

The Society for Historians of American
Foreign Relations



NEWSLETTER

Volume XI

Number 2

June, 1980

Page

- 1 Bernath Prize Lecture: John L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment.
- 14 Warren F. Kimball, Seduction Without Satisfaction: Textbooks and the Teaching of the History of American Foreign Policy and Diplomacy.
- 18 Milton O. Gustafson, The Supreme Court and Kissinger's Telephone Records.
- 22 SHAFR Council Meeting Minutes
- 24 Prizes/Competitions
- 25 Personals
- 26 Abstracts of Articles and Papers
- 30 Publications
- 31 Workshops and Conferences
- 33 SHAFR Calendar
- 34 SHAFR's Governing Bodies and Committees
- 37 Short Program for the Sixth Annual Meeting of SHAFR
- 38 Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Awards
- 41 American-East Asian Relations Newsletter

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MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in August. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZES: The Society administers three awards a year, all of them in honor of the late Stuart L. Bernath and all of them financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California. The details of each of these awards are given under the appropriate headings of each issue of the **Newsletter**.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors two printed works of a quarterly nature, the **Newsletter**, and **Diplomatic History**, a journal. All members receive these publications.

STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT

The 1980 Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lecture

by

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Historians, it has been argued, can be divided fairly neatly into two groups: lumpers and splitters.¹ Lumpers seek to impose order on the past: they deliver themselves of sweeping generalizations that attempt to make sense out of whole epochs; they seek to systematize complexity, to reduce the chaos, disorder, and sheer untidiness of history to neat patterns that fit precisely within the symmetrical confines of chapters of books, usually designed to be inflicted, at inflated prices, upon unsuspecting undergraduates. Splitters, on the other hand, write mostly for each other -- and their defenseless graduate students. They like to point out exceptions, qualifications, differences, incongruities, paradoxes; in short, they elevate quibbling to a high historiographical art. Both approaches, of course, are necessary, even indispensable, to the writing of history, but they do not always occur in the same proportion at the same time with reference to the same topic. Establishing a balance of power between lumpers and splitters is no easy thing.

This has been particularly true in a field some people are not yet prepared to admit is history -- the record of the past three and a half decades in America foreign policy. Initial treatments of postwar diplomacy tended toward the particular -- immensely detailed but not very analytical studies of what statesmen had said to each other, usually based on memoir material and published sources, sometimes also on inside information. The works of the late Herbert Feis come to mind here -- one dipped into them at first fascinated but then quickly surfeited by the detail, with a curious gnawing in the pit of the stomach that seemed to ask: what does it all mean? We soon found out, of course, through that epidemic of lumping known as revisionism: it was general, sweeping, breathtaking, at times rather like a trapeze artist leaping from one conclusion to another without visible means of support. Inevitably, a reaction set in -- the splitters appeared, industriously chewing away at the foundations of revisionism until many of its most impressive structures -- though not all -- came tumbling down. But nothing much has arisen to take its place: what we have had in the past few years is a considerable amount of careful and soundly-researched work, but no larger pattern has emerged from it. This is too bad, because important as absorption in the particular is, there is a certain value in stepping back to try to take in the whole picture, even if parts of it stick out of the frame in awkward places.

What I would like to try to do in this lecture is to get back on the trapeze: to engage in some of the lumping for which, I think, this lecture series was intended, fully aware, at the same time, of the target one thereby presents for the splitters that will follow. I would like to try to

make some sense out of the past 35 years of American foreign policy by approaching it, not from the traditional economic, diplomatic ideological or military perspectives, but from an angle of vision that I think incorporates all of these: that of grand strategy. By grand strategy, I mean quite simply the process by which ends are related to means, intentions to capabilities, interests to resources. Every maker of policy consciously or unconsciously has to go through such a process, but scholarly students of policy, in their current fascination with regional, topical, or bureaucratic approaches, pay curiously little attention to it. I should like to apply this strategic perspective to what seems to me to be the central theme of postwar American foreign policy -- containment -- with a view to attempting to explain some of its successive mutations, incarnations, and transformations, and to making certain tentative suggestions as to the course containment might take in the future.

I am not, let me hasten to add, proposing to turn into a political scientist before your very eyes. But my thinking has been influenced by some of what has been going on in that discipline, particularly by the work of Alexander George, who has done so much to break down many of the artificial barriers that separate our two fields. George has suggested that there exists, for political leaders, something he calls an operational code -- a set of assumptions about the world, formed early in one's career, that govern without much subsequent variation the way in which one responds to crises afterwards.² Building on this, I would suggest that there exist for presidential administrations certain strategic, or geopolitical, codes, assumptions about American interests in the world, potential threats to them, and feasible responses, that tend to be formed either before or just after an administration takes office, and tend not to change much thereafter, barring very unusual circumstances. "It is an illusion," Henry Kissinger has written, "to believe that leaders gain in profundity while they gain experience. ... the convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in office."³

It seems to me that there have been, in the postwar era, at least five distinct geopolitical codes: George Kennan's original strategy of containment, articulated and, I think, largely implemented by the Truman administration between 1947 and 1949; the assumptions surrounding NSC-68, put into effect between 1950 to 1953 as a result of the Korean War; the Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look", which lasted from 1953 to 1961; the Kennedy-Johnson "flexible response" strategy, which shaped our approach to the world until Johnson left office in 1969; and that complex of ideas we now nostalgically remember under the label "detente", articulated by Nixon and Kissinger in the early 1970's, and continued in effect by both Ford and Carter up until the very end of 1979. I would further argue that Afghanistan has set in motion a sixth strategy of containment, the outlines of which are not yet clear. Borrowing again from Alexander George, I would like here to undertake a modest "structured, focused comparison"⁴ of these geopolitical codes, these successive approaches to containment, to see what pattern might

emerge from them. My objective in all of this is to throw out to you a large, but I hope not too indigestible lump, which will at least give the splitters, who have been on a pretty thin diet lately, something to chew on.

The first thing to note, in looking at the American approach to the world since 1945, is that our leaders have, on the whole, perceived themselves as more often responding to challenges rather than initiating them. One searches in vain through the very considerable body of documentation now available for evidence of any sustained, offensively-motivated drive for world power: our empire, like most empires in the past, arose as a defensive response to perceived external threat. No doubt much of Soviet imperialism, Afghanistan included, can be explained in the same way: it is in the nature of great powers that they often do offensive things for defensive reasons. That being the case, it seems fair to say that our consistent goal throughout the postwar era has been to contain what we have seen, accurately or not, as efforts by the Soviet Union and later the international communist movement to upset the existing balance of power in the world. Different administrations have gone about this task, though, in different ways.

George Kennan's, of course, was the first strategy of containment, but there has been a fearful amount of confusion over what that strategy actually was. Part of the problem was the misleading and carelessly worded "X" article, published in **Foreign Affairs** in July, 1947, in which the word "containment" first gained public currency. Another difficulty was Kennan's own resistance, after that article was published, to setting down systematically any further exposition of his views: it was as if his ideas were so fragile and evanescent that they could not tolerate the process of being communicated, in any form other than orally, to those around him. Still further confusion arose thirty years later out of the effort of a well-meaning but probably over-zealous historian who took it upon himself to explain, in the pages of that same journal, "what Kennan really meant to say". This exercise in lumping succeeded only in stirring up the splitters in the profession, generating, as a result, rather more heat than light.⁵

Lumpers are rarely cured of the error of their ways, though, and so if I might ask your indulgence for the purposes of this lecture, it seems to me that the Kennan strategy came down to something like this:

(1) To work to restore the balance of power along the periphery of the Soviet Union left unstable by the defeats of Germany and Japan, not by assuming any explicit military responsibility for the defense of those areas, but by rehabilitating their economies to the extent necessary to bring back the self-confidence required for self-defense. The eventual goal, you will recall, was to deny the Russians control of the other four of the five vital centers of military-industrial power not then under their control.

(2) To work to reduce Soviet influence beyond the borders of the U.S.S.R. by encouraging and exploiting fragmentation within the international communist movement. Nationalism, Kennan thought, was

a more powerful force than ideology; hence, the United States should make use of national communist regimes where they could be helpful in containing the Russians. It was always the Soviet Union, in Kennan's mind, that was the major adversary; communism was a threat only to the extent that it was the instrument of Soviet foreign policy.

(3) To work to convince the Russians, by a long-term process of positive and negative reinforcement -- behavior modification, if you will -- that their own best interests would be served by accepting the international order as it was rather than by trying to change it. This meant a willingness, on our part, to negotiate as well as to stand firm.⁶

What Kennan was advocating here was what might be called a strategy of asymmetrical response. The challenge was the vast increase in Soviet military power brought about by the end of World War II, and the potential that posed for intimidating vital power centers on the periphery of the Soviet sphere. The response Kennan advocated, though, was not to try to counter the Russian threat with a conventional military buildup of our own. We lacked the resources for that, he thought, and even if we had had them, we would have had to use them on terrain and in circumstances selected by our adversaries rather than by ourselves. Instead, Kennan suggested applying our own strengths -- our economic power, our greater tolerance of nationalism -- against corresponding Soviet weaknesses. This did mean shifting the nature and at times the location of competition away from the original provocation, but Kennan thought that asymmetry necessary in order to retain the initiative for the United States.

To a greater extent than has been realized, the Truman administration did make an effort between 1947 and 1949 to implement Kennan's strategy. We did not respond to the situation in Europe or Japan with a big military build-up, conventional or nuclear. Instead, resources were poured into economic rehabilitation in both parts of the world. We did make an effort to exploit fragmentation within the international communist movement -- quite successfully in the case of Yugoslavia, less successfully but no less persistently in the case of China.⁷ The only element of Kennan's strategy not put into effect was his emphasis on negotiations, but that had always been a long-term program, and even Kennan had doubts as to whether it could be successful anytime soon.

Still, by 1950, it had become apparent that Kennan's strategy of asymmetrical response had failed. The reason, I think, was a fundamental flaw in his analysis that he has not fully worked out to this day. Kennan sought to instill a sense of psychological self-confidence among people threatened by Soviet expansionism, but he also insisted, because American resources were limited, on making distinctions between vital and peripheral interests. Areas not in themselves centers of industrial-military power, or areas not vital in some way to those that were, could be written off with no great harm. What Kennan failed to take into account was the possibility that such rational distinctions could induce irrational fears, thereby undermining self-confidence in areas that were vital as well as those that were not. One could not, for

example, blithely write off Greece, or Turkey, or South Korea, without shaking self-confidence in Western Europe and in Japan. One could not alleviate, solely by economic measures, the fears of those that had to live quite literally under the guns of the Red Army. Kennan had no better solution to this problem than to be of good cheer: it was like walking a tightrope, he said; it was fine as long as your didn't look down.⁸ In a way, he was right: the tightrope was an economical, if risky, way to cross the chasm; it has proven tougher and more resilient than anyone at the time could have imagined. But it was hard not to look down.

It was the alarm that came from looking down -- especially in the light of Mao Tse-tung's victory in China and the Soviet atomic bomb -- that caused President Truman early in 1950 to authorize the review of national security policy that resulted in NSC-68, the second of the postwar strategies of containment.⁹ NSC-68 differed from Kennan's strategy in several ways:

(1) NSC-68 made no effort, as Kennan had done, to distinguish between vital and peripheral interests. Instead, it defined interests, not by some independent frame of reference like Kennan's concept of vital power centers, but by the simple existence of threats: wherever the Soviet Union or its satellites threatened to expand their control, there American interests lay.

(2) There was also a difference in the perception of threat. Where Kennan had seen it strictly in terms of the Soviet Union, NSC-68 shifted the focus of concern to the international communist movement as a whole. It acknowledged that splits might eventually develop within that movement, but for the moment it argued that the balance of power was do delicately poised that any gain for communism, whether a gain for the Russians or not, would by that much diminish the security of the free world.

(3) NSC-68 argued that the United States should resist aggression at the time, in the place, and by the same means that it had occurred. The two great dangers to the American position in the world, it maintained, were escalation, which now that the Russians had the bomb could lead to atomic war, and humiliation, which if it occurred anywhere, could erode credibility everywhere. Responses to aggression, NSC-68 argued, should be proportioned to the offense. Or, to put it another way, symmetrical response.

(4) The United States could afford to do this, the authors of NSC-68 insisted, because its capabilities were almost infinitely expandable. Kennan had stressed the limits of American power, and the need, as a consequence, to differentiate between what the United States could do, and what it could not. NSC-68 took the position that there were no significant limits: the U.S. could afford whatever was necessary for the national defense, because the spending thereby generated would bring in higher tax revenues which could then be applied to balance budgets swollen by those expenditures in the first place. NSC-68 represented, in short the first intrusion into the national security planning process of the economic theories of John Maynard Keynes. At a time when a worldwide threat had created world-wide interests to be defended,

NSC-68 showed, reassuringly, how the nation could afford a world-wide response.

From a purely economic point of view, the theory behind NSC-68 was correct: the nation did more than triple defense spending in less than a year without seriously damaging the economy. Expenditures generated new revenues, much as the Keynesians had said they would; wage and price controls prevented inflation from becoming a serious problem. Politically, though, it was another matter. The American people were simply not willing to put up with a strategy that required the U.S. to fight limited wars of unlimited duration on unfavorable terrain. The criticisms of MacArthur, Hoover, Taft, Dulles, and Eisenhower all had this point in common: as Dulles put it in 1952, "we cannot. . . match the Red armies, man for man, gun for gun, and tank for tank at any particular time or place their general staff selects. To attempt that would mean real strength nowhere and bankruptcy everywhere."¹⁰

What Dulles recommended to solve this problem, of course, was a return to asymmetry, in the form of the so-called "New Look" -- the third of the postwar approaches to containment. In order to understand the New Look, it is necessary first to understand, in case there had been any doubt about this, that Eisenhower was not a Keynesian. He was convinced, with a tenacity that can only be described as awesome, that the country was as much threatened by deficit spending as by the communists: inflation was as much of a danger as aggression. If, in seeking to stop one, one got the other, then the effects would be just as bad. It was necessary instead to accept the fact that the nation's resources were limited, but to devise strategies by which, on a fixed base, we could defend global interests. This was the great attraction of the Dulles strategy, because whatever else one might say about them nuclear weapons did have the advantage of being cheap in proportion to the effects produced. Or, as someone put it at the time, more bang for the buck.

Critics have charged that this Eisenhower-Dulles strategy, which came to be known, misleadingly, as "massive retaliation", constituted nothing more than a crude threat to incinerate Moscow or Peking if some communist somewhere stepped across a line drawn in the dust by a militant John Foster Dulles. In fact, the strategy was a good deal more sophisticated than that.

Its chief priority was deterrence, but it was to be deterrence carried out by creating uncertainty rather than certainty in the mind of the enemy. The United States might respond with nuclear weapons, it was true, but the response might also be conventional, diplomatic, economic -- or none at all. The important thing was that the enemy not know -- that the risks, because they could not be easily calculated, **always be made to appear to outweigh the benefits. The advantage, for the United States, was that it need not relinquish the initiative to the enemy, as had been the case in Korea. It need not assume the massive costs of preparing for all contingencies, in order to be able to proportion**

response to offense. NSC-68 had allowed the enemy to determine the time, nature, and location of competition; Eisenhower and Dulles now sought to regain the initiative, to respond, as Dulles liked to put it, "at times and in places of our own choosing."

This return to asymmetry was, on the whole, more successful than was realized at the time, if one defines success in terms of maximizing effect while minimizing expense. Whether because of it or in spite of it, there was on the part of both Soviet and Chinese leaders a notable restraint during the Eisenhower years: no irresponsible provocations along the lines of Korea in 1950, or Cuba in 1962, or Afghanistan in 1979. Nor did the United States allow itself to be dragged into interminable conflicts in peripheral areas -- a fact that has made Dwight Eisenhower, in the eyes of several contemporary students of the Presidency, the most highly regarded of all postwar presidents.¹¹

Nevertheless, the Eisenhower strategy had given the appearance, by the late 1950's, of having failed, for some of the same reasons that the Kennan strategy had lost official support ten years earlier. The problem was inherent in the nature of asymmetrical response: by being selective in how one counters enemy initiatives, one conserves resources to be sure, but one also gives the impression of leaving flanks exposed. Enemy exploitation of such opportunities can set off an overall crisis of confidence, regardless of whether the areas actually endangered are worth defending in the first place.

Prime examples during the Eisenhower administration were the missile gap and the rise of revolutionary nationalism in the Third World. Eisenhower limited the American response in both situations, in the case of the missile gap because secret U-2 intelligence gave him reason to believe it was not serious, in the case of the Third World because though alarmed by communist inroads there, he was determined not to commit troops and resources on terrain selected by adversaries. In retrospect, both of these were wise decisions. The missile gap did prove to be a myth; nationalism turned out to be the dominant Third World ideology, not communism. But the appearance of inaction on Eisenhower's part--together with the fear that if he had chosen to act, he would have had few options available other than nuclear war or surrender -- provided the Democrats with a major campaign issue in 1960.

The Democratic critique of the "New Look" evolved into the strategy of "flexible response"--for our purposes, symmetrical response--based on assumptions similar to those that had informed NSC-68. That there were echoes of that earlier strategy in the Kennedy administration's approach to the world should not be surprising, given the fact that some of the same men--notably Dean Acheson, Dean Rusk, and Paul Nitze--were involved in shaping both. Their major argument, along with that of Kennedy's younger advisers, was that Eisenhower's asymmetry had left the nation vulnerable to a gradual erosion of its position: they were determined to return to the idea of countering threats to the balance of power where they occurred, without having to resort to either escalation or humiliation. Only by using it, they thought, could American power be

made credible: enemies had to be certain that if they committed aggression, at whatever level, the United States would respond in kind. The idea, in short, was calibration -- to do no more, but also no less, than was necessary to maintain American commitments in the world.

It is significant that this switch back to symmetry coincided with a reversal of attitudes toward the domestic economy. Kennedy and his advisers, notably Walter Heller, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, thought that Eisenhower's fiscal restraint had impaired economic growth; like the authors of NSC-68, they were convinced that the nation could spend considerably more on defense without damaging its domestic institutions. With effective management, the economy itself could be "fine tuned" to provide the means with which to implement symmetrical response on a global scale. Lyndon Johnson, who emphatically shared this line of reasoning, put it with characteristic bluntness in 1964: "We are the richest nation in the history of the world. We can afford to spend whatever is needed to keep this country safe and to keep our freedom secure. And we shall do just that."¹²

The result, predictably enough, was excess. The United States embarked on a quest for superiority in the field of strategic weapons, even after satellite reconnaissance had confirmed the non-existence of the missile gap. We undertook something approaching an obligation to maintain the balance of power throughout the world, not because Kennedy and Johnson saw communism as a monolith, but because they regarded American credibility as so vulnerable that it could be called into question everywhere if successfully challenged anywhere. And, as if all this were not enough, Johnson after becoming president coupled it all with the most ambitious domestic reform program since the New Deal.

What all of this represented, I think, was quest for the absolute - absolute security, absolute credibility, absolute reform -- in a world that was hardly hospitable to those objectives. There was in these strategies little sense of the relationship between ends and means, little awareness of the fact that because resources (and will) are finite commodities, distinctions have to be made, both at home and abroad, between peripheral and vital interests. Vietnam represented the logical outcome of this symmetrical response strategy: as in Korea, we confronted an enemy on terrain he had selected, in circumstances he controlled, and at a cost he largely determined. And, just as Korea had provided the political catalyst for a shift back to asymmetry, so Vietnam, with the election of Richard Nixon did the same thing.

Nixon and Kissinger brought us back to asymmetry in several different ways. First, and most important, they operated from a limited perception of means. Their assumption, made explicit in the Nixon Doctrine, was that the United States could no longer afford to counter adversaries on their home turf: other, less costly methods of containment would have to be found. Interestingly, though, Nixon and Kissinger did not return to the old Dulles strategy of nuclear retaliation - although they did retain Dulles' idea of cultivating unpredictability as a means of keeping adversaries off balance. Rather, they embraced, more

seriously than did any other postwar administration, the use of negotiations as an instrument of containment, with the idea of eventually integrating the Soviet Union through a process of positive and negative reinforcement into the established international order. Their chief instrument for accomplishing this was linkage -- in itself an asymmetrical idea, dependent on bringing about concessions in one area by applying pressures and inducements in another. The most important use of linkage, in turn, was the opening to Peking: for the first time the United States took advantage of the Sino-Soviet split, and, in the process, returned to the old idea that it was the Soviet Union, and not communism in general, that posed the major threat to American security. The ultimate goal of this strategy was to be stability through multi-polarity: "I think it will be a safer world," Nixon commented in 1972, "if we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China, Japan, each balancing the other. . . ."¹³

If all of this sounds vaguely familiar -- the concept of a pentagonal world order, the idea of exploiting differences within the international communist movement, the use of a kind of "behavior modification" therapy to bring the Soviet Union into line -- then I would suggest that it was not too far removed from what George Kennan had tried to do in the first place some two and a half decades earlier. It was not, I think, that Kissinger consciously looked to Kennan as a model: if anything, his vision ranged further back, to the geopolitics of 19th century Europe. But Kennan and Kissinger did operate from a similar set of strategic assumptions: that maintaining a global, though not necessarily regional, balance of power was a vital interest, that the means available to do that were limited, that threats, like interests, could be differentiated, and that, above all, to survive, one had to retain the initiative. So, by the time Henry Kissinger abandoned the orchestration of world affairs and left us all to our own devices, we had come full circle: the strategy of containment with which we entered 1977 was not all that different from the one with which we had left 1947.

But where have we come since? Here, I must admit to a certain perplexity. The Carter administration, despite the presence on its National Security Council of another Ivy League professor of government with a foreign accent, has been slower than any other postwar administration to make clear the fundamental assumptions upon which its approach to the world rests. It has given the appearance, in public, of simply responding to events, dignifying its own inconsistency with proclamations whose earnestness and piety are exceeded only by their mushiness.

In practice, though, the Carter administration has stuck fairly closely to the geopolitical assumptions of the Nixon-Kissinger era. It has not tried to assert that all interests are equally vital -- far from it. It has not regarded all threats as equally dangerous -- in fact, it has done more than any of its predecessors to differentiate between adversaries. It certainly has not, to this point, revived the idea that means are capable of indefinite expansion. It is true that, at the outset, there were some fairly conspicuous departures from the Nixon-Kissinger approach: the

human rights policy, the abandonment of linkage, the ostentatious shift away from a Sovietocentric focus that appears to have caused such painful feelings of rejection and neglect among sensitive egos in the Kremlin. But these were surface manifestations: the fundamental outlines of the Nixon-Kissinger approach to the world remained intact, right up to the end of 1979.

Not without significant debate, though. Asymmetry has, in recent years, come under increasing attack from symmetrically-minded critics: Nixon, Ford, and Carter, they have argued, allowed the Soviet Union to equal and then surpass us in military strength, and thus eroded our credibility throughout the world. Prominent in this campaign, interestingly enough, has been Paul Nitze, who as one of the authors of NSC-68 thirty years ago helped formulate the strategy of symmetrical response in the first place. Prominent among Nitze's critics, in turn, has been George Kennan himself, who has called for paying more attention "to our own inflation, and especially to the effects of that inflation on the military budget, and less to the effort to convince the rest of us of the menacing intentions and fearful strength of our Soviet opponents."¹⁴ If strategies of containment came full circle between the late 1940's and the late 1970's, then, so too did the argument over the respective merits of symmetrical and asymmetrical response.

Korea, of course, settled the argument in favor of symmetrical response in 1950; it might appear, today, as if Afghanistan has had a similar effect. Certainly Kennan's assurances of a few years back that the Soviet leadership was an aging gerontocracy, "not inclined towards major innovations of policy, particularly not risky or adventuresome ones"¹⁵ seem now somewhat overtaken by events. I am not sure this means, though, that we will now shift back, as we did after the shock of Korea, to Nitze's strategy of symmetrical response. The reason is that we are still living with the economic consequences of our last involvement with that strategy in Southeast Asia: unlike the situation at the time of NSC-68, no one has yet stepped forward to explain how we can afford a reversion to symmetrical globalism in a period of double-digit inflation. The budgetary horn of plenty is no more likely to return, now, it seems, than is the spirit of Camelot that last gave rise to it.

We are probably stuck, then, with the perception that means are limited, and that is a powerful inducement, however awesome the present danger, to strategic asymmetry. This is not necessarily a bad thing. Letting budgets shape strategy may not be the most sophisticated approach to policy-making, but I see little evidence that more ambitious techniques based on the precise calibration of response to offense have advanced the national interest very far. Where we have expanded means in the past, as in Korea and Vietnam, we have also tended to expand interests. And, as interests expanded, so too did perceptions of potential threats to them. Symmetrical response became, in a way, circular response, which is another name for a treadmill. Asymmetry, on the whole, has served us better: one need remember not only the accomplishments of Henry Kissinger, the curiously-successful presidency of Dwight Eisenhower, the "golden

age" of foreign policy creativity between 1947 and 1949, but also World War II itself, which we fought from a perception of scarcity, not abundance, and which as far as our own participation goes must be set down as the most cost-effective war of modern times. The essence of it is this, I think: the bracing discipline of stringency, like the prospect of imminent execution, does at least have the advantage of clearing the head, of encouraging one to distinguish between what is important and what is not, of forcing one to confront that elemental but often neglected question of Marshal Foch "What is it all about?"

Several conclusions emerge, I think, from this analysis of postwar strategies of containment. One is that there has been painfully little originality in them. We have shifted back and forth between symmetry and asymmetry, having to learn each time the problems with each, oblivious, for the most part, to the possibility that we might do better with neither. Conceptually, our debates over foreign policy have been little more than re-runs of those between George Kennan and Paul Nitze thirty years ago. If there is now to be a sixth strategy of containment, one would hope that it might reflect some new ideas; that is unlikely to happen, though, until we develop some reliable mechanisms for alerting policy-makers to the fact that what they think are innovations usually are not that at all, but rather some previous administration's forgotten mistakes.

Another thing this analysis reveals is the great importance of internal as opposed to external influences in shaping the American approach to the world. If one examines the points at which each successive strategy of containment gave way to the next -- 1950, 1953, 1961, 1969 -- one finds that all but one coincided with a shift of party in the White House. Only the change from the Kennan strategy to NSC-68 took place in response to something our adversaries did. This would tend to suggest, then, that there is more of a relationship between domestic politics and national security policy than has been thought.

The relationship, it seems to me, is two-fold. First, incoming administrations tend to define their geopolitical codes, not by an objective and dispassionate assessment of what is going on in the outside world, but by a determination not to repeat what they see as their immediate predecessor's errors. Hence, Eisenhower's asymmetrical New Look arose out of his critique, during the 1952 campaign, of Truman's commitment to symmetry. Kennedy's objections to asymmetry in 1960 led the nation back to symmetry once more. Nixon's promise to end the war that strategy had brought about contributed to his victory in 1968, and to a return to asymmetry. Even Carter, upon coming into office, felt obliged to stress the ways in which his strategy differed from Kissinger's; that he grafted these surface manifestations onto a set of underlying assumptions derived largely from Kissinger says something both about the compulsion, at all costs, to put distance between one's self and the previous administration, and about the remarkable ability of Carter and his advisers, apparently without being aware of what they are doing, to contradict themselves.

The second connection between party politics and foreign policy has to do with ideology. I do not mean here the old saw that Democrats are the party of war and prosperity, Republicans the party of peace and depression.¹⁶ But I do think there are differences, based not so much on party labels as on commitment to the economic theories of liberalism and conservatism. If we can buy the argument that the perception of means is critical in shaping national security policy, then it would follow that conservatives, given their traditional resistance to Keynesian economics, would tend to see means as less expandable than liberals. And, indeed, the pattern does seem to hold up. We have had no fiscal conservatives in the White House who have embraced symmetrical response, with its emphasis on expandable means. We have had no fiscal liberals who have endorsed asymmetry, with its emphasis on fixed means. Jimmy Carter, though a Democrat, is no fiscal liberal, as certain of his critics within the party are given to pointing out. Harry Truman was not one either until 1949: significantly his acceptance of expansionist economics on the home front was soon followed by a shift to symmetrical response in foreign affairs.¹⁷

I would not want this argument to suggest, as it might to some, a sudden susceptibility on my part to economic determinism: that is too big a lump, even for a lump. But this approach does help clarify, I think, the much-clouded relationship between the nation's economy, its politics, and its foreign policy. It accepts the revisionist argument that policy depends, not so much on what the economic situation actually is at any given time, but on how leaders perceive it. At the same time, though, it avoids the revisionists' tendency to ignore the very real ideological and political differences that exist among those leaders. It shows that one can be a capitalist, whatever that means these days, and still react to economic stimuli in very different ways.

Finally, this analysis may shed new light on the old suspicion that when one proliferates means, one tends to find excuses to use them. There is something in that, I think, if the record of the past 35 years is any guide. Credibility, in an asymmetrical strategy, comes by threatening to use incredible weapons, in the expectation that one will not actually have to do so: one risks escalation in order to achieve economy. Credibility, in a symmetrical strategy, comes by actually using less dangerous weapons on a limited scale: one sacrifices economy to avoid escalation. Obviously, a symmetrical response strategy is more likely to involve a nation in military conflict than an asymmetrical one; one has to weigh the costs, though, against the risks of not acting until the only option left is nuclear.

I said at the beginning that this would be a lumping lecture, and I can tell, from the faint sound of knives being sharpened in the background, that it has, to some extent, succeeded. How well this synthesis would hold up under rigorous investigation I am not sure: I can only say that I have found it useful in organizing my own thoughts about postwar foreign policy. I am even less sure what kind of predictor this analysis might be about the future of containment: we may well be moving into a period when neither symmetry nor asymmetry will suffice, and we will in

fact be forced to come up with something new. It may be that the Carter administration, in the time remaining to it, will be able to do this, or maybe not. But, if not, we do at least have the consolation of knowing that there is, waiting in the wings, a currently underemployed professor of government with a foreign accent and some pretensions to being a historian as well, who could probably be persuaded to defer writing volume two of his account of how he saved the world once, in order to take on the task again.

NOTES

1. See Antonia Fraser, "Restoring Charles II," **New Republic**, December 29, 1979, pp. 21-22.
2. Alexander L. George, "The 'Operational Code': A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Decision-Making," **International Studies Quarterly**, XII (June, 1969), 190-222.
3. Henry A. Kissinger, **White House Years** (Boston: 1979), p. 54.
4. Alexander L. George, "Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison," in Paul Gordon Lauren, ed., **Diplomatic History: New Approaches** (forthcoming).
5. John Lewis Gaddis, "Containment: A Reassessment," **Foreign Affairs**, LV (July, 1977), 873-887; Edward Mark, "The Question of Containment: A Reply to John Lewis Gaddis," **ibid.**, LVI (January, 1978), 430-440; John W. Coogan and Michael H. Hunt, "Kennan and Containment: A Comment," Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations **Newsletter**, IX (March, 1978), 23-25.
6. This is a distillation of Kennan's thinking based on an interview with him at Princeton, New Jersey, on February 2, 1977, and his writings and lectures between 1947 and 1949. See, in particular, NSC 20/1 (PPS 38), "U. S. Objectives With Respect to Russia," in Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis, eds., **Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950** (New York: 1978), pp. 176-189; Kennan's lectures at the National War College, September 17, 1948 and August 30, 1949, and at the Naval War College, October 11, 1948; and his notes prepared for a seminar at Princeton, January 23-26, 1949, and for a presentation to the House Armed Services Committee, January 25, 1949, all in the George F. Kennan Papers, Princeton University, Box 17.
7. See, on this point, David Allen Meyers, "American Policy Toward the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949-1955," Ph. D. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1979.
8. Kennan lecture to the Joint Orientation Conference, the Pentagon, November 8, 1948, Kennan Papers, Box 17.
9. NSC-68, "United States Objectives and Programs for National Security," April 14, 1950, **Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950**, I, 235-292.
10. John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness," **Life**, XXXII (May 19, 1952), p. 151.

11. See, on this point, Vincent P. DeSantis, "Eisenhower Revisionism," **Review of Politics**, XXXVIII (1976), 190-207; and George H. Quester, "Was Eisenhower a Genius?" **International Security** IV (Fall, 1979), 159-179.
12. Johnson informal remarks at the Pentagon, July 21, 1964, **Public Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson: 1963-64** (Washington: 1965), p. 875.
13. Interview in **Time**, January 3, 1972.
14. George F. Kennan, **The Cloud of Danger** (Boston: 1977), p. 11.
15. Quoted in Martin F. Herz, ed., **Decline of the West? George F. Kennan and His Critics** (Washington: 1978), p. 8.
16. For an evaluation of this argument, see Robert A. Divine, "War, Peace, and Political Parties in 20th Century America," Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations **Newsletter**, VIII (March, 1977), 1-6.
17. Alonzo L. Hamby, **Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Liberalism** (New York: 1973), pp. 329-334.

Dr. Gaddis is professor of history at Ohio University. As the recipient of the Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship for 1980, he delivered this paper at the SHAFR luncheon (April 11) during the annual convention of the OAH in San Francisco.

SEDUCTION WITHOUT SATISFACTION: TEXTBOOKS AND THE TEACHING OF THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND DIPLOMACY

by

Warren Kimball, Rutgers

The required textbook, that curse of undergraduate students, is making a come-back, and American diplomatic history is no exception. Unfortunately, the data available fails to explain why, after a decade of movement away from textbooks, diplomatic historians are once again using them. Possibly teachers of the history of American foreign policy are finding, as so many U.S. history survey teachers have complained, that students have become reluctant, even rebellious when assigned a half-dozen or more books to read. Even more significant may be the cumulative effect of years of "civics" and "social science" courses replacing formal historical study in high school. Arriving as college freshmen with little understanding of historiography, students are often confused and discouraged when faced with conflicting interpretations of the same events. A single text can alleviate that problem, although

another arises when students all too frequently treat that text as revealed truth. More importantly, a textbook seems more necessary when faced with a classroom full of students who think Jay's Treaty was drawn up by the Audubon Society.

With the return to textbooks, the matter of choosing a text becomes crucial. Publishers tend to keep sales figures under wraps, but no one--including a smiling group of executives at Prentice-Hall--disputes the widely held belief that Thomas A. Bailey's **Diplomatic History of the American People** still dominates the market, just as it has for the nearly forty years since it appeared in 1940! Some other texts have made inroads, but Bailey--for that's all teachers and students have called it for years--Bailey remains king of the mountain. My own impressions have no quantitative scientific validity, but I have lost count of the number of times that I have met non-academics, had occasion to tell them I taught diplomatic history, and been told that they had taken that course "way back when" in college and used a delightful textbook, you know, that one with all the great cartoons and funny stories. Forced to guess the name of the textbook, I haven't missed yet! To demonstrate just how remarkable that is, those same people can rarely recall which U.S. history survey text they used in college. It seems clear that Thomas Bailey's text is one of the three most influential books on the history of American foreign policy ever written--the other two being George Kennan's **American Diplomacy, 1900-1950** and William A. Williams's **Tragedy of American Diplomacy**, although the latter's effect has been greatest among professional historians.

How can we account for this incredible popularity, a popularity which is fittingly, given Thomas Bailey's presentation of public opinion, translated into influence on students? The desire to cut costs may account for the recent increases in textbook sales at the expense of supplementary readings, but Bailey has never appeared between anything but hard covers, so we must look elsewhere for an answer.

The chronological approach used by Bailey is mirrored in almost every other text, and attempts to escape such confines did not prove financially successful. Bailey's bibliographies are exhaustive, a technique which may sell a few texts to authors in need of ego massage, but there are many more teachers of the history of American foreign policy than there are historians cited in **A Diplomatic History of the American People**.

What about intellectual quality? No one can challenge the quality and productivity of Thomas Bailey. He is, in every sense of the phrase, a gentleman and a scholar. He is a giant in his profession, and his articles and monographs will continue to inform historians long after he retires from active scholarship (an event which is probably many books and many years away since diplomatic historians seem to be remarkably long-lived). In the tradition of Samuel Bemis, most diplomatic history texts are pseudomonographs, and Bailey has included enough

footnotes to heighten that impression. Nevertheless, in my eighteen years of teaching I have never heard one single colleague defend Bailey's text as intellectually superior to the other texts which were available. On the contrary, colleagues who have used the text were invariably defensive about that decision, a defensiveness which can be read as embarrassment. When I first began teaching, at the Naval Academy in 1961, Bailey was, and for some time remained, the text used by all of us who taught the required course in U. S. diplomatic history. Each year the faculty, about fifteen of us as I recall, would meet to consider what text to adopt (although the final decision was in the hands of the person in charge of that course). The discussion was essentially the same one I have always heard about the Bailey text. It's not the best text for scholars, but the students really like it. What's the sense in using a text that they won't even read? Besides, the argument went on, Bailey has all the basic facts which a text should provide. Is that what a text is supposed to supply--just the basic facts?

Recently, someone labeled Thomas Bailey the "Liberace of history." Bailey's response was that he considered the term a compliment. No one would argue that only unreadable books are scholarly, or that a textbook which students enjoy is automatically unsophisticated and superficial. In fact, Bailey presents a subtle and very sophisticated concept of how and why American foreign policy operated. But the thesis which Bailey offers is presented in a way which hides its real impact. How many students, beguiled by cartoons, cliches, alliterations, and an endless supply of anecdotes, failed to examine consciously the ideas which Bailey presented, even while those ideas were embedding themselves in their minds? How many students, out of countless thousands who have read and enjoyed Bailey, ever realized that he agreed with the Hamiltonian credo that "the people, sir, is a beast"? Few students realize that, in spite of protestations to the contrary, Bailey finds public opinion to be the enemy as well as the great blessing of American foreign policy. Who are his heroes? Men like James Polk and Franklin Roosevelt, presidents who deceived the public in the national interest. For all his genuflections toward public opinion, Bailey offers an elitist, anti-populist prescription for American foreign policy. The problem is not that Thomas Bailey lacks intellectual depth and sophistication; the problem is that teachers of diplomatic history have treated his text as light-weight and harmless. Finding a war scare behind every bush and picturing the United States as an innocent, normally acted upon by other, more cynical nations, has fostered a cowboy and Indians/good guys vs. bad guys approach among students. "Europe's distresses made American successes" is catchy and not totally wrong, but taken without some explanation, it exaggerates America's passivity. "Twisting the lion's tail," Bailey's (and others') phrase for Anglophobia in the 19th century, over-emphasizes the effect of the Irish-American vote and virtually ignores the very real fears of British power and competition held by most American statesmen.

Whether Bailey's views are right or wrong is a question of evidence and interpretation--but Bailey does foster a simplistic, uncritical, and monocausal view of the history of American foreign policy.

This suggests that the popularity of the Bailey text is not due just to its cartoons, catchy phrases, and adventure-story approach to history, but because that "good guys/bad guys" concept is so digestible. Bailey began serving up "pop" history long before today's tenure/job crunch pushed too many teachers into gimmicky and popularity contests. (Take, for instance, the current mini-course craze where esoteric slices of history--"I. Q. in History" is one horrible example--are offered to undergraduates without any prerequisites and devoid of the kind of historical context which could make them intellectually valuable. They sell, but then so does pornography.) Just as mini-courses, by taking history out of its context, fail to stimulate understanding and historical perception, so does a text which tells a "cracking good story" but in the process submerges nuance, context, and the multiplicity of human motivation. Bailey offers a simple, appealing, picture of an honest and innocent American public, often misled by demagogues and politicians but then saved in the nick of time by its elite leaders--from John Jay through Hamilton Fish on to Franklin Roosevelt. His broad interpretation--Wilsonian realism seems an accurate label--may well be valid, but it is rarely understood by students whose first contact with the history of American foreign policy is in the pages of **A Diplomatic History of the American People**. Intellectually, that is a seduction without satisfaction.

But merely attacking a discipline's most successful textbook does not solve enrollment problems. In fact, many ask whether diplomatic historians can afford to scrap a proven winner? But that question is based on false premises. Bailey may still command the lion's share of the diplomatic history market, but enrollment problems are part of a far broader crisis within the historical profession. That history enrollments have dropped overall suggests looking to something other than "pop" history for job security. A mini-course on "baseball and foreign policy" might bring in the science and psychology majors, but largely on a one-time basis. Even more pernicious, because the danger is less obvious, is the proliferation of one semester courses in 20th century American foreign policy. On that point, Bailey's refusal to go to a two volume paperback--whatever the reasons behind that decision--has been a blessing. How can students understand the roots of our foreign policy if teachers cut off 125 years of the national experience and another 175 years of colonial backgrounds? Bill Franklin, who used to trek up from the State Department in Foggy Bottom once a week to teach a course at Georgetown University, began his classes in "European diplomatic history" with the blunt statement that there was no such subject matter, except as it existed in the catalogue. One could possibly speak of "modern diplomatic history" so long as you were not too precise about the dates, but to narrow it down to a single continent was to distort reality beyond repair. He was right. Unless a history course offers ideas and concepts of substance and meaning; unless it

presents material which helps us understand the totality of human experience rather than dividing history into the narrow "problems" so treasured by geopoliticians; unless, in the words of Carl Becker, it "deepens the sympathies and fortifies the will," students would be, and apparently are, far wiser in choosing to take accounting, business management, and pre-professional courses.

That is not an attack on scholarly studies or seminars, for all of those, if they are worthwhile, relate to the broadest historical issues. On the contrary, only an active scholar, constantly engaged in research can be a great teacher, and Thomas Bailey is the obvious example. But when historians teach the survey courses, they must, in the vernacular of the sixties, make them relevant. Relevant not in the sense of catering to what is popular and "chic", but relevant to what is important and significant about their discipline. In the long run, historians can be popular only if they offer students something worthwhile.

The Supreme Court and Kissinger's Telephone Records

By Milton O. Gustafson
National Archives

Under a headline, "Supreme Court Backs Kissinger on Transcripts," the **New York Times** reported on March 4, 1980, that Henry Kissinger "won his Supreme Court battle to prevent public disclosure of the transcripts of telephone conversations that he conducted from his White House and State Department offices" from 1969 to 1976.

Historians of American foreign relations may be interested in knowing more details about the Supreme Court's decision, the facts in the case, and the possibility of future actions. Although Kissinger won a battle, it is (at least as of now) uncertain whether the war is over or whether there will be other battles over the ultimate disposition of the Kissinger transcripts.

Henry Kissinger served as an Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1969 to 1975 and as Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977. Throughout this period of government service, Kissinger's secretaries generally monitored his telephone conversations and recorded their contents either by shorthand or on tape. The stenographic notes or tapes were used to prepare detailed summaries, and sometimes verbatim transcripts, of Kissinger's business conversations, and then the tapes and notes were destroyed. By 1976, the summaries and transcripts for Kissinger's entire period of service were filed in his office at the State Department.

On October 29, 1976, Kissinger arranged to move the telephone records from the State Department to the New York estate of Nelson Rockefeller. On November 12, 1976, Kissinger donated his personal papers (excluding the telephone cards) to the Library of Congress, and on December 24, 1976, he gave his telephone records to the Library.

Under the terms of the second deed, public access to the collection will not begin until 2001 or five years after Kissinger's death, whichever is later, the other parties to the telephone conversations must either be dead or give their consent to the release of the transcripts. On December 28, 1976, the telephone records were shipped from Rockefeller's estate to the Library of Congress. Several weeks later, Lawrence Eagleburger, Kissinger's personal aide during most of his government service, extracted portions of the transcripts for inclusion in the files of the State Department and the National Security Council.

The Supreme Court's decision in March 1980 concluded over three years of litigation which followed the denials of three separate Freedom of Information Act requests for access to the transcripts. In January 1976, William Safire, a **New York Times** columnist, asked the State Department for Kissinger telephone records dated 1969-1971 in which Safire's name appeared or Kissinger discussed information "leaks" with certain White House officials. The State Department denied Safire's FOIA request by stating that Kissinger's telephone records as National Security Advisor were not agency records subject to FOIA disclosure. Safire appealed, arguing that the telephone notes became agency records by virtue of their relocation to the State Department, but the appeal was also denied.

On December 28, 1976, a group called the Military Audit Project (MAP) made a FOIA request to the State Department for transcripts of all Kissinger telephone conversations while he was Secretary of State. The request was denied on two grounds--the telephone notes were not agency records, and they were not in the custody and control of the State Department at the time the request was made. The appeal was denied.

On January 13, 1977, the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (RCFP), the American Historical Association, the American Political Science Association, and a number of others collectively made an FOIA request to the State Department for Kissinger's telephone notes while he was National Security Advisor and Secretary of State. This request was also denied for the same reasons given to the other requestors.

On January 4, 1977, the Archivist of the United States wrote to Kissinger, who was still Secretary of State, asking for permission to inspect the telephone notes to see if they were State Department records and to determine if Kissinger had authority to remove them from agency custody. The State Department's Legal Advisor issued a memorandum stating that as long as extracts of the official business contained in the notes were filed as agency records, Kissinger had complied with Department regulations. Kissinger replied to the Archivist on January 18, 1977, declining to permit inspection. The Archivist renewed his request for inspection on February 11, 1977. Subsequently, Kissinger did permit officials from the National Archives and the State Department to make a limited inspection of the telephone records to determine if they were agency records or if the information

they contained was adequately documented in State Department files. No definitive resolutions of those questions were made.

Meanwhile, Safire, the RCFP requestors, and the MAP requestors filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia under the Freedom of Information Act. The plaintiffs argued that the telephone summaries and transcripts were agency records that had been unlawfully removed and were being improperly withheld, and they asked the Court to order the Library of Congress to return them to the Department of State with directions to process them for disclosure under the FOIA.

Although the District Court Judge denied the release of telephone records made during Kissinger's period as National Security Advisor, he ruled that the transcripts produced while Kissinger was Secretary of State were agency records subject to disclosure under FOIA, and that Kissinger had wrongfully removed them by not obtaining prior approval from the Administrator of General Services. The judge admitted that the FOIA did not directly provide for relief since the records were in the custody of the Library of Congress, which is not an "agency" under the Act. Nevertheless, he contended that the FOIA permitted the court to invoke its equitable powers "to order the return of wrongfully removed agency documents where a statutory retrieval action appears unlikely." He issued an order requiring the Library to return the documents to the Department of State; requiring the Department of State to determine which of the summaries are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA; and to furnish the required materials to the FOIA plaintiffs.

Both Kissinger and the private parties appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court judgment, ordered a review of Kissinger transcripts made as Secretary of State and denied release of the summaries made during Kissinger's service as National Security Advisor. Both sides then appealed to the Supreme Court.

Justice William Rehnquist's majority opinion stated that "we need not, and do not, decide whether the telephone notes are agency records, or were wrongfully removed, for even assuming an affirmative answer to each of these questions, the FOIA plaintiffs were not entitled to relief." He argued that the Federal Records Act of 1950 and the Records Disposal Act of 1943 do not give private parties a right of action. Those acts provide only one remedy for the improper removal of a record from an agency. The head of the agency is required to notify the Attorney General if he determines or "has reason to believe" that records have been improperly removed from his agency. The Administrator of General Services is obligated to assist in such actions. The Attorney General may then bring suit to recover the records.

Does the Freedom of Information Act permit private actions to recover records wrongfully removed from agency custody? Rehnquist said no. The Freedom of Information Act permits court actions only if agency records have been improperly withheld. Since the FOIA requests were made to the State Department after the transcripts had left its custody, the State Department did not withhold them. "An

agency's failure to sue a third party to obtain possession is not a withholding under the Act." The decisions of the lower courts on the RCFP and the MAP requests were therefore overturned.

Safire's request was for transcripts made while Kissinger was National Security Advisor, but they were at the State Department at the time of the request. The Supreme Court agreed with the decisions of the lower courts on this request, that those transcripts were not "agency" records and the fact of their "mere physical location" in the State Department did not make them State Department records.

Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, and Powell joined Rehnquist in the majority opinion. For reasons not given, Justice Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases, and Justice Blackmun took no part in the decision of the cases. Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens wrote separate opinions, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Brennan argued that "if FOIA is to be more than a dead letter, it must necessarily incorporate some restraint upon the agency's powers to move documents beyond the reach of the FOIA requestor." In addition, he felt that "an agency would be improperly withholding documents if it failed to take steps to recover papers removed from its custody deliberately to evade a FOIA request."

Justice Stevens argued that at least some of the transcripts had to be agency records:

They were made in the regular course of conducting the agency's business, were the work product of agency personnel and agency assets, and were maintained in the possession and control of the agency prior to their removal by Dr. Kissinger. They were also regularly circulated to Dr. Kissinger's immediate staff and presumably used by the staff in making day-to-day decisions on behalf of the agency. Finally, Dr. Kissinger himself recognized that the State Department continued to have an interest in the summaries even after they had been removed, since he had a State Department employee review them in order to extract information that was not otherwise in the agency's files.

The fact that the extracts were not made until after the summaries had been transferred to the Library of Congress indicates that at least some of the summaries must have been agency records at the time of the transfer. The record is unclear as to how many extracts Eagleburger made, or whether all information from the telephone transcripts is fully incorporated in other memos in State Department files. To the extent it is not, the telephone records are the only written evidence of that information, and they are agency records. Stevens argued that the law was violated by transferring the records to the Library of Congress without obtaining the approval of the General Services Administration and the Archivist of the United States.

What next? According to newspaper reports, the position of the National Archives and the General Services Administration is that the Kissinger transcripts as Secretary of State are State Department records and they should be returned from the Library of Congress to the

State Department. The Kissinger transcripts as National Security Advisor should be transferred to the National Archives because the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act places custody and control of the Presidential historical materials of the Nixon administration in the Administrator of General Services. The State Department's official position is that it has not decided what, if anything, to do next. **Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti has addressed the issue, but only by stating that the Justice Department is studying the matter and has not decided whether to attempt to recover the telephone records or not.**

David Ginsburg, Kissinger's attorney, argues that the dispute over the transcripts is a mere intramural argument involving three federal parties--the Secretary of State, the Archivist of the United States, and the Librarian of Congress--and they all have the same lawyer, the Attorney General. The Librarian of Congress has custody, and that is nine-tenths of the law; if the Secretary of State objects, he can ask the Attorney General to bring suit to recover the transcripts; if the Archivist objects, he may submit a written report of the matter to the President and the Congress. Private parties have no legal rights.

Minutes, SHAFR COUNCIL

April 9, 1980

The Council met at 8:00 p.m. at the Board Room of the Hyatt-Regency Hotel in San Francisco. Present were President David M. Pletcher, Vice President Lawrence S. Kaplan, Council Members: Lawrence E. Gelfand, Warren F. Kimball, George C. Herring. Also in attendance were William J. Brinker, Richard D. Burns, Walter LaFeber, Richard A. Leopold, Arnold A. Offner, Kenneth E. Shewmaker, Geoffrey S. Smith, and Joan Hoff Wilson. Dr. Gerald and Myrna Bernath were present as special guests. Regrettably, illness prevented Executive Secretary-Treasurer Gary R. Hess from attending the Convention.

Despite the absence of a quorum the meeting was a forum for discussing a number of major issues before the Society. President Pletcher announced the winners of the Bernath prizes: the Bernath Book Award to Michael Schaller for **The United States and China in the Twentieth Century**; the Bernath Article Award(s) to David Alan Rosenberg for "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision" which appeared in the **Journal of American History** and to James I. Matray for "Truman's Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea" which also appeared in the **Journal of American History**; the Bernath Lecture Award to Burton Spivak of Bates College.

Additionally, President Pletcher named new members to the various prize committees: Article Committee, Sister Rachel West (Marian College, Indianapolis); Lecture Committee, Richard E. Welch, Jr.

(Lafayette College, Easton, PA.); Book Committee, Robert J. Donovan (Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs).

The chairmen of the various SHAFR committees commented briefly on their stewardship. Walter LaFeber noted the rising number of books entered into the Bernath prize competition this year. The winner was chosen from 30 competitors. Arnold Offner, speaking for the Article Award Committee observed that for the first time the Committee was deadlocked in their choice. Their decision was to honor both articles. With the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Bernath an additional \$200.00 was made available so that each of the winners would receive the full amount of the award. Kenneth Shewmaker reported that Burton Spivak was selected from twelve nominees and will be the luncheon speaker at the 1980 meeting in Detroit. The requirement that the Bernath lecturer be a teacher as well as a scholar was discussed in light of the increasing number of younger scholars outside the academy. The President resolved the question in favor of a loose construction of the language of the award after conversation with the Bernaths.

Richard D. Burns reported on the imminent conclusion of his labors as editor-in-chief of the revised **Guide to the Diplomatic History of the United States**. Only four chapters remain to be completed. The major question at this time is the format. At present one oversized volume is planned. Some preference was expressed for two smaller volumes if costs would permit. Sample pages of the final version will be made available to Council members for their inspection.

Gerald and Myrna Bernath explained in detail the functions of the "undesignated supplemental trust account" -- a new account established by the Bernaths to benefit SHAFR. They also addressed the question of raising the amounts of money granted for each of the awards. The possibility of subsidizing research travel for graduate students and assisting Bernath prize winners to attend conventions where their awards would be made came up for discussion. Dr. Bernath stressed his concern for building reserves which could be better tapped in a few years' time. No final decision was recommended at this time.

Joan Wilson reported that plans for the summer meeting of SHAFR at College Park on August 14-16 were near completion. Six sessions are planned. (A summary of the program appears later in this **Newsletter**).

Richard Leopold offered his interpretations of the state of the National Archives. There was wide agreement with the recommendation of the President that a single standing committee on "Government Relations" replace the **ad hoc** committees on the National Archives and the Foreign Relations series which have served over the last few years.

The meeting adjourned at 10:00 p.m.

Lawrence S. Kaplan

At the SHAFR luncheon on April 11, the Bernath lecturer for 1980, Professor John L. Gaddis (Ohio University), presented his address to an appreciative audience of approximately one hundred people. Alexander DeConde (University of California--Santa Barbara) paid a moving tribute to Stuart L. Bernath and presented Dr. and Mrs. Bernath to those assembled.

To the surprise of nearly everyone, Irwin Gellman (Newport Beach) presented President Pletcher with a gift and congratulations from his former graduate students.

COMPETITIONS / PRIZES

The Charles Thomson Prize for an Essay in American History

Essays may deal with any aspect of American history. They should be based upon substantial, but not exclusive, research in the National Archives and/or Presidential Libraries. The length of the text should not exceed 7,500 words. Entries should be submitted to the editor of **Prologue**, Washington, D.C. 20408, on or before August 1 1980. All entries will be judged by the OAH Thomson Prize Committee, and the winner will be notified by **Prologue's** editor. The winning essay will appear in the Spring 1981 issue of **Prologue** and the prize will be awarded to the author at the annual meeting of the organization.

Prize Award in the Field of Naval, Military, or Diplomatic History

An award of \$2,500.00 will be made by the University of Delaware Press for the best manuscript submitted by June 30, 1980 in the general area of Naval, Military, or Diplomatic History.

The Prize is unrestricted and is open to any author, American or foreign. Manuscripts submitted must represent the results of original research and must be documented in accordance with normally accepted scholarly standards. Manuscripts must be submitted prior to June 30, 1980, and will be judged by a committee of scholars appointed by the Press. Manuscripts must be in the English Language.

In addition to the award, the Press will publish the winning manuscript, and the prize author will receive royalties on the sale of the book. Besides the winning manuscript, the Press may select other entries for publication.

If the award attracts sufficient entries, the Press hopes to make this an annual prize, to encourage writers working in this important area.

Full details and entry forms are available. Interested authors are invited to write to Elizabeth B. Reynolds, Assistant Editor, University of Delaware Press, 326 HULLIHEN HALL, NEWARK, DELAWARE 19711.

PERSONALS

Joseph A. Fry (University of Nevada) has served as Acting Chairman of the History Department during the spring and summer of 1980. Professor Fry begins a one-year term as Chairman of the Faculty Senate in May 1980.

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Alfred E. Eckes, Jr. is presently Executive Director of the House Republican Conference, U. S. House of Representatives.

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Richard Lukas (Tennessee Tech. U.) has received a grant from the American Council of Learned Societies for research on Polish-American relations in the postwar period.

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Melvyn Leffler, (Vanderbilt University) is the recipient of an International Affairs Fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations. He is serving as a Special Assistant to the Assistant Deputy Under-Secretary of Defense in charge of Policy Planning.

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Thomas A. Bryson (West Georgia College) has received a grant to assist with the writing of a biography of Mark Lambert Bristol, U.S. High Commissioner to Turkey during the 1920s.

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Diane Clemens (University of California, Berkeley) has taken on additional responsibilities by accepting a part-time appointment as assistant to the Chancellor. Professor Clemens will concern herself with matters related to the status of women.

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Mark Guilderhus (Colorado State University) will begin serving as Departmental Chairman on July 1, 1980.

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Norman Ferris (Middle Tennessee State University) has been elected to the National Council of the American Association of University Professors for a 1980-1983 term. In addition, Professor Ferris has been re-elected President of the Tennessee Conference of AAUP.

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The dedication of the Richard H. Heindel Library on the Penn State-Capitol Campus has been set for June 5. Dr. Heindel, a former member of SHAFR, died July 31, 1979. He served as the first Dean of Faculty at Penn State-Capitol Campus and is well remembered for his **The American Impact on Great Britain**, published in 1940 and reissued in 1968.

LAST MINUTE NOTICE

Robert M. Warner, historian and library administrator at the University of Michigan, has been named Archivist of the United States. He will take over the National Archives and Records Service on July 15.

CONGRATULATIONS

Robert Dallek (University of California at Los Angeles) has received a prestigious Bancroft Prize from Columbia University for an exceptional book in American history. Professor Dallek won the award for his **Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945** (Oxford University Press). This book is also a nominee for the 1980 American Book Awards.

The National Intelligence Study Center in Washington, D.C. designated Ralph E. Weber's book, **United States Diplomatic Codes and Ciphers, 1775-1938** as the best scholarly book on intelligence in 1979. Professor Weber (Marquette University and Chairman of SHAFR's Committee on Membership) received the award at ceremonies in Washington on April 21, 1980.

ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED, OR SCHOLAR PAPERS DELIVERED BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

(Please limit abstracts to a total of twenty (20) lines of **Newsletter** space, or approximately two hundred (200) words. The desire to accommodate as many contributors as possible, plus the overriding problem of space, makes this restriction necessary. Double space all abstracts, and send them as you would have them appear in print. For abstracts of articles, please supply the date, the volume, the number within the volume, and the pages. It would be appreciated if abstracts were not sent until after a paper has been delivered, or an article has been printed. Also, please do not send abstracts of articles which have appeared in **Diplomatic History**, since all SHAFR members already receive the latter publication).

Thomas G. Paterson (University of Connecticut), "Clarence Edward Gauss," **Dictionary of American Biography, Supplement Six, 1956-1960**, (1980), 229-231. A brief survey of the life and career of the American Ambassador to China (1941-1944) who spent most of his diplomatic service in China after 1907. Known as a diligent functionary, Gauss received high marks for efficiency, steadiness, and dignity. He was meticulous, in command of the facts, frank, and demanding. His fellow Foreign Service officers thought him cranky and chilly. Lacking the college education of many of his cohorts, and not speaking Chinese, Gauss was ill at ease in social settings and never developed close relations with Chinese officials. He and Chiang Kai-shek were frequently at odds, with Gauss finding the Generalissimo a mismanager of China's economy. Gauss seldom concealed his criticism of Chiang and argued with Washington that loans to the haughty Chinese leader would be wasted. President Franklin D. Roosevelt often ignored Gauss'

advice and the President sent personal advisers to China who bypassed the Embassy. Gauss astutely foresaw the disintegration of Chiang's regime and the Communist assumption of power. Yet, like most Americans, he did not welcome the prospect of a Communist China. He thus reflected the American dilemma in China: he wanted neither Chiang nor Mao. Gauss was not an innovator and he left no diplomatic monuments. He is remembered as a self-effacing, intelligent bureaucrat who mastered his assignments.

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George C. Herring (University of Kentucky), "Nixon, Kissinger, and 'Madman' Diplomacy in the Far East," paper presented before the Organization of American Historians, April 10, 1980. Nixon assumed office confident that he could end the Vietnam War quickly and on his own terms, and in the summer of 1969, he initiated what he called "madman" diplomacy, warning Hanoi that if no progress toward a settlement were made by November 1 he would resort to "measures of great consequence and force." Members of Kissinger's staff subsequently developed a detailed plan, operation "Duck Hoop," which provided for intensive bombing and the mining of Haiphong harbor. Although the North Vietnamese ignored Nixon's ultimatum, the plan was eventually deemed unworkable and too dangerous politically. Nixon retreated from the ultimatum and fell back on Vietnamization as the key to achieving an "honorable" peace. The failure of "madman" diplomacy had important consequences. Nixon's initial confidence that he could end the war through intimidation forestalled the type of concessions that might have led to serious negotiations in 1969. His embarrassment at backing down probably contributed to the decision to invade Cambodia in 1970. Blaming his problems on his domestic foes, he began to sanction the type of reprisals that would lead to Watergate.

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Peter G. Edwards (St. Mark's College, University of Adelaide, South Australia), "Evatt and the Americans", **Historical Studies** (Melbourne), vol. 18, no. 73 (October 1979), 546-560. This article uses American sources to examine the relationship between American policy-makers and Dr. H.V. Evatt, the controversial Australian Minister for External Affairs from 1941 to 1949. Edwards argues that the objections held by United States officials went beyond Evatt's policies and his belligerent diplomatic methods. They doubted his personal integrity and resented his perceived role in Australian domestic politics, contrasting him with the Prime Minister, John Curtin. This contrast led to some misunderstanding of Australian policy and significantly affected the course of Australian-American relations.

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Richard H. Immerman (Princeton University), "Eisenhower and Dulles: Who Made the Decisions?" **Political Psychology**, 1, 2 (Autumn, 1979), 21-38. The overwhelming consensus among analysts of United States foreign policy during the Eisenhower administration is that it was dominated by John Foster Dulles. Regardless of their often differing

assessment of the policies, most writers agree that Dulles' forceful personality, lengthy preparation, and keen intellect enabled him to control and even manipulate the congenial but bland Dwight Eisenhower. This conventional view has been based on the public record, the period's journalistic accounts, and the appraisals of individuals who were largely outside the inner circles of both the White House and the State Department. By using material now available at the Eisenhower Library in combination with the extant but often overlooked sources--Eisenhower's wartime papers, interviews with White House and State Department insiders available in both the Dulles and Columbia University Oral History Collections, and studies of Eisenhower's pre-presidential career--the current scholar can determine that the standard interpretation of an Eisenhower pulled by the leading strings of Dulles is highly problematic.

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Edward A. Jamison (U.S. Foreign Service, Retired), "Cuba and the Inter-American System: Exclusion of the Castro Regime from the Organization of American States", **The Americas**, 3, January, 1980. In the wake of the Bay of Pigs debacle there developed in the Organization of American States a considered effort to deal on a multilateral basis with the challenge Fidel Castro's communism and his regime's ties with the Soviet Union posed to security in the hemisphere. Leadership in the process was accepted by Colombian President Alberto Lleras Camargo, who had been a principal architect of the Inter-American security system and Secretary General of the OAS for several years and who deplored the kind of U.S. unilateralism the Bay of Pigs episode reflected. Opposition to OAS involvement was strong from Mexico, Brazil and Argentina but several of the democratic governments--of which there were more in 1961 than before or since--came to favor firm action, including the application of sanctions, against Cuba's interventionism. The United States somewhat reluctantly concurred, although some of Kennedy's advisers continued to hope that a formula might be devised that would bring the larger states along. The Foreign Ministers' Meeting that was convoked in January, 1962 produced a unanimous--except for Cuba--declaration of incompatibility between OAS and communist principles and objectives and, by the bare 2/3rds vote required, a decision that such incompatibility, in and of itself, excluded the Castro regime from OAS participation.

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Stephen M. Millett (Battelle Columbus Laboratories), "The Capabilities of the American Nuclear Deterrent, 1945-1950," **Aerospace Historian**, 27 (Spring, 1980), 27-32. Contrary to the assertions of some revisionist historians, the author argues that the operational characteristics of the early American nuclear force may not have provided an unquestioned deterrence to Soviet actions in the early Cold War. There is a reasonable doubt that the U.S. may not have been able to deliver significant numbers of atomic bombs on Soviet Russia before summer 1948. Even by 1950 the U.S. may still not have been able to

deliver an atomic knockout to the Soviets. The author cautions historians not to exaggerate the role of nuclear weapons in Soviet-American relations soon after World War II.

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Stephen M. Millett (Battelle Columbus Laboratories), "The Moral Dilemma of Nuclear Deterrence," **Parameters. Journal of the U.S. Army War College**, 10 (March, 1980), 33-38. The author asserts that a nuclear war does not in reality have full freedom of choice in using or threatening the use of nuclear weapons. There are several factors that contribute to the "deterrence of the deterrent." One is morality, specifically the moral sensitivities of the American people that has placed restrictions on American nuclear diplomacy. The strategies of preemptive strike, massive retaliation, mutual assured destruction, and second-strike posture all suffer from moral inhibitions that depreciate its full credibility. American nuclear forces and doctrine must have the support of the American people in order to be fully effective tools of foreign and defense policies.

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Joseph M. Siracusa (University of Queensland, Australia), "NSC 68: A Reappraisal." Read at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians, San Francisco, April 9, 1980. This paper re-examines the origin, meaning, and impact of Policy Paper Number 68 of the National Security Council. NSC 68, one of the most important documents of the Cold War, was adopted as policy by the Truman Administration on 30 September 1950. An examination of recently de-classified archival materials, together with extensive interviews with the document's principal author, Paul H. Nitze (second director of State's Policy Planning Staff and a key member of the U.S. delegation to the S.A.L.T negotiations 1969-1974), suggests that the basic American position taken toward the U.S.S.R. in 1950 was consistent with policy followed since 1948. The only appreciable change in those years was the Truman Administration's shift in attitude toward the Soviet acquisition of the Atomic bomb, which, due to the inherent dynamics of the arms race, led to the decision to pursue a thermonuclear capacity. Equally significant, the available evidence indicates that the often-made case for the direct relationship between the recommendations contained in NSC 68 and the U.S. commitment to Korea is at best tenuous.

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"Two Europes and the Origins of the Cold War," a paper delivered by Robert L. Messer (University of Illinois at Chicago Circle) at the Organization of American Historians annual meeting in San Francisco, April 12, 1980. The premise of this paper is that the division of Europe was a consequence of World War II rather than a cause of the Cold War. The author attempts to demonstrate the relationship between Roosevelt's and Truman's varying perceptions of that outcome and the breakdown of the wartime Soviet-American alliance. The different

interpretation and priority that Roosevelt and Truman placed on the emergence of two Europes, one dominated by the Western Allies and the other by the Soviet Union, was not the sole or even most significant cause of the Cold War. This paper is based in part on materials recently released by the Truman Library.

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PUBLICATIONS IN U.S. DIPLOMACY BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

Dorothy Borg (Columbia University) and Waldo Heinrichs (Temple University), eds., **Uncertain Years: Chinese-American Relations, 1947-50**. 1980. Columbia University Press. \$17.50.

Lester D. Langley (University of Georgia), **The United States and the Caribbean, 1900-1970**. 1980. University of Georgia Press. \$22.00.

Peter G. Edwards (St. Mark's College, University of Adelaide) **Australia through American Eyes 1935-1945**. 1979. University of Queensland Press. Clothbound \$Aust. 12.95. In this work, Edwards selects, edits, and introduces observations made by U.S. diplomats Jay P. Moffat, Clarence E. Gauss, and Nelson T. Johnson during a crucial period in Australian-American relations.

Detlef Junker (University of Heidelberg), **Franklin D. Roosevelt. Macht und Vision; Präsident in Krisenzeiten**, 1979. Musterschmidt Verlag, Göttinger/Zürich, Frankfurt. 10,80DM.

Paolo Coletta (U.S. Naval Academy) **American Secretaries of the Navy**. 1980. Naval Institute. \$55.00.

Anthony M. Brescia (Nassau Community College) ed., **The Letters and Papers of Richard Rush**. Scholarly Resources Inc. 29 rolls. \$1,015.

Warren Cohen (Michigan State University) **Dean Rusk**. The American Secretaries of State and their Diplomacy Series. 1980. Cooper Square Publishers. \$19.50.

John Findling (Indiana University, New Albany), **Dictionary of American Diplomacy**. 1980. Greenwood Press. \$39.95.

David Long (University of New Hampshire) **A Documentary History of U.S. Foreign Relations, The Mid-1890s to 1979: Selections from and Additions to Ruhl J. Bartlett's The Record of American Diplomacy**. 1979. University Press of America. Paper \$8.50.

Paul Scheips (Silver Spring, Maryland) **The Panama Canal: Reading on its History**. 1980. Michael Glazier, Inc. \$28.50

William Widenor (University of Illinois) **Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for American Foreign Policy**. 1980. University of California Press. \$17.50.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS BY SHAFR MEMBERS

Thomas A. Bryson (West Georgia College) **Tars, Turks, and Tankers: The Role of the U.S. Navy in the Middle East, 1800-1979.** 1980. Scarecrow Press. \$14.00.

Robert F. Smith (University of Toledo) **Background to Revolution, The Development of Modern Cuba.** 2nd Ed. 1979. Krieger Publishing Co. Paperback \$6.95.

Akira Iriye (University of Chicago) **The Chinese and Japanese: Essays in Political and Cultural Interactions.** Princeton University Press. Clothbound \$25.00 Paperback \$9.95.

David Kyvig (University of Akron) and Myron Marty, **Local and Community History.** 1980. AHM Publishing Corp. Paperback \$5.95.

Glenn A. May (University of Texas, Arlington) **Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913.** 1980 Greenwood Press. \$27.50

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

The John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies of the Free University of Berlin has published the first edition of the **Directory of European Historians of Canada and the United States.** Compiled and edited by Willi Paul Adams and Wolfgang Helbig, the **Directory** lists historians of North America in eleven nations on the Continent and in the Republic of Ireland. Each of the 113 entries includes such information as publications, work in progress, and courses taught on North American subjects. The **Directory** is available at \$3.00 (postage included) from the library of the John F. Kennedy-Institute, Lansstrasse 7-9, D-1000 Berlin 33, West Germany.

CONFERENCES TO COME

The Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association will hold its annual meeting August 20-23 at the University of Southern California, in Los Angeles. There will be the usual no-host SHAFR reception on Friday, August 22, the exact time and place to appear in the PCB Program. The hosts point out that low cost housing for those coming to the PCB Meeting will be available on the USC Campus. Registration forms which include reservation requests for the housing will be mailed out to all American Historical Association members residing in the twelve Western states. Those who are not AHA members, or who will be coming from other parts of the country can obtain preregistration forms and room reservation request forms by writing to:

Dean John Schutz
Secretary-Treasurer, Pacific Coast Branch, AHA
Department of History
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, California 90007

The following SHAFR members will be delivering papers:
Robert J. McMahon (Historical Office, Dept. of State)
Thomas M. Leonard (University of North Florida)
William Slany (Deputy Historian, Department of State)
Craig Symonds (U. S. Naval Academy)
Gerald Wheeler (California State University, San Jose)
James I. Matray (University of Texas, Arlington)
William Stueck (University of Georgia)
Geoffrey S. Smith (Queens University)

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The Association for the Bibliography of History will hold a workshop June 12-15, 1980, at The University of Akron. It will explore needs and opportunities in regard to bibliographical tools, the teaching of bibliography, and the processing of and retrieval of information. Previous planning studies will be discussed as well as recent developments related to the "information explosion," its impact on historical scholarship and what priorities must be assigned to meet needs. Librarians, historians, and experts on automation systems are invited to participate.

Information regarding registration, accommodations, and travel is available from Warren F. Kuehl, Department of History, The University of Akron, Akron, OH 44325 or by calling 216/375-7008.

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The United States Air Force Academy will hold the ninth Military History Symposium between October 1 and 3. The program, "The American Military and the Far East," will examine the experience of United States armed forces in East Asia since 1900. For further information write Major Harry R. Borowski, Department of History, USAF Academy, CO 80840.

CONFERENCES PAST

On April 16 and 17, 1980 the Kent State University Center for NATO Studies was host for a conference on "NATO After Thirty Years." SHAFR members, prominent among those presenting papers, included Lawrence Kaplan (Kent State), Norman Graebner (Virginia), Thomas Etzold (U.S. Naval War College), Andre Kaspi (University of Paris, France), and Thomas Campbell (Florida State). The center for NATO Studies has received financial support from the NATO Information Service, Brussels.

NEW EDITOR APPOINTED

President David Pletcher announces that Professor Thomas H. Buckley of the University of Tulsa will assume responsibilities as editor of the SHAFR **Roster and Research List**. Professor Buckley's many accomplishments include: fellowship awards; a visiting professorship; the prize-winning book, **The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-22** (University of Tennessee Press); service as chairman of the History Department at Tulsa; and service as chairman of the Faculty of Humanistic Studies at Tulsa. Speaking for the Society, the **Newsletter** appreciates Professor Buckley's willingness to contribute his time and ability to the organization.

SHAFR's Calendar for 1980

August 1	Deadline for materials -- September Newsletter .
August 14-16	SHAFR's Sixth Annual Conference at the University of Maryland (see information in this issue).
August 20-23	The Pacific Coast Branch of the AHA will hold its 73rd annual meeting at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles (see information in this issue).
November 1	Deadline for materials -- December Newsletter .
November 1-15	Annual elections for officers of SHAFR.
November 12-15	The 46th annual meeting of the SHA will be held in Atlanta with headquarters at the Atlanta Biltmore
December 1	Deadline for materials -- January Newsletter .
December 28-30	The 95th annual convention of the AHA will be held in Washington, D.C. As usual, SHAFR will have a full round of activities at this meeting.

SHAFR'S GOVERNING BODIES (1980)

COUNCIL

(Elected Members)

Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa) 1980
Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers) 1980
Betty M. Unterberger (Texas A & M) 1980
Robert F. Smith (Toledo) 1981
George C. Herring (Kentucky) 1981
Robert Dallek (UCLA) 1982

(Past Presidents)

Raymond A. Esthus, (Tulane) 1980
Akira Iriye (Chicago) 1981
Paul Varg (Michigan State) 1982

Editorial Board, Diplomatic History

Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State), editor
Thomas D. Schoonover (S.W. Louisiana) 1980
Martin J. Sherwin (Pennsylvania) 1980
Joan Hoff Wilson (Arizona State) 1980
Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa) 1981
Marilyn B. Young (Michigan) 1981
William C. Stinchcombe (Syracuse) 1981
Beverly Zweiben-Slany (National Security Council) 1982
Irwin Gellman (Newport Beach, CA) 1982
Charles Neu (Brown U) 1982

COMMITTEES

The person listed first in each instance is the chairman/woman of that particular committee.

BERNATH ARTICLES

Lester D. Langley (U of Georgia) 1980
Noel Pugach (New Mexico) 1981
Rachel West (Marian College) 1982

BERNATH SPEAKER

Keith L. Nelson (U of California, Irvine) 1980
Jerald A. Combs (California State U., San Francisco) 1981
Richard E. Welch, Jr., (Lafayette College) 1982

BERNATH BOOK

Robert Dallek (UCLA) 1980
Thomas D. Schoonover (S.W. Louisiana) 1981
Robert J. Donovan (Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International Affairs) 1982

NOMINATIONS

Milton O. Gustafson (National Archives) 1980
Martin Sherwin (Pennsylvania) 1981
Theodore A. Wilson (Kansas) 1982

PROGRAM

Eugene P. Trani (Nebraska)
Joan Hoff Wilson (Arizona State)
Wayne Cole (Maryland)

MEMBERSHIP

Ralph E. Weber, Chairman
Department of History
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233

- I. **The Far East**
Sadao Asada
Department of Political
Science
Doshisha University
Kyoto, Japan
- II. **Georgia, North Carolina,
and South Carolina**
Mary Atwell
Department of History
Hollins College
Hollins College, Virginia 24020
- III. **Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and
Washington**
Wolfred Bauer
University of Puget Sound
Tacoma, Washington 98416
- IV. **Alabama, Florida, Mississippi,
and Tennessee**
Albert H. Bowman
Department of History
U of Tennessee (Chattanooga)
Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401

- V. **Delaware, Maryland, and New York**
 Anthony M. Brescia
 Nassau Community College
 Stewart Avenue
 Garden City, New York 11530
- VI. **Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia, and Alaska**
 Francis M. Carroll
 Department of History
 St. John's College
 University of Manitoba
 Winnipeg, 19, Canada
- VII. **District of Columbia and Virginia**
 Kenneth J. Hagan
 Department of History
 U.S. Naval Academy
 Annapolis, Maryland 21402
- VIII. **Illinois, Indiana and Kentucky**
 George Herring
 Department of History
 University of Kentucky
 Lexington, Kentucky 40506
- IX. **Michigan, Ohio, and West Virginia**
 Marvin Zahniser
 Department of History
 The Ohio State University
 Columbus, Ohio 43210
- X. **New Jersey and Pennsylvania**
 Frank X. J. Homer
 Department of History and
 Political Science
 University of Scranton
 Scranton, Pennsylvania
 18510
- XI. **Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island**
 Travis Beal Jacobs
 Department of History
 Middlebury College
 Middlebury, Vermont 05753
- XII. **Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming**
 Thomas C. Kennedy
 Department of History
 The University of Wyoming
 Laramie, Wyoming 82071
- XIII. **Kansas, Arkansas, and Oklahoma**
 Stephen J. Kneeshaw
 Department of History
 The School of the Ozarks
 Point Lookout, Missouri
 65726
- XIV. **Iowa, Missouri, and Nebraska**
 Richard N. Koltman
 Department of History
 Iowa State University
 Ames, Iowa 50011
- XV. **Australia**
 Joseph M. Siracusa
 Department of History
 U. of Queensland
 St. Lucia, Brisbane,
 Australia 4067
- XVI. **Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Labrador**
 Geoffrey S. Smith
 Department of History
 Queen's University
 Kingston, Ontario
- XVII. **Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont**
 Mark A. Stoler
 Department of History
 University of Vermont
 Wheeler House
 442 Main Street
 Burlington, Vermont 05401
- XVIII. **Louisiana and Texas**
 Betty M. Unterberger
 Department of History
 Texas A & M University
 College Station, Texas 77843

XIX. **Arizona, California, Hawaii,
and Nevada**
Gerald E. Wheeler, Dean
School of Social Sciences
San Jose State University
San Jose, California 95192

XX. **Wisconsin, Minnesota, South
Dakota, and North Dakota**
Ralph E. Weber
Department of History
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53233

SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAFR

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

Thursday, August 14

6:00- 7:30 Registration
7:30- 9:30 Open Session--New Methodologies and
American Diplomatic History
9:30 RECEPTION

August 14-16, 1980

Friday, August 15

8:00- 9:00 Registration
9:00- 9:30 Welcome: Wayne Cole, (University of Maryland)
David Pletcher (Indiana University)
9:45-12:00 Concurrent Sessions--Multinational
Corporations and American Foreign Policy,
1930-1950. Clio and E.O.: Declassification as a
Research Tool.
12:15-2:00 LUNCHEON
2:15- 4:30 Concurrent Sessions--American Foreign Policy
and Cold War: Three non-American Views.
Anglo-American Relations in the Era of World
War II.
6:00- 7:30 RECEPTION
7:30 DINNER--Wayne Cole, presiding
Fred Harvey Harrington, Address

Saturday, August 16

9:00-11:15 Concurrent Sessions--Republicans and Foreign
Policy in the Post World War II Period.
Regionalism: A Comparative Look.
11:30- 1:00 LUNCHEON--Lawrence Kaplan, presiding.

A mailing concerning registration, travel to and from the airport, on-campus housing, meals, etc., has been sent to the SHAFR membership. For additional information contact Wayne Cole; Dept. of History, University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland 20742.

For additional information concerning the program, contact the 1980 Program Chairman Eugene P. Trani, Assistant Vice President; 226 Regents Hall, University of Nebraska; Lincoln, Nebraska 68683.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL LECTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship was established in 1976 through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and is administered by a special committee of SHAFR. The Bernath Lecture is the feature at the official luncheon of the Society, held during the OAH convention in April of each year.

DESCRIPTION AND ELIGIBILITY: The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address, delivered at the annual meeting with the AHA, but is restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer is expected to concern himself/herself not specifically with his/her own research interests, but with broad issues of importance to students of American foreign relations. The award winner must be under forty-one (41) years of age.

PROCEDURES: The Bernath Lectureship Committee is now soliciting nominations for the 1982 award from members of the Society, agents, publishers, or members of any established history, political science, or journalism organization. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vitae, if available, should reach the Committee no later than December 1, 1980. The Chairman of the Committee, and the person to whom nominations should be sent, is Dr. Keith L. Nelson, Department of History, University of California (Irvine), Irvine, California 92717.

HONORARIUM: \$300.00 with publication of the lecture assured in the SHAFR Newsletter.

AWARD WINNERS

1977	Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
1978	David S. Patterson (Colgate)
1979	Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
1980	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1981	Burton Spivak (Bates College)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE FOR THE BEST SCHOLARLY ARTICLE IN U.S. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY DURING 1979

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Award for scholarly articles in American foreign affairs was set up in 1976 through the kindness of the young Bernath's parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, and it is administered through selected personnel of SHAFR. The objective of the award is to identify and to reward outstanding research and writing by the younger scholars in the area of U.S. diplomatic relations.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to the author of any article upon any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1979. The article must be among the author's first five (5) which have seen publication. Membership in SHAFR or upon a college/university faculty is not a prerequisite for entering the competition. Authors must be under thirty-five (35) years of age, or within five (5) years after receiving the doctorate, at the time the article was published. Previous winners of the S. L. Bernath book award are ineligible.

PROCEDURES: Articles shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each article (preferably reprints) should be sent to the chairman of the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee by January 15, 1980. The Chairman of that Committee for 1979 is Dr. Arnold A. Offner, Department of History, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts 02215.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$200.00. If two (2) or more authors are considered winners, the prize will be shared. The name of the successful writer(s) will be announced, along with the name of the victor in the Bernath book prize competition, during the luncheon for members of SHAFR, to be held at the annual OAH convention, meeting in April, 1980, at San Francisco.

AWARD WINNERS

1977	John C. A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)
1978	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1979	Brian L. Villa (U of Ottawa, Canada)
1980	James I. Matray (U of Texas, Arlington) David A. Rosenberg (U of Chicago)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITION FOR 1980

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition was initiated in 1972 by Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in memory of their late son. Administered by SHAFR, the purpose of the competition and the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing of a lengthy nature by young scholars in the field of U.S. diplomacy.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: the prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1979. It must be the author's first or second book. Authors are not required to be members of SHAFR, nor do they have to be professional academicians.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. Walter F. LaFeber, Department of History Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853. The works must be received not later than February 1, 1980.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$500.00. If two (2) or more writers are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be April, 1980, in San Francisco.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

1972	Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento) Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
1973	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1974	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1975	Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire) Stephen E. Pelz (U of Massachusetts-Amherst)
1976	Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
1977	Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
1978	James R. Leutze (North Carolina)
1979	Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston, MA)
1980	Michael Schaller (U of Arizona)



AMERICAN-EAST ASIAN RELATIONS NEWSLETTER

VOLUME I

NUMBER I

JUNE 1980

The **American-East Asian Relations (AEAR) Committee** is an affiliate of **SHAFR**, and serves as the national headquarters for those interested in the history of United States relations with the countries of East Asia. The **Committee's** basic belief is that this history embodies a two-way relationship which requires a thorough knowledge of **both** the United States and the particular East Asian nation (China, Japan, Korea, the Philippines) involved.

The current committee membership includes Dorothy Borg [Columbia] and John K. Fairbank [Harvard] who serve as continuing advisors, and Warren I. Cohen [Michigan State], Robert Dallek [UCLA], Raymond Esthus [Tulane], Akira Iriye [Chicago], Ernest May [Harvard], and Marlene Mayo [Maryland] who serve as regular members for two year terms.

The **AEAR Committee** succeeds the American Historical Association's **Committee** on American-East Asian Relations, which existed from 1969-78. The AHA Committee regarded much of its program as seminal, designed to stimulate activities - such as teaching, graduate work, conferences, and publications - in the study of American-East Asian relations. Throughout, emphasis was placed on the need to understand these relations from both perspectives. As the surest means of achieving this objective, the Committee conducted an extensive fellowship program, funded by the Ford Foundation, for the training of young specialists with a dual competence in American and East Asian (largely either Chinese or Japanese) studies.

The AHA Committee was dissolved with the termination of its program in 1979, but some of its members, as well as others were determined to preserve an institutional identity to serve the needs of scholars who have an interest in American-East Asian relations. Thus they decided to establish the new **American-East Asian Relations Committee** on the foundation of the old. The **SHAFR Council** approved its affiliate status in the spring of 1978.

The **Committee** has a small annual budget and a modest program centering around the dissemination of information to interested scholars. It intends to sponsor workshops and symposia as funds become available, and to encourage innovative teaching in this dual field. The continued existence of the **AEAR Committee** reflects the vitality of the field as well as the sense of community that exists among historians interested in both American foreign relations and East Asia.

As part of its dissemination program, the **Committee** has revamped the **AEAR Newsletter** not only to serve as a means of communication but also to generate new insights and activities in the field.

SHAFR members who are interested in knowing more about the **Committee's** work are encouraged to write to **Sheila Driscoll, AEAR Committee Co-ordinator**, 143 Arlington St., Winchester, Mass. 01890.

Akira Iriye
Chairman

* * * * *

At present, the AEAR Newsletter focuses on 5 areas of teaching and research. These areas and their respective editors are: 1) **Articles and books, Gary May** [Delaware]; 2) **Courses in AEAR, Bradford Lee** [Harvard]; 3) **Dissertations, Charles Lilley** [Northern Virginia]; 4) **Grants and Research, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker** [Colgate]; and 5) **Papers and Conferences, Michael Schaller** [Arizona]. **Mordechai Rozanski** [Pacific Lutheran University] is editor-in-chief.

Because the data collected from respondents and elsewhere has been voluminous, this issue is devoted to only 3 of our 5 areas of focus, and emphasizes the post-January 1978 period. Our next **Newsletter**, in Winter 1980, will contain information on the remaining areas including publications, papers/conferences, and individual research.

When possible, we will honor written requests for copies of course syllabi and other special information (see Dissertations below) in return for a small processing fee. Send requests to Sheila Driscoll at the address above.

We welcome information concerning current and completed work in **American-East Asian Relations** for inclusion in subsequent newsletters. Send information to Mordechai Rozanski, **AERA Newsletter**, Pacific Lutheran University, Tacoma, Washington 98447.

Mordechai Rozanski
Editor-in-chief

COURSES IN AMERICAN-EAST ASIAN RELATIONS

On the basis of replies to a letter of inquiry sent to over 300 departments of History, and of a selective scan of course catalogues of institutions that did not reply to the letter, we have compiled the following list of 80 universities or colleges which offer courses in the history of American-East Asian relations. The name of the institution is followed by the instructor and title of the courses. We have not listed courses in Asian history or American diplomatic history in which American-East Asian relations are only a sub-theme. We have in most cases listed courses on the diplomatic history of modern East Asia. (P) refers to projected courses and (S) to seminars. An asterisk* indicates available syllabi.

U. of Alabama (Huntsville), Kenneth Moss: "The Relations of the United States and the Far East."

Amherst College, Ray Moore: "East and West."

Andrews U., King-yi Hsu: "Sino-American Diplomacy."

U. of Arizona, Michael Schaller: "The U.S. and East Asia."*

Arizona State U., Winston Kahn: "Diplomatic History of East Asia," "MacArthur's Japan."

Armstrong State College, Steve Rhee: "Far Eastern International Relations."

Auburn U., Tal Henderson: "U.S. Far Eastern Diplomacy."

Ball State U., Phyllis Ann Zimmerman: "The History of American-East Asian Relations (P)."

Boise State U., Warren Tozer: "American-East Asian Relation (S);" "The China Lobby and the Radical Right (S)."

U. of Chicago, Akira Iriye: "American-East Asian Relations."

Claremont Men's College, Arthur Rosenbaum: "U.S.-Chinese Relations."

Colorado State U., Loren Crabtree: "American-East Asian Relations."
Columbia U., Carole Gluck: "W.W.II in American and Japanese History."

U. of Delaware, Alan Sweeten: "Americans in China."

Denison U., Barry Keenan: "The U.S. and China."

Doshisha U. (Kyoto), Sadao Asada: "History of International Relations in the Pacific Region."
Eastern Washington U., H.T. Wong and Lynn Triplett: "Asia and the West."

Emory U., Irwin Hyatt, Jr.: "The U.S. and East Asia;" "The Pacific War, 1941-45;" "Images of China (S);" and Thomas Williams: "The U.S. and the Vietnam War."*

U. OF FLORIDA, Richard Chang: "History of American-East Asian Relations."

Franklin and Marshall College, Michael Baron: "American Relations with East Asia 1898-Present."*

Georgetown U., Jules David: "U.S. and East Asia."

- Gettysburg College**, John Roger Stemen: "U.S. Relations with East Asia."
- U. of Guelph** (Ontario), John F. Melby: "International Relations of East and Southeast Asia."*
- Harvard U.**, Bradford Lee and Edwin Reischauer: "The U.S. and East Asia."
- U. of Hawaii** (Manoa), Yong-ho Choe: "U.S. in East Asia."
- U. of Hong Kong**, Kenneth Chern: "The U.S. and China, 1898-1950;" "The U.S. and China Since 1941."
- U. of Houston**, Sandra Hawley: "The Pacific Community."
- Indiana U.**, Leo Lee, Philip West, and George Wilson: "American-East Asian Relations."
- U. of Kansas**, Grant Goodman: "U.S. and East Asia;" "Hollywood on Asia."
- U. of Kentucky**, George Herring: "The Vietnam War (S)."
- Lafayette College**, Edwin Clausen: "Sino-American Relations: Mutual Perceptions and Reactions."
- Loyola College** (Baltimore), S.G. Reges: "Far Eastern Policy of the United States (S)."
- Loyola U.** (Chicago), Bonnie Oh: "U.S.-East Asian Relations Since 1898."
- U. of Maryland** (Baltimore County), Ka-che Yip: "U.S. and China."
- U. of Maryland**, (College Park), Marlene Mayo: "American Relations with China and Japan, 1750-1970;" "W.W.II in the Pacific and the Allied Occupation of Japan (P)."
- U. of Massachusetts** (Amherst), Stephen Pelz: "U.S.-East Asian Relations, 1784-1975 (S)."
- Miami U.** (Ohio), Gilbert Chan: "East Asian Diplomacy in the 20th Century."
- U. of Michigan**, Roger Hackett: "Soldiers, Diplomats, Merchants, Missionaries: American Involvement in Modern Japan."
- Michigan State U.**, Warren Cohen: "American Foreign Policy and East Asia."*
- U. of Minnesota**, Byron Marshall: "Japan and W.W. II."
- U. of Missouri** (St. Louis), Roy Gene Burns: "American-Asian Relations."
- Mount Holyoke College**, Jonathan Lipman: "U.S.-China Relations."
- U. of New Hampshire**, David Long: "Sino-American Relations."**
- U. of North Carolina**, Robert Miller and Michael Hunt: "The U.S. in the Pacific."
- North Carolina State U.**, Burton Beers: "U.S.-Far Eastern Relations."
- North Texas State U.**, Robert Detrick: "The U.S. and the Far East."
- Northern Illinois U.**, James Shirley: "America and Asia."
- U. of Notre Dame**, Yu-ming Shaw: "U.S. and Far East;" "America, China, and Japan."
- Ohio State U.**, T.Y. Li and Sam Chu: "Chinese-American Relations in the 19th and 20th Centuries."
- U. of Oklahoma**, Russell Buhite: "U S.-Far East."

Pacific Lutheran U., Mordechai Rozanski: "Modern China and the West."

U. of Pennsylvania, Hilary Conroy: "American Relations with the Far East;" "Diplomacy and Peacemaking: East Asia."

U. of Pittsburgh, Gary Allinson: "The U.S. and Japan (P)."

Providence College, Michael Metallo: "American-East Asian Relations."

U. of Puget Sound, Suzanne W. Barnett: "Misunderstanding China: Values, American Perceptions, and the Chinese Revolution 1930's-40's."*

Purdue U., Leonard Gordon: "Conflict in East Asia: the 20th Century."

U. of Rochester, W.B. Hauser: "Japan and Pearl Harbor;" and Jules Benjamin: "U.S. and Vietnam."

School of Advanced International Studies (Johns Hopkins), James Reardon-Anderson: "American-East Asian Relations 1890-1970."**

Seton Hall U. Edwin Pak-wah Leung: "American Foreign Policy in Asia;" "International Politics in the Far East."

U. of Southern California, Roger Dingman: "The Korean War."

Southern Methodist U., Sharon Nolte: "American-East Asian Relations (P)."

Temple U., Waldo Heinrichs and Shumpei Okamoto: "International Relations of East Asia, 1895 to Present."

U. of Toledo, William Hoover: "Diplomatic History of Modern Asia."

Towson State U., Wayne McWilliams: "America's Asian Wars."

Trinity College (Conn.), Kenneth Quinones: "U.S.-East Asian Relations;" "Americans in China Since 1784 (S)."

Trinity U. (Texas), Donald Clark: "The U.S. and the Far East."

Tulane U. Raymond Esthus: "U.S.-Asian Relations (S)."

U. of Tulsa, Thomas Buckley: "American-East Asian Relations."

Utah State U., R.E., Glatfelter and R.A. Hoover: "American Foreign Policy in the Pacific."

Valparaiso U., Keith Schoppa: "The U.S. and China;" "The U.S. and the Vietnamese Revolution."

U. of Virginia, John Israel: "America's Vietnam Interlude."

Wake Forest U., Michael Sinclair: "The American People in China."

U. of Washington, R.J.C. Butow: "The U.S. in Eastern Asia, 1784-1945;" "The Road to Pearl Harbor."

Westminster College, Delber McKee: "The U.S. and China in the 20th Century (S)."

Wheaton College (Illinois), Charles Webster: "Modern East Asian International Relations."

U. of Wisconsin (Milwaukee), William Renzi: "W.W. II in the Pacific."

Worcester State College, Emmett Shea: "U.S. and East Asia."

U. of Wyoming, Thomas Kennedy: "U.S.-Chinese Relations (S); "U.S.-Japanese Relations (S)."

Yale U., James Crowley: "The U.S. and East Asia, 1890-1953;" "Pacific War: Origins and Consequences, 1919-1953 (S)."

York College (Pennsylvania), Chin H. Suk: "American-East Asian Relations."

DISSERTATIONS IN AMERICAN-EAST ASIAN RELATIONS

Since January 1978 a large number of doctoral dissertations have been completed in American-East Asian relations, and an equally large number are still in progress. Because limitations of space prohibit publication of the entire list, the following bibliography includes only those studies that have been completed between January 1978 and May 1980 but have not yet been listed in **Dissertation Abstracts International (DAI)** or in other bibliographical guides. Individuals who are interested in the aggregate list may write to Sheila Driscoll (address listed above). For a small fee, she will send the complete bibliography.

GENERAL

- Chao, Daniel Kung-hua**, "Resource Nationalism and China's Foreign Policy." Political Science. Tufts University, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. 1979.
- Foltos, Lester**. "The Bulwark of Freedom: American Security Policy for East Asia, 1945-1950." History. University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign. 1980.
- Ng-Quinn, Michael**. "China and International Systems: History, Structures, Processes." History. Harvard University. 1978.
-

American-Chinese Relations

- Baron, Michael L.** "Tug of War: The Battle Over American Policy Toward China, 1946-1949." Political Science. Columbia University. 1980.
- Blum, Robert M.** "Congress, the Executive and the Origin of the American Containment Policy in the 'General Area of China.'" History. University of Texas, Austin. 1980.
- Cosgrove, Julia Fukuda**. "United States Economic Foreign Policy Toward China, 1943-1946." History. Washington University. 1980.
- Garver, John W.** "China's Decision for Rapprochement with the United States, 1969-1971." Political Science. University of Colorado, Boulder, 1979.
- Lam, Wing Hung**. "The Emergence of a Protestant Christian Apologetic in the Chinese Church During the Anti-Christian Movement in the 1920's." Theology. Princeton Theological Seminary. 1978.
- Schive, Chi Clock**. "A Study of the Economic Impacts of Direct Foreign Investment on a Less Developed Country: A Case Study of Taiwan." Economics. Case Western Reserve University. 1978.
- Ting, Chen Yueh-hung**. "The Intellectuals and the Chinese Revolution: A Study of the China Democratic League and Its Components, 1940-1949." History. New York University. 1978.

Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. "Patterns in the Dust: Chinese American Relations 1949-50." History. Columbia University. 1980.

American-Japanese Relations

Barnhart, Michael. "Autarky and International Law: Japan's Attempt to Achieve Self-Sufficiency and the Origins of the Pacific War." History. Harvard University. 1980.

Boyle, Michael J. "The Planning for the Occupation of Japan and the American Reform Tradition." History. University of Wyoming. 1979.

Burke, Robert Gifford. "Japanese Oil Policy 1945-1975: The Influence of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry on the Structure and Development of the Japanese Oil Industry." Political Science. Tufts University. The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. 1979.

Burns, Roy Gene. "American-Japanese Relations, 1920-1925." History. University of Missouri. No date.

Caldar, Kent Eyring. "Politics and the Market: The Dynamics of Japanese Credit Allocation, 1946-1978." History. Harvard University. 1978.

Caldwell, Martha A. "Petroleum Politics in Japan: State and Industry in a Changing Policy Context." Political Science. University of Wisconsin-Madison. No date.

Fisher, Larry W. "The Lockheed Affair... in Japanese Politics." Political Science. University of Colorado, Boulder. 1980.

Okimoto, Daniel I. "Ideas, Intellectuals, and Institutions: National Security and the Question of Nuclear Armament in Japan." Political Science. University of Michigan. 1978.

Tagawa, Kenneth M. "Justiciability and Judicial Power: Legal Standards of Reviewability and the Japanese Supreme Court." Political Science. University of Colorado, Boulder. 1979.

Tange, Toshiko. "Changes in Technology, Costs and In Comparative Advantage: An Empirical Study of Japanese-U.S. Manufacturing Exports." Economics. University of Pennsylvania. 1979.

American-Korean Relations

Swartout, Robert Jay, Jr. "Owen Nickerson Denny and the International Rivalries in Korea, 1885-1890." History. Washington State University. 1978.

GRANTS

The grant giving organizations listed below have indicated that research proposals in the field of American-East Asian relations would be welcome under the criteria of their funding programs. In future issues of the **Newsletter** we shall provide information about projects which have received grant assistance since January 1978 and include a general listing of research-in-progress in the American-East Asian field.

The following summary indicates the grant deadline, organization, address, and, where known, stipend (S), duration (D), eligibility/number of awards (E), and contact (C).

Grant Deadlines

No Date—Center for Advanced Research: Naval War College, Newport, R.I. 02840. (E) projects by U.S. government contract. (C) Capt. F.C. Caswell, USN.

No Date—Eleanor Roosevelt Institute: Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. 12538.

1980

June 2—National Endowment for the Humanities College Teachers Fellowships: Division of Fellowships, Mail Stop 101, 806 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506. (S) up to \$11,000 for 6 and \$22,000 for 12 months. (C) Karen Fuglie, Program Officer.

June 30 (also 9/30, 12/31, and 3/31/81)—**Committee on Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China:** National Research Council Fellowships, National Academy of Sciences, 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20418. (S) up to \$19,000/yr., plus moving expenses up to \$2,000. (D) 12 months; but 6-24 months possible with prorated stipend. Fellow resides in Washington and works with NRC committees on issues of science and technology and their application to national policy. (C) Ann H. Waigand, Program Assistant.

July 1—National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminars: Division of Fellowships, 806 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506. (S) support for seminar participants, salary for seminar director, secretarial support, direct and indirect costs to host institutions. (C) Dorothy Wartenberg, Program Director.

July 1—Fulbright Awards: Council for International Exchange of Scholars, 11 Dupont Circle, Washington, D.C. 20036. (S) maintenance and roundtrip travel. Research opportunities for 1981-82: Japan - 8 awards; Korea - 2; Philippines - 1; Taiwan - 1. (C) Marguerite Hulbert.

August 1—Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation: 2312 Red River, Austin, TX. 78705. (S) \$35/day per diem plus travel costs.

October 1—Council on Foreign Relations: 58 East 68th St. New York, N.Y. 10021. (S) appropriate for 1 year duration. (C) Director, International Affairs Fellowship Program.

October 1—John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation: 90 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016. (S) variable. (E) 286 awards to 2,977 applicants in 1979.

October 1 (also 2/1/81)—Harry S. Truman Library Institute Grants: Independence, Mo. 64050. (S) \$1,000. (E) younger scholars.

October 1—Woodrow Wilson International Center East Asia Program: Smithsonian Institution Building, Washington, D.C. 20506. (D) 9-12 months. (E) 5 fellowships awarded each year.

October 13—National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Stipend Programs: Division of Fellowships, 806 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506. (S) \$2,500. (D) 2 months. (C) Betty-Jean Bailey.

November (early)—Committee on Scholarly Communications with the People's Republic of China: National Program for Advanced Study and Research in China: National Academy of Sciences, 2101 Constitution Avenue, Washington, D.C. 20418. (S) 1979-80 levels: living allowance \$444, research allowance \$500, monthly stipend \$600-1750, travel to and from China, misc. travel \$500, and limited health insurance. (C) Ann H. Waigand, Program Assistant.

November 1-Doctoral Dissertation Fellowships of the Social Science Research Council: Fellowships and Grants, 605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016. (S) includes travel allowance for up to 24 months of field research.

November 3—Mellon Faculty Fellowships in the Humanities: Lamont Library 202. Harvard University, Cambridge, Ma. 02138. (S) \$17,000. (D) 12 months. (E) 15 fellowships each year. (C) Dr. Richard M. Hunt, Program Director.

November 10—National Endowment for the Humanities Residential Fellowships for College Teachers: Division of Fellowships, 806 15th St., Washington, D.C. 20506. (E) 7 seminars offered each year; fellows expected to conduct personal research beyond the seminar work.

November 15 or December 1—Japan Foundation: Suite 570, 600 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. (D) 2-14 months of research in Japan. Application forms available in August.

December 1—Postdoctoral Grants from the Social Science Research Council: Fellowships and Grants, 605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016. (S) range for East Asia up to \$25,000, includes travel, research, and maintenance expenses. (D) 3-12 months.

December 15—American Association of University Women: 2401 Virginia Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. **1.** American Fellowships for Dissertation Research. (S) \$3,000-7,000. (E) 10 awarded each year. **2.** American Fellowships for Postdoctoral Research. (S) up to \$9,000. (E) several each year. Applications available August 1, 1980.

December 31—Rockefeller Archive Center Research Grant Program: Hillcrest, Pocantico Hills, North Tarrytown, N.Y. 10591. (S) \$500-1,000. Collections touching on American-East Asian relations include: The Rockefeller Foundation, the China Medical Board, the Agricultural Development Council, the China Medical Board of New York, Inc., and the Population Council. (C) Joseph W. Ernst, Director.

1981

January 1—Advanced Research Program: U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013. (S) covers expenses while at the Institute.

January 1—Hoover Presidential Library Association, Inc.: P.O. Box 696, West Branch, Iowa 52358. (S) fellowships up to \$10,000; grants in aid, up to \$1,000. Applications available September 1, 1980.

January 10—National Humanities Center: P.O. Box 12256, Research Triangle Park, N.C. 27709. (S) based on fellow's salary, applicants urged to bring some measure of outside support. (E) Young Fellows: 3-10 years beyond doctorate; Senior Fellows: more than 10 years beyond doctorate; 40 fellows at Center each year.

February 1—Tom L. Evans Research Grant: Harry S. Truman Library Institute, Independence, Mo. 64050. (S) \$10,000. (D) 12 months.

March 1—Japan-U.S. Faculty Pairing Program in American and Comparative Studies: Institute of International Education, 809 UN Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017. (S) 1 round trip, 1 year's salary, plus cost of living differential, no provision for dependents. Applicants must submit joint proposal although only one of a pair is funded. (C) Susan Karp, Division of Study Abroad Programs.

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William Brinker, Department of History, Tennessee Tech, Cookeville, Tennessee 38501.

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: William K. Baker, Tennessee Tech.

ISSUES: The **Newsletter** is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December. All members receive the publication.

DEADLINE: All material must be in the office of the editor not later than four (4) weeks prior to the date of publication.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication. Copies of the **Newsletter** which are returned because of faulty addresses will be forwarded only upon the payment of a fee of \$1.00.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of most back numbers of the **Newsletter** are available and may be obtained from the editorial office upon the payment of a service charge of 75¢ per number. If the purchaser lives abroad, the charge is \$1.00 per number.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, honors, awards), announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered--or published--upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting the use of diplomatic materials in various (especially foreign) depositories, biographies and autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field of U. S. diplomacy, and even jokes (for fillers) if upon diplomatic topics. Authors of "straight" diplomatic articles should send their opuses to **Diplomatic History**. Space limitations forbid the carrying of book reviews by the **Newsletter**.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

1968	Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)
1969	Alexander De Conde (U of California--Santa Barbara)
1970	Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)
1971	Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)
1972	Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)
1973	Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)
1974	Bradford Perkins (Michigan)
1975	Armin H. Rappaport (U of California--San Diego)
1976	Robert A. Divine (Texas)
1977	Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)
1978	Akira Iriye (Chicago)
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