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**Page**

- 1 Diplomatic Dialings: John Foster Dulles Telephone Transcripts
- 15 Annotated Bibliography of German Language Dissertations and Habilitationsschriften on U.S. Foreign Relations Accepted between 1946 and 1981 by Thomas Schoonover (Part II)
- 18 Korean War Literature: A list of Selected Foreign-Language Materials by Hong-Kyu Park
- 20 Minutes of SHAFR Council Meeting
- 23 Report of SHAFR Secretary-Treasurer 1982
- 24 Poetry
- 25 Financial Report of Secretary-Treasurer
- 27 Report of SHAFR Finance Committee
- 28 Report of SHAFR Committee on Government Relations
- 29 Announcements
- 32 Abstracts
- 46 Personals
- 47 Publications
- 49 Calendar
- 50 Bernath Awards

## **SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS**

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**MEETINGS:** The annual meeting of the Society is held in August. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in April.

**PRIZES:** The Society administers three awards a year, all of them in honor of the late Stuart L. Bernath and all of them financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California. The details of each of these awards are given under the appropriate headings of each issue of the **Newsletter**.

**PUBLICATIONS:** The Society sponsors two printed works of a quarterly nature, the **Newsletter**, and **Diplomatic History**, a journal; a **Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects** is published occasionally.

**Diplomatic Dialings:  
The John Foster Dulles Telephone Transcripts**

by

Richard H. Immerman (University of Hawaii)

In the summer of 1968, Bryce Wood, the noted expert on United States relations with Latin America, published a short article with the provocative title, "Self-Plagiarism and Foreign Policy." By carefully dissecting the two State Department "White Papers" that analyzed the alleged Soviet penetration of the government of Guatemala's Jacobo Arbenz, Wood presented a fascinating illustration of how the United States sought both to prove its contention that the Kremlin had subverted the Guatemalan revolutionary movement and, in the process, to cover-up the CIA's involvement in the overthrow of Arbenz. After comparing the two publications, he concluded that the State Department must have been dissatisfied with the results of its original study and therefore ordered that it be replaced with a substitute three years later. This had to have been the case, he theorized, because the revised version omitted certain relevant facts and altered some of the initial wording, thereby substantially strengthening the earlier argument. Accordingly, Wood logically deduced that the Department hoped that subsequent readers and researchers would ignore the inconclusive findings of the "Basic Study" and accept as incontrovertible the official view of what took place.<sup>1</sup>

Wood based his argument on the limited documents available in the 1960s. Had he been writing a decade later, with the benefit of the transcripts summarizing Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' telephone conversations, he would have greatly enhanced his thesis. Wood could only extrapolate from the two State Department studies that Dulles and his associates determined that the findings of the 1954 publication were so tenuous that they had the substitute "Green Book" written in 1957. He was unaware that in the interim the Secretary continued to query his Assistant Secretary for Intelligence, W. Park Armstrong, as to whether the latter's shop had ever found direct evidence of a connection between the Arbenz government, Guatemalan Communists, and the Soviet Union. The phone transcripts divulge that during this time, in other words following the publication of the pointedly entitled PENETRATION OF THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF GUATEMALA BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, the Office of Intelligence was unable to uncover any direct evidence of such penetration. Hence Armstrong could only answer Dulles' questions with lame responses, the most positive being "nothing conclusive."<sup>2</sup>

Even more to the point, Wood undoubtedly would have been interested to learn that Dulles never wanted an official State Department White Paper in the first place. We now know that on July 3, 1954, the day after Carlos Castillo Armas, Washington's handpicked successor to Arbenz, had negotiated the agreement that assured him the

Guatemalan presidency, the Secretary of State phoned C.D. Jackson, who was vacationing in the Berkshire Mountains of Massachusetts. Dulles asked President Eisenhower's former Special Assistant for Cold War Strategy and mastermind of the International Information Activities Committee whether he could suggest someone with a "literary talent" who could write "a sort of historical novel" depicting the broad range of events in Guatemala. Dulles had not yet made up his mind whether the State Department's name should appear on the "opus in question." But he was certain it should be translated into Spanish and circulated throughout Latin America as well as in the United States. The author would have access to all the relevant documents except, of course, the CIA material, although the documentation would be published as a separate package. Dulles evidently believed that this type of presentation would be more effective than any traditional State Department publication, especially, as he explained to Jackson, if the author wrote it with an "Uncle Tom's Cabin or Ida Tarbell touch."<sup>3</sup>

Unfortunately, the phone transcripts do not shed any light on the reasons why the proposal came to naught. Jackson only replied that he considered the idea worth pursuing and that he would get back to the Secretary if he thought of some names.<sup>4</sup> Perhaps the executive of Henry Luce's empire could not find anyone suitable who was willing to accept this rather unique and ambitious assignment, or perhaps Dulles himself lost interest in the project as he moved on to other cold war battlefields. In any event, these brief glimpses at the type of information obtainable through the thirteen cartons of Dulles telephone transcripts are an indication of why, in my opinion, the collection, along with the phone summaries of Christian Herter, provide the historian with insights into the foreign policies of the administration that are unparalleled in analyses of other periods. I make this claim because the voluminous transcripts permit us to probe beneath the official layer of the decision making process, to go beyond even what is revealed through standard diplomatic reports and memoranda. As another Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, who, parenthetically, discontinued the practice of monitoring telephone conversations, remarked at the dedication of the Dulles Library of Diplomatic History at Princeton University, "The [official] papers themselves, standing alone, will not tell the complete story; they can only be clues to the story. . . only a fraction of what was in [Dulles'] mind, and the president he served, was inscribed in formal documents. The historian, if he is to be accurate, must try to reconstruct the context—the total context—which surrounded what was written down...To recapture the changing scene and what Mr. Dulles thought about it will be the historian's delicate and painstaking task."<sup>5</sup> We will never be able to reconstruct the total context of the diplomacy of the 1950s, nor can we know everything that was on Dulles' or Eisenhower's mind. Nevertheless the phone transcripts, more than any other set of documents, present us with the essential clues necessary in our performance of this "delicate and painstaking task."

Any assessment of the value of the Dulles transcripts must begin with a discussion of why such records were kept and a review of the process by which they were made available to scholars. Without trying to justify what Dulles did, I should emphasize that the monitoring of telephone conversations during the Eisenhower administration was considered standard procedure by both the White House and the State Department. And, while the practice was not made public, neither was it viewed by contemporaries with the negative connotations reflective of the more notorious Nixon era. As opposed to the Nixon procedure, Dulles instructed his secretaries, and particularly his personal secretary Phyllis Bernau, simply to listen in on his conversations on an office extension and to take notes summarizing what was said. No recording device was used, and the secretaries generally did not attempt to take down the conversation verbatim, albeit on occasion comments are set off as direct quotes.

The primary reason for the summaries becomes readily apparent once one looks at the notations on transcripts. In brief, after the summary notes were checked for accuracy and typed in paragraph form, they were distributed to Dulles' assistants to be acted upon.<sup>6</sup> As an illustration, we can see from one transcript that when Senator Joseph McCarthy phoned Dulles in January 1953 to tell him of his intention to investigate State Department personnel, Dulles not only replied that "he wanted all the help he could get. . . [although] he wanted the thing handled tactfully," but he had his assistant Roderic O'Connor personally deliver the memorandum of the conversation to Undersecretary of State Donald Lourie and the Department's legal advisor, Herman Phleger. O'Connor then filed the memorandum for future reference.<sup>7</sup> Since in this manner the transcripts became a kind of record of action, we can learn from them what was on the "minds" of those participating in the conversations, who else might have been privy to the discussions, and, just as important, what, if anything, was done in terms of implementation. Whereas it is a common lament that the widespread use of telephones in the modern era has weakened the fabric of historical documentation, I would argue, at least for the Eisenhower period, just the opposite is true.

This is not to say that Dulles discussed everything over the phone. The State Department was conscious of security, and the administration did have a special line installed between Dulles' office and the White House that could not be monitored. However, it was a very cumbersome device, requiring that notice be given in advance of a call being put through, so the Secretary rarely chose to take advantage of it. When Dulles, or the President, or brother Allen at the CIA, or some other official wanted to bring up a highly sensitive subject, he generally called on one of the two less secure lines and arranged for a face-to-face conference.<sup>8</sup>

Yet these cryptic conversations can also be instructive. For example, the transcripts as a whole reveal relatively little regarding the 1953 program against Mossadegh in Iran, even when compared to the later

covert operations in Guatemala and Indonesia. This is probably due in part to AJAX's having taken place so early in the administration. Nevertheless, the summary of a conversation between the two Dulleses on June 29th does present extremely suggestive information as to the project's planning. The summary is brief because Allen proposed that he come over to his brother's office to report the findings "with reference to Iran" of "his man who was just back from the East." It should be pointed out that this is precisely the time that Kim Roosevelt claims in his controversial memoir that he returned to Washington and received the official go-ahead. Furthermore, Allen unexpectedly alludes to Foreign Operations Administrator Harold Stassen's involvement in the project, and forecasts the tenor of his "man's" report by remarking that he "was optimistic that it can be done if the money can be found."<sup>9</sup> Similarly, we learn from a subsequent conversation that, owing to the CIA's estimate that the Shah was "an unaccountable character. . . [who] may pull out at the last minute," by the end of July Secretary Dulles was wondering whether it might not be best to call the entire operation off, or at least try to develop an alternate plan. Allen replied that he did not want to discuss the matter over the phone, but he assured Foster that he had cleared the operation directly with the President and it was "still active."<sup>10</sup>

Later in this article I will present a number of other illustrations of the new opportunities for analyses presented by the availability of the transcripts. However, I must also warn the reader of the potential for misusing the source. Cryptic conversations such as the above conversation between the Dulles brothers can be meaningless -- indeed misleading -- if not supplemented by supporting documentation. In this case, the phone call was but a prelude to a subsequent conference, which, evidently, was not monitored. Moreover, these are summary transcripts, and there are no taped recordings with which to corroborate their thoroughness or, for that matter, their accuracy. Dulles' secretaries possessed expert stenographic skills, but none was infallible or intimately familiar with the entire range of subjects that had to be transcribed. Occasionally one finds a phrase or name followed by a parenthetical question mark indicating the secretary's uncertainty. Most important, a cold written transcript, even if verbatim, might not convey the precise meaning intended by the participant. Only an actual recording can register inflection, intonation, emotion, and the subtle variations in the spoken language. Over-reliance on the telephone summaries will undoubtedly increase the omnipresent danger of misinterpretation.

Notwithstanding such qualifications, anyone studying the Eisenhower administration will find valuable material in this collection. In the course of his seven plus years as Secretary of State, Dulles spoke on the phone almost daily with seemingly everyone who participated in the formulation of administrative policy, from the President, to the Cabinet and Agency heads, to their subordinates in any department

whose expertise or responsibilities had an impact upon the conduct of state. In addition, there are countless summaries of his conversations with members of Congress, with his and Eisenhower's network of associates -- important people who were not directly involved in the government but certainly influenced it -- and, although not as numerous, his counterparts in other countries. As a result, hardly anything took place throughout this entire period that is not to some extent covered in the phone transcripts. To be more specific, we can find information not just on key foreign policy events such as Indochina, the Offshore Islands crises, the Geneva summit and other conferences, Suez, Lebanon, and even aerial surveillance, but also on what one normally might consider domestic concerns. These topics include race relations, government reorganization, congressional liaison and the use of patronage, the battle of the budget, and campaign politics like the promotion of Richard Nixon's 1960 candidacy. Small wonder that Dulles categorized the telephone transcripts apart from his other papers, judging them, along with certain personal letters, memoranda of conversations, daily appointment calendars, and his own draft working documents, as neither solely personal nor official documents subject to the usual classification procedures. To Dulles, the transcripts reflected his activities not just as Secretary of State, but more generally as a high official of the Eisenhower administration. If anything, he understated his view when he wrote the month before his death to Franklin Floate, the Administrator of General Services, "I believe these papers to be of significant historical value."<sup>11</sup>

Because Dulles believed the transcripts were so valuable, he intended from the beginning, as he put it, that "access to [them] for the purposes of furthering bonafide research in fields of history, political science, international relations and related subjects, shall be granted as widely as possible." As a matter of fact, he instructed the members of the committee he designated to supervise and control all his personal papers that: "The presumption shall be that access should be granted in any particular instance unless compelling reasons exist to withhold such access." These instructions underscore his overall perspective. Always history-minded, Dulles considered the preservation of the transcripts as a means to chronicle the record of the Eisenhower administration nearly equal in importance to the more immediate function of providing his own department with a record of action. He believed this because, convinced that the turbulent diplomacy over which he presided would come to be seen as a critical watershed in the history of the country, he felt it imperative that future generations be able to draw on his experiences in seeking solutions to their contemporary problems. Perhaps this belief stemmed from an over-inflated ego, or perhaps it stemmed from some idiosyncratic idealism. Regardless of such hypotheses, we can be thankful that Dulles recognized that candid records like the telephone transcripts are highly indicative of how a public official reaches his decisions and often bring to light subtle nuances of a policy or action that cannot be inferred just

from the official papers. For this reason, despite certain reservations, Dulles went to great lengths to insure that the transcripts be made available to scholars.<sup>12</sup>

Dulles' overarching desire to provide access to his papers was to a certain extent mitigated by his concern that their personal and private character, as well as the security interests of the government, be adequately protected. So after lengthy consultations with archivists, his State Department associates, and other members of the Eisenhower administration, including the President himself, he constructed a unique mechanism for their preservation. As mentioned, he began by dividing his files into several categories. The largest, comprised of his official files, naturally remained within the State Department. Then he organized his strictly private papers, all dated before he became Secretary in 1953. These he donated to Princeton University with the stipulation that a committee composed of his family, a former law partner at Sullivan and Cromwell, and his closest assistants in the State Department govern their use for twenty-five years. Significantly, Dulles realized that the utility of this group would be greatly enhanced if it were combined with his State papers. Therefore he directed another of his assistants, the historian Philip Crowl, to go through the official files and reproduce what he determined was the most important material. As a result, a third collection, on deposit also at Princeton, consists of microfilm copies of some 45,000 documents, including telegrams, memoranda, minutes of meetings, and briefing and position papers.<sup>13</sup>

The final category of files, made up largely of the telephone transcripts, presented Dulles with the most difficulties. Because of their personal nature, the Secretary did not deem them suitable for inclusion in the State Department collection, although he did extract any information or data that referred to official administrative matters and added it to the Department's permanent records. While Dulles insisted that historians be able to use these papers, he did not want to violate the privacy of the President or whomever else he had spoken with, nor did he want to release to the public without restriction material that, in his words, "pertains to the most delicate matters of state." Consequently, he made special arrangements for their disposal, selecting as his vehicle section 507 of the Federal Records Act, as amended. Dulles provided in his will, and in a separate letter to the Administrator of General Services, that the telephone transcripts and the other files that comprised the last group of his papers would go to the Eisenhower Library.<sup>14</sup>

Given his concerns, Dulles not surprisingly placed a number of restrictions on this collection. First, once on deposit at the Library it would be safeguarded as though it were highly classified. Secondly, although Dulles himself and the committee he previously established to supervise the papers donated to Princeton would have complete access to the transcripts and related documents at any time, other individuals wishing to use them had to apply in writing both to the committee and the Administrator of General Services. Even after receiving the



necessary approval, the researcher could not cite or quote from the papers without the permission of the committee. Dulles left it up to the committee's discretion as to when these restrictions should be removed, and, indeed, the transcripts are now available to all on microfilm.<sup>15</sup>

By setting up such a mechanism, Dulles intended to balance his concerns for security and privacy with the imperatives of historical analysis. Fortunately for researchers, he tipped the balance in favor of history. Dulles did not want the committee to monitor the use of the transcripts so that it could conceal the administration's darkest secrets. Rather, he established it "to prevent inadvertant error, resulting from lack of access on the part of a research to the total files." Dulles assumed, and in retrospect certainly correctly, that the transcripts would be made available to the public before the official State records, and thus could conceivably present the analyst with a distorted or inaccurate picture of the events. For this reason he mandated that the majority of the committee be comprised of his former assistants, who had firsthand knowledge of the Department's operations and were familiar with the records that might remain classified. Obviously such supervision is hardly ideal. Yet in light of Dulles' apprehension, which was quite legitimate, an oversight committee is most emphatically better than the denial of any access at all. In addition, Dulles did caution the committee not to get carried away with its responsibilities. After advising each member of his duties, he wrote, "It is my hope that your exercise of your functions and control will encourage and facilitate productive research work in and publication from my papers. . .and that you will not hinder or discourage such work."<sup>16</sup>

To accent the premium placed on the transcripts, it is instructive to relate briefly the controversy that Dulles' mode of preserving them produced. He decided that they should be deposited at the Eisenhower Library under the authority of General Services so that they could be given the same protection accorded official records. This decision greatly distressed William Dix, at the time Princeton's librarian. Dix protested that the Secretary clearly intended that Princeton house the essential material necessary for any scholar to research the diplomatic history of the 1950s, and it was to facilitate this research that the Dulles Library had been built. Therefore, Dix complained to Arthur Dean of Sullivan and Cromwell, if "perhaps the most important papers left by the Secretary," went to Abilene, anyone trying to do serious work would be forced to commute between Kansas and New Jersey, and the Library "will lack the meaning which [the donors responsible for its construction] intended it to have." Although not completely satisfied, Dix eventually accepted the solution that copies of the transcripts would be sent to Princeton at the same time that the Eisenhower Library opened the originals to the public. The point is that he recognized that no study of Dulles' diplomacy could be comprehensive without the transcripts. Dulles, by providing that they be made available at both Princeton and Abilene, undoubtedly recognized this also.<sup>17</sup>

Had Dix seen the transcripts when he objected to their separation from Princeton, he may well have presented an even stronger argument. A necessarily sketchy sampling of their contents will illustrate the incomparable information they offer for research. I will initially concentrate on those transcripts that deal with the Guatemalan intervention for two, somewhat contradictory reasons. First, it is on this topic that I have most extensively pieced together the phone conversations with official records and other papers, and only in such a context can their value be fully appreciated. Yet conversely, in delaying publication of the Foreign Relations series, the former foreign service officers who compose the so-called centralized declassification center have chosen Guatemala as a prime focus for their powerful axe. This attempt to deny historians the official records pertaining to the events of 1954 consequently makes the material available through the transcripts that much more critical. Not that telephone summaries can substitute for more conventional documentation. However, they may, within the limits of scholarly responsibility, enable the analyst to extrapolate more confidently from those documents already in the public domain. At the very least, they certainly facilitate the retrieval of a more complete record through the process stipulated under the Freedom of Information Act.

Literally every episode related to the sweeping United States effort under Eisenhower to overthrow Arbenz is unmasked or brought into sharper perspective by the transcripts. For example, a good deal has previously been written on the impact of the May, 1954 shipment of arms to Guatemala from Czechoslovakia, how the United States used its discovery of the **Alfhem's** cargo to launch its most devastating verbal barrage on the revolutionary government and to establish a blockade of the Guatemalan ports. The transcripts, however, not only present us with a bird's-eye view of how the State Department, White House, and CIA carefully orchestrated the public condemnation of the shipment, but they also provide us with keen insights into the rationale underlying the behind-the-scenes activities. Hence there is no longer any question that Washington, fearful that Arbenz intended to use the arms to create a peasant militia, decided at the time to implement its plans for Castillo Armas' invasion. As a matter of fact, Foster Dulles called his brother to find out whether the **Alfhem's** arrival had not already "invalidated" or "knocked the props out" from under the CIA's program. Allen told him not to worry, but, if at all possible, he would like to "pull it off" within the next month.<sup>18</sup>

The phone summaries also disclose in great detail the other components of the American response. They unveil the confusion that beset the administration when it determined that there was nothing illegal about the shipment. Even the Senate's ultra-conservative Majority Leader, William Knowland, questioned Dulles about how he could protest the purchase of arms when the United States official military mission remained in Guatemala ostensibly to train Arbenz's army how to use those very arms. The Secretary conceded that this

posed a serious problem, and promised Knowland he would find out the reason for the inconsistency. But instead of phoning the Pentagon for the answer, Dulles called Frank Wisner, who headed up the operation for the CIA. Wisner confirmed to Dulles that it was the Agency's decision to leave the United States military in Guatemala. The Deputy Director for Plans explained, "confidentially, the mission, like others we have behind the Iron Curtain, is used as eyes and ears for us."<sup>19</sup>

The summaries of the phone conversations concerning the blockade highlight further that compared to the demands of the cold war, policy makers in the 1950s looked upon the laws among nations as luxuries that the United States could often ill afford. A number of calls indicate that no matter how hard they tried, the State Department legal advisors could find no basis for the United States to blockade Guatemala, let alone for it to detain and search ships in the open seas. In desperation, Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland at one point suggested that the navy might be able to delay foreign vessels on the pretext that they were carrying atomic weapons. Ironically, it was Allen Dulles who torpedoed this idea, predicting that no countries, including United States allies, would find the pretext credible. Eisenhower, Dulles, and the other members of the National Security Council, nevertheless, felt that future arms shipments had to be stopped. Therefore, despite State's final legal opinion that a blockade could not be justified under either the Rio Treaty or the UN Charter, Dulles had Holland order that the navy intercept any suspicious looking vessels and, if they would not cooperate, escort them forcibly to Panama.<sup>20</sup>

Continuing along these same lines, the transcripts emphatically document that Dulles in particular, notwithstanding his "heavy-hearted" speech to the UN during the Suez crisis, had few qualms about compromising his avowed dedication to world order and international institutions when he felt United States interests demanded it. Some questions still remain regarding his long-range view of the 1954 Caracas Resolution, which he personally guided through the Inter-American Conference in March. In one exceptionally guarded phone conversation with his brother the next month, he did comment that "If... some action along the lines of the resolution we passed down there got under it might make other things more natural."<sup>21</sup>

However, when the arrival of the arms shipment prompted others in his Department, especially Holland, to propose that the United States invoke the Caracas Resolution by calling for a meeting of the OAS' Council of Foreign Ministers, the Secretary expressed his extreme reluctance. Part of his hesitancy stemmed from the estimates of his intelligence officers and ambassadors to Central America, who believed that the situation required stronger measures. Because of their opinion, Dulles told Holland, a meeting of the OAS Council would probably be a waste of his valuable time. Yet another call suggests a more important reason. Dulles feared that a resolution condemning Arbenz might actually be rejected, especially if the impending invasion failed. In the end he consented to call the meeting, but only on the condition that the Department delay its convocation until at least two-thirds of the OAS'

membership had pledged **in advance** to support a United States sponsored resolution. The meeting was never held. After Arbenz's overthrow Holland called to tell Dulles that he had arranged to "postpone [the meeting] for 30 days and then call it off -- but, he is not telling anybody that."<sup>22</sup>

The transcripts paint an even clearer picture of Dulles' willingness to disregard international organizations in connection with Arbenz's complaint before the UN Security Council. Indeed, the phone summaries related to this incident reveal perhaps in more detail than in any other episode of the Eisenhower era the administration's thinking on foreign policy and its mode of operation. Immediately following Castillo Armas' invasion, Arbenz's government formally requested that the Security Council meet in emergency session to examine the charge that Guatemala was the victim of outside aggression. Washington argued adamantly that the matter constituted an internal dispute, and should properly come under the aegis of the OAS. In fact, the administration preferred that Guatemala present its case before the Inter-American Peace Committee, not the general OAS Council, because the members of the Peace Committee "generally share United States views [and] a greater degree of control exists."<sup>23</sup>

Consistent with its composition, the Security Council voted overwhelmingly to refer Guatemala's complaint to the OAS. Not unexpectedly, the Soviet Union exercised its veto. Very unexpectedly, the next day both the British and the French reversed their positions and urged that the UN hear the Guatemalans out. Washington was caught off guard. Holland advocated that the State Department leak unsubstantiated, and in retrospect incorrect, rumors that Guatemala had bombed Honduras, thereby undercutting any sympathy the plight of Arbenz's government might have engendered. Dulles fumed that the United States had not placed Indochina before the UN out of deference to the French. Then the Secretary instructed representative to the UN, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., to use his position as president of the Security Council to insure that no meeting be held until the United States had in advance enough guaranteed votes to defeat any proposed agenda that included Guatemala. When Lodge said he could not delay the meeting beyond one more day, the Secretary confidently responded that only one day would be necessary.<sup>24</sup>

Dulles had reason to be confident. Coincidentally, the next day Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden were arriving in Washington to discuss the beleaguered Geneva talks. Dulles picked them up at the airport and drove them straight to the White House, where Eisenhower, according to Press Secretary James Hagerty's diary, "talked cold turkey" with Britain's two leading statesmen, telling them in unequivocal terms that "they have no right to stick their nose into matters which concern this hemisphere entirely."<sup>25</sup> The phone conversations add meaning to Eisenhower's words. For the first time since the UN's inception, a United States president authorized the Security Council delegates to use the veto against the British and the

French. Moreover, Dulles confided to Lodge that on the way in from the airport he had told Eden that "if we split on this, [he and Churchill] better pack up and go home." The Secretary then continued, perhaps foreshadowing Suez, "the happiest day of. . . [my] life will be when we don't have to modify our policies. . . to keep up a facade of unity."<sup>26</sup>

On his part, Lodge summoned the UN delegates from both renegade allies to his office and lectured them about loyalty. He finished the session on the ominous note: "If Great Britain and France felt that they must take an independent line backing the present government in Guatemala, we would feel free to take an equally independent line concerning such matters as Egypt and North Africa." Lodge reported to Dulles, "My announcement was received with great solemnity."<sup>27</sup>

Suffice it to say, less than two hours after telling Lodge of his conversation with Eden, Dulles called the Ambassador to the UN back to inform him that the British had agreed to abstain from the vote and would recommend to the French that they do likewise. Just to tie up any possible loose ends, three minutes later Dulles called French Ambassador Henri Bonnet to make sure he received the word. That afternoon the Security Council rejected the inclusion of Guatemala on the agenda, by a margin of one vote.<sup>28</sup>

The phone summaries divulge much more about the United States intervention in Guatemala. Nevertheless, that is not the subject of this article.<sup>29</sup> The preceding short vignettes are only an indication of the rich documentation that can be obtained from this uncommon source. And while I personally have dealt most extensively with the Guatemala material, it is but a subset of the wide range of topics that the transcripts allow us to explore more deeply. For the student of United States policy toward Indochina, the early estimates of the relative strengths of the French and Vietcong forces at Dien Bien Phu will prove fascinating. I certainly would not have expected Eisenhower to be more optimistic than his Secretary of State concerning the prospects for a French victory, or to appear more inclined than Dulles to commit the United States military. On this same subject, unless Admiral Radford lied over the phone, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff definitely did not mean to leave General Ely with the impression that Washington was prepared to launch an air strike to salvage the besieged French fortress. And as for the conventional view that the leaders of Congress stymied Dulles' and Radford's hope to win approval for Vulture, Dulles told Eisenhower that the historic April 3rd meeting "went pretty well."<sup>30</sup>

Perhaps more counter-intuitive is the material related to Dulles' attitude toward the SEATO pact. Rather than showing any symptoms of "pactomania," a lengthy conversation between Dulles and Livingston Merchant reveals that the Secretary had serious reservations about even going to Manila. In the privacy of his office he could explain candidly, "By going into a treaty of this sort, we limit our own freedom of action. Once we sign, then we have to consult re any action." Dulles, as we know, did agree to attend the conference, but apparently only because Merchant convinced him that if he did not the effect on

Thailand and Cambodia would be "fatal."<sup>31</sup>

To quickly move around the globe, the transcripts are especially instructive when studying the United States and the Middle East, whether one concentrates on the rise of Nasser, the genesis of the Eisenhower Doctrine, or the landing of the marines in Lebanon. A particularly intriguing conversation has to do with the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine to Jordan in 1957. In strict confidence Dulles related to Robert Murphy Eisenhower's suggestion that the State Department put out a story picturing King Hussein's pro-Nasser opponents as "puppets of the Kremlin. . .even if you can't prove every word." Dulles told Murphy to act on the suggestion right away, recommending that he plant the story with the Hearst newspaper chain as an exclusive.<sup>32</sup>

The transfer of the Sixth Fleet to the Eastern Mediterranean settled the Jordanian matter without further incident, but in another arena of the cold war, the phone conversations demonstrate how perilously close the United States came to moving beyond Dulles' notorious brink. They show that according to the military analysts, if Eisenhower had been forced to invoke the Formosa Resolution in 1958, the result "would [have been] of a nuclear character."<sup>33</sup> More unsettling, the transcripts indicate that the JCS unanimously considered conventional power inappropriate to defend the Offshore Islands, an assessment that places a foreboding perspective on Dulles' comment to Air Force Chief General Nathan Twining on September 2nd, "There [is] no use having of stuff and never being able to use it."<sup>34</sup>

If space permitted, I could offer illustrations of how the summaries present us with an inside view of all the diplomatic events in which Dulles participated. I could also add material reflective of more everyday concerns, such as the selection of ambassadors, the tortuous course of bipartisanship, and the not-always congenial relationships among the various key policy makers. Yet even if the transcripts did not yield the breadth of information that they do, they would still represent an invaluable tool for historical analysis. Consequently, whether they are technically classified as personal or official papers, they constitute a vital record of Eisenhower administration that properly belongs in the public domain. As one archivist wrote shortly after Dulles arranged to make the transcripts available, "a kind of Monday-morning quarter-backing becomes an activity essential to the success of the Republic. The people cannot call the plays in the heat of the game, especially in the conduct of foreign affairs, but they have an obligation constantly to appraise and reappraise the strategy of their representatives on the field of action in order that their opinions may guide and permit a more effective source of action in the future."<sup>35</sup> Dulles would have unquestionably concurred. He would also have extended this viewpoint to its logical conclusion. For Dulles understood that whereas it is our obligation to appraise the government's policies, it is the government's obligation to provide us with the documents.\*

\*I would like to thank Fred Greenstein and George Herring for their valuable criticisms and suggestions. I also gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Nancy Bressler and her staff at the Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University. John Burke assisted me with the research. An earlier version of this essay was presented at the 1981 Meeting of the American Historical Association, Los Angeles, California.

### Notes

1. Bryce Wood, "Self-Plagiarism and Foreign Policy," **Latin American Research Review** 3 (Summer 1968), 184-191.
2. For example, see Telephone Call to Mr. Armstrong, May 19, 1955, John Foster Dulles Papers, Telephone Conversation Series (hereafter JFDPTC), "General -- May 2-August 31, 1955 (6)." The original transcripts are located at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. Photocopies are at the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey.
3. Telephone Conversation with C.D. Jackson, July 3, 1954, JFDPTC, "Telephone Memoranda (Excepting to and from the White House), July 1-August 31, 1954 (5)."
4. **Ibid.**
5. Dean Rusk, Message read by President Robert F. Goheen at the Dedication of the John Foster Dulles Library of Diplomatic History, May 15, 1962, **The Princeton University Library Chronicle** 23 (Summer 1962), 152.
6. Interview with Phyllis Bernau Macomber, August 7, 1979; Interview with John W. Hanes, Jr., October 15, 1979.
7. Telephone Conversation with Sen. Jos. McCarthy, January 26, 1953, JFDPTC, "Telephone Memoranda (Excepting. . .), January-April 30, 1954 (4)."
8. Interview with Mr. William Macomber, October 28, 1981.
9. Telephone Conversation with Mr. Allen Dulles, June 29, 1953, JFDPTC, "Telephone Memoranda (Excepting. . .), May-June 30, 1953 (1)." See also Kermit Roosevelt, **Countercoup: The Struggle for Control of Iran** (New York, 1980), 135.
10. Telephone Conversation with Mr. Allen Dulles, July 24, 1953, JFDPTC, "Telephone Memoranda (Excepting. . .), July-October 31, 1953 (3)."
11. John Foster Dulles to Franklin Floate, April 5, 1959, JFDP, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey. I thank Mrs. Nancy Bressler and the staff of the Mudd Library for supplying me with the documents relating to Dulles' gift of his papers to Princeton.

12. John Foster Dulles to Members of the Committee, n.d., attached as Annex B to Dulles to Floate, April 5, 1959; Macomber interview; Press release of remarks of Arthur H. Dean upon the occasion of the dedication of the Dulles Library, May 15, 1962, JFDP, Princeton University; John E. Wickman, "John Foster Dulles' 'Letter of Gift,'" **The American Archivist** 31 (October 1968), 359.
13. Wickman, "Letter of Gift," 358-359; Philip A. Crowl, "The Dulles Library," **Foreign Service Journal** (September 1962), 49-50.
14. Dulles to Floate, April 5, 1959.
15. **Ibid.** and Annex A, attached. The microfilm copies are available through University Publications of America.
16. Dulles to Members of Committee.
17. William Dix to Arthur Dean, July 14, 1959; Dean to Dix, July 15, 1959; Dix to John Hanes, July 15, 1959; Dean to Dix, July 21, 1959; Department of State Press Release, July 21, 1959; Dean to President Dwight D. Eisenhower, September 24, 1959; all in JFDP, Princeton University.
18. Telephone Call to Mr. Allen Dulles, May 19, 1954, JFDPTC, "Telephone Memoranda (Excepting. . .), May 1-June 30, 1954 (3)."
19. Telephone conversations with Mr. Allen Dulles, May 17, 18, 1954; with Senator Knowland, May 18, 1954; with Frank Wisner, May 18, 1954; all in JFDPTC, "Telephone Memoranda (Excepting. . .), May 1-June 30, 1954 (3)."
20. Telephone Conversations with Mr. Allen Dulles, May 18, 19, 1954; with Mr. Holland, May 19, 1954; with Sec. (sic) Robert Anderson, May 19, 1954; all in JFDPTC, "Telephone Memoranda (Excepting. . .), May 1-June 30, 1954 (3)." Mr. English to Mr. Holland, May 20, 1954, attached to Holland to Ambassadors Donnelly and Pawley, May 27, 1954, Record Group (RG) 59, 714.00/5-2754, Decimal Files, Department of State, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (Hereafter, DF, DSNA); Robert Cutler, "Memo for President for Leaders' meeting, May 24/53 (sic), Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States, 1953-1961 (Whitman File), Legislative Meetings Series, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
21. Telephone Conversation with Mr. Allen Dulles, April 7, 1954, JFDPTC, "Telephone Memoranda (Excepting. . .), March-April 30, 1954 (1)."
22. John W. Fisher to Holland, April 19, 1954, RG 59, 714/4-1954; Whiting Willauer to Secretary of State, May 21, 1954, RG 59, 714.00/5-2154; both in DF, DSNA; Telephone conversations with Holland, June 9, 29, 1954; with Murphy, June 10, 11, 1954; all in JFDPTC, "Telephone Memoranda (Excepting. . .), May 1-June 30, 1954 (1, 2);" U.S. Department of State, "OAS Action against Communism in Guatemala, May 29, 1954, RG 59, 714.00/5-2954, DF, DSNA. See also the many State Department memoranda and minutes of meetings of the Guatemalan Group during June, 1954, in RG59, DF, DSNA.



23. Murphy (Acting) to AMEMBASSY, Managua and Tegucigalpa, June 21, 1954, RG 59, 714.00/6-2154, DF, DSNA.
24. Telephone Conversations with Holland, June 23, 1954; with Lodge, June 22, 24, 1954; all in JFDPTC, "Telephone Memoranda (Excepting. . .), May 1-June 30, 1954 (1)."
25. James C. Hagerty Diary, June 24, 26, 1954, James C. Hagerty Papers, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas.
26. Telephone Conversations with Lodge, June 24, 25, 1954, JFDPTC, "Telephone Memoranda (Excepting. . .), May 1-June 30, 1954 (1)."
27. Lodge to Secretary of State, June 24, 25, 1954, RG 59, 714.00/6-2454, 6-2554, DF, DSNA.
28. Telephone Conversations with Lodge and Bonnet, June 25, 1954, JFDPTC, "Telephone Memoranda (Excepting. . .), May 1-June 30, 1954 (1)."
29. For additional examples see Richard H. Immerman, **The CIA IN Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention** (Austin, Texas, 1982).
30. Telephone Conversations with Mr. Allen Dulles, March 16, 1954; Congressman Judd, March 29, 1954; all in JFDPTC, "Telephone Memoranda (Excepting. . .), May 1-June 30, 1954 (3);" Telephone Conversation with the President, April 3, 1954, JFDPTC, "General -- January-June 1954 (2)."
31. Telephone Conversation with Mr. Merchant, August 30, 1954, JFDPTC, "Telephone Memoranda (Excepting. . .), July 1-August 31, 1954 (1)."
32. Telephone Conversation with Mr. Murphy, April 26, 1957, JFDPTC, "Telephone Memoranda (Excepting. . .), March-April 30, 1957 (1)."
33. Telephone Conversation with Gov. Herter, September 19, 1958, JFDPTC, "Telephone Memoranda (Excepting. . .), August 1-October 31, 1958 (3)."
34. Telephone Conversation with General Twining, September 2, 1958, JFDPTC, "Telephone Memoranda (Excepting. . .), August 1-October 31, 1958 (4)."
35. William Dix, "The John Foster Dulles Library," **Princeton Athletic News**, October 10, 1959, p. 8.

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## Annotated Bibliography (Part II)

by

**Thomas Schoonover (Bielefeld University)**

Städtler, Erhard. "Die Ansbach-Bayreuther Truppen im amerikanischen Unabhängigkeitskrieg, 1777-1783: Forschungen zur Kulturgeschichte und Familienkunde" (Ansbach-Bayreuth Troops in the American War for Independence, 1777-1783: Research in Cultural and Family History). Diss., Erlangen, 1955. Interested in geneological and local history. Seeks to determine attitudes of the lower ranks of troops and to evaluate their impressions of and activities in the U.S. Sources: Library of Congress, Huntington Library, Br. Public Record Office, British Museum, Nurnberg, Ansbach, and other German archives.

Stelzer, Rudolf. "Reconstruction: Die politische, soziale und wirtschaftliche Umwälzung des amerikanischen Südens nach dem Bürgerkriege" (Reconstruction: Political, Social, and Economic Transformation of the American South after the Civil War.) Diss., Heidelberg, 1951. The industrialization of the South and its integration into the socio-economic life of the Union was not accidental. A people can be forced into its good fortune so long as the rules are maintained and followed. In both reconstruction in the South and in Germany after 1945, economic interests sped up the process of reconciliation. Sources: mostly secondary in English.

Stipke, Ulrich H. "Das Problem der anglo-amerikanischen Partnerschaft in der britischen Fernost- und Pazifikpolitik: Eine Studie zur angelsächsischen Weltpolitik unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Zeitraums 1919-1922" (The Problem of Anglo-American Partnership in the British Policy in the Far East and the Pacific: A Study of Anglo-Saxon World Policy with Special Consideration of the Period, 1919-1922). Diss., Hamburg, 1954. The concept of Anglo-American community had its core in the Atlantic area, but its beginnings in the Pacific. In the Atlantic and in the Pacific, the British-American arrangement did not involve competition in the sense of the U.S. seeking to displace and replace Britain, nor even to destroy the British empire. In the Far East, Britain increasingly adopted the U.S. policy line, not to say dependence upon the U.S. Sources: printed British, Canadian, Australian, New Zealand, U.S., and Soviet Union official documents.

Trebesch, Jochen. "Der Kongress der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und der Bereich des Auswärtigen. (Staatsrechtliche Aspekte der politischen Kontrolle des Präsidenten und der Mitwirkung durch die amerikanische Legislative im auswärtigen Bereich)" (The U.S. Congress and the Area of Foreign Affairs. (Legal Aspects of the Political Control of the President and of Cooperation through the American Legislature in the Area of Foreign Affairs)). Diss., Bonn, 1972. Examines the Congressional control of the Executive and its cooperation in matters of foreign relations. President does not have prerogative in foreign relations, given the interrelationships of foreign, military, domestic, and economic policies. Congress functions in a critical and negative role, particularly through its investigation powers. Congress needs better access to information to fulfill this investigatory and critical function. Sources: legal.

Tresp, Lothar. "Die Vereinigten Staaten, England und Deutschland in ihren Beziehungen während des Venezuela-Grenzstreits von 1895 und des Venezuela-Schuldenfalls von 1902 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Monroedoktrin" (Relations among U.S., England, and Germany during the Venezuela Boundary Dispute of 1895 and the Venezuela Debt Affair of 1902 with Special Consideration of the Monroe Doctrine). Diss., Würzburg, 1952. Britain risked insulting its partner Germany to win the goodwill of the U.S. in the Spanish-American War crisis of 1898. Britain sustained this position in subsequent choices between Germany and the U.S. As the Venezuela events of 1902/03 occurred, Britain's image in the U.S. was already one of honesty and

trustworthiness. Thus, British activity similar to Germany's reaped almost no criticism, while Germany was severely criticized.

Vasold, Manfred Hans. "Die amerikanische Chinapolitik 1945-1949: vom Zweiten Weltkrieg zur Machtergreifung der Kommunisten" (The American China Policy, 1945-1949: From the Second World War to the Communist Seizure of Power). Diss., Erlangen-Nürnberg, 1978. The U.S. presumption that the People's Republic of China was involved in the decision to initiate conflict in Korea was the product of three years of hardening attitudes towards Peking. PR China did not insist upon recognition as a prior step to economic and political discussion, so China's economic isolation from the west was the result of the U.S. embargo and the extension of this embargo to U.S. allies. Consequently, the PRC conducted over 80% of its trade with socialist countries and moved more toward autarky. Sources: U.S. National Archives.

Voigt, Wolfgang. "Grundzüge der Bündnispolitik der Kommunistischen Partei der USA unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der Bewegung der Afroamerikaner: (1945 bis zur Gegenwart)" (Fundamentals of the Alliance Policy of the U.S. Communist Party with Special Consideration of the Afro-American Movement (1945 to the Present)). Diss., Humboldt Univ. Berlin (GDR), 1978. Domestic Afro-American and working class policies of the U.S. Communist Party linked to the international movements of working class and ethnic, particularly Afro-American, groups. Recent period reveals integrated black-white worker organizations and the construction of an organized basis for fighting racism and exploitation.

Wandel, Eckhard. "Die Bedeutung der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika für das deutsche Reparationsproblem 1924-1929" (The Meaning of the U.S. for the German Reparation Problem, 1924-1929). Diss., Tübingen, 1970. (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1971). U.S. interested in quick reconstruction of Europe after the First World War to absorb its surplus capital and its surplus agrarian products. Resolution of German reparations' situation was essential to Europe's economic revitalization. The key to German reparations problems lay in Washington, since a revision of the Dawes Plan was impossible without the U.S. Sources: numerous U.S. and German archives.

Weber, Claus. "Soziologische Aspekte des Kampfes politisch relevanter U.S.-amerikanischer nationaler Minderheitengruppen um ihre volle Gleichberechtigung" (Sociological Aspects of the Struggle of Politically Relevant National Minorities in the U.S. for their Complete Equality). Diss., Greifswald (GDR), 1978. Examines the existence of about 25 million Afro-Americans, 8 million Mexican-Americans, 2 million Puerto Ricans, and 1 million Indians under conditions of racial exploitation and racial oppression. National minority matters viewed within context of international minority problems.

Weidenfeller, Gerhard. "VDA, Verein für das Deutschtum im Ausland, Allgemeiner Deutscher Schulverein: (1881-1918); ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des deutschen Nationalismus und Imperialismus im

Kaiserreich" (VDA, Society for Germandom Abroad, General Association for German Schools (1881-1918); A Contribution to the History of German Nationalism and Imperialism during the Empire). Diss., Münster, 1971. Although preserving "Deutschtum"/Germandom/was an aspect of German nationalism, this expansive form of preserving Germandom--language, culture, patriotism--was a form of worldwide nationalism which had normally only a minor relationship to German settlers in the U.S. More effective among German settlers in eastern and southern Europe.

Wellhausen, Marianne. "Über deutsche Auswanderung nach den Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika im 19. Jahrhundert unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Mittelfrankens" (Regarding German Emigration to the U.S. in the 19th Century with Special Attention to Middle Franckenland). Diss., Erlangen, 1949. The goal of most emigration, to achieve national and economic advantage for the motherland, was seldom fulfilled in the 19th century. Even during good times in Germany, the U.S. attracted German emigrants due to its image as a democratic land offering greater political, religious, and economic freedom and independence. Sources: Stadtarchiv Nürnberg and very limited printed.

Wersich, Rüdiger Bernd. "Zeitgenössischer Rechtsextremismus in den Vereinigten Staaten: Organization, Ideologie, Methoden und Einfluss, dargestellt unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der John Birch Society" (Contemporary Right-Wing Radicalism in the U.S.: Organization, Ideology, Methods, and Influence, presented with Special Attention to the John Birch Society). Diss., München, 1977. Compares the U.S. extreme right to other groups, such as Italian and German fascists and communists, but relies mostly upon internal analysis. However, the John Birch Society did not contain so much popular common thought as the German and Italian fascists and recognized an exaggerated individualism. Also treats the basic, common foreign policy convictions of the radical right.

## KOREAN WAR LITERATURE: A LIST OF SELECTED FOREIGN-LANGUAGE MATERIALS

by

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(Jarvis Christian College)

Attia, Gamal el-Din. **Les Forces armées des Nations Unies en Corée et au Moyen-Orient** (The Armed Forces of the United Nations in Korea and in the Middle East). Genève: Droz, 1963.

Bromberger, Serge, **et al. Retour de Corée** (Return from Korea). Paris: Julliard, 1951.

Chung, Song-Gwan. **Panmunjom ui Pisa** (An Inside Story of Panmunjom). Seoul: Pyoungmun Sa, 1953.

- Coyos, Celestin. **Ma Captivite en Corée du Nord** (My Captivity in North Korea). Paris: Grasset, 1954.
- Crahay, Albert. **Les Belges en Corée, 1951-1955** (The Belgians in Korea, 1951-1955). Bruxelles: La Renaissance du Livre, 1967.
- Devillers, Philippe. "L'U.R.S.S., la Chine et les origines de la guerre de Corée" (The U.S.S.R., China, and the Origins of the Korean War). **Revue Française de Science Politique**, 14 (1964): 1179-94.
- Frankenstein, Marc. "Les Initiatives de l'Inde pour le règlement du conflit coréen" (The Initiatives of India for the Settlement of Korean Conflict), **Revue Politique et Parlementaire**, 205 (1951): 53-62.
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- . **L'Organisation des Nations Unies devant le conflit coréen** (The Organization of the United Nations and the Korean War). Paris: A. Pedone, 1952.
- Hu, Hung-Lick. **Le Problème Coréen** (The Korean Problem). Paris: A. Pedone, 1953.
- Hwang, Byung-Moo. "Joong Kong un Oye Aprokgang eul Kun Nut Na?" (Why Did Communist China Cross the Yalu River?). **Shin Dong-A** (New East Asia) (June 1982): 240-52.
- Joong Ang Ilbo Sa. **Minjok ui Cheung-on: Hanguk Chonjaeng Sillok** (Witness to Nationalism: A Historical Record of the Korean War), 4 vols. Seoul: Eul Yoo Chulpan Sa, 1972.
- Kim, Hui-Il. **Mije ui Chosun Chimyak Sa** (History of the Invasion of American Imperialism in Korea). Pyongyang: Chosun Nodongdang Chulpan Sa, 1962.
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- . **Amerika teikokushugi no Chosen shinryaku** (History of American Aggression in Korea). Tokyo: Yuzanka Shuppan Kabushiki Kaisha, 1972.
- Kim, Il-Sung. **Chayuw Tongnip ul wihan Chosun Inmin ui Choguk Haebang Chonjaeng** (Korean People's Liberation War for Fatherland's Freedom and Independence). Pyongyang: Chosun Nodongdang Chulpan Sa, 1954.
- Korovin, E.A. **Chudovishchnye zlodneyaniya amerikanskikh agressorov v Koree** (The Outrageous Crimes of American Aggressors in Korea). Moscow: Znanie, 1952.
- Kravtsov, I. **Agressiya amerikanskogo imperializma v Koree, 1945-1951 gg.** (American Imperialist Aggression in Korea, 1945-1951). Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1951.
- Lee, Kyung-Nam. "38 Sun yi Mooneu Zeedun Na!" (The Day the 38th Parallel Line Broke). **Shin Dong-A** (New East Asia) (June 1982): 194-227.
- Minzoku Mondai Kenkyukai. **Chosen Senso-shi** (History of the Korean War). Tokyo: Koria Hyoronsha, 1967.
- Nam, Sang-Son. **Yuk io wa Haktobyoung** (The Korean War and the Student Volunteer Corps). Seoul: Hyosun Munhwa Sa, 1974.
- Pak, Chan. **Hanguk Woegyo Bisa** (Secret History of Korean Diplomacy). Seoul: Kimil Won, 1979.
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- \_\_\_\_\_. **Yuk io Sabyon Sa** (A History of the Korean Conflict). Seoul: Kukbangbu, 1959.
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- \_\_\_\_\_. **Yuk io Sabyon Yukkun Chonsa** (The Army's Battle History of the Korean War), 6 vols. Seoul: Yukkun Bonbu, 1954-57.
- Rin, Eiju. **Chosen Senso-shi** (History of the Korean War). Tokyo: Korja Hyoronsha, 1967.
- Samsonov, G.E. **Borba za mirnoe demokraticeskoe reshenie koreiskogo voprosa** (Struggle for a Peaceful, Democratic Solution of the Korean Problem). Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1960.
- Seizaburo, Shinobu. **Chosen Senso no Boppatsu** (The Outbreak of the Korean War). Tokyo: Fukumura, 1969.
- Takeo, Naoi. **Chosen Senran no Shinjitsu** (The Truth About the Korean War). Tokyo: Democratic Japan Society, 1953.
- Yi, Chong-Hak. **Hanguk Chonjaeng Sa** (The Military History of the Korean War). Seoul: Chung Um Sa, 1969.
- Zaslavskii, D. **Peremirie v Koree - vazhnyi vklad v delo mira** (Armistice in Korea - Important Contribution to the cause of Peace). Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1953.

**Minutes of the SHAFR Council Meeting**  
**Monday December 28, 1982**  
**AHA Washington**

President L. E. Gelfand, presiding.

Council members present: Gaddis Smith, Lawrence S. Wittner. Also in attendance: Ernest R. May, Robert Seager, II, Alan K. Henrikson, Warren F. Kimball, Warren F. Kuehl, William J. Brinker, Milton O. Gustafson, Harold D. Langley, Marvin R. Zahniser, William Z. Slany, Daniel C. Helmstadter.

Mr. Langley reported it seems certain that Catholic University will host the SHAFR summer conference in 1983. Details have yet to be worked out. Mr. Gelfand reported that George Washington University has confirmed for the SHAFR summer meeting of 1984. Also, he said, officers of SHAFR will continue to explore a joint meeting with the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association as well as an invitation to hold a summer conference at Drexel University in Philadelphia.

Mr. Gelfand reported that ABC-Clio Press, publisher of the **Guide to American Foreign Relations Since 1700**, wishes not to be held to the understanding that SHAFR members can purchase the **Guide** for \$49.50 through December 1983. Dr. Gale Schlacter, editor-in-chief of the Press, made the request because publishing the **Guide** has been costly beyond their expectations. Several avenues of action were explored. Mr. Zahniser was asked to obtain further information on publication costs and sales policies from Dr. Schlacter and to forward that information to Council for discussion at its OAH meeting in April. In the meantime, we are to insist that the \$49.50 price for members hold through April.

Mr. Gelfand asked that the Minutes show it was the sentiment of the group present that Richard Dean Burns be congratulated for the high quality of the **Guide**.

Mr. Henrikson reported for the Program Committee. The Committee will solicit suggestions by mail for the summer program in Washington, D.C. (1983). Paper themes may be suggested in keeping with the tentative plan to hold one or two joint sessions with the Conference on Peace Research in History and the American Military Institute.

Mr. Gelfand reported that negotiations are continuing with the Department of State to establish year-long Fellowships for younger American diplomatic historians. Discussion followed on what kind of State Department experiences would be most valuable for young scholars. Funding the fellowships is a problem that must be addressed. Mr. Gelfand, Mr. May, Mr. Zahniser and Mr. Slany will discuss the Fellowship matter with an Assistant Secretary of State on December 30 and report the results of their conversation to Council.

Mr. Gelfand reported on his correspondence with an official of the Commission d'Histoire des Relations Internationales, Mr. Vigezzi. There seems little reason for SHAFR to act, other than to notify members of the Centro Per Gli Studi Politica Estera E. Opinione Pubblica of the Universita Degli Studi Di Milano. Professor Brunello Vigezzi of the Centro is engaged in planning for an international historical congress and seeks papers in keeping with certain announced themes.

Mr. Gustafson, reporting for the Government Relations Committee, recommended that SHAFR place its financial resources exclusively behind the National Coordinating Committee (NCC) rather than dividing its resources between the NCC and the Coalition to Save our Documentary Heritage. The NCC is now receiving substantial support from the AHA and the OAH. Mr. Gustafson thinks the NCC is effective in lobbying for legislation to keep open government collections and in publicizing matters of concern to historians. On motion Council members supported the recommendation that SHAFR contribute \$500.00 this year to the NCC. This matter will be referred to the full Council by mail ballot.

Mr. Gelfand asked Council if a committee should not be appointed to begin revision of the **Guide**. Discussion followed about the need for a

supplement in five years, the **Guide** now being out-of-date by two years. Mr. R.D. Burns will be asked for his ideas on whether and how we should proceed on this matter. Mr. Kuehl urged that we begin plans for a new **Guide** at the earliest possible moment, and consider as well how the project will be underwritten.

Mr. Gelfand called for the report of Committees.

Mr. Zahniser reported for Mr. Weber, chair of the Membership Committee. Approval was voiced for Mr. Weber's suggested recasting of one membership district. Mr. Weber, by letter, asked if \$1,000 should not be set aside for a special membership drive. Much discussion followed. Should we try to gain new members among the foreign service officers? Should we try advertising in appropriate journals? Mr. Helmstadter, president of Scholarly Resources, suggested that we try exchange-advertising with **Diplomatic History** and other journals. The conclusion of the discussion pointed to the desirability of a report from the Membership Committee in which target membership audiences be identified and strategies suggested for reaching those audiences. Mr. Weber and his Committee members were commended for their good work.

Mr. Seager, reporting for **Diplomatic History**, asked that Messrs. Warren Kimball, John Gaddis, and David Pletcher be named to the editorial board of the journal. This recommendation will be referred to Council by mail ballot. Mr. Seager expressed a wish that senior scholars in the field submit more articles to the journal. He also asked whether **Diplomatic History** should not be indexed and asked that Council make a decision at its April meeting. The length and cost of an index is uncertain. Mr. Helmstadter will assist Mr. Seager in working out a cost estimate.

Mr. Brinker reported for the **Newsletter**. He emphasized the need for members to submit items, and brief articles, of interest to the membership. Mr. May suggested that many pertinent items are available from the NCC and might be noted in the **Newsletter**.

Mr. Zahniser submitted his Report as Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Dues and expenses this year are in close balance. All endowment monies and special accounts are now being supervised by the Finance Committee (Messrs. Hess, Varg, Kuehl, chair).

Mr. Kuehl, on behalf of the Finance Committee moved that E.M. Connaughton, W.F. Kuehl, L.E. Kaplan, and M.R. Zahniser, all persons who are authorized to write checks on SHAFR accounts, be bonded for \$50,000. This motion will be referred to Council by mail ballot.

Mr. Kuehl pointed out the contribution to the society made by the original Finance Committee (Sally Marks, Alexander DeConde, and Tom Schoonover) for having laid the foundation upon which the present committee is based.

Mr. Kuehl emphasized the necessity of the Council to order its priorities so that available monies can be directed toward the most important projects. He added that we must do everything possible to build up our general endowment account so that SHAFR has adequate



funding in future years.

Mr. Zahniser suggested the desirability of having the financial records of the Business Office for 1982 reviewed by a financial consultant and a report made to Council. He will pursue the matter.

Mr. Welch, by letter, reported for the Bernath Lecture Committee. The Committee already has several excellent nominees for 1983, but wishes to have even more persons nominated.

Mr. A.E. Campbell, University of Birmingham, by letter suggested that SHAFR should present only one candidate for vice-president. He saw little to recommend in the present system where two excellent people are nominated each year. Discussion followed. It was the general opinion that this constitutional matter, and others as well, be looked at for purposes of updating. President-elect May asked President Gelfand to appoint a Committee, to report to Council in April.

Council adjourned at 11:00 p.m.

Marvin R. Zahniser  
Executive Secretary-Treasurer

### **The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Report of the Secretary Treasurer 1982**

SHAFR membership continues in the 900 range as it has for the past several years. A plateau may well have been reached for the Membership Committee has recruited very actively in 1982. We have, in addition, had the attraction this year of offering the **Guide** to new members at the price available to continuing members. Professor Ralph Weber, chairman of our Membership Committee, has requested that the Council consider appropriating \$1,000.00 for advertising and special mailings in order to move our membership beyond its present plateau.

A very smooth transition has been effected in moving all special Society funds under the direct supervision of the Finance and Endowments Advisory Committee. Professor Warren Kuehl, as chairman of the committee, is working with Professors Hess and Varg in investing all Bernath funds, as well as the monies in the Holt, Graebner, and lifetime membership funds. Our collective goal is to invest SHAFR monies with a high degree of safety yet with a return that will give us solid financial strength.

We must all be pleased with the publication of the **Guide to American Foreign Relations Since 1700**. In keeping with earlier instructions from Council, I forwarded to ABC-Clio in April half the monies subscribed for the **Guide**, with promise that the other half would be forwarded when the volume was published. The second payment has now been made. ABC-Clio received a total of \$12,425.91.

It is well that SHAFR moved to a higher dues structure in this past year. Inflation across-the-board and the special expenses associated with advertising the **Guide** created a close match between expenditures and income.

Remarkable progress has been made toward reaching the goal of \$20,000.00 for the W. Stull Holt Fund. The Graebner Fund grows but at a more measured pace. Many persons are working, and giving most generously to support these funds.

There continues within SHAFR a high willingness on the part of its members to serve on various committees and to do the work of the committees expeditiously and with distinction.

We can continue to take pride in **Diplomatic History** as a journal of ever rising strength and prestige and in our **Newsletter** as a source of information and ideas current within the profession. We owe a note of thanks to the editors of these publications, as well as to the editor of our **Roster and Research Guide**, and to their universities for their generous support of SHAFR.

The Society continues to owe much to the generous support of Gerald and Myrna Bernath. Younger scholars eligible for the Bernath prizes, and students whose annual membership fee is now subsidized by Bernath funds, are especially helped by the Bernath endowment.

This has been a good year for SHAFR. On a concluding note, we must all be especially gratified that Lawrence Gelfand was president in the year that the **Guide** was published, for no one worked harder to insure that the project was undertaken by SHAFR.

Marvin R. Zahniser

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## POETRY SECTION

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Jeffrey J. Safford (Montana State University) has sent a companion piece to the poem concerning Henry Cabot Lodge which appeared in the last issue of the **Newsletter**. The following was found in the Diary of Hugh Gibson located at Stanford University. Gibson, then a 35-year-old career diplomat assigned to duties with Herbert Hoover's European Relief Program, also failed to attribute authorship, merely noting that "The following was today (28 March 1919) produced. . . ."

### ODE TO COLONEL HOUSE

"Wholly unquotable  
Always ungoatable  
Secretly notable  
Silence's spouse

Darkly inscrutable  
Quite irrefutable  
Nobly immutable  
Edward M. House"

## FINANCIAL REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY-TREASURER

Over \$54,000 was processed this year by the Business Office. Dues, **Guide** monies, Holt monies, and money from a variety of sources kept us constantly at work in sorting out accounts. A major step forward was made in the appointment of a Finance Committee that is advisory to the Secretary-Treasurer. This Committee is already overseeing the investment of all non-operating accounts, as indicated by the appended Report of Finance Committee. We owe much to the leadership of Warren F. Kuehl in making this step possible. A summary of business activity follows.

Carryover from 1981

2,930.47

### Receipts

Sale of <u>Guide</u>	12,455.61
Dues	11,516.40
Contributions to Holt Fund	11,276.50
Transfer from BGSU	6,966.66
Interest earned on excess funds	2,516.86
Bernath Living Trust	1,900.00
Proceeds from savings account	1,394.67
Bernath Prizes, 1981 & 1982	2,000.00
Contributions to Graebner Fund	692.29
Life Membership Funds	362.18
Sale of mailing list	327.00
Interest on Supplementary Account Bond	315.00

Receipts (contd)

Contributions to endowment	48.50
Total received	51,771.67
Total available	54,702.14

Disbursements

ABC-Clio, <u>Guide</u>	12,425.91
Transfers to Finance Comm., Akron	15,150.50
Scholarly Resources ( <u>Dip. Hist.</u> )	7,262.00
General operating expenses	2,026.53
Bernath interest, 1982	1,900.00
Bernath interest, 1981	950.00
Bernath prizes and expenses	1,250.00
Convention expense (AHA, OAH, SHAFR)	1,096.45
Council/Comm./Sec. Treas. expense	115.28
Miscellaneous	
Transfer of savings acct.	
to Akron	1,394.67
Contribution to NCC	215.00
Professional fees	195.00
Safe deposit box	<u>8.00</u>
	1,812.67
Total disbursed	43,989.34

Cash on Hand

Checking	2,158.03
Vanguard Money Market Fund	8,554.77
Total accounted for	54,702.14

For the convenience of those members who might keep a file of the SHAFR **Newsletter** we are enclosing a cover for the December 1982 issue. This previous issue was too hastily proof-read and errors too numerous to mention slipped in. -- editor

## THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William Brinker, Department of History, Tennessee Tech, Cookeville, Tennessee 38501

EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS: Anita J. Flowers and J. Scott Hickman Tennessee Tech.

EDITORIAL ASSISTANT: Jeanette Keith Denning, Tennessee Tech.

ISSUES: The **Newsletter** is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December. All members receive the publication.

DEADLINE: All material must be in the office of the editor not later than four (4) weeks prior to the date of publication.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of most back numbers of the **Newsletter** are available and may be obtained from the editorial office upon the payment of a service charge of 75¢ per number. If the purchaser lives abroad, the charge is \$1.00 per number.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, honors, awards), announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered--or published--upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting the use of diplomatic materials in various (especially foreign) depositories, biographies and autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the field of U. S. diplomacy, and even jokes (for fillers) if upon diplomatic topics. Authors of "straight" diplomatic articles should send their opuses to **Diplomatic History**. Space limitations forbid the carrying of book reviews by the **Newsletter**.

### FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

1968	Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)
1969	Alexander De Conde (U of California--Santa Barbara)
1970	Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)
1971	Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)
1972	Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)
1973	Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)
1974	Bradford Perkins (Michigan)
1975	Armin H. Rappaport (U of California--San Diego)
1976	Robert A. Divine (Texas)
1977	Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)
1978	Akira Iriye (Chicago)
1979	Paul A. Varg (Michigan State)
1980	David M. Pletcher (Indiana)
1981	Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State)
1982	Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa)

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