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NEW ENGLAND CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES CONCERNING AMERICAN POLICY
TOWARD THE PHILIPPINES, 1899-1908

Middle Tennessee State University

D.A.

1979

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AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE PHILIPPINES,
1899-1908

Nelson Ewin Johnson

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for the degree Doctor of Arts

December, 1979

NEW ENGLAND CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES CONCERNING
AMERICAN POLICY TOWARD THE PHILIPPINES,
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ABSTRACT

NEW ENGLAND CONGRESSIONAL ATTITUDES CONCERNING
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by Nelson Ewin Johnson

The New England Congressional delegation played a crucial role in the formulation of the United States' policy toward the Philippine Islands in the administrations of Presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt. In 1898, the distant archipelago was quickly subjugated by American naval and army forces during the Spanish-American War. President McKinley, responding to a rising tide of popular sentiment for keeping the islands, and his own conviction that the Philippines should not be returned to Spain, instructed the United States' negotiators at Paris to demand their session from Spain as part of the price of peace. The peace treaty, ratified by the Senate in early 1899, formally transferred the islands to the United States but did not address the question as to exactly what relationship the Philippines were to have to their conquerors.

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From 1899 through 1908, issues surrounding the questions of how the islands should be governed, what tariff preferences, if any, should be extended to Philippine products, and when the Filipinos should be granted their independence were often before Congress. The leading spokesmen for and against the Republican administrations' policies were from New England. The eloquent and influential Henry Cabot Lodge, Republican Senator from Massachusetts and Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Philippines, dominated debate in the upper house. His chief opponent was his fellow Republican and Senator from Massachusetts, George Frisbee Hoar. In the House, Republican Representative Frederick Gillett spoke for his party's presidents on Philippine matters as Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs. More than the Congressional delegations from any other section of the country, New England Congressmen voted for the acquisition and indefinite retention of the Philippines.

The Congressional debates on the Philippines provide a valuable mirror for viewing the expansionistic climate of opinion of the era. New England Congressmen, with the notable exception of Hoar, articulated the rationale of those who believed that American should expand its borders to include militarily strategic and economically valuable island possessions to insure the

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nation's emergence as a world power. Only by such actions could the United States fulfill its destiny and bring Christianity and the principles of democracy to less developed societies. Senator Hoar spoke only for the minority that opposed retention of the Philippines and pointed to the problems of administering the islands as inevitable consequences of America's embarking on a misguided imperialistic course.

The utilization of this subject in the teaching of history is also addressed. This study contains a review of historiographical interpretations of the forces behind the United States' expansionism at the end of the nineteenth century suitable for use in preparation for teaching American foreign policy at the turn of the century. Specific teaching techniques are outlined and evaluated with an emphasis on enriching the teaching of the introductory course in the history of the United States. The topic of the acquisition and administration of the Philippines, properly introduced into such a course, can serve as a valuable case study in foreign policy and an introduction to the history of national expansion. It contains many elements of similarity to other chapters in the history of the United States while at the same time remaining a unique thread in the fabric of the nation's past.

DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to my wife and children. To Wanda, whose understanding and support made it all possible. To Jason and Shannon, who went without a full time daddy, goes all my love.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The 1890's saw the United States emerge as a world power. The Spanish-American War of 1898 thrust the United States onto the international stage. In a twentieth century era when even "limited wars" are long and costly, it is sometimes difficult to understand the Spanish-American War, since it was brief and relatively inexpensive. Yet that conflict, though short, hastened great changes in the international role of the United States.

Expansionism has been an integral part of the history of the United States since its inception. It has surfaced as an especially strong force at various times throughout America's history. American desire for territorial growth in the 1840's, often labeled the spirit of Manifest Destiny, was the major factor which produced war with Mexico. When the Spanish-American War erupted a little over half a century later, territorial expansion was not the predominant issue, but it rapidly assumed gigantic proportions.

For most of the nineteenth century, the United States had been preoccupied with domestic problems--sectional

conflict, industrialism, the conquest of the West. By 1890, the frontier was fast disappearing; Civil War wounds were healing, and industry had come of age. In the final decade of the nineteenth century, the nation increasingly became interested in the world abroad. The result was a burst of expansionism that climaxed in the Spanish-American War. The United States had never thought of itself as an imperial power. From its earliest history, the United States had battled the imperial pretensions of England, France, and Spain. Americans had identified with colonial peoples, not colonial powers, and had sympathized with revolutions in other countries.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, many saw overseas expansion as a problem-solving device, aimed at ameliorating American social, economic, and national security problems. Opponents of imperialism argued strongly that the acquisition of the Filipinos, who had expressed no desire to come under American control, was a tragic deviation from the basic principles of self-government. Anti-imperialists also believed that the administration of the Philippines would bring more problems than benefits. These issues can be examined by listening to voices of the New England expansionists and anti-expansionists, in all their diversity. New England was chosen because the Congressional leaders of the expansionists and anti-expansionists represented this important

section of the United States. These leaders included Senators Henry Cabot Lodge, George F. Hoar, Eugene Hale, and William Frye, and Representative Frederick Gillette.

Swift defeat of the Spanish in 1898 insured an American presence in the Philippines but left the exact status of the islands still to be decided. The peace treaty transferred the territory to the United States from Spain; however, it did not deal with the specific relationship that was to exist between the Americans and the Filipinos. An analysis of the first years of the United States government's administration of the Philippines, as seen through the perspective of New England Senators and Representatives is revealing. The attitudes of the political leadership of this important section of the country provide an avenue for understanding the general attitude of Americans toward the nation's new imperial role.

Some interpretation of the basic forces that led the United States into expansion is required. This necessitates a brief description of the momentous events of the Spanish-American War which propelled the United States to the rank of a great power. The policies of the administrations of Presidents William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt toward the recently conquered territories are analyzed. In addition, the practical applications of a study of this type on regional attitudes toward foreign policy in the teaching of American history are developed.

To aid the teacher of a unit of study on expansionism, specific activities are included. These activities not only deal with expansionism at the beginning of the twentieth century but touch on expansionism in different periods of American history.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN IMPERIALISM IN 1890's

In 1898, the United States went to war with Spain. The proclaimed reasons were to "put an end to barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries . . . right at our door," and to protect American citizens and property in Cuba.¹ Many historians now agree that these professed reasons were not the only ones. Some evidence indicates that humanitarianism was aggressively advanced by a combination of special interest groups and a vehement segment of the American press. Generally, influential elements of the business community favored intervention in the Cuban revolution. In addition, the climate of opinion in the United States assured a receptive welcome to the war talk.²

¹James D. Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents 13 (New York: Bureau of National Literature, Inc., 1917), p. 6297.

²Julius W. Pratt, "American Business and the Spanish-American War," Hispanic American Historical Review 14 (August 1934): 2.

A group of influential leaders had been promoting, for some years, the view that the United States must undertake the role of an imperial power in world affairs. The war was welcomed as a step toward this fulfillment of the United States' Manifest Destiny. While a variety of reasons were advanced by contemporaries to promote and justify American imperialism, many historians see economic factors as predominant. The United States, by the late 1870's, had an export surplus. It was natural that business interests would encourage the government to obtain new colonial markets. Increased trade, in turn, called for a strong navy to protect it. To most of these historians, the doctrines of Social Darwinism, current at the time, were popular rationalizations that disguised the real motive for expansion. On the other hand, some authors believe that expansionist policies were created by United States observation of and eventual participation in the worldwide race for empire. Given the imperialistic climate of the times, they content that United States expansion was almost inevitable.

Harold Faulkner, a noted twentieth-century author, sees imperialism as a worldwide phenomena in America's Economic History. In fact, he sees expansionism as being a direct result of industrialization. New markets had to be developed to dispose of surplus products. Improvement in

transportation and communication, as well as manufacturing, speeded up this search for new markets. The United States entered the search for territorial possessions late, seemingly unaware of what was going on throughout the world. Faulkner recognizes that the Spanish-American War brought the United States out of its shell-like existence. Although he acknowledges the role of economic factors, Faulkner believes that the "yellow press," which strengthened American sympathy for the Cuban revolutionists and hatred for the policies of Spain, was a stronger force. According to Faulkner, behind the press was a small band of powerful expansionists led by Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Secretary of State, John Hay and others. These men were greatly influenced by the writings of Captain Alfred Mahan and welcomed the war as an opportunity to fulfill the United States' Manifest Destiny in world affairs.³ These men, then, grasped at any incident in an effort to fulfill their dreams of world empire.

Charles Beard, however, contends that economic interests were the most important factors. Beard was one of America's most distinguished historians and political

³Harold U. Faulkner, America's Economic History (New York: Harper, 1954), p. 558; Idem., Politics, Reform and Expansion, 1890-1900 (New York: Harper, 1957), pp. 48-56.

scientists. His first book, The Industrial Revolution (1901), struck a dominant chord of his thinking that was to pervade most of his later works: that the central theme of history is man's increasing assertion of his right and power to determine his own religion and politics, and corporately to control every form of his material environment.⁴

In 1913, Beard published An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, which asserted that the framers of the Constitution were more concerned for the property rights of their friends and themselves than the principles of political science, or by zeal for the public good. Beard applied an economic interpretation to later periods of American history in subsequent books, particularly in The Rise of American Civilization (1927), written in collaboration with his wife, and The Idea of National Interest (1934).

In these two later works, Beard states that United States' economic interests were disturbed, and American trade practically destroyed by the paralysis of economic life in Cuba. Like Faulkner, he places much blame for generating support for war on the sensationalism of the press in the United States. On the return of the Republican

⁴Concise Dictionary of American Biography. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1977.

party to power in 1897, Beard believes that business interests began to exert more influence on American foreign policy than they had during the preceeding administration of President Grover Cleveland. In fact, their platform had promised to protect the lives and property of American citizens on foreign soil, which included more than fifty million dollars in capital investments in Cuba. When affairs in Cuba went from bad to worse, with the formation by Spain of concentration camps, Beard saw a combination of economic interests, humanitarian concern, extensive journalistic coverage, as responsible for the popular tumult which drove the United States steadily to war. According to Beard, General Gomez, the Cuban rebel commander, deliberately destroyed American property and investments, gambling upon the reaction of business interests in the United States.⁵

Samuel F. Bemis has a long record of scholarly writing to his credit, and he is recognized as an expert in United States diplomatic developments. In The Latin

⁵Charles A. Beard and Mary Beard, The Rise of American Civilization (New York: Macmillan Company, 1933), pp. 369-70.; Idem., Contemporary American History, 1877-1913 (New York: Kennikat Press, 1914), pp. 56-88.; Idem., The Idea of National Interest (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1934), pp. 147-179.; Walter LaFeber, The New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion, 1860-1898 (New York: Holt, 1963), pp. 178-199.

American Policy of the United States and A Diplomatic History of the United States, Bemis reveals how the desire of the United States for security brought with it in logical succession all the various phases of our relations with other countries. From the first, Spain's colonies were a source of danger to the United States, and Bemis states that it was the policy of Democratic and Republican administration alike to see that they did not fall into the hands of some powerful European power.⁶

Certain phases of United States foreign policy have often been criticized by historians. It is in this that Bemis differs from many of those who have treated the subject before him. He finds little if anything to criticize in the attitude of the United States toward Spain's lost possessions. Indeed he stresses the patience of the administration of President William McKinley. Bemis states that the United States' interventionist policies were not so bad as was believed. He emphasizes the view that the economic materialism of the United States was in reality a myth. Specifically, Bemis says that the Spanish-American

⁶Samuel F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt and Brace, 1943), p. 137.; Idem., A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Holt, 1955), pp. 286-99.; Idem., The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy (New York: Pageant Book Co., 1928), pp. 27-66.; Idem., A Short History of American Foreign Policy and Diplomacy (New York: Holt, 1959), pp. 127-42.

War was a people's war, not President McKinley's or Congress' war. The declaration of war and acquisition of former Spanish territories were simply the right things to do.⁷

Richard Hofstadter, another twentieth-century scholar and author, has written extensively on American foreign relations. In "Manifest Destiny and the Philippines," from American in Crisis, Hofstadter describes the role of expansionism in the Philippines. He suggests public dissatisfaction as the basic cause for the growth of imperialism in the late 1890's. Unlike Faulkner and to a lesser extent Beard, he believes too much emphasis has been placed upon the role of newspapers, some even referring to the Spanish-American War as a "newspaper's war." The idea has some merit, he says, but it does not explain the war itself, much less its expansionistic result. Moreover,

Ibid.; Seward W. Livermore, "American Strategy and Diplomacy in the South Pacific, 1890-1914," Pacific Historical Review 12 (March 1943): 1.; Dorothea R. Muller, "Josiah Strong and American Nationalism; A Re-evaluation," Journal of American History 53 (December 1966): 487-503.

not all of the newspapers were sensationalist or pro-rebel in their reporting.⁸

Hofstadter examines the period prior to the Spanish-American War and concludes that the depression of 1893, the growth of big business, and internal social conflict created a mood of frustration in the United States. He believes that it was natural and quite common for frustrated people to strike out aggressively. Furthermore, Hofstadter sees Manifest Destiny as a sense of the inevitable. The idea of expansionism has been with Americans throughout their history. During the 1890's according to Hofstadter, most Americans felt that the United States was destined to expand and that expansion could not be resisted by other countries.⁹

George F. Kennan is considered by many historians to be an expert in American foreign policy. In American Diplomacy, 1900-1950, he examines the variety of arguments put forth by the expansionists for the territorial acquisitions of 1898 and comes to a different conclusion than

⁸Richard Hofstadter, "Manifest Destiny and the Philippines," America in Crisis (New York: Knopf, 1952), pp. 193-98.; Marcus M. Wilkerson, Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War (New York: Russell and Russell, 1967), pp. 108-21.; Joseph E. Wisan, The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press, 1895-1898 (New York: Octagon Press, 1934), pp. 439-49.

⁹Ibid.

Hofstadter. Kennan thinks that American expansionism was based simply on what he calls the "smell of empire."¹⁰ He believes that Americans saw the most powerful nations in the world becoming more involved in colonial acquisitions and simply had the urge to follow the example of the leading nations of Europe. Kennan certainly believes that the more influential statesmen had this desire to grasp more land. These political leaders wanted the American flag to fly over other countries. The desire to see the United States recognized as one of the great imperial powers of the world drove many of these men to adopt an expansionist stand. According to Kennan, then, the United States primarily entered upon a course of territorial acquisition because she did not want to be left out, while other countries were laying claims to possessions around the globe.¹¹

¹⁰George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 17.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 17-23.

Not all historians limit their analysis of American territorial expansion to just one major cause.¹² Thomas A. Bailey has written textbooks for high schools and colleges, and one of his specialties is American foreign policy. In A Diplomatic History of the American People and The Man In the Street Bailey states several reasons why the United States initially embarked on a course of expansion. Bailey states that in the 1890's a prevailing attitude was to expand. American merchants were beginning to fear that they might be shut out of China's potentially vast market. After the Spanish-American War was brought to a successful conclusion, many Americans felt a powerful naval base in the Philippines would protect American interests and increase American prestige. Mark Hanna, a Republican political boss, stated, "If it is commercialism to want the possession of a strategic point giving the American people an opportunity to maintain a foothold in the markets of that great Eastern country, for God's sake let us have commercialism."¹³

¹²B. J. Clinch, "Imperialism in the Philippines," American Catholic Quarterly 25 (April 1900): 209-28.; Henry C. Ide, "Philippine Problems," North American Review 186 (December 1907): 510-24.; F. G. Newlands, "Democrat in the Philippines," North American Review 181 (December 1905): 933-43.; P. Whitmarsh, "Causes of the War," Outlook, 31 March 1900, pp. 709-12.

¹³Quoted in Foster Rhea Dulles, America in the Pacific (Boston: Thomas Crowell Co., 1956), p. 42.

Bailey also concludes that there were powerful moral and religious arguments for expansion into the Philippines. The United States could free the Filipinos with the near certainty some other power would enter and control the islands. There was also the sentiment that the Filipinos, after the United States had destroyed Spanish control, were backward and, therefore, needed United States guidance. The United States could not in good conscience desert the Filipinos. A religious factor entered the picture when Protestant denominations urged retention to enable them to carry out missionary work in the islands.¹⁴

A new group of writers on diplomatic history appeared on the scene in the 1950's. William Appleman Williams, who now teaches at the University of Wisconsin, belongs to this group of writers, referred to as the "New Left." He is one of the most influential historians in this group. He has written several works, including The Tragedy of American Diplomacy and The Shaping of American Diplomacy.

Most of the New Left revisionists proclaim that they conceive of their work as a tool for change. They

¹⁴Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Meredith Publishing Company, 1964), p. 472.; Idem., The Man in the Street: The Impact of American Public Opinion On Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan Co., 1948), pp. 215-236.

almost always employ a double standard: Russia's actions in the Cold War era of the 1940's and 1950's are justified or explained by reference to national security; Western actions are measured against some high ideal and found wanting. New Left authors tend to exaggerate the importance of evidence which supports their themes and minimize or ignore materials which do not, although most revisionist writing has been characterized by impressive documentation from a wide variety of official and unofficial sources. In their zeal to make their points, some authors have been accused of having revised the evidence itself.¹⁵

Williams states that the United States was expansionistic in the late nineteenth century because of a mistaken conviction that the continued well-being of the American system required expansion. He insists that the United States' motives were not evil; nevertheless, he condemns its actions, for in practice, he says, it was the obsession to make the world over in the image of the United States that dominated. According to Williams, then, the main aspect of American diplomacy was to impose an alien capitalistic economic system, and frequently

¹⁵Robert J. Maddox, The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War (Princeton, J. J.: Princeton University Press, 1973), pp. 3-13.

alien political arrangements as well, upon other people.¹⁶

Williams emphasizes the effects of economics on expansionism. In fact, he believes foreign policy is directed by economic motives. Williams states that American policy has been influenced by the conviction that expansion of the American economic system into markets was required for the nation's continued prosperity and growth. He criticizes this idea, and in general, is quite critical of the United States' expansion policies. Williams believes that the central feature of United States relations in the Philippines was the adoption by policy makers of economic intervention as an end, as well as a means, of diplomacy.¹⁷

One should ask to what extent were these the real reasons the United States became expansionistic? In viewing these arguments, it is important to remember that national policies change as a nation itself changes. In the thirty-two years between the end of the Civil War and the end of the Spanish-American War, the nation had changed considerably. By the late 1870's, the United States had

¹⁶William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: World Publishing Co., 1959), pp. 12-18, 29-30.; Idem., The Shaping of American Diplomacy (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1956), pp. 3-28.

¹⁷Ibid.; Lloyd C. Gardner, Imperial America (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1976), pp. 23-47.

become an industrial power. American industries were able to produce more than they could sell at home, and American manufacturers became engaged in stiff competition with Europeans for markets and raw materials. In 1890, the census director pointed to another change. He declared that the American frontier no longer existed. One must determine to what extent these changes helped to explain the actions, the events, and the arguments that propelled the United States into expansionism. A study of the views of New England Congressmen may help to get at the "truth" of the mixture of motives that led the United States to expansion.

CHAPTER III

THE RISE OF IMPERIALISTIC THOUGHT

Many historians consider the period from 1898-1915 to be the United States' greatest period of imperialism. This is certainly one of the most active periods of expansionism, but this is by no means the only period. Since the Revolutionary War, the United States has been involved in many forms of expansion such as the War of 1812, Mexican War, and commercial expansion into the Far East, just to mention a few. There are a variety of reasons for the growth of imperialism. Quite frequently, it has been the result of a period of nationalistic fervor which puts intense pressure on the government to go to war, such as the Spanish-American war.

There are many definitions of imperialism. Probably, one of the most frequently cited definitions is that of an English Socialist, John Strachey, who described it as "nationalism on the offensive."¹ A more concise definition of imperialism may be found in Webster's Third

¹Encyclopedia Americana, 46th ed. (1973), s. v. "Imperialism," by the Americana Corporation.

New International Dictionary of the English Language.

Imperialism is defined as "the policy, practice, or advocacy of seeking or the acquiescing in the extension of the control or empire of a nation by the acquirement of new territory or dependencies especially when lying outside the nations natural boundaries, by the extension of its rule over other races of mankind."²

United States expansionism can be divided into three major periods. The first period occurred from the American Revolution to the end of the Mexican War in 1848. The second period ran from the Spanish-American War to World War I. The third major period covers the period from World War I to the present. Westward expansion, in many respects, a rather blatant act of imperialism, is usually classed separately.

The United States was never an isolated country and rarely pursued a policy of complete isolation. After the War of 1812, the United States succeeded in establishing a firm place for itself among the nations of the world. The young nation tried to free itself from intimate entanglements with European diplomacy. The Monroe Doctrine asserted the nation's primary interest in the development of the

²Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language, 16th ed. (1976), s. v. "Imperialism," by G. & C. Merriam Co.

New World and insisted that European countries should stay out of the Western hemisphere.

Because there was a vast continent to develop, the United States did not look for overseas colonies during the nineteenth century, but its acquisition of Louisiana, Florida, Texas, New Mexico, California, Oregon, the Gadsden Purchase, and Alaska showed with what determination continental expansion could be pursued.

Despite the purchase of Alaska in 1867, public interest in acquiring additional territory was not strong in the late 1860's and 1870's. However, in the 1880's, interest in overseas expansion and foreign affairs in general began to grow. Simultaneous with this emerging trend in the United States, the great colonial powers of Europe were competing to win ownership or control of most areas of the world. By the end of the century, nearly all the militarily weak and technologically less advanced parts of the world had been divided among the rival colonial empires. In 1898, the United States joined this dangerous game of imperial rivalry.

Perhaps the most important reason for the upsurge of expansionist interest in the United States was the activity of a small group of aggressive spokesmen, who took the basic issues concerning territorial acquisition, adapted them to their philosophy, and presented them to the

American people, where their impact was tremendous. The leading figures in this group were Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan of the United States Navy, United States Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Reverend Josiah Strong, and Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt.

One of the most influential voices favoring imperialism was that of Alfred Thayer Mahan. He was an avid reader of history and eventually, he turned to the writing of history, where he developed a new method of examining historical events. He shares with Frederick Jackson Turner, the famed historian of the westward movement, the distinction among American historians of creating a new philosophy of history.³

In his writings, Mahan's chief concern was the indoctrination of his fellow countrymen to the importance and significance of sea power.⁴ Although Mahan had a broad influence on the naval policies of other countries, he also had a profound impact upon the expansionist policies of the United States. He felt very strongly that the United States should assume a commanding position among world powers. Furthermore, he also saw clearly the implications, responsibilities, and obligations inherent in such a position.

³W. E. Livezey, Mahan On Sea Power (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1947), p. 35.

⁴Ibid., p. 8.

Few people contributed as much as he to the formation of public opinion on naval and foreign policy during the 1890's.

There was nothing in Mahan's early life to suggest such an extraordinary career. His father was a member of the faculty at West Point, and Mahan grew up in this military atmosphere. In 1856, at sixteen years of age, he entered Annapolis. Upon graduation, he served as a line officer and did not have a particularly eventful career. Mahan retired in 1896 after forty years of service, with the rank of captain.⁵

In 1884, the Naval War College was established. The president of the college, Stephen Luce, asked Mahan to join the teaching staff and give instructions in strategy, tactics, and naval history. He eagerly accepted the invitation and in 1886 succeeded Luce as president. It was while in this post that Mahan developed his concept of sea power and its influence on empires. His series of war college lectures later appeared under the title, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, in 1890. In these addresses, he contended that control of the seas was a historic factor that had never been systematically studied and appreciated as a factor in the emergence of world

⁵Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), pp. 22-23.

power.⁶ This was the basic theme of his writings for the next twenty years.

In his books, Mahan analyzed the effects of sea power on particular periods of history. He quoted many authors in support of his idea that historians were generally unfamiliar with the influence of sea power. Mahan devoted a great deal of time and space showing that a study of naval campaigns of the past would help in dealing with future wars. He stated that "A study of military history of the past, such as this, (referring to his book, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History), is enjoined by great military leaders as essential to correct ideas and to the skillful conduct of war in the future."⁷

Mahan described the sea as "a great highway."⁸ This is an important concept to remember when viewing Mahan. According to him, foreign trade was necessary to any empire, and it must be protected. He believed that the primary purpose of a navy, in a restricted sense, sprang from the existence of a merchant fleet, and disappeared with it, except for a nation with aggressive tendencies, that would retain a navy merely as a military establishment.

⁶Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power, p. 38.

⁷Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1890), pp. 1-3.

⁸Ibid., p. 25.

Mahan stated that shipping required strong seaports and strategically placed harbors for resupply and protection, thereby creating a demand for naval stations along the trade routes. This, then, created the three basic elements of sea power: merchant shipping, naval protection for this shipping, and colonies for markets and harbors.⁹

Mahan stated that there were six principal conditions affecting sea power of nations. These were geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, size of population, character of the people, and character of the government.¹⁰ These conditions must be elaborated upon, for they affect the basic character and thinking in the 1890's.

If a nation was so situated that it was not focused to maintain a standing army, but could focus its resources upon the sea, it had a large advantage, said Mahan. The position of a country may be such as to promote a concentration or dispersion of naval forces, with obvious advantages and/or disadvantages. A nation may also have the additional strategic advantage of a central location which would provide a good base for military operations against its enemies. Should a country have easy access to the high seas, and be in a position to control one or more shipping routes, it, then, had a tremendous advantage.

⁹Ibid., p. 26

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 29-31.

A country with a coastal frontier that offered its enemies easy access to the interior might be frequently invaded. However, a coast line with numerous and deep harbors was of paramount importance, according to Mahan, and more so, if the harbors were the mouths of navigable rivers, for this tended to promote commerce. However, this could be a two-edged sword; if one country's ships can sail down river, an enemy's ships can travel up river, although defensive emplacements could present problems.¹¹

The Captain's last condition concerned the size of the land mass itself, distinct from the population-related conditions. Concerning sea power, what was important was the length of the coastline and number of harbors, not square miles inside the borders, for it was the coastline that would be a factor in the size of a navy.¹²

After considering the natural features of a country, a consideration of the characteristics of population as affecting sea power was necessary. Obviously, the number of people a navy had to draw from was important, because the more people a country had, theoretically, the more ships that could be manned. What was more important was what may be referred to as "reserve force." This was the number of people involved in the support of a battle

¹¹Ibid.

¹²Ibid.

force, and how well a navy could replace its losses. Mahan, however, felt that a reserve force was losing its former importance because much of modern strategy was based on the concept of a quick decisive strike designed to cripple the enemy before he was organized.¹³

Mahan argued that sea power was based on a strong and active merchant fleet; thus, an aptitude for commercial enterprise was a distinguishing feature of a great sea power. Also, an aptitude for colonization was a trait of a world power. Furthermore, certain forms of government, and the character of its leaders at one time or another, exercised a marked influence upon the development of sea power. Mahan emphasized continuity and planning.¹⁴

After Mahan retired from the navy, he became a spokesman for an imperialistic foreign policy, emphasizing the above stated conclusions. He wrote extensively on United States' sea power and its relationship to expansion. There are certain tenets that are discernable in Mahan's writing. First, of course, is the importance of a powerful American navy. Second, he felt that the United States must abandon its isolationist policy and look outward. Third,

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1964), p. 293.

the United States must colonize, he said, if only in the interest of national defense.

Mahan, then, said that naval requirements made imperialism necessary. He further stated that the United States was unprepared to assert its influence in the American hemisphere, much less worldwide. As long as the United States had an inadequate navy, Mahan recognized that other foreign nations would continue their domination. He emphasized the economic impact of the United States on the rest of the world. Increased markets were needed, and to protect those markets, more naval bases throughout the world, by necessity, were required. Mahan, then, advocated three things. First, protection of the chief harbors, by fortifications and coast-defense. Second, he recognized the necessity of having a large, well-equipped navy. Third, Mahan stated that no foreign nation should be allowed to obtain a base within three thousand miles of San Francisco.¹⁵

By emphasizing such points repeatedly, Mahan's influence was quite significant. His ideas influenced the United States in its relationship with the Philippines, following the Spanish-American War. From the above

¹⁵Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1897), pp. 13-15.

statements, one can see that Mahan was prophetic in his predictions of increasing contacts with other nations. His influence on other countries was considerable. His doctrines were incorporated into the naval policies of England, France, and Germany, as well as the United States. Mahan's writings were avidly received in Europe, and when he visited Europe, he was enthusiastically welcomed. Without Mahan and others like him, conditions in the Philippines may have turned out differently. His arguments were repeatedly cited in Congress, by Henry Cabot Lodge and other expansionist Senators and Representatives. He had a profound influence on Theodore Roosevelt, who reviewed his works and corresponded with Mahan with regard to the annexation of territory.¹⁶

Additional support for expansion came from missionaries and from those who believed in "Anglo-Saxon" superiority. A widely-read author who espoused such ideas was the Congregational clergyman, Josiah Strong. Greatly influenced by Charles Darwin and John Fiske, Strong was an exponent of Anglo-Saxonism. In 1885, he published Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis. In this work Strong stated that the United States would become the dominant power throughout the world because of its

¹⁶Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power, pp. 257-259.

superiority. He was pleased with America materially, but not spiritually. He seemed to be prejudiced against immigrants, Catholics, Mormons, saloons, tobacco, large cities, socialists, and concentrated wealth, all of which he felt were menaces to the United States.¹⁷

Strong often employed an economic argument for imperialism. He said that the Anglo-Saxon people were "multiplying more rapidly than any other European race. It already owns one third of the earth, and will get more as it grows. By 1980 the world Anglo-Saxon race should number at least 713,000,000. Since North America is much bigger than the little English isle, it will be the best of Anglo-Saxonism."¹⁸ Strong, who thought God was training his favored race in the great struggle for survival, said that God was training the Anglo-Saxon race for an eventual takeover of the known lands. He believed the amount of unoccupied arable land on the earth was limited and that the major powers of the world would compete to control this land. As he envisioned the future, Strong believed that the Anglo-Saxon race would eventually take Mexico, Central and South America, and then expand its control to the far

¹⁷Ibid.

¹⁸Josiah Strong, Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present Crisis (New York: American Home Missionary Society, 1885), p. 168.

reaches of the world, spreading Christianity in the process.¹⁹

Strong also argued that a superior physical specimen was emerging in the United States. Darwin, Strong noted, had seen in Americans an example of natural selection at work. Strong was not thinking in 1885, of immediate overseas expansion. His chief concern was the spiritual redemption of the world, and he saw the United States participating in a great movement which would extend Christianity and democratic concepts throughout the world. Nevertheless, the emphasis that Strong placed on the role of the American people in this divine scheme supported the concept of the eventual extension overseas of national power. Here was the beginning of what would later be called "the imperialism of righteousness."²⁰ It provided justification for promoting United States commercial and political interests anywhere in the world. Later, Strong emphatically endorsed overseas expansion.²¹

¹⁹Ibid., pp. 222-23.

²⁰Frank Freidel, The Splendid Little War (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1958), pp. 3-5.

²¹Ibid.

Strong certainly had a significant impact on the growth of imperialistic thought in the 1890's. Our Country, alone, had a circulation of 170,000 copies in English. The volume was also translated into several foreign languages. Secretary of State, John Hay, Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge and others would use some of Strong's arguments in promoting further expansion.²²

Congress also had many of its members who were advocating expansion. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts was a driving force behind imperialism.²³ He wrote widely advocating his philosophy, often complaining about America's lack of aggressiveness in foreign affairs. Lodge advocated the building of a canal which would join the Atlantic with the Pacific. He then believed that the United States would be justified in annexing Hawaii, Samoa, and Cuba for defense. Perhaps no one in the United States, with the possible exception of Theodore Roosevelt, was more aggressively imperialistic. He seemed almost obsessed with the idea. Continually, Lodge talked of expelling Europe from the Western Hemisphere, of the need for the acquisition of overseas bases, and of the vital importance of building up American naval strength. One of Lodge's greatest

²²Foster Rhea Dulles, The Imperial Years (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1956), pp. 96-98.

²³Ibid.

efforts emphasizing such goals occurred in a speech to the Senate. The issue was the annexation of Hawaii; Lodge was obsessed with the desire to expand. In his speech, Lodge stressed the importance of sea power which was so essential to the greatness of every nation. To further dramatize his point, Lodge produced a map of the world, showing the many naval bases that England either owned or controlled.²⁴ Lodge began to use his power and influence more and more to emphasize his expansionist ideas.

The substance of this speech was later incorporated into an article for Forum in 1895, which had a wide impact on the rise of imperialism. In this article, he saw imperialism as a continuation of the Manifest Destiny of the United States. Lodge firmly believed that the United States would expand from the Rio Grande to the Arctic Ocean. He also sincerely believed that every consideration of national growth and national welfare demanded it. He advocated the building of a canal, joining the Atlantic with the Pacific Ocean. To protect that canal, Lodge urged the acquisition of the Hawaiian Islands and other lands necessary for the full protection of United States territory. He believed that trade would follow, and that the United States would have to build up a strong navy for

²⁴U. S. Congress, Senate, 53rd Cong., 3rd sess., Congressional Record 28: 3112-3113.

protection. He further advocated the concentration of people into great nations and large dominions. He warned that other nations of the world were expanding, and the United States must not fall behind.²⁵ As a member of the Senate, Lodge also played a large role in the formulation of the peace treaty ending the war with Spain and its application.

A man strongly influenced by Henry Cabot Lodge and Captain Alfred T. Mahan was Theodore Roosevelt. Roosevelt belonged to a generation with unshakable confidence in the progress of mankind and an equal determination to further that progress. Born October 27, 1858, he had parents who maintained an atmosphere of dignity, culture, and restraint in their home. As a child, he was handicapped by asthma and by poor eyesight, but by sheer determination, he taught himself to ride, shoot, and box. His best love, however, was natural history. After graduating from Harvard, he turned to the writing of history and in 1882 published The History of the Naval War of 1812. This book had a great impact upon his future philosophy. From 1889 to 1897, Roosevelt served as a civil service commissioner in

²⁵Henry Cabot Lodge, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy," Forum, March 1895, pp. 16-17.

Washington, where he made friends with John Hay, Henry Cabot Lodge, Alfred T. Mahan and others.²⁶

Roosevelt viewed expansion as being productive of far more good than harm to the conquered nations and peoples. He realized that some evils accompanied imperialism, but he looked upon them as a price man had to pay for government. In the course of the next few years, Roosevelt was to elaborate a philosophy and as President apply policies of imperialism rooted in this principle. If the reality of territorial acquisition did not always bring a harvest of benefits, Roosevelt still found much that was good in American imperialism.²⁷

Roosevelt's views often conflicted with Albert Beveridge, a Republican Senator from Indiana. Roosevelt lacked Beveridge's appreciation of and sympathy for the economic possibilities of empire. Josiah Strong's philosophy of expansion to spread Christianity also was not fully accepted by Roosevelt, yet he would support and advance this missionary argument when it suited his purposes. Nevertheless, Roosevelt's views were generally similar to the majority of imperialist voices in the 1890's. At the

²⁶Dumas Malone, ed., Dictionary of American Biography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935), pp. 135-36.

²⁷Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1964), p. 475.

foundation of this thinking was a firm belief of the positive results of expansionism. Roosevelt believed that backward races profited by contact with more advanced peoples and civilizations, learning among other things the techniques of self-government, while expanding nations grew stronger as they demonstrated their superiority. Such was Roosevelt's definition of imperialism. To this he added a humanitarian motive for American expansion. He felt that the most effective way to help one's fellow man was to bring him to the political maturity of democratic institutions. As a skillfull politician, he was not unaware of the appeal these vows had to the American public in the 1890's and early years of the twentieth century.²⁸

Roosevelt's passion was to build a great fleet, believing the United States must have one to be a world power. His concern for the navy as a powerful international political factor began with his study of naval strategy in the War of 1812. He published a book based on his analysis of that strategy, The History of the Naval War of 1812. He believed that there would have been no war had the United States had a strong navy. Roosevelt, then, came under the influence of Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, who was

²⁸David H. Burton, Theodore Roosevelt: Confident Imperialist (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1968), p. 30.

also advocating a strong American navy. He agreed with Mahan that England's sea power gave her world political power.²⁹ Few individuals influenced Roosevelt more than did Mahan, the foremost proponent of sea power. Although Roosevelt's views on expansion and the spread of civilization had been formed before he met Mahan or read his works, Mahan confirmed and amplified them. More than that, he transmitted to Roosevelt the belief that successful defense of the continental United States was hardly less dependent on a large battle fleet capable of offensive thrusts than was expansion into the remote reaches of the world.

As early as 1890, Roosevelt began making speeches in favor of a strong navy second to none. In an article published in the Atlantic Monthly, Roosevelt vigorously advocated forts with heavy guns for coastal defense, supply bases for offensive operations, and above all "the greatest need, a fighting fleet . . . a squadron of heavy battleships able to . . . attack; ships, the best of their kind, and plenty of them; a large navy, not merely cruisers but a full proportion of powerful battleships."³⁰ Thus, Roosevelt

²⁹Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power, pp. 257-59.

³⁰Burton, Theodore Roosevelt: Confident Imperialist, pp. 32-33.

began his public campaign to convince the American people of the indispensability of a big navy.

In his appeal for a strong navy, Roosevelt stressed the need for better fighting men. Realizing that too many men received promotion in the navy on the basis of seniority alone, Roosevelt set out to change this. Americans now talked more and more of a new phase of Manifest Destiny to be fulfilled in gaining control of islands in the Pacific Ocean, such as Hawaii and Samoa, the latter solely under American control. Roosevelt was determined to have the navy ready. Men spoke of an American empire extending throughout the world, and Roosevelt was committed to this idea. He believed in the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands and continually emphasized the construction of a canal linking the Atlantic with the Pacific. To achieve this a large navy was a necessity.³¹

In the 1890's, Roosevelt concluded that it was possible for the United States to exert some influence in Cuba and the Philippines. In 1895, the Venezuelan boundary dispute provided Roosevelt and other imperialists the opportunity to further their philosophy. Roosevelt pointed out that any defense of the Monroe Doctrine would depend upon

³¹Ibid., p. 35.

the effectiveness of the navy. He was very adept in using the controversy to fit his own purposes.³²

In 1897, thanks to the efforts of his friend, Henry Cabot Lodge, Roosevelt was named Assistant Secretary of the Navy.³³ This was a strategic setting for the imperialist policies of Theodore Roosevelt, for McKinley was not interested in the navy, and the Secretary of the Navy, John Davis Long, was cautious and did not wish to strengthen the navy. Roosevelt showed his true expansionist sentiments when he urged Mahan to see President McKinley, since he had influence with the President. Roosevelt wanted McKinley to take Hawaii, to avoid trouble with Japan, and build more battleships. Roosevelt thought only Mahan could influence McKinley.³⁴

As Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Roosevelt made many speeches, and in some of them, he made warlike statements. This upset the cautious Long, and he began to censor Roosevelt's speeches. Roosevelt was then forced to tone down his comments. He called himself "an Assistant

³²Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power, pp. 47-54.

³³Ibid., pp. 55-56.

³⁴Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 622-23.

Secretary of chastened spirit."³⁵ He backed down on his shipbuilding program and asked for a mere minimal increase. Roosevelt persisted, however, and quietly began "converting" Long. Despite a lack of support, Roosevelt continued to prepare the navy for the war that he thought was near. In the immediate task of placing the Navy in a state of readiness and of wisely using such a force in both a tactical and a strategic sense, Roosevelt made a valuable contribution to the Navy, as well as to expansion, as Assistant Secretary.³⁶

Although publicly Roosevelt had toned down his bellicose comments, in his private letters to friends, he clearly revealed his imperialist ideas and also gave a glimpse as to his future ambitions. On February 9, 1898, in a letter to Francis Cruger Moore, he wrote, "I should myself like to shape our foreign policy with the purpose ultimately of driving off this continent every European power." He further stated in the same letter, "I am not hostile to any European power . . . I am simply an American first and last, and therefore hostile to any power which wrongs us."³⁷

³⁵Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 158.

³⁶Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1898 (Gloucester, Mass.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), pp. 229-33.

³⁷Morison, The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, pp. 771-72.

The imperialists and their writings set the mood for the United States. They had made themselves visibly seen and heard in the 1890's. Americans were familiar with them and their goals. They, like the expansionists, would come to believe that it was the right and duty of the United States to extend its authority over new lands and peoples, and 1898 was the beginning for the United States. With the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, and the formulation of the peace treaty, the significance of these expansionists and what they stood for took on more meaning.

CHAPTER IV
CONGRESSIONAL DEBATES ON THE
TREATY OF PARIS, 1899

The Spanish-American War began in April, 1898, and ended four months later. The conflict grew out of American sympathy for the oppressed people of Cuba. But some Americans, dedicated expansionists, favored war for other reasons. For many years, the Cuban people had suffered under the harsh rule of Spain. The Cubans unsuccessfully revolted several times. In 1895, the Cubans began a new war for independence. The Spanish governor, Valeriano Weyler, used every possible means to crush the revolt, including the establishment of inhuman concentration camps.

In 1897, General Weyler was removed. Just when the situation seemed to be improving, the American people first glimpsed the De Lome Letter. De Lome, the Spanish minister to the United States, had written a letter to a friend in Cuba. This letter referred to President McKinley as "weak and a bidder for the admiration of the crowd."¹ The letter

¹H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America (Syracuse, N. Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1963), p. 356.

was later stolen, and it was published in the United States. The letter angered Americans and damaged Spanish-American relations.

Less than one week later, the Maine, an American battleship, exploded in Havana. Though the cause has never been determined, most Americans blamed the Spanish government. "Yellow journals" played up the incident. Cries of "Remember the Maine" swept the country.² The "yellow" press and the expansionists clamored for war. In April of 1898, Congress declared war. President McKinley was given the authority to use the army and navy to drive Spanish forces from Cuba. The military phase of the Spanish-American War was quite brief. The first important engagement of the war was fought in Manila Bay in May, 1898. Commodore George Dewey's naval force easily destroyed a fleet of old, outdated Spanish ships. However, he had to wait until an army arrived to occupy Manila in August. In Cuba, with the fall of Santiago, on July 17, 1898, Spain realized the futility of the war and began negotiations to end the war. Fighting stopped when an armistice was signed on August 12.³

²Ibid., 367.

³H. Wayne Morgan, America's Road to Empire (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 62.

From the point of view of those who favored intervention, it may have been a "splendid" war. From the point of view of the men who fought, the Spanish-American War was a tragedy of errors. For example, supplies of all types ran out. Woolen uniforms were issued to men fighting in the tropical heat. Medical supplies were inadequate. Less than 400 Americans were killed in battle, but over 5000 died from disease. Fortunately, for the United States the Spanish forces were even more disorganized.⁴

During the war, one could detect a subtle shift in McKinley's attitude. As public opinion in the United States appeared to be swinging more and more in favor of expansion overseas, so did McKinley begin to think in terms of acquiring territory. Republican leaders saw that imperialism could be used as a rallying point for support of their party, and they urged McKinley to appeal to American patriotism. McKinley, however, did not need much urging, for he was already thinking in terms of further acquisition of territory. Eventually, he took a strongly imperialist stance.⁵

⁴Ibid., pp. 90-97.

⁵Morgan, William McKinley and His America, p. 388.

During the military operations of the war, McKinley pondered what the United States should demand as victors at the peace table. After his death, among his private papers was found the statement, "While we are conducting war and until its conclusion we must keep all we get; when the war is over we must keep what we want."⁶ This gave an insight into the imperialist leanings of McKinley. The idea also foreshadowed the provisions of a future peace treaty.

As the war neared an end, President McKinley called numerous cabinet meetings to discuss possible peace terms. In the meetings there were usually varying opinions. Finally, William Day, McKinley's chief agent in the State Department, who was not committed to expansion, proposed a vote in which the United States vowed not to acquire the Philippines. McKinley rejected this, saying later, "I was afraid it would be carried."⁷ McKinley still had made no firm decision as to what he would do with reference to the Philippines. Newspapers and magazines throughout the country were pressuring McKinley to obtain territory. An article in Spectator emphasized that the United States Government would not be doing its duty unless two basic principles were adhered to. First, Spanish rule should

⁶Foster Rhea Dulles, The Imperial Years (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1956), p. 42.

⁷Ibid.

cease in Cuba, the Philippines, and in Porto Rico.

Second, the United States would decide the ultimate fate of these territories.⁸ According to the article, the only recourse open to the nation was to retain direct control of the islands.

Unable to continue the struggle, Spain asked for peace terms. The wish for a speedy armistice had been principally compelled by the landing of American troops in the Philippines and the approaching arrival of their commander, General Wesley Merritt. Spain realized that they would lose Cuba as a price of losing the war. As to the remaining issues, Spain wanted to minimize her losses. One problem that she encountered was McKinley's unpredictability. He had not made a firm commitment. The French ambassador, Jules Cambon, acted as the intermediary between the United States and Spain.⁹ The United States informed Cambon, who in turn informed Spain, that the United States wanted Spain to surrender Cuba and evacuate it immediately; that Spain must cede Porto Rico to the United States; and that the United States wanted an island in the Ladrões, of which the Philippine Islands are a part.¹⁰ To remove all doubt as to

⁸"America and the Terms of Peace," Spectator, 30 July 1898, pp. 136-37.

⁹Margaret Leech, In the Days of McKinley (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 282.

¹⁰Dulles, The Imperial Years, p. 158.

what the United States specifically required, and prevent any misunderstanding later, Secretary of State William Day drew up a protocol stating clearly, and without the slightest modification, the terms already offered to Spain. This document was then sent to Cambon. There was no specific reference to the Philippines.¹¹ New England Representatives from the states of Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont played an important role in the treaty negotiations. They assumed more significance when the treaty was debated in Congress.

The Philippine issue was the most complex problem. President McKinley at times leaned toward Spanish control; at other times he talked of their freedom. When Cambon met McKinley, he was distressed to hear that the United States seemingly wanted all the Philippines. McKinley, in the end, refused to commit himself and informed Cambon that the settlement would be left to the negotiators appointed by the two countries. Cambon realized that nothing further could be obtained, and he urged Spain to accept the proposals. The protocol was signed at 4:23; on Friday, August 12, 1898.¹²

¹¹H. Wayne Morgan, ed., Making Peace With Spain: The Diary of Whitelaw Reid (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Printing Division, 1965), pp. 231-32.

¹²Arnold Toynbee, Major Peace Treaties of Modern History (New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1967), pp. 851-52.

Each government was to name five commissioners who would arrange a treaty. According to prior agreement, the commissioners would hold their meetings in Paris, France. McKinley's choices as commissioners say something of his attitude at this time. The United States Commissioners were William Day, Cushman Davis, W. P. Frye, Whitelaw Reid, and George Gray.¹³ McKinley established something of a precedent by appointing to the commission the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Davis, and its next ranking Republican member, Senator Frye. The principal Democratic member was Senator Gray, the only known representative of the anti-imperialist viewpoint. The last member of the group was Whitelaw Reid, a prominent newspaper editor.¹⁴

Secretary of State, William Day, served as head of the delegation. At best, he was a lukewarm convert to overseas expansion. Lodge and others had worked on him to the extent that if he opposed annexation of territories, he would not do so strongly. When one looks at the remaining four members, it did not really matter what Day thought. Three delegates were avowed expansionists: Frye of Maine,

¹³Richard H. Titherington, A History of the Spanish-American War (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1900), p. 391.

¹⁴Ibid.

Davis of Minnesota, and Reid, editor of the New York Tribune. Davis, for some time, had proposed the annexation of Hawaii. Frye had made several statements advocating the seizure of Cuba by force. Reid had used his newspaper repeatedly, calling for the acquisition of territory. The lone dissenter against territorial acquisition was Gray, Democratic Senator from Delaware, but he could easily be outvoted.¹⁵

Spain's commissioners were Eugenio Montero Rios, president of the Spanish senate, Chairman; Buenaventura de Abarzuza Ferrer, a member of the Spanish senate, and formerly his country's ambassador at Paris; José de Guarnica, a justice of the Spanish supreme court; General Rafael Cerero; and Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, Spanish minister to Belgium.¹⁶ These men operated under a severe handicap. They represented the defeated nation, vainly trying to retain as much territory as possible.

The peace commission met in Paris on October 1, 1898. The conference lasted ten weeks. From the beginning, the Spaniards were on the defensive. Spain already

¹⁵Walter Millis, The Martial Spirit (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Riverside Press, 1931), pp. 372-73.

¹⁶Titherington, A History of the Spanish-American War, p. 391.

recognized that Cuba was lost. A much more serious problem concerned the Philippines. The Spanish commissioners tried to get the United States to submit the issue of the Philippines to arbitration but were quickly rebuffed. The American peace commissioners were also operating under a handicap. McKinley had not given them specific instructions. McKinley went on a speech-making tour. When he returned, he was ready to commit himself. Almost one year later, he would describe how he came to such a conclusion. McKinley further stated that he really did not want the Philippines, but when confronted with them, he did not know what to do. McKinley asked for advice from both Republicans and Democrats but received little constructive aid. He also prayed for guidance.¹⁷ Then, according to McKinley, he had a sudden inspiration. He decided that he could not return the territory to Spain. That would anger too many Americans and would not be fair to the Filipinos. McKinley also admitted that he could not turn the Philippines over to another country, stating that it was bad business. He thought the Filipinos were unfit for immediate independence, and he saw only one option left to him. The United States must

¹⁷Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: Meredith Publishing Company, 1964), p. 473.

retain the Philippine Islands, educate and Christianize the natives, and prepare them for independence.¹⁸ Most likely, McKinley heard the voice of the American people, who were urging him to take all the land, rather than God's voice.

On October 26, 1898, the United States peace commissioners finally obtained instructions from McKinley, through the state department:

The information which has come to the President since your departure convinces him that the acceptance of the cession of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands subject to the Spanish rule, or to be the subject of future contention, cannot be justified on political, commercial, or humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible, and the former must therefore be required.¹⁹

President McKinley was very concerned with the morality of the United States' position. Therefore, on October 28, 1898, Secretary Hay supplemented these instructions:

While the Philippines can be justly claimed by conquest, which position must not be yielded, yet their disposition, control and government the President prefers should be the subject of negotiation, as provided in the protocol. It is imperative upon us as victors we should be governed only by motives which will exalt our nation. Territorial expansion should be our least concern; that we shall

¹⁸Ibid., p. 474.

¹⁹Millis, The Martial Spirit, p. 385.

not shirk the moral obligations of our victory is of the greatest . . . How these instructions shall be carried out . . . the President leaves to the judgment and discretion of the commissioners.²⁰

The Spanish refused to surrender the territory, and it looked as if the negotiations would break off. Many Americans became concerned that war would continue. The Spanish commissioners declared that they must face public opinion too. They feared their loss of empire might topple the monarchy or provoke disorders in Spain.²¹ Spain really had no choice. Senator Frye suggested an unusual compromise, whereby the United States would give Spain a sum of money when the Philippines were turned over to the United States.²² Frye's plan then would soften the blow. Spain continued to delay, hoping that congressional supporters of territorial acquisition would be turned out of office in November, but these hopes were short-lived. A Republican majority in the Senate and House was maintained. Reluctantly, to obtain a treaty as soon as possible, McKinley agreed to Frye's suggestion. On November 13, 1898, through Hay, instructions were sent to the peace commissioners. They were

²⁰Ibid.

²¹Morgan, America's Road to Empire, pp. 97-98.

²²Ibid., pp. 98-99.

instructed to demand all of the Philippine Islands. If necessary, they were empowered to offer Spain a sum of money in the amount of \$10,000,000 to \$20,000,000.²³

The Spanish commissioners were reluctant to accept this proposal, but in reality, they had no other alternative. On November 28, 1898, they made their formal reply, in which Spain attempted to salvage her pride. Spain's commissioners said that war materials were sadly lacking, and to save her people from more useless fighting, Spain accepted the United States proposals for peace. These terms were the only ones that the United States had offered.²⁴

On November 30, 1898, the peace commissioners began drafting the articles of the treaty. On the evening of December 10, 1898, the treaty was formally concluded. It is interesting to note that only one line mentioned the money to be given to Spain. Americans did not view the treaty as a purchase of the Philippines, but it did help salvage Spanish honor; however, more protracted peace talks resulted. The formulation of the treaty was complete, but the Senate had to concur.

²³Millis, The Martial Spirit, p. 387.

²⁴Ibid., pp. 388-389.

When the Treaty of Paris was drawn up, there was little doubt that the majority of Senators favored its terms. Ratification of a treaty, however, required a two-thirds vote of the Senators. It would only take one-third plus one vote cast against the treaty to undo everything that the imperialists had worked for, and this frightened many of them. As early as December 7, 1898, Senator Lodge made known his fear:

We are going to have trouble over the treaty. How serious I do not know, but I confess I cannot think calmly of the rejection of that treaty by a little more than one-third of the Senate. It would be a repudiation of the President and humiliation of the whole country in the eyes of the world, and would show we are unfit as a nation to enter into great questions of foreign policy. I cannot believe that the opposition, which is of course Southern Democrats, can succeed.²⁵

Lodge was mistaken in his assumption that the opposition was composed entirely of Southern Democrats. As McKinley viewed the Senate, he saw four basic groups: (1) the administration Republicans favoring ratification; (2) the anti-administration Republicans like Senators George Hoar of Massachusetts and Eugene Hale of Maine, who opposed ratification; (3) Democrats who opposed acceptance; (4) and Democrats under the leadership of William Jennings Bryan, who for their own reasons,

²⁵Ibid., p. 392.

favored ratification.²⁶ The opposition was worrisome, and even before the treaty was signed, opposition in the Senate began to grow.

The campaign against ratification attracted a diverse group of people. It is worthwhile to note some of them. Benjamin Harrison and Grover Cleveland, both ex-Presidents, were opposed to the treaty. Among the Democratic anti-imperialists was presidential hopeful, William Jennings Bryan, who later changed his stance. There were four important anti-imperialists from New England: Senator George F. Hoar of Massachusetts, Senator Justin Morrill of Vermont (Died December 28, 1898), Senator Eugene Hale from Maine, and the Speaker of the House, Thomas B. Reed. Charles Boutelle of Maine and Samuel McCall of Massachusetts were other House Republicans who resisted their party's lead. Other anti-imperialists included labor leaders, former abolitionists and influential writers. Theodore Roosevelt referred to these anti-expansionists as "little better than traitors."²⁷ Henry Cabot Lodge remarked condescendingly, "What a singular

²⁶Morgan, America's Road to Empire, p. 101.

²⁷Elting E. Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 458.

collection the so-called anti-imperialists are getting together."²⁸

Leaders of both pro-imperialist and anti-imperialist forces in Congress represented the New England section. See Appendix A for a complete list of New England Congressmen. The six states in the region were represented by twelve Senators and twenty-seven Representatives. All Senators were Republicans, and only one Representative was a Democrat, John F. Fitzgerald of Massachusetts.

On December 10, 1898, the treaty was formally signed, yet the treaty was not presented to the Senate until January 4, 1899. During this time span, changing conditions in the Philippines had a profound effect on the treaty debate in the Senate. From December 10, 1898, until January 1, 1899, relations between the United States and the Philippines gradually worsened. The United States held only Manila, and during this period, Emilio Aguinaldo, the Filipino insurrectionist leader, had been extending his authority, continually calling for independence. General Elwell Otis, commander of United States forces in the area, urged the seizure of strategic areas of the

²⁸Fred H. Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898-1900," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review (September, 1934): 211-30.

Philippines before an open rebellion began. McKinley was reluctant to give this order.²⁹

McKinley, after receiving many pessimistic letters from Otis, decided that some action must be taken. On December 26, 1898, Otis received instructions from President McKinley to occupy all of the Philippines. Otis was to inform the native population that the United States was prepared to maintain the army's presence in the islands. Otis informed the Filipinos that the United States came as friends, not as invaders, but he had a difficult time convincing the natives.³⁰

At this time the treaty of peace had not even been submitted to the Senate. General Otis was certainly in an unenviable position. The United States in fact did come to the Philippines as invaders and did indeed conquer the islands. Otis' task was made even more difficult by additional instructions. He was to prevent rebellion, yet also make friends with the Filipinos. This was an impossible task.

When Otis moved to take the strategic areas, he discovered it was no longer possible to gain the respect and friendship of the Filipinos. January 1, 1899, found

²⁹Morgan, America's Road to Empire, p. 108.

³⁰Millis, The Martial Spirit, p. 396.

the insurgents still in command of most key strongholds. McKinley was unwilling to risk further confrontations at this time. On January 4, 1899, the Senate would receive the treaty of peace, and McKinley wanted nothing to endanger it. This was the state of affairs in the Philippines when the Senate received the treaty.³¹

The Treaty of Paris was submitted to the Senate on January 4, 1899. Senate consideration of the treaty was scheduled to be conducted behind closed doors in executive session. Senate debates over resolutions were in open session, however, and are important because they involved Constitutional and moral issues. Debate on the treaty really started in mid-December when Senator Orville Platt of Connecticut echoed the McKinley administration's stand, "Providence has put it (ratification of the treaty) upon us. We propose to execute it."³² Platt then said that the Constitution gave the United States the right to acquire territory. Senator George Vest of Missouri, a Democrat, disagreed, and on December 6, 1898, introduced a resolution to the Senate, declaring that "under the Constitution of the United States no power is given to the Federal Government to acquire

³¹Ibid.

³²U. S. Congress, Senate, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., 9 January 1899, Congressional Record 32: 502-03.

territory to be held and governed permanently as colonies."³³ Vest further stated that all land "must be acquired and governed with the purpose of ultimately organizing such territory into states suitable for admission into the Union."³⁴ The gauntlet was thrown down.

Vest's resolution gave the anti-expansionists and specifically Senator George Hoar the opportunity to debate the issue in public. When the treaty was presented to the Senate, the McKinley administration realized that it would encounter stiff opposition from the Democratic Party, and they set up appropriate defenses. The administration also recognized that some Republicans would desert the party and oppose the treaty. The McKinley administration was not prepared, however, for a full-scale attack by Republican leaders such as Hoar and Thomas B. Reed. The leader was Hoar, who according to both his supporters and detractors, conducted a campaign that was "a parliamentary classic."³⁵

33

U. S. Congress, Senate, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., 6 December 1898, Congressional Record 31: 20.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938), p. 32.

Hoar was elected to the Senate in 1876. He has been described as pugnacious and cantankerous, quick to take offense and ready to insult. Most people could not get along well with Hoar because of his quick temper. He was a study in emotional conflict and contradiction during this period. Hoar supported the annexation of Hawaii, yet, when Cuba rebelled, he opposed any policy that increased United States involvement. He was distressed when conditions in Cuba deteriorated and when McKinley asked Congress for the power to use force, Hoar supported him. Yet the Senator qualified his support of the President when he stated that the United States would go to war without "the slightest thought or desire of foreign conquest or of national gain or advantage."³⁶

On April 16, 1898, when the Senate passed a declaration of war against Spain, it contained a clause that recognized native Cubans as representatives of a new government. McKinley would not accept the proposal and at this time Eugene Hale and Justin Morrill supported McKinley. They later opposed McKinley. On June 20, 1898, Senator Hoar served notice to the McKinley administration that he would not support the acquisition of any territories and

³⁶U. S. Congress, Senate, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., 14 April 1898, Congressional Record 31: 3835.

their peoples.³⁷ In the summer of 1898, Hoar wrote Senator Chandler, stating, "For one I am willing to risk much for liberties, but I am willing to risk nothing for mere empire."³⁸

Hoar prepared to oppose the Treaty of Paris. He hoped to defeat the treaty and then rewrite it, giving independence to the former Spanish possessions. He moved swiftly to rally support in the Senate in opposition to the treaty.

Hoar's counterpart in the House of Representatives was Thomas B. Reed, a Maine Representative, and Speaker of the House. Reed was often called "Czar" Reed because of his dictatorial ways. He openly resented President McKinley, and he showed little enthusiasm for most expansionist ventures. Reed was concerned with the rise of imperialism, and he had made it clear that he would use all his powers to prevent war with Spain. Even after the Maine was destroyed, he refused to support appropriations for the construction of new battleships.³⁹ One Congressman stated that Reed "has the members . . . bottled up so tight they cannot breathe without his consent."⁴⁰

³⁷U. S. Congress, Senate, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., 5 July, 1898, Congressional Record, 31: 6660-63.

³⁸George F. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years (New York: Scribner, 1903), p. 315.

³⁹William A. Robinson, Thomas B. Reed: Parliamentarian (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1930), p. 356.

⁴⁰Ibid.

During the Spanish-American War, Reed became even more bitterly opposed to expansion. Most people attributed his opposition to a simple hatred for McKinley, but it was much more than that, as evidenced by an unpublished manuscript found shortly after his death. The letter was apparently written in October of 1898. The letter stated that the United States was at peace with the world. The disputes which other countries had, the United States had been fortunate to avoid. Reed envisioned control of foreign lands creating more problems than benefits. He saw United States acquisition of such possessions as the beginning of the end for peace in the American hemisphere.⁴¹

Whether the motive was opposition to expansion or personal dislike of McKinley, Reed, like Hoar, was determined to defeat the treaty. The Senate had sole power to ratify or reject the treaty. But the provision for a sum of money to be paid to Spain would have to have House approval, and Reed was determined that no money payment to Spain would pass the House of Representatives.

To oppose the anti-expansionists, the McKinley forces relied on Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of

⁴¹Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire (New York:McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), p. 208.

Massachusetts, Senator Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island, and Senator Orville Platt of Connecticut. One should note that Lodge, who was an ardent exponent of expansion, did not make a major address on the subject until January 24, 1899. Evidently, he kept a low profile and worked behind the scenes to get the necessary votes. The defense of the treaty was left to Aldrich and Platt.

As stated previously, the Vest Resolution of December 6, 1898, gave Hoar the opportunity to bring the issue to the public. On January 9, 1899, he defended this resolution in a very emotional, often angry speech. Realizing that he was a Republican who did not support the McKinley administration, Hoar felt compelled to reaffirm his loyalty to the Republican party. In this speech, he stated, "I have believed religiously, and from my soul, for half a century, in the great doctrines and principles of the Republican Party . . . I do not mean, if I can help it, to follow its hearse."⁴² Perhaps, he was also appealing to other Republicans who felt as he did but were reluctant to oppose McKinley.

Hoar questioned the right of the central government to legislate for ten to twelve million Filipinos without any restraint. Hoar was known for his wit and his

⁴²U. S. Congress, Senate, 55th Cong., 2nd sess., 6 December 1898, Congressional Record 31: 20.

sarcasm, and most of his comments were aimed at Senator Platt. He criticized Platt's comments that the United States had a right to conquer and govern people without Constitutional restraint. Senator Platt could no longer contain himself. He interrupted Hoar's speech, and arguments flowed between the two New Englanders. The main thrust of Hoar's speech was a denunciation of the imposition of American authority over the Philippines and that authority was immoral and unconstitutional. He then warned Congress that if the United States persisted in its intervention in Asia, the Monroe Doctrine would be destroyed. The result, then, would be European countries flocking to intervene in the Western hemisphere.⁴³ The McKinley forces now recognized a formidable enemy.

Early in the proceedings, the expansionist forces left the speechmaking to the opposition, while they gathered votes. A crisis quickly evolved. Lodge readily recognized the problem that existed. Delay favored the anti-expansionists. He also realized that Spain was urging the rejection of the treaty in hopes that they would receive better treatment in a re-negotiated treaty. Lodge still believed that there were enough votes to ratify the

⁴³Millis, The Martial Spirit, pp. 399-400.

treaty, but he also realized that Hoar and Hale were solidifying the opposition. A very worried Lodge made his first public defense of the treaty.⁴⁴

In his Senate speech of January 24, 1899, Lodge criticized the anti-expansionists, stating that he wanted "to get this country out of war and back to peace."⁴⁵ His concluding comments stated that the rejection of the treaty made the situation near impossible. Appealing to reason, he said,

The President cannot be sent across the Atlantic . . . hat in hand, to say with bated breath: "I am here in obedience to the mandate of a minority of one third of the Senate to tell you that we have been too victorious, and that you have yielded too much, and that I am very sorry that I took the Philippines from you." I do not think that any American President would do that.⁴⁶

Speeches similar to this had a telling effect. McKinley also used administrative pressure to bring some Senators into line. Aldrich, through William Frye, the President Pro-Tempore, promised better committee

⁴⁴Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livezey, The Philippines and the United States (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1951), pp. 38-45.

⁴⁵U. S. Congress, Senate, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., 24 January 1899, Congressional Record 32: 960.

⁴⁶Charles Sumner Olcott, The Life of William McKinley (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1916), p. 138.

assignments, and won over some votes.⁴⁷ Meanwhile, Hoar's hopes for victory were dampened when he discovered that William Jennings Bryan planned to support ratification of the treaty. Bryan saw that opposing the treaty would be politically foolish for the Democrats to defeat the treaty and technically continue the war with all its uncertainties. He also wanted to turn to the Presidential election of 1900, believing that most Americans were unconcerned about the treaty. Hoar continued to fight, saying, "if he could only prevent the ratification of that Treaty, he would willingly lay his head upon the block before the Vice-President's chair."⁴⁸

On February 4, 1899, Lodge, Aldrich, and Platt believed they were two or three votes short of ratification. They decided that the vote on the treaty would come on February 6, 1899. Unknown to the Senators at the time, however, fighting in the Philippines had broken out on February 4, 1899. McKinley remarked, "How foolish these people are. This means ratification of the treaty; the people will insist on ratification."⁴⁹ By February 6,

⁴⁷Ibid.

⁴⁸Beisner, Twelve Against Empire, p. 155.

⁴⁹Leech, In the Days of McKinley, p. 358.

the Senate became aware of this disturbing development in the islands.

The day of the crucial vote, February 6, 1899, finally arrived. The Senate dealt with the Vest Resolution first. In its final form, the Vest Resolution stated that the United States would control the Philippines until the Filipinos could establish a form of free government that would secure the rights of life, liberty, and property. The Amendment was defeated by a vote of 53 to 30. Hoar and Hale were the only two New England Republicans to vote for it. The remaining ten New England Senators, with the exception of Redfield Proctor of Vermont and George P. Wetmore of Rhode Island who were absent, voted to table the resolution.⁵⁰

The Senate then turned to the treaty. Because the Senate considered the treaty in executive session, the Congressional Record contains few references concerning treaty ratification. Other sources of information reveal that the treaty passed by a vote of 57 to 27. Only two more votes were needed to defeat the treaty. Credit for passage goes to Lodge, Aldrich, and Platt. Out of twelve New England Senators, only Hoar and Hale voted against Republican wishes. Proctor and Wetmore were,

⁵⁰U. S. Congress, Senate, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., 6 February 1899, Congressional Record 32: 1470-78.

once again, not present for the vote. Lodge reported however, that their support was with the McKinley forces.⁵¹

Senate action was not complete, however. The McEnery Resolution, named after Senator Samuel D. McEnery of Louisiana, was introduced in an effort to satisfy the anti-expansionists. The Resolution stated that the ratification of the treaty was not intended to make the Filipinos citizens of the United States. It further stated that the United States had no desire to annex the Philippines. The intention of the United States was to prepare the Filipinos for independence, and eventually free them.⁵²

Hoar failed to see the significance of this and immediately proposed an amendment, stating that the United States had no intention "to incorporate the inhabitants of said islands into citizenship of the United States, nor is it intended to annex said islands."⁵³ The amendment was tabled by a vote of 45 to 34. On the surface, Hoar's proposal was similar to the McEnery Resolution; however, Hoar included a definite time period for Philippine independence. Hoar and Hale were the only two New England Senators to vote against tabling the

⁵¹Ibid. ⁵²Ibid., 1479. ⁵³Ibid., 1487.

measure. Another similar resolution by Hoar was also easily defeated. He seemed to be using delaying tactics. The original McEnery Resolution then passed by a vote of 26 to 22, with Hoar being the only New England Senator to vote against it.⁵⁴ Apparently, he did so out of frustration, because all his efforts had failed.

The House of Representatives also had its share of controversy. The Speaker of the House, Thomas B. Reed, was anti-McKinley and anti-expansionism. He had opposed the Spanish-American War, and in actuality, he opposed most of McKinley's expansionist policies in the Philippines. From January 4, 1899, to the treaty's ratification on February 6, 1899, very little was said in the House about the Philippines. Of course, there was the attempt to clarify the United States' position in the territory, but these were effectively bottled up in conference committees by the pro-expansionists.⁵⁵

Most biographers of Reed stated that Reed used his power to defeat the treaty. The Congressional Record, however, did not always bear this out. One should remember that \$20,000,000 was to be paid to Spain. Although the House had little to do with the treaty, they had the power to reject this appropriation. While Reed

⁵⁴Ibid., 1488, 1494.

⁵⁵Beisner, Twelve Against Empire, pp. 208-209.

was sarcastic in his remarks, and attempted to delay passage of the bill, his influence was not that great. He certainly could have used his power more effectively.⁵⁶

Many House members had an attitude similar to that of Frederick H. Gillett, a Republican, from Massachusetts. He opposed the bill but still voted "to discharge that legal debt . . . with regret."⁵⁷ Summing up his feelings, he stated that he had rather pay "\$20,000,000 to be honorably rid of the Philippines than to pay \$20,000,000 for them."⁵⁸

On February 20, 1899, Gillett recommended to the House the passage of the appropriation for Spain. The final vote was 219 for, 33 opposed, and 95 not voting. Of twenty-six New England Representatives, not one member voted against the appropriation, although five members did not vote.⁵⁹ This support, combined with that of New England's Senators made the section a bulwark of support for McKinley's expansionist policies.

⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 204-05.

⁵⁷U. S. Congress, House, 55th Cong., 3rd sess., 20 February 1899, Congressional Record 32: 1703.

⁵⁸Ibid., 1701.

⁵⁹Ibid., 1701-05.

The ratification of the Treaty of Paris and the subsequent passage of the appropriations for Spain ended approximately one year of turmoil. The Congressional session was long and volatile. The United States had gone from peace to war, back to peace and world empire during this time span. Much of the anti-expansionist movement quickly faded. Although Senator Hoar made peace with President McKinley, he kept up his stern denunciation of imperialism. He continued to hope for some type of independence for the Philippines. To the end Hoar was torn by the often conflicting demands of anti-imperialism and party loyalty. Although troubled, Hoar defied party leadership to become the country's most determined anti-imperialist. Hoar, along with Hale, were the only two New England Senators to vote against the Treaty of Paris. Principles, to Hoar, were more important than party loyalty. Senator Hoar did not end his struggle; he continued to fight for the Filipinos until his death in 1904.⁶⁰

In the House of Representatives, there were few statements on the Philippine situation. Thomas Reed eventually grew more frustrated as he watched McKinley and the expansionists succeeding. Despite his powerful position as Speaker of the House, Reed felt unable to

⁶⁰Beisner, Twelve Against Empire, pp. 158-159.

effectively stop the imperialist measures. At sixty years of age, he was tired and wanted to end his public service. In April, 1899, Reed announced that he would retire in September of 1899. His opposition simply was not enough to overcome a determined administration. In the end, Reed's protests against expansionism were no more effective than other anti-expansionists. He had quite simply given up the fight.

One cannot say enough about the importance of the New England Senators, primarily Lodge, Platt, and Aldrich, in the ratification of the peace treaty. The debates showed that their unyielding efforts were the primary reason for the treaty's acceptance. Without the leadership of these New England Senators, who opposed the aggressive Hoar, the Treaty of Paris would have been defeated.

The United States was now embarked on an expansionist course. Because of its acquisition of the Philippines, there eventually developed a desire to build an inter-ocean canal. An increased desire to become more involved in Asian affairs also developed. The Spanish-American War and its ramifications created American policies that made an impact throughout the world. The United States now had the Philippines, but no program for administering them. The next few years were a

critical period for both the Philippines and the United States. They were a time for experiment. Congressional legislation and action affecting the Philippines became an important foreign policy issue. Americans learned that administering an empire was a large, complicated task and that the responsibilities were many.

CHAPTER V

NEW ENGLAND CONGRESSMEN AND THE SPOONER AMENDMENT

On a map, the Philippines appear as an island chain extending southward from the eastern part of Asia and forming a line protecting Asia's eastern shore. The archipelago consists of about 7,000 islands with a total area of approximately 114,000 square miles. In size this corresponds closely with the British Isles or the state of Arizona. Although there are many islands, only eleven are usually considered in most studies. The largest island, Luzon, is slightly smaller than Ohio while the next largest island, Mindanao, is about the area of Indiana. The third largest, Palawan, is smaller than Connecticut. In excess of two thousand islands are unnamed.¹

The Philippines have a complex racial history. In addition to mixtures with Europeans, the inhabitants are composed of various Southeast Asia types. Through the

¹Gladys Zabilka, Customs and Culture of the Philippines (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1963), p. 6.

centuries contact with Indian, Arab, and Chinese traders has influenced the native population racially and culturally. A variety of religions are in evidence, and the people speak several different native languages and dialects.

Congress dealt with the future of these people and these lands in the period 1899-1908. During these years, the composition of Congress changed quite frequently. To prevent any potential misconceptions or confusion because of these frequent changes, New England Congressmen are listed in Appendix B, according to Congressional Sessions. A political breakdown by party is also included. To facilitate a better understanding, the dates of those sessions are also given. The Republican party controlled the House and the Senate throughout the period 1899 through 1908. During this period, the Republican majority varied from nineteen to thirty. See Appendix C for more detail on party strength in Congress.

President McKinley wanted to establish civilian government in the Philippines as soon after treaty ratification as possible. The earliest American rule in the Philippines, however, was, by necessity, military, with first General Elwell Otis and then General Arthur MacArthur serving as military governor. Even before the ratification of the peace treaty, however, President

McKinley named a commission to study conditions in the islands and to report the best means of control. This first Philippine Commission was headed by the president of Cornell University, Jacob G. Schurman, and was known as the Schurman Commission. Upon arriving in the Philippines, the Commission found itself confronted with several problems. The territories were in no condition even for the partial establishment of civil rule. The Commission, on the one hand, felt compelled to justify the retention of the Philippines by pointing to the supposed dangers of anarchy which would ensue should control be removed. On the other hand, the Commission's dislike of the military inclined it to urge that peaceful conditions were practically established and that military aid was no longer needed. After a very careful investigation, the Commission submitted an elaborate report, which concluded that the natives were as yet incapable of self-government. The report also included an account of the conditions and resources of the Philippines, about which Americans knew little.²

The Schurman Commission was an investigative body, and in their report of January 31, 1900, they maintained that the Philippine Islands could not stand alone. To

²Elihu Root, The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States (New York: Ams Press, 1916), pp. 44-46.

become self-governing and independent, they needed the tutelage and protection of the United States for a period of years. The Commission stated that it was their belief that a United States presence was necessary to maintain stability. According to the Commission, the Spanish government had existed only for the plunder of the people who were taxed heavily under the pretext of levying war contributions. Crime was now rampant. In many provinces, there was absolute anarchy, and from all sides came petitions for protection. The Commission concluded that the United States could not escape its responsibilities to the Filipinos.³

Such evidence made a considerable impact on Congress and the President. In March, 1900, McKinley appointed a second commission. Events necessitated naming new members, when the original commission members showed an unwillingness to serve longer in the Philippines.⁴

The Second Commission consisted of William H. Taft, a Federal Judge, who also served as the President of the Commission; D. C. Worcester, a zoology professor at the University of Michigan; Luke E. Wright, a

³Ibid.

⁴Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livezey, The Philippines and the United States (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1951), p. 62.

Tennessee judge; Henry C. Ide, a lawyer from Vermont; and Bernard Moses, professor of Latin American history at the University of California. Approximately one year later, Filipinos would be added to the commission. To these men would be given the responsibility of establishing and organizing a civil government, subject to legislation passed by Congress. The Second Philippine Commission became the supreme legislative authority in the Philippines, but the military governor was retained as the chief executive.⁵

The Second Commission was given specific instructions. The first of these orders provided that government in the Philippines was to be transferred from the military governor to the Commission. An additional order stated that Taft would exercise executive authority in all civil affairs in the Philippines. When the military situation improved, the military would also be under the control of the civil governor. This was subject to the approval of the Secretary of War of the United States.⁶

McKinley and the Commission thought that Congress would also give instructions. This was not the case, however, for Congress, with one exception, took no major

⁵Ibid., p. 63.

⁶Henry Parker Willis, Our Philippine Problem (New York: Arno Press, 1970), p. 31.

action in the session that ran from December 3, 1900, to March 4, 1901. The exception was the passage of the Spooner Amendment to the Army Appropriations Bill in March, 1901. In actuality the amendment had been proposed as a Senate Resolution in early 1900. Essentially, the Spooner Amendment stated that when the insurrection against the authority of the United States was suppressed, the President, under the direction of Congress, would establish a system of government for maintaining and protecting the native Filipinos.⁷ The Spooner Amendment was to be the foundation of a future Philippine government.

Debate on the resolution filled many pages in the Congressional Record. The chief characters remained Senator Lodge and Senator Hoar. Both were sincerely fighting for their beliefs. Lodge got surprising aid from Senator Jacob Gallinger, a Republican from New Hampshire. Gallinger's aid was surprising because he had played only a minor role in the treaty debates. Senator Hoar stood alone among New England spokesmen in his opposition to administration policy.

On March 7, 1900, Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Philippines, took up the

⁷U. S. Congress, Senate, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 11 January 1900, Congressional Record 33: 763.

Philippine issue, by stating his support for the Spooner Amendment. Restating the amendment, Lodge said that it was sufficient for American needs. The amendment made no declarations and offered no promises for the future. He stringently opposed making any promises to the Filipinos about the future. Above all, his speech emphasized that Congress must exert its authority and allow the President the necessary power to deal with the Philippines. Appealing for bipartisan support, Lodge stated that "the Philippines should be an American question, not the sport of parties or the subject of party creeds."⁸ In other words, the responsibility for the territory rested upon all the American people, not upon the Democratic or Republican party. Here, Lodge launched an attack upon the Democratic Party for making the Philippines a political issue. He continually stated that the Philippines were the property of the United States. To his way of thinking, the Democrats criticized but came up with no useful solution to the problem. Their main argument was that the natives did not want the United States in the Philippines. Morally, it was wrong.⁹ Lodge, however, ignored their argument. "Our immediate

⁸U. S. Congress, Senate, 56 Cong., 1st sess., 7 March 1900, Congressional Record 33: 247.

⁹Ibid., 2618.

duty," he stated, "is to suppress this disorder, put an end to fighting, and restore peace and order."¹⁰

Seemingly wanting to stir patriotism of his fellow Senators, Lodge referred to Thomas Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence. Quoting from the historic document, he asked, what does "consent of the governed" mean? The Declaration, Lodge asserted, with its idea of consent of the governed, was a work of men chosen by the ballot of free, white, male citizens. These ideas were unheard of in the Orient. In fact, despotic government prevailed in that part of the world. He urged the United States not to abandon the Philippines, for this policy would be wrong to humanity and contrary to sound morals. On March 7, 1900, Lodge stated that the claim of Senator Hoar and others that the United States had deprived the Filipinos of their liberty was untrue. He believed they had never had true liberty and had none now, except when the United States gave it to them protected by the American military. He then argued that the United States could not have robbed them of their freedom, for they had none to lose.¹¹

Lodge then outlined the course of the United States actions in the Philippines since the outbreak of the

¹⁰Ibid.

¹¹Ibid., 2619-20.

insurrection. Quoting American military personnel, Aguinaldo, and others, Lodge contended that Aguinaldo did not represent all Filipinos. He insisted that Aguinaldo's rebel government represented only the leaders who set it up. Lodge quoted from sources that had never been used before, and cited information that had been unavailable earlier. As Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Philippines, Lodge often received confidential material from Taft. Lodge then made his most emotional appeal. He stated that warfare was being conducted in which every crime imaginable was committed against helpless persons, who were loyal to the United States. Lodge stated that anarchy would result should the United States leave the islands. Quite critical of Aguinaldo, Lodge further stated, "Anarchy came, and existed in full force wherever Aguinaldo held sway, coupled with bloodshed, pillage, and corruption."¹²

Summing up, Lodge stated that the United States should develop the Philippines and stimulate foreign commerce. He then urged the passage of the Spooner Amendment. Lodge's speech was very eloquent and quite forceful. From statements made later by New England Congressmen, his arguments were certainly persuasive, and possible swayed some of the "fence-sitters."¹³

¹²Ibid., 2626.

¹³Ibid.

At the conclusion of Lodge's speech, Redfield Proctor, a Republican from Vermont, read several letters noting the conditions in the Philippines. Less eloquent than Lodge, he also urged the acceptance of the Spooner Amendment as being the best solution, if not the only solution to the problem. The opposition, however, was prepared. Senator Hoar opposed any measure which implied United States' intention of remaining in the Philippines. In reality he was opposed to any form of expansion at this time. Hoar solidified the opposition. He gave the anti-expansionists a leader. Then, using every method available to them, Lodge's opponents delayed consideration of the measure, and it was never voted on by the Senate. Their favorite delaying tactic was the introduction of amendments which consumed considerable time.¹⁴

After the Presidential election of 1900, the Fifty-sixth Congress met for the last session. On February 5, 1901, the Senate was to consider the Army Appropriation Bill. Lodge used this opportunity to add to the bill the provisions of the Spooner Resolution. There was a move to declare the amendment to the appropriation bill out of order. The Senate then voted on the amendment. By a vote of 39-23, the Senate declared the amendment to

¹⁴U. S. Congress, Senate, 56th Cong., 1st sess., 15 March 1900, Congressional Record 33: 2957-2986.

be in order.¹⁵ No New England Senator voted against the motion. Senators George Hoar, Eugene Hale, William Frye, and George Wetmore did not vote. Only Senator Hale had a specific reason. He was paired with another Senator, but he would have voted for the amendment had he voted. The remaining three were apparently absent.

After a number of proposed amendments were defeated by the Senate, largely due to the influence of Senator Lodge, the measure was considered by both Houses of Congress. On February 27, 1901, the bill came to a vote in the Senate and was approved by a vote of 45 to 27, with sixteen Senators not voting.¹⁶ Senator Hoar was the only New England Senator to vote against it. Indeed, he was the only Republican to vote against the bill. Minor amendments were later added, but the intent of the bill was not altered.

On March 1, 1901, the House considered the Army Appropriation Bill, with the attached Spooner Amendment. The act passed by a vote of 161 to 137, with little serious debate. Fifty-one Representatives did not vote. Four New England Representatives, all Republicans, simply answered "present" when called upon. These four were from

¹⁵U. S. Congress, Senate 56th Cong., 2nd sess., 6 February 1901, Congressional Record 34: 2955-56.

¹⁶U. S. Congress, Senate 56th Cong., 2nd sess., 27 February 1901, Congressional Record 34: 3145.

Massachusetts. Like the New England Senators, the Representatives firmly supported the bill. No New England Representative played a key role in debates on the bill. They, like the New England Senators, were firmly behind administration policy in the Philippines.¹⁷

The provisions of the Spooner Bill became law in the last days of the Fifty-sixth Congress. In actuality, the bill authorized the President to do little that he was not already doing. It did, however, have some significance. Furthermore, the bill gave presidential action a firmer legal foundation. The act also removed doubt about the legality of the Second Philippine Commission. It also gave Congressional approval to the replacement of military rule in the Philippines by civilian rule, a change undoubtedly popular with the Filipinos. The Spooner Amendment was a radical departure for Congress, for it made McKinley a virtual dictator in the territory. Taking advantage of his new power, McKinley appointed Taft as the civil governor on June 21, 1901. The authority of General MacArthur, the military governor, was limited to the areas where there was continued active Filipino resistance.

¹⁷Ibid.

It was not until the beginning of the First Session of the Fifty-seventh Congress, in December, 1901, that Congress seriously began to concern themselves with the Philippine situation. Two issues were the predominant concern of Congress at that time: the relationship of the Philippines to the United States and the internal conditions in the islands.

The debates over the creation of a civil government and the tariff pointed out one very clear fact: the absence of adequate information on the Philippines. Senator Hoar might have been more effective in his opposition had he been fully aware of the conditions in the territory. Senator Lodge, chairman of the committee on the Philippines, was one of the few Senators who was fully aware of the situation, and he informed few people. Certainly he did not inform the opposition forces. Even before Congress was to consider the above measures, Senator Hoar had been deeply concerned because he could not get sufficient information about the Philippines, and he decided to take action. He proposed an inquiry into the Philippine situation, independent of Lodge's committee. On January 13, 1902, Hoar offered a resolution, calling for a special, independent Senate committee to investigate condition in the Philippines.¹⁸

¹⁸U. S. Congress, Senate, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 13 January 1902, Congressional Record 35: 597.

The resolution was to be discussed on the following day, January 14, 1902. Considerable debate resulted in Congress. Senator Lodge, Chairman of the Senate Philippine Committee, was quite upset at the proposed resolution. He felt that another committee on the Philippines would be tantamount to criticizing the work of his committee. He also realized that another committee would weaken considerably his position as the "authority" on the Philippines. Lodge stated that "the passage of a resolution of that character would . . . be the most serious reflection to which any committee could be subjected."¹⁹ Lodge even threatened to disband the Philippine committee, should another independent body be formed:

If it becomes necessary to appoint another committee to investigate the particular subject committed to the Committee on the Philippines by the action of the Senate, it seems to me that the reason for the existence of this committee has ceased. I think we should be consulted . . . as to the necessity of this investigation.²⁰

With the powerful Lodge opposing the independent investigative body, Hoar realized that his resolution stood little chance of passage. He then attempted to salvage what he could. On the surface, one might not understand Lodge's opposition; however, he realized the

¹⁹Ibid., 651.

²⁰Ibid.

potential harm of Hoar's resolution. If the resolution passed, information might surface about key issues such as the actual conditions existing in the Philippines; the actual cost of the Filipino war, and a variety of other issues. On all these topics, there had been a lack of information, much of it due, seemingly, to the fact that Lodge did not want an informed Senate or informed public. To his way of thinking, as long as they remained ignorant of the happenings in the Philippines, the easier it would be for him to get expansionist legislation passed.

In view of these facts, Hoar's resolution came at a critical time. There was not enough support in the Senate to pass the resolution as it was originally stated. Lodge was able to amend it, whereby the inquiry was placed in the hands of the Senate Philippine Committee, chaired and controlled by Lodge. The situation then was not appreciably changed. Senator Hoar was somewhat mollified when Lodge stated that his committee represented both Democrats and Republicans. According to Lodge, great care had been exercised when these members were chosen. He felt that his committee, and indeed assured Hoar, would make honest and effective investigations.²¹

²¹Ibid.

In the end, Senator Hoar accomplished little. Events continued as they had, with Lodge revealing only what he wanted others to know. Thus, there continued to be an ill-formed Congress on the major issues regarding the Philippine Islands. This was one reason why Senator Hoar was not as effective as he could have been.

Lodge's committee actually began the work of investigation on January 31, 1902. Although the committee had the power to call any witness needed to testify, Senator Lodge set forth certain restrictions. He stated that no individuals presently in the Philippines would be called to testify. His reasoning was that the distance was too great to call them back to the United States. He also said that "experts" on the Philippines who had never been there could not testify. Thus, by the process of elimination, the committee could examine only those who had been in the Philippines and had voluntarily returned. Practically speaking, the only persons who could testify were ex-soldiers. Career officers were reluctant to testify against the known wishes of the administration. These individual soldiers knew only the general situation in the Philippines and were not privy to actual statements of administrative policy. Their testimony did point out the weaknesses of military rule. Some of their testimony was published, and many people in the United States, as well as countries abroad,

were upset. This resulted in a still more vigorous application of suppression of information. Lodge made every effort to schedule as few meetings as possible. Furthermore, he came very close to actual concealment of the meeting times. When Congress adjourned, the Senate inquiry never resumed.²² Under these conditions, Congress began to consider key issues concerning the Philippines.

²²Willis, Our Philippine Problem, p. 157.

CHAPTER VI

NEW ENGLAND CONGRESSIONAL INFLUENCE AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE PHILIPPINES

President McKinley was eager to establish civil rule in the Philippines at the earliest possible time. Many Americans and Europeans were distressed that the United States had maintained military rule so long. The Spooner Amendment was designed to set in motion a plan to rectify this problem. Simply stating a solution and putting that idea into action were two entirely different things. The road to creation of a civil government was a rocky one. The McKinley administration believed that bad feelings against the military would be mitigated if a portion of the authority of government was transferred to a civil body. This civilian government could then serve as a check upon the military.

The War Department prepared what was known as the Philippine Civil Government Bill during the summer of 1901. The bill was almost completed before the assembling of Congress, and on January 7, 1902, it was presented to Congress. As originally drafted and presented by the War Department, the bill consisted of 111 sections. The early sections ratified President

McKinley's instructions, as conveyed in his orders of April 7, 1900, and July 21, 1901. They also confirmed the acts already passed by the Commission and gave the President and, under his orders, the Commission a great deal of governmental power. Other sections regulated the conditions under which certain lands might be disposed. It also provided for the disposition of public property inherited from Spaniards. A large part of the land of the islands was in the hands of three orders of friars: the Dominicans, Recoletos, and Augustinians. The purchase of the "friar lands" was authorized. There was concern with forestry regulations, and a system of mining laws was created. The bill further provided for a system in which certain appeals could be made to the United States Supreme Court. It regulated the issue of municipal bonds for public improvements. A considerable number of the provisions in the bill dealt with the establishment of a monetary and banking system. A permanent Bureau of Insular Affairs, consisting mainly of United States Senators, was created as an information-gathering agency. The last section repealed all other inconsistent legislation, within these guidelines.¹

¹Henry Parker Willis, Our Philippine Problem (New York: Arno Press, 1970), pp. 3-34.

The name for this bill, the Philippine Civil Government Bill, is almost a misnomer, for it said practically nothing about the creation of a government. It contained only a few sections dealing with specific power given the Commission. The Commission's power was broadened not by the provisions of the bill but by President McKinley's directives to the Commission after the bill became law.

The debate on the Civil Government Bill began in the Senate on April 18, 1902. The discussion continued, with various interruptions, until the First Session was almost over. The Bill was a time-consuming affair for the Senate. The Democrats debated charges of military cruelty and misrule. In his opening speech, Senator Joseph Rawlins of Utah set the tone. He stated that the Commission had too much power. For example, he said that it had power to declare war and make peace, raise armies and build navies, regulate trade with foreign countries, lay taxes, coin money, and ultimately had the power to destroy freedom of speech of the people and press.² Other Senators took up the issue, and such speeches continued until late May, 1902. The thrust of the Democrats' argument was that the United States had allowed

²U. S. Congress, Senate, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 18 April 1902, Congressional Record 35: 4525.

Cuba to maintain its independence and, therefore, was morally obligated to also give independence to the Philippines. There was no Democratic New England voice in this chorus for not one member of the party was elected to the Senate from this region from 1899-1908.³

Senator Hoar, once again, dominated the anti-expansionist forces. In a rather long speech on May 22, 1902, he attacked the whole Philippine policy of the Republican administration. He was one of the few Republicans who broke ranks, and he was the only New England Senator who continually opposed Republican policies. In this speech to the Senate, Hoar stated:

You are fighting for sovereignty. You are fighting for the principle of eternal dominion over that people. . . . We said in the case of Cuba that she had a right to be free and independent . . . but you made a totally different declaration about the Philippine Islands. You undertook in the treaty to acquire sovereignty over her for yourself. You declared . . . that you had a right to buy sovereignty. . . . The moment you made that declaration the Filipino people gave you notice that they treated it as a declaration of war. . . . We can not get rid of this one fact, we can not escape it, and we can not flinch from it. You chose war instead of peace.⁴

At the conclusion of Hoar's long speech, there was much applause, both on the floor and in the galleries.

³See Appendix C.

⁴U. S. Congress, Senate, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 22 May 1902, Congressional Record 35: 5788.

The presiding officer finally had to ask Senators to refrain from applause, for it violated Senate rules. Senator Hoar seemed to have had a large following. Though he rebuked the whole Philippine policy of the administration, he had relatively little to say concerning details of the pending legislation. His continued opposition created more problems for Republicans in general, and Senator Lodge in particular.⁵

Republicans had not intended to make much reply to the attacks from the Democratic side, but President Roosevelt and Senator Lodge realized that Senator's Hoar's speech forced them to take a stand. The enthusiasm of the opposition after Hoar's speech could not go unchecked. Henry Cabot Lodge once again was the main defender of Republican policies in the Philippines. He sought to vindicate the conduct of the army. He then attempted to put the opposition on the defensive by attacking their anti-administration position. Lodge continually emphasized that the well-being of the Filipinos was the desired objective. He stated that the military had always conducted themselves in an admirable manner. He also stated that the opposition forces made it more difficult to administer the Philippines. He put them on the defensive by accusing them of disloyalty.

⁵Ibid.

This was aimed particularly at Hoar. He then complained of the vagueness of the debates and their tendency to drift away from the points at issue. Such debates continued until June 26, 1902.⁶

A number of amendments were proposed in the Senate that would have extended constitutional guarantees to the Filipinos. These amendments also promised them independence at an early date and told the Filipinos that the United States never intended to grant them citizenship or admit the Philippines as a state or states. Only Senator Hoar voted for these amendments. Other New England Senators, led by Lodge, refused to vote for these amendments. Lodge wanted the question of eventual independence to remain open. The Philippine Civil Government Bill eventually passed by a vote of 48 to 30. Only one New England Senator voted against it: Senator Hoar. The remaining Senators followed the wishes of President Theodore Roosevelt, who had assumed the Presidency after the assassination of McKinley. During Roosevelt's administration, expansionist policies continued.⁷

⁶U. S. Congress, Senate, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 26 June 1902, Congressional Record 35: 4526-63.

⁷Ibid., 4564-67.

On June 26, 1902, the House of Representatives considered the Philippine Government Bill. Representative Frederick Gillett, a Republican from Massachusetts, chaired the committee that would consider the bill. First of all, a substitute bill was introduced, providing for a partially independent government until 1911, when full independence would be granted. This was out of the question in the eyes of administration Republicans. It also stipulated that there would be an independent body, in the Philippines, to be established later, that would rule the islands. The bill was sponsored mostly by Southern Democrats. At this time, no New England Representative made his presence known by taking part in the debates. The substitute bill was rejected by a vote of 137 to 97. It is significant that 110 Representatives did not vote. Seven Representatives were present and simply answered "present" when called upon and did not vote. Of the twenty-seven New England Representatives, only two voted to accept the substitute bill--Henry F. Naphen and John R. Thayer of Massachusetts, both Democrats. Four Republicans and one Democrat did not vote. Representative William H. Moody, a Republican from Massachusetts, was not present for the vote, for he had resigned on May 1, 1902. Seventeen of the twenty-five New England

Representatives voted against giving a qualified independent government. They were all Republicans.⁸

The Civil Government Bill was then taken up and passed by a similar vote of 140 to 97 with 110 Representatives not voting. Four New England Representatives did not vote. Three Representatives--one Republicans and two Democrats--voted against the bill. Eighteen Republicans voted to accept the government bill.⁹ Once again New England Representatives were strongly in favor of administration policies in the Philippines. Though no one demonstrated any significant leadership role, in this close vote, their collective vote in favor of the bill was very important.¹⁰

The final form of the bill was worked out in conference committee. As it emerged from the committee, it retained most of the provisions already enumerated. It did eliminate provisions for the creation of a banking system. There were several additions, including a bill of rights. The conference committee also provided for the taking of a census in the Philippines. It also ordered the calling of a Filipino legislative assembly, two years after the taking of the census. The bill was

⁸Ibid., 6627-31.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Ibid.

approved by Congress and signed by President Theodore Roosevelt on July 2, 1902.¹¹

The Civil Government Act was supposed to state the precise powers of the civil governor and the Commission. It was intended that the two would be separate. The only reference to this, however, was found in Section I of the act, and it said very little of any consequence. The confusion or lack of clarification of the powers of the government was allowed to remain. Civil government in the Philippines had to find its theoretical base elsewhere.

The discussion of civil government in the Philippines was, on the whole, unsatisfactory. One would expect to find in the rather lengthy debates serious discussions of actual conditions found in the Philippines. Contrary to this, one can find little specific discussion of the merits of the provisions of the bill throughout the debates. This may be due to the fact that few people knew the actual conditions in the Philippines. It may also be due to the fact that political parties saw administration of the Philippines as a political issue. To a certain extent, they were more interested in gaining political advantage than in developing a well-conceived

¹¹U. S. Congress, Senate, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 30 June 1902, Congressional Record 35: 7697.

plan for administering the islands. Democrats realized that the act would be passed by a partisan vote, and they seemingly preferred to address themselves to an over-all review and criticism of Philippine policy as a whole. Republicans were ready to pass the bill by sheer strength of numbers, and New England Republicans reflected this sentiment. During the debates, Congressional members were more interested in oratory than specific issues. Thus, when Lodge complained of the vagueness of the debates, he was very close to the truth.

Civil government came slowly but surely to the Philippines. The government thus created was to remain in effect until superceded by the Jones Act of 1916. Under this statute, the American-appointed Philippine Commission, which exercised virtual dictatorial powers, shared control with an assembly, elected by the Filipinos. Even though suffrage was restricted to the upper and upper middle class, the new government of shared responsibility was preferable to a government controlled exclusively by the United States.¹²

The second predominant concern of Congress was the relationship of the Philippines to the United States.

¹²Garel A. Grunder and William E. Livezey, The Philippines and the United States (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1951), p. 82.

The Philippines, when the United States assumed control, were economically exhausted by long-continued warfare. Their economic system had never rested upon a very sound basis even in the best of times under Spanish control. The transfer of sovereignty to the United States involved a complete change of economic relations. As a colony of Spain, the Philippines had enjoyed certain privileges. When they were transferred to the United States, they were still viewed as foreign territory by the United States and subject to the same customs regulations as other countries. In the beginning of this new relationship, the tariff situation was acceptable to the Filipinos, because it was simply a continuation of former Spanish policies. It was not acceptable, however, to many American businessmen. These business leaders began to pressure their representatives to lower some tariffs on Philippine products, resulting in the establishment of a tariff board, which was to make recommendations on tariff changes. The board was greatly influenced by business interests in the United States, who were encouraged to give their views.¹³

On December 4, 1901, Senator Lodge introduced a Philippine tariff bill in the Senate calling for a

¹³Robert L. Beisner, Twelve Against Empire (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), pp. 195-197, 216-17.

revision of the tariff rates reducing rates on necessities and increasing rates on luxuries. A special tariff measure was also introduced into the House of Representatives on December 17, 1901, patterned after the Lodge bill. The bill required Philippine goods entering the United States to pay the full Dingley tariff rates (though the Philippine Commission had sought a preference of 50 percent or more) and would temporarily exempt the Philippines from the coast-wise shipping laws of the United States. During consideration of the measure, the House first rejected a motion to extend free trade to the Philippines, by a vote of 173 to 121, with sixty-one not voting. Only three New England Representatives out of a total of twenty-seven voted to allow free trade with the Philippines. These three were John Thayer, a Democrat, and Samuel McCall and Charles Littlefield, both Republicans. A new tariff bill, requiring Philippine goods entering the United States to pay full Dingley rates, was then voted upon. It passed by a vote of 167 to 128, with sixty not voting. New England Representatives were solidly supportive of this tariff rate. Of twenty-seven Representatives, only three opposed it. Thayer and McCall of Massachusetts and Littlefield of Maine criticized the bill, but they were unable to get

any sizable support.¹⁴ Thus, it was passed with little debate in the House, and no New Englander played a major role, though three did vote to reject the measure.

The Senate delayed action until the latter part of January, 1902. On January 20, Lodge, Chairman of the Committee on the Philippines, reported to the full Senate that his committee was prepared to submit their recommendations. He also made it known that a minority report would be submitted. At this time, several members of Congress introduced letters, concerning the legislation. Several New England Congressmen, including Senators Jacob H. Gallinger and Henry E. Burnham of New Hampshire, and Joseph R. Hawley of Connecticut introduced such letters. Essentially these letters were appealing for more favorable economic legislation. It is questionable if these letters had a great impact on the Senators, for they sometimes voted in favor of special interest groups and sometimes did not.¹⁵

January 24, 1902, saw a great deal of activity in the Senate on the tariff proposal. First Lodge's committee gave the House bill a favorable report, and

¹⁴U. S. Congress, House, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 17 December 1901, Congressional Record 35: 427, 466.

¹⁵Grunder and Livezey, The Philippines and the United States, pp. 107-11.

indeed, Lodge's bill was similar. In his bill, the most important provision provided "That upon all articles the growth and produce of the Philippine Archipelago coming into the United States shall be levied, collected and paid only 75 percent of the rate of duty. . . ."16

The bill also provided for the refunding of duties collected to the Philippine treasury, and it refunded to the American importer export taxes levied in the Philippines. The Philippine Commission, for the first time on any major issue, disagreed with the Republican majority and recommended rates below fifty percent.¹⁷

Many Americans looked upon the bill as unsatisfactory. Some United States manufacturers feared competition from Philippine products and opposed any tariff reduction. Other businessmen desired an even greater lowering of the tariff rates than provided by the new law. Before voting upon the tariff, the Senate rejected, by a vote of 46 to 25 a minority substitute bill which sought to establish a free trade relationship with the Philippines until they had established a stable government. At that time, independence would be granted and full duties imposed upon Philippine imports. It is

¹⁶U. S. Congress, Senate, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 24 January 1902, Congressional Record 35: 750.

¹⁷Ibid., 751-53.

interesting to note that not one New England Senator voted for the amendment, not even Senator Hoar.¹⁸

After making minor changes in the reading of the tariff bill, the Senate passed it by a vote of 45 to 26, with seventeen not voting. No New England Senator voted against the tariff, although two men, Eugene Hale of Maine and William P. Dillingham of Vermont, both Republicans, did not vote.¹⁹ The bill as amended by the Senate was accepted by the House and signed by President Roosevelt on March 8, 1902.

On the tariff issue, one could detect a not so subtle change in Senator Hoar. He seldom showed the vigor of his earlier days. Senator Lodge also did not have to work as hard to get his measures passed. This might be due to the decline of Hoar's health, or perhaps Hoar was becoming reconciled to administration policies.

The tariff act of March 8, 1902, was never considered adequate by Philippine administrators who wanted lower rates for the islands' products. Additional tariff bills were passed in 1905 and 1906 at their urging. The tariff, however, was not significantly

¹⁸U. S. Congress, Senate, 57th Cong., 1st sess., 24 February 1902, Congressional Record 35: 2131-32.

¹⁹Ibid.

altered. During this period, no New England Congressman asserted himself either for or against the bills. By this time Senator Hoar was dead. There was no one as forceful to take his place, and Senator Lodge was not forced to play a major role.²⁰

The tariff issue was not fully resolved to the satisfaction of all concerned. After the tariff had passed, shipping regulations assumed more importance in the eyes of Congressmen. The United States soon discovered that it was virtually impossible to formulate a completely satisfactory colonial, commercial policy. The Treaty of Paris limited to a certain extent the flexibility of the United States. A group which hoped to profit financially from the United States' possession of the Philippines was the shipping industry. This industry thought that the acquisition of the Philippines would open up a field for profitable investment in shipbuilding and lucrative employment for the ships when built.²¹

A Philippine Customs Act of 1902 postponed the application of American coastwise shipping regulations to the Philippines until July 1, 1904. The Philippine

²⁰Grunder and Livezey, The Philippines and the United States, pp. 117-18.

²¹Willis, Our Philippine Problem, p. 285.

Commission recognized the limitations of this proposal, and in 1903, they asked that the shipping regulations be deferred until July 1, 1909. Congress responded in part to this request. They passed a bill, signed by Theodore Roosevelt, on April 15, 1904, which authorized the Philippine government to regulate inter-island shipping. It further postponed the application of the coastwise shipping laws to the Philippines until July 1, 1906. It was somewhat surprising that the bill was not debated in any depth. It was, however, overwhelmingly supported by New England Congressmen, both Democrats and Republicans. Taft, now Secretary of War, because of his experience in the Philippines, was asked to speak before Congress. He stated that he was not opposed to having United States coastwise shipping laws extended to the Philippines if the American tariff on their products was reduced sufficiently to give the advantage on the American market. He further stated that a reduction of the tariff, coupled with an extension of the shipping regulations would attract American capital to the Philippine Islands and promote business growth and development.²²

²²Grunder and Livezey, The Philippines and the United States, p. 117.

In the formulation of an American commercial policy, there was considerable conflict among groups wanting special treatment. New England Congressmen were continually receiving letters from these special interest groups, and they were presented to Congress. Very few letters embodying an anti-imperialist philosophy were presented to Congress. A continuous desire was shown by New England Representatives to increase Philippine trade. These men often represented factions which feared competition from foreign nations. While American administrators in the Philippines were on the whole concerned with advancing the welfare of the Filipinos, their policy recommendations were sometimes disregarded by Congress if they conflicted with special interest groups in the United States. For example, beet and cane sugar interests and producers of cigars and cigar wrappers appeared before the Senate in opposition to any reduction of duties on Philippine imports of sugar and tobacco. Largely due to their influence, the duty was not lowered. The economic policy decided on by Congress was at times unquestionably of great benefit to the Philippines, but it can not be maintained that their welfare was the sole reason for its adoption.²³

²³U. S. Congress, House, 58th Cong., 3rd sess., 12 December 1904, Congressional Record 39: 170-74.

The Civil Government Bill and the tariff question consumed much time for Congress. Yet, other issues remained. Specifically, the Civil Government Bill presented additional problems for Congress and United States administrators in the Philippine Islands. One of the most complicated problems was the religious issue. The Philippine Islands had long been Christianized. Under Spanish control, the Roman Catholic Church came to own large amounts of the best land. For several hundred years the Roman Catholic Church and the state had been so closely intertwined in the Philippines as to be inseparable to the eye of the ordinary man. It was unavoidable that the United State government in the Philippines should be obliged to meet and cope with this religious issue. During the Spanish-American War, popular resentment of the religious orders led to their being driven from their churches and lands. By shrewd negotiations at the Paris peace talks, they protected their property from seizure by the United States. Whether this implied the necessity of returning them to their estates and securing to them the control of the churches was another matter. If the United States showed excessive favoritism to the friars, then the natives would be upset. Bitter resentment against the friars was present among many Filipinos. Dominican, Recoleta, and Augustinian friars were in the majority,

and many of them had played a key role in local Spanish government. The Philippine Civil Government Act made provision whereby the United States would purchase the religious orders' estates, partition them, and then resell them. The natives, however, had no desire to pay the United States for this land.²⁴

When General MacArthur took over, he made some attempts to solve some aspects of the religious issue. On the whole, Congress stayed out of the controversy. MacArthur simply instituted certain constitutional guarantees concerning religious freedom and toleration. When the second Philippine Commission arrived, Taft concerned himself with the problem. To him the best solution to the problem was to purchase the land and be done with the issue. Early in 1902, Taft appeared before the United States Senate and recommended this solution. At that time, the Senate was reluctant to concern itself with the problem and eventually left it up to Taft. No New England Congressman made any significant statement on the issue. Approximately 400,000 acres of land were bought at a price of \$7,239,000. The bonds issued to raise the money bore interest at four percent and were sold in the United States.²⁵

²⁴Willis, Our Philippine Problem, pp. 191-205.

²⁵Ibid., p. 199.

This transaction greatly improved the situation, but it was not a complete solution. A real settlement was prevented by the Commission's apparent desire to gain the Catholic Church's aid in political control. Political consideration then stood in the way of a compromise. When the United States took control of the Philippines, it found a population bitterly opposed to the continued influence of the Catholic Church. If the United States had faced the church problems realistically and consulted the native Filipinos, future religious issues in the Philippines might very well have been avoided.

As Congress worked on a government and a tariff bill, Taft and the Commission wanted more American money invested in the Philippines. They felt this was necessary before the Philippine economy could become stronger. Many businessmen in the United States, however, were reluctant to invest large sums in the islands, without government protection of their money. They feared that a country destined for independence might take over their investments. The United States gave assurances that the Philippines would not obtain their independence in the near future. Taft was instrumental in getting a bill introduced in Congress granting the Philippine Commission the power to guarantee an income upon investments in railroads, and providing also for certain

issues of bonds for local improvements, as well as making changes in the Civil Government Act. It was drawn up and presented to the House of Representatives.

On March 31, 1904, the bill was referred to the Committee on Insular Affairs. A New Englander, Frederick Gillett, a Republican of Massachusetts, was the chairman of this important committee. This, of course, gave Massachusetts Congressmen the two most important posts concerning the Philippines. Gillett was an open expansionist and supporter of Republican administration policies. Therefore, most Congressmen knew what the Committee would recommend. There was little debate on the measure once it was introduced by the committee, and no New England Representative took part in the debates. In actuality, the debates that took place were dominated by Representative Henry Cooper of Wisconsin, who urged the passage of the bill. Essentially, he stated that businessmen would not risk capital in building railroads because there was no way to protect their investments. On April 14, 1904, the bill was voted upon in the House. By a vote of 138 to 123 the bill passed, with 102 Representatives not voting, and 19 answering "present" when called upon. Of New England's twenty-nine Representatives, sixteen voted for the bill; all were Republicans. Three Democrats and three Republicans from New England voted against the bill.

Six Republicans and one Democrat did not vote. For the first time, New England Representatives were not overwhelmingly behind administration policies. The vote can be misleading because so many did not vote. Massachusetts seemed somewhat divided at this time. It was also interesting to note that Maine's four Representatives, all Republicans, were not present for the vote.²⁶

From April 14, 1904, until December 11, 1904, there was little discussion of the issue in the Senate. On December 12, 1904, debates were more serious. The bill, as presented to the Senate, exempted all bonds issued by the government of the Philippines from taxation. It authorized the Philippine Commission to sell bonds for the construction of provincial and municipal public works. The bill also gave the Commission the authority to enter into contracts guaranteeing an income to railroad investments at a rate not exceeding five percent. The bill further authorized the importation of railroad construction equipment free of duty.²⁷ Of these provisions, the only ones that were open to serious debate were the sections authorizing the issue of local bonds and the guarantee of railroad incomes.

²⁶U. S. Congress, House, 58th Cong., 2nd sess., 14 April 1904, Congressional Record 38: 4818.

²⁷Willis, Our Philippine Problem, p. 384.

The opposition, led by Senator F. G. Newlands, a Democrat of Nevada, argued that the bill was morally wrong. He urged that the rate of interest should be drastically lowered. Senator Lodge of Massachusetts, who was in charge of the passage of the bill, ignored all of Newlands' arguments. Lodge was aided in his arguments by Senator Orville Platt, a Republican of Connecticut. Senator Newlands urged the delay of the bill and openly questioned the power and sincerity of the Philippine Commission. Lodge opposed any delay and reaffirmed his support for the Committee. He stated that Congress was not building railroads; it was simply giving the Philippine Commission the power to invite industries into the territories for this purpose.²⁸ From his comments, Lodge seemed sincere when he said he believed that railroads would serve to increase communication, bring people together, and, as a result, civilize them. Of the Philippine Commission, Lodge stated, "It is an executive body that acts by decrees. It moves with great ease. . . . It is not subject to the caprice of elections. If there is anywhere a governmental body that can move efficiently in a work of this kind, that body can."²⁹

²⁸U. S. Congress, Senate, 58th Cong., 3rd sess., 12 December 1904, Congressional Record 39: 134.

²⁹Ibid., 133.

On December 16, 1904, there was a movement by the opposition to reduce the rate of interest on the bonds from four percent to three percent. Lodge beat back this proposal in a very close vote: 37 to 35, with 18 Senators not voting. Although two New England Senators, both Republicans, did not vote, no others voted for the proposal. The opposition then attempted to strike out the section guaranteeing interest on railroad investment. Led by Lodge and Platt, this motion was defeated by a vote of 39 to 33, with 18 not voting. The results were exactly as stated above for New England.³⁰ In these close, critical votes, it is safe to assume if it had not been for the solidarity of the New England Senators, the outcome on the votes would probably have been different.

Additional proposals were made, but none were of major significance. When the bill came up for the final vote, it passed by a vote of 45 to 23, with 23 Senators not voting. New England Senators once again overwhelmingly voted to approve the bill. Of the twelve Senators, nine, all Republicans, voted for the bill. Senator Platt was unexpectedly called from the chamber, and he hastily paired himself with another Senator.

³⁰U. S. Congress, Senate, 58th Cong., 3rd sess., 16 December 1904, Congressional Record 39: 360.

If he had voted, he would have voted for the measure. It became law with the signature of President Roosevelt on February 6, 1905.³¹

The bill as signed, after the amendments were added, limited the amount of improvement bonds to be issued by the Philippine Commission to a maximum of \$5,000,000. It also limited the gross amount of bonds that might be issued by any municipality to an amount not exceeding five percent of the assessed valuation of the local property. Lodge allowed these amendments because they did not substantially interfere with the intent of the bill. It should be noted that had Lodge wished to oppose these amendments, he had the necessary votes to defeat them. While the closeness of the New England vote was a surprise, the vote in the Senate was to be expected. Lodge was firmly in control, and for many Senators, and certainly for those in New England, what Lodge said others usually endorsed.

As business gradually began investing in the Philippines, conditions in the territories began to improve. By 1908, considerable capital had flowed into the islands. By this date also, Congress had dealt with important issues concerning the Philippines, but the most important issue, independence, would be left to

³¹Ibid., 362.

the future. In 1907 a census was taken, and a year later the first real legislative elections were held. With these elections, a new era of United States-Philippine relations began.

In 1916, Eluhu Root briefly summarized Republican theory and practice for the years that his party had been primarily responsible for American policy in the Philippines. Root had been Secretary of War from 1899 to 1904 and Secretary of State from 1905 to 1909. He was one of the most important individuals in the formulation of the United States' early policy toward the Philippines. In discussing that policy, Root stated that the United States had assumed a trust for the future benefit of the Filipinos and were committed to that enterprise. He further stated that the United States was obligated to administer the Philippines until the natives could govern for themselves. Root also emphasized the need for continued study of the Philippines by the American people. He believed education was the most important service that we could give. To Root and other Republicans, our presence in the Philippines was required.³² However necessary, the Philippine policy questions certainly consumed much of Congress' time from

³²Charles B. Elliott, The Philippines to the End of the Military Regime (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1916), preface.

1899 to 1908. The so-called "Philippine question" was not solved by 1908, but some major issues had been resolved. Independence would come at some future, undetermined, time when Filipinos were judged ready to assume this responsibility. Until that time the islands would be administered by the United States. Economic development would be encouraged by bond sales for development projects and favorable tariff rates for island products. In the years after 1908, Filipino participation in the government increased and independence, delayed by Japanese invasion and World War II, was finally achieved in 1948.

CHAPTER VII

IMPERIALISM AND THE AMERICAN HISTORY

SURVEY COURSE

In recent years the place and purpose of history in the school curriculum, both at the secondary and college level, has been a subject of intense controversy. This controversy has focused on how history has been taught, what history has been taught, and the value of teaching history at all. Critics have claimed that history courses are too often dull, uninspiring, and educationally unproductive exercises in factual recall. Many declared that American history courses are biased and pay inadequate attention to the achievements of minority Americans. The most negative have characterized the teaching of history as irrelevant and useless.¹ History teachers rightly disagree with such charges and employ many teaching techniques that refute these criticisms. The study of American policy toward the Philippines and the broader theme of expansionism in American history can greatly enrich the curriculum of a survey course.

¹George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 8-15.

The expansionist theme is central to the history of the United States. Even before the Revolution, American colonists resisted England's policy of restricting settlement to an area east of the Appalachians. Once independent, the United States expanded westward across the continent with astonishing rapidity. Mexico and Canada were not far removed from many Americans' territorial ambitions. With Alaska's purchase, acquisition of Samoa, and Hawaii's annexation, the United States began to acquire a far-flung empire. The peace settlement with Spain after the Spanish-American War added new possessions and vital interests in the Far East.

Most Americans had little or no direct pre-existing economic interest in the Philippines. The economic value of the Philippines was merely prospective, and for many Americans this was enough. This general idea can be fitted easily into a discussion of the United States' stances and actions at other critical times on questions of territorial expansion.

One of the principal oddities of the Philippine episode and of foreign policy in general during this period can be discussed, either orally or on a written exam. The foreign policy of the United States from 1880 to 1920 was characterized by a series of decisions that thrust the nation into the arena of world power politics, but policymakers seemed uninformed, unprepared, and unable

to see the relationship between any single action and foreign policy in general. Using the Philippines as a beginning point, the teacher can discuss this pattern. The class could then pursue other twentieth-century foreign policy developments.

A second very useful way to approach the Philippine issue is to compare it to the mainstream of continental expansion in the nineteenth century. A comparison between the Indian wars and the Philippine revolt of Aguinaldo could be developed. Filipino rebels adopted much the same tactics. The policy of security camps in the Philippines can also be contrasted with the policy of creating Indian reservations in the West. Similarities and differences in the two policies may be debated.

Industrialism lies just below the surface of imperialism. The need for new markets and for new sources of raw materials and certain agricultural products was one cause of the United States' rise to world power. The teacher might wish to describe the economic relationship of the United States to the Philippines. The teacher also might use this relationship to develop a broader discussion of economic factors in foreign affairs. The teacher can point out that American ability to produce manufactured goods and money for investment purposes played a large part in the American policy that led to American involvement in World War I.

With relevance to politics and progressivism, it is interesting to note that Republican party domestic politics seems to be irrelevant to the issue of empire and world power. For example, William McKinley was a conservative Republican; Theodore Roosevelt was a progressive Republican; and William H. Taft was a moderate Republican. Although they held divergent views on domestic issues, they all played, more or less, similar roles in the formulation and execution of an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy. The political party affiliation of policymakers at the Congressional level, Democrat or Republican, however, played a significant role in legislation passed.

Imperialism and Congress' role in the development of American policy in the Philippines can be presented in the classroom in a number of ways. Some methods that may be used are:

1. Questioning
2. Films and filmstrips
3. Role-playing
4. Globes and maps
5. Individual reports and research
6. Panels and debates
7. Chalkboard work
8. Charts and graphs
9. Music, records, and tape recordings
10. Newspapers

Too often history teaching is approached with the lecture technique being the only method utilized. The inquiry method could prove an invaluable alternative approach. The concept of inquiry is often difficult to identify. Inquiry may be developed in a variety of methods. It is both simple and complex, intuitive and systematic. There is one thing that the inquiry method is not, and that is a single prescribed learning-teaching style. No single act or series of acts constitutes inquiry. Inquiry can proceed from any number of combinations. Whenever teachers observe their students reflecting on their subject matter, consciously involving themselves in the investigative process, engaging in analysis, or making judgments after evaluating pertinent evidence, they are learning through inquiry. This approach can be used to teach expansionism in the 1890's, and Congress' role in the administration of the Philippines. A variety of methods with which to teach the subject are available. Teachers should find that these activities will provide them additional avenues with which to approach the Philippine issue, as well as other related topics.

Activity One

The following exercise may be used as an introduction to the subject.

Divide the class into several small groups. Ask each group to list on one side of a piece of paper the ways in which they, their peers, and their families depend on or have been affected by countries outside the United States. They should consider such things as family ties, consumer goods, travel, military service, etc. Then have them list on the other side of the paper the role the United States government plays in any of the items on the first list. Here they might mention such things as import duties, passports, currency changes, military assignments, citizenship processes, etc. When the lists have been completed, the groups can compare and discuss their lists.

This activity should both personalize the study of foreign affairs for the class and should start students thinking about the ways in which nations become involved with each other and about the role governments play in these involvements.

Activity Two

One simple way to approach the topic is by the question and answer method. The following introductory, analytical and open-ended questions may be asked the class.

1. What did it mean to be a Great Power at the beginning of the twentieth century?
2. How did the United States become a Great Power at the beginning of the twentieth century?
3. Why did the United States go to war with Spain in 1898?
4. Do you think McKinley's arguments for going to war are believable? On what facts do you base your judgment?
5. How did McKinley decide what to do about the Philippines?
6. Why did McKinley decide to keep the Philippines?
7. How would you describe McKinley's attitude toward the Filipinos?
8. How did Senator Hoar's arguments compare with President McKinley's?
9. On the basis of what you have read in the survey American history text, do you think the Philippines should have been annexed? Why or why not?
10. Do you think policies similar to the ones followed from 1898-1902 would be justified today?
11. Do you think such policies would be acceptable to public opinion today? Why or why not?
12. Has Congress' attitude toward expansion changed recently?

Activity Three

Role playing is an excellent technique to obtain more student involvement. It can be effectively utilized when teaching about the acquisition and administration of the Philippines.

The teacher can select two students to assume the roles of witnesses appearing before the Senate, represented by the class. One student is to prepare a case which is being argued to convince the Senate that acquisition of the Philippines is in the best interests of the country. The other student should prepare an argument taking the opposite viewpoint--that is, to convince the Senate that expansionism in the Philippines is wrong. The students, representing Congress, can listen to each of the arguments and then ask questions. At the conclusion, the class can vote "for" or "against" United States involvement in the Philippines. The class vote should be made on the basis of the most convincing argument presented.

The teacher can use this exercise to explore other related areas. How Congress functions, the character of pro- and anti-imperialist sentiment, as well as sectional attitude toward national expansion may also be pertinent to the discussion.

Activity Four

Debates can be used to obtain a "feeling" for the period. This activity might take the form of a mock session of the United States Senate. This is the question before the Senate: should the United States annex the Philippine Islands? Students can assume the roles of speakers representing Senators from different sections of the country, American companies with investments in the Philippines, advocates of anti-imperialism, and those arguing the duty to "uplift, civilize, and Christianize the Filipinos." Each student can select the role he or she prefers, but a close familiarity with that point of view will of course be required. One student can act as moderator and stage the debate on this issue. This type of activity stimulates research and oral communication.

Activity Five

From their readings, the students will conduct a debate on the Spanish-American War, taking sides either for or against American involvement in that war. On the chalkboard, the teacher should write the following quotations:

1. "It was an unnecessary, an avoidable war."
2. It was "A Splendid Little War."

Inform the class that it will now conduct a debate on the war. The students may volunteer for the teams. Those who are not on the teams will listen to the debates and determine who won. They must be prepared to explain their vote.

Activity Six

Write these four statements on the chalkboard:

1. American involvement in the affairs of other nations was initially motivated by economic considerations.
2. Arguments for imperialism and expansionism were based on the assumed superiority of white, Anglo-Saxon American to non-American, non-Anglo-Saxon peoples.
3. Arguments for colonization were based on an assumed link between sea power and national greatness because a nation had to have colonies to have a viable merchant marine.
4. Arguments for colonization were based on the American desire to civilize backward populations.

Have the students copy them as headings of four large columns. Then, inform them that although the development outlined in the textbook and assigned readings indicate that the United States was undergoing a basic change in its attitude toward involvement with other nations in the late nineteenth century, the assumptions, beliefs, and values that underlay the change were not entirely new. They had their roots in earlier American history. When they identify the root(s) of the assumptions, they should write them in the appropriate column of this chart. This exercise will give the student the opportunity to view the reasons behind the awakening of American imperialism.

Activity Seven

Have the students review imperialism surrounding the Spanish-American War. Have them look especially at the information about the role played by the American press before the outbreak of war. Then, tell the students that they will now develop a list of statements which outline the proper role of the American press during an international crisis which may lead to war. They should also be concerned with the role of the press during a war. After the statements have been prepared and discussed, ask the students to consider these questions: Can their statements be applied to any crisis or war situations or only to the Spanish-American War? What impact did the newspapers have with regard to American policy in the Philippines? What impact, if any, do newspapers have on Congressional attitudes and actions? Does the proper role of the press have to be constantly evaluated each time a war breaks out?

Encourage any students who wish to do so to extend the activity into a research project on the role of the press before and during the various wars in which the United States has been involved. Their research may be limited to a particular time period, or may range all the way from the Revolutionary War up to the present. Have them consider the following as they do their research:

1. Does the role of the press right before or during a war seem to have changed over the years, or has it remained constant?
2. In what war did the press seem to be most active? Least active?
3. What criticisms have been leveled at the press for its activities before or during a war? Do you think the criticisms were justified?
4. What problems does the role of the press raise with respect to First Amendment guarantees?

The students should of course not confine themselves to these questions. They will, however, give the student a good starting point.

Activity Eight

Have the students read about the imperialist and anti-imperialist members of Congress in the period immediately following the Spanish-American War. Divide the class into groups so that each group is responsible for a different section of the country. Have each group produce a chart, listing the imperialist and anti-imperialist members in Congress from the section that they are studying. From their chart, each group should be able to consider certain questions. For example, what role did party play in the stand of members of Congress on foreign policy questions? What role did geographic location play? How did regional attitudes affect voting records? One may then compare and contrast these regional attitudes toward other wars and conquests. These and other related questions will help the student to better understand why Congressional members acted and voted as they did.

Some educators and teachers are presently troubled by doubts that studying history is valuable or useful. However, we cannot know who we are or where we are going without knowing where we came from. The period from 1899 to 1908 was a critical period in the development of the United States as a world power. Knowledge of this period of American history allows one to put the problems and crises of the present into perspective. If this period of American history teaches us anything, it is that new problems are really a continuation or resurrection of old ones, that new ideas are largely rediscoveries or variation of older ones, and that crisis is a normal human condition.

United States foreign relations present many complex issues. In view of this, eight activities were devised to aid the teacher. Many others may be developed. To further aid the teacher, a bibliography of works relating to the subject of the Philippine question is provided. This list of source materials may be of value to the teacher in preparing classroom activities and may also be used by students as a reading list. No compilation of sources would be complete without the inclusion of the United States Congressional Record. As the authoritative record of Congressional action, it constitutes a source of invaluable information.

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CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION

The thirty-five year period following the Civil War was one of unparalleled activity in the United States. In those years, the United States conquered its Western frontier, industrialized its economy, and built great cities. So intense was their attention to internal matters that Americans virtually turned their backs on foreign affairs. Americans were not much interested in international developments, and leaders of the world's influential nations showed little interest in America. Foreign powers continued into the latter part of the nineteenth century to look on the United States as a second-rate country.

In the decade of the 1880's, however, the flags of England, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Germany were being placed at numerous points all over the globe. The feeling grew that such imperial activity was essential if a country was to receive recognition as a great power. Accordingly, the United States gradually became infected with the spirit of empire and renewed its interest in world affairs. The only overseas territory under the American flag by mid-1880's was Midway

Island. In the closing years of the nineteenth century, diplomacy and war brought additions to the American empire.

The Spanish-American War began in 1898 and had an intoxicating effect on the United States. The war heightened the national spirit and directed Americans toward thinking about the opportunity to enlarge their overseas domain at the expense of the decaying empire of Spain. By the time the war ended, most of them were determined to seize the opportunity. Because of the Teller Amendment, the United States could not honorably take Cuba, but Congress had made no pledge regarding other Spanish territories. Especially attractive were the Philippines, and the United States turned its attention to that area.

The Philippines became the most populous and most distant of the United States' overseas dependencies. From the time they annexed the Philippines, Americans indicated they did not consider their occupation of the islands as permanent. Still Congress declined to face the question of precisely when they should grant independence. In 1902, the Philippines were organized as a territory, and in 1906, Congress affirmed the United States' intent of eventually withdrawing from the territory, but there was no firm commitment as to when this would occur.

In the previous chapters, United States policy toward the Philippines and its methods in administering insular government from 1899 to 1908 have been reviewed. Specifically, the attitude of New England Congressmen toward the administration of the Philippines has been studied. From this analysis, certain generalizations may be made as to the importance of this section of the country.

The Philippine issue in Congress was dominated by two New England Senators: Henry Cabot Lodge and George Frisbee Hoar, both from Massachusetts. From 1899 to 1904, the year of Senator Hoar's death, these two men waged a battle of words. Hoar was the leader of the opposition forces who opposed Republican administration policies. He solidified the opposition, and they rallied behind him. Although Hoar in the end accomplished little, the Congressional Record contains some of his stirring speeches on the Philippine issue. Hoar labored under the disadvantage of having the negative side of the debate. In his statements, Hoar criticized the expansionism of Lodge; however, he presented no alternative rather than a return to the past. Hoar displayed an admirable spirit in making his protest in the face of hostile public opinion. He was a thorn to the expansionists until his death in 1904, at the age of seventy-eight. After his death, leaderless, the anti-expansionists

declined in importance and in numbers. The key figure in the Philippine issue from 1899 to 1908 was Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. As Chairman of the Committee on the Philippines, he was extremely influential in the formulation of policy concerning the territory. Eloquent in all debates, he dominated the Philippine situation. He held New England together as a voting unit when other sections of the country were fragmented. He used his power so effectively that all Republican-sponsored legislation regarding the Philippines was passed.

Other New Englanders held the key appointments on committees that dealt with the Philippines. Representative Frederick Gillett of Massachusetts was the Chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs in the House. Senator William Frye of Main was president pro-tempore of the Senate, and he was an avowed expansionist. He also helped formulate the Treaty of Paris. These men were very vocal and were instrumental in getting Republican policies passed in the Senate and House.

The importance of the whole New England delegation in determining our Philippine policy cannot be overlooked. More than any other section of the country, New England overwhelmingly voted in favor of acquisition and indefinite retention of the islands. The House produced no great leaders from New England as did the Senate. Most Congressional votes on Philippine issues

were quite close. It is significant that had not New England voted as they did, many pieces of legislation would have failed.

The region was a Republican stronghold. From 1899-1908, no Democrat served as United States Senator from the region, and not one of the small number of Democratic Representatives played a significant role. New England voted, almost unanimously, for Republican administration policies. Furthermore, New England Congressmen were influential in getting others to vote as they did. Their basic argument that the United States could not abandon the Philippines led many Congressmen to support administration policies. Combined with humanitarian motives, this served to sway many Congressmen.

In the formulation of United States policy in the Philippines, there was considerable conflict. There was some inconsistency between the officially expressed aim of Philippine welfare and the legislation enacted. It was obviously impossible always to satisfy equally the claims of both Filipinos and Americans, or to please all groups within the United States who might have interests at stake. A continuous desire was shown by some members of Congress to win an increase in our share of Philippine trade. New England Congressmen firmly supported these policies. There was also a strong reluctance

in Congress to remove the regular tariff protection against certain Philippine imports.

American businessmen received some preference in legislation passed by Congress. As we have seen, sugar and cigar producers, to mention just two, opposed reduction of Philippine duties on these products, and they were largely successful. While American administrators in the islands were concerned with advancing the welfare of the Filipinos, their advice was sometimes disregarded by Congress. This was the case when the Philippine Commission wanted a reduction in the Dingley rates, but Congress was at times unquestionably of great benefit to the Philippines. The nonimposition of the coastwise shipping regulations was clearly advantageous to the islands. If the regulations had passed, all goods going to and coming from the Philippines would have been carried in United States ships, causing higher prices. Even though considerable time and effort was spent on devising a new tariff in Congress, many questions remained unanswered by 1908 as to its possible impact on the future.

By 1908 the Philippine problem had reached a point where definite action looking to the future was essential. No serious policy could be planned without the expectation of long years of effort in carrying it out. Rapid development of policy appeared impossible, since most significant legislation was a product of

years of work and the driving force of Henry Cabot Lodge. To a large degree that legislation was still incomplete.

The policy developed from 1899 to 1908, implied an indefinite maintenance of the existing status with no firm timetable for eventual independence. This policy created many problems after 1908. The first step in our Philippine policy should have been a firm declaration of the intention to work toward independence, accompanied by the establishment of a date for the recognition of the Filipinos' natural aspirations. That simple statement, and a commitment to honor it, would have made it much easier to govern the Philippines, and made it possible to avoid further entanglements.

APPENDIX A

NEW ENGLAND SENATORS¹

55th Congress, 3rd Session

December 5, 1898-March 4, 1899

- | | |
|-------------------|---|
| 1. Connecticut: | Orville H. Platt (R)
Joseph R. Hawley (R) |
| 2. Maine: | William P. Frye (R)
Eugene Hale (R) |
| 3. Massachusetts: | Henry Cabot Lodge (R)
George F. Hoar (R) |
| 4. New Hampshire: | William E. Chandler (R)
Jacob H. Gallinger (R) |
| 5. Rhode Island: | Nelson W. Aldrich (R)
George P. Wetmore (R) |
| 6. Vermont: | Redfield Proctor (R)
Jonathan Ross (R) |

R--Republican Party

D--Democrat Party

¹Lists of Senators and Representatives in Appendix A and B have been obtained from the introductory pages of the Congressional Record for each session. Party identification has been determined from biographical sketches contained in the Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1949 (Washington, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1950).

NEW ENGLAND REPRESENTATIVES

55th Congress, 3rd Session

December 5, 1898-March 4, 1899

1. Connecticut: Ebenezer J. Hill (R)
Charles A. Russell (R)
Nehemiah D. Sperry (R)
E. Stevens Henry (R)
2. Maine: Charles A. Boutelle (R)
Edwin C. Burleigh (R)
Nelson Dingley (R)
Thomas B. Reed (R)
3. Massachusetts: William E. Barrett (R)
Samuel J. Barrows (R)
John F. Fitzgerald (D)
Frederick H. Gillett (R)
William S. Greene (R)
William S. Knox (R)
George P. Lawrence (R)
William C. Lovering (R)
Samuel W. McCall (R)
William H. Moody (R)
Charles F. Sprague (R)
Joseph H. Walker (R)
George W. Weymouth (R)
4. New Hampshire: Frank G. Clarke (R)
Cyrus A. Sulloway (R)
5. Rhode Island: Melville Bull (R)
Adin B. Capron (R)
6. Vermont: William W. Grout (R)
H. Henry Powers (R)

APPENDIX B

NEW ENGLAND SENATORS

56th Congress, 1st Session

December 4, 1899 to June 7, 1900

1. Connecticut: Orville H. Platt (R)
Joseph R. Hawley (R)
2. Maine: William P. Frye (R)
Eugene Hale (R)
3. Massachusetts: Henry Cabot Lodge (R)
George F. Hoar (R)
4. New Hampshire: William E. Chandler (R)
Jacob H. Gallinger (R)
5. Rhode Island: Nelson W. Aldrich (R)
George P. Wetmore (R)
6. Vermont: Justin Morrill* (R)
Redfield Proctor (R)

*Died December 28, 1898. Replaced by Jonathan Ross (R).

NEW ENGLAND REPRESENTATIVES

56th Congress, 1st Session

December 4, 1899 to June 7, 1900

- | | |
|-------------------|--|
| 1. Connecticut: | E. Stevens Henry (R)
C. A. Russell (R)
Ebenezer J. Hill (R) |
| 2. Maine: | Amos L. Allen (R)*
Edwin C. Burleigh (R)
Charles L. Boutelle (R)
C. E. Littlefield (R)** |
| 3. Massachusetts: | John F. Fitzgerald (D)
William S. Greene (R)
George P. Lawrence (R)
Samuel W. McCall (R)
H. F. Naphen (D)
Charles Sprague (R)
George Weymouth (R)
Frederick H. Gillett (R)
William S. Knox (R)
William C. Lovering (R)
William H. Moody (R)
E. W. Roberts (R)
J. R. Thayer (D) |
| 4. New Hampshire: | Frank G. Clarke (R)
Cyrus A. Sulloway (R) |
| 5. Rhode Island: | Adin B. Capron (R)
Mellville Bull (R) |
| 6. Vermont: | William W. Grout (R)
H. Henry Powers (R) |

*Replaced Thomas B. Reed who resigned.

**Elected in place of Nelson Dingley who died.

NEW ENGLAND SENATORS

56th Congress, 2nd Session

December 3, 1900 to March 4, 1901

1. Connecticut: Orville H. Platt (R)
Joseph R. Hawley (R)
2. Maine: William P. Frye (R)
Eugene Hale (R)
3. Massachusetts: Henry Cabot Lodge (R)
George F. Hoar (R)
4. New Hampshire: Jacob H. Gallinger (R)
Henry E. Burnham (R)
5. Rhode Island: Nelson Aldrich (R)
George P. Wetmore (R)
6. Vermont: William P. Dillingham (R)
Redfield Proctor (R)

NEW ENGLAND REPRESENTATIVES

56th Congress, 2nd Session

December 3, 1900 to March 4, 1901

- | | |
|-------------------|--|
| 1. Connecticut: | Ebenezer J. Hill (R)
N. D. Sperry (R)
C. A. Russell (R)
E. Stevens Henry (R) |
| 2. Maine: | Amos L. Allen (R)
C. E. Littlefield (R)
Charles A. Boutelle (R)
Edwin Burleigh (R) |
| 3. Massachusetts: | John F. Fitzgerald (D)
William S. Greene (R)
George P. Lawrence (R)
Samuel McCall (R)
H. F. Naphen (D)
Charles Sprague (R)
George Weymouth (R)
Frederick Gillett (R)
William S. Knox (R)
William C. Lovering (R)
William H. Moody (R)
E. W. Roberts (R)
John R. Thayer (D) |
| 4. New Hampshire: | Frank G. Clarke (R)*
Cyrus A. Sulloway (R) |
| 5. Rhode Island: | Mellville Bull (R)
Adin B. Capron (R) |
| 6. Vermont: | William Grout (R)
H. Henry Powers (R) |

*Died January 9, 1901.

NEW ENGLAND SENATORS

57th Congress, 1st Session

December 2, 1901 to July 1, 1902

1. Connecticut: Orville H. Platt (R)
Joseph R. Hawley (R)
2. Maine: William P. Frye (R)
Eugene Hale (R)
3. Massachusetts: Henry Cabot Lodge (R)
George F. Hoar (R)
4. New Hampshire: Jacob H. Gallinger (R)
Henry E. Burnham (R)
5. Rhode Island: Nelson Aldrich (R)
George P. Wetmore (R)
6. Vermont: William P. Dillingham (R)
Redfield Proctor (R)

NEW ENGLAND REPRESENTATIVES

57th Congress, 1st Session

December 2, 1901 to July 1, 1902

1. Connecticut: E. Stevens Henry (R)
Charles A. Russell (R)
Ebenezer J. Hill (R)
Nehemiah D. Sperry (R)
2. Maine: Amos L. Allen (R)
Alewellyn Powers (R)*
Charles Littlefield (R)
Edwin C. Burleigh (R)
3. Massachusetts: Joseph A. Conry (D)
William S. Greene (R)
George P. Lawrence (R)
Samuel W. McCall (R)
Henry F. Naphen (D)
Ernest W. Roberts (R)
Frederick H. Gillett (R)
William S. Knox (R)
William C. Lovering (R)
William H. Moody (R)**
Samuel L. Powers (R)
John R. Thayer (D)
Charles Q. Tirrell (R)
4. New Hampshire: Frank D. Currier (R)
Cyrus A. Sulloway (R)
5. Rhode Island: Mellville Bull (R)
Adin B. Capron (R)
6. Vermont: David J. Foster (R)
Kittredge Haskins (R)

*Elected in place of Charles Boutelle who resigned.

**Resigned to become Secretary of the Navy, May 1, 1902.

NEW ENGLAND SENATORS
57th Congress, 2nd Session
December 1, 1902 to March 1903

1. Connecticut: Orville H. Platt (R)
Joseph R. Hawley (R)
2. Maine: William P. Frye (R)
Eugene Hale (R)
3. Massachusetts: Henry Cabot Lodge (R)
George F. Hoar (R)
4. New Hampshire: Jacob H. Gallinger (R)
Henry E. Burnham (R)
5. Rhode Island: Nelson Aldrich (R)
George P. Wetmore (R)
6. Vermont: William P. Dillingham (R)
Redfield Proctor (R)

NEW ENGLAND REPRESENTATIVES

57th Congress, 2nd Session

December 1, 1902 to March 4, 1903

1. Connecticut: Frank B. Brandegee (R)*
E. Stevens Henry (R)
Ebenezer J. Hill (R)
Nehemiah D. Sperry (R)
2. Maine: Amos Allen (R)
Edwin C. Burleigh (R)
Charles E. Littlefield (R)
Llewellyn Powers (R)
3. Massachusetts: Joseph A. Conroy (D)
Augustus P. Gardner (R)**
Frederick H. Gillett (R)
William S. Greene (R)
William S. Knox (R)
George P. Lawrence (R)
William C. Lovering (R)
Samuel W. McCall (R)
Henry F. Naphen (D)
Samuel L. Powers (R)
Ernest W. Roberts (R)
John R. Thayer (D)
Charles Q. Tirrell (R)
4. New Hampshire: Frank D. Currier (R)
Cyrus Sulloway (R)
5. Rhode Island: Mellville Bull (R)
Adin B. Capron (R)
6. Vermont: David J. Foster (R)
Kittredge Haskins (R)

*Elected in place of Charles A. Russell, who died.

**Elected in place of William H. Moody, who resigned.

NEW ENGLAND SENATORS

58th Congress, 1st Session

March 5-19 and November 9 to December 7, 1903

1. Connecticut: Orville H. Platt (R)
Joseph R. Hawley (R)
2. Maine: William P. Frye (R)
Eugene Hale (R)
3. Massachusetts: Henry Cabot Lodge (R)
George F. Hoar (R)
4. New Hampshire: Jacob H. Gallinger (R)
Henry E. Burnham (R)
5. Rhode Island: Nelson Aldrich (R)
George P. Wetmore (R)
6. Vermont: William P. Dillingham (R)
Redfield Proctor (R)

NEW ENGLAND REPRESENTATIVES

58th Congress, 1st Session

March 5-19 and November 9 to December 7, 1903

1. Connecticut: Frank B. Brandegee (R)
E. Stevens Henry (R)
Ebenezer J. Hill (R)
George L. Lilley
Nehemiah D. Sperry (R)
2. Maine: Amos L. Allen (R)
Edwin C. Burleigh (R)
Charles Littlefield (R)
Llewellyn Powers (R)
3. Massachusetts: Butler Ames (R)
Augustus Gardner (R)
Frederick H. Gillett (R)
William S. Greene (R)
John Keliher (D)
George P. Lawrence (R)
William C. Lovering (R)
Samuel W. McCall (R)
William S. McNary (D)
Samuel L. Powers (R)
Ernest W. Roberts (R)
John A. Sullivan (D)
John R. Thayer (D)
Charles Q. Tirrell (R)
4. New Hampshire: Frank D. Currier (R)
Cyrus A. Sulloway (R)
5. Rhode Island: Adin B. Capron (R)
Daniel L. D. Granger (D)
6. Vermont: David J. Foster (R)
Kittredge Haskins (R)

NEW ENGLAND SENATORS

58th Congress, 2nd Session

December 7, 1903 to April 38, 1904

1. Connecticut: Orville H. Platt (R)
Joseph R. Hawley (R)
2. Maine: William P. Frye (R)
Eugene Hale (R)
3. Massachusetts: Henry Cabot Lodge (R)
George F. Hoar (R)
4. New Hampshire: Jacob H. Gallinger (R)
Henry E. Burnham (R)
5. Rhode Island: Nelson Aldrich (R)
George P. Wetmore (R)
6. Vermont: William P. Dillingham (R)
Redfield Proctor (R)

NEW ENGLAND REPRESENTATIVES

58th Congress, 2nd Session

December 7, 1903 to April 38, 1904

1. Connecticut: Frank B. Brandegee (R)
Ebenezer J. Hill (R)
George L. Lilley (R)
Nehemiah D. Sperry (R)
E. Stevens Henry (R)
2. Maine: Amos Allen (R)
Edwin C. Burleigh (R)
Charles E. Littlefield (R)
Llewellyn Powers (R)
3. Massachusetts: Butler Ames (R)
Augustus Gardner (R)
Frederick H. Gillett (R)
William S. Greene (R)
John A. Keliher (D)
George P. Lawrence (R)
William C. Lovering (R)
Samuel W. McCall (R)
William S. McNary (D)
Samuel L. Powers (R)
Ernest W. Roberts (R)
John A. Sullivan (D)
John Thayer (D)
Charles Q. Tirrell (R)
4. New Hampshire: Frank D. Currier (R)
Cyrus A. Sulloway (R)
5. Rhode Island: Adin B. Capron (R)
Daniel L. D. Grandeur (D)
6. Vermont: David J. Foster (R)
Kittredge Haskins (R)

NEW ENGLAND SENATORS

58th Congress, 3rd Session

December 5, 1904 to March 4, 1905

1. Connecticut: Orville H. Platt (R)
Joseph R. Hawley (R)
2. Maine: William P. Frye (R)
Eugene Hale (R)
3. Massachusetts: W. Murray Crane (R)*
Henry Cabot Lodge (R)
4. New Hampshire: Jacob H. Gallinger (R)
Henry E. Burnham (R)
5. Rhode Island: Nelson Aldrich (R)
George P. Wetmore (R)
6. Vermont: William P. Dillingham (R)
Redfield Proctor (R)

*Replaced George F. Hoar who died.

NEW ENGLAND REPRESENTATIVES

58th Congress, 3rd Session

December 5, 1904 to March 4, 1905

1. Connecticut: Frank B. Brandegee (R)
E. Stevens Henry (R)
Ebenezer J. Hill (R)
George L. Lilley (R)
Nehemiah D. Sperry (R)
2. Maine: Amos L. Allen (R)
Edwin C. Burleigh (R)
Charles E. Littlefield (R)
Llewellyn Powers (R)
3. Massachusetts: Butler Ames (R)
Augustus Gardner (R)
Frederick H. Gillett (R)
William S. Greene (R)
John A. Keliher (D)
George P. Lawrence (R)
William C. Lovering (R)
Samuel W. McCall (R)
William S. McNary (D)
Samuel L. Powers (R)
Ernest W. Roberts (R)
John A. Sullivan (D)
John R. Thayer (D)
Charles Q. Tirrell (R)
4. New Hampshire: Frank D. Currier (R)
Cyrus A. Sulloway (R)
5. Rhode Island: Adin B. Capron (R)
Daniel L. D. Granger (D)
6. Vermont: David J. Foster (R)
Kittredge Haskins (R)

NEW ENGLAND SENATORS

59th Congress, 1st Session

December 4, 1905 to June 30, 1906

1. Connecticut: Frank B. Brandegee (R)*
Morgan G. Bulkeley (R)
2. Maine: William P. Frye (R)
Eugene Hale (R)
3. Massachusetts: W. Murray Crane (R)
Henry Cabot Lodge (R)
4. New Hampshire: Jacob H. Gallinger (R)
Henry E. Burnham (R)
5. Rhode Island: Nelson Aldrich (R)
George P. Wetmore (R)
6. Vermont: William P. Dillingham (R)
Redfield Proctor (R)

*In place of Orville Platt who died.

NEW ENGLAND REPRESENTATIVES

59th Congress, 1st Session

December 4, 1905 to June 30, 1906

1. Connecticut: Frank B. Brandegee (R)
E. Stevens Henry (R)
Edwin W. Higgins (R)*
Ebenezer J. Hill (R)
Nehemiah D. Sperry (R)
2. Maine: Amos L. Allen (R)
Edwin C. Burleigh (R)
Charles E. Littlefield (R)
Llewellyn Powers (R)
3. Massachusetts: Butler Ames (R)
Augustus Gardner (R)
Frederick H. Gillett (R)
William S. Greene (R)
Rockwood Hoar (R)
John A. Keliher (D)
George P. Lawrence (R)
William C. Lovering (R)
Samuel W. McCall (R)
William S. McNary (D)
Ernest W. Roberts (R)
John A. Sullivan (D)
Charles Q. Tirrell
4. New Hampshire: Frank D. Currier (R)
Cyrus A. Sulloway (R)
5. Rhode Island: Adin B. Capron (R)
Daniel L. D. Granger (D)
6. Vermont: David J. Foster (R)
Kittredge Haskins (R)

*In place of Frank Brandegee who resigned May 10, 1905.

NEW ENGLAND SENATORS

59th Congress, 2nd Session

December 3, 1906 to March 4, 1907

1. Connecticut: Frank B. Brandegee (R)
Moran G. Bulkeley (R)
2. Maine: William P. Frye (R)
Eugene Hale (R)
3. Massachusetts: W. Murray Crane (R)
Henry Cabot Lodge (R)
4. New Hampshire: Jacob H. Gallinger (R)
Henry E. Burnham (R)
5. Rhode Island: Nelson Aldrich (R)
George P. Wetmore (R)
6. Vermont: William P. Dillingham (R)
Redfield Proctor (R)

NEW ENGLAND REPRESENTATIVES

59th Congress, 2nd Session

December 3, 1906 to March 4, 1907

1. Connecticut: E. Stevens Henry (R)
Edwin W. Higgins (R)
Ebenezer J. Hill (R)
George L. Lilley (R)
Nehemiah D. Sperry (R)
2. Maine: Amos L. Allen (R)
Edwin C. Burleigh (R)
Charles Littlefield (R)
Llewellyn Powers (R)
3. Massachusetts: Butler Ames (R)
Augustus Gardner (R)
Frederick H. Gillett (R)
William S. Greene (R)
John A. Keliher (D)
George Lawrence (R)
William C. Lovering (R)
Samuel W. McCall (R)
William S. McNary (D)
Ernest W. Roberts (R)
John A. Sullivan (D)
Charles Q. Tirrell (R)
Charles G. Washburn (R)
John W. Weeks (R)
4. New Hampshire: Frank D. Currier (R)
Cyrus A. Sulloway (R)
5. Rhode Island: Adin B. Capron (R)
Daniel L. D. Granger (D)
6. Vermont: David J. Foster (R)
Kittredge Haskins (R)

NEW ENGLAND SENATORS

60th Congress, 1st Session

December 2, 1907 to May 30, 1908

1. Connecticut: Frank B. Brandegee (R)
Morgan G. Bulkeley (R)
2. Maine: William Frye (R)
Eugene Hale (R)
3. Massachusetts: W. Murray Crane (R)
Henry Cabot Lodge (R)
4. New Hampshire: Henry E. Burnham (R)
Jacob H. Gallinger (R)
5. Rhode Island: Nelson W. Aldrich (R)
George P. Wetmore (R)
6. Vermont: William P. Dillingham (R)
Redfield Proctor (R)*

*Died March 4, 1908.

NEW ENGLAND REPRESENTATIVES

60th Congress, 1st Session

December 2, 1907 to May 30, 1908

1. Connecticut:
 - E. Stevens Henry (R)
 - Edwin W. Higgins (R)
 - Ebenezer J. Hill (R)
 - George L. Lilley (R)
 - Nehemiah D. Sperry (R)
2. Maine:
 - Amos Allen (R)
 - Edwin C. Burleigh (R)
 - Charles E. Littlefield (R)*
 - Llewellyn Powers (R)
3. Massachusetts:
 - Butler Ames (R)
 - Augustus Gardner (R)
 - Frederick H. Gillett (R)
 - William S. Greene (R)
 - John A. Keliher (D)
 - George P. Lawrence (R)
 - William C. Lovering (R)
 - Samuel W. McCall (R)
 - Joseph F. O'Connell (D)
 - Andrew J. Peters (D)
 - Ernest Roberts (R)
 - Charles Q. Tirrell (R)
 - Charles G. Washburn (R)
 - John W. Weeks (R)
4. New Hampshire:
 - Frank Currier (R)
 - Cyrus A. Sulloway (R)
5. Rhode Island:
 - Adin B. Capron (R)
 - David L. D. Grander (D)
6. Vermont:
 - David Foster (R)
 - Kittredge Haskins (R)

*Resigned to take effect September 30, 1908.

APPENDIX C

PARTY STRENGTH IN CONGRESS¹

D-Democratic

R-Republican

Congress	Year	President
56	1899-01	R (McKinley)
57	1901-03	R (McKinley) R (Roosevelt)
58	1903-05	R (Roosevelt)
59	1905-07	R (Roosevelt)
60	1907-09	R (Roosevelt)

Note: The symbol R stands for the Republican Party, and the symbol D stands for the Democratic Party.

¹Richard B. Morris, ed., Encyclopedia of American History (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), pp. 426-27.

PARTY STRENGTH IN CONGRESS-Continued

Senate			House		
Majority party	Principal Minority party	Others	Majority party	Principal Minority party	Others
R 53	D 26	8	R 185	D 163	9
R 55	D 31	4	R 197	D 151	9
R 57	D 33	0	R 208	D 178	0
R 57	D 33	0	R 250	D 136	0
R 61	D 31	0	R 222	D 164	0

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