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ANGLO-AMERICAN RIVALRY AT THE CAIRO AND TEHERAN
CONFERENCES, 1943

Middle Tennessee State University

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ANGLO-AMERICAN RIVALRY AT THE CAIRO AND
TEHERAN CONFERENCES, 1943

James Benjamin Dressler

A dissertation presented to the
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ANGLO-AMERICAN RIVALRY AT THE CAIRO AND
TEHERAN CONFERENCES, 1943

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ABSTRACT

ANGLO-AMERICAN RIVALRY AT THE CAIRO AND TEHERAN CONFERENCES, 1943

by James Benjamin Dressler

This study focuses upon Anglo-American rivalry and its manifestation at the Cairo and Teheran Conferences. A brief examination of the history of Anglo-American relations with special attention given to the period between the outbreak of World War II in Europe and American entry following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor is included. Careful attention is given to the development of the special Churchill-Roosevelt relationship and its implications for Anglo-American affairs. Major areas of friction between the two nations and their leaders are noted, and the conferences at Cairo and Teheran are examined as case studies, illustrating the effects of such conflict upon the conduct of World War II.

The research relies upon a synthesis of primary and secondary source materials in order to note inconsistencies and conflicts among historians regarding both the events that took place and the motives behind them. No major areas of disagreement have been resolved, but most have been noted

James Benjamin Dressler

and examined. The major contribution of the research lies in its completeness, drawing, as it does, the often scattered, incomplete, and contradictory data together in a more coherent and comprehensive form than has been available before. Research findings indicate that the true significance of decisions made during the conferences and the motives of those involved is still a subject of much debate and probable misunderstanding.

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INTRODUCTION

In 1943, the first of the wartime conferences between Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin took place at Teheran, Iran. In addition, there were conferences at Cairo, Egypt, immediately prior to and after the conferences at Teheran. The major purpose of the conferences was to foster allied unity in order to pursue the war effort more effectively, but it was evident from the beginning that there were numerous points of conflict among the allies. The purpose of this study is to examine the various aspects of the conflict between American and British policy during the conferences. Not only is such conflict shown to be abundantly apparent as well as significant, but the motivation behind positions taken is examined.

Chapters I and II provide background information on Anglo-American relations and the unique role that Churchill and Roosevelt played in establishing them. Chapters III and IV discuss the conferences at Cairo and Teheran which are examined as case studies demonstrating the extent of friction between the British and Americans. Chapter V examines the final conference at Cairo and offers some concluding observations concerning the conflict manifested

during the round of conferences in general. No heretofore unknown revelations are generated. What does emerge from the research is a more comprehensive and clear appraisal of the subject than has been available.

The general summary of Anglo-American relations contained in Chapter I begins with an examination of the development of the British and American national characters and proceeds to trace the major aspects of the relationship from American independence to the era of World War II. In the process, the factors contributing to both harmony and discord are acknowledged. Special attention is given to the American reaction to World War II and the Anglo-American relationship that resulted. The activities of both Churchill and Roosevelt are closely examined.

Chapter II examines the lives of both Churchill and Roosevelt, focusing upon their role as war leaders. A major effort is made to link both men's early military and political experiences with their respective attitudes toward policy during the war years. The two leaders initiated a correspondence with one another that proves especially valuable. The detailed analysis of the relationship between the British prime minister and the American president that comprises a large part of the chapter is critical to understanding the various Anglo-American positions taken

during the conferences in question as well as the war as a whole.

Chapters III, IV, and V examine the conferences themselves and the various positions taken on military and political issues by the participants. While the primary focus is upon the conflict between the British and Americans, the relationship of the Soviets to Anglo-American strategic thinking is given special consideration. Elements of military strategy occupied the first days of the conference and the study focuses upon the conflict over a cross-channel invasion, operations in the Mediterranean and Indian Oceans, Turkish entry into the war, and the military value of China to the alliance. While many of the military operations involved definite political questions, certain political matters like the postwar fate of Germany, a post-war peacekeeping organization, and policies concerning Poland, France, Finland, Iran, and China were discussed, and are examined in detail. All of these issues threatened to disrupt allied unity, and it was extremely important that they be discussed with a view toward reaching some consensus of opinion.

Decisions of worldwide significance were either reached or implied at Cairo and Teheran, and some new realities concerning Anglo-American affairs were manifested.

By 1943, the United States was clearly the dominant partner, a fact very apparent at the conferences. The conclusion of the paper addresses the effects of Anglo-American conflict upon the decisions reached and implied at Cairo and Teheran. Questions concerning which side was right or wrong regarding the various issues discussed, what might have been or should have been done differently, and which participant gained or lost the most at the conferences are also examined. Few definitive answers to these questions are offered because historians themselves are sharply divided in their opinions regarding many of the issues.

Any study of Churchill is aided greatly by the voluminous writings of the man himself which make it easier to determine what was said and done as well as the motive. Roosevelt is more difficult, however, because no such quantity of material is available and because of the character of the man himself. The president wrote little, and without the literary efforts of his close associates even less would be known. Much contradictory information exists, and the president's motives are usually matters of mere speculation. Researching Roosevelt is a process similar to wading in quicksand; the more one struggles to understand the man and his motives, the more bogged down in the complexities of his character one becomes.

The British were the first to release an official government version of the conference proceedings in 1956, followed by the Americans in 1961, and finally the Russians in 1969. Though the official versions vary in their comprehensiveness, they have been supplemented by diaries, memoirs, and other personal accounts as to the nature of the discussions and motives involved. Taken as a whole, a reasonably complete picture of the conferences and the conflicts that occurred emerges. In addition, as the information was made public, various assessments and interpretations appeared immediately and in great profusion. This latter body of material is, in some cases, quite enlightening and generally helpful, while in other instances it is merely confusing. Some interpretations were written with apparent honesty and with an obvious attempt to achieve a maximum amount of objectivity, while others were obviously written to sustain a preconceived point of view or promote political goals. However, taken collectively, and assessed carefully, the information available allows a detailed and relatively complete examination to be made. In spite of this fact, it is probable that the definitive statement on the events in question is yet to be written.

CHAPTER I

AN OVERVIEW OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

The relationship between Great Britain and her former colonies in the United States is complex and multi-dimensional; occurring, as it does, in the military, political, diplomatic, cultural and even personal levels. In addition, the topic has been addressed by a multitude of historians--often with conflicting results. In order to place the various elements of the relationship in their proper context, a brief examination of the two cultures and their history is in order. For purposes of clarity, the term "Anglo-American" needs precise definition. Unless otherwise noted, the term "American" refers to the United States alone and "Anglo" to Great Britain. References including the British Empire, Commonwealth, or Latin America are so noted.

The basic similarities between the British and American people are, upon cursory examination, enough to suggest a high degree of homogeneity. As Arthur Campbell Turner notes, ". . . the original thirteen colonies were, after all, the greatest colonies of settlement ever peopled

by the British Isles."¹ The major point to note above is that the colonies were mainly peopled by Great Britain. Early Americans were primarily English. Far too much can be assumed based upon such a contention and many writers have been guilty of doing so, but the essential fact remains that the original colonies were overwhelmingly populated by British subjects and, though no immigration data were collected by the United States government prior to 1820, immigration from Britain remained relatively constant and heavy. It is estimated that, between 1815 and 1940, twenty-eight million persons left the British Isles to settle in other English-speaking areas. Of the above total, about 58 percent came to the United States.² When the United States did finally resort to immigration laws in the nineteenth century, those laws consistently favored northern Europeans in general and Great Britain in particular. Certainly the motives behind such emigration were varied, but overpopulation and economic problems are usually stressed by most authorities. Interestingly, Lord William Strang maintains that fears of overpopulation and unemployment were

¹Arthur Campbell Turner, The Unique Partnership; Britain and United States (New York: Pegasus, 1971), p. 11.

²John Bartlet Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain (New York: Columbia University Press, 1958), p. 109.

unfounded but assigns a high priority to the economic motive.³

Regardless of motive, the central point to note is that the Anglo-Saxon influence upon America was dominant in the early years and present throughout American history. From such influence was derived a common language, common legal traditions, similar political traditions and institutions, and a general racial and cultured affinity. As Turner has written: "Clearly, the foundation of the special relationship between Britain and the United States is demographic, the basic fact that to a considerable extent the population of the United States derives from British sources."⁴

Perhaps the most obvious similarity between the people of Great Britain and America is that of a common language, a factor mentioned by virtually every writer on the subject of Anglo-American relations. The fact that the two peoples speak and write the same language tremendously enhances both a sense of kinship and the feeling that their friendship is of a unique kind.

Further enhancing a sense of commonality is the similarity of law and political institutions in the two nations. The common law is the foundation of law on both

³William Strang, Britain in World Affairs (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 48.

⁴Turner, The Unique Partnership, p. 13.

sides of the Atlantic. In addition, early colonial political forms (such as the Virginia House of Burgesses) evolved on the English model. While it is true that the American Revolution changed the political structure of the colonies, it can be argued that, even then, the change was more one of form than substance. Many basic and common principles remained the same. Referring to such common principles Arthur Turner notes:

. . . the rule of law, the importance of the individual, the necessity of adequate discussion, the supreme importance of basing government on persuasion and consensus, and on some decent compromise between the rival desiderata of liberty and authority . . . is a major bond between them.⁵

H. C. Allen identifies two "main themes" dominating the history of Anglo-American relations which would seem to reinforce claims of deep seated cultural affinity. The first theme stresses the increasing amiability of the relationship and the second the shifting balance of power within it.⁶ Many historians have commented upon the abatement of hostility and general Anglophobia apparent by the end of the nineteenth century in America. The American Revolution and War of 1812 had left hostile feelings on both sides of the Atlantic, but the nineteenth century witnessed the resolution of a number of diplomatic problems between

⁵Ibid., p. 29.

⁶H. C. Allen, Conflict and Concord: The Anglo-American Relationship Since 1783 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1959), pp. 28-29.

the two nations. H. G. Nicholas suggests that the American preoccupation with opening up the west during the British colonial expansion of the late nineteenth century materially contributed to reduced Anglo-American friction.⁷

By the beginning of the twentieth century the friendship was clearly present and contributed to American cooperation in World War I. The inter-war years saw an American retreat into isolationism and a general disenchantment with Europe which was to prove only temporary. The cooperation of World War I turned into the alliance of World War II aided immeasurably by the personal relationship between Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt which will be discussed in detail later.

In the early phase of the relationship between Great Britain and the United States the former was clearly the dominant nation in every measurable sense. However, by the American Civil War it was clear that the relationship was changing. By World War I, it was equally clear that it was the United States that was dominant.⁸ Such a state of affairs was due less to a decline on the part of Great Britain than to an enormous increase in the power of the United States. Great Britain was hurt economically by World War I and the worldwide depression of the 1930s, but many

⁷H. G. Nicholas, The United States and Britain (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 6.

⁸Allen, Conflict and Concord, p. 28.

historians agree that it was not until the post-World War II era that her decline from great power status was obvious. Unlike Britain, the United States emerged from World War I an even stronger nation and, following World War II, was the most powerful nation in the world.

In an analysis of American diplomatic history that predates the cold war S. F. Bemis wrote, "The United States has had more diplomatic controversies, and more serious ones, with Great Britain than with any other nation."⁹ Though perhaps no longer true, such a statement implies that the existence of conflict between the two nations has been a persistent part of their relationship. Indeed, it can be persuasively argued that the very existence of such extensive and close contact between the two nations tended to increase the probabilities of friction and disagreement.¹⁰

The cultural and linguistic affinity has also given rise to problems. The languages are significantly different regarding vocabulary, accent, and idiom. This fact alone can cause the two peoples to perceive understandings that are not really there; something noted by many authors on the subject. The problem has been more pronounced on the part of the British than the Americans. Given the common tongue,

⁹S. F. Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (London: Holt, Rinehart, 1936), p. 405.

¹⁰Henry L. Roberts and Paul A. Wilson, Britain and the United States; Problems in Cooperation (New York: Harper & Bros., 1953), p. 9.

and failing to realize the extent to which modern Americans are descended from immigrants of non-British ancestry, the American is not readily seen as a foreigner. Even Winston Churchill (who should have, and probably did know better) went so far as to pose a dual citizenship for the two nations.¹¹

The typical American perception of the British people is determined, to a large extent, by the mannerisms and language of the British upper class.¹² This view has sometimes resulted in feelings that the British are arrogant, aloof, and generally difficult. Reinforcing this image is the series of clashes and conflicts with Great Britain that forms so much of American history. Many authorities seem to agree that such past incidents loom larger in the American mind than in the British. The American colonial experience itself is a factor in the overall relationship and finds its most concrete expression in a marked lack of support for British colonial aspirations. Americans also perceive themselves as being more egalitarian than the slightly archaic British.

Ultimately some misunderstanding and resentment spilled over into the foreign policy arena. For quite some time after the American Revolution that conflict was still

¹¹Ibid., p. 10.

¹²Crane Brinton, The United States and Britain (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1945), p. 69.

viewed in some British circles as hardly having changed America's colonial status.¹³ Though now clearly reconciled to the verdict of the American Revolution, the British were just as clearly not reconciled to the idea of American dominance in Anglo-American affairs until the aftermath of World War II. The friction attendant upon such a circumstance has been compared to the stormy relationship often existing between parent and child. In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries the child grew up, and World War II dramatized the fact in rather spectacular fashion.

Social and political change often takes a long time to work itself out but it is perhaps only natural for Americans to have projected such changes into the area of foreign affairs. In fact, both nations have done so; in the process, bolstering their actions with historical experience. The result is that, in British eyes, American attitudes toward European affairs have often looked hasty and naive, while the British approach has appeared excessively cautious and often unrealistic to the American.¹⁴ In contrast to Britain, America has been geographically more secure from major threat throughout its history. An interesting result of this is suggested by Henry L. Roberts and Paul A. Wilson:

While it would be going too far to say that the American habitually solved his difficulties by pulling up stakes

¹³Ibid., p. 134.

¹⁴Roberts and Wilson, Britain and the United States, p. 10.

and moving away from them, it is true that when he is confronted with a problem not to be solved in this way, his next tactic is often to attempt a knockout blow. . . . To the British on the other hand these are but a new manifestation of problems with which they have been long familiar and to which they have learned to accommodate themselves.¹⁵

Certainly, both approaches referred to above have produced results and have, to some degree, become part of the respective national characters. Americans traditionally do tend to seek quick, final solutions through maximum effort while the British exhibit a greater acceptance of the idea that there may be no quick or final resolution of a problem.

In stark contrast to the attention lavished upon its own New World colonies by the government of Spain, those of Great Britain were subjected to only minimal governmental interference until the mid-eighteenth century. During the period prior to the American Revolution the English colonists, left to their own devices, developed their own tradition of local self-government and generally independent character. This benign neglect by the mother country helped produce, slowly but inexorably, a change in attitude on the part of the colonists themselves. In increasing numbers they began referring to themselves as "Americans"; a term formerly reserved for the Indian only. This quiet change in attitude was obviously of enormous consequence even

¹⁵Ibid., p. 14.

though most historians agree that on the eve of the American Revolution the majority of colonists considered themselves loyal British subjects. Nevertheless, when the Revolution was over, the term "American" clearly referred to the former British subjects of the former British colonies. It is, therefore, with the American Revolution, that the Anglo-American relationship commences.

The American Revolution was the most important event of the eighteenth century relative to Anglo-American relations and greatly affects their subsequent development. As H. C. Allen states, "The truth is that in the late eighteenth century some kind of crisis in the relationship . . . was inevitable."¹⁶ It took time for Britain to accept, emotionally and psychologically, the fact of American independence. The Peace of Paris brought peace through impercise and vague language. Boundaries, debt settlements, and commercial relations were largely unresolved and left as potential sources of friction in Anglo-American relations.¹⁷

In spite of the violence of the Revolution and the marginal utility of the Peace of Paris, the two nations retained a commonality of interest; the strongest of these

¹⁶H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1955), p. 212.

¹⁷Nicholas, The United States and Britain, p. 10.

being of an economic and commercial nature. It is the bond of common interest that historically has provided a basis for political and social friendship almost unprecedented among independent nations. It has been argued that there is nothing actually special about the relationship, but this position finds few advocates on either side of the Atlantic. Such an argument (as Charles de Gaulle, among others, would be quick to point out) has represented more of an attempt to placate the jealous suspicions of other states than a statement of fact.

Warfare between Britain and France in the early nineteenth century led to deteriorating relations between both countries and the United States. American neutrality and the principle of "Freedom of the Sea" became increasingly difficult to maintain. The ultimate result was the War of 1812. Jay's Treaty had not been enough to eliminate anglophobia in American governing circles and British insensitivity added fuel to the fire. The British justification was simply that the country was fighting for its life and opposing the greatest tyrant in modern history.¹⁸ The Treaty of Ghent was preeminently recognition, on the part of both parties, that war was too costly a method of resolving disputes between them. It is imprecise as to when it became an axiom of policy on both

¹⁸Ibid., p. 17.

sides that war against the other was out of the question, but the War of 1812 was to be the last time that open military conflict occurred between the two countries. The emergence of this concept was a long, gradual process but was certainly fixed in both societies by the end of the nineteenth century. It is important to realize, however, that renunciation of warfare did not mean an end of friction.

Perhaps based upon a deep and abiding suspicion of Europe in general and Great Britain in particular, the United States isolated itself from European affairs following the War of 1812. This phenomenon did not represent a retreat into total isolationism as the Monroe Doctrine illustrates. The years between the War of 1812 and the American Civil War were relatively quiet. Anglo-American relations revolved around the settlement of boundary disputes, as well as commercial competition and rivalries in Latin America; primarily involving a possible Isthmian canal.

The American Civil War severely disrupted Anglo-American relations and set them back seriously. British sympathies were vague, divided, and changeable; factors not conducive to stability. The British dilemma was to somehow avoid alienating either side. Neither England nor the rest of Europe initially expected the North to be capable of subduing the South. The controversies centering around the

ships Trent and Alabama almost produced yet another war between the United States and Great Britain. However, the Trent affair saw the Lincoln administration acknowledge its error and the Alabama claims were submitted to arbitration. Thus, even under severe stress, the relationship was marked, in the end, by concession and conciliation rather than bloodshed. This is not to say that the relationship was initially good. The events of the war left hostility toward Britain in both the North and South, a hostility that would be long in dissipating.¹⁹

In spite of the tension generated by the Civil War, the last part of the nineteenth century was a period of increasingly good relations. By the end of the century both nations were emerging from isolationism and the United States even embarked upon "the great aberration" of American imperialism.²⁰ The Spanish-American War was perhaps the greatest expression of American imperialism during the century and largely accounts for expressions of sympathy extended to Britain during the Boer War. These mutual expressions of sympathy and support, combined with the dangers posed by her isolated position in the world made so apparent by the Boer War, influenced Britain to seek an "entente" with the United States.²¹ Fear of Germany led

¹⁹Allen, Great Britain and the United States, p. 453.

²⁰Ibid., p. 549.

²¹Allen, Conflict and Concord, p. 222.

Britain to also seek a rapprochement with France and an actual alliance with Japan.

"By the middle of the twentieth century, the anti-British zeal of the increasingly prosperous sons of Erin had become a rather distant memory, and had ceased to be an appreciable factor in the making of policy."²² However, in spite of the fact that the twentieth century has been notable for a steady improvement in Anglo-American relations, that improvement has not been without moments of conflict and rivalry.

The cordial relations of the late nineteenth century led Britain to seek an actual Anglo-American alliance by the beginning of the twentieth century. Unfortunately, there were still limitations upon the Anglo-American relationship that would preclude such a move at the time. As H. G. Nicholas notes:

There was no real need for such an alliance in terms of the U.S.A.'s observable and immediate national interests. Above all there was no basis for it in the habits of thought of the overwhelming majority of the population. To a minority, notably the Irish- and German-Americans, it would have been anathema.²³

The British efforts toward an alliance reflected growing concern over the world situation immediately prior to World War I as well as the fact (perhaps not fully realized in the United States at the time) that America was

²²Turner, The Unique Partnership, p. 19.

²³Nicholas, The United States and Britain, p. 60.

a major world power. As the century progressed, American thinking would catch up with the British on the subject, but, prior to World War I, and for some time thereafter, the avoidance of European alliances was uppermost in the American mind. It should also be noted that, in spite of the increasingly good relations, when war finally commenced in 1914, Anglo-American friction over "freedom of the seas" began immediately.

That the experience of 1812 was avoided is mute testimony to the solid foundation of Anglo-American relations by that date. Great Britain launched a massive and well-coordinated propaganda campaign aimed at drawing America into the war as an ally. The German propaganda effort was aimed only at keeping America neutral. Such a situation is indicative of realization, on the part of Germany, of a "special" Anglo-American relationship, formal alliance or not. In fact, there was little, if any, possibility of a war between Britain and the United States and problems over freedom of the seas between the two nations were quickly resolved. There was little likelihood of any sort of German-American alliance. The best Germany could hope for was United States neutrality, and even that proved impossible.

Ultimately, the United States entered World War I, not out of friendship for Great Britain, for three years of American neutrality cost Britain dearly, but as a result of

perceived German violations of American neutrality. Though the American effort was not minimal as some European statesmen predicted it would be, the Wilson administration retained a certain aloofness from the Anglo-French alliance.²⁴ It is well documented that the Wilson administration viewed its position as morally superior to that of the European powers both friend and foe. World War I can be viewed, from the American vantage point, as essentially a moral crusade; as a war fought to "end all wars" and "make the world safe for democracy."

Instead of assuming a role of world leadership following the war, the United States retreated, once again, into isolationism. Even the war had not produced an alliance, for the United States fought on the side of Britain and France as an "associated power." In the wake of the war, American membership in the League of Nations was rejected by the United States Senate. Though the European nations were generally and profoundly disturbed by the American attitude, the British were more understanding. In earlier years Britain had followed a similar policy relative to continental affairs. President Wilson never waivered in his belief that the American people, if not Congress, would support entry into the League. Wilson failed to understand that resistance to the League went far beyond Congress.

²⁴Allen, Conflict and Concord, p. 227.

Anglophobes generally viewed the League as an instrument of British policy. To make matters worse, the former allies began to bicker among themselves over who had really been responsible for winning the war. Such unseemly conduct was covered by the press in both Britain and America.

Traditional Irish-American hostility to Britain also played a role. In spite of the above circumstances concerning the failure of the United States to live up to European expectations after the war, H. C. Allen notes that:

. . . it is remarkable how little it affected Britain, in any direct sense, and how little it altered the pattern of Anglo-American relations. It was certainly a disillusionment which bit deep into British experience, but it was one which they had more than half expected.²⁵

However, a great many British leaders would be very skeptical of American intervention in European affairs as the events of the 1930s brought increasing instability and the rise of fascism to that continent. The Roosevelt administration showed promise in this regard but two decades of isolationism had left an indelible mark.

The policy of the United States during the 1920s and most of the 1930s was one of deliberate withdrawal from the rest of the world. Roberts and Wilson note that, ". . . the pace of social and economic reform was much faster in the

²⁵ Allen, Great Britain and the United States, p. 275.

United States than in the United Kingdom."²⁶ A gulf of awareness and understanding between the two nations became apparent during the period.

The United States attempted to limit its own military and political power during the 1920s and 1930s, in the process displaying a poor understanding of the responsibilities inherent with great power. The Debt Funding Act of 1922 opened up the subject of war debts around which so much misunderstanding and recrimination soon revolved. The entire issue was marked by insensitivity, demagoguery, and outright stupidity by all parties. As the Great Depression became worldwide, Great Britain, along with most other debtor nations, made only token repayments. After the Johnson Act of 1934, Britain ceased payment altogether. Such action did not help Anglo-American relations and, in fact, generated deep, mutual resentments, but did not produce any major setback.²⁷

Some progress was made in terms of Anglo-American relations through the British recognition of naval equality secured at the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 and London Naval Conference of 1930, as well as in the abandonment, by Britain, of the Anglo-Japanese alliance. However,

²⁶Roberts and Wilson, Britain and the United States, p. 12.

²⁷David Reynolds, "Competitive Co-Operation: Anglo-American Relations in World War II," The Historical Journal 23 (March 1980):236.

efforts to promote an Anglo-American opposition to Japanese aggression in Manchuria failed.

A comment by President Hoover's secretary of state concerning the Manchurian crisis is illustrative of the general American situation:

Even the most normal and rational steps which might have been taken by an American Secretary of State in such a situation were certain to be the subject of critical scrutiny and possible attack from some of his countrymen.²⁸

Even the New Deal of Franklin Roosevelt brought about no corresponding new approach to foreign policy. Americans seemed as wedded to pacifism and isolationism as ever. The collapse of the Versailles settlements, the rise of Mussolini and Hitler, the Japanese attack on Shanghai, and the Spanish Civil War all seemed to serve only to deepen the commitment to isolationism.²⁹

The isolationism and pacifism of America had its British equivalent. By the 1930s Britain was governed by men who remembered the catastrophe of World War I and were emotionally and morally committed to avoid a repetition.³⁰ In addition, there was a misplaced faith in the League of Nations by the general European public--a faith not matched by most European governments. "The peoples hoped and

²⁸Allen, Conflict and Concord, p. 229.

²⁹H. L. Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis (London: H. Fertig, 1936), p. 39.

³⁰Nicholas, The United States and Britain, p. 85.

believed that the League would be effective. The governments, who knew better, did not dare to try to disillusion them. The whole international structure rested upon an equivocation."³¹ Ultimately, the British people divided between those who favored "appeasement" and those who favored standing up to the Fascist dictators.

Though Anglo-American friendship remained a central tenet of British policy, the repeated American concern with isolation convinced British leaders that American friendship was passive. The most that could be counted upon was neutrality. Many British historians contend that, as a result of this American determination, no diplomatic or military combination such as occurred in the latter stages of World War I was possible.

Strang asserts that:

There was a determination not to go to war for anything but a clearly vital interest . . . if war once started, we [Britain] might have to meet Germany, Italy and Japan all at once. Therefore do nothing to provoke a war and be prepared to pay a price to avoid one. This, at bottom, was the root of the so-called policy of appeasement of the 1930s.³²

Was Great Britain that alone or, more precisely, was the United States that passive? The answer would seem to be that neither was the case. Roosevelt had become increasingly aware of the threat to peace posed by the Fascist powers,

³¹Nicholas, The United States and Britain, p. 85.

³²Ibid., p. 319.

and as early as January was discussing the need, within the government, for closer collaboration with Britain.³³ The Roosevelt approach had several guiding principles. Above all else, the United States should avoid commitments but, within that framework, seek to prevent the outbreak of war and, failing that, seek a favorable outcome while limiting the conflict.³⁴

It was the Panay incident that led to naval contacts between the two powers in London in January 1938. Toward the end of these talks Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles proposed an international conference to include the Fascist powers with the objective of lessening world tensions. This was a proposal that had long been debated within the Roosevelt administration and finally won the President's blessing. It was a bold move for the Roosevelt administration at the time and a golden opportunity for the British to finally involve the United States in European affairs once again. It was, however, rebuffed by Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain who preferred his own more specific approaches to the Facist powers. Such action was later described by Winston Churchill (with the benefit of considerable hindsight) as, ". . . the loss of the last

³³Mark M. Lowenthal, "Roosevelt and the Coming of the War: The Search for United States Policy 1937-42," Journal of Contemporary History 16 (July 1981):415.

³⁴Ibid., p. 414.

frail chance to save the world from tyranny otherwise than by war."³⁵ Chamberlain was clearly according appeasement a higher priority than Anglo-American cooperation. As he wrote in 1937, ". . . it is always best and safest to count on nothing from the Americans but words."³⁶ On this subject H. C. Nicholas makes an interesting and accurate observation:

There is nothing either in the terms of Roosevelt's proposal or elsewhere to suggest that, particularly in relation to Germany, he was much less of an appeaser at the time than Chamberlain. . . . That appeasement did not get woven into the fabric of Anglo-American relations is principally due to Chamberlain's varsity and insularity, his determination to pursue his own brand of appeasement on his own.³⁷

Roosevelt awoke to the danger of the Munich meeting before Chamberlain, but the realization still failed to produce much in the way of initial cooperation. Historians still debate what might have been, but the fact remains that little in the way of Anglo-American cooperation had taken place when on 1 September 1939 Hitler invaded Poland and on 3 September Britain and France declared war on Germany.

Events quickly forced the Roosevelt administration to face a number of realities. By June 1940 France was defeated and forced from the war, and British forces had

³⁵Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 1: The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), p. 254.

³⁶Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (London: Macmillan & Co., 1946), p. 322.

³⁷Nicholas, The United States and Britain, pp. 87-88.

been ejected from the continent. The entire strategic picture for Europe, if not the world, had been altered. The main questions facing American planners were whether Britain could avoid defeat and whether United States entry would be necessary to save Britain. As Nicholas points out, "The story of the U.S.A.'s approach to war is very largely the story of Anglo-American relations in 1940 and 1941."³⁸

As late as 1938 the armed strength of Great Britain was at least equal to that of the United States and the British potential to apply that strength was even greater.³⁹ By 1940 it was apparent on both sides of the Atlantic that Britain needed help. However, as W. N. Medlicott notes, ". . . the United States authorities were more generous in advice and exhortation than in practical help until Roosevelt had been safely re-elected in November 1940."⁴⁰ Indeed, the initial American reaction was to view Great Britain as lost and to adopt a unilateral policy of hemispheric defense known as "Rainbow 4." The plan was cancelled by Roosevelt himself who envisioned United States aid to the British war effort. Lowenthal states that, "It is not clear when President Roosevelt first made the connection between the continuation of British survival and

³⁸Ibid., p. 90.

³⁹Ibid., p. 14.

⁴⁰W. N. Medlicott, British Foreign Policy Since Versailles 1919-1963 (London: Methuen, 1968), p. 243.

his own desires to limit the role that the U.S. might be required to play."⁴¹ Nevertheless, make the decision Roosevelt did, and many authorities credit the British war effort in general and Winston Churchill specifically for influencing him. Chamberlain had been completely incapable of establishing a real rapport with Roosevelt and, after the embarrassing German triumph in Norway, was replaced as prime minister by Churchill. Churchill did all in his power to convince Roosevelt of the British will to fight and the idea that Britain was worth supporting. Support for Britain was presented as a way of keeping the United States out of the war. In requesting destroyers the spectre of German control of the British fleet became a constant theme. The priority accorded United States aid is stated by H. G. Nicholas, "To secure the closest possible cooperation of the U.S.A. in our war effort became, next to the defeat of Hitler itself, the main objective of British policy."⁴²

In fact, keeping the United States out of war by supplying Great Britain with war materials was very attractive to Roosevelt for domestic political reasons. There had existed between London and Washington, even during the period of inter-war American isolationism, a generally

⁴¹Lowenthal, "Roosevelt and the Coming of the War," p. 422.

⁴²H. G. Nicholas, Britain and the U.S.A. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp. 32-33.

free exchange of ideas and even some consultation.⁴³ This exchange had not influenced the passage of the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, and 1937, however. "By early 1935 nearly twenty bills designed to keep the nation out of war had appeared in Congress."⁴⁴ In the campaign of 1940, Roosevelt himself pledged, "Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars."⁴⁵ Two days after Britain went to war Roosevelt issued a Proclamation of Neutrality, bringing the neutrality legislation into effect.

Despite State Department opposition, the Neutrality Act of 1935 passed almost unanimously in Congress. The act prohibited export of war materials to a belligerent and was passed again in 1936 with considerable public support. The 1937 act was modified to allow goods to be sold to belligerents but required payment in cash--the famous "Cash and Carry" provisions. Material sold under the cash and carry provisions could not be carried in American vessels and could not include long-term loans or war materials. This fact itself was indication of a shift in thinking on the part of the American people. In spite of isolationist and pacifist elements that were often extremely vocal (such

⁴³Ibid., p. 24.

⁴⁴Allen, Great Britain and the United States, p. 772.

⁴⁵At Boston, on 30 October 1940. As quoted in Nicholas, The United States and Britain, p. 95.

as the America First Committee) public indignation with the fascist regimes was increasing. Until the war, isolationists led by such figures as Burton K. Wheeler, Hamilton Fish, Robert M. LaFollette, Jr., William Randolph Hearst, and Charles A. Lindbergh had been leaders of public opinion but by 1940 administration efforts to reverse the isolationist trend, as well as the pressures of world events, were having an effect. By the end of 1940 munitions were reaching Britain in a steady flow but British means of paying under the cash and carry provisions were running out.

Even with the slight shift in the mood of the American public, Roosevelt was slow to respond to Churchill's request for destroyers. The destroyers, the British argued, were desperately needed for convoy duty in the Atlantic war. The administration either still had doubts about the ability of Britain to survive or feared the wrath of the isolationists, or perhaps both.

Churchill had already failed in a scheme to trade ASDIC for the Norden bombsight and now was deliberately heightening American anxiety over the fate of Britain.⁴⁶ Once again the fate of the British fleet, should Britain fall, was mentioned. It should be noted that the destroyer deal was being negotiated during the height of the Battle of

⁴⁶ ASDIC was an underwater detection system superior to the American sonar and useful for anti-submarine warfare. The Norden bombsight was an American device allowing more effective high-level precision bombing.

Britain. The idea was to frighten the Americans into acting without convincing them that the situation was hopeless. In fact, Roosevelt was also receiving pressure from within his own Cabinet to agree to the transfer. In making the decision Roosevelt was forced to reach a positive conclusion regarding the survivability of Great Britain as well as confront the isolationists. The decision was evidently reached in the last two weeks of 1940.⁴⁷ The United States obtained a ninety-nine year lease on eight air and naval bases in Newfoundland and the British West Indies and Great Britain obtained fifty over-age destroyers.

The agreement was very significant in terms of Anglo-American relations. Roosevelt was in the middle of a campaign for re-election and the deal was too touchy for much public comment; however, in the words of Churchill:

This process means that . . . the British Empire and the United States will have to be somewhat mixed up together. . . . I do not view the process with any misgivings. I could not stop it if I wished: no one can stop it. Like the Mississippi it just keeps rolling along.⁴⁸

There can be no doubt that the deal tied the two nations more closely together. However, the agreement had required hard bargaining and that, in itself, was perhaps

⁴⁷Lowenthal, "Roosevelt and the Coming of the War," p. 423.

⁴⁸Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2: Their Finest Hour (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1949), p. 409.

as important as the destroyers. In fact, only nine of the destroyers saw service in the British navy prior to 1941.⁴⁹ Four months of negotiations had demonstrated that national security was not necessarily a zero-sum game. A gain for one side was not necessarily a loss to the other and vice-versa.⁵⁰ This was a critical lesson as future events would prove still further.

It has been noted that Great Britain's ability to pay for munitions under the cash and carry provisions of the Neutrality Act was strained; and, although the destroyer deal helped, it failed to alleviate the problem. In a letter on 8 December 1940 Churchill warned Roosevelt that Britain was fast approaching the time when it would no longer be possible to pay cash for munitions. Roosevelt already had on his desk the Stark Memorandum informing him that it would ultimately be necessary for the United States to take an active part in the war. Memories of Britain's default on past war loans made such loans, at the then present time, impossible. The president's answer was

⁴⁹Sir George Clark, gen. ed., The Oxford History of England, 15 vols. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), vol. 15: English History 1914-1945, by A. J. P. Taylor, p. 496.

⁵⁰James R. Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1977), p. 126.

Lend-Lease and he moved with uncharacteristic speed to prepare the American public for it.⁵¹

Lend-Lease moved the United States from a posture of neutrality to one of "non-belligerency." Non-belligerency was a policy of giving Britain all possible aid short of war, and represented a major policy adjustment. In a fireside chat the president explained his new policy to the nation.⁵² He pointed out that American and Axis interests were irreconcilable and the importance, to Britain, of American assistance. Much of the fireside chat stressed the commonality of American and British interests and the idea that the best way to avoid war was to support the British effort. Roosevelt still refused to accept the main premise of the Stark Memorandum to the effect that such support would lead to intervention; or, at least, he refused to say so. In any case Lend-Lease was an innovative concept that served the interests of both parties. Britain's dollar problem was not ended but at least became bearable. For the United States it was the decisive commitment although the full reality of that fact would not be immediately apparent.

⁵¹Lend-Lease was a policy that would enable Britain to obtain needed war materials postponing settlement until after the war, when repayment could be made in kind or otherwise.

⁵²See the Fireside Chat of 29 December 1940 in Samuel I. Rosenman, comp., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 9: War and Aid to Democracies, 1940 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1941), pp. 633-34.

Warren Kimbell suggests that the delay in finding a solution to Britain's dollar problem was perhaps due to a basic ignorance of international economics upon the part of the Roosevelt administration, as well as an attempt to take economic advantage of Great Britain.⁵³ From the beginning of the war, American policy had demanded that Britain sell business investments in America, buy dollars with gold, and offer investments in Latin America as collateral for Lend-Lease aid. Although Britain lost some gold, the other policies were not pursued but, had they been, Britain would have had little choice but to comply. The Roosevelt administration offered repeated assurances to Britain that such a hard line was necessary due to domestic political considerations. The argument was that Congress would never approve of Lend-Lease unless assurances could be given that Britain had truly used up all dollar resources. Most Americans could simply not understand how Britain could need dollars yet still possess ample supplies of British currency, but Lend-Lease went through Congress without challenge as to Britain's dollar problem.⁵⁴

Critics such as Eric Sevareid, Herbert Agar, and Charles Beard have all criticized Roosevelt for perpetrating a fraud on the American people. The basic charge is that

⁵³Warren F. Kimbell, The Most Unsordid Act: Lend-Lease, 1939-41 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 10.

⁵⁴Ibid.

the president knew full well that Lend-Lease would lead to war. Certainly that was to be the subsequent course of events, but it is not certain that Roosevelt intended it to be so. An interesting extension of this argument is found in Bruce Russett's work, No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of U.S. Entry into World War II. Russett argues that, once the Royal Air Force won the Battle of Britain, the British Isles were secure from invasion. The British had made it through the worst, and only by a long process of attrition could Germany have won. By the end of 1941, Russett maintains, Britain's survival was assured. Therefore, any belligerent action by the United States was a mistake.⁵⁵ Other historians fail to agree with Russett's analysis. Many argue that the security of the United States would have been seriously jeopardized with the continent of Europe under the control of Hitler's Germany. Had military action then become necessary, the effort would have been more costly in terms of both men and material.

Polls taken in the early weeks of 1941 clearly showed that a strong majority of the American public supported not only Lend-Lease but more direct measures to aid Britain, even at the risk of war.⁵⁶ Helping shape these

⁵⁵Bruce Russett, No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of U.S. Entry into World War II (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 25-26.

⁵⁶James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1970), p. 41.

opinions and opposing isolationist groups like America First was an interventionist group called the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies, headed by William Allen White.⁵⁷ Both isolationists and interventionists were divided into factions and these were reflected in Congress itself. To Roosevelt's credit, once he committed to Britain in the form of Lend-Lease he moved to control public opinion rather than be controlled by it. In a radio address to the Nation in 1941, the president promised, ". . . every possible assistance to Britain," and issued a Proclamation of Unlimited National Emergency.⁵⁸

On 5 August 1941 Roosevelt and Churchill met in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, for what was called the Atlantic Conference. It would be the first of nine historic conferences between the two leaders. Prior to this meeting the British Joint Planning Staff had already decided that active belligerency on the part of the United States would be necessary.⁵⁹ Secret staff talks between the two nations had already taken place in Washington. The talks had resulted in the formulation of an "Atlantic First" strategy but Far Eastern questions quickly demonstrated a lack of

⁵⁷Ibid.

⁵⁸Rosenman, War and Aid to Democracies, p. 190.

⁵⁹Lowenthal, "Roosevelt and the Coming of the War," p. 429.

harmony and were left very vague. The resulting plan of action was known as "ABC-1."

The Atlantic Conference was unusual in several respects. The two statesmen discussed the peace settlement of a war not yet won and to which only one party was a belligerent. The result of the meeting was a document known as the Atlantic Charter.⁶⁰ The meeting boosted British morale and underscored American concern. However, while the meeting allowed some useful cooperation between military and diplomatic officials, it also indicated Roosevelt was not then prepared to take further steps toward belligerency.⁶¹ It must be concluded that, in a sense, Roosevelt was floundering; clearly committed to supporting Great Britain's war effort but refusing to face the necessity of United States belligerency if meaningful support were to continue.

In September 1941, Roosevelt's advisors presented him with the "Victory Program" in response to his request for a global assessment.⁶² The plan called for American entry into the war in order to defeat Germany and Japan. The president was, in effect, being told that his options had largely run out. It is noteworthy that, in spite of incidents involving the ships Kearny and Reuben James in the

⁶⁰For content of the Charter see the appendix.

⁶¹Nicholas, The United States and Britain, p. 97.

⁶²Lowenthal, "Roosevelt and the Coming of the War," pp. 429-30.

North Atlantic, Roosevelt did not consider them sufficient provocation to act. Had Hitler not honored his pledge to Japan in the Tripartite Pact and declared war following Pearl Harbor, the United States might still have lacked what the president would have viewed as sufficient provocation.

At the Atlantic Conference, Churchill tried and failed in an effort to obtain an American guarantee of action in the event of Japanese aggression in the Pacific. The most Churchill was able to secure was a promise of a strong warning concerning Japanese aggression. The warning itself, when issued, was vague and meaningless. The Japanese, in fact, seemed conciliatory following the Atlantic meeting even seeking a summit meeting. Faced with conflicting advice as to the desirability of such a meeting, Roosevelt delayed. The embargoes of aviation fuel, scrap iron, and iron ore sales to Japan issued in 1940 had been largely a stall for time and led to the Hull-Nomura talks of 1941.

There was conflict within the Japanese government itself over the desirability of war with the United States. Even as talks between the two nations progressed the new prime minister, General Tojo, established a timetable for war should the talks prove unsatisfactory. On 18 October 1941 it was decided that unless the United States accepted Tokyo's terms by 5 November the Pearl Harbor attack would take place on 7 December.

American shock in the wake of Pearl Harbor was matched by British jubilation. In Churchill's stated opinion, the war was as good as won.⁶³ The attack upon Pearl Harbor resulted in the formation of an alliance that represents the high-water mark of Anglo-American relations. Countless pages have been written about the remarkable nature of the relationship that resulted. Normal diplomatic controversies between the two nations were immediately suspended for the duration of hostilities. In striking contrast to 1917-18 the United States would, in spite of much greater power than its partners, form a cooperative alliance which would seek victory through a consensus of strategic considerations.⁶⁴ There would be friction between the parties involved and the United States would usurp for itself the dominant position, but the cooperation and ultimate consensus were real. Such a situation is due, beyond any doubt, to the special nature of the Anglo-American relationship that had been building for almost a century.

On 13 December, Churchill and his advisors left Britain for Washington and a series of talks known as the Arcadia Conference. Churchill and his colleagues feared that, because of Pearl Harbor, the Americans would abandon

⁶³Churchill, Their Finest Hour, pp. 539-40.

⁶⁴The Declaration of the United Nations was considered an alliance.

the Atlantic First strategy. However, "ABC-1" was adhered to at Arcadia. A combined Chiefs of Staff Committee was formed in order to implement the strategy determined by Churchill and Roosevelt and the principle of "unity of command" was adopted that tended to reduce friction in the implementation of that strategy. One ominous (for the British) factor concerning the new committee was that it was to be headquartered in Washington because the Americans would be supplying the bulk of manpower and material and were geographically placed between the wars against Germany and Japan. The British members were headed by Sir John Dill and the Americans by George Marshall. Between these two men there developed an intimate working relationship that greatly facilitated the smooth functioning of the alliance.⁶⁵

To coordinate the production effort so essential to the war there were established the combined boards. The boards were the major instruments of Anglo-American cooperation in that vital area.⁶⁶ The boards contained representations of both governments and represented an unusual blending of administrations. As H. G. Nicholas points out:

The result of this elaborate interlocking machinery was, despite inevitable friction and slippage, a much higher

⁶⁵Nicholas, The United States and Britain, p. 102.

⁶⁶Ibid., p. 100.

degree of cooperation and unforced fusion than had ever before existed between two sovereign nation states.⁶⁷

The interlocking process was remarkably well developed but never were the two nations' economies completely integrated as some have suggested.

The topics discussed at Arcadia were of an economic, military, and political nature with all three often intertwined. However, questions of military strategy were preeminent. As McNeill notes:

Retrospectively, it is easy to recognize the tremendous importance of the decisions taken at the Arcadia Conference for the future of Anglo-American cooperation. In general, one may say that the basic institutions through which cooperation was to be carried on were established or took new forms during the Conference.⁶⁸

Arcadia resulted in a document called the United Nations Declaration which reaffirmed the Atlantic Charter and pledged its signers not to seek a separate peace with members of the Tripartite Pact.⁶⁹

While Arcadia hinted at unity of purpose in the military sphere, there were a number of contending theories as to precisely how the Europe first strategy should be implemented. The British clearly favored a strategy of peripheral attacks upon Germany combined with blockade and

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 101.

⁶⁸William Hardy McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia: Their Co-operation and Conflict 1941-1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 117.

⁶⁹For the text of this document see the appendix.

strategic bombing. Scarcity of resources and memories of losses incurred during World War I were behind the British attitude. The Americans were thinking along very different lines. American strategy envisioned a direct assault upon the principal enemy bringing maximum resources to bear. Such a strategy implied an invasion of Europe as quickly as possible. The respective positions were stated upon the occasion of every inter-allied conference prior to the actual invasion of Normandy in May 1944. The Americans began to suspect the British of stalling and outright cowardice while the British viewed the Americans as naive and ignorant of the factors involved.

By early 1942, a number of tactical proposals were being debated. The Americans were giving serious consideration to a cross-channel invasion of France in 1942 code named SLEDGEHAMMER. Such an operation was considered as either a sacrifice or a preliminary to a full-scale landing in 1943.⁷⁰ The main purpose of the operation was to ease pressure on the Russian front by drawing the Luftwaffe to the invasion site, depriving the Germans of air superiority over Russia, and perhaps destroying German air power in major air battles.⁷¹ The British felt such a

⁷⁰Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Harper and Bros., 1948), pp. 564, 569.

⁷¹McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia, pp. 173-74.

program was not only doomed to failure but that the bulk of the troops sacrificed would have to be British. However, they dared not push the Americans too hard for fear that they would begin to concentrate on the Pacific instead. Ultimately, SLEDGEHAMMER was relegated to the status of an emergency measure to be used if either Russia or Germany seemed on the point of collapse.⁷² In addition, a number of other plans were being considered. One plan was a buildup in Britain, code named BOLERO, which would be used to support an invasion in 1943 then known as ROUNDUP.⁷³ Another proposal, code named GYMNAST, involved an invasion of North Africa and was being heavily promoted by the British.

When Molotov visited Washington in May 1942 a major objective was to secure commitment to a second front in 1942. At this time Roosevelt assured Molotov of an invasion in 1942 and coerced Churchill into supporting the idea. Realization of an inability to deliver on the promise made to Molotov led to a search for an alternative and finally an Anglo-American landing in French North Africa on 8 November

⁷²Ibid., p. 176.

⁷³Lowenthal, "Roosevelt and the Coming of the War," p. 431.

1942. This was essentially the old GYMNAST plan now code named TORCH.⁷⁴

The whole question of the French reaction to TORCH was complex and confused. Technically, the Vichy government was neutral and, unlike Britain, the United States maintained diplomatic relations with the Vichy government of Marshal Petain. The British recognized General Charles de Gaulle as leader of a French government-in-exile. The American government supported, after the landings, the commander of the Vichy forces, Admiral Darlan, and, later, General Giraud rather than de Gaulle. The British viewed Giraud as incapable of generating French support and, at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, tried to effect a reconciliation between the two French leaders.⁷⁵

The arrogance of de Gaulle caused Roosevelt to despise him and come to favor a policy of allowing the French people to choose their own leader after liberation. Feelings toward de Gaulle also caused Roosevelt to be more tolerant toward Vichy than Churchill. From the British point of view, de Gaulle was the only man capable of building the strong France that would be needed to balance Germany on the continent.

⁷⁴Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 56.

⁷⁵Turner, The Unique Partnership, pp. 91-92.

The French problem raised the issue of the future of liberated states over which there was deep-seated Anglo-American disagreement. The future of Italy would cause problems in late 1943 and that of Greece in 1944. Underlying these problems was the whole issue of British and other European colonial possessions, especially that of India, about which Churchill was extremely sensitive. In the case of Italy and Greece, the governments claiming to rule them were monarchies for which Americans had no sympathy and the British a marked predilection. Anglo-American suspicions of one another were extreme on this issue and appeared consistently at the major wartime conferences.

The main accomplishments at Casablanca were that the British secured support for continued operations in the Mediterranean (provided they did not hinder the cross-channel effort) and the announcement of the doctrine of "unconditional surrender." Churchill had doubts about the wisdom of unconditional surrender but supported Roosevelt's announcement. However, as Feis points out, "Both . . . soon made an effort to see that the reasons for this policy and the policy itself were understood--and not taken to mean severity without limit."⁷⁶

At the Trident Conference in May 1943, Churchill pushed for an invasion of Italy which he claimed would not

⁷⁶Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 113.

hinder a cross-channel attack. Churchill was already maintaining such an attack could not be launched in 1943 anyway. Churchill would get his way. Operations in Italy (that would not jeopardize a 1944 invasion) would get underway, a target date of May 1944 was set for a cross-channel attack, and the scale of operations against Japan was to be stepped up.⁷⁷

The decision, made at Trident, to delay the second front severely strained relations with the Soviets. Roosevelt offered the position of ambassador to Russia to Joseph E. Davies and sent him to Russia with one goal: arranging a personal meeting between the President and Stalin. Herbert Feis maintains that Roosevelt wanted to meet Stalin, without Churchill, for a number of reasons. Such a meeting might dispel the idea that Churchill was too influential with Roosevelt as some in the United States maintained. Also, the President was sure he could establish better relations with Stalin than Churchill was able to do and, without Churchill, a more friendly atmosphere could be maintained.⁷⁸ Roosevelt seems not to have worried about causing Churchill to have feelings of anxiety over this matter. The Davies mission failed, but did mark the beginning of efforts to effect a meeting of the two leaders

⁷⁷Ibid., pp. 128-29.

⁷⁸Ibid., p. 132.

that would culminate in Teheran. It was at least evident that Soviet resentment of the West was deep and, if action were not forthcoming, the coalition itself could be in serious trouble.

By 1943 the problem of post-war considerations was beginning to assert itself. The main problems concerned post-war relief and rehabilitation and what safeguards could be established to prevent further war.⁷⁹ At the Trident Conference Churchill elaborated upon his own post-war ideas. He suggested creating a world organization and dividing the world into regional councils. All nations would divide their armed forces into two parts, one part for national use and the other for use by the councils. He also placed great weight on continuation of Anglo-American friendship.⁸⁰ Roosevelt, at first in agreement, rejected the regional councils at Hull's urging. Hull's objections were that such regional organizations could easily create great power spheres of influence and that American public opinion would resist participation in European or Asiatic councils.⁸¹ Churchill himself lost faith in the scheme when Russian resistance became manifest. The American position was stated by Hull at the Quadrant Conference in August 1943. The Americans proposed establishing, as early as possible,

⁷⁹McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia, pp. 313-16.

⁸⁰Ibid., p. 321.

⁸¹Ibid.

a worldwide international organization. The British accepted the idea and, in doing so, pinned their hopes for the future on American power as a counterbalance to growing Russian might.

The Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers convened in October 1943 and involved, as leading participants, Hull, Eden, and Molotov. Major topics discussed were the post-war settlement, the creation of an international organization for maintaining world peace, and military coordination with Russia. Notable, to the Americans, was a Russian pledge to join in the war against Japan when the European struggle was over. Hull was elated over the outcome of the meeting, and both Roosevelt and Churchill were impressed. Indeed, the Moscow Conference was probably the high-water mark in allied cooperation during the war. Of potentially momentous implications was the Four Power Declaration on General Security which Hull considered the greatest achievement of the conference.⁸² Russian agreement to this document implied a willingness to cooperate with Britain and America in the post-war world. There were disagreements among all three parties and they were serious; but, for the moment at least, the differences were pushed aside and the cooperative spirit came to the fore. The successes of the Moscow

⁸²For the text of this document, followed by the official communique, see the appendix.

Conference indicated that much could be expected from the forthcoming meeting of the Big Three at Teheran.

CHAPTER II

THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP: CHURCHILL AND ROOSEVELT

One of the more notable aspects of World War II was the degree of cooperation achieved through the Anglo-American relationship. Though the evolution of that relationship was discussed in Chapter I, its exceptional wartime characteristics cannot be adequately explained solely in those terms. Almost all authorities on the subject note that the special Anglo-American relationship was of primary significance regarding the overall allied war effort. It was the foundation upon which the allied coalition was built. The coalition, in turn, was largely maintained through the efforts of Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, who developed a working relationship unique among world leaders. During World War II Churchill and Roosevelt became friends. This did not mean an end to Anglo-American friction or to the pursuit of respective national interests. However, the close personal contacts between the two leaders enabled the consequences and inevitable confusion resulting from disputes to be minimized and, in so doing, enormously facilitated the war effort.

For the United States, the cooperation with Great Britain, aided by the Churchill-Roosevelt contact, certainly decreased both the time and effort required to win the war. For Great Britain the value of the contact was even greater as noted by Joseph P. Lash, "Without Churchill's leadership and the partnership that he established with Roosevelt, it is doubtful that Britain could have survived as an independent nation and the British as a free people."¹

Numerous writers have lauded Churchill's leadership abilities, viewing him as bold, strong, imaginative, and ultimately larger than life. In fact, so many superior qualities have been attributed to the man that he has been thoroughly mythologized. As a leader he was extraordinary but not perfect. Churchill's leadership, in reality, suffered at least the same degree of criticism, insult, and even personal attack, as that of any other British prime minister. In 1942 he was even compared to Adolf Hitler by the opposition as well as the British press.²

Churchill entered English politics at the top rather than serving a long apprenticeship. His father had been chancellor of the exchequer, thus providing access to the society of cabinet members. He, himself, became a minister

¹Joseph P. Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill 1939-1941: The Partnership that Saved the West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1976), p. 9.

²Brian Gardner, Churchill in Power (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1970), p. xv.

at the age of thirty-one and entered the cabinet two years later.³ His practical knowledge was therefore limited and he rarely had the benefit of personal experience in dealing with early political problems. He was also strongly swayed by emotion, and easily moved to display his own feelings.⁴ Biographer Lewis Broad states that, "He [Churchill] was not born for the age of the common man."⁵ In fact, Churchill knew little of British society beyond London political circles and the life of the upper class. The life of the ordinary citizen was remote to him.

He entered politics as an elected Conservative but, as events soon proved, Churchill was never a "party man." He believed in England, empire, laissez-faire, free trade, naval power, and social reform. Such a mixture defied labeling and, when combined with his characteristic lack of patience, caused many to view him as irresponsible. His enthusiasm did, on occasion, cause him to act on impulse; a fact noted by many of his contemporaries.

As home secretary, battling the strikers in 1911-1912, dealing with the women's suffrage movement, opposing rebellion in Ireland, Churchill proved not to be the radical

³A. J. P. Taylor et al., Churchill Revised: A Critical Assessment (New York: The Dial Press, 1969), p. 15.

⁴Lewis Broad, Winston Churchill: The Years of Preparation (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1958), p. 18.

⁵Ibid., p. 17.

many had thought. Asquith moved Churchill to the admiralty prior to World War I. When British generals failed to help the Belgians at Antwerp, Churchill, at the head of a contingent of marines, rushed to the scene and asked for command. He was unsuccessful but, once again, demonstrated his tendency to act impulsively. More serious was the Dardanelles affair. It was hoped that Germany could be reached by forcing a way through the Dardanelles and thus bypassing the stalemate on the western front. He pressed it upon both his admirals and ministerial colleagues. Though others supported the campaign, when it failed, Churchill took full responsibility for the result. "Failure at Gallipoli ruined Churchill for the duration of the First World War and saddled him with a reputation for hasty, though brilliant, improvisations."⁶ Although he resigned from the government after the Gallipoli disaster, Churchill later re-entered as minister of munitions under Lloyd George. His role did not call for him to function as a leader of policy or inspirer of strategy, but as General Haig noted:

I have no doubt that Winston means to do his utmost to provide the Army with all it requires, but at the same time he can hardly help meddling in the larger questions of strategy and tactics; for the solution of the latter he had no real training, and his agile mind only makes him a danger.⁷

⁶Ibid., p. 22.

⁷Richard Blake, ed., Private Papers of Douglas Haig, 1914-1919 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1952), pp. 254-44.

Churchill gained some measure of attention through his attacks on the Bolsheviks but he had few political friends, and, when the government of Lloyd George fell, so did Churchill. With Stanley Baldwin's help Churchill became chancellor of the exchequer, but unable to confine himself to the details of finance, ". . . he ranged over every field as though he were Prime Minister."⁸ Clinging to ideas of imperial greatness and balance of power, Churchill got little sympathy from the British public during the inter-war years. His alarm at the growth of the German Air Force and insistence that the size of the Royal Air Force be increased fell largely upon deaf ears. Churchill's opposition to Hitler won him some measure of popularity, but he lost it through support of King Edward VIII when the latter became involved in marital troubles. British public opinion was against the king and, when Churchill supported him, against Churchill as well. Edward's abdication in 1936 left Churchill alone and discredited.

By 1929, differences between Stanley Baldwin and Churchill had become so great that the latter resigned from office and would have no place in the government until becoming first lord of the admiralty in 1939. Strangely enough, it was, as biographer Lewis Broad notes, ". . . the

⁸Taylor et al., Churchill Revised, p. 27.

decisive step toward his own premiership."⁹ Churchill, during the period, felt that opportunity had passed him by, but continued to urge rearmament and resistance to Germany. This would be remembered when the appeasement policy of the Chamberlain government failed. Out of power for most of the period, Churchill was free of association with appeasement. Churchill later described his good fortune with the phrase, "Over me beat the invisible wings."¹⁰ In reality, as Taylor points out, ". . . Churchill, too, favored appeasement, once it did not spring from weakness."¹¹ In any case, his criticism of the mid-1930s helped stimulate rearmament in the ensuing years. By World War II he had gained considerable experience in dealing with the problems of war.

When Churchill became first lord in 1939, he was already urging Britain to take the lead in a coalition against Germany. His opinion that either France or Russia would be agreeable to such a coalition was wrong. Churchill, once again, simply believed what he wanted to believe. He also erred in assuming that a coalition, if formed, would deter Germany from fighting at all. Chamberlain was not impressed with the idea of a grand alliance and pronounced, "It is a very attractive idea;

⁹Broad, Churchill, p. 362.

¹⁰Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 162.

¹¹Taylor et al., Churchill Revised, p. 33.

indeed there is almost everything to be said for it until you come to examine its practicality. From that moment its attraction vanishes."¹² When Chamberlain acquiesced to the Munich settlement, Churchill spoke against the action in the House of Commons to no avail. Perhaps the most ironic observation concerning the action taken at Munich is the assertion that Chamberlain's intervention saved Hitler from being deposed by his own generals.¹³

As Chamberlain's appeasement policies failed, Churchill's popularity with the masses increased. In spite of urgings from various elements both in and out of the government, Chamberlain refused to offer Churchill an office. It was not until 1 September 1939, after Hitler invaded Poland, that Chamberlain invited Churchill to join the government as first lord of the admiralty. Anthony Eden was also brought back into the government several days later. Following the German attack upon Norway, Chamberlain resigned and Churchill took office. Many people within the government wanted Halifax rather than Churchill, but the former simply did not want to be a wartime prime minister.¹⁴ Opinion polls indicated that Churchill's base of support lay

¹²Feiling, Neville Chamberlain, p. 347.

¹³John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Nemesis of Power (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1953), pp. 77-91.

¹⁴Henry Pelling, Winston Churchill (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1974), pp. 437-38.

with those in the lower income groups.¹⁵ A. J. P. Taylor notes, ". . . in the last resort he Churchill succeeded by calling in the people against the men at the top."¹⁶

Chamberlain's assistant private secretary, John Colville, indicates the alarm with which the civil service treated Churchill's elevation to the position of prime minister:

In May 1940 the mere thought of Churchill as Prime Minister sent a cold chill down the spines of the staff at 10 Downing Street. . . . Indeed we felt that Chamberlain had been weak in allowing the First Lord of the Admiralty to assume responsibilities far in excess of his Department concerns, and if we had known he was conducting his own telegraphic correspondence with President Roosevelt we should have been still more horrified by such presumption. Our feelings at 10 Downing Street were widely shared in the Cabinet Offices, the Treasury and throughout Whitehall. . . . The country had fallen into the hands of an adventurer. . . . Seldom can a Prime Minister have taken office with "the Establishment," as it would now be called, so dubious of the choice and so prepared to find its doubts justified.¹⁷

Even Churchill's detractors admitted that he brought a new sense of urgency and vitality to the government.

Colville said:

Within a fortnight all was changed. I doubt if there has ever been such a rapid transformation of opinion in Whitehall and of the tempo at which business was conducted. . . . A sense of urgency was created in the course of a very few days and respectable civil servants were actually to be seen running along the corridors.

¹⁵News Chronicle, 1 Jan. 1940, as quoted in Pelling, Winston Churchill, p. 438.

¹⁶Taylor, English History, 15:475.

¹⁷John Wheeler-Bennett, Action This Day: Working With Churchill (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), pp. 48-49.

No delays were condoned; telephone switchboards quadrupled their efficiency; the Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Planning Staff were in almost constant session: regular office hours ceased to exist and weekends disappeared with them.¹⁸

In a sense, Churchill's entire existence had been spent in preparation for his role as Great Britain's war leader. If the war presented the nation with its "finest hour" it had similar results with Churchill himself. As prime minister, he had supreme power over the war effort and foreign affairs. He never grew tired of argument and seemed to lose respect for those who failed to press their own opinions. As a result, some saw him as a tyrant, but he usually imposed his will by discussion rather than dictation. As Brian Gardner notes, ". . . in his hands, power did not corrupt."¹⁹ Though many writers disagree, W. N. Medlicott offers a very reasonable assessment of Churchill's qualities upon becoming prime minister:

Winston Churchill, who succeeded Chamberlain as Prime Minister on 10 May 1940, was not only a powerful and immensely dominant leader. He was also a highly experienced, resourceful, and persistent politician, a first-rate administrator who understood the capacities of modern official machinery, and a formidable and persuasive negotiator.²⁰

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 50-51.

¹⁹Garner, Churchill in Power, p. xvii.

²⁰W. N. Medlicott, British Foreign Policy Since Versailles 1919-1963 (London: Methuen & Co., 1968), p. 240.

For Churchill, politics was a struggle for power and there was no divorce between war and policy. Policy was promoted through strategy which, in turn, would determine the outcome of war. This is the key to understanding Churchill's actions and policies as a war leader.

As the correspondence with Roosevelt suggests, Churchill did not like working through official channels; a characteristic that greatly disturbed many of his associates. Joseph Lash points out, "Both Churchill and Roosevelt understood that information was not only essential to wise judgment, but conferred authority on its possessor."²¹ Churchill's unorthodox administrative methods led many to rate him a poor administrator, but this contention seems invalid. Churchill's methods were his own and they worked. Putting the nation on a war footing created some confusion and wasted effort, and no administrator could have avoided it. As Elizabeth Barker says, "The great thing in war is to make fewer mistakes than the enemy."²² Churchill accomplished this.

British war strategy was Churchill's, and he did not hesitate to intrude upon the tactical operations of his generals. The prime minister's main goal was the total defeat of Hitler and the return of his conquests. There

²¹Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, p. 181.

²²Elizabeth Barker, Churchill and Eden at War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1978), p. 28.

were elements, within and without the government, that would not have insisted upon the total defeat of Germany, but Churchill refused to compromise with Hitler. On the eve of Hitler's attack upon Russia John Colville asked Churchill how he would address the House, considering his long-time anti-communist feelings. Churchill replied, "I have only one purpose, the destruction of Hitler, and my life is simplified thereby. If Hitler invaded Hell, I would make at least a favorable mention of the Devil in the House of Commons."²³ Any attempt at departure from Churchill's policy would have necessitated a new prime minister.²⁴ Unfortunately, Churchill never developed a clear European policy beyond the defeat of Germany.

Many of Churchill's accomplishments were due to his charismatic personality and gift of public speaking. Public speaking was ". . . a compulsive manifestation of his personality."²⁵ As a result of long experience in the House of Commons he could speak on impromptu occasions and his love of language usually made his utterances memorable. He both prepared and edited his own speeches and excelled as writer as well as speaker.²⁶ His list of published and

²³Kay Halle, Irrepressible Churchill (New York: World Publishing, 1966), p. 179. Unwritten comment attributed to Churchill by an "ear witness."

²⁴Taylor, Churchill Revised, p. 43.

²⁵Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, p. 188.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 188-91.

unpublished works is enormous. The prime minister used his skills to strengthen public resolve for the war effort as well as to seek public support for his own wartime policies.

Churchill realized very early in the war that Great Britain alone could not achieve victory. He also realized that the United States and the Soviet Union could not remain neutral indefinitely. Nevertheless, he misjudged the American people, thinking them overly pro-British. The American attitude was pro-British, but it did not translate into an automatic desire to rush to Britain's aid. In addition, Churchill developed an emotional attachment to President Roosevelt that exceeded the latter's attachment to him. Taylor notes that Roosevelt ". . . needed Great Britain for America's security. Otherwise he remained uninvolved."²⁷ There is considerable evidence to support such a conclusion. Regarding Russia, Churchill had no such illusions. Roosevelt might make a mistake about his personal relationship with Stalin, but Churchill knew that Soviet actions were always based upon practical considerations. Ultimately, it must be said of Churchill that, as a war leader, he was a man of contradiction; at times a pragmatic realist and, at other times, an impulsive boy. Perhaps it was always so.

Historical coincidence provided the United States with a leader who possessed many of the virtues as well as

²⁷Taylor, Churchill Revised, p. 47.

the faults of Winston Churchill. The qualities of Roosevelt as a person and as a leader have, like those of Churchill, been distorted and mythologized to such a degree that a realistic impression is difficult. Both men approached their supreme leadership roles at a time of grave national crisis; Churchill during World War II, and Roosevelt during the Great Depression. The qualities of any men who serve under such exceptional circumstances are certain to be examined in minute detail and, inevitably, result in very active defenders and critics. Historical circumstance forced both men into situations where their virtues and faults were magnified.

Franklin Roosevelt ranks as one of the most notable men of the twentieth century; the man who led the nation through both its greatest depression and greatest war could be nothing else. Without extraordinary qualities, Roosevelt would not have survived as the nation's leader for as long as he did. There was, however, nothing in Roosevelt's early life to suggest such capabilities. Born in 1882 in Hyde Park, New York, Roosevelt came from the same type of patrician background as Churchill. As Joseph Lash notes, "Both had been shaped by turn-of-the-century societies that were fast disappearing. . . ." ²⁸

²⁸Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, p. 179.

Roosevelt was educated at Groton and Harvard, where he was an average student. However, most biographers believe that his various non-academic pursuits gave him the poise, the sense of social status, and the overall social affability that would later become such great assets in politics. After marriage to Anna Eleanor Roosevelt in 1905, he attended law school at Columbia for two years.²⁹

Strongly influenced by his distant cousin Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt entered politics in a New York State Senate race, which he won. Oriented toward reform from the beginning, Roosevelt became a leader of reform Democrats in the New York legislature between 1911 and 1913.³⁰ In 1912 he opposed the Tammany machine in New York to support Woodrow Wilson for the Democratic presidential nomination and Wilson rewarded him by appointing him assistant secretary of the navy. Comparing his two great political mentors later in life Roosevelt stated:

Theodore Roosevelt lacked Woodrow Wilson's appeal to the fundamental and failed to stir, as Wilson did, the truly profound moral and social convictions. Wilson, on the other hand, failed where Theodore Roosevelt succeeded in stirring people to enthusiasm over specific individual events, even though these specific events may have been superficial in comparison with the fundamental.³¹

²⁹Gerald Nash, ed., Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1967), pp. 1-3.

³⁰Ibid., p. 3.

³¹Elliott Roosevelt, ed., F.D.R., His Personal Letters, 3 vols. (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1947-1950), 3:467.

Roosevelt was proud of his ability to judge the qualities of those he met and, as the above quote illustrates, not without justification.

By 1920 he was known well enough in political circles to be chosen by James Cox as his presidential running-mate. During the campaign, Roosevelt demonstrated considerable qualities as a public speaker. The campaign had a maturing effect upon him.

In 1921, poliomyelitis threatened to end what many saw as a very promising political career. Roosevelt was crippled for life. For the next few years he was preoccupied with efforts to regain his health. Some writers have suggested that it was polio rather than the depression or war that really accounted for Roosevelt's strength of character. Clearly it changed the man. One of the more thorough studies of the effects polio had upon Roosevelt is The Making of Franklin Roosevelt, by Richard Goldberg. Goldberg notes that, "The paralysis was a dividing line between the gay, haughty, superficial politician of the Wilson years and the resolute, serious, warm-hearted leader of the New Deal and World War Two years."³² Goldberg also believed that polio produced a genuine personality change in Roosevelt.³³

³²Richard Thayer Goldberg, The Making of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Cambridge: Abt Books, 1981), p. 205.

³³Ibid., p. 206.

In spite of his bout with polio, Roosevelt kept up his political interests and, as biographer Frank Freidel notes, "He kept a firm grip on even the most minute functions of the Dutchess County Democratic organization."³⁴ In 1928 he successfully ran for the governorship of New York, thus reentering public life. Reelected in 1930, he embarked upon a series of social and political reforms that greatly impressed some political observers. Historians have tended to view his experiences at this point of his career as leading to the New Deal at the national level.

Like Churchill at a later date, Roosevelt came to power in 1932 following the repudiation of the policies of his predecessor. When elected, he had no coherent, well-thought-out plan to meet the problems of the depression, but he seemed to possess some vague goals and a will to experiment. Roosevelt's vague ideas involved comprehensive social welfare and unemployment relief, but as Frank Freidel notes:

Obviously he [Roosevelt] had not faced up to the magnitude of expenditure that his program would involve. Obviously too, he had not in the slightest accepted the views of those who felt that the way out of the depression was large-scale public spending and deficit financing.³⁵

³⁴Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Ordeal (Boston: Little, Brown, 1954), p. 115.

³⁵Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Triumph (Boston: Little, Brown, 1956), p. 361.

Without any plan, what was to become known as the "brain trust" coalesced around him. According to James Burns, two things were remarkable about these men, ". . . the variety of their backgrounds and ideas, and the fact that not one of them dominated the channels of access to Roosevelt's mind."³⁶ These men created the New Deal. One of the most remarkable aspects of that program was the sweep and variety of those it helped.³⁷ One of Roosevelt's greatest talents, that he demonstrated repeatedly, was the ability to "pick the brains" of those around him.

Concerning foreign affairs the Democratic Party was vague, and Roosevelt, focusing upon domestic problems virtually ignored the subject during his campaign. According to Freidel, by 1933 Roosevelt was aware of the need for the United States to reassert itself as a world power and his concern over the growing military crisis in the world was second only to the economic crisis at home.³⁸ However, the best assessment of Roosevelt's initial performance in the foreign affairs arena is offered by Burns, "As a foreign policy maker, Roosevelt during his

³⁶James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1956), p. 153.

³⁷Ibid., p. 267.

³⁸Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Launching the New Deal (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973), p. 355.

first term was more pussyfooting politician than political leader."³⁹ Rather than confront the isolationists, he seemed to hope that events would cause them to change their minds. Burns offers several reasons for Roosevelt's lack of coherent action that include a threatened split in his own party on international issues; lack of any feel for public attitudes on the subject; fear of alienating support for the New Deal; and the desire not to take political risks with the 1936 election approaching.⁴⁰ The President expressed his feelings in August 1936 at Chautaugua, New York:

I have seen war. I have seen war on land and sea. I have seen blood running from the wounded. I have seen men coughing out their gassed lungs. I have seen the dead in the mud. I have seen cities destroyed. I have seen two hundred limping, exhausted men come out of line--the survivors of a regiment of one thousand that went forward forty-eight hours before. I have seen children starving. I have seen the agony of mothers and wives. I hate war.⁴¹

Roosevelt elaborated his thinking further during an address in Chicago on 5 October 1937:

It is . . . a matter of vital interest and concern to the people of the United States . . . that the maintenance of international morality be restored . . . that the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading. . . . America hates war. America hopes for peace.

³⁹Burns, The Lion and the Fox, p. 262.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 263.

⁴¹Samuel I. Rosenman, comp., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 5: The People Approve, 1936 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1938), p. 289.

Therefore, America actively engages in the search for peace.⁴²

The President embraced the principle of collective security. Throughout the 1930s he remained firm in his belief that international differences could be resolved through negotiation--all that was needed was good will. In 1939 he offered to act as intermediary in arranging discussions among the world powers on disarmament, trade, and political rights, but no nation seemed interested. Presidential efforts at disarmament were resisted by even the British who objected to allowing foreign observers to conduct inspections of their facilities. Hitler was not going to stop rearming in any case, and Roosevelt seemed to finally realize as much stating, "Obviously, unless every nation were willing to eliminate weapons of aggression and offensive warfare and to bind itself not to invade any foreign territory, it was useless to expect any other nation to disarm."⁴³

Peace in Europe was going to take more than the collective action envisioned by the President in his Chicago speech. On a more practical level he moved to modify

⁴²Samuel I. Rosenman, comp., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 6: The Constitution Prevails, 1932 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1941), pp. 409-11.

⁴³Samuel I. Rosenman, comp., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 8: War and Neutrality, 1939 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1941), p. xxv.

existing law so the nation could more effectively employ its power. However, it was not until after Hitler invaded Poland that Roosevelt was able to substitute "cash-and-carry" for a repeal of the arms embargo. Roosevelt's move toward military action was so oblique that historians still argue over motive and timing. In any case, the president balked at public discussion of the possibility of military action by the United States. It is clear that by 1939 he knew that the safety of America was closely related to resisting aggression overseas.⁴⁴ It is not so clear that he realized the full implications of such resistance.

Did President Roosevelt deliberately steer the United States into war while cynically professing to stand for peace and neutrality? Certainly, as Nathan Miller notes, ". . . in the year between his election to a third term and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, American neutrality became a fiction."⁴⁵ The president's actions on this question have been discussed in Chapter I, but the actual motives behind them will probably never be known. A good case can be made for Roosevelt the cynic, but critics should keep in mind that Roosevelt was not completely in control of events. Once committed to helping Great Britain,

⁴⁴Thomas Greer, What Roosevelt Thought (East Lansing: Michigan State Univ. Press, 1958), p. 180.

⁴⁵Nathan Miller, F.D.R.: An Intimate History (New York: Doubleday, 1983), p. 459.

which would have been difficult to avoid, the president seems to have faced a series of rapidly diminishing alternatives. When pressed too hard, Roosevelt did resort to deviousness and deceit and was a master at both. Arthur M. Schlesinger said of Roosevelt that, ". . . he never adequately recognized that casualness over methods might jeopardize or corrupt results."⁴⁶ In defense of the president, advisor Tom Corcoran has stated:

There isn't enough time . . . to explain everything to everyone, to cajole everyone, to persuade everyone, to make everyone see why it has to be done one way rather than another. If a President tried to do this, he would have no time left for anything else. So he must deceive, misrepresent, leave false impressions, even, sometimes lie--and trust to charm, loyalty and the result to make up for it. . . . A great man cannot be a good man.⁴⁷

President Roosevelt took the case for aid to Great Britain to the American people in a fireside chat delivered on 29 December 1940:

If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the continents of Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, and the high seas--and they will be in a position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this hemisphere. It is no exaggeration to say that all of us, in all the Americas, would be living at the point of a gun--a gun loaded with explosive bullets, economic as well as military.⁴⁸

⁴⁶From his book The Coming of the New Deal as quoted in William Leuchtenbury, ed., Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Profile (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967), p. 55.

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Rosenman, War and Aid to Democracies, p. 635.

By the fall of 1941 the president was playing an active, concerted role in the effort against Germany and its Axis partners. Again, his motives were of questionable legality and propriety, but he clearly thought his actions were necessary for the safety of the United States. In his Labor Day radio address on 1 September 1941 the president said:

The task of defeating Hitler may be long and arduous. There are a few appeasers and Nazi sympathizers who say it cannot be done. They even ask me to negotiate with Hitler--to pray for crumbs from his victorious table. They do, in fact, ask me to become the modern Benedict Arnold and betray all that I hold dear. . . . This course I have rejected--I reject it again.⁴⁹

Increased submarine warfare in the Atlantic and the threat thus posed to the supply line to Great Britain caused the president to prepare the public for offensive operations in his fireside chat of 11 September 1941:

No act of violence, no act of intimidation will keep us from maintaining intact two bulwarks of American defense: First, our line of supply of material to the enemies of Hitler; and second, the freedom of our shipping on the high seas.

No matter what it takes, no matter what it costs, we will keep open the line of legitimate commerce in these defensive waters.

We have sought no shooting war with Hitler. We do not seek it now. But neither do we want peace so much, that we are willing to pay for it by permitting him to attack our naval and merchant ships while they are on legitimate business.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Samuel I. Rosenman, comp., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 10: The Call to Battle Stations, 1941 (New York: Russell & Russell, 1950), pp. 368-69.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 390.

To many, these actions represented a strange way to search for peace, but, by the fall of 1941, Roosevelt had abandoned hopes of peace. Such a change in thinking was clearly reflected in his public utterances. He had not arrived at his position hurriedly or lightly and, if Congress were not ready for war, the situation as he saw it would not wait. Roosevelt's perceived alternatives were running out and his policy statements were reflecting that fact. If the president were not entirely candid with the American people (and he certainly was not), perhaps he can be excused due to the extraordinary nature of the peril that, in his opinion, confronted the nation. In any event, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and subsequent declarations of war by Germany and Italy resolved the immediate problem both for the president and the American people.

Since his first day in office, the president had possessed broad emergency powers granted by Congress, and he never relinquished them. There was never any doubt who made the decisions and controlled the American war effort. Roosevelt, on inauguration day 1933, transformed the Oval Office into a busy nerve center full of confident people, and so it had stayed since that time. Roosevelt had no equivalent of Churchill's red tags stating "Action this Day," but, by World War II, he had already demonstrated an enormous capacity to get things done. Like Churchill,

Roosevelt refused to be restricted in his access to information and frequently used unofficial channels. He often read State Department cables himself and bypassed Secretary of State Cordell Hull; a characteristic often manifested to Hull's acute embarrassment. ". . . Advice poured in on him from all sides, a phenomenon that was the more remarkable because the president gave so little of himself in return."⁵¹ Roosevelt, in fact, had very little patience with the red tape and orderly procedures of bureaucracy and often bypassed them in unorthodox fashion. Many of his associates, like those of Churchill, rated him a poor administrator, but the same qualifications of such criticism would seem to apply as in the case of the prime minister.

As with Churchill, the great power Roosevelt obtained as war leader would cause many to expect abuse. According to Lash, such suspicions were unfounded because both governments had balancing mechanisms to prevent abuse of power and because the temperament of both leaders was such as to preclude it.⁵² Also like Churchill, Roosevelt respected the right of subordinates to disagree and argue their positions. However, it was a formidable matter to stand up to either leader, and the president had a legendary

⁵¹Lash, Roosevelt and Churchill, p. 181.

⁵²Ibid., p. 183.

ability to charm and cajole. When Roosevelt spoke, many people simply heard what they wanted to hear and he was often quite content to let them. As Lash notes, ". . . unlike Churchill, Roosevelt preferred to get his way by indirection instead of argument or confrontation with his advisors."⁵³ Lash goes on to point out that the president expected people to argue with him but also knew when to stop. After he had heard the arguments and reached his decision, he expected no further debate.⁵⁴ Some associates were never able or willing to comply with such a policy.

Roosevelt, although capable of writing well, rarely wrote his own speeches as did Churchill and, unlike the latter, failed to distinguish himself as an author. Unlike the British practice of routinely keeping minutes of meetings, American policy was, in this respect, very casual, with the result that many important conversations between Roosevelt and others went unrecorded. It is, therefore, very difficult, and often impossible, to reconstruct the president's thoughts and comments concerning many policy decisions. However, several characteristics do become apparent: the president was far more subtle than Churchill, exceeded the latter in patience, and also possessed more

⁵³Ibid., p. 185.

⁵⁴Ibid.

self-control.⁵⁵ Without the recorded observations of his associates, even less would be known.

The Roosevelt "style" favored personal contact, and this was a primary factor leading to the wartime conferences between himself and Churchill as well as with Stalin. As commander-in-chief, he was in direct charge of the war effort and able to make far-reaching commitments on the spot. His flexibility and adaptability to a wide range of situations was a lifelong characteristic. Also of importance was Roosevelt's pragmatism. He was not bound by any dogma or theory and felt comfortable exploring new ideas and concepts. Much of his effectiveness was due to his great skill at communication, and he was genuinely concerned over anyone resisting his persuasiveness. Most contemporaries acknowledge Roosevelt as a consummate politician who had thoroughly mastered most of the skills needed to survive in American politics. Unfortunately, no man is without weaknesses, and one of the president's, manifested repeatedly in connection with the Russians, was his faith in his ability to "get at" Stalin and reason with the Russians in the same manner he had "gotten at" the American people and, for that matter, Winston Churchill as well.

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 190-95.

Historians generally give Roosevelt high marks for his direction of wartime strategy. Robert Dallek notes:

. . . Roosevelt was the principal architect of the basic strategic decisions that contributed so heavily to the early defeat of Germany and Japan. . . . The portrait of him as utterly naive or unrealistic about the Russians, for example, has been much overdrawn.⁵⁶

On many occasions, especially through 1943, Roosevelt sided with Churchill and the British Chiefs against his own Joint Chiefs on matters of strategy and tactics. In fact, ". . . he masked differences with his Chiefs by having the British carry the burden of the argument."⁵⁷ The president's seeming partiality to the British did lead to some resentment, and Finis Farr notes that George Marshall ". . . suspected the British of trying to set things up to dilute his power as Chief of Staff."⁵⁸ If this problem existed, it was apparently cured by giving Marshall five stars and assuring him he would take orders from no one but the president himself.

The debate over Roosevelt's qualities as a leader, the motives behind his actions, and his various personal capabilities, or lack thereof, will continue indefinitely.

⁵⁶Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 532-33.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 532.

⁵⁸Finis Farr, FDR (New Rochelle: Arlington House, 1972), p. 379.

In Roosevelt in Retrospect, John Gunther offers a very reasonable assessment of both Roosevelt and Churchill:

. . . Roosevelt sometimes did give the impression of being two-dimensional. Churchill seems fuller-bodied, with greater depth; one thinks of him as all one color, the scarlet of the beefeater guardsman or the purple of the Renaissance; FDR had a multiplicity of shadow tones and reflecting surfaces. Churchill, one feels, is always one man, though astoundingly various within his single flesh; Roosevelt was every sort of man who ever was.⁵⁹

W. H. McNeill makes an interesting summary of Anglo-American cooperation during the crucial period from 1936 to 1942. "What would have been inconceivable in 1936 . . . incredible in 1938 . . . impolitic in 1940 . . . was growing reality during 1941 and an accomplished fact by 1942."⁶⁰ While Churchill and Roosevelt cannot take full credit for the extraordinary change that took place in Anglo-American cooperation noted above, they were its primary architects.

Prior to World War II, the two men had met on only one occasion; when Roosevelt visited England during World War I they encountered one another at a dinner at Gray's Inn. The meeting was of little consequence, and Churchill had apparently forgotten about it, which somewhat irked Roosevelt upon the occasion of their meeting aboard the Augusta. However, the two men were already well acquainted with one another prior to the Augusta meeting due to a

⁵⁹ John Gunther, Roosevelt in Retrospect (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 14.

⁶⁰ McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia, pp. 5-6.

constant correspondence that would ultimately comprise one of the most extensive communications between world leaders in recorded history. According to acknowledged authorities Francis Loewenheim, Harold Langley, and Manfred Jonas:

In the five and a half years between the outbreak of war in Europe and the death of Roosevelt more than 1,700 letters, telegrams, and other messages--over 700 from Roosevelt and over 1,000 from Churchill--passed between the two men at an incredible average of nearly one each day.⁶¹

Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas also note that each leader was aware of the other's activities during the inter-war years, and there actually developed a certain mutual admiration, though they did not seek a meeting.⁶² It was Roosevelt who initiated the correspondence when on 11 September 1939 he wrote to Churchill who, at the time, was still serving as first lord of the admiralty. Roosevelt had proclaimed American neutrality just a few days earlier on 5 September, yet was now taking the unusual action of communicating directly with a subordinate official of a belligerent power. What prompted the first letter is obscure, but James Leutze feels that the visit of presidential advisor Felix Frankfurter to Oxford University in June 1939 may have been instrumental. Frankfurter met and talked with Churchill during his stay and came away

⁶¹Francis L. Loewenheim, Harold D. Langley, and Manfred Jonas, eds., Roosevelt and Churchill: Their Secret Wartime Correspondence (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1975), p. 4.

⁶²Ibid., p. 6.

extremely impressed; a fact duly reported to President Roosevelt.⁶³ The existence of the correspondence gradually became known, but it was three decades before its contents became available to the public. The very secrecy of its contents led to speculations about a conspiracy. While there seems to have been no actual conspiracy to draw America into the war involved in the correspondence, it does become clear that the president was involved in some very unneutral actions.

According to Leutze, a number of factors concerning the correspondence made secrecy an asset. First, the very extensiveness of the correspondence would have aroused the suspicion of critics. Second, the subject of American participation in the war was discussed and would certainly have aroused isolationist elements. Third, Churchill's accession to the prime ministership was involved. Finally, the fact that the two men were on such intimate and personal terms as early as they were would surely have led to suspicion.⁶⁴

It has already been indicated that the upper levels of the British civil service were initially unaware of the correspondence and some writers have indicated that

⁶³James Leutze, "The Secret of the Churchill-Roosevelt Correspondence: September 1939-May 1940," Journal of Contemporary History 10 (March 1975):470.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 469.

Chamberlain was ignorant of it as well. However, John Winant, American ambassador to Great Britain, notes that, "Mr. Chamberlain had arranged at the beginning of hostilities to keep the President informed on the war situation. He delegated this task to Mr. Churchill who was then First Lord of the Admiralty."⁶⁵ Apparently, the first public leak regarding the existence of the correspondence occurred in 1944 in the House of Commons. Later, in 1945, Senator Homer Ferguson demanded that the State Department surrender copies of the messages which the department, in turn, refused to do.⁶⁶ The State Department possessed only a small portion of the material anyway. In a newspaper interview, given on the occasion of Churchill's visit to the United States in 1945, he did confirm that there had been a correspondence link between himself and Roosevelt.⁶⁷ In The Grand Alliance, Churchill also credits the correspondence with being very helpful in establishing the close relationship between the two nations.⁶⁸ What initial British thoughts were as to the unorthodox nature of the contact are unknown, but obviously the situation worked to their advantage. It must also be remembered that Roosevelt had

⁶⁵John Winant, Letter from Grosvenor Square (New York: Greenwood Press, 1947), p. 37.

⁶⁶Leutze, "The Secret," p. 468.

⁶⁷New York Times, 18 April 1945.

⁶⁸Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 167.

already been rebuffed by Chamberlain and had developed some antipathy towards him. In light of this fact, and in view of the favorable impression the president had gained of Churchill, the contact may not be so unusual as it seems upon cursory examination. Also, Roosevelt did, on the same date as his first letter to Churchill, write to Chamberlain offering to correspond with him personally but nothing resulted from the offer and it was not repeated.⁶⁹

Initially, both the Foreign Office and the British ambassador, Lord Lothian, were unaware of the correspondence and this fact caused some resentment and confusion. Luetze argues that the Foreign Office, especially, objected not only to what was being said (many of Churchill's statements were being interpreted by the Americans as official British policy), but to the fact that it was Churchill who was discussing them.⁷⁰ The messages were going through the American embassy and many people in the Foreign Office also distrusted Joseph P. Kennedy as he was known to be a strong proponent of American neutrality. Kennedy bluntly informed Roosevelt that Churchill wanted the United States into the war as soon as possible. Kennedy's pessimism concerning aid to the British was based upon an opinion that it was too late to save Britain and that it was wiser to concentrate

⁶⁹U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1939, vol. I, "General" (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 424.

⁷⁰Luetze, "The Secret," pp. 473-74.

upon defending positions closer to home. In fact, there was a problem resulting from using the American embassy; the source of the problem was not Kennedy but rather an obscure code clerk named Tyler Gatewood Kent.⁷¹ In May 1940, British agents found Kent in possession of hundreds of classified documents and, with diplomatic immunity waived, Kent was sent to prison. Kent claimed he had collected the documents, all American property and containing some of the Churchill-Roosevelt letters, to give to the United States Senate or the press, not to a foreign power. Kent was against American intervention, and the material indicated, to him, that the president was actively working to bring the United States into the conflict.⁷²

Both men, in their early correspondence, confined their discussions largely to naval matters. Concerning Churchill's rapid response to the president's initial letter, Leutze quotes from a personal interview with Lord Edward Bridges stating that Churchill was ". . . eager to undo the harm he felt Chamberlain had done by not being more receptive to the President's earlier overtures."⁷³ The two leaders quickly realized that they had much in common, aside from Anglo-American cooperation, and a warm friendship seems

⁷¹Ibid., p. 466.

⁷²Ibid., pp. 466-67.

⁷³Ibid., p. 477.

to have developed. By the time of the Atlantic Conference they were addressing each other as "Franklin" and "Winston" and, over the ensuing years, exchanged many personal gifts. In addition, Roosevelt enjoyed teasing Churchill and could sometimes push the latter too far in this regard.

This should not distort the fact that there were differences of opinion and that they could become sharp. Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas point out the fact that Roosevelt never shared a belief in the "special relationship" to the same degree as Churchill and did not expect as much from it.⁷⁴ Most historians would concur. At both the Cairo and Teheran Conferences Churchill clearly expected more from the relationship than Roosevelt was willing to deliver. Churchill was hurt by developments which suggested that Roosevelt placed more emphasis upon Anglo-American relations than relations with China or Russia.⁷⁵ Letters between the two men indicate that the friendship remained intact despite such disappointments. Loewenheim, Langley, and Jonas firmly maintain that the friendship was genuine in spite of disappointments and differences of opinion.⁷⁶ Churchill always insisted the friendship was real and became angry when he heard Roosevelt or the relationship criticized.

⁷⁴Loewenheim, Roosevelt and Churchill, p. 11.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 12.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 13.

Churchill was not a devious man, and he was surely too proud to try to manufacture a friendship when none existed. The two men simply had shared too much, had accomplished too much together, and had come to know each other too well for them not to remain friends.⁷⁷

It certainly seemed, at Cairo and Teheran, that the president was not primarily concerned with Anglo-American relations. Yet, perhaps Roosevelt considered his relationship with Churchill, and Anglo-American relations in general, to be firm enough not to need special attention during the conferences. Relations with the Russians were extremely sensitive at the time, yet were considered critical to the success of the Allied war effort. Reaching an understanding with Stalin thus became the president's main concern. Russian suspicions of American and British motives were well known and, Roosevelt felt, needed to be dispelled if at all possible. If hurting British pride was the price of placating the Russians on this point, then it was a price the American could afford to pay. By 1943 the United States had clearly become the dominant partner in the Anglo-American relationship and both parties knew it. This fact severely limited the amount of pressure the British could exert in promoting their own views. It is doubtful if the British would have been any more solicitous of American feelings had positions been reversed.

⁷⁷Ibid.

Unfortunately, Roosevelt died before the end of the war and Anglo-American relations began to deteriorate from their high point of the Churchill-Roosevelt days. Whether this phenomenon was inherent in the relationship from the beginning or indicative of the special value of the Churchill-Roosevelt contribution is open to debate. Certainly, Truman lacked many of Roosevelt's characteristics and did not enjoy the same special friendship with Churchill. However, World War II produced a major realignment of political, military, and economic realities that tended to complicate international diplomacy generally.

CHAPTER III

ANGLO-AMERICAN RIVALRY AT THE CAIRO CONFERENCE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR TEHERAN

President Roosevelt wanted the Chinese to be present at Teheran, but one of the conditions Stalin had insisted upon was that no representatives of any nation other than Great Britain, the United States, and Russia be present. As a result, a meeting with the Chinese was scheduled to take place at Cairo from 22 November to 26 November as a preliminary to the Teheran meeting. Both Churchill and Roosevelt viewed the first conference at Cairo as a necessary preliminary to the conference with Stalin at Teheran, although for different reasons. It was generally assumed by the press, as well as most of the British and American people, that Churchill, Roosevelt, and their staffs would use the Cairo meeting to form some kind of common strategy to present to the Russians at Teheran.¹ It quickly became apparent, however, that both the American and British leaders, as well as their respective staffs, had different

¹New York Times, 22 November 1943, p. 8.

views on what should have priority of discussion at Cairo and Teheran. Furthermore, neither side seemed willing to compromise in order to arrive at a unified position on policy matters.

Initially, Churchill had desired a meeting with Roosevelt at Malta as a preliminary to the meeting at Cairo.² This desire arose from his stated alarm at Roosevelt's proposal on 27 October that the Russians send a representative to the Anglo-American military staff conferences to "listen, note, and make proposals."³ In his reply to Roosevelt, Churchill spoke bluntly,

I deprecate the idea of inviting a Russian military representative to sit in at the meetings of our Joint Staffs. . . . He would simply bay for a second front and block all other discussions. . . . I regard our right to sit together on the movements of our own two forces as fundamental and vital. . . . The only hope is the intimacy and friendship which has been established between us and between our High Staffs.⁴

Specifically, Churchill wanted to discuss plans for operations in the Mediterranean area with the Americans before meeting with either the Russians or the Chinese, but the idea was vetoed by Roosevelt who preferred to hold all

²J. R. M. Butler, gen. ed., History of the Second World War: United Kingdom Military Series, 5 vols. (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1956), vol. 5: Grand Strategy, August 1943-September 1944, by John Ehrman, pp. 157-58.

³Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, p. 242.

⁴Winston Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 5: Closing the Ring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1951), p. 315.

meetings at Cairo.⁵ Part of Churchill's problem was solved when the Russians, upon learning of the planned Chinese presence at Cairo, cancelled their scheduled attendance at the last minute and sent only an observer. However, the Chinese arrived in Cairo on 22 November in strength, and much too soon to suit the prime minister's purposes.⁶

In the following passage Churchill briefly outlined the pattern he hoped the coming series of conferences would take:

I wished the proceedings to take three stages: first, a broad Anglo-American agreement at Cairo; secondly, a Supreme Conference between the three heads of the governments of the three major powers at Teheran; and thirdly, on returning to Cairo, the discussion of what was purely Anglo-American business about the war in the Indian theatre and the Indian Ocean, which was certainly urgent.⁷

The British hoped for a full discussion with the Americans on the relation of operation OVERLORD to the Mediterranean theatre.⁸ Though the Quebec Conference had clearly resulted in an understanding that OVERLORD was to be the primary operation in 1944, Churchill still had aspirations in the Mediterranean and the Americans knew it. At Cairo and later at Teheran American suspicions of

⁵Ehrman, Grand Strategy, pp. 157-58.

⁶Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin, p. 245.

⁷Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 318.

⁸Ehrman, Grand Strategy, p. 157. OVERLORD was the code-name now given to what was essentially the old ROUNDUP operation or cross-channel invasion.

Churchill's motives were confirmed. American planners recommended a rigid adherence to the Quebec accords concerning OVERLORD.⁹ At Cairo, the British clearly desired to arrive at a common Anglo-American strategy to present to the Russians at later talks. The British hoped that a united front would induce the Russians to accept Anglo-American strategy for all of Europe. If that were accomplished, respective commitments to the European strategy would be determined and the war effort in the Far East could then be discussed with the Chinese in that context. The shortage of assault shipping for all operations meant that determining the order of priorities would be of paramount significance. In January 1943, the estimates of the number of landing craft needed for a cross-channel attack had been revised upward to twice the original figure and had been a major factor in planning ever since. British planners were constantly suspicious of American motives concerning the landing craft, ". . . seeing the Americans as more interested in maintaining landing craft for Pacific offensives. . . ." ¹⁰

Nor did the British share America's great concern over Far Eastern matters. In fact, the idea that China should be treated as an important world power seemed to

⁹Mark A. Stoler, The Politics of the Second Front (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1977), p. 135.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 114.

strike both the British and the Russians as absurd.¹¹ Commenting upon China to Eden, Churchill stated that, "It is affectation . . . to pretend that China is a power in any way comparable to the other three."¹² As early as March 1943, Anthony Eden, upon noticing the American preoccupation with China, had stated that, "China was probably going to have a revolution after the war, and that in any event Britain did not wish to see it ever emerge supreme in the Far East."¹³

The American approach to the conference at Cairo was markedly different from that of the British. The president had urgent business with Chiang Kai-shek, and Roosevelt and Hull were largely responsible for the Chinese presence at Cairo. The invitation to the Soviets had conveniently omitted mention of the Chinese, and, as a result, Molotov had been scheduled to come. It was Churchill who, already angry over the invitation to the Chinese, informed Stalin.¹⁴ The result was a cancellation of Molotov's attendance. The Russians refused to take part in strategy talks with the Chinese or even be identified with them as Russia was not at

¹¹Gabriel Kolko, The Politics of War (New York: Random House, 1968), p. 268.

¹²Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 308. Reference to "the other three" refers to Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union.

¹³Kolko, The Politics of War, p. 268.

¹⁴Stoler, Second Front, p. 137.

war with Japan and would risk no action that might possibly result in a two-front war. The unofficial observer the Russians sent was Molotov's aide, Andrei Vishinsky, whose presence was kept a strict secret.¹⁵ As Robert Murphy notes,

The President was very pleased that Stalin had sent Vishinsky to Cairo, because he knew that Vishinsky was one of Stalin's most intimate "personal representatives," whose reports would assuredly go straight to the Soviet dictator.¹⁶

If the British were not overly concerned with China, the Americans most assuredly were. Though opinions would later change, at the time of the Cairo and Teheran meetings the American military envisioned no strategy for the defeat of Japan that did not involve keeping China in the war as one of its essentials.¹⁷ A long war against Japan was envisioned and, it was feared, the fall of China would prolong it indefinitely. According to decisions made and reaffirmed at the Casablanca, Trident, and Quadrent conferences, Burma was to be reconquered in order to reopen

¹⁵Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City: Doubleday, 1964), p. 210.

¹⁶Ibid. Murphy goes on to add that Roosevelt was correct when he characterized Vishinsky as one of Stalin's "personal representatives." Vishinsky was also a very able individual as in a period of five months in 1943-44 he laid the foundation for Soviet policy in Western Europe and organized several satellite governments in Eastern Europe so effectively that they were to remain intact through years of postwar strains.

¹⁷Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 305.

land communications with China. The difficulties of geography and communications were so enormous that little real progress had been made as of the end of 1943. The American reaction to the failure of the Burma operation was to insist, at Cairo and Teheran, that what had not been accomplished in 1943 should be pursued even more actively in 1944.¹⁸

Little aid was going to China, and the Chinese government, in addition to having grave internal problems, felt neglected by the allies. Because of these problems the Americans had begun to fear that Chiang's government might either collapse or, in some other way, "fall out of the war."¹⁹ Largely because of this fear, Roosevelt felt it imperative to meet with Chiang in order to fully explain the global strategy to which China's needs were being subordinated and to arrive at some method of assuring the Chinese of continued allied, and especially American, interest in their fate.²⁰ Success in Burma thus came to be viewed as vital to sustaining Chinese morale as well as furnishing a greater volume of supplies.

There were other reasons for Roosevelt's concern over China. Chiang Kai-shek had been appealing, loudly and

¹⁸McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia, p. 339.

¹⁹Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 247.

²⁰Ibid.

publicly, for aid to China throughout 1943. Such appeals had been accompanied by hints that if support were not forthcoming China might be forced to seek a compromise peace with Japan.²¹ In addition, there was considerable public support for aid to China, and Roosevelt's political opponents were using the issue.²² The American public tended to view China as a fellow democracy that needed the aid, leadership, and inspiration of the United States. In fact, after a visit to Chungking immediately prior to the Cairo Conference, Patrick Hurley informed Roosevelt that:

. . . the Generalissimo and the Chinese people favor the principles of democracy and liberty . . . are opposed to the principles of imperialism and communism . . . have implicit confidence in your motives . . . and will therefore follow your leadership on the diplomatic and political questions that will be considered in the impending conference.²³

In contrast to the Americans, the British viewed Chiang's government as a typical example of oriental inefficiency and corruption that amounted to little more than a "bottomless pit" into which could be poured unlimited resources with little or no effect upon the war effort. As early as the Washington Conference, Churchill himself remarked that he was ". . . not prepared to undertake

²¹Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 307.

²²Ibid.

²³U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, "The Conference at Cairo and Teheran" (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 654.

something foolish purely in order to placate the Chinese."²⁴
 The Americans quickly became aware of how different their position on China was from that of the British, and the following statements by Admiral Leahy reflect the American reaction:

The British obviously did not have the same deep interest in China that we had. They seemed to overlook the fact that the defeat of Japan would cost many more ships, lives, not to mention dollars, if Chiang's ill-equipped, ill-led armies were not kept in the field . . . the fact could not be discounted that Chiang had several million men under arms and was forcing Japan to keep a large standing army in China and to keep it supplied.²⁵

Chiang Kai-shek agreed to meet with Roosevelt at Cairo only on the condition that the meeting would take place before the latter met with Stalin. Unless this could be arranged, Chiang indicated that he would rather meet with Roosevelt at a later date.²⁶ The Soviet government's attitude toward China, so far as it could be ascertained, was distinctly cool. Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, and Sinkiang were all viewed as areas where Sino-Soviet friction could arise. It was also thought that the Soviets would want some say in the future of Korea.²⁷ At the very least, Soviet entry into the war against Japan would be accompanied

²⁴Arthur Bryant, The Turn of the Tide 1939-1943 (London: Collins, 1957), p. 654.

²⁵William Leahy, I Was There (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1950), p. 202.

²⁶Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 247.

²⁷Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 322.

by demands for a considerable voice in re-drawing the map of east Asia. In addition, the Chinese were gravely concerned over the Soviet government's attitude toward them and the avowed Soviet intention to support the communist elements within China.²⁸

Roosevelt entered into conversations with the Chinese almost immediately upon arrival in Cairo and the meetings lasted from 22 November to 26 November.²⁹ On 23 November the president received a memorandum that contained some reassuring information for the Chinese. The memorandum stated that the Soviet government had indicated its desire to see a strong central government in postwar China and was convinced this was obtainable only through the generalissimo. However, the Soviets would insist on a more liberal policy and improved social conditions as well as some solution of the Chinese communist problem, either by acceptance of them as an independent political party or by bringing them into the government. The Soviets were also believed to have no ambitions on Chinese territory.³⁰ Roosevelt transmitted the contents of the memorandum, along with his personal faith in

²⁸U.S. Department of State, "Conferences at Cairo and Teheran," p. 376.

²⁹William Neumann, After Victory: Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin and the Making of the Peace (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), p. 115.

³⁰U.S. Department of State, "Conferences at Cairo and Teheran," p. 376.

Soviet intentions, to the generalissimo. The memorandum was presumably authored by Harry Hopkins, but, at its end, Averell Harriman indicated that the Chinese ambassador in Moscow had expressed opinions along the general lines noted in its text.

At a dinner party on the night of 23 November, Roosevelt discussed the future international position of China with Chiang Kai-shek. There is no American version of exactly what was discussed, but the Chinese summary record indicates that the president expressed his desire for China to take its place as one of the "Big Four" and Chiang said that China would be most happy to do so.³¹ Further discussion concerned Far Eastern territorial settlements in general as well as United States economic aid to China. On that same occasion, the two leaders also discussed the disposition of the Japanese empire after defeat. Roosevelt reportedly felt that China should play a leading role in the military occupation of Japan after the war, but Chiang stated his belief that China was unable and that the United States should therefore do it. Both men felt that Japan's reparations to China should be in the form of actual properties and that all the territory China had lost to Japan would be restored except the Ryukus, which would be administered jointly by the United States and China.³²

³¹Ibid., p. 323.

³²Ibid., pp. 323-25.

In fact, many American observers in China, including the ambassador, were assuring Washington that Chiang would never be so foolish as to seek peace with Japan just when ultimate allied victory was beginning to look increasingly certain.³³ If such were the case, the United States was in a very good position from which to demand solid results from the Chinese use of such aid as they received. In fact, John Davis stated:

We have a stronger bargaining position with Chiang Kai-shek than we seem to be willing to acknowledge. . . . He cannot desert us without disastrous results to himself and most of his principal supporters. We can, on the other hand, accomplish our immediate objective in Asia--the defeat of Japan--without his aid. We may have to in any case.³⁴

The president refused to put pressure on the Chinese at Cairo and, in fact, went so far as to promise Chiang amphibious operations in the Andaman Islands to coincide with a combined American, British, and Chinese land offensive in North Burma. Plans were quickly and incompletely drawn up for these operations at Cairo, though the Burma campaign had been discussed earlier. Roosevelt made the promise to Chiang knowing that Churchill absolutely refused to commit British forces to any amphibious operations in the area on a fixed date, if at all, and that

³³Thorne, Allies of a Kind, p. 324.

³⁴U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, "China" (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), p. 257.

without British support the operation would be impossible. The generalissimo departed Cairo for Chungking on 28 November feeling that he had scored a great success. However, due to commitments yet to be made at Teheran, the promise of amphibious and land operations was broken in less than ten days.³⁵ Coming events substantially altered the president's thinking on the strategic value of China.

It was not until 24 November that the British were able to state their objectives as the Anglo-American meetings on Mediterranean affairs officially opened.³⁶ In sum Churchill wanted:

. . . to convey more supplies by sea to Tito's partisans and to open the Dardenelles for convoys to Russia by means of a two-division assault upon Rhodes in February. Finally, to reassure the Americans, the Prime Minister reiterated that all preparations for Overlord were to go ahead full steam within the framework of the foregoing policy for the Mediterranean.³⁷

Roosevelt himself had given Churchill an opening for introducing his Mediterranean plans when, at the plenary session on 24 November, he stated that the Cairo meeting should be a preliminary survey of European operations. Final decision would depend on the results of the forthcoming meeting with Stalin. Roosevelt went on to state that he was sure the Russians would desire both Mediterranean

³⁵Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 774.

³⁶Thrumbull Higgins, Soft Underbelly (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 132.

³⁷Ibid.

operations as well as OVERLORD. Roosevelt thought that operations in the Aegean would produce little but admitted that Turkish entrance into the war ". . . would put quite a different complexion on the matter."³⁸ Churchill's response was that though OVERLORD was the primary operation it should not be allowed to rule out further Mediterranean action. He continued describing every possible operation in that sea and asked for further delay in transferring landing craft. Churchill, in reality, wanted to give priority of landing craft to operations against Rome and Rhodes which would probably postpone OVERLORD until late 1944.

By 25 November the British stated that it was absolutely essential to delay OVERLORD in order to insure its ultimate success. They also announced their firm opposition to the American concept of a supreme allied commander for all of Europe due to divergencies between themselves and the Americans over future operations. The differences were viewed as being political as well as military.³⁹ Before further debate could take place concerning these matters, however, the British and American staffs experienced serious arguments over proposed amphibious operations in the Indian Ocean.

³⁸U.S. Department of State, "Conferences at Cairo and Teheran," pp. 253-55.

³⁹Stoler, Second Front, p. 140.

Churchill had absolutely no enthusiasm for any kind of large-scale operations in the Indian Ocean, but the Americans advocated them persistently. On 26 November the Joint Logistics Committee admitted that OVERLORD could be launched late but argued that the then proposed timetable could be followed only if landing craft were shifted from Southeast Asia and further amphibious operations in the area cancelled.⁴⁰ With the Chinese demanding an offensive, Roosevelt refused to sanction the cancellation. In fact, three separate operations were then contending for primacy of landing craft, OVERLORD, the Adaman Islands operation called BUCCANEER, and an advance to the Po River in Italy code-named ACCOLADE. The problem appeared insoluble until 26 November when the Americans accepted the British Mediterranean proposals as a basis for discussion with the Soviets provided they did not interfere with BUCCANEER. In a combined staff conference on 26 November the United States Joint Chief gave their British counterparts the impression that they would postpone OVERLORD rather than abandon their promise to the Chinese. The British were stunned as the Americans seemed to be doing exactly what they had accused the British of doing in the Mediterranean; prolonging the war for political reasons.⁴¹

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 141.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 142.

On 29 November at Teheran, Churchill informed his Chiefs of Staff that he wished to go on record as refusing the Chinese request of amphibious and land operations in Burma.⁴² The prime minister was convinced that an amphibious operation against the Andaman Islands across the Bay of Bengal would cramp OVERLORD for landing and tank landing craft far more than any of his proposed operations in the Mediterranean.⁴³ By that time it had become apparent that the shortage of assault shipping, in addition to determining priorities, would be the decisive factor in all future operations.

There were also other, more politically oriented, reasons for the prime minister's objections to large-scale allied operations in Burma. Churchill often seemed to view Burma as an enemy-occupied part of the British empire rather than an area of strategic military value. Sherwood states that Churchill desired to drive the Japanese out of Burma more to avenge a mortal insult to imperial prestige than to open any supply route to the Chinese and, therefore, did not like the Americans or Chinese having any share in the credit for its liberation.⁴⁴ Although there is no conclusive proof of this assertion, it is known that, at the time, the prime

⁴²Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 252.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 772.

minister was gravely concerned over Britain's loss of world prestige and was looking for some way to regain it. Rather than focus allied efforts upon a Burma campaign, Churchill's strategic idea of how to deal with Japan in Southeast Asia was to isolate the home islands using a fleet of ships based in Singapore and Hong Kong. Thus, to the prime minister and his staff, the re-establishment of British power in these areas was the most important strategic objective, rather than a war in Burma where the only prize would be jungle or swampland and a supply line to a Chinese army which he considered of negligible value.⁴⁵

The Anglo-American conflict over the implementation of strategy was both direct and forceful. As the Cairo Conference ended, the British and Americans were farther apart on these matters than when it began. Roosevelt's support of Chiang Kai-shek seemed to force a choice between the Mediterranean operations desired by the British and launching OVERLORD on schedule. The Americans were insisting that the choice be left to Stalin at Teheran. Elliott Roosevelt clearly states that his father was optimistic that the Soviet leader would favor OVERLORD at the expense of the Mediterranean operations advocated by the British.⁴⁶ However, Lord Moran notes that, by the end of

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 773.

⁴⁶Elliott Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1946), pp. 151, 156.

the conference, both Hopkins and Marshall were worried about the firmness of the president's commitment to the cross-channel attack.⁴⁷

The British government acted as host for the Cairo Conference yet had expected results much greater than those actually achieved. The dependent relationship of China upon the United States served to fill both the British and the Russians with suspicion regarding the motives behind it.⁴⁸ As Gabriel Kilko states, ". . . Chiang could hardly cope with his monumental internal problems, much less pay a world role, and the Generalissimo was quite content to trade his vote for American aid at home."⁴⁹ The Americans were thoroughly convinced that, if their goals for China and the Far East in general could be accomplished, then the promise of aid and military operations in Burma was a fair price to pay.

The Chinese generally fared well at the conference. In fact, Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint frankly state that at Cairo ". . . Chiang had reached the peak of his fortunes."⁵⁰ The Americans, in sum, deeded China vast

⁴⁷ Sir Charles Wilson Moran, Churchill: Taken From the Diaries of Lord Moran (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1966), pp. 140-42.

⁴⁸ Kilko, The Politics of War, p. 268.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, Total War: The Story of World War II (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), p. 834.

areas, great political influence, and top responsibilities. In return it was expected that China would remain friendly and maintain a stable and effective government. At Teheran, however, Stalin informed the British and Americans that Russia had begun to make the troop dispositions necessary to enter the war against Japan once Germany had been defeated. Such a decision changed the strategic picture of the war and drastically reduced the value of China relative to strategic planning. The Soviets could supply both the bases and the manpower for operations against Japan that had formerly been expected from China. From the moment of Stalin's promise at Teheran, China became an object of secondary strategic importance and the Chinese were treated with considerably less solicitude.⁵¹

Regarding other aspects of the conference, Roosevelt, like the Joint Chiefs, attempted to put off all other basic strategic decisions until the meeting with the Russians at Teheran. The Americans, while at Cairo, were not consciously planning to align themselves with the Russians against the British as they had no firm idea of what positions the Russians would take.⁵² Roosevelt's promise to Chiang to the effect that the allies would undertake amphibious and land operations in Burma was made,

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Higgins, Soft Underbelly, p. 133.

". . . almost certainly by November 26, but the British would not find out until 28 November at Teheran.⁵³ The Cairo debate, as far as the British knew, was over a proposed operation with no party having made any firm commitments. When they found out the truth at Teheran they were at first disbelieving and then furious. To Churchill, on the eve of the Teheran Conference, the position seemed to be that the Americans might still accept the British strategy for Europe if they would, in turn, give in on the question of operations for Southeast Asia.⁵⁴ The British staff was certain that, given the appropriate Russian pressure, this would be the case.

The problems the British faced at Cairo caused Anthony Eden to remark, "This conference was the most difficult I ever attended," and Lord Moran, the prime minister's personal physician, summed up British feelings as follows:

What I find so shocking is that to the Americans the Prime Minister is the villain; they are far more skeptical of him than they are of Stalin. Anyway, whoever is to blame, it is clear that we are going to Teheran without a common plan.⁵⁵

Moran's statement was essentially correct, but the Combined Chiefs of Staff were able to arrive at a vague

⁵³Ehrman, Grand Strategy, p. 165.

⁵⁴Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 167.

⁵⁵Anthony Eden, The Reckoning (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 493; Moran, Churchill, p. 142.

program of action with respect to the Soviets though they were never able to make it truly effective. The main parts of the proposed collaboration are enumerated below:

1. During the forthcoming conference with the Soviets it is recommended that the following broad lines of action be adopted
 - a. That the Combined Chiefs agree upon joint strategy in Europe and get approval of the president and prime minister before meeting the Soviets.
 - b. That the Soviets be urged to coordinate effectively with the cross-channel invasion of France.
 - c. That the Combined Chiefs consult together before replying to proposals on which there has been no agreement.
 - d. That an agreed upon answer be obtained to any Soviet proposals which involve undertaking major operations through the Balkans or Aegean.
 - e. That a common policy be adopted concerning Turkey to include briefly the support of the Soviet proposal to force Turkey into the war.
2. It should be made clear to the Soviets that the United States and Great Britain are also involved in the Pacific and commitments there compel them to decide on further action only after careful consideration of the overall situation.
3. Instead of defending their own position, in the future, the United States and Britain will make specific requests of the Soviets.⁵⁶

On 24 November, Harry Hopkins wrote a rough draft of what was ultimately to become a joint press communique

⁵⁶U.S. Department of State, "Conferences at Cario and Teheran," pp. 426-27.

concerning the results of the Cairo Conference. The communique was released by the White House on 1 December 1943.⁵⁷ The draft was revised, prior to release, by both Churchill and Roosevelt. Chiang Kai-shek was almost certainly made aware of its contents prior to release as well but no record exists of his having had anything to do with its composition or revision.⁵⁸ The statement does not indicate that the Russians were consulted either but it is known that Harriman and Clark Kerr gave Molotov a copy of the communique on 27 November shortly after their arrival at Teheran. On 28 November, Molotov indicated that Stalin had acquainted himself with its contents and had no observations at all with regard to it.⁵⁹ However, two days later Stalin stated that he, ". . . thoroughly approved of it and all its contents."⁶⁰

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 448.

⁵⁸For the complete text of the communique, see the appendix.

⁵⁹U.S. Department of State, "Conferences at Cairo and Teheran," p. 616.

⁶⁰Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 254.

CHAPTER IV

TEHERAN: ANGLO-AMERICAN FRICTION CONTINUES

Roosevelt was the individual most responsible for the meeting at Teheran. He had been attempting to arrange a meeting with Stalin since shortly after the Japanese attack upon Pearl Harbor. The president was convinced that if he could meet Stalin face-to-face he would form a warm, personal relationship with him just as he had with Churchill and thus work with the Russian leader in the same open and intimate way.¹ Roosevelt stated his desire for an informal visit to Stalin saying, "I want to get away from the difficulties of large staff conferences or the red tape of diplomatic conversations."² The president proposed a meeting in the summer of 1943 and Stalin, in turn, suggested July or August. However, hopes for a summer meeting were

¹Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 209.

²U.S.S.R., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, vol. 2, "Correspondence with Franklin Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman, August 1941-December 1945" (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1957), p. 63.

dashed by the German summer offensive in July.³ The offensive made it impossible for Stalin to attend a summer or autumn meeting, but he did indicate his continued interest in a meeting to Roosevelt, on 8 August. In the same message he also indicated no objections to the attendance of Churchill at the talks, a prospect he had not favored in discussing earlier meetings.⁴

The following September Roosevelt again proposed talks which would take the form of a tripartite meeting between himself, Churchill, and Stalin to take place sometime between 15 November and 15 December. The president went on to suggest North Africa as a possible site and Stalin responded with an offer to meet in Teheran, Iran, a country where all three powers were represented. Roosevelt did not favor Iran because he had only ten days in which to sign and return Congressional documents and bad weather conditions could make it impossible to do so. Stalin, knowing how much Roosevelt desired the conference, then suggested that perhaps the whole idea should be postponed until the spring when he and the president could meet in Alaska. Stalin was also aware that an Alaskan meeting would almost certainly leave Churchill out and that Roosevelt had

³Ibid., p. 79.

⁴Ibid.

become committed to the idea of a tripartite meeting.⁵ It was either Teheran or nothing. Cordell Hull had been very favorably impressed by the Soviet dictator's "personality and approach" while in Moscow and was convinced that Stalin would not change his mind. He thus sought to persuade Roosevelt to look more favorably on Teheran.⁶ Finally, on 8 November, Roosevelt gave in and sent word to Stalin that he and Churchill would proceed to Teheran after the conference at Cairo.⁷

Historians, as well as those persons who participated in the actual events, differ regarding the motives behind the Soviet dictator's insistence upon Teheran. Some feel that Stalin had no ulterior motives in prolonging the negotiations over a conference site and did so only for reasons of military necessity and personal health. The Russians did feel it necessary to maintain constant contact with Moscow and the Russian Supreme Command, and Stalin was known to get violently ill when he flew.⁸ Another opinion is that Stalin was using the negotiations for the conference site to seek political advantage. Though Stalin had agreed

⁵Louis Fisher, The Life and Death of Stalin (New York: Harper and Bros., 1952), p. 195.

⁶Cordell Hull, The Memories of Cordell Hull, 3 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1948), 2:1311.

⁷U.S.S.R., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Correspondence," p. 105.

⁸Fisher, Stalin, p. 194.

to a meeting in principle, the idea of a direct confrontation with the two leaders who were known to have a close relationship seemed to offer little advantage at the time.⁹ At Teheran, he was at least forcing the world to come to him rather than vice versa; also, and even more importantly, by arguing over a matter that, in itself, was devoid of political significance, he might wear down the other two leaders, thus making them more willing to concede important political points later.¹⁰

The three leaders arrived in Teheran on Saturday, 27 November. Both Churchill and Stalin were quartered in their respective embassy compounds which were located next to each other and connected. While in Cairo, Vyshinsky had extended an invitation for Roosevelt to stay at the Russian embassy for the duration of the Teheran meetings but the invitation had not been confirmed by Stalin, and the president thus drove to the American legation.¹¹ Prior to the Soviet invitation, and while still at Cairo, the British also extended an invitation to Roosevelt to use their facilities in Teheran. Roosevelt declined the British invitation out

⁹Robert Payne, The Rise and Fall of Stalin (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), p. 589.

¹⁰Jan Librach, The Rise of the Soviet Empire (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 114.

¹¹U.S. Department of State, "Conferences at Cairo and Teheran," pp. 310, 475.

of fear of offending the Russians.¹² On Sunday, 28 November, Stalin, through Ambassador Harriman, extended a personal invitation to Roosevelt urging him to move into the Russian embassy.¹³ This was the invitation Roosevelt had been waiting for, and its delay was probably due to oversight rather than reluctance by the Russians. In fact, Adam Ulam states that Stalin was eager ". . . to detach the President from any schemes Churchill and the British might devise . . .," and that the Soviet dictator's desire in this regard matched Roosevelt's desire to gain Stalin's trust.¹⁴

While Churchill did not seem to be overly concerned with Roosevelt's decision to stay in the Russian embassy, the same cannot be said for the rest of his staff. Many persons within the British delegation felt that Stalin had invited the president to be his guest purely as a tactical move to prevent him from conferring extensively and in private with Churchill. The following statement by Lord Moran is representative of the general British attitude concerning the matter:

. . . no one in our party, except Winston, believes in Stalin's concern for the President's safety. Plainly it is convenient to him to have the President under his

¹²Ibid., p. 461.

¹³Ibid., p. 463.

¹⁴Adam B. Ulam, Stalin: The Man and His Era (New York: Viking Press, 1973), p. 588.

eye, where he cannot spend his time plotting with the British Prime Minister.¹⁵

The security situation at the conference was rather paradoxical. No party fully trusted the other's security precautions and they were all constantly checking for hidden bombs or microphones. Laslo Havas firmly maintains that there were as many as eighty microphones placed in the building assigned to Roosevelt and his staff by the Russians, and both Havas and Robert Payne insist that the Russian guards assigned to Roosevelt constantly monitored the president's most secret conversations.¹⁶ If true, the implications could be dramatic, but Adam Ulam disagrees, saying, "It is most unlikely that there were any hidden recording devices in Roosevelt's suite. Stalin would not jeopardize the great game he was playing for the sake of tidbits of trivial information."¹⁷ To date, no conclusive evidence exists concerning hidden microphones, and it is not probable that such evidence will be forthcoming. It is, however, highly probable that the presence of the NKVD in such numbers and in such close proximity hindered the president's freedom of movement and independence of

¹⁵Moran, Churchill, p. 144.

¹⁶Laslo Havas, The Long Jump (London: Garden City Press, 1967), p. 219; Payne, Rise and Fall of Stalin, p. 590.

¹⁷Ulam, Stalin, p. 588.

discussion.¹⁸ Sherwood indicates that it was precisely the presence of the NKVD which prevented Roosevelt from speaking to Churchill privately on the night of 29 November when the latter requested such a conversation. The guards would surely have conveyed the impression to Stalin that Churchill and Roosevelt were "hatching their own schemes."¹⁹

The main meetings at Teheran took place in Roosevelt's residence at the Russian embassy. The three leaders had four meetings which took place on 28, 29, 30 November and 1 December and are usually considered the primary ones of the conference. Roosevelt and Stalin had private meetings on 28 and 29 November as well as 1 December. Churchill met privately with Stalin on 28 November and 30 November. There is no record to indicate that at any time Roosevelt either sought or desired a private meeting with Churchill.

The president's desire to conduct the talks on an informal basis was granted. It was decided that there would be no agenda for the talks but instead each leader would introduce subjects he felt were of immediate concern. Such a procedure inevitably resulted in some rambling from

¹⁸The NKVD were the Russian secret police and were present in such profusion that it was not until the first session of the conference that the Americans and British realized that Stalin was not accompanied by part of his general staff after all. The Soviet generals and other high ranking officers seen about the compound were actually secret police.

¹⁹Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 784.

topic to topic but generally served its intended purpose.²⁰ The subjects of immediate concern were military matters, many of which became politically significant as they were discussed.²¹ The discussions of military strategy centered around the allied plans for OVERLORD with operations in the Mediterranean Sea and the Far East generally being considered as supplementary to it. Topics of political discussion consisted of Finland, France, China, Iran, and Poland as well as postwar territorial settlements regarding Germany and Roosevelt's plans for an international organization. The basic principle guiding discussions at Teheran was to postpone issues on which no agreement could be reached.

The decisions reached at Teheran were unquestionably determined by the three leaders themselves. Each leader had his own ideas on the issues mentioned above and each followed his own strategy in pursuing them. Churchill had one main concern at Teheran, and it overrode his consideration of everything else. Above all, he wanted a full program of strategic operations in the Mediterranean Sea and surrounding countries. The general goals he sought at Cairo were presented again at Teheran with tenacity and

²⁰Neumann, After Victory, p. 117.

²¹Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War (London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1975), p. 247.

persistence. Furthermore, not until the discussions at Teheran ensued could the prime minister bring himself to truly believe that Great Britain and the United States would take different positions on critical issues when confronting the Russians.²² Churchill's hopes of finding the Soviet leader sympathetic to his Turkish and Aegean projects vanished once Stalin made his point of view clear and, also, any sympathy Roosevelt might have had for Churchill's arguments quickly evaporated. In fact, one of the most significant aspects of the conference was the apparent solidarity of Russian and American military views and the corresponding isolation of Great Britain.²³ Robert Beitzell maintains that as late as October 1943 the prime minister's enthusiasm for a Big Three meeting was "nearly indiscernible" and that the last thing he desired was to have ". . . Roosevelt, Stalin, and Marshall, all singing praises of the French coast."²⁴ Churchill's reaction to these events is described by Moran as follows:

When I saw the P.M. after the first Plenary Session, which began at four o'clock 28 November, he seemed so dispirited that I departed from my prudent habit and

²²Moran, Churchill, p. 145.

²³McNeill, America, Britain, & Russia, p. 366.

²⁴Robert Beitzell, The Uneasy Alliance: America, Britain, and Russia, 1941-1943 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), p. 249.

asked him outright whether anything had gone wrong. He answered shortly: "A bloody lot has gone wrong."²⁵

The specific goals Churchill sought did not change from Cairo to Teheran, but the tactics he employed to seek those goals changed out of necessity. Once the prime minister came to realize that he could not rely on Roosevelt's support, the lines of conflict were drawn. Churchill found himself opposing Stalin with Roosevelt acting as arbiter, siding with the Russians on enough critical questions to effectively isolate him. Without the expected American support, Churchill resorted to persistent debate, a tactic at which he was a master. Roosevelt could sometimes not resist the prime minister's enthusiasm and at the first plenary session agreed to an operation in the Adriatic as a result. However, Stalin remained immune.²⁶ Churchill quickly realized that his lack of American support and the policy split between the British and Americans was very apparent to the Soviets. This fact, he knew, would render it impossible to take any kind of firm stand with Stalin.²⁷ Not only the prime minister but the entire British staff realized they were in trouble as Sir Alan Crook's comment to Lord Moran indicates: "This conference

²⁵Moran, Churchill, p. 145.

²⁶Beitzell, The Uneasy Alliance, pp. 313-14.

²⁷Moran, Churchill, p. 151.

is over when it has only just begun. Stalin has got the President in his pocket."²⁸

President Roosevelt's goals and expectations for the conference were far more complicated and detailed than those of Churchill, and were primarily directed toward the Soviets. In large measure, this explains the president's preoccupation with Soviet feelings and wishes as well as his corresponding neglect of Churchill. Furthermore, Roosevelt was firmly convinced that it was far more important to establish a reciprocal spirit of confidence with the Russians than to arrive at any specific compacts.²⁹ In his recent biography of Roosevelt, Nathan Miller states that, "For Roosevelt, the challenge of the Teheran Conference was to develop the same personal relationship with the inscrutable Stalin that he enjoyed with Churchill."³⁰ Miller goes on to explain that Roosevelt did not feel he was succeeding with Stalin until the morning of 1 December when he used Churchill to break the ice with the Russian leader. Miller relates an account of the incident in Roosevelt's own words as follows:

I thought it [the problem of Stalin] over all night and made up my mind I had to do something desperate. . . .

²⁸Ibid., p. 143.

²⁹Forest Davis, "What Really Happened at Teheran: Part I," Saturday Evening Post, May 13, 1944, p. 13.

³⁰Miller, F.D.R., p. 495.

On my way to the conference room that morning I caught up with Winston and I had just a moment to say to him, Winston, I hope you won't be sore at me for what I am going to do. . . . As soon as I sat down at the conference table, I began to tease Churchill about his Britishness, about John Bull, about his cigars, about his habits. . . . Winston got red and scowled, and the more he did so the more Stalin smiled . . . and for the first time in three days I saw the light. . . . From that time on our relations were personal, and Stalin himself indulged in an occasional witticism. The ice was broken and we talked like men and brothers.³¹

It is quite possible that some historians have misinterpreted Roosevelt's actions toward Churchill at Teheran. If the president himself is to be believed, he used Churchill as a tool to approach the rather correct and solemn Soviet dictator. If so, it was perhaps a presumption, but it did produce the personal contact the president so eagerly sought and would certainly have been very dangerous without the strong bond between president and prime minister. It must be said of Roosevelt that his trust in the Soviets was never complete. He did seek to establish a number of vague general agreements which, he hoped, could be used at a later date to bloc Soviet imperialistic tendencies if they could not be won over to his way of thinking.³² The president hoped to reconcile the Soviets to a cooperative peace that would bring the Soviet Union out of isolationism and involve them in a new world peacekeeping

³¹Ibid., pp. 495-96.

³²Alden Hatch, Franklin D. Roosevelt (New York: Henry Holt, 1947), p. 333.

organization.³³ According to Willard Range, the president had at least three basic reasons for believing that Soviet relations with the west could be worked out along peaceful and constructive lines. First, the Soviet record regarding peace was generally good. Second, the only weapon the Soviets had used, to any extent, outside their own borders was propaganda, and this seemed to indicate a lack of aggressive ambition. Finally, Roosevelt was convinced that time would temper the Soviet regime's radicalism and it would evolve into a more democratic libertarian society.³⁴

Roosevelt clearly expected the Soviet Union to emerge from World War II as a major world power. He also hoped for a period of peace after the war much like the nineteenth century Pax Britannica which presupposed that the powers able to make war were convinced that their self-interest demanded peace.³⁵ If such were to be the case, Soviet cooperation was essential. Maurice Matloff sums up the president's goals and expectations in the following statement:

To F.D.R. the summit meetings from Washington and Yalta were more than assemblies to iron out war strategy

³³Maurice Matloff, Mr. Roosevelt's Three Wars: F.D.R. as War Leader (Boulder: United States Air Force Academy, 1964), p. 5.

³⁴Willard Range, Franklin D. Roosevelt's World Order (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1959), pp. 181-82.

³⁵Forest Davis, "What Really Happened at Teheran: Part II," Saturday Evening Post, May 20, 1944, p. 48.

and policy; they were historic chapters in international co-operation. To this end he early essayed the role he played throughout the war--guardian of the good relations of the coalition.³⁶

Churchill possessed an almost instinctive dislike of Stalin, and the feeling was mutual. Perhaps this was because, at least to a degree, both were imperialists whose ambitions were in conflict. In any case, the prime minister viewed the Soviet leader as a man who wanted all he could get and more.³⁷ Yet, Churchill was not unaware of the value of the Soviet war effort and he approached Teheran realistically. If, in order to bring down a tyrant of unparalleled greed he had to use another tyrant of similar persuasion, the end would have to justify the means. Churchill was not completely hostile toward Stalin. Both the president and the prime minister viewed Stalin as more of a Russian nationalist than a communist and perhaps as someone whose demands might be met at relatively low cost.³⁸ Many historians maintain that Roosevelt became convinced that Stalin was genuinely friendly with no plans for world conquest, and that the president's miscalculation undermined the postwar settlement and resulted in the Cold War. Thomas Greer argues that Roosevelt felt that the Russian mistrust

³⁶Matloff, Mr. Roosevelt's Three Wars, p. 5.

³⁷Payne, Rise and Fall of Stalin, p. 596.

³⁸John Snell, Illusion and Necessity (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963), p. 139.

of the west was simply based upon a lack of understanding. Once this problem was removed, all would be well.³⁹ Nathan Miller does not agree. According to Miller, Roosevelt failed in his relations with the Soviet leader ". . . not through naiveté, but because Stalin had different objectives."⁴⁰

The president's assessment of Stalin and the character of the Russians in general may have been faulty, but it was considerably bolstered by that of his staff. All the Americans at the conference were favorably impressed by Stalin, though the close alignment of Russian and American military thinking may have been an important factor in this regard.⁴¹ The following statement by Admiral Leahy can be considered as representative of American opinion concerning the Soviet leader at Teheran:

The talk among ourselves as the meeting broke up [First Plenary Session on 28 November] was about Stalin. Most of us, before we met him, thought he was a bandit leader who had pushed himself up to the top of his government. That impression was wrong. We knew at once that we were dealing with a highly intelligent man who spoke well and was determined to get what he wanted for Russia. No professional soldier or sailor could find fault with that.⁴²

³⁹Greer, What Roosevelt Thought, p. 204.

⁴⁰Miller, F.D.R., p. 495.

⁴¹John Deane, The Strange Alliance (New York: Viking Press, 1947), p. 43.

⁴²Leahy, I Was There, p. 205.

Roosevelt seems to have feared that Churchill would let his distrust and dislike of the Soviets disrupt allied unity. In the following statements, made to his son Elliott at Teheran, he expressed his fears concerning the British prime minister:

Trouble is, the P.M. is thinking too much of the post-war balance of power, and where England will be. He's scared of letting the Russians get too strong. . . . Whenever the P.M. argued for our invasion through the Balkans, it was quite obvious to everyone in the room what he really meant. That he was above all else anxious to knife up into Central Europe, in order to keep the Red Army out of Austria and Rumania, even Hungary if possible. Stalin knew it, I knew it, everybody knew it.⁴³

The prime minister, by Roosevelt's own admission, never actually stated that his motives were those that are speculated upon above; however, Roosevelt was convinced of Churchill's motives and acted accordingly. He did not hide his annoyance with Churchill, and complained repeatedly to his own entourage that the prime minister was inspired more by feelings of British imperialism than by any desire to cooperate in an alliance. He was convinced that Churchill's military arguments were merely a cover to hide his real motives.⁴⁴

There is reason to believe that Roosevelt's convictions concerning the intentions of Churchill and the British in general had been building through much of 1943.

⁴³Roosevelt, As He Saw It, pp. 184-85.

⁴⁴McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia, p. 366.

Gaddis Smith states that the president had even come to fear that Britain, not Russia, might represent a disruptive force in the postwar world. He was afraid that, following the war, the British would return to their practice of carving out spheres of influence, thus provoking the Russians. Also, there would almost certainly be unrest in many of Britain's colonies unless these were given independence.⁴⁵ This opinion is shared by Elliott Roosevelt, Arthur Schlesinger, Charles Wilmot, Sir Norman Angell, and Christopher Thorne, to name but a few.

On no other single issue was Anglo-American opinion more divergent than on colonialism. While both the president and the State Department conceded that the British pursued their colonial policies in a more benign fashion than other European nations, the fact simply lessened the hostility rather than removed it. For America, the war was, at least in part, an anti-imperialist crusade, and the British Empire was the foreign empire that Americans knew best of all.⁴⁶ One persistent belief, held by the Americans,

⁴⁵Gaddis Smith, American Diplomacy During the Second World War, 1941-45 (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965), p. 63.

⁴⁶William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay, 1941-1945: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 22.

is described by R. F. Harrod in his biography of John Maynard Keynes:

. . . the British are a wily and cunning people diabolically astute in international finance, the British Empire always occupying the first place in their thoughts and plans, determined at all costs to advance its interests, and easily able to make rings around anyone who would oppose their Machiavellian projects. This mythology exerted some influence during the Second World War.⁴⁷

Colonial issues became a persistent and often bitter source of Anglo-American friction throughout the conference. In addition, British reluctance to establish a second front, their desire for a strong France, and history of hostility to Bolshevism all combined to make Roosevelt fear serious Anglo-Soviet postwar rivalry and struggle even harder to placate the Russians. These fears caused the American president to seek to appear an unselfish mediator interested only in world peace. Roosevelt sought to make the Russians feel that the United States valued an alliance with the Soviet Union more than any other alliance.⁴⁸

Much of what Stalin thought concerning Churchill, Roosevelt, and the events of Teheran is an enigma. However, it is known that his preparations for the Teheran meeting were thorough. He was convinced that adequate results could be obtained only by knowing his adversaries well and by having a complete picture of their character and tactics.

⁴⁷R. F. Harrod, The Life of John Maynard Keynes (London: Macmillan, 1951), p. 539.

⁴⁸Smith, American Diplomacy, pp. 63-65.

Concerning the prime minister and president, Stalin made the following statement to Milovan Djilas, a ranking Yugoslav communist, "Churchill is the kind who, if you don't watch him, will slip a kopek out of your pocket. . . . And Roosevelt! Roosevelt is not like that. He dips his hand only for bigger coins."⁴⁹ Stalin had, with deliberate planning, waited until he was in a position to take a threatening tone with his two rivals (he never considered them anything less) before consenting to a tripartite conference. With the recent successes of the Red Army he was prepared to drive a hard bargain, for he would be negotiating from a strong, relatively secure position. A further aid to the Soviet leader was the image he conveyed of statesmanlike calm and repose. It was Churchill who paced the floor arguing in a thoroughly agitated manner. Roosevelt never saw the dictator who raved at and terrorized his subordinates; the man who scribbled on an appeal for mercy from one of his generals, "scoundrel and male whore!"⁵⁰ It was a masterful performance and it affected the course of history.

That the American and Russian military views coincided at Teheran is a fact, but the reasons for such congruence were substantially different. The American

⁴⁹Miller, F.D.R., p. 496.

⁵⁰Ulam, Stalin, p. 589.

reason for insisting upon OVERLORD as soon as possible, and to the exclusion of operations in the Mediterranean area, arose basically out of a sincere belief that the operations offered the quickest and surest method of defeating Germany. Many historians argue that the Russians were fully aware of the political implications inherent in their occupation of most of southeast Europe. At Teheran, Stalin refused to discuss Russia's territorial interests in any detail, and Chester Wilmot, among others, argues that this was because he had no intention of speaking until he strengthened his hand by action.

His purpose at Teheran was not to seek from Roosevelt and Churchill political recognition of his claims, but to create the strategic situation that would enable him to enforce those claims whether they liked it or not.⁵¹

Stalin's promise to declare war on Japan after the defeat of Germany was simply another good strategic move. The Americans valued such a promise highly, and Stalin's promise may partially account for the pro-Russian position taken by Roosevelt throughout the conference. The promise itself cost Stalin nothing and, if ever implemented, would cost the Soviets far less than they would probably gain.⁵²

There is one additional element in Stalin's diplomatic strategy at Teheran that is often overlooked, yet

⁵¹Chester Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper and Bros., 1952), p. 711.

⁵²Woodward, British Foreign Policy, p. 248.

had considerable significance. It has already been noted that both Churchill and Roosevelt had a tendency to view the Soviet leader as more of a Russian nationalist than a communist, and this was, in part, due to the dissolution of the Comintern. According to Jan Librach, the official dissolution of the Comintern was definitely part of the Soviet diplomatic campaign for the realization of far-reaching war aims.⁵³ It was of little real use in wartime anyway, and its dissolution on the eve of the conferences in Moscow, Cairo, and Teheran could possibly serve to lend an air of respectability to the Soviet leader and his staff. The move had its effect, for even leading western diplomats were, or pretended to be, taken in by its significance.⁵⁴

At Teheran, military matters, especially those centered around OVERLORD, had priority of discussion. On this subject, the American planners greatly feared the influence of Churchill upon the president. The broad outlines of what each man thought in terms of military strategy have already been discussed, but at Teheran firm commitments would have to be made. Fears that Roosevelt would be won over to Churchill's Mediterranean schemes were not unfounded because the area fascinated the president almost as much as

⁵³Librach, Rise of the Soviet Empire, p. 38.

⁵⁴Ibid.

the prime minister, a fact often obscured because of their conflict over operations there.⁵⁵

The important difference, militarily, between Churchill and Roosevelt is that, unlike Churchill, Roosevelt had no clear and separate military strategy of his own or separate from that of his staff. On the few occasions when he did overrule his Joint Chiefs it was for the purpose of keeping the alliance with Great Britain and the Soviet Union working together, as can be further indicated by the comparatively free hand given the Joint Chiefs in the Pacific.⁵⁶ Although the Joint Chiefs were primarily concerned with the military action, they were not entirely blind to its political implications and are known to have pointed them out to the president on occasion. Late in March 1943, Marshall is known to have indicated the dangers inherent in the Anglo-American drive against Germany from the west not keeping pace with the Soviet drive from the east.⁵⁷ However, Roosevelt's feelings on the matter remained firm. He refused to use military strategy to achieve purely political purposes and felt it unwise to plan

⁵⁵Matloff, Mr. Roosevelt's Three Wars, pp. 6-7.

⁵⁶Ibid., p. 8.

⁵⁷Maurice Matloff, The United States Army in World War II, vol. 6: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943-1944 (Washington: Department of the Army, 1959), p. 68.

such strategy based upon a gamble as to its political results.⁵⁸

With American suspicions already aroused over British intention regarding OVERLORD, they wasted no time in stating their case to the Russians. American concern over the Russian position was quickly erased by Soviet confirmation of a desire to see an attack across the channel at the earliest possible date. It should be emphasized that American planners were not overly concerned over a short delay in OVERLORD necessitated by British operations in the Mediterranean. Had such been the case, compromise would have been easy. The real issue, from the American point of view, was the British determination to use the Mediterranean ventures to serve Britain's long-range political ends regardless of the effects upon the cross-channel attack. They tended to depreciate or ignore the already immense British investment in the attack as well as British pleas to strengthen the effort.⁵⁹ Faced with the solidarity of American and Russian views on the subject, the British were forced to give in and commit themselves irrevocably to OVERLORD which was then scheduled for 1 May 1944. The decision was reached on 30 November, and it was agreed that an American would command OVERLORD while a British general

⁵⁸Matloff, Mr. Roosevelt's Three Wars, p. 9.

⁵⁹Kent R. Greenfield, ed., Command Decisions (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1959), pp. 188-89.

would command any Mediterranean operations. This reaffirmed similar decisions made earlier at Quebec. In addition, for the first time, the Americans and the British were able to offer a joint proposal to Stalin. The specific proposals made to the Soviet leader are enumerated below:

1. That the Italian advance should be to the Pisa-Rimini Line.
2. An operation should take place in southern France concurrent with OVERLORD.
3. OVERLORD will be launched in May.⁶⁰

In efforts to reassure the British regarding the cross-channel invasion, the Americans constantly reminded them of the enormous resources they could mount for such an operation. However, the British remembered similar promises made in World War I which were filled only by manpower. They were simply not convinced that, given the time allotted, the Americans would be able to deploy enough equipment, especially landing craft, to make the attack a success. Jacques Laumay also points out that Churchill was absolutely convinced that a disaster on the coast of France was the only circumstance capable of resulting in the loss of the war.⁶¹ The British caution with regard to OVERLORD can be more easily understood in terms of their belief that

⁶⁰U.S. Department of State, "Conferences at Cairo and Teheran," pp. 563-64.

⁶¹Jacques Laumay, Secret Diplomacy of World War II, trans. Edward Nadier (New York: Simmons-Boardman, 1963), p. 102.

it would be their last great effort, and if it failed they would be unable to attempt it again. Even if the operation were to succeed, there would be no way to replace the losses it would inflict.⁶² In case of failure, British strength would be gone, leaving Britain a diminished power in world affairs. If the British war effort did not immediately collapse as a result, the war would certainly be prolonged beyond British power to continue.⁶³

McNeill feels that these were the long-range considerations haunting Churchill and the British planners, rather than any desire, as the Americans thought, to play politics in the Mediterranean. Churchill was sincerely convinced that the Mediterranean operations would make a significant contribution to the success of OVERLORD, and that the May deadline would bring disaster.⁶⁴ Though the Russians were unaware of the fact, Churchill soon succeeded in getting the date of the invasion rescheduled from May to June in order to launch an amphibious attack aimed at Rome in January.⁶⁵ It was decided not to inform Stalin as it could only serve to heighten Soviet suspicion and make the course of the conference that much more difficult.

⁶²Greenfield, Command Decisions, p. 44.

⁶³Ibid., p. 45.

⁶⁴McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia, p. 360.

⁶⁵Stoler, Politics of the Second Front, p. 150.

The specific Mediterranean projects Churchill advocated at Teheran are as follows:

1. A concerted attempt to induce or compel Turkey to enter the war.
2. Capture by blockade or landing of certain islands in the Aegean Sea.
3. Small forays across the Adriatic to supply and support the Yugoslav partisan fighters.
4. Carry the campaign in Italy to the capture of Rome and beyond to stabilize on a line extending through Pisa and Rimini.
5. Make a landing in southern France after the line in Italy was established.
6. Send an expedition to the head of the Adriatic for the purpose of trying to force a way through the Ljubljana Gap and then on to Austria and southeastern Hungary.⁶⁶

Churchill did not expect any of the above operations to require an excessive amount of men or material. If they could not be withheld from OVERLORD, he would attempt to withhold them from Burma instead. This consideration guaranteed that Churchill would never support Roosevelt's promised amphibious operations to the Chinese and the president eventually realized that fact.

The question of Turkish entry into the war was another military issue considered at Teheran, and it was Churchill who became its greatest advocate. If Turkey could be brought into the war and Rhodes captured, German forces could subsequently be forced entirely out of the Aegean. In

⁶⁶Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 260.

spite of known Turkish reluctance, it was decided to issue a joint summons calling for Turkish entry and to aid the Turks provided no amphibious operations would be involved, and no delay of OVERLORD would result. It was also decided to invite Turkish president Inonu to Cairo following the Teheran meeting to discuss the matter with Churchill, Roosevelt, and a Russian representative.⁶⁷

The decisions, at Teheran, concerning military strategy were of enormous importance. Teheran produced the first real strategic cooperation among the three powers for the defeat of Germany. The Soviets had little choice regarding the matter or where they would wage war. It would be Great Britain and the United States alone that would be able to shift their areas of operations and coordinate with the Soviets against Germany.

British strategy prior to Teheran was still based upon what had been agreed upon by Churchill, Roosevelt, and their respective staffs when they met in Washington shortly after Pearl Harbor. The new strategy adopted at Teheran was the first significant departure from that strategy, and resulted from an amalgamation of proposals set forth by all parties to the conference. Alone, its evolution represents a study in the art of compromise and diplomatic wording.

⁶⁷U.S. Department of State, "Conferences at Cairo and Teheran," p. 593.

Among the proposals, those of the British were the first and are enumerated below:

1. An operation shall be mounted for the south of France. Timing and scope to be decided later-- maybe after OVERLORD.
2. We advance to the Pisa-Rimini Line.
3. We assist partisans in Yugoslavia, but no forces other than commandos to be used.
4. Operations in Aegean are entirely dependent on the entry of Turkey into war. In any event no more landing craft will be kept away from OVERLORD for the specific purposes of operations in the Aegean.
5. In view of (2), we must keep landing craft in Mediterranean till 15 January.
6. Because of (5) earliest date of OVERLORD cannot now be before 1 June.⁶⁸

The above points were modified to some extent when presented to a meeting of the combined British and American staffs on 30 November. After considerable debate, the Combined Chiefs of Staff arrived at the following recommendations which were then presented to Churchill and Roosevelt.

1. That we should advance in Italy to the Pisa-Rimini Line. (This means that the 68LST which were due to be sent from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom for OVERLORD must be kept in the Mediterranean until 15 January.)
2. That an operation shall be mounted against the south of France on as big a scale as landing craft permit. For planning purposes D-day to be same as OVERLORD D-day.

⁶⁸Ehrman, Grand Strategy, p. 181.

3. To recommend to the president and prime minister respectively that we should inform Marshal Stalin that we will launch OVERLORD during May in conjunction with a supporting operation against the south of France on the largest scale that is permitted by the landing craft available at the time.⁶⁹

Churchill and Roosevelt next presented the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs to Stalin and, in the debate that followed, a common course of action was determined. The final military conclusions reached were:

1. The partisans in Yugoslavia should be supported by all means possible.
2. It would be desirable for Turkey to enter the war before the end of 1943.
3. The Soviets would go to war with Bulgaria if that nation attacked Turkey because of a Turkish declaration of war on Germany.
4. OVERLORD would be launched in May of 1944 the same time as an operation in southern France.
5. The military staffs of the three nations would, in the future, maintain close contact with one another.⁷⁰

Political issues filled a good part of the talks between the three leaders, although most specific decisions were left to a later date. Though less famous than the later conferences at Yalta and Potsdam, it was at Teheran that many of the most important and sensitive political issues were discussed among the three nations for the first

⁶⁹U.S. Department of State, "Conferences at Cairo and Teheran," p. 652.

⁷⁰Ibid.

time. It is also a fact that many of the positions taken on political issues discussed at Teheran were not substantially altered at later conferences. This was especially true of the discussions concerning Poland. It has already been noted that many of the discussions at Teheran centered around specific countries, and the problem of Poland was the most thoroughly discussed.

At the time of the Teheran Conference, relations between the Soviet Union and Poland could not have been much worse. In January 1943, the Soviet government had made it clear to the London-based Polish government-in-exile that it meant to claim permanently the areas of eastern Poland that Russian forces had occupied as a result of the Nazi-Soviet Part of 1939. The Polish government immediately denounced the Russian claim as being absolutely unacceptable and completely illegal. They appealed to both the American and British governments for support, and, though both were sympathetic, they would take no chances of angering Stalin because of the strategic need of a unified effort against Germany.⁷¹

In 1941, the Sikorski-Maisky Agreement was signed in which the Soviets renounced all territorial changes in Poland previously recognized in the Nazi-Soviet Pact. However, there was never any clear recognition from Maisky,

⁷¹Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 191.

the Soviet ambassador to London, of the postwar eastern boundaries. The agreement restored Soviet-Polish relations for the first time since Russia had seized parts of Poland as a result of the Pact of 1939. In the meantime, the Soviets worked to establish the Union of Polish Patriots at Saratov under a Polish woman, and colonel in the Red Army, named Wanda Wasilewska.⁷² This was the beginning of what became the Lublin government, a Polish government established by the Soviets to rival the London Polish government. The reaction of the Americans and British to these events and to further Soviet claims to Polish territory during 1942 is summarized by James Nathan and James Oliver:

. . . the Allied response became visibly more flexible. The West, not able to deliver a second front and watching the rapid advance of the Soviet army, began to back off from the Poles and move toward placation of Stalin. The British believed that the Americans, not having direct Eastern European interests, could more effectively back the Poles, whereas the Americans thought that the British, as Poland's ally, could defend Polish interest. As a result when Churchill and Harriman "could not find the time" to take up certain issues when Churchill visited Stalin in August 1942, the Poles felt abandoned.⁷³

As allied support of the Polish cause began to waver, the Poles became increasingly resistant to Soviet

⁷²Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, The Rape of Poland (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1948), p. 24.

⁷³James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, United States Foreign Policy and World Order (Boston: Little Brown, 1975), p. 40.

claims. The German discovery of the graves of approximately 15,000 Polish officers in the Katyn Forrest of Poland, which the Polish government came to believe were killed by the Russians in 1940, led to a break in relations once again on 26 April 1943. Both Churchill and Roosevelt attempted to dissuade Stalin from breaking relations but to no avail.⁷⁴

On 17 November 1943, Anthony Eden informed the Poles that it might be possible to break the deadlock with the Russians at Teheran. It was almost certainly Eden who first mentioned the subject to the Poles.⁷⁵ Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk hoped to be invited to Cairo to state the Polish position, but no such invitation was forthcoming.⁷⁶

Once at Teheran, Roosevelt left it to Churchill to take the lead concerning Poland. When the main discussions on Poland took place, Roosevelt did not take part, but neither did he dissent from the formula which Churchill and Stalin were to evolve. In the one discussion on Poland that the president had with Stalin, he informed the Soviet leader that, because of the large Polish vote in the United States, he would not and could not take part in any discussion

⁷⁴Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 194.

⁷⁵Mikolajczyk, Rape of Poland, pp. 252-53.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 46.

concerning the establishment of Polish borders.⁷⁷ The existence of six to seven million voters made it impossible to act until after the presidential election of 1944. However, he privately told Stalin that he would not object to Poland's eastern boundary being established along the Oder River, a position the Soviets were known to favor.⁷⁸

If Roosevelt wished to avoid the Polish problem, Churchill wanted some solution arrived at as quickly as possible because the Poles had become a constant nuisance. He subsequently informed Stalin that, while Britain was committed to a strong Poland, the British government was not committed to any specific borders.⁷⁹ No action was taken on the Polish matter until the discussions of political matters on 1 December. In the long run and after much debate, the eastern Polish boundary agreed upon was essentially the old Ribbentrop-Molotov line with minor revisions. Churchill did not really like the settlement but acknowledged that, under the circumstances, nothing better could be obtained and that the proposals should be offered to the Poles. In fact, both Churchill and Roosevelt felt that the most important point was the establishment of a completely free and independent Poland, and both felt the

⁷⁷George N. Crocker, Roosevelt's Road to Russia (Chicago: Henry Rynere, 1959), pp. 220-21.

⁷⁸Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 285.

⁷⁹Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 361.

Teheran formula would accomplish that goal.⁸⁰ As Nathan and Oliver point out, "There was probably no alternative available . . . but by this action they conceded to Stalin both the dominant voice in the future government of Poland and the territorial aggrandizement he desired."⁸¹

Another unsettled political problem to be faced at Teheran was that of Iran. British and Russian forces had occupied Iran in 1941 in order to establish and secure a new route of supply to Russia for Lend-Lease goods. By 29 January 1942, an Anglo-Soviet-Iranian treaty of alliance had been signed guaranteeing that the occupation was only temporary.⁸² However, both the British and Russians quickly came to suspect each other of attempting to extend their spheres of influence into Iran and considerable friction soon developed. There was only a small contingent of American troops in Iran for the purpose of operating railway and port facilities. At the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers, the question of the status of American, British, and Russian troops in Iran was discussed as well as the timing of their withdrawal. It was decided to leave the entire matter open and to take it up at Teheran later.

⁸⁰William C. Bullitt, "How We Won the War and Lost the Peace: Part II," Life, September 6, 1948, p. 86.

⁸¹Nathan and Oliver, United States Foreign Policy, p. 41.

⁸²U.S. Department of State, "Conferences at Cairo and Teheran," p. 648.

In spite of having a rather low priority of discussion at Teheran, Iran fared exceedingly well, largely due to the efforts of Roosevelt. The president was also the main promoter of the Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran which was signed on 1 December.⁸³ The statement gave the Iranians four things that they were known to want. First, it acknowledged their part in the war effort. Second, it promised consideration of their economic problems at the end of the war. Third, it affirmed a joint wish to maintain Iran's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Finally, it increased Iranian self-respect.⁸⁴

The problem of Finland was discussed among the three leaders on 1 December. The American and British governments had two reasons for wanting the Finns out of the war. They wanted to reduce the military pressure on Leningrad, and they also feared that Finland would never regain the status of an independent country if it were overrun by the Red Army, which would probably happen if Finland continued its war effort against the Soviets.⁸⁵ Roosevelt was the first to bring the subject up for discussion and asked if there were anything the United States could do to help get Finland out of the war. Stalin said he really did not think the

⁸³Ibid., p. 649. For the released text of the declaration, see the appendix.

⁸⁴Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 267.

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 268.

Finns wanted out of the war but agreed to accept a Finnish delegation in Moscow and stated his own terms for an agreement. Stalin's terms were:

1. Finland would be required to break relations with Germany and expel all Germans from the country.
2. The Finnish army would be required to demobilize.
3. The treaty of 1940 would have to be restored.
4. Certain Finnish territory would have to be granted to Russia in order to gain a more secure position for Leningrad. Viupuri on the Karelian Isthmus and Hango were proposed as permanent annexations.
5. Finland would be required to pay compensation for 50 percent of the damage resulting from her actions against the Soviet Union.⁸⁶

Upon hearing the above terms, both Churchill and Roosevelt sought in vain to persuade Stalin to soften them. In spite of the pressure, the Soviet leader refused to moderate his position, and when the Soviet-Finnish armistice was signed on 19 September 1944 the conditions were substantially those first outlined at Teheran.

The political discussions of Poland, Iran, and Finland were the occasion of no serious Anglo-American friction and even some combined resistance to the desires of the Soviets. However, the discussions concerning France brought no similar Anglo-American consensus and were instead the occasion for bitter debate and mutual suspicion.

⁸⁶Ibid., p. 369.

Involved in the discussion of France was the most sensitive aspect of Anglo-American reactions, the problem of colonialism.

Charles de Gaulle had been forced to watch the liberation of North Africa by Anglo-American forces acting without Free French participation. This move was followed by general Anglo-American support of a pro-Vichy and pro-allied French faction that was clearly hostile to his own movement. Yet, by the end of 1943, it was obvious to all that de Gaulle's position had dramatically improved. In 1942, de Gaulle had less than 100,000 men under his command and was practically a ward of the British government. By December 1943, his forces had grown to over 400,000, and the French Resistance movement recognized him as its leader. Also, having eased Giraud out as co-president, de Gaulle was the sole leader of the French Committee of National Liberation.⁸⁷ In spite of the above facts, as de Gaulle himself noted,

We ourselves had been excluded from the proceedings [Cairo and Teheran Conferences] to the point where Roosevelt and Churchill--the former flying over North Africa, the latter sailing along its coast to reach Cairo and Teheran--had taken care not to make contact with us.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Francois Kersaudy, Churchill and De Gaulle (New York: Atheneum, 1982), p. 302.

⁸⁸ Charles de Gaulle, The War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959), p. 227.

Nor, it should also be mentioned, did either leader attempt to meet with de Gaulle following the Teheran Conference as they reconvened once again at Cairo.

Roosevelt evidenced a harsh attitude toward France during the discussions at Teheran that was largely the result of a personal dislike for de Gaulle and the failure of France to resist Germany in 1940. The Americans had clearly favored General Henri Giraud as the person to head the government of postwar France. President Roosevelt mistrusted de Gaulle and considered him a potential French dictator, thus rejecting every suggestion to work more closely with the French Committee of National Liberation once de Gaulle became its president.⁸⁹ This was in spite of the fact that Roosevelt planned to rely heavily upon the governments-in-exile to exercise power as allied armies liberated Europe. In the French case, the president refused to even recognize such a government.⁹⁰

De Gaulle expected his committee to be directly responsible for the civil administration of France. The committee was stronger than any of the other expatriated regimes and was the only one that could claim effective authority over any significant portion of the national territory. The committee was also in control of a

⁸⁹Smith, American Diplomacy, p. 76.

⁹⁰Milton Viorst, Hostile Allies: F.D.R. and Charles de Gaulle (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 183.

considerable army that was prepared to help drive the Germans out of France and was vigorously supported within occupied France.⁹¹ In spite of these positive factors, Roosevelt remained convinced that de Gaulle, once installed, would never relinquish power, and he was determined to prevent him from getting his position with metropolitan France consolidated.

The president was already in Cairo when de Gaulle announced his claim to speak for all France and his intention to establish his government following the allied invasion. Upon hearing this, Roosevelt stated that he was becoming more inclined toward a purely military occupation of France.⁹² He tentatively proposed a plan to govern France after liberation through an official who would be directly responsible to the Supreme Allied Commander.⁹³ John Gaddis maintains that the root cause of the conflict between Roosevelt and de Gaulle over the formation of a French government was the former's desire to avoid playing politics until the war was won.⁹⁴ However, the issue would not wait and even Roosevelt was soon forced to conclude that

⁹¹Ibid., p. 184.

⁹²Ibid.

⁹³Smith, American Diplomacy, p. 76.

⁹⁴John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), p. 14.

France could not be governed as if it were Germany or Italy and that the actual management of civil affairs would have to remain in the hands of the French themselves. Nevertheless, if Roosevelt could have his way, it would be the allies who would control which Frenchmen would compose the new government and how much autonomy would be allowed.

Not all of Roosevelt's aversion concerning the French centered around de Gaulle. In fact, he seemed intent on punishing France as a whole for failing to offer the Germans any real resistance. In his opinion, all persons over forty years old should be eliminated from the new French government and particularly all those persons who had formed the old government.⁹⁵ He was also of the opinion that France would not become a first-class power again for at least twenty-five years.⁹⁶

Yet another aspect of Roosevelt's anger with France stemmed from his aversion to European colonialism, which he condemned in the sharpest terms. "Poverty in many parts of the world, he judged was the result of exploitation of native peoples by intruders."⁹⁷ While this was also clearly a criticism of Great Britain, in the French case, the president hoped to be able to correct the problem.

⁹⁵U.S. Department of State, "Conferences at Cairo and Teheran," p. 509.

⁹⁶Smith, American Diplomacy, p. 76.

⁹⁷Ibid.

Churchill and Roosevelt had already had a disagreement over French Indochina at Cairo, arising when the prime minister dismissed as nonsense Roosevelt's suggestion that the Chinese had no wish to control the area. To this, the president responded bluntly:

Winston, this is something which you are just not able to understand. You have 400 years of acquisitive instinct in your blood and you just don't understand how a country might not want to acquire land somewhere if they can get it. A new period has opened in the world's history and you will have to adjust to it.⁹⁸

It was Roosevelt's sincere hope that France could be stripped of her former colonies and strategic holdings. When the president first met with Stalin, on 28 November, he talked freely, in Churchill's absence, about trusteeship schemes. The two men agreed immediately that Indochina should not be restored to France. Roosevelt stated that:

. . . after 100 years of French rule in Indochina, the inhabitants were worse off than they had been before. . . . He added that he had discussed with Chiang Kai-shek the possibility of a system of trusteeship for Indochina which would have the task of preparing the people for independence within a definite period of time perhaps 20 to 30 years. Marshall Stalin completely agreed with this view.⁹⁹

During this convention, Roosevelt also suggested that it would be unwise to raise the question of India with Churchill.

⁹⁸Thomas M. Campbell and George C. Harring, eds., The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 1943-1946 (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975), p. 40.

⁹⁹U.S. Department of State, "Conferences at Cairo and Teheran," p. 485.

Stalin largely concurred with the president's attitude toward France. He was of the opinion himself that not only should France be deprived of Indochina but should also be made to pay for her "criminal collaboration with Germany."¹⁰⁰ The Soviet leader was thoroughly convinced that the French were guilty of actively helping the Germans. In his opinion, the French ruling class was "rotten to the core" and, using Bergery, the former French ambassador to Moscow as an example, went on to express his personal dislike of both the man and the government he represented.¹⁰¹ As for de Gaulle, Stalin attached little importance to him in political or any other matters, declaring that he felt Petain represented the real France. He felt that it was the collaborators rather than the resistance fighters who were expressing the true French sentiments. When mention was made of the allies holding certain key strong points around the world in order to insure peace, the Soviet leader felt that France should be excluded. In his opinion, France was not to be trusted with any such position outside her own borders.¹⁰²

Churchill stated that some strategic bases obviously would have to be controlled by the victorious powers, but that the British Empire did not desire additional territories. This was the line Churchill persistently

¹⁰⁰Ibid.

¹⁰¹Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 787.

¹⁰²Louis, Imperialism at Bay, p. 284.

argued during the conferences, despite Stalin's efforts to draw him out on territorial questions.¹⁰³

Once again, as was so often the case at Teheran, the prime minister found himself in disagreement with his two allies. Even on the question of de Gaulle he was in opposition. De Gaulle had tried British patience severely, but they were not unsympathetic to his cause. The British position was simply based upon the fact that they found de Gaulle and his committee more attractive than any other available alternative.¹⁰⁴ The British tactic was thus to support de Gaulle yet curb his ambitions through forcing him to join forces with other French elements more acceptable to Washington.

Churchill was convinced that France must be restored to the position of a powerful European nation after the war, and felt France would not only be capable but would have a right to take part in the managing of any strong points established after the war in the interests of peace. Not only did the prime minister favor a strong postwar French nation but also retention of colonial possessions. Any other course of action would certainly set a dangerous precedent for the British Empire itself, and might open the way for the application of Roosevelt's trusteeship schemes

¹⁰³Ibid.

¹⁰⁴Ehrman, Grand Strategy, p. 320.

throughout the world.¹⁰⁵ In addition, it could not have escaped Churchill's attention that, with Germany in ruins and France vastly reduced in power, Russian power in Europe would be impossible to challenge and the European balance of power would be effectively destroyed. The prime minister was convinced that only on a balance of power basis would good relations with the Soviet Union have a reasonable chance of being preserved.¹⁰⁶ He never had, and never would, share Roosevelt's faith that an international body could eliminate the chance of war and would, as a result, continue to place his faith in a balance of power. In addition, should the United States withdraw from active participation in European affairs after the war, Great Britain would then face the Soviets in Europe alone. Another very real possibility was that Britain would find itself in a postwar world dominated by the Soviets and the Americans. Under such circumstances British influence would be considerably reduced, and a strong France could prove very important.¹⁰⁷

President Roosevelt had never made a detailed study of the principle of collective security, preferring instead to concentrate on the chief objective of that principle--the cooperative action by states for the maintenance of world

¹⁰⁵McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia, p. 54.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 410.

¹⁰⁷Ibid., p. 320.

peace. Regarding the details and structures of an organization to achieve this goal, the president seems to have had few, if any, deep convictions. Gradually, one of the ideas he came to place great faith in was the concept of an Anglo-American policing system that could be used to enforce peace on a worldwide scale. This idea would be expanded to include China and the Soviet Union and, at Teheran, the president referred to them as the "Four Policemen."¹⁰⁸ This was not an idea developed at Teheran but rather something the president had been considering for some time. In March 1943, when Anthony Eden visited Washington, Roosevelt discussed the issue to the following effect:

It was the Big Powers that were going to have to write the peace treaties . . . and he did not want to have to do a lot of bargaining with the small states about it. The small states had all sorts of conflicting ambitions and any attempt to satisfy them would get nowhere.¹⁰⁹

The president had discussed numerous ideas and concepts with Churchill and the British government, but as far as Soviet views on the subject were concerned he knew nothing at all. One of his chief concerns at Teheran was to present his ideas to Stalin and attempt to enlist Soviet participation in his efforts. Stalin inquired whether the international organization Roosevelt envisioned would have

¹⁰⁸Range, F.D.R.'s World Order, p. 172.

¹⁰⁹Ibid.

the power to make binding decisions and the president was very evasive in his answer. Stalin also suggested that the small nations of the world would not like Roosevelt's idea and that he had doubts about Chinese ability to participate. In fact, the Soviet leader suggested a regional system similar to that which Churchill had already proposed, but Roosevelt countered with the same objections he had used with the prime minister. By the time Roosevelt and Stalin discussed the matter on 1 December, the president himself had become slightly hesitant over the various vaguely worded possibilities being discussed. He informed Stalin that he felt it was premature to bring the subject up in the formal discussions with Churchill as his ideas were still in the formative stages and needed further study.¹¹⁰ As a result, there was no mention of an international organization in the Teheran Declaration issued by the three leaders at the close of the conference. It is known, however, that, at some point in their discussions on 1 December, Stalin informed Roosevelt that he, too, had come to favor an international organization over regional organizations.¹¹¹ The entire matter was then relegated to the future.

Churchill had abandoned his ideas of regional organization prior to the conference at Teheran. Plans for

¹¹⁰Robert Divine, Roosevelt and World War II (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), p. 64.

¹¹¹Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 271.

a postwar international organization could wait as far as he was concerned. This was his position at Teheran, thus the British took little part in discussing the matter. The prime minister was unaware of what Roosevelt told Stalin at Teheran, but in commenting upon the talks at a later date said, "He [Roosevelt] does not seem to have made it clear that I also contemplated a Supreme United Nations Council of which three regional committees should be components."¹¹² What effect such knowledge might have had upon the Soviet leader's own thinking is unknown.

It was perhaps inevitable that any discussion of postwar territorial settlements would center around Germany. Once again, British and American ideas diverged. Roosevelt viewed the main problem as being whether to divide Germany or to leave it as a single entity. He was inclined toward a harsh settlement and preferred to rely upon measures of self-control and mutual accords to check the Soviets rather than upon a balance of power scheme. Churchill was primarily interested in having Prussia separated from Germany and feared that to completely crush Germany would leave the Soviets supreme in Europe and upset the balance of power. Stalin preferred the dismemberment of Germany, and wanted the country completely crushed and kept from any

¹¹²Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 363.

future revival of power.¹¹³ At Teheran it was agreed, at least in principle, to divide Germany into zones of occupation with an inter-allied zone which could serve as the seat of an inter-allied commission to deal with common matters of policy. Germany would thus not actually be partitioned along zonal lines, but would still be considered a national unit. The question was to what extent the zoned would be unified and just how far Germany would be decentralized.¹¹⁴ There was little or no disagreement over the idea of zones of occupation.

On the journey to Cairo, the president had reconsidered the equal division of Germany agreed upon at the Quebec Conference. At Quebec it had been agreed that the British would obtain the northwest third of Germany as their zone of occupation. Freehandedly, Roosevelt drew a map which allocated the main portion of Germany, including Berlin, to the United States. The British were relegated to the southwestern area of Germany near the French border. Thus, the president arrived at Teheran with ideas concerning Germany that were not only unknown to the British but even different from those expressed by Hull at the Moscow Conference in October. The confusion that resulted among

¹¹³U.S. Department of State, "Conference at Cairo and Teheran," p. 600.

¹¹⁴Hajo Holborn, American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947), pp. 22-23.

Anglo-American policy makers, as a result, were noticed immediately by the Russians.¹¹⁵

Roosevelt's plan for dividing Germany was all new to Churchill and, as the conference progressed, the British became increasingly reluctant to firmly commit themselves to a policy of dismemberment. Although all parties stated their position on the German question with little result, the subject was the occasion for one of the most dramatic moments of the conference on the evening of 29 November. The event was a dinner party, hosted by the Russians, during which all conversation was conducted, in the Russian custom, through the medium of a proffered toast. At some point during the meal, Elliott Roosevelt appeared and was seated at the table. The dinner, according to Churchill, was "highly restricted," and the prime minister seems to have considered Elliott's presence an intrusion.¹¹⁶ Stalin's expressed belief that Churchill was soft on Germany had been sharpened even more by differences over military planning that had emerged in earlier conferences that same day. It was perhaps for that reason Stalin teased Churchill unmercifully at the dinner meeting. When the subject of Germany was brought up, Stalin made the statement that fifty thousand of the German General Staff should be

¹¹⁵Kolko, Politics of War, p. 319.

¹¹⁶Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 373.

liquidated.¹¹⁷ Churchill replied, "I would rather be taken out into the garden here and now and be shot myself than sully my own and my country's honor by such infamy."¹¹⁸

When it came Elliott's turn to speak he proposed the following toast:

Russian, American, and British soldiers will settle the issue for most of those fifty thousand in battle, and I hope that not only those fifty thousand war criminals will be taken care of, but many hundreds of thousands more Nazis as well.¹¹⁹

Churchill immediately became furious, asking Elliott, "Are you interested in damaging relations between the Allies? Do you know what you are saying? How can you dare say such a thing?"¹²⁰ The prime minister went on to state that the British government would never agree to the cold-blooded murder of soldiers who had fought for their country. It was one thing to bring war criminals to trial for committing barbarous acts, but quite another to execute men for political purposes. President Roosevelt then tried to dismiss the matter as a macabre joke by saying that perhaps only forty-nine thousand need die.¹²¹ Churchill failed to see any humor in the situation and left the table,

¹¹⁷Beitzell, Uneasy Alliance, p. 330.

¹¹⁸Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 374.

¹¹⁹Roosevelt, As He Saw It, p. 190.

¹²⁰Ibid.

¹²¹Beitzell, Uneasy Alliance, p. 330.

returning only at the urging of Molotov and Stalin, who assured the prime minister that he had only been joking. Elliott later hinted that Churchill had too much to drink, but some historians have stated that it was not Churchill, but Elliott, who had consumed too much alcohol.¹²² In any event, Churchill was never fully convinced that Stalin's proposal was intended purely as a joke, and Elliott Roosevelt had earned the prime minister's undying distaste by making comments that were, at the least, inappropriate and not conducive to allied harmony.

The final discussions on Germany occurred on 1 December and produced no results. It was concluded that it was simply too soon to reach any real consensus on the German matter. "The rule for Germany, as for every other difficult question at Teheran was: if at first you disagree, postpone."¹²³ The entire issue was referred to the newly formed European Advisory Commission in London for further study.¹²⁴

¹²²Ibid.

¹²³Smith, American Diplomacy, p. 77.

¹²⁴The European Advisory Commission was created at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers with the main purpose, at the time, of preparing the way for a meeting of the "Big Three." Eden had wanted to assign broad responsibilities to the organization, but Hull and Molotov disagreed. The Russians seemed afraid of being outvoted, and Hull feared it might evolve into a regional organization capable of undermining any future world organization. (Smith, American Diplomacy, p. 73.) The organization was composed of the American and Russian ambassadors in London, Mr. Winant and Mr. Gusev, and Sir William Strang of the

On Wednesday, 1 December 1943, the three leaders signed a communique entitled simply "Declaration of the Three Powers" which was a short document designed to serve as no more than a press release.¹²⁵ The Teheran Conference was over, and on 2 December both the president and the prime minister flew out of Teheran bound for Cairo and yet another round of conferences. At Cairo the two leaders joined their Combined Chiefs and proceeded to settle the details of Anglo-American planning needed to implement the Teheran decisions. Prior to parting, the three leaders did not initiate their foreign secretaries and indulge in a round of mutual congratulations. Much had been achieved and, as Miller states, "Teheran marked the peak of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the West--a cooperation gained by leaning over backward to accommodate Stalin and by postponing difficult decisions."¹²⁶ However, Anthony Eden recorded that he was feeling less easy than at the end of the Moscow

British Foreign Office, each of whom was accompanied by a military and naval advisor. As a result of Teheran, the problems referred to it included the details of the German surrender as well as the administration of Allied military government in Germany and Austria. Ultimately, the EAC discussions produced little more than statements proclaiming the intention of the three powers to act together once the military capitulation was effected. To define the nature of such a common inter-allied policy simply went beyond the strength of the EAC (Holborn, American Military Government, pp. 22-23, 26).

¹²⁵For the text of the communique, see the appendix.

¹²⁶Miller, F.D.R., p. 497.

Conference. He was disturbed by the apparent sudden shifts in Soviet policy as well as Roosevelt's neglect of Chruchill in favor of the Russians.¹²⁷ American conduct at the conference certainly suggested a shift in Anglo-American relations.

¹²⁷Sir Anthony Eden, The Memoirs of Anthony Eden, Earl of Avon, 3 vols. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960-65), 2:497.

CHAPTER V

CAIRO AGAIN AND SOME GENERAL CONCLUSIONS

President Inonu of Turkey accepted the invitation to meet with Churchill and Roosevelt in Cairo following the conference at Teheran. Both leaders competed for the first chance to greet him. Roosevelt sent his son-in-law in the presidential plane to Adana to bring him to the meeting. Churchill sent his son, Randolph, in his official plane on the same errand. Inonu chose the American insignia.¹ On 4, 5, and 6 December, two meetings each day were held between the Turkish president, Churchill, and Roosevelt. Also observing the meetings was the Soviet representative, Voroshilov. These meetings were followed by a fourth meeting between the British and Turks on 7 December.

In all of the meetings, the prime minister did most of the talking. As the discussions progressed, Churchill used every means of persuasion at his command, but the Turks remained hesitant to enter the war. Inonu asked for supplies and time to train the Turkish troops in the use of modern weapons. However, Roosevelt refused to commit any

¹Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 266.

large quantities of supplies to Turkey because of OVERLORD commitments, and Churchill could not afford to allow much more time.² Inonu made it clear to both leaders that the war would not be popular in Turkey and, if only to preserve its existence, the Turkish government would have to ensure favorable conditions for its entrance into the conflict.

At Cairo, Roosevelt was no more enthusiastic over the prospect of Turkish entry than he had been at Teheran. The American Joint Chiefs had conducted a study of the effect of Turkish participation in the war that concluded the Turks could only be a burden to the war effort at that time. The ability of the allies to convey the necessary supplies was in doubt, and the supply route was a long one. It was also doubted that the Turks could count on receiving any really valuable assistance. These factors, coupled with the fact that the British themselves could not promise the Turks the assistance required to defend themselves, guaranteed that Inonu would not then bring Turkey into the war.³

Churchill, however, was not yet through. On 7 December he put one final proposal to Inonu. The Chiefs of Staff, along with Churchill, had developed a secret program for installing allied airfields and planes in Turkey. The

²McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia, p. 371.

³Leahy, I Was There, p. 190.

program, worked out during the previous four days, was presented to the Turkish president. The advantage of the plan was its secrecy, because the Turks feared German reprisals.⁴ The program, as Churchill explained it to Inonu, is described below:

The first stage would last until February 15, would be occupied by the infiltration of supplies and specialists for the preparation of airfields and communications, and by discussions in Ankara and Cairo on war plans, on the import of munitions, and on diplomatic questions. On 15th February the Allies would ask the Turks for permission to send in air squadrons. If the Turks then refused, the Allies would abandon all plans for further cooperation. If they accepted, the Allies would open the sea route from Egypt and Lavant, would send in British antitank and armoured units and munitions for the Turkish army and air force and would bring into operation the plans already concerted.⁵

The arrival of Royal Air Force squadrons would coincide with the declaration of war upon Germany. The Trukish president at least agreed to consider Churchill's proposal and to present it to the National Assembly, thus postponing any final decision for another two months. The results of the discussion were transmitted to the Americans and Russians who indicated acceptance.⁶

The British threats were only gestures, and Inonu realized that Roosevelt's support of Churchill's plans was nominal. The American president found Inonu's reservations

⁴Ehrman, Grand Strategy, p. 194.

⁵Ibid., pp. 194-95.

⁶Eden, The Reckoning, p. 497.

and overall views reasonable and said so.⁷ As John Grigg notes:

This was a cruel disappointment for Churchill, who had remained incurably hopeful of persuading the Turks to come in long after even Brooks--who had originally promoted the idea--had ceased to regard it as realistic.⁸

Ehrman states that Churchill remained undaunted by the Turkish problem and hoped for a favorable outcome but it was probably a false optimism.⁹ With Roosevelt's enthusiastic support the results might have been different, but for the time being Churchill had lost.

If the Turkish question represented a loss for Churchill's strategy at Cairo, the decision on the amphibious operation promised to Chiang Kai-shek represented a victory. Operation BUCCANEER had been a sore spot with the prime minister ever since he had first learned of it. He thought it a deception from the start, and it had constantly interfered with his proposed Mediterranean operations at Teheran. Now, in Cairo once again, Churchill was determined to kill the operation. If BUCCANEER were cancelled, some of the prime minister's Mediterranean schemes would still be possible.

⁷Beitzell, Uneasy Alliance, p. 361.

⁸John Grigg, 1943: The Victory That Never Was (New York: Hill and Wang, 1980), p. 189.

⁹Ehrman, Grand Strategy, p. 195.

The Americans continued to maintain that, if the promise to Chiang were not kept, China might collapse or make peace, thereby prolonging the war and making operations in the Pacific more difficult. Churchill wanted the landing craft for an attack upon Rhodes instead. The prime minister's best argument made use of the Soviet promise, given at Teheran, to enter the war against Japan. This factor would, he argued, require a complete reevaluation of the conduct of the war in the Pacific theatre. At the very least, the Soviets could provide much better airfields for bombing Japan than could be found in China.¹⁰ Soviet airfields would require no land supply route through Burma, and that country could thus be bypassed entirely.¹¹ Churchill continued his argument by pointing out that the landing craft thus freed from the Indian Ocean could be used in the Mediterranean and still be available for OVERLORD. He was now turning the Americans' own argument against them with embarrassing results, a fact which must have been delightful to him.¹²

Churchill reminded Roosevelt that the British had never committed themselves to either the scale or timing of BUCCANEER, and the president was well aware that without

¹⁰Matloff, Strategic Planning, p. 370.

¹¹Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 250.

¹²McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia, p. 369.

British naval and landing forces the operation would be impossible.¹³ These facts, combined with the simple truth of the prime minister's statements, finally convinced Roosevelt that a concession would have to be made to the British point of view. Therefore, on 5 December, the following message was dispatched to Chiang Kai-shek:

Conference with Stalin involves us in a combined grand operations on European continent in the late spring giving fair prospect of terminating war with Germany by end of summer 1944. These operations impose so large a requirement of heavy landing craft as to make it impracticable to devote a sufficient number to the amphibious operation in Bay of Bengal.¹⁴

It can be reasonably assumed that Chiang had expected some form of combined strategy to emerge from the Teheran Conference and that one of the reasons he insisted upon meeting with Roosevelt first was to obtain a commitment to the Burma operations in advance. If this were true, the president's message must have indeed been a shock, for it destroyed what the Chinese considered a firm commitment. The news disturbed the American Joint Chiefs, also, and it may have constituted the only time during the course of the war when Roosevelt arbitrarily overruled a unanimous decision by them.¹⁵ They were angry and bitterly disappointed over the president's course of action as well

¹³ Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 250; Matloff, Strategic Planning, p. 370.

¹⁴ McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia, p. 370.

¹⁵ Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 800.

as being convinced that it unnecessarily prolonged the Pacific war. However, regardless of their feelings, Roosevelt's decision was firm. The Chinese were offered a smaller-scale operation in place of BUCCANEER, but their refusal to cooperate resulted in the cancellation of all amphibious operations in Southeast Asia.

If amphibious operations were out, air operations to Chiang were greatly expanded. In fact, the scale of air operations became so extensive that Secretary of War Stimson wrote almost a year later that:

The amount of effort which we have put into the "Over the Hump" airline has been bleeding us white in transport airplanes--it has consumed so many. Today [3 October 1944] we are hamstrung in Holland and the mouth of the Scheldt River for lack of transport planes necessary to make new air-borne flights in that neighborhood. The same lack is crippling us in northern Italy. This effort over the mountains of Burma bids fair to cost us an extra winter in the main theatre of the war.¹⁶

If there were to be no BUCCANEER, the American pledge of aid to the Chinese would be kept. It is certain that the effort cost the Americans more than is generally realized, but it is difficult to measure the actual effect the air operations had upon the war in Europe.

The final item of business at the second Cairo Conference concerned the selection of a commander for operation OVERLORD. For that job, after prolonged and

¹⁶Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper and Bros., 1948), p. 251.

extensive reflection, Roosevelt selected General Eisenhower. General Marshall had been the logical and expected choice but he was badly needed in Washington. The selection of the commander for OVERLORD was perhaps the most important decision made at Cairo. It was a decision made by Roosevelt alone, without further discussion with Churchill, and against the advice of most presidential advisors. According to John Grigg, the president informed Churchill of his decision,

. . . almost casually, as they were driving out from Cairo to the Pyramids. He then said that he proposed instead to appoint Eisenhower, and Churchill replied that the British would trust their fortune to his direction with hearty goodwill.¹⁷

Grigg goes on to point out that the real reason Roosevelt failed to select Marshall was more complicated than an inability to part with the general's services in Washington. There was also pressure from the British and from the American public to be considered. The British had no objection to Marshall's appointment, but they would not agree to giving him overall command in Europe and, at the same time, have him remain United States Chief of Staff. The American public, it was believed, would not settle for what would otherwise be a demotion for the general. Since no compromise could be arrived at, Marshall was not

¹⁷Grigg, 1943, p. 191.

selected.¹⁸ In addition, with the British finally committed to the operation, one of the president's main reasons for favoring Marshall was removed; that of choosing the American most able to protect the operation against Churchill.¹⁹

In a message received on 7 December, Stalin was informed that Eisenhower had been chosen in Cairo as the commander of OVERLORD. In a reply on 10 December, the Soviet leader indicated his approval and wished the new commander success.²⁰ History has now proven that Roosevelt's choice of Eisenhower was a wise one. After a year of working with allied forces in the Mediterranean area, he had demonstrated an ability to make the coalition work in a satisfactory manner. This ability he brought to England in 1944, and once again demonstrated to the satisfaction of all concerned.²¹

President Roosevelt departed Cairo on 7 December a happy man. He was convinced he had accomplished his major goals during the round of conferences. Churchill stayed behind for several days and finally succumbed to complete physical collapse and what his physician, Lord Moran,

¹⁸Ibid., p. 190.

¹⁹Ehrman, Grand Strategy, pp. 200-01.

²⁰U.S.S.R., Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Correspondence, pp. 112, 114.

²¹Forrest Pogue, The Supreme Command (Washington: Department of the Army, 1954), p. 35.

diagnosed as pneumonia. Upon cursory examination the Teheran Conference represents a triumph of American diplomacy and a clear assertion of supremacy in the area of Anglo-American affairs. In some respects it was, but historians are still debating the results of the conference and the real "winner" remains in doubt.

Some authorities maintain that the president made a serious mistake regarding his judgment of the Soviet dictator. Certainly he did seem inclined to give the Soviets the benefit of any doubt, and Thomas Greer argues that he was simply blind to the harsh realities of the internal tyranny of the Soviet Union as well as the ruthless character of Stalin himself.²² To a certain extent, such an assertion, if true, can be explained by the pro-Soviet propaganda that was fed to the American people during World War II in the interest of allied unity. Propaganda had long been recognized as a valuable and effective means of obtaining mass public support of government policy and is a common tool of all modern governments. However, the inherent danger of propaganda is that those who espouse it may themselves become believers, even when it is not based upon facts. In an effort to foster allied unity, many claims were made concerning the Soviets that had little or no basis, in fact, but merely reflected wishful thinking.

²²Greer, What Roosevelt Thought, p. 204.

It is the contention of William Bullitt that Roosevelt, as well as some of his top advisors, were themselves affected by the waves of pro-Soviet propaganda they had started.²³

Upon arriving in Washington after the round of conferences, the president told his private secretary Francis Perkins:

I wish someone would tell me about the Russians. I don't know a good Russian from a bad Russian. I can tell a good Frenchman from a bad Frenchman. I can tell a good Italian from a bad Italian. I know a good Greek when I see one. But I don't understand the Russians. I just don't know what makes them tick.²⁴

In view of the above statements, the conclusion the president reached concerning Stalin seems surprising. In fact, the comment stands alone as his sole expression of doubt. If Roosevelt believed he lacked an understanding of Russians in general, his statements concerning Stalin indicate that he at least thought he understood their leader. The president believed that he had succeeded in winning Stalin over to his way of thinking. In his own words, he found Stalin to be "get-at-able."²⁵ However, as Louis Fisher explains in his biography of the Soviet leader, Stalin was not really "get-at-able" by anyone, and that was his greatest strength. Roosevelt made a mistake because he

²³Bullitt, "How We Won," Part I, p. 97.

²⁴Francis Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: Viking Press, 1946), p. 86.

²⁵Fisher, Life and Death of Stalin, p. 205.

had never met a man like Stalin, a man who was almost impervious to human personality.²⁶ At Teheran he went to immense lengths to secure Stalin's friendship and, in the process, exposed weaknesses of which Stalin took full advantage. George Crocker states that the president was completely wrong in his belief that he could handle Stalin. At Teheran it was Stalin who did the handling without Roosevelt actually realizing it. His basic diagnosis of the problem as being one of a slight case of suspicion and mistrust was inadequate.²⁷ In fact, if Krushev's report to the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 is even approximately correct, Stalin was already incurably on the road to insanity before the president even met him.²⁸ The extent of the Kremlin leader's insanity, if he really were insane, is impossible to authoritatively prove. In any case, as a Soviet publicist wrote, "at the Teheran Conference Stalin reached the culminating point of his career."²⁹ Adam Ulam agrees, referring to Teheran as ". . . his greatest victory of the war . . . what Stalingrad had been militarily, Teheran was diplomatically."³⁰ Such a statement could very

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Crocker, Roosevelt's Road to Russia, p. 226.

²⁸Range, F.D.R.'s World Order, p. 195.

²⁹Bernard J. Hutton, Stalin--The Miraculous Georgian (London: Garden City Press, 1961), p. 261.

³⁰Ulam, Stalin, p. 587.

well be true because, at Teheran, the Soviet leader obtained the advantage that he would seek to exploit later at Yalta and Potsdam.

The fact that Roosevelt was not the only one fooled by Stalin is a matter of little consequence. Considering the control the president exercised over American policy, he was the only person who had to be fooled. Stalin played the role of gracious host at the conference, taking every opportunity to impress upon Roosevelt that he was not a communist of the "Lenin type" and that he had no ambitions for world conquest or revolution.³¹ All evidence indicates that Stalin's approach worked. In a fireside chat on 24 December 1943, the president said concerning Stalin:

I may say that I got along fine with Marshal Stalin. He is a man who combines a tremendous, relentless determination with a stalwart good humor. I believe that he is truly representative of the heart and soul of Russia; and I believe that we are going to get along very well with him and the Russian people--very well indeed.³²

President Roosevelt's policy of seeking only vague and general agreements with the Soviets at Teheran did secure the freedom from commitments that he desired. His policy also turned out to be self-defeating because, while individually, the implied agreements seemed to mean little

³¹Jan Ciechanowski, Defeat in Victory (Garden City: Doubleday, 1947), p. 247.

³²Samuel I. Rosenman, comp., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, vol. 12: The Tide Turns, 1943 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1950), p. 558.

if collectively enforced they had the potential to determine the future of Europe. As one unidentified American participant at the conference wrote:

Germany is to be broken up and kept broken up. The states of eastern, southeastern, and central Europe will not be permitted to group themselves into any federations or associations. France . . . will not be permitted to maintain any appreciable military establishment. Poland and Italy will not be permitted to maintain any appreciable armed force. The result would be that the Soviet Union would be the only important military and political force on the continent of Europe.³³

It is virtually certain that the State Department neither drafted nor approved of the partition plan Roosevelt presented at Teheran. All the president would say was that "he and his advisors" had "had a shot at a plan" as a basis for discussion.³⁴

President Roosevelt's remarks concerning the small nations of the world, made in connection with Poland and the international peace-keeping organization, indicate that he was not overly concerned with the rights of small states. This does not mean that he would deny these nations anything that could be given to them, but it does indicate that this prime concern was insuring world peace. With this concern in mind, the Executive Council he proposed in connection with the new organization was, as Robert Divine says,

³³Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 275.

³⁴John L. Snell, Dilemma Over Germany (New Orleans: Phausor Press, 1959), p. 48.

". . . a ceremonial concession to the dedicated internationalists and a sop to the small countries."³⁵ The president placed his real faith in the Four Policemen.

It is the opinion of many historians that Roosevelt's main problem at Teheran, and in foreign affairs generally, was his tendency to rely too much upon his own ability. His wartime power, the record of victory, the high esteem in which he was held by the world in general, and the weakness of the State Department all reinforced that tendency. In the area of domestic politics the president had demonstrated a certain genius, but his talents on the international level have not been so highly regarded. Both Churchill and Stalin seemed to demonstrate a knowledge of international affairs that was beyond the president. As historian Herbert Feis points out:

Fortunes of war, relative military power, national and political purposes and geography--rather than principle--determined the measure of influence exercised by each of the three main allies in each separate situation. Roosevelt and Hull never reconciled themselves to the rule of such realities.³⁶

In evaluating Roosevelt's conduct of foreign policy as it was displayed at Teheran, it is both correct and fair to say that he made some serious mistakes regarding both what he did and did not do. Teheran is now generally

³⁵Divine, Roosevelt and World War II, p. 15.

³⁶Herbert Feis, "The Three Who Lead," Foreign Affairs 37 (January 1959):289.

regarded as a diplomatic failure for the United States. The president had advisors, many of great talent and capability, but he often chose not to use them. One advisor in particular, who warned the president against placing too much faith in Soviet cooperation, was William Bullitt. As the United States' first ambassador to the Soviet Union, Bullitt warned that the Soviets intended to create a communist sphere of influence in Europe. His warning became known as the Bullitt thesis and was documented in a series of letters sent to the president in January 1943.³⁷ He not only ceased to be a Roosevelt intimate, but ended the war serving in the French army.

However, Roosevelt was no fool, a fact that some critics of his conduct in wartime conferences tend to forget. He was simply out of his element and badly out-classed. In addition, relations with the Soviets did not deteriorate to an openly hostile level until after his death, nor did joint action among the allies. It is easy to make the mistake of judging the president's conduct at Teheran in terms of developments that became manifest much later. He made mistakes, but viewed from the perspective of the time he made them they were not so apparent as they were to become later.

³⁷Orville Bullitt, For the President: Personal and Secret Correspondence Between Franklin D. Roosevelt and William C. Bullitt (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), pp. 572-600.

Churchill's conduct at Teheran tends to be regarded by historians more favorably than that of Roosevelt. However, the prime minister's conduct was not free of error. If the president's problem were a failure to recognize political realities, Churchill had a similar problem regarding the conduct of military operations. Though lacking the military experience of Churchill, both Roosevelt and Stalin evidenced a greater ability to comprehend military realities.³⁸ The prime minister was often able to view his actions and their possible effects on long-term policy because of a well developed historical sense. However, as Sir Basil Hart suggests, he was also inclined to act spontaneously and allow his fighting instinct and emotions to sway his judgment.³⁹ He also had a tendency, when concentrating on one problem, to forget the other problems which were involved with its solution. This often resulted in failure to relate short-range plans to overall long-range strategy. Under such circumstances, he was quite successful from a purely tactical point of view but did not stand out as a great strategist.⁴⁰

³⁸Trumbull Higgins, Winston Churchill and the Second Front 1940-1943 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 195.

³⁹Sir Basil Liddell Hart, "Churchill in War, A Study of His Capacity and Performance in the Military Sphere," Encounter 26 (April 1966):14.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 22.

The Second World War was essentially a struggle favored by the political left in Great Britain, and it is doubtful if a Labor Government would have resisted the long-range goals sought by the Americans with the same stubbornness shown by Churchill and his government.⁴¹

Churchill's views on war strategy, in 1943, reflected the earlier defensive strategy of 1940 and 1941. If Great Britain incurred casualties on the scale of World War I, it would, almost certainly, mean the end of the Churchill government. Nevertheless, the military policies the prime minister advocated made more sense in terms of a mediated peace and could not be equated with the unconditional surrender policy of the United States. This was the basic factor underlying the seeming solidarity of American and Russian military views at Teheran as opposed to those of the British. Churchill, in effect, seemed to be looking for a way out of a problem which he must have realized would ultimately have to be faced, that of a large-scale confrontation with the German army in western Europe. As Higgins points out,

Conducting war according to Mr. Churchill's mode any longer than absolutely necessary played right into the hands of German policy; the Reich always could spare small forces to dally with the allies in the Mediterranean.⁴²

⁴¹Higgins, Winston Churchill and the Second Front, p. 196.

⁴²Ibid., p. 187.

In the above respect, the Italian campaign was a case in point and, as an aid to OVERLORD, it was practically negligible. The need for large numbers of German troops to protect Italy from invasion disappeared when the invasion was actually made. By June 1944, General Kesselring was facing an allied army twice the size of his own and doing a credible job of it.⁴³ If Kesselring should fail to stop the allies, the Alps would, and both sides knew it. The American argument for breaking off the offensive after the strategic southern airfields were taken was thus justified. The end result of the Italian effort was that very few German reserves were drawn away from Normandy. While the Teheran decisions did not spell defeat for the British program in the Mediterranean, as a contribution toward the success of OVERLORD, the program meant very little.

The assertion of some historians, to the effect that the British were not sincere in their commitment to OVERLORD, is doubtful. The Americans considered the British acceptance of a definite date for the operation as one of their greatest achievements of the conference, but it was a shallow success at best. Prior to Teheran, some American planners had doubted that the British ever intended to pursue the operation at all. The evidence does not justify such a conclusion. Churchill's military concepts were never

⁴³Hart, "Churchill in War," p. 20.

so wrong as to lead him to conclude that Germany could be defeated by operations in the Mediterranean alone. Also, once committed to a land war in Europe, the prime minister pursued it vigorously no matter what his strategic ideas might have been or how much he desired to limit casualties.⁴⁴

Churchill's assumption that he could win Stalin over to his own position was doomed from the beginning. In view of Soviet military successes prior to Teheran, the Russians stood to gain relatively little by having an Anglo-American presence in the Mediterranean, eastern Europe, or the Balkans. Once Roosevelt and Stalin discovered the basic agreement of their strategic outlooks, there was absolutely no chance that the prime minister could sway them from what both considered the basic national interests of their respective countries.⁴⁵ It is unfortunate that the errors Churchill made in military estimates resulted in an American loss of faith in the wisdom of his political judgment as well.

Few question the fact that Teheran was a triumph for Soviet diplomacy, but the credit due Stalin for the success is debatable. Both the fortunes of war and the state of Anglo-American relations certainly played a role. Soviet

⁴⁴Higgins, Winston Churchill and the Second Front, p. 212.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 135.

military successes left Stalin in a good position to make demands upon his allies. Also, lack of agreement between the British and Americans gave the Soviet leader a further opportunity to promote his policies. Would a common Anglo-American position at Teheran have made any real difference? By approaching the Teheran Conference without any common strategy, Churchill and Roosevelt, in effect, left it up to Stalin to decide how the allies would fight the remainder of the war in Europe.⁴⁶ The strategy split between the British and Americans thus gave the Soviets an advantage far out of proportion to anything their diplomacy deserved. Churchill possessed a more realistic view of the Soviets than did Roosevelt, but he failed to convey this view to the Americans with enough justification to sway their judgment. The American attitude was not based solely upon the prime minister's then recent utterances but also upon his long history of hostility toward the Soviets. His efforts to bring about intervention in Soviet affairs in 1917 contributed to Russian hostility toward the West for many years. The British prime minister was simply the wrong man to lecture the Americans on the subject of the Soviets, and there was no one else of sufficient prestige.

Criticism of Roosevelt, to the effect that he won the war and lost the peace, has already been alluded to.

⁴⁶Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors, p. 211.

The president's failings in this area may not be as great as some historians have charged, but the fact remains that the result was an immediate victory rather than an ultimate peace. Hanson Baldwin suggests that the political immaturity of America is at least partly to blame, and that not only the president but Americans in general failed to remember that:

Wars are merely an extension of politics by other means; that wars have objectives; that wars without objectives represent particularly senseless slaughters; that unless a nation is to engage in an unlimited holocaust those objectives must be attainable by the available strength, limited by the victor's capacity to enforce them and the willingness of the vanquished to accept them; and that the general objective of wars is a more stable peace. We [the United States] forget that the unity of outlook between Allies in war never extends to the subsequent discussion of peace terms.⁴⁷

It was not inevitable that the United States would fail to develop a realistic wartime political strategy. It was in exactly this regard that many historians feel Churchill could have made his greatest contribution. Whatever his military feelings, in the realm of practical politics the prime minister had few equals. However, by the time of the conference at Teheran, the American military's mistrust of Churchill's military policies had been successfully transmitted to Roosevelt and carried into the political realm as well. This was not as serious at Teheran as it would become later, because the period from 1940

⁴⁷Hanson W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War (New York: Harper and Bros., 1949), p. 1.

through 1943 was a time when military action was paramount. By 1944, the primary considerations had become political, but mistrust of Churchill had not evaporated and his counsel was largely ignored. It was partially this factor that gave the Teheran political decisions their significance as they were discussed in an incomplete fashion, exclusive of political realities, and allowed to remain that way at later conferences in spite of Churchill's efforts.⁴⁸ At Teheran, without a single formal commitment, the guidelines for governing the settlement of the war were established. As Gaddis Smith says, "The Yalta Conference in February, 1945, is usually considered the great decision making conclave of the war, but Yalta merely filled in the outline already sketched at Teheran."⁴⁹

The outcome of Roosevelt's gamble with Stalin could not fairly be judged until long after Teheran. The president was fully aware of the gamble he was taking and knew the consequences of failure. It is also doubtful that even Churchill, at the time, realized the full extent of the Soviet victory. Perhaps of more importance than the question of who won is why they won. Did Soviet diplomacy actually win concessions or did the British and Americans lose by default? How serious was the lack of Anglo-American

⁴⁸Higgins, Winston Churchill and the Second Front, pp. 212-13.

⁴⁹Smith, American Diplomacy, p. 75.

cooperation evidenced at the conference? One school of thought on the subject argues that, if it cannot be said that the western allies gained very much from Teheran, they did not actually lose much either. This interpretation is based upon the premise that the only way the Soviets could have been geographically contained would have been for the western allies to have occupied areas ahead of the Soviet army. It is doubtful that any amount of Anglo-American cooperation could have accomplished such a goal.⁵⁰ Inherent in this concept is also the idea that no amount of diplomatic effort could have stopped the Russians from gaining objectives they had been seeking for a half-century or longer. Such an analysis would suggest that the lack of Anglo-American unity at the conference was not as important as some historians have maintained. However, General Mark Clark states that:

I am firmly convinced that the French forces alone, with seven divisions available, could have captured Marseilles, protected General Eisenhower's southern flank, and advanced up the Rhone Valley to join hands with the main OVERLORD forces. The VI American corps with its three divisions, could then have remained in Italy. The impetus of the Allied advance in Italy would thus not have been lost and we could have advanced into the Balkans.⁵¹

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George Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 84-85.

⁵¹Mark Clark, Calculated Risk (New York: Harper and Bros., 1950), p. 369.

Clark went on to point out the fact that Eisenhower himself had admitted to Churchill that an attack through the Balkans might be more productive from the standpoint of obtaining Anglo-American political objectives than would any attack through France.⁵² Richard Leighton makes what is perhaps the best judgment of the Teheran decisions in the following manner, "The decisions foreshadowed the events, but it is less certain that they shaped them as well."⁵³

Leighton also suggests that the debate over the various issues discussed at Teheran enabled the Soviets to arrive at two basic conclusions. First, that in the case of Anglo-American differences of view, the prime minister ultimately had to give in to Roosevelt. Second, that Roosevelt was closer to his military than to his diplomatic advisors, and that the American military did not always understand the political consequences of their own decisions.⁵⁴ The above knowledge gave the Soviets as much of an advantage as any actual decision of the conference, implied or otherwise, as it left them in a position to determine an effective strategy for future conferences.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Richard M. Leighton, "Overlord Versus the Mediterranean at the Cairo-Teheran Conference," in Command Decisions, ed., Kent Roberts (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1959), p. 208.

⁵⁴Ibid., p. 200.

The final assessment of Anglo-American diplomacy at Teheran seems best accomplished through a synthesis of expert opinion. It would have been possible to check Soviet goals at Teheran, although the war effort would certainly have been prolonged. The decision in favor of operation OVERLORD meant a shorter war but resulted in the Soviet occupation of eastern Europe and thus a political victory over the western allies. An attempt to reduce or eliminate the extent of this victory through a British or American move into eastern Europe was possible, but the results are problematical. Certainly, the problems inherent in such an effort would have been greater than those involved in launching OVERLORD. Anglo-American diplomacy thus did not lose as much as is sometimes alleged, but neither can it be said to have gained as much as the opportunity offered. It is in this sense that the Soviet diplomatic victory is best understood.

"The Grand Alliance," as Churchill called it, did not outlive the war. After Roosevelt's death, the foreign policy of the United States changed under the Truman administration. At Potsdam, a new mood on the part of the Americans was obvious. The new American president challenged known Soviet views one after another. The Cold War forced the British into an openly secondary status within the Anglo-American relationship. The enormous might of the Soviet Union could be effectively challenged only by

the equally enormous might of the United States. As the term "Superpower" suggests, each nation possessed military strength far in excess of any possible rivals. Great Britain simply lacked the resources, economic or military, to continue the leadership role in world affairs that had been the norm prior to the war. For Britain, the ability to adjust the European power balance was lost and, for both the United States and Britain, a major reassessment of foreign policy and of the Anglo-American relationship became necessary. In the years since World War II, relations between the two nations have fluctuated, but the essence of the special relationship has remained intact and shows signs of continuing well into the future.

APPENDIX

TEXT OF THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

The President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, being met together, deem it right to make known certain common principles in the national policies of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better future for the world.

FIRST--Their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;

SECOND--They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;

THIRD--They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them;

FOURTH--They will endeavor, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity;

FIFTH--They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all Nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement, and social security;

SIXTH--After the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all Nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want;

SEVENTH--Such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance;

EIGHTH--They believe that all of the Nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, or air armaments continue to be employed by Nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such Nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.

[Signed] FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

[Signed] WINSTON S. CHURCHILL

Source: James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom (New York: Harcourt Brace Javanovich, 1970), pp. 130-31.

UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION

A Joint Declaration by The United States of America, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Panama, Poland, South Africa, Yugoslavia,

The Governments signatory hereto,

Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated August 14, 1941, known as the Atlantic Charter,

Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world, Declare:

1. Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at war.

2. Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.

The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.

Done at Washington
January First, 1942.

Source: William Hardy McNeill, America, Britain, and Russia: Their Co-Operation and Conflict 1941-1946 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 100-01.

FOUR POWER DECLARATION

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China:

united in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declaration, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the people allied with them from the menace of aggression; recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world's human and economic resources for armaments; jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.

4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practical date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security pending the re-establishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

FOUR POWER DECLARATION (continued)

That they will confer and co-operate with one another and with other members of the United States to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

Source: Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Arthur L. Smith, World War II Policy and Strategy: Selected Documents with Commentary (Oxford: Clio Press, 1979), pp. 277-78.

TEXT OF THE CAIRO COMMUNIQUE

President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and Prime Minister Churchill, together with their respective military and diplomatic advisers, have completed a conference in North Africa. The following general statement was issued.

The several military missions have agreed upon future military operations against Japan. The three great Allies expressed their resolve to bring unrelenting pressure against their brutal enemies by sea, land and air. This pressure is already rising.

The three great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.

With these objectives in view the three Allies, in harmony with those of the United Nations at war with Japan, will continue to persevere in the serious and prolonged operations necessary to procure the unconditional surrender of Japan.

Source: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, "Conferences at Cairo and Teheran" (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961). pp. 448-49.

DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS
REGARDING IRAN

The President of the United States, the Premier of the U.S.S.R., and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.

The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their world-wide military operations and to the world-wide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.

With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.

The Governments of the United States, the U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.

Winston S. Churchill
J. Stalin
Franklin D. Roosevelt

Source: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, "Conferences at Cairo and Teheran" (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 448-49.

DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS

We--The President of the United States, The Prime Minister of Great Britain, and the Premier of the Soviet Union, have met these four days past in this, the capital of our ally, Iran, and have shaped and confirmed our common policy.

We express our determination that our nations shall work together in war and in the peace that will follow.

As to war--Our military staffs have joined in our round table discussions, and we have concerted our plans for the destruction of the German forces. We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations which will be undertaken from the East, West and South.

The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours.

And as to peace--we are sure that our concord will make it an enduring peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility resting upon us and all the United Nations, to make a peace which will command the good will of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world, and banish the scourage and terror of war for many generations.

With our diplomatic advisers we have surveyed the problems of the future. We shall seek the cooperation and the active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart in mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of democratic nations.

No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U-boats by sea, and their war planes from the air.

Our attack will be relentless and increasing.

Emerging from these friendly conferences we look with confidence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences.

DECLARATION OF THE THREE POWERS (continued)

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.

Signed at Teheran, December 1, 1943.

Roosevelt
Stalin
Churchill

Source: U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1943, "Conferences at Cairo and Teheran" (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 448-49.

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