1930's, and the 1940's, the post-war relationships between the USA and the USSR were simply a continuum. At the war's end we might well have asked, "So what is new?"

Perhaps the error arises in the equating of the ceremonial attending the naming of a policy with the beginning of the policy. Unfortunately, too many may have done so, and in consequence may have missed relationship continuities which should be essential to a balanced and non-distorted evaluation of the era of the Cold War.

As a matter of fact, the period of US-Soviet relations which followed World War II might properly be referred to as "The Neo-Cold War," if a distinction is necessary, come into being during the post-World War II era when the USA was able to play so extraordinary a multifaceted role in world affairs, as distinct from the variegated "cold war" which embraced the period between the wars--1917-1921, 1921-1933, 1933-1941--and even during the subdued frictionalism which obtained during the course of World War II against the greater common foe, the Axis Alliance. That which we now commonly label "The Cold War" grew relentlessly out of the earlier relationships and in a continuity which even engaged the attention of almost the very same personalities.

It is not my intention to quibble over the matter. Premises and concomitant foci regarding historical developments should be very important considerations in critical evaluation. If the Cold War did in fact begin as a post-World War II phenomenon, starting, let us say, for example, with the Yalta Conference of 1945 or, perhaps, with the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, or with Churchill's speech of 1946 at Fulton, Missouri, or with Truman's enunciation of his doctrine in 1947, then the developing international tensions and antagonisms, especially vis-a-vis the USA and the USSR, which derived therefrom, might be viewed in one way. If the Cold War, however, could be seen to have begun earlier, again to illustrate, as with the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939, then the course of developments which followed might be viewed in another way. And, if the Cold War could be seen to have begun still earlier, with the Bolshevik Revolution in October-November 1917, then the course of all developments which followed might be viewed and evaluated in yet another way. The role of this time-premise factor in critical historiography should be fairly simple to understand. It is an imperative in appropriate consideration, yet too often is it likely to suffer from oversight, especially in the instance of the Cold War.

REPORTS OF SECRETARY-TREASURER

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations

December 27, 1974

ADMINISTRATIVE

The move of the National Office from Philadelphia to Akron proved to be reasonably smooth, and procedures have been adopted and implemented which should make future operations effective and efficient. An excellent office staff under the direction of Pamela Lagodich at the University of Akron has made much of this possible.

No significant problems arose during the year. The two officers concentrated upon familiarizing themselves with operational details and in pursuing goals already set by the Society. Their major attention focused upon (1) completing the formal arrangement for the Bernath Prize; (2) helping the **ad hoc** committee under Robert Ferrell explore the question of a journal; (3) exploring with Larry Gelfand proposals for a new guide to diplomatic history; (4) reorganizing the membership files; (5) providing information to Nolan Fowler for the **Newsletter**; (6) organizing conventions; (7) conducting the election; and (8) administering the budget.

The Society will be listed in the U.S. Office of Education's **Directory of Education Associations, 1975**, and we have applied to the AHA for affiliation.

BUDGET REPORT

The Society enjoyed a sound fiscal year. It had one major expenditure of \$625.82 in attorney fees for incorporation proceedings. Other expenses were considerably below total anticipated outlays, allowing a transfer of \$675.00 to the Endowment Fund, an account representing nine life memberships, which had been borrowed upon in previous years. Around \$600.00 of the carryover amount of December 28, 1974, of \$853.75 will be expended for expenses of the Society for the 1974 AHA meeting and for the requested \$200.00 allocation to the Bernath Prize.

We were fortunate in formalizing the Bernath Agreement, and the Society now holds \$8,000.00 in United States government bonds bearing 7½ percent interest. This will in the course of a full year yield \$600.00, allowing payment of \$500.00 for the Bernath Prize and an accumulation in accordance with the Agreement. Unfortunately, the bonds were not transferred to the Society in time to accumulate a full year's income by the time the Award will be granted in April of 1975. The Society will thus be \$200.00 short and rather than impose further upon the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Bernath, this amount can be expended from the 1974 carryover, and the Joint Secretary-Treasurer so recommends.

The budget proposed for 1975 anticipates a carryover for that year in excess of \$400.00.

1974 Budget Statement

December 28, 1974

INCOME	Actual		
	Philadelphia Account	Akron Account	Total
Cash on Hand, January 1, 1974	\$1,244.29		\$1,244.29
Dues	276.00	\$2,328.50	2,604.50
Conventions (Meals, Smokers)		182.50	182.50
Life Memberships		75.00	75.00
Other	70.00		70.00
Bernath Prize	<u>500.00</u>		<u>500.00</u>
	\$2,090.29	\$2,586.00	\$4,676.29
EXPENDITURES			
Postage	48.00	36.44	84.44
Telephone	127.48	14.10	141.58
Office Supplies		3.25	3.25
Printing	99.00	275.58	374.58
Student Help	80.00		80.00
Committee Expenses		18.74	18.74
Incorporation (Attorney Fees)	625.82		625.82
Secretary-Treasurer Travel		49.42	49.42
Convention Expenses			
Speakers		8.00	8.00
AHA	591.45		591.45
OAH		60.24	60.24
SHA		43.91	43.91
Bernath Prize	500.00	500.00	1,000.00
Miscellaneous			
Refunds, Overpayments of Dues, Luncheons, etc.		18.50	18.50
Bank Service Fees	18.54	14.07	32.61
Petty Cash		10.00	10.00
Safety Deposit Box		5.00	5.00
Transfer to Endowment (9 Life Memberships)		<u>675.00</u>	<u>675.00</u>
INCOME	\$2,090.29	\$2,586.00	\$4,676.29
EXPENDITURES	2,090.29	1,732.25	3,822.54
BALANCE	-0-	853.75	853.75

Endowment Fund as of December 15, 1974

Eight Memberships plus One Honorary \$675.00

Interest 4.99

679.99

Bernath Fund

\$8,000 Interest Bearing Bonds

Income, 1974
Reserve-0-
-0-

NOMINATIONS COMMITTEE

The Nominations Committee of 1974, chaired by Samuel F. Wells, presented a slate which was voted on in October and November, 1974. Robert A. Divine was elected Vice President; Joseph O'Grady, member of Council, and George C. Herring, Jr., member of the Nominations Committee. The 1975 Nominations Committee under the chairmanship of Lawrence Gelfand will present its slate in the spring. In 1974 Lawrence S. Kaplan and Warren F. Kuehl were replaced by Samuel F. Wells and Joan Hoff Wilson.

MEMBERSHIP COMMITTEE

The Committee was completely reworked in 1974 under the leadership of the Chairman, Leon Boothe. It has been dormant, but a list of the members appeared in the December issue of the **Newsletter** and it is already working hard. In addition, a new application brochure was prepared, and it should yield good results. A modest recruitment effort at the Southern Historical Association brought in eight members from a geographical area where membership has been weak.

New members for the year totalled 70: 54 regular, 14 students, and 2 institutions.

The National Office reviewed the membership files during the year and removed delinquent persons, some of whom had not paid dues in over two years. This reduced the total roster by nearly 37 names. One member died. As of December 15, the record is as follows.

Regular	387
Student	29
Life	9 (paid; 1 honorary)
Institutional	<u>2</u>
	427

The program scheduled in Washington in August should enhance opportunities to add new members, because it provides evidence of an active Society.

BERNATH PRIZE COMMITTEE

The final agreement between SHAFR and Dr. and Mrs. Gerald Bernath was signed on August 24, 1974, establishing the conditions under which the annual prize will be managed. The Bernaths have contributed long-term United States Treasury Bonds whose total interest will yield a minimum of \$500.00 annually. Each future winner of the prize will in addition receive a certificate identifying the achievement. This office recommends that the SHAFR assume the additional expenses for this year which the handling of the prize will involve.

Lawrence S. Kaplan)

Joint Secretary-Treasurer

Warren F. Kuehl)

PROPOSED 1975 BUDGET

INCOME

Dues	\$2,150.00	
Interest from Endowment	30.00	
Convention Income (Meals, Smokers)	<u>500.00</u> ¹	
		\$2,680.00
Carryover from 1974		<u>863.09</u>
Total Available		\$3,543.09 ²

EXPENDITURES

General Supplies

Postage and Mailing	300.00
Telephone (Long Distance)	300.00
Office Supplies	50.00
Printing	<u>100.00</u>

750.00

Executive Secretary, Council and Committee Expenses

Executive-Secretary Travel	600.00 ³
Council and Committee Costs	150.00
Convention Costs ¹	
AHA	600.00
OAH	200.00
Southern	75.00
Washington Meeting	<u>200.00</u>

1,825.00

Speakers at Conventions

250.00⁴

250.00

Miscellaneous

Petty Cash	25.00
Banking Expenses (Service Charge, Deposit Box)	<u>5.00</u>

30.00

Transfer to Endowment

-0-

Bernath Prize

200.00

Carryover to 1976

488.09

\$3,543.09

Stuart L. Bernath Prize Account

Income	\$ 600.00
Award	<u>500.00</u>
Accumulation	\$ 100.00

1. SHAFR collects monies for luncheons at the AHA meeting. The OAH handles all financing for luncheons at its sessions. The amounts can vary substantially. Other expenses are primarily associated with cost of the smoker arrangements. The cash bar arrangement does not cover all expenses.
2. The Universities of Akron and Kent State assume secretarial expenses, student assistant salaries, and most of the general office supplies. Tennessee Technological University underwrites all expenses for the **Newsletter**, including editorial work, printing, and mailing, and it also provides mailing labels for all general business of the Society. Rutgers University at Newark publishes the **Roster & Research List** every other year. This involves the expenses associated with its compilation, reproduction and mailing.
3. Convention expenses for the Joint Secretary-Treasurer have been almost fully assumed by their institutions since the Society's founding. Given the uncertainties of university budgets, however, it seems expedient to provide a line item to cover part of the expenses here if it becomes necessary to do so.
4. The invited speaker at the spring meeting is offered expenses. At times these are paid; sometimes the speaker waives that offer.

SHAFR COUNCIL MEETING

December 27, 1974

The Council meeting was held in conjunction with the American Historical Association sessions in Chicago. President Bradford Perkins called the meeting to order at 8:35 P.M. in room 415 of the Conrad Hilton Hotel. Those present included Robert Ferrell, Armin Rappaport, Thomas Paterson, Lawrence Gelfand, Jules Davids, Nolan Fowler, Lawrence Kaplan and Warren Kuehl.

The report of the Joint Secretary-Treasurer was received pending formal action upon specific recommendations. Business then proceeded to committee reports. Thomas Paterson announced that the Program Committee had sessions prepared for forthcoming meetings and then distributed copies of the program for the First National Meeting of SHAFR to be held at Georgetown University in Washington, D. C., August 15-16, 1975. (Meeting details will be mailed). Jules Davids reported that local arrangements had been largely completed, and he described these and the costs thereof. Council decided that a \$3.00 registration fee seemed reasonable to cover some of the costs and instructed Davids to plan for two types of registration--one for registration alone, the other to include all costs of room, meals, and registration. Those present were enthusiastic in their praise of the quality of the program and in

their appreciation to Georgetown University for providing facilities at such reasonable costs. Council members agreed to invite Tom Paterson to remain as Program Chairman until September 1, 1975, and asked him to consult with the incoming president regarding the composition of the committee.

There was no report from the Nominations Committee but the election results were noted.

The Membership Committee made no report.

Larry Gelfand reported on the proposal to update the Bemis and Griffin **Guide to American Diplomatic History**. He noted that the application to the National Endowment for the Humanities requesting \$2,000,000 for eight years had not been successful. Letters and conversations with Endowment officials indicated a willingness of the latter to consider a revised proposal under a new Bibliographical Tool Project if it did not require more than \$50,000 a year for three years and if it were limited to a more recent time period. Reconsideration by Professor Gelfand indicated that a proposal could be redrafted on a more limited scale which would cost \$400,000 for a three year project. This would be limited to the period 1900-1950 for source materials and 1900-1970 for literature. Extensive discussion followed which indicated concern over the time period and that an additional \$250,000 would still be needed to complete the limited project.

No reports were received from the Bernath Prize Committee or from Warren Kimball concerning the **Roster & Research List**. It was noted that the Bernath Committee had received 23 books and that the **Roster** would be distributed early in 1975.

Nolan Fowler commented that he welcomed varied materials from the members for the **Newsletter** and that the four-year agreement with Tennessee Technological University was now at mid-point. Council members expressed their satisfaction with the publication and thanked the editor for his dedication and effort.

Robert Ferrell reported as chairman of the **ad hoc** committee which had been set up to consider a journal for the Society. He noted that two approaches had been made from SHAFR members, one from Joseph May at Youngstown State University and one from Thomas D. Schoonover of the University of Southwestern Louisiana. Both universities have expressed a preliminary interest in underwriting the costs, but considerable detail remains to be explored on funding, especially the length of the fiscal commitment. After a long discussion about the necessity of having full support from an institution so as not to burden SHAFR or impose large increases in dues on members and to assure a quality journal, Professor Ferrell was instructed to continue negotiations with the representative of these two institutions and to consider other leads which have not yet developed.

Council then went into Executive Session for formal action.

The incoming president was requested to write formal letters of thanks to Professor Paul B. Johnson of Roosevelt University for his help on local arrangements in connection with the AHA meeting and to the presidents of Tennessee Technological University, Rutgers University at Newark, the University of Akron, and Kent State University, all of which had contributed fiscally in support of SHAFR activities in 1974.

The proposed budget for 1975 was approved. (See page 22). A special motion was incorporated, authorizing the payment of \$200 from regular funds to the Bernath Prize of 1975. This was necessitated because of delays in the transfers of bonds to the Society. Legal problems first arose, but even after the agreement was formally approved the transfer in ownership from Dr. and Mrs. Bernath took nearly four months. Thus interest anticipated in the amount of \$300 will not be realized for half of 1974-75 and it will not be paid until after the spring of 1975 when the \$500 Award is granted.

The Council then considered action on the Bemis project. It discussed the report of Larry Gelfand and considered a letter from E. Berkeley Tompkins of the National Historical Publications Commission. This communication expressed an interest in having the NHPC staff undertake the updating project but noted that no time could be devoted to it for nearly 18 months. Questions were raised about what role SHAFR or its members should play in such an NHPC undertaking.

The Council agreed that SHAFR would support Larry Gelfand in resubmitting a proposal to the NEH but recorded its concern over the limited time period and noted its preference that coverage begin with the American Revolution. Professor Gelfand was to be asked to keep the officers of SHAFR fully informed and to report again to the Council during the OAH sessions in Boston.

No action was taken regarding future summer programs, pending the result of the forthcoming Georgetown meeting, or on the subject of designating an archival depository for SHAFR records.

The Joint Secretaries were instructed to develop further opportunities to cooperate with the Southern Historical Association regarding joint meetings.

It was also decided that new members who join six months after dues notices are sent will have their payment apply to the next year. This means that dues received from new members after September 15 will have their membership so recorded.

A discussion then ensued over the Freedom of Information Act and operating procedures to gain access to materials. It was decided to raise this subject before the full meeting of the members at the luncheon on December 28.

The meeting adjourned at 12:40 A.M.

ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED, OR SCHOLARLY PAPERS
DELIVERED, BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

John A. Bernbaum (Historical Office, Department of State), "Austria in the Plans of the Grand Alliance," **Transactions** (Conference Group for Social and Administrative History), IV (1974), 8-27. An analysis of the evolution of Allied policy toward Austria from the **Anschluss** through the Potsdam Conference. The Allies never approached the "Austrian problem" as an issue to be dealt with on its own merits, but only as a part of a larger "German problem". Conflicting objectives of the partners of the Grand Alliance resulted in their approving a contradiction in the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, which described Austria as a victim of Nazism yet held Austria responsible for its role in the war. It was this contradiction that laid the seeds for future conflict over Austria and led to that country's ten-year occupation.

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Justus D. Doenecke (New College, Sarasota, Fla.), "Isolationists of the 1930s and 1940s: an Historical Geographical Essay," in R. W. Sellen and T. W. Bryson, eds., **American Diplomatic History: Issues and Methods** (Vol. XIII of the West Georgia College Studies in the Social Sciences, 1974). Originally a paper delivered at a regional meeting of SHAFR in February 1972 at Georgia State U, this essay first tackled the problem of defining isolationism, then moved to the current examination of World War II. Doenecke listed some fourteen areas that need further research, discussing each in turn: (a) isolationist groups, (b) press, radio, and publicists, (c) agrarian roots, (d) sections, (e) business, (f) labor, (g) Congress, (h) ethnic and religious factors, (i) pacifism, (j) intellectual roots; (k) sociological theory, (l) "Edenic" myths, (m) wartime activities, (n) Cold War activities. The writer concluded by stressing the need for a lesser amount of polemics in isolationistic studies.

* * * * *

Alan K. Henrikson (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts U, Medford, Mass.), "Maps, Globes, and the 'Cold War,'" **Special Libraries**, 65 (Oct./Nov. 1974), 445-454. An illustrated article, based on a larger study, of the revolution that occurred during the 1940s in the way Americans visually imagined and graphically represented the world. The consequences of the new world-view, termed "Air-Age Globalism," for American-Soviet relations are examined. It is suggested that the radically altered real and imagined spatiotemporal context in which the two powers found themselves was a basic cause of the Cold War, comparable in importance to the well-known military, political, economic, and ideological causes.

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Salvatore Prisco III (Union College, New Jersey), "A Note on John Barrett's China Policy," **The Pacific Historian**, XVIII, 2 (Summer, 1974), 47-54. A consideration of John Barrett's contribution to the climate of opinion in the 1890's which led to the Open Door Policy. As minister to Siam (1894-1898), special war correspondent of the Hearst newspapers during the Spanish-American War, and aspirant for the position of U.S. minister to Peking in 1901, Barrett championed the concepts of equal opportunity of trade and territorial integrity in the hope of encouraging a progressive partnership between the United States and China.

* * * * *

Frederick H. Schapsmeier (U of Wisconsin-Oshkosh), "Paul H. Douglas: From Pacifist to Soldier-Statesman," **Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society**, LXVII (1974), 307-323. Paul H. Douglas, a former professor of economics at the U of Chicago, served with distinction in the U.S. Senate from 1949 to 1967. During that time he established a reputation as both a champion of the welfare state and as a vigorous hawk in the Cold War. His career thus makes an interesting case study of the transformation of American liberalism as it pertained to foreign affairs. During the Twenties and Thirties, Douglas was committed to isolationism. This stance was derived from his pacifism as a Quaker. The shock of Munich in 1938, though, caused him to support military preparedness and later to be active in the William Allen White Committee to Aid the Allies. Out of feelings of guilt, Douglas joined the Marine Corps as a private in 1941 and rose to the rank of major. He received wounds in the Pacific theater which left his left arm thereafter useless. When he entered the Senate, his career paralleled the most intensive period of the Cold War. With a large Slavic constituency in Chicago, Douglas tended to go beyond the containment policy and to support liberation. Due to his strong support of the war in Vietnam, though, Douglas was defeated in the 1966 election. His career thus dramatically reflected the changing moods of liberal attitudes towards international affairs during the period from 1920 to 1970.

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Ronald Spector (Center of Military History, Dep't of the Army), "What the Local Annamites are Thinking: American Views of Vietnamese in China, 1942-45," in **Southeast Asia: an International Quarterly**, vol. III, #2 (Spring, 1974). Most studies of American policy toward Indo-China have concentrated upon American relations with Britain and France over the question of the future of the area. Little attention has been given to the views and actions of American officials toward the Vietnamese themselves. Authors who have dealt with this subject appear to be preoccupied with the mysterious activities of the Office of Strategic Services and have neglected the role of State Department officials and military personnel. The records show that, as early as 1943, American consuls and other officials were in contact with Viet Minh and reporting on its activities, albeit somewhat inaccurately.

Their reports were apparently unknown or ignored at the higher level of the foreign affairs bureaucracy where American policy-makers appeared to be following that venerable old adage, "Don't confuse me with the facts; I've already made up my mind."

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Harry Stegmaier, Jr. (Frostburg State College, Frostburg, Maryland). "Delaying the Crisis: Oil, Mexico and Dwight Morrow 1925-1928." Duquesne History Forum, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, October 31, 1974. Following the Mexican Revolution and the creation of the constitution of 1917, Mexican leaders attempted periodically to regulate United States oil interests. One such attempt occurred in late 1925, precipitating a crisis which lasted over two years. The petroleum companies defied the new Mexican petroleum regulations. Their cries for assistance reached sympathetic ears in the State Department, particularly those of Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg. Only outraged public opinion and determined Congressional opposition prevented United States military intervention in 1927 on behalf of the oil companies. Historians have given Dwight W. Morrow, who was appointed ambassador to Mexico in 1927, much credit for resolving the oil crisis. In reality, he merely delayed a showdown between Mexico and the companies. His diplomacy allowed a weak Mexico to withdraw gracefully from an unwanted confrontation in 1927-1928. When Mexico challenged the companies again ten years later she was in a much stronger position. Dwight W. Morrow's diplomacy eventually made it possible for Mexico successfully to expropriate the oil companies in 1938 by delaying the crisis for ten years.

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Warren W. Tozer (Boise State U), "The Closing of the Open Door: The Shanghai Power Company and the Chinese Communists." Annual meeting of the MCAA, Nov., 1974. This paper, based upon the study of the correspondence of the American-owned Shanghai Power Company (SPC), the largest electrical utility in China, substantiates the position of those, like John S. Service, who believed that the Chinese Communists desired American aid and cooperation. SPC's experiences while operating under Communist control for over eighteen months suggest that the United States could have developed some type of trade relationship with the PRC until as late as January 1950. The U.S. government, however, was more intent on defending its legal rights in China than in keeping the door open for trade with the Chinese mainland, and thereby destroyed any chance of developing relations with the PRC.

PUBLICATIONS BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

Thomas A. Bailey (Professor emeritus, Stanford U), **A Diplomatic History of the American People**. Ninth ed. 1974. Prentice-Hall. \$11.95.

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James J. Barnes (Wabash College), **Authors, Publishers and Politicians: The Quest for an Anglo-American Copyright Agreement, 1815-54**. 1974. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd; Columbus: Ohio State U Press. \$13.00.

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The work, **Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941**, edited by Dorothy Borg (Columbia U) and Shumpei Okamoto and published in a hardback edition by Columbia U Press in 1973 for \$25.00 has as of last year been available from the same press in paperback at \$8.00. The Japanese edition of the book has received the Mainichi Special Book Prize, one of the most coveted honors in Japan, as well as the Yoshida Prize in History and Diplomacy.

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Robert J. C. Butow, **The John Doe Associates: Backdoor Diplomacy for Peace, 1941**. 1974. Stanford U Press. \$16.95. Reviewed in **History**, Feb., 1975.

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Edward W. Chester, (U of Texas-Arlington), **Clash of Titans: Africa and U.S. Foreign Policy**. 1974. Orbis Books. \$12.95. Favorably reviewed in **History**, Jan., 1975.

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Alexander DeConde (U of California at Santa Barbara), **Entangling Alliance: Politics and Diplomacy Under George Washington**. 1974 (rep. of 1958 ed.). Greenwood Press. \$22.50.

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Martin L. Fausold and George T. Mazuzan (SUNY at Geneseo), eds., **The Hoover Presidency: A Reappraisal**. 1974. Albany: State U of New York Press. \$12.00. Two members of SHAFR, Selig Adler (SUNY at Buffalo) and Joan Hoff Wilson (U of California at Sacramento) are authors of essays dealing with President Hoover's foreign policy. Reviewed in **History**, Feb., 1975.

Lloyd C. Gardner (Rutgers), ed., **American Foreign Policy, Present to Past: A Narrative with Readings and Documents.** 1974. The Free Press. \$10.00.

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Milton O. Gustafson (Chief, Diplomatic Branch of National Archives), ed., **The National Archives and Foreign Relations Research.** 1974. Ohio U Press. \$10.00. This book is a collection of the papers that were read (exactly one dozen were done by members of SHAFR), and the discussions which were held, at the Conference on the Archives of United States Foreign Relations, Washington, D. C., June 16-17, 1969.

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Fredrick H. Schapsmeier (U of Wisconsin-Oshkosh), **Ezra Taft Benson and the Politics of Agriculture: The Eisenhower Years, 1953-1961.** 1975. Danville, Ill.: Interstate Press. Pb. \$6.50. Deals with, among other topics, the Food for Peace (PL 480) Program.

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Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (Graduate Center, CUNY), ed., **Dynamics of World Power: A Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1972.** 1973. McGraw-Hill. Five Volumes. \$169.00.

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Ronald Spector (Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army), **Admiral of the New Empire: The Life and Career of George Dewey.** 1974. La. State U Press. \$10.00.

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Gerald E. Wheeler (San Jose State, and former editor of SHAFR Newsletter), **Admiral William Veazie Pratt, U. S. Navy: A Sailor's Life.** 1974. Naval History Division, Department of the Navy (distributed by U. S. Government Printing Office). \$8.30. Favorably reviewed in **History**, Feb., 1975.

PERSONALS

The Nominating Board of the OAH has submitted the name of Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern U, and former president of SHAFR) as its nominee for vice president in the general elections which will be concluded by March 20. SHAFR was further honored by the nomination of Joan Hoff Wilson (California State U at Sacramento and co-winner of the first Stuart L. Bernath Prize) for membership upon the Nominating Board itself.

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Joseph M. Siracusa (U of Queensland, Australia) has been the recipient of grants from the government of Australia and the Harry S. Truman Library for the purpose of conducting research in the U.S. during 1975 on a proposed volume which will deal with the intellectual origins of the Cold War.

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Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana U and former president of SHAFR) and David F. Trask (SUNY at Stony Brook) are visiting lecturers in the Department of Strategy at the Naval War College, Newport, R.I., during the current academic year.

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David W. Hirst (senior research historian in the department of history, Princeton University, and associate editor of **The Papers of Woodrow Wilson**) was the recipient of the Philip M. Hamer Award for 1974. This award, made by the Society of American Archivists, is given for distinction in the field of historical editing.

QUERIES

For a brief biography on Clarence Edward Gauss (1887-1960), I would appreciate information on sources, primary and secondary. Please write Professor Thomas G. Paterson, Department of History, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut 06268.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

SHAFR will sponsor its usual activities at the annual meeting of the OAH in Boston, April 16-19. The Council will meet in Room 421 of the Statler Hilton, the Convention headquarters, on Wednesday evening, April 16, 7:30-10:00. A smoker and cash bar will take place in Room 436 of the Hilton on Thursday evening, April 17, 5:00-7:00. A luncheon will be held in Parlor A on the mezzanine floor of the Hilton on Friday, April 18, at 12:00. The speaker for this occasion will be Dr. Selig Adler of SUNY at Buffalo (and a member of SHAFR) whose paper will be titled "The United States and the Middle Eastern Dilemma, 1917-1939." A business meeting will follow the address. The feature of the latter will be the awarding of the Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Prize for 1975.

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The Historical Office of the Department of State will host an "open house" on the afternoon of Thursday, August 14, the day prior to the SHAFR meeting in Washington. The session will include tours of the Department's Operations Center and of the Central Files, and a discussion with members of the Office's Foreign Relations and Historical Studies Divisions concerning their work. Because the number of participants may have to be limited, scholars interested in attending the session should request a reservation as soon as possible by writing to The Director, Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D. C. 20520.

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The OAH will hold its annual meeting for 1976 in St. Louis, Missouri. Anyone who wishes to have a part in the program at that meeting should contact the chairman of the Program Committee, Dr. Alden T. Vaughan, 616 Fayerweather Hall, Columbia University, New York City, New York 10027, at once if he (she) has not done so already. The deadline for the submission of prospective papers, workshops, or panels is April 1. Since the convention will coincide with a portion of the observation of the Bicentennial, the committee will emphasize topics dealing with the Revolutionary period. Prospective topics should be outlined in a two-page summary, setting forth the thesis, methodology, and significance of each proposal.

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The SHAFR Council at its meeting on December 27, 1974, discussed the question of the access of scholars to materials under the Freedom of Information Act. The subject seemed sufficiently important to raise

at the business meeting following the luncheon on December 28. Comments there did not reflect extensive concern because only six of the fifty-one present had sought materials under the act. Most of these, however, expressed some dissatisfaction with the results. The question was raised whether SHAFR should establish a committee to receive reports from members who have failed to gain access to requested materials and then to formulate some plan of action.

To gather information which will allow Council to decide whether to act, the National Office would like to receive reports from members on their experiences, both successful and unsuccessful. It would be helpful if these could be sent by April 1 for the Council's consideration at its meeting in Boston. Please communicate with Warren F. Kuehl, SHAFR, Department of History, University of Akron, Akron, Ohio 44325.

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Diplomatic researchers who are contemplating work abroad are advised to secure a copy of a recently-published brochure of the Department of State, titled **Public Availability of Diplomatic Archives** (1974). It is a mine of information, covering the archives of the nations of the world from Afghanistan to Zambia. Write to the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D. C. 20520.

VOLUNTEER SPEAKERS SERVICE OF USIA

Foreign Service posts unanimously consider experienced lecturers their most effective means of promoting more comprehensive mutual understanding. Our overseas posts need speakers who can speak authoritatively on subjects relevant to particular objectives. Foremost among these goals are the promotion of a greater comprehension abroad of American foreign policy, of the American cultural scene including education, of its economy, or of such subjects as mass communications, urban transportation, and environmental questions.

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If, as an American scholar or specialist, you are traveling abroad and have sufficient time at any stop to allow for programming there or in nearby countries, you are invited to send to this office as far in advance as possible, your curriculum vitae, your suggested lecture topics, and your exact itinerary. Once received by USIS posts, they will contact you through this office if they see an opportunity for effective programming. USIS posts make the ultimate decision on whether they can program a speaker and how.

They may ask you, as a Volunteer Speaker, to deliver lectures at a university or before other select audiences, to conduct or participate in a seminar or panel discussion, or to meet informally and socially with specialists in your field of interest. Many speakers have considered this last a particularly rewarding experience.

If a program can be arranged, USIS posts will reimburse you for travel expenses involved in departing from your original itinerary. They can also offer you a modest honorarium. They are authorized to pay for travel within their own host country and even to another country, but neither they nor USIS can pay for travel from the United States to an overseas post.

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Washington, D. C. 20547

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE COMPETITION FOR 1976

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations announces that the 1976 competition for the Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Prize upon a book dealing with any aspect of American foreign affairs is open. The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of U.S. diplomatic relations.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1975. It must be the author's first or second book.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. Ernest R. May, Chairman, Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Prize Committee, Department of History, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02178. The works must be received not later than December 31, 1975.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$500.00. If two (2) or more works are deemed winners, as in 1972, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be April, 1976, at St. Louis, Missouri.

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Ever of SHAFR**

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THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: Nolan Fowler, Department of History, Tennessee Tech, Cookeville, Tennessee 38501.

ISSUES: The **Newsletter** is published on the 15th of March, June, and September, and on the 1st of December. All members receive the publication.

DEADLINES: All material must be in the office of the editor not later than six (6) weeks prior to the publication date.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication. Copies of the **Newsletter** which are returned because of faulty addresses will be forwarded only upon the payment of a fee of 50¢.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of all back numbers of the **Newsletter** are available and may be obtained from the editorial office upon the payment of a service charge of 35¢ per number. If the purchaser lives abroad, the charge is 50¢ per number.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, honors, awards), announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered—or published—upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, lists of accessions of diplomatic materials to libraries, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting diplomatic materials in various depositories. Because of space limitations, "straight" articles and book reviews are unacceptable.