


Passport

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review



Inside...

A Roundtable on Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War

The Art of Teaching Biography

A Roundtable Discussion on Matthew Jacobs' *Imagining the Middle East*

...and much more!

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The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review



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Passport is published three times per year (April, September, January), by the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, and is distributed to all members of the Society. Submissions should be sent to the attention of the editor, and are acceptable in all formats, although electronic copy by email to passport@osu.edu is preferred. Submissions should follow the guidelines articulated in the *Chicago Manual of Style*. Manuscripts accepted for publication will be edited to conform to *Passport* style, space limitations, and other requirements. The author is responsible for accuracy and for obtaining all permissions necessary for publication. Manuscripts will not be returned. Interested advertisers can find relevant information on the web at: <http://www.shaf.org/newsletter/passportrates.htm>, or can contact the editor. The opinions expressed in *Passport* do not necessarily reflect the opinions of SHAFR, of Brigham Young University, or of The Ohio State University.

The editors of *Passport* wish to acknowledge the generous financial and institutional support of Brigham Young University, the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies, The Ohio State University, and the Mershon Center for International Security Studies.

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The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review
Volume 43, Number 3, January 2013

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At Home in the World

Mark Phillip Bradley

Understanding,” Hannah Arendt wrote in a 1954 essay, “is a complicated process that never produces equivocal results. It is an unending activity by which, in constant change and variation, we come to terms with and reconcile ourselves to reality, that is, try to be at home in the world.”¹ Few would accuse Arendt of being a sentimental scholar, but her notion of becoming “at home in the world” resonated for me when I first read her essay. The community of scholars that is SHAFR is necessarily concerned with the problematics of knowledge and knowing. As scholars we probe archival and other primary sources in the United States and around the globe to push beyond the difficulties of understanding American engagement in the world. And we collectively draw upon those efforts as we work to help our students and a wider public better understand the shifting contours of American diplomacy.

SHAFR offers us another sort of home too, especially at our annual conferences. Here we come together not only to present our work and gain critical feedback but, just as important, to offer support for and draw fellowship from our friends and colleagues who are, to employ another political vocabulary from 1950s America, fellow travelers. I am, as they say, a card-carrying member of SHAFR and am honored to serve as your president this year. The SHAFR community has been an important part of my life now for almost twenty years. I know the same is true for many of you.

Planning for our 2013 conference is well underway in the capable hands of its co-chairs, Hang Nguyen and Paul Chamberlain and the irreplaceable Jennifer Walton, who magnificently oversees the logistics for our conferences. The theme for the 2013 conference is “America and the World—The World and America,” and we anticipate a lively set of panels and papers. But underneath the formal program is a series of efforts and initiatives that we hope will advance SHAFR’s continuing efforts to build a strong, diverse, and vibrant community and help its members become, in Arendt’s words, at home in the world. Here is some of what we have in mind.

Fostering Connections Across Time and Space. Often the history of American foreign relations can seem to be almost solely about the wars (hot and cold) of the twentieth century. In fact, the variety of analytical optics used by so many of our members who write and teach about twentieth-



century American diplomacy has expanded exponentially in recent decades, as has the array used to examine the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and even earlier. But we too rarely put ourselves in conversation across these chronological divides. For instance, how might the transformative new scholarship on American foreign relations before the twentieth century inform thinking about the more recent past? Our plenary session for the 2013 conference aims to explore that question. Entitled *Writing American Diplomatic History in the Longue Durée*, the session will feature four eminent SHAFR members whose work has focused on the period before 1900—Kristin Hoganson, Paul A. Kramer, Jay Sexton, and John W. Hall. They have been invited to respond to this question: “What do you wish scholars of the twentieth century might better understand about the content, interpretations,

and methods of the periods in which you work?” As respondents, two distinguished SHAFR members working on the twentieth century—Anne L. Foster and Erez Manela—will reflect on how what they have heard makes them think differently, and perhaps more creatively, about their practice for the twentieth century. George C. Herring, whose magisterial *From Colony to Superpower* is centrally concerned with the full chronological scope of American diplomatic history, will chair the plenary. George promises to keep the plenary participants on a tight leash so that we can have enough time for the audience to engage with the panelists on these issues as well. I am grateful to Jay Sexton for organizing the plenary. And I hope all of you will attend this important effort to enlarge our collective conversation about how we write the history of American diplomacy.

Supporting Our Graduate Student Members. During my first week of graduate school a well-meaning staff member from Harvard’s Office of Career Services told us at orientation that we couldn’t have begun our Ph.D. work at a better moment for getting a job, given the graying of the professoriate and what looked to be an avalanche of retirements over the coming decade. A year later, Congress abolished the mandatory retirement age. Suddenly our prospects looked quite different in what is in part a cautionary tale about the need to maintain a healthy historical skepticism about all talk of the future. But whatever my cohort and others may have faced on the job market, today’s hiring climate is, to put it delicately, a challenging one, and SHAFR wants to provide all the

support it can to our graduate student members and recent Ph.D.s. At our June conference we will for the first time offer a job search boot camp in which participants will have the opportunity to receive individualized feedback on their cover letters and CVs, whether for academic jobs or jobs outside of the academy, from recently hired and more senior scholars through one-on-one conversations about their materials. More details and registration information are available elsewhere in this issue of *Passport*. I encourage all of you who are on the market this year to consider participating in this session, and I thank SHAFR Council graduate student representatives Christopher Dietrich and Annessa Stagner and council member Sarah B. Synder for all their good work in putting this event together. We can't promise it will magically produce jobs for all our members, but we believe it will nicely complement and extend ongoing job preparation efforts at their home institutions.

Reaching Beyond the Academy. The academic job track isn't the only professional route for SHAFR members. Our current membership, in fact, does a lot of things. If some of us teach at colleges and universities, others work in K-12 settings or as independent scholars, and an increasing number of us do diplomatic history and forms of public history in government and the non-profit and business sectors. Our keynote speaker at the June conference, Timothy J. Naftali, exemplifies the diverse professional paths our members are taking. Tim has been a professor of history at the University of Hawai'i, an independent scholar with a variety of impressive books under his belt on the history of the Cold War and counterintelligence, the director of the Nixon Presidential Library, and most recently a research fellow at the New America Foundation. His keynote address will touch in part on his controversial tenure at the Nixon Library and promises to be a highpoint of the conference. Tim's presence at the conference is one indication of SHAFR's growing engagement beyond the academy, as is our effort to center the graduate student job boot camp on jobs both within and outside the academy.

Building Community. The undergraduates at Chicago, where I teach, are notorious for wearing t-shirts that proclaim "University of Chicago: Where Fun Comes to Die." At moments that same sentiment can also be felt at any academic conference as we nerdily (no name-calling intended; I see myself as a kind of über-nerd) go about our business. In truth, Chicago undergraduates do have some fun now and again, and this year's conference organizers

and I thought our membership should too. So for one night of the conference we have decided to give you an intellectual night off and invite you to join all of the SHAFR membership for a delicious farm-to-table dinner, lively conversation, and dancing at the Top of the Town in Arlington, Virginia, which has what the *Washington Post* calls a "spectacular wall to wall vista overlooking the monuments on the Mall and seemingly everything else in the Washington area." Check it out at <http://www.topofthetown.net/>. If the view of the Mall doesn't win you over, do keep in mind that many past presidents of SHAFR will be on hand shaking their groove things after dinner. And if chatting rather than dancing is more your style, that is OK too. What we really hope is that in sitting down for a meal together outside the conference venue we will help further deepen the bonds that draw us together as a community. I hope you will be able to join us for this event.

Beyond the annual conference, SHAFR is working in other ways to continue to strengthen our community and raise our profile in the wider world. SHAFR Council member Mary Dudziak, for instance, is overseeing a new committee that is building a more robust presence for the organization on the web. I also want to invite members to get in touch with me if they have specific initiatives to propose for the SHAFR Council to consider. You can most easily reach me at mbradley@uchicago.edu.

At home in the world. Hannah Arendt had the fate of the postwar world on her mind when she wrote about where the often difficult processes of understanding can take us. While her words speak to how we approach our individual and collective intellectual projects, they can also remind us of how much the vigorously diverse home of the SHAFR community matters for us as scholars and for our own well-being in the world.

Note:

1. Hannah Arendt, "Understanding Politics (The Difficulties of Understanding)" in *Essays in Understanding: 1930-1954*, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York, 1994), 307-8.



Call for Applications: Editor of *Diplomatic History*

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), an affiliate of the AHA, is issuing a Call for Proposals to edit its flagship publication, *Diplomatic History (DH)*. The term of appointment will begin in August 2014 and, as stipulated in SHAFR's by-laws, will extend for at least three but no more than five years.

Diplomatic History is the leading journal in the fields of U.S. foreign relations and international history. In 2011, full-text downloads of *DH* articles reached 160,000. SHAFR provides a substantial subvention to the editorial office doing the intellectual work of producing the journal. It has been the practice that the home institution of the editorial office also contributes financially and in kind to the production of the journal. From January 2013, the journal will be published by Oxford University Press. The current administrative setup includes an editor-in-chief, an executive editor, two associate editors (one for book reviews and one for communications), graduate student assistant editors, and a board of editors. While SHAFR's by-laws mandate a board of editors, they do not mandate the current division of labor. The editorial staff can but need not be located at a single institution.

Applicants submitting a proposal should, in no more than five pages:

1. Specify the major individuals who would be involved and describe the role of each person.
2. Specify the support, both financial and in-kind, that the host-institution guarantees it will provide to the Editorial office.
3. Assess the intellectual strength of *DH* as it now stands.
4. Offer a vision for the journal as it evolves. Where would you like to take *DH*?

The deadline for submission of proposals is **March 1, 2013**. The final decision will be made by the president of SHAFR with the approval of the society's council.

SHAFR's council established an advisory committee composed of Frank Costigliola (chair), Richard Immerman, Andrew Preston, Emily Rosenberg, and Naoko Shibusawa. Prospective applicants should feel free to consult with members of the committee. Applications should be submitted to frank.costigliola@uconn.edu.

The advisory committee expects to meet with finalists at the OAH annual meeting in April 2013 and make its recommendation to the president and to the council at the June 2013 SHAFR meeting.

Roundtable on Richard Nixon and the Vietnam War

*Robert J. McMahon, Michael J. Allen, David I. Goldman, David L. Anderson,
Jussi M. Hanhimäki, John M. Carland, and Jeffrey P. Kimball*

Roundtable Introduction

Robert J. McMahon

In 2010, four new volumes documenting United States policy during the final stages of the Vietnam War were published in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series. Covering the period from July 1970 to July 1975, those volumes have made more than 4,000 pages of mostly high-level documents available to the public and to the scholarly community, many for the first time. This quartet of *FRUS* volumes contains a wealth of newly declassified primary sources, material that should prove indispensable to all current and future historians of the Vietnam War. They form the basis for the present roundtable.

Scholars do not wait, of course, for the release of all, or even most, of the documentation pertaining to a particular foreign relations topic before writing about that topic. Indeed, clashing interpretations of the origins of the Cold War, based on mere fragmentary evidence, became well established long before the U.S. government had even begun the systematic declassification of records essential to that topic. Studies of the Vietnam War have mimicked that pattern. We were debating the relative merits of the conventional critique of American actions in Vietnam versus the revisionist challenge to that critique at a time when much of the relevant documentation still remained closed to scholars. The unauthorized release of the *Pentagon Papers*, in 1971, allowed for a stronger empirical foundation for early Vietnam War studies, to be sure, especially if compared to early accounts of the Cold War. But that was true only for the period, up to 1967, covered by the internal Defense Department study. Most of the core policy records of the Richard M. Nixon administration retained their security classifications for several decades after the president's resignation from office.

Nixon's Vietnam War policies, as a result, have been much less carefully studied by scholars than those pursued by his predecessors, Lyndon B. Johnson and John F. Kennedy. In addition to the comparative paucity—until fairly recently—of high-level governmental sources for the final phase of the Vietnam War, the relative inattention to the Nixon years was also influenced by the widespread conviction among specialists that the war's critical turning point—the Tet offensive of 1968—arrived a year before Nixon even entered the White House. Thus George C.

Herring's classic book, *America's Longest War* (first published in 1979), devoted the lion's share of its narrative to the period up through the 1968 election, treating the Nixon presidency as a kind of postscript. Yet, as Jeffrey Kimball's incisive historiographical essay makes clear, a significant—and highly contentious—historical literature on Nixon and the Vietnam War developed nonetheless.

The present roundtable consists of reviews by three leading Vietnam War scholars of three of the four *FRUS* volumes published in 2010. Their assessments are followed by responses from the volume editors—the too frequently overlooked scholars responsible for selecting and annotating the documents published in the official State Department volumes on the history of U.S. foreign relations. Kimball's informed survey of the key issues and questions that have divided scholars about Nixon's approach to the Vietnam

War provides a fitting context for this forum.

Reviewers of *FRUS* volumes accept an especially daunting assignment, as most readers of *Passport* probably understand—and as the present roundtable makes clear. Is one responsible for evaluating the merits of a work of documentary editing—a genre of scholarship quite distinct from that of interpretive history? Or is one, instead, obligated to account for the new information and fresh revelations contained in the volume under review, while commenting on possible lines of interpretation that might emerge from the mass of documentary material it houses? Following the former tack proves complicated by a fundamental conundrum: namely, no one can knowledgeably assess the strengths or shortcomings of an editor's selection

decisions unless they also possess a top-secret security clearance and have similar access to the universe of documents from which the selections were made. Reviewers can, on the other hand, comment on the apparatus of documentary editing: an editor's use of explanatory footnotes and editorial notes to lend cohesiveness to the collection; the identification of important documents that space precluded publishing; references to relevant sources in the public record, to other volumes in the *FRUS* series, and to the memoir literature; notifications to the reader about holes in the documentary record; and much more. Yet, curiously, *FRUS* reviewers rarely explore those avenues, thereby missing the opportunity to evaluate the volumes in this venerable series on their own terms. Most, rather, follow the second tack, choosing to concentrate on the various cables, memoranda, policy papers, and records

of meetings included in a particular volume.

This roundtable follows that pattern. The critics devote the bulk of their attention to the documents themselves, and particularly to their presumed significance to broader historiographical debates about the nature and efficacy of Nixon's Vietnam strategy. Some of the participants in this lively and illuminating forum imply—or even state outright—that a particular volume proves or disproves a certain interpretation. But such claims should be parsed with care. Documents alone cannot write history; only historians can. And it remains axiomatic that complex documentary volumes, compiled by skilled editors—as the ones under review here certainly have been—lend themselves not to unitary historical interpretations but to multiple, even contradictory, historical interpretations. Documents, as Jussi Hanhimäki wisely notes below, are merely our “raw materials.”

Review of David Goldman and Erin Mahan, eds., *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976*, vol. 7, *Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972*.

Michael J. Allen

With the 2010 release of four new volumes on U.S. policy in Indochina during the Nixon years—beginning with the July 1970–January 1972 volume reviewed here and continuing with two volumes on 1972 and a final volume on January 1973–July 1975—the editors of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series have completed their monumental chronicle of the American war in Vietnam. A documentary endeavor as colossal as the war they document, the eighteen *FRUS* volumes on “Vietnam”—the most recent of which include the war's spread into Paris, Cambodia, Laos, and Congress—bring together some 17,000 pages of source material and took more than a quarter century to produce. And while earlier volumes tended to enrich things already known or sensed from *The Pentagon Papers*, the latest releases break considerable new evidentiary ground and include previously undiscovered gems from the White House taping system, which began voice-activated operation in February 1971, generating a torrent of unguarded, often vicious talk unlike anything found in prior volumes.¹

In sifting through unopened and recently opened Nixon materials, *FRUS* editors have performed an invaluable service to scholars of the war's understudied late years. These materials will accelerate, enhance, challenge, and change the emergent literature on the war's dénouement.² That said, little in the July 1970–January 1972 volume, which begins at the end of the Cambodian invasion and ends on the eve of the Easter Offensive, will alter the prevailing view that the war entered a holding pattern in these months and that not much of great consequence occurred as all sides prepared for the climactic clashes they had planned for 1972. The action here occurs mainly on secondary fronts—the U.S.-orchestrated, South Vietnamese-executed Lam Son 719 invasion of Laos in February 1971 that dominates the book's first half and the secret Paris Peace Talks and triangular diplomacy that drives its second half—while the war's central front and ultimate prize, South Vietnam, lurks in the shadows for long stretches, relatively quiet but never quite stable.

One learns from this volume that such misdirection was precisely the point for the Nixon White House, which went to great lengths to get “Vietnam off the front pages” by making it “a small country” in an expanded field of great

power diplomacy (186, 246).³ Nixon as Oz, hiding his retreat from Vietnam behind great billowing clouds of bluster and bombs, is by now a familiar figure to historians.⁴ Still, even if we sense what Tricky Dick was up to behind his curtain of security classifications, executive privilege, and international intrigue, as we uncover the full extent of his schemes it becomes harder, not easier, to incorporate his diversions into our work—and to grasp their consequences for Americans and the world—without allowing our attention to be turned from the essential facts of American error, arrogance, and aggression in Indochina. To their credit, the editors of this volume have largely achieved such binocular acuity by keeping one eye fixed at all times on the man who best embodied those faults: Richard Nixon.

It is not news to say that Richard Nixon was an unrivaled practitioner of diplomatic deception and political skulduggery. Hunter S. Thompson eulogized him as a “man so crooked that he needed servants to help him screw his pants on,” while Nixon's neighbor, historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., called him “the greatest shit . . . ever elected President,” a man so corrupt that “no disclosure about his greed and knavery would ever be the last.”⁵ Each release of Nixon materials confirms this view. Yet this established fact remains problematic for those charged with creating the official history of Nixon's foreign policy, given their mandate that “the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy.”

can that goal be achieved when dealing with a president who was determined to conceal the defects in a defective policy? How should *FRUS* editors document Nixon's policymaking when words and deeds did not correspond? As Jonathan Schell put it in 1975, “What the Nixon men thought was unconnected to what they said. What they said was unconnected to what they did. What they did or said they were doing at one moment was unconnected to what they did or said they were doing the next moment. And when they were driven from office, they left behind them not one but several unconnected records of themselves.”⁶

Through the exacting recreation of Nixon's direct communications with his closest advisers and the painstaking juxtaposition of those secret utterances with his official positions, the editors of this volume do their best to respond to this challenge. While not the only course imaginable—unofficial and non-U.S. sources can be equally revealing—it is the only one open to official historians, and the editors demonstrate that it can be a highly effective means to pierce the false front of Nixon's diplomacy and perceive its darker, more twisted design. Paying less attention to the State Department, the Department of Defense, and the CIA than is typical for *FRUS*, the editors hone in on Nixon's conversations with his inner circle—National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and his deputy Alexander Haig, Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Thomas Moorer—as the sole source of reliable information in “a White House of lies.”⁷

Fortunately, there is no shortage of such communications. The White House tapes have long been the gift that keeps on giving, but rarely have they yielded greater bounty. The editors present many revelatory presidential conversations for the first time. To cite one instance that shows how brazen Nixon was in pursuit of schemes he never intended to bring peace, the editors have recreated a series of exchanges from April and May 1971 in

which Nixon ordered Kissinger to resume his secret talks with North Vietnam. He did so not because he believed in the “Mickey Mouse game of going over to Paris,” but because he feared that without “a cosmetic offer on POWs” the restive National League of POW/MIA Families would join tens of thousands of Vietnam Veterans Against the War then gathered in Washington to protest the war, and that together they would persuade Congress to cut off funds for the war (197). Even having emphasized Nixon’s vulnerability on the POW/MIA issue in my recent book, I was surprised to see how quickly and solicitously he reacted to restive POW families in early 1971 and how directly they shaped his diplomacy that spring.⁸ “If those POW wives start running around, coming on to this general election, and veterans, you’re in real—we are in troubles like you wouldn’t—,” Nixon agonized. “I know this Congress. On that issue . . . they’d desert us . . . so goddamned fast it’d make your head spin” (191).

Yet genuine as such fears were, and however immediate their impact on the Paris talks, they never led Nixon to waver in his determination to end the war on his terms according to his timetable. Lest Kissinger think otherwise, Nixon told him that “despite all the way we put the cosmetics on, Henry . . . our policy is, is to win the war.” As in recent work by Larry Berman and Lien Hang-Nguyen, diplomacy is here revealed as a means to that end, not a path to peace. “Understand: I’m just looking for a gimmick,” he continued. “The purpose is, is not to get them to accept the offer—we hope to Christ they don’t; we know they won’t—but that the purpose is to make an offer that . . . makes them look absolutely intransigent, see?” “I know,” Kissinger affirmed, suggesting that he offer Hanoi a fixed U.S. withdrawal date in return for the immediate release of American POWs and that he follow this hollow offer with an empty threat: “Now, look, this President is extremely tough” and “if you don’t accept this, he will stop at nothing.” “That’s right,” Nixon thrilled. “And imply that you might do it. . . . Use nuclear weapons,” Kissinger said. He was quick to add that “if they, then, charge us with it, I’ll deny it.” “Oh, sure,” Nixon shrugged (190).

Historians who read such exchanges will undoubtedly wish that they had such verbatim transcripts of all presidencies—too bad we don’t have Nixon to kick around anymore. But we can learn a lot from the Nixon tapes while they last, starting with the South Vietnamese invasion of Laos launched on February 8, 1971, immediately before the taping system came on line. The first taped conversation transcribed for this volume occurred on February 18 between Nixon and Kissinger and, like most, it is a doozy. Topics range from diplomacy (we learn that the POW deal Kissinger offered in May was one he had intended to make only after the October 1971 South Vietnamese elections)—to domestic politics (“If this country is radicalized, it will not be from the Left. The Left will start it, but the Right will take it over,” Kissinger prophesied)—to the place of the Laos invasion in Nixon’s grand strategy (“the main thing I’m interested in is just to be sure the South Vietnamese fight well,” Nixon remarked, “because our South Vietnam” was “going to be battling in there for years to come”) (131).

Historians have long held that the Laos invasion was meant to prove the viability of Vietnamization. But the evidence here shows more clearly and concretely than ever before that Laos was the opening act in a war that, by late 1970, Nixon planned to continue through the 1972 elections and beyond. Nixon’s disappointment over Hanoi’s rejection of his October 7, 1970 offer of a ceasefire in place, and its failure to bring GOP victories in the 1970 elections, reaffirmed his belief that his antagonists were only pretending to seek peace in order to “carry on the war without being bombed,” as he told South Vietnam’s Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky in late November (76). Determined to give as good as he got, Nixon decided to

“give the NVN a bang,” ordering air strikes in support of a dramatic but unsuccessful raid on a North Vietnamese prison camp and telling Haig that he wanted “some plans” to take the fight to the enemy (96, 78).

Haig’s challenge was how to realize this directive when Nixon had already withdrawn 200,000 American troops from South Vietnam and announced plans to withdraw another 60,000 by May; when the Cooper-Church Amendment had rendered Cambodia and Laos off-limits to a U.S. ground invasion; when Cambodia had already been invaded, bombed, and largely destroyed; and when North Vietnam remained off-limits to U.S. bombing thanks to the Paris Peace Talks. Through a process of elimination, Haig determined that Laos was the only target left and that South Vietnam possessed the only army capable of invading it, though any invasion would require U.S. air support. Within weeks he had drawn up plans for the Lam Son 719 assault on “the vital NVA/VC logistic nerve center” in southern Laos and was in Saigon selling the plan to President Nguyen Van Thieu (89). Meanwhile, Nixon resolved to fight on for at least two more years to keep trouble from “mounting in ‘72 that we won’t be able to deal with and which we’ll have to answer for at the elections.”⁹ If Thieu went along he might also secure his own future by making it impossible for the communists to wage an offensive before the South Vietnamese elections in October 1971. And so “these little fellows,” as Army Chief of Staff William Westmoreland called the South Vietnamese, were again sent to die to reelect the men who decreed their deaths in order that those men could send still more Vietnamese to their deaths in the years to come (178).

As they superintended the Laos invasion, Nixon and his men ran through the usual emotions that accompanied all U.S. offensives in Indochina, from boastful assurances that American military might would finally “break the back of the enemy,” to mid-operational doubts about whether anything had “been achieved,” to fevered admonitions that this campaign was “the last chance,” to “mystification and confusion” at their lack of success, to final, pained recognition that the failed plan “cost us very, very seriously” (96, 142, 147, 156, 188). In its essentials Lam Son 719 echoed earlier failures like the 1963 Ap Bac debacle that prompted the Americanization of the war in the first place. South Vietnamese commanders urged forward by Americans on the scene while under countermanning orders from Saigon to avoid casualties traipsed “about in circles in areas where we know there are neither enemy forces nor caches” to let “the enemy get out of the way,” as Kissinger complained (164).¹⁰ As always, the South’s failure was “not so much a matter of hardware and equipment, but of political structure and national will” (259).

Yet the inability to solve Saigon’s political problems through military force was a lesson that U.S. presidents refused to learn. And despite or perhaps because of the long litany of similar failures in the past, the Laos failure did little to alter the war’s course. Nixon stuck to his plans, announcing in April the withdrawal of another 100,000 U.S. troops by year’s end and sending Kissinger back to Paris in May, albeit with a weaker hand. Such steps were “necessary in view of the mixed results of the Lamson [*sic*] 719 operation and its unexpected conclusion which has placed the President under increasing political pressure,” Kissinger confessed. But Nixon had always envisioned a fighting withdrawal that would culminate after the 1972 elections; Laos only hastened his intermediary moves (170). On the war’s other side, North Vietnam’s Politburo remained determined to topple Thieu through the Paris talks, the October elections, or offensive military operations it planned for 1972, which it now contemplated with new confidence.¹¹

While new documentation concerning the Laos invasion help clarify its place in Nixon’s long-term plans,

the operation was too short-lived and insubstantial for those revelations to alter dramatically our understanding of larger war. Foreign relations historians are likely to find revelations from the volume's latter half, especially those that concern Nixon's doubts about triangular diplomacy, to be of greater interest and importance. Dismissing as "gobbledygook" Kissinger's claims that "the Chinese thing and the Russian—particularly the Chinese thing" would bring concessions in Paris, Nixon told Haig, "They aren't going to talk. Why the hell should they?" "They've got us by the balls," he admitted to Kissinger. "Let's forget the Russian thing and the rest. . . . The game is where it is. All that matters here is Vietnam" (197, 200).

For Nixon, talk, whether to the Soviets, the Chinese, the Vietnamese, the Congress, or even the American people, was just war by another name—"it's talk, talk, fight, fight. It's the old trick"—which is why he engaged in it but never believed it would bring peace. "The Chinese and all the Russians simply won't talk to the North Vietnamese," he insisted to the very end of 1971 (281). It was a skepticism that Kissinger, his chief negotiator, must have tired of hearing, coming as it did not just from his boss but from his Vietnamese interlocutors, who chided him about administration tactics. "The last few years you have been trying to go here and there to seek a way out" but managed only to "make the problem more complicated for yourself, because you don't get the results you expect. There's no magical way to settle the problems of Vietnam outside of serious negotiations here in Paris" (236).

Ultimately, the problems of Vietnam would be settled in Vietnam—nowhere else, not even Paris—and in November the secret talks broke down. The immediate cause was Nguyen Van Thieu's strong-arm tactics in the October election, which made it difficult for competing candidates to get their names on the ballot. The only opponent who managed to do so, communist-backed Duong Van "Big" Minh, quit the race after he supplied proof to the United States that Thieu had directed subordinates "to do whatever is necessary to arrange the election in Thieu's favor." Even for his supporters, Thieu's actions "completely undermine[d] President Nixon's policy of support to Vietnam" by invalidating its "fundamental premise": that the South Vietnamese must be allowed to choose their own leadership (250). And most reasonable people, including Nixon's State Department, considered the crisis "a God-sent opportunity to get rid of" Thieu, thus removing the only remaining impediment to a negotiated peace (248). Communist officials invited that course of action when they pushed Duong Van Minh to quit, hoping it would then be easier for Nixon to dump Thieu than stand by him as he proceeded with a farcical one-man referendum (259, 267).¹²

But Nixon had no intention of abandoning Thieu. "Never, never . . . I hope never . . . Never. Never, never, never," he fulminated when Kissinger told him that some wanted to "turn on Thieu" (248). That Thieu was the one man standing in the way of peace was precisely what Nixon liked best about him; that the State Department didn't recognize that fact is precisely why it had little policy influence. Thieu's continuation was essential to the war's continuation; his survival was intrinsic to South Vietnam's survival as an instrument of U.S. policy (100). Both sides knew this, which is why the communists insisted on Thieu's ouster as doggedly as Nixon refused it and why Thieu's fate was the major sticking point throughout their negotiations. But Nixon preferred to couch his support for Thieu in terms of self-determination, and he could not abide being forced to admit the reality of his policy, which was now so plainly revealed to be at odds with his professed

democratic principles. Thus, after North Vietnamese delegate Xuan Thuy scoffed that he "really did not expect that after the election . . . Mr. Special Advisor Kissinger would still affirm that the United States wants fair elections in South Vietnam" when the facts clearly proved that it sought "to maintain the Nguyen Van Thieu Administration in power in order to implement neocolonialism in South Vietnam," Kissinger declared, "I believe we have reached the end of these discussions" (254). The two sides would not meet again until the following July, after the communists launched the Easter Offensive and after Nixon resumed bombing North Vietnam.

Nixon not only predicted this outcome, he welcomed it. He had long considered diplomacy an unwelcome restraint. "We've got to bang 'em somehow, Henry," he insisted. But with Kissinger's incessant talks, "there's never a good time" (201). "The idea that we will wait and have them screw around in those meetings in Paris again" was virtually intolerable to him. "We have to have a record, sir," Kissinger's loyal lieutenant Haig objected. "You have to have a record of proposing a fixed withdrawal date, and it being turned down." "Sure," Nixon answered. "That record will be made, and then we'll go" (197).

Such exchanges suggest that Nixon's purpose in Paris, as in Beijing and Moscow, was not to negotiate peace but to create the false impression of having made the attempt, which he could then use to justify renewed violence when the talks inevitably failed. And that is precisely the path he followed when the talks collapsed in November, first disclosing the secret channel in a nationally televised address and then ordering renewed air strikes on North Vietnam. Although those events are barely touched on in this volume, Nixon predicted them throughout. When the talks broke off, Nixon seemed vindicated and relieved, telling Kissinger the "talks have been nothing but nothing, believe me," as he indulged in fantasies of the coming carnage (280). "The day after that election—win, lose, or draw—we will bomb the bejeezus out of them," he vowed in a sinister preview of the Christmas bombings. "And, incidentally, I wouldn't worry about a little slop over, and knock off a few villages and hamlets and the rest . . . I'd finish off the goddamn place. Bomb Haiphong. You know, the whole thing. I would put a crippling blow on it. Go on for sixty days of bombing. Just knock the shit out of them." "And then, everybody would say, 'Oh, horrible, horrible, horrible.' [laughs] That's all right. You agree or not?" he asked his chief diplomat. "Absolutely. Absolutely!" Kissinger answered (278).

Such a barbarous policy, later executed according to plan, should disprove the baseless claim popularized by Lewis Sorley's bestseller that America's last years in Vietnam represented a "better war," characterized by counterinsurgency, that was virtually "won . . . in late 1970."¹³ At times Nixon dreamed it was so, as when he told Kissinger, "Listen, Henry, Cambodia won the war" (46). But throughout this volume we see these two architects of U.S. policy confronting the same intractable problems in Vietnam that confounded their predecessors, "just one jump ahead of the sheriff the whole time" (259). Faced with mounting challenges and diminished resources, Nixon responded not with restraint in the use of force, a hallmark of both counterinsurgency and détente, but with "air," as in air power, though Nixon typically omits the second word of that phrase. The word "air" appears almost four hundred times in this volume; Nixon utters it like a prayer, calling on aerial bombardment with mounting frequency and desperation as his other weapons disappeared. "Once we are below 100,000 troops we have no combat effectiveness

For Nixon, talk, whether to the Soviets, the Chinese, the Vietnamese, the Congress, or even the American people, was just war by another name—"it's talk, talk, fight, fight. It's the old trick"—which is why he engaged in it but never believed it would bring peace.

left," Kissinger told Nixon in one characteristic passage. "None," Nixon agreed, before adding, "Well, the air" (157).

One can't help but note the double meaning of the word "air" here and elsewhere, as when Nixon asks Moorer during the Laos invasion, "What are we doing? Just punishing them with air?" and is told "Yes, sir" (140). In these pages filled with transcripts of literal verbal talk, it is as if Nixon waged war with air, with words, with talks rather than with men at arms. This volume proves that Nixon's air war was indeed punishing—of the 13,650 communists killed in Lam Son 719, 4,400 were KBA or "killed by air," and 180 American pilots and helicopter crew members died in the effort (182). But it also impresses on us just how much of Nixon's war was waged with empty words and hot air deployed to no clear purpose save to continue the killing.

In one of the last conversations reprinted here, Haig told Nixon that "we're using massive air but that's not going to solve everything." Encountering this assessment on page 1014, most historians will likely agree. None of their massive air made "this miserable war," as Nixon called it, any better. After reading this volume, historians will likely also endorse Nixon's assessment of the peace talks: "What the Christ has happened at the talks? Nothing" (281). Neither Nixon's bombs nor Kissinger's talks brought Americans or Vietnamese closer to peace. But that does not mean that the record this volume provides is unimportant. To the contrary, its value is the proof it offers that nothing was precisely Nixon's plan: he intended for nothing to happen between July 1970 and January 1972, nothing except more war. All the air he expended in this conversation-filled and bomb-saturated text was devoted to that end.

Notes:

1. *FRUS* volumes have included taped presidential phone calls in the past, but the 1971–73 volumes are the first to feature voice-activated recordings of all calls and conversations from the Oval Office, the Cabinet Room, Nixon's hideaway office in the Old Executive Office Building, the Lincoln Sitting Room, and Aspen Lodge at Camp David.
2. Michael J. Allen, *Until the Last Man Comes Home: POWs, MIAs, and the Unending Vietnam War* (Chapel Hill, 2009); Larry Berman, *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam* (New York, 2001); Jeffrey Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War* (Lawrence, KS, 1998); Edwin Martini, *Invisible Enemies: The American War on Vietnam, 1975–2000* (Amherst, 2007); Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, *Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam* (Chapel Hill, 2012); Stephen P. Randolph, *Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Easter Offensive* (Cambridge, MA, 2007).
3. As is *FRUS* custom, parenthetical citations refer to document numbers, not page numbers.
4. Robert Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (New York, 2007), 210.
5. Hunter S. Thompson, "He Was a Crook," *Rolling Stone*, 16 June 1994, 42; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Journals, 1952–2000* (New York, 2007), 382.
6. Jonathan Schell, *The Time of Illusion* (New York, 1976), 6, 52.
7. Richard Reeves, *President Nixon: Alone in the White House* (New York, 2001), 15.
8. Allen, *Until the Last Man Comes Home*, chap. 1, esp. 40–56.
9. H.R. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House* (New York, 1994), 224.
10. Neil Sheehan, *Bright Shining Lie* (New York, 1989), 201–66.
11. Nguyen, *Hanoi's War*, 211–13, 231–34.
12. Robert Brigham, *Guerilla Diplomacy: The NLF's Foreign Relations and the Vietnam War* (Ithaca, 1999), 97–100.
13. Lewis Sorley, *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam* (New York, 1999), 215.

Response to Michael J. Allen's review of *Foreign Relation of the United States, 1969–1976*, vol. VII, *Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972*, eds. David I. Goldman and Erin Mahan

David I. Goldman

Shrouded in the shadows cast by two towering and well-studied events in the Vietnam War—the May 1970 U.S. Cambodian Operation and the April 1972 North Vietnamese Easter Offensive—the period covered by the volume under discussion here, July 1970 to January 1972, has remained in relative scholarly obscurity. In the opinion of the historical editors of the volume, however, these seventeen months were quite significant and deserve greater illumination. During this period, the Nixon administration tested the bounds of covert actions against North Vietnamese supply lines in Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam and decided to provide military support to the fragile governments in Cambodia and Laos. It also tried a number of new diplomatic initiatives, elevated the pace of troop withdrawals, and committed itself more fully to Vietnamization.

Erin Mahan and I are therefore grateful to Andrew Johns for organizing this roundtable and to Michael J. Allen for his assessment of and insightful comments on this *FRUS* volume. Allen is a noted scholar of the Vietnam War and the author of an important history of the U.S. prisoner-of-war/missing-in-action movement. With that in mind, we can only take pleasure in reading that he believes our work "has performed an invaluable service to scholars of the war's understudied late years" and that it will "accelerate, enhance, challenge, and change the emergent literature on the war's denouement."

Time, technological complications, and career trajectories have dictated that my response must be relatively brief. (*n.b.* Erin Mahan has opted not to write one.) I will offer general impressions of the review and my recollections of what I consider some of the more noteworthy aspects of the volume. I will also provide some context on how it was produced that may prove of interest to the readers of *Passport* and the *FRUS* volume.

Neither my co-editor nor I was a specialist on the Vietnam War when we began our work on the volume, and we both focused on different areas after leaving the State Department. We worked on the volume sequentially. I completed the collection, selection, and annotation of the bulk of the textual material between 2002 and 2004. I also identified about twenty Nixon tape excerpts from over two hundred possibly relevant conversations to have digitally copied and enhanced and transcribed. At the time, the office was developing a system in cooperation with the National Archives to have this work done, but the kinks were not fully worked out of the process and I did not get the digital copies before I left to work at the Center of Military History in spring 2005.

After my departure from State, and before her own in 2007, Mahan, as the supervisory editor, completed the historical editing of the volume and added valuable material from the diaries of Admiral Thomas J. Moorer, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1970 to 1974. Because of security access restrictions, I was not privy to what transpired with the volume after I left State, but as I understand it, a number of people in the office edited the tape transcripts, and John Carland drafted much of the prefatory material. As with all *FRUS* volumes, the manuscript underwent a long production and declassification phase before it was released in 2009. The volume was thus truly a collective effort, and I thank all those who were involved.

In his review, Allen indicated a particular interest in the tape transcripts, commenting that they are the "gift that keeps on giving." I certainly agree that the tapes represent

an important addition to the historic record. They provide a critical window into the motivations of the key actors, which is particularly important in the case of President Nixon. For an administration that produced reams of textual material, there is surprisingly little in the textual record that reveals the deeper beliefs and motivations of its leader. Apart from about half a box of Nixon's outgoing memoranda (in which he focused on public relations and *ad hominem* attacks on those he perceived as his enemies, particularly the press, and often eerily referred to himself in the third person), his brief marginalia on reports and other documents, and the notes that Kissinger had prepared on his conversations with the president, I found very little in the record outside of the tapes that reflected the core Nixon.¹

As seductive as the tapes are, however, I would caution that the transcripts should be read in conjunction with the textual record. Many of the key players in the Nixon administration have noted that the president tended to say provocative things in private conversations and that his staff members knew not to act on some of his more outlandish musings. For example, one only need look at the White House deliberations over Kissinger's secret meetings with the North Vietnamese during the period covered in the book. While Nixon may have been less enthusiastic about the negotiations than Kissinger and groused about them often in the taped conversations, the paper record shows that the president approved Kissinger's trips to Paris to meet his interlocutors and endorsed the negotiating positions he took. In his essay in this issue of *Passport*, John Carland recounts that Kissinger told him at the September 2010 Department of State conference on the release of the Nixon volumes that the office had focused too much on the tapes in our volumes. I had almost the same conversation with Kissinger at the end of that event. Although his concern may have been self-serving, because the tapes sometimes show him in a poor light, to some degree, he had a point: the tapes are interesting for the context they provide and some of the historical lacunae they fill, but they are best used to augment the paper record and cannot supplant it.

Along with the tape transcripts, I believe the other documents in this volume offer some important additions to the historical record. They do not offer many completely new revelations. Because of publication delays caused by personnel problems in the office,² difficulties in working with the Nixon tapes, and the slow pace of declassification review, many of the stories covered in these pages have already been told in memoirs, interviews, investigative news reports, and earlier document releases. However, the documents do add important new historical layers and official substantiation for certain events. In addition, they provide leads for further research by scholars. Although I was not involved in the final editorial and declassification decisions and I worked on the publication a number of years ago, I recall that page constraints precluded the inclusion of many important documents. I can, therefore, assure scholars that many important stories on the period remain to be told.

As for what I see as some of the volume's highlights, Cambodia and Laos loom large. In spite of the administration's initial belief that U.S. operations in Cambodia in May 1970 had been somewhat successful, the volume shows that the situation in both countries quickly deteriorated, prompting the president and his advisors to shore up their non-Communist governments with military

aid and covert assistance. This aid included support to special guerilla units from Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos, and cooperation with allies in the region, including the Thai government.

In the middle of the deliberations over Cambodia in the autumn of 1970, the CIA issued a report revising earlier estimates of the role that the port of Sihanoukville in that country had played in North Vietnamese efforts to smuggle arms and supplies to its allies in Cambodia and South Vietnam. The revisions showed that the port had been a critical conduit for the Communists until it was closed down earlier that year. The volume provides documents on this intelligence and on how the revelations led the Nixon administration to push for significant personnel changes at the agency. In addition, the records indicate that in the administration's estimation North Vietnam would be increasingly reliant on its overland supply routes through Laos (referred to collectively as the Ho Chi Minh Trail) with the closure of Sihanoukville.

To some degree the new information on Sihanoukville also helped persuade the administration to focus on interdicting the overland supply lines. One of the major undertakings to this end was LAM SON 719, a joint U.S.–South Vietnamese cross-border operation into Cambodia and southern Laos to cut the trail in early 1971. In this operation the South Vietnamese provided most of the ground forces, while the United States contributed substantial air and logistical support. In addition to interdiction, the administration hoped that the operation would demonstrate the progress that it had made in Vietnamization, the U.S. program to arm and train South Vietnamese forces to gradually assume most of the war effort. The volume covers the decision-making behind this operation in some detail and shows the ugly aftermath in the Nixon White House when it ultimately failed.

Interneccine court battles and intrigue were rife in the Nixon administration and are reflected in the material in the volume. Along with their scandalous quality, these personality conflicts often blended with policymaking and affected the course of the war. One instance of personal conflict becoming entangled with policymaking involved troop withdrawal rates. While President Nixon had committed himself in April 1970 to reduce troop numbers in Vietnam by 150,000 within about a year, the volume provides some documentation on heated battles within the administration over the pace of the withdrawals. Kissinger and Haig, in particular, believed that Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird had "painted the President into a corner" by structuring the fiscal year 1971 defense budget in a way that accelerated withdrawals faster than the administration or the military deemed prudent. In the end, however, the White House felt it had little ability to counter Laird's fiscal construct, so it ultimately decided take advantage of the *fait accompli* to score some public affairs points. The volume also illustrates how the White House used backchannel messages, particularly correspondence between Kissinger and the U.S. ambassador in Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, to exclude certain senior cabinet members from military and diplomatic developments.

While the president and his defense secretary may have taken different sides on the rate of troop withdrawals, the volume also shows that they came together on other issues. One example was a joint Army–Air Force raid on a North Vietnamese prison camp known as Son Tay outside

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of Hanoi on November 20, 1970. The volume includes some interesting documentation on the administration's decision to approve the mission and a series of air strikes in conjunction with it. It also shows that Laird and the commander of the operation had seen CIA intelligence on the day of the operation indicating that the prisoners may have been moved from the facility but decided to go ahead with the operation anyway. Ultimately, the joint force found no prisoners at the facility, but because it was able to enter and leave the compound without losing a man, many in the administration, including the president, painted the operation as a success.

Along with military efforts, the volume also documents in detail the Nixon administration's diplomatic push during the period, including the president's proposal on October 7, 1970, for a ceasefire in place and the resumption of Kissinger's secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese in Paris in September 1970. I included as much of the text of these important and lengthy discussions as possible within the confines of one volume, as well as the most significant high-level deliberative material behind them. I also tried to provide extended coverage of the administration's decision in January 1972 to disclose the record of talks in conjunction with another diplomatic push. Also noteworthy is the material in the volume on U.S. covert support to political groups in South Vietnam, the administration's rocky relationship with the South Vietnamese president, Nguyen Van Thieu, and its unsuccessful efforts to ensure that Thieu held a fair and competitive election in October 1971.

I would like to thank Andrew Johns again for organizing this roundtable and Michael Allen for his astute analysis. I hope that this volume and their efforts will help bring this important period in the history of U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia out of the shadows and entice scholars to explore what up until now has been relatively uncharted terrain.

Notes:

1. The collection of memos from Nixon was in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 341, Subject Files.

2. On the personnel problems see http://www.newyorker.com/talk/2009/01/12/090112ta_talk_vogt; <http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2009/02/tweed-wars-revisited.htm>; http://www.fas.org/blog/secret/2008/12/crisis_in_frus.html; <http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/124568.pdf>.

"Peace with Honor and All That Jazz": A Review of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Vol. 9, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973*

David L. Anderson

The Paris Peace Accords of January 1973 have been the focus of much scholarly attention and controversy. John M. Carland and the editorial team at the U.S. Department of State's Office of the Historian have assembled an immensely valuable compendium of Nixon administration documents on this pivotal subject. The volume opens with a memorandum of conversation of the nine-hour session that took place on October 8, 1972, in a Paris suburb—the session in which Le Duc Tho and Henry Kissinger began the process of crafting the document that, with few changes, the warring parties signed in a grand ballroom in Paris on January 27, 1973. The negotiators styled the final document the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. In their final footnote to these 1,184 pages, however, the FRUS editors offer this contemporary observation from Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker: "I am afraid we must anticipate that heavy fighting will continue tomorrow after the cease-fire has been declared" (1184n2). Why this agreement was signed when it was, what it represented, and why it was immediately

obvious that it did not mean an end to the war are the questions that this volume addresses and that historians continue to debate.

The editors provide an excellent selection of documents that tell the story of the multiple conflicts within the negotiating process. In addition to showing the differences between Washington's positions on issues and those of Hanoi and Saigon, the records also reveal tensions between Richard Nixon and Kissinger (what Nixon aide Robert Haldeman called the "K problem") and show Al Haig mediating between the two men. There were tensions, too, between the White House and the Pentagon, Congress, and the press (495–99, 678). The editors make effective use of the Nixon tapes, many transcribed specifically for this volume, to show that Nixon and Kissinger were intensely frustrated by and personally disliked Vietnamese from both the South and the North—Kissinger especially. He referred to Vietnamese as "nuts," "insane," "bastards," and worse. There are glimpses of the Soviet and Chinese roles and a few CIA intelligence estimates on both Vietnams. Judicious editorial notes confirm or contrast elements of these documents with accounts from memoirs.

The general narrative of negotiation of the peace accords has been available from news accounts, memoirs, the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration, personal papers, oral history interviews, and some Vietnamese records. Based on these sources, a rich literature on the negotiations exists by a number of distinguished historians, including Jeffrey Kimball, Larry Berman, Pierre Asselin, Jussi Hanhimäki, and Lien-Hang T. Nguyen.¹ Scholarly debate has been, at times, spirited.² Four basic interpretations of the negotiations and accords have emerged from these studies. The first, advanced by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in their memoirs, is the "stab in the back" argument that their diplomacy was effective but that first Hanoi failed to adhere to the agreements and then Congress refused to help Saigon in the face of Hanoi's perfidy. The second, the "decent interval" argument, is advanced by Kimball and supported by Hanhimäki. They examine Nixon and Kissinger's domestic and international need to preserve their credibility as leaders and argue that Washington knew Saigon would not survive. The White House's goal was for the United States to leave with the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) intact and able to survive long enough to limit U.S. liability for the final fall. Berman makes a third argument for "permanent war"; in his view, Nixon and Kissinger sought the accords to respond to domestic pressure to end the war but secretly planned to reapply force in support of Saigon when Hanoi inevitably broke the agreement. Finally, Asselin and Nguyen look at the war from an international perspective, recognizing the agency of the governments in Hanoi and Saigon as well as Moscow and Beijing in explaining the final peace process.³

Because of these various accounts, there are few real surprises in the narrative that emerge from this *FRUS* volume, but the documents make it clear that the United States was negotiating its withdrawal with both Hanoi and Saigon. To achieve the October agreement, the United States made concessions. It did not require Hanoi to recognize the Saigon government as long as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) accepted political talks with the RVN, and it agreed to allow northern troops to remain in the South with a cease-fire in place. RVN President Nguyen Van Thieu understood that these terms imperiled his regime, but he also saw clearly that he had to accept them to keep any hope of current and future U.S. support alive. Hanoi had diplomatic leverage mainly because of its staying power. It had endured all that the United States had thrown at it since President John Kennedy increased American military intervention in Vietnam in 1961. Conversely, Saigon had not responded well to the northern-sponsored insurrection. The

United States could always have expended more resources (bombing, troops, money, lives, and global political capital), but it had reached a limit on what it would pay to keep Saigon viable. As Nixon told Haig on December 12, "There comes a time when it must end" (602). Hanoi and Saigon both recognized the American position. The talks from October to January put these long-term trends into sharp focus.

In the end, the United States was the nation with choices, as it had been from the beginning. Hanoi had adopted a heroic strategy, claiming that it would never accept an externally imposed American neocolonial structure in Vietnam. Its rhetoric was always extreme. There was a limit to how much death and destruction the DRV could endure, but the comrades in Hanoi were willing to push that limit far beyond the level to which Washington was prepared to go. As CIA analyst George Carver wrote, "It is most unlikely that there are any 'doves' in the Politburo or any 'peace faction' therein in the sense of persons questing for peace as an intrinsic end in itself" (340). The Saigon leadership was not so heroic. RVN leaders from Ngo Dinh Diem to Thieu resisted the DRV out of an instinct for self-preservation. They knew that the political and economic investment they and their narrow base of political adherents had made in partnering with the United States would mark them for death in a Vietnam ruled by the Vietnam Workers Party, as the Communist Party labeled itself. As Kissinger put it, Thieu and his aides were "having great difficulty with cutting the American umbilical cord" (215).

On the other hand, the United States had inserted itself into the conflict for reasons that had little to do with Vietnam: it was in a global chess match with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC); Southeast Asia was economically important to America's commercial friends in Japan and Europe; and most especially, it had created a domestic political formula that made toughness on communism an asset at election time. The choice to stop the American war in Vietnam had long been there for U.S. presidents. Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon all made conscious decisions to continue. In the end Washington stopped the war for the same reason most wars are stopped: the initial reasons for going to war lost urgency.⁴ The global chess game had changed with efforts at détente with Moscow and Beijing, the global economy had become more diversified, and the domestic political environment made stopping more popular than continuing (owing in part to two groups that Nixon abhorred—the antiwar movement and congressional critics of the war).

These documents show that, by the fall of 1972, the scene was set. The United States had decided to stop, and the DRV and RVN would go on struggling alone. The two Vietnams (perhaps Bernard Fall's description of two competing internal visions of a post-colonial Vietnam still held) had no choice.⁵ It was the political heirs of Ho Chi Minh, not the political heirs of John Kennedy, who were prepared to pay any price and bear any burden in defense of their own liberty (not necessarily liberty in the abstract but in terms of their own reality). The regime in Saigon had lost years before. There were, of course, RVN patriots, but there were not enough of them. By late 1972, the RVN leadership was defeated.⁶

For Washington, the end game was crucial because the United States was not a defeated nation. It could walk away, dust itself off, lick its self-imposed wounds, and still have

the largest economy, strongest military, and most desirable popular culture in the world. Its allies saw the United States coming to its senses after its self-created credibility dilemma.⁷ Nixon and Kissinger were moving on to new relations with the PRC and USSR and turning to new challenges in the Middle East and Latin America.

Nixon and Kissinger had underestimated Thieu's resistance, however. They thought that the RVN got a lot from the October agreement and would accept it (196–97). What they did not understand was that Thieu felt he did not get enough. Although Nixon made many secret assurances to Thieu to get his cooperation, those messages were complex and their meaning unclear. He told Thieu on November 14, for example, that he would "take swift and severe retaliatory action" if Hanoi failed to abide by the agreement (397).

The administration also underestimated the American people's desire to be done with Vietnam once and for all. Nixon thought that removal of the U.S. troops would make the war a "non-issue" with the public and that "the average person doesn't give a damn" (674–75). It was not that simple.

Nixon and Kissinger really believed that they would have a workable agreement with Hanoi if Congress went along. However, the White House never had any trust in Congress. As the White House tapes show, Nixon and his inner circle saw Congress (along with the press, "the professors," and even the Pentagon) as the enemy (351–53). Nixon kept his letters to Thieu a closely guarded secret because he wanted to keep Congress in the dark (767). He never consulted any congressmen (and thus had no reason to blame Congress later for losing the war). The details of the agreement were unknown to Congress until the document was initialed on January 23. It then became clear that Nixon had promised support to both Thieu

and Le Duc Tho that was not his to promise. Without telling Congress in advance, he offered Hanoi reconstruction funds to sweeten the deal. Kissinger thought that the DRV's leaders were "panting" for aid and that the offer of funds would encourage them to sign (125).

It is Kimball's argument that Nixon's intention to put the blame on Congress, if all went wrong, was consistent with the decent interval thesis (491–92).⁸ Nixon and Kissinger had, however, convinced themselves that the RVN was strong enough and the peace agreement was good enough to be successful. Nixon knew that "peace with honor and all that jazz" was only rhetoric (1051). At the same time, he claimed that "South Vietnam has the strongest army in Asia" and that it would someday be like South Korea (697). Since Nixon and Kissinger did not consult congressional leaders about these future commitments, they had no basis for their later claims that Congress lost the war.

When Hanoi stiffened its terms in November and December, after Nixon chose not to proceed in October without Thieu, the White House decided that bombing was the only leverage it had against Hanoi (53, 531–34). Right before the Christmas bombing of the Hanoi-Haiphong complex began, Kissinger reflected that "the one thing that's eroded them most seriously is the bombing" (578; also 705). Kissinger's aide John Negroponte asserted that the bombing was unnecessary because, in reality, "we are bombing them to force them to accept our concessions" (vi). Asselin charges that this comment is American-centric and suggests that U.S. officials saw themselves as controlling the pace and direction of negotiations without appreciation for the impact of Saigon and Hanoi on the process.¹⁰ That

These documents alone do not tip the historiography toward any one school. Kimball and Berman may give Nixon and Kissinger too much credit for control over the negotiations and hence too much responsibility. Asselin and Nguyen are correct to give agency to the Vietnamese, and Nixon was putting too much hope into Moscow and Beijing influencing Hanoi. The Vietnamese on both sides ultimately set the parameters of possible options, as they had from the beginning of the war.

criticism is a bit extreme. Negroponte was making a wry comment about the inability of the United States to get what it wanted when it wanted it.

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A candid description of U.S. policy in December 1972 is found in a taped conversation between Nixon and Haig. Nixon said that Thieu’s “interests are total, unconditional surrender of the enemy. Ours are an honorable withdrawal . . . giving them an opportunity, over a period of time, to win politically.” Haig noted that Thieu was not going to get a total surrender because “he hasn’t earned it. He hasn’t won it on the battlefield.” Nixon responded: “But he can’t either can he? Well, he could win, maybe, if we continue to bomb the shit out of them forever . . . for three or four years.” “We just won’t do it,” Haig asserted. Nixon then concluded: “Russia and China cannot allow North Vietnam to lose; we cannot allow South Vietnam to lose. That’s where this war is at the present time. . . . Under those circumstances, so you make peace. . . . It’s as cold as that” (583–84).

Notes:

1. Jeffrey Kimball, *Nixon’s Vietnam War* (Lawrence, KS, 1998); Jeffrey Kimball, *The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy* (Lawrence, KS, 2004); Larry Berman, *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Betrayal in Vietnam* (New York, 2001); Pierre Asselin, *A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement* (Chapel Hill, 2002); Jussi Hanhimäki, *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York, 2004); Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, “Cold War Contradictions: Toward an International History of the Second Indochina War, 1969–1973,” in *Making Sense of the Vietnam Wars: Local, National, and Transnational Perspectives*, Mark Philip Bradley and Marilyn B. Young, eds. (New York, 2008), 219–49; and Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, *Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam* (Chapel Hill, 2012).
2. See, for example, Jeffrey Kimball, “Decent Interval or Not? The Paris Agreement and the End of the Vietnam War,” *Passport: The Newsletter of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations* 34 (December 2003): 26–31; and Larry Berman, “A Final Word on the Decent Interval Strategy,” *ibid.*, 32–33.
3. See Nguyen, “Cold War Contradictions,” 222–26; and Hanhimäki, *Flawed Architect*, 230, 258. Kimball, *Nixon’s Vietnam War*, 369, characterizes Nixon’s interpretation as part of “his mystique of personal achievement.”
4. Jeffrey Kimball, “How Wars End: The Vietnam War,” *Peace and Change* 20 (April 1995): 83–202.
5. Bernard B. Fall, *The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis*, rev. ed. (New York, 1964).
6. Bui Diem with David Chanoff, *In the Jaws of History* (Boston, 1987), 306–8.
7. Eugenie M. Blang, *Allies at Odds: America, Europe, and Vietnam, 1961–1968* (Lanham, MD, 2011), 189–91.
8. Kimball, *Vietnam War Files*, 28; Kimball, *Nixon’s Vietnam War*, 368–71.
9. Asselin, *Bitter Peace*, 178.

Review of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VIII, Vietnam, January–October 1972. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010

Jussi M. Hanhimäki

October 12, 1972, was, Richard Nixon’s Chief of Staff Robert Haldeman wrote in his diaries, “a super-historic night.”¹ Earlier that evening National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger and his deputy, Alexander Haig, had returned from a three-day negotiation marathon in Paris. Arriving at the president’s hideaway office in the Executive Office Building adjacent to the White House, Kissinger was full of bravado. He had finally ironed out an acceptable agreement. With Haldeman, Haig and Nixon listening intently, Kissinger explained that the treaty he had concluded was far better than anyone could have expected. Most important, it guaranteed a cease-fire-in-place by the end of October. The withdrawal of U.S. troops and the return of American POWs would take place within sixty days after the ceasefire. In short, America’s longest war would be over by the end of the year.

It was not to be. The October agreements fell victim to the many problems embedded in Kissinger and Nixon’s Vietnam policy. In late October South Vietnamese President Nguyen Thieu soundly rejected what Kissinger had to offer; to him, the part of the agreements allowing North Vietnamese troops—more than 100,000 of them—to remain in South Vietnam amounted to political suicide. Meanwhile Nixon, virtually assured of victory in the November 1972 presidential election, became worried about being accused of playing domestic politics at the cost of the South Vietnamese. Thus, after he was reelected by an overwhelming margin, he sent Kissinger back to Paris for three additional series of negotiations with Le Duc Tho. Those negotiations eventually resulted in the signing of the January 1973 Paris Peace Agreement. Sandwiched in between the second and third series of negotiations were the infamous Christmas bombings; in late December 1972 American B-52s pounded North Vietnam for two weeks. Then, in January 1973, Nixon virtually had to blackmail Thieu into accepting an agreement that, for all intents and purposes, was a replica of the one concluded in October. In the end there was no “peace with honor”; the agreement resulted in a temporary truce that allowed the United States to withdraw its remaining troops from South Vietnam and retrieve its prisoners of war from Hanoi.

This well-known story is amply documented in the volume of *FRUS* under review. Like all similar tomes, this one is a product of painstaking research and editorial selection. Its main sources are the Nixon Presidential Materials Project and, in particular, the various files of the National Security Council. The editors have also included selections from the Nixon tapes, particularly telephone conversations and the president’s meetings with his key advisors. Additional documentation has been scoured from Henry Kissinger’s papers at the Library of Congress, the appropriate State and Defense Department files, and the CIA. To this has been added a smattering of insights from various published sources, most notably *The Haldeman Diaries*.

The end result is a treasure trove of documentation on American policy towards Vietnam in the first ten months of 1972. Throughout the volume major military developments that shaped policy in this period—the North Vietnamese Spring offensive that began in late March 1972 and the U.S.–South Vietnamese response to it—intertwine with the tortuous diplomatic negotiations that ultimately produced the (initially) ill-fated October agreements. The volume provides, indeed, an immensely helpful if necessarily incomplete tool for anyone trying to understand this critical

period in the Nixon administration's Vietnam policy.

Organized chronologically, the documents are divided into four major sections. The first and briefest part includes documents from the period preceding the North Vietnamese Spring Offensive. Discussions among Nixon, Kissinger, Haig and others are interspersed with military analysis about North Vietnamese movements and speculation about the possibility of a negotiated settlement. A sense of growing frustration is evident throughout, captured in a memo from February 15, 1972 by John D. Negroponte of the NSC staff to Kissinger. "After over three years of Paris Talks, Hanoi's fundamental objectives have remained unchanged," Negroponte wrote, predicting no change in the North Vietnamese attitude "before 1973" (102).

While Americans had expected a North Vietnamese assault in the spring of 1972, the scale of the so-called Easter Offensive that began in late March caught the Nixon administration by surprise. Documents in the second section of the volume provide the tools for reconstructing the initial anger and confusion that top members of the Nixon administration felt as they scrambled for information about—as well as an effective response to—the initially successful North Vietnamese crossing of the demilitarized zone into the south. The relative success of the assault in April prompted the cessation of public peace talks in Paris and gave rise to plans for a major bombing and mining campaign against North Vietnam. At the same time, Kissinger's secret talks with Hanoi's representatives continued. Indeed, one of the more interesting documents in this part of the book consists of Kissinger's meeting with Le Duc Tho (his chief North Vietnamese counterpart) in Paris on May 2, 1972. Perhaps predictably, Tho rejected all American proposals. In the days that followed, the groundwork for the massive bombing and mining campaign—of Hanoi and Haiphong harbor—were laid out. "We must do something drastic," Kissinger maintained in a lengthy conversation with Nixon on May 5. Yet he raised concerns about the possibility that the Soviets, North Vietnam's chief supporters, would react by cancelling the Moscow summit, a centerpiece of the administration's détente policy.

In the end, the bombing and mining went ahead, the Soviets did not cancel the summit and Nixon claimed that his actions showed true leadership. But the lengthy discussions—including an inconclusive National Security Council Meeting of May 8, 1972—that are documented in this volume are evidence of the complex nature of decision-making even in what is generally considered one of the most centralized foreign policy machineries among recent U.S. administrations. Evident in the documentation are also a number of unsavory items that illustrate the pervasive distrust between the civilian and military branches of the government, the personal disdain for certain high officials in the administration—"we're not going to ask him," Nixon said at one point with regard to Secretary of State William Rogers (407)—and the low opinion Americans had of their South Vietnamese allies.

The third part of the document selection is devoted to a two-month period following the start of the bombing-mining campaign and the resumption of the Paris negotiations in July. The fourth and last section traces the process that led to the October agreements in Paris. Together, these two parts consist of roughly 600 pages of documents—memos, telephone conversations, briefings, analyses—that provide a good basis for understanding how the use of military power was seen in Washington as key to the final negotiated outcome. They give anyone wishing to study the ups and downs of the Nixon administration's efforts to extricate the United States from Vietnam valuable raw material.

Overall, the document selection in this *FRUS* volume is impressive. The mix of one-on-one telephone conversations,

formal meetings, military situation reports, and diplomatic dispatches gives the reader a good sense of the intensity of the era and the pressure on decision makers to come up with solutions to match their always imperfect knowledge of the facts on the ground. The inclusion of several memcons of the Washington Special Actions Group—an interdepartmental committee chaired by Kissinger—also gives a glimpse of the ways in which the national security advisor, with Nixon's blessing, was able to control the agenda (and guide meetings to "correct" decisions). Naturally, the fact that these are purely American documents leaves the reader wondering about the reactions and decision-making policies elsewhere (most importantly in Hanoi and Saigon, but also in Beijing and Moscow). As we do not have similar document collections for the many "other sides," the story is likely to remain unbalanced in this regard.²

There are a number of things that are missing from this volume but provided in other tomes—a relatively obvious shortcoming common to all document collections. For example, the preparation for and discussions during the Beijing and Moscow summits of 1972 obviously overlapped with the ups and downs of the Vietnam War. Anyone wishing to get a more complete picture of the relationship between these two "triumphs" of Nixon's détente and the crucible of the Vietnam War is well advised to consult the appropriate *FRUS* volumes.³

The materials here do offer hints about a few other intriguing issues. Two related ones warrant specific attention, as they have a certain timeless quality. The first is the limited amount of detail that the ultimate decision makers can actually absorb. On the pages of this volume, for example, it is evident that President Nixon, despite his obsession with the war and the many sleepless nights it undoubtedly caused him, had very little interest in or understanding of Vietnam. What he did have an interest in was the lessons of history and their applicability. For instance, on April 4, as the Easter Offensive was fully under way, Nixon ruminated to Kissinger about British military strategy in World War I, concluding, in typical Nixonian prose, "The hell with the ground! We're trying to win the war" (196–97). On the same day, Nixon pondered Napoleon's victories and defeats and then announced, with a detour to sporting metaphors, that "basically it's like football. Strategy never changes with football... you give ground in the middle of the field, hold the line at the goal line, and then score a touchdown" (205).

Nixon's lack of interest in or knowledge of the specifics of Vietnam is, of course, understandable. His workload was immense, and he was juggling many things at once. Of course, his workload hardly justifies Nixon's obvious disregard for the concerns of America's South Vietnamese allies (the lack of consultation with Saigon about strategy is evident throughout). His predilection for ignoring the Vietnamese may also be emblematic of a more general American tendency to avoid consulting other nations. Consider the manner in which the United States has treated the countries that it has in recent years been "defending" (Iraq, for some reason, comes to mind).

Equally understandable—and hinted at numerous documents in this volume—is Nixon's obsession with his re-election. This stage of the Vietnam War was, of course, closely intertwined with the presidential campaign, leading up to election day in early November 1972. Nixon triumphed easily (indeed, he scored a political touchdown). But some readers may find the many references to domestic politics throughout the documents disturbing indications of the Nixon administration's priorities. In early August, for example, Nixon and Kissinger spoke about the relationship between the presidential election and the ongoing peace talks in Paris. Nixon was aware that he could not break off the talks prior to the elections, yet he was intent on tricking Hanoi. As he put it, "Frankly, I'd like to trick them. I'd like

to do it in a way that we make a settlement, and then screw them in the implementation, to be quite candid.... promise something, and then, right after the election, say Thieu wouldn't do it.... November 7th, and these sons-of-bitches have strung us along, then we just continue to step it up." Kissinger, equally candid, maintained that "the question is, now: how can we maneuver it so that we can have a process, so that it can look like a settlement by election day, but the process is still open.... If we can get that done, then we can screw them (the North Vietnamese) after Election Day." The discussion then moved to the ultimate point. "I think this could finish the destruction of McGovern," Kissinger opined. "Oh yes. And it does.... We've got to win big," agreed Nixon (785–788). Such ruminations naturally raise questions about the extent to which domestic political considerations were driving diplomacy and the use of force in Vietnam.

All in all, this document volume is an extremely useful tool for researchers. It does not, on its own, give answers to all the puzzles of the ten months that preceded the October 1972 agreements negotiated between Kissinger and Tho, the two men who, in 1973, would be named as co-recipients of the Nobel Peace Prize. Many other factors that influenced the final extrication of American forces from Vietnam—relations with the USSR and the PRC, domestic politics and so on—must be examined with the help of other evidence. But it is clear that no historian planning to write the story of the Nixon administration's Vietnam policy can do so without this painstakingly compiled collection of documents. It will be a crucial tool for researchers for a very long time to come.

Notes:

1. H.R.. Haldeman, *The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House* (New York, 1994), 517.
2. Happily, there is a plethora of books that deal with non-American decision making regarding the Vietnam War. See the sources cited in Frederik Logevall, "The Indochina Wars and the Cold War, 1945–1975," in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Volume II: Crises and Détente* (Cambridge, 2010), 281–304.
3. Specifically, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976*, volumes XIV, XV and XVII.

Foreign Relations of the United States and Vietnam, January 1972 to January 1973

John M. Carland

I want to thank *Passport* editor Andrew Johns for organizing this roundtable. Even more, I want to thank Professors Jussi M. Hanhimäki and David L. Anderson for their willingness to engage in the roundtable process and to provide serious commentary about the two documentary histories I compiled and edited for the Office of the Historian at the Department of State.

Before responding to their comments—Hanhimäki's on the Easter Offensive volume² and Anderson's on the Paris Peace Accords volume³—I want to discuss two related topics to place the volumes in context: the origin of the volumes and how the volumes developed from research plan to finished products.

When I arrived at the Office of the Historian in late 2002, I had spent the previous seventeen years at the United States Army Center of Military History (CMH) researching and writing operational history of the Vietnam War. Because of this background the Historian's Office at

State wanted me to prepare two documentary histories of United States Vietnam War policy. Together the volumes would cover the period from January 1972 to January 1973, and they would be published in the *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* series. This was a plum assignment—I was to document the history of American policy when important and exciting things actually happened, things that consequently led the United States, via the Paris Peace Accords, to disengage/withdraw from the Vietnam War. I was pleased as punch. As the song goes, "Nice work if you can get it."

Already generally familiar with the Nixon administration's Vietnam War from my years at CMH, I thought the first thing to do was to read the memoir literature—primarily but not exclusively Richard M. Nixon's *RN*, Henry A. Kissinger's *White House Years* and his partly duplicative *Ending the Vietnam War*, and Alexander M. Haig's *Inner Circles*. Although memoir literature can be one-sided, it seemed (and still seems) the best way to discover and to understand the issues and actions that decision makers and policy makers believed important. After all, what they thought was important is arguably the critical criterion for *FRUS* document selection. Why? Simply because it is the policy maker's perception of reality, and not a perhaps more objective and accurate rendering of reality (drawn by a historian), that determines the course of decision making and action taking, which is, in the end, what a *FRUS* volume documents.

Out of this understanding, I concluded that while research had to be, as it is in all *FRUS* volumes, multi-archival and multi-agency, the major focus would be on the Nixon Papers and, within that large collection, on the National Security Files. Other collections—in the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, at the Library of Congress, and in other locations—would not be ignored, of course, but Nixon's National Security Files would be front and center.

After further reflection, I also decided that the period had a central theme, a single critical path, and that was the path of disengagement and withdrawal from the Vietnam War. That path would appropriately be seen as a single drama in two acts, and the documentary history of each act would become a *FRUS* volume. The first act was the Easter Offensive story, which began in January 1972 and ended on the eve of critical negotiations in Paris between Kissinger and Hanoi's chief negotiator, Le Duc Tho, in early October. The second act was the story of the agreement negotiated by Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, the agreement's collapse between late October and mid-December, the subsequent Christmas bombing of North Vietnam by the United States, and the final agreement, the Paris Peace Accords, in January 1973. With the preceding in mind, research would focus on military, diplomatic, and political material that addressed the process of disengagement and withdrawal.

From these considerations a plan to research in the archives and agencies mentioned previously and in additional ones as necessary emerged. Research for the Easter Offensive volume would come first, but when opportunity permitted during that process I would copy material that might be helpful in the Paris Peace Accords volume. (That said, it was still the case that the bulk of research for the second volume would take place after the first one was completed.) I also drew up a rough chapter outline that was flexible and that might change with time (and would do the same later for the second volume).

Implementing the research plan proved easier for me than would be the case today. At the time the Nixon Papers

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resided still at College Park, Maryland. Therefore, getting to them involved little more than a twenty-seven-mile drive on the Capitol Beltway from Annandale in Northern Virginia to College Park several days a week for as long as was necessary (a stressful and challenging journey, to be sure, but not quite in the same league as flying to California, where the collection is now). Other agency/archival document sites were also in the region, and so in a short time I had amassed thousands of documents possibly relevant to the Easter Offensive volume. I repeated the drill a few years later when researching the second volume.

Having organized the movement and arrival of the documents to the Historian's Office, what was I to do with them? As all *FRUS* compilers do, I first arranged my research chronologically. Though this may seem too simple a first step, it is really the only way to effectively tease out the story, themes, and patterns that exist in the documents and to understand how they relate to one another. Once I had the documents "chronned," I read through them two or three times and set aside for additional reading those I thought I might include in the volume.

As I absorbed the material it became clear that while many elements were in play in the policy process, the key ones—the ones that drove Nixon's thinking, decisions, and actions, and Kissinger's and Haig's analyses, recommendations, and actions—revolved around Nixon's and his advisers' understanding of force and diplomacy and how the two related to one another in the specific context of Vietnam. Indeed, Nixon, to a degree his critics refuse to recognize fully, grasped a further fact: namely, that force and diplomacy, when they worked together, could achieve much more than would otherwise be the case.

Having arrived at this point, I decided that the guiding principle of selection in each volume was, as noted above, how a document advanced the story in terms of force and diplomacy and how each might relate to the other in driving the decisions and actions of the principals. I made this approach explicit as the theory of the volume in the preface to the Easter Offensive volume.⁴ It would also apply to the Paris Peace Accords volume. I should emphasize that this theory came from below, from the material gathered, and in no way was imposed from above.

With these thoughts in mind I began selecting and annotating documents. Working within limits set by the office chain of command, I brought together about 1,400 typescript pages of messages, memoranda, speeches, and transcripts to complete the Easter Offensive volume. Later, I selected the same sort of material for inclusion in the Paris Peace Accords volume but ended with more than the initial limit of 1,400 pages because of the addition of more transcripts of Nixon tapes.

As I completed each volume, my role as a principal in the process changed. In large measure those in the Historian's Office concerned with the declassification and editorial side of *FRUS* took over advancing the volumes to publication. However, I continued to participate in this process, especially regarding declassification problems—and here I use the proper word, "problems," and not the weasel word, "issues." As it turned out, a serious declassification conflict arose between our office and another agency regarding two documents in the Paris Peace Accords volume (the Easter Offensive volume was published in 2010 without controversy). The other agency wanted the Historian's Office to exclude the documents despite their previous declassification according to long established procedures. However, when push came to shove, I insisted that the two documents were integral to the policy story and had to be included. The Historian's Office and the other agency engaged in a bureaucratic battle for over a year. In 2010 the Paris Accords volume was published online with the two documents redacted. Ultimately, however, the Historian's Office prevailed (it

does not always). When the parties reached a resolution in 2011, the Historian's Office printed the hardcopy volume with the full text of the two documents, inserted the two documents into the online version, and retained a 2010 publication date for both.

Response to Jussi Hanhimäki's Comments

It is mother's milk to a *FRUS* compiler to read a reviewer's characterization of his selections as "a treasure trove of documentation on American policy towards Vietnam" and as "an immensely helpful" tool for understanding Nixon's Vietnam policy. It only adds to the pleasure to further read that "no historian planning to write the story of the Nixon administration's Vietnam policy can do so without this painstakingly compiled collection of documents." Jussi Hanhimäki, author of a sharp-edged and distinguished study of Kissinger as national security adviser and secretary of state, provides these words in his review of my Easter Offensive volume. He has also, and appropriately, qualified this praise by noting that the collection, is "necessarily incomplete," since no single volume could contain everything of importance on the subject. In this instance, for example, he directs readers to other *FRUS* volumes that deal with U.S. policy and the Soviet Union and China and also suggests that more Vietnamese documents would also have been helpful. On this last subject I could not agree more and bear witness to Hanoi's continuing unwillingness to open its critical archives—party and military—generally to researchers, even Vietnamese ones.

The above notwithstanding, Hanhimäki makes a number of points in his critique that are worth elaborating or commenting on or both:

1. *Domestic Politics and the Compilation.* He suggests that some readers might find it disturbing and, if I may extrapolate, even shocking that many documents in the compilation show Nixon connecting his re-election campaign to the peace talks in Paris and the fighting in Southeast Asia. Since presidents have done this in campaigns since the early days of the Republic it is hard to see why one should be disturbed or, for that matter, shocked. All presidents who are up for re-election make connections, often in a very public and not very subtle way, between their national security policies and their campaigns. Certainly the 2012 campaign is very much in this tradition. Thus, I am not certain one should make very much of this issue.

2. *Transcripts of Conversations.* Noting the variety of documentation available to the *FRUS* compiler, and indeed to all who mine the rich material the Nixon administration left behind, Hanhimäki quotes more than once from conversations between Nixon and Kissinger in the volume. The many conversations printed in the volume—not just between Nixon and Kissinger but between one or the other or both of these two and other senior players in the policy process—humanize the actors, making clear to readers that these documents, and the policies and decisions they record, did not originate from administrative automatons but from living, breathing, imperfect, and sometimes inadvertently amusing individuals. Thus I included in a telephone conversation Nixon had with Haig on 2 May 1972 Haig's response to the president's asking if he was in a meeting. Haig's reply? "No, sir. As a matter of fact I'm in the sauna bath." Nixon seemed unperturbed and simply said, "Oh, good. Good, good, good. Well, that's good. I hope you're fine. I was just going to check, is there anything new?" (396).⁵ Then a serious discussion ensued about operational matters in South Vietnam.

3. *Selecting Transcripts*. Due to space limitations I could not choose as many transcripts of conversations as I thought the subject matter of each volume warranted. Therefore, I selected the ones that to me best illuminated the policy process and sometimes even the moment of decision itself. I am not sure historians will ever be as blessed in sources as revealing as are the tapes of conversations from the Nixon Papers and the transcripts of telephone conversations of Kissinger and, to a lesser extent, of Haig. When used in conjunction with more traditional documentation (messages, memoranda, and the like) the transcripts become wonderful explanation multipliers. A good example, from the many possibilities in the volume, is the transcript from 4 October. President Nixon was at Camp David and Kissinger in Washington and the two were talking about, among other things, the upcoming negotiations in Paris. They discussed how to deal with Thieu if an agreement emerged from the talks and how to deal with him if one did not. "Supposing we don't get to an agreement we are in good shape as far as Thieu is concerned," Kissinger said. But, he continued, "If we do get to an agreement [and Thieu proves reluctant to accept it] I will just have to go out and—" at which point Nixon interjected, "And cram it down his throat." Kissinger continued the president's thought, saying: "And cram it down his throat and say this is it. And if he won't settle on this basis we will have to withdraw our support." Kissinger then followed through to a logical and important conclusion. "We can't," he said, "fight a war beyond a certain point" (1063).⁶

On the subject of the value of these transcripts, I might mention a brief conversation I had with Kissinger on the morning of 29 September 2010 before he delivered a major speech at the State Department on—what else?—the Vietnam War. In response to my question about the utility of the *FRUS* volumes for understanding Nixon's Vietnam policy, he responded that the volumes were well done but had "too many conversations." His handlers then whisked him away for his speech, leaving my follow-up questions unasked and unanswered. But the very fact that Kissinger questioned the value of the transcripts by saying there were too many of them confirmed for me, if I needed confirmation, the opposite view.

4. *The Scale of the Easter Offensive—a Surprise?* Hanhimäki believes that "the scale of the so-called Easter Offensive that began in late March caught the Nixon administration by surprise." I am not so sure this was the case. After all, the very first document in the volume, dated 20 January 1972, is from the theater commander informing Washington that a major offensive is on the way and that he needs additional authority and power to counter it. In response Nixon almost immediately began to consider and then order a substantial ramping up of air and naval power in the region.

Interestingly enough, Nixon's advisers recommended a reactive caution while the president insisted on doing more. Witness what Nixon said to Kissinger and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker on 3 February, almost two months before the enemy offensive began: "We will see that more planes are put in there [in Southeast Asia theater], and carriers." And then, noting that he had had to push senior military officers to agree to these actions, all of which were taken in anticipation of the coming enemy offensive, Nixon added, "Goddamnit, they should have asked for more planes and carriers. Henry, I don't understand the military" (77). The following day the president issued National Security

Decision Memorandum 149 (78–79), which ordered an additional carrier to join the three currently operating in Southeast Asia; it also directed more B-52s and fighter bomber squadrons to Southeast Asia and removed the restrictions on the number of sorties by the bombers and fighter bombers.

5. *Force and Diplomacy*. When he deployed those bombers, fighter-bombers, carriers, and other naval forces to the Southeast Asia theater, Nixon clearly expected the enemy to embark on a major offensive and clearly intended to meet that offensive with a powerful response. In this context, it is important to note that Nixon and Kissinger understood well that in a military conflict the facts on the ground dictate the nature of a settlement. In other words, they saw force as a means to make certain that the enemy could not win on the battlefield; they did not see the use of force as an end in itself. If the enemy could not win on the battlefield he would be compelled to return to the negotiating table for serious settlement talks—which is what happened. In short, Nixon used force to achieve his desired objective—a negotiated settlement; he used force to leverage diplomacy. On this topic, Professor Hanhimäki shrewdly observes that documents in the second half of the volume "provide a good basis for understanding how the use of military power was seen in Washington as a key to the final negotiated outcome."

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6. *Non-American Documentation*. "Naturally," Hanhimäki writes, "the fact that these are purely American documents leaves the reader wondering about the reactions and decision-making policies elsewhere (most importantly in Hanoi and Saigon, but also in Beijing and Moscow)." While this is true, I believe it should be read as a description of the enterprise and not a criticism of it. A *FRUS* volume, as its very title makes clear, is always about documenting the foreign relations of the United States. Nonetheless, in one critical instance I did use documentation from the memoir of a senior North Vietnamese official (1074–77).⁷ My purpose was to explain how the enemy reached critical decisions in August–September 1972 about the upcoming October negotiations in Paris. Simply put, on the recommendation of a special committee formed to report to the Hanoi Politburo about how to deal with the Americans, Hanoi decided to make short-term concessions to gain the key long-term goal: the U.S. departure from South Vietnam with no residual military force left in place. They no longer demanded the resignation of South Vietnamese President Thieu; a coalition government that included Communists did not have to replace Thieu's government; and the United States could continue to supply weapons and other assistance to South Vietnam.

While there are other points worth making regarding Professor Hanhimäki's review, I will stop before too much becomes way too much and move on to Professor Anderson's comments.

Response to David Anderson's Comments

We all know that the richness of the literature on the history of any event, period, or problem is directly related to the quality and quantity of available documentation. For decades editors of *FRUS* compilations have endeavored, through the privileged access they enjoy to government documents still classified or otherwise unavailable to non-official historians, to provide that quality directly and, by

becoming the means for others to pry open government collections, to provide the quantity indirectly. The verdict on how well or poorly we have accomplished these tasks, or at least the perception of how well or poorly we have done so, is found in reviews such as the one provided by Professor Anderson.⁸ It is a pleasing validation of my efforts to read that the material selected and printed represents “an immensely valuable compendium of Nixon administration documents on this pivotal subject [the Paris Peace Accords].”

However, as in the case of Hanhimäki’s comments, several of Anderson’s remarks deserve responses and/or elaborations.

Anderson, who is the author and editor of a number of respected books on the Vietnam War, is absolutely right to note that the documents underscore “multiple” and serious conflicts between and among the principals inside the negotiating process (broadly defined). He accurately enumerates the major ones the volume records—those within the Nixon White House and within the larger Nixon administration, as well as those between Washington and Saigon and between Washington and Hanoi, among others.

Within the Nixon White House the key relationship was of course that between President Nixon and his assistant for national security affairs, Henry Kissinger. That relationship suffered and soured substantially during this period, and that process effectively makes Anderson’s point about conflict. A multitude of problems and challenges contributed to this relationship becoming a troubled one, including stress from the negotiations in Paris, Vietnamization, the American troop drawdown, the anti-war movement, Congress, the press, the emerging Watergate crisis, and Nixon’s other major initiatives (détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China).

A compelling illustration of Nixon’s growing unhappiness with and concern about Kissinger can be seen in a 30 November 1972 conversation between Nixon and a sympathetic Alexander Haig, then Kissinger’s deputy. Referring to the heavy load Kissinger carried at the negotiations in Paris, where he dealt with difficult Communist adversaries, and in Saigon, where he dealt with an ally who on occasion was also a difficult adversary, Nixon said, “Henry cannot take the—this heat much longer. You know what I mean? He’s—you know what I mean? It’s been hard for him. But an emotional pattern here is—.” To this Haig replied, “It’s worse. Well, I, this past—well, he had three weeks where I thought he lost touch with reality. It started out in Paris, the first round in October.” Haig noted that Kissinger lost it again in Saigon later in the same month, when he met with South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu. He claimed that Kissinger “was sending two messages to the North Vietnamese, agreeing to the [unclear, but probably a reference to the agreement just negotiated in Paris with Le Duc Tho], knowing that Thieu was not on board, and it was going to take some careful working. That’s what caused our problem. Now, this week he started to regain himself. And I think he did a very fine job last week [in Paris]” (497–98; see also 497n6).⁹

In this context Anderson mentions the “mediating” role Haig played between Nixon and Kissinger. To be sure, he did play such a role, but in doing so he created an even more significant role for himself. As a result, one of the major subthemes in this volume is the rise of Haig. While it would be going too far to suggest he was a rival for Kissinger’s place in policymaking, Haig became in these months a much more important figure than he had been in the past. At this stage in the war, one can argue that Nixon found Haig more simpatico in policy and in person than he did Kissinger. His preference for Haig may have arisen because Haig tended to give him advice he wanted to hear—advice, I hasten to add, that Haig believed appropriate—regarding

Nixon’s consideration of the use and utility of force. Haig would leave the White House in January 1973 to become Army vice-chief of staff but remained intimately involved in Vietnam policy. In May he returned to the White House to take Haldeman’s place when Watergate forced Haldeman out.

One instance of Haig’s increased role in the administration occurred after Kissinger’s disastrous meeting with President Thieu in late October 1972, when Thieu rejected Kissinger’s just negotiated treaty. Haig took over as the Nixon administration’s point man with Thieu. In November and December of 1972 and again in January 1973, he traveled to Saigon to deliver personally Nixon’s messages to Thieu. These messages were increasingly tough ones.

In his mid-December trip Haig delivered a letter from Nixon to Thieu that included these serious words: “General Haig’s mission now represents my final effort to . . . convey my irrevocable intention to proceed, preferably with your cooperation but, if necessary, alone.” Nixon did hold out a carrot to Thieu when he told him that the bombing of North Vietnam about to get underway (Linebacker II) was “meant to convey to the enemy my determination to bring the conflict to a rapid end—as well as to show what I am prepared to do [on South Vietnam’s behalf] in case of violation of the agreement.” Nixon said, however, that Thieu should not misunderstand the bombing; it did not “signal a willingness or intent to continue U.S. military involvement if Hanoi meets the requirements for a settlement which I have set” (724–25).

Despite such messages, Thieu, playing a dangerous game, continued his quixotic quest for better terms. Haig, in his last trip to Saigon, in mid-January 1973, delivered a sterner message. In the starkest of terms, as he later reported to Kissinger, he told Thieu that “we could no longer indulge in theoretical arguments for we had, in fact, arrived at a point where a hard decision would have to be made in Saigon.” He drove his point home by telling Thieu that “without an agreement there would no longer be U.S. aid” (1010). Within a few days Thieu fell in line and agreed to sign the settlement document. While it is true that Thieu did so primarily to assure South Vietnam of the United States’ continued support, the way in which it happened, with a minimum of public fuss and damage to Nixon’s policy, had much to do with Haig’s ability to convey Nixon’s carrot and stick messages with conviction and clarity. Kissinger could not have brought Thieu to this point; Haig could and did.

As one would expect, extensive documentation in the volume deals with the negotiations in Paris. Kissinger, as Nixon’s operative/representative in these negotiations, gave, as the many memoranda of conversations that are printed in the volume demonstrate, a series of virtuoso performances. The conflict inherent in these negotiations took its toll on Kissinger. By late 1972, he seemed exhausted, frustrated, and short-tempered. For example, while conversing with Nixon about the North Vietnamese at the Paris talks on 7 November 1972 he said that “what we are seeing is their normal negotiating habit. They’re shits, if I can use a—I mean they are tawdry, miserable, filthy people. They make the Russians look good.” Not to be one-upped, Nixon added, “And the Russians make the Chinese look good” (648). No doubt Kissinger’s intemperate characterization came from the stressors mentioned earlier and reflected more than three years of wear and tear in hard and fruitless negotiating with the North Vietnamese. Nonetheless, he continued to pursue skillfully the president’s objectives and eventually succeeded in January, negotiating a draft treaty that in its essentials was remarkably similar to the one negotiated in October. This January document, we should realize, was the one that the Nixon administration “crammed” down Thieu’s throat.

In his review, Anderson mentions four basic

interpretations or theories of the negotiations and accords that have emerged from the scholarship and memoir literature. Within the context of the volume and its documents each is worth comment:

1. *The Stab-in-the-Back Theory*. Anderson notes that according to this theory, prominent in the memoirs of both Nixon and Kissinger, the administration's diplomacy in achieving a settlement was effective, but "Hanoi failed to adhere to the agreements and then Congress refused to help Saigon in the face of Hanoi's perfidy." Those on the other side of this theory still feel the need to push back against it and its proponents, as the following example demonstrates.

In an August 2010 meeting with Ambassador Richard Holbrooke about his place on the program of the State Department's conference the next month on America's Vietnam War, he told me in no uncertain terms, as only he could, that I had to change the conference's program. Why? Because I had scheduled him to speak before Kissinger. I replied that since he (Holbrooke) was keynote speaker he should logically speak first (after a short speech by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to open the conference).

No, Holbrooke replied, that wouldn't do. Why not, I asked? For the simple reason, he replied, that Kissinger's major aim in life was to protect his Vietnam War record and the Peace Accords and the only way he could do this was to blame Congress for the fact that the policy had failed and South Vietnam had fallen. If Kissinger said anything along these lines in his speech (which would, Holbrooke obviously believed, amount to a "stab-in-the-back" attack), he had to be positioned to respond. At the time I was primarily concerned, as conference organizer and coordinator, about a possible disaster: Holbrooke refusing to speak first and Kissinger refusing to let him speak second, and one or the other or both opting out of the conference in high dudgeon. But my fears came to naught when Kissinger graciously agreed to change places with Holbrooke on the program.

Although I believe to this day that it looked odd for the keynoter not to be the first speaker, Holbrooke's insistence on this rearrangement of the program could not have worked out better for the conference. Kissinger spoke first and eloquently defended the Nixon administration's policy on negotiations and the war, while Holbrooke, equally eloquent, followed and argued that Kissinger was wrong and that indeed America's entire participation in the war had been wrong, a colossal mistake. As it turned out, Kissinger did make a few mild comments about the role of Congress, but they were insufficiently accusatory to require Holbrooke to respond. Still, it was obvious that Ambassador Holbrooke wanted to keep his powder dry and his weapon ready to counter any attempt by Kissinger to blame Congress for the fall of Saigon.

Given the publication of such classic stab-in-the-back books as Mark Moyar's *Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965* (2006), Lewis Sorley's *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam* (2007), and George J. Veith's *Black April: The Fall of South Vietnam, 1973-75* (2012), and given this incident in 2010, the charge that the war was lost away from the battlefield by the bad behavior of leaders on the home front is still very much with us, despite there being little in archival collections and *FRUS* documents to support it.

2. *The Decent Interval Theory*. This theory, which has been intensely argued and kept alive by Jeffrey Kimball

and others, remains an argument for which the evidence used by proponents fails to support their interpretive rhetoric. Many who live their lives amidst the swirls and eddies of alternative histories will no doubt dispute this statement. However, without better evidence than the belief that Nixon and Kissinger were so cynical and devious that they must have developed and implemented it, which is enough for some, the decent interval theory is difficult if not impossible to sustain. The most convincing rebuttal to the theory, revolving around a typical set of claims about Nixon and Kissinger's supposed machinations, can be found in Pierre Asselin's 2006 review essay in *Diplomatic History* of Kimball's 2004 *The Vietnam War Files: Uncovering the Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy*, wherein Asselin concludes that Kimball's so-called "'original' conclusions [about the madman theory and the decent interval theory] consist of conjectures and extrapolations from evidence that is circumstantial at best. None of the book's alleged 'smoking guns' actually smoke."¹⁰

Those who do favor the theory tend to find support in documents from Nixon's and Kissinger's dealings with the Soviet Union and China (and thus in documents that tend

to appear in *FRUS* volumes). Such support has to prove, in Professor Anderson's words, that "the White House's goal was for the United States to leave with the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) intact and able to survive long enough to limit U.S. liability for the final fall." This goal would call for prior planning and purpose on the part of Nixon and Kissinger, for which proof, as most use the word, simply does not exist. (Such proof may exist, of course, but despite strenuous efforts by those seeking it, it has not been found.) It is not enough to state, as Kimball

does in the March 2003 issue of *Passport*, that "I maintain that sometime between 1970 and 1971 Nixon and Kissinger, out of necessity, had deliberately chosen to pursue a decent interval solution." There has to be more. Questions that have not been answered and backed by documents must be answered—with evidence. To wit: When did this decision "to pursue a decent interval solution" take place? What were the precise circumstances surrounding the decision? Were there pre-decisional meetings on this subject? Surely there had to be, so when did they occur? What was said by whom at these meetings? Where's the beef?¹¹

Scholars who argue that Kissinger—by telling Chinese and Soviet rulers that the United States had no intention of returning to Vietnam after a settlement had been reached and American forces had been withdrawn, and indeed was content to let historical forces work themselves out to create the future—somehow managed to convey, in Marxist-Leninist jargon, a long-in-place Nixon administration decent interval policy must have decoder rings the rest of us do not possess.

Meaning for historians must be dictated by documents and deeds interpreted through Occam's razor. We should assume that Kissinger meant what he said when he told Zhou Enlai on 10 July 1971 that "what we require is, a transition period between the military withdrawal and the political evolution. Not so that we can re-enter, but so that we can let the people of Vietnam and of other parts of Indochina determine their own fate."¹² We should assume that Kissinger meant what he said when he told Leonid Brezhnev on 21 April 1972 that "we have two principal objectives. One is to bring about an honorable withdrawal of all our forces [from Vietnam]; secondly, to put a time interval between our withdrawal and the political process which would then start. We are prepared to let the real

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balance of forces in Vietnam determine the future of Vietnam. We are not committed to a permanent political involvement there, and we always keep our word."¹³ And what did he say? Unambiguously, that the United States would depart Vietnam, would not return, and would leave the resolution of differences between the two Vietnams to the future.

3. *Berman's Permanent War Theory.* Larry Berman's permanent war theory, spelled out in his *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam*, tells us that Nixon and Kissinger, through the duplicitous negotiations and a duplicitous settlement in the Peace Accords, intended to create a subtle and nuanced new way to continue the war in Southeast Asia permanently. Despite the many logical and evidentiary obstacles to the theory, Berman has displayed great tenacity in advocating it. One can admire his doggedness while noting that the theory has received little traction in the historical community. He does capture in often melodramatic terms the ethical and moral slipperiness of practically all of the principals in this drama, but this very real achievement does not constitute proof of his thesis. The more probable and prosaic truth is that Nixon and Kissinger intended and promised that the United States would intervene only if North Vietnam egregiously violated the Peace Accords.

Irony finds its way into Berman's book in one area worth highlighting—the author's approach to documentation. He rails against Nixon and Kissinger because "they used many classified top-secret documents in writing their respective memoirs but later made sure that everyone else would have great difficulty accessing the same records."¹⁴ Yet he puts in place in his book a sourcing system so arcane, complex, and difficult to use that it becomes unlikely that any reader/scholar will make the effort to find the documents and then compare his or her interpretation of those documents with Berman's. This could not have been the intent of his eccentric system but it is certainly the result. One wishes he had used a traditional method—i.e., numbered footnotes, or even endnotes—to document his sources, as he did in his earlier books.

4. *Agency in Other Entities Theory.* This notion has been argued directly and indirectly over the past decade by scholars such as Pierre Asselin and Lien-Hang Nguyen. At its heart is the persuasive notion that principals other than the United States played important roles in the war—i.e., they had agency, the capacity to act and so influence the war and ancillary events. This is not a new idea: agency theory vis-à-vis the war has been around at least since Ralph Smith published between 1983 and 1990 three pioneering volumes in what was to be, before his premature death, a five-volume series called *An International History of the Vietnam War*.

FRUS volumes on Vietnam, mine and others, do not contradict agency theory despite the fact that such volumes, by definition, focus on United States policy. As a matter of fact, it would be hard to read the documents in this volume, in the Easter Offensive volume, and in other *FRUS* volumes, and not realize how much the actions of the United States in the Vietnam War were reactive to the actions of others (e.g., Thieu's resistance to and scuttling of the October settlement and North Vietnam's refusal to withdraw its troops from South Vietnam as part of a settlement).

Two more general points about Anderson's review. First, he properly notes what should be obvious but increasingly is not—that the Vietnam War was part of the Cold War (or Global Chess Game, as he terms it). To be sure, the Vietnam War was many things for many nations and entities—e.g., a civil war, an insurgency/counter insurgency conflict, a war between states, and a Great Power intervention—but it

was also a prominent part of the almost half-century-long Cold War, the most significant one in the second half of the twentieth century. If, as the Cold War recedes into history, the Vietnam War ceases to be seen in this context, the actions and motivations of Cold War principals in Vietnam will become more difficult to comprehend. Second, Anderson perceptively picks up on the substance and import of the last footnote in the volume (1184). The message quoted in the footnote not only gives added value to the document printed but also, and this is partly why I selected it, makes it clear that the fighting was far from over.

Conclusion

Nixon and Kissinger formed one of the most effective national security policy partnerships in American history. We all know that they were both quirky individuals whose approach to national security issues remains controversial, but they were also intelligent, rational, and able men who came into office with an agenda, Nixon's agenda. At the top of that agenda were three objectives. The first two, détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with Communist China, could not be achieved, or so Nixon believed, until a third objective, liquidating the Vietnam War, occurred. These were, to repeat, Nixon's objectives, and he brought Kissinger on board to see to their achievement.

I will conclude with a generalization that emerges from my research for these two volumes. The generalization is not new but rather an affirmation of something old, and though it should be obvious, it seems not always to be so these days. In the relationship that developed between the two of them, Nixon was in charge. We hear, mostly from those in the opposition, about Kissinger as the grey eminence behind Nixon. The charge is essentially that Kissinger played Svengali to Nixon's Trilby. Despite this being patently not so, it seems necessary to (re)assert the obvious: Nixon was in charge. He was the senior partner, the strategist, while Kissinger was the adviser (he certainly gave reams of strategic advice), theoretician, operative, and tactician.¹⁵ In this partnership the two worked in tandem to achieve—again, whether one approves or disapproves of what they did or how they did what they did—great things from 1969 to 1973.

Now on to the end. On 14 December 1972 Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig met in the Oval Office to discuss what to do since negotiations with the North Vietnamese in Paris had collapsed. One topic under discussion at the meeting was how to present to the press the decision to massively bomb North Vietnam to bring it back to the negotiating table. In the course of that discussion Nixon went on a rant about enemies that reads like free verse (title supplied by Carland):

The Enemy

by Richard M. Nixon

The press is the enemy.
The press is the enemy.
The establishment is the enemy.
The professors are the enemy.
Professors are the enemy.

Write that on the blackboard 100 times.
And never forget it.¹⁶

Happily, in their roundtable comments "the professors"—Jussi M. Hanhimäki and David L. Anderson—have definitely proved that they are not the enemy. On the contrary, they have delivered knowledgeable, judicious, cogent, and insightful observations about the documents selected and annotated in these two volumes. In doing so, they have brought clarity to the complex

task of understanding and explaining the formation and implementation of American policy for Vietnam in a critical period. Without a doubt, they have shown that they “get” documentary history and understand its utility to the historical community. For all of these things I am grateful.

Notes:

1. The views expressed in this essay are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.
2. More formally, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969-1976, VIII, Vietnam, January–October 1972* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010). It will be called the Easter Offensive volume throughout.
3. More formally, *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969-1976, IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2010). It will be called the Paris Peace Accords volume throughout.
4. “Documents in this volume,” I wrote, “examine the link between force and diplomacy in U.S. national security policy toward the Vietnam war. In the period the volume covers, force drove diplomacy. Only by recognizing this can the process by which America's Vietnam War policy was formulated and implemented be fully understood.” *FRUS, 1969-1976, VIII, Vietnam, January–October 1972*; pp. iv–v, quoted words on p. iv. In the Historian's Office at the time the director, by tradition, signed the preface, while the editor-compiler, in this case me, also by tradition, drafted it.
5. Pagination in parentheses in this section of the essay refers to a page or pages in the Easter Offensive volume.
6. As it turned out, Kissinger failed in October to “cram” down Thieu's throat the agreement he had negotiated in Paris. For the full story see the section in the Paris Peace Accords volume titled “Breakthrough in Paris Blocked in Saigon, October 8–23 1972,” 1–289.
7. I am grateful to Merle Pribbenow for this translation. Indeed, most of us who research and write about the history of the Vietnam War are in debt to him for translating and making available scores of histories, memoirs, and documents from the other side.
8. And of course by Professor Hanhimäki.
9. Pagination in parentheses in this section of the essay refers to a page or pages in the Paris Peace Accords volume.
10. Pierre Asselin, “Kimball's Vietnam War,” *Diplomatic History* 30 (January 2006): 163–67.
11. Certainly not in Kimball's *Nixon's Vietnam War* (Lawrence, KS, 1998). There are five references to the decent interval theory in the index and a careful parsing of text on each page the index sends a reader to elicits nothing in the way of serious support for the theory.
12. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, XVII, China, 1969-1972* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), 417; see also 965.
13. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006), 486.
14. Larry Berman, *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam* (New York, 2001), 9.
15. Jeffrey Kimball and I do agree on one thing: that in their relationship Nixon was the strategist and Kissinger the tactician (though on occasion the roles might blur a bit). See Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War*, 370.
16. The exchange in the transcript from which this “poem” comes can be found in the Peace Accords volume on page 678.

Vietnam War Nixonography

Jeffrey P. Kimball

Richard M. Nixon's entanglement in the Vietnam Wars began in 1953 during the French War, when he was vice president of the United States. It climaxed between 1969 and 1973 when, as president, he paradoxically escalated U.S. military operations and simultaneously withdrew U.S. armed forces from South Vietnam. Accounts of his role in and influence on the course of the war include homefront, battlefield, and diplomatic-front histories that variously emphasize subject matter ranging from White House decision making to the role of advisory, bureaucratic, congressional, diplomatic, military, international, and transnational actors and institutions. The latter two categories include the Vietnamese parties, the Soviets, the Chinese, allies on both sides, states bordering Vietnam, the antiwar resistance in the United States and Europe, the press, private citizen intermediaries, and religious and ethnic groups everywhere. In varying degrees, thematic emphases and methodological strategies incorporate a range of approaches: diplomatic, military, political, biographical, social, intellectual, economic, psychological, cultural, or a combination of these.¹ At least four archetypal interpretations originated during the wartime debate about the causes, conduct, and conclusion of the “Nixon phase” of the war: the Nixonian-Kissingerian defense of administration policies; the antiwar critique of the war and of Nixon administration policies; interpretations in the “middle,” which incorporate elements from the above two; and competing South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese/National Liberation Front accounts.

Nixon's influence upon the historiography of the war and its political and cultural legacy has been significant. In speeches and books, he portrayed himself as a discerning presidential leader who possessed a unified conception of global politics and challenged the bureaucracy's narrow-minded, ossified thinking and the public's naïve idealism.

Nixon's influence upon the historiography of the war and its political and cultural legacy has been significant. In speeches and books, he portrayed himself as a discerning presidential leader who possessed a unified conception of global politics and challenged the bureaucracy's narrow-minded, ossified thinking and the public's naïve idealism. Maintaining that he had developed a strategy for restoring relations with the People's Republic of China even before his election as president, he claimed credit for having initiated rapprochement, and he contended that his motives were noble as well as sensible: bringing China back into the family of nations, reopening trade, withdrawing from Vietnam, and creating an environment conducive to regional peace and stability. Characterizing his steps toward détente with the Soviet Union as both realistic and imaginative, he credited this policy with having contributed to his successes in advancing nuclear arms control, broadening trade, promoting European stability, and terminating U.S. participation in the Vietnam War.

Nixon also lauded the prudent practicality of his so-called Nixon Doctrine, the promising initiatives of his Mideast policies, and the righteous realism of linkage and triangular diplomacy in bringing an honorable conclusion to the American War in Vietnam on 27 January 1973 with the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam. Citing his self-styled masterful handling of this seemingly intractable conflict—which, he claimed, he had inherited from his Democratic predecessors—he maintained that he had snatched victory from the jaws of defeat, brought American soldiers home, rescued POWs, given the Saigon regime the ability to endure and survive, protected the rising capitalist tigers of the Pacific Rim from communism, and preserved American credibility. These

putative accomplishments—and especially his claims that he brought an end to the Vietnam War, reestablished relations with China, and reduced tensions with the Soviet Union—constituted the key pillars of what Nixon called his “structure of peace.” That the Vietnam War was ultimately lost was the fault, Nixon claimed, of Congress, the antiwar movement, the press, his political opponents’ exploitation of the Watergate affair, and ultimately the American people.²

The influence of Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon’s national security assistant and, later, secretary of state, has been comparably influential. As had Nixon, he put a positive spin on the major benchmarks of their joint foreign policy, but he gave himself more credit for having made crucial contributions to the creation of a new international order. He too singled out administration opponents for his severest criticism, but he grudgingly acknowledged the dark side of Nixon’s psyche as well as his excessive partisanship, and he noted that these inherent flaws of Nixon’s personality had detrimental consequences for his policies and presidency. Kissinger, however, portrayed himself as having been a restraining influence on Nixon and his hardline advisers in the White House.³ Even though both Nixon and Kissinger have provided considerable information in their memoirs and histories about their and others’ roles in the war, they have also taken steps to obscure and withhold information from the public.⁴

Although abundant archival releases since the early 1990s (mostly in the United States but also elsewhere) have made it possible for historians to distinguish between fact and fable on many key points of dispute in the historiography of the war, much remains contentious. This lingering interpretive disagreement has less to do with the supposed epistemological and metaphysical impossibility of discovering historical facts and verifiable theories and more to do with the nature of the questions asked, the quality of the debate about the use and interpretation of evidence, and gaps in the body of evidence available. These gaps stem not only from the absence of written or taped evidence about particular events but also from continuing agency resistance to the declassification of particular documentary sets and from the exclusion or omission of selected declassified tapes and documents from volumes in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series.⁵

My abbreviated survey of English-language historiography refrains from lumping articles, books, or authors into such vague, judgmental, political, and misleading historiographic categories as “pro-Nixon,” “anti-Nixon,” “balanced,” “traditionalist,” “revisionist,” or “internationalist.” It is organized instead under headings that describe some of the major historical issues, topics, questions, and problems concerning Nixon’s and Kissinger’s direction of the war and what, to my knowledge and understanding, recent evidence reveals about them. Some representative works are cited in the endnotes and others in the text. The word “historian” as used herein applies not only to academic historians but political scientists, independent scholars, journalists, presidential aides, diplomats, soldiers, and anyone else of whom I am aware or have space to mention who has written a serious work of history or a memoir that contains noteworthy information about and interpretations of Nixon, Kissinger, and the Nixon phase of the Vietnam War.

What was Nixon’s influence upon U.S. intervention in Indochina during his vice presidential tenure in the 1950s and his out-of-office “wilderness years” between 1963 and 1968?

During and after the French War, Nixon advocated and endorsed U.S. policies and escalations whose consequences he would inherit when president. Comparatively little has been written about Nixon’s influence during his pre-presidential years. Brief accounts can be found in memoirs and biographies and those other studies of the Vietnam War that cover Nixon’s Asia trip in the fall of 1953, the Vietminh siege of Dien Bien Phu (1953–54), the coming to power of Ngo Dien Diem (1954–55), the formation of SEATO (1954–55), and the politics of the Vietnam War in the United States during the 1950s and 1960s.⁶ Although Nixon’s proactive support of more forceful intervention during and after the First Indochina War was probably not decisive, he helped to create the conditions that led to a larger U.S. involvement and the quagmire of Vietnam. Presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson inherited an American war in Indochina from President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and Vice President Nixon before President Nixon, in turn, inherited a larger war from Kennedy and Johnson.

What was Nixon’s Vietnam-related political strategy in the 1968 presidential campaign?

Before 1968, Nixon was a “hawk” on the war, consistently and publicly advocating military escalation in Vietnam. Kicking off his run for the Republican nomination for the presidency in the New Hampshire primary in March 1968, however, he pivoted to a rhetorical position in the middle of the political spectrum with the slogan “peace with honor.” His call for peace through negotiations and U.S. troop withdrawals appealed to centrist “owls” and some liberal “doves.” But his qualification of a peace with *honor* translated into a negotiated settlement favoring U.S. support of the Saigon government, which appealed to hawkish voters in both political parties. Nixon’s conservative slogan of “law and order”—which complemented his “Southern strategy”—exploited widening political and cultural fissures in the body politic concerning race, civil rights, crime, urban “riots,” the “counterculture,” and antiwar protests.

Historians more or less agree on this record but differ about how to characterize Nixon’s personality, mentality, and behavior—not only in relation to domestic politics but also to foreign affairs. They variously portray him as astutely pragmatic, realistic, ruthlessly Machiavellian, inauthentically “hollow,” genuinely conservative (but not on the far right), liberal (on some domestic issues),⁷ and/or psychologically maladjusted.⁸ Kissinger has not escaped psycho-biographical scrutiny either.⁹

Psychological analyses raise the old issue of the role of the individual in history. My own view is that the workings of the mind of an individual occupying or serving in the office of the U.S. presidency are noteworthy because of the immense power of the office. They are even more significant when the individual’s personality is highly unusual, and Nixon’s personality seems to have fit into this category. His slant on things was sufficiently idiosyncratic to make a difference, adding an unpredictable, chaotic

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element to the standard American formulas for war and diplomacy. His faith in the virtues of struggle, force, military threats, and secret diplomacy, for example, encouraged him to believe, initially, that he could succeed in Vietnam despite the difficult complications of a conflict that others had recognized long before. His emotions and moods influenced the tactics he chose, such as the bombing of Cambodia, the invasions of Cambodia and Laos, and the bombing of Hanoi and mining of Haiphong. In the end, however, Nixon's fundamental policies, actions, successes, and failures were the product of large forces and broad contexts in U.S. culture and the international arena. He was not a *sui generis* actor; nor could he make history just as he pleased.¹⁰

Did Nixon interfere with Johnson's negotiating effort in 1968?

Nixon had been concerned as early as 1967 about a 1968 "October surprise" in the form of President Johnson taking steps toward peace in Vietnam, the timing of which would, he assumed, politically benefit his Democratic rival for the presidency, be it Johnson or someone else. Supported by ample archival evidence, the current historical consensus is that Nixon organized a clandestine operation in which his operatives communicated with South Vietnam's President Nguyen Van Thieu through Anna Chennault, a transnational actor and Republican notable, to encourage him to reject Johnson's peace effort in exchange for a better deal under a President Nixon. The conspiracy succeeded. A few hours after Johnson's 31 October announcement that he would halt the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam as a first step toward the opening of peace talks in Paris, Thieu publicly voiced his opposition, dashing voters' hopes for peace and halting Hubert Humphrey's rise in the polls. Johnson's motives in seeking negotiations seem to have been diplomatic rather than political, since he did little else to assist Humphrey's campaign; and although aware of Nixon's surreptitious activities, the president did nothing to expose them.¹¹

There has long been uncertainty about Kissinger's role in this international cabal, but recently released White House tapes appear to confirm his willing and knowing complicity in passing information to the Nixon camp about the trajectory of the behind-the-scenes talks in Paris that led to the bombing halt and an agreement to establish formal peace talks between the warring parties.¹² The principal unanswerable historical question has to do with the extent to which Thieu's announcement of opposition to the negotiation deal influenced the American electorate's vote in favor of Nixon on November 5.

Did Nixon or Kissinger make the most important contributions to the administration's foreign policies?

Many authors credit Kissinger as the architect, engineer, or maker of U.S. policy and diplomacy.¹³ Fewer describe Nixon in these ways.¹⁴ Some portray Nixon and Kissinger as uneasy partners in the conduct of foreign affairs¹⁵ but so intertwined as to deserve the moniker "Nixinger."¹⁶ Some also note a functional division of labor, in which Nixon was more the strategist and decider, while Kissinger was more the indispensable tactician and implementer, as well as the occasional enabler of Nixon's more forceful inclinations in foreign policy.¹⁷ White House tapes and telephone conversations provide indispensable information about their complex relationship, but a fuller answer to the question remains elusive. Additional sources are needed, such as Kissinger's diary and handwritten notes of meetings with Nixon.

Did Nixon have a Vietnam plan, and, if he did, what was it, and when did he put it together?

Candidate Nixon implied early in 1968 that he had a secret plan for peace with honor in Vietnam. But he dodged the political trap of formally listing its constituent parts, even though he floated some ideas piecemeal during the campaign: troop withdrawals, Vietnamization, pacification, and triangular diplomacy.¹⁸ Once in office, Nixon's public posture was that there was indeed a plan for peace in Vietnam and that it consisted mainly of de-Americanization, Vietnamization, and negotiation.

This argument remains the conventional wisdom in U.S. history textbooks and popular memory. An alternative view originating during the conflict contended that Nixon and Kissinger were prolonging the conflict by following a duplicitous strategy of expanding and intensifying the war with the invasion of Cambodia and Laos, the mining of North Vietnamese ports, and the resumption of the bombing of northern North Vietnam. Information contained in National Security Study Memorandum 1 (21 January 1969), which was leaked to the press in the spring of 1971, confirmed critics in this view of Nixingerian strategy—as would Nixon's own comments during and after the war that he had combined broad diplomatic strategies with "irresistible military pressure" against Hanoi.¹⁹ But Kissinger's former aide Roger Morris argued in a 1977 book about his former boss that the president and his assistant did not at any time have anything that could be recognized as a plan for Vietnam. Instead, their approach was marked by indecision, equivocation, deceit, and self-deception, mixed with personal ambition, power-seeking, distrust of the bureaucracy, and an obsession with projecting an image of toughness.²⁰

Recent archival declassifications reveal that Morris's thesis has considerable merit. Nixon and Kissinger, however, *did* have an "overall game plan," as they called it, consisting of several options or alternatives, which altogether amounted to a strategy of "sticks and carrots," the equivalent of the other side's strategy of "fight and talk."²¹ Although Vietnamization was a key option, it was only one of many. The others included negotiations with Vietnamese Communists, linkage and triangular diplomacy, the "China card," and military pressure on their Vietnamese enemies. The framework of a plan was in place by February 1969; it grew out of Nixon's and Kissinger's pre-election ideas, Daniel Ellsberg's December 1968 RAND study, Joint Chiefs of Staff assessments, input from Melvin Laird and William Rogers, and, most important, Nixinger preferences. As time passed and circumstances dictated or warranted, Nixon and Kissinger fleshed out and revised details of their game plan while alternately prioritizing some options over others, and they withheld key information from aides, cabinet members, and the public.²²

Did Nixon employ the "madman theory"?

What Nixon called irresistible military pressure consisted of the continuation of ground operations, the escalation and expansion of "counterinsurgency" and air operations, and what he secretly named the "madman theory." Nixon's chief-of-staff H. R. Haldeman introduced the term to the public in his 1978 memoir *The Ends of Power*, explaining that Nixon had told him in late 1968 that it would be a central but secret part of his Vietnam strategy. Its technical name, Haldeman wrote, was "the principle of the threat of excessive force"—including nuclear force. Haldeman reaffirmed Nixon's embrace of the madman theory in a 1990 interview with journalist and biographer Walter Isaacson. Kissinger, Haldeman added, "bought into" the theory²³ and was not its progenitor, as some had suggested.²⁴ Kissinger had long supported coupling

the threat of force with the practice of diplomacy, but without the madman theory's core notion of signaling the threatener's supposed irrationality.

Many historians who addressed the topic before the early 1990s expressed doubt about or dismissed Haldeman's account, in part because they misunderstood Haldeman's remarks as meaning that Nixon *was* a madman. They failed to recognize the madman theory as a coercive threat-strategy employed by Nixon—one very much like Eisenhower's and Dulles' "brinkmanship" and similar strategies employed through history since ancient times but most strikingly during the nuclear age. By the late 1990s and beyond, however, declassified documents and tapes, the memoirs and oral histories of other Nixon aides, and studies of Nixon's own words and deeds between 1969 and 1973 lent convincing support to Haldeman's original claim as well as his contention about Kissinger's collaboration in their deployment of the principle of threatening excessive force.²⁵ Yet many authors remain silent on the matter, even while emphasizing Nixinger's military threats and actual use of massive force with diplomacy.²⁶

What was Nixon's goal in Vietnam?

During the war and in the decade or so after it ended, historians offered various explanations for why American decision makers waged war in Vietnam. These included lessons they had drawn from World War II; their Cold War mindset; their perceptions of Soviet strength and intent; U.S. conflicts of interest with the USSR; American messianism; the domino theory; the "quagmire" trap; electoral politics; the psychological idiosyncrasies of presidents and their advisers; militarism; the influence of special-interest groups and bureaucracies; economic motives and forces; and fear of losing credibility. In the last one or two decades, historians have probably given less consideration to the "why question" as their attention turned increasingly to modernization, cultural, postcolonial, and transnational studies. Close scrutiny of Nixon's public speeches and private comments during his political career suggests he waged war in Vietnam for all the reasons listed above. But in 1968 and beyond, his concerns about credibility and electoral politics probably loomed largest.

Policymakers and historians, however, have defined credibility differently. Jonathan Schell, for example, linked it to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Robert J. McMahon emphasized credibility's psychological and ideational dimensions. For Nixon and Kissinger, credibility was a blanket term for their foreign policy goals, whose purpose was the preservation of a U.S.-led global system. Nixon, like other policymakers, believed that if he were perceived to have abandoned a U.S. ally to an ally of his Soviet adversary, America's will and ability to protect other allies and clients against revolutionary upheaval and "Communist aggression" would be cast into doubt, as would its credibility vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China on a range of issues from nuclear arms to Mideast politics.

A concern with credibility ran deeper than nuclear deterrence and was more than just an idea or cultural manifestation of U.S. exceptionalism. Throughout history, powers great and small have fought in pursuit of maintaining credibility, even when the costs of continued fighting outweighed its functional practicality.²⁷

From the 1950s on, the avoidance-of-defeat syndrome in Vietnam militated against changing course, and the United States became entrapped in a quagmire.²⁸ But recognizing the futility of military victory in South Vietnam²⁹ and concerned about the war's political and economic costs (as were many others in the Establishment), Nixon and Kissinger thought it necessary to seek an "honorable" way out—namely, one that avoided the loss of credibility. Nixon

also worried about the political price of failure, believing that "losing South Vietnam" would produce a right-wing backlash,³⁰ alienate voters who were not on the Right, and damage his reelection chances in 1972.

Did Nixinger pursue a "decent-interval" policy?

In practice, the Johnson and Nixon administrations' definition of the avoidance of defeat meant keeping the noncommunist Saigon government in power. But for how long? In public statements, Nixon and Kissinger affirmed they would never sign a negotiated agreement that removed President Thieu from office. But Daniel Ellsberg in 1971 and David Landau and Roger Morris in 1972 claimed that the administration was following a decent-interval policy in Vietnam.³¹ Each understood or explained the policy somewhat differently, but Ellsberg's account in his memoir *Secrets* (2002) more or less encompassed all of the contemporary understandings among former aides. He explained that in 1967 Kissinger "argued that our only objective in Vietnam should be to get some sort of assurance [from Hanoi] of what he called a 'decent interval' between our departure and a Communist takeover, so that we could withdraw without the humiliation of an abrupt, naked collapse of our earlier objectives." Coming during the final phase of negotiations in Paris, the Landau and Morris charges prompted Kissinger to issue a non-denial denial to reporters: "There is no hidden agreement with North Vietnam for any specific interval after which we would no longer care if they marched in and took over South Vietnam. What we really want to say is that we gave Thieu a decent chance to survive."³² (The parsable phrases are "no hidden agreement" and "specific interval.")

After the warring parties signed the Paris Agreement in January 1973, the issue faded from public discourse. But Frank Snepp, former CIA chief strategy analyst in Saigon, reignited public discussion of the issue with his book, *Decent Interval: An Insider's Account of Saigon's Indecent End* (1977), published in the wake of the fall of Saigon in late April 1975. The national discussion of the decent-interval option was soon buried under the avalanche of controversy that came with the CIA's lawsuit alleging that Snepp had profited from breaking his contract of secrecy. Still, Snepp is remembered by many as the first and most important whistle blower and critic of the Nixon administration's decent-interval exit strategy.

Despite the title of Snepp's book, however, his textual references to the decent-interval policy were inconspicuous and meager. Attributing the term to Kissinger's critics, his account was actually something of a defense of Nixon and Kissinger, who, Snepp claimed, had wanted to preserve the Saigon government by means of an international strategy that would achieve permanent "equilibrium" and "stalemate" between the two Vietnams. He blamed Saigon's "indecent" fall on others: previous administrations, the public, and government agencies. For almost two more decades, many if not most historians would either reject or ignore the decent-interval explanation of Nixinger policies. Some would repeat versions of Snepp's thesis. Those who more or less accepted the decent-interval thesis, however defined, would only mention it in passing. Although Kissinger continues to deny that the administration pursued a decent-interval strategy, he has recently conceded several points: historical documentation confirms the administration made "statements" about the decent interval; the Paris settlement "was a precarious agreement"; the administration was "willing to abide by the outcome of . . . [a post-settlement] political contest"; and "we could not commit ourselves for all eternity to maintain a government against all conceivable contingencies. . . . So in that sense, the decent interval phrase has a meaning."³³

But declassified tapes and documents uncovered since the mid-1990s strongly support the view that from late 1970 to early 1971, when the Nixon-Kissinger strategy had clearly failed to force the other side to make concessions, and as the administration continued to withdraw troops unilaterally, Nixon and Kissinger prioritized the decent-interval option. It had evolved from a policy designed in 1969 for the purpose of providing Thieu with a decent chance of enduring for an indeterminate period after a U.S. exit (*with or without a negotiated agreement on the matter*) to one designed after 1970 to provide him with sufficient military assistance and equipment to survive for a reasonable interval of at least one to three years after the American departure.³⁴ On August 3, 1972, for example, when Nixon and Kissinger were discussing the political and international cost-benefits of a pre-election deal in Paris, Kissinger reminded Nixon of the outcome they were aiming for. “We’ve got to find some [negotiated] formula that holds the thing together a year or two, after which—after a year, Mr. President, Vietnam will be a backwater. If we settle it, say, this October, by January ’74 no one will give a damn.”³⁵

Despite Nixon’s postwar claims, which some historians have repeated, the administration was not planning to carry out aerial bombing on the scale of the 1972 Linebacker operations in support of Saigon should the North invade the South after the U.S. exit. On September 29, 1972, for example, Nixon told Kissinger that “[b]y next summer, Henry, we have to get out. . . . You know what that means? Get the air out, too.”³⁶ The administration’s negotiating strategy had been designed to achieve a settlement on or around the time of the U.S. presidential election in 1972, not only to provide time for Vietnamization to strengthen Thieu’s position but also to prevent a possible Communist defeat of the Saigon government from jeopardizing Nixon’s reelection. It was a strategy that contributed to the prolongation of the American War in Vietnam to late January 1973.³⁷

Did Nixinger have a “Grand Design”?

Some historians have suggested that Nixon and Kissinger tried to carry out a Grand Design, consisting mainly of an integrated strategy of détente, rapprochement, triangular diplomacy, and the Nixon Doctrine, to solve their Vietnam problem.³⁸ Nixon initiated the Grand Design narrative in his January 1969 inaugural address, promising a “new era of negotiation” and a strengthening of “the structure of peace.” Video and gallery exhibits at the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in Yorba Linda, California and on the Web have portrayed Nixon’s termination of the American War in Vietnam as one of the three main pillars of his structure of peace, the other two of which were rapprochement with the People’s Republic of China and détente with the Soviet Union. These were themes that Nixon and Kissinger also promoted in their postwar memoirs, along with the argument that Nixon forced Hanoi to agree to his negotiating terms in January 1973 by heavily bombing North Vietnam.

Others, however, have doubted the existence of or played down the Grand Design, regarding it instead as an ill-defined and more or less traditional stick-and-carrot *modus operandi* of military threat and force combined with diplomacy. Or they have argued that it was not so much a design as it was a series of improvised reactions to electoral politics, bureaucratic infighting, and domestic and international crises, as well as approaches pursued or

proposed by past administrations, such as Eisenhower’s New Look.³⁹

Similarly, archival sources and the public record indicate that the so-called Nixon Doctrine never became a leading principle, grand strategy, or master plan guiding the Nixon administration’s policy decisions in Southeast Asia or the rest of the developing world. In other words, it was not a policy doctrine. As Kissinger’s aide Winston Lord pointed out in his contemporary analysis, “there is no such thing as a grand strategy for Asia”; the “proposed policy is not all that different from the rhetoric of past policy.”⁴⁰ Nixon himself had originally explained to reporters in Guam on 25 July 1969 that administration policies would be made “on a case-by-case basis.”⁴¹ The labels that reporters gave to the loose ideas Nixon had voiced at his Guam press conference—“Guam Doctrine” and “Nixon Doctrine”—proved popular with pundits and the public and were embraced by the White House because they served Nixon’s political purposes on the homefront.⁴² As do many historians, the editor of the relevant *FRUS* volume on the subject disagrees, however, and accepts the reality of the Nixon Doctrine, linking it to a Grand Design.⁴³

Historians also disagree about whether Nixinger’s overarching policy purpose was global predominance or a new “equilibrium” or “condominium” with the Soviet Union and the resurgent nations of China, Germany, and Japan. In either case, historians appear to agree that their objective was to preserve a leading role for the United States in world affairs, and some emphasize that this aim was consistent with the grand goals that previous and subsequent administrations had pursued or considered.⁴⁴

The Paris Negotiations

Gareth Porter’s *Peace Denied: The United States, Vietnam, and the Paris Agreement* (1975), Allan E. Goodman’s *Lost Peace: America’s Search for a Negotiated Settlement of the Vietnam War* (1978), and Kissinger’s *White House Years* (1978) were the standard accounts of the negotiations in Paris between Washington and Hanoi before the declassification of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s papers, tapes, telephone conversations, and international sources beginning in the early to mid-1990s. My *Nixon’s Vietnam War* (1998) and *Vietnam War Files* (2004),⁴⁵ Larry Berman’s *No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger, and Betrayal in Vietnam* (2001), Pierre Asselin’s *Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement* (2002),⁴⁶ and Lien-Hang T. Nguyen’s *Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam* (2012), draw to one degree or another on formerly secret U.S. sources, interviews of participants, published sources, and declassified or leaked state papers from China, Europe, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam. Ilya V. Gaiduk’s *The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War* (1996) examines Moscow’s role from 1964 to 1973. Robert K. Brigham’s *Guerrilla Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Viet Nam War* (1998) traces the evolution of the National Liberation Front’s diplomatic stance.

The most important book on the history of the negotiations published in Hanoi in English translation is Luu Van Loi and Nguyen Anh Vu’s *Le Duc Tho–Kissinger Negotiations in Paris* (1996). The authors offer a rare close-up look at decision making in Hanoi through their narrative history of the talks, their occasional personal memories and observations, and their extensive quotations from and paraphrases of selected planning papers, cables, and memoranda of conversation from Vietnamese archives. Singapore historian Ang Cheng Guan’s *The Vietnam*

Despite the growing availability of formerly secret documents and tapes (which, it must be emphasized, all historians have not exploited in equal measure), interpretations differ on such critical issues as the decent-interval solution, the policy goals and diplomatic strategies of both sides, and the impact of triangular diplomacy and of the Linebacker I and II bombings upon the Paris negotiations.

War from the Other Side (2002) summarizes the story of Communist policy and diplomacy; Nguyen Tien Hung and Jerrold L. Schecter's *Palace File* (1986) presents Saigon's perspective, including much useful information about the Saigon government, as does Nguyen Phu Duc's *Vietnam Peace Negotiations* (2005).

Despite the growing availability of formerly secret documents and tapes (which, it must be emphasized, all historians have not exploited in equal measure), interpretations differ on such critical issues as the decent-interval solution, the policy goals and diplomatic strategies of both sides, and the impact of triangular diplomacy and of the Linebacker I and II bombings upon the Paris negotiations. The Nixon-Kissinger position on the latter, for example, was and still is that the Linebacker bombings—especially the so-called Christmas bombings of December 1972—forced the other side back to the table and coerced them into making key concessions. John M. Carland, editor of volumes VIII and IX of *FRUS: Vietnam*, also takes this position. In *Powerful and Brutal Weapons: Nixon, Kissinger, and the Easter Offensive* (2007), Stephen P. Randolph presents a well-researched and nuanced version of this thesis but notes in his conclusion that both sides compromised in Paris.

In several publications since at least 1998, I have argued that both the Easter Offensive and Linebacker had helped reestablish a military deadlock that finally convinced both sides to return to the table in January 1973. Each was prepared to make key concessions. The Christmas bombings helped Nixon make his compromises palatable to the Right, while also damaging North Vietnam's offensive capabilities for another year and ensuring a decent interval for Nixon and Kissinger. Even though Lien-Hang T. Nguyen does not directly address this thesis in *Hanoi's War*, she appears to accept it. But she credits Moscow's and Beijing's influence upon Hanoi more than Hanoi's appreciation of military deadlock with having encouraged the politburo to seek a negotiated settlement.

The historiography of this period of the Vietnam War, of course, has addressed other topics of interest and importance besides those I have commented upon. Among the diplomatic, military, legal, and political topics are the motives, goals, and methods of the politburo in Hanoi, the People's Army of Vietnam, and the People's Liberation Army; the fighting ability of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and the staying power of the Saigon government; Chinese and Soviet assistance to North Vietnam and the degree to which Moscow and Beijing did or did not sway Hanoi's policies; the relationships of nonbelligerent European and Asian nations (other than the USSR and the PRC) with the major belligerents; the bombings and invasions of Cambodia and Laos; the Phoenix counterinsurgency program; the My Lai massacre and the trial of Lt. William Calley; and Nixon's reorganization of national security agency structures and procedures, his political exploitation of the POW/MIA question, and his contributions to the "imperial presidency." Those topics also possess social, intellectual, cultural, and international dimensions, as do these: the reform of the U.S. Selective Service system and its replacement with an all-volunteer force; GI resistance to the war; the erosion of U.S. armed forces discipline and morale; the news media and the war; the nature and experience of war and battle in Vietnam; women and the war; minorities in the military; the effects of Agent Orange; the fate of returning veterans; and the consequences of the war. A proper discussion of these and other important subjects

would require several additional essays.

There is also a sizeable body of historical and polemical writing on the topic of whether the United States could have won the war militarily. George Herring's article, "American Strategy in Vietnam: The Postwar Debate" (1982), was one of the early surveys of the arguments. Thomas Paterson summarized the case against the possibility of a winning strategy for the United States in his essay "Historical Memory and Illusive Victories" (1988). The best known and most oft-cited history of snatching defeat from the jaws of victory is probably Lewis Sorley's *A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam* (1999), in which the author argued that the military won the war on the ground but civilian diplomats and the Congress lost it at the negotiating table and at home.

Some military commanders in Vietnam and the Joint Chiefs of Staff may have believed that the war could have been won militarily, but victory would have come with a price: one requiring the deployment of vastly more military power (including combat manpower), the expansion of the war throughout

Some military commanders in Vietnam and the Joint Chiefs of Staff may have believed that the war could have been won militarily, but victory would have come with a price: one requiring the deployment of vastly more military power (including combat manpower), the expansion of the war throughout Indochina, the continuance of warfare into the indeterminate future, and confrontations with the Soviet Union and China.

Indochina, the continuance of warfare into the indeterminate future, and confrontations with the Soviet Union and China. Often overlooked by those who have insisted that the war could have been won but for liberal civilian policymakers, the press, Congress, the antiwar movement, and the wavering citizenry is the view from the top as revealed in high-level memos, memcons, reports from the field, and intelligence assessments from 1968 on. These reports and assessments led Nixon, Kissinger, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, and other high- and mid-level officials to conclude that the war could not be won militarily and that in any case it would have been impossible to sustain the U.S. effort at prevailing or higher levels considering existing and growing economic constraints, the political climate at home, the strain on the U.S. global military force posture, and other pressing international problems facing the United States. By 1972, moreover, key war hawks in Congress had informed Nixon that victory in any meaningful sense was either unattainable or cost-ineffective and told him that the war should not continue to be fought for Thieu's survival alone, considering the citizenry's impatience with the war after at least a decade of costly fighting. The belief of key U.S. decision makers and power brokers in the improbability of victory preceded the Watergate break-in and its political fallout, which Nixon and Kissinger would later claim had eroded their freedom of action in Vietnam. Despite their and others' doubts about the possibility of military victory, however, Nixon and Kissinger strove to achieve another kind of victory—one that would provide Thieu with a decent chance for political survival—by resorting to exceptional military threats and means, which had the effect of expanding and escalating the war in Indochina between 1969 and 1973 and extending it to 1975. In the end, they had to settle on a decent interval without a decent chance.

Their ultimate failure (as I and many others have argued) was the product of many causes, beginning with the inherent difficulty of winning by conventional means wars that are variously characterized as people's wars, wars of liberation, guerrilla wars, dirty wars, or asymmetric wars. Additional and related causes included North Vietnamese and Viet Cong resilience; the economic, military, and diplomatic aid Hanoi received from the outside (counterbalancing the aid received by Saigon and the damage done by U.S. bombing and mining to

North Vietnam's infrastructure); the inherent political and military weaknesses of Thieu's government and South Vietnam's armed forces; the abstract, ersatz nature of U.S. aims and interests, which did not easily translate into publicly perceived vital interests; and the limits of American power short of nuclear war. Nixon and his allies, however, placed the blame for defeat on others, and many Americans continue to hold the antiwar opposition (and others) responsible for failure in Vietnam. Hawkish advocates of escalation had been the first to charge during the war that the movement's activities undermined the war effort.⁴⁷

On the question of the movement's impact upon the course of the war, the late Charles DeBenedetti, one of the leading historians of the antiwar movement, concluded that "dissidents did not stop the war, but they made it stoppable."⁴⁸ By 1968 they had provided an alternative analysis of the war's causes, wisdom, and morality, while also proposing alternative schemes for exiting Vietnam, thus preparing the ground for mainstream politicians and policymakers to mount viable political challenges to the war from within the executive branch and Congress and through the electoral process. This view remains the consensus among historians of the antiwar opposition. These historians have also affirmed that activist participants in the antiwar movement and those among the citizenry who were not active but who were against the war for one reason or another were in overwhelming numbers people who held liberal, leftist, or pacifist views. (Cold War liberals, as opposed to reform liberals—to use the terminology of the day—generally supported the war.) Attitudes toward the war also varied by gender, race, occupation, age, education, region, and other demographic factors.⁴⁹

On the right, conservatives generally supported the war, pushed for military escalation, and caused Nixon and other presidents to fear a right-wing backlash in the event of defeat in Vietnam. Mary Brennan's *Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP* (1995) and Andrew L. Johns's *Vietnam's Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War* (2010) are among the comparatively few studies about conservatives during the Vietnam era. In *The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy* (2006), Mario Del Pero linked Kissinger to the origins of neoconservatism. In *Apocalypse Then: American Intellectuals and the Vietnam War, 1954–1975* (1998), Robert R. Tomes discussed the responses of intellectuals of all political stripes to the Vietnam War.

Nixon's presidential term and the Vietnam War were watersheds in U.S. and world history. His diplomatic, military, political, and cultural legacy endures. For the most part, it appears to be one of political fracturing and cultural division at home as well as persisting acrimonious debate about how or how not to get into, out of, or fight a war of national liberation that resembles the Vietnam War.⁵⁰

Notes:

1. Bibliographies and historiographic surveys with which to begin include Robert L. Beisner and Kurt W. Hanson (eds.), *American Foreign Relations since 1600: A Guide to the Literature* (Santa Barbara, 2003); Jeffrey P. Kimball, "The Vietnam War," in *A Companion to Richard M. Nixon*, ed. Melvin Small (Oxford, UK, 2011), 380–399; and Edwin E. Moise, "Vietnam War Bibliography," <http://www.clemson.edu/caah/history/facultypages/EdMoise/nixon.html>.
2. See, e.g., Nixon, *In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat, and Renewal* (New York, 1990), chap. 37.
3. The best single source for Kissinger's views on the war is *White House Years* (Boston, 1979), from which he drew *Ending the Vietnam War: A History of American Involvement in and Extermination from the Vietnam War* (New York, 2003).
4. See, e.g., Karl Weissenbach, "Beyond Elvis and the Tapes: Research at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project," *The Record*:

News from the National Archives and Records Administration 2 (May 1996); and Joan Hoff, "Researchers' Nightmare: Studying the Nixon Presidency," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 26 (Winter 1996).
5. See, e.g., Jeffrey P. Kimball, "Sticks and Carrots, Fighting and Talking, Stalemate and Compromise," review of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, VIII, Vietnam, January–October 1972* (Washington DC, 2010), <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/FRUS/PDF/FRUS5.pdf>.

6. See, e.g., Stephen E. Ambrose, *Nixon: The Education of a Politician, 1913–1962* (New York, 1987); William Bundy, *A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency* (New York, 1998); Lloyd Gardner, *Approaching Vietnam: from World War II through Dienbienphu, 1941–1954* (New York, 1988); Jeffrey P. Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War* (Lawrence, KS, 1998); Nixon, *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York, 1978); John Prados, *The Sky Would Fall: Operation Vulture* (New York, 1983); Ronald H. Spector, *Advice and Support: The Early Years, 1941–1960* (Washington DC, 1983).

7. Even though some historians regard Nixon as a liberal on domestic matters, Nixon considered himself a conservative who had been forced by political circumstances and conditions to support liberal legislation; he did, however, privately distance himself from the views of the far-right while seeking their public support. He was a practical conservative, not a practical liberal. See, e.g., Oval Office Conversation no. 508–13, Nixon and Kissinger, 9:45 a.m.–12:04 p.m., 2 June 1971, White House Tapes, Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, CA (NPL); and the 10 July 1970 entry in the various print, electronic, and archival versions of H. R. Haldeman's diary (along with other entries throughout the diary).

8. Psychohistorical analyses are divided between Freudians and non-Freudians. For starters, see David Abrahamsen, *Nixon vs. Nixon: An Emotional Tragedy* (New York, 1977); James David Barber, *The Presidential Character* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1972); Fawn Brodie, *Richard Nixon: The Shaping of His Character* (New York, 1981); Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War*; Stanley Allen Renshon, "Psychological Analysis and Presidential Personality: The Case of Richard Nixon," *History of Childhood Quarterly: The Journal of Psychohistory* 2 (Winter 1975): 415–450; Bruce Mazlish, *In Search of Nixon: A Psychobiographical Inquiry* (New York, 1972); Vamik D. Volkan et al., *Richard Nixon: A Psychobiography* (New York, 1997).

9. See, e.g., Paul Boyer, "Dr. Strangelove," in *Past Imperfect: History According to the Movies*, ed. Mark C. Carnes et al. (New York, 1995); Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (New York, 1992); Barbara Keys, "The Emotional Statesman," *Diplomatic History* 35 (September 2011): 587–609; Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War*.

10. See, e.g., my summary and analysis in *Nixon's Vietnam War*, chaps. 1, 4 & passim.

11. Ambrose, *Nixon: The Education of a Politician*; Bundy, *Tangled Web*; Robert Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (New York, 2007); Catherine Forslund, *Anna Chennault: Informal Diplomacy and Asian Relations* (Wilmington DE, 2002); Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House* (New York, 1983); Andrew L. Johns, *Vietnam's Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War* (Lexington, KY, 2010); Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War*; Nguyen Tien Hung and Jerrold L. Schecter, *The Palace File* (New York, 1986); Herbert S. Parmet, *Richard Nixon and His America* (Boston, 1990); Robert Parry, "Profiting Off Nixon's Vietnam 'Treason,'" 6 March 2012, <http://readersupportednews.org/opinion2/277-75/10325-profiting-off-nixons-vietnam-treason>; Kent G. Sieg, "The 1968 Presidential Election and Peace in Vietnam," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 26 (Fall 1996): 1062–1080; Melvin Small, "The Election of 1968," *Diplomatic History* 28 (September 2004): 513–528; Richard J. Whalen, *Catch the Falling Flag: A Republican's Challenge to His Party* (Boston, 1972).

12. See, e.g., the thread for "Henry Kissinger & the Nixon-Chennault-Thieu Cabal of 1968 [Kimball]," 19 April 2011, *H-Diplo*, <http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl?trx=vx&list=H-Diplo&month=1104&week=c&msg=v18g74TLBȳTCI2MqcvPN%2bQ&user=&pw=>.

13. See Mario Del Pero, *The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca NY, 2006); Jussi Hanhimäki *The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York, 2004); David Landau, *Kissinger: The Uses of Power* (Boston, 1972); Bruce Mazlish, *Kissinger: The European Mind in American Policy* (New York, 1976); Robert

Schulzinger, *Henry Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy* (New York, 1989); Jeremy Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century* (Cambridge, MA, 2007).

14. See Franz Schurmann, *The Foreign Politics of Richard Nixon: The Grand Design* (Berkeley CA, 1987).

15. See Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger*; Hersh, *Price of Power*, 16. Perhaps the first published use of the term was in "Foreign Relations: The Nixinger Report," *Time*, 21 February 1972.

17. See Stephen E. Ambrose, *Nixon: The Triumph of a Politician, 1962–1972* (New York, 1989); Bundy, *Tangled Web*; William Burr, ed., *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow* (New York, 1998); Joan Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered* (New York, 1994); Isaacson, *Kissinger*; Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War*; Jeffrey P. Kimball, *Vietnam War Files: The Secret History of Nixon-Era Strategy* (Lawrence, KS, 2004); Melvin Small, *The Presidency of Richard Nixon* (Lawrence, KS, 1999); Tad Szulc, *The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years* (New York, 1978).

18. See *New York Times*, 6 and 21 March and 2 August 1968; Richard M. Nixon, "Vietnam," in *Nixon Speaks Out: Major Speeches and Statements by Richard Nixon in the Presidential Campaign of 1968* (New York, 1968).

19. Nixon, *No More Vietnams* (New York, 1985).

20. Roger Morris, *Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1977).

21. Both sides' strategies included public relations propaganda or spin along with diplomacy and military operations.

22. Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War*; Kimball, *Vietnam War Files*.

23. Isaacson, *Kissinger*.

24. See, e.g., Hersh, *Price of Power*; Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered*; Daniel Ellsberg, *Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers* (New York, 2002).

25. Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War*; Kimball, *Vietnam War Files*; Burr and Kimball, "Nixon's Secret Nuclear Alert: Vietnam War Diplomacy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Readiness Test, October 1969," *Cold War History* 3 (January 2003): 113–156.

26. On a related note, John Carland, the editor of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, VIII, Vietnam, January–October 1972* and *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973*, does not mention the madman theory, even though he makes a case for the efficacy of Nixon's use and threats of excessive force in facilitating his diplomacy. On the other hand, M. Todd Bennett, the editor of *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, XXXIV, National Security Policy, 1969–1972* (Washington DC, 2011), does discuss the madman theory and includes a few documents about it but implicitly dismisses the argument that Nixon used the term or employed the strategy by citing a problematic source (p. 232). For an analysis of that source, see Kimball, *Vietnam War Files*, 54–56 (not cited by the *FRUS* editor).

27. Jonathan Schell, *The Time of Illusion* (New York, 1975); Robert McMahon, "Credibility and World Power: Exploring the Psychological Dimension in Postwar American Diplomacy," *Diplomatic History* 15 (Fall 1991): 455–472; Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War*.

28. Leslie H. Gelb, "The System Worked," *Foreign Policy* 3 (Summer 1971): 140–167; Daniel Ellsberg, *Papers on the War* (1972). But cf. Jeffrey P. Kimball, "Argument without End," in *To Reason Why: The Debate about the Causes of U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War*, ed. Jeffrey P. Kimball (Philadelphia, 1990); and David G. Press, "The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats during the 'Appeasement' Crises of the 1930s," *International Security* 29 (Winter 2004).

29. See, e.g., Whalen, *Catch the Falling Flag*.

30. See, e.g., Kissinger, *White House Years*, 969, 979.

31. Daniel Ellsberg, "Laos: What Nixon Is Up To," *New York Review of Books*, 11 March 1971; Roger Morris, "The Ultimate Betrayal," *New York Times*, 1 June 1972.

32. MemCon, Kissinger's luncheon with foreign correspondents, 4 November 1972, folder: Press, TV, News, etc. Nov 1972—[2 of 2], box 379, NSC Files: Subject Files, NPL.

33. Quoted in Kimball review of *The American Experience in Southeast Asia, 1946–1975*, a conference organized by the U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, 29–30 September 2010, Washington D.C., <http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/reports/PDF/AmericanExperience-SEAsia-Kimball.pdf>. Kissinger was responding to a question posed by historian Thomas A. Schwartz.

34. Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War*; Kimball, *Vietnam War Files*; and Jeffrey P. Kimball, "Decent Interval or Not? The Paris Agreement and the End of the Vietnam War," *Passport* 34 (December 2003): 26–31. In "Selling the 'Decent Interval':

Kissinger, Triangular Diplomacy, and the End of the Vietnam War, 1971–73," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 14 (March 2003): 159–194, Jussi Hanhimäki appears to emphasize connections between the decent interval and great power diplomacy over the decent interval as a strategy for Vietnam itself. I have argued that Nixon and Kissinger were aiming the decent-interval ploy not at Moscow and Beijing but at Hanoi. William Burr notes that while Nixon and Kissinger hoped that China could facilitate an agreement between Washington and Hanoi, Zhou Enlai's deference to Hanoi's negotiating position in talks with Kissinger indicated that the Vietnam problem could not be solved in Beijing. See "The Complexities of Rapprochement," in Academic Committee of Beijing Forum at Peking University, eds., *The Harmony and Prosperity of Civilizations: Selected Papers of Beijing Forum* (Beijing, 2005).

35. Oval Office Conversation, Nixon and Kissinger, 3 August 1972, Nixon White House Tapes, NPL.

36. *FRUS*, 1969–1976, VIII, *Vietnam*, January–October 1972, doc. 270.

37. Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War*; Kimball, *Vietnam War Files*; and Ken Hughes, "Fatal Politics: Nixon's Political Timetable for Withdrawing from Vietnam," *Diplomatic History* 34 (June 2010): 497–506. Also see Hughes, "Fatal Politics: The Nixon Tapes, Vietnam, and the Biggest Republican Presidential Landslide," *Blogspot*, June 10, 2009, <http://fatalpolitics.blogspot.com/2009/06/watch-all-episodes-of-fatal-politics.html>.

38. See, e.g., Dan Caldwell, "The Legitimation of the Nixon-Kissinger Grand Design and Grand Strategy," *Diplomatic History* 33 (September 2009); Del Pero, *The Eccentric Realist*; Schulzinger, *Doctor of Diplomacy*; Schurmann, *The Foreign Politics of Richard Nixon*; Suri, *Henry Kissinger and the American Century*.

39. See, e.g., Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered*; Evelyn Goh, *Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974* (New York, 2005); Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, 2nd ed. (Washington DC, 1994); Jussi M. Hanhimäki, "An Elusive Grand Design," and Mary E. Sarotte, "The Frailties of Grand Strategies," in *Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969–1977*, ed. Frederick Logevall and Andrew Preston (New York, 2008); Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War*; Kimball, *Vietnam War Files*; Thomas J. McCormick, *America's Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War and After*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore, 1995); Keith Nelson, *The Making of Détente: Soviet-American Relations in the Shadow of Vietnam* (Baltimore, 1995); Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War* (New York, 2005); Mary E. Sarotte, *Dealing with the Devil: East Germany, Détente, and Ostpolitik, 1969–1973* (Chapel Hill, 2001); Dale Van Atta, *With Honor: Melvin Laird in War, Peace, and Politics* (Madison, WI, 2008).

40. Memorandum, Lord to Kissinger, 23 January 1970, subj: Issues Raised by the Nixon Doctrine for Asia, folder 2: Misc. Materials—Selected Lord Memos, box 335, Subject-Numeric Files, 1970–73, Department of State Central Files, GRDOS, RG 59, NARA. Cf. *FRUS*, 1969–1976, I, *Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972* (Washington DC, 2003), doc. 54.

41. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard Nixon, 1969* (Washington DC, 1971), 548–552.

42. Jeffrey P. Kimball, "The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 36 (March 2006): 59–74.

43. "Summary," *FRUS*, 1969–1976, I, *Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972* (Washington DC, 2003).

44. E.g., Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*; Hanhimäki, "An Elusive Grand Design," in *Nixon in the World*; Kimball, *Nixon's Vietnam War*; Gabriel Kolko, *Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, the United States, and the Modern Historical Experience* (New York, 1985).

45. Also see Jeffrey P. Kimball, "The Panmunjom and Paris Armistices: Patterns of War Termination," in *America, The Vietnam War, and the World: Comparative and International Perspectives*, ed. Andreas W. Daum, Lloyd Gardner, and Wilfried Mautsch (New York, 2003).

46. Also see Pierre Asselin, "Revisionism Triumphant: Hanoi's Diplomatic Strategy in the Nixon Era," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 13 (Fall 2011): 101–137.

47. See, e.g., Jeffrey P. Kimball, "The Stab-in-the-Back Legend and the Vietnam War," *Armed Forces and Society* 14 (Spring 1988): 433–458.


48. Charles DeBenedetti, "On the Significance of Peace Activism: America, 1961–1975," *Peace and Change: A Journal of Peace Research* 9 (Summer 1983): 6–20.

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The Movement and the Sixties: Protest in America from Greensboro to Wounded Knee (New York, 1995); Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield (assisting author), *An American Ordeal: The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era* (Syracuse, 1990); Melvin Small, *Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1988); Melvin Small and William D. Hoover, eds., *Give Peace a Chance: Exploring the Vietnam Antiwar Movement* (Syracuse NY, 1994); and Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, *Who Spoke Up? American Protest against the War in Vietnam* (Garden City, NJ, 1984). On polling, begin with John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (New York, 1973).

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PHOENIX and the Drones

John Prados

Among the most controversial security initiatives implemented during the American war in Vietnam, the program known as Phoenix sparked intense public concern, fierce debate, and earnest questioning of its effectiveness. In retrospect its security impact remains in dispute while its methods are widely viewed as a net negative in terms of public support for the war. Today's "drone war" can be viewed as similar to Phoenix in that it aims to neutralize an adversary hierarchy: in this case, the Al Qaeda and Taliban figures leading the fight against the United States and its allies. A comparison of the Phoenix Program and the drone war serves to illuminate some important aspects of the present security dilemma and highlight ways current operations may be both inapt and inept. This essay is not a discussion of details so much as a reflection on the larger phenomenon of these programs. Two elements lie at the heart of the matter. The first is the environment in which the military operations take place. The second is the legal framework within which the activities are conducted. Each will be treated here.

There are substantial differences as well as some similarities between the military environment during the Vietnam War and that in which hostilities occur today. Vietnam was a war between nations and societies. Two South Vietnamese social entities were in conflict, one of them aided and dominated by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam), the other allied with the United States. There was a very real sense on both sides that endowing their respective Vietnamese factions with attributes of social dynamism and statehood offered prospects of securing the loyalty of the Vietnamese populace and hence a path toward military success. Economic and social activities were integrated with military security measures. "Nation building" was integrated with "pacification" and conventional military operations in the overall effort. The Phoenix Program evolved as a component of pacification within one entity, South Vietnam.

Today's situation is quite different. "War on Terror" is an awkward name and does not quite fit an array of hostilities that includes a shooting war in Afghanistan; the former war in Iraq; covert operations in Libya and Syria; security activities in sub-Saharan Africa, the Philippines, and Indonesia; and the drone war itself, whose tentacles at this writing reach into Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. In this conflict states are engaging "non-state actors." The style of military operations in Afghanistan resembles that of Vietnam (patrols, security posts and cordons, anti-partisan sweeps, a massively favorable odds ratio that does not appear to have produced positive results). The United States eschewed nation-building in the second Bush administration, then engaged in a brief flirtation with counterinsurgency and pacification techniques late in the decade, but abandoned them once again. Operational methods evolved to combine security cordons with aimed strikes. Within Afghanistan these strikes are carried out by special forces. Everywhere else they are made by drones. The drone war began as a targeted activity to get at Al Qaeda terrorist leaders in Pakistan, with one side strike at an enemy identified in Yemen. It has evolved into a sustained campaign in Pakistan and Yemen, with reported

additional strikes in Somalia.

Both the Phoenix Program and the drone war were products of frustration. In Vietnam the sense was that standard pacification activities did not touch the "Viet Cong Infrastructure," the hierarchy of the enemy's leadership. Phoenix aimed specifically at that leadership. In the current conflict the bulk of the adversary's hierarchy is located outside the theater of operations in a nation with which the United States is not at war. Thus the adversary's command structure seemed untouchable by means of standard techniques.

The drone war began as a highly controlled covert program for remote attacks directed at identified presumed enemy leaders. Therein lie major differences between the two operations. The drone war, even with all its recent expansion, is still a low-intensity activity overall, whereas the Vietnamese operations were a "mass" activity by comparison. Because Phoenix aimed at the Liberation Front leadership very broadly, its patrols netted large numbers of prisoners along with the casualties. In fact, South Vietnamese prisons had to be expanded to accommodate the people swept up by Phoenix. In addition, the tactical activity in Phoenix was driven by "goals" handed down from on high, which practically guaranteed mass action on the ground. In the drone war, so far as we know, there are no specific numerical goals.

Control mechanisms also differ. In Phoenix, U.S. intelligence attempted to identify and list the Liberation Front cadres; intelligence advisers at the district level opened files on persons with those names; and once evidence developed the files went before a district-level board, which approved operations against the targets. This methodology opened the program to corruption: false information from informants drove some targeting, and the desire to avoid being named led people to pay protection money. With the drone war, the listing and target approval function is entirely in the hands of U.S. officials. This arrangement should preclude corruption, especially because most target data flows from technical intelligence collection rather than informants. At the highest level, President Barack Obama personally approves the target lists.

However, like Phoenix, the drone war has been hampered by a narrow intelligence base. In Phoenix the volume of intelligence collection varied inversely with the extent of Liberation Front sympathies in an area and was impacted by the degree of prevalent corruption. Today the intelligence is limited by inherent factors. Visual collection mechanisms cannot be omnipresent; they are laid on in response to other indicators. Those indicators may be specific—a cell phone intercept, shipments of bomb components traced to an address, a notice of some meeting—but they are frequently as amorphous as the ubiquitous "chatter" or the notion that some targeted group is very active in an area. Even visual cues require interpretation. Is driving an SUV proof of terrorist intent? Is brandishing a weapon—in a region where a great proportion of the populace bears arms—proof the individual is Taliban? The very existence of debate over the idea of "signature strikes" serves to underline the uncertainties involved. Once it comes down to the level of the drone pilot and his managers making a split-second

decision on ordnance release, more often than not based on nothing more than images on a monitor, it becomes evident that the uncertainties predominate.

Another difference between Phoenix and the drone war lies in the programs' goals. Although Phoenix became notorious as a "murder program"—some 26,000 Vietnamese deaths are attributed to it—its purpose was to "neutralize" the Liberation Front hierarchy. Doing so required gathering more intelligence, so there was always an incentive to capture cadres rather than kill them. New interrogation centers were established for South Vietnamese districts and provinces to do the questioning. While the extent to which Phoenix results encompassed real enemy cadres rather than victimized civilians will always be debatable, the presumption has to be that some of the (55,000) prisoners were really enemies and that over time intelligence knowledge of the Liberation Front improved. In the drone war the purpose of the strikes is strictly military. There is no pretense that neutralization means anything other than killing, and the deaths add nothing to the knowledge base.

Moreover, Phoenix aimed at influencing the outcome of war within Vietnam itself. The drone war is intended to affect conflict in a *different country altogether*. The number of innocents perishing in these attacks is hotly disputed. Claims of terrorist dead, according to *The Long War Journal*, amount to nearly 2,700 (in both Pakistan and Yemen) as of September 2012. At that level the operation can no longer be viewed as narrowly targeting the adversary high command. Most fatalities are rank and file, not partisan commanders. The aim is general suppression of adversary capability apart from and in addition to its leadership. The drone war as covert activity has given way to drones as part of a conventional interdiction campaign. That alteration may have occurred as early as 2006 and certainly did so by 2009. The transformation is confirmed by the fact that the "target set"—to use the military's term—has changed; it is no longer Al Qaeda leaders but the Taliban insurgents who fight in Afghanistan.

One final distinction must be noted. The Phoenix Program always resided within a broader counterinsurgency effort. Thus, while the notorious aspects of Phoenix may not have provided an incentive to side with the United States, Vietnamese villagers had other reasons to acquiesce. Considerations such as land reform, economic aid, direct election of village officials, and the greater security afforded by the creation of local militias could help take the edge off the flight of the arbitrary Phoenix. By contrast, the drone war is an exercise in pure punitive force. Where pacification in Vietnam might conceivably have led villagers to align themselves with the United States, in Pakistan and elsewhere the only imaginable emotional response to the attacks and civilian deaths will be resentment against the United States.

The legal framework for these activities also warrants attention. Whether these "neutralization operations" aimed to kill or merely to capture, they required some instrument of approval. The approvals themselves need scrutiny. The South Vietnamese president, Nguyen Van Thieu, authorized the Phoenix Program in a pair of decrees in the summer of 1968. These decrees did not mandate assassinations but also did not prohibit them. Officially, it was South Vietnamese law that governed the effort, though Americans who participated were also bound by the regulations of their own agencies or armed services.

Central Intelligence Agency officials provided not only

the concept for the Phoenix Program but also most of the people who initially staffed its central office, three-quarters of the regional officers-in-charge, and a substantial portion of the local personnel. The agency funded the strike forces associated with the program, which were called Provincial Reconnaissance Units. This CIA support continued through 1970, fueling various charges against Phoenix as a CIA entity. At the time the real CIA association, while dismissed in public, was seen as advantageous within government because agency funding was more flexible and CIA oversight hardly existed. But most of the personnel who worked the program as part of pacification were American military personnel. The overall pacification apparatus in South Vietnam was a military command, subject to service regulations. Once the military, as a part of the sequence of its withdrawal from the Vietnam War, pulled its people out of Phoenix, the CIA was incapable of pursuing the program on its own, and the effort inevitably devolved upon the South Vietnamese.

After 1975 an entire framework of presidential executive orders and congressional oversight evolved to regulate intelligence operations. This framework included prohibitions on assassination written into presidential executive orders governing intelligence operations. The drone war nevertheless began as a CIA activity. There are important weaknesses in oversight mechanisms. Congress is reluctant to intervene in matters of perceived national security, and presidents waived their own prohibitions against assassination. The CIA also seized upon the drone war as a vehicle to reinvigorate its covert operations apparatus. But the expansion of drone operations into a regional interdiction campaign conducted on multiple fronts opened the door to much-increased participation by the

U.S. military. Military contributions began to seem even more desirable when controversies engulfed the CIA over black sites, torture, and renditions. Pentagon officials were already moving to expand military capabilities for special operations. On one level the drone war has provided a vehicle for the militarization of the CIA.

One facet of this evolution is the latest controversy over legal authorization, subsumed in the niceties of debate over so-called "Title 10" and "Title 50" operations. Without burdening this discussion with legal detail, suffice it to say that Title 10 refers to that portion of the United States Code that governs the Department of Defense and the U.S. military. Title 50 covers the CIA. Hence Title 10 authorities require adherence to standard legal strictures on initiating and conducting war. Title 50 puts a program under the rubric of CIA covert operations. There is no declaration of war in place that permits hostilities in Pakistan (a putative U.S. ally), Yemen, Somalia, or elsewhere in Africa. The only existing authority, the 9/11 Congressional Resolution, becomes a shakier foundation the farther operations move away from Afghanistan.

Title 10 activity also calls into question Executive compliance with the War Powers Act. While the impact of that law has been limited, chief executives are loath to be found in open violation of it—witness President Obama's maneuvers to have NATO nations take the lead in the Libya affair of 2011 (Obama also filed a report with Congress, as required by the act). Reliance upon Title 10 bears potentially negative legal implications for the drone war. We have what amounts to a conventional military operation—an aerial interdiction campaign—that is carried out in large part by military forces but is cloaked as a CIA covert activity. The

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dangers of an Executive alternating between Title 10 and Title 50 in order to maximize legal authority for the conduct of coercive activities should be plain.

The legal issue that has garnered the most attention in the drone war is, of course, the one that connects it most closely to the Phoenix Program—assassination, and more specifically, the targeting of American citizens. This issue emerged in high relief in 2011 with the killing in Yemen of American citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, his son, and another American. The administration has crafted a legal argument embodied in secret memoranda, akin to the notorious Department of Justice “torture memos,” that is said to justify the targeting of citizens who take a belligerent stance and pose a direct threat to the United States. The memoranda are secret, however, and there is no way to measure them against the obvious violation of the due process protections in the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution or the Fourth and Sixth Amendment guarantees of trial and against search and seizure. In the drone war there is no pretense at capture of suspects for trial, and the accused have no opportunity to present evidence. The CIA and its military cohorts are empaneled as judge, jury, and executioners, and in place of an indictment and evidence the public sees only whatever charges the government chooses to serve up. For all of the abuses in Phoenix, suspects apprehended during operations were at least put before (military) tribunals.

In the Vietnam era, when Phoenix was condemned as an assassination program, it was South Vietnamese laws that were implicated. Suspects were arbitrarily charged and had little opportunity to defend themselves. But the trials, sham or not, took place. As for assassination, it is instructive that

the United States showed its discomfort with the practice. In October 1969 the pacification organization responsible for the program (a military authority) issued an official directive prohibiting participation in any assassination. That directive was later reissued. These rules may not have dissuaded American personnel in the Phoenix Program from killing anyone, but at least they were on the books. Prohibitions of a similar sort exist in U.S. military regulations today. Here is an instance in which reliance on Title 50 over Title 10 conveys a license to kill.

Looking back, it is perplexing to reflect that a notorious program from Vietnam days now seems more coherent, better conceived, and even better regulated than what is going on today. The drone war is far from attaining the breadth or impact of Phoenix and may never incur the political cost that the Vietnam effort eventually did. But the potential for blowback from the drones should not be underestimated, especially as their weight in the military effort increases. It is also possible that the military effect of the drones will attain greater significance, although the limited intelligence base argues against that. The drone war raises some of the same legal and political issues as the Vietnam program. Those can ultimately be more costly to the United States than any of the discrete operational achievements, in particular at the international level, as the controversy over CIA black prisons and interrogation methods illustrates very well. And—to engage the larger issue of a nation’s descent into conflict—the drone war seems to have evolved with much of the same failure to anticipate consequences as did the U.S. commitment in Vietnam.

SHAFR Job Search Workshop

To help better prepare our graduate student membership for the job market SHAFR will host a hands-on job search workshop on Friday, June 21 from 7-9 am during the 2013 SHAFR conference in Arlington, Virginia. Students will have the opportunity to receive individualized feedback on their cover letters and cvs, whether for academic jobs or those outside of the academy. At the workshop, each participant will be paired with recently hired and more senior scholars for one-on-one conversations about their materials.

Graduate students (and newly minted Ph.D.s) must express their interest in participating in the workshop, indicate whether they anticipate applying for jobs in or out of the academy and attach a Word version of their cover letter and cv to jobworkshop@shafr.org no later than **February 15, 2013**. Those wishing to participate should apply early as space will be limited.



Spiderman, Shakespeare, and Kennan: The Art of Teaching Biography

John Lewis Gaddis

Editor's note: This lecture was originally delivered on June 30, 2012 at the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations conference in Hartford, CT. AJ

I have been fortunate enough, with my recent biography of George F. Kennan,¹ to have won a number of awards. None carry the personal meaning for me, though, of the Robert H. Ferrell prize, which I have the honor of accepting today.

I first met Bob during the tumultuous spring of 1968 while interviewing for a job—my first—at Indiana University Southeast, then at Jeffersonville. Remarkably, or so it seemed to me at the time, the History Department in Bloomington carefully screened applicants for regional campus jobs, and it was through that process that I first encountered Professor Ferrell, whose writing I had greatly admired as a graduate student. Even more remarkably, he had already read a draft of my dissertation. We met in a hallway in Ballantine Hall and, upon being told who I was, he assumed an authoritative stance which I have ever since sought to emulate. “Young man,” he said, “you must always remember, when you write ‘on the other hand,’ to tell us what the first hand was.”

That and much else from Bob was good advice: he was one of the great mentors in my life—alongside Bob Divine and Wayne Morgan at Texas and the editor of my first book, Bill Leuchtenberg—who taught me how to write. It was only then, I can see now, that I learned how to think.

It is often said that clear writing precedes cogent thinking, but I don't think the principle is as frequently taught these days as it once was. Fully 90 percent of the time I spend on undergraduate and graduate student papers at Yale involves fixing the writing. “Can't you just concentrate on the argument?” my students ask plaintively after I have sent their drafts back several times. “Sorry,” I reply. “Your prose is too cumbersome, coagulated, bloated, meandering, and therefore opaque for me to know what the argument is.” I always try to be as tactful as possible. And when the students protest that their other professors don't seem to mind, I say that I do, and that it is all Ferrell's fault.

My original title for this talk was “The Promises—and Pitfalls—of Authorized Biography,” and I will meander around to that in due course. But as I sat down to write it, a larger issue kept popping up in my mind: what do we think we are doing when we write biographies in the first place?

You would think I would have worked this out before ever beginning the Kennan book, but the truth is that I didn't—or, perhaps more accurately, I couldn't. Looking back, I can see several reasons why. One is that there were then, and are still, surprisingly few guides to doing biography. A good place to start is Hermione Lee's *Biography: A Very Short Introduction*, but that didn't appear until 2009, too late to do me much good. It was clear, when I started, that I would be pretty much on my own.

After moving to Yale in 1997 I found a way, though,

to get some help from my students. Ever since then I have taught a junior seminar on “The Art of Biography,” but it is always focused more on the practice of that discipline than on its nature. We read a selection of biographies and autobiographies ranging widely across time and space and then talk about what we like and don't like about each of them. My students, I have found, are tough critics. But I have never asked them to become theorists—that is, to identify principles of biography that might apply not only across time and space, but also across the varying backgrounds, interests, and capabilities of potential readers of biography.

If I had such principles in mind when I finally began writing the Kennan biography in 2007, I didn't articulate them, even to myself. I just did whatever felt right, and whatever the readers of my draft chapters—my students, my editors, and my wife—told me I could do better.

But if my proposition that writing precedes thinking has any plausibility, then the completion of this project should make it possible at last to address the question I have posed: What are we doing when we write biographies? What principles lie behind them? Can these be taught?

II.

I have had the opportunity this summer to work on these issues, not with Yale students, but with a group of ten teachers from the New Haven public schools. Conducted under the auspices of the Yale-New Haven Teachers Institute, our seminar also carries the title “The Art of Biography.” But the teaching of it, as you might imagine, is very different. These “students,” who meet with me once a week, have normally put in a full day teaching their own students before they make their way to my late-afternoon class on the Yale campus. By the time I see them, they are often exhausted, but their passion for their profession still shows.

Their students come from grades one through twelve, and within each of those grades, skill levels vary enormously. Many of the students are on what are called “reduced lunch” programs—that doesn't mean less food, as in *Oliver Twist*, but subsidized prices. Some have already experienced levels of violence comparable to those veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan have seen. Very few, sadly, will ever get into Yale. They walk or bike or drive past our campus all the time, but for most of them it is an alien world.

So what can I teach their teachers this summer that will help them reach the students they will be teaching for most of the rest of the year in the city that surrounds Yale? In particular, what principles of biography might apply across such great differences in grade levels, skills, and socio-economic-psychological backgrounds? How can I equip the teachers in my seminar, in short, with the Spiderman-like agility required to cross great chasms? For with great power—they surely have that—does indeed come great responsibility.

III.

George Kennan, not often associated with Spiderman, offers a clue. He once justified the study of history by pointing out that “the spectacular mechanical and scientific creations of modern man tend to conceal from him the nature of his own humanity and to encourage him in all sorts of Promethean ambitions and illusions. It is precisely this person who, as he gets carried along on the dizzy pace of technological change, needs most to be reminded of the nature of the species he belongs to, of the limitations that rest upon him, of the essential elements, both tragic and helpful, of his own condition.”²

I can’t say that my own biography of Kennan, which took thirty years to complete, proceeded at a dizzying pace. But it certainly is the case that I gave less attention than I might have to the essential elements of biography, which are what my New Haven teachers need to know. So this summer’s seminar is, for me, a “back to basics,” “rubber meets the road” moment in which Promethean ambitions and illusions are of little use.

Socrates, though, is very useful. For was it not he who insisted that all students everywhere know more than they think they know? That the role of teachers is to get their students to see this? That once they have, the students can teach themselves, and they will be less likely to forget what they have learned than if somebody simply told them what they are supposed to know?

That is how we are approaching the study of biography this summer. It is a cooperative enterprise between an ancient Greek and a mid-twentieth-century statesman who, by charting a course beyond the equally dangerous alternatives of war and appeasement, has as good a claim as anyone to having made it possible for us to convene such a seminar in the first place.

IV.

We have decided to start with *autobiography*. My teachers will ask their students to answer two questions that the students ask each other all the time: “Who are you?” “Where do you come from?” These are such old questions that you will find them throughout *The Iliad* and *The Odyssey*. And even though you might not want to assign those texts to elementary school students—they carry R ratings for sex and violence—they do suggest a first principle of biography: that identity is inseparable from history.

If that simple idea has proven robust enough to transfer across some three thousand years, across the shift from illiterate to literate civilizations and across cultural chasms even wider and deeper than those my hard-working teachers have to cross, then it ought to be possible for them to convey it in their own classrooms, at whatever the grade level.

Imagine a class in which the students are given five sentences, or five paragraphs, or five pages—length is less important than that there be a limit—to say who they are. They would not be able to do this without saying where they come from. They would be channeling Homer, even if they had never heard of him. And by having to articulate what they already know, they would have satisfied Socrates as well. Not bad for a first lesson, which you could probably teach even in the first grade.

I don’t know for sure when George Kennan first made this connection between identity and history in his own life, but it had to have been early. For how could he not

have noticed that other kids had mothers and he did not? That she had died shortly after his birth? And that he had probably killed her?

He hadn’t, of course—she died of appendicitis, not in childbirth—but the grown-ups were slow in explaining this to young George. The effects lingered, he often acknowledged to me, throughout his life. But he left it to me to figure out how. In his extraordinary sense of guilt, perhaps? In his tendency to take responsibility for too much? In the loneliness that never left him? In all of the above, no doubt, but I had to balance this sadness in the book with something else I knew from knowing him personally: that Kennan found refuge in attempting to live an ordinary life. He didn’t always succeed, but it seemed important to show him trying.

Take, for example, the first chapter of the biography. You will find there a spooky speculation on suicide that George, at the age of seven, inflicted on his older sister Jeanette. It was so alarming that she was able to remember the exact dialogue seven decades later. But you will also find quotes from the diary George kept briefly in 1916, in which he appears to be a normal

twelve-year-old boy. “My room is being painted over,” he wrote on January 31, the same day that he saw, if only from a distance, his first president of the United States, who happened to be visiting Milwaukee. Which was more important—the paint or the president? They were about equal in significance to him at that age, and that, in turn, was significant to me. For it showed George constructing an identity not just from the history he had inherited, but from the choices he himself was learning to make. He was allowing himself to be superficial. “Lightness of being” is not a quality most people would associate with Kennan, but I knew him to be capable of it. That was my justification for selecting evidence that showed it.

V.

This practice of selecting for *significance*, as it happens, is a second principle of biography that I have been working on this summer with my New Haven teachers.

If you were to ask even first graders to write or just talk about who they are and where they come from, they would not only place what they say within a historical perspective, they would also select for significance in saying it. They would know that they couldn’t include all that exists within even their short memories. They would have to leave some things out, and if you asked them how they had gone about doing this, they would probably say that they had excluded certain memories because they were boring, or unimportant, or embarrassing, or painful, or because they couldn’t remember them clearly enough.

They would be illustrating the important fact that *expression requires compression*. You have to fit what you are saying within the frame provided for it. That might be a literal frame if you are painting a portrait, but it could also be the attention span of your classmates, or the patience of your teacher, or the page limit imposed by your publisher, or if you are William Shakespeare, the cuts you have had to make in your great new play about a depressed Dane to make sure that the first performance, at the Globe, can end before the sun goes down. That final fencing match could have been quite literally a killer if it had had to be performed in the dark.³

I was fortunate to have had, by most standards, a large frame—300,000 words, about 700 book pages—within which to portray the life of George Kennan. But it did not

always seem so to me. I had to cover, after all, 101 years and deal with the contents of some 330 boxes of exceedingly rich archival material, plus the hundred pages of interviews I did with Kennan and his contemporaries when I started this project in the early 1980s, while still giving at least some attention to the issues raised by the biographers that had preceded me.

I wound up not using about ninety percent of the notes I took and the photocopies I made. But was this unused material therefore useless? I don't think so, because it gave me the basis for regarding the things I did use as illustrative. They *represented* a larger number of similar things that I didn't have the space to discuss but knew had happened. Would another biographer have made such selections differently? Of course. Several have already taken the opportunity, in their reviews of the Kennan book, to say precisely how.

VI.

All of which leads, then, to a third principle of biography that I am exploring with my New Haven teachers: how might they explain, to their students, that there is no such thing, in biography, as *objectivity*? That there will never be a truly definitive life of anybody?

Imagine another classroom—maybe a fourth-grade one this time—in which Chun-ho and José are asked to prepare, independently, brief biographies of their friend Kate. They would quickly find that these would not correspond in all respects, because each of Kate's biographers, in fitting their work to the frame allowed, would have selected something different about her as illustrative.

The principle being taught here would be that *selection ensures subjectivity*. Biographers can't possibly include every fact about anybody. Who biographers are will determine what they consider to be important and hence what gets into the books they write. Different books will contain different facts, even if they are about the same person.

Incidentally, does that person have the right to authorize a biography? That is an issue that I think we might let our fourth graders work out. Kate could, of course, decide not to cooperate with either Chun-ho or José, but she would be giving up the opportunity to tell her side of the story, something that few kids—or for that matter elder statesmen—can resist. Or she might cooperate with both of them as a way of hedging her bets, for if one biography turned out to be dreadful, there would still be another. I have sometimes suspected Henry Kissinger of following this procedure.

But if a subject takes his or her authorized biographers seriously, having several can take up a lot of time, leaving each of them with less of a life to write about in the first place. There is, thus, a certain logic in having only one.

How I became Kennan's authorized biographer remains something of a mystery to me and, I am sure, to many others. He and I hardly knew each other at the time, in 1981. It could have been an act of faith, but it could as easily have been a roll of the dice, a risky, high-stakes gamble. My guess is, though, that it was a matter of convenience: it had not occurred to George when he gave his papers to Princeton in the 1970s that he would soon be besieged by biographers. I was, I suspect, the biographical equivalent of one-stop shopping.

Did Kennan regret his choice, as some reviewers have suggested he did, or should have? I know that at times I made him nervous. He didn't share my growing respect for Ronald Reagan. I didn't share his late-in-life enthusiasm for a Council of State. We agreed in opposing NATO expansion. We disagreed about—but agreed not to discuss—George W. Bush. We retained, in short, our respective identities: it didn't occur to us that either should be absorbed into the other. And Kennan never took me up on the offer I left open

throughout our long relationship: that at any point he could back out of the deal.

Given the bitter history of so many other authorized biographies, I can see now how lucky I was. George and I maintained mutual respect, perhaps because we also maintained a certain distance. "I'm glad you're at Yale and not Princeton," he once said to me. "That way you're not always around and under foot."

VII.

Back, though, to our fourth graders and to what they have learned about subjectivity. If no two biographers would write about the same person in the same way, then which one should a reader trust? How do we, as biographers, know when we have got it right? How might you check to see how well an authorized biographer has done his or her job?

The answer, of course, is archives, or whatever else has survived from the era in which the subject of the biography lived. But how would you introduce this concept to fourth graders, or to middle or high school students? And how would you also show the limitations of archives?

One way might be to ask your students to keep track of the records they will leave behind from some particular day in their present life. When I try this with Yalies, they come up with predictable things like diary entries or papers they have prepared for class, e-mails, tweets, and Facebook pages, internet browsing histories during boring lectures, swipe card records for getting in and out of their dorms, and receipts from Starbucks or for pizza deliveries or for frozen yogurt—their insatiable appetite for which will surely puzzle future historians of everyday life at this stage in the twenty-first century.

But when I ask them how well these archives and artifacts reflect what they actually did on the day in question, my students are shocked: the surviving sources, they say, will pick up very little of what they felt or talked about on that day. What is most important to them, they worry, will be lost. They leave my class convinced that they'll be misunderstood down through the corridors of time, without being able to do anything about it.

Other than to hope for *imaginative* biographers. When I ask them what they mean by this, they say that they will want biographers who can fill the archival gaps, who will use their knowledge of the era, but also their imagination, to reconstruct what must have happened—or at least what probably happened—on any particular day.

But isn't this writing fiction, our clever fourth graders might ask? It is in a way, I would try to explain to them, but it is more like paleontology: the fitting of imagined flesh to surviving bones. That is something that even the youngest kids can understand, dinosaur experts that most of them are. I know this because I see them lined up outside the Peabody Museum when I walk into campus most mornings. There is even a big dinosaur outside now that they can pose with. And as the curators take them around inside, the kids' comments shift quickly from the initial "Yuck!" or "Ick!" to "Wow!" and then "Awesome!"

For the point of visiting a natural history museum now—unlike what it might have been when the first ones opened—is not to gross people out over freaks or prodigies, but to show the evolution of life forms through changing environments over long periods of time. It is to illustrate adaptations, not all of which are successful, because environments can at times change faster than the adaptations do.

The only reasons you might wrench some ancient animal out of its own environment and plunk it down in our own world be to sell a scary novel, as the late Michael Crichton did, or to make a hair-raising movie, as Steven Spielberg did. But the kids would understand that this

would not be science, and without it being too much of a stretch, I think you could get them to see that it would not be biography either. At least not good biography.

VIII.

That brings me around to a final principle, which is that *even if biography can't be objective, it should be fair*. I would define "fairness" as sensitivity to context. It is not fair—however fashionable it may be—to wrench historical figures from the context in which they flourished, to put them on display in our own, and then to say, "Gross!" Or "Yuck!" Or "How hopelessly retro." There is an obligation first, I think, to apply the standards of their time, and only then to apply our own. I often ask my students to speculate about the ways they will appear "retro" to their own children and grandchildren. None look forward to being exhibited as freaks in the future. So what is our justification for writing biographies that depend on such displays now?

Maybe I am oversensitive to this issue, because so many of the things Kennan wrote or said lent themselves to such exhibitions. I did not ignore these in the biography, but I did try to keep them in context. Would they have been considered outrageous by the standards of the time in which they originated—however outrageous they may appear to us now? I found some that passed that test, and many that did not. I tried, in what I wrote, to distinguish between them.

But could this concept of "fairness" in biography—assuming you are willing to accept this sense of it—be taught to fourth graders? Well, try making fun of the dinosaurs these kids have seen as they file out of the Peabody on any particular morning. "Gross, right?" "Yucky, right?" "Hopelessly retro, right?" you might say to them as they are getting on their school buses. "Yeah, right," the kids would probably say. But they'd be talking about you.

So is there a dinosaur in the Kennan biography? There is, actually, and it was George who put him there. He once

famously described democracy as being like "one of those prehistoric monsters with a body as long as this room and a brain the size of a pin: he lives there in his comfortable primeval mud and pays little attention to his environment; he is slow to wrath—in fact, you practically have to whack his tail off to make him aware that his interests are being disturbed; but, once he grasps this, he lays about him with such blind determination that he not only destroys his adversary but largely wrecks his native habitat."⁴

To Kennan's lasting embarrassment, *American Diplomacy*, where this passage appears, became and remains his most widely read book. It was also his first, and he quickly came to see it as shallow, superficial, and in many places wrong—a set of lectures dashed off without considering how they would look in print. There were several instances in Kennan's life in which the writings he spent the least time on—others included the long telegram, the X article, and the Reith lectures—became the ones most controversially remembered. Kennan's dinosaur, in this sense, chased him for the rest of his life.

I cannot help but reflect upon the Shakespearian tragedy implicit in what transpired with Kennan's work. The Bard's most famous stage direction, from *A Winter's Tale*, is "Exit, pursued by a bear." So how could I not use, as the final line of this talk about Kennan, about biography, and about the possibility of teaching of that subject to impressionable but wise kids, this slightly modified version: "Exit, pursued by a dinosaur."

Notes:

1. John Lewis Gaddis, *George F. Kennan: An American Life* (New York, 2011).
2. George F. Kennan, "The Experience of Writing History," in Stephen Vaughn, ed., *The Vital Past: Writings on the Uses of History* (Athens, GA, 1985), 97.
3. I have borrowed this observation from James Shapiro, *A Year in the Life of William Shakespeare: 1599* (New York, 2005), 303–4.
4. Gaddis, *George F. Kennan*, 435.

America and the World, the World and America

The 2013 SHAFR meeting, "America and the World, the World and America," will be held from June 20-22 at the Renaissance Arlington Capital View in Arlington, Virginia. We hope you will join us there!

The conference will kick off with the first panel session at 1pm on Thursday, June 20, followed by a welcome reception, open to all registrants, and an evening plenary session. The plenary session, titled "America and the World – the World and America: Writing American Diplomatic History in the Longue Durée," will put leading scholars of eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth century American diplomatic history in conversation with one another. John W. Hall (University of Wisconsin-Madison), Jay Sexton (Oxford University), Kristin L. Hoganson (University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign) and Paul A. Kramer (Vanderbilt University) will launch the roundtable, while Erez Manela (Harvard University) and Anne L. Foster (Indiana State University) will respond, and George C. Herring (University of Kentucky) will chair.

Luncheon speakers will be SHAFR president Mark Philip Bradley, the Bernadotte E. Schmitt Professor of International History and the College at the University of Chicago, and Timothy J. Naftali. Naftali, former director of the Nixon Presidential Library and Senior Research Fellow in the National Security Studies Program at the New American Foundation, will speak on "Legacy vs. Access? The Challenges of Researching Presidential History."

We are also planning a hands-on Job Search Workshop on the morning of June 21 to help better prepare our membership for the job market. Graduate students (and newly minted Ph.D.s) must express their interest in participating in the workshop, indicate whether they anticipate applying for jobs in or out of the academy and attach a Word version of their cover letter and cv to jobworkshop@shafr.org no later than **February 15, 2013**. Those wishing to participate should apply early as space will be limited.

This year's social event will be a dinner dance at Top of the Town, a setting that features sweeping views of Washington landmarks across the Potomac River. Top of the Town is located within walking distance of the Rosslyn Metro (blue and orange lines). Round-trip chartered bus tickets will also be available for purchase.

The LEED-certified Renaissance Arlington Capital View is located at 2800 South Potomac Avenue, two miles from Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (airport code DCA). There is complimentary hotel shuttle service every 20 minutes between 7 am and 11 pm to DCA and the Crystal City Metro (blue and yellow lines). The Crystal City Metro is connected to the Crystal City Shops, which features retail locations as well as restaurants from the casual Hamburger Hamlet or Bailey's Pub and Grill to the Spanish tapas restaurant Jaleo Crystal City or the classic Ruth's Chris Steak House. In the Renaissance Arlington Capital View Lobby, SOCCI Urban Italian Kitchen and Bar serves breakfast, lunch, and dinner, while Espressamente illy Coffee House serves coffee and light fare during the day. A 24-hour fitness center and heated indoor pool are also available on site, and there is complimentary wi-fi access in the lobby.

Conference room rates are \$139/night, single or double occupancy, plus tax. Hotel guests will receive complimentary high speed internet access in their rooms. On-site self parking is available for the reduced rate of \$18 per day for guests, or \$6/hour in-and-out or \$22/day for visitors.

Hotel reservations can be made by calling Renaissance Hotels toll-free at 1-800-HOTELS1 and asking for the SHAFR room block, or by going online to <http://bit.ly/UvsuMn>, where the group code, shashaa, has already been entered in the reservation box.

Printed program booklets and registration forms will be mailed out to all SHAFR members with a current domestic U.S. address in April. Online registration will be available in late March. Registration fees for the 2013 conference will be:

\$80 standard
\$30 adjunct faculty or K-12 teacher
\$30 student

Please note that there is a surcharge after June 1, 2013.

For more details about conference arrangements, visit <http://www.shafr.org/conferences/2013-annual-meeting/> or follow us on Twitter @SHAFRConference. For questions about registration and other conference logistics, please contact Jennifer Walton, the Conference Coordinator, at conference@shafr.org.

Roundtable Discussion on Matthew Jacobs' *Imagining the Middle East: The Building of an American Foreign Policy, 1918-1967*

Mary Ann Heiss, Kent F. Schull, Nancy Stockdale, Babak Rahimi, W. Taylor Fain,
Jeffrey Byrne, and Matthew F. Jacobs

Introduction

Mary Ann Heiss

Matthew Jacobs' *Imagining the Middle East: The Building of an American Foreign Policy, 1918-1967* is certainly timely, given the manifold current—and sure to be continuing—sites of U.S. interest and involvement in the region. As the five reviews that comprise this roundtable make clear, the book is also eminently praiseworthy on a scholarly level. Jeffrey James Byrne dubs it “a compelling intellectual history of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East region.” For Kent F. Schull, it is “a welcome addition to a burgeoning scholarship that utilizes the new diplomatic history approach to elucidate the complex and often contradictory influences upon U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East.” Babak Rahimi lauds it as “arguably . . . the best theoretical analysis yet on the subject” of “how cultural processes shape the history and future trajectories of American involvement in the Middle East.” And W. Tyler Fain and Nancy Stockdale both suggest that it deserves a broad readership, proclaiming, respectively, that it “should find its way onto the reading lists and bookshelves of everyone concerned with America’s relations with the Middle East” and that it “may well become standard reading for those looking to understand how mid-century political imaginings of the Middle East influenced American politics.” Although each reviewer provides a unique perspective on the book, as well as a variety of critical assessments, a number of repeated themes emerge. Two strike me as meriting consideration here.

One theme that recurs in several of the reviews that follow is the role of what might be described as the non-state voice in molding and shaping U.S. foreign policy. In the case of *Imagining the Middle East*, that voice belonged to an unofficial cadre of business, academic, media, and religious experts (with a few government officials sprinkled in for good measure) who were largely responsible for making the Middle East known to and knowable for Americans. The knowledge these experts produced, Jacobs contends, then went on to guide the formulation of U.S. policy toward the region. To be sure, the reviewers were not

all convinced that Jacobs had successfully demonstrated a direct link between the “imaginings” of this informal network and actual U.S. policy, with Byrne being the most critical. Without exception, however, they appreciate his assertion that the roots of U.S. policy can only be discerned by extending one’s gaze beyond official policymaking circles to the unofficial realm of expert knowledge and perceptions. Perhaps Rahimi puts this point best when he avers that understanding U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East necessitates “a focus on how knowledge is produced through complex systems of representation rather than mere study of policy strategies.” Without question, Jacobs’ effort to shed light on the cultural and intellectual foundations of U.S. Middle East policy as generated by an informal network of regional experts constitutes a real contribution to the field, as does his demonstration that network-generated conceptions of the region did not always square with reality.

Without question, Jacobs’ effort to shed light on the cultural and intellectual foundations of U.S. Middle East policy as generated by an informal network of regional experts constitutes a real contribution to the field, as does his demonstration that network-generated conceptions of the region did not always square with reality.

A second theme that makes its way into a number of the reviews is the long—and deleterious—reach of American exceptionalism, as the knowledge generated by the informal network of Middle East experts was intended to be marshaled in support of U.S. efforts to remake the region in its own image. As Jacobs makes clear, there was never a thought that such a project might be unwise or potentially unsuccessful. On the contrary, U.S. officials were confident in both the rightness of their mission to transform the Middle East based on U.S. norms and the guarantee of that mission’s success. Stockdale provides the most concrete explication of this tendency when she notes that U.S. officials blamed the failure of their modernization efforts in the region on inherent shortcomings and deficiencies in the region’s people rather than considering the efficacy or wisdom of their campaign to fit those people into a one-size-fits-all model based on the U.S. experience. In the process, they revealed the way idealized conceptions of the Middle East based on an imagined U.S.-framed future blinded them to the region’s true present—and guaranteed the failure of the U.S. errand to remake the region’s future in the process. Schull, too, speaks to the exceptionalist bent of U.S. thinking when he castigates the hubris inherent in network experts’ belief that the United States could and should interject itself into the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian

conflict. Highlighting the extent to which exceptionalist thinking permeated U.S. thinking regarding the Middle East is unquestionably another contribution that *Imagining the Middle East* makes to the literature.

Although all of the reviewers affirm the importance of Jacobs' subject and applaud his effort to identify the early twentieth-century roots of U.S. policy toward the Middle East, as is always the case with roundtables of this sort, each assesses the overall success of Jacobs' book differently. Schull is the most critical, particularly concerning Jacobs' use of a thematic over a more overtly chronological organizational scheme, a criticism Byrne shares. But the other reviewers, particularly Byrne and Fain, also raise important points of critique concerning the book's chronological parameters, source base, and choice of examples. Such quibbles—large and small—notwithstanding, Jacobs should be commended for producing a volume that has stimulated much thought, discussion, and even debate.

The New Diplomatic History and U.S. Foreign Policy from a Middle East Socio-Cultural Historian's Perspective: Review of Matthew F. Jacobs, *Imagining the Middle East: The Building of an American Foreign Policy, 1918–1967*

Kent F. Schull

Matthew F. Jacobs' book, *Imagining the Middle East: The Building of an American Foreign Policy, 1918–1967*, is a welcome addition to a burgeoning scholarship that utilizes the new diplomatic history approach to elucidate the complex and often contradictory influences upon U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East. As Jacobs acknowledges, his book is best understood within the context of several relatively recent works investigating the cultural aspects of and influences on U.S. foreign policy in this region (12). The two most important are Douglas Little's *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945*, 3rd ed., and Melani McAlister's *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945–2000*, 2nd ed. Little's is primarily a thorough history of U.S. policy towards the Middle East, whereas McAlister focuses on the image of the Middle East in American culture during the same time period. Jacobs attempts to insert his argument between these two works by looking at the intersection between and mutual effects of image and policy. Little's book appears to have influenced him more heavily, as evidenced by the structure of his monograph; more on that subject below.

The purpose of Jacobs' book is to leave the smoky back rooms and elite policy meetings and investigate who in the United States imagined the Middle East, how they imagined it, and how their imaginings influenced U.S. policy on this volatile and vital region of the world. The book is not, however, an exhaustive analysis of U.S. policy on the region. "Instead, it is an effort to grapple with how professional observers of, commentators on, and makers of policy toward the Middle East understood the region in its entirety" (2). Indeed, the purpose of Jacobs' book, as the subtitle indicates, is to explain the various and diverse influences on the construction of this policy. "From the end of World War I to the late 1960s, an evolving, informal network of specialists—somewhat transnational in scope—from academia, the business world, government, and the media was responsible for interpreting the Middle East for American audiences" (235).

This informal network imagined U.S. involvement in the Middle East as guided by four interrelated issues, which are the themes around which Jacobs organizes his book. After the first chapter, in which Jacobs discusses the formation of the informal transnational network of

authorities on the Middle East from the nineteenth century until the end of the 1960s, he deals with those four themes in order. The first theme involves religion: the network assumed that a monolithic, medieval, totalitarian, and aggressively reactive Islam permeated all levels of state and society in the region and was now causing a severe identity crisis throughout the Islamic world as it confronted modernity. The second theme is nationalism: the network believed the development of regional, liberal, and secular nationalisms in the region was a beneficial counterweight to the corrosive influence of Islam. However, regional nationalism became a malignant cancer when Mohammad Mossadegh (Iran) and Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser (Egypt) combined it with populist rhetoric and radical mass politics as epitomized by Nasser's pan-Arab nationalism. The third theme deals with modernization: the network maintained that a U.S.-designed and led modernization program, strategically promoted and carefully implemented so as not to fan the extremes of religious and nationalist sentiment, would help to solve the region's many social, economic, and political crises. The final theme is the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The experts believed that the United States possessed the capacity and responsibility to manage that volatile conflict, notwithstanding the contradictory web of tangled domestic and international constraints affecting the efficacy of U.S. policy towards this conflagration.

In addition to the four themes on which this book centers, Jacobs also weaves four "interpretive threads" throughout the imaginings of this informal network and discusses how they affected the issues that the network believed central to the Middle East's evolution. The first thread involves U.S. economic (oil) and national security concerns (the Cold War) and the effect of those concerns on imaginings about and subsequent policies toward the Middle East. The second thread focuses on how the nature of expertise and authority concerning the region changed in the United States over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Once reliant on missionaries, businessmen, and producers of travel literature, the government turned to academics and journalists and began to employ area studies specialists, many of whom were trained at academic institutions in the United States. The third thread running throughout Jacobs' book concerns the consistent efforts of this informal network to envision the transformation of the Middle East into a modern, secular, democratic, industrialized, and capitalist region. This transformation was to be guided by the United States as the fulfillment of a secular and sacred mission to share its prosperity and democratic values with the rest of the world. Obviously, this third thread and Jacobs' third theme overlap significantly—so much so that they are often indistinguishable throughout the book's narrative, particularly in chapter 4, which focuses on the transformation of the Middle East through modernization efforts.

The final thread is Jacobs' attempt "to contribute to . . . a 'post-orientalist' understanding of the multifaceted relationship between the United States and the Middle East" in an effort to link, at least contextually, specific thinkers and producers of knowledge about the Middle East with U.S. foreign policy (9). This is probably the least necessary and insightful of the four threads. Edward Said's seminal argument has received so much analysis, engagement, criticism, and refinement since its publication in 1979 that Jacobs' foray into this issue offers little that is fresh or enlightening. In fact, Jacobs' own analysis of American efforts to transform the Middle East using itself as the ideal model of modernization only reinforces the Saidian binaries that Jacobs is supposedly attempting to eclipse. By linking all four threads, however, with the four themes outlined above, Jacobs insightfully and effectively creates what Timothy Mitchell calls a "framework of meaning" that officials and politicians simultaneously conveyed to

the American public and drew upon to shape U.S. foreign policy for the Middle East (11).

According to Jacobs, discordant voices challenging the informal network's rendering of the four issues affecting U.S. involvement in the Middle East eventually arose within and outside the network and resulted in its fracturing in the wake of the 1967 Six-Day War. Jacobs clearly demonstrates the mounting tension leading up to the 1967 War, as academics and policymakers employed their greater experience and an improved knowledge base to provide alternative views of the Middle East. Unfortunately, many in this informal network (Fouad Ajami, Bernard Lewis and their acolytes) still propagate their binary Cold War era imaginings, now wrapped in the old-new veneer of Islamophobia, to policymakers and the general public.

While the threads are effectively woven throughout the entire book, the four themes Jacobs uses suffer from a lack of cohesion. Although he claims in the introduction and epilogue that the themes are closely connected and must be understood in the aggregate, he does not demonstrate their mutual connectivity. His argument is methodologically sound and his understanding of the discourses that informed American decision making from the erection of the mandates to the June 1967 war is nuanced, but he does not present an adequate synthesis of that argument. The reader comes away from this book much enlightened about the varied influences on U.S. foreign policy but is disappointed that those influences are not better integrated. For example, how can Jacobs' informal network imagine and formulate policy on the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict when it is disaggregated from its imaginings of Islam, Pan-Arab nationalism, and modernization? Jacobs thoroughly investigates the effects of the Suez Crisis of 1956 on the development of Pan-Arab nationalism but virtually ignores its influence on the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict when Israel was the primary aggressor against Egypt (121–131, 220)!

Perhaps Jacobs' argument simply reflects the disjointed nature and flawed understandings of this informal network. However, much research has demonstrated the direct and deep connections between U.S. foreign policy and the growth of Pan-Arab nationalism, the suppression of political Islam, the management and escalation of the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and U.S. attempts at Middle East modernization in the mid-1950s.¹ These connections were not lost on American policymakers at the time, especially in light of events of 1954 (Nasser's consolidation of power over the Free Officers Movement, his suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Israel's infamous Lavon Affair), 1955 (Israel's Gaza raid and its alliance and arms deal with France, together with Nasser's refusal to join the Baghdad Pact (CENTO), his participation in the Bandung Conference and Non-Alignment Movement, Egypt's recognition of the People's Republic of China, Nasser's arms deal with Czechoslovakia, an increase in Egyptian-sponsored Palestinian raids on Israel, and the closing of the Straits of Tiran), and 1956 (the failure of Project Alpha, the United States' refusal to honor its pledge to support the Aswan Dam project in Egypt, Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal, and finally, the Suez Crisis, when Israel, Britain, and France invaded Egypt). This three-year period has intimate connections to all four of the themes Jacobs highlights, but unfortunately the author does not adequately link them together. Events on the ground, imaginings, and policies related to each of Jacobs' themes are completely dependent

Much research has demonstrated the direct and deep connections between U.S. foreign policy and the growth of Pan-Arab nationalism, the suppression of political Islam, the management and escalation of the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and U.S. attempts at Middle East modernization in the mid-1950s.¹ These connections were not lost on American policymakers at the time, especially in light of events of 1954

upon each other and should never have been separated in such an arbitrary way.

That said, Jacobs' themes and most of his threads are justified and, in this reviewer's opinion, mostly accurate. The disconnect among events, imaginings and policies is not necessarily the result of Jacobs' proposed project, methodology, conclusions, or his insightful use of sources.

It is a direct result of his monograph's flawed organization. It is apparent that the scholarship of Douglas Little has deeply influenced Jacobs' work. He says as much in the introduction and acknowledgements and further demonstrates it in his bibliography and footnotes, where no other scholar is cited more than Little. Little's influence is so great that Jacobs even patterns the structure of his book on *American Orientalism: The United States and the Modern Middle East since 1945*. Both books are structured so that the reader can consume their contents as a whole or in parts. As Jacobs explains, "The book's thematic organization makes it possible to read each chapter independently, but several threads tie the chapters together into a cohesive examination of how professional Middle East watchers imagine the region" (3).

Unfortunately, the reader comes away disappointed. It appears that the author's desire to use a structure similar to Little's led him to shun a chronological approach to the themes that his book attempts to synthesize. Islam, radicalized mass politics and Pan-Arab nationalism, U.S.-guided modernization of the Middle East, and the management of the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict were not mutually exclusive. All occurred simultaneously and were intertwined as they factored into the Middle East imagined by the informal network Jacobs so effectively describes. Jacobs' treatment of these four themes in artificial isolation from each other results in a highly repetitive and disconnected narrative, as each chapter rehashes many of the same issues, peoples, and events discussed in previous ones. This problem could have been solved easily had he treated his subject chronologically.

It is commendable that Jacobs has "no intention of propagating or perpetuating a variety of deeply flawed perceptions of and stereotypes about the Middle East and its peoples" (11). However, some of his more minor claims and some of the background information unrelated to his overall argument actually do perpetuate some misconceptions. Perhaps these inaccuracies, anachronistic statements, and omissions are of the kind that only a specialist of the region would recognize. However, they exemplify a problem that bedevils many diplomatic historians who still do not possess the in-depth knowledge and training in the history, culture, and languages of the Middle East that is requisite for adequately and accurately assessing the nature and effects of U.S. foreign policy in the region.

Two examples will suffice to demonstrate this point. First, Jacobs offhandedly states that "U.S. missionaries had a large presence [in the Ottoman Empire] and witnessed the Turkish massacres of Armenians over the preceding three decades" (31). This is inaccurate, and it perpetuates a portion of the chauvinistic ethno-nationalist propaganda campaigns that the Turkish and Armenian governments have waged against each other for decades. The various massacres of Armenians that occurred in the Ottoman Empire from 1890 through World War One were carried out by Ottoman forces consisting of a variety of ethnicities. The primary perpetrators of the massacres of Armenians

in the 1890s were the Hamidiye corps, established by the Pan-Islamist Sultan Abdülhamid II and patterned after the Russian Cossack brigades. These troops were made up primarily of Kurdish tribesmen. During World War One, the Ottoman forces that carried out the horrific atrocities against the empire's Armenian population were made up of ethnically mixed Muslims, among them Arabs, Circassians, Kurds, and Turks. While Turkish nationalism and ethnic Turks did indeed play a major role in the World War One atrocities against Armenians, they were neither the sole instigators nor perpetrators. It is time this debate and these horrific atrocities were extricated from present-day ethno-nationalist agendas and placed in their proper historical contexts.

The second example involves Jacobs' treatment of educational efforts by American missionaries in the Ottoman Empire. He accurately claims that these missionaries established several colleges and hundreds of primary and secondary schools; however, his argument clearly implies that only Arabs were taught in these institutions, even when one of the two named schools is Robert College in present-day Istanbul (14–15)! The vast majority of that college's student body was not Arab. This passage also implies that missionaries learned only Arabic and proselytized only to Arabs, as if they were the sole population in the Middle East. In addition to Arabic, American missionaries learned Turkish, Armenian, Kurdish, and a host of other Middle Eastern languages in their attempts to convert, educate, and "uplift" these peoples. These two examples may seem petty, because in the end they do not affect the author's overall argument in anyway. They do, however, demonstrate the continued dearth of an accurate knowledge base on the Middle East from which many foreign policy analysts and diplomatic historians continue to suffer.

Notwithstanding the problem of organization and minor factual errors, this is an insightful, well-argued, and important work on the influences and development of U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East, and this reviewer highly recommends its adoption for graduate student reading lists.

Note:

1. For an excellent if brief treatment of the connections between events in the Middle East and their effects on U.S. foreign policy see James L. Gelvin's *The Israel-Palestinian Conflict: One Hundred Years of War*, 2nd ed. (New York, 2007), 165–182. For a more thorough treatment of the international politics and diplomacy of this critical period see Charles Smith's *Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents*, 7th ed. (New York, 2010), 232–251. Ironically, Jacobs does not appear to have consulted either of these important and standard studies of the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Additionally, his bibliography lacks any reference to a standardly accepted study of this conflict. This is very puzzling, since one-fourth of his argument hinges on this topic.

Review of Matthew F. Jacobs, *Imagining the Middle East: The Building of an American Foreign Policy, 1918–1967*

Nancy Stockdale

Throughout the twentieth century, the United States enmeshed itself diplomatically, economically, overtly, and covertly into the political workings of each Middle Eastern country. Then, as the current century dawned, the events of 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the increasing intractability of regional contests such as the Israel-Palestine conflict brought to light the

truly vast extent to which the United States has not only guided and shaped Middle Eastern affairs but also ignored the costs to its own security. In this context, many scholars have wrestled with the question "How did we get here?" Matthew F. Jacobs' new book, *Imagining the Middle East*, strives to answer that question. Using myriad diplomatic, academic, and economic source materials, Jacobs argues that imaginary conceptions of the region, promoted first by "experts" and then put into practice by government and non-governmental actors, have shaped American policy to help create the very serious political, social, and economic issues in the region we witness today.

Jacobs' book begins with that now-clichéd moment in the aftermath of 9/11 when then-President George W.

Bush addressed the American public with the question "Why do they hate us?" The binary "they" and "us," argues Jacobs, was but an unsophisticated reiteration of how American policymakers and their academic informants had been conceptualizing the Middle East for several decades. "Specialists" and "experts" in the region throughout the twentieth century conceived of the area in two ways, according to Jacobs. First, they created a notion that the region was guided by certain easily definable characteristics that motivated its populations to act

in certain predictable ways. Second, they imagined the future of the region as they hoped to create it as a result of American engagement. That is, they defined the Middle East according to attributes they argued applied across space and time, and they projected their own hopes and visions of how the United States could remake the region to suit its own interests.

Jacobs argues that American engagement in the Middle East has been driven by ideas about an imaginary future and that the United States has had no genuine sense of the impact of its intervention on the politics or populations of the disparate nations of the Middle East. In short, American influence has been self-serving. That argument is not unique, but it is not the main focus of Jacobs' book. His primary contribution is an historical narrative of dynamic American networks of "experts"—businessmen, policymakers, strategists, and others—who have worked to formulate, promote, and control images of the Middle East and the exercise of American authority based on these imaginary ideals.

Some of these experts, both self-proclaimed and acknowledged, were deeply entrenched in academic research—among them Bernard Lewis and H. A. R. Gibb, European scholars from the Orientalist tradition. However, many others were engaged in the realms of business, politics, and journalism, and some came from Middle Eastern nations, especially Lebanon. What these diverse groups had in common, according to Jacobs, was a keen desire to continue imagining the Middle East in a future state, a future that could be shaped by American interests for American interests. Viewing the United States as having a unique role to play in shaping the world at large, these networks envisioned the Middle East—with its symbolic, strategic, and economic resources—as a pivotal element of America's assertion of its global hegemony.

Central to the imaginary vision of the Middle East among these networks were the older, traditional notions of the region as a place guided by its religiosity—both as the Holy Land and as a place supposedly dominated by Islamic despotism. However, the twentieth century married these notions to ideals of modernization, development, and—of course—the build-up of the oil industry in the region as a focal point for power and progress. Drives for secularism and nationalism, coupled with new ways of using religion

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as a political force, struggled against each other in the imaginations of these experts. As hopeful development narratives collided with the exercise of power in the Arab-Israeli wars, in nationalism and nationalization, and in civil conflicts unique to nations that were being lumped together into one neat regional package by the foreign “experts,” tensions between Middle Eastern states and actors and the United States escalated far beyond the visions these specialist networks promoted. The result, Jacobs argues, was deep American entrenchment in a variety of Middle Eastern morasses from which it could not—and still cannot—clearly extricate itself and in which self-serving American dreams of a “modern” Middle East clash with a less than stellar military and political record of interference in the region that crushes such dreams.

One of the key contributions of Jacobs’ work is the realization, through the examination of published and unpublished documents from theorists, academics, and policymakers, that even as the mid-twentieth century honed in on secularism as an imperative of modernity, traditional Orientalist notions of the Middle East as inherently, almost ineluctably religious persisted. Ideas about the Arab-Israeli conflict as a battle based in religion, views of Islam as an intrinsically despotic system, and the widely held belief that religious institutions could not and would not be frameworks for pro-American sentiment have figured widely in American visions of the Middle East. Moreover, Jacobs makes it clear that in large part the reason this thinking was so persistent was that, even though the post-World War II Middle East was increasingly important because of its oil and its strategic location rather than its cultural or religious symbolism, many of the American “experts” of the region had missionary backgrounds. They continued to read the area through religious lenses, even though that perspective was not necessarily germane to the issues at hand. Moreover, they had no credentials: they were often accepted as experts merely because of their longstanding residence in the region and/or their knowledge of Arabic. They brought their own personal biases and baggage into the sphere of policy, journalism, and negotiations about the modern future, even as they themselves were products of the non-modern past.

Another important point of this book is Jacobs’ assertion that American “expertise” regarding the role of Islam and other religions in the region has been skewed greatly by those who took on the task of defining and explaining what religions in the Middle East are and how they function. For example, military and diplomatic studies of the region from the 1950s relied on non-experts, often choosing clergy of other faiths to explain Islam to business and government officials. Those studies continued to express many of the same clichés about Islam being by its very nature at odds with modernity that secularists did. The binary image of a Middle East at war with its own identity—trapped between the “traditionalism” of Islam and secular, modern Westernization—became the standard trope. This false trope not only drove American policymakers alternately to reject or embrace an either/or dialectic with “Islamists” and “secularists” (depending upon how those policymakers perceived American interests) but also prevented a more nuanced dialogue and, ultimately, more long-term stability in the region.

As American interests in development, the petroleum industry, and military power grew in the 1950s—the era of Nasser, Mossadegh, and heightened states of hot and

cold war between Arab nations and the Israelis—the image of the Middle East as a place in desperate need of American moral, political, economic, and infrastructural intervention became even more prevalent. Books such as Doreen Warriner’s *Land and Poverty in the Middle East* (1948), which presented the poor of the region as among the most degraded and untrustworthy upon the planet, were heralded as insightful masterpieces decades after their debut, regardless of the dramatic social and economic changes on the ground. Such studies led to a strong belief among Jacobs’ networks of American power that the region needed to be saved by an America that could revamp Middle Eastern social, political, and economic structures as it saw fit. However, Jacobs is quick to point out that, while there were real structural deficiencies in a Middle East racked by the aftermath of postcolonialism, the creation of Israel, and the devastating changes of the two world wars, his American experts also deluded themselves into believing that native people did not see or refused to see the challenges facing them and had to be led along to support the goals of the United States in a refashioning of the Middle East—as the Americans envisioned it.

By the 1960s, Jacobs argues, American experts were promoting ideas about the de-Arabization of the Arab nations, for they attributed Middle Eastern problems of poverty, development, health, and warfare to “essential” qualities of Arab culture rather than seeing them as the results of historical experiences. When they were presented with American plans for such a dramatic transformation of their cultures, Arabs resisted. Their resistance puzzled the “experts” and the governments that relied upon them. Having failed to convince Middle Easterners to embrace all elements of their plans for remaking the region, the Americans blamed the people of

the region, not their own failed assumptions about the universal applicability of their methods of development and their modernization projects.

Most troubling to Americans, perhaps, was their inability to convince the rest of the Middle East to accept an imagined—and later, realized—Jewish Palestine. The introduction of Zionism into the Middle East with the creation of the state of Israel was not as easily embraced by American “experts” as current American-Israeli relations might suggest. Within Jacobs’ expert networks there were sharp divisions about Middle Eastern alliances. These divisions existed throughout his period of study, particularly during the Kennedy administration. While the experts at hand presented a variety of interpretations to support each position, Jacobs admits that ultimately most networks came to agree that supporting Israel was in the interests of American authority, even though outsiders may have viewed this conclusion as counterintuitive.

Jacobs’ work is adroitly written and supported by a variety of governmental, organizational, and academic sources, including a host of presidential papers and documentation from the CIA and the Council on Foreign Relations. Perhaps most impressive, however, is his decision to stop his inquiry in 1967. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, American approaches to the transformation of the Middle East changed dramatically. Although the view of the United States as imbued with a sacred as well as a secular mission to transform the world remained in much political and popular imagery, its more overt support of Israel (despite its illegal control of the 1967 occupied territories), Pahlavi Iran (regardless of its extraordinary human rights abuses and disparity of wealth), and Saudi Arabia (like Iran, a

American “expertise” regarding the role of Islam and other religions in the region has been skewed greatly by those who took on the task of defining and explaining what religions in the Middle East are and how they function. For example, military and diplomatic studies of the region from the 1950s relied on non-experts, often choosing clergy of other faiths to explain Islam to business and government officials.

nation racked by human rights concerns), coupled with its increasing disdain toward religious political movements (just as secular politics were so largely discredited among Middle Easterners by corruption and failed projects), further damaged American authority in the region. The subsequent divides in politics and academia surrounding Middle Eastern Studies that emerged in the wake of the Gulf War, 9/11, and their aftermath have deeply fractured the networks of expertise that Jacobs studies. However, this well-written and impressively researched book may well become standard reading for those looking to understand how mid-century political imaginings of the Middle East influenced American politics in the era before today's current intellectual and political conflicts over the subject.

Review of Matthew F. Jacobs' *Imagining the Middle East: The Building of an American Foreign Policy, 1918–1967*

Babak Rahimi

Over the last decade, American adventures in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown the limits of a foreign policy that is largely built around the rhetoric of alterity and hostility. While on the surface this rhetoric may help simplify Washington's political stance toward the Middle East, such confrontational language reflects a deeper side of a political culture that essentially frames the region as a dark entity to be confronted or, alternatively, to be redeemed from its own ills. In a discursive sense, post-9/11 American policy still appears to rely on the use of powerful narratives about the Middle East that justify U.S. military ventures in the region through the idioms of "evil" and "terror" or around the discourse of development and democratization. A renewed look at U.S. foreign policy toward the Middle East, therefore, requires a study of such narratives with a focus on how knowledge is produced through complex systems of representation rather than mere study of policy strategies.

The timely publication of *Imagining the Middle East* by Matthew F. Jacobs fills the longstanding need for an original study of U.S. foreign policy that focuses on how cultural processes shape the historical and future trajectories of American involvement in the Middle East. With the aim of providing a detailed analysis of the intricacies of U.S. foreign policy, Jacobs has arguably written the best theoretical analysis yet on the subject. In this engaging, astonishingly rich and erudite work, Jacobs lays out the complex discursive process through which American policymakers have justified or explained economic or security policies aimed at imagining a future Middle East, a new Middle East in line with U.S. interests.

From an intellectual point of view, Jacobs is on firmest ground when he shows how an informal and transnational network of Middle East experts, specialists and policy-oriented analysts (ranging from academics and journalists to media specialists and military experts) construct discursive frameworks through reading, citation, and meetings and ultimately produce knowledge on certain characteristics, cultural practices, social norms and conflicts of the Middle East with the aim of supporting policymaking processes. Working with archival sources comprised of articles and letters exchanged and circulated among academics and specialists on the Middle East, the author is at pains to show how U.S. foreign policy has relied heavily on such informal

networks, which historically have set the boundaries of discussion regarding American involvement in the region from the first half of the twentieth century to the 1960s. More important, Jacobs is intent on showing how for the most part such networks are keen on imagining a future Middle East that is more "modern" and, hence, accommodating to U.S. interests. For Jacobs, culture and ideas are central to the study of foreign policy, to the way claims based on special authority are made about the region and to the way imaginaries shaped by such professional and policy-oriented networks have affected and will continue to affect U.S.–Middle East relations, especially over the coming decades.

Jacobs's argument develops over five chapters, plus an epilogue, and starts with a lucid and lively introduction. In the first chapter, the study considers the historical development of a distinct type of knowledge production along with an informal network of Middle East experts that grew in size in close correlation with increasing American national interests in the region—interests that included maintaining secure access to transportation and safeguarding the operation of commercial activities such as the petroleum economy. After WWI, such groups of professionals produced knowledge about an emerging Middle East that reinforced both the secular and sacred orientations of American foreign policy. With the growing demand for knowledge about the region at the beginning of the Cold War, the new class of specialists, closely tied to American universities, enhanced production of knowledge about the Middle East in ways that reframed U.S. global power in the context of a new world

order.

Chapter 2 moves from the secular to the sacred and offers a fascinating study of how differences between the United States and the Middle East have revolved around imaginaries of religious life at an operational level in the region. What this chapter brilliantly reveals is the underlying Orientalist discursive trends in the growing class of Middle East experts, who would conceptually frame the role of religion in the region through the limited discursive binaries of tradition and modernity, defining Islam as ill-equipped to deal with modernization, which was perceived at the time in terms of "westernization." In chapter 3 Jacobs examines the specialists' critical reaction to anti-colonization and nationalistic movements in countries such as Egypt and Iran from the 1950s to the 1960s. Three phases, Jacobs argues, underline the way a transnational network of experts defined Middle Eastern nationalism: the first extended from 1918 to the 1950s, when Arab nationalism was believed to be a benign force inspired by American missionaries; the second spanned the decade prior to WWII, when elites such as Mustafa Kemal and Reza Shah Pahlavi introduced different forms of nationalism that at times were in conflict with U.S. interests in the region, though still seen positive by the experts; the third existed between the 1950s and 1960s, when nationalism was largely viewed as a negative force, a movement that had to be reinterpreted in a new light that would ultimately help U.S. interests in the changing regional context.

Chapter 4 continues the discussion from the previous chapter with a new focus on how imaginaries of the Middle East began to revolve around ways to transform the social structure and socio-cultural life of the region. The 1960s define an era of reimagining and as a result transforming the Middle East in terms of secularization

and economic transformation. Liberal developmentalism in the form of modernizing attempts to rectify Middle Eastern underdevelopment played a critical role in the way the United States sought to manage change in the region. It engaged with various countries and became increasingly involved in the region, especially in Iran. Chapter 5 looks at the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict and how factions within the network of Middle East specialists disagreed about solutions to the conflict, at least prior to the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Jacobs' exposition is at its best in this chapter. He shows how after 1948 a younger generation of specialists, accepting Israel as a new state and a friend of the United States, began to rethink and try to find new solutions to the growing problem of Palestinian refugees. With the U.S. involvement in the Arab-Israeli military conflict in 1967, major frictions within the informal network and disagreements about its understandings and interpretations of the Middle East began to emerge that changed the dynamic in the production of knowledge about the region. Such conflict intensified in the decades to come, especially after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, when another demand for a "new Middle East" was pronounced through the military interventionism endorsed by the Bush administration.

There is an important lesson here for academics and specialists of Middle Eastern studies who intellectually, and even at times administratively, contribute to policy circles in Washington: beware of the historically contingent disposition of your discourses and how you produce knowledge about the region you specialize. What Jacobs achieves in this book is a sober, critical narrative of the relationship between discourse and power and how an epistemic community of policy-oriented specialists can, at times dangerously, set the boundaries for discussion on key issues that determine American involvement in and by extension the ultimate fate of a strategically significant region.

The main question, however, persists: how could a new, alternative assemblage of knowledge about the Middle East go beyond the secular and sacred ways of imagining the region and hence offer a way across the rhetoric of confrontation or transformation that seems to dominate U.S. policy toward the region? The more we genuinely seek a more creative approach, the more works such as *Imagining the Middle East* can help us find ways to overcome tensions between how we construct imaginaries and how we discover new realities about a region closely tied to global security.

Intellectual Underpinnings of a Complex Diplomacy: Matthew F. Jacobs' *Imagining the Middle East*

W. Taylor Fain

As Cold War tensions escalated in 1950, Philip Hitti, the chairman of Princeton University's Department of Oriental Languages and Literatures, wrote to Assistant Secretary of State George C. McGhee that his department stood "ready in this national emergency to cooperate to the utmost limits of its resources with any agencies in Washington, civilian and military" to provide training and expertise of value to American policymakers in the Middle East, "this vitally important but hitherto relatively neglected region."¹ In the era after the Iraq War it is difficult to imagine a university or department offering

such unconditional support to official Washington. The academy has frequently been a key locus of activism and vocal opposition to the United States' Middle East policies, at least since the first war against Saddam Hussein in 1991. In May 2003, the organization *Historians Against the War* condemned the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq as part of its opposition to "the current empire-building and war-making activities of the United States government at home and abroad."² Four years later the Network of Concerned Anthropologists declared in its Pledge of Non-Participation in Counterinsurgency that "anthropologists should not engage in research and other activities that contribute to counterinsurgency operations in Iraq or in related theaters in the 'war on terror'."³ Hitti's determination to put the resources of his department and faculty so unequivocally behind American policy in the Middle East now seems a relic of a long-ago era.

Why and how scholars like Hitti worked to forge a relationship with official Washington and shape the content of U.S. policy in the Middle East is the subject of Matthew Jacobs' important new study, *Imagining the Middle East: The Building of American Foreign Policy, 1918-1967*. As its title suggests, Jacobs' book is about perceptions, and in few places have American perceptions and political realities on the ground been so frequently at odds as in this volatile part of the world. Jacobs' book is not an examination of America's Middle East policies per se. Rather it is a study of their philosophical underpinnings and the ways in which a growing throng of Middle East area specialists both inside and outside the U.S. foreign policy and national security establishment came to understand the region and shape the course of American diplomacy

there from the end of World War I to the conclusion of the Arab-Israeli Six Day War.

Jacobs explains persuasively how an "informal, transnational network" of academics, businesspeople, journalists, observers, experts, and policymakers coalesced by the middle of the twentieth century to help define and pursue American interests in the Middle East. Through "network nodes" like the Council on Foreign Relations and its study groups, the Middle East Institute, and the various departments and centers of Middle East studies at elite universities, the members of this network sought to construct a useful "framework of meaning" to explain the complex social, economic, and political issues with which the Middle East confronted U.S. policymakers. Undergirding these efforts was the conviction that this new expertise would allow the United States to play a transformative role in the region, guiding the peoples and fragile new nations of the Middle East along the road to American-style liberal capitalism.

Jacobs' book takes the form of five closely related essays bound together by their emphasis on the evolution of this network. Chapter 1 explains how American missionaries, philanthropists, and travelers, who in the nineteenth century had identified a broadly redemptive mission for the United States in the Middle East, steadily gave way to a community of policy-oriented secular experts dedicated to the production of knowledge about the region that could serve specific American political and economic ends. In his second chapter, Jacobs assesses the struggles of area experts to arrive at an "operational understanding" of Islam and its impact on the Middle East. What, they asked, was Islam's relationship to the forces of tradition and modernity, communism and nationalism? How might it be harnessed or accommodated by American diplomacy? Jacobs' third chapter examines the evolution of American

perceptions of Middle Eastern nationalism and mass politics, a topic characterized by one CIA analyst in 1960 as a volatile “amalgam of interests, religion, propaganda, and mobs.” Focusing on Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, Jacobs shows how American experts grappled with the impact of individual personalities and underlying social forces at the heart of local nationalisms. He demonstrates that after the Middle East crises of 1958, American experts struggled to identify new ways to conciliate and co-opt the energies of Arab nationalism.

Jacobs turns next to the efforts of American experts, businessmen, and policymakers to transform the Middle East politically and socially through economic modernization. Exploiting the burgeoning literature of modernization theory, he explicates how efforts to modernize the region through the machinery of the League of Nations mandate system and the “liberal developmentalism” of private economic actors like the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) were succeeded by programs of direct financial assistance and projects grounded in social-scientific modernization theories emerging from American universities. In his final chapter, Jacobs grapples with the impact of the Arab-Israeli conflict on his informal network of experts. U.S. support for the establishment of Israel deeply dismayed many members of the network, who believed that an intractable Arab-Israeli struggle over Palestine would do irreparable harm to American interests in the Middle East. Their concerns brought them into conflict with high-level policymakers, powerful interest groups, and, frequently, one another. Jacobs shows that efforts by the network to recompose itself after 1948 ultimately foundered as the Arab-Israeli struggle became increasingly enmeshed in the larger Cold War calculus of the United States. After the 1967 war, Jacobs’ informal network of experts fractured over a number of issues, and it never recovered.

This is a work of very sophisticated analysis that skillfully blends the political, social, and intellectual history of America’s diplomacy in the Middle East. Jacobs bucks the prevailing trend towards international and multi-archival research and instead roots his study firmly in U.S. documentary sources, a perfectly reasonable choice given the way he defines his topic. He also synthesizes with great skill a large body of research and incorporates into his work the insights of a host of scholars. Most important, he acknowledges an intellectual debt to Douglas Little’s studies of U.S. diplomacy and strategy in the region, Melani McAlister’s examination of the impact of the Middle East on American popular culture and perceptions of its place in the world, and especially David Engerman’s explorations of how scholarship and regional expertise shaped U.S. foreign policies. Jacobs’ decision to extend his analysis back in time to the era of the First World War and to effectively de-center the Cold War from his study usefully underscores the continuities in the issues confronting America’s Middle East policies over the twentieth century.

Jacobs’ book is exemplary on many levels. It provides rich material for discussion and debate, but three points deserve further mention here. The book’s most sophisticated and satisfying chapter treats evolving American perceptions of Middle Eastern nationalisms, a subject to which I have given a lot of thought myself. Jacobs is correct that following the 1956 Suez crisis and especially the 1958 revolution in Iraq, U.S. policymakers and Middle East experts began to reconsider their interpretation of Arab nationalism and the role they could play in channeling its energies in directions consistent with U.S. interests. His examination of Senator J. William Fulbright’s crucial role in this reassessment is spot on, although he could have bolstered it by using the records

of the Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series). However, Jacobs argues that before the late 1950s, U.S. experts judged Arab nationalism to be a largely benign force to be accommodated. After the Iraqi revolution, he asserts, they identified the emergence of a newly radicalized form of Arab nationalism with which the United States had to seek a new relationship. This is not quite accurate. In fact, by the early 1950s U.S. policymakers were making a critical distinction between what they termed “moderate” or “responsible” Arab nationalism, of the type espoused by Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia, Nuri Said in Iraq, and Camille Chamoun in Lebanon, and “revolutionary” or “radical” Arab nationalism of the type espoused by Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser in Egypt. They were confident that they could co-opt the energies of radical Arab nationalism, but they never properly understood how volatile, factionalized, and personalized this strain of nationalism was and so continued to be regularly frustrated in their efforts to work with it.

Jacobs’s treatment of American oil companies, particularly ARAMCO, and their efforts to promote a strategy of “liberal developmentalism” in the Middle East is also largely persuasive. ARAMCO regularly acted as a tool of U.S. government policy in the area, although its interest in profit occasionally clashed with Washington’s interest in fostering regional stability. Jacobs borrows from Robert Vitalis’ work to show how ARAMCO’s public relations apparatus promoted a progressive picture of the company’s activities in Saudi Arabia, but he misses the opportunity to explore the workings of ARAMCO’s Arabian Affairs Division (AAD). Led by George Rentz and his deputy, William Mulligan, the AAD employed historians, ethnographers, linguists, and a host of other area experts to conduct research in support of the company’s work and to promote ARAMCO’s (and the Saudi monarchy’s) image as a benign and transformative force in the Arabian Peninsula. The William Mulligan Papers, housed at Georgetown University’s Lauinger Library, would have enabled Jacobs to enrich further his exploration of the interactions between area experts, corporate executives, and government policymakers in the Middle East.

Finally, I question whether 1967 is an appropriate end point for Jacobs’ study. By concluding his analysis just as his informal transnational network of experts began to fracture in the wake of the Six Day War, he neglects the opportunity to explain more fully how the community of Middle East area specialists has become so factionalized and in many cases deeply suspicious of U.S. motives and policies in the Middle East. While he touches on this topic in the final pages of the book’s epilogue, it demands further investigation and the sort of close examination that Jacobs so deftly performs in his earlier chapters. Clearly, the documentary, memoir, and secondary sources exist which would allow him to parse the impact of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the Iranian revolution, the burgeoning influence of Edward Said’s *Orientalism*, the sputtering Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the inconclusive 1991 Gulf War. But this is not so much a criticism as a plea for more. Jacobs has written a perceptive and illuminating study which should find its way onto the reading lists and bookshelves of everyone concerned with America’s relations with the Middle East.

Notes:

1. Matthew F. Jacobs, *Imagining the Middle East: The Building of an American Foreign Policy, 1918-1967* (Chapel Hill, 2011), 43.
2. Report on May 31, 2003 HAW Meeting, Historians Against the War website, Virtual Movement Archive. Accessed February 11, 2012. <http://www.historiansagainstwar.org/nycmeeting.html>.

3. David Glen, "Petitioners Urge Anthropologists to Stop Working with Pentagon in Iraq War," *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, September 19, 2007. Accessed February 11, 2012. <http://chronicle.com/article/Petitioners-Urge/39593>.

Review of Matthew F. Jacobs, *Imagining the Middle East: The Building of an American Foreign Policy, 1918–1967*

Jeffrey James Byrne

With *Imagining the Middle East*, Matthew Jacobs provides a compelling intellectual history of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East region. His goal is to show how the exercise of U.S. power was justified and defined by "an evolving, informal network of specialists—somewhat transnational in scope—from academia, the business world, government, and the media" (235). Jacobs readily compares his project to David Engerman's work on Russia experts and Sovietologists in the shaping of policy and the "interpretation" of the Soviet Union for the American public. *Imagining the Middle East* is certainly a very timely work in that respect, for academic and policy-oriented discussion of the Middle East region has grown over the years to acquire an influence somewhat comparable to that of Sovietology in its heyday, in addition to becoming possibly a uniquely contentious field. Yet while Jacobs recognizes the contemporary relevance of his subject—indeed, he opens his book in almost the same way that Douglas Little begins *American Orientalism*, by quoting George W. Bush's "Why do they hate us?" speech—his aim is to provide a deeper historical context for American interpretations of the Middle East. He breaks out of a strictly Cold War-oriented perspective by beginning his study in 1918 and ending it in 1967, a year he considers decisive in the evolution of regional expertise.

Appropriately, the book's evidential base consists of extensive research in several presidential libraries, foreign policy-oriented material in the National Archives in College Park, the papers of policymakers and experts, oral history, newspapers, magazines, speeches and so on. Jacobs' thoroughness is evident, and it is clear throughout the text that he has a deep familiarity with the various schools of thought and influential figures in Middle Eastern studies during the period in question. He fluidly invokes these diverse forms of evidence in support of his arguments. The chapters are organized thematically, proceeding from the early history of America's Middle Eastern expertise network to treating in turn each of the four issues that Jacobs deems crucial: Islam, nationalism, modernization, and Israel-Palestine. At the same time, with the exception of the final chapter on the Israel-Palestine question, Jacobs does attempt to provide some sense of chronological narrative between the chapters. That is, he argues that nationalism succeeded Islam in the 1950s as the primary concern of American observers and policymakers and that modernization then succeeded nationalism in the late 1950s and early 1960s. However, the book might have benefited greatly from a more overtly chronological organization in order to underscore the impact of these intellectual debates on actual policy. I personally would also have preferred to see the Israel-Palestine chapter come much earlier, since the author himself shows that this vital issue lies beneath practically all other issues throughout the 1950s and 1960s, including Arab nationalism and modernization.

In the first chapter, Jacobs narrates the creation of this informal network of Middle Eastern expertise in the first half of the twentieth century. Initially, Western understanding of the region had been based mostly on "adventurer, captivity, missionary, and tourist narratives" (51–52) that for the most part described backward, impoverished lands in desperate need of salvation. During the interwar period,

academic investigation of the contemporary Middle East increased, but the field remained largely in the hands of Europeans with pronounced Orientalist attitudes and scholars of the ancient Near East, who exhibited a tendency towards essentialism and sweeping assertions about the characters of Turks and Arabs. Then, he explains, "World War II revealed that the growing demand for knowledge on the contemporary Middle East outran the supply of qualified specialists and the knowledge they could provide" (41). The Cold War and the strategic import of oil provided impetus and funding for a substantial expansion and professionalization of knowledge production for the region, leading to the creation of Middle East studies departments and centers in American universities. The new ranks of Middle East experts, brought together from a variety of disciplines, generally expected to have a fruitful relationship with policymakers. This chapter provides a compelling account of the creation of a new regional category of knowledge production, but it would have been interesting to have situated Middle East studies in a larger context of intellectual professionalization and the codification of regions (particularly Africa) in order to explore whether this particular field boasted certain unique characteristics and to question its fundamental boundaries (not least in the literal, territorial sense).

In his second and third chapters, Jacobs addresses American assessments of Islam and nationalism. He argues convincingly that American observers generally took a dim view of Islam's influence over Middle Eastern societies and placed the religion on the wrong side of an emphatic traditional/modern or static/dynamic binary. A tendency to rely heavily on Islam's foundational texts in order to interpret contemporary Muslim politics resulted in rampant essentialism (a phenomenon still much in evidence today), even though it would have been patently problematic to place equal emphasis on the content of the Bible in order to describe 1950s America. This dubious approach also converged with Cold War-era preoccupations and rhetoric, leading many commentators on the Middle East region to describe Islam as "monolithic" or "totalitarian." Overall, the second chapter is an excellent account of how some basic—and persistent—shortcomings in the American knowledge base set deep roots in discussions of the Middle East.

In the following chapter, Jacobs suggests that U.S. observers first saw the rise of nationalism in the early 1950s as a largely positive, modernizing force that would overcome the supposed stasis of the region's societies. They quickly soured on this new trend, he notes, when figures like Mohammad Mossadegh and Gamal 'Abd al-Nasser voiced their opposition to Washington's policies. He vividly describes how American analysts and policymakers instinctively reverted to portraying Arabs and Iranians as being innately susceptible to irrationality, fanaticism, mass hysteria, and the veneration of prophet-like charismatic dictators. The observation that Western officials frequently portrayed Middle Eastern leaders as childlike, overemotional, and feminine is not in itself new, but *Imagining the Middle East* does succeed in situating these biases in a richer discursive genealogy. Taken both as a whole and individually, the book's first three chapters provide a valuable account of the formation of modern American ideas of this region.

On the other hand, it is less clear just how discussions among the informal network of Middle East experts influenced actual policy. Jacobs repeatedly refers to what he calls "America's sacred and secular mission in the Middle East" (that expression or a close variant of it appears multiple times in each chapter) in order to suggest that some sweeping, transformational purpose overarches all of the United States' interactions with the region during the twentieth century. In support of this proposition,

he cites abundant prognostications on Middle Eastern development prospects and diagnoses of social conditions. It is certainly indisputable that many Americans, from Christian missionaries to State Department officials, aspired to dramatically improve the spiritual or material lives of the region's inhabitants. Yet it is hard to see, at least during the 1945–1967 period that is the focus of this book, how these ambitions swayed what appears to have been an overwhelmingly pragmatic and reactive regional foreign policy determined by vital strategic expediencies.

It is in that respect that chapter 4, "What Modernization Requires of the Arabs . . . Is Their De-Arabization," is problematic. Seeking to complement the now extensive literature on the Kennedy and Johnson administrations' efforts to modernize the developing world, Jacobs argues here that American dreams of revolutionary transformation in the Middle East "peaked from the late 1950s to the mid 1960s, when policymakers implemented new social scientific modernization theories in U.S. relations with countries such as Egypt and Iran" (142). Unfortunately, Egypt serves as a very unconvincing case study for Washington's deployment of modernization theory in its relations with a developing country. As Jacobs himself acknowledges, U.S. aid to Egypt during this era did not consist mostly of technical and industrial transfers but rather foodstuffs provided under the auspices of PL-480—the Food For Peace program (175). He much too credulously accepts American officials' feeble argument that food aid constituted modernization assistance because it freed up funds for Cairo to spend on other purposes, such as industrialization projects.

The beneficiaries of the Food For Peace program recognized it for what it really was: an aid program determined not by their needs but by U.S. domestic considerations such as agricultural subsidies, budgetary pressures, and a powerful lobby opposed to rewarding "Communist sympathizing" governments such as Egypt's with American benevolence. Food deliveries did nothing to promote industrialization or sustainable development and actually had some negative ramifications: they impeded the development of local agricultural sectors by dumping free produce on the market, and the United States—the Johnson administration in particular—crudely wielded the threat of the withdrawal of food aid in order to influence the recipient government's policies. So while the PL-480 program undoubtedly benefited many hungry Egyptians, as a symbol of transformation it paled in comparison to the Soviet Union's construction of the Aswan Dam, which was the cornerstone of Egypt's development strategy. Moreover, the only other American assistance project in Egypt that the author identifies is the rescue of Nubian monuments from locations that would be flooded by the Soviet-led dam project (176–177)—a worthy endeavor to be sure, but hardly a transformative one. Granted, Iran is a much more useful choice for the second case study of America's modernization mission, but this chapter's overall argument is weakened nevertheless.

The final chapter, on how the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian dilemma affected the informal network of Middle East expertise, is perhaps the strongest in the book because in arguing that this issue created rifts both within the network and between the network and policymakers, Jacobs gives a fuller exploration of the relationship between intellectual debate and the policy sphere. I would have preferred this

material to come earlier in the book partly for this reason but also because in chronological terms Israel clearly becomes a paramount concern by the late 1940s. However, the author considers the Israel-Palestine question to be different in nature from what were, in his judgment, the other main concerns of Middle East experts—Islam, nationalism, and modernity. First, those other concerns were of a more obscure, academic character, whereas the Israel-Palestine issue provoked much more passionate debate among experts, policymakers, politicians, and the public alike. Second, Jacobs argues that this issue was distinguished by the way in which it encouraged senior policymakers to bypass the regional expert community's discussion process altogether, starting with Truman's support for, and swift recognition of, Israel's founding.

On this basis, the Arab-Israeli question actually forces itself to the center of the book's narrative, since the author credits it with creating a rift between the realm of policy and the informal expert community. This tension was especially disturbing for older members of that circle, who saw the foundation of Israel as a fundamentally destabilizing event, deleterious to the tidy regional schema they had envisioned for American diplomacy. The book ends in 1967 because Jacobs deems that to be another decisive year for the expert community's relationship with policy. A permanent schism sets in, with the professionals working in the State Department and other official bodies generally being more supportive of the close U.S.–Israeli alliance than commentators further from

the levels of power, in academia and so on. This narrative is intriguing, even if the 1967 cut-off seems a little too abrupt.

But all books must end, and before it does *Imagining the Middle East* makes an important contribution to our understanding of America's steadily escalating role in the Middle East throughout the twentieth century. Jacobs' insights will be valued by scholars of the Middle East and of American foreign policy generally, and some of the book's individual chapters could be usefully assigned to advanced undergraduates. *Imagining the Middle East* does provide a more thorough account of the imaginings of the expert community than of their influence over policy, thereby under-delivering somewhat on the book's subtitle, but by addressing the redrawing of Washington's collective cognitive map, it successfully historicizes debates that have since acquired a false aura of timelessness.

Roundtable Response

Matthew F. Jacobs

I wish to thank each of the reviewers for the time and care they took in reading my book and for composing what were for the most part very thoughtful responses. I am grateful for the many compliments and will address many of the various concerns the reviewers expressed. Because I believe anyone who reads all the reviews will emerge with a fair sense of my approach and arguments, I will not spend time and space rehashing those issues. Instead, I will proceed by addressing comments or concerns that appear in multiple reviews and then tackle those that are specific to individual reviews.

When I read the reviews I was struck by (and, immodestly, took a certain amount of pride in) the fact that with the possible exception of Kent Schull each reader seems

It is less clear just how discussions among the informal network of Middle East experts influenced actual policy. Jacobs repeatedly refers to what he calls "America's sacred and secular mission in the Middle East" (that expression or a close variant of it appears multiple times in each chapter) in order to suggest that some sweeping, transformational purpose overarches all of the United States' interactions with the region during the twentieth century.

to have found something different to appreciate in the book. Nancy Stockdale liked my discussion of “networks of power”; Babak Rahimi my “theoretical analysis” and focus on “the imaginaries of religious life”; W. Taylor Fain my take on interpretations of Arab nationalism; Jeffrey James Byrne my chapter on the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I wrote the book the way I did in part to reach across audiences, hoping that readers from different disciplines or with different concerns might find within it not only something that meshed neatly with their own interests, but also something that might lead them to consider lines of inquiry with which they might be less familiar. Of course, such an approach also opens one up to a range of criticisms and quibbles, to which I will now turn.

The first criticism I will address appeared in multiple reviews and concerns my decision to organize the book thematically rather than in a more explicitly chronological manner. Byrne raises the point most thoughtfully and utilizes a nice discussion of the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict to demonstrate some of the flaws inherent in my thematic organization. Schull is a bit more creative in attributing the organization of my book to an intellectual fascination with Douglas Little. The reality is much less intriguing and far more laborious. While I do appreciate Little’s scholarship, the organization is a product of my own work and evaluation of the material. Indeed, after I had drafted the manuscript thematically, I spent six months rewriting it chronologically, so that I might see the costs and benefits of each approach. The thematic approach offered much more clarity in terms of theme development but resulted in less integration and more redundancy, while the chronological approach limited the redundancies and offered greater integration but resulted in less sophisticated theme development and, quite frankly, a bland and repetitive basic chapter structure. Hence I chose themes over chronology, but I did so with two caveats. The first was that I placed the themes in the order in which the evidence suggested they rose and fell in prominence. Thus, religion came before nationalism, which came before modernization. The second was that I knew, and I believe I state clearly in the book (see 188–89 in particular), that the Arab-Israeli-Palestinian conflict was different and that it did not fall neatly in line with the rest of the book. So, to the extent that a preference for a chronological narrative is based on well-reasoned analysis, as it is in Byrne’s case, I take the point, but I stand by the decisions I made when writing the book.

The second point I wish to address is identified most explicitly by Nancy Stockdale but also comes up implicitly in some of the other reviews. In what is more an observation than a criticism, Stockdale notes that my work begins with George W. Bush’s “why do they hate us” moment, which is now a cliché. I agree that the moment has become a cliché but would also ask why and on what that cliché is based. The answers to those two questions help explain why my book took the shape it did. Simply put, there is a reason why clichés become clichés and stereotypes become stereotypes: rightly or wrongly (mostly the latter, I would contend), they resonate with people. I therefore set out to examine what issues came to resonate in the minds of this network of specialists and how those issues and the discussions around them helped shape U.S. relations with the Middle East. Though these ideas could at times lead to specific policy prescriptions, they did not have to do so to exercise influence over some aspects of U.S. policy in the region.

That leads me to Byrne’s point about the book underdelivering on its subtitle, a comment I was not entirely surprised to see. As anyone who has written a book knows, the author and publisher negotiate over the title, with the publisher having the final say. The primary title—*Imagining the Middle East*—was always mine. The editors at the

University of North Carolina Press preferred their subtitle to my admittedly much less appealing suggestions. I was concerned, however, that emphasizing “the building of an American foreign policy” might contradict a point I make several times in the book: that the framework of meaning that I examine was not always or even often prescriptive of particular policies. I ultimately agreed that this subtitle might work, and I hoped that readers would not find that it promised something the book failed to deliver. Sadly, that appears to have been the case for Byrne.

I do quibble a bit with Byrne’s argument that my chapter on modernization theory is undercut by the “very unconvincing case study” of Egypt, in part he says because I “much too credulously accept” the perspective of U.S. officials regarding the motivations for and impact of the Egyptian aid program. First, I note in my discussion of Egypt (174–180) that the program was limited and full of contradictions and potential trouble spots. Second, a quick look at my footnote on Egyptian economic growth during the years of the U.S. aid program would indicate that it is not U.S. assertions I am accepting, but rather those of respected scholars Roger Owen and Sevetket Pamuk.¹ It seems quite clear to me that food aid did free up Egyptian resources for infrastructure projects in particular. That said, I do agree with some of Byrne’s points. For example, I explicitly note that the program was designed to achieve U.S. political objectives first and foremost, and therefore I agree completely with Byrne’s assertion that the program was not determined by the recipient’s wishes. I take no issue with his contention that the U.S. program paled in comparison with Soviet construction of the Aswan Dam, which had a far larger—though also not entirely positive—impact on Egyptian development. Last, I agree completely with the point that the program had negative consequences. Indeed, my bibliography includes a reference to Timothy Mitchell’s powerful critique of U.S. aid programs, which specifically notes that U.S. aid fundamentally altered the Egyptian diet. Perhaps I should have made that point in the text as well.²

While W. Taylor Fain’s review is largely complimentary, there are two points to which I wish to respond. The first concerns his statement that I argue it was not until the late 1950s that U.S. experts recognized a newly radicalized form of Arab nationalism and that up to that point they had considered Arab nationalism to be a benign force. That strikes me as a bit of a misreading of at least the latter half of that chapter. In fact, I contend that the network’s view of Nasser in particular, and of Arab nationalism in general, was becoming much more negative—and U.S. policies were consequently becoming more confrontational—by 1955. To be sure, I do not mention the distinction between moderate/responsible and revolutionary/radical Arab nationalisms that Fain highlights, but I do have a lengthy discussion of shifting views of Nasser. Moreover, the point of the entire section of the chapter that deals with 1958 and its aftermath is to examine another shift, this one based on the realization that the confrontational policies of the mid-1950s had failed. I do agree with Fain’s point that members of the network and U.S. policymakers continued to be frustrated in their efforts both to understand and to work with or co-opt Arab nationalism. Fain also points out that utilizing the Mulligan Papers at Georgetown would have allowed me to explore more fully the workings of ARAMCO’s Arabian Affairs Division, which was essentially an in-house intelligence unit that worked closely with U.S. officials. I could not agree more here. Every author I speak to seems to have one last thing they wish they had done, and for me this is it. I became aware of the Mulligan Papers when I was revising the manuscript, and at that point a range of time constraints prevented me from investigating them and integrating them into my analysis.

Let me turn now to Kent Schull’s review. Obviously

I wish he had found my work to be more insightful and engaging than he apparently did, but each reader is entitled to his or her own opinion. I do think it disingenuous to suggest that the various interpretive, methodological, and organizational choices I made were arbitrary or the product of some misplaced desire to emulate another historian. As any scholar who has written a book knows, no book appears in its final form by default; rather, the process is defined by an almost infinite number of choices. Some of those choices work out for the best, while others do not, but any scholar with sufficient respect for his or her peers recognizes the effort that goes into those choices. I am also confident enough in my own educational and training background so as not to feel the need to defend it here, but I would make the same point regarding his far-too-simplistic and overwrought comments about the absence of specialist knowledge within the field of “diplomatic history.”

That said, Schull does raise some points that warrant consideration, or at least a response. I will concede that I might have crafted both the reference to “Turkish massacres of Armenians” and the reference to language instruction differently. The problem in each instance was not a lack of knowledge but of clarity. Moreover, if Schull is resting his critique of the level of specialist knowledge within the field of diplomatic history on these two instances, then I am not too worried. His concerns about the structure of the book, which other reviewers shared and I addressed earlier, are also fair, though he might have put more effort

into thinking through why I might have chosen to organize the book as I did. I even agree with his assertion that the emphasis on and debate over Edward Said that continues to permeate the field of Middle East studies is dated and tired. Yet one still cannot ignore it, especially if one is writing a book about discourses.

I will conclude by responding briefly to a concern that appeared in different forms in several reviews: how I might have ended the book differently. I must say that the suggestions that emerge from these reviews—applying the discourses to the post-1967 period and examining more closely the continued and even deepening politicization of the field of Middle Eastern studies—crossed my mind. In fact, I actually outlined a much lengthier conclusion that tackled these issues much more explicitly. However, I did not feel I could do these topics justice unless I added significantly to the length of the book. I therefore decided that it made more sense to end the book as I did and leave open the possibility of a follow-up volume focused entirely on the post-1967 period.

Notes:

1. See Roger Owen and Sevket Pamuk, *A History of Middle Eastern Economies in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, MA, 1999), 252.

2. Timothy Mitchell, “America’s Egypt: Discourse of the Development Industry,” *Middle East Report* 21 (Mar.–Apr. 1991): 18–34, 36.

In the April 2013 issue of *Passport*:

- A roundtable on Tim Borstelmann, *The 1970s*
- Sarah Snyder on the historiography of human rights
- Reviews of recent *FRUS* volumes

and more...



“And Perhaps a Little More”:¹ The George C. Marshall Secretary of State Papers

Mark A. Stoler

George C. Marshall is considered one of the most important and successful secretaries of state in American history. Volume 6 of *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, which covers his 1947–1949 tenure in that position, is scheduled to be published in December 2012 by the Johns Hopkins University Press. As editor of that volume, I thought it appropriate to apprise SHAFR members of some of its contents.

A little background first. I took over as editor after the sudden and tragic death of Larry I. Bland, the longtime editor who had been responsible for the publication of the first five volumes of the Marshall Papers and was working on the sixth volume at the time of his death in November 2007. Those first five volumes covered Marshall's life from his birth in 1880 through his extraordinary military career, with an emphasis on his tenure as army chief of staff during World War II. The fifth volume also covered the special diplomatic mission he undertook to China from late 1945 through 1946 in a futile effort to mediate a settlement between the Nationalists and the Communists and thereby avert civil war in that country.

Volume 6 begins with Marshall's return from China and appointment as secretary of state in early January of 1947. Approximately 80 percent of the documents in the volume, organized into four chronological chapters, cover his ensuing two years as secretary of state. A fifth chapter then covers his January 1949 resignation and recovery from major surgery through his September 1949 appointment as head of the American Red Cross. A sixth chapter covering that Red Cross work up to his September 1950 appointment as secretary of defense had originally been planned for inclusion in this volume, but it was moved to the seventh and final volume (which is scheduled for completion in 2014) to avoid having to abridge the secretary of state material.

As those of us involved in this project quickly discovered, Larry Bland had been doing the work of at least two people and had been assisted only by his longtime associate editor, Sharon Ritenour Stevens, and, occasionally, part-time assistants. To enable me to focus on editorial work and expedite the project, which had already lasted more than 30 years, Marshall Foundation President Brian Shaw appointed former Eisenhower Library Director Daniel Holt as managing editor and project director to handle all administrative matters and oversee the completion of volumes 6 and 7. Brian also added both a full-time research assistant for Sharon Stevens and a part-time assistant editor, Anne S. Wells of the staff of *The Journal of Military History*. Then in 2011 Sharon Stevens became seriously ill, and Mame Warren, formerly director of Hopkins History Enterprises at the John Hopkins University Press, was added as a full-time assistant editor.

Prior to his death Larry Bland had already selected all the documents to be included in volume 6 and with Sharon Stevens had begun drafting many of the necessary footnotes. In addition to multiple proofreadings of each document to ensure accuracy, my primary tasks were to

complete and edit those footnotes, draft additional ones as needed, and create both needed headnotes and excerpts from some of the congressional hearings at which Marshall testified. Other members of the team aided me in these tasks and also prepared a complete list of those hearings and a chronology, as well as appropriate charts, maps, illustrations and a glossary.

As with previous volumes, Larry had selected the documents for volume 6 with an eye to illustrating the important issues with which Marshall dealt. Personal correspondence with family members and friends was also included, both to shed additional light on some of these issues and to show something of the personal life of this very private man. He once told his first undersecretary of state, Dean Acheson, that he had “no feelings except those I reserve for Mrs. Marshall.”² That, as some of the personal papers in this collection illustrate, was something of an overstatement.

As had been the case in all his previous official positions, Marshall's signature as secretary of state often appeared on documents he did not write. And as had been the case with past volumes of the State Department's, these were not considered Marshall documents and were not included in volume 6, save in explanatory notes. Inclusion as a Marshall document required evidence that he actually wrote, dictated, spoke, or edited it (and he was notorious for heavily editing documents drafted by members of his staff). Some of the documents that passed this test and are included previously appeared in whole or part in the appropriate volumes of the State Department's *Foreign Relations* series, but many have not previously been published. And even those that had been previously published are in this volume heavily annotated for the first time, with text taken from the originals in the National Archives.

Marshall's appointment and status as secretary of state was unique. With a Democrat as president and the Republicans in control of the new Congress, any foreign policy initiatives would require bipartisanship. One of Marshall's major tasks as secretary of state would be to create and maintain such bipartisanship, and he clearly possessed the prestige and apolitical reputation to do so. Indeed, so great was the esteem in which he was held by both political parties as well as the public that Republican Senator Arthur Vandenberg was able and willing to put his nomination through the Foreign Relations Committee that he chaired without hearings or opposition and to obtain full Senate approval on the same day. Nevertheless, Marshall's appointment made him a potential candidate for the presidency in 1948, as well as the first in line to succeed Truman via the succession act then in effect (since Vice President Truman had become president in 1945 on the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, the office of vice president was vacant). Realizing that these facts could destroy any effort to create and maintain a bipartisan foreign policy, Marshall upon his arrival at Union Station in Washington on January 21, 1947, was “explicit and emphatic” in informing

the press "ONCE AND FOR ALL" that he considered his office nonpolitical and that he could not be considered a candidate or be drafted for political office under any circumstance.³

The number and importance of issues with which Marshall had to deal as secretary of state was staggering. In addition to the European Recovery Program, for which he later received the Nobel Peace Prize, they included the Greek and Chinese civil wars; the Truman Doctrine; the decolonization and partition of as well as the ensuing wars in Palestine and India, leading to the creation of Israel, India and Pakistan; the decolonization of the Dutch East Indies and the creation of Indonesia; the Rio Pact and the creation of the Organization of American States; a major reorganization of the state department; the creation of the postwar national security establishment with the National Security Act of 1947; the Czech coup; the Berlin Blockade and airlift; the creation of NATO and West Germany; and the maintenance of the fledgling United Nations. In addition to dealing with all of these issues, Marshall also had to testify at a very large number of congressional hearings, attend numerous and lengthy international conferences, hold press conferences, make public speeches in person and via radio, have meetings and maintain extensive correspondence with everyone from President Harry S. Truman on down, create and maintain the postwar bipartisan foreign policy in Congress, and virtually tour the whole country to garner support for the European Recovery Program.

The ensuing strain on Marshall was enormous. Having been army chief of staff throughout all of World War II, he was clearly used to working under enormous pressure, but he found being secretary of state in some ways even more demanding. "I think the past three weeks have been the worst I have ever experienced," he wrote to his sister Marie in early March of 1947, "because of the tremendous amount of matter I have had to absorb mentally, the number of people I have had to see, and the number of hearings I have had to appear at before Congress."⁴ By year's end he was mentally exhausted and insisted on some time off to recover before his major congressional testimony, scheduled for early 1948, to obtain approval and funding for the Marshall Plan. As one of the state department officials who had accompanied the secretary to the London Foreign Ministers Conference informed Under Secretary Robert Lovett and Marshall's special assistant General Marshall S. Carter in mid-December, "This question of a holiday at Pinehurst [his winter vacation home in North Carolina] is practically an obsession with him. . . . He said it isn't that he is physically tired but rather he needs a mental rest. My prediction is that unless he gets this rest he is going to be a lot less effective than otherwise."⁵ The remedy clearly worked, as evidenced by the exceptionally high quality of his testimony before Congress and the ensuing approval of the European Recovery Program.⁶

Throughout my work on volume 6 of the Marshall Papers over the last four years, Dan Holt had to remind me repeatedly that as an editor my task was not to provide scholarly interpretations or resolve thorny historical issues and historiographical disputes but just to present the documents and facts for other historians to analyze. I tried to follow his advice but nevertheless remained curious about some of the issues revealed in the papers. Here, briefly, are a few of them for other SHAFR members to ponder and explore.

One that particularly interested me concerned the famous speech Marshall gave at Harvard on June 5, 1947, that led to the European Recovery Program. In what probably ranks as the greatest understatement in the history of American foreign relations, Marshall had informed Harvard President James B. Conant on May 28, only a week beforehand, that he would indeed attend the university's commencement ceremonies on June 5 to accept an honorary

degree and that while he would not be making a formal address, he would "make a few remarks in appreciation of the honor and perhaps a little more."⁷ Marshall's recollection of just who wrote those "few remarks" (they took only twelve minutes and ten seconds to deliver) differ from the commonly accepted version. That version, based largely on the memoirs of state department officials Joseph Jones and Charles Bohlen, maintains that Bohlen wrote the speech from memoranda by Policy Planning Staff head George F. Kennan and Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs Will Clayton, with Marshall adding only the introductory and concluding paragraphs at the last minute. As Bohlen wrote, "the final version of the speech, put together after a number of meetings, closely followed the structure of my draft and picked up much of my phrasing."⁸

On May 30 Marshall did direct his aide Carter to "have someone consider the various suggestions as to talks that I might make and prepare a draft for a less than ten-minute talk by me at Harvard to the Alumni." The task was given to Bohlen. But Marshall's memory of what then occurred differed substantially from what Bohlen and Jones maintained. On February 17, 1953, he responded to a query from Kennan regarding the speech by writing that "I called on Chip Bohlen and you to prepare, independent of each other, a definite recommendation on the subject. Also I grew restless and dictated one of my own, and . . . the end result was very much a combination of all three."⁹ Three years later, in 1956, Marshall in an oral history interview with his authorized biographer, Forrest C. Pogue, gave a similar account: "I talked it over with George Kennan and Chip Bohlen, and I told them to each start out wholly independent of the other and give me what they thought. And when theirs came in, they were quite apart. It was not a case of one opposing the other. It was almost a totally different approach. And I cut out part of Kennan's speech and part of Bohlen's speech and part of my speech and put the three together" on the flight to Boston and at Conant's house just prior to the speech.¹⁰

Most historians (including me) have accepted the Jones-Bohlen version. And there is certainly evidence for doing so. But the accuracy of Jones's memoir is questionable, as is illustrated by an error he made at the end of his volume that led to the creation of an historical myth: that Winston Churchill had labeled the Marshall Plan "the most unsordid act in history."¹¹ In reality Churchill made that comment about Lend-Lease during World War II, not about the postwar Marshall Plan. Furthermore, given their positions in the State Department, neither Jones nor Bohlen would have had knowledge of how or when the final version of the Harvard speech was put together.¹²

A second issue concerns Marshall's relationship with China in general, and with Madame Chiang Kai-shek in particular. Throughout his tenure as secretary of state, Marshall held to the same "Europe first" global strategy that he had maintained throughout World War II and consistently opposed any direct U.S. military involvement in the Chinese Civil War. He did so despite—or perhaps because of—his own extensive experiences in China, first during the 1920s and again in 1945–1946, as well as the bitter experiences of his subordinate General Joseph Stilwell during World War II. On this subject Marshall and Kennan held similar views, even though the secretary often modified what he once referred to as Kennan's "mode of expression" on this and other matters.¹³ Yet at the same time Marshall maintained an extensive personal correspondence with Madame Chiang Kai-shek and even welcomed her as his house guest in late 1948. He may have done so because of the friendship she had developed with his wife Katherine during the 1945–46 China mission, but his lengthy letters to Madame Chiang go far beyond what would have been required or expected in such a situation.¹⁴ So did his invitation to her to stay at his Leesburg home in

late 1948—and in quarters within that home far roomier and more luxurious than his own—at the same time that he was undergoing and recovering from major surgery at Walter Reed Army Hospital. As a Victorian, Marshall may have found it possible to maintain this dichotomy between personal and political matters with Madame Chiang. She certainly did not. She visited him three times at the hospital, twice immediately before and once a few weeks after his December 7 surgery, and on two of those occasions she tried vainly to convince him to use his influence to obtain additional U.S. support (including military involvement in the form of a high-ranking U.S. officer and subordinates to work with the Chinese armed forces) and avoid the looming collapse of her husband's armies and government.¹⁵

A third issue concerns Marshall's stand on the partition of Palestine and recognition of the state of Israel. Marshall's opposition to partition and recognition is fairly well known. So is his angry attack on recognition as "a transparent dodge to win a few votes" and his statement to Truman that were the president to accept the advice of his political counselor Clark Clifford and recognize Israel, and were he (Marshall) to vote (which he never did), he "would vote against the president."¹⁶ What may not be as well known are the reasons for his opposition to partition which he expressed to Zionist leader (and future Israeli foreign minister) Moshe Shertok (later Sharret) and others, as well as his conflict with Eleanor Roosevelt over the matter. Within volume 6 the reader will find extensive correspondence between Marshall and Roosevelt on Palestine and Israel (including Roosevelt's offer to resign as chair of the UN Human Rights Commission), as well as his conversations with Shertok, Truman and others.¹⁷

A fourth issue, and one that may come as a surprise to many, is the absence of any strong Cold War rhetoric in Marshall's 1947 public statements. Although surprised and stung by Moscow's hostile public statements in that year, only after Soviet rejection and denunciation of the European Recovery Program (as well as the ensuing Czech coup and Berlin blockade) does one find him attacking the Soviet Union directly. In this regard Marshall might be considered one of the last members of the Truman administration to become a cold warrior—at least rhetorically.

Another fact that may surprise many is the intense interest Marshall exhibited in the study and teaching of history. On numerous occasions he criticized that teaching for its emphasis on what he labeled "mere memory feats, particularly as to dates."¹⁸ Indeed, he had done so as early as 1939 in addressing the annual meeting of the American Historical Association, and he frequently did so again from 1947 to 1949. In a speech on February 22, 1947, at Princeton University, he called instead for a "deep understanding" of history—not just U.S. history and not solely as a guide to the future—and he movingly asserted that "one usually emerges from an intimate understanding of the past with its lessons and its wisdom, with convictions which put fire in the soul. I seriously doubt whether a man can think with full wisdom and with deep convictions regarding certain of the basic international issues today who has not at least reviewed in his mind the period of the Peloponnesian War and the Fall of Athens."¹⁹


Perhaps it was this understanding of history that accounts for Marshall's extraordinary ability throughout his career to see beyond the immediate issues he faced to the long-term consequences of particular courses of action. Most striking to me in this regard was an episode from World War II. In early March 1943 he established a Civil Affairs Division within the Army General Staff to govern areas that would be taken during the war, and he delivered an extraordinary admonition to the officer he had appointed as head of that division: to remember the trust the American people had in its armed forces, a trust that officer could destroy overnight by his behavior.²⁰ Marshall

exhibited similar prescience on numerous occasions as secretary of state. It was for good reason that Ernest May and Richard Neustadt cited him as a classic example of a policymaker who made good rather than bad use of history and who personified what they labeled "seeing and thinking in time streams."²¹

These are but a few of the many fascinating issues and documents in volume 6 of the Marshall Papers that will be of interest to SHAFR members—especially but far from exclusively those members who deal with the events and personalities of the years 1947–1949. In accordance with Dan Holt's advice to me on how to be an editor, I merely present them here for others to explore.

Notes:

1. Dean Acheson, *Sketches from Life of Men I Have Known* (New York, 1959), 154.
2. "The Secretary's Statement of January 21, 1947 at Union Station as Reported by Neal Stanford of the *Christian Science Monitor*," *Marshall Papers* 6: 7–8. Emphasis in original.
3. Letter, Marshall to Mrs. Marie Singer, March 4, 1947, Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office, Selected, in *Marshall Papers* 6: 62.
4. Telegram, Humelsine in London to Lovett and Carter, Dec. 16, 1947, Marshall Papers, Pentagon Office, Selected, in *Marshall Papers* 6: 293.
5. The vacation lasted from Dec. 20, 1947, to Jan. 5, 1948. "I had a fine rest, the first of more than 5 days since June '39," Marshall wrote to his old Virginia Military Institute classmate Leonard K. Nicholson on Jan. 5, "and I feel ready for the battle of Washington." Letter, Marshall to Nicholson, Jan. 5, 1948, Marshall Papers, Secretary of State, General, in *ibid.*, 307. For Marshall's congressional testimony on Jan. 8 and 12, 1948, see 309–34.
6. Letter, Marshall to James B. Conant, May 28, 1947, *ibid.*, 141.
7. Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929–1969* (New York, 1973), 263; Joseph Marion Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks* (New York, 1955).
8. Letter, Marshall to Kennan, Feb. 17, 1953, Marshall Papers, Retirement, General, in *Marshall Papers* 6: 149–50.
9. Larry I. Bland, ed., *George C. Marshall Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue* (Lexington, VA, 1991), 559, quoted in *Marshall Papers* 6: 150.
10. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks*, 256.
11. The most recent volume on the Marshall Plan by Greg Berhman is one of the few works—perhaps even the only one—to accept the Marshall version. Greg Berhman, *The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped Save Europe* (New York, 2007), 66–67 and 358.
12. *Marshall Papers* 6: 238–44 and 548–50; quote from 550. In late 1948 Marshall also rejected the public criticism of Chiang that Kennan had recommended. According to Defense Secretary James Forrestal, Marshall in a November 26 cabinet meeting said that such criticism "would administer the final coup de grace to Chiang's government, and this, he felt, we could not do." *Ibid.*, 631, from Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), 534.
13. See, for example, *Marshall Papers* 6: 16–17, 136–37.
14. *Ibid.*, 6: 633–36, 638–40. For additional Marshall views on aid to China see 368–82, 472–73, 478–79 and 482–83.
15. *Foreign Relations*, 1948, 5, Part 2: 455.
16. *Marshall Papers* 6: 209–12, 422–25, 454–55, 457–58, 459–60, 542–45, 614–16, and 619–20.
17. Letter, Marshall to Edward J. Devitt, Oct. 31, 1947, Marshall Papers, Secretary of State, General, in *ibid.*, 233–34.
18. *Ibid.*, 47–50; quote on p. 49. For the 1939 speech to the American Historical Association, see Larry I. Bland, ed., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall*, vol. 2, "We Cannot Delay," July 1, 1939–December 6, 1941 (Baltimore, 1986), 123–27.
19. See Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall, vol. 3, Organizer of Victory, 1943–1945* (New York, 1973), 458–59.
20. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, *Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers* (New York, 1986), 247–56.



SHAFR Council Meeting Minutes
Approved by Council 8/8/12

Thursday, June 28, 2012
8:00 am-12:45 PM
Hartford Marriott Downtown

Council members present: Laura Belmonte, Mark Bradley, Carol Chin, Frank Costigliola, Christopher Dietrich, Mary Dudziak, Peter L. Hahn, Mitchell Lerner, Andrew Preston, Andrew Rotter, Marc Selverstone, Sarah Snyder, Annessa Stagner, Tom Zeiler (Presiding)

Others present: Matt Ambrose, Kristin Hoganson, Andrew Johns, Chester Pach, Jennifer Walton

Business Items:

1) Announcements

Zeiler called the meeting to order at 8:07 AM, welcoming the council and inviting them to introduce themselves.

2) Recap of motions passed by e-mail since January meeting

Hahn reported that Council, since its last meeting in January, approved two motions by e-mail ballots: 1) to approve the minutes from the January Council meeting, and 2) to approve Lexington, Kentucky as the site of the 2014 SHAFR conference.

3) Report from the Ways & Means Committee

Rotter, standing in for Marilyn Young, reported three items from the Ways and Means Committee:

A) Endowment Management

Rotter summarized a report prepared by Endowment Liaison and W&M member Emily Rosenberg on SHAFR's current endowment managers' fee structure and on the possibilities of adopting an investment framework emphasizing socially responsible investment strategies. The Rosenberg report compared fee structures among three firms and presented possibilities for negotiating reduced fee structures as part of a management arrangement. As the report recommended, Council agreed to hold in abeyance the possibility of dealing with the largest prospective firm on the reasoning that it would lack local service representation and that its fees were not advantageous.

The current investment strategy is relatively conservative, but Rosenberg and the committee noted that comparable organizations such as AHA are actually even more conservative. While a look at the most recent historical data shows that this slightly more aggressive allocation has seemed to generally pay off, Council may want to consider a shift in strategy to slightly more conservative allocations.

Based on information from SHAFR's CPA, Rotter reported that socially responsible strategies can limit options, and exist on a spectrum from more to less restrictive, and therefore need to be defined clearly. The committee concluded that further investigation into these details was merited, to see what such a strategy would look like, options within that framework, and how the SHAFR portfolio would have done with such a strategy in the past and potentially in the future. After discussion, members agreed that the W&M Committee should explore the precise definition of socially responsible investing and assess its pros and cons.

B) Budget issues

Rotter reported that the W&M Committee anticipated a decline in revenue in the near future. W&M had discussed possible cuts in expenditures to offset the expected revenue shortfall. However, the committee reached a consensus that it would be premature to make spending cuts in light of the growth in the Endowment and the possibility that revenue shortfalls might not materialize on the worst-case scale. Rotter reported that the committee recommended that Council could continue spending at current rates, rely on the endowment earnings as a cushion to cover any shortfall, and monitor actual revenues for 1-2 years before making any major spending cuts. After discussion of specific figures for the endowment and publishing revenues, Council concurred on the utility of postponing major reassessments of spending until conditions under the new contract were better understood.

C) Internship proposal

Rotter reported on the proposal, raised at a past meeting, to fund an internship at the Woodrow Wilson Center at \$5,000 per year. Belmonte said that her inclination was to wait a year and see how SHAFR's finances develop, so that any commitment made to the program could be enduring. This suggestion met with general approval, and no action was taken.

4) SHAFR events at OAH annual meetings

Bradley recommended that SHAFR move the Bernath Lecture luncheon from the OAH to the AHA in light of the high attendance at SHAFR events at the AHA and low attendance at those events at the OAH. Because speakers have been scheduled for 2013, he recommended that this change take effect in 2014. To offset the loss of SHAFR presence at the OAH, Bradley proposed that SHAFR presidents proactively schedule an academic panel or two at the OAH.

Discussion ensued on whether the luncheon would remain a part of the Bernath lecture and whether to try to boost turnout for the Bernath at OAH or to simply boost visibility at OAH through other events. Dudziak suggested that SHAFR should try to increase its visibility at OAH through panels rather than social events, citing the military history lectures at the AHA, which are well attended. Chin stated that the point of the Bernath lecture is to celebrate colleagues, but if it became another panel, the calculus for attendance changes. General agreement was expressed with the principle that the president should implement the recommended shift of the Bernath Lecture to the AHA beginning in 2014.

5) Report of Website Task Force

Dudziak reported several recommendations from the Website Task Force (Belmonte, Dudziak, Selverstone, Stagner): 1) a resolution to thank Brian Etheridge for his service and support with the website to date. 2) appointment of a new webmaster. 3) creation of a standing committee on the SHAFR website, with responsibility to oversee SHAFR's website and other web-based programs and to advise the webmaster. 4) allocation of sufficient resources to redesign the SHAFR website and compensate the new webmaster.

Dudziak proposed that Council first appoint a new webmaster, who could then work with the committee to conduct the redesign. Discussion ensued on the appropriate level of compensation for the webmaster and a consensus emerged that \$5,000 per year would be appropriate for planning purposes. Belmonte emphasized the need to ensure coordination between the web committee and the teaching, program, and conference committees. It was suggested that Council consider hiring a company to manage the website, noting SHAFR members might not have the technical expertise needed to keep the website at the level SHAFR is looking for, but a consensus emerged that having a webmaster who understood SHAFR's mission and values was crucial and that a redesign firm could also train the webmaster to handle the technical challenges. Dudziak indicated these issues would be addressed during the webmaster bidding process.

Dudziak moved a resolution of thanks to Brian Etheridge for his service as SHAFR's webmaster. The motion was seconded and passed unanimously. Dudziak then moved to create a standing committee on SHAFR's web presence; the motion was seconded and passed unanimously. Dudziak then moved to appropriate \$15,000, \$5,000 (recurring) for the webmaster, and \$10,000 (once) to spend on web design, at the discretion of the committee. The motion was seconded and passed unanimously.

6) SHAFR *Guide to the Literature* and contract with ABC-Clio

Zeiler noted that the survey on the *Guide to the Literature* had a low response rate. Zeiler also reported on some difficulties with ABC-Clio posting updates, making the electronic version available, and shipping volumes. Zeiler asked Council if the commercial model for the *Guide* should continue. Dudziak stated that if she could just get to the *Guide* from the web with a single click she would use it. Selverstone stated that in the event of a move away from ABC-Clio, the *Guide* could have a SHAFR domain name. Hahn and Zeiler noted the expense of maintaining the *Guide* and the difficulty identifying chapter editors. Dudziak suggested switching to a wiki-based model instead, perhaps open-source but restricted to SHAFR members. Zeiler agreed this was an idea worth investigating. Hahn agreed to investigate what options were permitted in the *Guide* contract.

7) Discussion of authority of Nominating Committee

Rotter noted that there had been some question recently about the weight the Nominating Committee gives to the raw number of received nominations for specific individuals vis-à-vis other factors. Rotter reported that a Nominating Committee member indicated that the committee takes into account many other factors including CV, contributions to the literature, and diversity. Discussion ensued on how much weight the raw number factor was perceived to hold among the membership at large and on the potential impact on the process of submitting one's name for nomination. While the discussion noted the importance of transparency and equity, Council decided that, as the bylaws render the SHAFR Council and the Nominating Committee independent of each other, any action or further discussion on this question was outside the scope of Council's immediate responsibilities.

8) Discussion of venues for 2015 and 2016 annual meetings

Zeiler reported that the 2015 annual meeting would be in Washington and that a search would be conducted for the 2016 venue. He indicated that San Diego remained a possibility, although there was evidence that it would be more expensive than other options, and that there was considerable support for a West Coast venue. Zeiler favored an overseas option like Havana, although this option would be contingent on diplomatic and political events. Costigliola asked if the DC hotel 2015 would be the same as 2013. Hahn replied that a competitive search would be conducted after the 2013 meeting.

9) Motion to merge the Diversity & International grants program and the SHAFR Global Scholars Grant program

Zeiler reported on the progress of the new SHAFR Global Scholars Grant to bring in international scholars to the 2012 meeting. One is composed of global scholars. The main problem in the SGSG program is that persons not awarded funds were unaware of the Diversity & International program.

Hahn reported that this year while the popularity of the Diversity & International grants program had flagged in recent years, in 2012 the entire \$25,000 had been allocated (about \$20,000 by the Program Committee and about \$5,000 by the Membership Committee). Hahn recommended that the two committees streamline communication to ensure consistency between the programs. Snyder stated that she supported such a streamlining effort. Zeiler recommended against combining the programs, as there were elements of specific recognition and achievement in the SGSG program that D&I might not be

able to completely capture. He recommended preserving the current division and improving coordination, communication, and timing. After some discussion, Council agreed to keep the programs separate and improve coordination. Zeiler planned to discuss the situation with the Program Committee. Costigliola then moved to re-authorize the D&I grants program for an additional four years (2013-2016) at \$25,000 per year. The motion was seconded and passed unanimously.

10) Motion to clarify stipulations on dissertation prize competitions

Hahn noted that the Dissertation Prize Committee asked for clarity on the stipulations regarding the date of a dissertation that affected a candidate's eligibility for the dissertation prizes.

As Hahn suggested, Belmonte moved that for the Oxford University Press USA Dissertation Prize in International History and the Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize competitions, *the year in which a doctoral degree is awarded* shall be operative in determining the eligibility of a dissertation.

The motion was seconded and passed unanimously with none abstaining.

11) *Diplomatic History* editorial succession

Bradley reported that he would oversee the process voted by Council last year to conduct a review of proposals to edit *Diplomatic History* after the expiration of the current editorial assignment in August 2014. He planned to appoint an ad-hoc committee of 5 people, representing the various constituencies of SHAFR, and ask it to explore the experience of other societies conducting a review in early 2013. He envisioned the committee extending a call for applications in early 2013, evaluating those applications in the spring, and bringing a recommendation to Council in June 2013. While Bradley would be unable formally to create the committee until January, he intended to lay some preliminary groundwork to that this timetable could be followed.

Reports

12) *Passport*

Johns reported that the transition of the editorship from Mitch Lerner to himself had gone well. Johns stated that Lerner had been very effective as consulting editor, and expressed his hope that Council would allow Lerner to stay on in that role, largely because most of the infrastructure for *Passport* is still at Ohio State. *Passport* is stable on financial grounds, with Mershon Center grants forthcoming. Oxford will pay for the publication and mailing of *Passport* as Wiley-Blackwell has. In terms of content, there have been few changes.

13) *Diplomatic History*

Zeiler reported that *DH's* acceptance rates are up .5 percent, but that the absolute level is still about the same as rates at the *American Historical Review* and the *Journal of American History*. Costigliola asked if Robert Schulzinger had expressed any interest in continuing with *DH* in any capacity. Zeiler replied that Schulzinger would retire. Zeiler noted that Oxford's very strong international imprint might mean that article downloads would increase above their already strong numbers. Zeiler also highlighted *DH's* continuing efforts to improve the gender balance and maintain the presence of international scholars. Zeiler has appointed Ken Osgood to head up *DH's* web presence and initiatives.

14) Teaching Committee

Pach reported that the committee was moving ahead with updating syllabi and getting documents on the website. The lesson plan project would be delayed until Fall. In discussion about other initiatives from the State Department and Miller Center on historical documents, Pach stated that the committee was discussing whether the primary source initiative might be duplicative and in what form it would continue if at all, particularly in view of any changes to SHAFR's web presence policies. He will keep Council apprised of deliberations on the subject.

15) 2012 SHAFR Conference

Hoganson reported that the 2012 Program Committee has 62 panel slots to fill, a smaller number than in years past. The acceptance rate was 57% of individuals and 67% of full panel proposals.

Hoganson recommended several reforms of the on-line application process to avoid problems encountered this year. To address the problem that applicants could not save their applications in progress, the Program Committee should post an application template that allows saving in progress or should alert applicants to gather all needed materials before starting. Hoganson also recommended automating the separation of individual applications and the transfer of information from applications to the spreadsheets; centralizing the grants process by creating a single form that allows users to check boxes for all funds they wish to apply for; and automating the dispatch of confirmation letters. Hoganson also recommended consistency and transparency in the allocation of funds from the global scholars program.

Hoganson reported that the \$500 initially allocated to pay the RA who assisted with applications proved to be insufficient and that the Program Committee was pleased to have an additional sum allocated. Zeiler agreed to look into software vendors that provide services capable of this level of automation without requiring it to be integrated into the website manually. The long-term management of this process would be assigned to the new webmaster.

Walton reported that registrations likely will run between 350 and 400 for this conference, an excellent number. She also

noted other positive trends, such as increased international registrants and advertising revenue. AV expenses continue to run high, affirming the wisdom of concentrating AV panels into single rooms and denying belated requests for AV support. As suggested by someone, Walton agreed to research a fee structure for one day registration at future meetings for local non-academics such as K-12 teachers. Council indicated favor for the idea of offering the student discounted rates for all conference activities to K-12 teachers as well as adjunct professors.

16) 2013 SHAFR Conference

Bradley reported that Lien-Hang Nguyen and Paul Chamberlin will co-chair the 2013 Program Committee. A conference theme is pending. The plenary, which George Herring will chair, will feature 18th and 19th century historians in conversation with 20th century historians about topical and methodological connections over time. Tim Naftali will lecture at the Saturday lunch, focusing on his experiences as director of the Nixon library. Bradley plans to schedule the social event on Friday night in lieu of a second plenary, in hope of increasing participation at the social. He is investigating possible venues including museums and historical sites. Some discussion ensued of potential benefits and drawbacks to this approach. Bradley noted that the 2013 conference will provide a good opportunity to experiment with a new schedule.

17) 2014 SHAFR Conference

Zeiler reported that the 2014 conference will be held at Lexington, Kentucky and will most likely find a way to honor George Herring.

18) 2012 Summer Institute

Costigliola reported that he and co-director Andy Rotter received 50-60 applicants and accepted 12 (8 women and 4 men). Ten of the twelve attended. The Institute was an intense, wonderful learning experience. Rotter stated that the informal evaluations indicated universal acclaim for the opportunities to discuss each other's work. All planned to attend the current SHAFR conference, buoyed by the confidence of entering the meeting with a network of colleagues from the Institute. Costigliola added that the Institute thus served as a great recruiting tool.

19) 2013 Summer Institute

Zeiler reported that the SI Oversight Committee approved a proposal to host the 2013 SI from Leopoldo Nuti, Martin Sherwin, and Christian Ostermann. The SI will focus on "The International History of Nuclear Weapons": and will be hosted at the Wilson Center in Washington in the week preceding the SHAFR conference.

Hahn noted that the 2013 proposal was the first one selected through a competitive process, and that only the one proposal had been received. He also noted that Council would need to extend the authority to hold SIs in 2014 and beyond if indeed it wanted the program to continue. Costigliola recommended renewing the program for 6 additional years, through 2019, noting that assurance of continuity in this program would generate abiding interest and additional proposals to host it in the future. Rotter so moved, the motion was seconded, and it passed unanimously.

20) Reports on recent prizes and fellowships

Hahn reported that Sara Fieldston and David Wight will receive Dissertation Completion Fellowships in 2012-2013; that Toshihiro Niguchi will receive the 2012 Oxford University Press USA Dissertation Prize in International History; and that Melvyn Leffler will receive the 2012 Norman & Laura Graebner Lifetime Achievement Award. John Gaddis, who was unable to attend the OAH in April where it was announced that he won the Robert Ferrell Book Prize, will physically receive the award at the Saturday luncheon just before he delivers the keynote address. Gaddis graciously declined the prize money, returning it as a donation to SHAFR in honor of Robert Ferrell.

21) Concluding remarks


Zeiler thanked all in attendance and wished them an enjoyable conference.

The meeting adjourned at 12:15 pm.

Respectfully submitted,
Peter L. Hahn
Executive Director

PLH/ma





1. Research Notes

FRUS E-Books

The Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State is pleased to announce the release of its *Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS)* series in a new e-book format that is readable on popular electronic devices such as the Amazon Kindle and Apple iPad. The e-book edition combines many of the benefits of print and web publications in a new form that is portable and extremely convenient. During the pilot phase of the *FRUS* e-book initiative, five selected *FRUS* volumes are available here. The public is invited to download the new e-books and provide feedback to help improve the *FRUS* e-book edition. At the conclusion of the pilot phase later this year, the Office will work to offer e-book versions of many more *FRUS* volumes both through the Office website and on a wide array of e-bookstores. The Office will continue to expand and enhance its e-book offerings, as part of the ongoing *FRUS* digitization effort.

The *FRUS* e-book initiative is an outgrowth of the Office of the Historian's efforts to optimize the series for its website. Because the Office adopted the Text Encoding Initiative's open, robust XML-based file format (TEI), a single digital master TEI file can store an entire *FRUS* volume and can be transformed into either a set of web pages or an e-book. The free, open source eXist-db server that powers the entire Office of the Historian website also provides the tools needed to transform the *FRUS* TEI files into HTML and e-book formats.

For questions about the *FRUS* e-book initiative, please see our FAQ page at <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ebooks>; for other questions or to provide feedback, please contact historyebooks@state.gov. To receive updates about new releases, follow us on Twitter at @HistoryAtState.



2. Announcements

SHAFR Syllabus Initiative

SHAFR maintains on its web site a collection of syllabi and student assignments for courses in international history. Now that a new academic year has begun, we hope you will send your syllabi and assignments to us for posting. We are interested in syllabi for *any* course in international history, whether chronological (e.g. U.S. involvement in world affairs since 1914) or thematic (e.g. the international history of the Cold War; gender and U.S. foreign policy). We would like syllabi for courses that are taught at either the undergraduate or graduate level, as well as those that are primarily lecture or those that are colloquia. In addition, we would like to encourage you to submit assignments that you give your students, including essays or work involving online resources. The addition of course materials to this collection will make it an even more valuable resource for the sharing of ideas about course structure, readings, and learning assignments. Submission of materials as Word (.doc or .docx) documents is preferable.

Please e-mail syllabi and course materials to Nicole Phelps (Nicole.Phelps@uvm.edu). You can find the SHAFR collection of syllabi and assignments at: <http://www.shafr.org/teaching/higher-education/syllabi-initiative/>. Thanks for your help.



Department of State Blog

The official blog of the U.S. Department of State, DipNote, is accessible at <http://blogs.state.gov>. Its purpose is to serve as "a place to share stories, discuss experiences, and inspire new ideas on the important foreign policy issues of the day." Recent entries include a discussion of the availability of the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series in e-book format.



Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship

Launched in 1967, the International Affairs Fellowship (IAF) is a distinguished program offered by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) to assist mid-career scholars and professionals in advancing their analytic capabilities and broadening their foreign policy experience. The program aims to strengthen career development by helping outstanding individuals acquire and apply foreign policy skills beyond the scope of their professional and scholarly achievements. The distinctive character of the IAF Program lies in the contrasting professional experiences fellows obtain through their twelve-month appointment. Selected fellows from academia and the private sector spend fellowship tenures in public service and policy-oriented settings, while government officials spend their tenures in a scholarly atmosphere free from operational pressure.

CFR awards approximately ten fellowships annually to highly accomplished individuals who have a capacity for

independent work and who are eager to undertake serious foreign policy analysis. Approximately half of the selected IAFs each year spend their tenures working full-time in government; the remaining half are placed at academic institutions, think tanks, or non profit organizations. CFR's Fellowship Affairs Office assists all fellows in finding a suitable affiliation for the year. In addition to providing the opportunity to carry out research, the IAF Program integrates all fellows into the intellectual life of CFR. Fellows who are not placed at CFR during their tenure are invited to attend and participate in select CFR meetings and events. Alumni of the program stay connected with CFR and its prestigious network of professionals and leaders, and convene at CFR's annual IAF Conference in New York City each spring.

Interested candidates who meet the program's eligibility requirements can apply online between **June 1 and October 1** on an annual basis. Candidates who are selected as IAF finalists will be notified between December and January, with finalist interviews scheduled in Washington, DC, and New York City between January and February. Official selections and announcement of IAF awards will be made between February and March.

The IAF Program is only open to U.S. citizens and permanent residents between the ages of twenty-seven and thirty-five who are eligible to work in the United States. CFR does not sponsor for visas. While a PhD is not a requirement, selected fellows generally hold an advanced degree and possess a strong record of work experience as well as a firm grounding in the field of foreign policy. The program does not fund pre- or postdoctoral research, work toward a degree, or the completion of projects for which substantial progress has been made prior to the fellowship period.

Selection as an IAF is based on a combination of the following criteria: scholarly qualifications, achievements and promise, depth and breadth of professional experience, firm grounding in foreign policy and international relations, and an application proposal that focuses on solutions to identified problems in U.S. foreign policy. Applicants are encouraged to plan a systematic approach to assessing the major substantive and process issues of their planned research. The proposal will be judged on the proposed work's originality, practicality, potential, likelihood of completion during the fellowship period, and the contribution it will make to the applicant's individual career development.

The selection process is highly competitive. CFR's Fellowship Affairs Office processes the applications, and the IAF selection committee reviews all applications to identify the most promising candidates. About one-third of the most qualified applicants are selected as finalists to be interviewed by several IAF selection committee members. Based on the overall application and the results of the interviews, the selection committee chooses approximately ten finalists to be fellows.

The duration of the fellowship is twelve months, preferably beginning in September. Though deferment is not an option, requests to do so, for up to one year only, will be considered on a case-by-case basis and under special circumstances. The program awards a stipend of \$85,000. Fellows are considered independent contractors rather than employees of CFR, and are not eligible for employment benefits, including health insurance.

If you are interested in the fellowship, please contact fellowships@cfcr.org or 212-434-9740. For more information, please visit www.cfr.org/fellowships.



CFP: Transatlantic Studies Association Annual Conference at Northumbria University, Newcastle,
July 8-11, 2013

The Chairman of the TSA, Prof Alan Dobson (St. Andrews University) and Dr. Michael Patrick Cullinane (Northumbria University) would like to extend an invitation to the 2013 Transatlantic Studies Association Annual Conference. Our outstanding 2013 plenary guests are:

Professor Donna Alvah (St. Lawrence University)
Professor Susan Manning (University of Edinburgh)
Professor Michael Clarke (Royal United Services Institute)

Professor Erwan Lagadec will lead a roundtable discussion of his book, *Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century*, with respondents.

Panel proposals and individual papers are welcome for any of the general or sub-panels. A 300 word abstract of proposal and brief CV to panel leaders or to Alan Dobson (ad98@st-andrews.ac.uk) and Michael Cullinane (michael.cullinane@northumbria.ac.uk)

Deadline – April 30, 2013.

The general panels, subpanels and panel leaders for 2012 are:

1.Literature and Culture: Constance Post (cjpost@iastate.edu) and Louise Walsh (walsh.lou@gmail.com)

Sub-panel:

- Transatlantic Romantic Dialogues: Clare Elliott (clare.elliott@northumbria.ac.uk)

2.Economics: Fiona Venn (vennf@essex.ac.uk) and Joe McKinney (joe_mckinney@baylor.edu)



3. History, Security Studies and IR: Alan Dobson (ad98@st-andrews.ac.uk) and David Ryan (david.ryan@ucc.ie)
- Sub-panels:
- NATO: Ellen Hallams (EHallams.jscsc@defenceacademy.mod.uk) and Luca Ratti (ratti@uniroma3.it) Ben Zyla, (ben.zyla@gmail.com)
 - Ethnicity and security in the transatlantic world: David Haglund (david.haglund@queensu.ca)
 - The U.S. Pivot to Asia: Erwan Lagadec (elagadec@gwu.edu)
 - Diplomats at War: The American Experience: Simon Rofe (simon.rofe@soas.ac.uk)
 - Anglo-American Relations: Steve Marsh (marshsi@cardiff.ac.uk) and Charlie Whitham (cwhitham@uwic.ac.uk)
 - Transatlantic Relations during the Second World War: Tom Mills (t.c.mills@lancaster.ac.uk) and Gavin Bailey (g.j.bailey@dundee.ac.uk)
4. Bringing South Borders In: Perceptions, Strategies and Political Action of Latin America and Africa in Transatlantic Relations: Alexandre Luís Moreli Rocha (alexandremoreli@yahoo.com.br)
- Subpanels:
- Transatlantic Approaches to Energy Security: John R. Deni (john.deni@us.army.mil)
 - 40th Anniversary of the 1973 Oil and Middle Eastern Crises: Transatlantic Perspectives: Fiona Venn (vennf@essex.ac.uk)
5. Planning, Regeneration and the Environment: Antonia Sagredo (asagredo@flog.uned.es) and Tony Jackson (a.a.jackson@dundee.ac.uk)
6. Migration and Diaspora in the Atlantic World: Tanja Bueltmann, tanja.bueltmann@northumbria.ac.uk
- Sub-panels:
- The Anglican Church in the Atlantic World: Joe Hardwick (joseph.hardwick@northumbria.ac.uk)
 - British Cultural Legacies in the Atlantic World: Tanja Bueltmann (tanja.bueltmann@northumbria.ac.uk)



Call for Papers: Cryptologic History Symposium

The National Security Agency's Center for Cryptologic History sponsors a biennial Cryptologic History Symposium, and the next conference will be held **October 10-11, 2013**. Historians from the Center, the Intelligence Community, the defense establishment, and the military services, as well as distinguished scholars from American and foreign academic institutions, veterans of the profession, graduate and undergraduate students, and the interested public all will gather for two days of reflection and debate on relevant and important topics from the cryptologic past.

Past symposia have featured scholarship that set out new ways to consider our cryptologic heritage, and this one will be no exception. The intended goal is to foster discussion on how cryptology has impacted political, diplomatic, economic, and military tactics, operations, strategy, planning, and command and control throughout history. Any serious researcher whose work touches upon the historical aspects of cryptology defined in its broadest sense is encouraged to participate. The conference will provide many opportunities for interaction with leading historians and other distinguished experts. The mix of practitioners, scholars, and interested observers always precipitates a lively debate promoting an enhanced appreciation for the context of past events.

The theme for the upcoming conference will be "Technological Change and Cryptology: Meeting the Historical Challenges." The practice and application of cryptanalysis and cryptography have been radically altered as the evolution of technology has accelerated. Conference participants will delve into the technical, scientific, methodological, political, and industrial underpinnings of signals intelligence and information assurance as presented throughout a broad swath of history. While presenters may choose to focus on purely technological topics, the panels will include papers on a broad range of related operational, organizational, counterintelligence, policy, and international themes. The audience will be particularly interested in new findings on the intersection of technology and cryptology as signals systems evolved from manual to machine-assisted to digital formats.

The Symposium will be held at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory's Kossiakoff Center, in Laurel, Maryland, a location central to the Baltimore, Maryland, and Washington, D.C., areas. At this time, interested persons are invited to submit proposals for a single presentation or even a full panel. The topics can relate to this year's theme, but all serious work on any unclassified aspect of cryptologic history will be considered. Proposals should include an abstract for each paper as well as biographical sketches for each presenter. To submit proposals or form more information on this conference, contact Dr. Kent Sieg, the Symposium Executive Director, by telephone at 301-688-2336 or via e-mail at kgsieg@nsa.gov.



Call for Papers: St Antony's International Review

Following successfully publishing wholly themed issues between 2005 and 2010, forthcoming issues of the *St Antony's International Review (STAIR)* will also include a General Section. *STAIR* therefore invites authors to submit original research manuscripts on topics of contemporary relevance in international affairs. Submissions from the fields of political

science and international relations, philosophy, and international history will all be considered. Articles may take either a theoretical or policy-oriented approach. We caution, however, that *STAIR* has a broad readership and therefore prizes accessibility of language and content.

STAIR is the only peer-reviewed journal of international affairs at the University of Oxford. Set up by graduate students of St Antony's College in 2005, the *Review* has carved out a distinctive niche as a cross-disciplinary outlet for research on the most pressing contemporary global issues, providing a forum in which emerging scholars can publish their work alongside established academics and policymakers. Distinguished past contributors include John Baylis, Valerie J. Bunce, Robert O. Keohane, James N. Rosenau, and Alfred Stepan.

Please note that *STAIR* will continue to devote at least half of each issue to a special theme of contemporary significance. Authors should therefore refer to the themed Calls for Papers available at www.stair-journal.org to determine whether their particular areas of interest are covered by upcoming special issues. All articles that do not fit with the upcoming special themes listed here should be submitted to the General Section.

STAIR will review manuscripts that contain original, previously unpublished material of up to 6,000 words (including footnotes with complete bibliographic information). Authors are asked to include a word count and an abstract of no more than 300 words. Submissions are sent to external reviewers for comment. Decisions can generally be expected within three months. For further information on manuscript preparation, referencing, and diction, please refer to the "Notes for Contributors" available at www.stair-journal.org.

Please send submissions to stair@sant.ox.ac.uk.



Call for Applications

The Smith Richardson Foundation's International Security and Foreign Policy Program is pleased to announce its annual grant competition to support junior faculty research on American foreign policy, international relations, international security, military policy, and diplomatic and military history. The Foundation will award at least three research grants of \$60,000 each to support tenure-track junior faculty engaged in the research and writing of a scholarly book on an issue or topic of interest to the policy community.

These grants are intended to buy-out up to one year of teaching time and to underwrite research costs (including research assistance and travel). Each grant will be paid directly to, and should be administered by, the academic institution at which the junior faculty member works. Projects in military and diplomatic history are especially encouraged. Group or collaborative projects will not be considered.

Procedure

An applicant must submit a research proposal, a maximum of ten pages, that includes the following five sections:

- a one-page executive summary;
- a brief description of the policy issue or the problem that the proposed book will examine;
- a description of the background and body of knowledge on the issue to be addressed by the book;
- a description of the personnel and methods (e.g., research questions, research strategy, analytical approach, tentative organization of the book, etc.); and
- a brief explanation of the implications of the prospective findings of the research for the policy community.

The applicant should also include a *curriculum vitae*, a detailed budget explaining how the grant would be used, and a work timetable with a start date. A template for a junior faculty proposal is available at the Foundation's website.

Proposal Evaluation Criteria

Proposals will be evaluated based on the following criteria: the relevance of potential analysis and findings to current and future foreign and security policy issues; the potential of the project to innovate the field and to contribute to academic or policy literature on the chosen topic; the degree to which research questions and analytical methods are well defined; the degree to which the project will develop valuable new data or information through field work, archival work, or other methods; and the applicant's publication record.

Eligibility

An applicant must have a Ph.D., preferably in Political Science, Public Policy, Policy Analysis, International Political Economy, or History. He or she also must hold a position as a full-time tenure-track faculty member of a college or university in the United States. An applicant should explain how he or she meets all of these requirements in a cover letter to the proposal.



Deadline

The Foundation must receive all Junior Faculty Research Grant proposals postmarked by **June 15, 2013**. Applicants will be notified of the Foundation's decision by October 31, 2013.

Please e-mail your proposal to juniorfaculty@srf.org as a single document, ideally in PDF or Microsoft Word .doc/.docx format, or mail an unstapled hard copy to:

Junior Faculty Research / International Program
Smith Richardson Foundation
60 Jesup Road
Westport, CT 06880



Commission on the History of International Relations

All interested SHAFR members are invited to become members of the Commission on the History of International Relations, a thirty-year old organization headquartered in Milan, Italy. The CHIR is an international network of scholars from more than thirty countries. Its mission is to advance the study of the history of international relations through the cross-fertilization of ideas. The commission links different disciplinary sub-fields and approaches to the study of international history and foreign relations and provides an open forum for the communication of ideas and information between scholars. With its global range, the CHIR is ideally placed to provide links between separate national organizations dedicated to the study of international relations and foreign policy. Given the growing internationalization of SHAFR, the CHIR is an organization that could prove very beneficial to our members. Please consider becoming an active member of this important international association.

Membership fees are just \$25.00 (or 17 Euros) for one year; \$40.00 (or 28 Euros) for two years; or \$50.00 (or 35 Euros) for three years. The official languages of the Commission are both English and French. Reduced membership rates are available for young scholars and graduate students.

Please consult the Commission's website (www.polestra.com/comintrel/) for additional information, including planned Commission activities for the upcoming international history congress in Jinan, China, in 2015.

Robert J. McMahan
Member, Bureau of the CHIR



2013 John H. Dunning Prize, American Historical Association

In recognition of outstanding historical writing in United States history, the American Historical Association offers the John H. Dunning Prize. Established by a bequest from Mathilde Dunning in 1927 to be awarded for an outstanding monograph on any subject relating to United States history, this prize is offered biennially in odd-numbered years.

To be eligible for consideration, an entry must be of scholarly historical nature. It must be the author's first or second book, published after May 1, 2011 and before April 30, 2013. Research, accuracy, originality, and literary merit are important factors.

One copy of each entry (no more than five titles from any one publisher) must be received by each of the committee members (see AHA website for details). Entries must be postmarked by or on **May 15, 2013** to be eligible; late entries will not be considered. Recipients will be announced at the January 2-5, 2014 AHA Annual Meeting in Washington, D.C.



3. Upcoming SHAFR Deadlines

Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize

The purpose of the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded annually to an author for his or her first book on any aspect of the history of American foreign relations.

Eligibility: The prize is to be awarded for a first book. The book must be a history of international relations. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, editions of essays and documents, and works that represent social science disciplines other than history are not eligible.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contributions to scholarship. Winning books should have exceptional interpretative and analytical qualities. They should demonstrate mastery of primary material and relevant secondary works, and they should display careful organization and distinguished writing. Five copies of each book must be submitted with a letter of nomination.

The award will be announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. The prize will be divided only when two superior books are so evenly matched that any other decision seems unsatisfactory to the selection committee. The committee will not award the prize if there is no book in the competition which meets the standards of excellence established for the prize.

To nominate a book published in 2012 for the 2013 prize, send five copies of the book and a letter of nomination to Professor Anne Foster, Department of History, Indiana State University, 200 N. Seventh Street, Terre Haute, IN 47809-1902. Books may be sent at any time during 2013, but must arrive by **December 1, 2013**.



Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize recognizes and encourages excellence in teaching and research in the field of foreign relations by younger scholars. The prize of \$1000 is awarded annually.

Eligibility: The prize is open to any person under forty-one years of age or within ten years of the receipt of the PhD whose scholarly achievements represent excellence in teaching and research. Nominations may be made by any member of SHAFR or of any other established history, political science, or journalism department or organization.

Procedures: Nominations, in the form of a letter and the nominee's c.v., should be sent to the Chair of the Bernath Lecture Committee. The nominating letter should discuss evidence of the nominee's excellence in teaching and research.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians (OAH). The winner of the prize will deliver a lecture during the SHAFR luncheon at the next year's OAH annual meeting. The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to a SHAFR presidential address and should address broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy, not the lecturer's specific research interests. The lecturer is awarded \$1,000 plus up to \$500 in travel expenses to the OAH, and his or her lecture is published in *Diplomatic History*.

To be considered for the 2013 award, nominations must be received by **February 28, 2013**. Nominations should be sent to Professor Michelle Mart, Department of History, Pennsylvania State University-Berks, Tulpehocken Road, P.O. Box 7009, Reading, PA 19610 (e-mail: mam20@psu.edu).



Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations. The prize of \$1,000 is awarded annually to the author of a distinguished article appearing in a scholarly journal or edited book, on any topic in United States foreign relations.

Eligibility: The author must be under forty-one years of age or within ten years of receiving the Ph.D. at the time of the article's acceptance for publication. The article must be among the first six publications by the author. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award or the Myrna F. Bernath Book Award are ineligible.

Procedures: All articles appearing in *Diplomatic History* will be automatically considered without nomination. Other nominations may be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

To nominate an article published in 2012 for the 2013 prize, send three copies of the article and a letter of nomination to Professor Donna Alvah, Department of History, St. Lawrence University, 23 Romoda Drive, Canton, NY 13617. Deadline for nominations is **February 1, 2013**.



Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize

This prize is designed to reward distinguished scholarship in the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded annually. The Ferrell Prize was established to honor Robert H. Ferrell, professor of diplomatic history at Indiana University from 1961 to 1990, by his former students.

Eligibility: The Ferrell Prize recognizes any book beyond the first monograph by the author. To be considered, a book must deal with the history of American foreign relations, broadly defined. Biographies of statesmen and diplomats are eligible. General surveys, autobiographies, or editions of essays and documents are not eligible.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of SHAFR. Three copies of the book must be submitted.

The award is announced during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.



To nominate a book published in 2012 for the 2013 prize, send three copies of the book and a letter of nomination to Professor Jeffrey Engel, Clements Department of History, Southern Methodist University, P.O. Box 750176, Dallas, TX 75275. Books may be sent at any time during 2013, but must arrive by **December 15, 2013**.



Myrna F. Bernath Book Award

The purpose of this award is to encourage scholarship by women in U.S. foreign relations history. The prize of \$2,500 is awarded biannually (even years) to the author of the best book written by a woman in the field and published during the preceding two calendar years.

Eligibility: Nominees should be women who have published distinguished books in U.S. foreign relations, transnational history, international history, peace studies, cultural interchange, and defense or strategic studies. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or any member of SHAFR. A nominating letter explaining why the book deserves consideration must accompany each entry in the competition. Books will be judged primarily in regard to their contribution to scholarship. Three copies of each book (or page proofs) must be submitted with a letter of nomination.

The award is presented during the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

The deadline for nominations for the 2014 prize is **December 1, 2013**. Submit required materials to Professor Kathryn Statler, Department of History, University of San Diego, 5998 Alcala Park, San Diego, CA 92110.



The Norman and Laura Graebner Award

The Graebner Award is a lifetime achievement award intended to recognize a senior historian of United States foreign relations who has significantly contributed to the development of the field, through scholarship, teaching, and/or service, over his or her career. The award of \$2,000 is awarded biannually. The Graebner Award was established by the former students of Norman A. Graebner, professor of diplomatic history at the University of Illinois and the University of Virginia, to honor Norman and his wife Laura for their years of devotion to teaching and research in the field.

Eligibility: The Graebner prize will be awarded to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic or international affairs. The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Procedures: Letters of nomination, submitted in triplicate, should (a) provide a brief biography of the nominee, including educational background, academic or other positions held, and awards and honors received; (b) list the nominee's major scholarly works and discuss the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs; (c) describe the candidate's career, note any teaching honors and awards, and comment on the candidate's classroom skills; and (d) detail the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices and discussing particular activities. Self-nominations are accepted.

Graebner awards are announced at SHAFR's annual meeting. The next deadline for nominations is **March 1, 2013**. Submit materials to Penny Von Eschen, Department of History, University of Michigan, 1029 Tisch Hall, Ann Arbor, MI 48109.



The Betty M. Unterberger Dissertation Prize

The Betty M. Unterberger Prize is intended to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing by graduate students in the field of diplomatic history. The Prize of \$1,000 is awarded biannually (in odd years) to the author of a dissertation, completed during the previous two calendar years, on any topic in United States foreign relations history. The Prize is announced at the annual SHAFR conference.

The Prize was established in 2004 to honor Betty Miller Unterberger, a founder of SHAFR and long-time professor of diplomatic history at Texas A&M University.

Procedures: A dissertation may be submitted for consideration by the author or by the author's advisor. Three copies of the dissertation should be submitted, along with a cover letter explaining why the dissertation deserves consideration.

To be considered for the 2013 award, nominations and supporting materials must be received by **February 28, 2013**. Submit materials to Professor Hiroshi Kitamura, Department of History, College of William and Mary, P.O. Box 8795, Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795.



Arthur S. Link-Warren F. Kuehl Prize for Documentary Editing

The Link-Kuehl Prize is awarded for outstanding collections of primary source materials in the fields of international or diplomatic history, especially those distinguished by the inclusion of commentary designed to interpret the documents and set them within their historical context. Published works as well as electronic collections and audio-visual compilations are eligible. The prize is not limited to works on American foreign policy, but is open to works on the history of international, multi-archival, and/or American foreign relations, policy, and diplomacy.

The award of \$1,000 is presented biannually (odd years) to the best work published during the preceding two calendar years. The award is announced at the SHAFR luncheon during the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians.

Procedures: Nominations may be made by any person or publisher. Submission details will be available in mid-2013. To be considered for the 2015 prize, nominations must be received by **January 15, 2015**.



SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship

SHAFR invites applications for its dissertation completion fellowship. SHAFR will make two, year-long awards, in the amount of \$20,000 each, to support the writing and completion of the doctoral dissertation in the academic year 2011-12. These highly competitive fellowships will support the most promising doctoral candidates in the final phase of completing their dissertations. SHAFR membership is required.

Applicants should be candidates for the PhD in a humanities or social science doctoral program (most likely history), must have been admitted to candidacy, and must be at the writing stage, with all substantial research completed by the time of the award. Applicants should be working on a topic in the field of U.S. foreign relations history or international history, broadly defined, and must be current members of SHAFR. Because successful applicants are expected to finish writing the dissertation during the tenure of the fellowship, they should not engage in teaching opportunities or extensive paid work, except at the discretion of the Fellowship Committee. At the termination of the award period, recipients must provide a one page (250-word) report to the SHAFR Council on the use of the fellowship, to be considered for publication in *Passport*, the society newsletter.

The submission packet should include:

- A one page application letter describing the project's significance, the applicant's status, other support received or applied for and the prospects for completion within the year
- A three page (750 word) statement of the research
- A curriculum vitae
- A letter of recommendation from the primary doctoral advisor.

Applications should be sent by electronic mail to dissertation-fellowships@shafr.org. The subject line should clearly indicate "Last Name: SHAFR Dissertation Completion Fellowship.

The annual deadline for submissions is **April 1**. Fellowship awards will be decided by around May 1 and will be announced formally during the SHAFR annual meeting in June, with expenditure to be administered during the subsequent academic year.



Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant

The Bernath Dissertation Grant of up to \$4,000 is intended to help graduate students defray expenses encountered in the writing of their dissertations. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Holt, Gelfand-Rappaport, and Bemis grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application at www.shafr.org. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship

The W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship of up to \$4,000 is intended to defray the costs of travel necessary to conduct research on a significant dissertation project. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Stuart L. Bernath, Gelfand-Rappaport, and Bemis grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application at www.shafr.org. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



Lawrence Gelfand – Armin Rappaport Dissertation Fellowship

SHAFR established this fellowship to honor Lawrence Gelfand, founding member and former SHAFR president and Armin Rappaport, founding editor of *Diplomatic History*.

The Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship of up to \$4,000 is intended to defray the costs of dissertation research travel. The fellowship is awarded annually at SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Stuart L. Bernath, Holt, and Bemis grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application at www.shafr.org. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



Samuel Flagg Bemis Dissertation Research Grants

The Samuel F. Bemis Research Grants are intended to promote dissertation research by graduate students. A limited number of grants of varying amounts (generally, up to \$2,000) will be awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. (Applicants for this award will be considered automatically for the Stuart L. Bernath, Holt, and Gelfand-Rappaport grants.)

Applicants must be actively working on dissertations dealing with some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application at www.shafr.org. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship

The Michael J. Hogan Foreign language Fellowship was established to honor Michael J. Hogan, long-time editor of *Diplomatic History*.

The Hogan Fellowship of up to \$4,000 is intended to promote research in foreign language sources by graduate students. The fellowship is intended to defray the costs of studying foreign languages needed for research. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Applicants must be graduate students researching some aspect of U.S. foreign relations history. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application at www.shafr.org. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**.



Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants

The William Appleman Williams Junior Faculty Research Grants are intended to promote scholarly research by untenured college and university faculty and others who are within six years of the Ph.D. and who are working as professional historians. Grants are limited to scholars working on the *first research monograph*. A limited number of grants of varying amounts (generally, up to \$2,000) will be awarded annually to help defray the costs of domestic or international travel necessary to conduct research on significant scholarly projects. The award is announced formally at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application at www.shafr.org. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship

The Myrna F. Bernath Fellowship was established by the Bernath family to promote scholarship in U.S. foreign relations history by women.

The Myrna Bernath Fellowship of up to \$5,000 is intended to defray the costs of scholarly research by women. It is awarded biannually (in odd years) and announced at the SHAFR luncheon held during the annual meeting of the American Historical Association.

Applications are welcomed from women at U.S. universities as well as women abroad who wish to do research in the United States. Preference will be given to graduate students and those within five years of completion of their PhDs. Membership in SHAFR is required.

Procedures: Self-nominations are expected. Please download and complete the application at www.shafr.org. The annual deadline for applications is **October 1**.

Within eight months of receiving the award, each successful applicant must file with the SHAFR Business Office a brief report on how the funds were spent. Such reports will be considered for publication in *Passport*.



4. Recent Publications of Interest

Abrams, Elliot. *Tested by Zion: The Bush Administration and the Israel-Palestinian Conflict* (Cambridge, 2012).

Aid, Matthew M. *Intel Wars: The Secret History of the Fight against Terror* (Bloomsbury, 2012).

Al-Marayati, Abid A. *A Diplomatic History of Modern Iraq* (Literary Licensing, 2012).

Ashton, Nigel and Bryan R. Gibson. *The Iran-Iraq War: New International Perspectives* (Routledge, 2012).

Beacom, Aaron. *International Diplomacy and the Olympic Movement: The New Mediators* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

Bellamy, Alex J. *Massacres and Morality: Mass Atrocities in an Age of Civilian Immunity* (Oxford, 2012).

Bennett, M. Todd. *One World, Big Screen: Hollywood, the Allies, and World War II* (North Carolina, 2012).

Boghardt, Thomas. *The Zimmerman Telegram: Intelligence, Diplomacy, and America's Entry into World War I* (Naval Institute Press, 2012).

Bracken, Paul. *The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics* (Times, 2012).

Brasseaux, Carl A. *Ruined by This Miserable War: The Dispatches of Charles Prosper Fauconnet, a French Diplomat in New Orleans, 1863-1868* (Tennessee, 2013).

Cairo, Michael F. *The Gulf: The Bush Presidencies and the Middle East* (Kentucky, 2012).

Calandri, Elena, and Daniele Caviglia, Antonio Varsori, *Detente in Cold War Europe: Politics and Diplomacy in the Middle East* (Tauris, 2012).



- Chamberlin, Paul Thomas. *The Global Offensive: The United States, the Palestine Liberation Organization, and the Making of the Post-Cold War Order* (Oxford, 2012).
- Cooper, James. *Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan: A Very Political Special Relationship* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
- Cullinane, Michael Patrick. *Liberty and American Anti-Imperialism, 1898-1909* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012)
- Daigle, Craig. *The Limits of Detente: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1969-1973* (Yale, 2012).
- Dallek, Robert. *Democrat and Diplomat: The Life of William E. Dodd* (Oxford, 2012).
- Dilks, David. *Churchill and Company: Allies and Rivals in War and Peace* (Tauris, 2012).
- Dobbs, Michael. *Six Months in 1945: FDR, Stalin, Churchill, and Truman - from World War to Cold War* (Knopf, 2012).
- Dolin, Eric Jay. *When American First Met China: An Exotic History of Tea, Drugs, and Money in the Age of Sail* (Liveright, 2012).
- Friedman, Max Paul. *Rethinking Anti-Americanism: The History of an Exceptional Concept in American Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, 2012).
- Garlitz, Richard and Lisa Jarvinen, eds., *Teaching America to the World and the World to America: Education and Foreign Relations since 1870* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
- Glenny, Misha. *The Balkans: Nationalism, War, and the Great Powers, 1804-2011* (Penguin, 2012).
- Gordon, Michael R. and Bernard E. Trainor. *The Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama* (Pantheon, 2012).
- Grow, Michael. *U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War* (Kansas, 2012).
- Hamilton, John Maxwell, and Robert Mann, eds. *A Journalist's Diplomatic Mission: Ray Stannard Baker's World War I Diary* (Louisiana, 2012).
- Hannay, David. *Britain's Quest for a Role: A Diplomatic Memoir from Europe to the UN* (Tauris, 2013).
- Hart, Justin. *Empire of Ideas: The Origins of Public Diplomacy and the Transformation of U.S. Foreign Policy* (Oxford, 2013).
- Herman, Michael and Gwilym Hughes, eds. *Intelligence in the Cold War: What Difference Did it Make?* (Routledge, 2012).
- Hindell, Keith. *A Gilded Vagabond* (Book Guild, 2012).
- Irwin, Ryan M. *Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order* (Oxford, 2012).
- Isaac, Joel and Duncan Bell, eds. *Uncertain Empire: American History and the Idea of the Cold War* (Oxford, 2012).
- Ishibashi, Natsuyo. *Alliance Security Dilemmas in the Iraq War: German and Japanese Responses* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
- Kennedy, Paul. *Engineers of Victory: The Problem Solvers who Turned the Tide in the Second World War* (Random House, 2013).
- Kleuters, Joost. *Reunification in West German Party Politics from Westbindung to Ostpolitik* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
- Krabbendam, Hans and John M. Thompson, ed. *America's Transatlantic Turn: Theodore Roosevelt and the 'Discovery' of Europe* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
- Kurtzer, Daniel C., et. al. *The Peace Puzzle: America's Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 1989-2012* (Cornell, 2012).
- Leibiger, Stuart. *A Companion to James Madison and James Monroe* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).
- Margolies, Daniel S. *A Companion to Harry S. Truman* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2012).
- Marino, Soraya M. and Ronald W. Pruesson, eds. *Fifty Years of Revolution: Perspectives on Cuba, the United States, and the World* (Florida, 2012).
- Mayers, David. *FDR's Ambassadors and the Diplomacy of Crisis: From the Rise of Hitler to the End of World War II* (Cambridge, 2012).
- Mazower, Mark. *Governing the World: The History of an Idea* (Penguin, 2012).
- McMahon, Robert. *Guide to US Foreign Policy* (CQ, 2012).
- Mikoyan, Sergo and Svetlana Savranskaya, ed. *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Missiles of November* (Stanford, 2012).
- Mills, Thomas C. *Post-War Planning on the Periphery: Anglo-American Economic Diplomacy In South America, 1939-1945* (Edinburgh, 2012).

- Mooney, Jadwiga E. Pieper, and Fabio Lanza, eds. *De-Centering Cold War History: Local and Global Change* (Routledge, 2012).
- Nau, Henry R. and Deepa M. Ollapally, eds. *Worldviews of Aspiring Powers: Domestic Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia* (Oxford, 2012).
- Nolan, Mary. *The Transatlantic Century: Europe and America, 1890-2010* (Cambridge, 2012).
- O'Sullivan, Christopher. *FDR and the End of Empire: The Origins of American Power in the Middle East* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
- Patrikarakos, David. *Nuclear Iran: The Birth of an Atomic State* (Tauris, 2012).
- Pettifer, James. *Kosova Liberation Army* (C. Hurst, 2012).
- Priest, Andrew. *Kennedy, Johnson, and NATO: Britain, America and the Dynamics of Alliance, 1962-68* (Routledge, 2012).
- Quan, H.L.T. *Growth Against Democracy: Savage Developmentism in the Modern World* (Lexington, 2012).
- Radeljic, Branislav. *Europe and the Collapse of Yugoslavia: The Role of Non-State Actors and European Diplomacy* (Tauris, 2012).
- Rakove, Robert B. *Kennedy, Johnson, and the Nonaligned World* (Cambridge, 2012).
- Richardson, James D., ed. *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Confederacy including the Diplomatic Correspondence 1861-1865* (Ulan, 2012).
- Rofe, J. Simon and Alison Holmes, *The London Embassy: The Ambassadors of Grosvenor Square, 1938-2008* (Palgrave, 2012).
- Rofe, J. Simon, Andrew Williams, and Amelia Hatfield, *International History and International Relations* (Routledge, 2012)
- Roll, David L. *The Hopkins Touch: Harry Hopkins and the Forging of the Alliance to Defeat Hitler* (Oxford, 2013).
- Rosenberg, Emily S. and Akira Iriye, Jurgen Osterhammel, eds. *A History of the World, a World Connecting: 1870-1945* (Belknap, 2012).
- Shinohara, Hatsue. *US International Lawyers in the Interwar Years* (Cambridge, 2012).
- Sadlier, Darlene J. *Americans All: Good Neighbor Cultural Diplomacy in World War II* (Texas, 2012).
- Stahr, Walter. *Seward* (Simon and Schuster, 2012).
- Stern, Sheldon. *The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths versus Reality* (Stanford, 2012).
- Thomas, Evan. *Ike's Bluff: President Eisenhower's Secret Battle to Save the World* (Little, Brown, 2012).
- Van Vlack, Milton C. *Silas Deane, Revolutionary War Diplomat and Politician* (McFarland, 2013)
- Wald, Alan M. *American Night: The Literary Left in the Era of the Cold War* (North Carolina, 2012).
- Westad, Odd Arne. *Restless Empire: China and the World Since 1750* (Basic, 2012).
- Wohlstetter, John C. *Sleepwalking with the Bomb* (Discovery, 2012).
- Yang, Suzanne Xiao. *China in UN Security Council Decision-Making on Iraq: Conflicting Understandings, Competing Preferences* (Routledge, 2012).
- Young, John W. *Twentieth-Century Diplomacy: A Case Study of British Practice, 1963-1976* (Cambridge, 2012).



Sept. 3, 2012

Dear Professor Hahn,

I'm writing to express my gratitude for the Michael J. Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship I received from SHAFR last year.

I spent two months this summer in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam taking an intensive Vietnamese language course at the University of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University. For four hours every morning, I practiced speaking, listening, writing, and reading the language with two excellent instructors in a small group setting. In the afternoons, I continued to expand my vocabulary while conducting preliminary research at the National Archives Center II and at the General Sciences Library. The Hogan Foreign Language Fellowship gave me the opportunity not only to improve my Vietnamese language skills, but also to explore a variety of research materials relevant to my dissertation project on United States and South Vietnamese relations from 1963-1975.

I am very thankful for SHAFR's generosity in enabling me to study advanced Vietnamese in Vietnam and helping me achieve the language proficiency for future dissertation research there.

Best regards,
Helen Pho
University of Texas at Austin



Thank you SHAFR for granting me the honor of receiving the Samuel Flag Bemis Grant. The grant enabled me to conduct archival research for my dissertation, which studies the impact petrodollars had on the foreign relations of the United States and the Middle East and North Africa in the 1970s. The funding from the grant enabled me to conduct archival research at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta, Georgia, where I collected records pertaining to the Carter administration's policies on recycling petrodollars back into the American economy. The grant also assisted my research at the special collections holdings at Georgetown University in Washington DC, where I looked at the papers of former ARAMCO and Bechtel employees, and the National Archives at College Park, Maryland, where I looked at the policy deliberations and decisions of the Treasury Department during the Nixon and Ford administrations.

Thank you again for the Samuel Flag Bemis Grant. Without the support of organizations like SHAFR, I would never have been able to afford the extensive travel necessary for the multi-archival approach to foreign policy and transnational history which my dissertation envisions.

Sincerely,
David M. Wight
University of California, Irvine



In 2012, SHAFR awarded me the Lawrence Gelfand-Armin Rappaport Dissertation Fellowship. Along with a summer travel grant from the University of Virginia Society of Fellows, the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship enabled me to conduct dissertation research in Guatemala and South Africa on the overseas missionary work of American evangelical organizations, human rights issues, and U.S. foreign relations during the late twentieth century. The documents that I examined at the archives I visited will allow me to illuminate the connections between American evangelicals, local churches, and state authorities in Ríos Montt-era Guatemala and the Apartheid government of South Africa. In so doing, they will help me to explain how exposure to these regimes through evangelistic work shaped the foreign policy views of American Christians and mobilized them to lobby Congress and the president, shaping U.S. foreign relations during this period.

During my three weeks in Guatemala, I focused my research efforts at the Centro de Investigaciones Regionales de Mesoamérica (CIRMA), which holds a rich collection of documents, newspapers, and audio-visual sources from the 1980s. I discovered key information about American and American-funded evangelical groups operating in Guatemala and their relationship with the evangelical dictator General Efraín Ríos Montt, who seized power

there in 1982, and with the US government, American elected officials, and the public. While at CIRMA, I also examined documents generated by Guatemalan church and political organizations, as well as American church groups and NGOs, concerning the human rights situation in the country prior to, during, and after the Ríos Montt regime.

I divided my three week-long trip to South Africa between the National Archives in Pretoria and the National Library in Cape Town. At the National Archives, which houses government documents from 1910 to the present, I examined a large, un-inventoried collection of documents compiled by the Justice Department of South Africa related to the South African government's attempts to undermine the anti-apartheid efforts of the South African Council of Churches and Bishop Desmond Tutu. These documents shed considerable light not only on the South African Council of Churches and its connections with left-leaning American Christian churches, but also on the right-leaning churches (in South Africa and the United States) working to uphold the racial and political status quo. Included in this collection were revealing communications between the South African ambassador to the United States and the South African Department of Justice. Additionally, I examined newspaper coverage on religious groups, apartheid, human rights, regional policy, and South African relations with the United States. While visiting the National Library, I examined a number of publications and newsletters published by conservative evangelical Christian groups in South Africa. These publications illuminate the policy objectives of these groups and reveal the connections between evangelical groups throughout the world.

I am deeply thankful for the support for my research that SHAFR has provided. Neither of these research trips would have been possible without the financial aid that I received through the Gelfand-Rappaport Fellowship, which covered my airfare for both trips, as well as my lodging and per diem in Guatemala. The materials that I gathered in Guatemala and South Africa have been instrumental in informing my analysis of the relationship between evangelical missionary efforts, human rights, and American foreign policy, and will form a critical part of my dissertation.

Lauren Turek
University of Virginia



August 18, 2012

Dear Dr. Hahn,

I write to express my gratitude for the Bemis grant from SHAFR that allowed me to conduct dissertation research in the United Kingdom during the summer of 2012.

My dissertation discusses marine insurance in America between the mid eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. On the broadest level, I use transformations in the marine insurance business (incorporations, capitalization, insuring practices, interventions in foreign affairs) as a way to understand the evolving relationship between American mercantile communities and the new republic. The Bemis grant enabled me to contextualize my American findings with material from British archives—such material is sorely needed in the history of American financial corporations.

The British material I was able to acquire thanks to SHAFR was the final piece that has allowed me to create a full outline of the dissertation, which is composed of four sections. The first will discuss two key Anglo-Atlantic contexts for American insurance: early modern insurance as it was practiced under “Lex Mercatoria,” the law of merchants, and British insurance in the eighteenth century as practiced at Lloyd’s of London and by the two first chartered British corporations, whose records belong to the London Metropolitan Archives. The second section will discuss transformations in insurance that took place as a result of American independence. I will narrate the battles that took place over the incorporation of the first American insurance companies, and provide empirical evidence about the size of the American insurance sector in the early republic. Early American insurance companies at first reflected the particular social and cultural attributes of the mercantile communities that founded them, but they quickly developed a shared set of practices and forged financial networks that crossed regional boundaries. The companies also placed a significant amount of capital at the disposal of early American banks.

The third section of the dissertation will turn to cultural matters. Early American insurance companies, particularly those of Boston and Philadelphia, made gifts of silver plate to virtuous shipmasters; they sent delegations to march in parades honoring George Washington; they built buildings and published their autobiographies. This section of the dissertation will discuss how insurers, engaging in these behaviors, succeeded in disassociating themselves from the “gamblers” at Lloyd’s of London (depicted in rare caricatures I found in Lloyd’s own archives) and making the insurance business seem patriotic and respectable. Finally, I will discuss how insurers shaped foreign affairs during the long unsettled period that lasted from the 1790s through the end of the Napoleonic

Wars. Insurers were an international community of regulators whose laws and practices were separate from, but nevertheless overlapped and interacted with, the laws of states. By working to recover confiscated American property from foreign governments, American insurers became political actors in their own right. This section will draw heavily on the cases prosecuted by American insurers in British admiralty courts. In the National Archives of the United Kingdom, I was able to track several of these cases from their origins through their conclusions, and to gain a better understanding of the ways in which they were conducted. Without the funding provided by SHAFR, I would have been unable to acquire this material.

I regret that I was unable to meet your or your colleagues at the SHAFR conference this past January. For 2012-2013, I have received fellowships from LCP/PEAES and the McNeil Center for Early American Studies and I will be spending the academic year in Philadelphia. If you or any other members of the committee are in the area I would be happy to share more about the project and to express my gratitude in person.

Very best,
Hannah Farber
Ph. D. Candidate
University of California, Berkeley



Dear Professor Hahn,

I am writing to express my sincere thanks for the Samuel Flagg Bemis Research Grant that SHAFR awarded me this past December. This summer, I used the funds to support my research at a number of libraries and public and private archives in Nashville, Tennessee Washington, D.C., and Atlanta, Georgia. At each stop, I found countless, invaluable sources for my dissertation, which focuses on the complex relationship among African Americans, the United States government, and Haitians from 1863 to 1915. I am grateful that SHAFR's financial support helped make this research possible and allowed me to gain critical insights into the ways that African American political rights, Haitian sovereignty, and U.S. imperialism became intertwined during that era.

Sincerely,

Brandon R. Byrd
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

The Last Word

How I Spent (Part of) My Summer Vacation: The SHAFR Summer Institute, June 2012

Andrew Rotter

It was early on a Friday evening in Storrs, Connecticut, when the first crisis hit: the group was out of toilet paper. I hadn't reckoned on this when I agreed to serve, with Frank Costigliola, as co-director of the 2012 SHAFR Summer Institute (SSI). I swallowed my rising panic and assessed the situation. Was I being spoiled when I assumed that the grad student apartments we had rented at the University of Connecticut would come supplied with toilet paper? Would the group—the directors and ten participants—dissolve into recrimination and despair even before our discussions began the next morning? Or might we bond over our sense of shared privation, perhaps compare ourselves to U.S. diplomats roughing it in the Soviet Union during the 1930s, and rally together, instant equals in our misery, to find a way through?

It turns out that it is possible to buy toilet paper in Storrs on a Friday night, especially if you have a brilliant program coordinator named Rachel Traficanti. The UConn housing staff quickly came through with more. And we did seem to bond, though for a variety of reasons having only a little to do with this small early glitch.

For those who don't know it, the SSI provides an opportunity for young scholars—in our case, a combination of advanced graduate students and early-career faculty—to come together for several days with a pair of established historians (“old people”) to discuss issues of moment in the field of U.S. foreign relations history. Each SSI has a theme; one previous version featured the Cold War, while another dealt with human rights and the international economy.

We started our SSI with a question—“Does



Culture Matter?”—then got to the point: “The Emotions, the Senses, and Other New Approaches to the History of U.S. Foreign International Relations.” The theme reflected the work Frank and I had been doing recently, he on the role of emotion in making and breaking the World War II alliance, I on the five senses and empire in India and the Philippines. Our hope was to introduce participants to some of the best work in the history of the emotions and the senses. We constructed the lengthy reading list accordingly, including theoretical writing that the two of us had found useful in our own scholarship. On the list were books and articles by Jerome Kagan, Barbara Rosenwein, Mark M. Smith, Barbara Keys, Connie

Chiang, and others. We hoped, as we wrote in our call for applications, “to nudge participants toward fresh ways of thinking about standard topics or toward new topics altogether,” now or later. Since we expected (rightly) that few of our applicants would be writing on the emotions or the senses, we looked for people whose subjects seemed to us susceptible to such approaches or who showed methodological flexibility in their current projects and might thus be receptive to our intellectual idiosyncrasies.

We worried that the theme was a trifle esoteric and that no one would apply, but as it happened, we took in nearly sixty applications. We accepted twelve participants, two of whom ultimately withdrew for personal reasons. Thus, we were a tidy group of ten plus two.

We got very lucky. Not only were the participants predictably bright, imaginative, and engaged from the start, they were also gracious to each other and us, cooperative rather than competitive, relaxed,

personable, and often pretty funny. We had a wonderful time. The talk was always serious and honest, without posturing or pretense. Everyone involved seemed eager to learn from everyone else, and the participant evaluations of the SSI suggest that is what they did. Our conversations were further enriched by contributions from several leading figures in the field. Kristin Hoganson, Paul Kramer, and Andrew Preston joined us for a morning's discussion of articles and books they had just published. And at dinner one evening, held at Frank's house near campus, Susan Ferber of Oxford University Press offered good advice to historians looking to publish their first monographs.

I would emphasize the sense of intellectual and emotional community (not so much sensory, though we all did live in apartments on the same hallway) the group experienced. We tried, by combining living and talking, walking and talking, and eating and talking, to blur distinctions between the allegedly intellectual and the so-called social. We were concerned initially that the group was too small, but its scale meant that no cliques could form, or so we hoped, and I think that none did. People looked after each other, borrowed from each other, drove each other around, and invited our visitors, the program coordinator, and my wife, who joined us for several days, fully into the fold.

I think it helped to emphasize the participants' own writing. We had Institute members post in advance summaries of their work on the SSI website, which was hosted by the university. All of us read them. We devoted most of two days to brief presentations of dissertation findings or book proposals, followed by vigorous discussion of the issues raised and, frequently, suggestions for further thinking or reading. The tone was encouraging and cheerful, much like that of a high-level graduate seminar, though with perhaps less of the corrosive spirit of dismantling other scholars' hard work than I remember from my own graduate school days. Out of these conversations came a network of associations, attachments to like-minded

people who promised to support each other into the future. I now have ten more smart historians to whom I can send my scribblings about the senses and empire, and I trust the others feel they can reciprocate. And all of the participants registered for the SHAFR meeting that followed (and could be seen well into the night drinking together at Hartford bars).

SHAFR covers most of the costs of the Institute, including transportation to and from the site, housing, some food, small stipends for participants and rather larger ones for the directors. The SSI convenes for five days just prior to the start of the annual SHAFR conference, and it worked well this year to hold the Institute in Storrs, forty-five minutes away from the conference hotel in downtown Hartford. (Jokes about both places abounded, but I was gently reminded, more than once, that I live in Hamilton, New York.) Ours was the fifth SSI, but it will definitely not be the last. In June 2012, Council made clear its enthusiasm for the benefits of the Institutes by reauthorizing them for another five years.

The SSI's are not inexpensive. One could argue that there is much else SHAFR could do with its money, including save it. But that, as Council recognized, would mean jettisoning a program that has proved enormously popular among younger members and potential members and useful to the organization as a whole. All of this year's participants expressed an appreciation for the chance to be part of the Institute and a strong interest in SHAFR. The SSI for 2013 is set: Martin Sherwin, Christian Ostermann, and Leopoldo Nuti will seek applications for "The International History of Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation, Strategy, and Arms Control from the Cold War to the Global South," to be held at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC. Future Institutes will, I trust, attract a good deal of interest from those hoping to direct them and those applying to participate. They offer a stimulating way to spend part of a summer, even if you have to bring your own toilet paper.



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