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PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors two printed works of a quarterly nature, the Newsletter, and Diplomatic History, a journal; a Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects is published occasionally.

A Research Note on America's Senior Representatives Abroad at the Turn of the Century

by
H.E. Mattox (Chapel Hill)

From the time of Jacksonian democracy to the era of Calvin Coolidge, the large majority of America's diplomatic and consular officers clearly were amateurs. The appellation applies to lower-ranking officials as well as chiefs of mission throughout this hundred-year stretch of United States history. It is not clear, however, that a lack of professional status equated with a lack of basic educational or intellectual qualifications, nor that the political spoils system necessarily resulted in the appointment to posts overseas of "worn-out, useless, second-rate politicians."¹ Such, nevertheless, is the usual perception of the diplomatic and consular corps in those years, one that is at least implicit in the substantial literature on the twentieth century efforts to establish merit principles in the Foreign Service.²

A contrary view is possible. Edward Pessen, in a recent study of the appointive process throughout American history, draws a pertinent judgment: "Appointees to high judicial, diplomatic, and even administrative posts. . . appear to have been cut of even finer cloth than. . . [those] who have had to run the electoral gauntlet."³ Social cloth can be defined in several ways, but if the quoted sentence may be taken to mean broadly that such appointees have sprung from elevated social-economic cultural backgrounds, certainly in comparison with the average American, the assessment seems to be borne out in the case of senior officers in service abroad during one period in the era of amateurism, the two decades from 1890 to 1910.

This writer is undertaking a study of the origins of more than 300 ambassadors, ministers, ministers resident, and consuls general who served overseas during that time. The period was one of transition from pure spoils to limited merit principles but was chosen because it affords the opportunity to investigate the qualifications of appointees to a system not quite yet affected significantly by civil service reform sentiment. Obviously, the turn of the

century also was a crucial transitional period in the United States's development into an internationally-recognized world power. The American foreign affairs establishment was emerging from a "quiet time of diplomatic doldrums," in Bemis's phrase, during those years. After 1898, it began to matter more who was stationed abroad because the stakes were higher.

Secretaries of legation or embassy and lower-ranking consular officers, unless they were promoted to a senior position by 1910, are excluded from the study so as to bring a degree of manageability to the data. Microfilmed Department of State lists and official registers are the sources of most personal information thus far, although Department of State records have been consulted in some instances and will be used to a greater extent as the study progresses.⁴ The sample of senior appointees includes the overwhelming majority of those who actually served abroad, 1890-1910.

Preliminary results of the study indicate that America's senior envoys and consuls around the turn of the century were drawn from select, strikingly small groups in the nation's society. The prior principal professions of the appointees is illustrative. Of the 290 officers on whom information in this regard has been developed, more than one-fourth were active in the legal profession (See Table I). Another 13 per cent were journalists, writers, or editors, and 15 per cent were from the business or banking fields. A further 15 per cent of the group was composed of persons formerly in other government positions, many of them appointive, or in education. Young men with no significant professional experience before entering the diplomatic or consular service in subordinate positions--those who might be called quasi-careerists--made up almost ten per cent of the total senior appointments. Planters and farmers and a miscellaneous category account for the remainder.

As a group, then, more than two-thirds of these senior officers were trained and experienced in one of four major career fields: the law, journalism, business, or education. If those with backgrounds in government are added, along with the quasi-careerists, nearly all of whom rose through the ranks, the figure increases to slightly above 85 per cent of the total.

Table I
 Professional Backgrounds upon Appointment 290 Senior
 U. S. Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 1890-1910

Profession	Number	Per cent
Law	80	27.6
Journalism, Letters	53	18.3
Business, Banking	44	15.2
"Quasi-careerists"	28	9.7
Education	22	7.6
Government	21	7.2
Agriculture	10	3.4
Other	32	11.0
Totals	290	100.0

Occupations aside, politicians were present in the senior ranks, to be sure. Ex-members of Congress totalled 31 of the officers in the 1890-1910 period, or a little more than ten per cent of the group. To this can be added ten former governors, two of whom also served in the congress. The net total of 39 former congressmen and governors represented less than one-seventh of the 290-senior officer sample over the 20 year period, however. As Elmer Pliske has demonstrated, the turn of the century was as well the turning point in such appointments. Nearly 15 per cent of the senior officers in the decade of the 1890s had prominent political backgrounds; thereafter the number dropped abruptly and permanently to about one per cent of the total.⁵

The men who held the senior positions (there were no women appointees) came from the mere three per cent of the male work force that made up the recognized professions in 1900, the mid point of the period studied. Few physicians or clergymen, two of the largest professional groups of the time, were included, but as we have seen, lawyers, teachers, merchants and bankers were. All of these groups combined under the heading of "professions" in the 1900 Census accounted for only 828,000 of the 28 million men actively employed.⁶

The level of education also set apart America's senior diplomats and consuls. At a time when only one in 20 white Americans went to school beyond the age of 17, about three-fourths of the sample had graduated from a four-year college or university. Data have

been gathered thus far on 277 of the chiefs of diplomatic mission and consuls general. Less than a fourth (64 officers) evidently had no exposure to higher education, the majority of these serving at consular posts. Thirty per cent of the college- or university-educated officers attended Ivy League schools--42 senior diplomats and 22 consuls general. Four persons received bachelor's degrees or the equivalent from European institutions. Six others studied in Europe without taking degrees. The senior diplomatic and consular services at the turn of the century, it seems evident, reflected extraordinarily high educational standards in comparison with the American population as a whole.

Other general characteristics of the group emerge from the study. The selection of officers was broad based; they were geographically representative of the United States, with one regional exception. A larger body of data is at hand here: 343 officers are identified, including those previously accounted for as to professional and educational backgrounds. Not surprisingly, a large proportion of the senior appointees was from the North Atlantic states, as grouped in the 1900 Census (see Table II). New York was by far the leading single state in the nation, with 46 officers named. But an even larger total of appointments was made from 11 North Central states, the area, not incidentally, that Presidents Harrison, McKinley, and Taft called home. Other regions were less heavily represented in absolute numbers, but only the South Central states, with their Democratic party orientation in a mainly Republican era and their large numbers of disenfranchised blacks, were under-represented in relation to the regional population distribution in 1900.

The place of birth was not always the same as the locale from which a consul general, say, was appointed. Close to ten per cent of the senior officers on whom information on birthplace is available (32 of 329) were naturalized immigrants. The majority of the group nevertheless hailed from the state in which they were born. Further, most of them lived in cities by the time they had gained sufficient stature in their professional fields to warrant selection.

Table II
Regional Origins for Appointment Purposes 343 Senior
Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 1890-1910

Region	No. Apptd.	% of Total	Region's % of 1900 Pop.
North Atlantic	114	33.2	27.6
North Central	119	34.7	34.8
South Atlantic	57	16.6	13.7
South Central	28	8.2	18.5
Western	25	7.2	5.4
Totals	343	100.0	100.0

The postings abroad of these political appointees follow no discernible pattern. Somewhat unexpectedly, however, the study reveals that a small majority of the 343-officer sample held more than one overseas assignment. By 1910, our cutoff year, one-third of them (114) had amassed more than ten years as diplomatic or consular officers, including those who left prior to that year for whatever reason. Another one-third had served in the five- to ten-year range. Some few had exceptionally long periods of uninterrupted service--this in a day when hiring and firing was considered the norm upon a change of administration. Others held several appointments, but with sporadic periods of service. A total of 166 officers (48 per cent) did conform to the pattern of political change, in that they were one-time senior diplomats or consular officers. Eleven per cent of the group, for example, was in and out during the Harrison Administration, never to return. A group of comparable size had the same experience under the second Cleveland Administration.

The senior foreign service at the turn of the century clearly presented no settled career track for those interested in appointment abroad. On the contrary, it was a decidedly precarious way to make a living, quite aside from salary levels. The pre-professional service nonetheless came to have a substantial cadre of experienced, if technically amateur, senior diplomatic and consular officers.

A broadly typical appointee of the period was white--only a handful of blacks was named, and those to a limited number of posts.⁷ He was likely a native of the Northeast or the Middle West and a college graduate. He was middle-aged; three-fifths of the total sample were in their 40's or 50's when appointed to a senior position. He was more likely than not to have had a previous career as a lawyer, a journalist or editor, or a businessman. The odds were not much better than even in the span of years 1890-1910 that an appointee to a senior post would serve more than once. It was more than probable, however, that he would remain in the diplomatic or consular service for at least five years.

One thing was sure: The senior officer of the era had to have political connections. There were, after all, among the last years before merit principles began to have an impact. The typical appointee was not, on the other hand, necessarily a politician of national stature; relatively few had been members of Congress or governors. Nor was he, incidentally, a military veteran in this period a full generation after the Civil War, although about one in four had in fact served under arms. Finally, he was usually urban based upon appointment and a native-born citizen of the United States.

The foregoing information suggests the somewhat surprising conclusion that America's pre-reform, pre-professional senior representatives abroad were some of the best and brightest of the times. These men came from select socio-economic strata, by and large. Amateurs and spoils system appointees they were upon entry, but members of good standing of America's emerging middle class professionals they also were. They were not self-evidently in the majority "Political friends and nonentities."⁸ These officers were in the main educated and experienced professionals, not in diplomacy or consular affairs, but generally speaking in areas of intellectual endeavor not greatly removed from those fields. Their prior careers in the law, journalism, business, and most of the other professions that engaged these senior officers before entering into duties abroad, in conjunction with on-the-job diplomatic or consular experience gained over a period of several years, marked them as the superior products of an avowedly democratic system of selection. A merit-based sub-

elite, in Gaetano Mosca's formulation, they were not.⁹ The services were still wide open to the inept as well as the capable, depending on their political connections. The Rogers Act codifying the desired professionalization of the unified Foreign Service was not enacted for the better part of a generation after 1900. But the senior ranks of the still-separate services at the turn of the century were far from being stuffed with "useless, second-rate politicians" whatever may have been the case in earlier times.

If this thesis is taken as demonstrated at least tentatively and can be supported by additional research, our perceptions of the group will require modification. Foreign service reform may have been needed in an organizational sense, but not critically with respect to the human material that staffed the senior ranks. Not only was an elitist group of young men entering the lower positions in the diplomatic service during this period, as pointed out, among others, by Thomas H. Etzold,¹⁰ but there was already a comparable cadre of their elders in place: America's unrecognized elite of senior officers.

FOOTNOTES

¹This is the assessment of a South Carolina Congressman in 1834; see Warren F. Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United States, 1779-1939: A Study in Administrative History (Chicago, 1961), p 18.

²I refer especially to the studies of Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., Ilchman, Jerry Israel, and Richard H. Werking.

³Edward Pessen, "Social Structure and Politics in American History," American Historical Review, Vol. 87, no. 5 (Dec. 1982), p. 1315. Especially informative on the subject of elites in American life are Robert Weibe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New York, 1967), and Philip Burch's multi-volumed Elites in American History (New York, 1980, 1981). Several essay-length studies of particular interest are in Frederic C. Jaher, ed., The Rich, the Well Born, and the Powerful: Elites and Upper Classes in History (Urbana, Ill., 1973).

⁴No personnel files were kept before 1910. The files entitled "Application and Recommendation for Office, 1797-1901," and "Name Index to Appointment of United States Diplomatic and Consular Officers, 1776-1933," RG 59, National Archives, Washington, D.C., are informative, however. The Department of State publication, United States Chiefs of Mission 1778-1982 (Washington, rev. 1982), is a valuable compilation of senior diplomatic officers by name and post.

⁵Elmer Pliske, United States Diplomats and their Missions: A Profile of American Emissaries since 1778 (Washington, 1975), p. 198.

⁶Census information in this and the following paragraphs is from U.S. Government, Census Reports, Twelfth Census of the United States, 1900 (Washington, 1901), Vols. I and II.

⁷Blacks were identified as "colored" in Department of State indexes and ledger lists, but not so categorized in official registers. They served at few posts other than Monrovia and Port-au-Prince.

⁸Quoted phrase from John L. Thomas in Bernard Bailyn, et al., The Great Republic (Lexington, Mass., 1977), p. 930. Thomas's comment applies more particularly to the slightly earlier period of the latter 1830s and he notes that the service included a handful of able diplomats.

⁹Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York, 1939). C. Wright Mills, in The Power Elite (New York, 1956), characterizes such select groups as threatening to free institutions. This was hardly the case with the senior foreign service 1890-1910, however.

¹⁰Thomas H. Etzold, The Conduct of American Foreign Relations: The Other Side of Diplomacy (New York, 1977), pp. 22-27.

STUDENT BONERS

On December 1, 1823, Canning publically disavowed any British designs of aggression in Spanish America."
--Geoff Smith (Queens University, Kingston)

**THE AMERICAN 'EASTERN ESTABLISHMENT'
AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS:
A CHALLENGE FOR HISTORIANS
Priscilla M. Roberts**

Part I

This article's title perhaps seems a trifle provocative. The idea that there exists in the United States a body of individuals committed to what are often loosely termed 'internationalist' policies, men drawn largely from the leading financial and business institutions, law firms, Ivy League universities, major philanthropic foundations, and communications media of the East Coast, who take a particular interest in and have had a substantial impact upon the direction of twentieth-century American foreign affairs, is scarcely novel. Indeed, some years ago David Halberstam's massive study of the Vietnam War, The Best and the Brightest, in which he made use of the concept of the foreign policy 'Establishment' as a means of elucidating American involvement in the conflict, for many weeks headed the bestseller lists.¹ Leading policymakers themselves employ the term. In his most recent volume of memoirs, Henry Kissinger went so far as to blame much of what he perceived as the prevailing malaise which afflicted the conduct of American foreign affairs during and after the Vietnam years upon the loss of confidence of what he described as "the foreign policy Establishment. . . . [t]he leadership group in America that had won the battle against isolationism in the 1940s and sustained a responsible American involvement in the world throughout the postwar period."² Many other books and articles have likewise given considerable emphasis to the foreign policy role of what their authors believe can be regarded as an East Coast 'Establishment.'

Closer examination of the extant historiography on the 'Establishment' soon, however, reveals that, while some stimulating work on the subject exists, there is a surprising dearth of serious full-scale studies. Journalists have probably been the most prolific writers on the 'Eastern Establishment,' a term which, indeed, still lacks a certain academic respectability, due in part, one suspects, to its frequent appearance in the news media, an arena which so-called serious historians tend to regard with distrust mingled with

what, in at least some cases, seems not unlike fascination. (Lest I be supposed to disparage such studies, I should add that, in my opinion, the majority of the most stimulating, interesting, and perceptive work to date on the 'Establishment' is that of various American and British journalists.)

Richard M. Rovere's semi-serious article of 1961, "The American Establishment," which attracted much attention and which many who might be supposed to possess 'Establishment' credentials felt was at least partially accurate, was the fons et origo of this particular body of work. Rovere attempted to define the membership and institutional organization of the 'Establishment' and to describe the predominant characteristics of its personnel. Like virtually all subsequent journalists who have commented on the 'Establishment,' he regarded its foreign policy attitudes as central to any understanding of this group's aims and purposes, and stressed the importance of conformity to the 'Establishment' line on international affairs. Rovere suggested that, whereas 'Establishment' members are permitted much latitude in their behavior as to domestic matters, such tolerance ends at the water's edge. "The Establishment," he wrote, "has always favored foreign aid. It is, in fact, a matter on which Establishment discipline may be invoked."³ In the most recent major work on the subject, their book The American Establishment, Leonard and Mark Silk likewise devoted considerable space to the 'Establishment's' foreign policy attitudes and activities. Moreover, they opined that: "In the United States, if The THING [the synonym for the British ruling elite coined by William Cobbett, the nineteenth-century English pamphleteer] is to be located in its purest form, then the Council on Foreign Relations is the place."⁴ Consciously or not, the Silks were echoing the conclusion of Theodore H. White, who in 1965 chose as the most central 'Establishment' institution that same Council, which he felt "emphasize[d the 'Establishment's'] brooding concern for America's larger position in the world."⁵ Shortly afterwards, the respected columnist Joseph Kraft pointed out that, historically, "the main function [of the 'Establishment'] . . . was to drive isolationism from the field, to make internationalism not only respectable but beyond serious questions." Kraft went so far as to suggest that, by the mid-1960s, the general acceptance which American foreign

policymaking circles accorded these principles had actually destroyed the 'Establishment's' raison d'etre and made it obsolete.⁶

The shock of the Vietnam War was largely responsible for two of the most extensive and penetrating journalistic studies of the 'Establishment's' influence upon foreign affairs: Halberstam's The Best and the Brightest, and Godfrey Hodgson's In Our Time. In the first work Halberstam, who had spent several years reporting the Vietnam War for the New York Times, made an impassioned, scathing, and bitter indictment of the 'Eastern Establishment.' He laid much of the responsibility for American involvement in Vietnam upon the lack of perception, false assumptions, and hubris of such 'Establishment' representatives within the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations as McGeorge and William P. Bundy, Walt W. Rostow, Robert McNamara, and Dean Rusk. Halberstam believed that such men were the heirs to a foreign policy tradition which led them to make grave errors of judgment respecting both the American people and American omnipotence in international affairs.⁷ Although perhaps understandably less bitter than Halberstam, the British Hodgson concurred in ascribing much of the blame for American involvement in Vietnam to the 'Eastern Establishment's' foreign policy tradition. He too claimed that members of the 'Establishment' attach more importance to their fellows' stance on foreign affairs than to their views on domestic matters. As he put it: "The kernel of the bipartisan Establishment's policy was simple: to oppose isolationism." Moreover, Hodgson traced the 'Establishment's' influence upon official foreign policymaking back at least to World War II, when, he argued, there came together in government service "the internationally minded lawyers, bankers and executives of multinational corporations in New York, the government officials in Washington, and the academics, especially in Cambridge."⁸

While journalists perhaps preponderate in this field, several important academic works have also made some use of the concept of a foreign policy 'Establishment.' Various scholars have argued, sometimes only tangentially, that for much of the twentieth century a small group of men, who apparently closely resemble what is often popularly termed the 'Establishment,' have dominated American foreign

policymaking. In the study American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay, which appeared in the late 1960s, Ernest R. May suggested that since even before the turn of the century, few Americans have taken any strong interest in foreign affairs. He characterized the "influentials," "opinion leaders," or "foreign policy establishment" of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century "public specially interested in foreign policy" as upper-class, wealthy, educated, and possessed of some international experience in the sense of travel in and connections with Europe. Prominent among this foreign policy public, May claimed, were leading lawyers, bankers, industrialists, politicians, clergymen, educators, and editors. In an early version of his study, moreover, he stated that in this period, "to an even greater extent than has been observed in recent times, New Yorkers dominated the national foreign policy establishment." May suggested that throughout the twentieth century men of this type may have exercised a disproportionate influence upon the conduct of United States foreign policy, and that the American public as a whole not only takes little interest in foreign affairs, but has been offered a choice between alternative policies only on occasions when members of this inner circle have disagreed among themselves.⁹

Some years later, in The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy, Bernard C. Cohen also contended that official American foreign policymakers pay relatively little heed to the views of the general American public, whom in practice they attempt to "educate" to endorse their own views. By contrast, Cohen pointed out, certain prominent "notables" such as -- in the 1950s and 1960s -- John J. McCloy, Dean Acheson, the Rockefeller brothers, George F. Kennan, Walter R. Reuther, and Christian Herter, "private men of public standing with prior experience in foreign affairs" gained from either governmental or international business work, do enjoy ready access to official policymakers and can frequently influence their foreign policy decisions. Indeed, many government officials tend to regard such men as elder statesmen and often consult them of their own volition.¹⁰

In the book Roots of War, published the same year as Cohen's study, Richard J. Barnet drew attention to the ascendancy over post-1940 American foreign policymaking of "a national security elite remarkable

for its cohesiveness, consistency, and above all, persistence. Nothing like it," he claimed, "existed before in the United States and, outside the area of foreign affairs, its equivalent cannot be found." Barnett characterized this elite as a closely-knit aristocracy of talent, composed of men of great ability and high ideals, who live in a somewhat rarefied world which, while endowing them with high-level international contacts, gives them little understanding of either their own country or ordinary people. Drawing attention to such men's domination of foreign affairs he pointed out that "between 1940 and 1967 . . . all the first- and second-level posts in a huge national security bureaucracy were held by fewer than four hundred individuals who rotate[d] through a variety of key posts." The great majority of these came from the leading corporate and financial institutions of New York and, to a lesser extent, Boston and Detroit. Besides holding public office, Barnett argued, as private citizens many of these individuals have the entree to the highest circles of any administration and give governmental officials much informal advice. Like Halberstam and Hodgson, he contended that this group of men bore much of the responsibility for American involvement in the Vietnam War.¹¹

In Second Chance, his study of "the triumph of internationalism in America during World War II," Robert A. Divine concentrated on a slightly earlier period. He drew attention to the existence from around 1920 onwards of a body of committed "internationalists." According to Divine, these individuals were an extremely homogeneous group. Predominantly "old-stock Protestant Americans" and well-to-do Anglophiles, the great majority of them came from the Northeastern United States. They were primarily interested in Europe, "believed that the United States had inherited England's role as arbiter of world affairs," and "showed little sympathy for the plight of colonial peoples . . . Bankers, lawyers, editors, professors and ministers predominated; there were few salesmen or clerks and no workmen in their ranks. The business community was represented by men who dealt in the world markets . . . Small manufacturers, real-estate brokers and insurance executives were conspicuously absent." The most prominent of the organizations through which these interwar "internationalists" expressed their foreign

policy views were, in Divine's opinion, the League of Nations Association, the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, the Foreign Policy Association, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Like Barnet, Divine claimed that these "internationalists" were insulated from "the man in the street," and showed a marked inability to comprehend prevailing American public sentiment on foreign policy issues. During the Second World War, most of them supported American aid to the Allies and in many cases American intervention; they were also keen advocates of United States participation in some form of postwar international organization.¹²

While Divine did not specifically refer to a foreign policy 'Establishment,' other American and British historians have utilized the concept when dealing with the period during and after World War II. In his study of those Americans who prior to Pearl Harbor strongly supported American intervention in the war, Mark Lincoln Chadwin pointed out that the great majority of these individuals could plausibly be regarded as members of the 'Establishment.'¹³ The British scholar H. G. Nicholas believed that "in the critically formative years of 1947 to 1949 both Britain and the U.S.A. were fortunate in being able to command the services of an exceptional group of leaders Deeply patriotic, their vision nonetheless transcended parochial nationalism and served the interests of a wider community, sometimes of the North Atlantic, often of a yet wider world." The Americans among these leaders, Nicholas wrote: came to bear the label of 'the East Coast establishment,' a label accurately descriptive not so much of their origins, which were far more diverse and scattered than it implied, but of a certain community of outlook. Many had served wartime apprenticeships in Washington or the armed services which had given them firsthand experience of alliance politics. Most shared the experience of having battled against parochialism and isolationism at home. Most -- though not all -- had been Atlantic Firsters.¹⁴

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has also employed the term 'Establishment' in connection with foreign affairs. In A Thousand Days, his characteristically lengthy

tome on the Kennedy Administration, he spoke of "the New York financial and legal community -- that arsenal of talent which had so long furnished a steady supply of always orthodox and often able people to Democratic as well as Republican administrations. This community," Schlesinger continued,

was the heart of the American Establishment. Its household deities were Henry L. Stimson and Elihu Root; its present leaders [in 1960], Robert A. Lovett and John J. McCloy; its front organizations, the Rockefeller, Ford and Carnegie foundations and the Council on Foreign Relations; its organs, the New York Times and Foreign Affairs. Its politics were predominantly Republican; but it possessed what its admirers saw as a commitment to public service and its critics as an appetite for power which impelled its members to serve Presidents of whatever political faith.

Schlesinger described John F. Kennedy's efforts as president to reassure and work with this community, which his own attacks upon French policies in Algeria and his father's anti-interventionism before World War II -- and also the latter's maverick financial activities -- had seriously alarmed.¹⁵

Impressive as the body of journalistic and academic labors discussed here may at first appear, on the whole an absence of large-scale, fully researched, detailed, and dispassionate studies characterizes scholarly works on the 'Establishment.' Those which currently exist are generally either fairly small-scale, suggestive rather than conclusive, or else large but impressionistic studies such as those of Halberstam and Hodgson. Few are based upon extensive primary research. In several of these works, moreover, the 'Establishment' features only as one of several groups discussed, and the allotted few pages are naturally sketchy. Under such constraints, the very personnel of the 'Establishment' inevitably often remain somewhat shadowy general types; the vivid individual character sketches of Halberstam, Kraft, and the Silks are in sharp contrast to other writing in this area.

Little serious attempt has yet been made even to define whom one may consider to be members of the

'Establishment,' or wherein, if at all, the 'Establishment's' foreign policy views differ from those held by many other Americans, let alone to discuss the reasons why those holding these views should subscribe to them. Most of those studies I have mentioned aver that since at least 1940 the 'Establishment' has exercised a substantial and significant influence upon the course of American foreign affairs. They do not however, pause to discuss precisely how great a role in the direction of American foreign policy the 'Establishment,' as opposed to any other group, enjoyed in connection with any specific issue or on any given occasion, or whether its power in this area increased, diminished, or varied in force over time.

One particularly notable gap is the absence of any real work upon the origins and development of the 'Establishment's' foreign policy tradition. Or indeed upon the 'Establishment' itself in the years prior to 1940.¹⁶ Most studies have concentrated upon the years since the outbreak of World War II, when the 'Establishment' is generally thought to have begun to play a large official role in American foreign policymaking. Most of those journalists who have written on the subject have conceded that the 'Establishment' possesses an 'internationalist' tradition stretching back to such distant figures of the turn of the century as Theodore Roosevelt and Elihu Root, one transmitted to various latter-day heirs, notably Henry L. Stimson, Robert A. Lovett, McCloy, Acheson, and the Bundy brothers. Beyond mentioning a few names these commentators have, however, made little attempt to describe either the transmission and, perhaps, modification of this tradition, or its possible influence upon the course of American foreign affairs prior to 1940. Even those who stress the centrality of 'internationalism' to the 'Establishment's' world view and its -- by American standards -- venerable antecedents have made few convincing efforts to account for the origins and trace the roots of the 'Establishment's' commitment to 'internationalist' policies. Halberstam and Hodgson made somewhat vague references to the effect of a belief in "public service," and the latter also suggested that the 'Establishment's' foreign policy attitudes were in part "a legacy from half-buried layers of New England puritanism." Barnet, too, drew attention to the influence of Calvinist thinking, but

also gave some weight to simple lust for power and a craving for order upon a global scale.¹⁷ Such inchoate suggestions shed little convincing light upon the roots of the 'Establishment's' foreign policy beliefs; one is left with the sense that the 'Establishment' is naturally 'internationalist' and could be no other. A detached observer might not hold this truth to be entirely self-evident.

While regretting the lack of serious studies of the pre-1940 'Establishment,' one would not wish to ignore the often outstanding recent work of such historians as Frank Costigliola, Michael J. Hogan, Burton I. Kaufman, Melvyn P. Leffler, Walter A. McDougall, Carl P. Parrini, Stephen A. Schuker, Dan P. Silverman, Robert H. Van Meter, Jr., and Joan Hoff Wilson. Their writings have devoted considerable attention to American 'internationalism' during the 1920s and 1930s. While they have rarely concentrated deliberately upon men and organizations simply because of what one might term their 'Establishment' connections these works contain much important information on and valuable insights into the activities of many groups and individuals who might well be thought to play significant roles within the 'Establishment.'¹⁸ Interestingly, though, these historians have generally abstained--perhaps deliberately, but quite possibly because they find the concept somewhat unwieldy--from using the term 'Establishment.'

Several factors appear to have contributed to the dearth of major studies of the 'Establishment' and to what often seems to be professional historians' reluctance to employ the term. Firstly, the undoubted journalistic and popular connotations of the concept of an 'Eastern Establishment' have tended to make it somewhat suspect to soi-disant serious historians. Until recently, academics had well-nigh abandoned the subject to journalists, who are indubitably more concerned to elucidate current events than to investigate in great detail the initial antecedents of later developments. As a result, most writing on the 'Establishment' has tended to concentrate on the immediate past, from World War II onwards, rather than delving into the events of World War I and the interwar years.

Secondly, the highly politicized nature of the idea of an 'Eastern Establishment' militated against the appearance of detached, scholarly studies. The very term is, of course, heavily freighted with intense emotional, class, sectional, and social overtones. It is probably true to say that the concept of an 'Establishment' runs counter to many important tenets of the American political tradition of democracy. Any American historian may well find it difficult to remain detached when faced with the implication that there exists within American society a superior class, an elite of some description which sets policies for the rest of the nation. Most historians are likely to be participants in at least some current political debates, and may well have strong opinions as to the rights and wrongs of the attitudes and activities of members of the 'Establishment.' Any study of the influence of such a body as the 'Establishment' upon United States foreign policy, which has generated so many explosive debates this century, may well prove decidedly controversial, and quite possibly furnish ammunition for use by opponents in current and subsequent political disputes. Indeed, many of those who in theory probably deplore even the idea of an 'Establishment' may well, in practice, approve of many developments which seem to them at least partially the product of its influence, an added inducement to refrain from overly close contemplation of the subject. A certain unofficial self-denying -- perhaps self-protecting -- ordinance may have deterred many historians from becoming involved in so potentially contentious an area.

Partly because of many academics' disinclination to become entangled with so uncertain and potentially loaded a subject, non-journalistic writers on the 'Establishment' were often drawn from either the far Right or the radical Left of the American political spectrum. Although ideologically far apart, both groups exhibited a similar highly antagonistic and polemical attitude. The extreme conservative Right were the first to attack what they described as the 'Eastern Establishment,' a term which seems to have originated during the internecine fights between the Republican party's 'internationalist' and 'isolationist' wings during and after World War II, which culminated in the "big steal" of 1952, when General Eisenhower rather than the 'isolationist' Robert A. Taft won the presidential nomination. From the mid-

1930s until at least the early 1950s, conservative Republicans of the Taft-Goldwater stamp claimed, the "New York kingmakers," liberal 'internationalist' Republicans from the top financial, business, legal, and publishing circles of the East Coast, succeeded in foisting upon their party left- or liberal-leaning presidential candidates. Their motives, so those advancing this theory alleged, were to ensure continued administration support, whoever might win the election, for 'internationalist' foreign policies such as intervention in World War II and postwar foreign aid.¹⁹ From its first appearance, therefore, the term 'Eastern Establishment' bore, at least for fundamentalist right-wing Republicans, almost indelibly pejorative connotations. Books such as M. Stanton Evans' The Liberal Establishment and John A. Stormer's None Dare Call It Treason echoed Senator Joseph McCarthy's accusations that liberal East Coast Republicans and Democrats alike were guilty of elitism, prodigality, socialism, and shortsighted if not downright traitorous pro-Communism.²⁰

From the mid-1950s onward, the radical Left -- reviving and echoing traditional agrarian populist suspicions of East Coast bankers and businessmen -- also sharply criticized both the 'Establishment's' social and economic power within American society and its foreign policy role. Even before the Vietnam War C. Wright Mills, in his famous book The Power Elite, suggested that the highest industrial, political, and military decision-making circles of the United States are intimately linked; that both social and familial ties and common economic interests bind the rich throughout the nation; that their wealth is largely invested in the giant corporations; and that, since these corporations in large part control their country's political and military institutions, the corporate rich are thereby enabled to set U.S. political, social, and economic goals at home and abroad.²¹

The Vietnam War gave a great boost to this point of view and to a school of historiography which tended to bring a monolithic approach to the study of American foreign relations, ascribing all developments solely to the rational pursuit of American economic interests. Studies by Noam Chomsky, G. William Domhoff, Gabriel Kolko, Christopher Lasch, William Appleman Williams, and others stressed the influence

within the American government of what some termed the "governing class" or "new mandarins." Explicitly or implicitly, they regarded such individuals as representatives of American capitalism, intent on pursuing policies deliberately designed to further the interests of the American business system and the corporate institutions with which they were connected. These historians focused upon the foreign policy role of the U.S. financial and business elite, together with those government officials, politicians, lawyers, academics, media representatives, foundation executives, and others whom they regarded as its ancillary agents. Their studies fiercely criticized the diplomatic influence and activities of such people as being immoral, undemocratic, and intended only to benefit, sustain, and consolidate the American capitalist system. In some cases this interpretation of U.S. foreign affairs was carried back even before the founding of the Republic, and alleged to have guided the direction of American foreign policy ever since.²² Works with a similar emphasis depicted the Council on Foreign Relations as an "Imperial Brain Trust," founded in 1920 with the primary aim of furthering the drive of American capitalist interests for world economic hegemony, and painted the more recently established Trilateral Commission in a comparable light.²³ The whole thrust of the radical revisionist historiographical school was harshly condemnatory of the 'Establishment,' whose existence such historians generally accepted -- usually regarding it as synonymous with the American upper class and the corporate elite -- and whose attitudes and activities they attributed to either desire for personal economic gain, or anxiety to preserve and reinforce the American capitalist and class system, or both.

Interesting and stimulating as some of the radical revisionists' work may be, their portrayals of the 'Establishment' or -- as the case might be -- the "governing class," "power elite," or prominent financiers and businessmen, tended to lack subtlety and to accept the a priori assumption that economic factors of one kind or another accounted for virtually all the foreign policy views and activities of their chosen subjects. In part, this may have been due to the overriding influence of the Vietnam War, a third factor which helps to explain the lack of large-scale, scholarly, well-researched studies of the

'Establishment.' The War indubitably greatly increased public, journalistic, and scholarly interest in the attitudes and influence of the 'Establishment' upon the direction of American foreign affairs. The emotions unleashed by the conflict were, however, often far from conducive to detached and dispassionate analysis of and reflection upon the 'Establishment' and its works. The majority of the larger studies of the 'Establishment' mentioned earlier were the product of the radical reconsideration of the course of twentieth-century American foreign policy induced by the trauma of Vietnam. They reflected the mood of national self-examination as to how America had become involved in the struggle and, at least on occasion, were also a search for scapegoats. Many such works, including those of Halberstam, Hodgson, and Barnett, and most radical revisionist studies, were therefore bitterly critical of what they perceived as the 'Establishment's' role in embroiling the United States in Vietnam. Moreover, most of these studies tended to discuss the 'Establishment' primarily in the light of the prevailing preoccupation with Vietnam, a fact which helps to account for the relative lack of attention given to the origins of the 'Establishment's' foreign policy tradition, as opposed to its manifestations from the Second World War onward.

A fourth, and perhaps both the primary and the most interesting reason for the lack of scholarly study which the 'Establishment's' foreign policy views attracted may well have been that, from around 1940 until at least the early 1960s, within governmental, policymaking, and opinion-forming circles these attitudes attained the status of a near-orthodoxy. Immediately before World War II men from the great East Coast financial and legal institutions, including Stimson, McCloy, Lovett, Acheson, James V. Forrestal, and many others, moved into the American government in order to help Franklin D. Roosevelt prepare the United States to aid the Allies and possibly enter the war. As Barnett has rightly pointed out, during and after the Second World War such individuals maintained and consolidated their hold upon the decision-making and operational apparatus of American foreign policy, dominating the State, Defense, and Treasury Departments and other bureaucratic agencies concerned with international affairs.²⁴ Meanwhile, sympathetic commentators such as Walter Lippmann disseminated the

strategic dogma of the 'Atlantic Alliance,' the doctrine that the United States and the Allied nations of Western Europe shared common strategic, economic, moral, and cultural interests of such importance that the United States should at all costs -- not excluding war -- be prepared to defend them. A concomitant of this theory was the conviction that for much of World War I and the 1920s and 1930s, most Americans had failed to recognize these vital interests, an oversight which had led directly to the nation's entanglement in World War II.²⁵

Despite challenges from the right wing of the Republican party, until the mid 1960s these doctrines held relatively undisputed sway within American foreign policymaking circles. Moreover, an entire school of historians, the self-styled Realists, accepted the basic Mahanist premise of this line of thought, and the corollary that considerations of national security and strategic interests had made it essential for the United States to intervene in both world wars and, after 1945, to maintain the 'Atlantic Alliance' by means of such expedients as N.A.T.O. and the Marshall Plan.²⁶ In this atmosphere the traditional 'internationalist' views of leading East Coast financiers, lawyers, government officials, and others required no elaborate explanation, because they were considered the only defensible, logical, and prescient attitude to adopt. 'Isolationism,' by contrast, was regarded not as an intellectually responsible or respectable position, but as an aberration which required much justification. The prevailing climate of opinion naturally tended to inhibit dispassionate study, let alone questioning, of the 'Establishment's' most fundamental foreign policy beliefs.

FOOTNOTES

¹David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York, 1973).

²Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, 1982): 84-86, quotation from p. 84.

³Richard H. Rovere, "The American Establishment," in idem, The American Establishment and other reports, opinions and speculations (New York, 1963): 233-249,

quotation from p. 238. See also Rovere's later reassessment, "Postscript: A 1978 Commentary," Wilson Quarterly 2 (Summer 1978): 180-182.

⁴Leonard Silk and Mark Silk, The American Establishment (New York, 1980), esp. chs. 6-8, quotation from p. 184.

⁵Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1964 (New York, 1965): 63-69, quotation from p. 68.

⁶Joseph Kraft, Profiles in Power: A Washington Insight (New York, 1966), esp. 187-192, quotation from p. 188.

⁷Halberstam, Best and the Brightest.

⁸Godfrey Hodgson, In Our Time: America from World War II to Nixon (London, 1977), esp. 111-133, quotations from pp. 115 and 118. See also idem, "The Establishment," Foreign Policy 9 (Winter 1972-1973): 3-40.

⁹Ernest R. May, American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay (New York, 1968), esp. 17-94, 198-230. Quotation from idem, "American Imperialism: A Reinterpretation," Perspectives in American History I (1967): 187. May's portrait of the "influentials" may be compared with those in Kenneth P. Adler and David Bobrow, "Interest and Influence in Foreign Affairs," Public Opinion Quarterly 20 (Spring 1956): 89-101; and James N. Rosenau, National Leadership and Foreign Policy: A Case Study in the Mobilization of Public Support (Princeton, 1963).

¹⁰Bernard C. Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston, 1973), esp. 84-88, quotation from p. 84.

¹¹Richard J. Barnet, Roots of War: The Men and Institutions Behind U. S. Foreign Policy (New York, 1973): 48-75, 179-182, quotations from p. 48. Several other historians and social scientists have also commented, from a rather more radical standpoint, upon the extent to which a relatively small group of men from the great business institutions have dominated American foreign policymaking since World War II. See C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York, 1956), esp. 274-275; G. William Domhoff, Who

Rules America? (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1967): 97-107;
Gabriel Kolko, The Roots of American Foreign Policy:
An Analysis of Power and Purpose (Boston, 1969): 16-
26.

¹²Robert A. Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of
Internationalism in America During World War II (New
York, 1967), esp. 6-28, quotations from pp. 22-23. On
the interwar 'internationalists,' see also Selig
Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: its Twentieth-Century
Reaction (New York, 1957): 113-117, 119-128, 132-
133, 138-139, 148-150, 177-196; idem, The Uncertain
Giant, 1921-1941: American Foreign Policy Between
the Wars (New York, 1965): 23, 25-28, 33-42; Robert
E. Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in
America's Foreign Relations: The Great
Transformation of the Twentieth Century (Chicago,
1953): 321-323.

¹³Mark Lincoln Chadwin, The Warhawks: American
Interventionists Before Pearl Harbor (New York, 1968),
esp. 69-71.

¹⁴H. G. Nicholas, The United States and Britain
(Chicago, 1975): 120-121. Comparing these Americans
to their British counterparts, Nicholas continued:
"In Britain a longer commitment to world participation
meant that there was no exactly equivalent group of
self-conscious advocates, but in Whitehall and in
Westminster there was a common bond among those, a
very large number, who had served either in Washington
or with Americans in London or the services during the
war, men for whom the keystone of British policy had
been and would remain the alliance with the U.S.A."
Ibid.: 121.

¹⁵Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John
F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston, 1965): 128-
129, quotation from p. 128. A typical 'Establishment'
reaction to the Kennedys would appear to have been
that of the veteran lawyer-diplomat George Ball, who
in his recent volume of memoirs recalled that he "had
long despised the elder Kennedy, who represented
everything I disliked and mistrusted. He had been a
buccaneer on Wall Street, an opportunist in politics,
and a debilitating influence when our civilization was
fighting for its life. . . . Before I could
wholeheartedly support the new President, I had to
satisfy myself that he was free of his father's views

and influence." George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern (New York, 1982): 165-166.

¹⁶Various sociological studies of the American upper class or elite groups contain some information on the pre-World War II period; otherwise very little has yet been written on the 'Establishment' prior to 1940. See E. Digby Baltzell, Philadelphia Gentlemen: The Making of a National Upper Class (New York, 1958); idem, The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America (New York, 1965); idem, Puritan Boston and Quaker Philadelphia: Two Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Class Authority and Leadership (Boston, 1979); G. Edward White, The Eastern Establishment and the Western Experience: The West of Frederic Remington, Theodore Roosevelt, and Owen Wister (New Haven, 1964), esp. 18-30; Domhoff, Who Rules America?; idem, The Bohemian Grove and Other Retreats: A Study in Class Cohesiveness (New York, 1975); idem, The Powers That Be: Process of Ruling Class Domination in America (New York, 1979); Philip H. Burch, Jr., Elites in American History, 3 vols. (New York, 1980-1981); Frederic Cople Jaher, The Urban Establishment: Upper Strata in Boston, New York, Charleston, Chicago, and Los Angeles (Urbana, IL, 1981).

¹⁷Halberstam, Best and the Brightest, esp. 63-64; Hodgson, In Our Time: 114, 118-119; Barnett, Roots of War: 64-75.

¹⁸See esp. Frank Costigliola, "The Politics of Financial Stabilization: American Reconstruction in Europe, 1924-30" (Ph.D. diss., Cornell University, 1973); Michael J. Hogan, Informal Entente: The Private Structure of Cooperation in Anglo-American Diplomacy, 1918-1928 (Columbia, MO, 1977); Burton I. Kaufman, Efficiency and Expansion: Foreign Trade Organization in the Wilson Administration, 1913-1921 (Westport, CT, 1974); Melvyn P. Leffler, The Elusive Quest: America's Pursuit of European Stability and French Security, 1919-1933 (Chapel Hill, NC, 1979); Walter A. McDougall, France's Rhineland Diplomacy, 1914-1924: The Last Bid for a Balance of Power in Europe (Princeton, 1978); Carl P. Parrini, Heir to Empire: United States Economic Diplomacy 1916-1923 (Pittsburgh, 1969); Stephen A. Schuker, The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan (Chapel

Hill, NC, 1976); Dan P. Silverman, Reconstructing Europe After the Great War (Cambridge, MA, 1982); Robert Hardin Van Meter, Jr., "The United States and European Recovery, 1918-1923: A Study of Public Policy and Private Finance" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1971); Joan Hoff Wilson, American Business and Foreign Policy 1920-1933 (Lexington, KY, 1971). See also Stephen V. O. Clarke, Central Bank Cooperation 1924-1931 (New York, 1967); idem, The Reconstruction of the International Monetary System: The Attempts of 1922 and 1933 (Princeton, 1973); Kenneth Paul Jones, ed., U.S. Diplomats in Europe, 1919-1941 (Santa Barbara, CA, 1981); Richard Hemmig Meyer, Bankers' Diplomacy: Monetary Stabilization in the Twenties (New York, 1970).

19See, e.g., C. Nelson Sparks, One Man -- Wendell Willkie (New York, 1943); Phyllis Schlafly, A Choice not an Echo (Alton, IL, 1964). Another interesting work in this tradition is Wickliffe B. Vennard, Sr., The Federal Reserve Corporation: 42 Years of Subversion in 100 Acts, 4th ed. (Boston, 1956). On the division within the Republican party between the 'isolationists' and 'internationalists,' a split which seems to coincide with that between those Republicans who were noninterventionists before Pearl Harbor and favored an 'Asia First' policy during and after the war and those who were interventionists prior to Pearl Harbor and subsequently supported a 'Europe First' policy, see Ronald J. Caridi, The Korean War and American Politics: The Republican Party as a Case Study (Philadelphia, 1968), esp. 19-20, 126-133.

20M. Stanton Evans, The Liberal Establishment (New York, 1965); John A. Stormer, None Dare Call It Treason (Florissant, MO, 1964), esp. 200-227.

21Mills, The Power Elite. See also idem, "The Power Elite: Military, Economic, and Political," in Problems of Power in American Democracy, ed. Arthur Kornhauser (Detroit, 1959): 145-172, 175-183.

22See, e.g., Noam Chomsky, America Power and the New Mandarins (London, 1964); works by Domhoff cited in note 16; Kolko, Roots of American Foreign Policy; idem, Main Currents in American History (New York, 1976); Christopher Lasch, "The Foreign Policy Elite and the War in Vietnam," in idem, The World of Nations: Reflections on American History, Politics

and Culture (New York, 1973): 232-249; William Appelman Williams, The Contours of American History (Cleveland and New York, 1961); idem, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, 2nd revised and enlarged ed. (New York, 1972); idem, America Confronts a Revolutionary World: 1776-1976 (New York, 1976); idem, Empire as a Way of Life: An Essay on the Causes and Character of America's Present Predicament, Along With a Few Thoughts About An Alternative (New York, 1980); Lloyd C. Gardner, Imperial America: American Foreign Policy since 1898 (New York, 1976); Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-1980, 4th ed. (New York, 1980).

23 Laurence H. Shoup and William Minter, Imperial Brain Trust: The Council on Foreign Relations and the United States Foreign Policy (New York, 1977); Holly Sklar, ed., Trilateralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planning for World Management (Boston, 1980).

24 Barnet, Roots of War: 52-54. See also Hodgson, In Our Time: 115-117; idem, "The Establishment:" 8-9; Silk and Silk, American Establishment: 276-278; Priscilla M. Roberts, "The American 'Eastern Establishment' and World War I: The Emergence of a Foreign Policy Tradition" (Ph.D. diss., Cambridge University, 1981): 590-592.

25 Ibid.: 595-599; Walter Lippmann, U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (New York, 1943); idem, U.S. War Aims (New York, 1944); Ronald Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century (Boston, 1980): 379-392, 403-417; Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest: 115-125, 397-400.

26 See, e.g., George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy 1900-1950 (Chicago, 1951); Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense of the National Interest: A Critical Examination of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1951); Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest; Adler, Isolationist Impulse; idem, Uncertain Giant; Chadwin, Warhawks; John G. Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers: The Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920 (Lexington, KY, 1972); Divine, Second Chance; idem, The Reluctant Belligerent: American Entry into World War II (New York, 1965); Robert H. Ferrell, Peace in Their Time: The Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (New Haven, 1952); idem, American Diplomacy in the

Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933 (New Haven, 1957); Betty Glad, Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence (Urbana, IL, 1966); Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935-1941 (Ithaca, NY, 1966); John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, 4th revised ed. (New York, 1971).

(The conclusion of this essay will appear in the March issue. --Editor)

YULETIDE GREETINGS FROM ABROAD

by

David A. Langbart, (NARS)

In December 1948, an unusual and decidedly unbureaucratic exchange of telegrams took place between the Department of State and the United States embassy in Moscow. During the early months of the Berlin Blockade a sense of isolation pervaded the embassy in Moscow. The impending holiday season looked like it would be gloomy and depressing for the staff there. As a morale-building measure, John M. McSweeney of the division of Eastern European Affairs drafted a seasons greetings telegram for the embassy. McSweeney himself had been transferred from the U.S.S.R. the previous July and probably knew well the isolation foreigners experienced in that country even before the heightening of tensions over Berlin. Although drafted on December 24 as a Christmas greeting, the department did not send the telegram until December 27. In its final form, his telegram read:

NO DISTRIBUTION

AEMBASSY

DEC 27 1948

MOSCOW

1424

To all happy Moscow workers from Eastern European commissariat best wishes and exhortations for overfulfillment Yuletide norm.

[Robert] LOVETT
ACTING [Secretary of State]

Not to be outdone, the embassy responded four days later with its own greeting. It read:

RESTRICTED

FROM: Moscow
TO: Secretary of State

NO: 3069, December 31, 1 p.m.

PERSONAL FOR LEADERS AND CO-WORKERS EUR, EE
AND RELATED COMMISSARIATS

Happy report, dear leaders, that workers here already overfulfilled year's end norms all fields, particularly those established Ministry Computation Industry (east). We assure you, beloved comrades, that inspired by your precious example and teachings, we will not rest on these laurels but will struggle ever on towards even greater victories in 1949.

[Foy] KOHLER
[Charge d'Affaires ad interim]

These two telegrams can be found in the National Archives, Legislative and diplomatic Branch, Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, 1945-1949 Central Decimal file: 124.616/12-2748 and 124.616/12-3148.

The following is a letter distributed by the Steering Committee of the **COALITION TO SAVE OUR DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE**

October 24, 1983

During recent weeks several actions have occurred on the NARS/NHPRC legislative front. This letter is to bring you up to date on these actions and, more importantly, urge your immediate action to help speed the process of freeing NARS from the GSA.

The Senate Governmental Affairs Committee held hearings on S. 905 on July 29. Witnesses who spoke forcefully in behalf of independence were historian

Barbara Tuchman, Former Archivist of the United States James B. Rhoads, AHA Executive Director Samuel Gammon, and Archivist of New York State Larry Hackman. GSA Administrator Gerald Carmen spoke against independence. With 41 Senators currently sponsoring S. 905, we hope that the bill will be reported out of full committee soon, and that floor action will come this fall.

On the house side, Congressmen Jack Brooks and Glenn English introduced an independence bill, H.R. 3987 on September 27.

Recent threats to NARS make it imperative that we vigorously push the independence bills to passage. Two weeks ago, the GSA Administrator was ready to make his own appointment of someone who was not professionally qualified as Assistant Archivist for Presidential Libraries, over the objections of the Archivist of the U.S. When the Archivist put his objections in writing, the Administrator changed his mind on this issue, but then proceeded to begin to make sweeping changes by filling top level jobs at NARS (such as the position of Assistant Archivist for Records Centers) with his own choices and moving to transfer certain individuals at NARS to other positions outside NARS (such as the detailing of the Public Information Officer to GSA). He has also threatened to transfer the Federal Records Centers to GSA by administrative order. There are also rumors that the White House Personnel Office has been requested to find a candidate for Archivist of the United States. This is clearly an attempt to destroy the management team that Robert Warner has chosen and either force him out or remove him. Additionally, the removal of the Office of Federal Records Centers from NARS would further dismember the agency before independence is achieved.

Therefore it is imperative that we make an all out effort to push the independence of NARS. We need House cosponsors for H.R. 3987. Just a few letters from a Representative's district on this issue could make the difference. Write your Representative urging that he or she cosponsor the independence legislation and vigorously push for its passage. Send copies of your letters to Congressman Jack Brooks, chairman of the House Government Operations Committee and Frank Horton, ranking minority member of this committee.

Letters to the leadership of the Senate (Senators Baker, Stevens, and Byrd) requesting floor action on S. 905 are also very important.

NHPRC Authorization:

On October 6, S. 1513 passed the Senate. This bill would reauthorize the grants program for 5 years, at \$4 million in FY84-85 and at \$5 million in FY86-88. The House and Senate now need to resolve the differences between H.R. 2196 and S. 1513 so the bill can be signed into law. This legislation will give the grants program stability which it has not had since its authorization expired in 1981.

Senator Mark Hatfield, the prime sponsor of S.1513, should be thanked by all of us. Others who were particularly helpful were Senators Stennis and Eagleton.

FY84 funding:

The current continuing resolution funds NARS and the NHPRC at the FY83 levels through November 10. The FY84 Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government Appropriations bill has not been agreed to by either house. If a bill does not pass before the Congress recesses in November it is probable that NARS/NHPRC funding will be covered under the continuing resolution again in FY84.

Without grass roots support from those who care about the future of our National Archives and the NHPRC, the work that Coalition representatives do in Washington would be an exercise in futility. It is more important than ever that you make your views known to your representatives. And we hope that you will also enlist the aid of others through newsletters, phone calls and other means. Please act now!

Sincerely,

The members of the Coalition Steering Committee

With regret the editor includes the following comments by SHAFR members concerning three most notable practitioners of our profession:

Professor Julius William Pratt (1888-1983)

When Julius W. Pratt died quietly and peacefully on January 28, 1983 at Mt. Holly, New Jersey, a giant in the field of American Diplomatic History passed from the scene. The history profession has lost one of its most vital spirits. Throughout his 95 years, Professor Pratt's great energy and quick mind never flagged. Younger historians may find it difficult to believe he had such a long productive and academic career that began at the United States Naval Academy in 1916 and that ended, so far as active teaching was concerned, in 1968 at the University of Notre Dame.

Though arthritis and badly failing eyesight made life physically taxing for Professor Pratt in his last years, his mind was alert and active right to the end. Right to the last he read the New York Times every day, kept up with the various news broadcasts, and overcame the limitations of his eyesight by the use of "Talking Books." He maintained his keen interest in the literature on American Diplomacy, and only a few years ago brought out a new and revised edition of his widely used History of United States Foreign Policy. He also maintained his interest in America's current foreign policies and current affairs and kept writing in his diary until a few days before his death.

Professor Pratt was born in South Dakota in 1888 and received his doctorate from the University of Chicago in 1924. In addition to teaching at the Naval Academy and Notre Dame, he taught at Rutgers, Rochester, Harvard, D'Youville, Columbia, Hood, Welles, and Munich, and was at the State University of New York at Buffalo for his longest tenure, 32 years. It is not necessary to recall the major and enduring contributions Professor Pratt made to historical literature. His name is known and cherished by historians everywhere and especially by those who work in his own special field.

In addition to his many scholarly contributions, Professor Pratt was dedicated to the preservation of the purity of the English language. According to one who knew him very well, whatever his last thought may have been, it was framed as a complete sentence and, as one of his friends remarked, "with all the commas in place."

--Vincent de Santis

Thomas A. Bailey Remembered

On July 26, 1983, after several months of deteriorating health, Thomas A. Bailey, the first president of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, died at age 80 near Stanford, the university where as undergraduate, graduate student, and professor he had studied, taught, and lived most of his life. During his long career he had also spent a year teaching at the University of California, Berkeley, three years at the University of Hawaii, and various short periods at other institutions as a lecturer or visiting professor. Since most members of the Society are doubtless familiar with his writings, and since his autobiography, The American Pageant Revisited: Recollections of a Stanford Historian (Stanford, Calif., 1982), has placed on record many of the personal qualities he chose to reveal, I shall not dwell on those aspects of his life and career. Instead, I shall share with you a few remembrances about Tom as man, scholar, and teacher from the perspective of one who knew him and worked with him as a graduate student far too many years ago.

Aside from the love for his wife and family, Tom all of his adult life had two consuming love affairs, one with Stanford, and the other with history, as teacher and as scholar. At Stanford he spent so much time at the Quad, the heart of the campus, that colleagues thought of him virtually as much a part of it as the architecture. Indeed, on the third floor of the history corner of the Quad he wrote the numerous books and articles which brought him fame as one of the nation's most distinguished diplomatic historians. In the lecture halls and classrooms there, also, he did most of his teaching.

For years Professor Bailey was known as perhaps the finest and most popular lecturer on campus. I recall that in my years at Stanford as a graduate student that reputation attracted large classes, and even the wives of graduate students from various disciplines who made it a point at least once a quarter to visit his classes just to see and hear him perform. In later years, I heard, his style of lecturing lost some of its popularity. Nonetheless, he always had a devoted following.

Tom's lecturing had a flamboyance about it, perhaps in the manner of the Baptist preacher that at one time he had desired to become, that one could not easily ignore or forget. He prepared and structured his lectures with meticulous care, and he seemed to come alive in the classroom, speaking in rapid, energetic bursts. This dynamism, like his lectures, may have been rehearsed for the occasion, for he always struck me as an innately shy, or, even retiring, man. To the best of my knowledge, he never winged a lecture. For him to have done so, moreover, would not have been in keeping with his temperament. He once told me, as he did others, that while at Hawaii, where he really began his teaching career, he would rehearse his lectures hours at a time before the mirror.

Despite the rehearsals, Bailey the teacher tried, and I think often succeeded, in conveying to his audience the impression of spontaneity. He used all kinds of devices to hold students' attention and to elicit from them warmth and response, especially laughter. He filled his lectures with anecdotes, witticisms, carefully turned phrases, and jokes. As he wrote with typical self-mockery in his autobiography, he considered the use of such techniques to evoke laughter quite proper because "one should remember that those who are laughing are not snoring." Bailey once recounted how during the New Deal era he made use of student assistants provided by funds from the National Youth Administration to search through back issues of magazines, such as Readers' Digest, for puns, jokes or humorous stories he could incorporate into his lectures. He kept files of such materials, and he did make use of them in future lectures and books.

Outside the classroom, and sometimes in his seminars, which were carefully structured but not rehearsed, he seemed to take pleasure in humorous anecdotes and in the manipulation of words. Despite the delight in story telling and in the humorous, I can never recall hearing an off color anecdote from him. Also in the satire he often employed in the classroom there was nothing malicious. As everyone involved with history at Stanford knew, and as he indicated in his memoirs, Professor Bailey timed his lectures to the minute. Many of us as graduate students believed that he even scheduled his jokes with time built in for the expected student guffaws or other response. His

lectures would begin with the last echo of the class bell and would ordinarily finish just a few seconds before the closing bell rang out. Such fine tuning left no room for interruptions or disruptions. If anyone dared walk into the classroom after he had begun his lecture, he would stop his delivery before the offender could take a seat, and then would order him out of the classroom. Yet even in such rare instances of sternness he did not act the martinet.

Beyond the world of Stanford, Tom's esteem as scholar overshadowed that as teacher. His scholarly reputation rests on a prolific career wherein he produced a mass of works of impressive erudition and appealing readability. He worked on his research and writing ceaselessly. Other than on a Sunday, hardly a day passed without Tom being in his office wearing a green eyeshade, putting thin strips of paper as markers in books he had read, and writing on some article or book. He found no end of pleasure in probing the American past, drawing from it what he deemed principles or lessons, and to write about it. He seemed to take particular joy, in his teaching as well as his writing, in exposing what he called historical myths. Like the works of other diplomatic historians of his generation, such as Samuel F. Bemis, his histories reflect strong patriotic feelings, or what he termed his "love for America."

Thomas Bailey founded no school of history and had no cult following, for he did not infuse his work with a strong ideological slant, yet he apparently had a considerable influence on the writing of American diplomatic history. He felt that his deepest impact came from his exceptional and sustained emphasis on the role of public opinion in the shaping of American foreign policy. Until he took this approach in his writings, he believed, scholars had generally slighted the elements of public opinion and pressure group politics. While the role of such opinion in the making of policy seems less important now than in the forties when he wrote his pioneering study The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy (New York, 1948), few scholars today write American diplomatic history without taking into account public attitudes and pressures.

Bailey the writer also spoke frequently with feeling and some pride about his notably successful textbook writing. He viewed it as a means of reaching college undergraduates and arousing in them an interest in American history as written in a stimulating style by a competent scholar. His style, epigrammatic, vivid, colorful, and expressed in simple, direct sentences became known to generations of college students all over the United States and beyond through his Diplomatic History of the American People. Filled with anecdotes, puns, pithy quotations, and a generous use of cartoons, unique maps and charts, but anchored firmly in sound scholarship, this history became one of the best-selling and most popular textbooks in America. It went through ten editions, and seems to have acquired such a following that it had a self-perpetuating momentum. It appeared at times that the success of his textbooks obscured the quality of his other writings. Above all, he was a careful scholar who wrote numerous monographs and penetrating essays and who believed deeply in the educating and civilizing value of history.

This conviction, I believe, also colored Tom's view of university life. He had little patience for the seemingly endless committees that had in his time entrenched themselves in American academic life, or for administrative tasks. Nonetheless, he served two terms as head of Stanford's history department because he felt a duty, to his university and to his profession, to do so. He performed this task, as he did others, diligently and well. Indeed, during his tenure the department made a number of distinguished appointments and took major rank in the academic world.

During his time as administrator Bailey never stopped his work as productive scholar. Nor did he after retirement. Always his devotion to history remained undiminished. In retirement he continued his old habit of visiting his office in the history corner daily to revise his textbooks and to work on fresh scholarship. During these years he researched and wrote eight books, either alone or in collaboration with Captain Paul B. Ryan, a former graduate student and friend. Only impaired health in the last six months or so of his life kept Tom from researching, writing, and publishing to the end.

Since I knew Tom mainly as teacher, scholar, and professional friend, his personal qualities that I had occasion to observe showed up in that relationship. Since he guarded his time and did not suffer fools easily, he sometimes seemed distant or reserved. This impression, I believe, stemmed from his intrinsic bashfulness. In all the years I knew him, he always had time for me and my problems, and he gave himself graciously. He also donated time generously to others, especially to graduate students, and he encouraged younger scholars and colleagues in their research and writing often with close readings and helpful criticism of their work. Such help reflected Thomas Bailey's kindness. I cannot recall ever hearing from his lips a harsh attack on any colleague at Stanford, or in the profession as a whole, though he did lash out at times at ideological dissenters from his kind of orthodoxy, such as isolationists. Yet he did not parade his political allegiances. Although essentially conservative in his political and social views, he often supported liberal causes and frequently abandoned his usual Republican attachment to vote the Democratic ticket. As with his politics, he wore his distinctions with modesty, an unusual characteristic in a profession where jealousies over petty honors can often be ferocious. Even in his generosity, another noteworthy feature in his character, he gave quietly and without ostentation. From the steady royalties from his books, he donated considerable money to Stanford, especially to its libraries and history department. He also remembered SHAFR with the largest contribution to date to its general endowment fund.

While Bailey had been honored with election to the presidencies of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association and the Organization of American Historians, he seemed to have taken special pleasure in his presidency of, and association with, SHAFR. This feeling may, in part, have come from his role in the founding of the society. When Joseph P. O'Grady approached him with the idea of forming such an organization, Tom responded favorably but said he did not have the time necessary for such a task. He suggested that Joe get in touch with me. I was pleased to work with Joe and David M. Pletcher in launching the Society, but I have always felt that somehow the spirit and character of Tom Bailey and his dedication to history and his profession have stood

behind the organization from its inception until his death. I know from conversations with him that he was both amazed and delighted with the solid growth of the Society, in prestige as well as in numbers. I like to think that just as his reputation as historian lives on through his scholarship, so does a part of him in our Society.

--Alexander DeConde

REMEMBERING ARMIN RAPPAPORT (1916-1983)

Armin Rappaport was our teacher. He thrived on teaching, eager to use the classroom as his stage to excite, challenge, and entertain. Quick-witted and jovial, Rappaport also knew his diplomatic history. His students, especially the thousands who signed up for his undergraduate courses at the University of California, Berkeley and the University of California, San Diego were always rewarded by his unique blend of scholarship and entertainment. He stimulated many undergraduates to major in history, not just to learn the past, but to acquire analytical skill--a critical sense--that they could apply to various questions and careers. And he trained some thirty doctoral students, instilling in them the need to conduct archival research, making them conscious of the need to strive to be both a good teacher and a good writer.

Armin Rappaport, at age 67, died on October 27, 1983 in San Francisco's Letterman Hospital. Two weeks earlier he had undergone surgery to remove a brain tumor, but complications from radiation therapy developed and pneumonia set in. He is survived by his widow, Marjorie Sprouse Rappaport, and two grown sons, Kenneth and Stephen. A native of New York City, Rappaport earned his Bachelor's degree at the University of Virginia (1936) and his Master's from Yale University (1942), where he studied under Samuel Flagg Bemis. During the Second World War, Rappaport served in army intelligence, and he remained in the Army Reserve until 1960, when he retired as a lieutenant colonel. After the war he enrolled at Stanford University to work with Thomas A. Bailey. Rappaport received his doctorate from Stanford in 1949, and that year he joined the faculty at Berkeley. He remained there until 1967. In 1964-65 he was a Fulbright professor at the University of Paris; he

lectured in Europe throughout his career. In 1967 he moved to UCSD to become Provost of the Third College and Chairman of the History Department. But in those tumultuous years of the counter-culture and Vietnam, his plans for that college were cut short. Radical students and faculty, including Angela Davis, succeeded in converting it to the "Third World College." Rappaport resigned from the Provost's office and continued as Chairman of History until 1970, helping to build it into a highly respected department. He retired in July, 1983, although he intended to teach his diplomatic history course one more time in the Fall.

Armin Rappaport's books came early in his career: The British Press and Wilsonian Neutrality (Stanford University Press, 1951); The Navy League of the United States (Wayne State University Press, 1962); and Henry L. Stimson and Japan, 1931-1933 (University of Chicago Press, 1963). He edited Issues in American Diplomacy (Macmillan, 1965); Sources in American Diplomacy (Macmillan, 1966); and Essays in American Diplomacy (Macmillan, 1967). He also wrote a brief textbook, A History of American Diplomacy (Macmillan, 1975). He contributed chapters and articles to Alexander DeConde's Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy (1978), Richard Dean Burns' Guide to American Foreign Relations since 1700 (1983), and Diplomatic History. His later years were devoted to teaching and the profession. He was active in SHAFR, being elected its President in 1975. He helped launch Diplomatic History becoming its first editor.

Armin was a popular man of enviable energy. He played squash religiously, drove his MG sport car with verve, loved good wine and food, wore Ivy League tweeds, and always seemed to be going some place--in a hurry. Conversations with him were spirited and fun, characterized by a fine mix of intelligence and humor. In his rhythmic and animated style, he regaled his listeners with stories. Of Samuel Flagg Bemis there were many. Bemis' 1916 experience aboard the French ship Sussex, when it was torpedoed in the English Channel, stands out. Bemis saw the torpedo dart toward the vessel. Fresh from the archives, the young Bemis worried about his precious notes on Jay's Treaty. Into the lifeboats went women, children, and Bemis' little bag of research notes. Into the water went Bemis.

Armin was a magician with words. His technique was to juxtapose a number of synonyms, then contrast them with some antonyms and homonyms, all the while describing historical events. A review of your notes soon revealed that you were not only being drilled in history, but in vocabulary. He truly loved to work and play with words, and a gentle smile would form when he noticed that you recognized that his use of language was important, and enjoyable.

His magnetism as a master lecturer derived from his great enthusiasm. He was absolutely alive on stage in front of anywhere from 125 to 500 students. He had a feel for his audience. On occasion a sleeping student was brought to a state of unusual attention by a casual comment. Once, in lecturing at Berkeley on John Quincy Adams and the annexation of the Floridas, Rappaport found himself spread-eagled in front of a large map, his right hand pointing to New Orleans, his left arm and hand waving over the Floridas. He was drawing the now familiar metaphor of the peninsula of Florida as the pistol butt, the panhandle as a barrel, and New Orleans and the mouth of the Mississippi as a hostile gunman's target. Waxing warm with his usual energetic delivery, he halted, shouting "Stop! Stop! All I see are moving pens and pencils and the top of heads. Here I am making this grand thesbian effort, with diction worthy of Barrymore, eloquence meant for Churchill, and cadences that ring like Shakespeare, and all I see are note "takers." He then walked to the edge of the stage, pointed an accusing finger at a couple of laggards still gazing at their notebooks, and commanded all to listen and see. Back to the map he went, back to the story of the Floridas, his wide-eyed students engaged in the subject.

In smaller classes he used the Socratic method, nudging students to analyze documents and to interpret essays. Sometimes he asked you to assume you were diplomat "X" or President "Y." Why did they decide as they did? He thus provoked debate. In the healthy give-and-take, he was never dogmatic, never the ideologue. Even though his own views were decidedly traditional and Cold Warriorish, he did not impose them on us. He encouraged us to think, to debate, to refine, to prove--but never to conform. He urged "traditionalists" to read and respect the writing of

"revisionists," and vice-versa. Why did they think as they did? We were always impressed by his open-mindedness and fair-mindedness, by his insistence that evidence match generalization and that slogans were no substitute for carefully-constructed arguments.

Armin Rappaport cared about his students, developing a special relationship with them, drawing out the best in them, prompting them to cultivate their talent and to reach for high standards. How sad it is that forthcoming classes will be denied his electricity and his influence. We remember Armin for his spirit, wit, tolerance, care, and intelligence. We join his many other students in our pride in having worked with him. We know that his many friends throughout this nation and abroad will take a moment after reading our statement to remember this good person in their own ways.

--Thomas G. Paterson (University of Connecticut)
Thomas Zoumaras (University of Connecticut)
Kenneth J. Hagan (U.S. Naval Academy)
Joan Hoff-Wilson (Indiana University-OAH)

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Robert L. Messer (Illinois-Chicago Circle) has been awarded the Tom L. Evans Grant for 1983 by the Board of Directors of the Truman Library Institute. Dr. Messer will be doing research on President Truman and United States nuclear weapons policy.

A number of SHAFR members have received smaller grants from the Truman Board. Among them are Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (Edinburgh), Clayton R. Koopes (Oberlin), Malcolm A. McKinnon (Harvard), Chester J. Pach, Jr., (Texas Tech), Priscilla M. Roberts (Maryland), David A. Rosenberg (Houston), and Robert A. Wampler (Harvard).

The Gerald R. Ford Foundation has announced research grants awarded to SHAFR members Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones (Edinburgh) and Frederick Schapsmeier (Wisconsin-Oshkosh).

1984 SUMMER SEMINARS FOR COLLEGE TEACHERS

The National Endowment for the Humanities is pleased to announce that 80 seminars for college teachers will be offered during the summer of 1984. The Summer Seminars program provides teachers in two-year, four-year, and five-year colleges with a unique opportunity for advanced study or research. In 1984, places will be offered to 960 participants at 45 different institutions across the United States as well as one in Rome.

Each participant will receive a stipend of \$3000 to cover travel to and from the seminar location, books, and research and living expenses.

For detailed information about the requirements and subject matter of individual seminars, about the availability of housing, and for application instructions and forms, please write directly to the seminar directors at the addresses indicated. (The seminars listed below are those the editor believes would be of interest to SHAFR members.)

Robert A. Divine
Department of History
University of Texas
Austin, TX 78712

The American Presidency from
FDR to Nixon
(June 13-August 10, 1984)
Open only to teachers
in two-year colleges

Ellis Hawley and
Lawrence Gelfand
205 Shaeffer Hall
University of Iowa
Iowa City, IA 52242

Planners and Politicians in Wartime
and Inter-War America: 1917-1945
(June 13-August 10, 1984)

Robin W. Winks
Department of History
c/o NEH Summer Seminars
Box 2145
Yale Station
New Haven, CT 06520

The Problem of Imperialism in
Comparative Perspective:
Britain and the United States
(June 13-August 10, 1984)

**CALL FOR APPLICATIONS: FACULTY SEMINAR
ON TEACHING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE**

The Consortium for the Study of Intelligence (CSI), a project of the National Strategy Information Center, will sponsor the third faculty seminar on the teaching of foreign intelligence from July 13-21, 1984, at Bowdoin College in Brunswick, Maine. Applications are invited from faculty who are presently teaching in the field of diplomatic or military history, or any discipline that includes intelligence-related areas. The deadline for applications will be February 17, 1984. Approximately 25 participants will be selected. CSI will pay round-trip travel and room and board. Contact: Dr. Roy Godson, Coordinator, Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, Suite 601, 1730 Rhode Island Ave, NW, Washington, D.C. 20036, (202) 429-0129.

University Publications of America, Inc. (44 No. Market Street, Frederick, Maryland 21701) is publishing a bimonthly newsletter/ book review entitled Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene. The editor is Thomas F. Troy; the cost is \$25 annually.

1984 BERLIN SEMINAR

The 1984 Berlin Seminar has been expanded to include four days in East Berlin in cooperation with the DDR-USA Friendship Society of the DDR. Sessions will be held at the Europäische Akademie of West Berlin from July 2-7 and in East Berlin from July 7-11, 1984.

These seminars have been organized by Bradley University's Department of History in cooperation with the Europäische Akademie since 1981. Both specialists and non-specialists in German History and U.S.-German relations should benefit from the sessions. Presentations are made by German faculty, news reporters, and government officials.

American participants must pay their travel expenses to Berlin. A small fee covers the room, board and other basic activity during the Berlin sessions.

A few vacancies are open for the 45 positions available for 1984. Faculty interested in 1984, 1985 or future sessions should write for further information to:

Lester H. Brune
Department of History
Bradley University
Peoria, IL 61625

PUBLICATIONS

Lester D. Langley (University of Georgia), The Banana Wars: An Inner History of American Empire, 1900-1934. 1983. University of Kentucky Press. \$26.00.

Thomas G. Paterson (University of Connecticut), Major Problems in American Foreign Policy: Documents and Essays. 2nd edition. 2 Volumes in paper. Heath. \$13.95 per volume.

Linda Killen (Radford University) and Richard Lael (Westminister College), Versailles and After: An Annotated Bibliography of American Foreign Relations, 1919-1933. 1983. Garland.

Wayne S. Cole (University of Maryland), Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-45. 1983. University of Nebraska Press. \$26.50.

Hugh DeSantis (Department of State), The Diplomacy of Silence. 1983. University of Chicago. Paperback \$8.95.

CALENDAR

- December 27-30 The 98th annual convention of the AHA will be held in San Francisco. The headquarters hotel will be the Hyatt Regency Embarcadero.
- January 1, 1984 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
- January 15 Deadline, nominations for the 1983 Bernath article award.

- February 1 Deadline, materials for the March Newsletter.
- February 1 Deadline, nominations for the 1983 Bernath book award.
- April 4-7 The 77th annual meeting of the OAH will be held in Los Angeles with the headquarters at the Biltmore Hotel.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June Newsletter
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September Newsletter.
- August The 10th annual conference of SHAFR will be held at George Washington University. Proposals are due early in the new year (1984). The Program Chairman is:
 William H. Becker
 Department of History
 George Washington University
 Washington, D.C. 20052
- October 31-November 3 The 50th annual meeting of the Southern Historical Association will be held in Louisville. The Galt House will be the headquarters hotel.
- November 1 Deadline, materials for the December Newsletter
- November 1-15 Annual elections for officers of SHAFR.
- December 1 Deadline, nominations for the 1984 Bernath Memorial lectureship.
- December 27-30 The 99th annual meeting of the AHA will be held in Chicago. The headquarters hotel is yet to be announced. (The deadline for proposals has passed.)

(The 1985 OAH will meet in Minneapolis, April 17-20

Program Chair: Gerald N. Grob
Department of History
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, NJ 08903

The deadline for proposals is
February 15, 1984.)

STUDENT FOIBLES

Mark Gilderhaus (Colorado State University) sends the following for our edification.

A student in an upper-division class submitted a paper presumably about the American decision to intervene in Vietnam. I found the paper to be unacceptable in every respect and told him so. It was so bad I could not put a grade on it. He said, "That's funny. When I turned it in at junior college, I got a D."

**THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZE FOR THE BEST
SCHOLARLY ARTICLE IN U.S. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY**

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Award for scholarly articles in American foreign affairs was set up in 1976 through the kindness of the young Bernath's parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, and it is administered through selected personnel of SHAFR. The objective of the award is to identify and to reward outstanding research and writing by the younger scholars in the area of U.S. diplomatic relations.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

Eligibility: Prize competition is open to the author of any article upon any topic in American Foreign Relations that is published during 1983. The article must be among the author's first five (V) which have seen publication. Membership in SHAFR or upon a college/university faculty is not a prerequisite for entering the competition. Authors must be under thirty-five (35) years of age, or within within five (5) years after receiving the doctorate, at the time the article was published. Previous winners of the S.L. Bernath book award are ineligible.

Procedures: Articles shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each article (preferably reprints) should be sent to the chairman of the Stuart L. Bernath Article Prize Committee by January 15, 1984. The Chairman of the Committee for 1983 is Harry Stegmaier, Department of History, Frostburg State University, Frostburg, Maryland 21532.

Amount of Award: \$300.00. If two (2) or more authors are considered winners, the prize will be shared. The name of the successful writer(s) will be announced, along with the name of the victor in the Bernath book prize competition, during the luncheon for members of SHAFR, to be held at the annual OAH Convention, meeting in 1984, at Los Angeles.

AWARD WINNERS

1977	John C.A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)
1978	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1979	Brian L. Villa (U of Ottawa, Canada)
1980	James I. Matray (New Mexico State U) David A. Rosenberg (U of Chicago)
1981	Douglas Little (Clark U)
1982	Fred Pollock (Cedar Knolls, N.J.)
1983	Chester Pach (Texas Tech)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL LECTURE IN AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship was established in 1976 through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and is administered by a special committee of SHAFR. The Bernath Lecture is the feature at the official luncheon of the Society, held during the OAH convention in April of each year.

Description and Eligibility: The lecture should be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address, delivered at the annual meeting with the AHA, but is restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer is expected to concern himself/herself not specifically with his/her own research interests, but with broad issues of importance to students of American foreign relations. The award winner must be under forty-one (41) years of age.

Procedures: The Bernath lectureship Committee is now soliciting nominations for the 1985 award from members of the Society, agents, publishers, or members of any established history, political science, or journalism organization. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vitae, if available, should reach the Committee no later than December 1, 1983. The Chairman of the Committee, and the person to whom nominations should be sent, is Harriet D. Schwar, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Honorarium: \$500.00 with publication of the lecture assured in *Diplomatic History*.

AWARD WINNERS

1977	Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
1978	David S. Patterson (Colgate)
1979	Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
1980	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1981	Burton Spivak (Bates College)
1982	Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)
1983	Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt)
1984	Michael J. Hogan (Miami)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL BOOK COMPETITON

The Stuart L. Bernath memorial Book Competition was initiated in 1972 by Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in memory of their late son. Administered by SHAFR, the purpose of the competiton and the award is to recognize and encourage distinguished research and writing of a lengthy nature by young scholars in the field of U.S. diplomacy.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

Eligibility: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1983. It must be the author's first or second book. Authors are not required to be members of SHAFR, nor do they have to be professional academicians.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. William Stinchcombe, Department of History, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y. 13210. The works must be received no later than February 1, 1984.

Amount of Award: \$1,000.00. If two (2) or more writers are deemed winners, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH.

Previous Winners

- 1972 Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)
Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)
- 1973 John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
- 1974 Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
- 1975 Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)
Stephen E. Pelz (U of Massachusetts-Amherst)
- 1976 Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)
- 1977 Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)
- 1978 James R. Leutze (North Carolina)
- 1979 Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston)
- 1980 Michael Schaller (U of Arizona)
- 1981 Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke)
Hugh DeSantis (Department of State)
- 1982 David Reynolds (Cambridge U)
- 1983 Richard Immerman (U of Hawaii)

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

- SPONSOR:** Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.
- EDITOR:** William J. Brinker, Department of History, Tennessee Tech.
- EDITORIAL ASSOCIATE:** John W. Winters, Tennessee Tech.
- EDITORIAL ASSISTANT:** Scott Hickman, Tennessee Tech.
- ISSUES:** The Newsletter is published on the 1st of March, June, September, and December. All members receive the publication.
- DEADLINES:** All material must be in the office of the editor not later than four (4) weeks prior to the date of publication.
- ADDRESS CHANGES:** Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication.
- BACK ISSUES:** Copies of most back numbers of the Newsletter are available and may be obtained from the editorial office upon payment of a service charge of 75 cents per number. If the purchaser lives abroad, the charge is \$1.00 per number.
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