

The Society for Historians of American
Foreign Relations



NEWSLETTER

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SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Founded in 1967. Chartered in 1972.

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MEMBERSHIP: Anyone interested in U. S. diplomatic history is invited to become a member of SHAFR. Annual dues are \$12.50, payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Fees for students are \$6.00, for retired members are \$8.00, and institutional affiliations are \$30.00. Life memberships are \$175.00. In the case of membership by a husband-wife team dues, one of them shall be one-half that of the regular price.

MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in August. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZES: The Society administers three awards a year, all of them in honor of the late Stuart L. Bernath and all of them financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California. The details of each of these awards are given under the appropriate headings of each issue of the **Newsletter**.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors two printed works of a quarterly nature, the **Newsletter**, and **Diplomatic History**, a journal. All members receive these publications.

THE BRITISH PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, NEW STYLE

by

Robert Frazier (University of Nottingham)

In reviewing my set of SHAFR Newsletters, I note that the article 'Research in the British Public Record Office' by Professor Scholes in Vol. I, No. 1 (December 1969) has never been up-dated. Since that time a large number of British Government records have been released, although their availability is not always obvious. More important is the fact that most of the material SHAFR members will want to see is now in a new home.

The bulk of the modern files of the Public Record Office was moved in 1977 to a new purpose-built center at Kew, about eight miles from the old location in the middle of London. The new building is located on Ruskin Avenue, just off the South Circular Road (Route A205), a few hundred yards south of Kew Bridge and not far from the great tourist attraction of Kew Gardens. There is good parking just outside the building, but the main road net-work is narrow two-lane, so that plenty of time should be allowed if arriving by car. Kew Gardens Underground Station (District Line) is less than ten minutes walk; a No. 27 'bus to Kew Green from the Marylebone Road area of central London will probably be less expensive. The search rooms are open from 9:30 to 5, Monday through Friday, except for British holidays and a stock-taking period of about two weeks each October. The entry lounge is open at 9 a.m. for the shelter of early arrivals.

Admission is strictly by Reader's Ticket which is obtained by writing well in advance for an application form to The Keeper, Public Record Office, Ruskin Avenue, Kew, Richmond, Surrey, TW9 4DU, England. While it may be possible to arrange for a ticket once you have arrived in London, this will take some time (at least half a day). Applicants will be informed that a ticket will be issued on their first visit, at which time they will need positive identification (a passport is best).

The ground floor of the new building consists of a reception center, check room, lounge, and a restaurant. When the building first opened, the restaurant provided a fairly extensive menu, waitress service, and a respectable wine list. Unfortunately, most of the patrons were more interested in snatching quick food in order to get back to their documents, so that it has come down to cafeteria service. Even so, one can obtain a full meal or sandwiches, along with bottled beer or wine by the glass, at reasonable prices. The coffee, for England, is excellent.

The working area is on the first floor (American second floor). This comprises two large reading rooms (one not yet in use, but not at present needed) and the main reference room. Upon arrival on this floor turn left into the Langdale Reading Room, and ask at the delivery desk for an assignment to a seat and a bleeper. The bleeper will sound whenever documents are available for you. Then go to the reference room and find a vacant computer terminal (you may have to get in line at

busy periods). The terminals have excellent instructions, and are programmed to catch errors and to tell you about them politely. You type in your ticket number, seat number and the class and file number of the documents you want. You may order three 'pieces' (i.e., folders of documents) initially, and three more when the first lot have arrived at the delivery desk. After that, you may only order an additional piece after you have returned one. The computer will administer a rap on the knuckles if you exceed six pieces on order or on hand at any one time.

It will take from half an hour to an hour to receive each document, since delivery is by human hand, and the Record Office is usually understaffed. This delay can be a nuisance when one is combing a long series of files looking for one piece of information--it is often possible to finish your review of all six pieces in less than the delivery time. For this reason, it is wise to order a new piece as soon as each earlier one has been returned. No documents can be ordered for same day delivery after 3:30, so that it is important to have the full permitted number of pieces on order at this time. You can order documents for delivery next morning, and have pieces held for you overnight.

Working conditions are excellent. The building is air-conditioned (a sweater or jacket is advisable). Seats are at hexagonal desks which are well-lit and have reasonable space. There is a separate area for those wishing to use their own typewriters. All longhand work must be done in pencil.

Photostat facilities (last order at 4 p.m.) are readily available, but the average order requires three days to process. Photostats will be mailed at your expense (but airmail to the states will cost about 25 cents per page; surface about 10 cents). The photostats themselves are quite expensive--about 40 cents per page. The quality is sometimes poor, especially if the original is handwritten (often the case) or a carbon copy typed on both sides of flimsy paper. Keep detailed notes identifying each page sent to photocopy; otherwise you may end up with some valuable material to which you cannot put the appropriate file numbers.

There are usually two Assistant Keepers on duty in the Reference Room plus one or two in the Reading Room. They are most helpful, but cannot be expected to know the intimate details of the particular topic you are working on.

The printed guide books on the Public Record Office are useful, but they offer little specific help on the post-1939 period. A great deal of valuable research time can be saved by detailed study in advance of **Lists and Indexes, Public Record Office, London**, Millwood (N.J.): Kraus-Thompson, Supplementary Series, No. XIII, Vols. 18-22, 24-28. These volumes comprise lists of numbers and titles of the folders of documents (pieces) which have or will be deposited by the Foreign Office, including those not yet released. The titles are usually accurate descriptions, but you cannot rely on them. A folder entitled 'Visit of the Ambassador to Athens to the Foreign Office' dated just before the events leading to the Truman Doctrine turned out to concern the demands of the Athens Embassy for more refrigerators. The Kraus-Thompson volumes are complete for the Foreign Office through

F0371 Citations

by

Robert Frazier, The University of Nottingham

The publication in the September 1981 **Newsletter** of the **Diplomatic History Guidelines and Style Sheet** was most useful, but it raises one point of argument with respect to the method of citation of documents in F0371 (British Foreign Office Political Correspondence).

There are two methods of citation for this record class. The first is that now specified for **Diplomatic History**, requiring four elements, e.g.: W15465/24/802/, in which W is the symbol of the specific department of the Foreign Office originating the file; 15465 the file number; 24 the code number of a group of files on the same general subject; and 802 an indicator for a specific subdivision of the department dealing with the matter. The other method would identify this file simply as: 50268/15465, where 50268 is a Public Record Office index known as the 'piece number' (in actuality the call number for a bundle of related files) and 15465 the file number.

What may be surprising, and is definitely important, is that the simpler second citation identifies one and only one file. The first and more elaborate reference will often lead to two or more different files; in other words, it is not an exclusive citation. This is because the Foreign Office starts numbering its files from '1' at the beginning of each year. Therefore W15465/24/802 may be used every year for a new and different file. Not all such references are duplicated, but the possibility is always present. A few minutes' check turns up these two examples:

E1683/46/31 refers to one file in PRO piece number 52572 (a bundle of 1946 files) under the general title 'Future Status of Transjordan'; and equally to a different file in piece number 61768 (a 1947 bundle) under the title 'Sundry Expressions of Opinion on the Palestine Question'. Similarly, UE1261/38/53 refers both to a file in piece 52982 (1946) and to a completely different one in piece 62332 (1947). Admittedly, in many cases the year of origin of the file will be known; but there will certainly be instances when it is neither stated nor obvious from context. The problem of possible duplication in the system now prescribed could be cured by adding the year to the citation, e.g.: W15465/24/802/1945. This would make it an exclusive citation, but this is cumbersome compared to 50268/15465.

An equally important reason for using the simple 'piece and file' citation is that of easy access to the file. It cannot be ordered at the Public Record Office by using the reference **Diplomatic History** now prescribes. Instead this file number must be searched for in **Lists and Indexes** under the appropriate year, department, sub-department, and subject group, in order to determine the piece number (which is the only number the PRO computer will recognize). If the file is dated 1947 or later, the piece number can at present only be found in the Reference Room in the Public Record Office itself, requiring the unnecessary use of precious London time. With the 'piece and file' citation, the file can be ordered immediately.

Diplomatic History has in the past normally used a combination of the two systems, e.g.: 19828/A3150/170/45,¹ where 19828 is the piece number. There can be no objection to wishing to reduce the length of the citation, but why drop the piece number, when the letter symbol and the two last elements can be dropped instead?

Finally, **Diplomatic History**, by setting an example, might encourage graduate students to use the same system. At present, it may require several days to identify the references to F0371 in an American Ph.D. dissertation, in order to verify them in the PRO.

For all these reasons, it is strongly urged that **Diplomatic History** adopt the 'piece and file' system of citation for F0371, instead of that now prescribed.

¹See articles by Harrison, V-3; Weiler, V-1; Boyle, III-1; Grace, III-2. Wittner, III-2 and IV-2, uses the piece and file system alone; Gormly, IV-2, and Miscamble, II-2, use the newly prescribed system; Pollack, V-3, uses both at different times.

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The Final Report* on

A GUIDE TO AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS SINCE 1700

by

Richard Dean Burns, editor

Three years of work is finished and the SHAFR **Guide** will soon be a reality. This announcement will undoubtedly come as a surprise to those well-meaning colleagues—with previous experiences in putting together collaborative works—who warned me that, while the idea of having some 40 specialists develop chapters was fine, it would be impossible to obtain promised work. I'm pleased that they were wrong; indeed, the cooperative spirit displayed by the participants leaves me with a debt of gratitude which I hope will be partially repaid by the finished **Guide**. To those many individuals who contributed "above and beyond" their initial commitments, I would like to add an additional "thank you." And to Warren Kuehl, University of Akron, a special "thanks" for his advice and support during the early stages when both were truly needed. Mary Gormly, Reference Librarian at California State University, Los Angeles, deserves special recognition for her long hours spent tracking down errant bibliographical citations. Financial grants from the Alvin M. Bentley Foundation and the National Endowment for the Humanities were essential as they provided time for me to edit the chapters and typing and photo-copying of various drafts.

The new **Guide** is the result of a truly cooperative effort. Bibliographical references supplied by contributing editors were frequently moved to other chapters as the basic design and scope of **Guide** was altered to accommodate new suggestions and themes. While seeking to make sure that the volume provided a comprehensive review of American foreign relations, I have sought to make sure that each chapter provides a comprehensive review of its particular topic. Thus the researcher will have access to nearly 10,000 specific references as well as nearly 3,000 cross-referenced items.

The following is the **Table of Contents** of the **Guide**, with the contributing editors:

Chapter

- 1 Reference Aids
(David Trask, Department of State)
- 2 Overviews: Diplomatic Surveys, Themes & Theories
(Richard Dean Burns, Cal. St., Los Angeles)
- 3 Colonial and Imperial Diplomacy, to 1774
(Larry Kaplan, Kent State U)
- 4 The American Revolution, 1775-1783
(William Stinchcombe, Syracuse)

*This report is built on my "Interim Report on the **Guide to American Foreign Relations, 1700-1978**" which appeared in the **Newsletter** 10:1 (Mar. 1979), 33-37.

- 5 Confederation and Federalist Eras, 1783-1801
(Albert Bowman, U of Tennessee, Chattanooga)
- 6 The Jeffersonian Era, 1801-1815
(Bradford Perkins, Michigan)
- 7 Florida, Hispanic America, and the Monroe Doctrine
(Lester Langley, Georgia)
- 8 American Diplomatic and Commercial Relations with
Europe, 1815-1861
(John Schroeder, U of Wisconsin, Milwaukee)
- 9 U.S. and Mexico, 1821-1861
(David Pletcher, Indiana)
- 10 Canadian-American Boundary, 1783-1872
(Howard Jones, Alabama)
- 11 Civil War Diplomacy
(Frank Merli, Queens College, CCNY)
- 12 Expansionist Efforts after Civil War, 1865-1898
(Paul Holbo, Oregon)
- 13 The Spanish-American War, 1898-1900
(Armin Rappaport, U of California, San Diego)
- 14 U.S. Relations with Europe, 1865-1914
(Larry E. Gelfand & Scott R. Hall, Iowa)
- 15 U.S. and Latin America, 1861-1919
(Roger Trask, South Florida)
- 16 Peace, Arbitration and International Movements, to 1914
(Warren Kuehl, Akron)
- 17 U.S., East and Southeast Asia, to 1913
(Raymond Esthus, Tulane)
- 18 U.S., Turkey, Middle East and Africa, to 1939
(Thomas Bryson, West Georgia)
- 19 World War I and the Peace Settlement, 1914-1920
(Larry E. Gelfand and Scott R. Hall, Iowa)
- 20 Internationalism, Isolationism, Disarmament &
Economics, 1920-1937
(Robert Ferrell, Indiana)
- 21 Interwar Diplomacy, 1920-1937
(Robert Ferrell, Indiana)
- 22 Prelude to World War II, 1936-1941
(Edward Bennett, Washington State & Gary Ross,
La Verne)
- 23 Wartime Diplomacy, 1941-1945
(Forrest Pogue, Smithsonian Institution)

- 24 U.S. Cold War Diplomacy: Overviews, Historiography & Personalities
(John Gaddis, Ohio U)
- 25 Anglo-American-Soviet Diplomacy for the Postwar World, 1941-1945
(Warren Kimball, Rutgers U, Newark)
- 26 U.S. and the Soviet Union, 1946-1953
(Martin Sherwin, Tufts)
- 27 U.S. and East Asia, 1941-1953
(Michael Hunt, North Carolina)
- 28 U.S. and Europe, Since 1945
(Thomas Buckley, Tulsa)
- 29 U.S. and the Soviet Union, Since 1953
(Thomas Paterson, Connecticut)
- 30 U.S., Southeast Asia and the Indochina Wars, Since 1941
(George Herring, Kentucky)
- 31 U.S. East Asia, Since 1953
(Akria Iriye, Chicago)
- 32 U.S., Australia, New Zealand and the Central Pacific
(Joseph Siracusa, U of Queensland, Australia)
- 33 U.S. and the Middle East, Since 1941
(Bruce Kuniholm, Duke)
- 34 U.S., Caribbean and Central America, Since 1941
(Thomas Leonard, North Fla.)
- 35 U.S., Mexico, and South America, Since 1941
(Larry Hill, Texas A & M)
- 36 U.S. and Canada, Since 1945
(Robert Bothwell, U of Toronto)
- 37 U.S., South Asia, and Sub-Sahara Africa, Since 1914
(Gary Hess, Bowling Green St; Thomas Noer, Carthage;
& Louis Wilson, Claremont Men's College)
- 38 International Organizations, Law, and Peace Movements, Since 1941
(Warren Kuehl, Akron)
- 39 Economic Issues and Foreign Policy
(Joan Hoff Wilson, Arizona State)
- 40 The Arms Forces, Strategy & Foreign Policy
(Russell Weigley, Temple)

Undoubtedly we have overlooked important published works and probably I should have added additional topics and themes, but at some point it was necessary to stop collecting references and to organize and print what we had gathered. In our proposed 5-year up-date volume, I

am sure that we will be able to include those important items that were the victims of over-sight. To that end, I would hope that those of you who use the **Guide** would take the time to inform me of items overlooked and of topics and themes ignored.

In his perceptive **Preface** to the Guide, Professor Lawrence E. Gelfand argues that reference tools are essential to the pursuit of the historian's craft. In its manner of collecting published books and essays a bibliographical guide ought, he writes, "to suggest the kinds of issues and questions that scholars have been addressing and at least by implication those significant questions that continue to elude historical scholarship." It is my hope that we have done this.

State Department Records on Microfilm

by
Milton O. Gustafson

The National Archives has been microfilming selected groups of records with high research value since 1940. Under this program, negative microfilm is retained by the National Archives and positive prints are made from the master negatives and sold at moderate prices. The chief purposes of the program are to make archival sources more easily accessible to libraries, research centers, and scholars, and to insure against the loss of valuable information should the original records be destroyed.

Almost all of the records of the Department of State dated through 1906, now in the National Archives, have been published on microfilm. In addition, many of the records in the Department of State's Decimal File (a subject-filing system) for the period from 1910 to 1929 have been published on microfilm. These publications are listed, roll-by-roll, on pages 5-9 and 12-96 of the **Catalog of National Archives Microfilm Publications**, published in 1974 and available at no cost from the Publications Sales Branch, National Archives, Washington, DC 20408.

The Diplomatic Branch of the National Archives has produced over 500 other microfilm publications since publication of the 1974 Catalog. Because the existence of these publications is not well known, for a variety of reasons, this article will briefly describe some of them. More information (including roll lists) is available from the Diplomatic Branch. The current cost of microfilm publications is \$15 per roll, and each roll contains about 1000 pages.

In addition, the National Archives can furnish paper copies or microfilm copies of specific documents or entire files upon request. The cost is much higher (currently 20 cents per frame for negative microfilm and 25 cents per page for paper copies), but for a small amount of material it is still cheaper than a trip to Washington. It also is usually cheaper than microfilm offered by private microfilm publishers with extensive advertising budgets.

For example, there are over 8,000 intelligence reports prepared by the Research and Analysis Branch of the OSS, 1941-45, and the State Department 1945-61, in one series arranged by report number, in the

custody of the Diplomatic Branch. All of the reports dated through 1947 have been declassified, as have many of the reports dated from 1947 to 1961. The Diplomatic Branch can furnish copies of specific reports now, and plans to produce a microfiche publication of the entire series—one report per microfiche card. That way scholars can order specific intelligence reports from the National Archives for a nominal fee. Or, they can order copies of the intelligence reports from a microfilm publisher. Since records in the National Archives are in the public domain, there can be no objection if a microfilm publisher obtains a microfilm copy of selected intelligence reports and then offers them for resale to the public.

Already available on microfiche (at 46 cents per fiche; minimum order \$5) are the 63 numbered reports of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, 1947-49, (M1171, 73 microfiche cards, \$33.58).

Following is a list of other recent microfilm publications of the Diplomatic Branch which may be of interest to members of SHAFR:

Notter File on Postwar Planning

Documents of the Interdivisional Country and Area Committees, 1943-46 (T1221, 6 rolls)

Documents of the Postwar Programs Committee, 1944, (T1222, 4 rolls)

Minutes of Meetings of the Interdivisional Area Committee on the Far East, 1943-46 (T1197, 1 roll).

State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee

Minutes of Meetings of SWNCC, 1944-47 (T1194, 1 roll)

Minutes of Meetings of the Subcommittee for the Far East, 1945-47 (T1198, 1 roll)

Records of the Subcommittee for the Far East, 1945-48 (T1205, 14 rolls)

Records of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace, WWI

General Records, 1918-31 (M820, 563 rolls)

"Inquiry Documents" (Special Reports and Studies, 1917-19 (M1107, 47 rolls)

Letters of Application and Recommendation

Polk, Taylor and Fillmore Administrations, 1845-53 (M873, 98 rolls)

Pierce and Buchanan Administrations, 1853-61 (M967, 50 rolls)

Grant Administrations, 1869-77 (M968, 69 rolls)

General

Purport Lists for the Decimal File, 1910-44 (M973, 654 rolls)

Reports of Clerks and Bureau Officers, 1790-1911 (M800, 8 rolls)

Numerical and Minor Files, 1906-10 (M862, 1241 rolls)

Records Relating to Guano Islands, 1852-1912 (M974, 7 rolls)

Records of the Secretary of State's Staff Committee, 1944-47 (M1054, 5 rolls)

Marshall/Lovett Memorandums to President Truman, 1947-48 (M1135, 3 rolls)

Decimal File

The Diplomatic Branch has produced 35 microfilm publications of records in the Decimal File for various time periods (1910-29, 1930-39, and 1940-44) since 1974. A list of these publications will appear in a future issue of the **SHAFR Newsletter**.

SHAFR Election Returns

In the recent polling SHAFR members selected the following officers:

Vice President Ernest R. May (Harvard)
Council Member Gaddis Smith (Yale)
Council Member Lawrence S. Wittner (SUNY-Albany)
Nominations Committee . . . Ronald L. Steel (Carnegie Endowment)

The September 1981 issue of the SHAFR **Newsletter** incorrectly listed the chairman of the Bernath Memorial Book Competition for 1982. Books should be sent to:

J. Samuel Walker
Historical Office
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
1717 H Street, N.W. — Room 1015
Washington, D.C. 20555

The Woodrow Wilson Worshipers

by

Thomas A. Bailey

The existence of a Wilson cult came forcefully to my attention during the Christmas season of 1943. I was then teaching for the year at Harvard, on leave from Stanford, and had found time to examine the private papers of Wilson deposited in Washington. Some of the fruits of this research were incorporated in a paper that I read to a room filled with American historians at our annual meeting in New York City. I do not remember the precise title of my effort but it related to the numerous mistakes or alleged mistakes made by Wilson in negotiating the Treaty of Versailles with Germany. My primary purpose was to point out what had gone wrong the last time so that we could do better the next time, as indeed we did in 1945.

I sensed that my remarks were being received reasonably well, for I pointed out that a considerable number of Wilson's alleged miscalculations or blunders in peacemaking were unavoidable or otherwise defensible. After I had finished speaking, the meeting was thrown open to questions from the floor. Only three or so were forthcoming and they were quickly answered, including a somewhat irrelevant inquiry from a former contemporary of Wilson, "What about the mistakes of Prime Minister David Lloyd George at Paris?" I truthfully replied that British history was outside the area of my current research.

Unfortunately, a reporter for **Time** magazine was present and he evidently resorted to the unwritten rule of some journalists of this era: never exaggerate unless you improve the story. This newsman's subsequent account carried the lurid heading: "Wilson's 21 Blunders." No mention was made of the fact that I had absolved the President of any real responsibility for a considerable number of these alleged blunders, mistakes, or miscalculations.

The public outcry promptly began. Protesting letters from frustrated Democrats, superannuated clergymen, and other Wilson worshipers poured in on me and **Time** (issue of January 10, 1944). One of these complaints came to the magazine from an American historian in a college near Harvard. He probably had not been present when my paper was presented, but he evidently was eager to rely on the garbled report in **Time**.

Our **Newsletter** of September 1981 presents a challenging article by David F. Trask titled "Woodrow Wilson and the Coordination of Force and Diplomacy." The verdict is that the embattled President, in this phase of the post-armistice negotiations, failed to achieve the needed coordination. On two critical occasions the Treaty of Versailles, with the Covenant of the League of Nations incorporated as the first part at Wilson's insistence, came before the Senate for approval. The President's own countrymen and countrywomen failed to lend sufficient support. In both instances a sickly and secluded Wilson sent word from the White House to the Democratic minority to reject the treaty, with the dozen or so Lodge reservations added. Each time

enough of the loyal Wilson Democrats obediently voted negatively to defeat the necessary two-thirds vote.

In this manner Wilson himself blocked the only path by which he could possibly secure approval of the treaty. There is ample evidence in Wilson's private papers that the stubborn President was not completely his rational self after the massive stroke in September 1919. A fellow Democrat, Senator Ashurst of Arizona, bluntly warned him on the floor of the Senate, "If you want to kill your own child because the Senate straightens out its crooked limbs, you must take the responsibility and accept the verdict of history."

The harsh lesson was well learned by July 1945 — some twenty-five years later. After only six days of debate the United Nations charter was approved by the lopsided Senate vote of 89 to 2, in contrast with the futile eight or so months spent in debating the Versailles Treaty with the League covenant incorporated. An impassioned Senator Connally of Texas, referring in 1945 to the deadlock of 1919-1920, cried out, "Can you not see the blood on the floor?" Of course this blood was only figurative. But it obviously referred to the Democratic minority in the Senate, enough of whom had blindly done Wilson's bidding to kill the Treaty, including the League of Nations. The extent of Wilson's stubbornness and confusion is highlighted by his abortive private scheme, as preserved in his papers, to persuade the dissenting Senators to resign and stand for reelection on the treaty issue, in the manner of a parliamentary form of government. Then the President would accede to the wishes of the electorate.

In seclusion Wilson even pulled wires for an unprecedented third-term nomination by the Democrats in their National Convention of 1920 in San Francisco. In reality, this wreck of a man did not have the ghost of a chance of winning either the nomination or the election at the hands of a disillusioned electorate. In desperation Wilson finally decided to have the League of Nations issue thrown into the "solemn referendum" of the confusing presidential election of 1920. This was a dangerous and hopeless alternative, because the overwhelming Harding landslide of 1920 condemned Wilson's brain child to death as far as the United States was concerned.

My critical assessment of Wilson's handling of the peacemaking process was fully revealed in two books published by Macmillan in 1944 and 1945. They sold rather well and are still in print. The first one, **Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace** (1944), was most distasteful to Wilson admirers. The United States was then deep in World War II, so I had living proof that the peace had been lost. The second book, **Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal** (1945), also evoked the complaint from Wilsonians that I had been too critical of the President. There is, of course, a fine line between being critical and too critical, and the author is obviously in a better position than the ordinary reader to judge where that line should go. This second book also offended many Wilson worshipers, including an obviously elderly lady in New England. She wrote to me saying, "Young man, I wish you were here so I could slap your face."

The most violent blast of all came from the noted historian-political

scientist Charles A. Beard, who in a bitter anti-Roosevelt book condemned me for using the word "betrayal." He argued that Wilson did not betray anybody, although I am sure Beard must have recognized that I was using "betrayal" in the sense of raising high expectations and then disappointing them. Wilson certainly did so, particularly in his treatment of France and Germany and in his failure to provide millions of worried Americans with membership in a League of Nations designed to avert the next world war.

We can see through the haze of some sixty-three years that politics became involved to a dangerous degree in the Treaty debate. Wilson, the Democrat, had led in America's greatest war up to that point, and the Republicans were determined to return to the seats of power, as they did overwhelmingly in 1921. President Wilson and Senator Lodge obviously disliked each other but we now know that each was governed in large part by principle, including the presumed welfare of the nation. We also know that Wilson privately would accept some reservations to the Versailles treaty that were not markedly different from those proposed by Lodge, who for his part was consistent.

Back in 1912, President Taft, Wilson's portly predecessor, was a Republican, and Senator Lodge, a fellow Republican, had led the successful fight in the Senate to amend or water down Taft's proposed arbitration treaties with various nations. After these mutilated pacts had passed the Senate hatchet, they proved to be so unsatisfactory to President Taft that he refused to carry through the ratification process. In effect Wilson did essentially the same thing, when in desperation, he forced the infant League of Nations to run in the hopeless and confusing presidential race of 1920.

TEXTBOOKS REDUX: ROBERT FERRELL'S AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

Geoffrey S. Smith (Queens U.)

Historians of United States foreign relations have evinced in the recent past much concern with the state of their craft.¹ This introspection no doubt derives from the problems of falling enrollments and the unemployment of new PhD's, from the abysmal knowledge of Americans generally about world affairs, and from the uncertain status of American foreign policy itself. Despite numerous sophisticated monographs and articles that have appeared in the last decade, the emergence of a dynamic organization, and a journal providing younger scholars an outlet for their work, the future of diplomatic history in the classroom remains clouded.² Just when it seemed that diplomatic historians had overcome the alleged amateurism, imprecision, and lack of feel for social setting that earned them the appellation of "sports" from colleagues laboring in more arcane fields, along came the "new" social history, with its innovative methodology and its emphasis upon labor, blacks, and prenational subjects, to make the study of foreign relations again a stepchild.³

In 1964, on the eve of the bizarre events that impinged so dramatically upon the profession, I undertook at Berkeley my first graduate training in the history of American foreign policy, in a seminar conducted by Gerald Wheeler. As with most seminars, the first term of that course was devoted to mastering what struck me at the time (quaint notion) as an uncountable number of books, articles, and documents. The history of diplomatic history was a challenging field, but not nearly as foreboding as the tortured shopping bag Prof. Wheeler toted on the first day of classes. Within that bag lay heavier reading yet--"the textbooks" (historians reified!)--and each of us faced one week that term to consider and compare corresponding chapters from the twelve volumes, ranging from such hoary accounts as John W. Foster's **A Century of American Diplomacy, 1776-1876** (1900), to the latest work, at the time, Alexander DeConde's **A History of American Foreign Policy** (1963).

Whether Wheeler thought we were effete (the bag approached two stone) was beside the point; attacking these tomes was a masochistic exercise, and more than one of us felt that Wheeler's experience with the Navy had imbued him with a corresponding sadism. But this assignment, it later became clear, was something more--a rite of passage endured by a high proportion of graduate students. The effect of this experience is difficult to gauge: When we got jobs, a few joined the textbook writers; others chose not to emphasize texts in their courses; still others, the majority, preached the gospel according to Bemis, Bailey, Cole, Leopold, DeConde, Pratt, or Ferrell.

Gone from most reading lists by the late 1960s were such names as Carl Russell Fish, Willis F. Johnson, Louis M. Sears, Albert Bushnell Hart, and John Bassett Moore. In their stead a new generation of

historians entered the field, writing texts that reflected the ideological conflict of their times, and--spurred by the time lag that slowed passage of information from monograph to textbook--producing volumes that were opinionated and attractive. Reflecting the need to keep abreast of current foreign relations research, joint efforts by two or three writers were not uncommon.⁴ Meanwhile, the dreadnoughts of the field rolled on, reappearing in new editions. Like the late, lamented big car industry, however, few of these evidenced substantial innovation, beyond new prefaces to suggest novel contents, enlarged bibliographical sections, or a concluding chapter or two, usually ominous in tone, to "bring the story up to date."

Nevertheless, despite our lack of knowledge about the effects of textbooks upon generations of students, the revised texts retained their eminence in the classroom, indicating perhaps a mixture of their own virtues, and some inertia within our ranks. One author who has revised considerable portions of his text since it first appeared twenty-two years ago is Robert H. Ferrell, whose **American Diplomacy: A History** (3rd ed., New York: Norton, 1975), according to a recent survey in the **Newsletter**, still ranks as one of the "big three."⁵

Ferrell, of course, needs little introduction to SHAFR members, having served as its president in 1971-1972. An indefatigable and sometimes serendipitous digger in the archives, he wrote, among other studies, **Peace in Their Time** (1952), **American Diplomacy in the Great Depression** (1957), and biographies of Frank Kellogg, Henry Stimson, and George Marshall in the American Secretaries of State series, which he now edits. More recently, he edited collections of the correspondence of President Harry S. Truman and the diaries of Dwight D. Eisenhower, along with the former's **Autobiography**. In addition, Ferrell served as an editorial consultant for Scribner's, became a source of encouragement for many younger historians--not just his own students--and, as revealed in his contribution to **The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal** (1972), demonstrated little sympathy for new left revisionism.

Like all texts, **American Diplomacy** possesses its strong and weak points. Maps, illustrations and cartoons, representative documents, and opinionated historiographical comments are numerous and informative, and verse from such diverse poets as Joel Barlow, William Cullen Bryant, and Vinegar Joe Stillwell enhance the volume's literary quality. Ferrell's trump card, in fact, is his prose, which flows as clearly as the Monongahela once did. He is a master of the vignette, and this, combined with wit, understatement, and (usually) intellectual humility, makes his topical narrative a far more appealing read than he and his peers must have had wading through their mentor's sombre text.⁶

Some might say that Ferrell trivializes diplomatic history when he reveals, for instance, that JFK's "Berliner" speech in 1963 referred to a German sweet-roll as much as it did to the inhabitants of that city (p. 672). But humor of this sort provides the bridge educator Jerome S. Bruner once identified as necessary to close the gap between professional expertise and student ignorance. It may not be important to know that the expenditure for the Marshall Plan was only a fraction of

some substance behind such observations, no doubt, but they cause problems coming back in examination booklets.

If history is strange, wonderful, and inscrutable, it can also be inconsistent (a problem, in fairness, no textbook writer escapes). Take Ferrell's treatment of James K. Polk. In discussing his diplomacy prior to the Mexican War, Ferrell pictures an "able, conscientious, sincere man" (p. 196) who placed the national interest above partisan politics. Yet shortly thereafter (p. 200), Ferrell terms the conflict a "war of aggression" and establishes the possibility that a "correct diplomatic method" existed "to realize a good end." What this was we are never told. Similarly, if Polk rose above politics on the Mexican issue, he did not in his Oregon diplomacy. Were there two Polks? Did they overlap? Similarly, one does not have to accept the "back-door" theory of Pearl Harbor to quarrel with Ferrell's conclusion that U. S. Pacific policy before World War II was "correct and careful" (p. 556). The author himself admits that the Allies, the U. S. included, misread the meaning of the Tripartite Pact, and that policy planners in the Office of Naval Intelligence failed to heed warnings about Japanese intractability from Ambassador Joseph Grew. Here, as well, one would welcome more on how cultural perceptions on both sides interfered with conciliatory diplomacy.

There are other debatable generalizations, some of which might be classed with the "what-if" school of history. Might "statesmanship in London in the half-decade after 1770 [have] easily prevented further trouble by the colonists?" (p. 31). Perhaps, although Bernard Bailyn and Alan Heimert might demur. How can one know that the War of 1812 could have been avoided, "with honor" (p. 151), or that the conflict was the most unpopular war in U. S. history? Would George Bickley have become as famous as Sam Houston did twenty-five years earlier had Bickley been able to carve up Mexico into two dozen new slave states? Maybe, but he also might have ended his career as a filibusterer like Narciso López, or provoked European intervention. Certainly one agrees that "an active and responsible American foreign policy for peace" (p. 429) might have prevented World War I, but where would that policy have come from--given Woodrow Wilson's diplomatic inexperience and the state of the nation in 1914? Or, if Wilson had died of the stroke he suffered in 1919, would the Senate, in a burst of grief, have approved the Treaty of Versailles?

In like vein, sophisticated undergraduates will surmise what Thomas Jefferson was doing with "a certain Mrs. Walker" (p. 107), or how Smedley D. Butler earned the name, "old gimlet-eye" (p. 415). But students will miss consideration of the effects of NSC-68 upon post-World-War-II policy, wonder in light of Ferrell's distaste why John Foster Dulles was such "a stirring subject" (p. 673), and question why the Japanese militarists who sought control of Tokyo's foreign policy in the 1930s were "old enough to know better" (p. 535), why Napoleon sold Louisiana to the United States (p. 109), and why the Korean War ended (pp. 716, 826). A few no doubt will grumble at Ferrell's assigning, the **Pentagon Papers** notwithstanding, U. S. intervention in Vietnam to "the politics of inadvertence" and to French intrigues (pp. 721, 797), and

what Americans spent on liquor during the same period (p. 636), that the weight of ticker-tape and debris following General Douglas MacArthur's triumphal New York parade in 1951 was, at 16,600,000 lbs., more than four times that heaped upon the old soldier's nearest competitor (p. 715), or that India's population increased by approximately forty-five million in the five years between the appearance of the first and second editions of **American Diplomacy** (p. 723). But alcohol abuse, pollution, and population control are global concerns, and students have a way of remembering these points more easily than the intricacies of the Transcontinental Treaty negotiations. Whether presenting the best textbook account I have seen of the "Perdicaris Alive or Raisuli Dead" episode, lamenting the fate of Sir Edward Pakenham, or recounting Harold Nicolson's observation that the first diplomats may have been the **angeloi**, Ferrell makes it clear that wry humor, in the proper context, can be equally or more attractive than the strident tone that suffuses some recent texts, and more successful in countering the cynicism of a large part of our student population. A common-sense approach, expressed in the words of an unrepentant New Deal Democrat and self-confessed "inveterate generalizer and moralizer,"⁷ dominates **American Diplomacy**, which—although eschewing the presidential synthesis favored by many textbook writers—nonetheless stresses idiosyncratic rather than structural themes, and the implementation rather than formulation of policy. If this perspective detracts from explaining how the requirements of the Republic's domestic system affect its external behavior, Ferrell has never accorded; as have the radical historians, much importance to the so-called exogenous variables in American foreign relations. Although he writes, for example, of a "rising empire" in the late colonial period (p. 188), concedes that American expansionists behaved "like Europeans" in the mid-nineteenth century (p. 182), and refers to "American management of economic life everywhere in the world" in recent decades (p. 845), one searches in vain for an admission that economic developments have determined in a systematic and crucial way this country's diplomacy.

Readers may also question Ferrell's explanations of causation and change, which at times recall the old radio show, "I Love a Mystery." Like the Roman historian Livy, who subordinated the precision of statement to the perfection of style, and who assigned historical events to the intercession of the Gods, Ferrell at times pays homage to the ancient powers of **providencia**, **necesita**, and **virtú**. Granted that irony is the hand-maiden of history—and **American Diplomacy** is filled with irony—Ferrell makes one grope a bit when he explains that British sympathies during Civil War jumped from the South to the Union as a result of a "chapter of accidents, whatever it was, perhaps the inscrutable process of Manifest Destiny" (p. 250). One may agree with Ferrell, furthermore, that American success in the Oregon Treaty of 1846 indicated that "history sometimes works in strange and wondrous ways. . ." (p. 217), or with his comment that "strange is the course of history" when, a century after concluding that the Ryukyu Islands were not worth fighting for, Washington fought for them (p. 240). There is

some substance behind such observations, no doubt, but they cause problems coming back in examination booklets.

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probably fewer still--given the current disposition to extol the virtues of that "noble" conflict--will rail at his judgment that student radicals committed the "stupidity of stupidities" when they occupied university and college administration buildings (p. 795).

Ferrell clearly possesses what Charles S. Maier calls "a feel for the perceived constraints on possible historical choices," and he recreates convincingly "the plausible context in which policy debate took place." This is a traditional skill, Maier observes, "no easier for being traditional," but offering little enticement to prospective historians, and not much incentive to ethnocentric undergraduates.⁸ Although it is unfair to ask Ferrell to be a man for all seasons (he's done pretty well so far), one hopes that authors of future textbooks will address themselves more to the fundamental interplay between culture and power, and between force and diplomacy, and that the new textbooks will also incorporate more systematic analyses of the historic foreign policy roles of private interest groups, bureaucracies, and competing domestic and external economic systems.

This brief essay neglects Ferrell's stand on the now-arid debate concerning the origins of the Cold War. Yet one should mention his disinclination to use history to remake the present and influence the future. Like Reinhold Niebuhr and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Ferrell believes that history is no redeemer, and that in the long run neither statesmen nor citizens will transcend their inherent limitations and the heavy burdens they bear. Anxiety and frustration, rather than progress and fulfillment, will comprise the lot of policy makers in years to come, and there really isn't much to be done except to persevere in the quest for survival. If this Sisyphean predicament bolsters current moral values and establishment policies, it also reflects our imperfect world, where diplomatic choice usually means a lesser evil. In discerning that some global problems now lie beyond American competence, students may yet learn the most valuable lesson of all.

NOTES

¹See, for example, Alexander DeConde, "What's Wrong With American Diplomatic History," **SHAFR Newsletter**, 1(May, 1970), 1-16; Thomas J. McCormick, "The State of American Diplomatic History," in Herbert Bass(ed.), **The State of American History** (New York, 1970), pp. 119-141; Laurence Evans, "The Dangers of Diplomatic History," in *ibid.*, pp. 142-156; David S. Patterson, "What's Wrong (and Right) with Diplomatic History? A Diagnosis and a Prescription," **SHAFR Newsletter**, 9(September, 1978), 1-14; Robert D. Schulzinger, "The Reaction of Falling Expectations: Diplomatic History Today," paper delivered to OAH, Detroit, April, 1981.

²Cf. Alexander DeConde, **American Diplomatic History in Transformation** (Washington, 1976).

³Charles S. Maier, "Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations," in Michael Kammen(ed.), **The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States** (Ithaca, 1980), p. 355.

⁴Lloyd C. Gardner, Walter F. LaFeber, Thomas J. McCormick, **Creation of the American Empire: U.S. Diplomatic History** (Chicago, 1973); Thomas G. Paterson, J. Garry Clifford, Kenneth J. Hagan, **American Foreign Policy: A History** (Lexington, Mass., 1977).

⁵William Stueck, "Report on a Survey of Instructors in American Diplomatic History," **SHAFR Newsletter**, 11(March 1980), 2-6. Cf. Sandra Caruthers Thomson and Clayton A. Coppin, Jr., "Texts and Teachings: A Profile of Historians of American Foreign Relations in 1972," *ibid.*, 4 (September, 1973), 4-23.

⁶That text, of course, is Samuel F. Bemis, **A Diplomatic History of the United States** (New York, 1936).

⁷Robert H. Ferrell, "The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman," **SHAFR Newsletter**, 11(December, 1980), 7.

⁸Maier, "Marking Time," p. 357.

ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED, OR SCHOLARLY PAPERS DELIVERED BY MEMBERS OF SHAFR

(Please limit abstracts to a total of twenty (20) lines of **Newsletter** space, or approximately two hundred (200) words. The desire to accommodate as many contributors as possible, plus the overriding problem of space, makes this restriction necessary. Double space all abstracts, and send them as you would have them appear in print. For abstracts of articles, please supply the date, the volume, the number within the volume, and the pages. It would be appreciated if abstracts were not sent until after a paper has been delivered, or an article has been printed. Also, please do not send abstracts of articles which have appeared in **Diplomatic History**, since all SHAFR members already receive the latter publication).

THE 1981 SHAFR PROGRAM

The seventh annual SHAFR national meeting took place at The American University in Washington, D.C., July 30 - August 1, 1981. It sought to provide some common ground for the full range of the members' interests.

The opening session on Thursday evening at American University focused on "Historians' Access to Government Documents: At Crisis Stage?" Chaired by Wayne S. Cole of the University of Maryland, the panel included Dr. Milton O. Gustafson, Chief of the Diplomatic Branch of the National Archives; Dr. William Z. Slany, Acting Historian of the Department of State; Professor Betty Miller Unterberger of Texas A & M University, chairperson for the Department of State Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation; and Professor Lloyd C. Gardner of Rutgers University, chairman of the OAH ad hoc Committee on the **Foreign Relations** Series and Government

Declassification Policies. Three of the five are members of SHAFR's new standing Committee of Government Relations.

The first speaker, Dr. Gustafson, traced the historical evolution of government policies on research access to files of the Department of State. He explained that from 1938 to 1972 Department of State records generally were opened year-by-year, after 25 to 30 years, with relatively few documents withheld. President Nixon's Executive Order of 1972, amendments to the Freedom of Information Act effective in 1975, and President Carter's Executive Order of 1978 changed that relatively simple system into something that is incredibly complex. With those changes, if Department of State records are in the National Archives they are open for research, but many more documents are withdrawn. Earlier policies provided that certain categories of **documents** were withdrawn, but now categories of **information** are withheld from researchers. That change has fundamental and troublesome significance. To find the restricted information hundreds of people must read millions of pages to withdraw thousands of documents. Because of the length of time needed to review the 1950-1954 files it is unlikely that they can be made available in the National Archives before 1985—if then.

Filling in for Dr. David Trask who had recently resigned as Historian of the Department of State, Dr. Slany described the role of the Office of the Historian in the preparation of the **Foreign Relations** volumes, and the impact of Executive Order 12065 and the Department of State's Classification/Declassification Center on the functioning of the Office of the Historian. Though a **Foreign Relations** volume was published in July 1981, 1977 was the last year in which any substantial number of volumes in the series were published. Professor Unterberger and Professor Gardner detailed and updated in alarming terms their earlier committee reports on difficulties and crises seriously slowing publication of the **Foreign Relations** volumes and blocking early transfer of Department of State files on readily usable terms to National Archives.

The attentive audience of more than 120 persons included many active research historians, as well as professional historians from the Department of State, National Archives, and other government offices. Questions and contributions from that audience further underscored the difficulties facing diplomatic historians doing research in government records. Among those in the audience contributing to the deliberations were Edwin Allen Thompson of National Archives, Samuel R. Gammon, III, of the American Historical Association, and John P. Glennon of the Department of State. The session adjourned with the admonition that the alarming problems called for increased vigilance and positive efforts by individual historians and by professional organizations to act (perhaps through their legislative representatives in Congress) lest the **Foreign Relations** series and America's reputation for openness in the research use of government records be eroded even further.

On the morning of July 31, Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State) presided

at a session of the Seventh Annual Conference of SHAFR, American University, entitled "The Development of an American Diplomatic Style." Jonathan Dull (Papers of Benjamin Franklin) presented the first paper on Franklin as a diplomatic traditionalist. He found a problem in distinguishing between Franklin the traditionalist from Franklin the revolutionary diplomat. In contrast to his companions in Paris he was a traditionalist, using restraint and civility as tools to win practical goals. James Hutson of the Library of Congress cast Adams in a Franklin mold as far as Adams' position in the traditional mode of balance-of-power diplomacy is concerned. His title "John Adams: Militia Diplomat" was used ironically. William Stinchcombe (Syracuse University) found John Marshall by contrast not a diplomat at all, but a negotiator. He was preeminently a lawyer, making his stay in France an occasion for displaying his technical skills as an adversary. Marshall had the virtue of being more flexible than his colleague, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, at least in the outset of his mission to France. Albert Hall Bowman (University of Tennessee at Chattanooga) observed that, while each of the diplomats had different styles, they shared the common American view of the era: namely, that America was unique and should avoid temptation to have that quality compromised by excessive attachment to any European nation. Their means may have been traditional and pragmatic, but the principles they defended were revolutionary in the implications they held for the monarchies of Europe.

Approximately fifty people attended the session on "America and the Politics of European Reconstruction." Dr. Carolyn Eisenberg (Institute for Research in History) presented a paper entitled "Reflections on the Soviet Menace: the German Example, 1945-1949," and essentially blamed the United States for the developments that led to the partition of Germany. She argued that the United States and the Soviet Union originally wanted some cooperation but when conservatives forced an anti-labor posture on the State Department the Soviets reacted to protect the "worker state" they had created in East Germany. Professor Peter Boyle's (University of Nottingham) paper "The British Foreign Office View of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1948: The Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan," utilized recently opened papers of the Foreign Office to stress the important role played by the British in moving the United States toward greater involvement in European affairs. He stressed the point that containment was not a policy hatched in Washington and forced on a reluctant Europe as the price for economic aid. Professor Thomas Lairson (Rollins College) took a more theoretical approach in his paper "The Assumption and Exercise of Hegemony: American Foreign Policy, 1948-1950." Lairson, a political scientist, presented the Hegemonic model of international relations and then attempted to fit United States policy into this mold.

Professor Raymond J. Raymond (University of Connecticut) presented an incisive and vigorous commentary. He praised Boyle for an enlightening paper, but noted that he played down the extent to which the Europeans misled the United States, and got what they wanted from American diplomats. As for Professor Lairson, Raymond

suggested that he now spend some time in the archives documenting his theoretical model. Dr. Eisenberg did not see fit to send her paper to anyone so the brief critique was based on the oral presentation. Raymond's main criticism was that Eisenberg followed the "New Left" line in attacking the diplomacy of the open world, but by implication accepted the desirability of a closed world.

Robert Beisner, who undertook responsibility for local arrangements of the meeting, presided over the noon luncheon, which was attended by 95 people. The featured luncheon speaker was Leslie Gelb, Washington correspondent for **The New York Times**, who spoke on the topic, "Trying to Get Diplomatic Truths in Washington." He tried with admirable boldness to advise the assembled historians on which principles of historical evidence to employ in establishing the veracity of various reports emanating from the capital.

There were two sessions Friday afternoon. The first paper, presented by David J. Calabro of the U.S. Military Academy, was entitled "The Diplomacy of Andrew Jackson: In the American Tradition." Instead of viewing Jacksonian diplomacy narrowly within its contemporary setting like most historians hitherto, Calabro undertook to examine it as "part of the unfolding record of a specific generation of American diplomats who adjudged the formative concepts and assumptions that characterized United States diplomatic tradition." Although Jackson's domestic politics were often imbued with idealism and an urge toward reform, his foreign policies reflected the same conservatism as those of his predecessors. Jacksonian diplomats "rendered the country a successful if limited service" — successful because they recognized "the nation's consistently improving position within the hemisphere and the world" without exceeding the bounds of American power, and limited because, as many other historians have observed, Jackson was not confronted with many major diplomatic problems. Calabro developed his interpretation primarily by discussing in some detail Jackson's handling of two questions, the French debt and Texan annexation.

The second paper, presented by Norman Ferris of Middle Tennessee State University, was entitled "Lincoln and Seward in Civil War Diplomacy: Their Relationship at the Outset Reexamined." Ferris' purpose was direct and simple—to remove the "one striking blemish" on the record of a great secretary of state by demonstrating that "Seward's foreign war panacea is a historians' hallucination," a myth whose persistence says more about historians' inability to appreciate the plain meaning of the written word than about Seward's war mongering. The conventional exaggerated interpretation of Seward's memorandum of April 1, 1861, Ferris argued, stems largely from the writings of Lincoln's two secretaries, John Nicolay and John Hay, and a later journalist, Patrick Sowler. After detailed examination of the memorandum in question, Ferris concluded that Seward was really seeking Presidential approval of a hard-nosed policy that would prevent foreign war by warning Europe not to intervene in the Western hemisphere, as well as authority to carry out that policy without

interference from other cabinet members. Ferris characterized Seward as forthright, honest, and ebulliently optimistic, with "a strong aversion to war."

The two commentators, John Offner of Shippensburg State College and Thomas M. Lansburg of the Alabama Department of Archives and History, agreed to divide the two papers between them. Offner gave Jackson low marks for realism in the French debts question and found that his handling of Texas owed much to domestic political considerations. Offner suggested that a better illustration of Calabro's continuity thesis might be found in Jackson's support of commercial expansion. The other commentator, Lansburg, received Ferris' controversial paper about Seward only a few days before the convention and, not having time to prepare a suitable commentary, abandoned his plans to attend the session.

Although Ferris' paper thus received little attention from the formal commentators (Offner volunteered a few remarks impromptu), it drew nearly all the fire from a responsive audience of about forty, which repeatedly called on Ferris to defend his points. The result was a lively discussion which could hardly be stopped at the end of the allocated time. Most questioners were less than fully convinced of Seward's pacific intentions and wondered whether Ferris had not relied too heavily on surmise in interpreting the April 1 memorandum. An atmosphere of polite skepticism pervaded the hall at the end of the session, along with the appreciative glow that usually follows a good argument in which all sides feel they have come off well.

About 60 people attended the Friday afternoon session on "The Global Economy and Cold War America," moderated by Duane Tananbaum of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Vassar College. Blanche Wiesen Cook, Professor of History at John Jay College, the City University of New York, spoke on "The Economics of Eisenhower's American Century." She emphasized the economic rationale behind the Administration's foreign policy, maintaining that Eisenhower, Dulles, George Humphrey, and C.D. Jackson sought to establish a world in which American capitalism could continue to expand and prosper.

William H. Becker of the George Washington University then examined "Bureaucratic Organization and American Foreign Economic Policy: The Nixon Years." Dr. Becker stressed that the Nixon Administration's failure to build a bureaucratic organization within the government capable of integrating economic policy to diplomacy proved costly both in terms of the broad economic interests of the United States and in terms of the Administration's own foreign policy goals. In particular, he focused on how the lack of a competent bureaucratic structure contributed to the Nixon Administration's mishandling of the devaluation of the dollar and the dispute over most-favored-nation status for communist states in the Trade Act of 1974.

Commentator Linda Killen of Radford University then compared and contrasted the two papers, pointing out their relative strengths and weaknesses. And, as time permitted, the panelists responded to a number of comments and questions from members of the audience.

In the evening, Charles DeBenedetti presided over a dinner attended by 130 people. In his featured address, Norman Graebner, Stettinius Professor of History at the University of Virginia, discussed "Bismarck's Europe: An American View," and effectively demonstrated the familiarity and sophistication that different late 19th century American leaders showed in their assessment of the contemporary European balance of power. Immediately prior to Professor Graebner's presentation, it was announced that the SHAFR Council had voted to establish the Graebner Prize, which is to be awarded annually to the outstanding book dealing with the history of U.S. foreign relations to 1900.

At an informal session later that evening, Professor David Culbert (LSU-Baton Rouge) showed portions of "Television's Vietnam," a film that he and Peter Rollins are completing on the impact of television news reporting on the U.S.-Vietnamese War. A good many questions and comments followed Culbert's presentation.

In the morning of Saturday, August 1, two sessions took place. The session on "The Press and the President: The Kennedy Years" met at 9:00 a.m. on Saturday, August 1, 1981, in the Ward Building, Room 3, American University. About 35 members of SHAFR attended. Dr. Montague Kern, a Washington media analyst, and Professor Ralph Levering of Earlham College, presented papers on Kennedy and the press which were the product of a large collaborative research project for a book on the same topic. While conceding Kennedy's skill in dealing with the press, the papers challenged the notion that JFK's press management left him maximum flexibility in the area of foreign policy.

Dr. Kern focused on Kennedy's handling of the press. Using extensive interview material and research in the Kennedy Papers, she showed the deep personal involvement of Kennedy and his staff in developing favorable press relations and highlighted a number of the techniques they used. In general, she concluded, Kennedy was quite successful in dealing with the press. Examining the relationship between press and president in the Laotian and Berlin crises of 1961, however, she went on to argue that Kennedy's success had limits. In each case, the press put considerable pressure on the White House in the early stages, elevating the issues to the level of a crisis and forcing Kennedy's attention. Kern thus concluded that despite his skill in press relations and the patriotic climate in which he operated, Kennedy "frequently found himself under pressure from distinctly non-presidential forces at work on issues, visible and magnified in the press." The image of the imperial presidency, she added, may have been "overdrawn."

Professor Levering examined the response of the press to Kennedy's handling of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Buddhist crisis in Vietnam in late 1963. Employing several types of content analysis of five major newspapers representing various shades of American political

opinion, he concluded, like Kern, that despite Kennedy's skill at press relations, newspapers significantly influenced his foreign policy. In each case, the press, in the early stages, put significant pressure on the White House. In the Cuban Crisis, the pressure emanated from conservative newspapers and reflected the influence of Republican politicians. In the Vietnam crisis, it derived from moderate-liberal papers and to some extent reflected divisions within the administration itself on whether Ngo Dinh Diem should remain or should be replaced. In each instance, Kennedy was able to regain the initiative and effectively use the press only after he had instituted policies which conformed with the dominant criticism earlier manifested in the newspapers. In concluding that the press placed "important constraints" on the making of foreign policy in the Kennedy years, Levering went on to emphasize that the newspapers were not powers in their own right—David Halberstam's "powers that be"—but were reflectors "of issues raised by other forces in society."

The commentators praised both papers for their scholarly analysis of a problem which has been shrouded by myth and partisan controversy, but also raised a number of questions and challenged some of the authors' assertions. Professor David Culbert of Louisiana State University, whose research has concentrated on media influence on foreign policy, questioned whether Kennedy's skill at press relations was unique or even unusual in recent history, pointing out that Eisenhower's considerable success in this area was ignored by both papers. Culbert also questioned whether the central issues raised by the papers could be adequately dealt with without reference to television, which Kennedy considered at least as important as the press and which, in the case of Vietnam, may have had greater impact.

Chalmers Roberts, for many years diplomatic correspondent for the Washington **Post**, raised similar questions and offered a number of observations based on his personal experiences. Citing both FDR and Eisenhower as examples, Roberts agreed with Culbert that Kennedy's skill was hardly unique among recent presidents. In this regard, and also in regard to Vietnam, Roberts chided historians for not being sufficiently sensitive to continuity in history. Their tendency, he felt, was to emphasize the newness without reference to the precedents and accumulated political and intellectual baggage which so influences foreign policy and presidential leadership. Roberts also argued that necessarily subjective assessments of "atmospherics" were a more valid way of determining influences on decisions than the more scientific method of counting column inches and numbers of editorials. Roberts concurred with Culbert regarding the importance of considering television, but cautioned against overstating its influence. Much of what comes out of the television, he pointedly noted, originates in newspapers. After a spirited exchange among the panelists and questions from the audience, the session adjourned.

Incoming SHAFR president Lawrence Gelfand spoke at the Saturday noon luncheon that drew 40 people. Professor Gelfand noted the

increasing importance of SHAFR as an organization among internationally concerned scholars working on campuses that are experiencing declining interest in international studies. He also stressed the importance of genuine international history in place of the continuing emphasis among U.S. historians upon national particularism. Finally, he thanked the members of the Program Committee—Lloyd Ambrosius, Robert Beisner, Gary Hess, and Eugene Trani—for their work in arranging for the meeting. I would most emphatically do the same.

Respectfully,

Charles DeBenedetti
Chairman, 1981 Program Committee

OTHER ABSTRACTS

Joseph M. Siracusa (University of Queensland, Australia), "The Night Stalin and Churchill Divided Europe: The View from Washington," **Review of Politics**, 43, No. 3 (July, 1981), 381-409. This essay is essentially an analysis of the response of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration to Anglo-Soviet efforts to divide the Balkans in the late stages of World War II, from the May Agreement of 1944, which was in fact never consummated, to the Churchill-Stalin Percentage Agreement of October 1944, which was never implemented. Throughout the story of the Percentage Agreement, President Roosevelt emerges as a figure torn by the realities of war as perceived by the Churchills and Kennans on the one side and the higher ideals of postwar perceived by the Hulls and (Breckinridge) Longs on the other side. Surrounded by Department of State officials obsessed with fears that the division of eastern Europe into spheres of influence would lead to yet another "War for Survival," faced with a fourth Presidential election campaign, and knowing that there were no happy solutions to problems in the region but certain they would have to be dealt with at some time, it is not surprising to find FDR pursuing seemingly contradictory policies. Materials for the article were drawn mainly from the Public Record Office, London, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library and the Library of Congress.

_____, "U.S. Perspectives on the Utility of Military Force: Have Americans Learned the Lessons of Vietnam?" Paper read at the Strategic and Defense Studies Unit, Western Australian Institute of Technology, Perth, Australia, July 31, 1981. This paper traced the origins and evolution of the appeal to force to post-1945 United States policy makers, with particular attention to the Vietnam experience. It concludes that what is surprising is how seldom Americans have turned to force as a solution to political problems. It also suggests that the Reagan administration has little to learn from the "lessons" of Vietnam but much to learn about itself.

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James I. Matray (New Mexico State University), "Captive of the Cold War: The Decision to Divide Korea at the 38th Parallel," **Pacific Historical Review**, L, 2 (May 1981), 145-168. This article demonstrates that the Soviet-American partition of Korea was a direct outgrowth of the demise of the Grand Alliance and the emergence of the Cold War. Stalin's actions in Eastern Europe early in 1945 alarmed Truman greatly and convinced him that Moscow would pursue "sovietization" in Asia as well. Thus, shortly after becoming president, Truman abandoned Roosevelt's policy of pursuing a four-power trusteeship and began to search for an alternative that would eliminate any opportunity for Soviet expansion in Korea. Ultimately, Truman found the solution to the Korean predicament in the atomic bomb and the premature surrender of Japan, which, he hoped, would permit unilateral American occupation of Korea and the exclusion of the Soviet Union from participation in the reconstruction of that Asian nation. When the Red Army entered the Pacific war earlier than expected, Truman was fortunate to gain Stalin's approval for his proposal to divide Korea into two zones of occupation. The failure of Truman's gamble therefore resulted in the emergence of two Koreas and the Korean peninsula became a major political and military battleground in the Cold War.

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Stanley L. Falk (US Army Center of Military History), "General Kenney, The Indirect Approach, and the B-29's," **Aerospace Historian**, 27, No. 4 (Fall/September 1981), 147-55. This article traces the unsuccessful efforts of Gen. George C. Kenny, General MacArthur's air commander in World War II, to obtain the new strategic bomber, the B29, for use in the Southwest Pacific Theater (SWPA). Like MacArthur, Kenney held that the SWPA was the most important theater in the Pacific, and he felt that the use of B-29s against Japanese oil targets there could prove decisive. Army Air Forces commander Gen. H. H. Arnold, however, was unpersuaded, and the first B-29s went to China, with the final B-29 assault on Japan being launched from the Marianas in late 1944. The article supports Arnold's position, but points out that, prior to the capture of the Marianas, the B-29s would have been more effective in the SWPA than they were in the China area, where they proved of limited use.

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Thomas G. Paterson (University of Connecticut), "If Europe, Why Not China? The Containment Doctrine, 1947-49," **Prologue**, 13, No. 1 (Spring 1981), 19-38. Illustrated.

Based upon archival research, this article attempts to explain why the United States launched energetic foreign aid programs for Europe in the early Cold War, but acted hesitantly and with comparative restraint in China, despite a perceived Soviet/Communist threat in both regions. Discussed are such factors as a Europe-first priority; the size and uninviting terrain of China; Jian Jieshi's (Chiang Kai-shek's) weak regime and its resistance to American advice; and China's failure to

satisfy a pre-Korean War American requirement that recipient governments commit themselves to self-help. It is argued that the United States did pursue active containment in China (including aid of \$3 billion), rejected an interpretation of Mao Zedong as an Asian Tito, and supported Jiang to the end. Yet the Truman Administration never explained its China policy well and thereby invited harsh criticism that it was inconsistent in applying the containment doctrine. Truman officials suffered under the self-imposed restraint that they would not publicly highlight Jiang's ineptitude for fear that such frankness would further undermine his faltering regime and insure its collapse. In the final analysis, Truman would not abandon Jiang because he was the only viable instrument for the containment of the Soviet Union in China. The containment of Communism in China proved ineffective not because Truman decided to let Jiang fall or to hold back decisive aid, but because of unfavorable local conditions that wrecked American purpose.

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Alan K. Henrickson (The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University), "The Emanation of Power," **International Security**, 6, 1 (Summer 1981), 152-164. An analytical essay concerning the phenomenon of emanated power (or "aura" of power) which, when perceived by others, has historically enabled some societies to exert influence far beyond the scope of their military or economic might. Because such influence can be greater than the sum of its "elements," it is mistaken to conceive of foreign policy making as a process of mechanically balancing means and ends (restoring "solvency").

———, "The Moralist as Geopolitician," **The Fletcher Forum: A Journal of Studies in International Affairs**, 5, 2 (Spring 1981), 391-414. A review essay, based on Henry A. Kissinger's **White House Years**, analyzing the underlying philosophical concepts, diplomatic and bureaucratic methods, historical achievements, and statesmanly legacy of Professor Kissinger's service as NSC Adviser. A moralist without a clear set of ethical precepts, a **Geopolitiker** with only an instinctual sense of political and economic geography, Kissinger nonetheless deserves, given his vaulting ambition and his Protean adaptability, the comparison he himself implicitly invites with "great" statesmen of other times and places.

———, "Pacific Community: The Notion," in Robert W. Barnett, ed., **Pacific Region Interdependencies: A Compendium of Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee** (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 137-139. An excerpt from oral remarks made during a panel discussion at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars concerning possible collaboration among "Pacific Basin" states. The importance of geographical imagery in giving focus to political and economic plans is stressed. The genesis of the Atlantic Community, built around a geographical unit conceived of almost as a "lake," is contrasted with that of a possible new community around the Pacific, an entity still often viewed as "the world ocean."

———, "The Rediscovery of North America," paper delivered at OAH Meeting, Detroit, April 1-4, 1981. A comprehensive examination, in

broad historical perspective, of recent proposals by President Ronald Reagan, Governor Edmund G. Brown, Jr., and others for an American-Canadian-Mexican "Accord" or "Community." A basic distinction is drawn between a unitary, or "continental" conception of such North American cooperation and a pluralist, or "trilateral," conception—the latter perhaps being less reflective of changing social and other realities on the continent but nonetheless politically somewhat less objectionable to Ottawa and Mexico City.

_____, "Space Politics in Historical and Futuristic Perspective," **The Fletcher Forum: A Journal of Studies in International Affairs**, 5, 1 (Winter 1981), 106-114. An argument for the "spatial" character of all politics, and for the continuity of maritime and territorial expansion in the Classical period, overseas navigation in the Age of the Renaissance, and the present-day exploration of outer space. A major by-product of today's space exploration and ultimately colonization, it is speculated, may be a fundamentally altered image of **Homo sapiens**—a specific challenging of our inherited assumptions about Man's nature and behavior, leading to an appreciation of the ways in which such assumptions have been not only Europe-bound but also, more profoundly, Earth-bound.

SHAFR'S CALENDAR 1981-1982

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| December 28-30 | The 96th annual convention of the AHA will held in Los Angeles with headquarters at the Bonaventure Hotel. (Details on page 34.) |
| January 1 | Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR. |
| January 15 | Deadline nominations for the 1982 Bernath article award. |
| February 1 | Deadline, nominations for the 1982 Bernath book prize. |
| February 1 | Deadline, materials for the March Newsletter . |
| March 31- April 3 | The 75th annual meeting of the OAH will be held in Philadelphia with the headquarters at the Franklin Plaza Hotel. |
| May 1 | Deadline, materials for the June Newsletter . |
| July | The 4th annual convention of SHEAR (Society for Historians of the Early American Republic) will meet at Memphis State University. Proposals are due before February 1, 1982.
Program Chairman:
Prof. Carl E. Prince
Department of History
New York University
Washington Square
New York, NY 10003 |

- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September **Newsletter**.
- August 5-7 The 8th annual conference of SHAFR will be held at Boston University. Proposals due in by March 1.
 Program Chairman:
 Prof. LLOYD Ambrosius
 Department of History
 University of Nebraska
 Lincoln, Nebraska 68588
- August 18-21 The 75th meeting of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association will be held at Mills College, Oakland, California.
 Program Chairman:
 Prof. Joseph E. Illich
 Department of History
 San Francisco State University
 1600 Holloway Ave.
 San Francisco, CA 94132
- November 1 Deadline, materials for the December **Newsletter**.
- November 1-15 Annual elections for officers of SHAFR.
- November 3-6 The 48th annual meeting of the Southern Historical Association will meet at Memphis with headquarters at the Peabody Hotel.
 Program Chairman:
 Prof. Robert W. Johannsen
 Department of History
 University of Illinois
 Urbana, Illinois 61801
- December 1 Deadline, nominations for the 1983 Bernath Memorial lectureship.
- December 27-30 The 97th annual convention of the AHA will be held in Washington, D.C. Deadline for proposals has passed.

The program Chairman for the 1983 OAH meeting in Cincinnati has announced a March 1, 1982 deadline for all proposals.

The chairman is:
 Professor Joel H. Silbey
 Department of History
 453 McGraw Hall
 Cornell University
 Ithaca, NY 14853

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Pomona College announces that Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. will deliver the third annual Ena H. Thompson Lectures on February 22-25, 1982. His theme will be "Affirmative Government in American History" and among his talks will be one on "The FDR Legacy and Foreign Policy." This year's lectures will be part of the Franklin D. Roosevelt National Centennial commemoration. For further information contact Richard A. Harrison, Department of History, Pomona College, Claremont, California 91711.

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The U.S. Air Force Academy's Department of History will sponsor a Conference on the teaching of World History May 12-14, 1982. The Conference will include several prominent scholars in the field and will treat World History at both the college and secondary levels. For information and registration materials, write to: Captain Joe Dixon, Department of History, USAF Academy CO 80840.

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BERLIN SEMINAR — 1982

From June 21 — 26, 1982, Bradley University's Department of History will sponsor its 2nd annual one-week seminar at the Europaeische Akademie of West Berlin. The first seminar for American professors of history and international relations was held in July, 1981.

Participants selected to attend the seminar are provided with all expenses during the seminar by grants subsidized by the West German government. Travel expenses to Berlin are paid by the participants. For information and application forms write: Lester H. Brune, Bradley University, History Department, Peoria, Illinois 61625.

USMA HISTORY SYMPOSIUM

April 21-23, 1982

The United States Military Academy will sponsor a history symposium entitled "The Theory and Practice of American National Security, 1945-1960" at West Point, New York. Historians and Political Scientists will present papers on political, strategic, economic, and other aspects of American national security policy during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. Among the participants are the following SHAFR members:

Ernest R. May (Harvard)
David A. Rosenberg (Chicago)
John Lewis Gaddis, (Ohio U)
Thomas H. Etzold (Naval War College)
Martin J. Sherwin (Tufts)
Lloyd Gardner (Rutgers)
Gary W. Reichard (Ohio State)
Walter LaFeber (Cornell)
Joan Hoff Wilson (Indiana)
Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)

For further information contact: Colonel Paul L. Miles, Jr.,
Department of History, USMA, West Point, New York 10996.

POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY QUARTERLY

A new journal, **Political Geography Quarterly**, has been launched in the wake of a major renaissance in political geography, a result of a general increase in geographers' appreciation of the importance of the political factor in their researches. The new journal is designed to provide a central focus for developments in this rapidly expanding subdiscipline. The aim is to bring together contributions from the three major strands of current political geography research: 1) continuing research on 'traditional' topics such as geostrategic regions and the spatial structure of the state; 2) quantitative, positivist studies such as in electoral geography and policy impact studies; and 3) political economy approaches dealing with issues such as those arising from alternative theories of the state or the world-economy perspective. The journal also provides a forum for non-geographers with an interest in the spatial dimension in politics. In short the policy of the journal is pluralistic and inter-disciplinary for all students of political studies with an interest in the geographical or spatial aspects of their subject matter. Butterworths of London are publishing the journal and the first issue is scheduled for January, 1982. The editor is Peter J. Taylor (University of Newcastle upon Tyne); John O'Loughlin (University of Illinois, Urbana) is Associate Editor and Andrew Kirby (University of Reading) is Book Review Editor. For further information on the journal and the submission of manuscripts for review, contact John O'Loughlin, Department of Geography, 607 South Mathews St., University of Illinois, Urbana, IL 61801.

SCHEDULE OF SHAFR ACTIVITIES AT THE AHA

Council Meeting, Sunday, December 27..... 8:00-10:00 p.m.
Los Cerritos Room, Bonaventure Hotel

Reception (cash-bar), Monday, December 28..... 5:00-7:00 p.m.
San Bernardino Room, Bonaventure Hotel

Luncheon, Tuesday, December 29..... 12:15-2:00 p.m.
San Bernardino Room, Bonaventure Hotel

Luncheon Address: Lawrence Kaplan presenting "Europe in the
'American Century,' A Retrospective View."

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SEARCH FOR EDITOR OF DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

SHAFR President Lawrence S. Kaplan has appointed a committee to search for a new editor for **Diplomatic History**. The current editor, Warren I. Cohen, plans to leave the journal in June, 1982. The members of the search committee are Thomas G. Paterson (Connecticut), chairman; Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State), and Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers-Newark).

The committee welcomes applications from interested members. Applications should include (1) Personal vita; (2) Statement of interest and qualifications based upon demonstrated scholarship; (3) Availability of institutional support. It is estimated that in addition to secretarial support, the host institution will need to provide a minimum of \$3,000-\$4,000 (for copy-editing, photocopying, postage, telephone, and miscellaneous costs). The possibility of an editorial assistant or assistants should also be discussed.

The committee hopes to make a recommendation to the Council at the April, 1982 Organization of American Historians annual meeting. To permit adequate review, the committee would appreciate receiving completed applications by February 1, 1982.

Please address one copy of an application to each member of the committee: Professor Thomas G. Paterson, Department of History, University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut 06268; Professor Warren I. Cohen, Department of History, Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan 48824; Professor Warren F. Kimball, 19 Larsen Road, Somerset, NJ 18873.

IN MEMORIAM

W. Stull Holt

Stull Holt, a long-time member of SHAFR, active on the Council in the 1960s, took his life on 13 October 1981 to avoid the further misery and degradation of cancer, which he had fought with characteristic courage and sardonic humor for four years. He was 85. In the months before his death, visitors noted the great pride he took in the election of one of his students, Lawrence E. Gelfand, as vice president of SHAFR. Another of his students, Warren I. Cohen, is editor of **Diplomatic History**.

Holt had a long and distinguished career at Johns Hopkins University and the University of Washington. He also taught summer school at Harvard, the University of California, Berkeley, and Stanford. William Diamond, Eric Goldman, and Bernard Mayo were among his outstanding graduate students at Hopkins. Other distinguished scholars like Stuart W. Bruchey and John Higham were marked by their

contact as undergraduates with Holt. When he left Hopkins, Goldman edited a **festschrift, Historiography and Urbanization: Essays in American History in Honor of W. Stull Holt**. The dedication read:

The men who studied under W. Stull Holt at the Johns Hopkins University will not forget the experience. He made research a quest for meaning, and gave to the quest a gallant and generous comradeship. These essays in historiography and urbanization, the fields of Professor Holt's special interest, have been prepared as an expression of respect and affection.

Of Holt's scholarly writings, **Treaties Defeated by the Senate**, first published in 1933, has long been considered a classic—especially for his brilliant analysis of the votes on the Treaty of Versailles. He also wrote urban history and historiography. When he retired in 1967, Gelfand and Robert A. Skotheim brought together a collection of his writings, published as **Historical Scholarship in the United States and Other Essays**.

From 1963-1964, Holt acted as executive secretary of the American Historical Association and managing editor of the *American Historical Review*. He was a professional in the broadest sense of the term: committed to teaching, scholarship, and the historical associations in which he was always active. The AAUP, at the national and local levels, also absorbed some of his energy. But most of all, he enjoyed recruiting young scholars and the challenge of making historians of them.

One of Holt's convictions was of the importance of political activism for scholars. He insisted that an academic position did not require a man to become a "moral eunuch." And what his students could not learn from his words, he demonstrated by the way in which he lived. In 1916, convinced that the war in Europe was America's war, he went to France where he drove an ambulance and fought at Verdun—where he won the *Croix de Guerre*. He flew for the army air force after the United States intervened in 1917. In the 1930s Holt struggled to awaken Americans to the danger he perceived from Hitler's Germany, ultimately joining with Arthur O. Lovejoy in the Baltimore chapter of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies.

Holt's interventionism antagonized the president of Johns Hopkins who hired Charles A. Beard to counter the efforts of Holt and Lovejoy. Holt left Hopkins for the University of Washington in 1940. He hardly had begun his effort to build a great department there when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor—and he went off to war again. In 1941 Holt failed to persuade army authorities to let him fly again, but instead created and led an important intelligence operation in England, for which he was awarded the Order of the British Empire (OBE). Among his treasured war souvenirs was a cable reprimanding him for compromising American security—by sharing information with the U.S. Navy.

Throughout the postwar years, Holt urged a strong military posture for the United States and was long a defender of the American role in Vietnam. For him, as for Dean Rusk, the situation in Vietnam was another occasion when a powerful America had an obligation to defend a weak people who wanted to be free. From opponents of the war he heard arguments that reminded him of the 1930s and he rejected those arguments in the 1960s and 1970s as he had earlier. Active in Democratic politics in Seattle, he was twice a delegate to the party's national conventions, served on the platform committee and received national television coverage in 1968 for his stand in support of the Johnson administration's foreign policies during the committee debates.

Holt had a Darwinian sense of how truth would be determined and loved a good fight. With Holt in the chair, the advanced seminar at the University of Washington became a test under fire for the student presenting a chapter of a dissertation or the faculty member offering the draft of an article. Nothing tickled him more than to have one of his students brush aside the blows and counterattack—especially if Holt himself became the target. Much of the same style prevailed in university, national, or international politics. In his correspondence and his speeches, there was always a sharp edge—and there was always admiration for a worthy opponent. But beware the unworthy opponent! There was no quarter for the likes of Harry Elmer Barnes who he thought had sold out to Hitler, or Karl Wittfogel who had sold out to Joe McCarthy, or Charles Callan Tansill, who had sold out to both.

As he moved through his seventies and eighties, Holt, like many of his generation, was not happy with what others were doing to the university he had helped build and the country for which he had fought. One response was a witty, sometimes biting volume of poetry, **An American Faculty**, written with a friend (or two) and modelled after Edgar Lee Master's **Spoon River Anthology**. It constitutes a marvelous guide to his values and his complaints about the 1960s and 70s.

And so our loss is great. A man a little larger than life—teacher, scholar, warrior and poet—warm, funny, fierce and courtly Stull Holt has left us to muck up the world by ourselves.

PUBLICATIONS IN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

Kenneth Rea and John A. Brewer (Shreveport, La.), eds., **The Forgotten Ambassador: The Reports of John Leighton Stuart, 1946-1949**. 1981. Westview. \$26.25.

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Petillo, Carol Morris (Boston College), **Douglas MacArthur: The Philippine Years**. 1981 Indiana University Press. \$17.50.

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Thomas J. Osborne (So. Laguna, CA), **Empire Can Wait: American Opposition to Hawaiian Annexation, 1893-1898**. 1981. Kent State Press. \$18.00.

Charles M. Dobbs (Metropolitan State College, Denver), **The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, The Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950**. 1981. Kent State Press. \$18.50.

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Robert J. McMahon (Washington, D.C.), **Colonialism and Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence, 1945-1949**. 1981. Cornell University Press. \$22.50.

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Goran Rystad (University of Lund), **Ambiguous Imperialism: American Foreign Policy and Domestic Politics at the Turn of the Century**. 1981. Almqvist and Wiksell. \$16.00.

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Robert M. Hathaway (Ridgewood, NJ), **Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944-1947**. 1981. Columbia University Press. \$22.50.

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Goran Rystad (University of Lund), ed., **Congress and American Foreign Policy**. 1981. Almqvist and Wiksell. \$18.00. This work includes essays by SHAFR members Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (University of Edinburgh); Lloyd E. Ambrosius (University of Nebraska-Lincoln); and Leif Eliasson (University of Lund).

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David Culbert (Louisiana State University), **Mission to Moscow**. Wisconsin-Warner Bros. Screenplay Service, University of Wisconsin Press. 1980. \$15.00; paper, \$5.95

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Robert Divine (University of Texas), ed., **Exploring the Johnson Years**. 1981. University of Texas Press. This work includes essays by SHAFR members Walter LaFeber (Cornell), George Herring (Kentucky), and David Culbert (Louisiana State). \$25.00.

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Stuart Anderson (Rose Institute, Claremont Men's College), **Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895-1904**. 1981. Fairleigh Dickinson University Press. \$23.50.

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Larry I. Bland (Marshall Foundation) and Sharon R. Ritenour, **The Papers of George Catlett Marshall**. Vol. I. **The Soldierly Spirit**. 1981. Johns Hopkins University Press. \$30.00.

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Barry Rubin (Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies), **Paved With Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran**. 1981. Penguin paperback edition. \$5.95.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Edward L. Schapsmeier and Frederick H. Schapsmeier (Wisconsin State — Oshkosh), **Political Parties and Civic Action Groups**. Vol. LV of **The Encyclopedia of American Institutions Series**. 1981. Greenwood Press. \$49.50.

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John M. Carroll (Lamar University), and William J. Baker, eds., **Sports in Modern America**. 1981. River City Publishers, St. Louis. This work includes an essay by SHAFR member James Harper (Texas Tech).

PERSONALS

Edward P. Crapol has become chairman of the History Department of the College of William and Mary.

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Robert A. Divine (University of Texas) has been appointed to the George W. Littlefield Professorship in American History.

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George A. Levesque has become a professor in the Department of African/Afro-American Studies, State University of New York-Albany.

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Joseph M. Siracusa (University of Queensland) has become a Reader in American Diplomatic History.

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Joseph A. Fry (University of Nevada, Las Vegas) has received tenure.

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Thomas H. Etzold (Naval War College) in October 1981 became Director of Strategic Research in the Office of the Director of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.

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Stephen C. Rabe (University of Texas at Dallas) received a grant-in-aid from the Rockefeller Archive Center of Rockefeller University for work in the social and cultural role of North American business and philanthropic organizations in Latin America.

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James I. Matray (New Mexico State University) was promoted from Visiting Assistant Professor to Assistant Professor effective in September, 1982.

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David Culbert (Louisiana State University) has received a three-year \$50,000 Kellogg National Fellowship to make a film about Huey Long's use of the media. He has also been invited to present a paper on the Frank Capra **Why We Fight** series at the Conference on Radio and Film Propaganda in World War II, sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation, and to be held at the Bellagio Conference Center, Lake Como, Italy, April 5-9, 1982.

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITION

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition was initiated in 1972 by Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in memory of their late son. Administered by SHAFR, the purpose of the competition and the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing of a lengthy nature by young scholars in the field of U.S. diplomacy.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: the prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1981. It must be the author's first or second book. Authors are not required to be members of SHAFR, nor do they have to be professional academicians.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: J. Samuel Walker; Historical Office; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 1717 H Street, N.W. — Room 1015; Washington, DC. 20555. The works must be received no later than February 1, 1982.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$500.00 If two (2) or more writers are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be in Philadelphia.

PREVIOUS WINNERS

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| 1972 | Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth) |
| 1973 | John L. Gaddis (Ohio U) |
| 1974 | Michael H. Hunt (Yale) |
| 1975 | Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
Stephen E. Petz (U of Massachusetts-Amherst) |
| 1976 | Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton) |
| 1977 | Roger V. Dingman (Southern California) |
| 1978 | James R. Leutz (North Carolina) |
| 1979 | Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston, MA) |
| 1980 | Michael Schaller (U of Arizona) |
| 1981 | Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke)
Hugh DeSantis (Dept. of State) |

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE FOR THE BEST SCHOLARLY ARTICLE IN U.S. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Award for scholarly articles in American foreign affairs was set up in 1976 through the kindness of the young Bernath's parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, and it is administered through selected personnel of SHAFR. The objective of the award is to identify and to reward outstanding research and writing by the younger scholars in the area of U.S. diplomatic relations

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: Prize competition is open to the author of any article upon any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1981. The article must be among the author's first five (5) which have seen publication. Membership in SHAFR or upon a college/university faculty is not a prerequisite for entering the competition. Authors must be under thirty-five (35) years of age, or within five (5) years after receiving the doctorate, at the time the article was published. Previous winners of the S.L. Bernath book award are ineligible.

PROCEDURES: Articles shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR, Five (5) copies of each article (preferably reprints) should be sent to the chairman of the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee by January 15, 1982. The Chairman of the Committee for 1981 is Dr. Noel Pugach, Department of History, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM 87131.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$200.00. If two (2) or more authors are considered winners, the prize will be shared. The name of the successful writer(s) will be announced, along with the name of the victor in the Bernath book prize competition, during the luncheon for members of SHAFR, to be held at the annual OAH Convention, meeting in 1982, at Philadelphia.

AWARD WINNERS

- 1977 John C. A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)
- 1978 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
- 1979 Brian L. Villa (U of Ottawa, Canada)
- 1980 James I. Matray (New Mexico State University)
David A. Rosenberg (U of Chicago)
- 1981 Douglas Little (Clark U)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL LECTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship was established in 1976 through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Beverly Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and is administered by a special committee of SHAFR. The Bernath Lecture is the feature at the official luncheon of the Society, held during the OAH convention in April of each year.

DESCRIPTION AND ELIGIBILITY: The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address, delivered at the annual meeting with the AHA, but is restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer is expected to concern himself/herself not specifically with his/her own research interests, but with broad issues of importance to students of American foreign relations. The award winner must be under forty-one (41) years of age.

PROCEDURES: The Bernath Lectureship Committee is now soliciting nominations for the 1982 award from members of the Society agents, publishers, or members of any established history, political science, or journalism organization. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vitae, if available, should reach the Committee no later than December 1, 1981. The Chairman of the Committee, and the person to whom nominations should be sent, is Dr. Jerald A. Combs, Department of History, California State University, San Francisco, CA 94132.

HONORARIUM: \$300.00 with publication of the lecture assured in the SHAFR **Newsletter**.

AWARD WINNERS

- 1977 Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
- 1978 David S. Patterson (Colgate)
- 1979 Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
- 1980 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
- 1981 Burton Spivak (Bates College)



This fifth issue of the AEAR Newsletter continues our effort to provide significant information on teaching, research and publications in American-East Asian Relations. We have divided this task into 5 areas of focus and editorial responsibility. These are: 1) **Publications**, Gary May, Delaware; 2) **Courses in AEAR**, Bradford Lee, Harvard; 3) **Dissertations**, Charles Lilley, North Virginia; 4) **Grants and Research**, Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Colgate; and 5) **Papers and Conferences**, Michael Schaller, Arizona.

To date, we have provided information on courses, dissertations, and grants (**SHAFR Newsletter**, Vo. XI, No. 2, June, 1980), on papers and conferences (**SHAFR Newsletter**, Vol. XI, No. 4, December 1980), on research in progress (**SHAFR Newsletter**, Vol. XII, No. 2, June 1981), and on publications (**SHAFR Newsletter**, Vol. XII, No. 3, September 1981). This issue updates publications and grants and fellowships.

We plan to update each of these 5 areas of focus in the coming year and to add several new related topics. We welcome current information about articles, books, dissertations, papers and conferences, and grants and research. We also welcome comments and any suggestions about future directions. Please write to Mordechai Rozanski, Office of International Education, Pacific Lutheran University, Tacoma, Washington 98447.

PUBLICATIONS

The following selected list of published articles and books in 1981 was compiled by Gary May to update the September issue. A further update will be offered in a subsequent issue. We request current information to be sent to M. Rozanski at the address above.

Articles

- Barnhart, Michael A. "Japan's Economic Security and the Origins of the Pacific War." **The Journal of Strategic Studies** (June 1981).
- Cohen, Warren I. "Consul General O. Edmund Clubb on the 'Inevitability' of Conflict Between the United States and the Peoples' Republic of China." **Diplomatic History** Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring 1981).
- Fever, John H. "The China Aid Bill of 1948: Limited Assistance As A Cold War Strategy." **Diplomatic History** Vol. 5, No. 2 (Spring 1981).

Goldstein, Jonathan. "Early American Image of the Chinese Through Artifacts and Chinoiserie." **Asian Studies Quarterly** (Taipei) Vol. IX, No. 1 (Spring 1981).

Paterson, Thomas G. "If Europe, Why Not China? The Containment Doctrine, 1947-49." **Prologue** Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring 1981).

Books

Baker, Mark. **Nam: The Vietnam War in the Words of the Men and Women Who Fought There**. New York: Morrow, 1981.

Committee for the Compilation of Materials on Damage Caused by the Atomic Bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. **Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Physical, Medical and Social Effects of the Atomic Bombings**. New York: Basic Books, 1981.

Cook, Blanche Wiesen. **The Declassified Eisenhower**. New York: Doubleday, 1981.

Dallek, Robert. **Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy 1932-1945**. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979. Paperback edition available, January 1981.

Divine, Robert, **Eisenhower and the Cold War**. New York: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Ferrell, Robert, ed. **The Eisenhower Diaries**. New York: W.W. Norton, 1981.

Goldstein, Jonathan. **Philadelphia and the China Trade**. Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State press, 1981.

May, Glenn. **Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913**. Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1980.

Santoli, Al. **Everything We Had: An Oral History of the Vietnam War by Thirty-three American Soldiers Who Fought It**. New York: Random House, 1980.

Starr, John Bryan, ed. **The Future of U.S.-China Relations**. New York: New York University Press, 1981.

Thomson, James C., Peter W. Stanley & John Curtis Perry. **Sentimental Imperialists: The American Experience in East Asia**. New York: Harper and Row, 1981.

GRANTS

The following list of grants and fellowships was compiled by Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and covers the period from December 1981 to August 1982. An update will be published in June 1982. The grant giving organizations listed below have indicated that research proposals in the field of American-East Asian relations would be welcome under the criteria of their funding programs.

The following summary indicates the grant deadline, organization,

address, and, where known, stipend (S), duration (D), eligibility/number of awards (E), and contact (C).

GRANT DEADLINES

No Date—Center for Advanced Research: Naval War College, Newport, R.I. 02840. (E) projects by U.S. government contract. (C) Capt. F.C. Caswell, USN.

No Date—Eleanor Roosevelt Institute: Franklin Delano Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. 12538.

1981

December 1—Postdoctoral Grants from the Social Science Research Council: Fellowships and Grants, 605 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016 (S) includes travel, research, and maintenance expenses. (D) 3-12 months.

December 15—American Association of University Women: 2401 Virginia Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. 1. American Fellowships for Dissertation Research. (E) 10 awarded each year. 2. American Fellowships for Postdoctoral Research. (E) several each year. Applications available August 1, 1980.

December 31—Rockefeller Archive Center Research Grant Program: Hillcrest, Pocantico Hills, North Tarrytown, N.Y. 10591. (S) \$500-\$1,000. Collections touching on American-East Asian relations include: The Rockefeller Foundation, the China Medical Board, the Agricultural Development Council, the China Medical Board of New York, Inc., and the Population Council. (C) Joseph W. Ernst, Director.

1982

January 1—Advanced Research Program: U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013. (S) covers expenses while at the Institute.

January 1—Hoover Presidential Library Association, Inc.: P.O. Box 696, West Branch, Iowa 52358. (S) fellowships up to \$10,000; grants in aid, up to \$1,000. Applications available September 1, 1981.

January 10—National Humanities Center: P.O. Box 12256, Research Triangle Park, N.C. 27709. (S) based on fellow's salary, applicants urged to bring some measure of outside support. (E) Young Fellows: 3-10 years beyond doctorate; Senior Fellows: more than 10 years beyond doctorate; 40 fellows at Center each year.

February 1—Tom L. Evans Research Grant: Harry S. Truman Library Institute, Independence, Mo. 64050. (S) \$10,000. (D) 12 months.

March 1—Japan-U.S. Faculty Pairing Program in American and Comparative Studies: Institute of International Education, 809 UN Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017. (S) 1 round trip, 1 year's salary, plus cost of living differential, no provision for dependents. Applicants must submit joint proposal although only one of a pair is funded. (C) Susan Karp, Division of Study Aboard Programs.

April 1—National Endowment for the Humanities Summer Seminars: Division of Fellowships, 806 15th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506. (S) support for seminar participants, salary for seminar director, secretarial support, direct and indirect costs to host institutions. (C) Dorothy Wartenberg, Program Director.

June 1—National Endowment for the Humanities College Teachers Fellowships: Division of Fellowships, Mail Stop 101, 806 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20506. (S) up to \$11,000 for 6 and \$22,000 for 12 months. (C) Karen Fuglie, Program Officer.

August—Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation: 2312 Red River, Austin, TX. 78705. (S) \$35/day per diem plus travel costs.

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William Brinker, Department of History, Tennessee Tech, Cookeville, Tennessee 38501

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: Jeanette Denning, Tennessee Tech.

ISSUES: The **Newsletter** is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December. All members receive the publication.

DEADLINE: All material must be in the office of the editor not later than four (4) weeks prior to the date of publication.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication. Copies of the **Newsletter** which are returned because of faulty addresses will be forwarded only upon the payment of a fee of \$1.00.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of most back numbers of the **Newsletter** are available and may be obtained from the editorial office upon the payment of a service charge of 75¢ per number. If the purchaser lives abroad, the charge is \$1.00 per number.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, honors, awards), announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered--or published--upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting the use of diplomatic materials in various (especially foreign) depositories, biographies and autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field of U. S. diplomacy, and even jokes (for fillers) if upon diplomatic topics. Authors of "straight" diplomatic articles should send their opuses to **Diplomatic History**. Space limitations forbid the carrying of book reviews by the **Newsletter**.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

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1969	Alexander De Conde (U of California--Santa Barbara)
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