



The Society for Historians of American
Foreign Relations

NEWSLETTER

Volume IX

Number 4

December, 1978

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DEFINING ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE**

by

Richard Dean Burns*

Laymen, students and specialists have long floundered in the semantic tides of "arms control" and "disarmament" usage. For the specialist, the definitional confusion stems from many causes. To George W. Ball, the subject of arms control and disarmament is "more abstruse and arcane" than any other issue in foreign affairs "because there is no solid experience to supply a precedent..."¹ Either Ball is defining arms control and disarmament exclusively in terms of nuclear weapons, or his historical view is woefully inadequate. To Charles A. Barker, who describes the Rush-Bagot understanding (after 1870) as an example of "general and complete disarmament," the definitional confusion stems from a failure to differentiate among different arms control and disarmament techniques and to appreciate the various characteristics of these techniques.² The Rush-Bagot agreement (1817) and subsequent related accords did not limit or reduce the armed forces of either the United States or Britain (and Canada); it only restricted the geographical area where they could be employed.

My purpose here is to offer some definitional guidelines. To accomplish this, I propose to (1) examine the general, abstract definitions applied over the past decades to the basic terms "arms control" and "disarmament," and (2) employ historical examples to establish more precise definitions for the various arms control and disarmament techniques.

The confusion arising from the use of both "arms control" and "disarmament" to describe post-World War II efforts to manage armaments, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) talks, the Biological Warfare Treaty, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, stems from the failure to understand that these two terms **can** be used synonymously. They have been, can be, and are used often as umbrella terms to encompass a number of specific techniques to control armaments and reduce martial violence. But they have occasionally been used independently to suggest two separate systems; indeed, today some people emphasize the distinctions between the two terms in tones bordering on theological cant.

Actually, the term "disarmament" is the older and more widely used of the two. It became fashionable during the 19th century, and particularly after the Hague Conference of 1899, to use "disarmament" to describe **all** international efforts to limit, reduce, or control the implements of war. While linguistic purists might employ

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****The writer owes a special debt of gratitude to Ms. Susan Hoffman Hutson for her editorial skills in helping to bring the wide-ranging data in this article under control.**

"disarmament" in the literal sense--that is, the total elimination of armaments and armies--most diplomats & commentators have not. "Disarmament does not mean the disbanding of the whole nor even the greater part of the armed forces of the world," British diplomat Philip J. Noel-Baker explained in 1926. "It means, rather, the reduction, the modest but, we hope, not negligible reduction, of those forces, and their limitation by a general international treaty....."³

In the post-World War II era, "disarmament" has been likewise employed as an umbrella term. Henry W. Forbes, for example, in his **The Strategy of Disarmament** defined his subject as involving the quantitative and qualitative reduction of armaments, the outlawing of inhumane means of warfare, and the demilitarization of geographic areas.⁴ The former Director of the United Nations Disarmament Affairs Division, William Epstein, reports that in the United Nations and its subsidiary agencies "the term 'disarmament' has in practice been used not as meaning total disarmament but as a generic term covering all measures relating to the field--from small steps to reduce tensions or build confidence, through regulation of armaments or arms control, up to general and complete disarmament."⁵

It was the academic specialists, those linking the technology of nuclear weaponry to the politics of the Cold War, who in the early 1950s began substituting "arms control" for "disarmament." As these professionals viewed it, the term "disarmament" not only lacked semantic precision, it tended to carry a tone of utopianism. "Arms control to be meaningful must be devised in relation to the technological factors which produced the need for it," Henry A. Kissinger wrote in 1960. "It cannot be conceived in a fit of moral indignation. Effective schemes require careful, detailed dispassionate studies and the willingness to engage in patient, highly technical negotiations. Otherwise arms control may increase rather than diminish insecurity."⁶

Moreover, these new experts believed that "arms control" better described the new military-diplomatic relationship. According to Thomas C. Schelling & Morton H. Halperin, "the use of the term 'arms control' rather than 'disarmament' is simply a broadening of definition to include all forms of military cooperation between potential enemies in the interest of reducing the likelihood of war, its scope & violence if it occurs, and the political and economic costs of being prepared for it."⁷ Yet another writer argues in favor of using "arms control" because it is a more comprehensive term and as such "it embraces all the problems ranging from total disarmament, to the selective strengthening of armaments for the purpose of increasing the stability of mutual deterrence."⁸

Most "arms controllers" today would subscribe to the definition put forward by Schelling and Halperin in their **Strategy and Arms Control**. They describe "arms control" as a concept which recognizes that "our military relation with potential enemies is not one of pure conflict and opposition, but involves strong elements of mutual interest in the avoidance of a war that neither side wants, in minimizing the costs and risks of the arms competition, and in curtailing the scope and violence of war in the event it occurs."⁹

Aside from the semantic differences between the two terms, "arms control" and "disarmament," there can--and often does--exist a differing emphasis regarding priorities. Those individuals who

encourage being labelled "disarmers" seek to reduce the importance of the deterrence system itself. They argue that partial, step-by-step measures provide, at best, only short-term, piecemeal benefits, while ignoring the unprecedented peril posed by the vast arsenals of strategic weapons. Even though the disarmers have supported partial measures--such as the partial Test Ban Treaty, NPT, and SALT I--they believe that such efforts are largely "cosmetic" in effect and conceal the lack of progress (or even attention) essential to the main goal--international reduction and limitation of strategic and tactical weapons.

Those individuals who insist upon being identified as "arms controllers" tend to believe that the most realistic way to achieve a peaceful world is by linking their limited, step-by-step measures to the perfecting of the current nuclear deterrence system and to the ensuring of the strategic military balance. They seek international stability; consequently, they give little thought to the prospect of a warless world. Indeed, they are exceedingly cautious about advocating any significant arms reductions because it might cause a disequilibrium in the strategic balance.

However, "arms controllers" have created an "open definition" which, while providing operational flexibility, has obscured important distinctions and sacrificed precision. This open definition is discouraging because it fails to provide satisfactory, generally agreed upon, working definitions of specific mechanisms or techniques. It is even becoming increasingly difficult for arms control specialists to communicate with each other. The current use of "conventional arms control" is a case in point: some analysts take this phrase to mean "regulating conventional arms traffic," while others interpret it to mean "naval arms limitations" in the Indian Ocean and Mediterranean, or the "mutual and balanced force reduction" (MBFR) negotiations in Europe. Obviously, this phrase does not tell us much; about the only point of agreement here is that the military weapons involved are nuclear or non-nuclear. Even this distinction, however, becomes blurred when MBFR talks turn to the issue of "tactical" nuclear weapons.

All of this raises a more fundamental question: do not these definitional emphases, between arms control and disarmament, and upon the nature of weapons themselves, place emphasis at the wrong point? Should not the definitional focus be upon the arms control/disarmament **techniques** or **mechanisms** considered or employed? After all, could not (& have not) the same **techniques** apply to both conventional and nuclear weapons? Does not the placing of definitional focus on specific weapons (nuclear or "conventional") obscure valid and informative historical similarities involved in comparative negotiatory and verification processes?

II

Historical experiences can be employed to define the basic **techniques** which comprise arms control and disarmament activities, and the basic **methods** by which these objectives have been achieved. Any attempt to establish new typographies will, I realize, evoke dismay from those individuals who have wrestled with that Aristotelian curse. Yet, would not definitions grounded in past experiences sharpen existing abstract definitions without being inhibiting, and bring them more in line with real-world problems? And, how can we discount the

argument that "without definitions, we cannot begin to think or analyze with any scientific exactness, much less add anything of value to our knowledge of reality?"¹⁰

A. Defining arms control and disarmament techniques

As noted in the previous section, the terms "arms control" and "disarmament" are used, often interchangeably, to encompass a number of specific techniques designed to restrain the construction and use of armaments. An examination of past arms control and disarmament experiences suggests that these various techniques may be divided into at least six general categories.¹¹

1. Limitation and Reduction of Weapons

This technique involves placing specified limits on the mobilization, possession, or construction of military forces and equipment; it may, additionally, result in the reduction of existing military forces and equipment. These restrictions may be "qualitative," which regulates weapons design, as well as "quantitative," which limits numbers of weapons. Examples include:

201 B.C.	Rome-Carthage Treaty	(limited military forces)
1787	Anglo-French Pact	(limited navies)
1808	Franco-Prussian Treaty	(limited Prussian army)
1902	Argentina-Chile Protocol	(limited navies)
1919	Versailles Treaty	(limited German forces)
1922	Washington Treaty	(limited major navies)
1923	Central American Treaty	(limited all forces)
1930	London Naval Treaty	(limited navies)
1972	SALT I	(limited ABM s)
1974	Vladivostok Agreement	(limited offensive missiles)

2. Demilitarization, Denuclearization and Neutralization

Demilitarization and denuclearization involve removing or placing restrictions on military forces, weapons, and fortifications within a prescribed area of land, water, or airspace. Neutralization is a special international status which guarantees political independence and territorial integrity, subject to the conditions that the neutralized state will not engage in war except to defend itself. The essential feature of all three is its emphasis on geographical areas. Examples include:

448 B. C.	Athens-Persia Accord	(demilitarized Aegean Sea)
1815	Declaration of Swiss Neutrality	(neutralized Switzerland)
1817	Rush-Bagot Agreement	(demilitarized Great Lakes)
1881	Declaration Demilitarizing the Straits of Magellan	(demilitarized Straits of Magellan)
1905	Karlstadt Convention	(demilitarized Norway-Sweden border)
1955	Austrian State Treaty	(neutralized Austria)
1959	Antarctic Treaty	(demilitarized continent)
1967	Latin American Treaty	(denuclearization of Latin America)
1967	Outer Space Treaty	(demilitarized space)

3. Controlling Arms Manufacture and Traffic

This technique involves the use of restrictions, including embargoes, on the sale or transfer of weapons and munitions. It also involves placing prohibitions on the manufacture of specific weapons. Examples include:

1100 B. C.	Israel-Philistines	(limited Israel's use of iron)
1919	Embargo of China	(restrained arms trade)
1919	Treaty of St. Germain	(restrained colonial arms trade)
1935	League Arms Embargo	(against Paraguay and Bolivia)
1950	Tripartite Declaration	(limited arms sales to Middle East)
1963	U. N. Arms Embargo	(against South Africa)
1967	Nonproliferation Treaty	(restricted spread of nuclear weapons)

4. Regulating or Outlawing Specific Weapons

This technique seeks to regulate the military use of, or to eliminate the possession of, specific--primarily aggressive--weapons. The reason for regulating or eliminating a specific weapon is usually based on the assumption that the unrestricted use, or use at all, of this weapon exceeds the "just use of force." Example include;

201 B.C.	Rome-Carthage Treaty	(prohibited war elephants)
1139	Lateran Council Decl.	(prohibited crossbow)
1899/1907	Hague Treaties	(prohibited poison gas and bombing)
1922/1936	Submarine Protocols	(regulated submarine warfare)
1925	Geneva Protocols	(prohibited poison gas)
1972	BW Treaty	(prohibited biological warfare)

5. Rules of War

This technique aims at lessening the violence and damage of war, if it should break out. The relevant principles underlying the rules of war (or laws of war) may be summarized as (a) the prohibition of weapons that cause unnecessary or disproportionate suffering; (b) the distinction between civilians and soldiers, that is, between combatants and non-combatants; and (c) the realization that the demands of humanity may prevail over the demands of warfare. Examples include:

989/1150	Peace and Truce of God	(established noncombatant status)
1868	St. Petersburg Decl.	(prohibited "dum-dum" bullets)
1899/1907	Hague Treaties	(codification of rules of war)
1935	Roerich Pact	(protected cultural treasures)
1955	Hague Convention	(protected cultural treasures)

6. Stabilizing the International Military Environment

This technique, through a variety of mechanisms, seeks to lower international tensions and, consequently, to make war less likely. The emphasis here is on preventive actions to lessen the possibility of accidental war or the eruption of an uncontrollable **cause célèbre**, which might quickly escalate to war. Additionally, emphasis is placed on protecting the environment from lasting damage due to the use or testing of military weapons. Examples include:

1805/1936	Turkish Straits Pacts	(stabilized Eastern Mediterranean)
1963	Test Ban Treaty	(protected atmosphere)
1963/1971	Hot Line Pacts	(improved communications to reduce possible nuclear war)
1971	U. S.-U. S. S. R. Treaty	(reduce risk of possible nuclear war)
1972--	Weather Modification Draft	(proposed to prevent tinkering with weather to improve warfare)
1973	U. S.-U. S. S. R. Treaty	(reduce possibility of accidental nuclear war)

Obviously, these six categories are not exclusive, for the outlawing of weapons has the same effect as limiting them, and a treaty that prohibits the pacing of Weapons of Mass Destruction in Outer Space (1967) also is an example of the demilitarization of a geographic area. In addition, a treaty might incorporate several different arms control techniques within a single document: the Versailles treaty (1919), for example, limited the number of German weapons, demilitarized specific zones, and outlawed the German manufacture of certain weapons such as military aircraft, submarines, and tanks. Despite these qualifications, the value of using such categories is that they assist one in gaining a clearer perspective of the various types of arms control devices that have been employed.

B. Methods of Achieving Arms Control/Disarmament

Historically, the **methods of achieving** arms control and disarmament arrangements may be classified into three broad categories, each of which is subdivided into two additional categories. There are, then, six general methods by which arms control and disarmament objectives may be achieved.

1. RETRIBUTIVE MEASURES

- a. **by extermination:** this ancient and drastic means of insuring no future warlike response from one's opponent is most clearly dramatized by Rome's destruction of Carthage in 146 B.C.
- b. **by imposition:** this method usually results when the victors force arms limitation measures on their vanquished foes. Two examples are the terms imposed upon Carthage (201 B.C.) and upon Germany at Versailles in 1919.

2. UNILATERAL MEASURES

- c. **by unilateral neglect:** this method (often confused with the succeeding one) refers to a nation's failure to provide for an adequate defense. Examples include the U.S.'s "unilateral" disarmament after the Civil War (1866) or Britain's and the U.S.'s self-imposed reduction after World War I.
- d. **by unilateral decision:** this is a conscious decided policy of self-imposed military restrictions or limitations. The Peace and Truce of God and the outlawing of the crossbow during the middle ages are two examples; other examples would include Japan's post-World War II constitution (Art. 9) and Austria's treaty (1955), both restricting armaments to "defensive" purposes.

3. RECIPROCAL MEASURES

e. **by bilateral negotiation:** this is a traditional means by which two nations seek mutually acceptable solutions to problems created by armaments. The Anglo-French naval pact (1787), the Rush-Bagot agreement (1817), the Anglo-German naval accord (1935), and the agreement, and the SALT treaties represent but a few such settlements.

f. **by multilateral negotiation:** this is the most common twentieth century approach since military-political problems are at least regional, if not global, and thus involve the vital interests of several states: also the range of weapons and their destructive capacities tend to support a multinational approach. The Hague treaties (1899 and 1907), the Washington naval pact (1922), the Test Ban accord (1963), and the Nonproliferation Treaty (1967) are demonstrative of this method.

During the decades following both world wars the major powers have been almost constantly engaged in some form of negotiations over the problems of weaponry. In many instances, these discussions have been multilateral undertakings under the auspices of the League of Nations and, later, the United Nations.

III

What have we accomplished by cataloguing the basic characteristics and objectives of past arms control and disarmament activities? These typographies will, I hope, make it easier for the diplomatic historian to perceive the broad dimensions of arms control and disarmament, to identify specific arms control and disarmament mechanisms, and to improve the possibilities of meaningful comparative analysis. Perhaps these typographies will also refocus the attention of international relations specialists and the self-styled arms controllers, from weapons characteristics to the political-military process and, thereby, dispel the notion that it is impossible to learn anything from pre-1945 arms control and disarmament experiences that is applicable to the nuclear era.

In the search, historical and contemporary, for a peaceful world, it is important to remember that these arms control and disarmament techniques are (were) possible **means**, but never **ends**. These techniques are part of a complicated, but not mysterious, process in the achievement of a stable world.¹²

NOTES

1. George W. Ball, **Diplomacy For A Crowded World** (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976), p. 114.
2. Charles A. Barker, **Problems of World Disarmament** (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), p. 2.
3. Philip J. Noel-Baker, **Disarmament** (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1926), p. 2.
4. Henry W. Forbes, **The Strategy of Disarmament** (Washington, D. C.; Public Affairs Press, 1962).
5. William Epstein, **Disarmament: Twenty-Five Years of Effort** (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Relations, 1971), pp. 3-4.
6. Henry A. Kissinger, **The Necessity of Choice** (New York: Harpers, 1960), p. 213.
7. Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, "Arms Control as Military Strategy," **Current** (May, 1961), p. 40. An extract from their joint book, **Strategy and Arms Control** (1961).
8. Allen R. Ferguson, "Mechanics of Some Limited Disarmament Measures," **American Economic Review** (May, 1961), p.479.
9. Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, **Strategy and Arms Control** (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), p. 1.
10. James E. Dougherty, **How to Think About Arms Control and Disarmament** (New York: Crane, Russak, 1973), p. 22.
11. See Richard Dean Burns, **Arms Control & Disarmament: A Bibliography** (Santa Barbara: Clio Press, 1977), for references to the listed treaties.
12. On this point see Roger V. Dingman, **Power In The Pacific: The Origins of Naval Limitations, 1914-1922** (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976), p. xii.

THE VATICAN SECRET ARCHIVE

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While the archival holdings of the Vatican are well known to students of medieval, renaissance, and reformation history, their audience among historians of United States, Latin American, and modern European history is much smaller. As a result, the Vatican Secret Archive (**Archivio Segreto Vaticano**) remains a relatively untapped source for the study of modern diplomatic and political history.

As the central depository for records pertaining to the operation of the Roman Catholic Church the Vatican Secret Archive possesses a wealth of administrative, diplomatic, ecclesiastical, and financial documents from the thirteenth century to the present. For the diplomatic historian the most significant group of documents is the collection of the Secretariat of State (**Segreteria di Stato**), the papal office which serves as the foreign ministry of the Vatican.

The collection of the Secretariat of State is divided chronologically into two main groups (a third group pertaining to the Napoleonic period is supposedly being organized). The **Fondo Vecchio** contains material from the sixteenth century through the eighteenth century with some material from the nineteenth century. The documents, bound into volumes or tied into bundles, consist primarily of correspondence with papal nuncios. In addition to ecclesiastical information such correspondence routinely contained reports on political affairs and personalities. The material is organized according to country, and not surprisingly in view of the Vatican's interest and the political organization of the world in this period, represents only European states. Reports on non-European affairs may occasionally appear in the file of a European power (e. g., Latin American affairs in the files of Spain and Portugal). This particular collection is extensive with such areas as France, the German states, Naples, Poland, and Spain represented by several hundred volumes or bundles apiece. The **Fondo Vecchio** also contains a collection of curial correspondence with church officials and private persons from the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries. This collection, consisting of over a thousand volumes or bundles, is organized according to correspondent (letters of cardinals, letters of bishops, letters of princes, etc.) and contains ecclesiastical and political reports, congratulatory messages, and petitions.

Of perhaps greater interest to historians of modern diplomacy is the **Fondo Moderno**. This group of documents contains the record of papal diplomacy since the early nineteenth century as well as many records pertaining to the internal administration of the Papal States. The **Fondo Moderno** is divided into nine headings (**titoli**) of which the last (**Affari Esteri**) concerns papal diplomacy. Under this heading the diplomatic

records are organized into various sections (**rubriche**) representing geographic or subject categories (Madrid nuncio, Paris nuncio, American affairs, etc.). Each section may be subdivided into several dossiers (**fascicoli**) representing chronological or geographic subdivisions.

The **Fondo Moderno** contains correspondence with papal nuncios and consuls, communications from foreign diplomats accredited to the Papal States, reports from bishops, and memoranda from various Papal ministries. While the emphasis is on European affairs, the collection includes material on North and South America, Africa, and Asia. For example, information on the reign of Emperor Maximilian of Mexico is available in **Rubrica** 279 (American Affairs). A small collection of reports from papal consuls in the United States, especially from the period of the Civil War & Reconstruction, can be found in **Rubrica** 292 (Papal Consuls: America, Athens, and Corfu) which also contains extensive material on Balkan affairs. **Rubrica** 280 (Propaganda File) contains reports on ecclesiastical, economic, and social conditions in mission territories in Africa and Asia.

There are two useful finding aids for the **Fondo Moderno**. The **rubricelle** books list documents by topic within each year. Under a particular year and subject heading the researcher will find a list of relevant documents, a brief description of each document, and a protocol number for each document. In the **protocol** books the researcher will find each document listed by protocol number with a reference to the **rubrica** to which the document was assigned. By allowing a researcher to trace a document to a particular **rubrica** these volumes provide a useful short cut in a collection where the filing of dispatches often depended upon the whim of a clerk.

The Vatican has opened its records for research up to 1878. Apparently it is possible to secure special permission to examine documents from the closed period but such permission is very rare. A small group of documents from the open period is reserved in a special collection under the Congregation for the Public Affairs of the Church. Researchers must obtain permission from the Cardinal Secretary of State to use this special collection.

The Vatican Secret Archive is in the complex of corridors, rooms, and galleries known as the Apostolic Palace. The visitor enters Vatican City by the Porta Santa Anna which is on the Via di Porta Angelica, a few steps to the right of St. Peter's Square. From the gate a short street leads through an arch into the Belvedere Courtyard of the Apostolic Palace. The Vatican Archive and the Vatican Library share the building on the north side of this courtyard. Along the way there are posts of Swiss Guards and Vatican police to guide the wandering scholar.

Inside the Archive the porter will direct the new visitor to the Secretariat on the third floor to obtain an entry card. The visitor must present a letter of introduction from an academic institution and two passport photographs. The visitor completes an application form and writes a brief letter to the Pope requesting permission to use the Archive. The entry card is usually granted immediately and the entire application process should take no more than twenty minutes. The card

governs entry to the Archive and passage through any guard posts outside the Archive.

The reading room is located on the third floor of the Archive. The attendants will direct the researcher to a desk and explain the use of the various finding aids. To order records the researcher completes in triplicate (no carbons) a request slip for each volume or file desired. No one may receive more than five volumes or files in any one day. Since the attendants allow the request slips to accumulate before sending to the vaults for the documents, a delay of twenty or thirty minutes between order and delivery is common. An efficient photocopying service is available.

The working language of the Vatican has long been Italian and a knowledge of that language facilitates research in the documents. A familiarity with French or, to a lesser extent, Spanish is also useful. Latin appears infrequently in the modern diplomatic records and then primarily in formal proclamations or the reports of missionary bishops who could not speak Italian or French. None of the attendants in the reading room speak English but an archivist, Monsignor Charles Burns, is available for consultations with researchers from English-speaking countries. Monsignor Burns knows the collections very well and is attentive to the needs of scholars but as a senior archivist his primary responsibilities are outside of the reading room and he cannot devote much time to researchers.

The Vatican Secret Archive is open weekdays from 8:30 to 1:30. It is closed on all Catholic religious holidays as well as for Christmas (December 24--January 1) and summer (July 16--September 15) holidays. The Archive requires men to wear coats (even in the heat of a Roman summer) and expects women to dress in a conservative, professional manner. English-speaking scholars should notify Monsignor Burns of their plans well in advance of their arrival in Rome.

**REPORT ON THE FOURTH NATIONAL MEETING,
THE SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF
AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS
(August 3-5, 1978)**

(This report was prepared by Betty Miller Unterberger, Professor of History, Texas A & M University and the SHAFR Program Chairperson for 1978, in part upon the basis of summaries submitted by session chairpersons).

SHAFR's Fourth National Meeting began with an evening reception and candle-light tour at Gunston Hall, through the courtesy of George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia. Local arrangements were made by Leon E. Boothe, Professor of History and Associate Dean of the College of Liberal Arts at the University. Approximately 140 persons registered for the conference.

The inaugural session on Friday morning, August 4, with about 30 persons attending, was opened by Akira Iriye of the University of Chicago, President of the Society, followed by greetings on behalf of George Mason University from Leon Boothe. A panel discussion followed on "The Status of Official Historians: Retrospect and Prospect", chaired by David F. Trask, The Historian, Department of State. Panelists included Richard G. Hewlett, Chief Historian, Department of Energy, Maurice Matloff, Chief Historian, U.S. Army Center of Military History, and Forrest C. Pogue, Director, Dwight D. Eisenhower Institute for Historical Research.

An attentive audience listened as Dr. Trask offered some introductory remarks on the reasons for holding a session on the status of official historians. He stressed the fact that relations between official historians and academic historians had not been satisfactory for many years and were still not completely sound. His analysis centered on the observation that during the very period when official history expanded and matured, it came under attack as second-rate and/or as slanted. The sequence of events through the McCarthy era, the Vietnam War, and the Watergate period tended to deepen academic distrust of official history, even though no one ever proved allegations of incompetence or political interference. In recent years, however, the situation has improved to a degree, perhaps because old wounds have been healing and because official history has gained broad public recognition and acceptance while academic history has experienced difficult times.

Dr. Matloff then described the development of the Center of Military History's volumes on World War II, demonstrating the professional character of the volumes. He then noted that the status of official historians had improved in some ways but that the picture was less

favorable in some other respects. There had been growing acceptance in government but a mixed pattern existed. In the guild of historians there was also a mixed picture, if the situation was examined in terms of whether official historians became prominent in professional organizations; whether they were invited to serve as visiting professors; and whether their material was put to use in teaching and other contexts. He noted that "professors without classrooms" were entitled to equal treatment and status in the profession, but that this situation did not always prevail. He concluded with the observation that academic and official historians benefited very much from cooperation.

Dr. Hewlett reviewed his activities as the historian of the Atomic Energy Commission and successor organizations, on the ground that his experience was generally representative of the situation with respect to federal historians during the post-World War II years. He commented particularly on efforts designed to achieve independent status. Exchange between the academic historians and his group proved mutually beneficial. The general situation contributed to real professional growth. It was possible in government to develop certain techniques such as team research, an accomplishment less feasible in other contexts. Efforts to reach out to academia proved generally successful across the years of his service.

Dr. Pogue commented extensively on his experience during the 1930s and during the Second World War as an official historian. He drew attention to the many barriers to the development of official history, since largely swept away. He emphasized the importance of official history as an initial investigation of important topics. If official history was not written, the first professional studies of vital events would be long delayed. He also drew attention to the importance of official history in facilitating the opening of the public record for the benefit of private scholars. Throughout his remarks he inserted recollections of his dealings, particularly with Generals Marshall and Eisenhower during World War II and shortly after as the Center for Military history began to function.

Dr. Trask concluded the session by suggesting three steps for the future: (a) it was time for both academics and official historians to abandon old stereotypes and to seek to understand each other better; (b) it was time to eliminate any vestiges of discrimination against official historians in professional societies; (c) it was time to search out the many areas of possible cooperation for mutual benefit and for the benefit of the whole of society. He concluded on the happy thought that the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations was seeking to facilitate each of these steps.

The speaker at the Friday luncheon, attended by about 100 persons, was Jacques Reinstein, former member of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, 1947-1948, who presented an informal and broadly-ranging account of his experiences which he entitled, "Memories of an Unwilling Cold Warrior." Considerable comment followed, particularly, by the Cold War historians present. Theodore A. Wilson from the University of Kansas presided at the luncheon.

Two sessions were held concurrently on Friday afternoon starting at 2:15. The program on "Cold War Origins: Another View", chaired by

Gary R. Hess, Bowling Green State University, was attended by over 100 persons. In his paper "The British Foreign Office View of the Origins of the Cold War," Peter Boyle of the University of Nottingham detailed the attitudes of prominent British officials toward the emerging Cold War policy of the United States. Reflecting a strong anti-Soviet bias, these officials equated America's maturity as a world leader with the shift from reliance on the United Nations and moral posturing toward acceptance of the essentials of containment. Hugh De Santis of Temple University argued, in his paper "State Department East European Specialists and the Origins of the Cold War: The View from the Balkans," that recent accounts emphasizing an anti-Soviet consensus on the part of officials responsible for the Eastern European area fail to appreciate the conflicting images of the Soviet Union held by career diplomats in the field and in the Department of State. Suggesting the significance of the immediate environment in determining diplomatic perceptions, De Santis maintained that officials in the field initially adhered to the belief in Soviet friendship, but that a number of factors, including Soviet behavior in the Balkans, appeals from noncommunist elites, and the influence of British diplomats in the area, resulted in the development of an unfavorable image of the Soviet Union. Officials in the State Department, who were insulated from conditions in the Balkans, proved, however, to be much more reluctant to abandon the perception of Soviet-American cooperation.

In the final paper "Planning for a PINCHER War: Policy Objectives and Military Strategy in American Planning for War with the Soviet Union," David A. Rosenberg, the University of Chicago, examined the record of the Joint Chiefs of Staff strategic plans, especially the increased reliance on atomic weapons after the summer of 1947, indicating that direction of strategic planning resulted, in part, from the lack of adequate conventional forces. War plan BROILER, drafted in late 1947 and approved in March 1948, was based on the assumption that the United States would utilize its atomic weapons for a massive strategic air operation against the Soviet Union. NSC 20/4, approved in November 1948, brought a degree of coordination to diplomatic-military strategy, but military planners, given the pressures of the atomic age and the nature of the potential enemy, held an ascendant position over policy-makers, who endeavored to fulfill the function of providing a political framework for the formulation of war plans.

In his comments, Ronald D. Landa of the Historical Office, Department of State, observed that the papers contributed substantially to the scholarship on the Cold War. With respect to Boyle's paper, he raised a number of questions: the adequacy of the research in the British Foreign Office files; whether British policy itself deserved direct examination; the extent to which historians (contrary to Boyle's assertion) have in fact agreed with the British analysis of the American response to the Soviet Union; and the lack of precise reasoning in accounting for the anti-Soviet bias of British officials. On the De Santis

paper, the commentator, while finding the conclusions to be plausible doubted whether the division between diplomats in the field and those in the Department was clear-cut and noted that, even allowing for differences, officials in the Balkans, offered no significantly different policy alternatives. Finally, Landa suggested that the many JCS and intelligence studies cited in the Rosenberg paper may have had little effect on policy prior to NSC 20/4 or NSC 30. A lively twenty-five minute question and comment session followed, covering a variety of issues raised in the papers.

Approximately 40 people attended the panel on "Outlawing War: A Fifty-Year Perspective," moderated by J. Chal Vinson, from the University of Georgia. Harold Josephson of the University of North Carolina at Charlotte spoke on "Internationalists and the Pact of Paris." Tracing the history of the Pact from 1928 to the present, he maintained that despite numerous detractors the Pact has been a significant force in American foreign policy. Initially it unified diverse peace groups. Internationalists, both groups and individuals, subsequently sought to use the Pact as a link to the League of Nations and as an interpretation of international law in harmony with collective security. The Hoover-Stimson administration sought without success to implement the Pact. President Franklin D. Roosevelt largely ignored it. After the Second World War the Pact was rarely invoked but its principles--renunciation of war and pacific settlement of disputes--"became central aspects of American foreign policy."

James B. Donnelly of Washington and Jefferson College then presented his paper, "Prentiss Gilbert's Mission to the League of Nations Council, October 1931." Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson authorized the American consul to Geneva, Prentiss Gilbert, to sit with the League of Nations Council, then considering the crisis brought on by Japan's move into Manchuria. For a time it appeared that the United States might act through the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty to support the League of Nations. Progress was inhibited by Stimson's caution and Gilbert's lack of authority. Instructions for day-to-day decisions were complicated by the garbled condition of trans-Atlantic telephone communication. Stimson's attention was distracted by Pierre Laval's visit to Washington and the isolationists' fear of involvement with the League. Eventually Gilbert while still allowed to sit at the League table was ordered to keep his mouth shut. The October emergency League session ended in a failure that might have been avoided.

The first commentator was Ralph B. Levering of Western Maryland College. He found Josephson's paper especially effective in emphasizing a positive view of American foreign policy in the 1920s and bringing out legal interpretations of the Pact. His chief criticism was that the internationalists tended to make broad, unjustified claims as to the potential of the Pact which represented their own wishful thinking far more than it did American foreign policy.

Levering found Donnelly's paper well researched but felt it did not prove its claim that failure at Geneva was avoidable. Neither Stimson nor Hoover was prepared to act and they, as well as their potential allies, were too distracted by the world depression to concentrate on diplomacy.

The second commentator, Warren F. Kuehl, University of Akron, tended to agree with this criticism of Donnelly. He cited a number of reasons which worked against strong American leadership in promoting world peace in 1931. Kuehl also questioned the significance of the Pact of Paris in the League Council's planning in 1931.

Kuehl found Josephson's view of the pact of Paris optimistic and rated the Pact most noteworthy in forcing United States neutrality policy toward a position compatible with internationalism. It was also significant in the movement from the League's original emphasis on force to stop disputes toward emphasis on peaceful settlement of disputes before they erupted into violence. Members of the audience asked a number of searching questions and added interesting comments.

At 7:00 p.m. on Friday, George Mason University hosted a delightful reception in the Study Lounge of the Student Union for the members of SHAFR. At the banquet which followed, Norman A. Graebner of the University of Virginia presided. The speaker was Alexander De Conde, of the University of California, Santa Barbara, who delivered a thoughtful and provocative paper entitled "Reflections on the French Alliance." The talk was followed by a lengthy and spirited discussion.

Two sessions were held concurrently on Saturday morning, August 5, beginning at 9:30. Warren F. Kimball of Rutgers University, Newark, presided over the panel on "The United States in the Middle East," attended by "an enthusiastic and chipper crowd of 50 in spite of it being the morning after a Friday night out." David Schoenbaum from the University of Iowa took a sad and sardonic look at "Truman's Choice: Origins of U.S.-Israeli Relations, 1948-59." In surveying the events and decisions which eventually found the United States acting as an international sponsor for Israel, Schoenbaum glumly illustrated how little the impasse in the Middle East has changed, much less progressed, since 1948-49. He argued that the words of a 1949 National Security Council report might have been written yesterday, not thirty years ago: "Israel, the authors found, was militarily and technically superior to the Arabs, but politically fragile in ways likely to make its policy inflexible. By contrast, the Arabs were feckless and incompetent, mutually suspicious, contentious, and principally united 'in their implacable animosity toward, and common fear of, Israel.' It was assumed that this would make their policies inflexible too, and also make their governments vulnerable."

"Apples and Dominoes: The Northern Tier as Crucible for Postwar America" was the intriguing title of a paper by Bruce R. Kuniholm of Duke University. In a tightly-reasoned presentation, he challenged the bulk of the experts on the origins of the Cold War by arguing that tension in Eastern Europe was not the immediate cause of the Cold War, since the Truman Administration accepted Soviet control there as a **fait accompli**. Rather, contrary to recent arguments, the Truman Doctrine was a major shift in American policy and the point at which American Leaders concluded that further Soviet expansion would have a domino effect. Thus, Kuniholm asserted, the Truman Doctrine was a rational and admirable response.

The critics, John De Novo of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, and Edward W. Chester of the University of Texas, Arlington, raised a number of objections and offered alternative interpretations and data, and the audience quickly followed suit. In the lively discussion which ensued most people seemed eager to continue the discussion begun during the previous day's session on the Cold War as it related to the Middle East. Only the onset of hunger pangs brought the session to a close.

More than 35 persons attended the session on "Women in American Foreign Relations: An Historiographical Problem," chaired by Homer L. Calkin, recently retired as the Deputy Director of Research and Reference, Office of the Historian, Department of State. Two well-documented papers were presented on the role of women in foreign relations, the first time such a topic had been included at a SHAFR conference. Anna K. Nelson of George Washington University, in a paper entitled "Jane Storms Cazneau: Nineteenth Century Expansionist," pointed out that most historians have not bothered to identify Cazneau properly or to assume that she had more of a role than as a colorful female companion to the principal male actors. In reality she was a publicist, promoter, lobbyist, and contact for American expansionism in Cuba, Santo Domingo, and elsewhere. Knowing leaders from Burr to Seward, her career, which she pursued under three names and which extended over twenty-five years, embodied the strengths and weaknesses of the movement that glorified manifest destiny. Nelson noted that documentation concerning Cazneau's career was scattered through many collections.

Joan Hoff Wilson of Arizona State University, in her paper on "Jeannette Rankin: Twentieth-Century Pacifist," was confronted with an insufficiency of documentary material and the disappearance of letters and a journal known to have existed at one time. Wilson traced Rankin's career as a pacifist from 1909-10, through votes in Congress against two world wars, until her death in 1973. Wilson concluded that Rankin's pacifism was anything but passive, static, or moderate, but at the same time it was never very sophisticated. Hence the meaning of her life and pacifistic foreign policy was more symbolic than practical.

Both commentators noted the excellence of the two papers and the high quality of the documentation cited in footnotes. Gerald K. Haines of the National Archives mentioned sources in the National Archives, particularly the "Applications and Recommendations" for positions in the Department of State, which would be valuable for further research on the role of women. He raised questions regarding Cazneau's views on slavery and woman suffrage. Berenice Carroll of the University of Illinois outlined areas in which women have been active in foreign relations and which need further research. These include women in official, appointed or elected positions, members of non-official organizations, publicists, intellectuals, and lobbyists. Comments were followed by extended discussion and questions from the floor which ended only with the arrival of the lunch hour.

The final event of the conference was the luncheon at noon on Saturday, August 5, with approximately 100 persons present. Betty Miller Unterberger, Chairperson of the SHAFR Program Committee,

presided. Prior to the final luncheon speaker, President Iriye made announcements. At the conclusion of a delightful lunch, Robert W. Tucker of Johns Hopkins University, just recently returned from a summer spent in the Middle East, offered a wide-ranging and speculative discussion of "American Policy in the Middle East." After a spirited discussion from the audience, the Fourth National Meeting of the Society was adjourned.

The consensus of those attending the conference indicated that it was a stimulating program in an attractive setting. Leon Boothe served as a gracious host, and the general feeling was that the SHAFR Council ought to establish the national meeting as an annual affair. There was general approval when President Iriye announced the acceptance of the invitation of Theodore A. Wilson from the University of Kansas to hold the Fifth National Meeting at his institution.

SUMMARY, EXECUTIVE ORDER 12065

by
Beverly Zweiben
Director, Freedom of Information
National Security Council

On December 1, President Carter's Executive Order on National Security Information changed the ground rules under which the public may gain access to classified information. As the President indicated in the preamble to the Order, his intent is to achieve a symmetry between the public interest in access to government information and the need to protect certain national security information. This the Administration hopes to accomplish by tightening the standards by which information may be classified at the first instance, and secondly, by accelerating the process by which information is declassified and released to the public. I propose to summarize these criteria and to underscore those provisions particularly interesting to historians.

The tightened standard for classifying a document initially (and, incidentally, for continuing classification) is reflected in the two-tiered requirements for initial and continued classification. First, the order specifies seven categories of information which may be classified:

- Military plans, weapons, or operations;
- Foreign government information;
- Intelligence sources and methods;
- Foreign relations or foreign activities of the U.S.
- Scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national security;
- U.S. Government programs for safeguarding nuclear material, or facilities;
- Other limited categories not covered by these provisions.

The second step gives teeth to these criteria. The Executive Order stipulates that only information which first meets these standards and, second, whose unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause at least **identifiable** damage to the national security may be

classified, as distinct from the more general provisions of the previous Order. National security is defined for these purposes as the national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Foreign government information (information provided to the United States in confidence or produced pursuant to a written joint arrangement requiring confidentiality with a foreign government or international organization of governments) contains the implicit presumption that unauthorized disclosure will cause at least identifiable damage to the national security. After December 1, no document may be classified in the face of a FOIA or mandatory classification review request unless authorized under specific criteria by a senior agency official.

For historians, the impact of these nine stringent standards for classification is overshadowed by the dramatic speed-up in systematic review ordered by the President. Declassification review is now required for all documents reaching twenty years of age, although it is hoped that many will be declassified at a date or event not more than six years from their original classification. On the presumption, however, that release of classified material at twenty years flies in the face of foreign expectations of confidentiality, and will have a "chilling effect" on the exchange of vital information, foreign government information may be kept classified up to thirty years and, in some cases, beyond.

As evidence of the President's emphasis on declassification equal to that on classification, the Archivist of the United States is authorized at the end of an administration to consult with appropriate agencies and to review and declassify or downgrade all information classified by the President, White House Staff, and presidential committees or commissions.

In exceptional circumstances, documents which meet the stringent two-tiered criteria for classification, and whose release could be expected to cause at least identifiable damage to the national security, may require further evaluation for reasons of public interest in disclosure. In such unique circumstances, the President has authorized appropriate officials to balance the two on the scales of public policy and to declassify such material where necessary.

As under the previous order, declassification and downgrading may be accomplished either systematically or in response to a specific request for mandatory classification review. Within the next ten years, each agency (including the National Security Council) is expected to achieve nirvana--declassification review of all documents twenty years old or more. And by June 1, 1979, each agency will issue guidelines, after consultations with the Archivist, to be used in the systematic review of twenty year-old information, which will indicate specific categories of information requiring page-by-page review instead of automatic declassification. Unclassified versions of these guidelines will be published in the **Federal Register**. Again, foreign government information is exempt from this provision. Unless declassified earlier, foreign government information need not be reviewed systematically for thirty years.

Mandatory review procedures continue to provide the channel by which the public requires the government to search for and review reasonably-described documents within sixty days. The exceptions of course, are Presidential papers less than ten years old. Note the change

in procedures which requires the Archivist to refer agency documents for direct response to requestors. It is hoped that this will speed the process between initiation and conclusion of the process.

A more limited form of access is that allowed to historical researchers and former Presidential appointees. As provided in the previous Order, an agency may grant access to historians under controlled security regulations; former Presidential appointees may have access which is limited to papers originated, reviewed, signed, or received during their period of tenure.

Whether the Order will be effective in making a reality of the intent with which it was conceived is the question implicit in these remarks in the first days of implementation. The Director of the Information Security Oversight Office, under the overall authority of the NSC, will play a crucial role in overseeing agency compliance, hearing complaints from the public, developing directives for the implementation of the Order, reviewing agency-implementing regulations and guidelines for systematic review, and finally reporting to the President the effectiveness of the Order in reaching his stated goals. The Archivist will play a pivotal role in the development of agency guidelines and adherence to these standards. An important measure of our success must be the degree to which government meets the public's perceived need for greater access to information, and the expectation that information requiring protection will receive it. The annual meeting of SHAFR in August will allow historians an early opportunity and a forum to evaluate the success of this endeavor.

WHO INDEED?

(Anonymous)

(Dr. Robert H. Ferrell, Indiana University and fourth president of SHAFR, found this bid of doggerel in the papers of Charles and Horace Hobbs at the Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pa. It may have enjoyed a fair degree of currency, for Dr. Ferrell said he had also seen it in the papers of a U.S. Senator in the library of the Illinois State Historical Society. To those in the historical profession who cherish exalted ideas concerning the great crusader of World War I it may be somewhat of a surprise to learn that with a certain segment of the U.S. population--and omitting the Henry Cabot Lodge--Theodore Roosevelt group--Woodrow Wilson was a bungler and egotist of the first water).

I
Who watched and waited long ago-
And vacillated to and fro-
And made a mess of Mexico?
'Twas Woodrow!

II

When Germany provoked a war
Of frightfulness unknown before,
Who wrote epistles by the score?
'Twas Woodrow!

III

Who watched the havoc Germans wrought?
And when our aid from Belgium sought,
Who preached "neutrality in thought"?
'Twas Woodrow!

IV

Who saw French cities overrun
And desecrated by the Hun
And said that nothing should be done?
'Twas Woodrow!

V

When babes were massacred at sea
Who said how rude those Germans be,
Another note is due from me?
'Twas Woodrow!

VI

When we were asked to aid the plight
Of Allies struggling for the right--
Who said we are "too proud to fight"?
'Twas Woodrow!

VII

Who captured ballots by the score
And held the chair he held before
Because "he kept us out of war"?
'Twas Woodrow!

VIII

But when at last the country chose
To rise in arms against the foes--
Who quickly struck a martial pose?
'Twas Woodrow!

IX

And when the task was scarce begun
 Of vanquishing the Frightful Hun
 Who talked of quitting ere 'twas done?
 'Twas Woodrow!

X

When need was great of generals good,
 Who did the meanest trick he could
 And side-tracked General Leonard Wood?
 'Twas Woodrow!

XI

Who picked pigmies by the score
 And turned brains from White House door,
 So he alone could win the war?
 'Twas Woodrow!

XII

Who, just as stubborn as a rock,
 Put Naval honor on the block
 And made an Admiral of his Doc?
 'Twas Woodrow!

XIII

When fighting men on double quick
 Were making Hindenburg feel sick-
 Who thought his letters did the trick?
 'Twas Woodrow!

XIV

Who, in a pre-election note,
 Told all the people how to vote
 And thereby made himself the goat?
 'Twas Woodrow!

XV

At Château-Thierry, who fought well?
 Who chased the Hun to St. Mihiel?
 And on the Meuse who gave them hell?
 Not Woodrow!

XVI

Then who should go with courage high
 To sit in conclave at Versailles-
 And stick his finger in the pie,
 But Woodrow!

XVII

And who the victory flush should feel?
 And who adorn the official reel?
 And who be written up by Creel?
 But Woodrow!

XVIII

Since Emperors from their thrones are hurled
 For whom should banners be unfurled
 As AUTOCRAT of all the world?
 But Woodrow!

XIX

A statue soon methinks we'll see
 The central sight in gay Paree-
 Napoleon's great vis-a-vis.
 Our Woodrow!

XX

There stands he--sword returned to sheath.
 There lies the Kaiser, minus teeth.
 And this the legend underneath:
 "I DID IT"!

PERSONALS

J. K. Sweeney (South Dakota State), with grants from the American Council of Learned Societies, the Harry S. Truman Library, the Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation and the South Dakota State Research Fund, used his semester sabbatical to further examine the Luso-American connection, 1791-1974.

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During 1977-78 Ronald Spector (Center of Military History, Department of the Army) served as a Senior Fulbright Lecturer in India with his base at the Jamia Millia Islamia University in Delhi. In this period he also lectured at the U of the Philippines, and gave a paper at the Seventh Meeting of the International Association of Historians of Asia in Bangkok, Thailand, under an ACLS travel grant.

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Timothy M. Mathewson (U of Wisconsin-Superior) recently received a grant from the Penrose Fund of the American Philosophical Society which will enable him to complete his research into Haitian-American relations, 1791-1804.

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Since mid-May, 1977, Thomas D. Schoonover (Southwestern Louisiana) has taken two lengthy trips to Europe, plus a six weeks jaunt to Central America--all for research purposes. Highlight of his travels was the experience of working in the German Central Archives at Merseberg and Potsdam in East Germany. During his absence from the U.S. he was appointed to the Diplomatic History Steering Committee of the Social Science History Association.

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Joseph S. Tulchin (North Carolina) is presently a visiting scholar at the Centro de Estudios de Estado y Sociedad, Buenos Aires, Argentina. He is now also a consulting editor for the publication, **American Studies International** with the "New World" as his area of specialization.

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Ralph F. de Bedts (Old Dominion U) was recently raised to the category of Eminent Professor at his institution with a substantial increase in salary. He was one of about thirty persons chosen from a total faculty of 550. The appointment is for a three-year period with the possibility of renewal at its expiration.

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Lee H. Burke, formerly in the Office of the Historian, the State Department, at the first of this year accepted a position as assistant to the vice president of Utah State University.

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Announced early this summer as the recipients of NEH fellowships for study and research during part or all of 1978-79 were these members of SHAFR: Wayne S. Cole (Maryland, and ex-president of the Society), and Michael H. Hunt (Yale). Robert J.C. Butow (U of Washington) was honored with a Guggenheim fellowship.

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James K. Libbey (Eastern Kentucky) has been appointed associate dean for the College of Arts and Humanities at his school.

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Kenton J. Clymer (U of Texas, El Paso) was Fulbright Visiting Professor at Philippine Christian U during the past academic year.

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The American Studies Research Centre sponsored a course, may 29-June 24, titled "Looking for America, 1877-Present." A select group of college and university teachers attended the sessions which covered "the literature and the political, diplomatic and cultural history of modern America." Raymond G. O'Connor (U of Miami-Florida) was one of the faculty.

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Martin V. Melosi (Texas A & M) has been chosen as the general editor of an **Environmental History Series**, to be sponsored by the Texas A & M University Press.

**ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED, OR SCHOLARLY PAPERS
DELIVERED, BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR**

(Please limit abstracts to a total of fifteen (15) lines of **Newsletter** space. The overriding problem of space, plus the wish to accommodate as many contributors as possible, makes this restriction necessary. Don't send lengthy summaries to the editor with the request that he cut as he sees fit. Go over abstracts carefully before mailing. If words are omitted, or statements are vague, the editor in attempting to make needed changes may do violence to the meaning of the article or paper. Do not send abstracts until a paper has actually been delivered, or an article has actually appeared in print. For abstracts of articles, please supply the date, the volume, the number within the volume, and the pages. Double space all abstracts).

Robert D. Accinelli (U of Toronto) "The Roosevelt Administration and the World Court Defeat, 1935," **The Historian**, XL, 3 (May, 1978), 463-478. The Senate's dramatic refusal on January 29, 1935 to sanction American membership in the World Court marked the onset of the high tide of isolationism in the 1930's. This essay is the first in-depth analysis of Franklin D. Roosevelt's reasons for seeking membership, the strategy pursued to attain the Senate's approval, and his administration's responsibility for, and reaction to, the defeat. The president's decision to submit the Court proposal was well-considered and stemmed from a variety of motives, personal, political and diplomatic. But he did not overvalue the proposal & was not prepared to pay too high a political price for its approval. A close study of the administration's strategy indicates that the defeat--and the harmful psychological impact it produced in Europe and the United States--might have been averted had the administration's leadership been bolder and more alert. It was the absence of such leadership, more than any other reason, which accounted for the isolationists' unexpected and unnecessary victory.

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David J. Alvarez (St. Mary's College of California), "The Vatican and the War in the Far East, 1941-1943," **The Historian**, XL, 3 (May, 1978), 508-523. With the approach of war in the Pacific, Japan sought to establish diplomatic relations with the Holy See in order to improve its international status and influence Catholic opinion in the United States and Latin America. The Vatican responded favorably in the hope of protecting Church interests in the Far East and enhancing its wartime mission of mediation and humanitarian relief. Unable to block Japanese-Vatican relations, the United States successfully encouraged China and the Netherlands to establish relations with the Holy See. The Vatican used its new diplomatic status in the Far East to conduct relief work among Allied prisoners and internees and protect Catholics against depredations by China and Japan. Despite its efforts the Vatican could not overcome the many cultural, military, and political

obstacles, and as a result its policy in the Far East was only partially successful.

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Russell D. Buhite (U of Oklahoma), "Major Interests: American Policy Toward China, Taiwan, and Korea, 1945-1950," **Pacific Historical Review**, XLVII, 3 (August, 1978), 425-451. This essay argues that it is necessary to study American-Asian policy in the late forties in terms of a new category of interests and that China, Taiwan and Korea became "major" interests. It demonstrates that, because of great concern about the Soviet Union the United States hung on as long as possible in China and began considering ways of preventing the loss of Taiwan and Korea to the 'Soviet bloc' well before the beginning of the Korean War.

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Justus D. Doenecke (New College, U of South Florida), "Review Essay: The Isolationists and a Usable Past," **Peace and Change**, V (Spring, 1978), 67-73. A look at recent studies of such people as Charles A. Lindbergh, Robert A. Taft, John T. Flynn, Herbert Hoover, Charles A. Beard, Oswald Garrison Villard, and Lawrence Dennis. The author warns against overstressing the "prophetic" nature of their warnings but finds the new group of researchers presenting rich, and extremely valuable, materials.

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Justus D. Doenecke (New College, U of South Florida), "General Robert E. Wood: The Evolution of a Conservative," **Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society**, LXXI (August, 1978), 162-175. Wood, head of Sears Roebuck and erstwhile leader of the America First Committee, was one of the nation's leading industrialists. This article traced Wood's early flirtation with the New Deal, belief in currency manipulation, opposition to FDR's foreign policy, and later Cold War views. It was based on the Wood Papers at the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa.

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Thomas G. Paterson (University of Connecticut), "Bearing the Burden: A Critical Look at JFK's Foreign Policy," **Virginia Quarterly Review**, LIV (Spring, 1978), 193-212. This essay, based upon documents and oral histories in the Kennedy Library, as well as upon autobiographies and secondary literature, finds the wellsprings of John F. Kennedy's foreign policy in (1) the historical lessons of the 1930s and 1940s; (2) the conspicuous style, personality, and mood of the President and his "action intellectuals"; and (3) counterrevolutionary thought best summarized by the phrases "nation-building" and "modernization." These ingredients compelled an activist diplomacy which determined to win the Cold War through boldness. The Cuban Missile Crisis, among other topics, was studied to test the interpretation.

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Thomas Schoonover, (Southwestern Louisiana), "Central American Trade and Navigation: 19th Century Data Sources," **Latin American Research Review**, XIII (1978), 157-169. While primarily of interest to Latin Americanists, this essay does discuss U.S. sources of trade and navigation statistics, and Central American statistical sources which reveal trade and navigation data regarding activity with the U.S.

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Thomas Schoonover, (Southwestern Louisiana), "Costa Rican Trade and Navigation Ties with the United States, Germany, and Europe, 1840-1885," **Jahrbuch für Geschichte von Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas**, XV (1977), 269-309. This article considered the Costa Rican foreign trade situation in terms of the sharp competition over Central American commerce which developed among the western industrial states, especially the U.S., Germany, Great Britain & France. It concluded that the intense competition among these states tended to contribute toward the increasing inability of Costa Rica to remain master of its own house.

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Thomas Schoonover (Southwestern Louisiana), "Foreign Relations and Bleeding, Kansas in 1858," **Kansas Historical Quarterly**, XLII (Winter, 1976), 345-352. An introduction to, and translation of, a long document which reveals that Costa Rican diplomats interpreted the fate of Kansas in the late 1850s as having a direct relevance to the immediate future of their country and to the whole Central American and Caribbean region. The Costa Rican diplomats foresaw a Northern victory in Kansas which would probably result in increased filibustering and other forms of aggression from a South seeking to reestablish a balance within the Union.

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Joseph M. Siracusa (University of Queensland, Australia), "The Americanization of Australia: From Imperial Appendage to Satellite?" Paper read at the Royal Military College, Duntroon, Canberra, September, 1978. The aim of this paper was to explore the impact of American ideas and ideals on Australian national life throughout the twentieth century, with particular emphasis on the effects of the presence of over two million American troops on Australian soil during World War II. The conclusion of this analysis seemed to suggest that since at least the 1940s, Australians have tended to adopt American society as a model both to imitate (in a positive sense, e.g., technology) and to avoid (in a negative sense, e.g., racial violence).

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Joseph M. Siracusa (University of Queensland, Australia), "Paul H. Nitze, NSC 68 and the Soviet Union: In Search of a Cold War Paradigm." Paper read at the annual meeting of the Western Social Science History Section, Denver, April, 1978. The purpose of this paper, which was essentially a content analysis of NSC 68, was to suggest the particular role played by Paul H. Nitze, the second director of State's Policy Planning Staff, in the drafting of this document. As the principal author of NSC 68, as well as the sole author of the Presidential "Terms of Reference," Nitze's world outlook pretty much informed the tone and contents of this document which was adopted as policy by the Truman Administration on September 30, 1950. Material for the paper was drawn from the National Archives and from interviews with Mr. Nitze.

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Joseph M. Siracusa (University of Queensland, Australia), "The State of Australian-American Relations: Some Impressions." Paper read at the Seventh National Conference of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Canberra, Australia, April, 1977. Basically a

historical survey of what has come to be known as a "special relationship," this paper indicated the extent to which Australian-American relations have survived & prospered through the twentieth century. At present, the analysis concluded, Australian and American foreign policies tend both to **complement and parallel** each other, each adding in its own way to a positive and constructive post-Vietnam foreign policy outlook.

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J. K. Sweeney (South Dakota State), "The Luso-American Connection: The Courtship, 1940-1941," **Iberian Studies**, VI, 1 (Spring, 1977). Portuguese-American relations in the early years of the war were characterized by American insensitivity and unconscious arrogance. Still, Portugal's economic importance to the Axis and the strategic location of its colonies, made it necessary for the United States to pay court to the Salazar regime.

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Randall B. Woods (Arkansas) "Conflict or Community? The United States and Argentina's Admission to the United Nations," **Pacific Historical Review**, XLVI, 3 (August, 1977), 361-386. In April-May, 1945, American diplomats provoked a storm of controversy at home and abroad by sponsoring Argentina for full membership in the United Nations. In doing so, Washington supported a country that for two years after United States' entry into the war had maintained diplomatic ties with the Axis powers, served as a base for German espionage in the Western Hemisphere, and submitted to the rule of two autocratic militarist governments. At the U. N. C. I. O. meeting the Soviet Union, decrying the fascist nature of the Argentine government, attempted to persuade the U.S. to accept Communist Poland as a member of the U.N. in return for Soviet acquiescence in the seating of Argentina. The U.S. delegation, however, with the aid of Latin America, tied the seating of Argentina to the granting of Assembly seats to Byelorussia & the Ukraine, and then blocked the admission of Poland. Argentina's admission, and the strategy involved was the work of two groups of policy makers within the State Department who agreed that the cause of world peace and America's long-range interests at both the hemispheric and global levels would best be served by international cooperation. For the Latin Americanists in the State Department, Argentina's admission marked the culmination of a campaign to alleviate apprehension south of the Rio Grande caused by wartime intervention into Argentine affairs. At the same time, after Latin America threatened to block the seating of Byelorussia and the Ukraine, a group of internationalists supported an invitation to Argentina in order to prevent Communist nations from withdrawing from the U.N.

Publications in U.S. Diplomacy by Members of SHAFR

Alexander De Conde (U of California, Santa Barbara), editor-in-chief, **Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy**, 1978. Charles Scribner's Sons. Three vols. \$123.00. The work "contains 95 specially commissioned essays which explore concepts, trends, and doctrines of American foreign policy." Approximately three-fourths of the essays are by members of SHAFR--as might be expected.

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John M. Dobson (Iowa State), **America's Ascent: The United States Becomes a Great Power, 1880-1914**. 1978. Northern Illinois U Press. Cl. \$15.00; pb. \$4.00

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Kenneth J. Hagan (U. S. Naval Academy), ed., **In Peace and War: Interpretations of American Naval History, 1775-1976**. 1978. Greenwood Press, Inc., \$17.50. No. 16 in series, Contributions in Military History. Eight of the seventeen essays are by members of SHAFR.

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Burton I. Kaufman (Kansas State), **The Oil Cartel Case: A Documentary Study of Antitrust Activity in the Cold War Era**. 1978. Greenwood Press, Inc. \$15.95. No. 72 in series, Contributions in American History.

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Albert Norman (Norwich U), **The Panama Canal Treaties of 1977; A Political Evaluation**. 1978. Publisher: The author, 3 Alpine Drive, Northfield, Vermont 05663. \$6.50.

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Joseph M. Siracusa (U of Queensland, Australia) and Daniel M. Smith (late, U of Colorado), **The Testing of America, 1914-1945**. 1978. Forum Press, Inc. Pb. \$5.95.

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Joseph S. Tulchin (North Carolina), ed., **Hemispheric Perspectives on the United States; Papers from the New World Conference**. 1978. Greenwood Press, Inc. \$22.50. No. 36 in series, Contributions in American Studies.

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Rachel West (Marian College), **The Department of State on the Eve of the First World War**. 1978. U of Georgia Press. \$11.50.

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Other Publications by Members of SHAFR

John M. Belohlavek (U of South Florida), **George Mifflin Dallas; Jacksonian Patrician**. 1977. Pennsylvania State U Press. \$12.75. Favorably reviewed in **History**, May/June, 1978, and in **American Historical Review**, October, 1978.

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Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (Graduate Center, CUNY), **Robert Kennedy and His Times**. 1978. Houghton Mifflin. \$19.95. Reviewed in umpteen newspapers and magazines.

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Ronald Spector (Center of Military History, Department of Army), **Professors of War: The Naval War College and the Development of the Naval Profession**. 1977. Naval War College and U.S. Government Printing Office. Pb. \$2.95.

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SHAFR ANNOUNCEMENTS

The fifth SHAFR summer conference will be held upon the campus of the University of Kansas, August 9-10, 1979. Dr. Theodore A. Wilson, Department of History at the U of Kansas and SHAFR Program Chairman for 1979, has an open ear--and mind--to suggestions regarding this conference. Members who have ideas with respect to papers, panels, or colloquia which might be presented at this gathering, or who know of distinguished figures in the field of diplomacy who might be induced to participate, should write Dr. Wilson at the above school, Lawrence, Kansas 66045.

Dr. Wilson wishes to remind the research-minded members of the Society that "business can easily be combined with pleasure" by attending this meeting. The Eisenhower Library (in Abilene) is a little over 100 miles to the west on I-71, while less than half that distance to the east is the Truman Library at Independence, Mo.

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Want to help SHAFR--financially? Here's how. The Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University has published the book, **American and Soviet Military Trends Since the Cuban Missile Crisis**. It provides considerable data on force sizes, weapons systems, and future projections and policies, with much data also on NATO. Annexes include "Roles and Missions U.S. Armed Forces," SALT treaty texts, and other protocols of the era.

Members of SHAFR may purchase this 496-page volume through the National Office, with a 40% commission to SHAFR. The soft-bound edition is \$10.95, and the hard-bound \$14.95. Make checks payable to SHAFR.

OTHER ANNOUNCEMENTS

A booklet, **Grants and Fellowships of Interest to Historians, 1978-79**, is still available. The new, expanded grants guide lists 132 sources of funding for historians at all levels of study, research, and professional development. Information contained in the pamphlet includes eligibility requirements, deadlines, addresses, and telephone numbers for grants and fellowships carrying a collective value of several million dollars. Price is \$3.00 for AHA members and ISP subscribers; \$4.00 for nonmembers and institutions. Send prepaid orders to: AHA Publications, 400 A Street, S. E., Washington, D.C. 20003.

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"Congress, Information and Foreign Affairs," is the subject of a recent (1978) committee print of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, written by Dr. Harry L. Wrenn, foreign policy analyst for the Congressional Research Service. Addressing the question of information manipulation by the executive branch, both through suppression and selective release of documents, this study examines the legislative response, its complacency, and its complaints, from Pearl Harbor to the end of the Vietnam War. Divided into a historical survey and an analysis of the issues, the study suggests that power and information are irrevocably linked. "If Congress has no intention to make broad public policy decisions in a particular area, it will have no incentive to collect and evaluate information useful to that end," Wrenn concluded. "It will accomplish very little to provide it with computers, an enlarged professional staff, or other technical means of information support in this situation." Copies of this committee print of 103 pages are available at no cost from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D. C., 20510.

The Committee also reports a large supply of material on the recent Panama Canal Treaty is still available for free distribution. This includes a 1,688-page compilation of "Background Documents Relating to the

Panama Canal," five volumes of committee hearings, copies of the treaty, the committee report, and a chronology of events. Those interested in receiving this information should write to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

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The national Endowment for the Humanities has announced that it is cooperating with the national Science Foundation's Antarctic Research Program in selecting a scholar in the humanities to spend one to six months in Antarctica between the beginning of October, 1979, and the end of March, 1980. The National Endowment for the Arts, also a partner in the venture, will be selecting an artist to visit Antarctica during this period.

The NEH Antarctic Fellowship is intended for scholars whose work seems likely to lead to significant contributions to humanistic thought and knowledge. The scope of Endowment support includes all the fields of the humanities and those areas of the social sciences that employ historical or philosophical approaches, such as jurisprudence, international relations, political theory, sociology, and other subjects concerned primarily with questions of value rather than with quantitative matters. James H. Blessing, Director, NEH Division of Fellowships, writes: "Scholars working in the fields of United States-Soviet relations, international cooperation, and international law might, it seems to me, find the opportunity intriguing, but there are probably other appropriate fields as well. Perhaps it goes without saying that the more squarely humanistic a potential applicant's project, the more appropriate." Candidates for degrees and persons seeking support for work leading toward degrees are not eligible, although applicants need not have advanced degrees to qualify. Applicants must be doing, or planning to do, research relating in whole or in part to Antarctica.

The Antarctic Fellowship will be awarded for a continuous period of either three, six, or twelve months of full-time study and research, with maximum stipends of \$5,000 for three months, \$10,000 for six, and \$20,000 for twelve. The stipend will be based upon the Fellow's current academic year salary, minus sabbatical and other grants. The Fellow will be expected to spend a substantial period in Antarctica. Travel, polar clothing, and subsistence in Antarctica will be provided by the National Science Foundation. Applications should be submitted no later than January 2, 1979.

For further information or application materials, write:

Antarctic Fellowship
 Division of Fellowships
 National Endowment for the Humanities
 Washington, D. C. 20506

or call Mr. David Coder or Mr. Joseph Neville at (202) 724-0333.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL LECTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship was established in 1976 through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and is administered by a special committee of SHAFR. The Bernath Lecture is the feature at the official luncheon of the Society, held during the OAH convention in April of each year.

DESCRIPTION AND ELIGIBILITY: The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address, delivered at the annual meeting with the AHA, but is restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer is expected to concern himself/herself not specifically with his/her own research interests, but with broad issues of importance to students of American foreign relations. The award winner must be under forty-one (41) years of age.

PROCEDURES: The Bernath Lectureship Committee is now soliciting nominations for the 1981 award from members of the Society, agents, publishers, or members of any established history, political science, or journalism organization. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vitae, if available, should reach the Committee no later than December 1, 1979. The Chairman of the Committee, and the person to whom nominations should be sent, is Dr. Kenneth E. Shewmaker, Department of History, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755.

HONORARIUM: \$300.00 with publication of the lecture assured in the SHAFR Newsletter.

AWARD WINNERS

- 1977 Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
- 1978 David S. Patterson (Colgate)
- 1979 Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITION FOR 1979

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition was initiated in 1972 by Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in memory of their late son. Administered by SHAFR, the purpose of the competition and the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing of a lengthy nature by young scholars in the field of U. S. diplomacy.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1978. It must be the author's first or second book. Authors are not required to be members of SHAFR, nor do they have to be professional academicians.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. Ronald Steel, c/o Department of Government, University of Texas, Austin, Texas 78712. The works must be received not later than February 1, 1979.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$500.00. If two (2) or more writers are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be April, 1979, in New Orleans.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

1972	Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento) Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
1973	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1974	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1975	Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire) Stephen E. Pelz (U of Massachusetts-Amherst)
1976	Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
1977	Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
1978	James R. Leutze (North Carolina)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE FOR THE BEST SCHOLARLY ARTICLE IN U. S. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY DURING 1978

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Award for scholarly articles in American foreign affairs was set up in 1976 through the kindness of the young Bernath's parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, and it is administered through selected personnel of SHAFR. The objective of the award is to identify and to reward outstanding research and writing by the younger scholars in the area of U. S. diplomatic relations.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to the author of any article upon any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1978. The article must be among the author's first seven (7) which have seen publication. Membership in SHAFR or upon a college/university faculty is not a prerequisite for entering the competition.

PROCEDURES: Articles shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each article (preferably reprints) should be sent to the chairman of the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee by January 15, 1979. The Chairman of that Committee for 1978 is Dr. Charles E. Neu, Department of History, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island 02906.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$200.00. If two (2) or more authors are considered winners, the prize will be shared. The name of the successful writer(s) will be announced, along with the name of the victor in the Bernath book prize competition, during the luncheon for members of SHAFR, to be held at the annual OAH convention, meeting in April, 1979, at New Orleans.

AWARD WINNERS

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|------|---|
| 1977 | John C. A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.). |
| 1978 | Michael H. Hunt (Yale) |

SHAFR ROSTER AND RESEARCH LIST

Please use this form to register your general and current research interests as well as your address. It would be quite helpful if members would send revised information to the editor whenever new data is available, since that would make it much easier to keep the files up to date and thereby avoid a rush in the fall at the time of publication. If a form is not available, a short memo will suffice. Changes which pertain only to address should be sent to the National Office, Department of History, University of Akron, Akron, Ohio 44325, and they will in turn be passed on to the editors of the **List**, the **Newsletter**, and **Diplomatic History**. Unless new data is submitted, previously-listed research projects will be repeated.

Name: _____

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Institutional Affiliation (if different from address): _____

General Area of Research Interest: _____

Current Research Project(s): _____

If this research is of a pre-doctoral nature, check here: _____

Mail this completed form to:

Dr. Warren F. Kimball, editor
SHAFR Roster & Research List
Department of History
Rutgers University (Newark)
Newark, New Jersey 07102

SHAFR'S 1978-79 CALENDAR

- December 28-30 The 93rd annual meeting of the AHA will take place in San Francisco with the Hilton Hotel as headquarters.
- December 27 SHAFR Council will meet in Diablo Room, Hilton Hotel, 8:00-10:30 P.M.
- December 28 Editorial Board meeting, **Diplomatic History**, 4:00 P.M., Parlor B, St. Francis Hotel.
- December 28 SHAFR reception, 5:00-7:00 P.M., Georgian Room, St. Francis Hotel.
- December 29 SHAFR luncheon, 12:00 noon, Savoy Hall, Holiday Inn, Union Square. Akira Iriye will give his presidential address: "Culture and Power: Intercultural Dimensions of International Relations." With a few exceptions, SHAFR officials begin their tenure during, or at end, of this convention.
- December 29 Editors and contributors to a revision of S.F. Bemis and G.G. Griffin's **Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States** (1921) will meet, 7:30-9:30 A.M., in Olympian Room of St. Francis Hotel.
- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the National Office of SHAFR.
- January 15 Deadline, nominations for 1979 Bernath article award.
- February 1 Deadline, material for March **Newsletter** with publication one month later.
- February 1 Deadline, nominations for 1979 Bernath book prize.

- April 11-14 The OAH will hold its 72nd annual meeting in New Orleans with the Hyatt Regency as headquarters. SHAFR will sponsor a full complement of "doings" at this convention. Among other things, Marilyn B. Young (Michigan) will deliver a paper in her role as winner of the Bernath memorial lectureship for 1979, and the announcement of the victors in the Bernath Book contest and the Bernath article competition will be made.
- May 1 Deadline, material for June **Newsletter** with publication one month later.
- August 1 Deadline, material for September **Newsletter** with publication one month later.
- August 9-10 SHAFR's Fifth Annual Conference at the University of Kansas.
- August 9-12 The Pacific Coast Branch of the AHA will hold its 72nd annual meeting at the University of Hawaii, Honolulu. SHAFR will have a reception at this convention.
- November 1 Deadline, material for December **Newsletter** with publication one month later.
- November 1 Deadline, additions and deletions for SHAFR's **Roster and Research List**.
- November 1-15 Annual elections for officers of SHAFR.
- November 14-17 The 45th annual meeting of the SHA will take place in Washington, D.C, with the Shoreham Hotel as headquarters. SHAFR will hold a reception at this convocation.
- December 1 Deadline, nominations for 1980 Bernath memorial lectureship.
- December 28-30 The 94th annual convention of the AHA will be held in New York City. As usual, SHAFR will have a full round of activities at this meeting. With the exception of a few individuals, the officials of SHAFR for 1980 will begin their tenure at the end of this convention.

BULLETIN

In the recently-concluded election for officials of SHAFR, David M. Pletcher (Indiana) was chosen as vice president, Robert F. Smith (Toledo) and George C. Herring (Kentucky) were elected to the Council, and Gary R. Hess (Bowling Green) became a member of the Nominations Committee. Paul A. Varg (Michigan State), currently the vice president, will assume the duties of the presidency at the conclusion of the SHAFR-AHA convention in San Francisco in late December.

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: Nolan Fowler, Department of History, Tennessee Tech, Cookeville, Tennessee 38501.

ISSUES: The **Newsletter** is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December. All members receive the publication.

DEADLINES: All material must be in the office of the editor not later than four (4) weeks prior to the date of publication.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication. Copies of the **Newsletter** which are returned because of faulty addresses will be forwarded only upon the payment of a fee of 50¢.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of all back numbers of the **Newsletter** are available and may be obtained from the editorial office upon the payment of a service charge of 50¢ per number. If the purchaser lives abroad, the charge is 75¢ per number.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, honors, awards), announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered—or published—upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, lists of accessions of diplomatic materials to libraries, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting diplomatic materials in various depositories. Because of space limitations, "straight" articles and book reviews are unacceptable.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

1968	Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)
1969	Alexander De Conde (U of California - Santa Barbara)
1970	Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)
1971	Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)
1972	Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)
1973	Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)
1974	Bradford Perkins (Michigan)
1975	Armin H. Rappaport (U of California - San Diego)
1976	Robert A. Divine (Texas)
1977	Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)

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