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PRIZES: The Society administers three awards a year, all of them in honor of the late Stuart L. Bernath and all of them financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California. The details of each of these awards are given under the appropriate headings of each issue of the **Newsletter**.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors two printed works of a quarterly nature, the **Newsletter**, and **Diplomatic History**, a journal. All members receive these publications.

REPUBLICAN DREAMS AND NATIONAL INTEREST: THE JEFFERSONIANS AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Burton Spivak*

During the last few years, American historians have produced an impressive amount of scholarship on the Jeffersonian era: Garry Wills and Morton White on the Declaration and the philosophy of the Revolution; Lance Banning on the Republican opposition of the 1790s; Forrest McDonald, Robert Johnstone and Noble Cunningham on Jefferson's presidency; and Drew McCoy and Ralph Lerner on the general themes of political economy and economic culture. Although these and other studies defy a simple synthesis, much of their meaning, in different ways and sometimes unintentionally, suggests an important change in our understanding of the early republic. Thomas Jefferson, it seems, is becoming less important to what is now emerging in our literature as the central development of the post-Revolutionary years. That development no longer concerns the political order and the transition from deference to democracy, but rather the social order and the transition from "virtuous citizen" to "commercial man."¹

While the focus of our history-writing was political freedom, Jefferson's centrality to the early national period and his relevance to the democratizing aspects of the Age of Jackson were readily explicable. So too was his hold on the American imagination.² Washington, Hamilton, and John Adams were simply too elitist to become Democracy's symbols. Sam Adams and other authentic 18th century democrats were, oddly enough, too common for democratic veneration. Jefferson survived and thrived, as John Adams knew he would, because a democratic people could find no more uncommon symbol of their political dreams. His importance to the period, then, has rested on his compelling relationship to the liberal idea that government, properly constructed, is a transaction of free men."³ But what of society properly constructed? After the Revolution what was the liberal social idea?

The modern American image of a liberal society begins to emerge with some clarity in the Age of Jackson. By then its ideal had become the legitimate power of self-interest, washing through unobstructed markets of free entrepreneurs, hedged in only by public opinion and voluntary contract enforceable at law.⁴ In the generation before the Civil War this market metaphor attached itself to all modes of human

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America, commercial oppression precedes unfair taxation. When it outlines the only foundation of an acceptable Anglo-American connection, its language and substance are explicitly commercial. Prior to the cataclysm of 1776, Jefferson still believed that trade with the English should form an important dimension of America's economic life where appropriate and mutually beneficial. "But let them not think to exclude us from going to other markets," he warned.⁷ That commerce should be free had become a Revolutionary article of faith. Both Jefferson's Declaration and the Congress' Model Treaty of 1776 amplified the creed, as Adam Smith's famous book of the same year provided its intellectual foundation. Jefferson spent a long life in its service. He traveled to Europe in the 1780s to liberate the world market on the principle of free trade. His years in Washington's cabinet turned on the two goals of expanding commerce and aligning the Republic on the side of European liberty, both without involving the young nation in war.⁸ During his presidency, he used diplomacy, economic weapons and military threats to promote trade in the Mediterranean, and on the Mississippi and the Atlantic. Throughout it all, however, Jefferson's encounter with commerce was laced with doubts and second thoughts. Foreign trade was both necessary and dangerous, a vital part of his republican dream and yet its potential undoing. In many ways, Jefferson's public life turned on the pros and cons of this complex and ambivalent commercial vision.

Most important on the plus side was the simple fact that the underdeveloped state of the domestic economy required foreign markets for American agriculture. While this dependency was threatening, it was not unwelcome; in fact it was of the utmost importance to the republican scheme of social and political development. In a trade-off that lay at the heart of the republican economic persuasion, the Jeffersonians were willing to risk *national* dependency on foreign markets to prevent the growth of *personal, individual* dependency in America, and with it the inevitable decay of representative government. It seemed that only by leaving its workshops and customers in Europe could the United States avoid the adverse social and political consequences of large-scale industrialism. Domestic industry on the English model presumed pools of dependent people, a social demography ill-suited to a free politics. As grim as this industrial image was, the Jeffersonians were equally apprehensive about its opposite: a primitive, agricultural subsistence. The only alternative seemed to be a prosperous world-wide commercial exchange of raw materials for finished goods. Foreign trade was thus an important component of the republican social and political design.⁹

As important as commerce was, however, it still posed fundamental problems; and these existed in two overlapping contexts: commerce as *national activity*, and commerce as *private, individual vocation*. With regard to the first was Jefferson's fear that national commerce usually bred international conflict and war. He saw the source of this tendency in European mercantilism. That reactionary ideology had transformed trade into a national weapon tied its courses to the power and interests of

the political state. In the process it had sacrificed the individual and clogged the world's ports with myriad restrictions. These political devices inhibited the natural exchange of productivity and fueled the national hatreds for the wars that usually followed. It seems to Jefferson that while production was a private, individual act, the right to exchange, an absolutely essential aspect of the productive right, had been appropriated by the state. Without it, the right to produce had little real value. To return this right of exchange to the private citizen was the American Revolution's most liberal economic idea.

John Adams and Benjamin Franklin has already begun this effort when Jefferson joined them in Europe in 1784. Because reason was on the side of right, he began his diplomacy with typical optimism. Throughout the American leg of his journey-- from Virginia to Boston and from there to sail to France -- he recorded in happy detail the particular American products that would find ready sale in European markets once trade had been placed on a free and natural footing.¹⁰ Armed with little more than good intentions, ample information, and their free-trade notions -- our "liberal sentiments" John Adams called them -- the American diplomats tried to transform Europe.¹¹ Their outline of a sensible world economy rested on a complete division between the political state and economic man. They hoped to emancipate trade from national rivalry through the medium of negotiated treaties that would finally erase national distinctions in the world market. Natives and aliens would enjoy similar rights in all commercial ports. Revolutionary diplomacy aimed at nothing less than the peaceful and complete liberation of international commercial activity implied in the term world citizen. It was an incredibly naive undertaking and it largely failed, even when the goal became the more realistic one of "most favored nation" reciprocity.

Its failure to fashion a world economy drained of political power and geared to private transactions forced the Revolutionary generation to embrace its own mercantilism geared to the retaliatory power of a congressionally harnessed American market. Unable to depoliticize the world market, the United States had no choice but to politicize its own. American diplomats learned this first. "If we cannot obtain reciprocal Liberty," John Adams warned from London, "we must adopt reciprocal Prohibitions. . . . We must not be the Bubbles of our own Liberal Sentiments. We must not be the Dupes."¹² Jefferson echoed these thoughts from Paris. Because Europe would not even consider free trade, he confessed, "we shall be obliged to adopt a system which may shackle them in our ports, as they do us in theirs."¹³ But to play this European game required greater amounts of domestic political consolidation than had been deemed either necessary or safe a few short years before, and consequently the liberal odyssey begun by Adams and Jefferson in Europe was concluded on a more conservative note by Madison and Hamilton in Philadelphia. In the process the leaders of the early republic, especially those who would become the

leaders of the Republican party, had found their national commercial weapon: a politicized American market.

After the Constitutional Settlement of 1787 a new stage began in America's economic relationship with the Old World because its national government could finally withhold the privilege of the American market in rhythm with foreign mistreatment of American export trade. This import-oriented approach was the essence of Jefferson's peaceable coercion, a policy which in theory never included an economically destructive and politically divisive embargo on American shipping and exports. The strategies of embargo and economic coercion were separate aspects of Jeffersonian statecraft, each with its own purpose and rationale. An embargo was a defensive, precautionary tactic that temporarily withheld ships and property from the world's oceans because war was considered imminent. Import-oriented economic coercion, on the other hand, was a merchantist tool of commercial diplomacy that threatened or actually restricted foreign access to the American market. Although part of its rationale was an antagonistic world economy of national rivalries, another part was the assumption of peace and the opportunity to expand trade through economic retaliation.¹⁹

But could this kind of economic coercion promote trade and preserve peace in a mercantilist world? That was both the dream and the doubt, and therefore an important part of Jefferson's anxiety about an American maritime future. Champion as he would the weapon's utility, misgivings on its essential attribute -- that it could protect the nation's commerce short of war -- often crowded in. In a brooding prospectus written while still in Europe, Jefferson acknowledged that "our commerce on the ocean and in other countries must be paid for by frequent war. The justest dispositions possible in ourselves, will not secure us against it."¹⁵ Nor, it sometimes seemed, could be peaceful weapon of economic retaliation.

Although this persistent gap between trade and peace dampened Jefferson's enthusiasm for commerce, there were other doubts that were more disturbing than the war-related ones, because they could not even be addressed by separating world commerce from the web of national rivalry, or by tailoring that perfect instrument of national retaliation. These other doubts were more intractable because they concerned private commercial behavior itself rather than foreign restrictions on national commercial freedom. When the focus switched from the commercial needs of the American republic to the commercial life of the republican citizen, Jefferson confronted dangers that hinged on the implications of the commercial vocation for the qualities of individual character on which he thought the republican political experiment rested. Whether the commercial vocation was compatible with republican manners and morals, and therefore whether it was at all compatible with a republican political order was a question that Jefferson could not answer affirmatively. A republic could not withstand too much commerce or too many merchants. Self-interest was the heart of the matter.

For Jefferson, the essence of a republican political order was majority rule through popular institutions composed of representatives of the people's choosing. In the early going of the Revolution, he spoke confidently about this bright possibility, about the innate popular capacity for self-government, about how the American people had exchanged the monarchical form for the republican seemingly without effort, "with as much ease," he noted, "as would have attended their throwing off an old, and putting on a new suit of clothes."¹⁶ The casualness of Jefferson's metaphor obscured the complex transition then taking place in American political practice. In addition, on this occasion and many others, his sunny language about American freedom, French freedom, indeed about the universal implications of 1776, combined with his genuine belief that God had intended man for society and self-government -- "could the contrary of this be proved," he once ventured, "I should conclude either that there is no God, or that he is a malevolent being" -- all have supported the notion that Jefferson was freedom's ideologue while John Adams, let us say, more sober and historical, was more its critical servant.¹⁷

Although Jefferson was less tentative than Adams about man's capacity for political freedom, he was as careful a student of its necessary environment. Balanced against his liberal faith in man's moral capacity for self-government was a conservative emphasis on the fragility of this capacity and on the proper social order necessary for its development.¹⁸ This moral sense, or virtue, was freighted with ambiguous meaning in the 18th century, but all the ambiguities turned on the general theme of sacrifice. Franklin's sense of the word was the most modern because his stress on frugality, thrift and personal industry made the subject and object of the sacrificial act synonymous; the autonomous individual merely sacrificed present for future self by deferring immediate gratification for greater long-range rewards. Although Adams and Jefferson both rejected this privatization of virtue, they differed sharply on the precise object of the benevolent act. For the New Englander, the object of benevolence was always vague, distant and corporate; in other words, the state or the public good. For the Virginian, however, the object of virtuous behavior was much less abstract, located instead in the living circle of human relationships. "The essence of virtue," he wrote on countless occasions, "is in doing good to others." In this scheme, man's capacity for disinterest and sympathetic behavior became the foundation of both private morality and political liberty in America. Responsible freedom, "both public and private," was located "in a good heart," put there by creation "so that no error of reasoning or speculation might lead us astray."¹⁹ Because of the importance of personal virtue to republican politics, and because of the nurturing or corrupting impact of social milieu on it, Jefferson's political faith required a particular social foundation. In this regard he paid close attention to vocation in America, returning to it often as a chief determinant of private character and therefore of the public order as well. His anticommercialism, then, was at its core political. "Merchants love nobody," Jefferson once wrote. They act according to

the "dictate" of ["self-] interest," without "love or hatred to anybody."²⁰ The commercial vocation bred manipulative skills, entrepreneurial abilities, a strategic mentality, and a cold heart. Agriculture was also a vocation and therefore profit-oriented. But it was a more republican form of labor because it folded self-interest into the softening webs of nature, family associations, "a society of real friends" and "wholesome labor" and "honest reward."²¹ Only by appreciating Jefferson's insistence on the political implications of particular vocations and lifestyles, can we come to term with a quirk in his political science that invariably (and sometimes in the same sentence) connected occupation to character, and both of these to political freedom. "It is my principle," he wrote James Madison, "that the will of the majority should prevail. This reliance cannot deceive us, as long as we remain virtuous; and I think we shall be so, as long as agriculture is our principle object." "Indeed, it seems to me" he wrote on another occasion, "that in proportion as commercial avarice. . .advance[s] on us from north and east, the principles of free government are to retire to the agricultural states....With honesty and self-government for her portion, agriculture may abandon.....to others the fruits of commerce."²²

Because Jefferson did not understand majority rule as the political resolution of economic conflicts predicated on self-interest, he saw in the spread of self-interest, the salient aspect of the commercial vocation, the undoing of republican government in America. Commerce and its mentality, like slavery and its corruptions and paper money and its evils, was a snake in the republican garden. A commercial society of self-interested entrepreneurs would inevitably create a politics of self-interest, a republican anomaly. But some commerce was necessary to avoid both agricultural stagnation, and industrialism with its crowded cities and dependent people. Commerce as national activity; commerce as individual vocation. Embedded in their conundrums is the central theme of Jefferson's public life: an attempt to make commerce compatible with republicanism.

To manage the nation's commerce in republican fashion required, above all, that it be as closely connected to agriculture as possible. "We have no occasion for more commerce than to take off our superfluous produce," he asserted in 1787, "a steady application to agriculture with just trade enough to take off its superfluities is our wisest course."²³ This kind of trade promoted agricultural development and seemed not to require massive naval and military support which were anathema to republican principles. In the event of European war it was less likely than the carrying trade to provoke belligerent reprisals. Although doubts on all fronts lingered, this kind of trade seemed potentially compatible with economic prosperity, and the dreams of peace, limited government, and a republican social and political order. All these things -- and especially a republican society of honest relationships and moral sense, and a republican politics of representative institutions composed of virtuous men -- comprised the Jeffersonian national interest. It had one other essential attribute, it was anti-English.²⁴

"A proud, hectoring, carnivorous race," Jefferson called the English.

He wished, he told John Adams, that there was "an ocean of fire between that Island and us."²⁵ What are we to make of such sentiments and language, especially since anti-English statements were so common to Republican political oratory? How are we to separate conventional thoughts ritualized into trite language and political slogans from the genuine passionate article?

Even a casual reading of the writings of the leading Republicans shows that Jefferson's anglophobia was deeper, more persistent, and more central to his whole orientation than the usual garden variety. There is a personal dimension to his anglophobia, a relationship that it bears to his maturing identity and his capacity for Revolutionary activity that invites the methods of the careful psycho-historian. Jefferson's whole life bears witness to the pain of separation and the desire to keep family, friends, and relationships together. The Congress deleted from his Declaration the phrase about "the last stab to agonizing affection." Jefferson once said of Anglo-American relations that "there can be no medium between those who have loved so much."²⁶ In the coming of the Revolution, Jefferson was a philosophical patriot and a psychological tory. I doubt whether he could have embraced Revolution had he not first cleared a psychological path toward separation by magnifying both America's innocence and England's wilful betrayal of trust. National separation had a personal dimension; and Jefferson's intense and sometimes morbid anglophobia was the permanent emotional cost of his Revolutionary freedom and a continuing source of his republican identity. He often defined the Republic itself through negative reference to Great Britain. English society had been thoroughly corrupted by self-interest and commercialism. It nurtured either condescension and dependence or manipulative relationships. He thought diplomacy with the English futile because "An American contending by stratagem against those exercised in it from their cradle would undoubtedly be outwitted by them."²⁷ His hatred of Federalism was part of a larger fear of Great Britain. Indeed he saw in the Hamiltonian political and economic system a betrayal of republican dreams and a dangerous duplication of an English model of government and society.²⁸ Anglophobia, in short, was inextricably connected to Jefferson's Revolutionary identity, his republican vision, and his conception of nationality itself.

For all these reasons, Jefferson was leary about closer commercial relations with England, even if they could be had on advantageous terms. And this he always doubted, so wedded was England to commercial monopoly, its "national disease," its national "insanity," he called it.²⁹ To divert trade from England and toward the Continent he took to be a central goal of American diplomacy. Although he often spoke about economic retaliation against England, it was rarely to improve Anglo-American trade per se, but rather to clear the English out of the Northwest, or to open up their Caribbean Islands, the only trade with them he ever coveted, or to improve America's standing with other European courts, or to coerce England's acceptance of America's neutral right to trade with England's enemies.³⁰

So a foreign trade tilted away from England and toward the Continent, a peacetime trade in American goods on American ships, this for Jefferson was the sum of the nation's commercial interest. But when he became president, England still monopolized the American trade, and for economically unavoidable reasons: the availability of English credit, the real absence of other viable trading partners, and American preference for English goods. Jefferson himself once refused to buy a French harness, even though his comrade Lafayette made the purchase a matter of republican honor, because the English variety was more to his taste. "It is not from a love of the English but a love of myself," he confessed, "that I sometimes find myself obliged to buy their manufactures." This personal inclination, multiplied a thousand fold throughout society, created an English pattern to American trade that was as natural as it was persistent.³¹

But whether we are talking about English trade or Continental trade, the point remains that most of Jefferson's pre-presidential efforts on behalf of commerce turned on expanding America's native peacetime trade. I mention this fact because of the irony it anticipates: most of Jefferson's presidential efforts had a much different commercial emphasis, and by his own reckoning a more dangerous and less republican emphasis. I am talking about the lucrative wartime carrying trade in the goods of England's European enemies and their colonial possessions in the New World. This imperial trade was generally off-limits to American ships during peacetime. But when pressed by war and the Royal Navy, England's enemies gladly opened this trade to neutral carriers. So it was that during the Napoleonic Wars the United States tried to assume the role of prosperous middleman, transporting French and Spanish goods between colonies and mother countries. The defense of this business fell to Jefferson's diplomacy. It would ultimately consume his presidency.

The Jeffersonian defense of the wartime carrying trade is a particularly revealing window on a tragic pattern common to much subsequent American experience. The initial defense never had Jefferson's wholehearted support. The carrying trade became an administrative measure merely because not to defend it involved significant political risks and to defend it successfully seemed only to require a strong legal and moral argument on its behalf. The defense became potentially costly only after England, the nation that stood to lose the most from America's claim, refused to accept the logic of Jefferson's explanation of "honest neutrality," and backed this refusal with force. The English challenge provoked Jefferson's nationalism and anglophobia and thereby deepened a policy commitment that his republicanism had always found objectionable. The climax to this conflict of nationalistic anger and republican guilt occurred when Jefferson, in the midst of the embargo crisis, renounced foreign trade completely and fashioned a new political economy that transformed his agrarianism and significantly altered his attitude toward the relationship between the Old World and the New. The denouement, sketched in letters when Jefferson was out of power, maintained this new orientation with only slight modification.

Whether the carrying trade was a prudent national objective attainable without excessive cost or war, indeed whether it was a worthy republican objective, were questions that had troubled Jefferson since the beginnings of the disintegration of European peace in the 1780s. The trade fed on war and was therefore unseemly. It upset the republican design by divorcing trade from agriculture. Because it also divorced productivity from profit, it promoted "commercial avarice," "speculation," and "a spirit of gambling." And because it would become little more than a French trade covered by an American flag, it was in fact unneutral and would certainly provoke a stern response from Great Britain. For all these reasons, Jefferson never really departed from his candid 1780's assessment of the carrying trade: "At first blush a war between [England and France] would promise advantage to us...Yet I think we shall lose in happiness and morals by being lanuched again into the ocean of speculation, led to overtrade ourselves, [and] tempted to become sea-robbers under French colors."³²

A host of pressures weakened Jefferson's commitment to a prudent and republican commercial policy and "launched" his administration onto "an ocean of speculation" and troubles. The carrying trade was very profitable activity. There were also the political needs of the Republican Party in New England. There was Jefferson's nationalism that invariably surfaced whenever England pinched, regardless of the propriety of American demands. And there was Jefferson's exquisite rationalism, a characteristic that often equated tight argument with sound policy. "I send you a pamphlet," Jefferson wrote a friend in 1806, "in which the British doctrine that a commerce not open to neutrals in peace shall not be pursused by them in war is logically and unanswerably refuted."³³ Language was Jefferson's medium, language, logic and persuasion. If a case could be made, then doubts could be exorcised and policy might take care of itself. If a perfect case could be made, then the rational world would have to nod its assent. Jefferson went to great lengths to prove the fairness and legality of American demands, as much to himself as anyone else. Great Britain, so his argument ran, benefited more from the American market than did France. This advantage cancelled whatever benefit Franch might derive from America's neutral carriage. "We shall thus become what we sincerely wish to be," he wrote, "honestly neutral and truly useful to both billigerents: to the one by keeping open a market for the consumption of her manufacturers; to the other by securing for her a safe carriage of all her productions, metropolitan or colonial, while their own means are restrained by their enemy."³⁴ Words had transformed American purpose. No longer a self-interested neutral, Jefferson's America had become a disinterested servant to a war-torn world. The argument neither convinced England nor handled the needs of policy.

England's response was the **Essex** decision of 1805, a maritime ruling that severely tightened the requirements of the "broken voyage" and thereby threatened the American carrying trade with wholesale captures and condemnations. Jefferson's response was more ambivalent. There were only two options available to the United States

in the wake of the **Essex** decision. It could accept England's judicial innovation and navigate through a more dangerous but still profitable maritime environment as best it could. Or it could try to change that environment with diplomacy or power. Jefferson adopted the second course, but only partially. The carrying trade had his support at the beginning of his second term, but only if pamphlets and persuasion could secure it. His doubts on the propriety of the whole business left him lukewarm to stronger measures than being championed by its northern congressional advocates. Jefferson's pronouncement bounced between national assertion and republican restraint, but his policy, unable to relate the two in coherent fashion, simply drifted. His uncertainty on the direction of policy left its formulation to the Republican congressional majority.³⁵

The 1806 congressional response to England's commercial challenge turned on regional economic interest. The crux of the matter was that while the **Essex** decision threatened the North's wartime carrying trade, it posed no threat whatever to the South's direct commodity trade with its best customer, Great Britain. Congressman from carrying trade states wanted to close the American market to all English imports, the classic Republican commercial weapon. This policy eluded them because southern Republicans and a southern president though it simply risked too much. Nonimportation would dry up government revenues,³⁶ postpone the retirement of the national debt, and menace the South's agricultural prosperity. It would certainly escalate the Anglo-American commercial disagreement, and might even result in military conflict. These unwelcome facts seemed undeniable. "The proper arguments" for those who thought otherwise, John Randolph gleefully noted, "were a straight waistcoat, a dark room, water gruel, and depletion." Contained in this southern Republican rhetoric was a precise formulation of the national interest that emphasized debt retirement, agriculture, and what they called "honest" or "useful trade," a trade on American ships and in American goods. Wartime carriage, on the other hand, was a "mushroom," a "fungus," "a spirit of avaricious traffic." To risk agricultural prosperity and peace on its behalf was the height of national folly. It also raised disturbing questions about the moral content of the national interest. Should a republican nation embrace foreign war as profitable enterprise? Should, as John Taylor put it, "the God of peace" or "the lord of hosts" inspire republican economic development? To protect this kind of trade with words was one thing; but to use stronger weapons, either commercial or military, required the public marriage of republican prosperity to foreign war. At this misalliance the congressional majority and President Jefferson balked.

The result was a watered-down version of nonimportation with its implementation date postponed almost a year. "A dose of chicken broth to be taken nine months hence," John Randolph called it. But as compromised as the Nonimportation Act of 1806 was, however, its passage marked the only time during Jefferson's presidency that either he or the Congress intentionally adopted a policy of economic

coercion. An intellectual fascination with the power of the American market as a foreign policy weapon was an important component of the theory of Republican statecraft, intruding and demanding a hearing whenever the need for policy arose. But during his presidency, theory and policy never converged. To stakes were too narrow and the risks too high in 1806. In the wake of the **Chesapeake** attack the following summer, Jefferson found the English threat so malevolent that he favored war, not the peaceable substitute of economic coercion. And Jefferson's famous Embargo of 1807, although it would eventually be pressed into service as a commercial weapon, had far different origins.

Like most significant commitments of national purpose, the embargo began innocently enough; not really a policy at all as Jefferson conceived it, but more an attempt to buy time, "an intervening period" he called it, an expedient, merely a temporary bow to the realities of European power and to the deterioration of America's commercial position in a volatile world. Threats had multiplied on all fronts. To its attack on the carrying trade, England now added restrictions on the wartime pattern of America's trade in its own goods. France matched these commercial restrictions to the extent of its ability. France's behavior finally drew Jefferson's attention to the European dimension of America's problem. Trade anywhere seemed to threaten war with all of Europe while America was grossly unprepared with much of its maritime wealth still at sea. So the embargo was simply a prelude to the difficult decisions that awaited the Jeffersonians in the wake of Europe's refusal to accept a conception of neutral rights that they were unwilling to abandon.³⁷

As elusive as the embargo's ends were, however, they did not include economic coercion. Most Jeffersonians understood that embargo was simply the wrong economic weapon. It hurt America more than it hurt Europe. It strangled foreign trade to protect it. It punished exports, not imports. It was not the embodiment of Republican traditions, but their caricature. In the embargo's early going, the Jeffersonians understood these stern facts and shaped policy within them. They understood that domestic economic desires robbed the embargo of time and therefore undercut its value as a commercial weapon.³⁸

How to find coercive power in a policy that the American people would soon force the administration to abandon? By the spring of 1808 the Jeffersonians had found an answer and only then did the embargo become a realistic weapon in their hands. But its potential utility had come to rest not on the economic pain that its indeterminate continuation might inflict on Europe, but on the economic pain that it everyday inflicted on the American people. This domestic distress would surely convince Europe that the embargo must soon be repealed, and that on its repeal, if the belligerent restrictions were still in place, war at America's doing would directly follow. The foundation of this hope points to one of the embargo's many ironies: whatever coercive power it possessed -- a coercive power measured only by its ability to change European policy -- derived not from a lengthy withdrawal from the world market, but rather from the promise of war that was implicit in

the embargo's necessarily short-lived duration. Traditional modes of force still dominated administration thinking. This was the message that the Jeffersonians instructed their diplomats -- William Pinkney in London and John Armstrong in Paris -- to convey to Europe.³⁹

By mid-1808 Jefferson's fondest hope was that the United States could once more turn the European balance to its advantage, and thereby both avoid war and preserve its prosperous neutrality as well. The gist of the gambit was this: each ambassador was to tell his respective assignment that the embargo would be taken off American trade not later than December 1808, the beginning of the next congressional session. And when the embargo was lifted, the United States would simultaneously resume trade with whichever belligerent had removed its restrictions and declare war against whichever belligerent kept its commercial restrictions in force. The ultimate hope was that both belligerents, anxious for American trade and quasi-military alliance, would snap at the bait. But the scenario was even more complex. The worst contingency was that neither belligerent would oblige. Since war against both was unthinkable, the United States would then, in Jefferson's phrase, "take our choice of enemies between them." But declaring war against England -- still the Republicans' chief enemy -- while the French decrees were still on the books, would create political divisions at home. So the Republicans embraced the incompatible diplomatic objectives of total peace and manageable war against a single enemy. With incredible naivete, they thought they could tilt their efforts dramatically in France's favor to win its compliance without foreclosing the possibility of accord with Great Britain.

The bias in the two ostensibly equal offers was contained in the fiction that there was a difference between ocean-based and land-based belligerent commercial restrictions. The administration chose to allow that only maritime restrictions violated international law and neutral rights. These were only marginal to the French war effort, although they underwrote England's. Land-based or port restrictions, on the other hand, were France's strength, and they afflicted England and America with equal fury. But because of the need for manageable war, these restrictions became, in Jefferson's phrase, "vigorously legal, tho not friendly."⁴⁰ This diplomatic bias in favor of France seemed to insure Armstrong's success and, at the least, manageable war against a single enemy. Madison told Armstrong to emphasize that what the United States was in fact demanding from France "would....immaterially diminish its operations against the British commerce, that operation being so completely in the power of France on land, and so little in her power on the high seas."⁴¹ Armstrong's trump, however, was Pinkney's embarrassment. It offended his intelligence, he so much as told his secretary of state, to have to peddle England so transparently a pro-French policy. In the end, both aspects of the gambit failed. Madison could not believe it. The offer to France was so rationally in its interest. "It would seem," he told Armstrong in anger, "as if the Imperial cabinet had never paid sufficient attention to the smallness of the sacrifice" that the United States had required.⁴²

Would the administration have gone to war against England if France had obliged? This is proper inference from the diplomacy I have just sketched, but not a proper inference from the essential character of the Jeffersonians. The policies of 1808 that had connected the embargo's coercive power to the promise of war had about them a false bravado, almost like children whistling past the graveyard. When the boogeyman appeared, the bravado vanished, and the children ran. The Jeffersonians were consequently left with an embargo they did not want because its alternative was the war that they could not face. Merely to threaten war, it appears, was the extent of their belligerence.

Beyond this, the 1808 scenerio reminds us, again, of the abstract rationality that often blinded the Jeffersonians. Caught up in the seductive logic of their own policies, they never considered that their reasoning might appear either self-interested or naive from a different point of view, say from another nation's point of view. They became trapped in their fictions, so trapped that I doubt whether they seriously considered either the possibility of failure or the hard choices they would then inherit. At any rate, whether they faced candidly the possibility of war at the beginning or during their high stakes diplomacy, they certainly could not face war at its end. As a result, coercive embargo was all that remained. Only at the conclusion of his presidency did Jefferson's embargo become the weapon of economic coercion that he had never intended it to be. Only them, in the words of a Massachusetts Republican, did Jefferson feel impelled "to hug the embargo and die in its embrace."⁴³

So economically coercive embargo became the Republicans' final, grand defense of the nation's wartime commerce. But it became much more. Frustrations long pent up and doubts and anxieties long obscured welled over the surface and transformed this ill-starred and ironical policy one last time. During its last few months, the embargo also became Jefferson's renunciation of foreign trade. A lifetime in its service had ended in disaster. Never again, if the embargo could make it so, would the Republic pay such a heavy price for merchant avarice. The embargo would redeem agricultural America, even if it had to transform the meaning of agrarianism to do it. From the experience of the embargo would emerge a fully republican economy; internally diverse, honestly productive in its rural and urban dimensions, and weened from "the jealousy among our commercial men" that had visited such trauma on the nation. The embargo had become the nation's renewal and Jefferson's contrition. Throughout his presidency he had supported, against his instincts, all the demands of Northern commerce. Indeed said one sympathetic New Englander, "[the Jeffersonians] are.....friendly to commerce *overmuch*. They waste themselves in defending it in all the immunities that its self-styled *friends* claim for it." Jefferson now cursed the same trade that his diplomacy had struggled to defend. "This exuberant commerce," he wrote in anger toward the end, "is now bringing war on us." When he renounced foreign trade and found sanctuary in a republican economy that existed largely in his imagination and would take generations to implement in society, his

own involvement in the nation's quest for wartime profit fueled the rejection, shaped the new dream, and gave the embargo its most poignant relevance.⁴⁴

The hatreds and emotions -- against Europe and commerce -- that had surfaced with such fury during the embargo months spent themselves during the long years of Jefferson's retirement. Hatred of the Old World gave way to a sense of inevitably proper distance. He now spoke as calmly about the validity of the doctrine of the two hemispheres as he once had spoken euphorically about the possibilities of European redemption implied in the American Revolution. No longer an augury of European rebirth, Jefferson's Republic had become, instead, "a splendid libel" on the Old World. In these clamorous emotions we can see the origins of the Monroe Doctrine, just as in his dream of a fully independent economy we can see the outlines of Henry Clay's American System.⁴⁵ When the passions of his presidency abated, this economic dream underwent slight modification. There was now room in it for some foreign commerce; but only a fully republican commerce. Writing to John Adams in 1815, Jefferson asked: "Have our commercial citizens merited from their country its encountering another war to protect their gambling enterprises? The transportation of our own produce, in our own vessels.....I hold to be fundamental.....But [as to] whether we shall protect the mere agency of our merchants and shipowners in carrying on the commerce of other nations," he hoped this claim would never find its way into republican commercial policy. The circle was completed. Jefferson the Sage live long enough to repudiate the foreign policy of Jefferson the President.⁴⁶

The issues and substance of foreign policy change, but a nation's diplomatic style persists through time. On this point I would like to conclude. We can see in the travail of the Jeffersonians several unpleasant aspects of the American diplomatic tradition. First, we see a pervasive national egocentrism. The United States has always taken itself too seriously, in part because of its liberal mission, and suffered unnecessarily for it. We have often thought that unwelcome events throughout a complex world were motivated primarily by anti-American design. An inability to make vital distinctions regarding the foreign policies of other nations, especially an inability to distinguish between those policies that were anti-American by intent, and those policies that simply discomfited America as an unintentional result of larger struggles that had little to do with the United States, has often bedeviled our foreign policy. A perceptive Pennsylvanian described the Jeffersonians' international setting this way: "[France and England] are engaged in a conflict upon the point of extermination. The weapons they employ, though they wound us, are only meant for each other. Let us act on that idea, and we may preserve our peace without sacrificing either our honor or our property."⁴⁷ The Jeffersonians could not act on that sensible idea. Nor could many of their successors.

Second, we can see in the Jeffersonians' style an inability to acknowledge American self-interest in relations with the rest of the world. Their social thought held that personal self-interest was

incompatible with republican community. In the same vein, national self-interest became incompatible with a stable international order. Hence their exquisite gymnastics to find permissible cover, either legal or moral, for national self-regard. Their efforts were perversely successful in that the Jeffersonians often became imprisoned by the logic and decency of their own fictions. Once words had transformed interest into either benevolence or justice, then policy became seductively simple and devoid of any real danger. And when the world scorned their fictions, the Jeffersonians often rejected the world. In this tendency, I think, we can see the origins of the later-day American vacillation between internationalism and isolation.

Finally, because the Jeffersonians blessed their own nation's interest with international legality and republican dreams, they were particularly insensitive to the hard interests of other nations and unable to recognize that successful diplomacy requires that all parties win something. In their diplomacy with England they were unwilling to compromise on any essential issue. On impressments, for example, Madison once suggested that potential compromise might involve an English promise to forego impressments and to return Americans already taken, in exchange for an American promise to forego employing English sailors and to return those already enticed into the American merchant service. When Gallatin found that to return bonafide English sailors would endanger American commerce because there were so many of them, compromise on impressments was never again discussed. America wanted its sailors, and England's as well.⁴⁸ On the outstanding commercial issues, a suitable compromise might have involved less English restriction on America's trade in its own produce in exchange for an American willingness to scale down its claims to full carrying privileges because they so clearly complicated England's efforts at national survival. Although this line of action was briefly mentioned in 1808 cabinet meetings, it was never seriously considered.⁴⁹ Complete victory on all essential issues precludes diplomatic settlement when another nation has interests to protect as well. The Jeffersonians failed as diplomats in part because they could not acknowledge the legitimacy or relevance of England's interests, commitments and problems. Maybe they could not because they had already persuaded themselves that their own nation's demands were not self-interested at all but rather expressions of morality and justice. So it has often been in the American diplomatic experience.

FOOTNOTES

¹Garry Wills, **Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence** (New York, 1978); Morton White, **The Philosophy of the American Revolution** (New York, 1978); Lance Banning, **The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology** (Ithaca, N.Y., 1978); Forrest McDonald, **The Presidency of Thomas Jefferson** (Lawrence, Kan., 1976); Robert M. Johnstone, Jr., **Jefferson and the Presidency: Leadership in the Young Republic** (Ithaca, N.Y., 1978); Noble E. Cunningham, Jr., **The Process of Government Under Jefferson** (Princeton, N.J., 1978); Burton Spivak, **Jefferson's English Crisis: Commerce, Embargo, and the Republican Revolution** (Charlottesville, Va., 1979); Drew R. McCoy, **The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America** (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980); Ralph Lerner, "Commerce and Character: The Anglo-American as New-Model Man," **William and Mary Quarterly**, 3d Ser., XXXVI (1979), 3-26.

²Jefferson's course in the American imagination has been brilliantly traced by Merrill D. Peterson in his **The Jefferson Image in the American Mind** (New York, 1960).

³The phrase is from David Hawke, **A Transaction of Free Men: The Birth and Course of the Declaration of Independence** (New York, 1964).

⁴The beginnings of this market definition of society in the Age of Jefferson are suggested in Forrest McDonald, **Alexander Hamilton: A Biography** (New York, 1979), and Morton J. Horwitz, **The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860** (Cambridge, Mass., 1977).

⁵Ralph Lerner, "Commerce and Character: The Anglo-American as New-Model-Man," **William and Mary Quarterly**, 3d Ser., XXXVI (1979), 3-26; Thomas Jefferson (TJ) to John Adams, Oct. 16, 1816, in Lester J. Cappon, ed., **The Adams-Jefferson Letters** (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1959), p. 492 (hereafter cited as Cappon).

⁶TJ to James Ogilvie, Aug. 11, 1811, TJ to Horatio G. Spafford, Mar. 17, 1814, Albert Ellery Bergh, ed., **The Writings of Thomas Jefferson** (Washington, D.C., 1907), 13:69, 14-120 (hereafter cited as Bergh).

⁷Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British North America, in Merrill D. Peterson, ed., **The Portable Thomas Jefferson** (New York, 1977), pp. 20-21.

⁸The Anas, July 8, Aug. 2, Aug. 20, 1793, Bergh, 1:366-68, 380-83, 390-93; TJ to Colonel Mason, Feb. 4, 1790, TJ to James Madison, May 19, 1793, TJ to Elbridge Gerry, Jan. 26, 1799, Bergh, 8:124-25, 9:97, 10:77; The Autobiography of Thomas Jefferson, Bergh, 1:158-59.

⁹For recent discussions of this theme see, Burton Spivak, **Jefferson's English Crisis: Commerce, Embargo, and the Republican Revolution** (Charlottesville, Va., 1979), pp.1-12, 198-225; Drew R. McCoy, **The Elusive Republic: Political Economy in Jeffersonian America** (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1980), pp. 76-119.

¹⁰The Autobiography of Thomas Jefferson, Bergh, 1:89-90.

¹¹For a careful analysis of American commercial diplomacy after the Revolution, particularly from Jefferson's vantage point, see, Merrill D. Peterson, "Thomas Jefferson and Commercial Policy, 1783-93," in Peterson, ed., **Thomas Jefferson, a Profile** (New York, 1967), pp. 104-34.

¹²John Adams to TJ, Aug. 7, Sept. 4, Nov. 4, 1785, Julian P. Boyd, ed., **The Papers of Thomas Jefferson** (Princeton, N.J., 1950-), 8:354-55, 9:11 (hereafter cited as Boyd).

¹³TJ to Hogendorp, Oct. 13, 1785, Bergh, 5:184.

¹⁴Spivak, **Jefferson's English Crisis**, pp. x-xi, 68-70.

¹⁵TJ to John Jay, Aug. 23, 1785, Bergh, 5:93-95.

¹⁶TJ to Benjamin Franklin, Aug. 13, 1774, Bergh, 4:34.

¹⁷TJ to David Hartley, Jul. 2, 1787, Bergh, 6:151; TJ to John Adams, Oct. 28, 1813, Cappon, p. 388; TJ to Madame La Duchesse D'Auville, April 2, 1790, TJ to John Dickinson, Mar. 6, 1801, TJ to Dr. Joseph Priestly, June 19, 1802, Bergh, 8:18, 10:217, 324-25; Autobiography, Bergh, 1:158-59; TJ to Colonel Mason, Feb. 4, 1790, Bergh, 8:124-25.

¹⁸The relationship between social milieu, republican character and political institutions runs through much of Jefferson's writing. Particular aspects of the theme can be traced in, TJ to Baron Geismer, Sept. 6, 1785, TJ to John Bannister, Oct. 15, 1785, TJ to James Ross, May 8, 1786, TJ to George Washington, Nov. 14, 1786, TJ to Benjamin Hawkins, Aug. 4, 1787, TJ to Peter Carr, Aug. 10, 1786, TJ to Governor Rutledge, Aug. 6, 1787, TJ to Mr. M'alister, Dec. 22, 1791, to Lafayette, June 16, 1792, TJ to George Washington, Sept. 9, 1792, TJ to John Sullivan, Feb. 9, 1797, TJ to John Taylor, June 1, 1798, TJ to Thomas Lomas, Mar., 12, 1799, TJ to Thaddeus Kosciusko, April 2, 1802, TJ to David Williams, Nov. 14, 1803, Bergh, 5:128-29, 185-88, 325; 6: 2-4, 251-62; 8:274-75, 396-408; 9:377-78; 10:44-47, 123-24, 173, 310, 428-31.

¹⁹TJ to John Adams, Oct. 16, 1816, Cappon, p. 492; TJ to Peter Carr, Aug. 19, 1785, TJ to James Madison, June 20, 1787, TJ to George Washington, Aug. 14, 1787, TJ Peter Carr, Aug. 10, 1787, TJ to Thomas Law, June 13, 1814, Bergh, 5:82-87; 6:134, 256-260, 276-78; 14:138-44.

²⁰TJ to John Langdon, Sept. 11, 1785, Bergh, 5:131.

²¹TJ to Mr. Bellini, Sept. 30, 1785, TJ to Archibald Stuart, Jan. 25, 1786, TJ to Mrs. Bingham, Feb. 7, 1787, TJ to George Washington, Aug. 14, 1787, TJ to William Duane, Aug. 4, 1812, TJ to Monsieur Dupont de Nemours, April 24, 1816, Bergh, 5:152-54, 259; 6:81-82, 276-78; 13:181-82; 14:487-93.

²²TJ to James Madison, Dec. 12, 1787, TJ to Henry Middleton, Jan. 8, 1813, Bergh, 6:392-93; 13:203.

²³TJ to Wilson Miles Cary, Aug. 12, 1787, to George Washington, Aug. 14, 1787, to John Blair, Aug. 13, 1787, Boyd, 12:24, 38, 28.

²⁴For a full treatment of the many dimensions of Jefferson's anglophobia see, Spivak, **Jefferson's English Crisis**.

²⁵TJ to Abigail Adams, June 21, 1785, to John Adams, Feb. 28, 1796, Cappon, pp. 34, 200.

²⁶TJ to Dr. Price, Aug. 7, 1785, Bergh, 5:57; Garry Wills, **Inventing America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence** (New York, 1978), pp. 273-319, 374-79.

²⁷TJ to James Madison, Mar. 19, 1803, Madison Papers, Library of Congress (LC), Ser. 2, reel 25.

²⁸The Anas, Feb. 4, 1818, Mar. 1, July 10, Oct. 1, 1792, Feb. 7, Mar. 2, 1793, Bergh, 1:271-83, 290-92, 309-12, 316-19, 332-33, 345; TJ to George Washington May 23, 1792, TJ to Phillip Mazei, April 24, 1796, TJ to Elbridge Gerry, May 13, 1797, TJ to General Gates, May 30, 1797, TJ to Colonel Arthur Campbell, Sept. 1, 1797, TJ to A.H. Rowan, Sept. 26, 1798, TJ to Benjamin Rush, Jan. 16, 1811, Bergh, 8:342-49; 9:336, 383-85, 391-92, 419-420; 10:60; 13:4; Spivak, **Jefferson's English Crisis**, pp. 210-20. Federalism, Jefferson wrote in 1797, was "calculated to sap the very foundations of republicanism" (TJ to Aaron Burr, July 17, Bergh, 9:403).

²⁹TJ to General Henry Dearborn, Aug. 14, 1811, TJ to William A. Burwell, Aug. 19, 1811, Bergh, 13:73, 78; TJ to John Langdon, Sept. 11, 1785, TJ to Richard Henry Lee, April 22, 1786, TJ to John Page, May 4, 1786, TJ to William Carmichael, May 5, 1786, TJ to Edward Rutledge, July 4, 1790, Aug. 25, 1791, TJ to John Hollins, May 11, 1811, TJ to John Crawford, Jan. 2, 1812, Bergh, 5:130-31, 292-94, 305-06, 308; 8:60, 234; 13:58, 118; TJ to John Adams, Sept. 24, Nov. 19, 1785, TJ to Abigail Adams, Aug. 9, 1786, Cappon, 68, 94-96, 149.

³⁰TJ to James Monroe, July 17, 1785, TJ to Elbridge Gerry, May 17, 1786, TJ to Colonel Humphreys, May 7, 1786, TJ to Colonel Innes, Mar. 13, 1791, TJ to Thomas Pinckney, June 11, 1792, TJ to James Madison, Mar. 1793, Bergh, 5:16-20, 315-16, 319; 8:145-46, 369-72; 9:33-34.

³¹TJ to Lafayette, Nov. 3, 1786, Boyd, 10:505.

³²TJ to John Blair, Aug. 13, 1787, TJ to George Washington, Aug. 14, 1787, Boyd, 12:28, 38; TJ to John Jay, Oct. 8, 1787, TJ to William Short, Oct. 3, 1801, Bergh, 6:323-34; 10:285-88.

³³TJ to Pierre Samuel Dupont de Nemours, Feb. 12, 1806, Jefferson Papers, LC.

³⁴TJ to James Bowdoin, July 10, 1806, Jefferson Papers, LC.

³⁵This and the following two paragraphs build from Spivak, **Jefferson's English Crisis**, pp. 23-46, 51-72.

³⁶Jefferson's long-standing effort to multiply America's foreign sources of industrial supply was connected to his realization that without such diversity, nonimportation was useless foreign policy weapon. Its utility had always been predicated on an array of trading partners; indeed, without such diversity, closing the American market to England, regardless of the purpose or justification, became fiscally dangerous because of the crucial importance of import duties to government revenues and to the retirement of the public debt. Throughout Jefferson's second term, leading Republicans realized that England's near monopoly over America's import trade denied nonimportation any real plausibility in Anglo-American commercial dealings. Samuel Smith of Maryland caught the problem perfectly: "It is indeed a mortifying thing that we cannot in an effectual manner resist the insults and injuries of GB.....We have no revenue but that arises from importation. We have eight million dollars annually to pay for the extinguishment of the public debt and the interest thereon besides all the expenditures of government, the army and navy. If by nonimportation we cut off that great source of revenue [duties on imported English goods] how are we to meet the payment?" (Samuel Smith to [?], Dec. 19, 1805, Samuel Smith Letterbooks, Samuel Smith Papers, LC).

³⁷Spivak, **Jefferson's English Crisis**, pp. 102-6.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 106-111.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 117-31.

⁴⁰TJ to Robert Livingston, Oct. 15, 1808, Jefferson Papers, LC.

⁴¹James Madison to John Armstrong, May 2, 1808, Diplomatic Instructions, All Countries, vol. 6, National Archives (NA).

⁴²William Pinkney to James Madison, Dec. 25, 1808, Dispatches, Great Britain, Pinkney, vol. 15, NA; James Madison to John Armstrong, July 22, 1808, Diplomatic Instructions, All Countries, vol. 6, NA.

⁴³Orchard Cook to John Quincy Adams, Jan. 1, 1809, Adams Family Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, reel 407.

⁴⁴TJ to Thomas Leiper, Jan. 21, 1809, TJ to David Humphreys, Jan. 20, 1809, TJ to Benjamin Stoddert, Feb. 18, 1809, Jefferson Papers, LC; C.P. Sumner to Joseph Story, Dec. 1808, Joseph Story Papers, LC; TJ to Monsieur Dupont De Nemours, April 15, 1811, TJ to John Adams, Jan. 21, 1812, TJ to General Thaddeus Kosciuszko, June 28, 1812, TJ to John Melish, Jan. 13, 1813, TJ to James Maury, June 16, 1815, TJ to Benjamin Austin, Jan. 9, 1816, Bergh, 13:38-39, 122-24, 170-71, 207-08; 14:315-19, 388-92; Spivak, **Jefferson's English Crisis**, pp. 203-210.

⁴⁵TJ to James Monroe, May 5, 1811, TJ to Baron Alexander von Humbolt, Dec. 6, 1813, TJ to John Crawford, Jan. 2, 1814, TJ to Thaddeus Kosciuszko, April 13, 1814, Bergh, 13:60, 117-19; 14:22, 41-43; TJ to John Adams, Aug. 10, 1815, Cappon, p. 454.

⁴⁶TJ to John Adams, June 10, 1815, Cappon, pp. 442-43; TJ to Thomas Cooper, Jan. 16, 1814, Bergh, 14:54-63

⁴⁷Alexander Dallas to Albert Gallatin, Dec. 23, 1807, Gallatin Papers, New York University, reel 15.

⁴⁸Madison, Observations in Cabinet Meeting, Feb. 2, 1807, Jefferson Papers, LC; Albert Gallatin to James Madison, April 13, 1807, TJ to James Madison, April 21, 1807, Madison Papers, LC, Ser. 2, reel 25.

⁴⁹TJ, Notes on Cabinet Meeting, July 6, 1808, Jefferson Papers, LC.



THE PROBLEMS AND PLEASURES OF LECTURING AT PERUVIAN UNIVERSITIES

Robert W. Sellen

The letter of invitation to lecture at the University of San Marcos in Lima, Peru, was written in some of the most elegant Spanish composed during this century, appropriate for the oldest university in the western hemisphere. It was also a bit vague and I wondered if the Director of **Proyeccion Social** (which deals with public meetings, conferences, and the like) really meant it. Friends who specialize in Latin American affairs said he might and probably did.

So I responded with great pleasure but somewhat less eloquence, offering "**Los origenes y la evolucion de la Guerra Fria**" ("The origins and evolution of the Cold War") as a topic. I also offered to speak in Spanish, but added that I needed a lot of notice for that: I couldn't do it "extemp" but would have to write it out in advance.

All that was in May. Weeks and then months went by and I heard nothing. Much later, I learned that the entire university had gone on strike, but I could never learn exactly why or for how long.

In the autumn, after I had written the invitation off, came word that the topic was a good one and inquiring how many lectures I would like to

give. I sent back a couple of proposals, not knowing what sorts of arrangements would best suit San Marcos but offering a choice. Again, some weeks went by with no further word. If the lectures were to be in December, the best time for me to go, time was getting short for airline reservations and other basic plans.

So I tried the telephone **larga distancia**, serving as interpreter between American operators with southern accents and Peruvian operators with no English. I was never able to speak with the actual Director, but November brought another letter from him, saying oh yes, we're expecting you the week of December 8-13. The letter didn't say which proposal for lectures he had chosen. It was also too late by now for me to write the lectures out in Spanish. But I decided to "go with the flow," as people said back in the 1960's, and ad-lib the Cold War in however many lectures of whatever length San Marcos wanted. After all, I do a whole graduate course on it. So I wrote back naming a date and time of arrival.

Arrival in Lima late one Saturday afternoon presented my wife and me with our first lesson in the fact that Peru is a land of sharp contrasts. A San Marcos official met our Braniff flight. He was accompanied by a high ranking officer of the immigration service, and the two of them swept us past -- not through -- immigration and customs, the officer detouring long enough to have one of his subordinates stamp our passports. Everyone else from the crowded DC-8 languished in a single, interminable line.

We found ourselves not in any mere hotel but entertained while in Lima by the director of a medical research institute at San Marcos, a several time Guggenheim Fellow, housed in splendor in the suburb of Chaclacayo. That exposed us to more contracts. Each day we would leave the 300 foot by 300 foot compound with its formal garden and grove of avocado trees, and set out for Lima on the worst single road we have ever experienced in any country. The 12 year old son in the household confided to us that Peru's roads are not fit for a burro and the only sure way of getting to Lima and back was by tractor. Our host's big American car did manage to stand the strain.

I still didn't know how many lectures I was to give, but the next morning, Sunday, our host showed me **La Prensa**, one of the two major Lima newspapers. In the **Exterior** section, devoted to foreign news, was an announcement of my **conferencias**, complete with the San Marcos seal. There would be two of them for two hours each, one on the origins and one on the evolution of the Cold War. They would be held at the Raúl Porras Barrenchea Institute for Peruvian Studies, in an area named Miraflores. The institute sounded appropriate and the area's name was pretty, but I wondered about that location, which I soon learned is several miles from the San Marcos campus. Still, "go with the flow," I told myself.

Another revelation: the announcement did not identify me as a professor of diplomatic history, but as **jefe** of the Department of History, a job to which I would have a W.T. Sherman response. When I mentioned this my host smiled and said that titles draw audiences. In Peru one needs to be Director or **Jefe** of something.

Monday turned out to be a holiday, devoted to a drive into the foothills of the Andes. More contrast: once outside verdant Chacabayo with its irrigation one is in some of the most barren hills on the face of the earth. Not one sprig of green relieved the scene.

Tuesday morning I visited San Marcos and learned more. First, I need have no worry about speaking in English; a professor of Linguistics would interpret as simultaneously as I wished. Second, I observed the graffiti on campus, mostly in four or five-foot letters on walls, and knew why the lectures were to be in Miraflores. Most of the non-science students are "Cadillac Communists" and many remain verbally devoted to the late Chairman Mao. One of the points of disagreement among them seems to be whether Teng Hsiao-ping is "**mierda**" de perro or "**caca**" de perro -- the latter being more infantile.

That evening was the first lecture, scheduled for seven p.m. That seemed a reasonable hour to me, because of lot of time spent in Mexico has impressed upon me that in Latin America dinner before nine p.m. is uncivilized. Our hosts were in no hurry, which was also not surprising since almost nothing starts on time south of the Rio Grande. But when we arrived at the elegant old mansion shortly after seven no one else was there and the doors were still locked.

We found the janitor, who grumblingly opened up, and about fifteen minutes later the director of the institute arrived, most cordial though a bit surprised to see us there so early. Ten minutes after that arrived the Director of **Proyeccion Social**, who was to preside, and then the audience began filtering in. At eight o'clock we began.

I managed an introduction in Spanish, stating my point of view and apologizing for speaking mostly in English. The professor of Linguistics turned out to be a lady of as great charm as linguistic skill and we were soon a smoothly functioning team. She needed help only with a few exotic political terms (containment, Kremlinologist), and the audience seemed amusedly accepting of brief pauses while she, the director, and I worked out the proper wording.

The audience was exactly what one would expect from notices in **La Prensa** and none on campus. Faculty and townspeople, entirely middle and upper class, well turned out, they were attentive, interested, and discreet. When I concluded by inviting questions they appeared stunned; their expressions seemed to say: but one does not question visiting experts! The only question either evening came from our host's wife, a Brazilian of Austrian parents, with whom I'd had good talks **auf Deutsch**.

All of this was appropriate to the ambience of Old San Marcos, as opposed to the new generation of Maoists. Another example of San Marcos in operation came when my wife, a reading supervisor in the Atlanta schools, expressed a wish to see a school or two. No, no; that wouldn't do. She was given an appointment with the Deputy Minister of Education in the Peruvian Government, significant in a centralized country with no local school boards or systems. The Deputy Minister sent her out to tour schools with an expert in elementary education, an interpreter just in case, a car, and a driver. After the tour he asked her to

speak to his staff, and she talked for an hour about problems common to both countries, her ways of dealing with them, and then answered questions for another hour.

The San Marcos people did something more for me, too. After the first lecture one of them inquired if I would like to speak at Villareal University the following week, after we returned from a trip to the high Andes. I said sure, I enjoy audiences, and the San Marcos people had already discovered my strong element of "ham." So it was arranged.

San Marcos is justly famous, but I had never heard of Villareal. Few people in the U.S. have; it's too new. I learned later that the **Universidad Nacional Federico Villareal** is a government funded institution of some 20,000 students and an outgrowth of the **Universidad Communal del Centro**, founded in the early 1960s by APRA. Almost all of the 20,000 students are **Apristas**.

APRA is the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance, founded some 50 years ago by the late Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre. It seeks change that would really make a difference to **indigenistas**, Indians and Mestizos, rather than to the small "Castilian" elite. Haya even coined a term, "Indoamerica," for countries with large Indian and Mestizo populations. APRA members can be violently anti-Soviet because of the USSR's aggression (as in Afghanistan) and blatant racism. I had a vague idea of all of this, but learned much more during a long evening at Villareal.

The audience was not the one in Miraflores. Villareal is in the center of Lima, a bustling downtown campus. The big lecture hall was jammed with standees. I was introduced by a professor of Biochemistry, evidently because he is politically reliable, and he turned out to be friendly and open. We had time for conversation while the hall slowly emptied from another meeting and our crowd came in. By starting time we were good friends, swapping stories, and he told one that made me laugh loudly, whereupon, my wife told me later, the students looked pleased; imagine, a **gringo** with a sense of humor!

Once more I did my Spanish introduction, emphasizing my belief in the equal value of all cultures, my regret that so few **Norteamericanos** know anything about other cultures, and some of the unhappy effects of this lack. By now the linguistics professor was an old hand at Cold War terminology, and before we knew it we had talked for 90 minutes, summarizing both origins and evolution of the Cold War.

This time, when I asked for questions, people stood up or put hands up all over the place. They asked questions at a rapid rate for another 90 minutes, mostly on contemporary issues. Did Carter really mean his human rights policy? What did I think of the U.S. policy toward Israel? Would the superpowers ever quit intervening in other countries? What difference would Reagan make to U.S. foreign policy?

Apristas has appreciated my jabs at Stalin and Brezhnev; they particularly enjoyed laughing at a so-called communist leader who collects limousines. They had appreciated candor about U.S. mistakes during the Cold War. Now their response was even greater to frankness, and I felt more and more encouraged about being frank. Yes, Carter

meant it, but communicates poorly and doesn't know how to administer anything. Emotionally I'm a Zionist because of research in Nazi documents, but in realistic terms one has to realize that Arabs are people, too, with needs and feelings -- something very difficult for Americans to do because of their ignorance and their press. The superpowers are likely to go on intervening not merely because of their strength but because they have not thoroughly rationalized their motives that they lack awareness of what they are doing. I hesitate to predict what any human being will do, but Reagan's track record indicates some possibilities . . . and whatever they had heard about a landslide, a lot of us didn't vote for him.

What brought the house down was my account of the American legend that the President elected every 20 years dies in office, and my wish that Mr. Reagan would do that quietly, without pain, but as quickly as possible to spare the whole world a lot of trouble.

It was 11 p.m.; one last question? Did I know who Haya de la Torre was? This was perfect. Not only did I know of Haya, but J. Fred Rippy, whose last PhD. student I was, had known him personally and approved of APRA. I told them this, said goodnight, and got a standing ovation. More than that; they crowded around for autographs, and one even gave me a precious object indeed, an inscribed photograph of Haya de la Torre. As we left, the biochemist inquired, "Next stop, Broadway?" I told him that it was tempting to try, but I didn't think the Cold War would play very well. As we know, it has been bad enough on the front pages and worse in the private documents.

Being an incurable optimist, I can't believe that Ronald Reagan will make as big a mess of American foreign policy as many of us have imagined he would -- or as many Latin American are convinced he will. But I'm glad to have made one small gesture in the direction of inter-American solidarity.

Matthew Fontaine Maury, His *Sailing Directions*, and the Historian of American Foreign Relations: A Speculative Essay

Kenneth John Blume

SUNY-Binghamton

Lieutenant Matthew Fontaine Maury is today one of the greatly underrated figures in nineteenth century American foreign relations, but in the late Antebellum period few other American naval officers had so distinguished an international reputation. His **Sailing Directions** brought him wide fame, his **Physical Geography of the Sea** went through numerous editions, and his voluminous other writings strengthened the link between the American naval and scientific establishments. Then, in the Civil War, Maury wounded his national stature by joining other messmates in loyalty to state rather than Union. Nevertheless, his influence in the apolitical science of ocean navigation persisted. Curiously, however, American diplomatic historians have tended to ignore this side of Maury's work. Given its impact upon the patterns of sea voyages during the second half of the nineteenth century, historians cannot afford to analyze American foreign contacts without taking into account Maury's acclaimed **Sailing Directions**.

The history and contemporary significance of Maury's work in navigation can easily be summarized.¹ He had devoted many years to studying ocean currents, tides, winds, and sailing patterns, and in the mid-1840s he began to publish his **Wind and Current Charts**. With the cooperation of captains throughout the world, Maury was able to collect, collate, and analyze thousands of sailing returns. In 1851 he published the first edition of his **Explanations and Sailing Directions to Accompany the Wind and Current Charts**. That year saw the publication of three editions of the **Sailing Directions**. A fourth edition was published the following year, a fifth in 1853, a sixth in 1854, and a seventh in 1855. A French version--evidence of the worldwide influence of the work--was published in 1857. By 1858-1859, when the eighth edition appeared, Maury had collected so much data that he needed two large volumes to accomodate all the information. Publication of Maury's charts was suspended at the beginning of the Civil War but began again in the 1880s.

Belying the complexity of compiling such a work, the rationale and purposes of Maury's **Sailing Directions** were remarkably simple. Taking advantage of the experience of hundreds of sea captains, Maury evaluated thousands of logs to determine the **shortest** routes between various ports. His charts "were to revolutionize navigation."² In commercial navigation especially, time is indeed money. Less time between ports means lower costs in wages and supplies, less chance of maritime accidents, and consequently lower insurance premiums. The significance of Maury's work, therefore, should be evident.

Prior to Maury's studies, of course, ship captains relied upon individual judgement and the "rule of thumb" to pilot their vessels from port to port. Maury's recommendations-- sometimes contradicting both traditional "wisdom" and British Admiralty suggestions--gained acceptance slowly among some conservative seamen. But before long, the advantages of Maury's directions became clear, and skeptics became converts. Maury's directions **worked**. A month was shaved off a round-trip between Baltimore and Rio, and a month and a half on a one-way trip from New York to San Francisco.³ By the mid-1850s, therefore, few navigators dissented from Maury's recommended routes.

The **Sailing Directions**, as one scholar has indicated, is "much more than what its title promises."⁴ The eighth edition, especially, is a long and rambling conglomeration of scientific information, speculation, and recommendation. The first volume of that edition contains most of the data appearing in Maury's **Physical Geography of the Sea**. Volume Two recommends preferred ocean routes. This second volume requires slow and careful digestion.

Given the acknowledged influence of Maury's work, the historian of American foreign relations would therefore do well to note something of what Maury actually says. We discover in Maury's **Sailing Directions** the key to understanding the basic trade routes of the second half of the nineteenth century, the period in which, we are told, the United States began to "look outward" and acquire an informal empire. The balance of this essay will therefore present some of Maury's routes and will then proceed to speculate on the value of these routes to the scholar of the 1980s.

Maury stresses the importance of Great Circle sailing. For example, in discussing the routes to the Straits of Sunda and beyond, he writes:

There is no part of the world where the master of a sailing vessel can turn his knowledge of the principles of Great Circle sailing to more advantage than he can when his course lies east in that great expanse of ocean on the polar side of the calm belt of Capricorn.⁵

Maury cautions that winds and currents often interfere with Great Circle sailing. In other words, he advocates a pragmatic approach to navigation: find the quickest and most direct route by taking into account Great Circles, currents, and winds. More often than not, however, the Great Circle approach would provide the greatest possible savings. For example:

In attempting to follow these Great Circle routes, navigators should recollect that the greatest saving of distance, as compared with the rhumb-line route [6] is always along those arcs that lie nearly east and west, and are furthest from the equator; and that, so far as distance is concerned, he might as well be out of his way on one side of these arcs as the other.⁷

Maury admits that an iron-clad adherence to Great Circle sailing could at times result in lost time. His interest in winds and currents clearly accounts for that pragmatism. Nevertheless, his emphasis upon Great Circles is well taken and provides a good "rule of thumb" for the

arm-chair historian-navigator who attempts to discern the sailing patterns of old. Let us examine Maury's recommended routes to the Orient, an area of great historiographical debate among historians of American foreign relations. We shall examine first Maury's recommendations for trips between the Atlantic coast and the Orient, and then for those between the Pacific coast and Asia. First, the Atlantic Coast ships. **All** ships--hailing from either America or Europe--must steer for the same point if they are heading for the Southern Hemisphere: São Roque on the bulge of Brazil. From this point, Maury writes:

...the highway then forks. All vessels for India, China, or Australia, hugging the wind turn off to the east [i.e., toward the Cape of Good Hope]; those that are bound around Cape Horn keep straight on. . . .⁸

Note that **all** ships leaving American or European Atlantic ports enroute for Asia are advised to take the Cape of Good Hope route. Note, too, that with all vessels heading for São Roque sailing **distances** to Asia (and the Pacific Northwest) are virtually the same whether the port of origin be American (East Coast) **or** European. In terms of travel, trade, and communication, then, East Coast Antebellum Americans were no closer to the Orient or the Pacific Northwest than were the British.

What of the return voyage? Speaking of the routes to and from Australia, Maury writes:

The best way for vessels...to **go** is by doubling the Cape of Good Hope; and the best way to **come** is **via** Cape Horn; and for this reason, viz: The prevailing winds in the extra-tropical regions of the southern hemisphere are from the NW., which of course makes fair winds for the outward bound around the Cape of Good Hope, and fair winds for the homeward bound around Cape Horn.⁹

The routes between the East Coast and Asia, therefore, are clear: around the Cape of Good Hope on voyages out, and around the Horn on voyages back. In the days of the "old" China trade, of course, New York and Boston clippers regularly headed around the Horn, sailed up the West Coast to the Oregon/Washington/British Columbia regions, and from there sailed to the Orient. But such routes resulted from Antebellum economic necessities, the United States having in those days few goods to ship to China. Pacific Northwest furs and pelts (or Hawaiian sandalwood) were essential. But by Maury's day, and especially after the Civil War, economic realities were changing. Throughout the century the East Coast ports maintained a stranglehold on American foreign commerce, and the routes to be followed on trips to the Orient, according to Maury, were Good Hope out, the Horn back.

But what of the Pacific ports? Maury admits, even in the eighth edition of the **Sailing Directions**, that he has incomplete data for routes between Asia and the Northwest coast of America. "For a thorough discussion of these routes a thousand abstracts are required," he writes.¹⁰ Nevertheless, Maury identifies certain preferred courses. Just as there are two different routes for the Atlantic ports--one route outward bound and one homeward bound--so for the voyage between the Northwest

and Asia. Ships traveling from American Pacific ports to Asia are advised to make use of the trade winds during July and August, heading for the Sandwich Islands. "Make the best of your way to the NE. trades," Maury writes, "and run them down about the parallel of 18° or 20°,"¹¹ On the other hand, Maury suggests that during September and October one should keep between 22° and 24°--or well north of Hawaii--to achieve decent sailing time. Significantly, Hawaii figures as a stopping-off point in only a tentative way. It provides a port for vessels en route to Asia only during those months when the trade winds are favorable. What sort of stepping-stone to the trade of Asia is this?

Did the Sandwich Islands provide more of a stepping-stone for vessels **returning** from Asia to the Pacific ports of North America? Let us turn once again to Maury.

The route from China to California is, in distance, from 800 to 1,200 miles shorter than the route through the NE. trades, **via** Sandwich Islands &c, **from** California to China. It is well, especially in summer and fall, when the weather is mild, to bear this fact in mind.

The Great Circle from the free ports of China and Japan to the Pacific States and British Columbia may be followed by sailing vessels all the year.....¹²

At the same time, Maury admits that the voyage from Asia takes too long and can be shortened by careful attention to charts. He provides a table of the returns from almost three dozen vessels that, during the 1850s, crossed from China to California. **None** of these vessels came near Hawaii. Indeed, the closest any of the ships got to the Hawaiian Islands was 36° North--that is, at least fifteen degrees **north** of those islands. The voyages to the coast of North America crossed the 160° West meridian as far north as 49°, while the average was 40° 30' North. Furthermore, none of the ships came anywhere near Midway Island. What then of Hawaii? Why, also, is Midway so named? Before considering such questions, let us take one final look at Maury's advice.

The Lieutenant devoted another section of his **Sailing Directions** to routes between California and Australia. His recommendations are clear. Vessels heading **from** Australia **to** California are advised to go one of two ways: south of what is today Tasmania and then south of New Zealand; or through the Bass Strait between Australia and Tasmania and then the Cook Strait of New Zealand. Ships passing south of New Zealand should,

...steer for the parallel of 40° or 45° S., between the meridians of 150° and 140° W., thence for the equator between 120° and 130° W., crossing, by a north course, both the horse latitudes of the southern hemisphere and the equatorial doldrums; then run through the NE. trades as best you may, keeping a "rap full" [13] and running up into the variables beyond the horse latitude calms of the northern hemisphere, if need be, to complete your easing and make your port.¹⁴

A glance at the map will indicate that this route takes sailing ships far indeed from Hawaii. The ship following a passage through Cook Strait should take a course that is only slightly different. Meanwhile, Maury

and Asia. Ships traveling from American Pacific ports to Asia are advised to make use of the trade winds during July and August, heading for the Sandwich Islands. "Make the best of your way to the NE. trades," Maury writes, "and run them down about the parallel of 18° or 20°,"¹¹ On the other hand, Maury suggests that during September and October one should keep between 22° and 24°--or well north of Hawaii--to achieve decent sailing time. Significantly, Hawaii figures as a stopping-off point in only a tentative way. It provides a port for vessels en route to Asia only during those months when the trade winds are favorable. What sort of stepping-stone to the trade of Asia is this?

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A glance at the map will indicate that this route takes sailing ships far indeed from Hawaii. The ship following a passage through Cook Strait should take a course that is only slightly different. Meanwhile, Maury

suggests that ships traveling from California to Australia "should be down as soon as possible into the NE. trades...crossing the equator anywhere between the meridians of 140° and 150° W..."¹⁵ Again, we note the absence of Hawaii in these sailing directions.

What, then, does all this contribute to the study of nineteenth century American Pacific relations? As we have already indicated, many historians acknowledge Maury's mid-century influence, yet they also usually ignore the implications of that influence. The **Sailing Directions** tends to de-emphasize the geographical importance of such islands as Hawaii and Samoa to American merchant vessels. But many American historians continue to ascribe growing American interest in these Pacific outposts largely to their positions as stepping-stones to the trade of the Orient. Admittedly, many historians present more complex pictures of American interest in the Pacific by including strategic and defense concerns. Nevertheless, the general picture of America's Pacific relations during the late nineteenth century remains distressingly incomplete.

While Maury might not hold the "key" to this picture, he does provide a point of departure for some observations that might push the thinking of diplomatic historians in new directions. For example, although the present essay attempts to rehabilitate and re-emphasize Maury's impact on American foreign contacts, we might for the sake of argument reconsider that very premise. Perhaps our critics might answer that historians have made too much of Maury's influence. Perhaps economic factors occasionally (or often) took precedence over currents and winds. Perhaps, too, the transition from sail to steam at the very moment that Maury was publishing his various editions of the **Sailing Directions** made them nearly obsolete from the outset.

Clearly, Maury's **Sailing Directions** were written for sailing ships and therefore emphasize the importance of certain factors and geographical areas. But do steamships necessitate **new** areas of interest? The key words here, of course, are **coal** and **coaling stations**. Obviously, steamships need both. But dare we over-emphasize such needs as factors in American Pacific interests and policy? If we consider once again Maury's recommendations, from the perspective not just of the quickest route but also the shortest mileage, we can easily see a continuing application of the Lieutenant's great work. We are led, therefore, to ask ourselves just how far out of the way a steamship captain might be willing to travel for coal. Hundreds of miles? Thousands? Maury's **Sailing Directions**, with its emphasis on Great Circles, tended to take sailing vessels along routes of greater mileage in order to catch winds and currents that would, over all, save **time**. Maury's **ideal** routes, those of the shortest **distances**, could certainly be applied in later years to steamships less concerned with the vagaries of wind and current. Thus, we might very well assume, Maury's tomes continued to be prized even aboard coal-powered vessels, by captains whose careers, after all, spanned both sail **and** steam.

Steamships need concern themselves more with distance than with winds, but the historian of American foreign relations has tended to

overlook, or perhaps distort, the reality of America's naval and mercantile fleets. While much is made of an American desire for coaling stations, the diplomatic historian rarely connects that assertion with two other facts of late-nineteenth century America: an American steam navy was virtually non-existent until the early 1890s; and the American merchant fleet, declining steadily during the period, doggedly remained a **sailing** fleet through the end of the century. Furthermore, historians seem to have forgotten that the agreements providing for American naval stations at Pearl Harbor and Samoa remained dead letters until quite late in the century. The United States government clearly was not overly concerned with exercising its negotiated prerogative to establish such bases. Should those realities affect the emphasis many historians place on coaling stations? How, further, do those realities affect our previous proposal that Maury's publication was becoming obsolete even as it went through its various editions? Obviously, Maury again takes on new importance, while the shibboleth of the coaling station cries out for re-evaluation.

The diplomatic historian should also consider other questions. He needs to see Pacific islands from a non-West Coast perspective. Midway Island, after all, is not midway to anything. Rather, it is near the Aleutians and the sea approaches to Hawaii. Thus, the historian must see Pacific islands from their own geographical perspective in order to determine what usefulness, if any, such islands possessed for the nineteenth century American. In doing so, the diplomatic historian must weigh trade against national security, and the reasons for interest in a Pacific island against the reasons for acquisition. Throughout all this, the historian with an understanding of Maury's work should be able to put political, economic, geographical, and military considerations in a long-needed balance.

Perhaps for this very reason it is a pity that the length of the Eighth Edition **Sailing Directions** probably makes its complete reprinting financially impractical. On the other hand, the second volume, the most valuable to historians, might easily be republished in a somewhat abridged form. Works of considerably less historical value are reprinted—even in these days of retrenchment. Why not Maury? His **Physical Geography of the Sea** has been available in a scholarly reprint for almost two decades—much to the benefit of historians of science. Diplomatic historians deserve no less. Then, with their reprint edition of the **Sailing Directions** before them, and with a globe or conic-projection of the Pacific next to them, they would be prepared to see the Orient, the Pacific Northwest, and the routes thereto, as the American of the nineteenth century saw them.

ENDNOTES

¹For a more detailed account, see, Frances Leigh Williams, **Matthew Fontaine Maury, Scientist of the Sea** (New Brunswick, N.J., Rutgers University Press, 1963), 178-95.

²*Ibid.*, 179.

³Ibid., 180 & 190.

⁴John Leighly, "Introduction," in Matthew Fontaine Maury, **The Physical Geography of the Sea and its Meterology** (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963), xii.

⁵Matthew Fontaine Maury, **Explanations and Sailing Directions to Accompany the Wind and Current Charts, Approved by Captain D.N. Ingraham, Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance and Hydrography, and Published by Authority of Hon. Isaac, Toucey, Secretary of the Navy**, 8th ed. (Washington, Willian A. Harris, 1858-59), II, 709.

⁶This is the path a ship takes if it maintains a constant compass direction. It is not a straight line of vision, but rather a straight line on a Mercator map, on which it cuts each meridian at the same angle.

⁷Maury, **Sailing Directions**, II, 711.

⁸Ibid., 143.

⁹Ibid., 484-5.

¹⁰Ibid., 764.

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid., 767.

¹³That is, a little off the wind, all sails drawing well.

¹⁴Maury, **Sailing Directions**, II, 769.

¹⁵Ibid, 770

MINUTES OF COUNCIL MEETING

April 1, 1981

The Council met on April 1, 1981, in the Cadillac Room, Detroit Plaza Hotel. Members present: Lawrence S. Kaplan, Lawrence Gelfand, Walter LaFeber, David M. Pletcher, Robert Freeman Smith, Sandra C. Taylor, Paul A. Varg, Gary R. Hess. Also present were: William Brinker, Peter Cohen, Wayne S. Cole, Jerald A. Combs, Charles DeBenedetti, Milton O. Gustafson, Warren Kuehl, Basil Rauch, Betty M. Unterberger.

President Kaplan convened the meeting at 8:15 p.m. He announced a number of appointments: J. Samuel Walker (Nuclear Regulatory Agency) to the Bernath Book Committee, Harry Stegmaier (Frostburg State) to the Bernath Speaker Committee, Harriet Schwar (Department of State) to the Bernath Article Committee (each of these three year terms beginning immediately); Betty M. Unterberger (Texas A & M) and Ronald Spector (Department of the Army) to the Committee on Government Relations (each for a three year term beginning in January 1982). He also noted that the terms of the first members of the Committee on Government Relations have been set as follows: Jules Davids and Melvin Small (1981), Wayne S. Cole and Milton Gustafson (1982), Lloyd C. Gardner and Roger Dingman (1983). In addition, the President reported that: plans have been made to hold summer conferences at Boston University in 1982 and at George Washington University in 1983; the preface to the **Guide to American Foreign Relations** has been completed; the contract with Scholarly Resources for publication of **Diplomatic History** from 1982 to 1984 has been signed.

On behalf of the Program Committee, DeBenedetti reported that the program for the 1981 summer conference at American University has been completed; he noted that the opening general session will be devoted to the issues of declassification of diplomatic documents and that the other sessions were balanced between pre-1900 and twentieth century topics.

Reports on the Bernath Prizes followed. Combs reported that DeBenedetti has been selected as the 1982 Bernath Memorial Lecturer. Hess indicated that the Book Committee had decided, after reviewing 23 entries, to recognize two books: Bruce R. Kuniholm, **The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece**, published by the Princeton University Press; Hugh DeSantis, **The Diplomacy of Silence: The American Foreign Service, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War**, published by the University of Chicago Press. He also reported that the Article Committee had considered ten articles and had awarded its prize to Douglas Little for "Twenty Years of Turmoil: ITT, the State Department, and Spain, 1924-1944," **Business History Review**.

Hess also summarized a recent update on the progress of the **Guide** received from Richard Burns: all 40 chapters have been received and edited; 38 chapters have been reviewed by Contributing Editors and sent to the Clio Press for copy-editing; the remaining two edited

chapters should be approved shortly by the Contributing Editors; the press will survey SHAFR members on hard cover and soft cover use of the **Guide**; Eric Boehm of Clio Press will cooperate fully with SHAFR in producing a quality work at reasonable cost.

As chairman of the Committee on Government Relations, Cole spoke of the crisis confronting diplomatic historians as a result of the delay in publishing the **Foreign Relations** volumes and the opening of documents. Betty Unterberger emphasized the need for seeking support from members of Congress and noted that the report of the Department of State Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation had been brought to the attention of several key Representatives and Senators. She also underscored the Advisory Committee's grave concern over the possible publication of **Foreign Relations** volumes in which substantial portions have been deleted as a result of reclassification of documents.

Moving to items on the agenda, Council discussed the suggestion that the Bernath Memorial Lecture be published in **Diplomatic History** rather than the **Newsletter**. The major reason for this proposal was to give wider circulation to the lectures. Taylor moved that beginning with the 1982 lecture, publication will be in **Diplomatic History**. Gelfand seconded (By mail ballot, Council approved the motion.)

Council considered at length the proposal of Clearwater Publishing Company seeking SHAFR endorsement of its plan to publish selected documents which are not included in the **Foreign Relations** volumes. The views of David Trask, as expressed in a recent letter, were summarized. A number of concerns were expressed at the meeting: such as publication might be seen as a substitute for the **Foreign Relations** volumes, and lead to reduced size of that series; the means by which Clearwater would select and arrange documents were uncertain (would it, for instance, follow the format in the **Foreign Relations** volumes?). It was agreed that the proposal should be referred to the Committee on Government Relations.

Council next acted upon a suggestion to amend the by-laws so that the general membership meeting would be a part of the annual summer conference. It was observed that the present provision for such a meeting at the OAH convention is no longer feasible, since the Bernath Lecture is the center of the Society's luncheon. Smith moved that Council propose such an amendment to the membership. Pletcher seconded. (By mail ballot, Council approved the motion.)

Council next considered a revision of membership dues. The increased costs of the journal and administrative expenses necessitate a revision of the dues structure beginning in 1982. Gelfand moved adoption of the following: \$12.50 for regular members; \$8.00 for retired members; \$6.00 for student members; \$175.00 for life membership. The student rate is subject to consultation with the Bernaths to utilize interest being earned by the Supplementary Fund to subsidize the costs of student membership. Fletcher seconded the motion. (The Council, by mail ballot, approved.)

Varg shared concern about the future of the AHA and OAH in view of

the increasing costs of membership in those two major societies, hotel and other convention expenses for their annual meetings. The administrative expenses of AHA and OAH offices seemed, in some ways, to be excessive. It was suggested the AHA and OAH ought to be encouraged to establish long-range planning committees. There was considerable sympathy for the concerns expressed, but rather than take any formal action on the matter, it was agreed that SHAFR should seek to make these views known through informal means.

Unterberger called attention to the Reagan administration plans to eliminate all funding for the National Historical Publications and Records and Commission. She urged that SHAFR support the Coalition to SAVE Our Documentary Heritage which has been organized on behalf of the NHPRC. It was also suggested that members should contact Congress on the matter, but that restoration of NHPRC ought not be at the expense of funding for the National Archives.

Meeting adjourned at 10:00 p.m.

Gary R. Hess

SHAFR LUNCHEON--APRIL 3, 1981

Approximately eighty persons attended the SHAFR luncheon at the Detroit Plaza on April 3. The Bernath prizes were announced and President Kaplan reported briefly on the Council meeting. The Bernath Memorial Lecture, "Republican Dreams and National Interest: The Jeffersonians and American Foreign Policy" was presented by Burton Spivak of Bates College.

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SHAFR'S CALENDAR FOR 1981

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|------------------|--|
| July 30-August 1 | SHAFR'S 7th annual conference at American University in Washington, D.C., (See page 45 for schedule) |
| August 1 | Deadline: materials for September Newsletter . |
| August 16-19 | Meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch of the AHA at the University of Oregon-Eugene. There will be a SHAFR reception. |
| November 1 | Deadline: materials for December Newsletter . |
| November 1-15 | Annual elections for officers of SHAFR. |
| November 11-14 | The 47th annual meeting of the SHA will be held in Louisville with headquarters at the Galt House. |
| December 1 | Deadline: nominations for 1982 Bernath memorial lectureship. |
| December 28-30 | The 96th annual convention of the AHA will be held in Los Angeles with headquarters at the Biltmore Hotel. There will be the usual SHAFR activities at this meeting. |

PERSONALS

Martin Elzy, after six and one-half years at the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library working mostly with foreign and military policy materials, is moving to the Carter Presidential Materials Project in Atlanta -- the embryonic James Earl Carter Library. (Elzy reports that the Carter Project staff is currently three, soon to double, and eventually reach about twenty members. A permanent site has not yet been selected for the library.)

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Lawrence S. Wittner (State University of New York, Albany) has been named a member of the OAH's Binkley-Stephenson Award Committee which chooses the best article in the **JAH**.

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James H. Hitchman (Western Washington University) spent the last academic year as a Fulbright lecturer in American History at the University of Mysore. Hitchman spoke on U.S. Expansionism, 1898-1902 and on the History of the Cold War at several Indian Universities. **The Indian Journal of American Studies** (Hyderabad) accepted his article, "Chameleon on Plaid: Interpreting U.S. History since 1941." He also gave three historiographical lectures to Indian College teachers at a workshop in the American Studies Research Centre, Hyderabad. Mysore University printed his three special lectures on public opinion and American foreign policy.

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Stephen D. Bodayla (Marycrest College, Davenport) has received a grant from the American Philosophical Society for continued research on a biography of Dwight Whitney Morrow. Bodayla has also been elected to a three year term on the Board of the Quad-Cities World Affairs Council.

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Manfred Jonas (Union College) has been named Washington Irving Professor in Modern Literary and Historical studies at Union.

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At least three SHAFR members have received Guggenheim Fellowships for specific research. Charles E. Neu (Brown University) for a biography of Edward M. House; Michael Schaller (University of Arizona), the occupation of Japan and containment in Southeast Asia, 1945-1953; and Joan Hoff Wilson (Arizona State University and currently visiting professor of history at the University of Virginia) for a work on the legal legacy of Mary Beard.

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Waldo Heinrichs (Temple University) will offer an NEH summer seminar on The Transformation of the American Role in East Asia, 1937-1954. The seminar will be from June 2 to August 14, 1981.

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Harold Josephson (University of North Carolina at Charlotte) has received a fellowship from the NEH to study the impact of former American communists on the Cold War. The project is titled "Death of the Soviet Dream: Ex-Communists Witnesses in the United States."

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Miriam J. Haron (Pace University) has been awarded an NEH Summer Stipend for research on Anglo-American Relations and the disposition of Arab Palestine.

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Tom Leonard (University of North Florida) served as program chairman for the Florida College Teachers of History Conference which met on March 5-7, 1981. Thomas Campbell (Florida State University) chaired a session on "Wilsonian Diplomacy: 1919 Paris Peace/Conference" at the FCTH and Lester D. Langley (University of Georgia) delivered the dinner address, "The United States and the Modern Caribbean."

PUBLICATIONS IN U.S. DIPLOMACY

Justus D. Doenecke (University of South Florida) compiler, **The Diplomacy of Frustrations: The Manchurian Crisis of 1931-1933 as Revealed in the Papers of Stanley K. Hornbeck.** 1981. Hoover Institute Press. \$22.95.

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Akira Iriye (University of Chicago), **Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945.** 1981. Harvard University Press. \$22.00.

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Terry H. Anderson (Texas A & M University), **The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947.** 1981. University of Missouri Press. \$18.00.

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William Stinchcombe (Syracuse University), **The XYZ Affair.** 1981 Greenwood Press. \$23.95.

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Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State University) and Robert W. Clawsen, editors, **NATO After Thirty Years.** 1981. Scholarly Resources Inc. Cloth \$19.95, paper \$8.95. These twelve papers--delivered at the 1980 conference at the Center for NATO Studies at Kent State University--shed light on the problems of maintaining the Atlantic Alliance through the first generation of its history. The topics concern areas of current academic interest and matters of contemporary policy debate.

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David F. Trask (The Historian, Department of State), **The War with Spain in 1898.** 1981. Macmillan. \$29.95. This book covers all aspects of the struggle and makes a special effort to treat the role of the Spanish, the Puerto Ricans, the Cubans, and the Filipinos. This work is part of the Macmillan History of American Wars series

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Gerald K. Haines (National Archives) and J. Samuel Walker (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) editors, **American Foreign Relations: A Historiographical Review**. 1981. Greenwood Press. \$35.00 This work is a summary of the current status of U.S. diplomatic history. There are seventeen essays (nearly all written by SHAFR members) some of which cover chronological periods from before the constitution through the early cold war. Others are devoted to U.S. relations with Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America in the twentieth century.

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Angel Viñas (Madrid). Los pactos secretos de Franco con Estados Unidos. Bases, ayuda económica, recortes de soberanía. 1981. Grijalbo, Barcelona. This book is based on Spanish documentary evidence kept at various State archives which have been unexplored so far: Office of the Chief of State, Office of the Government Secretariat, minutes of Cabinet meetings, and Office of the General Director of the Foreign Exchange Authority. Documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (General Archives) have also been consulted to trace Spanish perspectives on the rapprochement with the United States between 1949 and 1953. This is the first book to reveal the exact nature of the initial arrangements established by the U.S. with the Franco regime. They were operational until 1970.

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The Society for Technical Communication (Washington, D.C. Chapter) has presented an Award of Merit to the National Archives and Records Service for **The United States and Russia: The Beginning of Relations 1765-1815**.

Other Publications

Walter S. Poole (Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff), editor, **The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy**, Vol. IV, 1950-1952. 1981. Michael Glazier Inc. \$49.00.

Russell F. Weigley (Temple University), **Eisenhower's Lieutenants: The Campaign of France and Germany, 1944-45**, 1981. Indiana University Press. \$22.50.

Paolo E. Coletta, **The United States Navy and Defense Unification, 1947-1953**. 1981. University of Delaware Press. \$25.00.

Willard L. Beaulac (Washington, D.C.) **The Fractured Continent: Latin America in Close-up**. 1980. Hoover Institute Press. \$11.95

Jamie W. Moore (The Citadel) **The Fortifications Board 1816-1828 And the Definition of National Security**, 1981. This is volume XVI in **The Citadel Monograph Series**.

SHAFR'S GOVERNING BODIES

(1981)

COUNCIL

(Elected Members)

- Robert F. Smith (Toledo) 1981
- George C. Herring (Kentucky) 1981
- Robert Dallek (UCLA) 1982
- Arnold Offner (Boston U.) 1982
- Sandra C. Taylor (Utah) 1983
- Walter LaFeber (Cornell) 1983

(Past Presidents)

- Akira Iriye (Chicago) 1981
- Paul Varg (Michigan State) 1982
- David M. Pletcher (Indiana) 1983

Editorial Board, Diplomatic History

- Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State), editor
- Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa) 1981
- Marilyn B. Young (Michigan) 1981
- William C. Stinchcombe (Syracuse) 1981
- Russell Buhite (Oklahoma) 1982
- Irwin Gellman (Newport Beach, CA) 1982
- Charles Neu (Brown U) 1982
- Manfred Jonas (Union) 1983
- Thomas Patterson (Connecticut) 1983
- Betty M. Unterberger (Texas A & M) 1983

COMMITTEES

The person listed first in each instance is the chairman/woman of that particular committee.

BERNATH ARTICLES

- Noel Pugach (New Mexico) 1981
- Rachel West (Marian College) 1982
- Harriet Schwar (Department of State) 1983

BERNATH SPEAKER

- Jerald A. Combs (California State U., San Francisco) 1981
- Richard E. Welch, Jr., (Lafayette College) 1982
- Harry Stegmaier (Frostburg State) 1983

BERNATH BOOK

- Thomas D. Schoonover (S.W. Louisiana) 1981
Robert J. Donovan (Woodrow Wilson School of Public & International
Affairs) 1982
J. Samuel Walker (Nuclear Regulatory Agency) 1983

NOMINATIONS

- Martin Sherwin (Tufts) 1981
Theodore A. Wilson (Kansas) 1982
Samuel F. Wells (Woodrow Wilson Center) 1983

PROGRAM

- Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)
Eugene P. Trani (Missouri-Kansas City)
Robert Beisner (American)
Lloyd Ambrosius Nebraska) 

MEMBERSHIP

Ralph E. Weber, Chairman
Department of History
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin 532333

- | | |
|--|---|
| I. The Far East
Sadao Asada
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Science
Doshisha University
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New York
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| II. Georgia, North Carolina,
and South Carolina
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Alberta, British Columbia, and
Alaska
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St. John's College
University of Manitoba
Winnipeg, 19, Canada |
| III. Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and
Washington
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Tacoma, Washington 98416 | VII. District of Columbia and
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| IV. Alabama, Florida, Mississippi,
and Tennessee
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- IX. **Michigan, Ohio, and West Virginia**
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- XV. **Australia**
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St. Lucia, Brisbane,
Australia 4067
- XVI. **Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, and Labrador**
Geoffrey S. Smith
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Kingston, Ontario
- XVII. **Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont**
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- XVIII. **Louisiana and Texas**
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- XIX. **Arizona, California, Hawaii, and Nevada**
Roger Dingman
Dept. of History
University of Southern California-
Los Angeles, Ca 90007
- XX. **Wisconsin, Minnesota, South Dakota, and North Dakota**
Joseph Smith
Department of History
Carroll College
Waukesha, WI 53186
- XXI. **British Isles**
Joseph Smith
Department of History
University of Exeter
Exeter EX4 4QH England

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

Diplomatic historians have essential and continuing needs for research access to government records on American foreign relations. The size and complexity of the federal bureaucracy, the massive and varied character of government records, and the complicated and often annoying regulations and restrictions on the use of those records can make efforts to use them increasingly difficult, confusing, and frustrating for research scholars. In an effort to provide information on the use of government records, and to communicate scholarly concerns to those in the government charged with custody and control of those records, SHAFR established a new standing Committee on Government Relations. It was authorized by an amendment to SHAFR By-Laws approved by the membership late in 1980. David Pletcher and Lawrence Kaplan as presidents of SHAFR have appointed the first members to that Committee. It reports to the Council. It supplants an earlier *ad hoc* committee chaired by Richard Leopold; that earlier committee's report was published in the September 1979 issue of the SHAFR **Newsletter**. The members of the new Committee on Government Relations are Melvin Small of Wayne State University, Milton Gustafson of National Archives, Lloyd Gardner of Rutgers University, Roger Dingman of the University of Southern California, Jules Davids of Georgetown University, and Wayne Cole of the University of Maryland (chairman).

The Committee has both informational and "watch dog" responsibilities. It is particularly concerned with the Department of State: expeditious and quality publication of the **Foreign Relations** volumes, declassification of Department of State records, and the opening of those records for scholarly research. With foreign affairs involving many departments and agencies, however, the Committee's concerns are not limited to the Department of State. The presidency, Congress, and many departments, agencies, and offices are of importance for research scholars. Historians are affected by federal legislation such as the Freedom of Information Act, the Privacy Act, and proposed legislation on use of House of Representative records, as well as by administrative rulemaking and executive orders such as President Carter's Executive Order 12065 on classification and declassification.

In addition to continuing and routine concerns, crises arise from time to time that have major immediate and long range importance for scholars doing research on foreign affairs in government records. Without minimizing other critical problems, the most alarming crisis affecting American diplomatic historians at this time involves the functioning of the Department of State Classification-Declassification Center. Staffed largely by retired Foreign Service Officers and headed by Clay McManaway, the CDC has detailed responsibility and authority for declassification of Department of State records under E.O. 12065. Under McManaway's direction the CDC has interpreted "foreign government information" which is exempt from declassification much more broadly than the Office of the Historian had earlier. In general it has been far more conservative than the Office of the Historian in

reviewing new records to see if they can be declassified. That has drastically slowed publication of **Foreign Relations** volumes, delayed transfer of Department of State records on readily usable terms to National Archives, and even affected publication of the historical series volumes on executive sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

That declassification problem was explained clearly and forcefully in the annual report of the Department of State Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, chaired by Professor Betty Miller Unterberger. Its report was published in the March 1981 issue of the **SHAFR Newsletter** and deserves careful study by SHAFR members. An **ad hoc** committee of the Organization of American Historians, chaired by Professor Lloyd C. Gardner, has also focused constructive attention on the problem.

The difficulty does not simply pit scholars against government bureaucrats. Many fine historians within the Department of State, National Archives, the Senate Historical Office, and other government historical offices are in the front lines battling for greater openness for scholarly research use of government records. Those courageous historians deserve support from scholars whose battles they are fighting.

Historians may disagree on just what changes might be most effective. Perhaps it would be best if the CDC were dissolved or its authority reduced and the Department of State reverted to its earlier procedures. Perhaps E.O. 12065 should be revised or replaced. Changes in personnel might help. Whatever the solutions, SHAFR members could help through publicity on the matter, by working through individual senators and congressmen, and by providing information about their experiences in using the Freedom of Information Act or E.O. 12065 for SHAFR officers through the Committee on Government Relations. The Committee earnestly solicits suggestions and guidance from diplomatic historians on procedures it might follow to serve the needs and interests of scholars doing research on foreign affairs in government records. Government historians need our broad-based help in their efforts to serve the scholarly community and the ends of a better informed public in a functioning democracy.

Wayne Cole

RECORD OF COUNCIL ACTION ON RESOLUTION FROM COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT RELATIONS

The Committee on Government Relations, at its meeting on April 2 recommended that the Council adopt the following resolution and take whatever steps it can to implement it:

WHEREAS, the current situation in regard to the public's access to government records and documents pertaining to the conduct of

American foreign relations has reached a critical stage, the SHAFR Council hereby resolves:

- I. That immediate steps be taken to end the delay in the publication of the **Foreign Relations** series. This delay is a direct result of new practices now being implemented and those still being developed by the Classification/Declassification Center, and can best be corrected by abolishing the CDC and returning to practices that had worked reasonably well in the production of the volumes in previous years.
- II. That similar steps be taken to end the delay in making available the records themselves at the National Archives. The CDC is now developing guidelines that will make it difficult, if not impossible, for Archives staff to make available to researchers the same sorts of material that were previously opened for the years during World War II down through 1949.
- III. That notwithstanding the two points above, the Office of the Historian refuse to permit the publication of any **Foreign Relations** volume that does not meet the Department of State's own set of regulations requiring the series to be comprehensive and accurate, or any volume that falls below the standards for excellence and integrity established in all those published since World War II.
- IV. That the National Archives should refuse, for the same reasons, to accession any block of records for which the CDC guidelines prevent research into the comprehensive materials necessary for scholarly excellence.
- V. That all members of SHAFR should be appraised of this crisis and urged to contact members of Congress in all-out effort to reaffirm the principles of openness in government and declassification of all records on a well-understood time table according to the original intention of earlier executive orders.

By mail ballot, Council approved the resolution.

Gary R. Hess
Executive Secretary-Treasurer

CONFERENCES TO COME

The Fifth Symposium on the Occupation of Japan will be sponsored by the MacArthur Memorial, the MacArthur Memorial Foundation, and Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia, on October 20-21, 1981. The theme of this year's symposium is "The Occupation of Japan: The International Context." The deadline for proposals is October 1, 1981. Inquiries should be directed to: Director, MacArthur Memorial, MacArthur Square, Norfolk, Virginia 23510.

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The Fifteenth Annual Duquesne University History Forum will be held on October 12, 13, and 14 at the William Penn Hotel in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Those wishing to submit proposals for papers or sessions, or who wish to serve as moderators or commentators should contact the Forum's Director at the Department of History, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA 15219.

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The History Department of the United States Naval Academy will sponsor its fifth Naval History Symposium on October 1-2, 1981. For information, contact Professor Frederick S. Harrod, History Department, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, MD 21402.

SHAFR'S SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING

**The American University
July 30 - August 1, 1981**

Thursday, July 30

6:00-7:30 p.m. Registration Ward Lobby

7:30-9:30 p.m. Session

Historians' Access to Government Documents: At Crisis Stage?

Friday, July 31

7:30-9:00 a.m. Council Meeting Ward II

8:00-9:00 a.m. Registration Ward Lobby

9:15-9:40 a.m. Welcome Ward II

9:45-noon Concurrent Sessions:

The Development of an American Diplomatic Style Ward 2

America and the Politics of European Reconstruction Ward 5

12:15 p.m. Luncheon -- Address by Leslie Gelb

2:15-4:30 p.m. Concurrent Sessions:

The World According to Jackson and Lincoln Ward 5

The Global Economy and Cold War America Ward 3

6:00-7:00 p.m. Reception -- International Service Building Lounge

7:30 p.m. Dinner -- Address by Norman A. Graebner

Saturday, August 1

9:00-11:15 a.m. Concurrent Sessions:

The United States and the Middle East Since 1940 Ward 5

The Press and the President: The Kennedy Years Ward 3

11:30 a.m. Luncheon

**THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE FOR THE
BEST SCHOLARLY ARTICLE IN U.S. DIPLOMATIC
HISTORY DURING 1979**

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Award for scholarly articles in American foreign affairs was set up in 1976 through the kindness of the young Bernath's parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, and it is administered through selected personnel of SHAFR. The objective of the award is to identify and to reward outstanding research and writing by the younger scholars in the area of U.S. diplomatic relations

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to the author of any article upon any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1981. The article must be among the author's first five (5) which have seen publication. Membership in SHAFR or upon a college/university faculty is not a prerequisite for entering the competition. Authors must be under thirty-five (35) years of age, or within five (5) years after receiving the doctorate, at the time the article was published. Previous winners of the S.L. Bernath book award are ineligible.

PROCEDURES: Articles shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR, Five (5) copies of each article (preferably reprints) should be sent to the chairman of the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee by January 15, 1982. The Chairman of the Committee for 1981 is Dr. Noel Pugach, Department of History, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$200.00. If two (2) or more authors are considered winners, the prize will be shared. The name of the successful writer(s) will be announced, along with the name of the victor in the Bernath book prize competition, during the luncheon for members of SHAFR, to be held at the annual OAH Convention, meeting in 1982, at Philadelphia.

AWARD WINNERS

1977 John C. A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)

- 1978 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
- 1979 Brian L. Villa (U of Ottawa, Canada)
- 1980 James I. Matray (New Mexico State University)
David A. Rosenberg (U of Chicago)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITION FOR 1980

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition was initiated in 1972 by Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in memory of their late son. Administered by SHAFR, the purpose of the competition and the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing of a lengthy nature by young scholars in the field of U.S. diplomacy.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: the prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1981. It must be the author's first or second book. Authors are not required to be members of SHAFR, nor do they have to be professional academicians.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. Thomas D. Schoonover, Department of History, University of Southwestern Louisiana, Lafayette, LA 70504. The works must be received not later than February 1, 1982.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$500.00 If two (2) or more writers are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be in Philadelphia.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

- 1972 Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
- 1973 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
- 1974 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
- 1975 Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
Stephen E. Petz (U of Massachusetts-Amherst)
- 1976 Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)

- 1977 Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
- 1978 James R. Leutz (North Carolina)
- 1979 Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston, MA)
- 1980 Michael Schaller (U of Arizona)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL LECTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship was established in 1976 through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and is administered by a special committee of SHAFR. The Bernath Lecture is the feature at the official luncheon of the Society, held during the OAH convention in April of each year.

DESCRIPTION AND ELIGIBILITY: The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address, delivered at the annual meeting with the AHA, but is restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer is expected to concern himself/herself not specifically with his/her own research interests, but with broad issues of importance to students of American foreign relations. The award winner must be under forty-one (41) years of age.

PROCEDURES: The Bernath Lectureship Committee is now soliciting nominations for the 1982 award from members of the Society agents, publishers, or members of any established history, political science, or journalism organization. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vitae, if available, should reach the Committee no later than December 1, 1981. The Chairman of the Committee, and the person to whom nominations should be sent, is Dr. Jerald A. Combs, Department of History, California State University, San Francisco, CA 94132.

HONORARIUM: \$300.00 with publication of the lecture assured in the SHAFR **Newsletter**.

AWARD WINNERS

- 1977 Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
- 1978 David S. Patterson (Colgate)
- 1979 Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
- 1980 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
- 1981 Burton Spivak (Bates College)



This third issue of the **AEAR Newsletter** continues our effort to provide significant information on teaching, research and publications in American-East Asian Relations. We have divided this task into 5 areas of focus and editorial responsibility. These are: 1) **Publications, Gary May**, Delaware; 2) **Courses in AEAR, Bradford Lee**, Harvard; 3) **Dissertations, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker**, Colgate; and 5) **Papers and Conferences, Michael Schaller**, Arizona.

To date, we have provided information on courses, dissertations, and grants (**SHAFR Newsletter**, Vol. XI, No. 2, June 1980), and on papers and conferences (**SHAFR Newsletter**, Vol. XI, NO. 4, December 1980). This issue focuses on research in progress.

We plan to update each of these 5 areas of focus in the coming year and to add several new related topics. We welcome current information about articles, books, dissertations, papers and conferences, and research. We also welcome comments and any suggestions about future directions. Please write to **Mordechai Rozanski, Office of International Education, Pacific Lutheran University, Tacoma, Washington 98447**.

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

The following list of research projects in progress was prepared by **Nancy Bernkopf Tucker** and covers the period from 1978 to 1981. It has been divided into general and country categories and includes information on the name of the researcher(s), the institutional affiliation, the discipline (where available), the research topic or the title of a completed or forthcoming publication (indicated by T), the expected date of completion (where available; indicated by D), and the funding source (where available, indicated by F).

GENERAL

Austin, James D. Yale University.

(T) Far Eastern Policy of the Truman Administration; (F) Harry S Truman Library Institute, 1978-79.

- Buhite, Russell D. University of Oklahoma, History.
 (T) **Soviet American Relations in Asia, 1945-1954**; (D) expected publication, Summer 1981; (F) University of Oklahoma Research Fund.
- Burns, Roy Gene. University of Missouri at St. Louis, History.
 (T) American-Asian Relations in the 20th Century.
- Butow, R.J.C. University of Washington, School of International Studies. (T) Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Far East; (F) John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation, 1978-79.
- Cohen, Warren, I. and Janice P. Cohen, Michigan State University, History. (T) Art as a Vehicle for American Understanding of East Asian Culture, 1784-1894; (F) Luce Foundation Grant to the University of Chicago.
- Daniels, Roger. University of Cincinnati.
 (T) Comparative History of Asian Immigration to North America.
- Dingman, Roger. University of California, History.
 (T) Development of United States Strategic Plans for War in East Asia, 1945-1954; (F) Center for Advanced Research, U.S. Naval War College.
- Doenecke, Justus D. New College of the University of South Florida.
 (T) Chapters on United States-Asian policies in: **Not to the Swift: The Old Isolationists in the Cold War Era** (Lewisburg, Pa.: Bucknell University Press, 1979), and **The Presidencies of James A. Garfield and Chester A. Arthur**; (D) expected publication, Spring 1981.
- Fox, Galen. Department of State.
 (T) The Evolving Sino-Japanese Relationship and the United States Response; (F) Council on Foreign Relations.
- Lee, Bradford, Harvard University, History.
 (T) "The Politics of National Priorities in the United States, China, and Japan, 1919-1941."

AMERICAN-CHINESE RELATIONS

- Carter, Carolle. Menlo College, History/Political Science.
 (T) The American Observer Group in Yen-an, 1944-47; (F) U.S. Army Military History Institute.
- Chan, Gilbert. Miami University (Ohio), History.
 (T) Co-editor of **China's Foreign Relations: Selected Studies**; (D) forthcoming. [The book emphasizes China's relations with the United States, the Soviet Union, and Taiwan during the 1970s.]
- Chen, Chi. National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), History.
 (T) American Public Opinion and the Twenty-one Demands of 1915; (F) Asia Foundation.
- Chern, Kenneth S. University of Hong Kong, History.
 (T) Sino-American Relations, 1961-1972: Mutual Perceptions and

- Policies; (F) Moody Grant from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation, 1977, and University of Hong Kong Research Grants, 1976-1979.
- Chong, Key Ray. Texas Tech University, History.
(T) Enlightened Self-interest: The Role of Americans in Chinese Reform and Revolutionary Movements, 1898-1922.
- Chu, Samuel C. Ohio State University, History.
(T) Contributor to **The Future of Taiwan: A Different of Opinion**, (White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1980); (F) Johnson Foundation.
- Cohen, Warren I. Michigan State University, History.
(T) Chinese American Relations, 1949-1979; and Historiography of Chinese-American Relations Since 1945 (works published since 1969); (D) expected completion, May 1981.
- Crow, Michael G. University of California (Irvine), History.
(T) America's Liberal Order and China's Revolution; (F) Eleanor Roosevelt Institute.
- Davids, Jules. Georgetown University, History.
(T) Editor, **American Diplomatic and Public Papers: The United States and China; The United States and China, Imperial Rivalries, 1861-1893**. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1979, and **The Sino-Japanese War to the Russo-Japanese War, 1894-1905**; (D) expected completion, Spring 1981.
- Dayer, Roberta Allbert, State University College (Fredonia), History,
(T) Biography of Sir Charles Addis, 1861-1945; (F) American Philosophical Society.
- Detrick, Robert H. North Texas State University.
(T) Biography of Henry Andrea Burgevine.
- Dow, Tsung-i, Florida Atlanta University, History.
(T) Why Marxism Obscured American Influence in China.
- Doenecke, Justus. New College of the University of South Florida, History.
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Petillo, Carol H. Boston College, History.

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