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Page

- | | |
|----|---|
| 1 | The Eisenhower Solarium Notes by William B. Pickett |
| 10 | The Future of American Diplomatic History by Joan Hoff-Wilson |
| 22 | Notes from the 1984 Summer SHAFR Conference edited by William Becker |
| 42 | Minutes of the SHAFR Council Meeting—Minneapolis |
| 50 | Report of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation |
| 57 | Announcements |
| 59 | Publications |
| 61 | Personals |
| 63 | Calendar |
| 64 | Bernath Awards |
| 68 | Holt Fellowship |

SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

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MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in August. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZES: The Society administers several awards. Four of them in honor of the late Stuart L. Bernath and financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California. Another award honors the late W. Stull Holt. The details of each of these awards are given in under the appropriate headings of each issue of the Newsletter.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly Newsletter; Diplomatic History, a journal; and the occasional Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects.

THE EISENHOWER SOLARIUM NOTES

by

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Newly released notes of July, 1953 on the Solarium Conference will revise earlier interpretations of Dwight D. Eisenhower's strategy in the cold war. They reveal that neither the writers who characterized Eisenhower's approach as primarily deterrence through reliance on a capacity for massive nuclear retaliation nor those who considered him chiefly to have relied on conventional containment, building alliances and using covert CIA operations against communist subversion beyond the borders of the Soviet bloc, have been correct. As revealed in the notes, Eisenhower's strategy was much more complex. It rejected as its objective the notion raised in the 1952 Republican national convention of rolling back Soviet control from places such as Eastern Europe where the Red Army remained after World War II and moved instead to build such a position of strength that other nations would respect Western interests and find them a source of support. This strategy required that Eisenhower be willing to use any means at his disposal in dealing with the Soviet Union, including retention of sizable conventional military forces as well as nuclear weapons to deter aggression. This strategy proposed that the United States, together with its allies, develop the strength necessary to prevent communist political or military gains and, without being provocative, to diminish Soviet influence in the world.

There was a tense atmosphere during this period, with stalemate in Korea, war between France and communists in Vietnam, charges of American communists in the State Department, unresolved problems of German and Austrian occupation (unification or permanent

division), absence as yet of a European defense community, and with Stalin's death the preceding March anti-Soviet riots in East Germany and Poland. Consequently, Eisenhower's strategy was bold, uncompromising in its attitude toward the Soviets but designed to stabilize relations with them and restore the morale of the non-communist world.

American foreign policy was successful in both building strength and preventing war, although failing to reduce the communist threat. American foreign policy brought about an end to the Korean War; a network of alliances and bases surrounding the communist sphere; institutions at home for national security coordination, defense mobilization and technological development; a rearmed West Germany incorporated into a NATO army; covert CIA activities that overthrew unsympathetic governments in Iran, Guatemala, and the Congo; and the capacity to intervene militarily in trouble spots like the Formosa Straits and Lebanon. However, it did not prevent Soviet consolidation in Eastern Europe and East Germany, extension of influence to Egypt and, in the Western Hemisphere, to Cuba. It did not prevent the establishment of a communist North Vietnam. Nor did it provide a framework for conciliation, instead it challenged the Soviets to catch up.

Eisenhower established his strategy during a six-week, top-secret policy study in June and July of 1953. With armistice negotiations going on at Panmunjom, he called together at the National War College in Washington eighteen top national security officials of his administration for a brain-storming conference to examine the alternatives and obtain agreement on the best approach for dealing with the Soviet Union. The conference was codenamed "Operation Solarium" for the location, a small penthouse on the White House roof, where Eisenhower two months earlier had approved the idea for such a study conference brought to him by Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell "Beetle" Smith, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Special Assistant to the President C. D. Jackson, Central Intelligence Director Allen Dulles, and Special

Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert Cutler. The written report of the Solarium conference, after further discussion and revision, was adopted by the National Security Council in the autumn of 1953, becoming in the words of Cutler, "the basis for the first national security policy paper of the Eisenhower Administration." Andrew J. Goodpaster, a participant and later Eisenhower's staff secretary, called it a "means of forging a single controlling idea that would dominate his administration."¹

Eisenhower selected or approved the participants who, as they arrived at the National War College, received instructions written by him and his Secretary of State—with assistance from a five-person committee headed by war hero, General Jimmy Doolittle, and including Dean Rusk (later to be Secretary of State under Kennedy and Johnson). The participants were divided into three separate task forces with six members in each. Each group was to write a strategy directive based on one of three assumptions that reflected Eisenhower's perceptions about the full range of actions the Soviets and their satellites might take in the years ahead.² The first group, Task Force A, led by former chairman of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, formulator of Truman's containment policy, and ambassador to Moscow, George F. Kennan, assumed that the Soviet Union posed a long-term threat to the United States, one that was mainly political, economic, and ideological. Task Force B, under the leadership of Major General James McCormack, assumed that the Soviets were aggressive but militarily cautious, unwilling to risk general war or to move against interests supported by a resolute United States. Task Force C, led by General Lyman Lymnitzer, assumed that the Soviet Union was on the move, increasing its military strength, political activity, and subversion in an effort to expand its territory and influence.³

In their deliberations each task force obtained Central Intelligence Agency briefings, evaluated Soviet activities and capabilities, discussed possible American responses, and developed a consensus. At the

conclusion of the study in mid-June, they came together to discuss their findings. They then presented them at a gathering of the entire top echelon of foreign and defense policy officials together with the President at an expanded National Security Council meeting in the White House basement. Eisenhower concluded the session with a thirty-minute summary that demonstrated his mastery of world realities and acceptance of a national security strategy that differed little from that of his predecessor, Harry S. Truman. The speech is still classified, but when Eisenhower sat down it was clear, in the words of Goodpaster, that "rollback was dead and that something in the area of containment or areas of interest would be pursued."⁴

The recommendations that came out of the Solarium conference were influenced most heavily by the conclusions of George Kennan's Task Force A and assumed a long-term rather than short-term threat, political and economic rather than military competition, and efforts by the Soviets to spread their influence through subversion and propaganda rather than militarily. These conclusions recognized American economic and military superiority to the Soviet bloc and saw room for strategic initiatives. The West should attempt diplomatically to bring a unified Germany into a Western alliance. The United States, without the use of military force or threat, should attempt to influence Eastern-bloc nations to break away from Soviet control and increase the means available to prevent geographic extension of Soviet power.⁵

The Proposed New Basic Concept prepared by the National Security Council staff on July 30, 1953 reflected the Solarium deliberations. In order of importance to national security, the policy planners recommended a strategy "(1) To build and maintain U.S. capability for a strong retaliatory offensive, a base for mobilization, and a continental defense. (2) To concentrate on creating strong, independent, and self-sufficient groupings of nations friendly to the United States centered on Western Europe (including Germany)

and on Japan in the Far East. (3) To confine future U.S. foreign assistance: (a) to supporting the development of these regional groupings in Western Europe and the Far East; and (b) to selective and limited military aid and technical assistance to other free nations. (4) To make publicly known, in an appropriate and unmistakable fashion, the areas in which any clearly recognizable advance by Soviet bloc military forces beyond present borders will be considered by the United States as initiating general war between itself and the Soviet bloc. (5) To take selected aggressive actions of a limited scope involving moderately increased risks of general war, to eliminate Soviet-dominated areas within the free world and to reduce Soviet power in the Satellite periphery." A note accompanying the list estimated the "risk of general war resulting from aggressive action directed at the Soviet bloc as less grave at the present time than did Task Force A" and that American policy "aims during the near future to create a 'climate of victory,' to bolster the morale and strength of the free world while forcing the Soviet bloc on the defensive."⁶

Scrutiny of the Proposed New Basic Concept reveals that the first three items derived from recommendations of Task Force A, political and economic containment with initiative in areas of Soviet vulnerability. Accordingly, item 1--build and maintain capability for strong retaliatory offensive, base for mobilization, and continental defense--is a response to what Task Force A considered a lack of American readiness for mobilization and general war and a need to impress legislators with the "unprecedented absolute cost" of the program in peacetime, estimated at \$40 billion annually.⁷ The second item--creating strong, independent, and self-sufficient groupings of friendly nations in Western Europe (Germany), and the Far East (Japan)--was a reference to the Task Force's recommended economic expansion in Western Europe, increased responsibility on NATO nations for defense and foreign policy, and especially to create a "reunified, sovereign, independent Germany with a democratic form of government" rearmed with

non-nuclear weapons. In the Far East, the object of encouraging an independent and friendly mainland China required "fostering the prestige and power growth of Japan as the dominant power in Asia."⁸ Item three--limiting foreign assistance to supporting regional groupings in Western Europe and the Far East and to "selective and limited military aid and technical assistance"--referred to Task Force A's recommended trade liberalization, stimulation of private investment, and activities by the International Bank and Export-Import Bank in Europe, and gradual withdrawal of support to France except in such areas as the war against communism in Indochina that it "cannot realistically meet alone."⁹ In the Middle East, aid would be for certain Arab economic development projects through U.N. agencies and the World Bank, small arms for local police forces, and technical assistance.¹⁰ The United States would continue in the Far East to support South Korea, Formosa, and, of course, for a while after an end of the Korean war, Japan--"the main bulwark of [the] free world in the western Pacific."¹¹

Recommendations of Task Force B appeared mainly in item 4--to make public the areas in which a Soviet advance will be considered by the United States a reason for general war. While toning down that task force's willingness to use the threat of general war as the "primary sanction against further Soviet-Bloc aggression," it accepted the group's recommendation of full American military support to contain communist expansion everywhere. "No line was found which would exclude any large areas as not absolutely vital to U.S. security. . . . It is proposed that the line be drawn along the borders of the present Soviet Bloc, filling the gaps in the Middle East and South Asia which are not covered by current NATO and other commitments, as well as clearing up final uncertainty as to U.S. intentions under these alliances."¹² The United States hence would signal in advance that there were no areas of the world in which it was willing to tolerate expansion of Soviet influence.

The fifth and final item, while appearing to draw upon Task Force C in its mention of offensive actions to eliminate Soviet-dominated areas in the "free world" and "reduce Soviet power in the Satellite periphery," refers to the approach of Task Force A because of its emphasis on "selected" actions of "limited scope" and reveals a cautious brand of containment. In Germany the latter group had recommended a negotiated German reunification that "can exploit and intensify present Soviet internal stresses and achieve, in due course, the first major roll back of Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe." But this approach also involved concurrent efforts to "effect the early and direct rearmament of West Germany." The Proposed New Basic Concept, in omitting such words as "roll back" and emphasizing building strength reflected an awareness that rearming West Germany was probably incompatible with negotiated reunification.

American purposes in the Far East included direct support of both French and indigenous forces fighting the Viet Minh in Indochina so that they might "regain the military initiative" and also holding firm in South Korea "while seeking political unification."¹³ As part of an effort to reduce Soviet power, this would mean that "vulnerabilities of the Soviet Bloc should be exploited by various covert and overt means. The U.S. should seek to convince the Kremlin of the fallacy of the fundamental concepts upon which their policies are based, while simultaneously trying to persuade the Soviet leaders that it is not too late to turn back from their present course."¹⁴

Although not mentioned specifically in the Proposed New Basic Concept, in retrospect one can see that Eisenhower's strategy also drew upon Task Force C's recommendations for the use of covert activities, atomic weapons, and intervention in Indochina. That group with its assumptions of a most dangerous Soviet Union had recommended that the United States prosecute "initially . . . a large part of our intensified cold war covertly using a national program of deception and concealment from public disclosure and Soviet discernment."¹⁵ It had advocated a strategy to end the

cold war by "winning it" and a "national command post to concentrate our political, military and economic resources on winning." Atomic weapons should be used in Korea, it said, in event no cease-fire agreement was reached and fighting is resumed. In Indochina, it recommended organizing "indigenous forces" and "closer U.S.-French military collaboration; expansion of forces; and organization of divisional size units; and more vigorous and aggressive conduct of war."16

Nor did the Proposed New Basic Concept specify negotiations, but in refusing to undertake extreme measures without great provocation it implied a long, even dangerous competition of ideologies in which there would be communication though probably not conciliation between the two nations. This was the reason the United States had to take leadership in building free world strength. Negotiations were part of the strategy recommended by Task Force C, if only for exploiting "favorable developments and improving our political position." And they appeared prominently in Task Force A's explanation that "This build-up would create a position of strength" as a "background for negotiation" but with "understanding that some concessions may be necessary to achieve results, although not at the expense of our overall position of strength."17

As the Solarium documents make clear, Eisenhower's strategy was an elaboration of Secretary of State Dean Acheson's efforts to combat communism by building strength both at home and abroad. It differed in that the new proposals addressed the longterm nature of the Soviet threat through concern for the effect of the cold war on the Western economies; and advocated active diplomacy to create alliances around the Soviet periphery, reliance even in peacetime on both nuclear and conventional military deterrence, and willingness to establish communications with the Soviets to stabilize relations and reduce the possibility of misunderstanding.

Notes

¹Robert Cutler, No Time for Rest (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), pp. 307-310; Andrew J. Goodpaster, Oral History, OH 477, April 10, 1982, Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas, p. 14.

²General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Interview with Author, January 11, 1985. General Goodpaster, former aide to Eisenhower at SHAPE, the following year became the President's closest White House aide in foreign and defense policy with the title Staff Secretary.

³Cutler, pp. 309-310; George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1950-1963, Vol. II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), pp. 181-182. Kennan said "when the exercise was completed it was the concept propounded by my team [Task Force A] that received the presidential approval." This, it seems, was an oversimplification. Having lost his job at the State Department a few months before, he recalled, with some irony, at the end of the summer "standing on a podium in a room in the White House basement briefing the entire cabinet and other senior officials of the government on the rationale and the intricacies of the policy toward Russia which, it was decided, the government should now pursue." p. 182.

⁴George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1950-1963, Vol. II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1972), p. 186; Goodpaster, Oral History, OH 477, pp. 13-14.

⁵Goodpaster, Interview, January 11, 1985.

⁶One five-line item in the note remains classified. Top secret Memorandum, Project Solarium: Summary of Basic Concepts of Task Forces, July 30, 1953, WHOSANSA, NSC Series, Subject Subseries, Box 10, Project Solarium (1), Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas. Goodpaster, Interview, January 11, 1985.

⁷James Lay, Jr. memorandum to NSC, 22 July 1953, ibid., pp. 5-6.

⁸Ibid., pp. 8-9, 12.

⁹Ibid., pp. 8, 10.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 15.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 12-13.

¹²Report of Task Forces B & C of Project Solarium, n.d., ibid., file (2), pp. 20-21.

¹³Lay to NSC, ibid., pp. 9, 10, 12-14.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 15.

¹⁵Report of Task Forces B & C, p. 26.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 32.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 30 and Lay to NSC, p. 16.

THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

by

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In December, 1984, an entire session at the American Historical Association annual meeting was devoted to the topic, "The Future of American Diplomatic History." It turned out to be largely a discussion over the current lack of consensus within the field of U.S. foreign policy. As the final speaker at that session, I made the following points. First, our pursuit of historiographical consensus, I believe, is ahistorical, illusory, and possibly a camouflage for more serious questions which divide us, such as past disagreements over the war in Vietnam. Second, instead of concentrating on how to construct an interpretive consensus, it might be more productive to discuss the implications of what many of us do share

in common; namely, a much more sophisticated methodology which has been given the name corporatism. It is corporatism as a methodology--as a research tool--not corporatism as a means to consensus or as a basic historiographical concept that gives commonality to much of the current research into U.S. foreign relations.

Next, I introduced into the discussion the question of access to information. I think that access problems have the potential for dividing historians of foreign relations, especially those of us in the contemporary field, more than interpretative questions do. Fourth, while I think that research in the field of foreign relations is healthy and hardy, I sense both an absence of passion and persuasion in our current discussions of interpretative differences over the origins of the Cold War--possibly stemming from a sense of loss of power and prestige within the historical profession, in general, and among diplomatic historians, in particular. Fifth, I am of the opinion that we need an ethical imperative behind our writings rather than a historiographical consensus.

Despite recent proclamations about the field of international relations "marking time," being "much quieter," with the debate between "orthodox and revisionist historians [having] softened and differences narrowed,"¹ the fact remains that there is still no comprehensive agreement on the origins of the Cold War almost fifty years after it came into existence as a historical and historiographical phenomenon. One could legitimately ask if we really don't know, or can't agree, on the origins of the Cold War after nearly a half-century of debate, when will we? And if we never do, what does this mean, if anything, for the future of historical writing about U.S. foreign policy?

Given the reopening of the Cold War debate in 1983-84 scholarly publications,² I am not convinced that the verbal or theoretical battle is waning as much as many of us had thought. To compare one of the points in an

authoritatively documented analysis of the national security concepts of American defense officials to "not discovering sex until the age of . . . forty-two," does not seem to me a "more mature" or less confrontational approach to the debate.³ Moreover, statements like "we will not convince one another in any event," and "consensus, even if it were to exist, will always be as much a matter of fashion as of 'truth,'"⁴ lead me to question why we continue to beat our breasts about obtaining agreement on the origins of the Cold War--as though consensus has been the hallmark or norm in the writing of U.S. diplomatic history. The anguish expressed over the lack of a unifying consensual construct since the end of the Second World War is approaching the absurd in terms of sheer quantity and self-flagellation quality.

The search for such a synthesis is, in all likelihood, a futile pursuit. All of the review articles under consideration at the AHA session lamented the current lack of consensus in the field. Yet, consensus has not been the natural state or hallmark of writings about U.S. diplomatic history. Unlike most subfields of U.S. history, the professionalization of foreign policy specialists did not take place until relatively recently; this is, until the 1920s. From the beginning it was characterized by more disputes and disagreements than consensus.⁵

The role methodology played in these debates is significant depending on whether the research occurred before or after the Second World War. The initial generation of professional diplomatic historians, however much they may have disagreed with one another, shared a research based largely on documents available in the United States. Most wrote diplomatic history as though it were simply an exercise in the exchange of formal communiques between countries. In one very important sense, therefore, diplomatic historians before the Second World War shared a common methodological approach which gave them a sense of professional comradery if not an interpretative consensus.

According to Charles Maier, William Langer represented the "greatest historian of international relations the United States has produced since World War I," because he encouraged and embodied the greatest consensual force toward "collective enterprise" and "collective purpose."⁶ Langer's reliance on simplistic rational actor model and research based primarily on diplomatic communiques, however transnational and multiarchival it was, pales when compared to the international systems analysis, socioeconomic, psychoorganizational and cultural methodology represented in the best of today's foreign policy studies by historians and political scientists.

From the simple "mastery of public documents" and concentration on the impact a few prominent individuals had in the formulation of foreign policy, the field has burgeoned in the last fifteen to twenty years into one which is both truly interdisciplinary and global "in terms of social structure and international systemic considerations." According to Melvyn Leffler,

We know a lot more about the diversity and demands of interest groups; have a much better understanding of the relationships between ideology and self interest; have begun to explore not only a host of bureaucracies and organizations but also to analyze the men and women who staff these bureaucracies; have developed a serious debate about the interrelations between public opinion, domestic politics and executive decision making; have placed the United States in the larger context of international history; and, on occasion, even have explained the impact of our foreign behavior on the social, economic, and political texture of other societies.⁷

This is no mean achievement and the New Left has contributed greatly to transforming corporatist research methods into a modern methodological tool, albeit, not into a consensus. I believe that modern methodological methods of research almost guarantee no

such dominant consensus will emerge over the origins of the Cold War or other current and future historiographical disputes for the remainder of the century and probably well into the next. Unlike the methodology of pre-World War II diplomatic historians, the corporatist methodology of contemporary diplomatic historians tends to pull them apart rather than bring them together.

We have made a methodological move from exclusive emphasis on power relationships between powerful people in powerful nations expressed in a manageable number of public and private papers to the mind-boggling amount of documentation on post-World War II events--both classified and declassified. This methodological shift has revealed the diverse influences on foreign policy decision making by prompting some of the more sophisticated research techniques. But in the process, this quantum leap in methodology has fragmented our interpretation of diplomatic history. It has produced myriad micro-cosmic views that seldom are translated into macro-cosmic significance. Obviously, the view from the State Department may not be quite what it was from the Pentagon, or from the White House or the National Security Council, or from a cultural perspective of what constitutes power or national security.

This methodologically motivated fragmentation incidently coincided with the fragmentation of the historical profession itself into smaller and smaller subfields and specialized societies and fields over the last twenty years, of which SHAFR is but one of the more successful examples. These two types of fragmentation based on methodology and specialization in turn coincided with a decline in professional prestige for historians because of a glut on the academic market. Moreover, diplomatic specialists have experienced an additional decline in status, unlike political scientists or systems analysts who, since the early 1960s, came into greater prominence in terms of the decision making process at governmental levels and in think tanks across the country. Thus, decline in prestige and status combined with

fragmenting experiences based on methodology and specialization, have weakened the chances of arriving at an over-arching synthesis for the remainder of this century.

Perhaps our desire as historians, if not our actual obsession, for consensus on major foreign policy events is a subconscious reflection of the belief that with unity of opinion will come returned professional power and prestige: in the classroom as we once again begin to mesmerize our students as many of our mentors did with anecdotes and comprehensive analytical explanations of all wars and all other major foreign policy events; and power and prestige in high places as we aspire to influence decision makers with a coherent rather than chaotic approach to facts.

Most decision makers are in need of predigested justifications for foreign policy actions. Unlike the political scientists and systems analysts, who are only too ready to provide packaged rationalizations, we as historians have sputtered out complexities and engaged in what appears a seamless web of name-calling, e.g., right wing idealists, hard realists, soft or restrained realists, liberal moralists, moderate revisionists, post-revisionists, neoconservative revisionists, neoorthodox revisionists, neo-realists, orthodox scholars, toothless revisionism, truculent orthodoxy, traditionalist retreats, multi-lateralism, productionism, corporatism, neocorporatism, and global corporatism. Perhaps the worst label in this litany of epithets is that of professional revisionist. Curiously, few of those writing the many essays urging consensus have commented on the ludicrous and debilitating labelling that has, and is going on, within the field of U.S. foreign relations among diplomatic historians.

Interpretative fragmentation and excessive categorization of each other are not going to be resolved by saying it is a question of looking at the glass half empty or half full. I no longer think that some of us are even looking at the same glass. In all likelihood, no amount of additional research will

change the minds of the proponents of the leading schools on the origins of the Cold War and the other controversial foreign policy events since the Second World War, barring the discovery of new and unexpected sources of information. Proponents on both sides have said as much with such statements: "The notion that Soviet or other archives could ultimately resolve the deepest problems of historical responsibility remains a naive one." ". . .well meaning friends, colleagues, and students remonstrate with me regularly [for placing too much] emphasis on the role of George Kennan and the Policy Planning Staff though to no avail."⁸

The absence of a post-World War II synthesis is all the more disturbing to those who desire one because there is as yet no general agreement about corporatism as a methodology, let alone as a basis for interpretative consensus. Furthermore, I sense more resignation than reconciliation in the embattled positions which continue to exist on post-World War II foreign policy issues. These positions, I suspect, reflect not only lingering methodological disagreements, but also differences over Vietnam and different visions of America arising out of that war among an entire generation of diplomatic historians. It will take another generation of scholars to rise above the personal and historiographical trauma generated by Vietnam. This combination of disagreements over methodology and our positions on the war in Vietnam have produced a sterile and/or boring quality to the latest flare-up of the Cold War debate in 1983 and 1984 articles. There is a lack of both passionate persuasion in the latest round of statements and rejoinders.

Why is this the case? What continues to separate us so deeply, so fundamentally, and yet so dispassionately? First, as I have said, corporatist methodology tends to divide rather than unite. Second, individual reactions to the war in Vietnam has fundamentally affected basic views of America for the 1980s and beyond. The Indochinese War divided and continues to divide diplomatic historians according to

positions during the 1960s and early 1970s, and because of our collective guilt over the excesses to which we often carried those positions. Third, our personal sense that the profession has often lost prestige both inside and outside academe is a divisive, albeit, unspoken factor. Fourth, we are divided over not simply how we do research, but most importantly, how we obtain access to information—as insiders or outsiders.

Obviously, as graduate students, we all began as outsiders, with little standing in the profession. Traditionally, age took care of this problem, turning outsiders into insiders, through hard work and the incremental benefits of the old boys network. Since the Second World War, and particularly with the decline of academic jobs for trained historians, the generational factor or variable for obtaining academic positions is less stable, less reliable than in the past.

Instead, access to information, especially on topics since 1945, has become all important. The name of the research game is in danger of becoming one of privileged access on the part of insiders whether they be journalists or historians. Outsiders currently wait for aggregate declassification or attempt scattergun declassification through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) because they have not benefited from government jobs giving them knowledge of declassified information or access to those government officials who can facilitate FOIA searches or grant privileged access to their papers.

Although the Organization of American Historians and the American Historical Association are on record favoring access, those in the field of contemporary foreign policy already have less access today to aggregate bodies of documents than ten years ago. This is not simply because of the latest congressional expansion of CIA exemptions to the FOIA. It is due primarily to a series of executive orders and other actions taken by the federal government in the Reagan administration.⁹

According to statistics from the Information Security Oversight Office, less aggregate data is available because of executive orders, loopholes in mandatory review, and changed guidelines for declassification procedures. For example, the latest report of the Information Security Oversight Office revealed there has been a significant decline in systematic review of documents during the last four years with a drop from 90.3 million pages reviewed in 1980 to 12.4 million pages reviewed in 1983. There is also now less money for publication of official history of government agencies which in turn means less access to classified documents by the federal historians writing those histories. Moreover, regression in the classification/declassification procedures led to delayed and expurgated volumes in the Foreign Relation Series.

In the future those in the field of contemporary foreign relations may also face access problems and destruction of documents through the creation of paperless computerized government record keeping which most of us have not even contemplated in our wildest dreams. We may become involved in a doublethink activity known as the paperless paperchase. Think of a research world in which we never see drafts but only final, word-processed versions of major documents. Entire files, especially those revealing, personal memos and notations to documents which often ended up under lot numbers at NARS, can, and in all likelihood will, be obliterated at the touch of a button before the official records are turned over to NARS. Accessing computerized information will no doubt further divide us into insider and outsider research groups, regardless of whether federal agencies ever honor the 30 year rule, or executive orders become more lenient.

These access problems and our more sophisticated methodology leading to greater specialization, combined with the divisions created over our various reactions to Vietnam have created, I believe, a narrow mind set and often turgid writing style which do not lend themselves to making ethical or other kinds of

sweeping generalizations about U.S. foreign policy. Yet these generalizations based on ethical principles are needed more than ever as the end of this century approaches. In 1971 in the midst of the righteous excesses taking place by proponents on both sides of the war in Vietnam, Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., pointed out that amorality was necessary in foreign relations except in those few areas "with so moral a character the moral judgment must control political judgment."¹⁰ The five moral foreign policy areas he lists at the time were:

- 1) war crimes and atrocities
- 2) nuclear arms race
- 3) colonialism
- 4) racism
- 5) world poverty

I would add to his list a sixth moral concern: the environmental impact of technology.

Since 1971 conditions in most of the areas listed by Schlesinger have worsened. But because of the specialization and methodological divisions, access problems and political differences, I am not convinced that diplomatic historians of my generation, and the graduate students we are now training, have the ethically-driven motivation to write about these or their subjects without journalistic sensationalism or mindless partisanship. Our hearts may tell us to do so but our source dependency, especially if we are working from privileged access to classified documents, and our complicated sophisticated methodological techniques mitigate against it.

In fact, we may even be using our methodological and interpretative differences to mask both inequitable access and moral indifference. If research based on privileged access increases in the future then we may fail to influence the public and decision makers alike, not because we were unable to reach consensus, but because we would not make ethical judgments on major present and past events. Consensus is a false issue--it is not our major problem. Ethical complacency is, especially noticeable on contemporary foreign policy topics. Our emphasis and efforts should no

longer be so single mindedly on how to interpret the origins of the Cold War, but how to evaluate past decisions and national security concepts in order to end that war rather than continue to justify it through complex and morally meaningless explanations.

There is an anonymous historical axiom which states: "The future is not what it was, but the past is what historians make it." I would like to change it to read: "The future is not what we thought it would be but historians have the obligation to shape it ethically even if we can not come up with a unifying synthesis." Yet I fear we will be less able to do that in the future than we have in the past as we divide more and more into a group of insiders with privileged access and outsiders who suspect that the interpretations of the insiders suffer from what Connor Cruise O'Brien called revolutionary subordination in the 1960s.

We not only need an ethical imperative behind our writing but I think we also must take steps to insure that access to documentation be more, rather than less, open on an equitable basis. Currently, specialists in the field of U.S. foreign relations are too concerned about lack of interpretative consensus and not enough concerned about what really divides the field. Divisions over interpretation are rooted in questions of access to information and ethics. Unfortunately, the reasons for these serious divisions are likely to be exacerbated rather than dissipated for the remainder of the century.

FOOTNOTES

¹Charles S. Maier, "Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations," in The Past Before Us: Contemporary Historical Writing in the United States, ed. Michael Kammen (Ithaca, 1980), pp. 355-87; John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic History, 7, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 171; Jerald A. Combs, "Cold

War Historiography: An Alternative to John Gaddis's Post-Revisionism," SHAFR Newsletter, 15, no. 2 (June 1984): 9.

²Lloyd C. Gardner, Lawrence S. Kaplan, Warren F. Kimball, and Bruce Kuniholm, "Responses to John Lewis Gaddis, 'The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War,'" Diplomatic History," 7, no. 3 (Summer 1983): 191-204; Melvyn P. Leffler, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48," John Lewis Gaddis, Bruce Kuniholm, "Comments," AHR, 89, no. 2 (April 1984): 346-400.

³Gaddis, "Comments," p. 384.

⁴Gardner, "Responses to Gaddis," p. 191; Kuniholm, "Responses to Gaddis," p. 201.

⁵Here are but a few of the twentieth-century topics over which diplomatic historians have not been able to reach comprehensive agreement: the concept of the open door in China and other parts of the world, significance of peace and disarmament movements, reasons for America's entry into the First World War, the meaning of isolationism, the concept of American empire and imperialism, the contemporary meaning of the Monroe Doctrine, U.S. relations and intentions with respect to Japan before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the role of public opinion in determining foreign policy, reasons behind recognition of the Soviet Union, the interpretation of Yalta, how to define U.S. national interest or security in a nuclear age, the role of ideology and/or economics in determining what national interest is.

⁶Maier, "Marking Time," p. 355.

⁷Melvyn P. Leffler, "Responses to Charles S. Maier, 'Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations,'" Diplomatic History, 5, no. 4 (Fall 1981): 369.

⁸Kuniholm, "Responses to Gaddis," p. 201; Gaddis, "Comments," p. 382.

⁹Thomas G. Paterson, "The Present Danger of Thought Control," AHR Perspectives, 22, no.4 (April 1984): 14-16; Anna Kasten Nelson, "Classified History," OAH Newsletter, 12, no. 3 (August 1984): 5-7.

¹⁰Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "The Necessary Amoralilty of Foreign Affairs," Harper's Magazine, August 1971, p. 75.

EXTENDED NOTES
FROM THE 1984 SUMMER SHAFR MEETING
AT WASHINGTON

compiled by
William Becker (George Washington University)

(The session, "Sources for Understanding the Vietnam Conflict" as edited by George Herring, appeared in the March 1985 SHAFR Newsletter.)

Over fifty individuals took part in the Saturday morning, August 4, 1984 program entitled "Institutionalizing Containment" moderated by Richard Dean Burns (California State University, Los Angeles). Professor Randall Bennett Woods (University of Arkansas) spoke on "An American Ideology: Multilateralism in Anglo-American Relations, 1941-1946." Professor Woods focused on the 1946 British loan and emphasized the conservative mistrust within the Congress and American public, which he termed a manifestation of "an American ideology." He centered on the aspirations of U.S. "multilateralists" who sought to construct a free-trade system encompassing as much of the world as possible out of the conviction that the collective good necessarily would follow. They presumed, moreover, that the success of any such venture depended upon their ability to get the British to play according to proper rules. The U.S. loan,

premised upon dismantling the imperial preference system, accomplished the goal of getting the British to play but also had the unanticipated consequence of so weakening the empire that Britain no longer could perform the traditional role in the Near and Middle East and intensified the burdens of the United States.

Professor Chester J. Pach, Jr. (Texas Tech University) addressed the topic "The Truman Administration and the Decision for a Global Military Assistance Program." Professor Pach described the process by which the Mutual Defense Assistance Act came into existence in October 1949. He began by attacking a misconception--the false notion that the Military Assistance Program was merely a corollary of NATO--and demonstrated that MAP amounted to much more. The first in a long series of Cold War arms bills, the Mutual Defense Assistance Act made military aid "a major instrument of containment." Emphasizing the bureaucratic maneuverings, Pach concluded that a consensus existed within the Truman administration in support of arms aid; thus the question was not should we provide it? but rather, how and by what means do we do it when we do it? State Department officials, fearing the consequences of a public discussion, hesitated to involve the Congress out of concern for obstruction and delay. They preferred swift, secret methods of dispensing the arms. Professional soldiers, in contrast, bridled over depletion of scarce equipment reserves, calculated the existing ad hoc procedures would never be effective, and wanted to be able to establish priorities and determine primary and secondary recipients. Both groups of U.S. officials, however, were far less fearful of a full-scale Russian invasion of Europe than of the prospects of clandestine operations, subversive activities, and covert aggression by indirect means. Hence they agreed on the goal of using U.S. military assistance to check the spread of Soviet influence even while they quarreled over the means of distributing it.

Dr. Yasuhara Yoko (Washington, D.C.) examined "The China Committee and U.S. Embargo Policy, 1945-1952." Dr. Yasuhara argued that U.S. policy in Asia, after

the defeat of Japan, initially displayed some flexibility because of uncertainty over the outcome of the civil war in China. At first U.S. planners hoped to promote reconstruction by encouraging trade between China and Japan and later intended to promote Titoism within the Chinese Communist camp through commercial incentives. The onset of the Korean war and the Chinese intervention produced a sharp change in policy aimed at restrictive economic policies and stringent efforts to line up European and Japanese support for them. In examining the origins of the "international export control network" subsequently operated under the aegis of the U.S., Dr. Yasuhara argues that the export controls had a dual purpose, that they aimed at "undermining economic and military strength of Communist countries" and "at the same time were an important element which formed an economic basis of U.S. hegemony in international relations after World War II."

In commenting on the papers, Professor Mark T. Gilderhaus (Colorado State University) gave all three high points "for their depth and breath of archival research and for imaginative utilization of sources." Nevertheless, he did feel it was necessary "to pick some nits." He suggested that Woods' paper was somewhat flawed by conceptual fuzziness because the term "mutilateralism" lacked clear definition. While Pach's paper centered on the debate between diplomats and soldiers, Gilderhaus found that he wanted to know more: what was Truman's role? did anyone see the program as provocative? what were congressional responses? and what were the consequences of the MAP activities? (Pach demurred suggesting that his forthcoming book will respond to most of these points.) Gilderhaus found Dr. Yasuhara's arguments, in part, a challenge to John Lewis Gaddis' notion (Diplomatic History 7:3 (1983)) that the postwar American empire was defensive rather than offensive and by invitation rather than imposition. Yasuhara had noted that U.S. aid provided Washington with powerful leverage because one of the strings attached to the aid was that the recipients impose export controls on strategic items desired by Communist

nations. Surely, Gilderhaus noted, such practices amounted to "imposition."

Discussion was brief, but spirited. The audience joined Woods in seeking to define "multilateralism" but not everyone was satisfied with the results. Audience comments reinforced Pach's contention of military "conservatism." Equipment standardization policies, especially the U.S. Air Force's aggressive efforts, were discussed; in general, however, most discussants agreed that military/defense officials were generally quite concerned about becoming over-committed. Dr. Yasuhara was queried about the effectiveness of the U.S. embargo of Communist China, to which she replied that it was effective in the short run, but not over the long haul.

An American Foreign Service Officers Oral History
Project: A Roundtable Discussion

This roundtable chaired by Peter P. Hill (George Washington University) addressed the problems and opportunities inherent in a proposal by two retired Foreign Service Officers, C. Stuart Kennedy and Victor Wolf, to establish an FSO oral history project in affiliation with The George Washington University. In outlining their goals and procedures, Kennedy and Wolf underscored their concern that an important part of the historical record would be lost unless an organized effort were made either to tape or to secure in writing the memoirs of middle-level officials who worked on the fringes and sometimes close to the center of the diplomatic past. While they will not refuse written memoirs from any era or region, the proponents of the project will target Northeast Asia and the Persian Gulf area in the late 1940's and early 1950's. They also propose to interview corporate figures and other persons not of the Foreign Service.

Panelist Julis W. Friend, former CIA official, dwelt on the problems posed by various government codes of secrecy which, he thought, were certain to inhibit access to the kinds of data that interviewees would find useful to jog their memories. Former Ambassador

Samuel R. Gammon, in a follow-up on the panel side, expressed concern as to how reliable the memories of aging Foreign Service Officers might be, although he indulged in a bit of reminiscence that left no doubt that his own recollections were sharp indeed. Donald Ritchie of the U.S. Senate Historical office, and the only panelist with hands-on experience in taping, described how richly rewarding a well-conducted interview could be. Give an interviewee a date, a cluster of names, and an idea of context, he said, and he may recall detail the interviewer would not have thought to ask.

Brisk exchanges followed between panel and audience, the latter numbering about 40 historians and government officials. Discussion focused first on the selection of interviewers. Should they be historians, graduate students, or peers? Answers suggested that any of the three could be either good or bad. A well-informed historian might elicit more defensiveness than information if there were no rapport. On the other hand, a well-prepared doctoral candidate might set just the right tone. Nor should former FSO's themselves be overlooked as interviewers insofar as what they lacked in interview technique might be more than compensated by their ability to put a fellow FSO at ease.

Some felt that the proposed time periods and geographical areas would put undue restrictions on the Project's full potential. Discussion reached no consensus as to whether interviews should be focused or encompassing, although most speakers seemed to agree that a certain degree of diffuseness was unavoidable. Kennedy and Wolf iterated that they would not refuse written memoirs from any area or time period. Indeed, the Project would solicit interviews or memoirs of officers whose failing health might make them a perishable source, regardless of the individual's experiential background. Moreover, the regional or chronological interest exhibited by potential funders of the Project would have a diffusing effect.

Although discussants seemed to feel that the Department of State would cooperate with the purposes of the Project, they recurred frequently to the "secrecy" problem, voicing concern as to what constraints Foreign Service Officers might feel themselves under, even after retirement. It was agreed that some interviewees would properly refuse to answer certain types of questions. Others might insist on a lapse of time before tapes were released. The assumption was made, however, that an experienced Foreign Service Officer would know instinctively what he could say, what he should not say, and what he might say, subject to appropriate clearance. Kennedy and Wolf made clear their willingness to cope with this problem, specifically, to make tapes subject to whatever conditions might be imposed on their release, rather than lose the source altogether.

Members of the audience who were familiar with oral interviewing offered a variety of cautions, to wit, (1) one hour of interviewing is almost never enough; (2) don't set time limits; and (3) keep the tape running. As one explained, the interviewee often asks that the "machine" be turned off so that he can speak off the record. A skillful interviewer will respond: "No, let's let the tape run. You can always edit out material later." Oftentimes, the interviewee will decide that he wants to preserve the very remarks he initially thought ought not to be recorded.

Enthusiasm for the Project seemed exemplified by the willingness of the audience to give advice rather than to question its premises. (Note: The Project's affiliative process has reached the stage of contract negotiation with The George Washington University, as of early December, 1984.)

The session "Anglo-American Relations: The Personal Equation", chaired by Edward M. Coffman (University of Wisconsin), included three interesting papers. In "Frederick R. Burnham: The British Empire's American Scout", Richard H. Bradford (West Virginia Institute of Technology) sketched the life of this Anglophile who translated his attitude into service for the

British. Captain Alex Danchev (Royal Military Academy-Sandhurst) followed with an examination of the famous friendship between General Marshall and Field Marshal Dill and its influence on the Anglo-American relationship during World War II in his paper "Very Special Relationship: Field Marshal Sir John Dill and General George Marshall". The concluding paper, "Winston Churchill and America, 1895-1940: The Making of an Anglo-American", Fraser J. Harbutt (Emory University) analyzed the evolution of this most famed Anglo-American's attitudes toward his mother's country throughout his life prior to World War II. Harold Langley (Smithsonian Institution) contributed a thoughtful commentary. There were some perceptive questions and comments from the audience of some 75 to 100 persons.

The last AMI session, "The War Of 1812 Revisited," chaired by Mary Ellen Condon (U.S. Army Center of Military History), included two papers and two commentators. In his paper on "The Militia: Bulwark of the Home Front?" John K. Mahon (University of Florida) offered the reader selected ways in which the militia system was handicapped from fully functioning as the bulwark of the home front. The shortcomings chosen were: Lack of unit cohesion since militia detachments were composed of men from different standing units; forced leadership by regular Army officers unknown to or distrusted by the militia; poor supply organization at the state and federal levels, rendering some units virtually useless; Federalist Party obstructionism sometimes manifested by the refusal of several Federalist governors to honor the federal government's call for state militia levies.

In his comments, Robert H. Brown (American University) pointed to presidential bungling and mismanagement as a deterrent to the militia system fully functioning as a bulwark of the home front. Brown felt that Madison should have moved quickly and creatively to remedy any structural deficiencies in that system, and he should have dealt better at getting Federalist support for the war. Brown invoked the special privilege of historians to second guess by suggesting that if

Madison had appointed leading Federalists, such as New York's Rufus King or Virginia's John Marshall, to head the War and Navy Departments how much good might have followed (FDR and Winston Churchill had cabinets of national unity). Madison would have shown the entire country that the War of 1812 was indeed an honorable patriotic struggle and not a partisan Republican War.

Commenting on Professor Mahon's paper Professor Harry L. Coles (Ohio State University) praised Mahon for bringing into sharp focus the difficulties inherent in the attempt to mesh two military systems in time of crisis. Although the paper would enlighten even the specialists, Coles worried that the general reader might find himself adrift. Coles felt that a static analysis had been applied to a dynamic situation; that it would have aided our understanding if we had been told the reasons for success as well as the reasons for failure. In Coles' point of view the deterrents mentioned by Professor Mahon were certainly important in preventing the militia from being the bulwark of the republic, but they paled before disaffection, political opposition, uninspired leadership, and lack of military success.

The second paper, "Commodore Isaac Chauncey and the Lake Ontario Campaign," by William S. Dudley of the U.S. Naval Historical Center, focussed on a man who was at his best in building up and equipping the Ontario fleet, but who was unsuited for naval command. Chauncey's poor military leadership in the field--he was unwilling to fight without overwhelming superiority--ultimately contributed to failure on the Great Lakes. Dudley felt that presidential mismanagement must share some of the blame for the lack of leadership in the field and for the failure of Madison's seize-and-hostage Canada strategy.

Professor Brown commented that Mr. Dudley's paper by pointing to poor leadership in the field and poor management by President Madison was a contribution in the "Warrior vs. Manager" argument. According to Brown, Mr. Dudley reminded us once again how badly the Madison administration floundered in its conduct of

the War of 1812, and "in the end, it was Madison himself who mishandled the execution of the seize-and-hostage Canada strategy." (Brown's comments, p. 6.)

Professor Coles gave Mr. Dudley credit for mastering old accounts of the War of 1812, adding to them some new or previously little used source material--such as his extensive use of the Isaac Chauncey Papers in the William L. Clements Library--and examining old evidence in a new light. Regarding the latter, Coles pointed in particular to Mr. Dudley's discussion of the penetrating letter of Secretary Jones to President Madison of 26 October 1814 in which Jones questions the whole strategy followed by government down to that time.

THE KOREAN WAR: INPUT AND INFLUENCE

Chaired by David W. Mahon (Dept. of State)

At this session William Stueck (University of Georgia) and Rosemary Foot (University of Sussex) explored the degree of influence exerted upon the United States during the early and decisive months of the Korean War by Great Britain, which was then America's most important ally.

In "Input Without Influence: British policy in the Early Months of the Korean War," Stueck described the many factors which led influential British Foreign Office and Defense officials to consider urging caution on the United States in expanding the war beyond the 38th parallel. Britain, unlike the United States, had a diplomatic relationship with the new Communist government in China. Its commonwealth partner, India, was a transmission belt for various warnings to the United States against extending the war to the North. Britain wished to get China into the United Nations and encourage Chinese "Titoism," and also if possible to induce the Americans to limit their commitment to the Chinese Nationalists. The British Chiefs of Staff believed that movement of non-Korean forces beyond the Parallel would lead to an overcommitment of resources in Korea and limit the buildup in Europe.

Balanced against these considerations was a general unwillingness on the part of British leaders to lose credibility with the United States (especially after the Inchon landings) by urging too much caution. Also Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin fundamentally agreed "with the American argument that to leave Korea divided at the 38th parallel would represent a victory for the Soviet Union." Bevin also perceived that to oppose America in Korea would be to lose influence with her regarding China. He did not, nor did anyone else, "anticipate the problems that would arise if the tide of battle shifted precipitiously in Korea." Britain's influence was limited at least partly because its own counsels were divided and it therefore did not press its case vigorously.

In her paper "Input with Influence: The British Effort to Avert an Expanded War, December 1950-January 1951," Rosemary Foot argues that Britain in the December talks between Truman, Attlee and their advisers exerted considerable influence in restraining potential U.S. action against China in the wake of the battlefield reverses of November. Admittedly, some U.S. officials, notably Acheson, were unlikely to have taken precipitate action, but the British representations at the least reinforced their position. Some of the British arguments were repeated later in internal State Department memoranda.

British influence was more readily detectable in maneuvering at the United Nations which resulted in a substantial rewording of the UN resolution condemning China as an aggressor for its intervention in Korea. The thrust of the modifications was to delay UN consideration of additional measures to be taken against China. Britain was influential in this matter because American prestige had diminished in the wake of battlefield reverses and because of the obvious disarray of the U.S. Government as it strove to meet the new situation. Additionally, Bevin's illness removed his more pro-American voice from the policy-making process. The decisions for restraint in the winter of 1950-1951 were crucial, and created the boundaries within which the war came to an end.

The discussants pointed out that both papers were soundly researched, making optimum use of English-language archives, and well-reasoned. Each could be expanded to consider other influences, and thus arrive at a more synoptic picture of the degree of British influence on U.S. policy as compared with other factors.

The afternoon session on "Wilson The Realist Revisited," chaired by John Milton Cooper, Jr. (University of Wisconsin-Madison) was attended by about 150 persons. Both papers presented Woodrow Wilson in the unexpected posture of a patient, even crafty, realistic statesman. David Schmidt's "Woodrow Wilson and the Liberal Peace: The Problem of Italy and Imperialism" showed how Wilson resisted persistent pressures from the Italian government, which raised the specter of internal revolution, to modify his opposition to their expansionism in the Adriatic. Thomas Knock's "Wilson vs. Kennan" stressed the similarities in both men's approaches and outlooks in foreign policy, despite Kennan's widely known criticisms of Wilson. In the comments, Linda Killen noted that Schmidt could have done more with Yugoslavia and I noted that he could have done more with internal Italian sources. Interestingly, nearly all of the questions and comments from the floor were concerned with Kennan and his activities in the 1940's, and very little about Wilson or the post-World War I settlement.

The Friday morning sessions entitled "Mid-Century Expansionism" and chaired by Norman A. Graebner were far broader in coverage than the title suggested. One paper indeed dealt with American expansionism toward Canada in the early 1850's; the other two analyzed Southern expansionism but ranged far beyond the mid-nineteenth century to include almost every aspect of the Southern view toward the world.

Reginald C. Stuart (University of Prince Edward Island) opened the session with a paper entitled "American Expansionism and the 1854 Reciprocity Treaty with British North America." Ostensibly this

treaty provided for free trade on specific items, mostly natural products, free navigation of the St. Lawrence and St. John rivers, and free American access to Canadian fisheries. The drive for the treaty came from Canadians who, following the English Corn Law of 1846, believed that their economic future hinged on strong commercial links with the United States. The United States did not respond until 1852. Thereafter it succumbed to Canadian and British pressure and signed the Reciprocity Treaty in 1854. Much of Stuart's paper analyzes the arguments that overcame American protectionism. Within the framework of American expansionism in the 1850's, this treaty quickly loomed as the forerunner of increased United States interference in Canadian affairs, beginning with the American command of the Canadian market and ending, for some, with the Americanization of the British colony and the unification of North America. The treaty failed to live up to any such expectations; it came to an end in 1866. The United States and Canada, the author notes, were not on converging historical paths after all.

Tennant McWilliams (University of Alabama, Birmingham), presented a paper, "Expansionism in Southern History." The author admitted the speculative nature of his paper as he sought to analyze the role of the South in American's foreign relations from the late eighteenth century into the twentieth. He saw the South motivated by ideals and self-interest as embodied in American expansionism. He defined the South's early leaders—Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe—as expansionists whose expansionism appeared in the acquisitions of Louisiana and the Floridas as well as in the Monroe Doctrine. Such policies satisfied Southern self-interest. That self-interest promoted Southern expansionism from the days of Andrew Jackson until the 1850's. The triumph of the industrial North in the 1860's dampened the Southern interest in expansion and by 1898 had turned many Southerners into anti-imperialists. They continued to oppose the involvements of Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft. With the rise of Woodrow Wilson, a Southerner, the old Southern

expansionism returned. The South accepted Wilson's program, including membership in the League of Nations. Again the South would lead the nation as it did in the time of Jefferson. The South supported the war policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt; in the Cold War it moved to the right in favoring a strong American reaction to the Soviet danger. Like Americans elsewhere, Southerners at first supported the war in Vietnam but ultimately turned against it.

Joseph A Fry (University of Nevada: Las Vegas), read the paper, "John Tyler Morgan: Bourbon Expansionist" which was more specific and limited in scope. It traced the expansionist career of the Alabama Democrat who took up the Southern cause abroad at the end of the nineteenth century. His perspective was always Southern. He used Southern arguments to further projects that seemed to favor Southern interests. His underlying purpose was to rebuild the South's position in American life. He decried the industrial and commercial dominance of the Northeast. Thus he opposed the tariff and monetary policies of the Republican and Northern Democratic parties. Without broader markets Morgan argued, the South would never recover its lost economic power. A canal through Nicaragua, he believed, would serve the commercial interests of the Southern states admirably by keeping the flow of trade inside the Gulf of Mexico. It would additionally open up new markets in Latin America for Southern products. Morgan advocated a larger merchant marine to promote Southern exports. He responded as well to the prospects of increased trade with Africa and China. In 1898 he advocated the acquisition of both Puerto Rico and Cuba. He opposed Southern conservatives in his support of Philippine annexation. Despite his Southern bias, Morgan was a superb representative of the expansionist element in the United States at the turn of the century.

Both Anna K. Nelson (George Washington University) and Edward P. Crapol (College of William and Mary) offered thoughtful commentaries on the three papers. Neither offered any telling objections. They noted, as did the session's chairman, Norman Graebner, and members

of the audience, that the papers defined American expansion very broadly to include almost every phenomenon that increased the power and influence of the United States in world affairs—attitudes, trade, investment, internationalism, canals, railroads, naval and military preparedness.

WAR MEMORIALS AS HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL SYMBOLS
(Chair: David S. Patterson, Office of the Historian,
U.S. Department of State)

This session was preceded the previous afternoon by a bus tour of several war memorials in the Washington, D.C. area. The tour was intended to serve as a visual introduction to the session.

In the opening paper, "From Pride to Pathos: Memorializing the Civil War and World War I," Jay Luvaas (U.S. Army War College), traced the development of Civil War national battlefield parks beginning in the 1890s at Chickamauga, Antietam, Shiloh, Gettysburg, and Vicksburg, which both commemorated the heroic dead and deeds of the Northern and Southern armies and preserved the battlefields as out-of-doors textbooks in tactics and troop leading for professional military studies. The emphasis on military studies resulted in meticulous recreation of battle sites, including construction of roads along the battle lines, erection of detailed legends and tablets to provide facts on the regiments involved, important movements, and casualties, and the facing of monuments of figures always toward the enemy. The Western Front in World War I, by contrast, contains thousands of memorials, which stand as mute testimony to the dead but do not attempt to reconstruct the ebb and flow of the battles. Professor Luvaas cited in particular the memorials at Passchendaele, Ypres, and Vimy Ridge as conveying the stark, sombre, and haunting mood of the World War experience. Compared with the European nations' memorials, he observed, the American Civil War memorials, as well as the American and Canadian memorials in Europe commemorating the World War, reflect the pride and youthful optimism of their nations and soldiers.

The second paper by Edward Tabor Linenthal (University of Wisconsin at Oshkosh), "Custer Battlefield as War Memorial," described the development of heroic interpretations of General Custer and his Last Stand at Little Big Horn in 1876. For many Americans Custer's defeat was turned into a moral victory which was expressed in elaborate commemorative celebrations. A veritable Custer cult, Linenthal stressed, developed in the United States to perpetuate the memory of his heroic actions. More recently, the rise of the Indian protest movement and negative reactions to the Vietnam War challenged the idealized portrayal of Custer as a brave and sacrificial hero in the "opening" of the West for white civilization and popularized instead the notion of Custer as a scapegoat for the sins of white America and the battle as a final act of Indian defiance against the tragic destruction of native American cultures. Linenthal explained how the divergent views of Custer as a national symbol resulted in intense discord at the centennial celebrations of his death in 1976.

In his paper on the "Vietnam Veterans Memorial," John Wheeler (Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund) described the origins and evolution of the movement for a Vietnam Veterans Memorial and the controversies surrounding its funding, location, and design. He attributed the comparatively short time interval in the creation of the memorial to the national need to get over the Vietnam experience and the giving of money to it as part of the healing process. Wheeler also referred to the symbolic power of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, which represents a turning away from the utilitarian trend in memorials following World War II. He emphasized the consequences of the Vietnam experience on the "baby boom" generation, especially on its foreign policy elites who, he predicted, will be leading this nation well into the twenty-first century, and he challenged historians to interpret the interconnections between the experiences of Vietnam veterans and other contemporary currents in American society, such as the women's and environmental movements.

In his comment Martin K. Gordon (Historical Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) noted that a common feature of the three papers was the veterans' self-conscious efforts in raising the money for and erecting the memorials so that future generations would remember their sacrifices. Another was the political controversies surrounding their establishment. He also pointed to the reconciliation theme of the memorials and offered additional contrasts between European and American memorials. Audience discussion touched on recent archaeological findings at the Custer battle site and the contribution of art to the remembrance of past wars.

AVOIDANCE OF WAR

August 2, 1984

Over forty people attended the afternoon session on "Avoidance of War," chaired by Charles L. DeBenedetti (University of Toledo). In the first paper, Professor John Offner (Shippensburg University) contended on the basis of new findings how President William McKinley attempted during the first ten days of April 1898 to negotiate a last-ditch settlement of Spanish-Cuban differences and derail the congressional drive for an American war with Spain. Encouraged by a request from the Vatican, McKinley delayed his scheduled April 4 war address to the Congress, and instead explored contacts with Vatican officials, Spanish authorities, and the New York-based leaders of the Cuban Junto. When the Queen Regent hinted at an armistice in Cuba, McKinley launched a fuller attempt to avoid war through dealings with his Cabinet, congressional leaders, and European powers, seeking especially to pressure the Junto into an armistice. His efforts, however, proved fruitless. The Junto held out against the armistice, demanding instead American recognition of Cuban independence. The Spanish government, antagonized by U.S. diplomatic bungling, refused to concede an armistice. And, most of all, Republican congressional leaders, fearful of a setback in the November elections, demanded that Congress stand responsible for responding to the armistice proposal. McKinley conceded, allowed the Congress to determine

U.S. war policy, and accepted the popular drive toward war.

Altogether, Offner argued that McKinley made a most "serious effort to keep the peace." In his struggle, the President encountered greatest opposition from the Cuban Junto, which refused to stop fighting for anything less than American recognition of Cuban independence, and from the Congress, which insisted upon leading Americans into foreign war for internal peace and stability. McKinley's only problem was that he intended to stand by the American constitutional system, and defer to Congress in its insistence upon war.

Michael Lutkzer (New York University) showed how American statesmen proved more adroit at avoiding war during the 1895 Anglo-American crisis over the British-Venezuelan boundary quarrel. Operating against a complex backdrop of Anglo-American resentments, Secretary of State Richard Olney dispatched to the British in July, 1895, a sharply-worded note which asserted that America's 'fiat is law' in the Western Hemisphere and warned against any serious European involvement in South America. Britain's Lord Salisbury responded with an equally sharp rejoinder which challenged Washington's claim to suzerainty in the name of the Monroe Doctrine in the Western Hemisphere, and helped precipitate an unexpected crisis. Unilaterally, President Grover Cleveland announced that the U.S. was planning to establish an arbitration commission to rule on the British-Venezuelan dispute, and rallied congressional and patriotic sentiment to his side. Canadian patriots meanwhile viewed Washington's actions as preparatory for an attack upon Canada, while British opinionshapers professed amazement that such a quarrel might lead to war. Preoccupied by developments in South Africa (including German intrigues) and convinced that they were overextended in the world, British policymakers drew back from any confrontation with the U.S., and the crisis passed.

Employing insights drawn from the study by political scientists of international crises, Lutzker contended that the Anglo-American crisis of 1896 signified "a classic case of misperception." British and American leaders perceived their adversaries and respective expectations quite differently from what each intended. Happily, the two powers were saved from war only by the willingness of one to pull back in the face of global overcommitments. In the process, Britain strengthened its overall world position through its willingness to retrench, a precedent that Lutzker believes might prove useful in helping modern world powers survive the age of deterrence.

In his comments, Professor Robert Beisner (American University) welcomed the complementary nature of the papers: Offner introduced new material to describe an old story in a fresh and particular way; Lutzker applied new models as a means of re-analyzing a familiar historical episode in light of propositions from the developing field of crisis study. But Beisner also had his reservations. Beisner believed that, for all of Offner's attempts to emphasize McKinley's pacific intentions, the President could have done significantly more to avoid war with the Spanish. The problem, Beisner thought, was not so much that McKinley wanted to avoid war. The problem was how to get Spain to surrender short of war. In a similar way, Beisner wondered whether the Venezuelan boundary dispute truly presented a war-threatening crisis. More importantly, he believed that Lutzker's application of social scientific models to this case was too unfocussed. He urged historians who planned to use a case study to test the value of a specific social scientific model to be quite explicit in applying their preferred model.

David Trask (U.S. Army Center of Military History) likewise proposed that the two papers were useful for different but complementary reasons. Confessing his sympathy for Offner's basic assumptions, Trask maintained that Offner's paper adds strength to the view that McKinley was essentially a domestic conservative who only acceded reluctantly to

congressional demands for war and expansion. More than ever, Trask said, Offner's paper confirms that McKinley was neither a Machiavellian realist obsessed with the national interest nor a tool of vested interests eager to divert domestic demands for radical social and economic change toward the road of overseas expansion.

Trask also supported Lutzker's analysis; but he was more reluctant than Lutzker to extend the "lessons" of the case (British retrenchment in light of overcommitment) to the Cold War. Trask allowed that peaceable resolution of past crises "provide statesmen with highly suggestive possibilities to consider." But he declined--despite his enthusiasm for public history--to contend that case studies suggest the preferred way of proceeding through great power crises in the nuclear age.

The session entitled, "American Business Community And China," and chaired by Noel H. Pugach, served to commemorate the bicentennial of America's China trade. The two papers focused on time periods--the 1920s and the late 1940s--that deserve further investigation. Both papers explored the relationship between the United States government and the expansion of American business in China and found Washington's efforts wanting.

John P. Rossi (Rutgers University), argued in his paper, "Organizing the Open Door: The China Trade Act & Business-Government Relations in the Promotion of American Exports to China, 1918-1930," that the China Trade Act was never framed in a way that would actually help Americans capture the potentially great China market. The Treasury Department, fearful of losing revenue, and a sizeable group of senators, philosophically opposed to giving a special subsidy to an interest group, blocked the campaign mounted by American business groups in China and the United States.

In his paper, "The Last Act: American Business in Shanghai and the End of the Treaty Port Era," Mark

Wilkinson (Austin College), analyzed the complicated situation facing American businessmen who returned to Shanghai after its liberation from the Japanese. He also demonstrated that the State Department failed miserably in its attempt to use American business interests as a bridge to the Communists in 1948-49.

In their comments, Bonner Russell Cohen (Beaufort, South Carolina) and Noel Pugach enlarged on the themes raised in the papers. Dr. Cohen addressed the larger context of China, with specific reference to the Marshall Mission. Noel Pugach noted that the emphasis placed by American business on the China Trade Act masked some of the deeper problems confronting American enterprise in China.

"TOWARD A EUROPEAN ALLIANCE, 1945-1949"

Lawrence S. Kaplan
(Kent State U.)

Before an audience of 75 the two panelists provided some familiar and unfamiliar insights, observations, and information on the development of the Atlantic alliance. While the perspectives were quite different both papers shared an implicit assumption about the vital role of the United States in the growth of European unity after World War II.

Dr. Richard Best spoke about the Anglo-American special relationship, particularly military relationship, that went back to the common experiences of World War II. British activity helped to prevent the United States from returning to its prewar posture on foreign and military policies. Britain hoped to use American power to replace its own waning strength as it sought to fashion policies for the continent and the Mediterranean.

Dr. Wolfgang Krieger looked at the question of the United States and the European alliance through the role played by General Lucius Clay in occupied West Germany. While Germany is the centerpiece of both European and American policy, General Clay's role is evaluated as less imposing than conventional wisdom

has considered it in the past. Dr. Krieger finds Clay's power waning after the Berlin crisis and even disregarded when Secretary of State Acheson considered possibilities for withdrawal of American troops and the demilitarization of West Germany as late as the spring of 1949.

Like Dr. Best, his paper emphasizes the importance of the continuing American entanglement with Europe. Both papers assume that the United States had to be induced to remain in Europe for the sake of Europe's security. Dr. Best finds British actions to secure this support central to the alliance while Dr. Krieger finds the fate of Germany as the critical focus of both Europe and America in the period.

The commentators Lawrence Kaplan and Robert Hathaway recognized the difficulties of encapsulating sophisticated theses--both papers are selections from larger studies--into a twenty-minute presentation. Distortion inevitably follows, and Dr. Hathaway pointed out the absence of Clay's accomplishments in the paper as well as a need for a broader understanding of Clay's specific contributions to America's German policy. Dr. Best leaves a different impression: by attributing more influence to Anglo-American harmony as well as intimacy than the records supply. As their concluding comments showed, the authors will take these caveats into account in later stages of the studies, and indeed had anticipated much of the commentary directed to them in this session. The audience offered a number of informed and useful comments which addressed not only the immediate postwar problems but also the effects of the Korean War on the Atlantic alliance.

**MINUTES OF THE SHAFR COUNCIL MEETING HELD IN
MINNEAPOLIS, APRIL 18, 1985 AT THE HYATT REGENCY
HOTEL, WARREN F. KUEHL, PRESIDING**

In attendance were Council members: Charles DeBenedetti, Geoffrey Smith, Michael Hunt, Melvyn

Leffler, Roger Trask, Martin Sherwin, and Marvin Zahniser. Also attending were Vice President Betty Unterberger, David Pletcher, William Kamman, William Brinker, Michael Hogan, Milton Gustafson, Daniel Helmstadter, and J.D. Patterson.

Mr. Kuehl called first on Ms. Page Putnam Miller to report on the activities of the National Coordinating Committee for the Promotion of History. Ms. Miller discussed first the search for the position of Archivist of the United States. Several names were distributed, those known to be under consideration. She anticipates that Donald Regan will be the person making the choice. Ms. Miller also led a discussion on the difficulties raised for graduate students working on dissertations by the Freedom of Information Act. Present guidelines as interpreted indicate that the charges for searches and reproduction of archival materials will be provided free only if a determination is made by an agency that completion of the dissertation is in the public interest. The search charges to the graduate students, and others, can be enormous--and individual must agree to fund the charges before the search is made and is thus without a good idea of the potential costs of the search. Discussion followed about how officers of SHAFR might assist history graduate students caught in these difficult situations. Also, the membership, it was agreed, ought to be encouraged to express their disapproval of these circumstances to their congressman or other appropriate persons or agencies. Ms. Miller then excused herself following the discussion.

Next, Mr. Kuehl recounted SHAFR's efforts to place two SHAFR members on the Department of State's Advisory Committee on Historical Documentation. This Committee, among other duties, offers advice to the Department on the Foreign Relations series. Dr. Slany of the Department's Historical Office had responded positively to an inquiry about possible SHAFR representation, asking that five names be presented to the Department. Mr. Sherwin asked if Council should nominate individuals who must then pass a government security process. That is, should SHAFR lend itself

to this process? Other members of Council thought the gains of representation on the Committee sufficient to override any uncertainties. Mr. Kuehl asked about how the SHAFR nominees should be chosen, and agreement was expressed to his appointing a committee of three former SHAFR presidents (Ernest May, Lawrence Gelfand, and Warren Cohen) to present a list of five nominees. The Report of the Committee will be considered at the summer conference Council meeting.

Mr. Zahniser reported as Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Membership continues around the one thousand level. The operating budget is in commendable shape, in part because of the recent dues increase. Last, the duties of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer will transfer on June 1 to William Kamman, Department Chair at North Texas State University. Mr. Zahniser then asked Council to consider whether it was necessary to continue requiring students wishing to become SHAFR members to have their advisor countersign the application form. Council determined that the faculty counter-signature is unnecessary.

Mr. Kuehl then presented a report on SHAFR's committees which he and Mr. Zahniser had prepared. The proliferation of committees, the stipulated appointment of committee members at different times of the years with reports also coming due at different seasons, and the vague definition of the duties of the Government Relations Committee and the Finance Committee, mandated that these problems be addressed in some orderly way. Council examined the wording of the Report concerning committee duties and with but one minor revision accepted the Report.

Council next read the letter of Mr. Dingman concerning the program and local arrangements for the forthcoming SHAFR summer conference at Stanford University. Mr. Kuehl commended Mr. Dingman for his imagination and efficiency in constructing the program and ironing out potential problems.

Mr. Kuehl reported that he had recently received a letter from George Herring, editor of Diplomatic History, indicating that he and Mr. Seager will not continue their editorial responsibilities beyond June 1986. Mr. Kuehl intends to try to persuade them otherwise, but he also believes a search committee should be appointed. He indicated that he will appoint Mr. Sherwin, Mr. Leffler, Mr. W. Cohen, Mr. Herring and Mr. Seager to the Committee and will designate a chair at an early moment.

Where will the SHAFR summer meeting be held in 1986? Mr. Kuehl indicated that SHAFR had received an invitation from Georgetown University. June and July appear to be the best months to hold the meetings, insofar as the University is concerned. The time will be negotiated by Mr. Kuehl. Mr. DeBenedetti asked if SHAFR should once again plan its program (for summer 1986) in conjunction with the Conference on Peace Research in History and the American Military Institute. The response was an enthusiastic "Yes".

Mr. Pletcher then presented the Report of the Ad hoc Committee on Constitutional Revisions. On a proposal to revise Article 2, Section 2, to provide for only one nominee for the position of Vice President, by a vote of 6, with 1 abstention, the proposal was defeated. Because of exorbitant costs it was proposed to revise Article III, Section 3, so that a CPA need not audit SHAFR's books each year. This proposal was adopted by a vote of Yes 6, No 1. Next proposed was a definition of the duties of the Finance Committee, to be added to the By-Laws. The proposal read as follows.

"The Finance Committee shall consist of one person designated by Council to administer endowment accounts plus three members appointed by the President for a term of three years. For the purpose of establishing and maintaining a regular rotation of membership on the Committee the President may appoint members for a term of one and two years. The three appointed members shall review annual budget statements, advise the

Executive Secretary-Treasurer and the agent Council has designated regarding investment policy and expenditures of nonoperating accounts, and assist in raising funds."

It was agreed that the following sentence should be added:

"Should the Committee deem it advisable, it is authorized to order an audit."

The amended proposal was adopted by acclamation. Next, it was proposed under Section 3, concerning the Program Committee, to appoint Committee members for one year rather than two. The proposal read as follows:

"The Program Committee shall consist of five members in good standing, who hold no other office in the Society, appointed by the President for a term of one year. Two co-chairpersons shall be designated, one to oversee the program and one primarily responsible for local arrangements."

Upon discussion it was decided to strike the phrase "who hold no other office in the Society." The amended proposal then passed unanimously. Last, concerning Article VI, Section 1, lines 1-2, it was recommended that "The Editor of Diplomatic History shall be appointed by the President with the approval of Council for a term of at least three years and not exceeding five years" rather than the current stipulation of a five year term. Mr. Pletcher explained the need for flexibility when SHAFR is searching for a new journal editor(s). Adopted unanimously.

These proposed changes will be referred to the membership for their consideration and determination, as stipulated by Article VII of the By-Laws ("...amendments must be approved by a majority vote of Council and a majority of those participating in a mail ballot.")

Mr. Zahniser then presented the problem of providing SHAFR memberships for scholars in countries where they have no access to dollars. He has been contacted numerous times by foreign scholars who wish to receive Diplomatic History but are without resources. Where might resources be found to sponsor memberships, as the Asia Foundation has done for PRC scholars over the past several years? No easy solution occurring to Council, Mr. Kuehl will appoint an Ad Hoc committee to study and report on the matter.

Mr. Hogan reported that Mr. Leffler was the Bernath Article winner for 1984 for his article, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48," which appeared in the American Historical Review (April 1984). Mr. Leffler reported that David Wyman's book, The Abandonment of the Jews: American and the Holocaust, 1941-1945 was the Bernath Book Prize winner for 1984. Over thirty books were entered in the competition, many of them of very high quality.

By letter, Mr. Buhite reported that the Bernath Lecturer for 1986 will be William Stueck of the University of Georgia.

Mr. Smith reported that John Nielson, a doctoral student of Alexander DeConde, had won the Bernath Dissertation Support Award for 1985.

Mr. DeBenedetti indicated that the Norman and Laura Graebner Award will first be made in 1986. He and other members of the Graebner Award Committee will present specific criteria for the award at the Council meeting at Stanford University.

Upon the recommendation of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald Bernath, Council agreed that the Bernath Book Prize should be raised from \$1,000 to \$1,500. The higher award will first be made for the winner among the 1985 entries.

Mr. Zahniser reported on rates for liability insurance for SHAFR that he has received from The Association of

Professional Liability Insurance Plan (Albert H. Wohlers & Co., Administrators, Chicago, and Equity General Agents, Inc., of Los Angeles). He has yet to hear from a representative of The Chubb Group concerning rates. Council having earlier agreed to the principle of taking out liability insurance, agreed that when a third set of rates has been received that Mr. Zahniser and Mr. Kuehl should proceed to take out a policy. It was also agreed that the coverage will be paid out of SHAFR funds on a pro-rated basis. For example, if endowment funds represent 70% of SHAFR's total assets, 70% of the costs of the liability policy will be paid for from endowment accounts.

Mr. Kuehl announced the appointment of a number of committee members and chairs of committees.

Last, Mr. Sherwin asked Council support for the following resolution which had been passed in the Council of the Organization of American Historians that afternoon. The resolution, which followed a discussion on possible OAH investments in companies conducting business in South Africa, read as follows:

It is resolved that:

1. The OAH proceed as expeditiously as possible, within the context of prudential financial management to sell its holdings of stock and bonds in companies that invest or do business in South Africa.
2. that the OAH announce its intention to refuse, beginning immediately, to purchase stocks and bonds of such companies.
3. that this decision be communicated to the American Council of Learned Societies and other professional organizations.

After a brief discussion, Council indicated its support of the Resolution and directed that in a future mailing the membership of SHAFR be presented the opportunity to indicate their position on the Resolution. [Note: SHAFR has no investments in companies conducting business in South Africa.]

There being no further business, the meeting was adjourned at 10:05 p.m.

Marvin R. Zahniser
Executive Secretary-Treasurer

At the SHAFR luncheon, Warren Kuehl introduced the following resolution:

"Resolved that SHAFR members here assembled in Minneapolis, MN, this 20th day of April speak for the entire membership in commending Marvin Zahniser for his service as secretary-treasurer. He has been highly efficient, always conscientious in advancing the interests of SHAFR, and masterful in his administrative capacity. SHAFR has benefited greatly from his voluntary service, and we as members thank him fully for his contribution in time and energy."

The resolution was approved unanimously by a rising vote of acclamation.

Marvin Zahniser has asked the following note to be printed:

To my SHAFR colleagues:

I am most grateful for the resolution introduced by Warren Kuehl and thank my colleagues for their support.

When I began the task as Executive Secretary some four years ago, Gary Hess, my predecessor said, "There's lots of work, Marvin, but the great thing about the position is that you get to work with first-rate people." Such indeed has been the case. And I must add that in my term not a single person in the SHAFR organization has said "no" when asked to assist in our common work. This, I think, speaks well for our perception of SHAFR and the work that it is doing.

There are persons to whom I owe a special debt. Warren Kuehl has given me almost daily guidance and assistance. All of us are in his debt, and not just Marvin Zahniser. Also my personal secretary, Mrs. Janice Gulker, has given cheerful service and long hours to SHAFR. Mrs. Elsbeth Connaughton, the Administrative Associate of OSU's Department of History, has kept our books efficiently and accurately. I also owe a great debt to Dean G. Micheal Riley who has constantly supported the use of Ohio State's resources to assist SHAFR.

On June 1, William Kamman of North Texas State University will become the Executive of SHAFR. I hope--and am confident--that Dr. Kamman will be given the same wonderful cooperation that you have extended to me.

Marvin R. Zahniser

**REPORT: ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON HISTORICAL DIPLOMATIC
DOCUMENTATION
MEETING OF NOVEMBER 9, 1984**

The 28th annual meeting of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation met in Washington on 9 November, 1984. Committee members present included John Gaddis, Carol S. Gruber, and Warren F. Kuehl, representing the American Historical Association; Ole R. Holsti and Deborah W. Larson, for the American Political Science Association, and John L. Hargrove, for the American Society of International Law.

At the opening session, which convened at 9:15 a.m. nearly 40 persons attended, including 27 members of the staff of the Historical Office. John McCarthy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Bureau of Public Affairs, welcomed committee members on behalf of Assistant Secretary John Hughes. Mr. McCarthy reported on constructive thought within the State

Department in response to reports of the Advisory Committee over the past few years and especially that of 1983.

Committee members decided to depart from the tradition of electing a person serving the last year of an appointment because that individual cannot be present to follow up on the previous report. They thus elected a newcomer, Warren F. Kuehl.

William Slany, the Historian, then offered an oral commentary in which he referred extensively to a Status Report prepared in response to a request by Congress for information regarding delays in the Foreign Relations series and steps needed to accelerate publication. That document, submitted in August, proved to be useful in the ensuing discussions.

Mr. Slany noted that the series faces problems which necessitate reassessments without violating the essential mandate to produce the most important documents and serve as a guide to unpublished diplomatic records.

The problems identified include

- (1) the increasingly staggering accumulation of documents which must be processed by the H.O. staff;
- (2) sensitive foreign government information even in U.S. documents;
- (3) other-agency documents over which the H.O. lacks access despite an Inter-agency Access Agreement;
- (4) continuing delays in the declassification process, largely attributable to clearance procedures outside of the State Department.
- (5) delays of up to two years in the publication process even after volumes are cleared;
- (6) the size and number of published books in relation to costs;
- (7) growing concern over the status of electronic records, including durability and accessibility;
- (8) staff allocation of time for preparing the regular series, special ones such as the Vietnam War,

current documents volumes, and policy studies for the State Department.

While some of these have been addressed by previous Committees, it is the combined weight that requires consideration. Mr. Slany noted the helpfulness of previous reports, especially that of 1983, and reaffirmed the dependence of the Historical Office upon the scholarly community for advice and support. The status report by John P. Glennon on the Foreign Relations series as of August showed the following stages of work.

Since November, 1983, the Office has released five volumes:

- 1952-1954, IV, American Republics (January, 1984)
- 1952-1954, I, General: Political and Economic Matters. 2 parts (April, 1984)
- 1952-1954, XV, Korea. 2 parts (June, 1984)
- 1952-1954, XII, Part 1, East Asia and the Pacific. (September, 1984)
- 1952-1954, II, National Security Affairs, 2 parts (November, 1984)

The Status of the following volumes listed last year as in "the final declassification stage at NSC" are as follows:

- 1951, IV, Europe. (Expected release in August, 1985)
- 1952-1954, XIV, China and Japan (Set for release in January or February, 1985)
- 1955-1957, Vietnam. (Projected for mid-1985)

Volumes in the final declassification stage and ready for NSC review:

- 1952-1954, VII, Central Europe
- 1955-1957, China
- 1952-1954, IX, Near East
- 1955-1957, IX, Western European Security and Integration
- 1955-1957, XXI, South Asia

1952-1954, VI, Western Europe
1955-1957, VIII, Austrian State Treaty; Geneva Summit
Conference; Geneva Foreign Ministers
Conference

Volumes not cleared but under final discussion and
negotiation:

1952-1954, VIII, Eastern Europe
1952-1954, X, Iran
1952-1954, XII, Part 2, East Asia

Volumes for the 1955-1957 series have been prepared
and most have been approved by the Department of State
and the Classification/Declassification Center, but
nearly all require some clearance from NSC or the
Department of Defense.

The 1958-1960 series is in process with approximately
one-half of the volumes compiled.

Extensive discussion ensued regarding the problems
identified, and the Committee's formal recommendations
follow.

It wishes to begin by commending the Historian and the
staff for the excellent Report to Congress with its
review of conditions. The Committee recommends that
it be made available so scholars and others can read
it. The Committee, while sympathetic and supportive
of almost all features of the Report, took exception
to one major aspect. While it appreciated the
logistical and logical reasons presented why the
Foreign Relations should accept a 30-year line for the
series, the Committee felt compelled not to endorse
such a concept. Considerable concern was expressed by
committee members that even a 30-year line would see
continuing erosion and that it was important to record
the serious concern of the scholarly community that
lines drawn be followed. It is vital to continue to
address the reasons for delays in the declassification
process and to hasten the publication of volumes once
they have been cleared.

The Committee recognizes that implementation of the report, even to maintain a 30-year position, will require additional resources for the Historical Office and other agencies involved in the declassification process. It therefore welcomed indications of renewed effort within the Department of State to support the series fully, and it cannot emphasize strongly enough its hope that this will materialize. Implementation here can help alleviate problems identified under items 1 and 8. It also urges the Historian to pursue more vigorously previous recommendations of Advisory Committees regarding the possibility of using microform supplements to adjust to the increasing volume of data which cannot be met by the printed volumes alone. The Committee further commends a proposed reorganization plan of the Historical Office as another step toward improved efficiency.

Discussions which indicated that the charter creating the Advisory Committee is subject to review provided additional opportunity to respond to items 1, 4, and 8. The Committee first recommends that the Advisory Committee be expanded to include representatives named by the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. This will provide the Historical Office with additional persons who can provide substantive advice. Second, it endorses the suggestion of the Historian for the creation of an editorial board and for consultants. It has requested him to prepare a written statement, based on suggestions raised during discussions, on how these working bodies or individuals would be nominated and chosen, on their size and number, and on how they could be utilized. The Committee recommends that any editorial board should function as a sub-committee of the Advisory Committee and that persons selected should be active users of the Foreign Relations series. The role of consultants can be left flexible. It is evident that the scholarly integrity of the series should not be sacrificed by printing volumes with important classified documents omitted because they have not yet been cleared. Yet, waiting until particular items have been cleared has delayed publication and will continue to do so. The use of consultant-specialists

can be useful to Historical Office staff members in evaluating these tradeoff decisions, and it can also provide assurance to scholars that volumes, even if published without certain documents, are not compromised. The Advisory Committee reaffirmed its belief that where significant items have been omitted from printed volumes the editors must alert readers that the documentation is not complete.

Discussion regarding items 2,3, and 4 on the problem of declassification and the resulting delays require continuing attention. The Committee welcomes and commends the Secretary of State's response to the 1983 report which requested additional resources for the Historical Office and the CDC to implement his recommendation for faster processing. The Committee was pleased to hear reports, especially from John Burke, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Classification/Declassification, of inter-agency efforts to work with the Historical Office in clearing items for the series. The Committee recognizes, however, that more effort will be necessary in the form of interagency cooperation. It urges the Department of State to request the president to acknowledge and reaffirm the policy enunciated in President Nixon's directive, Executive Order 11652, and issue clear guidelines to agencies regarding its implementation.

Items 5 and 6 regarding publication problems, especially delays after the contents of volumes have been prepared and cleared, need to be addressed more vigorously. The Committee reaffirmed the recommendations of 1982 that the Historian seek a waiver of GPO printing requirements and explore publication by a private or university house. Questions raised about dissemination also require attention. The Committee thus asked the Historian to study and report on the feasibility of larger press runs, better sales promotion, a possible distribution through a university press consortium, and subscription rates for individuals. It also suggests checking whether the USIA cannot be utilized to place complete sets or available volumes in overseas university and research libraries.

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Disturbing reports, item 7, about the status of computer-stored records since 1974 require more information before any problems are addressed. The Historian is thus requested to prepare a report for the Advisory Committee on the situation as well as what studies are under way to correct conditions.

The Committee identified other concerns but did not have sufficient time to explore them. These included the status of foreign originated documents, the possibility of putting documents on-line in a databank, and proposed legislation that could affect the freedom of information process. The Committee also feels uncertain about making recommendations regarding the Vietnam series, particularly regarding preliminary interim volumes versus a full compendium. It does strongly recommend that the Historical Office initiate the consultant process and seek the judgment of respected scholars on that subject.

The Committee was pleased at reports that the Department of State is seriously considering suggestions for internships in the Historical Office. Committee members also decided that they would inform their scholarly constituency of proposed congressional bills regarding freedom of information and the impact these may have on scholars. It is evident that considerable effort has been made to respond to concerns expressed by Advisory Committees over the past few years. Morale of the staff of the Historical Office seems high, and all comments reveal a spirit of high professionalism in the desire to produce a full and definitive record in the face of obstacles. The evident support and verbal expressions regarding the importance of the Foreign Relations series by officers of the Department of State is encouraging. The Historical Office has achieved an apparently good working relationship with some of the agencies involved in the declassification process. Nevertheless, as this report indicates, serious and major problems need to be addressed.

Dr. John L. Gaddis, Ohio University
Dr. Carol S. Gruber, William Paterson College
Dr. John Lawrence Hargrove, American Society of
International Law
Dr. Ole R. Holsti, Duke University
Dr. Warren F. Kuehl, University of Akron, Chair
Dr. Deborah W. Larson, Columbia University

ANNOUNCEMENTS

NEW LIBRARY PROJECT IN ROME

The Bayne Library Collection for Mediterranean Studies and the Gino Germani Foundation for Comparative Studies of Modernization and Development have affiliated by agreement of 1983. The Bayne collection is the outgrowth of the gift of the personal library by E.A. Bayne, founder-director. The Center for Mediterranean Studies has been associated with the American Universities Field Staff since 1967. The Germani Foundation honors the memory of Gino Germani, a leading expert on Latin America and Southern Europe.

The library project might be of interest to SHAFR members when in Rome, or for their students.

CHINARD PRIZE

The Gilbert Chinard awards are made jointly by the Institute Francais de Washington and the Society for French Historical Studies for distinguished scholarly books or manuscripts in the history of Franco-American relations by Canadian or American authors published during 1985. The Chinard prize is awarded annually for a book or manuscript in page-proof and an Incentive Award is available for an unpublished book-length manuscript, generally by a younger scholar.

Deadline for the 1985 award is December 1, and five copies of each entrant should be sent to:

Professor John McV. Haight Jr.
Chairman, Chinard Prize Committee
Department of History, Maginnes #9
Lehigh University
Bethlehem, PA 18015

The winners will be announced at the annual conference of the Society for French Historical Studies in the spring of 1986.

SYMPOSIUM ON THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

The MacArthur Memorial Foundation, the MacArthur Memorial, and Old Dominion University announce the Seventh Symposium on the Occupation of Japan, October 16-17, 1986. The theme is "The Impact of the Korean War." The conference will probe the social, political, economic, and diplomatic impact of the Korean War on Japan. The Foundation will provide lodging and meals for all participants and half travel for presenters of papers. Address proposals (with resume) for presenter and discussant roles by October 1, 1985 to:

Director
MacArthur Memorial
MacArthur Square
Norfolk, Virginia 23510

VIETNAM WAR VOLUME

Donald A. Ritchie (Historical Office, U.S. Senate) sends the following:

The deepening American involvement in Vietnam from 1961 to 1964, early Congressional skepticism, U.S. involvement in the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, and the origins of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution -- and what Congress intended in that resolution -- are meticulously presented in The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Senate Print 98-185, part 2). This volume was prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by William Conrad

Gibbons of the Congressional Research Service, and is part of a projected four-volume series. The research drew on many still-classified documents and on interviews with participants. It is available for sale through the Government Printing Office for \$10. (Copies of volume 1 are still available at \$8.95.)

CALL FOR PAPERS

The French Association for American Studies (A.F.E.A.) will be holding its 1986 meeting at the Chateau de Chamarande, near Paris, on May 23-25. There will be no set theme for the conference, but specific workshops will be organized. Proposals and abstracts should be addressed before October 1, 1985, to the Conference Coordinator, Serge Ricard, Department d'Americain, 29, avenue Robert Schuman, 13621 Aix-en-Provence CEDEX, France.

PUBLICATIONS

Manfred Jonas (Union College), The United States and Germany: A Diplomatic History. Cornell University Press. 1985. Cloth ISBN 0-8014-1634-5 \$29.50, paper ISBN 0-8014-9890-2 \$12.95.

Douglas Little (Clark University), Malevolent Neutrality: The United States, Great Britain, and the Origins of the Spanish Civil War. Cornell University Press. Cloth ISBN 0-8014-176904 \$29.95.

Kenneth M. Coleman and George C. Herring (University of Kentucky), The Central American Crisis: Sources of Conflict and the Failure of U.S. Policy. Scholarly Resources. 1985. Cloth ISBN 0-8420-2238-4 \$30.00, paper ISBN 0-8420-2240-6 \$9.95.

Robert Beisner (The American University), Twelve Against Empire: The Anti-Imperialists 1898-1900. Re-issued with a new Preface. University of Chicago Press. 1985. ISBN 0-226-04171-9 \$9.95.

William B. Pickett (Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology), Vigo County Interim Report: The Indiana Historic Sites and Structures Inventory. Indiana Department of Natural Resources and Historic Landmarks Foundation.

Steven L. Rearden (Herndon, Virginia), The Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine: Paul H. Nitze and the Soviet Challenge. Westview Press with the Johns Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute. 1984. Paper ISBN 0-86531-898-0 \$15.00.

----, History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Formative Years, 1947-1950. Government Printing Office. 1984. Cloth \$25.00.

Norman H. Graebner ed. (University of Virginia), Traditions and Values: American Diplomacy 1790-1865: Volume VII, American Values Projected Abroad. This Graebner volume includes essays by SHAFR members Burton Spivak, Kenneth Shewmaker (Dartmouth), and Norman Ferris (Middle Tennessee State University). 1985. Cloth \$21.75, paper \$10.75.

----, Traditions and Values: Studies in American Diplomacy, 1865-1945: Volume VIII of American Values Projected Abroad. University Press of America. 1985. Richard E. Welch Jr. (Lafayette College), Fredrick W. Marks III (Forest Hills, New York), Lloyd Abrosius (University of Nebraska), and Richard Dean Burns (California State/Los Angeles). Cloth \$20.75, paper \$10.15.

James I. Matray (New Mexico State University), The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950. University of Hawaii Press. 1985. ISBN 0-824809734 \$30.00.

Klaus Schwabe (Historisches Institut, Aachen), Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918-1919: Missionary Diplomacy and the Realities of Power. University of North Carolina Press. 1985. ISBN 0-8087-1618-3 \$36.00.

PERSONALS

William Widenor (University of Illinois/Urbana-Champaign), has been named chairman of the Department.

Thomas Buckley (University of Tulsa) was selected by faculty and students to receive the "Outstanding Teacher" Award at the May graduation services.

Steven L. Rearden (Herndon, Virginia) has won the 1984 Henry Adams Prize given by the Society for History in the Federal Government for the year's outstanding publication in the field of the history of the federal government. Rearden won the prize for History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense: The Formative Years, 1947-1950. (See complete note in Publications section.) Congratulations!

Hong-Kyu Park (Jarvis Christian College) has been awarded a research grant from the 1985-86 UNCF Faculty Scholars Program supported by the MacArthur Foundation. He will work on a study of American diplomacy toward Korea, 1941-1945.

Melvin Small (Wayne State University) and J. David Singer are the editors of an anthology produced especially for use with the telecourse associated with WAR--the eight episode series undertaken by the National Film Board of Canada.

Robert Dallek (University of California, Los Angeles) and Anna K. Nelson (George Washington University) are both candidates for three-year terms as Divisional Committee Members for the American Historical Association. Good Luck!

Frank Ninkovich (St. Johns University/New York) received an award from the Organization of American Historians for the best scholarly article published in the Journal of American History during the past year. The article was "The Rockefeller Foundation, China, and Cultural Change" (JAH, March 1984). Congratulations!



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CALENDAR

- June 26-28 The 11th annual conference of SHAFR will be held at Stanford University. See program in March Newsletter, pages 38-45.
- August 1 Deadline, materials for the September Newsletter
- November 1 Deadline, materials for the December Newsletter
- November 1-15 Annual elections for SHAFR officers.
- November 13-16 The 51st annual meeting of the Southern Historical Association will be held in Houston. The Shamrock Hilton will be the headquarters.
- December 1 Deadline, nominations for the Bernath Dissertation Support award.
- December 27-30 The 100th annual meeting of the AHA will be held in New York City. The headquarters hotel is yet to be announced. The deadline for proposals has passed.
- January 1 Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
- January 20 Deadlines for the 1985 Bernath article award and the Bernath book award.
- February 1 Deadline, materials for the March Newsletter.
- March 1 Nominations for the Bernath lecture prize are due.

- April 1 Applications for the W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship are due.
- April 9-12 The 79th annual meeting of the OAH will be held in New York City. The headquarters hotel will be the New York Statler.
- May 1 Deadline, materials for the June Newsletter

(The AHA has announced Margaret C. Jacob, Graduate Center, City University of New York, to be the program chair for the 1986 annual meeting.)

THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize, were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976 respectively, through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition

Description: This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations.

Eligibility: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations, published during 1985. It must be the author's first or second book.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The book should be sent directly to: Stephen E. Pelz, History Department, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Amherst, Massachusetts 01003.

Books may be sent at any time during 1985, but should not arrive later than January 20, 1986.

The award of \$1500.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians, in April, 1986, in New York City.

Previous Winners:

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1972 | Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento) |
| | Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth) |
| 1973 | John L. Gaddis (Ohio U) |
| 1974 | Michael H. Hunt (Yale) |
| 1975 | Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire) |
| | Stephen E. Pelz (Massachusetts-Amherst) |
| 1976 | Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton) |
| 1977 | Roger V. Dingman (Southern California) |
| 1978 | James R. Leutze (North Carolina) |
| 1979 | Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston) |
| 1980 | Michael Schaller (Arizona) |
| 1981 | Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke) |
| | Hugh DeSantis (Department of State) |
| 1982 | David Reynolds (Cambridge) |
| 1983 | Richard Immerman (Hawaii) |
| 1984 | David Wyman (Massachusetts-Amherst) |

The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

Eligibility: The lecture will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the annual meetings of the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for

teaching and research. Each lecturer will address himself not specifically to his own research interests, but to broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy.

Procedures: The Bernath Lecture Committee is soliciting nominations for the lecture from members of the Society. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vita, if available, should reach the Committee no later than March 1, 1986. The chairman of the committee to whom nominations should be sent is: Russell Buhite, Department of History, University of Oklahoma, Normal, Oklahoma 73069.

The award is \$500.00, with publication in Diplomatic History

Previous Winners

- | | |
|------|--|
| 1977 | Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute) |
| 1978 | David S. Patterson (Colgate) |
| 1979 | Marilyn B. Young (Michigan) |
| 1980 | John L. Gaddis (Ohio U) |
| 1981 | Burton Spivak (Bates College) |
| 1982 | Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo) |
| 1983 | Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt) |
| 1984 | Michael J. Hogan (Miami) |
| 1985 | Michael Schaller (Arizona) |

The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

Eligibility: Prize competition is open to any article on any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1985. The author must be under 35 years of age, or within 5 years after receiving the Ph.D., at the time of publication. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

Procedures: Nominations shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR by January 20, 1986. It will be helpful if the person making the nomination can supply at least one copy and if possible five (5) copies. The chairperson of the committee is: Harold Josephson, Department of History, University of North Carolina, Charlotte, No. Carolina 28223.

The award of \$300.00 will be presented at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH in April, 1986, in New York City.

The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Fund

This fund has been established through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath in honor of their late son to help doctoral students defray some of the expenses encountered in the concluding phases of writing their dissertations.

Requirements include:

1. The dissertation must cover some aspect of American foreign relations.
2. An award will help defray:
 - (a) last-minute costs to consult a collection of original materials that has just become available or to obtain photocopies from such sources
 - (b) typing and/or reproducing copies of the manuscript
 - (c) abstracting costs.
3. The award committee presumes that most research and writing of the dissertation has been completed. Awards are not intended for general research or for time to write.
4. Applicants must be members of SHAFR.
5. A report on how the funds were used must be filed by the successful applicant(s) not later than six (6) months following presentation of each award.
6. The applicant's supervisor must include a brief statement certifying the accuracy of the applicant's request and report of completion.

7. Generally an award will not exceed \$500.00, and a minimum, of three awards each year will be made. More awards are possible if the amounts requested are less.

Nominations, with supporting documentation should be sent to Geoffrey S. Smith, Bernath Dissertation Fund Chair, Department of History, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, K7L 3N6. The deadline for applications is December 1, 1985.

1985 award winner - John Nielson (UC-Santa Barbara).

THE SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS INVITES APPLICATIONS FOR THE W. STULL HOLT DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP TO BE AWARDED IN JUNE, 1985.

The award will be \$1500.00.

Applicants must be candidates for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, whose dissertation projects are directly concerned with the history of United States foreign relations. The award is intended for the defraying of travel and living expenses connected with the research and/or the writing of the dissertation.

To be qualified, applicants must be candidates in good standing at a doctoral granting graduate school who will have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree (including the general or comprehensive examinations) except for the dissertation before April, 1985.

There is no special application form. Applicants must submit a complete academic transcript of graduate work to date. A prospectus of the dissertation must accompany the application. This should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, and chief source materials. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used.

Three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one letter from the director of the dissertation, should be submitted to the committee.

Deadline for filing applications and supporting letters for this year's award will be April 1, 1985.

Applications should be addressed to the Chairperson of this year's W. Stull Holt Fellowship Committee: Lawrence E. Gelfand, Department of History, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242.

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University,
Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: William J. Brinker, Department of History,
Tennessee Tech.

EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS: Renea Griffith and Greg Gormley,
Tennessee Tech.

ISSUES: The Newsletter is published on the 1st of
March, June, September and December.

DEADLINES: All material must be in the hands of the
editor no later than four weeks prior to
publication date.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Changes of address should be sent to
the Executive Secretary-Treasurer: William
Kamman, North Texas State University, Denton,
Texas 76203.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of back numbers of the Newsletter
may be obtained from the editorial office upon
payment of a charge of \$1.00 per copy: for
members living abroad, \$2.00.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals, announcements,
abstracts of scholarly papers and articles
delivered--or published--upon diplomatic sub-
jects, bibliographical or historiographical
essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, infor-
mation about foreign depositories, biographies,
autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the
field, jokes, etc.

FORMER PRESIDENTS OF SHAFR

- 1968 Thomas A. Bailey (Stanford)
- 1969 Alexander DeConde (California-Santa Barbara)
- 1970 Richard W. Leopold (Northwestern)
- 1971 Robert H. Ferrell (Indiana)
- 1972 Norman A. Graebner (Virginia)
- 1973 Wayne S. Cole (Maryland)
- 1974 Bradford Perkins (Michigan)
- 1975 Armin H. Rappaport (California-San Diego)
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- 1977 Raymond A. Esthus (Tulane)
- 1978 Akira Iriye (Chicago)
- 1979 Paul A. Varg (Michigan State)
- 1980 David M. Pletcher (Indiana)
- 1981 Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State)
- 1982 Lawrence E. Gelfand (Iowa)
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