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Foreign Relations



**NEWSLETTER**

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Page

- 1 A President's Appraisal, 1985 by Warren F. Kuehl
- 3 The Role of Electoral Politics in American Foreign Policy Formulations by William Widenor
- 29 Melby's Kuomintang Follies by Chester J. Pach, Jr.
- 34 Researching American Foreign Relations Abroad: New Delhi by Andrew J. Rotter
- 40 Announcements
- 45 Personals
- 47 Abstracts
- 49 Publications
- 51 Calendar
- 52 Bernath, Holt, and Graebner Awards

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**SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS**  
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MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in the summer. The Society also meets with the American Historical Association in December, and with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZES: The Society administers several awards. Four of them honor the late Stuart L. Bernath, and are financed through the generosity of his parents, Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath of Laguna Hills, California. Awards also honor the late W. Stull Holt, and Laura and Norman Graebner. The details of each of these awards are given in under the appropriate headings in each Newsletter.

PUBLICATIONS: The Society sponsors a quarterly Newsletter, Diplomatic History, a journal; and the occasional Membership Roster and List of Current Research Projects.

## A PRESIDENT'S APPRAISAL, 1985

Warren F. Kuehl

As SHAFR nears the end of its second decade, it is advantageous to assess its work and direction. There is much reason for self-adulation: its remarkable growth, its stable financial condition, the healthy involvement of members in its activities, and the encouragement of young scholars largely through the stimulus of the Stuart L. Bernath prizes and funds and the W. Stull Holt research grant. The soon-to-be inaugurated Graebner award will honor a distinguished scholar.

Scholarship has been advanced through sessions at conventions, the now well-established summer conferences, our excellent Diplomatic History, and the spirit of friendly collegiality so characteristic of members. One is overwhelmed at the signs and spirit of helpfulness. We must add to this list a Newsletter that is one of the best and fullest of any professional society and which has been an exceptional cohesive force. All these items add up to a list of quite remarkable accomplishments.

Yet all is not perfect. SHAFR has, despite committees, a few declarations, and the stalwart efforts of a few members, not become involved in struggles to open records, to hasten the declassification process, or to assume initiative on freedom of information concerns. The situation may be changing with representation on the State Department's Advisory Committee on Historical Documentation and a revised Government Relations Committee, which largely through the work of Milton Gustafson now has a clearly stated directive. SHAFR has been one of the more generous supporters to the National Coordination Committee, through its contributions, but so much needs to be done that extensive extra effort is required.

There has also been too much neglect of teaching. The Newsletter periodically carries items, but there has been little systematic appraisal of what we do in our classrooms, to compare techniques, and to share. The one notable exception, related to the war in Vietnam, merely dramatizes the omissions and suggests what can be done in other areas.

Teaching also should encompass the general public, which SHAFR has generally ignored. It has made little effort to become involved in extending the authoritative knowledge of its members, to relate current diplomatic concerns to the past, or to stand up to decry the misuse of diplomatic history by political figures. There are real problems concerning how to do this, but public outreach is possible through NEH programs, and that path is worth exploring.

It is obvious that an excellent base exists for moving positively in some of these areas as SHAFR soon enters its third decade. There may be others we should examine. It would be good to see SHAFR address such subjects vigorously. A good beginning might be a forum in this Newsletter with responses to this appraisal.

**The Role of Electoral Politics  
in American Foreign Policy Formulation:  
Are Historians Meeting the Conceptual Challenge?\***

by

William Widenor (University of Illinois)

We live in a politically sophisticated - some would even say cynical - age. No sitting President can make a move in international relations or with respect to the economy but what a newscaster will suggest that, whatever the intrinsic merits of the action, it may also have been designed to enhance his own re-election prospects. Whereas our newscasters seem content merely to insinuate relationships, our economists have made a strong argument that political considerations have often precluded economic rationality, that we are frequently confronted with what amounts to political control of the economy, and that America's domestic aspirations (read demands for economic well-being manifested in the political arena) have frequently precluded the adoption of those economic policies most conducive to the maintenance of a liberal international order.<sup>1</sup>

Over the last several decades a chorus of State Department officials have also been complaining with growing exasperation that foreign policy decisions are no longer being made with a view to serving foreign policy ends but rather with an eye to their effect on domestic politics.<sup>2</sup> The present generation of historians in their preoccupation with demonstrating the connection between economic interest and foreign

\*This essay began in embryonic form as a paper delivered to the Organization of American Historians at their April, 1981 convention in Detroit. I would like to thank the session chairman, I.M. Destler, the commentators, Paul Kleppner and Ralph B. Levering, and my fellow paper presenter, Donald T. Critchlow, for their suggestions, criticisms and above all, for challenging me to move beyond the mere enumeration of examples.

policy, a necessary and long overdue correction of the historical record, have not been inclined to pay much attention to such protestations. The estrangement that developed between historians and policymakers in the 1960s and 1970s, however understandable, has had some unfortunate results. Historians in their efforts to ferret out the hidden truths behind policymaking have adopted an adversary position and have come to regard with suspicion any explanation emanating from the bureaucracy, even those from the lower or working echelons of policymaking. But working level bureaucrats who complain about the "politicization" of American foreign relations have been just as critical of the direction of the country's foreign policy as have academics who have stressed its economic orientation, and perhaps the time has come to reintroduce the two most persistent groups of critics and establish a dialogue between them.

The State Department's increasing sensitivity to the influence of domestic politics stems no doubt from two not unrelated developments, its political vulnerability as evidenced by the fact that it became in successive generations first the favorite whipping boy of the McCarthyite Right and then of the Radical Left, and the tendency of recent Presidents to show little interest in strengthening the career services and much more in controlling and restricting them through appointees who owe allegiance primarily to the top political officials.<sup>3</sup> Is it not time for us to take a serious look at why this has been the case? Presidents seem to have their own set of priorities which differ frequently and markedly from those of policymakers who do not face elections and can afford to take a longer range view. Is it possible, for example, that the apparent posturing and the inconsistency in application that characterized the Carter Administration's foreign policy, and brought forth so many complaints from those charged with implementing it, had at least an underlying political logic? Even if we are reluctant to credit the more sensational charges such as those leveled against President Jimmy Carter by Jack Anderson, we do know that the President's pollster, Pat Caddell, evinced marked

interest in the potential domestic political repercussions of certain foreign policy positions, and we do know that the President made effective use of the hostage issue (claiming its imminent resolution) in his primary campaign against Senator Kennedy. Even in Carter's own telling, or in that of his chief adviser, Hamilton Jordan, it is not easy to distinguish between the high road of statesmanship and the tortuous path of domestic political advantage. As one perceptive commentator stated the problem: "On any given day in Jordan's diary, it is hard to tell whether he considers Khomeini or Teddy Kennedy the greater enemy."<sup>4</sup>

One need not dwell on Carter's performance. As the recent contributions to the history of Sino-American relations in the decisive years 1949 and 1950 so strongly attest, the Communist victory over the Nationalists gave the Republicans so potent a political club that the Truman Administration could not even seriously entertain certain policy options. For example, with respect to the possibility of continuing aid to a Communist China, Acting Secretary Robert Lovett bluntly told the ERA Administrator Paul Hoffman that the decision had to be made "in terms of what was feasible or desirable from the standpoint of congressional and public reaction in this country, rather than what was desirable purely from the standpoint of our relationship with China or the Chinese people."<sup>5</sup> A number of historians of the American debacle in Vietnam have also argued that American policy in Vietnam, at least in the minds of its architects, was directly related to American domestic politics, that a series of American Presidents in the 1960s tried to hold Saigon so that they might not lose Washington.<sup>6</sup> And some observers now consider it more than coincidental that President Johnson announced the opening of peace talks with the North Vietnamese just a few days before the presidential election of 1968 and that Henry Kissinger's famous and misleading "Peace is at hand" speech came just before the 1972 election. In fact, Kissinger's latest volume of memoirs can be read as an exercise, only partially successful, in trying to

insulate foreign policy from the domestic political vicissitudes of the Nixon Administration and as a lament that the charge he once leveled against the Israelis ("Israel has no foreign policy, only domestic politics") applies almost as much to the United States.<sup>7</sup>

The question naturally arises whether we are dealing here with a new phenomenon or whether such occurrences may not be endemic to the conduct of foreign policy under American conditions. In his recent book, Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy, Alexander Haig, in the course of venting his spleen against Mrs. Kirkpatrick, notes that she was "merely acting according to the rules of the system which had at its heart an evidently irresistible desire to save the President's popularity even if this meant undermining the President's policies."<sup>8</sup> Unfortunately, neither the nature of the "system" nor the derivation of its "rules" are the subject of analysis or speculation. And, moreover Haig's comments tend to perpetuate the conventional stereotype that national leaders fall into two categories: the statesmen (Haig naturally tries to include himself in this group), and the nefarious (always one's opponents) who play politics with foreign policy. If only the matter were really that simple.

Alexis de Tocqueville always thought that the conduct of foreign policy would be one of the American democracy's greatest difficulties. Another famous commentator on American mores, Lord Bryce, noted the frequent demagogic use of foreign policy issues to obtain domestic political advantage in the 1880s and the extent to which American opposition parties tended to be opportunistic rather than consistent or constructive on matters of foreign policy, and concluded that were it not for its isolation and physical invulnerability the United States might face grave problems.<sup>9</sup> From the very beginning of the Republic, the American system of government has exhibited certain troublesome tendencies. Washington quickly discovered that under American conditions domestic politics and foreign policy could not readily be



separated. Jay's Treaty with England in 1795 did perhaps more than any domestic controversy to precipitate the development of the first two American political parties, the Federalists who supported the treaty and the Republicans who opposed it. Even the decision to send Jay to London in the first place was as much a domestic political maneuver as it was a foreign policy initiative.<sup>10</sup>

The importance of the domestic political aspect of American foreign policy has been an almost constant and axiomatic theme of British observers of the American political scene. The British Minister, Sir Charles Bagot, trying to explain why Monroe's Administration could not bring itself to condemn Andrew Jackson's incursion into Florida, advised London in 1818 that "there is a Key which will explain this and always will explain every measure of this Government, namely: Elections."<sup>11</sup> And over a century later in 1944 the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax, reported that "the fact that American foreign policy is a function not only of America's strategic world interests but of the domestic political situation in the United States has been made repeatedly clear."<sup>12</sup> Though these are matters which American politicians have been understandably loath to spell out on paper (with the result that our evidence will usually be partial and suggestive rather than definitive), historians have managed to unearth a few gems. Particularly revealing and unusual in its candor is a memorandum from Clark Clifford to Truman designed to be a blueprint for Truman's strategy in the 1948 election. It reveals the role domestic politics played in the recognition of Israel, but that we have known for a long time and have been prepared to dismiss as a special case. More arresting is the following passage:

There is considerable political advantage to the Administration in its battle with the Kremlin. The best guess today is that our poor relations with Russia will intensify. The nation is already united behind the President on this issue. The worse matters get, up to a fairly certain point --

real danger of imminent war -- the more is there a sense of crisis. And in times of crisis the American citizen tends to back up his President.<sup>13</sup>

If this sort of thing is not new, why have we paid such scant attention to it? David Halberstam in his most recent book, The Powers That Be, attributes our inattention to the fact that although our press corps has been congenitally skeptical in assessing the intentions and ambitions of domestic politicians, it has never brought such toughness of mind to bear on the politics of foreign policy.<sup>14</sup> The same complaint might well be lodged against historians. Indeed, in our role as custodians of the national intellectual inheritance, we may have been particularly susceptible to the old saw that politics stop at the water's edge and particularly reluctant to credit Ambrose Bierce's cynical definition of politics as "the conduct of public affairs for private advantage."<sup>15</sup> Politics have never stopped at the water's edge, however useful such a myth may once have been in protecting the country from the ravages of that fact's more flagrant and destructive manifestations.

We have been making progress. Robert Dallek's fertile The American Style of Foreign Policy will hopefully provoke a new debate about the domestic roots of foreign policy in the broadest, cultural context and stimulate others to endeavor to relate Dallek's cultural and psychological insights to specific calculations about how to conduct foreign policy and still win elections.<sup>16</sup> The compilation of doctoral dissertations on United States foreign relations published in recent issues of Diplomatic History contains an encouraging number of dissertations directly addressed to the relation between international politics and domestic politics.<sup>17</sup> Ernest May has dared to tackle even that most sacred of cows, the Monroe Doctrine, and to suggest that the origins of that doctrine were not unrelated to the forthcoming presidential election of 1824. However, as evidenced by the heat of Harry Ammon's rejoinder to May's argument, and by his insistence that the doctrine was shaped by the administration's reading of

the international political situation rather than the domestic one, resistance to such an approach is still strong.<sup>18</sup> As Walter LaFeber has observed, there is considerable evidence that foreign policy has often followed partisan lines, and hence a crying need to endeavor to relate American diplomatic history to the new history of nineteenth century politics. Yet such a relationship remains to be consummated; in LaFeber's words, "there has been hardly even an introduction or courtship."<sup>19</sup>

The obstacles to a frank appraisal of the domestic political factors involved in foreign policy formulation are considerable and not easily overcome. The methodological problems are significant, and I shall discuss those later in this essay, but many of our problems are conceptual and stem not so much from lack of evidence as from certain underlying assumptions.<sup>20</sup> Two somewhat contradictory strains in our intellectual inheritance have often caused us to view foreign policy as something with its own life, existing primarily in the international sphere and essentially cut off from domestic politics. The first such strain is normative democratic theory which takes an idealized view of the way things should function in a democratic society and uses it to explain the way that the American political system actually works. It is simply assumed that in a democracy public attitudes are automatically transformed into policy. The people supposedly get the kind of foreign policy they want, and hence the question of manipulating foreign policy for domestic political benefit does not even arise. The President is only serving the people if he has his eyes constantly on the opinion polls. Politicians quite naturally tend to encourage this misconception and are prone to claim, as did FDR in one of his more famous speeches, that "a Government can be no better than the public opinion which sustains it."<sup>21</sup>

The second strain is normative diplomatic theory, which has an elitist bent, and assumes that foreign policy is a function of the configuration of international power, and that experts observing international developments can come up with an

objective definition of the American national interest under prevailing conditions. The American people as a whole are supposedly incapable of such sophisticated analysis and hence have no role in foreign policy formulation. Here too domestic politics are deemed to be irrelevant and their intrusion considered to be inimical to the selection of the proper foreign policy.

Both of these theories are essentially straw constructions. Scarcely anyone today would admit to subscribing to them and yet their influence has not entirely disappeared. They still tend to obstruct the development of an empirically based descriptive theory of how foreign policy is actually made in this country because neither can be reconciled with the kinds of links and connections between foreign policy and domestic politics that I have already described. Moreover, unless rooted out they are likely to continue to inhibit our efforts to view foreign policy making as a political process in the widest social sense, efforts which though still in the formative stage show considerable promise.<sup>22</sup>

The second, normative diplomatic theory, is perhaps more easily discarded than the first. Even if we set aside the thorny philosophical problem of how to define the national interest of a democratic society, and even if we acknowledge the proprietary feelings of our George Kennans and Henry Kissingers and document our leaders' ability to mobilize public opinion in support of certain policies, we are still a long way from demonstrating that American foreign policy is designed to serve foreign policy ends. At least two major obstacles are readily apparent. The first issues from the well-known emphasis that political scientists have placed on the role of bureaucratic politics in foreign policy formulation.<sup>23</sup> The second is a function of historical observation. The closer one looks at the bureaucratic chaos that has surrounded the conduct of foreign policy under a president such as Franklin Roosevelt the more difficult it is to assume that a basic rationality has pervaded the American decision-making process.<sup>24</sup>

The first theory, normative democratic theory, presents a somewhat more serious obstacle. One of the tenets of our democratic faith has long been the idea that public policy is an expression of public opinion, and the corollary idea that public opinion is opinion originating among the public and not opinion forced or foisted on the people by the government. Though Jack Anderson's headline "Polls Dictate Carter Policy" was intended to be derogatory, a good many Americans might well reply so what? What is wrong with the President being guided by public opinion? Even historians have often operated on the basis of the dubious assumption that policymakers respond to an independently generated public opinion, and consequently have devoted entirely too much time to the direct study of public opinion on foreign policy issues, neglecting both the government's role in shaping opinion and the political process through which that opinion manifests itself.<sup>25</sup> But those who would persist in upholding normative democratic theory in this area must do so by ignoring the accumulated findings of social scientists in the last several decades. For example, there is almost no evidence to support the proposition that officeholders have to heed the opinion of the moment when deciding issues of foreign policy. Typical studies now speak of the government mobilizing public support for foreign policy decisions already taken and about presidents finding both public opinion and the Congress permissive rather than restrictive on foreign policy questions.<sup>26</sup> In fact most studies of opinions and attitudes of the public toward foreign affairs show with remarkable consistency that the degree of attention, the amount of knowledge, and the tendency to respond to important international developments are distressingly minimal. One might even ask, with Hans Morgenthau, whether there is such a thing as public opinion with respect to foreign policy formation that antedates the formation of the policy itself.<sup>27</sup> Moreover, ever since Walter Lippmann's pioneering work in 1922, students of public opinion have stressed the non-rational elements in individual opinions, the vast ignorance of the American public in the area of foreign affairs, the role of elites in shaping group opinion, and the great difficulties involved in

assessing effective public opinion.<sup>28</sup> In short, it is no longer intellectually respectable to argue simply that foreign policy reflects public opinion.

But does that mean that public opinion plays no role at all in foreign policy formulation? Probably not. We know that Presidents follow the opinion polls carefully, that they now even have their own pollsters, and that they are often concerned about how the public will react to some contemplated step in foreign policy.<sup>29</sup> Consequently, one might argue that despite the latitude we give our political leaders, foreign policy is not fashioned in a political vacuum, that public opinion is still important when viewed as a part of the influence of domestic partisan politics on foreign policy formulation. Our political system is such that the political advantage of those temporarily in positions of power will always be a primary factor in policymaking. And what appear to be foreign policy decisions, and are justified as such to the public, may actually be the outcome of a political bargaining process or of calculations respecting potential political advantage, processes in which considerations of national interest may have long since been forgotten. In other words, the suggestion is that foreign policy formulation in this country should be thought of as a political process, but not necessarily as either a democratic or a rational one.

At least two additional objections may be anticipated. First, since the publication of William Appleman William's The Tragedy of American Diplomacy in 1959, there has arisen a whole school of historians of American foreign relations who view the subject from an interpretive perspective dominated by considerations of economic interest and who are likely to regard an interpretation that emphasizes domestic politics as an attack on their position. The issue is a sensitive one. Undoubtedly, many of those who have been attracted to the new emphasis on domestic politics have seen it as an alternative to explanations based on an economic determinism, even in some cases as a means of challenging the dominance achieved by William and his followers in the 60s and

early 70s. Such a perspective makes resistance inevitable. Even Thomas Paterson, who in his most recent book On Every Front, has moved a long way from the unicausal economic explanation he advanced initially in Soviet - American Confrontation, is at pains to denigrate the role of Congress and of the public in the formulation of American foreign policy. As Paterson puts it "Foreign policy initiative lay with the executive branch. The administration's diplomacy was not determined by the buffeting winds of public sentiment or by an obstructionist Congress."<sup>30</sup> Though usually careful to introduce guarded modifiers such as "seldom," or "sometimes," on occasion Paterson even makes so bold as to compare Truman's latitude in foreign policy formulation to that of Stalin.<sup>31</sup> Even though we have had a number of good books emphasizing the constraints imposed on policymakers by the exigencies of domestic politics, John Gaddis's The Origins of the Cold War foremost among them, Paterson's point of view continues to be more widely accepted. The prevailing consensus as reflected in a recent symposium in Diplomatic History seems to be that "more recent analyses demonstrate a greater tendency to policymakers to influence public opinion than to be influenced by it."<sup>32</sup> Still, as Gaddis notes, this is an area where so-called post-revisionists remain divided.<sup>33</sup>

At first glance there would appear to be little common meeting ground. But on further reflection a number of possibilities suggest themselves. First, Paterson may be right about the Truman Administration, but those pre-Korea years of foreign policy consensus may be atypical and hence inadequate support for generalization. Secondly, Paterson may be right when he asserts that "seldom did Truman have to do what he did not want to do,"<sup>34</sup> and yet Truman may have been such a political man that what he wanted to do was always conditioned by a perspective developed out of years of avoiding the pitfalls of domestic politics.<sup>35</sup> It may be time for all of us to look more carefully, as historians of Chinese-American relations have recently done, at the roads not taken -- at options considered and rejected as potentially too politically

damaging. As Charles Maier has reminded us, Presidents cannot afford the luxury of separating domestic and foreign challenges, because "the approval earned by responding to one set of problems conditions the freedom of action to deal with the other."<sup>36</sup> Thirdly, even if we accept the argument that policymakers can do much to create opinion, that does not warrant the assumption that they are necessarily serving a foreign policy end when they do so. Finally, Paterson and also Williams and his followers stress the internal stimuli that have propelled American foreign policy. Williams is more restrictive and attributes most American actions to that combination of economic interest and ideology that he shorthands as "open door diplomacy,"<sup>37</sup> while Paterson speaks of the "fundamentals -- (the) ideas, economic and strategic needs, power -- (that) explain why the United States wanted to and had to become a central participant in the making of the postwar world."<sup>38</sup> It may, I deeply hope, yet be possible to persuade Paterson that the nature of American politics belongs among his list of fundamentals or to persuade Williams and his followers that they might fruitfully investigate the role of economic interests in the political process rather than assume a direct relationship between the interests of Wall Street and State Department policy; the chasm between our respective positions is not really so wide that it may not someday be bridged.<sup>39</sup>

In fact, from some perspectives we can already be lumped together. In his review of Alexander De Conde, ed. Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, D.C. Watt criticized most of the contributors (revisionists and non-revisionists alike) for being "not so much historians of American foreign policy as historians of the role of foreign policy issues in American politics."<sup>40</sup> Watt may think that the two are separable (and in the British experience they may well be), but most historians of American foreign relations would deny that contention and in that very denial there should be considerable common ground. Moreover, we have a common intellectual inheritance. Eckart Kehr's famous 1931 doctoral dissertation,



Schlachtflottenbau and Parteipolitik, which challenged the traditional emphasis of German historians on the primacy of foreign policy had considerable influence on Charles Beard, and Williams has freely acknowledged his own debts to Beard.<sup>41</sup> Kehr was able to establish a strong link between Imperial Germany's battleship construction policy and the requirements of its various political parties. Often those parties were little more than tools of the economic interest groups they served, but they also often had political reasons for taking the stands they did. Of course, it was and remains much easier to trace the political influence of economic interests groups in multi-party systems where it is possible to speak of an industrialists' party, an agricultural party, etc. than it is to do the same in a two-party system as loosely structured as that of the United States. However much one may quarrel with particular aspects of Arno Mayer's efforts to relate the foreign policies of the European states to their changing political and social structures, the revealing fact is that no American diplomatic historian has even made a similar effort.<sup>42</sup> We have not yet come up to Kehr's standards in our analysis, but that may well be because we have interpreted Innenpolitik much too narrowly and have tended to denigrate its very essence, namely its political dimension.

Another objection might be framed in the form of a question: "Are foreign policy issues really all that important in electoral politics?" A sceptic might recall the probably apocryphal story according to which the Governor of Illinois, William Stratton, supposedly told Richard Nixon in 1960, "You can say all you want about foreign affairs, but what is really important is the price of hogs in Chicago and St. Louis." Only rarely have foreign policy issues divided parties in this country and only seldom have they seized the attention of sizeable pressure groups. Moreover, determinations as to public attitudes on foreign policy issues have not yet successfully been derived from voting statistics. We have focused a good deal of attention on issue voting but, as one recent study has pointed out, because of

methodological problems "the impact of issue voting has never been adequately measured."<sup>43</sup> Hence, we can probably never prove that voters with a particular foreign policy concern (say, for example, voters of Eastern European descent in 1946) made their individual voting decisions on that basis alone. Still I see no reason why we should be content with studies which merely elucidate the attitudes of particular ethnic and religious groups toward American foreign policy. It may yet prove instructive to look much more carefully at how campaigns were conducted and at what kinds of appeals were made in Congressional districts which voted in a markedly different manner from one election to the next and where there is reason to assume that foreign policy issues may have played a substantial role.

Confronted with such obstacles to forging links between electoral politics and foreign policy, it is understandable that so many students of the subject emphasize the weakness of electoral accountability on foreign policy issues.<sup>44</sup> Nevertheless, for a number of reasons we may be wise to persist. First, one can doubt with Bernard Cohen the public's capacity for retaliation on foreign policy issues and still argue that a President can manipulate and shape his foreign policy so as to secure maximum domestic political advantage. Enhanced public interest and the recent saliency of foreign policy problems may even have increased the temptation to play politics with foreign policy. Since the Second World War foreign policy has emerged as the principal concern of American Presidents. The priority bestowed on foreign policy by recent administrations is evident even in such obvious indicators as the daily preoccupation of officials and the patterns of expenditure at the national level. It is also increasingly reflected in the behavior of candidates for our highest office. Clearly no one has received the nomination of a major political party in recent American history who dismissed foreign policy or deprecated his own ability to handle foreign policy problems.<sup>46</sup> And even if we observe that the disagreements between candidates on specific foreign policy issues have been infrequent, we must admit to having

witnessed a great deal of posturing, a good many efforts to cultivate the image of being toughminded yet cautious, a good many efforts to paint one's opponent as either "soft" or as a "warmonger." Of course, electioneering is not policymaking, but it can foreclose policy options and nurture unrealistic thinking, and in a world where images are important and the public is not particularly well informed, the temptations may be to pander to the public's prejudices and to their inclination to choose the easy way out -- to opt for what Walter Lippmann once called "the soft side of the equations."<sup>47</sup> No historian of American foreign relations needs to be instructed on the dangers inherent in conducting foreign policy on such a basis. The point here is rather that a focus on the links between foreign policy and electoral politics may serve an explanatory function. At the very least, it may help explain why debates over foreign policy issues in this country take on such an emotional and unsophisticated guise, why the education of the public on foreign policy issues never seems to materialize and why American foreign policy is so solipsistic, attuned to a kind of American reality that precludes an understanding of the realities presented by other countries.

Secondly, such an approach may at least shed some light on what Bernard Cohen once referred to as the heart of our intellectual failure in the area of the relationship between public opinion and the foreign policy maker, namely "the absence of theories of foreign policy making based on a realistic understanding of political strategies."<sup>48</sup> It may also help us to comprehend and assess what James Rosenau has termed "the dynamics whereby public policy and public opinion become functions of each other."<sup>49</sup> Elections are an important part of those dynamics in American society; as Jerome Bruner once phrased it: "Statesmen and the interests propose the shape of the future. But the people condone their chauvinism, deplore their cupidity, or glorify their idealism. In a democratic society, elections are the pay-off."<sup>50</sup> The electoral nexus may not count for much as a medium of democratic control of the conduct of foreign

policy,<sup>51</sup> but that does not mean that it does not deserve our attention as an arena in which opinion and policy impact on one another.

Thirdly, and perhaps of more immediate significance for the practicing historian, an approach that emphasizes the role of electoral politics in foreign policy formulation may help with some of our specific interpretive problems. In a recent article analyzing United States planning for the United Nations, I wondered out loud why F.D.R appeared to attach so much importance to an organization which contravened many of his own insights into the successful conduct of international relations. But triggered by some observations of Robert Dallek and James MacGregor Burns, I began to recall that Roosevelt had a long history of approaching foreign policy problems from the standpoint of domestic political advantage, and started to ask myself whether Roosevelt may not have approached the problem of international organization in much the same way. Properly handled, a UN policy was capable of producing substantial political dividends, and this may help us to understand why Roosevelt gave his UN policy such high priority status. It may also be the domestic political dynamics of the issue that afford the best explanation for Roosevelt's changing views on the proper structure for the UN and for his tendency to promise more than the UN could ever deliver. Moreover, it may not have been just coincidence that the Dumbarton Oaks Conference was scheduled so as to provide a launching pad for Roosevelt's re-election campaign and that the election of 1944 witnessed the decimation of the ranks of one-time isolationists in Congress. Few Presidents are likely to incriminate themselves directly in such matters, and consequently what some historians call conclusive proof will usually be lacking. But instead of this causing us to avert our gaze, perhaps it should encourage us to look more closely at the timing of policy decisions and announcements and to cultivate the kind of sophistication in analysis manifested by those who have written on the subject of the political control of the economy.<sup>52</sup>

Beyond dispute is the fact that the State Department eventually mounted a massive public relations campaign on behalf of American membership in the UN,<sup>53</sup> a campaign which later led to charges that the UN had been oversold to the American people, but the real question is what significance we should attach to that event. Such an educational campaign is in accord with our recent experiences with Presidents adept at shaping public opinion; it fits well with current public opinion theory which stresses presidential latitude and leadership, and it can even be used to support the Soviet view that American diplomats frequently use public opinion as a convenient excuse. Vishinski once said that "the Soviet Union would never agree to the right of the small nations to judge the acts of the Great Powers and, when Charles Bohlen ventured the opinion that the American people were not likely to approve any denial of small nation's rights, Vishinski said that the American people should learn to obey their leaders."<sup>54</sup> Of course, Presidents can shape public opinion, and especially in crisis situations they have a great deal of latitude, but when an issue like that of establishing an international organization is around for a number of years, when it requires eventual Congressional approval, when it has behind it a large number of almost fanatically devoted advocates, and when it plays an important role in the dynamics of party alignment, a President has fewer options and is presented with many temptations. Roosevelt may well be the father of the UN but in the process of reconciling the domestic politics and the international politics involved in establishing an international organization he may have led the American people to accept two improbable assumptions, one, that national sovereignty and world order could be made compatible, and two, that world order American style was compatible with a continuation of the Soviet alliance. For a variety of reasons, personal and political, Roosevelt seems to have been unable to bring himself to face the hard choices. And this was probably the more difficult because the issue of international organization, especially so long as one could talk in generalities, was tailor-made for Democratic party advantage.<sup>55</sup>

The point may be neither that public opinion has a significant impact on foreign policy formulation nor that Roosevelt was only a cynical politician subordinating his foreign policy to the eternal search for domestic political advantage, but rather the point may be that our political culture is such that our Roosevelts can come to believe that their own political interests and the foreign policy interest of the country are indistinguishable. A successful foreign policy clearly requires public support and a policy that does not produce results is unlikely to be electorally popular. Hence, the distinction between the domestic political and the external requirements of a foreign policy is readily blurred, and it is probably a rare President who doesn't occasionally find refuge in the fact. As discerning V.O. Key once put it: "One can never be certain of the extent to which the parallelism of governmental action and public preference results from governmental influence on opinion and to what extent it results from the adjustment of public policy to bring it into accord with public opinion."<sup>56</sup>

Influence flows to government as well as from government, and our judgments about the nature of that process cannot but be influenced by our assessments of the personal qualities of our leaders. The problem of determining the nature of the relationship between structures (political, economic, or administrative) and personality remains a matter of supreme difficulty for diplomatic historians. The line between presidential leadership of public opinion on foreign policy issues and manipulation of that opinion for partisan advantage is not easy to draw. Nevertheless, perhaps it is time for a somewhat higher level of skepticism and for some new research designs.

#### NOTES

<sup>1</sup>Edward Tufte, The Political Control of the Economy (Princeton, 1978); David P. Calleo, The Imperious Economy (Cambridge, Mass., 1982), p. 3.

<sup>2</sup>Those officials involved with the conduct of either Middle or Far Eastern policy have been particularly outspoken. One fairly typical lament dates the demise of the State Department's effective influence in the shaping of American foreign policy on Palestine from 1938. From that time on, claims J. Rives Childs (Foreign Service Farewell [Charlottesville, Va., 1969], p.105), "anything having to do with the formation... of policy passed progressively out of the hands of professional career officers, whose sole concern was the protection of American interests and was dictated more and more exclusively by the White House in light of domestic political considerations." A similar complaint from a different political perspective was voiced by Owen

Lattimore in the course of criticizing the Truman Administration's white paper on China. That white paper reflected, charged Lattimore,

the increasing ruthlessness of political warfare within the United States. To cover what was being made a look like a moral soft spot on the domestic front in American politics, it sets out to show that in the high strategy of politics in Asia the Administration was as relentlessly anti-Russia as the most fire-eating Republican and that in pursuit of impeccably anti-Russian aims the United States had engaged in as much intervention as the traffic could possibly bear. It is one of the most astonishing documents in diplomatic history" (Lattimore quoted in William L. O'Neill, A Better World: The Great Schism--Stalinism and the American Intellectuals [New York, 1982], p. 263).

<sup>3</sup>I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Organizational Reform (Princeton, 1972), p. 31.

<sup>4</sup>Thomas Griffith, "A Tilt Called Cynicism," Time, Nov. 22, 1982, p. 102.

<sup>5</sup>Lovett quoted in Robert M. Blum, Drawing the Line: The Origin of the American Containment Policy in East Asia (New York, 1982), p. 27. The domestic politics

of foreign policy decisions is also, and understandably, an overriding theme in Gary May, China Scapegoat: The Diplomatic Ordeal of John Carter Vincent (Prospect Heights, Illinois, 1982). The argument that the fear of further domestic political retribution precluded the pursuit of many a promising option is also a feature of Nancy Tucker's Patterns in the Dust: Chinese American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950 (New York, 1983), pp. 131 and 185.

<sup>6</sup>See especially Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked (Washington, 1979).

<sup>7</sup>Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston, 1982), p. xx; Edward Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger (New York, 1976), p. 163.

<sup>8</sup>Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy (New York, 1984), pp. 269-70.

<sup>9</sup>Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Phillips Bradley (New York, 1948), I, pp. 234-35; James Bryce, American Commonwealth (London, 1889), I, pp. 66, 303.

<sup>10</sup>See Joseph Charles, The Origins of the American Party System (New York, 1961).

<sup>11</sup>Quoted in Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy (New York, 1973), p. 326.

<sup>12</sup>Thomas E. Hachey, ed., Confidential Dispatches: Analyses of America by the British Ambassador, 1939-1945 (Evanston, Illinois, 1974), p. 169.

<sup>13</sup>Allen Yarnell, Democrats and Progressives: The 1948 Presidential Election as a Test of Postwar Liberalism (Berkeley, 1974), pp. 36-37.

<sup>14</sup>Halberstam, The Powers That Be (New York, 1979), p. 447.



<sup>15</sup>Quoted in Thomas A. Bailey, The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion on Foreign Policy (New York, 1948), p. 88.

<sup>16</sup>Robert Dallek, The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs (New York, 1983).

<sup>17</sup>See, for example, Scott A. Harris, "Domestic Politics and the Formulation of United States China Policy, 1949-1972," University of Wisconsin (Madison), 1980. Donald J. Manning, "Soviet-American Relations, 1929-1941: The Impact of Domestic Considerations of Foreign Policy Decision-Making," Michigan State University, 1978; Douglas J. Murray, "The Relation Between International Politics and Domestic Politics: The Politics of North American Defense," University of Texas (Austin), 1979; Samuel Sandler, "Reconciling Domestic and International Politics: The Eisenhower and Nixon Presidencies," Johns Hopkins University, 1977; Kenneth Ray Stevens, "The 'Caroline' Affair: Anglo-American Relations and Domestic Politics, 1837-1842," Indiana University, 1982. Duane Tannenbaum, "The Bricker Amendment Controversy: The Interaction between Domestic and Foreign Affairs," Columbia University, 1980. George B. Young, "The Influence of Politics on American Diplomacy during Cleveland's Administration 1885-1889, 1893-1897," Yale University, 1979.

<sup>18</sup>Ernest R. May, The Making of the Monroe Doctrine (Cambridge, Mass., 1975); Harry Ammon, "The Monroe Doctrine: Domestic Politics or National Decision?" and Ernest R. May, "Response to Harry Ammon," Diplomatic History 5 (Winter, 1981): 53-73.

<sup>19</sup>Walter LaFeber's contribution to "Responses to Charles S. Maier, 'Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations,'" Diplomatic History 5 (Fall, 1981), 364.

<sup>20</sup>For example, in his distinguished book on American involvement in Vietnam, George Herring often cites compelling domestic political considerations for

choosing certain policy options, only to dismiss them by observing that international considerations were the paramount factor. In discussing John F. Kennedy's policy he writes: "Throughout the year, Republicans and right-wing Democrats had charged the administration with weakness, and Kennedy seems to have feared that a decision to negotiate on Vietnam would unleash domestic political attacks on him as rancorous and destructive as those which had followed the fall of China in 1949. The President was more concerned with the international implications however" (America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 [New York, 1979], p.82.) Similarly, with respect to Lyndon Johnson, Herring observes that "Johnson and Rusk had been at the center of the political upheaval that had followed the fall of China in 1949, and they were certain that the 'loss' of Vietnam would produce an even more explosive debate, 'a mean and destructive debate,' Johnson once commented, 'that would shatter my Presidency, kill my administration and damage our democracy.' They feared even more deeply the international consequences of withdrawal" (America's Longest War, pp. 142-143). The same pattern emerges in his discussion of Nixon: "As a young Congressman, Nixon had led the right-wing Republican attack on Truman for "losing" China, and, like Johnson before him, he feared the domestic upheaval that might accompany the fall of South Vietnam to Communism. The reaction would be 'terrible,' he told a journalist in May 1969, ...we would destroy ourselves if we pulled out in a way that wasn't really honorable.' Most important, Nixon and Kissinger feared the international consequences of a precipitous withdrawal" (America's Longest War, p. 219). Herring may be right in each instance, but we need to know a great deal more about the thought processes and priorities of the Presidents involved and about their reading of the public pulse before we can be sure.

<sup>21</sup>Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York, 1983), V, p. 43.

<sup>22</sup>See, for example, Marc Trachtenberg, "The Social Interpretation of Foreign Policy," Review of Politics (1978): 328-350; Morton Berkowitz et al., The Politics of American Foreign Policy: The Social Context of Decisions (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1977); and Barry Hughes, The Domestic Context of American Foreign Policy (San Francisco, 1978).

<sup>23</sup>See especially Graham T. Allison, The Essence of Decision; Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, 1971); I.M. Destler, Presidents, Bureaucrats, and Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C., 1974); and Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (New York, 1971).

<sup>24</sup>See especially William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire (New York, 1978), p. 87 and also Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy, 1938-1976 (New York, 1977), pp. 47-48; Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945 (New York, 1978), pp. 715-716; and Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston, 1977), p. 57.

<sup>25</sup>See Lawrence Gelfand's thoughtful observations in "American Foreign Policy and Public Opinion: Some Concerns for Scholars," Reviews in American History (Sept., 1977), 418-425.

<sup>26</sup>Among books which stress the public's malleability are Bernard C. Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement (Princeton, 1957); Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr., Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion (Bloomington, Indiana, 1965); Robert C. Hilderbrand, Power and the People: Executive Management of Public Opinion in Foreign Affairs, 1897-1921 (Chapel Hill, 1981); Michael Leigh, Mobilizing Consent: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy, 1937-1947 (Westport, Conn., 1976); Ralph B. Levering, American Opinion and the Russian Alliance, 1939-1945 (Chapel Hill, 1976) and The Public and American Foreign

Policy, 1918-1978 (New York, 1978); and James N. Rosenau, National Leadership and Foreign Policy: A Case Study in the Mobilization of Public Support (Princeton, 1963).

<sup>27</sup>See Morgenthau's foreword to Doris A. Graber, Public Opinion, the President, and Foreign Policy (New York, 1968), p. iii.

<sup>28</sup>In addition to the works cited under n. 26 above see Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York, 1950); Harwood Childs, Public Opinion: Nature, Formation and Role (Princeton, 1965); V. O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York, 1964); Lester Markel, ed., Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York, 1949); and James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York, 1964).

<sup>29</sup>An excellent study which might be used as a model for other presidencies is Richard W. Steele, "The Pulse of the People: Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Gauging of American Public Opinion," Journal of Contemporary History 9 (1974): 195-216. See also Ernest May's discussion of the infrequency with which American statesmen have acted in a manner contrary to the public will in his "The Role of Public Opinion" in William Nelson, ed., Theory and Practice in American Politics (Chicago, 1964); p. 118.

<sup>30</sup>On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War (New York, 1979), p.114. It should be noted, however, that in Soviet-American Confrontation (Baltimore, 1973), p. 53, Paterson argues that "the administration knew that it was politically dangerous to go to Congress in mid-1946 for more money for the Export-Import Bank to cover a Russian loan or for a special appropriation for Russia."

<sup>31</sup>On Every Front, p. 173.

<sup>32</sup>See Melvyn Leffler's contribution to "Responses to Charles S. Maier, 'Marking Time: The Historiography

of International Relations," Diplomatic History 4 (Fall, 1981), 368.

<sup>33</sup>John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," Diplomatic History 7 (Summer, 1983), 178.

<sup>34</sup>On Every Front, p. 114.

<sup>35</sup>In this regard Robert Messer's description of the modus operandi of Jimmy Byrnes may be instructive: "Byrnes was not simply an indicator of mass public opinion. His antennae were more sensitive, more sophisticated than that. As an experienced and astute legislative manager, he had spent much of his life estimating majorities among those who counted. He was alert to the first breath of change in the domestic political winds (James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War [Chapel Hill, 1982], p. 7).

<sup>36</sup>Charles S. Maier, "Marking Time: The Historiography of International Relations," in Michael Kammen, ed. The Past Before Us (Ithaca, 1980), p. 385.

<sup>37</sup>The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York, 1959).

<sup>38</sup>On Every Front, p. 70.

<sup>39</sup>We need to know more about how corporations with an interest in American foreign policy operate in particular instances. Suggestive may be the fact that United Fruit in the early 1950s put a lot of effort into shaping public and congressional opinion re Guatemalan policy and did not rely exclusively on its extensive governmental connections. See Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit (New York, 1982), pp. 79-97. Another and potentially very fertile work to which historians should turn their attention is Robert A. Pastor, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy, 1929-1976 (Berkeley, 1980).

<sup>40</sup>Times Literary Supplement, 27 November 1981, p. 1382.

<sup>41</sup>See Arthur Lloyd Skop, "The Primacy of Domestic Politics: Eckart Kehr and the Intellectual Development of Charles Beard," History and Theory 13 (1974), 119-131.

<sup>42</sup>Arno J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (New Haven, 1959), and Politics and Diplomacy of Peacemaking (London, 1968).

<sup>43</sup>Benjamin Page and Richard Brody, "Policy Voting and the Electoral Process: The Vietnam War Issue," American Political Science Review 66 (1972): 981.

<sup>44</sup>See, for example, Bernard C. Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign Policy (Boston, 1973), pp. 184-186.

<sup>45</sup>Robert A. Divine, Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections, 1940-1948 (New York, 1974), p. viii.

<sup>46</sup>Bernard C. Cohen, ed., Foreign Policy in American Government (Boston, 1965), pp. 3-5.

<sup>47</sup>Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (New York, 1955), p. 42.

<sup>48</sup>Bernard C. Cohen, "The Relationship Between Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Maker," in Melvin Small, ed., Public Opinion and Historians: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Detroit, 1970), p. 77.

<sup>49</sup>James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: An Operational Formulation (New York, 1964), p. 17.

<sup>50</sup>Jerome S. Bruner, Mandate from the People (New York, 1944), p. 3.

<sup>51</sup>The phrase is borrowed from Marc Trachtenberg's suggestive article "The Social Interpretation of Foreign Policy," p. 335. Trachtenberg appears to be somewhat more optimistic than I that elections may yet

turn out to afford some form of democratic control over foreign policy.

<sup>52</sup>See, for example, Edward Tufte, The Political Control of the Economy (Princeton, 1978) and Donald T. Critchlow, "The Political Control of the Economy: Deficit Spending as a Political Belief, 1932-1952," The Public Historian (Spring, 1981), pp. 5-22.

<sup>53</sup>See especially Wilbur Edel, "The State Department, the Public and the United Nations Concept, 1939-1945," diss. Columbia, 1951.

<sup>54</sup>Quoted in Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York, 1950), p. 852.

<sup>55</sup>For a more detailed discussion of the possibility of interpreting the UN policy of the Roosevelt Administration in terms of domestic politics see my "United States Planning for the United Nations: Have We Been Asking the Right Questions?" Diplomatic History 6 (Summer, 1982), pp. 245-265.

<sup>56</sup>Public Opinion and American Democracy, p. 423.

### **Melby's Kuomintang Follies**

edited by

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John F. Melby was an eloquent witness to the collapse of the Nationalist government in China. As Second Secretary of the American embassy in Chungking and Nanking from 1945 through 1948, Melby recorded his observations in a diary, excerpts from which appeared in The Mandate of Heaven: Record of a Civil War; China, 1945-49 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968). Melby's memoir provided not only an account of the disintegration of Kuomintang rule, but also penetrating portraits of leaders, Chinese and American, who tried to stave off defeat. Chiang Kai-shek, in Melby's eyes, was "the perfect picture of

a Mongol emperor" whose "complete self-confidence somehow conveyed the limitation of outlook;" General Albert C. Wedemeyer was "the only living human being" immune to "the justly famous charm act of Madame Chiang;" Ambassador John Leighton Stuart "never gave up until there was no longer anything to give up." With an alternately funny, acid, and evocative pen, Melby described a government in decline and a society in turmoil. "It seems," he reflected, "that in this world where there is not death there is confusion."

Missing from Melby's memoir, but nestled among his papers, is a summary in verse of the folly and decay that surrounded Melby in China.<sup>1</sup> Although undated, this lampoon was probably written during 1948; although unsigned, it exudes Melby's trenchant wit. It is a worthy and witty addendum to Melby's lively record of the Chinese Civil War.

Every Monday morn at ten,  
Chiang Kai-shek and Wu Teh-chen<sup>2</sup>  
Bow three times and make salaam  
To the phizz of Sunset Sam

(chorus) Kuomintang, my Kuomintang,  
Always right and never wrong.  
Here's to San Min Chu-I--Phooey!<sup>3</sup>

Ninety words, no more no less,  
Augur China's happiness.  
As O.K. Yui<sup>4</sup> reads the will,  
Kung<sup>5</sup> slips out to tap the till.

(chorus)

"Democracy" is very good,  
So is "People's Livelihood",  
"Nationalism"--much to give,<sup>6</sup>  
If you have a relative.<sup>7</sup>

(chorus)



Pai Chung-hsi,<sup>8</sup> he falls asleep,  
Counting little Moslem sheep;  
Chen Li-fu<sup>9</sup> repeats the text,  
Wond'ring whom to bump off next.

(chorus)

Missing from the august throng  
Is that old Baptist, Feng Yu-hsiang,<sup>10</sup>  
Who ditched the flock of party jerks,  
To study foreign waterworks.

(chorus)

Heark, the litany is sung:  
"Down with rebel Mao Tse-tung!"  
Loud and clear, this proud refrain,  
As Chen Yi<sup>11</sup> wrecks another train.

(chorus)

Chiang now speaks, as man to man,  
"Boys, I've got another plan."  
It won't take much to get it done--  
Just the mint of Washington.

(chorus)

"We've got Bullitt, Judd and Luce,"<sup>12</sup>  
"And the spectre of the Russ."  
"Marshall can't afford to scoff  
"If he smells beef stroganoff."

(chorus)

Budgets rise and budgets fall,  
But here there are no falls at all.  
Presses wheeze while paper chits  
Eradicate the deficits.

(chorus)

Meanwhile, there's not much to mind,  
Nanking has the tax in kind;  
And to guard its threatened door,  
The staunch Peace Preservation Corps.<sup>13</sup>

(chorus)

Banned, the Democratic League,<sup>14</sup>  
But freedom rings within intrigue:  
They elected party gnats  
To posts as "Social Democrats".

(chorus)

One more piece of business left:  
A clumsy bit of public theft.  
The culprit's scolded, then is hurled  
Upon a trip around the world.

(chorus)

So every Monday morn at ten,  
The boys discuss reform, and then  
Love for country mounts and mounts  
In growing New York bank accounts.<sup>15</sup>

(chorus)

Finally, the meeting's done,  
The all-important victory won--  
Three more bows from every knave,  
As Sun revolves inside his grave.

Kuomintang, my Kuomintang,  
Always right and never wrong.  
Here's to San Min Chu-i: Phooey!

### Notes

<sup>1</sup>China File--General 1948 (June-Dec.), Melby Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

<sup>2</sup>Secretary General of the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee, 1941-49.

<sup>3</sup>A series of lectures delivered in 1924 by Sun Yat-sen and published in English as the Three Principles of the People.

<sup>4</sup>Nationalist Vice Minister of Finance, 1941-44, and Minister of Finance, 1944-48. The reading of Sun Yat-sen's will, which some Chinese considered a sacred document, was a Monday morning ritual in Nationalist government offices. See C. Martin Wilbur, Sun Yat-Sen: Frustrated Patriot (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 277-78.

<sup>5</sup>H. H. Kung, Nationalist Minister of Finance, 1933-44, notorious for his diversion of government funds to personal accounts. See Michael Schaller, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 97-98.

<sup>6</sup>Sun Yat-sen's three principles were Nationalism, People's Livelihood, and Democracy.

<sup>7</sup>Nepotism and corruption brought political power and wealth to the Soong family, whose members included Madame Chiang, her brother-in-law H. H. Kung, and her brother T. V. Soong, Governor of the Central Bank of China and Nationalist Foreign Minister.

<sup>8</sup>Nationalist Minister of National Defense, 1946-48, and a leading Moslem.

<sup>9</sup>Leader, along with his brother Chen Kuo-fo, of the CC Clique, a reactionary faction of the Kuomintang.

<sup>10</sup>Nationalist general and convert to Christianity, who baptized his troops with a firehose. In 1947, while heading a Nationalist mission to the United States to study water conservation, Feng denounced the Nationalist government and joined a dissident faction of the Kuomintang that opposed Chiang's leadership.

<sup>11</sup>Commander of the Communist New Fourth Army, who cut the important Lunghai railroad during fighting in Shantung Province in 1947.

<sup>12</sup>William C. Bullitt, former ambassador to the Soviet Union, Representative Walter H. Judd, Republican of Minnesota, and Henry Luce, editor-in-chief of Time and Life, all staunch anti-communists and outspoken advocates of increased American aid to the Nationalists.

<sup>13</sup>Nationalists Chinese provincial military force.

<sup>14</sup>In October 1947, the Nationalist Government outlawed the Democratic League, a political organization with strong support came from liberal intellectuals.

<sup>15</sup>During the final months of the Chinese Civil War, President Harry S. Truman fixed the blame for the Nationalist defeat on the "grafters and crooks" in Chiang's ruling circle. He told David E. Lilienthal, the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, that the United States had given the Nationalists \$2.5 billion in aid since World War II, and "I'll bet you that a billion dollars of it is in New York banks today." See Lilienthal, Journals Vol. II: The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 525.

**Researching American Foreign Relations Abroad:  
New Delhi**

by

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During the 1984-85 academic year, I had the opportunity to work in India on American-Indian relations after 1946. Some of my experiences and observations might be of interest to diplomatic historians.

Previous authors of these essays--visitors to the Vatican (David Alvarez), Canada (William Stueck), and

the Philippines (Roger Dingman)--have described an abundance of material in these countries' archives of great value to American foreign relations specialists. I cannot make the same claim for Indian sources. I can report, however, that with some preparation, appropriate expectations, a sense of humor, a bit of patience and a measure of polite doggedness, scholars can find useful information in New Delhi on Indian statecraft and policymaking. More significantly, the documents--almost all of them in English--reveal much about the psychology of India's statesmen and stateswomen, and broadly suggest the cultural milieu within which policymakers operated.

There are two major obstacles to doing research on Indian diplomacy after 1947. The first is the great sensitivity of the Indian government to the possible revelation of politically compromising or embarrassing information. Indian leaders, and many other Indians, believe their country is under siege, and that enemies in other countries and within India might make use of information revealed by naive Western scholars. Official caution will often seem excessive to a scholar who has worked in American and British archives. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs claims to open its documents after thirty years, but in fact it doesn't work that way: it is difficult to find much on US-India relations in the Indian National Archives in New Delhi, and documents on Indian relations with border states--Pakistan (or that area), Kashmir, Bhutan, Sikkim, Tibet and China--are closed after 1913.

The prospects for a loosening of official restrictions are dim. Recent events have raised India's suspicion of Western countries. Some Indian leaders believe that the US had a hand in the assassination of Mrs. Gandhi last November, most Indians are unhappy over what they regard as American, Canadian and British refusal to crack down on militant Sikhs, and the French were implicated in the Coomar Narain spy scandal that broke in January 1985. National Archives officials hope that the Ministry of External Affairs will surrender more documents to them when a new

Archives building, now under construction in New Delhi, is completed next year. A conversation I had with a Ministry official suggests that this is unlikely. The issue is not storage space, but secrecy.

The second obstacle to effective research on Indian-American relations is bureaucracy. At times it is hard to tell where government policy leaves off and bureaucratic inertia begins. Certainly bureaucracy presents the researcher with an interminable series of day-to-day frustrations. You wait in offices for bureaucrats who never come or come very late, sometimes because they haven't been told you are waiting. You fill out forms, wait for several officials to pound them into legitimacy with their rubber stamps, and then are told that the forms are invalid because you have failed to print your name in block letters. There are different values of permission. That you are allowed to consult one collection in a library does not mean you are allowed to consult another, for which special permission must be received, and neither permission confers the privilege to photocopy. So it goes. I found the most successful strategy for dealing with the bureaucracy was to be courteous and firm. Abusing an official may be momentarily liberating, but that kind of behavior is considered the last refuge of imperialists, and it will get you nowhere.

Most diplomatic historians will need to work only in New Delhi, the capital. The place to begin is the National Archives of India, located on Janpath, New Delhi's main road. Obtain a temporary pass from the reception office to the left of the main door, and ask to see someone upstairs, perhaps an Assistant Director. That person will wish you well, then send you downstairs to the Research Room, where someone will inform you of at least some of the procedures you must follow before you can begin your work. Here is what you must do:

1. Produce letters from the US Embassy in New Delhi and your department chair or a senior scholar at home,

certifying that you are an American citizen and a "bona fide" scholar.

2. Fill out forms requesting permission to use the Archives.

3. Apply for a scholar's pass, to be shown at the main door. This application will take about ten days to process; until you receive the pass, you can get daily passes from the reception office.

4. Determine immediately if any of the documents you are likely to requisition are in the government's "closed" category. If you are working on the post-1947 period, simply assume that some will be. Write a letter to the Ministry of External Affairs, requesting permission to see closed documents. Officials at the Archives will forward your request to the Ministry and pursue it diligently. Your request will probably be denied. If the Ministry decides, however, to allow you to see closed papers, expect it to attach conditions to its approval, perhaps including the right to screen your notes before you leave India.

5. Requisition the government of India's Index to the Proceedings of the External Affairs Department for the years you are interested in; you may request five at a time. These volumes provide file numbers and brief descriptions of the files. Do not assume that because a file is listed in the index it will be available. On the other hand, a file described as "secret" in the index may now be declassified.

6. Requisition the files you want, using the slips available at the front desk. You may request ten files at a time. Orders go in twice a day, at 10 AM and 1 PM, and files are brought from storage twice, at 1 and 4. You should, therefore, arrive before 10 AM, fill out twenty slips, hand them in with the request that they be "sent up" in two batches, then spend the day going through more indexes or off somewhere else, returning the next morning to see your files.

7. If your files are not there, it is because (a) they are "closed," that is classified, of (b) they are "not transferred" from the Ministry to the Archives, which also means they are classified, or (c) they are considered too "brittle" to be handled by scholars. I convinced the Director of the Archives to allow me to see documents in this last category, but as it turned

out the brittle documents were also "closed," and thus unavailable.

A vast majority of the files I requisitioned were either closed or not transferred, and my experience might discourage other scholars from trying to use the Archives. I advise researchers to visit anyway. Indian classification rules are irregularly applied, and gems do occasionally turn up: I found a very interesting file on Indian policy toward Indochina in 1949. The staff at the Archives, from Director R.K. Perti on down, are friendly and cooperative. Working conditions are reasonably good. Researchers get their own desks, and each desk has its own fan and light. (The building, alas, is not air conditioned, but the new building reportedly will be.) The Research Room is open from 9:30 to 7 six days a week, except for the second Saturday of the month. The Archives building is a brisk walk from Connaught Circus, the shopping and restaurant center of New Delhi, and near a number of good hotels.

The best place to do research on Indo-US relations in Delhi is the Jawarharlal Nehru Museum and Library, located at Teen Murti House, the first Prime Minister's palatial residence. The Library is an attractive modern building back and to the left as you enter the Teen Murti compound. Here too it is essential to prove bona fides with a letter from your department chair. Here too you will be asked to fill out an admission form, in return for which you will receive an admission card, permitting you to consult books, journals, newspapers and private papers available in the Library. The Library has excellent collections of all these things. Space is a bit short in the main reading room, so arrive early (the library is open from 9 to 7 six days a week) and claim a desk or part of a table, pushing aside any books that have been left there. Collect books, journals and newspapers yourself, or ask the capable staff for help.

Of greatest interest to diplomatic historians are the private papers housed upstairs the Library's manuscript room. Included in this collection, and of



value, are the papers of the All India Congress Committee, Vijayalakshmi Pandit (Nehru's sister), M.C. Chagla, G.B. Pant, K.P.S. Menon, and Jawarharlal Nehru. The Nehru papers, open through September 1946, are available only by special permission, but this is easy to obtain through Mrs. Jayaprabha Ravindran in the manuscript room. There are oral history transcripts of interviews with Menon, Indonesian nationalists Mohammed Hatta and Ali Sastroamidjojo, and Chester Bowles, and papers on US-India relations from the Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower libraries. The Nehru papers after September 1946, the papers of J.J. Singh, Asaf Ali, and V.K. Krishna Menon, are in the Library but closed to all but a few scholars at this writing.

There is no great difficulty in obtaining manuscripts. Simply go through the list of collections, jot down the name, number and dates of the ones you want, then submit your requests in duplicate to Mrs. Ravindran on whomever is at the desk. Unless there is a rush on, the documents should appear within twenty minutes. The staff will keep your files for you overnight, and you may help yourself to them the following morning. Photocopying is available, with advance notice, for 60 paise (about \$.05) a page.

Despite limited-seating, inadequate lighting, and microfilm readers that need fifteen minutes of rest every hour, the Nehru Library is a splendid place to work. The building is air conditioned and chairs are comfortable. Many scholars and students drop in to catch up on their newspaper or journal reading, and no one seems to mind. A canteen in the Library serves coffee, tea and inexpensive snacks, though most Westerners will find it inadequate for lunch and will prefer to catch an autorickshaw to the Connaught area, a ten minute ride. The Teen Murti grounds are delightful for a stroll. You'll find beautiful flowers, peacocks, the Nehru Museum, a planetarium--outside is a model of the space shuttle--and a hoary medieval hunting lodge.

Scholars interested in Mahatma's Gandhi's role in creating an Indian foreign policy should visit the Gandhi Museum and Library, near the Jamuna River. The Library has a complete collection of Gandhi's works, as well as a number of general works on Indian foreign relations.

New Delhi is an exciting city. It has impressive monuments, attractive parks, lively bazaars, interesting museums, and terrific shopping. It is possible to find comfortable accommodations and good food for a reasonable price. In addition, there is an ineffable quality of life in India that Westerners seem better able to experience than to explain. Too many Westerners romanticize India; one would have to be extremely cold-blooded to ignore the pollution, disease, and terrible poverty in New Delhi and throughout the country. But there is also an undeniable enchantment there, and it is well worth a visit. There is much to be learned in India, and only a small part of it comes from documents.

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### ANNOUNCEMENTS

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### OBITUARY

E. Berkeley Tompkins, a former SHAFR member, died on April 17 at Boca Raton, Florida. Tompkins served as director of the Philadelphia Maritime Museum, was associated with Stanford University and the Hoover Institution of War, Revolution, and Peace (1963-1971), was director of Delaware's Division of Historical and Cultural Affairs from 1971-1973, and was Executive Director of the National Historical Publications and Records Commission. After leaving NHPRC, Tompkins remained in the Washington area serving as an investment counselor and president of a consulting firm. In 1982 he moved to Florida.

Tompkins produced numerous publications. We remain indebted for Anti-Imperialism in the United States: The Great Debate, 1890-1920 (1970).

### GRAEBNER AWARD SOLICITATIONS

On behalf of the Graebner Award Committee, Richard Dean Burns is soliciting nominations for the 1986 Graebner Award, which is to be made at SHAFR's June meeting in Washington. Nominators are asked to submit three copies of a statement (details on pages 58-9 of this Newsletter) by March 1, 1986, to Professor Burns in care of the Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, California State University-Los Angeles, 5151 State University Drive, Los Angeles, CA 90032.

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### SHAFR activities at the AHA

Council Meeting                      Friday, Dec. 27                      8-11p.m.  
Conference Room 3, 9th floor, Marriott

Reception:                              Saturday, Dec. 28                      5-7p.m.  
Room 10, 7th floor, Marriott

Luncheon:                                Sunday, Dec. 29                      12:15-2p.m.  
Board Rooms 8 & 9, 4th floor, Marriott

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Justus Doenecke, co-chair of program for the 1986 summer SHAFR meeting at Georgetown, reminds the members that all persons interested in presenting papers or organizing sessions should forward a letter including title and abstract of the paper and the names and university affiliation of prospective participants. Full panels are preferred. Papers and panels are particularly welcome on the forty years of Cold War historiography and matters of declassification. For further information contact:

Justus Doenecke  
Division of Social Sciences  
New College, University of South Florida  
Sarasota, Florida 33580

### CALL FOR PAPERS

The Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association will meet in Honolulu, Hawaii, August 13-17, 1986. The association is inviting papers and/or session panels. Direct inquiries to:

G. Ralph Falconeri  
Department of History  
University of Oregon  
Eugene, Oregon 97403

### CONFERENCE ON U.S.-MOROCCAN RELATIONS

To commemorate the bicentennial of U.S.-Moroccan relations (in 1786 Thomas Barclay and Sidi Muhammad bin Abdallah negotiated the Treaty of Marrakesh) Old Dominion University, Norfolk, Virginia and Mohammad V University in Rabat, Morocco, will co-sponsor an interdisciplinary conference on U.S.-Moroccan Relations. The conference will be held in Norfolk on November 14-15, 1986. Sessions are anticipated to focus on cultural, political, strategic and economic aspects of the past, present and future relationship. Abstracts may be presented in Arabic, English, or French. The deadline for proposals is March 1, 1986.

Proposals should be submitted to:

Jerome Bookin-Weiner  
Center for International  
Programs  
Old Dominion University  
Norfolk, Virginia 23508

or

Mohamed El Mansour  
Department d' Histoire  
Universite Mohammed V  
Rabat, Morocco

## REQUEST FOR BOOKS

Fudan University, one of China's best, has created a Center for American Studies which includes a Program on Chinese-American Relations. The Program is directed by the prominent scholar, Wang Xi. Professor Wang has indicated a need for books on American-East Asian Relations. If you are willing to donate books of good quality, please send them to Warren Cohen who will forward them. If you prefer, send them directly to Wang Xi.

Warren Cohen	Wang Xi
Asian Studies Center	Chinese-American Relations
101 International Center	Program
Michigan State University	Fudan University
East Lansing, MI 48824	Shanghai
	People's Republic of China

## COMMISSION OF HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

During the International Congress of Historical Sciences which took place in Bucharest in August 1980, a group of scholars from various countries proposed the formation of a Commission of History of International Relations. The founding of this commission was held in Milan from October 24th to 26th, 1981.

During the next few years the Commission will follow these guidelines:

(1) Study and discussion of the methodological problems concerning the History of International Relations and its teaching.

(2) Research into the History of International Relations in the Modern and Contemporary Ages as it relates to European and non-European states.

(3) Circulation of information concerning the opening and availability of archives, bibliographies

already completed or in progress and any other subject of interest for our field of study.

(4) Selection of common subjects for discussion and research in light of both the International Congresses of Historical Sciences and of other meetings and initiatives.

The Commission hopes to secure the cooperation of Institutes and bodies interested in studying the History of International Relations. (SHAFR has become a member of this organization). The Commission plans to send all members a Newsletter with information on the Commission's activities and on the scientific initiatives which are scheduled in the years 1985 and 1986.

#### **CALL FOR PAPERS**

The Society for Historians of the Early American Republic will hold its 8th conference on the early republic July 24-26, 1986, at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville. Proposals should be sent to Barbara Oberg, Box 348-A Baruch College, 17 Lexington Avenue, New York, NY 10010, before January 15, 1986.

#### **SEMINAR IN CUBA**

(The following reached the Newsletter office too late for participants to meet deadlines. However, it may be of interest as an information item.)

The Center for Cuban Studies, in collaboration with the National Cuban Archives, is organizing a special seminar and tour of Cuban archival and historical agencies and museums January 6-20, 1986. Claudia Hommel, New York City archivist and librarian, will lead the tour.

## WORLD WAR II AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN AMERICA

The above conference will be held at the Newark Campus of Rutgers University--the State University of New Jersey, April 4-6, 1986. Sessions will deal with literature, film, women, race relations, medicine, international relations, intelligence, and warfare.

For further information contact Warren Kimball, WWII Conference, Rutgers University, Newark, NJ 07102. Tel. (201) 648-5897.

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### PERSONALS

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Dorothy V. Jones (Newberry Library) has been awarded a MacArthur Foundation Fellowship in International Security by the Social Science Research Council. The two-year postdoctoral fellowship will underwrite training in philosophy and applied ethics, and research on the problem of an ethical framework for international affairs.

Olaf Riste (Forsvarets Hogskole, Oslo, Norway) has been appointed to the governing bureau of the Commission of History of International Relations. (See the item in Announcements).

Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt University) has been named winner of the Harold L. Peterson Award for the best periodical article dealing with American military history published in 1984. The winning article, "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48," appeared in the American Historical Review in April 1984. Congratulations!

SHAFR members Thomas M. Leonard (University of North Florida), Anna K. Nelson (George Washington University), and Priscilla Roberts (University of Hong Kong) are among those scholars receiving 1985 Beveridge & Littleton-Griswold Research Grants for

work on The United States and Central America; American Foreign Policy During the Eisenhower Administration; and Kuhn, Loeb & Company respectively.

Robert Dallek (UCLA) and Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt University) have received ACLS fellowships and/or grants-and-aid.

John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University) was among those scholars who visited the People's Republic of China and subsequently issued a report, American Studies in China, which discusses the state of American Studies in China.

David Culbert (Louisiana State University) has received an Earhart Foundation Fellowship and will be on leave January 1-June 1, 1986. Professor Culbert gave a plenary address on "Film and the Historian: Television's Vietnam," at the 16th International Congress of Historical Sciences, Stuttgart, August 1985. In September the 90-minute film, Huey Long, premiered at the New York Film Festival. Vincent Canby gave the film an extremely favorable review in the New York Times. Culbert originated the idea for the film and served as Associate Producer and Director of Historical Research.

Jim Hitchman (Western Washington University) is spending the fall semester at the Canadian-American Center, University of Maine at Orono.

Robert R. Swartout, Jr (Carroll of Montana) has been named the college's first recipient of the Burlington Northern Foundation Faculty Achievement Award given for superior scholarship and excellence in classroom teaching. Congratulations!



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## BONERS

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"From watching this film [Hearts and Minds], one could be led to believe many untruths. Had I not known better I would have believed that Vietnam was the only war in which civilians were ever killed after watching this film."

submitted by Sandra C. Taylor  
University of Utah

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## ABSTRACTS

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Howard Jones (University of Alabama), "The Diplomacy of Restraint: The United States' Efforts to Repatriate Greek Children Evacuated During the Civil War of 1946-49," Journal of Modern Greek Studies, III (May 1985): 65-85. During the Greek Civil War of 1946-49, Greek Communist guerrillas evacuated 28,000 children from Greece and relocated them in Yugoslavia and other East European Communist states. When the government in Athens accused the rebels of genocide and appealed to the UN and the US for help, the Truman administration in Washington felt compelled to examine the charges. The United States was committed to Greece (and Turkey) by the Truman Doctrine of March 1947, and this apparent new challenge of psychological warfare seemed to constitute an effort to undermine the Greek people's faith in America and promote a communist takeover. Despite the administration's hardline reputation, its advisers acted with restraint. The White House could not openly criticize Yugoslavia without endangering the possibility of exploiting the growing rift between Tito and the Soviets. Furthermore, there was no proof of Soviet involvement in the alleged kidnappings. Secretary of State George C. Marshall concluded that it was impossible to attribute motive. Indeed, he believed it likely that the Greek guerrillas were transporting the youths to safety in light of possible starvation

and an expected resurgence of war in northern Greece. But Marshall also understood that the administration was under pressure from Greek-American organizations and that failure to act in behalf of Greece would set a bad example for other nations during the Cold War. Thus he took the only feasible course: he appealed to the UN to work for the children's repatriation on humanitarian grounds. Although few of the youths ever returned to their homes in Greece, Marshall's policies maintained America's prestige in a no-win situation.

Frederick W. Marks III, "Franklin Roosevelt's Diplomatic Debut: The Myth of the Hundred Days," South Atlantic Quarterly, LXXXIV (Summer 1985). Contrary to the prevailing notion of a president preoccupied with domestic crises during the Hundred Days, one who was unable or unwilling to devote sufficient thought and time to foreign affairs, this article seeks to demonstrate that FDR plunged into a startlingly broad range of diplomatic activity from the moment he first entered the White House. He set a record not only for the number of times he met with foreign leaders, but also for the way in which he personally carried the burden of negotiation and for the sheer number of initiatives, virtually all of them fruitless. Roosevelt embraced the role of world leader in a way never again matched prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor and with results which can only be described as counterproductive. His was an administration which, intentionally or not, reinforced parochial attitudes, helping thereby to fashion the isolationist juggernaut of later fame.

James H. Hitchman (Western Washington University) "Parry and Thrust: Eisenhower, the Soviet Union and India, 1953-1961," World Review, vol. 24, No. 1, (April 1985). Based on material in the Eisenhower Library, this article contends that the President devised a realistic policy for India that consisted of a personal cultivation of Nehru, prompt recognition of the strategic importance of South Asia and economic assistance as an anticommunist measure. The evidence

indicates that Eisenhower and the NSC were aware of the Soviet economic offensive in India sooner than critics have realized, that Ike had a more sympathetic understanding of Nehru's socialism and nonalignment than observers have admitted and that the U.S. concluded an arms agreement with Pakistan in order to appear reliable to Pakistan, realizing that an alliance or close relations with India were impossible given Nehru's desire to avoid western entanglements and the proximity of Russia to India.

Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth College), "Forging the 'Great Chain': Daniel Webster and the Origins of American Foreign Policy Toward East Asia and the Pacific, 1841-1852," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 129, No. 3 (1985) 225-259. The essay seeks, through an examination of Daniel Webster's career as a diplomatist, to provide a general reassessment of the origins of American foreign policy toward East Asia and the Pacific region. It concludes that during two nonconsecutive terms as secretary of state, from 1841 to 1843 and from 1850 to 1852, Webster designed a cohesive strategy of maritime expansion for East Asia and the Pacific.

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## PUBLICATIONS

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D. Clayton James (Mississippi State), The Years of MacArthur: Triumph and Disaster 1945-1965. Houghton Mifflin. 1985. \$29.95, ISBN 0-395-36004-8.

James C. Bradford, ed., Command Under Sail: Makers of the American Naval Tradition 1775-1850. Naval Institute Press. 1985. \$24.95, ISBN 0-87021-137-4.

Richard Pfau (University of Miami), No Sacrifice Too Great: The Life of Lewis L. Strauss. University Press of Virginia. 1985. \$17.95, ISBN 0-8139-1038-2.

Carol Petillo (Boston College), ed., The Ordeal of Elizabeth Vaughan: A Wartime Diary of the Philippines. University of Georgia Press. 1985. \$24.95, ISBN 0-8203-0751-3.

Richard E. Welch, Jr. (LaFayette College), Response to Revolution: The United States and the Cuban Revolution, 1959-1961. University of North Carolina Press. 1985. \$24.00 cloth, ISBN 0-8078-1613-2; \$9.95 paper, ISBN 0-8078-4136-6.

Joseph M. Siracusa (University of Queensland, Australia), The Changing of America: 1945 to the Present. 1985. Forum Press. \$14.95, ISBN 0-8827-3116-5.

Ralph F. de Bedts (Old Dominion University), Ambassador Joseph Kennedy 1938-1940: An Anatomy of Appeasement. Peter Lang Publishing, New York, 1985. Cloth. \$31.15, ISBN 0-8204-0229-X.

Lester H. Brune (Bradley University), Chronological History of United States Foreign Relations: 1776 to January 20, 1981. Garland Publishing. 2 volumes. \$150.00, ISBN 0-8240-9056-X.

Robert Beisner (American University), From the Old Diplomacy to the New: 1865-1900. Harlen Davidson. 1985. Now in paper \$7.95, ISBN 0-88295-702-3.

David L Anderson (Indiana Central University), Imperialism & Idealism: American Diplomats in China, 1861-1898. Indiana University Press. 1985. \$24.95, ISBN 0-253-32918-3.

Bruce Kuklick (University of Pennsylvania), Churchmen & Philosophers: From Jonathan Edwards to John Dewey. Yale University Press. 1985. \$27.50, ISBN 0-8071-1237-2.

K. Jack Bauer (Rensselaer Polytech Institute), Zackary Taylor: Soldier, Planter, Statesman of the Old Southwest. Louisiana State University Press. 1985. \$29.95, ISBN 0-8071-1237-2.

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**CALENDAR**

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- December 27-30      The 100th annual meeting of the AHA will be held in New York. The headquarters hotel is to be the Marriott Marquis on Times Square.
- January 1            Membership fees in all categories are due, payable at the national office of SHAFR.
- January 20           Deadlines for the 1985 Bernath article award and the Bernath book award.
- February 1           Deadline, materials for the March Newsletter.
- March 1              Nominations for the Bernath lecture prize are due.
- April 1               Applications for the W. Stull Holt Dissertation Fellowship are due.
- April 9 - 12         The 79th annual meeting of the OAH will be held in New York with headquarters at the New York Penta Hotel.
- May 1                 Deadline, materials for the June Newsletter.
- June 25-28          The 12th annual conference of SHAFR will be held at Georgetown University. Program co-chairs are Thomas Helde (Georgetown) and Justus Doenecke (New College, University of South Florida). See announcements for more information.

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| August 1      | Deadline, materials for the September <u>Newsletter</u> .          |
| November 1    | Deadline, materials for the December <u>Newsletter</u> .           |
| November 1-15 | Annual election for SHAFR officers.                                |
| December 1    | Deadline, nominations for the Bernath Dissertation Support Awards. |

(The 1986 AHA will meet in Chicago at the Hyatt Regency. Margaret C. Jacob, Graduate Center, City University of New York, is the program chair for the meeting.)

(The 1987 OAH will meet in Philadelphia, April 2-5. The program co-chairs are:

Drew Gilpin Faust, American Civilization, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104  
and

Ronald Walters, Department of History, the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Maryland, 21218.

The deadline for submissions in March 15, 1986.)

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**THE STUART L. BERNATH MEMORIAL PRIZES**

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The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Lectureship, the Memorial Book Competition, and the Memorial Lecture Prize, were established in 1976, 1972, and 1976 respectively, through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath, Laguna Hills, California, in honor of their late son, and are administered by special committees of SHAFR.

**The Stuart L. Bernath Memorial Book Competition**

Description: This is a competition for a book dealing with any aspect of American foreign relations. The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage

distinguished research and writing by scholars of American foreign relations.

Eligibility: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations, published during 1985. It must be the author's first or second book.

Procedures: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The book should be sent directly to: Stephen E. Pelz, History Department, University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Amherst, Massachusetts 01003.

Books may be sent at any time during 1985, but should not arrive later than January 20, 1986.

The award of \$1500.00 will be announced at the annual luncheon of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations held in conjunction with the Organization of American Historians, in April, 1986, in New York City.

#### Previous Winners:

- |      |  |
|------|--|
| 1972 | Joan Hoff Wilson (Sacramento)                  |
|      | Kenneth E. Shewmaker (Dartmouth)               |
| 1973 | John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)                        |
| 1974 | Michael H. Hunt (Yale)                         |
| 1975 | Frank D. McCann, Jr. (New Hampshire)           |
|      | Stephen E. Pelz (Massachusetts-Amherst)        |
| 1976 | Martin J. Sherwin (Princeton)                  |
| 1977 | Roger V. Dingman (Southern California)         |
| 1978 | James R. Leutze (North Carolina - Chapel Hill) |
| 1979 | Phillip J. Baram (Program Manager, Boston)     |
| 1980 | Michael Schaller (Arizona)                     |
| 1981 | Bruce R. Kuniholm (Duke)                       |
|      | Hugh DeSantis (Department of State)            |
| 1982 | David Reynolds (Cambridge)                     |
| 1983 | Richard Immerman (Hawaii)                      |
| 1984 | Michael H. Hunt (North Carolina - Chapel Hill) |
| 1985 | David Wyman (Massachusetts-Amherst)            |

## The Stuart L. Bernath Lecture Prize

Eligibility: The lecture will be comparable in style and scope to the yearly SHAFR presidential address delivered at the annual meetings of the American Historical Association, but will be restricted to younger scholars with excellent reputations for teaching and research. Each lecturer will address himself not specifically to his own research interests, but to broad issues of concern to students of American foreign policy.

Procedures: The Bernath Lecture Committee is soliciting nominations for the lecture from members of the Society. Nominations, in the form of a short letter and curriculum vita, if available, should reach the Committee no later than March 1, 1986. The chairman of the committee to whom nominations should be sent is: Russell Buhite, Department of History, University of Oklahoma, Normal, Oklahoma 73069.

The award is \$500.00, with publication in Diplomatic History

### Previous Winners

1977	Joan Hoff Wilson (Fellow, Radcliffe Institute)
1978	David S. Patterson (Colgate)
1979	Marilyn B. Young (Michigan)
1980	John L. Gaddis (Ohio U)
1981	Burton Spivak (Bates College)
1982	Charles DeBenedetti (Toledo)
1983	Melvyn P. Leffler (Vanderbilt)
1984	Michael J. Hogan (Miami)
1985	Michael Schaller (Arizona)



## The Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize

The purpose of the prize is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of diplomatic relations.

Eligibility: Prize competition is open to any article on any topic in American foreign relations that is published during 1985. The author must be under 35 years of age, or within 5 years after receiving the Ph.D., at the time of publication. Previous winners of the Stuart L. Bernath Book Award are excluded.

Procedures: Nominations shall be submitted by the author or by any member of SHAFR by January 20, 1986. It will be helpful if the person making the nomination can supply at least one copy and if possible five (5) copies. The chairperson of the committee is: Harold Josephson, Department of History, University of North Carolina, Charlotte, North Carolina 28223.

The award of \$300.00 will be presented at the SHAFR luncheon at the annual meeting of the OAH in April, 1986, in New York City.

### Previous Winners

1977	John C.A. Stagg (U of Auckland, N.Z.)
1978	Michael H. Hunt (Yale)
1979	Brian L. Villa (U of Ottawa)
1980	James I. Matray (New Mexico State) David A. Rosenberg (Chicago)
1981	David Little (Clark)
1982	Fred Pollack (Cedar Knolls, N.J.)
1983	Chester Pach, Jr. (Texas Tech)
1985	Melvyn Leffler (Vanderbilt)

## The Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Fund

This fund has been established through the generosity of Dr. and Mrs. Gerald J. Bernath in honor of their late son to help doctoral students defray some of the expenses encountered in the concluding phases of writing their dissertations.

Requirements include:

1. The dissertation must cover some aspect of American foreign relations.
2. An award will help defray:
  - (a) last-minute costs to consult a collection of original materials that has just become available or to obtain photocopies from such sources
  - (b) typing and/or reproducing copies of the manuscript
  - (c) abstracting costs.
3. The award committee presumes that most research and writing of the dissertation has been completed. Awards are not intended for general research or for time to write.
4. Applicants must be members of SHAFR.
5. A report on how the funds were used must be filed by the successful applicant(s) not later than six (6) months following presentation of each award.
6. The applicant's supervisor must include a brief statement certifying the accuracy of the applicant's request and report of completion.
7. Generally an award will not exceed \$500.00, and a minimum, of three awards each year will be made. More awards are possible if the amounts requested are less.

Nominations, with supporting documentation should be sent to Geoffrey S. Smith, Bernath Dissertation Fund Chair, Department of History, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, Canada, K7L 3N6. The deadline for applications is December 1, 1985.

1985 award winner - John Nielson (UC-Santa Barbara).

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**THE SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN  
RELATIONS INVITES APPLICATIONS FOR THE W. STULL HOLT  
DISSERTATION FELLOWSHIP TO BE AWARDED IN JUNE, 1985.**  
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The award will be \$1500.00.

Applicants must be candidates for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, whose dissertation projects are directly concerned with the history of United States foreign relations. The award is intended for the defraying of travel and living expenses connected with the research and/or the writing of the dissertation.

To be qualified, applicants must be candidates in good standing at a doctoral granting graduate school who will have satisfactorily completed all requirements for the doctoral degree (including the general or comprehensive examinations) except for the dissertation before April, 1985.

There is no special application form. Applicants must submit a complete academic transcript of graduate work to date. A prospectus of the dissertation must accompany the application. This should describe the dissertation project as fully as possible, indicating the scope, method, and chief source materials. The applicant should indicate how the fellowship, if awarded, would be used.

Three letters from graduate teachers familiar with the work of the applicant, including one letter from the director of the dissertation, should be submitted to the committee.

Deadline for filing applications and supporting letters for this year's award will be April 1, 1985.

Applications should be addressed to the Chairperson of this year's W. Stull Holt Fellowship Committee: Lawrence E. Gelfand, Department of History, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52242.

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## THE NORMAN AND LAURA GRAEBNER AWARD

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The Graebner prize is to be awarded every other year at SHAFR's summer conference to a senior historian of United States foreign relations whose achievements in the fields of scholarship, teaching, and government or community service have contributed most significantly to the fuller understanding of American diplomatic history.

### Conditions of the Award:

The Graebner prize will be awarded biannually, beginning in 1986, to a distinguished scholar of diplomatic and international affairs. It is expected that this scholar would be 60 years of age or older.

The recipient's career must demonstrate excellence in scholarship, teaching, and/or service to the profession. Although the prize is not restricted to academic historians, the recipient must have distinguished himself or herself through the study of international affairs from a historical perspective.

Applicants, or individuals nominating a candidate, are requested to submit three (3) copies of a letter which:

(a) provides a brief biography of the candidate, including educational background, academic or other positions held and awards and honors received;

(b) lists the candidate's major scholarly works and discusses the nature of his or her contribution to the study of diplomatic history and international affairs;

(c) describes the candidate's teaching career, listing any teaching honors and awards and commenting on the candidate's classroom skills; and

(d) details the candidate's services to the historical profession, listing specific organizations and offices, and discussing particular activities.

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## THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

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EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS: Donna Mealer and Payton Robbins,  
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MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals, announcements,  
abstracts of scholarly papers and articles  
delivered--or published--upon diplomatic sub-  
jects, bibliographical or historiographical  
essays, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature, infor-  
mation about foreign depositories, biographies,  
autobiographies of "elder statesmen" in the  
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