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THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE: A TEACHING STRATEGY INVOLVING
PRIMARY DOCUMENTATION

Middle Tennessee State University

D.A. 1983

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THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE: A TEACHING STRATEGY
INVOLVING PRIMARY DOCUMENTATION

Michael J. Sweeny

A dissertation presented to the
Graduate Faculty of Middle Tennessee State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree Doctor of Arts

May, 1983

THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE: A TEACHING STRATEGY
INVOLVING PRIMARY DOCUMENTATION

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ABSTRACT

THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE: A TEACHING STRATEGY INVOLVING PRIMARY DOCUMENTATION

by Michael J. Sweeny

This dissertation holds that the student in college level American History surveys should be exposed to primary documents to help him interpret evidence and present conclusions no matter what field of endeavor he follows after his college experience. It is further suggested that the format that would work best would be one in which the primary documents are interwoven into the text and not one in which the student has to go to the appendix of a book or to the library to obtain the documents.

A 186 page paper was developed presenting a selected group of primary documents covering the Potsdam Conference. The principal source of these materials was the United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945, Volumes I and II. This was supplemented by materials from newspapers and several memoirs.

Selection of materials was made to present a balanced view of the conference while emphasizing issues

Michael J. Sweeny

which seemed likely to interest the students. They were the fate of Germany, the final settlement of the Polish problem, plans for defeating Japan and the postwar settlement with that country, and the activities, influence and views of Harry S. Truman. The three official documents issued by the participants, the Proclamation, the Communique and the Protocol, were attached in their entirety.

This dissertation was tested in three courses at Middle Tennessee State University in the summer of 1982. Each student was given a printed copy of the Potsdam paper. The students were given one week to complete an essay on one of five topics. They then took a multiple-choice and identification test to see if they read the paper and answered a questionnaire, which among other things inquired if they would have gone to the library and read the main text of the documents.

Results indicate a document was developed that was applicable to all grades and sexes. The students performed very well on the essay and read the other materials. They much preferred the inclusion of the documents in the text rather than in an appendix or the library.

DEDICATION

The author dedicates this dissertation to:

J. T. SWEENY and MARY HELEN BROWN

J. T. Sweeny, the author's paternal grandfather, who only completed the eighth grade, had a saying: "Get along with everyone in life--from the president of a company to the custodian."

Mary Helen Brown, the author's maternal grandmother, was a died-in-the-wool Republican who admired a man from Missouri--Harry S. Truman.

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The author wishes to acknowledge Mrs. Wilma Lee Grant, his typist and friend. This lady will never know how much her guidance and influence has had on the author.

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Dr. and Mrs. Francis J. Riel have been most gracious to the author while he has resided in Murfreesboro for the past five years. The author will never forget their generous hospitality and love. The author wishes to give a tremendous thank you to Dr. John J. Gich who was working on his dissertation when the author arrived in Murfreesboro, and was the first friend the author made. The author will be eternally grateful to Dr. Gich for introducing him to Mrs. Wilma Lee Grant and to Dr. and Mrs. Riel.

The author wishes to thank his family, Dr. and Mrs. W. T. Sweeny, parents of the author, and his brothers, Mark, John Edward, and Steven Matthew Sweeny.

Above all, the author thanks God Almighty for giving him the gift to understand and love history, and for giving him the ability to teach history--the record of the human race.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In February, 1945, United States President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill, and Russian Premier Joseph Stalin met at Yalta on the Crimea for a major wartime conference. A number of issues were discussed including Eastern Europe and Germany, and a series of important agreements were reached. As time elapsed it became obvious to the Western Powers that Russia was not living up to some of the agreements, including free elections in Poland.

Churchill, in a series of diplomatic cables in March and April of 1945, discussed these problems with President Roosevelt. The President was of the belief the various problems could be resolved. On April 12, 1945, Roosevelt died. His successor was Harry S. Truman, who as Vice-President had not been kept informed of the problems resulting from the Yalta conference.

The President was enlightened about the problems as he read the cables and listened to the late President's advisors. Churchill, in a cable on May 9, 1945, convinced Truman that exchanging diplomatic notes would not solve the

problems among the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. A conference among them was necessary to resolve the situation. Stalin agreed and Potsdam, a suburb in the Soviet Sector in Berlin, Germany, was chosen as the conference site. This became the last World War II conference.

A number of significant agreements were reached at Potsdam involving Germany, Poland, Iran, Turkey, Austria, Japan, and other areas. Three major documents were issued: the Proclamation, Communique, and Protocol. The Proclamation called upon Japan to surrender. The Communique, which was released immediately after the Potsdam Conference, listed the topics covered at the conference. The Protocol, released two years later, contained the formal agreements reached at the conference.

Robin George Collingwood in his classic, The Idea of History, said that "every historian would agree . . . that history is a kind of research or inquiry." He further stated that it proceeds by "the interpretation of evidence: where evidence is a collective name for things which singly are called documents. . . ." ¹ Henry Steele Commanger in A Study of History quotes with favor Carl Becker's statement

¹Robin George Collingwood, The Idea of History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957, A Galaxy Book), pp. 9-10.

that "every man is his own historian."² And he says that we all do in a crude fashion what professional historians do. We collect evidence, organize it, dress it up with drama and art, and interpret it.³

Numerous student manuals such as those by Jules R. Benjamin, Norman Canter, and others agree that the use of primary documents by the students for writing is very important. Yet, in most instances, students in history courses on the junior high, high school and introductory college levels normally learn by reading textbooks, listening to lectures, watching audio-visual materials, and otherwise receiving pre-digested secondary materials. There have been some efforts at producing materials allowing the student to use primary materials; in two instances, primary sources are located in the main text of the book. The Harvard University Studies Project incorporates primary material in the main text. In one of their works, The American Revolution, Crisis of Law and Change, the editors write, "the book aids the student in developing a clearer idea and understanding of the issues involved in this great conflict."⁴ The Amherst Project, sponsored by Amherst

²Henry Steele Commager, A Study of History (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Books, Inc., 1966), p. 15.

³Ibid.

⁴Donald W. Oliver and Fred M. Newmann, The American Revolution, Crisis of Law and Change (New York: Xerox Corporation, 1967), back cover.

College, also incorporates primary source material in the main text. The Van Nostrand Anvil paperback series follows the format of incorporating primary source material at the end of the main text of their books. Norman Graebner in Cold War Diplomacy 1945-1960, an Anvil paperback, presents a brief survey of American foreign policy with primary source material located in the back of the book. In this approach, the student must stop and search for the primary material, read it and then return to the main text.

It is the contention of this dissertation that the students in the sophomore college level American History course should be exposed to primary documents to help them understand more how to interpret evidence and present conclusions no matter what field of endeavor they follow after their college experience. It is also the contention of the dissertation that the format that would work best would be one in which the primary documents are interwoven into the text and not one in which the student has to go to the appendix of a book or to the library to obtain the documents.

Any number of events in American History could be chosen to develop such a primary source document for the use of the student. Potsdam has been chosen since its decisions continue to affect America's foreign policy and the life of many people in the world today through a divided Germany, a Polish problem, a Turkish-Russian contest over the Dardanelles, and a continuing nuclear warfare controversy.

The first and most time-consuming part of this dissertation was creating the document presenting the primary sources on the Potsdam Conference to the students. The principal source for these materials was the United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945, Volumes I and II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1960). This is a massive work consisting of two lengthy volumes. This was supplemented by newspaper materials from the period and by primary source materials from several memoirs of the participants including those by President Truman and Marshal Ahukov, and by materials from scholarly works on the period.

Neither of the major works on the Potsdam Conference by Herbert Feis and Charles Mee present any primary materials.⁵ Thus, it was necessary for the author to choose which materials were most appropriate. Selection was made with the idea of presenting a balanced view of the conference, while at the same time emphasizing the issues which seemed most likely to interest the students in an introductory college American History survey. Essentially, four issues were selected: the fate of Germany now that the

⁵Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace The Potsdam Conference (Princeton: University Press, 1960); Charles Mee, Jr., Meeting at Potsdam (New York: M. Evans and Company, 1975).

war in Europe was over; the final settlement of the Polish problem; the plans for defeating Japan and the settlement with that country after the war; and the activities, influence, and views of United States President Harry S. Truman. Finally, the three official documents issued by the participants, the Proclamation, the Communique, and the Protocol, were attached in their entirety.

Having chosen the material, it was necessary for the author to provide the students with some guidance. The first chapter of the testing document was a summary of the situation in Europe in 1945, a brief discussion of why the conference was called, an overview of the conference itself and the documents it issued, and an explanation to the students about the exercise in which they would participate. Introductory and transitory statements by the author were necessary through the nine substantive chapters. In all of this the principle was followed that the author should provide enough explanation to the students so they could understand the documents. At the same time, an attempt was made to give no interpretation of the documents themselves since that was the essential activity of the students in the essay portion of the exercise.

Finally, having produced a 186-page document the author had the document printed and bound at the Middle Tennessee State University Print Shop. Thus, each student was furnished with a personal copy of the Potsdam Document.

The dissertation was then field tested in three American History survey classes on the campus of Middle Tennessee State University in the summer of 1982. The classes were taught by Dr. Newell S. Moore, Dr. Jerry Brookshire, and Dr. David Rowe. Sixty-five students read the dissertation and completed a number of academic exercises. They were given a choice of one of five take-home essays covering an important aspect of the conference: the fate of Germany at Potsdam; Poland at the conference; Japan at the conference (this dealt with the origins and the issuance of the Potsdam Proclamation, which called upon Japan to surrender); the views of the American President Harry S. Truman; or compare and contrast the communique and protocol. The students were to do a four- to eight-page essay, worth sixty-five percent of their grades.⁶

The students were given one week to complete the exercise. On the day the essays were returned, the students performed two in-class exercises. A multiple-choice test and an identification test were administered, which were designed to see if the students read the Potsdam Document in general and did not just follow the essay guidelines. A questionnaire inquired into a number of items, e.g., if they

⁶The reader will find copies of each of these exercises and a discussion on the results in the concluding chapter of the dissertation beginning on page 196.

would have gone to the library and read the main text of the documents.

Thus, this dissertation traced the origins of the Potsdam Conference, the actual proceedings, and the conclusion. Most of the materials compiled for student use are from the actual documents coming from the conference. Some newspaper coverage from the New York Times has been included to give the student an idea of public coverage of the conference. The students were given primary material without any comments from historians in the diplomatic field. They were not informed of the various interpretations or different schools in the field of diplomacy. This dissertation has given the student an in-depth study into the interworkings of a diplomatic conference, an exercise, which would be prohibitive for the professor to do in class since he is under a rigid time limit to cover vast amounts of material in the American History survey course.

The reader should bear in mind these documents were not made public until 1960, fifteen years after the conference. Thus, what transpired was kept from the public at the time. The author left the code symbols such as "TOP SECRET" AND "MOST SECRET" in the documents to give the reader a "feel" for the document. These documents were mainly diplomatic cables or telegrams, and the code symbols are important in determining the availability of who would

read them. In some cases code "EYES ONLY" appears and that means the document was for the eyes only of the recipient.

The next ten chapters consist of the documents compiled for the use of the students. The final chapter deals with the results of the field test which includes sample essays and results of the multiple-choice test, identification test, and questionnaire. Finally, certain conclusions are reached from this research.

CHAPTER II

SUMMARY OF THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE

The year 1945 found the war in Europe and in the Pacific continuing. On February 11, 1945, the Yalta (Crimea) Conference in the Soviet Union, attended by United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill and Russian Premier Josip Stalin, ended and issued an official record of their talks, referred to as a communique. Among the issues discussed at the conference were: the defeat of Germany; the occupation and control of Germany; a declaration on liberated Europe; Poland; Yugoslavia; the United Nations Organization; and general unity for peace after the war. Shortly after the Yalta or Crimea Conference problems arose. A communist government came into power in Rumania. This was a violation of the American and British concept of the Declaration on Liberated Europe, agreed upon at Yalta. The Declaration had expressed the views of the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union on countries liberated from the rule of Hitler's Germany.

Prime Minister Churchill shortly afterwards began informing Roosevelt that the Russians were putting a

communist government in Poland. This was definitely a violation of the Yalta or Crimea agreement on Poland. There were two Polish governments in 1945, one in London composed of exiles and one in Warsaw formed after the liberation of the country from Nazi rule. The Yalta or Crimea agreement on Poland called for free elections. The Russians were not living up to that agreement for free elections. In April, 1945, the American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman, sent a message to President Roosevelt saying the Russians were not allowing the American Navy access to Gdynia, Poland, as agreed to at Yalta.

On April 12, 1945, tragedy struck the United States of America. Franklin D. Roosevelt died. A former Senator from Missouri, Vice-President Harry S. Truman, assumed the office of the President of the United States. Truman, Vice-President for only two and two-thirds months, had been kept in the dark on foreign policy matters by Roosevelt. Thus, the man from Missouri had a great deal of learning to do when he became the thirty-third President of the United States. In doing so he became aware of the problems that had arisen since the Yalta (Crimea) Conference.

Upon Stalin's inquiry, Harriman said the best way to show continued support between the United States and Russia was to send the Russian Foreign Secretary, Vyacheslav Molotov, to the San Francisco Conference for the organization of the United Nations. Molotov stopped off in

Washington, D.C., for two meetings with President Truman on his way to San Francisco. At the second one Truman bluntly told the Russian that his country would have no problems with the United States if the Russians would simply carry out their end of the agreements reached at the Yalta (Crimea) Conference. He told them to quit violating these agreements and there would be no problems between the United States and Russia. The blunt language upset Molotov. However, President Truman did not apologize for his tough talk.

Things did not improve. Russia gained control of Vienna after the liberation of eastern Austria from Nazi rule. They would not allow either the United States or Great Britain entry into Vienna. On May 6, 1945, Churchill sent a cable to President Truman suggesting a conference would be a good way to solve these problems with the Soviet Union. Churchill indicated that sending messages or cables had not been successful.

Two days later the war in Europe ended with the German surrender. The next day President Truman sent a Top Secret message to Churchill, agreeing with the Prime Minister's suggestion for a conference. The French were excluded from the entire consultations. A number of incidents between the United States and France during and after World War II led to this decision. The French refused to leave Stuttgart, Germany. The American

Commanding General of the Sixth Army, Jacob L. Devers, had told the French troops to leave the city. But General De Gaulle had ordered the troops to remain there. President Truman, through diplomatic channels, sent a letter to General De Gaulle telling him supplies to the French were being stopped. The French troops then left the city. Another incident occurred in June, 1945, when the French tried to make a border change in the Aosta Valley in northwest Italy. Again, President Truman was informed of this and he sent a letter to De Gaulle expressing his disgust with this action. Though De Gaulle corrected the situation, France was not invited to the upcoming conference.

To prepare for the conference President Truman sent, in May, 1945, Harry Hopkins and Joseph Davies on diplomatic missions. Hopkins, a former advisor to Roosevelt, was sent to Moscow. There he would confer with Stalin on a number of issues, including the conference. Davies, a former Ambassador to Moscow, was sent to London to discuss various issues with Churchill. Stalin now agreed to a conference also.

The Russians were placed in charge of choosing a location for the meeting. They chose a suburb of Berlin in the Soviet Sector called Potsdam. Russia had liberated Berlin, and the city was to be divided into three sectors: American, British and Soviet. Later the French would also receive a sector. The housing of the conference delegates

would be in Babelsberg, southwest of Potsdam, Germany, in the Soviet Sector. An American president does not merely attend a conference. Major General Floyd L. Parks, American Commanding General of the Berlin District, was granted permission from the Russians to check out the housing conditions for President Truman and the American delegation. Major General Parks would in a detailed memorandum, which has been included in this paper, make some recommendations on housing and location for the meeting. Communication equipment was needed for the Americans to keep the American delegation in contact with Washington, D.C., and other installations. However, to install this equipment, permission from the Russians was needed. The American Ambassador to Moscow, Harriman, sent a note marked "URGENT AND TOP SECRET" to the Soviet Assistant Foreign Commissar Vyshinsky seeking permission to install this equipment, which was quickly granted.

The agenda for the conference was another difficulty. The British sent a list of proposed topics to the United States. American State Department officials analyzed this list and made their comments known to President Truman. The United States would make four major agenda proposals on the first day of the conference. The Soviets would not reveal their list until the conference.

The President traveled by train from Washington, D.C., to Newport News, Virginia, to board the Augusta on

July 6, 1945, for a sea voyage to Antwerp, Belgium. This voyage gave the President nine days to prepare for the conference, which was scheduled July 16, 1945. The President arrived in Belgium on July 15, 1945, and then took a plane to Berlin.

The start of the conference was delayed one day because Premier Stalin suffered a mild heart attack, but the public would only be told by the news media that Stalin was delayed. The conference began on July 17, 1945, and ended on August 2, 1945.

There were thirteen official plenary meetings. At first the delegates were President Truman, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Premier Stalin. Truman was made chairman for the meetings because he was the only head of state attending. On July 26, 1945, the conference recessed to allow British Prime Minister Churchill to return to London to wait for the election results. Under the British system, the party with the most seats in Parliament forms the government. Churchill's party lost, and the new Prime Minister was Clement Attlee, who attended the resumption of the conference on July 28, 1945.

On July 26, 1945, the Potsdam Proclamation was issued to the world, signed by the United States, Great Britain, and China. It called upon Japan to give up or face extensive destruction. The proclamation was issued on the first successful test of an atomic bomb, but did not refer

directly to the bomb. The official meetings with the heads of government again stopped for two days, July 29, 1945, to July 30, 1945, because Premier Stalin became ill.

At its conclusion on August 2, the conference, as in the case of the Yalta (Crimea) Conference, issued a communique to the world. The conference also prepared a protocol. A protocol put in writing the official agreements reached at the conference. The communique revealed that a number of vital issues were discussed at Potsdam: establishment of a council of foreign ministers; the post-war treatment of Germany; reparations from Germany; disposal of the German navy and merchant marine fleet; the transfer of a city (Koenigsberg) to the Soviet Union; fate of war criminals; situation of Austria; future of Poland; conclusion of peace treaties with various countries and admission of these countries into the United Nations; territorial trusteeships; allied control commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary; transfer of German population; and military activities in the Pacific against Japan.

The protocol covered practically all of the previously mentioned topics. However, it also contained some which were not reported to the public immediately. These included: oil equipment in Rumania; international zone of Tangier; the Black Sea Straits; international inland waterways; Iran; European inland transport conference; directives to military commanders on allied control council

for Germany; and use of allied property for satellite reparations or war trophies. The protocol was finally released to the public in 1947 because most of the agreements mentioned in it had been carried out.

Rarely are diplomatic conferences neat and orderly. The results of the Potsdam Conference were certainly incomplete. For example, there was a compromise on the western frontier of Poland. The Polish Government would administer former German territory until a German peace conference was held, but this German peace conference was never held. The Allied Control Council in Berlin was to deal with various problems, political and economic. The Soviets instead installed their own government.

The reaction to Potsdam has varied over the years. The conference was made into a television motion picture and shown on the National Broadcasting Corporation on April 8, 1976, under the title, "Truman at Potsdam." T.V. Guide wrote, "The last summit conference of World War II was held at Potsdam, near Berlin, in July 1945. . . . The clash of these strong personalities will be dramatized in 'Truman at Potsdam,' on NBC, Thursday, April 8."¹

There have been two major books on the Potsdam Conference. One was by Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton

¹T.V. Guide, April 3, 1976, p. 11.

University Press, 1960). Feis had access to the Potsdam Papers before they were published. His book covers the conference on a topical basis. The author does not fully cover the origins of the Potsdam proclamation, which called upon Japan to give up. His sources are documented, unlike Charles Mee's book on Potsdam. The Feis book presents a balanced account of the conference.

Another work on the conference is by Charles L. Mee, Jr., Meeting at Potsdam (New York: M. Evans and Company, Inc., 1975). This book was used as the basis for the television movie, "Truman at Potsdam." Mee's book lacks documentation. Documentation enables the reader to check out the author's sources and enables students, historians, and others an opportunity to look up additional material. Mee spends a great deal of time describing the various participants. Mee's book has been described as popular history. This means the book was written for the general audience rather than a student of that particular topic. Until the Russian Government opens up their documents on this conference, a complete book on this subject will remain impossible.

Your textbook by Current, Williams, and Freidel contains the following on the conference:

At the Potsdam conference (July 1945) Truman could secure few satisfactory agreements on questions involving occupied and liberated countries. Despite the failure at Potsdam, Truman's secretary of State, James

F. Byrnes, continued in a conciliatory fashion to seek accommodation with the Russians.

The Potsdam conference provided for a Council of Foreign Ministers to draft treaties with Italy and the former Axis satellites.²

On the issuance of the Potsdam proclamation, which your textbook refers to as the Potsdam Declaration, the following is said:

At a meeting of Allied leaders in Potsdam, Germany, in mid-July 1945, President Harry S Truman (who had succeeded Roosevelt) received word that the first atomic test was successful. He and Prime Minister Clement Attlee (who had succeeded Churchill) issued the Potsdam Declaration urging the Japanese to surrender or face utter devastation.³

Your textbook contains an error. Clement Attlee did not sign the Potsdam Declaration. Prime Minister Churchill signed the document as noted in the following cable marked "MOST SECRET" he sent to President Truman.

Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman

MOST SECRET WHITEHALL [Babelsberg], July 25, 1945.
MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, I thank you for your letter of July 25. . . .

I return the copy of the Potsdam Proclamation to Japan by the Heads of Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Republic of China, which I received from you yesterday. I am willing to sign it on behalf of His Majesty's Government in its present form,

²Richard N. Current, T. Harry Williams, and Frank Freidel, American History: A Survey Volume II: Since 1865, 5th ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 724.

³Ibid., p. 713.

and I hope you will issue it as you propose whenever you choose and as soon as possible.

Yours very sincerely, WINSTON S. CHURCHILL⁴

Historians call the preceding document a primary source. That means it came from Winston S. Churchill, not from any other source.

Explanation to the Students
About this Exercise

This exercise will expose the reader to primary source materials. Diplomatic cables, with various codes and markings such as the one previously noted, "MOST SECRET," are reprinted as they were received by the various officials. The markings have been reproduced to give the reader an idea how the document appeared when transmitted to that particular official. The exercise will give the reader an idea how the interworkings of diplomacy and foreign policy take place.

The reader will have a view of diplomacy that the public, at that time, did not witness. One must remember these cables did not reach the general public until 1960, fifteen years after the conference. As noted, your textbook paid scant attention to this topic. There are many reasons

⁴United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 1279. Hereafter cited as Potsdam Papers, II.

for this, but mostly space. The authors of your textbook simply did not have the space to go into detail on many historical topics. This exercise will expose the reader to one topic in American history and give the reader exposure to primary material. Some authors have the reader either look at the back of their book or merely tell the reader to see a particular source for the entire contents of the primary document. This exercise will, hopefully, give the reader a feeling of "you are there" with the diplomats and heads of government.

Historians would treat the previously mentioned cable from Churchill to President Truman in one of three ways: they would, in their book or article, paraphrase the Prime Minister's announcement he was signing the Potsdam Proclamation; they would write that Churchill signed the proclamation and in a footnote indicate for the full text of the Prime Minister's cable see Document No. 1249 in Volume II of the Foreign Relations of the United States The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference, 1945); or in a footnote write, "see appendix of this book for the full text of the Churchill cable to Truman."

The reader in this exercise will not have to go to Volume II of the Foreign Relations of the United States The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945 to read the full text of Document 1249, the number assigned to the Churchill cable of July 25, 1945, to Truman. There will be

a test on this material: 65 percent of the grade will come from an essay and 35 percent from short answer and multiple choice questions.

Throughout the paper abbreviations, symbols and code names will be used. A list is as follows.

List of Abbreviations, Symbols
and Code Names

The editors of the Potsdam Papers used many abbreviations, symbols and code names. The following are the ones used in this dissertation. Some are obvious and are noted, "self-explanatory."

AGWar--Adjutant General, War Department

EYES ONLY--Communications indicator used on messages which were to receive extremely limited distribution.

FAT MAN--An atomic bomb of the implosion type (the type dropped on Nagasaki; previously tested as an experimental device in New Mexico on July 16, 1945).

NKVD--People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Soviet Union).

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY--self explanatory.

P--Document symbol used by the British Delegation to the Berlin Conference on papers relating to plenary meetings.

PERSONAL--self explanatory.

S-1--Code name for the atomic bomb.

SA--National Socialist Storm Troops (Germany).

SECRET--self explanatory.

SHAEF--Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force.

SS--National Socialist Elite Guard (Germany).

SD--Communications indicator, Security Service of the National Socialist Elite Guard (Germany).

TERMINAL--code name for the Berlin Conference, July 16--August 2, 1945.

topsec--top secret.

TOP SECRET--self explanatory.

URGENT--self explanatory.

VICTORY--Communications indicator used on outgoing messages from the United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference (a VICTORY-IN number was also assigned to incoming messages).

WAR--Military communications indicator.⁵

⁵Potsdam Papers, II, pp. xxxvii-xli.

CHAPTER III

GENESIS OF THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE

In the Spring of 1945 disagreement emerged on the diplomatic front among the major powers that had defeated Germany. A Communist government was installed in Rumania, a clear violation of the British-American view of the Declaration on Liberated Europe agreed upon at the February, 1945, Yalta or Crimea Conference. The Declaration on Liberated Europe, agreed upon by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, read:

V

DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE

We have drawn up and subscribed to a Declaration on liberated Europe. This Declaration provides for concerting the policies of the three Powers and for joint action by them in meeting the political and economic problems of liberated Europe in accordance with democratic principles. The text of the Declaration is as follows:

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the President of the United States of America have consulted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to creat[e] democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter--the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live--the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the agressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed people; (c) to form interim governmental authorities boradly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe where matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately consult together on the measures necessary to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and the general well-being of all mankind.

In issuing this declaration, the Three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the procedure suggested.¹

¹United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers The Conference at Malta and Yalta 1945 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 971-973. Hereafter cited as FRUS: Yalta.

Vyacheslav Molotov, the Russian Foreign Secretary, had his own views on the creation of a Polish government. Molotov's ideas were counter to those expressed in the Yalta (Crimea) agreement on Poland.² The Yalta (Crimea) communique which contained a provision on Poland and was signed by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union read:

VI

POLAND

We came to the Crimea Conference resolved to settle our differences about Poland. We discussed fully all aspects of the question. We reaffirm our common desire to see established a strong, free, independent and democratic Poland. As a result of our discussions we have agreed on the conditions in which a new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity may be formed in such a manner as to command recognition by the three major powers.

The agreement reached is as follows:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

M. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized as a Commission to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the reorganization of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of

²Keith Eubank, The Summit Conferences: 1919-1960 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1966), p. 106.

National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the U.S.S.R., which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The three Heads of Government consider that the eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favor of Poland. They recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and west. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.³

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill noted in a March 13, 1945, cable to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt that Molotov must be stopped from setting up a communist government in Poland. The British Prime Minister urged the President to appeal directly to Joseph Stalin, Soviet Premier. Roosevelt replied that he would do so unless "all else failed."⁴ There were other events that strained Allied relations.

³FRUS: Yalta, pp. 973-974.

⁴Eubank, The Summit Conferences, pp. 106-107.

On April 2, 1945, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman, informed the President that the Soviets were hindering American progress in appraising bomb damage in areas under Soviet control and forbidding the navy access to Gdynia, which is located in northern Poland. "Both proposals," he said, "were agreed to at Yalta."⁵

James V. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, after attending the State-War-Navy Meeting of April 2, 1945, noted in his diary that Russian-American relations were "crumbling."⁶

President Roosevelt was in Warm Springs, Georgia, since March 30, 1945, resting from his journey to the Yalta (Crimea) Conference. The International News Service, on April 12, 1945, received a message from White House Secretary Steve Early and passed it along on its news wire at 5:47 p.m.:

FLASH WASHN-----FDR DEAD⁷

Vice President Harry S. Truman was the next President of the United States.⁸

⁵FRUS: Yalta, p. 992.

⁶Walter Millis with E. S. Duffield, The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 18.

⁷Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945-1948 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1977), p. 7.

⁸Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions Memoirs by Harry S. Truman (New York: Signet paperback, 1965), p. 15. Hereafter cites as Truman, Memoirs, I.

Stalin wanted to know how Russia could show its appreciation towards the late President. American Ambassador to Moscow, Harriman, suggested that Molotov be included in the Russian delegation to the San Francisco Conference, which was to be held on the organization of the United Nations. Stalin agreed to send his Foreign Minister.⁹

Harriman left for Washington, D.C., to assist Truman and observe if the new President had a grasp of the problems since the Yalta Conference. However, the Missourian was on top of the situation, much to Harriman's surprise. Truman had read all of the cables between Moscow and Washington.¹⁰

Molotov stopped off in Washington, D.C., on his way to San Francisco. On the evening of April 22, Truman went to Blair House, where important visitors stay, to pay a courtesy call on the Russian. Later, Charles E. Bohlen wrote a memorandum of this meeting:

Memorandum of Conversation by Mr. Charles E. Bohlen,
Assistant to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1945.
Participants: The President
Mr. Stettinius
Mr. Molotov

⁹Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History 1929-1969 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1973), p. 210.

¹⁰W. Averell Harriman, America and Russia in a Changing World (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1971), p. 40.

Ambassador Harriman
Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Bohlen

The President greeted Mr. Molotov warmly and said he was glad to welcome him to the United States. After an exchange of amenities and questions in regard to Mr. Molotov's trip by air, the President said that he wished to tell Mr. Molotov that he had the greatest admiration for Marshal Stalin and the Soviet Republic and that he hoped that the relations which President Roosevelt had established between our two countries would be maintained. Mr. Molotov said he brought greetings from Marshal Stalin and that he was very pleased to hear personally from the President that he intended to continue the policy of friendship which had been that of President Roosevelt. The President said he stood squarely behind all commitments and agreements taken by our late great President and that he would do everything he could to follow along that path. Mr. Molotov said that the Government and people of the Soviet Union share that hope and he was sure that they could work out successfully any difficulties which lay in the path. The President agreed and said that we must work out these difficulties. Mr. Molotov replied that he felt that there existed a good basis in the Dumbarton Oaks plan and the Crimea [Yalta] decisions. The President repeated that he stood by the decisions and intended to carry them out. Mr. Molotov expressed his agreement and added that the Crimean decisions were sufficiently clear to overcome any difficulties which had arisen. The President then said he wished to mention the most difficult question relating to the Crimean decisions and that was the Polish matter. He said that the proper solution of the Polish question was of great importance because of its effect on American public opinion and that in his opinion it was the most important that faced us. Mr. Molotov replied that he knew this was an important question for the United States but that it would be understood that it was even more important for the Soviet Union; that Poland was far from the United States but bordered on the Soviet Union and this Polish question was therefore vital for them. He added that in its larger aspects the Polish question had become for our people the symbol of the future development of our international relations. He repeated that he intended to carry out to the full, both the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and the Crimean decision. He said there were a number of minor matters in respect to San Francisco which he hoped that the Foreign Ministers would be able to settle here in Washington. Mr. Molotov replied that he thought an agreement could easily be reached on these

points provided that the views of the Soviet Union were taken into consideration. The President said that they should discuss all these matters further, to which Mr. Molotov agreed. Mr. Molotov observed that the Soviet Government attached the greatest importance to the San Francisco Conference. The President said that the American people did likewise. Mr. Molotov remarked that with the military developments of recent weeks, political questions become even more important than they had been before. The President agreed and said that was one reason why he had wanted to talk to him. Mr. Molotov said that the discussions between the three Heads of State had always been fruitful and had led to good agreements. Mr. Molotov then inquired whether the agreements in regard to the Far Eastern situation made at Yalta still stood. The President replied that they did and repeated that he intended to carry out all of the agreements made by President Roosevelt. He then proposed that they drink a toast to the health of Marshal Stalin to which Mr. Molotov replied that they should drink a toast to the three Heads of State, President Truman, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshall Stalin.

The conversation then became general with a toast drunk to the three Heads of State. During this conversation, however, Mr. Molotov remarked that, as he had told Ambassador Harriman, he only expected to spend a few days in San Francisco.

Also, the President said he hoped before too long to see Marshal Stalin and perhaps visit him in Russia or to receive him here as a guest. Mr. Molotov said he knew the Marshal was also eager to meet President Truman.¹¹

Another meeting between Molotov and the President was held the next day, the 23rd. Truman informed the Minister that, if his country desired any economic aid from the United States, discussion on Poland had to be carried on the basis of American proposals. The Polish issue, the President said, was one of public opinion. American support

¹¹United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Europe 1945, V (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 235-236. Hereafter cited as FRUS 1945, V.

would be vital in order to persuade Congress to grant Russia this aid. Truman wanted the Soviets to implement the Crimea decision.

Molotov said these difficulties could be worked out. Stalin, he noted, had given his views in previous cables. The same formula, Stalin believed, could be implemented in the case of Poland. The President reminded the Minister that an agreement had been reached and it only needed implementation.¹²

A number of Poles, Molotov pointed out, worked against the Russian Army. Truman said he was not concerned with propaganda. Stalin must be informed, said the President, that Russia had failed to keep up its end of the Yalta Agreements. Bohlen, who translated for the President, wrote in his memoirs that Molotov "turned a little ashy."¹³

Truman repeated that the only way for both countries to continue on a basis of friendship was to carry out the agreements on a mutual basis, "not on the basis of a one-way street."¹⁴ Stunned, Molotov replied, "I have never been talked to like that in my life."¹⁵ The Missourian shot

¹²Truman, Memoirs, I, pp. 70-71.

¹³Bohlen, Witness to History 1929-1969, p. 213.

¹⁴Truman, Memoirs, I, p. 82.

¹⁵Ibid.

back, "Carry out your agreements and you won't get talked to like that."¹⁶

That afternoon the President met with various military leaders and informed them of his meeting that morning with Molotov. The Americans, he noted, were prepared to continue with the San Francisco Conference "and if the Russians did not wish to join us they could go to hell."¹⁷

There were other problems among the Allies. The German Army in Northern Italy began to surrender. The Germans controlled the northeast corner of the Adriatic, which included Trieste and Venezia Giulia or the Istrian region.¹⁸ Yugoslav partisans were under the command of

¹⁶Ibid., p. 82.

¹⁷FRUS 1945, V, pp. 252-253. The Missouriian's strong words towards the Russian Minister did not go unnoticed. United Press correspondent Allen Drury wrote in his diary at the San Francisco Conference that Molotov conferred with the Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius on various matters. "Molotov complained to Stettinius that 'no man' had ever given him such a dressing-down as he received from Harry Truman." Allen Drury, A Senate Journal 1943-45 (New York: McGraw-Hill Co., 1945), p. 402. Harriman, who was in the next room during the conversation between the President and Molotov, wrote later that he was "a little taken aback . . . when the President attacked Molotov so vigorously. I suppose it was true that Molotov had never been talked to so bluntly before by a foreigner." W. Averell Harriman and Elie Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941-1946 (New York: Random House, 1975), pp. 453-454.

¹⁸Lisle A. Rose, Dubious Victory The United States and the End of World War II (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1973), p. 120.

Josip Tito. Tito had recently returned from a visit to Moscow. These partisans rushed into the area and gained control. This action caused American State Department officials, including Joseph Grew, to fear that Tito was doing this for the Russians.¹⁹

The situation in Austria was bleak. A provisional government, with the blessing of the Russians, was being established in Austria under a socialist, Karl Renner.²⁰ The Soviets recognized the Renner administration despite a plea from Washington to hold up any action. Anglo-American representatives were denied admission to Vienna. This increased allied suspicions of Russia's purpose toward Austria.²¹

The American representatives on the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria and Rumania, Major general John Crane and Brigadier General Cortland T. Schuyler, reported to the President. They told him of the Russian operations in these countries. This confirmed Harriman's major fear as far as

¹⁹Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., American Ambassador (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 374.

²⁰United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: European Advisory Commission; Austria, Germany, 1945, III (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 94-95.

²¹Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 623-625.

Russian designs in the eastern and central portion of Europe.²²

The time had arrived for a meeting among the major allies, the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union. Churchill made a suggestion to the President on May 6th. The British Prime Minister wrote, ". . . matters can hardly be carried further by correspondence and that, as soon as possible, there should be a meeting of three heads of government."²³ Truman agreed and this was noted in his May 9th cable to Churchill which read:

President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill

[Washington,] 9 May 1945.

TOP SECRET

31. Your messages 34 and 35.

I am in agreement with your opinion that a meeting of the three heads of government would be desirable in order to get action on the questions of interest to the three governments upon which either a decision or a common understanding have not been reached.

I very much prefer to have the request for such a tripartite meeting originate from Marshal Stalin and not from either one of us. Perhaps you have means of some kind with which to endeavor to induce Stalin to suggest or request such a meeting.

In the meantime it is my present intention to adhere to our interpretation of the Yalta agreements, and to stand firmly on our present announced attitude toward all the questions at issue.

²²United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945, I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 3. Hereafter cited as Potsdam Papers, I.

²³Ibid., p. 4.

In order to prepare for a possible tripartite meeting in the not distant future, I would be very pleased to have from you a list of the questions that you consider it necessary or desirable for us to bring up for discussion, and also suggestions as to meeting places.

There should now be no valid excuse for Stalin's refusing to come west toward us.

In regard to timing, it will be extremely difficult for me to absent myself from Washington before the end of the fiscal year (30 June), but I probably will be able to get away after that date.²⁴

Thus, the machinery began to turn for a meeting of the three major powers. Churchill sent a cable on May 11, expressing to President Truman a fear that Stalin might think the allies were "ganging up" on him.

President Truman to Prime Minister Churchill

[Washington,] 11 May 1945.

TOP SECRET

36. Your Number 40.

I would much prefer to have Stalin propose the meeting and believe it is worth while to endeavor, through our Ambassadors, to induce him to propose the meeting. If such an effort fails, we can then consider our issuing an invitation jointly or severally.

When and if such a meeting is arranged, it appears to me that in order to avoid any suspicion of our "ganging up" it would be advantageous for us to proceed to the meeting place separately.

When the conference ends, if my duties here do not make it impossible, I shall be very pleased to make a visit to England where you and I may discuss fully our common interests and problems.

I am fully in agreement that the next few months will decide questions of the greatest consequence to the whole world.²⁵

²⁴Ibid., p. 4.

²⁵Ibid., p. 8.

The French were not invited to the upcoming meeting due to various incidents during the war. The American Commanding General of the Sixth Army Group, Jacob L. Devers, on April 27, had ordered the French Army to leave Stuttgart. The American plan would call for the Americans to control the city and the French forces to move further south. General de Lattre de Tassigny, the local French Commander, said he was under General Charles De Gaulle's orders to remain in the city.²⁶ The Commanding General of the American Forces, Dwight David Eisenhower, informed the President of the incident. In turn, the President informed General De Gaulle. The Acting Secretary of State, Joseph Grew, notified Stettinus of this action. The Secretary of State was attending the San Francisco Conference. A copy of Eisenhower's letter to President Truman and the text of the President's message to General De Gaulle were included in the cable to Stettinus:

The Acting Secretary of State
to the Secretary of State

Washington, May 1, 1945.

19. There follows the text of a message from President to General de Gaulle:

"General Eisenhower's message to you regarding Stuttgart, dated April 28th, has just been brought to my attention. In a matter of this importance I must be frank in stating that I am shocked by the attitude of your Government in this matter and its evident implications. Also I am deeply concerned, in view of the

²⁶Truman, Memoirs, I, p. 238.

publicity already given the matter in this country from French sources, that the American public will become aware of what has actually transpired as I know this would awaken a storm of resentment which would be most unfortunate in its results.

If the time has come, in your opinion, when the French Army is to be considered as engaged in carrying out the political desires of the French Government, then an entire rearrangement of command will have to be made, but I should deplore such a crisis and I am certain it would be deeply regretted by you and your Government."

General Eisenhower's letter of April 28 to which reference was made in the President's message read as follows:

"As you are aware, instructions were issued by General Devers to General De Lattre de Tassigny to evacuate Stuttgart because this city was in the operational zone of the Seventh Army, and was urgently needed as a link in the supply and communications system supporting the current military operations of the Army. I regret to learn that because of instructions received direct from you General De Lattre has declined to obey the orders of his army group commander.

I am informed that your instructions to General De Lattre were to hold Stuttgart and all other territory occupied by the First French Army until the French zone of occupation has been delimited. I am sure you must realize that the location of Stuttgart in connection with any French zone of occupation did not enter the minds of either General Devers or myself, as this is a matter entirely outside the scope of my responsibility, which is limited to the military defeat of our common enemy, Germany.

Under the circumstances, I must of course accept the situation, as I myself am unwilling to take any action which would reduce the effectiveness of the military effort against Germany, either by withholding supplies from the First French Army or by any other measures which would affect their fighting strength. Moreover, I will never personally be a party to initiating any type of struggle or quarrel between your government and troops under my command, which could result only in weakening bonds of national friendship as well as the exemplary spirit of cooperation that has characterized the actions of French and American forces in the battle line. Accordingly, I am seeking another solution for the maintenance of the Seventh Army.

I believe the issuance direct to the First French Army of orders based on political grounds which run counter to the operational instructions given through the military chain of command, violates the understanding with the United States government under which French divisions, armed and equipped by the United States government, were to be placed under the Combined Chiefs of Staff whose orders I am carrying out in this theater of operations. It was with complete faith in this understanding that I have so long and so earnestly supported French request for armament for additional divisions.

In the present circumstances I can do nothing else than fully to inform the Combined Chiefs of Staff of this development, and to point out that I can no longer count with certainty upon the operational use of any French forces they may contemplate equipping in the future. I repeat that I have no knowledge of the probable decisions that may result from negotiations going forward between your government and Britain and the United States concerning a future French zone of occupation in Germany. Consequently the embarrassment I am now experiencing in supplying and administering the Seventh U.S. Army, and in coordination military operations involving the First French Army, seems to me the more regrettable."²⁷

Franco-American relations were strained again in June when De Gaulle attempted to make some minor corrections in the Franco-Italian border. After the war was over the French led by Charles De Gaulle attempted to annex parts of the Aosta Valley in northwest Italy. This ran counter to General Eisenhower's order that all French troops leave Italy.²⁸

²⁷United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Europe 1945, IV (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 682-683. Hereafter cited as FRUS 1945, IV.

²⁸Guy de Carmoy, The French Policies of France, trans. by Elaine P. Halperin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 19.

Truman heard of this and instead of having other members of government handle this situation the Missourian decided to inform De Gaulle in a direct manner. The President's letter was sent through the American Ambassador, in France, Jefferson Caffery:

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador
in France (Caffery)

Washington, June 6, 1945--5 p.m.

2565. 1. Please deliver to General de Gaulle immediately following communication to him from President Truman:

2. "My dear General: You have by this time no doubt seen the message from this Government which was communicated to your Foreign Minister yesterday. I wish to appeal to you directly in this matter and to notify you with what great concern and how seriously I view the action of the 1st French Army in the Province of Cuneo in northwest Italy.

3. This Army, under the command of General Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander on the Western Front, ignored orders issued for the occupation and organization of Allied Military Government in Italy under Field Marshal Alexander, the Allied Commander in Italy. More recently the following events have taken place: On May 30 General Doyen, commanding the French Army in the Alps sent a letter to General Crittenberger, commanding the U.S. IV Corps in Northwestern Italy, referring to an attempt to establish Allied Military Government in the Province of Cuneo. The letter ends with the following paragraph:

4. 'France cannot consent that a modification against her will would be made in the existing state of affairs in the Alps Maritimes. This would be contrary to her honor and her security. I have been ordered by the Provisional Government of the French Republic to occupy and administer this territory. This mission being incompatible with the installation of an Allied military agency in the same region, I find myself obliged to oppose it. Any insistence in this direction would assume a clearly unfriendly character, even a hostile character and could have grave consequences.'

5. On June 2 General Crittenberger received another letter from General Doyen referring to his previous letter. Following is the text:

6. 'I have sent to General Juin simultaneously copy of the letter I asked Major Rogers to deliver to you. I beg to let you know that I have just been notified of the full approval given by the Chief of the Provisional Government of the French Republic.

7. 'General de Gaulle has instructed me to make as clear as possible to the Allied Command that I have received the order to prevent the setting up of Allied Military Government in territories occupied by our troops and administered by us by all necessary means without exception.'

8. This constitutes a very blunt statement of the intention of the French Government to maintain its forces contrary to the order of the Allied Supreme Commander and in direct contravention of the principles which I accept, and I know you will agree, as representing the best interests of all Allied Governments in preserving a hard won peace, namely the avoidance of military action to accomplish political ends.

9. The messages above referred to also contain the almost unbelievable threat that French soldiers bearing American arms will combat American and Allied soldiers whose efforts and sacrifices have so recently and successfully contributed to the liberation of France itself.

10. Indeed, this action comes at the time of the very anniversary of our landings in Normandy which set in motion the forces that resulted in that liberation.

11. The people of this country have only the friendliest motives and feelings toward France and its people, but I am sure that they would be profoundly shocked if they were made aware of the nature of the action which your military officers, presumably with your personal approval, have threatened to take. Before I acquaint the people of the United States with this situation, I beg of you to reconsider the matter, withdraw your troops from the area and await an orderly and rational determination of whatever ultimate claims your Government feels impelled to make. Such action cannot fail to advance rather than reduce the prestige of France and at the same time operate to the immediate advantage and welfare of the French people.

12. While this threat by the French Government is outstanding against American soldiers, I regret that I have no alternative but to issue instructions that no

further issues of military equipment or munitions can be made to French troops. Rations will continue to be supplied. Signed. Harry S. Truman."²⁹

De Gaulle gave in to the President's demand.³⁰ This incident was disturbing to the President. Robert D. Murphy, political advisor to the President, wrote years later that, when De Gaulle requested to be included at the meeting in Potsdam, Truman "saw to it that his request was never even considered formally."³¹ The war in Europe ended in May, 1945.

²⁹FRUS 1945, IV, pp. 734-735.

³⁰Donovan, Conflict and Crisis The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945-1948, p. 58. The French, after World War I, had been given authority from the League of Nations to manage present-day Syria and Lebanon or the Levant. The Allies recognized the independence of Syria and Lebanon as sovereign nations. The French were determined to retain their rights in this area. In May, 1945, De Gaulle and a number of French troops landed in Beirut, Lebanon. The United States urged the French to observe the sovereignty of these countries. The British supported the American position. The French withdrew from the area after the British landed troops in Beirut. President Truman, at a May 31 staff meeting, noted, "Those French ought to be taken out and castrated." Diary of Eben A. Ayers, entry May 31, 1945, as quoted in Donovan, Conflict and Crisis The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945-1948, pp. 58-59.

³¹Robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York: Pyramid Books, paperback, 1965), p. 321. Eben A. Ayers, Assistant White House Press Secretary, wrote in his diary, "The President himself commented one morning recently that de Gaulle had insulted President Roosevelt and his troops had killed Americans and he [Truman] could not forgive him for those things." Eben A. Ayers diary entry of July 7, 1945, as quoted in Donovan, Conflict and Crisis The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1945-1948, p. 59.

Later in the month two diplomats were going to Moscow and London. The purpose was to prepare for a possible meeting. Earlier Harriman and Bohlen believed it would be good for Soviet-American relations that Harry Hopkins, former advisor to Roosevelt, be sent to Moscow for discussions with Stalin.³² Joseph E. Davies, former American Ambassador to Moscow, was sent to Britain to discuss various issues in person rather via diplomatic cable.³³

Hopkins, before his departure, conferred with Truman. The President told the former advisor to Roosevelt, that the United States had carried out its commitments and Russia was expected to do the same. "I told Harry," wrote the President years later, "he could use diplomatic language, or he could use a baseball bat if he thought that was proper approach to Mr. Stalin."³⁴ The location of the meeting was suggested by the Russian Foreign Minister, Molotov. Molotov sent his message to the American Ambassador in Moscow, W. Averell Harriman, which read:

³²Harriman, America and Russia in a Changing World, p. 40.

³³Potsdam Papers, I, p. 63.

³⁴Robert H. Ferrell, ed., Off the Record The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1980), p. 31.

The Soviet Foreign Commissar (Molotov) to the
Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

[Translation]

PERSONAL AND
TOP SECRET

Moscow, May 26, 1945.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: Today, during the conversation between Marshal J. V. Stalin and Mr. Hopkins it was mentioned with regard to a place for the pending meeting of the Heads of Government of our countries that in the message of J. V. Stalin to President Truman the region of Berlin was spoken of. For the purpose of accuracy I must tell you now that mention was made of this area for a meeting not in the above mentioned message but in my answering telegram to Mr. Joseph Davies who, referring to his conversation with the President, recently raised the question of a meeting of the two heads of Government and also of a place of this meeting.

Sincerely yours,

V. MOLOTOV³⁵

Upon the conclusion of the Hopkins-Stalin talks, the American Ambassador in Moscow sent a report of these conversations to President Truman:

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Harriman) to the President

TOP SECRET

[Moscow,] 8 June 1945.

Now that Harry has left, I thought you might want me to give you a brief report on his visit.

There is no doubt when we saw Stalin the first time that he was gravely concerned over the adverse developments during the past three months in the relations between our two countries. A firm position which President Roosevelt took before he died and you have taken on several issues has had its effect. He showed, however, that he did not fully understand the basis of the difficulties. In the early talks he took the offensive in complaining about our misdeeds and aggressively indicated that if we did not wish to deal on a friendly basis with the Soviet Union, she was strong enough to look after herself. He was clearly glad to see Harry and accepted unquestioningly the fact that you sent him as an indication of your desire to

³⁵Potsdam Papers, I, p. 85.

work with him (Stalin). Harry did a first rate job in presenting your views and in explaining the most important matters, particularly Poland, which were causing us concern.

I am afraid Stalin does not and never will fully understand our interest in a free Poland as a matter of principle. He is a realist in all of his actions, and it is hard for him to appreciate our faith in all of his abstract principles. It is difficult for him to understand why we should want to interfere with Soviet policy in a country like Poland, which he considers so important to Russia's security, unless we have some ulterior motive. He does, however, appreciate that he must deal with the position we have taken and, in addition, from all reports we have from inside Poland, he needs our assistance and that of Great Britain's in obtaining a stable political situation within that country.

I believe I told you that I was certain Molotov did not report to Stalin accurately and in fact truthfully in all cases. This was brought out again [in] our talks. It is also clear that Molotov is far more suspicious of us and less willing to view matters in our mutual relations from a broad standpoint than is Stalin. The fact that we were able to see Stalin six times and deal directly with him was a great help. If it were possible to see him more frequently, many of our difficulties could be overcome.

Although the agreement to start the consultations with the Poles in Moscow is a big step forward, I am afraid that we will have trouble with Molotov when it comes to working out the details of the reorganization of the Warsaw Government. He possibly will not continue in the spirit of our recent talks and the Poles themselves will also be difficult. I hope, however, to be able to handle the consultations for my part in such a way that we can either come to a conclusion or point up the differences sufficiently clearly so as to make it possible for you to come to a conclusion with Stalin when you meet him with Churchill.

The talks about the Far East, I feel, were of real value, particularly Stalin's agreement to take up with Soong in the first instance the political matters affecting China in the Yalta agreement, and also his agreement to allow the Generalissimo's representatives to go into Manchuria with the Russian troops to set up Chinese National Government Administration.

The last talk, on voting procedure, was most interesting. It was clear that Stalin had not understood at all the issues between us. In spite of Molotov's explanation and defense of the Soviet

position, Stalin waived [waved] him aside and accepted our position. He stated, however, he did not consider that "a country is virtuous because it is small." And he had a good deal to say about the troubles small nations have made in the world. This, he said, he was quite ready to state publicly as well as privately. He expressed emphatically his unwillingness to allow the Soviet Union's interests to be affected by such countries.

In conclusion, I feel that Harry's visit has been more successful than I had hoped. Although there are and will continue to be many unsolved problems with the Soviet Government, I believe that his visit has produced a much better atmosphere for your meeting with Stalin.

Physically Harry stood the trip reasonably well. The strain of the first week took a lot out of him, and it was a good thing that he had a few days to rest up before starting home.

Bohlen's presence was, as usual, most helpful.³⁶

May 27, 1945, found Davies in London. He gave the British Prime Minister a message from President Truman which pointed out the necessity for a meeting to overcome the disagreements that arose from the decisions arrived at the Yalta Conference held earlier in the year. The message went on to say the United States intended to carry out Roosevelt's foreign policy and strive towards peace upon the conclusion of the war. Truman wanted to confer with Stalin prior to the scheduled conference.³⁷

Churchill was vehemently opposed to any pre-conference between the American leader and Stalin. The Prime Minister, after he calmed down, informed Davies that he was upset that Truman wanted to exclude him from the

³⁶Ibid., pp. 61-62.

³⁷Ibid., pp. 64-66.

pre-conference meeting. What worried Britain was being left out of any discussions with the major leaders of the world and being denied full partner status at Postdam.³⁸

The two men then proceeded to discuss the various situations in Europe ranging from relations with Charles De Gaulle to the British view of Europe as a whole. The date of the conference did not escape disagreement among the leaders; July 15, or thereabouts, was agreeable with Stalin and Truman. The British Prime Minister, in his June 6, 1945, cable, accepted July 15 as the date for the conference. He indicated to President Truman this was being relayed to Stalin.³⁹

³⁸William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1950), p. 379.

³⁹Ibid., pp. 92-93.

CHAPTER IV

ARRANGEMENTS FOR HOUSING AND PREPARING THE AGENDA FOR THE CONFERENCE

Housing was of importance to Churchill, and he noted this in his cable of June 9, 1945, to President Truman:

Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 9 June [19]45.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret.
Number 82.

While I have agreed in principle to our triple meeting in Berlin on July 15th, I hope you will agree with me that the British, American and Russian delegations shall have entirely separate quarters assigned to them and have their own guards, and that there shall be a fourth place prepared in which we meet to confer. I could not accept as at Yalta the principle that we go to Berlin, over which it is agreed we are to have triple or with the French quadruple parity, merely as guests of the Soviet Government and armies. We should provide everything for ourselves and be able to meet on equal terms. I should like to know how you stand about this.¹

¹United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945, I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 94-95. Hereafter cited as Potsdam Papers, I. The Russians had control of Berlin because Roosevelt allowed General Eisenhower to advance to the Elbe River, which is south of Berlin, and left the capital of Germany for the Soviet forces. This was done for military purposes. Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945-1948 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1977), p. 52.

Prime Minister Churchill sent a cable dated June 23, 1945, to President Truman. It contained a reply to the Prime Minister from Premier Stalin on housing for the conference. It read:

Prime Minister Churchill to President Truman

TOP SECRET

LONDON, 23 June 1945.

Prime Minister to President Truman. Personal and top secret.
Number 98.

Reference my 94.

a. Stalin has replied as follows:

"I have received your message of the 17th June.

1. The delegations will be housed as you propose in your message and as was arranged in the Crimea. Each delegation will have its own closed territory under a regime regulated at the discretion of the head of the delegation. The area in which the three delegations will be housed is Babelsberg, southeast of Potsdam. There will be a fourth building for the joint sessions--the Palace of the German Crown Prince in Potsdam.

2. Marshal Zhukov will be in Berlin on June 28th. The advance parties of Montgomery and Eisenhower should be sent in about this time to reconnoitre and take over the buildings in Babelsberg. Montgomery's and Eisenhower's advance parties will be able to obtain on the spot all the necessary information and further details about the buildings from General Kruglov, who is known to your people from Yalta.

3. Not far from the area where the delegations will be housed there is a good airfield in the small village Kladow, which could also be used as a landing ground.

b. I have instructed Montgomery to send an advance party to Babelsberg as soon as possible to reconnoitre and take over the buildings allotted to the British Delegation.²

Major General Floyd L. Parks, American Commanding General of the Berlin District, was granted permission from

²Potsdam Papers, I, P. 118.

the Russians to inspect the housing conditions for the President and his group. The following is a memorandum which contains excerpts from Major Park's visit to Berlin:

Memorandum by the Commanding General,
United States Sector, Berlin
District (Parks)

EXCERPT FROM MAJOR GENERAL PARKS' REPORT
OF VISIT TO BERLIN, JUNE 24, 1945

1. Following instructions given me on 16th June, 1945, I departed at 1600 hours Frankfurt time, 22nd June and arrived at Tempelhof Airdrome 1900 hours Moscow time, same day. Moscow time is not used in Berlin by the Soviet troops and I agreed to its use by the U.S. forces in Berlin in order to avoid confusion. It is one hour earlier than double summer time used at Frankfurt and three hours earlier than Greenwich time.

2. Lt. Gen. Vlasik, Deputy to Col. Gen. Kruglov, met me at the airdrome. Gen. Kruglov is Chief of Security for Marshal Stalin and in charge of arrangements for the Big Three conference. Permission was given to set up the radio communications to establish direct contact with SHAEF, ample transportation was provided, and aircraft and crews were cared for at Tempelhof airdrom.

3. My staff and I were conducted by Gen. Vlasik to Babelsberg by way of Unter den Linden, Brandenburg Gates, Tiergarten, and the Grunewald Forest. I conferred immediately with Gen. Kruglov at his Headquarters, and also present were Gen. Vlasik and Maj. Gen. Gorkinsky, Commandant and Security Officer, Greater Berlin District, who was in charge of arrangements at Yalta.

4. General Kruglov stated that the Russians had intended to be the hosts and had selected Babelsberg to accommodate the official parties because it was a community of fairly pretentious residences and had comparatively light bomb damages. He also pointed out that it was convenient to the Crown Prince's palace at Potsdam, where the conference itself is to be held and that the routes from the billeting area to the conference building were easily protected and policed.

5. He stated that as his authority extended to arrangements for the conference only and these arrangements were confined to the Babelsberg-Potsdam area, he could not discuss entry into the Berlin District itself by U.S. troops. General Kruglov promised to arrange for

me a courtesy call on Marshal Zhukov's Chief of Staff, or his representative, at which meeting I might ascertain whether or not any instructions had been received from Moscow permitting discussions relative to Berlin itself.

6. Gen. Kruglov indicated on a map the billet area which would be turned over to the U.S. for exclusive occupancy of conferees, administration, and guard. Everything within this area would be the responsibility of the U.S. and outside of this compound the Soviets would maintain security and guard. I pointed out that approximately 400 to 450 officials would be present with a corresponding number of service personnel to cater to them; that, in addition, there would be well over 1,000 other troops for the supply, maintenance, guard, etc. and that I felt the area was too small. Gen. Kruglov expressed great surprise at the size of the U.S. party and stated that Mr. Hopkins had estimated the number to be 150. He had not received a list of U.S. officials but assumed that approximately the same number would come that came to Yalta; they had planned to run the conference similar to the Yalta meeting and were installing approximately the same signal communication facilities.

7. When I pointed out to Gen. Kruglov that it would be necessary to begin truck movements of tentage, rations, petrol, etc. at once and that we desired to use the route Dessau-Berlin, he stated this would be satisfactory and would be arranged. I also stated that we desired to institute air courier service between Berlin-Halle-Frankfurt at once, using the direct route to Halle and he said this would be satisfactory.

8. Gen. Kruglov stated that since the airfield at Gatow (Kiadow) was only six miles from Potsdam, it had been designated as the terminus for the conference. I stated that we had no objections if it was adequate for C-54s and that I would have our air officer inspect it. I have no report from my air officer yet, but I flew over Gatow leaving Berlin and it appears even better than Tempelhof as to approaches, length of runways, etc. Both are sod fields.

9. Gen. Kruglov stated that he would have the motor echelon of my recce party met the following day at the junction of the Berlin Ringbahn and the Dessau Autobahn.

10. My staff and I were conducted to a billet by Gen. Kruglov. It was completely outfitted with beds and clean linen. Since our rations had not arrived from the airdrome, he sent over rations for us and a cook to assist our cook. He also sent me a case of wine and General Vlasik sent me some champagne. The meal was delicious.

11. Maj. Gen. Gorlinsky conducted me through the billets of the U.S. compound on Saturday morning, June 23. There are about 70 houses, well built, but old, with one to two baths each, and the Soviet authorities are in the midst of completely renovating them, promising to complete it. The majority are middle-class homes, a few being large enough for VIPs. The one earmarked for President Truman is old-fashioned, but spacious. Others suitable for the various high military and civil officers are nearby. They will be adequate for the short sojourn of the party, if the party is small. A hasty survey indicates that from 500-600 individuals can be housed, this figure including orderlies and mess attendants. There will not be enough houses if 450 officials arrive and although tentage can help to some extent, it is not a solution. The matter will be solved only if the U.S. Sector, Berlin District, or the Zehlendorf portion thereof, is turned over to us and the excess stationed therein.

12. I conferred again with Col. Gen. Kruglov at 1230. A telephone message was received during this conference that the motor serial of my recon group had arrived at the border and was in excess of the agreed 50 officers, 175 EM and 50 vehicles. I requested Gen. Kruglov to pass only the agreed number. It developed later in this conference that he could not give the authority which he had promised yesterday for our trucks to use the Dessau-Berlin Autobahn for purposes of resupply. He did say, however, that the Soviet authorities agreed to the use of the airdrome by our courier planes.

13. General Kruglov, at 1300 hours, escorted me through the Crown Prince's palace in Potsdam where the conference itself will be held. While I have not seen other conferences, Lt. Col. Pantuhoff, who is my interpreter, states that the facilities are infinitely better than at Teheran or Yalta. There is a large vaulted banquet hall in which a round table will be placed for the conference and there is space in the wings for offices, committee rooms, conference rooms, etc. The Soviet authorities have put the building and grounds in excellent shape.

14. As no information had been received as to visiting Marshal Zhukov's headquarters, I proposed to depart for Frankfurt at 1500 hours. Just before leaving for the airdrome, I received a message that Marshal Zhukov's Chief of Staff would meet me at the airdrome.

15. He met me at Tempelhof and I expressed my appreciation at his courtesy for coming to see me in order to save my time and thanked him for the cordial hospitality I had received from Col. Gen. Kruglov. I

told him that the only difficulty I had at the moment was in operating trucks between Berlin and Dessau for supply of rations, gasoline, tentage, etc. He stated he had no authority for permitting more than 50 vehicles in the Russian zone but that the 50 which had entered Babelsberg would be permitted to operate between Berlin and Dessau for supply purposes. Feeling that Gen. Kruglov's statement was sufficient, I did not mention the matter of aircraft to him. However, as I was boarding my plane, and after the departure of the Chief of Staff, Gorlinsky and the Field Commander at Tempelhof stated it would be necessary to get permission for the aircraft to return. After much discussion I told General Gorlinsky I would return and the courier plane would return, and that we would send a radio message for the information of Gen. Kruglov giving the ETA. I stated that the route would be direct from Halle to Berlin and that it would be impracticable for me to secure permission from Moscow every time a plane was flown to Berlin with supplies. He agreed that this advance notice of ETA would be satisfactory and said that agreement would be reached after my return to Berlin as to procedure thereafter, whereby no notice would have to be given.

16. We departed Tempelhof at 1600 hours, Moscow time and flew over Swan Island in the Havel River, the alleged home of Goebbels; with one or two exceptions, the houses on Swan Island are severely damaged. We flew the direct route from Berlin to Halle, observing the Autobahn. One arch bridge over a ravine had been blown, and there are at least five overhead bridges which have been dropped on the Autobahn. At 1645, Moscow time, I noted the head of the column of my motor serial on the Autobahn about three miles east of [the] Elbe River.

17. At Halle I stopped and gave instructions to my Chief of Staff and arrived at Frankfurt at 1745 Frankfurt time.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Recommend acceptance of the Crown Prince's palace at Potsdam as suitable for the Big Three conference.
2. Recommend that the Soviet plan for a compound of billets for the U.S. conferees at Babelsberg be accepted.
3. Recommend expedition of negotiations to make available U.S. Sector, Berlin District, for quartering and bivouacking of supply troops, minor officials, press, etc. as there is no room for them at Babelsberg. If adjustment of all zones of occupation is not effected

on 1 July, pressure should be brought to bear to permit erection of camps and bivouacs in Zehlendorf which adjoins Babelsberg and is sure to be part of the U.S. zone. We urgently require authority for immediate reconnaissance in Berlin.³

The American Ambassador in the Soviet Union sent a message, dated June 25, 1945, to the Assistant Foreign Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Andrey Yanvaryevich Vyshinsky, on the need for the installation of communication equipment for the conference:

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)
to the Soviet Assistant Foreign
Commissar (Vyshinsky)

URGENT AND TOP SECRET
No. 362a

Moscow, June 25, 1945.

DEAR MR. VYSHINSKI: I have received another urgent cable from General Eisenhower repeating the requests that I submitted to you in my letter of June 23 with regard to reconnaissance of Zehlendorf for additional camp sites, the use of the Halle-Berlin Autobahn without special authority in each case, and authority to increase the size of General Parks' party at Babelsberg.

The most pressing matter is the establishment of a very high frequency radio-telephone terminal and teletypewriter facilities in the Berlin area with a relay point in the vicinity of Luckenwalde near Belzig. These installations take considerable time, and we are afraid that if the installations do not start at once we will be unable to have them completed by the time the Berlin conference opens. Major General Frank B. [E.] Stoner and a special group of Signal Corps personnel have been sent from Washington to make the installation, and they are now waiting at Frankfurt for authorization to proceed to Berlin.

It would be very helpful if authority could be issued to the local Soviet Commander in Berlin to grant authority for such operations as are necessary in Berlin in preparation for the conference. As General Eisenhower points out, it is time consuming and cumbersome to have to obtain permission from Moscow in each

³Potsdam Papers, I, pp. 121-125.

instance regarding these inconsequential matters.

I would be most grateful for an early reply.

Sincerely yours, W. A. HARRIMAN⁴

The Assistant Foreign Commissar did not waste any time in replying to the Ambassador's message. Permission was granted to the American's request:

The Soviet Assistant Foreign Commissar (Vyshinsky)
to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

[Translation]

URGENT AND SECRET

Moscow, June 26, 1945.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR, With reference to your letter of June 25 in which you point out that among the preparatory measures for the meeting the most urgent is the erection of a high-frequency radio telephone station and of a teletype system, the People's Commissariat has given instructions to the Soviet military organs in Berlin to get in touch immediately with General Parks on this matter and, after having fixed the number of the communications group headed by Major General Frank B. [E.] Stoner, to permit this group to proceed to Berlin.

Please accept [etc.]

A. VYSHINSKI⁵

Preparation of the Agenda

President Truman, in his May 9, 1945, cable to Churchill, indicated that the British draw up a list of items to be discussed at the meeting.⁶ On May 29, the British Minister in Washington, Lord Halifax, notified the Acting Secretary of State that the Prime Minister would be

⁴Ibid., pp. 126-127.

⁵Ibid., p. 131.

⁶Ibid., p. 4.

discussing a list of proposals for the conference. The American Department of State, at the request of President Truman, made a detailed study of the British proposals and offered their views. This study was forwarded to the President in a June 14, 1945, memorandum from Joseph C. Grew, Acting Secretary of State. The memorandum from Grew and the State Department study read:

The Acting Secretary of State to the President

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 14, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Comments on Prime Minister Churchill's
Suggested Topics for Discussion at the Next
Meeting of the Heads of Government

With my memorandum of May 30 submitting Prime Minister Churchill's suggested list of subjects for discussion for the next meeting of the heads of government I offered to send you the Department's comments thereon. A memorandum commenting upon the topics is now attached.

While in general the subject matter covered by Mr. Churchill is satisfactory and deals with a number of problems requiring urgent clarification, the form of presentation, I feel, is unfortunate: Mr. Churchill's list is so drawn as to give the appearance largely of a bill of complaints against the Soviet Government, which seems hardly the proper approach to the forthcoming meeting. Presumably he would wish to reword his list of subjects prior to any communication of it to Marshal Stalin. Furthermore, several of the problems mentioned by Mr. Churchill seem to be on the way to settlement and may well be solved before your meeting.

I am having prepared in the Department:

- (1) A suggested list of questions which you may wish to bring up for discussion, together with pertinent memoranda. These will include the two points raised in your memoranda of July [June] 9 concerning procedure to facilitate interchange of views on the terms of the European Peace Settlements and the Twenty-five Year Treaty for the demilitarization of Germany.

(2) A full set of detailed memoranda on policy with regard to the subjects suggested by the British Prime Minister;

(3) A complete set of memoranda covering various policy questions which conceivably may be raised by Marshal Stalin or may arise in the course of discussion, and

(4) A full collection of pertinent maps.

JOSEPH C. GREW

[Attachment]

MEMORANDUM

<u>British Agenda</u>	<u>Comments</u>
1. <u>Poland</u>	
(a) Main question.	No comment required pending outcome of talks in Moscow and further study of Mr. Hopkins' report.
(b) Russian action in handing over Germany territory to Poland before peace settlement and without consulting either United States or British Governments.	
2. <u>Germany</u> . Inter-Allied policy and machinery as regards Germany including	
(a) Conditions and timing for bringing into force of occupational zones.	As you are aware this subject is now under discussion between the Governments. The State and War Departments are not prepared to defer indefinitely the withdrawal into the zones. According to Article 6 of the protocol on the zones of occupation, this protocol is to go into effect simultaneously with the signing of the surrender instrument. The Prime Minister has now agreed that this should be done, and that the settlement of the Austrian zones should be part of this arrangement. It is likely that sufficient progress will be achieved in the present discussions, so that the

question will not have to be further considered at the forthcoming meeting.

British Agenda

(b) Establishment of a German Government or local administrations.

Comments

(1) It is recommended that this Government propose the restoration throughout Germany of local self-government through elective councils and proceed forthwith to put this proposal into effect in the United States zone.

(2) It is recommended that this Government propose the authorization for the whole of Germany of non-Nazi political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion and proceed forthwith to put this proposal into effect in the United States zone.

(3) It is recommended that this Government propose the introduction of the representative and elective principles into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as results of local self-government seem to warrant this further step.

(4) It is recommended that this Government oppose the creation of separate integrated German administrative and political entities coinciding with the four zones of occupation and favor, on the contrary, the use of central German administrative machinery, in so far as possible, for the despatch of business above the provincial or state level. It is in consequence further recommended that this Government oppose the partition of Germany, either de facto or de jure, along the lines of the

zones of occupation.

(5) It is recommended that this Government oppose the establishment for the time being of a central German Government in contradistinction to the restoration of such central administrative agencies as would serve the interests of the Control Council.

British Agenda

Comments

(c) Feeding of Germany as a whole.

(d) Disposal of displaced persons in Germany especially Russians.

(e) Problem of German reparation with particular reference to Russian habit of stripping bare territories which they control.

(f) Disposal of German fleet and merchant ships.

3. Austria.

(a) Establishment of zones, particularly in Vienna, and of Control Commission.

No comment on the inclusion of these items. Pertinent memoranda are being prepared.

The European Advisory Commission has been deadlocked for some time in completing arrangements on zones and occupational machinery for Austria. This situation results from the Soviet Government's insistence that in zoning Vienna for occupation by the four Powers, the city limits be delineated as they were before 1938 (which would leave no airfield in our Vienna zone), while we prefer use of the present wider limits of the city, including the suburbs, with an airfield in our zone. The War Department has insisted upon having adequate facilities in Vienna,

particularly airfields, and has not been willing to accept the airport offered by the Soviet Government. To solve this difficulty, military missions of the United States, United Kingdom and France have gone to Vienna to survey the situation and make recommendations to the European Advisory Commission, which it is hoped, will lead to a settlement.

While the agreement on control machinery for Austria and a protocol on zones (exclusive of Vienna) have not yet been formally recommended by the European Advisory Commission, these questions should not present great difficulty, once the Vienna

British Agenda

Comments

zone is agreed upon. If the present survey leads to a rapid agreement on Vienna, the European Advisory Commission can presumably make its recommendations at once in a form in which the four governments will approve.

Therefore this question may or may not require discussion in the meeting, depending upon developments in the next few weeks.

(b) Recognition of an Austrian Government satisfactory to all Allied Governments.

It is recommended that this Government agree to give prompt consideration to the question of the recognition of the Renner Government after the zones of occupation, including the subdivision of Vienna, are satisfactorily delineated and our troops have taken up their positions accordingly and after an agreement on inter-Allied control machinery has been concluded and put into

(c) Feeding of
Austria.

4. Yugoslavia
Maintenance of
status quo with regard
to Yugoslav-Italian and
Yugoslav-Austrian
frontiers pending peace
settlement.

5. Balkans

(a) Russian
behaviour generally in
Rumania, Bulgaria and
Hungary.

(1) As regards
treatment of British and
American representatives
on Control Commission.

(2) As regards the
setting up of puppet
governments in those
countries.

effect. We should also
stipulate that the Renner
Government should prepare to
hold elections as soon as
possible, under the super-
vision of the Occupying Powers,
for a constituent assembly.

As regards the Trieste and
Carinthia questions an ade-
quate settlement has now been
reached which will make it
possible to cover this topic
very briefly. The status quo
should be maintained in
respect of the Klagenfurt
region. No zone of occupation
should be given to Yugoslavia
and in the final peace settle-
ment this area will be
retained by Austria. More
important, however, would be
the application of the Yalta
principles to the totalitarian
regime which has been set up
in Yugoslavia. Our recommen-
dation as seen at the moment
would not be for formal
tripartite consultation under
the Yalta formula if Yugoslavs
could themselves be induced to
move in this direction, since
the Government and political
intolerance of the Partisans
is cause for some real concern.

Although this section with its
three sub-headings covers the
main points there should be
some differentiation of treat-
ment between them as regards
their importance. Sub-heading
(3) (removal of industrial
equipment) hardly seems
appropriate for discussion
between the Heads of States
since probably the worst part
of it has already taken place.

(3) As regards removal by Soviet authorities of industrial equipment especially in Rumania under the guise of booty.

It would seem appropriate, therefore, that discussions in respect of this point take place on the diplomatic level. Since Anglo-American interests and responsibilities under the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe in Rumania require that we have a greater share in the Allied Control Commissions and other Allied activities the Soviet Government should be induced to agree that future Allied activities in these countries be on a genuinely tripartite basis. Joint decisions should be taken regarding:

1. The manner of the execution of the armistice agreements in the second period.

2. A program for the withdrawal of Soviet troops on the basis of the four Nations' agreement at Moscow on October 30, 1943.

3. The implementation of the Crimea Declaration on Liberated Europe, including its application in the matter of elections.

4. The conclusion of peace treaties and reestablishment of diplomatic relations.

5. The recognition and application of the principle of non-exclusion and equal access in economic relations between former satellites and other countries. This section requires rewording in the light of Marshal Stalin's proposal to establish regular diplomatic relations. Essentially the whole problem in the satellite states is to determine:

1. Are they really independent.

(b) Question of concluding peace treaties with these minor enemy states with a view to withdrawal of Russian armies of occupation.

2. Is the Soviet Army to remain.

3. If we accept less than really tripartite authority can we obtain firm assurances of non-exclusion for our rightful activities.

5B Albania

A short topic on Albania might be added worded as follows:

Agreement on parallel action regarding recognition of an Albanian Government. It would be desirable for the three Governments to reach agreement to the effect that no action will be taken with respect to the recognition of an Albanian Government without prior consultation.

6. Persia

Question of mutual withdrawal of troops.

7. Italy, Greece and Turkey

(a) Re-definition of our policy and interests in these countries.

(b) Conclusion of a peace treaty with Italy.

No comment upon the wording of this section.

These topics are substantially what we proposed but a separate agenda in regard to Italy might be suggested as follows:

1. Review of tripartite policy, the U.S. objectives being the early political independence and economic recovery of Italy.

2. Italy's admission to the ranks of the United Nations.

3. Immediate revision of the surrender terms, keeping only controls essential:

a) to cover Allied military requirements as long as Allied forces remain in or operate from Italy;

b) to implement the pledge that the people will have an untrammelled choice of their form of government;

c) to safeguard disputed territories within the 1939 frontiers against settlements forced either by the Italians or rival claimants pending the final peace negotiations.

4. Negotiation in the near future of a definitive peace treaty, permitting the Italians to take part in discussions at an early stage rather than being forced to sign a treaty already negotiated in all details by the victorious powers.

It would be preferable that these subjects not be placed upon the agenda unless specifically requested by the Soviets. If the Montreux Convention and entrances to the Baltic are discussed it might also be desirable to include a discussion on Russian access to the Persian Gulf through Iran.

8. Russian access to the sea.

(a) Agreements of Montreux Convention (if raised by the Russians).

(b) Special interests regarding entrances to the Baltic (if raised by the Russians).

9. General

(a) Refusal of Soviet Government to allow Yalta declaration on liberated Europe to be applied to countries in which they are interested.

Difficulties on this subject have arisen in Czechoslovakia and Austria. In Austria, the Soviet Government has permitted establishment of a Provisional Austrian Government without consultation with us. The joint occupation plans for Austria are discussed above under 3 (a) [.]

With respect to Czechoslovakia, the situation is now somewhat improved. For some weeks, the Soviet Government refused to grant permission for our mission to proceed to the seat of the Czechoslovak Government at Kosice and cancelled abruptly plans which had been under way for some time to send the diplomatic corps from London to Kosice. However, the Benes

Government has now moved to Prague and our mission proceeded from London to Prague about June 1. We do not as yet have much information about the conditions there and consequently are not yet ready to decide whether or not the status of Czechoslovakia should be discussed at the meeting.

(b) Refusal of Soviet Government to allow representatives of the Press to function freely in countries under Soviet military administration.

(c) Transfer of German population from Poland and Czechoslovakia.

No comment as to the inclusion of these subjects on the agenda.

While we do not feel that it would be desirable to raise the Palestine question at this time and it is noted that it is apparently not the intention of the British Government to do so, a memorandum on the subject will be prepared for use in case the Soviets should bring the matter up for discussion. A memorandum on the current situation in the Levant States for use in case the Soviet Government introduces the subject is also being prepared. It is felt, however, that since it has been publicly stated that it is not the intention of the United States Government to endeavor to reach a solution of this question in the absence of representatives of France and the Levant States it would be desirable to avoid discussions of it in the meeting of the Big Three.⁷

⁷Potsdam Papers, I, pp. 164-173

President Truman was to leave for the conference on July 7, 1945. Prior to his departure he took a cruise on July 4, 1945, with a number of friends, aides, and advisers. Two days later a memorandum from his advisers, John Snyder, Samuel Rosenman and George Allen, was received covering the issues they discussed on that cruise. The concluding paragraph of the memorandum expressed their confidence that President Truman would be successful at Potsdam: "We think that as a well known Missouri horse trader, the American people expect you to bring something home to them."⁸

⁸Ibid., p. 228.

CHAPTER V

PRESIDENT TRUMAN TRAVELS TO POTSDAM AND SETTLES IN FOR THE CONFERENCE

On Friday, July 6, President Truman and his group left Washington, D.C., for Newport News, Virginia, by way of train. The President's train arrived the next day on Saturday, July 7, and from the train station they went to the port. There he and his party boarded the Augusta bound for Antwerp, Belgium.¹ The U.S.S. Philadelphia joined the Augusta and sailed ahead of the President's ship (this provided for a smooth ride for the President and his group). There was no destroyer or air escort for the voyage to Europe or the return trip.²

¹United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945, II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 4-5. Hereafter cited as Potsdam Papers, II. The editors of the Potsdam Papers, II, note that Lieutenant William M. Rigdon, U.S.N., served as Personal Secretary to President Truman and compiled a "Log of the President's Trip to the Berlin Conference (July 6, 1945 to August 7, 1945)."

²*Ibid.*, p. 5. At the end of the day, President Truman wrote in his diary, ". . . I have to make [this trip] --win, lose or draw--and we must win. I'm not working for any interest but the Republic of the United States. I [am] giving nothing away except to save starving people and even

During the trip the President and his aides studied background papers on various topics that might be discussed at the Conference and socialized with the crew of the Augusta. On Sunday, July 15, the Augusta docked at Antwerp, Belgium. There a delegation of officials from Belgium and from the United States, including General Eisenhower, greeted the President and his group. Then the American delegation left by the way of automobile for a thirty-five mile trip to the airport in Brussels.

Five hours later the President's plane landed at Gatow Airport, located in the British Sector of Berlin.³ Berlin was one hundred ten miles inside the Soviet zone of Germany. The Americans, British, and Soviets were in charge of certain sectors of Berlin. Later the French received a sector in Berlin.⁴

Lieutenant William M. Rigdon, Personal Secretary to the President, described the journey from the airport to Babelsberg:

We passed through a section of Potsdam enroute from Gatow to Babelsberg. Part of the route was guarded by American and British troops, but the greater part of the

then I hope we can only help them to help themselves." Truman Diary, July 7, 1945, in Robert Ferrell, Off the Record The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1980), p. 49. Hereafter cited as Ferrell, Off the Record.

³Ibid., pp. 6-8.

⁴Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis The Presidency Harry S. Truman 1945-1948 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1977), p. 59.

route was patrolled by green-capped Soviet frontier guardsmen as this was a Soviet-controlled area.⁵

It was here the American, British and Soviet delegations would live during the duration of the conference. Rigdon describes the living quarters for the American-British delegations:

The American and British delegations to the conference were housed in Babelsberg in little territorial "islands" within the Soviet-occupied zone [sector] of Greater Berlin.

The President and party arrived at his assigned quarters in Babelsberg. Babelsberg is a suburb of Berlin, about 12 miles south-west of the city, between Berlin and Potsdam. It lies along winding Griebnitz Lake and is in a thickly wooded area. It has a pleasant climate at this time of the year, with an average mean temperature in the low 60's. The town was quite popular with the Germans as a summer resort. . . .⁶

Rigdon continues to describe President Truman's living quarters and his staff:

The President's quarters at No. 2 Kaiser Strasse (called the "Little White House") was a three-story stucco residence. . . . It is right on Lake Griebnitz and is surrounded on three sides by groves of trees and shrubbery forming a very beautiful garden that reaches down to the lake. The house was stripped of its furnishings during the war but had been refurnished by the Russians.

It was nicely furnished during our stay but, like most European homes, the bathroom and bathing facilities were wholly inadequate. Nor was it screened, so that the mosquitos gave us a "working over" during our first few nights there until the weather had cooled somewhat.

The President occupied a suite on the second floor (north side), consisting of bedroom, sitting room, office and breakfast room. He also had a private sun-porch outside his office. . . .

⁵Potsdam Papers, II, p. 8.

⁶Ibid., pp. 8-9.

The President maintained his own mess at Babelsberg, employing Filipino cooks and stewards brought from the Potomac. . . .⁷

The Joint Chiefs of Staff and officials from the American State Department, Rigdon wrote, were housed near Truman's quarters. The communications center and map room were located in the President's living area with wire service to Frankfurt and Washington. Prime Minister Churchill's quarters were located at 23 Ringstrasse, two blocks from the Little White House. The British quarters were similar to those of the Americans; however, they were "a bit better furnished than the President's."⁸ Stalin lived in the same city and was about a mile from President Truman's residence. Thus, the American and British delegations had to make a three-mile journey to Potsdam for the meetings, while Stalin had a shorter journey to travel.⁹

⁷Ibid., p. 9. In his diary for July 16, President Truman wrote his impression of the living quarters for the conference: "The house as were all others was stripped of everything by the Russians--not even a tin spoon left. The American commander, however, being a man of energy, caught the Russian loot train and recovered enough furniture to make the place liveable. Nothing matches. We have a two ton German side board in the dining room and a French Chippendale table and chairs--maybe a mixture of both. There is a birdseye maple wardrobe and an oak chest matching the two ton side board in my bed room. It is comfortable enough all round but what a nightmare it would give an interior decorator." Ferrell, Off the Record, p. 50.

⁸Ibid., p. 10.

⁹Ibid.

As the American and British delegations settled in for the evening the reporters filed their stories for the next day's editions of their newspapers. The New York Times would give its readers front page coverage of the President's arrival in Berlin in the Monday, July 16, edition. On the second page of that edition a small story, sent by wireless with a July 15 dateline, described the creature comforts of the delegates:

Ice Plant Requisitioned
For Potsdam Conferees

By Wireless to The New York Times

BERLIN, July 15--The delegates to the Big Three conference in Potsdam will have all the comforts occupying troops can provide.

A Berlin ice plant has been taken over to insure that they do not want for cold drinks, and there are adequate stocks of bourbon, gin, Scotch, vermouth, wines and liquers to please every taste.

For the first meal the mess officer, Maj. John E. Lennox of Boston, said that there would be melons, berries, lettuce hearts, tomatoes and all things GI's dream of eating. The ten-ton mobile refrigerators will hold choice meats for the official party.

Meals will be served in Old World silver, fine glassware and rich linens salvaged from Berlin's ruins.¹⁰

The Monday, July 16, 1945, edition of the New York Times carried on the same page a story by Tania Long describing the meeting room where the delegations would discuss the various topics concerning Europe and the world. The story with a July 15 dateline read:

¹⁰The New York Times, July 16, 1945, p. 2.

Leaders Will Meet in Bleak Room
In Potsdam to Settle Reich's Fate

Truman, Stalin and Churchill Will Enter by
Separate Doors--Russians Daub in Star
for Cloud in Painting as Symbol

By TANIA LONG
By Wireless to The New York Times

BERLIN, July 15--The Big Three leaders will begin their series of historic conferences tomorrow in a large oak-paneled room in a building that the Russians have specially outfitted for the occasion in the Potsdam area, west of Berlin. [Press services said that the meetings would be held in a place of the former Kaiser.]

The room, measuring about fifty by forty feet, contains little furniture beyond a big, round table, covered in dark red cloth, and the chairs required to seat the three chiefs and members of their staffs. There are fifteen chairs around the table and the three in which President Truman, Premier Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill will sit stand out by their greater size and by cupids perched on their backs.

The somberness of the room--its color scheme is dark red, black and gold--is unrelieved by groups of American, British and Russian flags placed at the top of the paneling and by two immense chandeliers of wrought iron and glass eight feet in diameter and six feet in height, each with thirty light bulbs.

The room has a vaulted roof with oak beams built between beams painted white. At one end a window thirty by forty feet looks out on a landscaped garden.

The conference room has three entrances. Each of the leaders will enter by a different door for the first meeting. They will be followed by members of their staffs. Only the three Chiefs of State will be driven up the driveway to the terrace of the house, passing through the main gates.

Each Has Consulting Room

At one end of the conference room is a door leading to Mr. Churchill's private consulting room and office, where he can meet with his assistants and discuss with them problems from the British viewpoint.

Beyond this, but not connected with it, is Mr. Truman's consulting room, furnished with a desk, tables and comfortable chairs. Mr. Truman's office contains a number of books in English. Among the books are Mahan's "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History," which has several uncut pages; Homer Lee's "The Valor of Ignorance," several copies of Will Livingston Comfort's novels and an assortment of "Westerns" and novels of the Nineteen Hundreds. Also among them is Martha Dodd's book on Berlin, "Through Embassy Eyes."

Each of the three leaders has his own suite of rooms in the building in addition to his office. Mr. Churchill's is separated from his consulting room. He lives in another wing turned over to the British. Mr. Truman's is directly above his office and is reached by a small, narrow staircase. Each suite consists of a bedroom, sitting room and bath and has a small private dining room near by. President Truman's dining room is next to his consulting room and has only four chairs and a small table.

Mr. Truman's rooms are furnished in a nondescript mahogany.

In another part of the building that can be reached through a long narrow corridor is a huge dining room in which the other participants in the meetings will eat. The room is big enough to seat fifty and is decorated with light wallpaper with a pattern of flowers and pheasants.

Russians Switch Symbols

A painting in the room showed a dark cloud over a vessel, and the Russians thought that this was not right at a time like this, so they removed the cloud and substituted a large, shining star, which they say is symbolic of Russian-American unity, since a star appears prominently in each nation's heraldry.

On the third floor of the building are twelve rooms outfitted as offices and one, the largest of all, is a message center. Here are teletypes and telephone switchboards which will connect the Big Three with the rest of the world.¹¹

¹¹Tania Long, "Leaders Will Meet in Bleak Room In Potsdam to Settle Reich's Fate," the New York Times, Monday July 16, 1945, edition, p. 2.

President Truman learned on Monday, July 16, that Stalin had not arrived.¹² The real reason for the delay was that Stalin, who was sixty-six years old, had suffered a mild heart attack.¹³ The President received British Prime Minister Churchill in the morning. The news accounts reported this was a courtesy call.¹⁴

With this delay, President Truman toured Berlin.¹⁵ Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, received in Berlin a

¹²Potsdam Papers, II, p. 11.

¹³Ferrell, Off the Record, p. 50. Stalin was sixty-six years old at the time of the Potsdam Conference. He would die in 1953.

¹⁴The New York Times, July 17, 1945, p. 1. Truman recorded in his diary of his meeting with Churchill at 11 A.M.: "He was on time to the dot. His daughter told Gen. Vaughan he hadn't been up so early in ten years! I'd been up for four and one half hours. We had a most pleasant conversation. He is a most charming and a very clever person--meaning clever in the English not the Kentucky sense. He gave me a lot of hooey about how great my country is and how he loved Roosevelt and how he intended to love me etc. etc. Well. I gave him as cordial a reception as I could--being naturally (I hope) a polite and agreeable person. I am sure we can get along if he doesn't try to give me too much soft soap. You know soft soap is made of ash hopper lye and it burns to beat hell when it gets into the eyes. It's fine for chigger bites but not so good for rose complexions. But I haven't a rose complexion. We struck a 'blow for liberty' when he left in Scotch--not the right brand for the purpose as the old V.P. Jack Garner can testify. The photo men had a field day when he left." Ferrell, Off the Record, pp. 51-52.

¹⁵Ferrell, Off the Record, p. 52. Truman recorded his impressions of Berlin in his diary: "Then we went on to Berlin and saw absolute ruin. Hitler's folly. He overreached himself by trying to take in too much territory. He had no morals and his people backed him up. Never did I see a more sorrowful sight, nor witness retribution to the nth degree. The most sorrowful part of the situation is the

cable marked "TOP SECRET, URGENT" from George L. Harrison, Special Consultant to Stimson and Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee on atomic energy. This cryptic message dealt with the successful development of the atomic bomb (operated on this morning). It noted that complete results are not available; however, it seems the test was successful. A local press release was issued to satisfy the press, for the "MANHATTAN" project, the name assigned to the development of the bomb, which was a secret to the general public. The project director, Dr. Leslie R. Groves, the cryptic message stated, was pleased with the test. The message was first delivered to Stimson's aid, Colonel William H. Kyle. At 7:30 P.M. Stimson took this message to the Little White House.

The President and Secretary of State, James F. Brynes, seemed pleased. The message read:

The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee
(Harrison) to the Secretary of
War (Stimson)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 16 July 1945.

deluded Hitlerian populace. Of course the Russians have kidnapped the able bodied and I suppose have made involuntary workmen of them. They have also looted every house left standing and have sent the loot to Russia. But Hitler did the same thing to them. It is the Golden Rule in reverse--and it is not an uplifting sight. What a pity that the human animal is not able to put his moral thinking into practice! We saw old men, old women, young women, children from tots to teens carrying packs, pushing carts, pulling carts, evidently ejected by the conquerors and carrying what they could of their belongings to nowhere in particular." Ferrell, Off the Record, p. 52.

URGENT

WAR 32887. For Colonel Kyle's EYES ONLY from Harrison for Mr. Stimson.

Operated on this morning. Diagnosis not yet complete but results seem satisfactory and already exceed expectations. Local press release necessary as interest extends great distance. Dr. Groves pleased. He returns tomorrow. I will keep you posted.¹⁶

¹⁶Potsdam Papers II, p. 1360n Footnote 2 for document number 1303).

CHAPTER VI

THE FIRST WEEK AT POTSDAM, JULY 17, 1945,
TO JULY 22, 1945

Berlin--Tuesday, July 17, 1945

Premier Stalin paid a courtesy call on President Truman around noon. The President wrote in his diary of the meeting:

I told Stalin that I am no diplomat but usually said yes & no to questions after hearing all the argument. It pleased him.

We had lunch, talked socially, put on a real show drinking toasts to everyone, then had pictures made in the back yard.¹

The President and his staff left for the first plenary meeting. After still and motion pictures were made of the participants the meeting started around 5:00 P.M.² The major problem for the participants was translation. Any disagreement over the Russian word for its English

¹Robert H. Ferrell, Off the Record The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1980), p. 52. Hereafter cited as Ferrell, Off the Record.

²United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference 1945, II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 12. Hereafter cited as Potsdam Papers, II.

equivalent was settled at the table.³ Truman wrote years later about the translation problems:

I was impressed with [Bohlen's] alertness to shadings and evasions in the translation of Stalin's remarks to me by Stalin's own interpreter [Vladimir Nikolayevich], Pavlov. Frequently, Bohlen would correct the interpretation made by Pavlov and clarify obscure meanings. Stalin, too, appreciated Bohlen's performance, for he would smile each time Bohlen corrected Pavlov.⁴

President Truman was the only Chief of State at the conference and at Stalin's suggestion was made chairman.⁵

The primary objective of the first plenary meeting was to list topics for discussion in future sessions. President Truman made his first proposal, the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers.⁶ The President said:

One of the most urgent problems in the field of foreign relations facing us today is the establishment of some procedure and machinery for the development of peace negotiations and territorial settlements without which the existing confusion, political and economic stagnation will continue to the serious detriment of Europe and the world.⁷

³Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions Memoirs by Harry S. Truman (New York: Signet paperback, 1965), p. 387. Hereafter cited as Truman, Memoirs, I.

⁴Harry S. Truman, "TRUMAN BIDS U.S. BE FIRM TO SOVIET," the New York Times, July 31, 1959, p. 3. This article was a copyright article for the North American Newspaper Alliance.

⁵Robert D. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York: Pyramid paperback, 1965), p. 305.

⁶Ibid., p. 52.

⁷Truman, Memoirs, I, p. 380.

The council would be composed of foreign ministers from the United States, Great Britain, Russia, France and China.⁸ The second proposal of President Truman dealt with the control of Germany. This proposal covered the political and economic principles of how Germany would operate in the future.⁹ President Truman presented his third proposal on the implementation of the Yalta declaration on liberated Europe. The American proposal called for the immediate diplomatic recognition of these countries and the conclusion of peace treaties with them. The final proposal was the admission of Italy into the United Nations organization. All were referred to their foreign ministers.

Stalin presented the Soviet list of topics: disposition of the German merchant fleet; reparations from Italy; trusteeship of territories from the defeated nations; question of diplomatic relations with satellite states and the government of Spain; question of Tangier, Syria and Lebanon, and the emigre Polish Government in London, England.¹⁰

Churchill then presented his list of topics: European peace settlement; application of the Yalta declaration on liberated Europe; war crimes; Poland; Polish

⁸Ibid., p. 380.

⁹Potsdam Papers, II, pp. 52-53.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 54-56.

western frontier; transfer of German population from Poland and Czechoslovakia; Italy and the conclusion of a peace treaty; removal of oil equipment in Rumania; Turkey; and Iran. The Soviet and British topics were referred to the foreign ministers at the conference for further study. Churchill said their foreign ministers could give them two or three topics for discussion at future meetings.

"I don't want just to discuss," said Truman, "I want to decide."¹¹ "You want something in the bag each day," replied Churchill.¹² The time for future meetings was set at 4:00 P.M. The first meeting adjourned at 6:55 P.M. The President and his party left for their quarters.¹³

Berlin--Wednesday, July 18, 1945


The second plenary meeting began at 4:00 P.M. After much discussion it was agreed to use 1937 as the geographical definition of Germany. As President Truman pointed out, they would be discussing what Germany possessed after World War I and what was settled by the Versailles Treaty of

¹¹Ibid., p. 63.

¹²Ibid.

¹³Ibid., p. 12.

1919.¹⁴ The shaded areas, in the following map, indicate Germany as of December 31, 1937:¹⁵



Poland was the next topic. The Soviet delegation presented its proposal on Poland. Sergey Goulunsky, Expert Consultant, read the Soviet statement to the Heads of Government:

Proposal by the Soviet Delegation

[Translation]

DRAFT SUBMITTED BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION JULY 18

THE STATEMENT OF THE HEADS OF THE THREE
GOVERNMENTS ON THE POLISH QUESTION

¹⁴Ibid., p. 96.

¹⁵Alfred M. de Zayas, with a forward by Robert Murphy, Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., paperback, 1979), p. xxvi.

In view of the setting up on the basis of the decisions of the Crimea Conference of the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity and in view of the establishment by the United States of America and by Great Britain of diplomatic relations with Poland, which previously already existed between Poland and the Soviet Union, we agreed that the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America as well as the Governments of other United Nations shall sever all relations with the government of Arciszewski. We deem it imperative to render to the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity the necessary assistance in the immediate transmission to it of all stock, assets and all other property belonging to Poland, which still is at the disposal of the government of Arciszewski and of its organs, in whatever form this property may be and no matter where or at whose disposal this property may prove to be at the present moment. The transfer of this property to any institution of any kind or to private persons is forbidden.

We also found it necessary that the Polish armed forces, including the navy and the merchant marine, now subordinated to the government of Arciszewski, should be subordinated to the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity, which [will?] determine the further measures to be taken in respect of these armed forces, men of war and merchant ships.¹⁶

After some discussion, the British presented their proposal on Poland. It read:

Proposal by the British Delegation

[BABELSBERG, July 19, 1945.]

[DRAFT OF A STATEMENT ON POLAND]

(1) We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognised by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and the United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of

¹⁶Ibid., p. 1110.

their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.

(2) The British and United States Governments express their willingness to discuss with properly accredited representatives of the Polish Provisional Government the orderly transfer to it of Polish State property, including the Polish Embassies in London and Washington, in regard to which measures of conservation have been taken by the two Governments. They assume that such discussions would embrace also the questions of the acknowledgement by the Polish Provisional of liability for the credits advanced to the late Polish Government and other outstanding debts, and the relation of such advances to any assets of the Polish State available abroad.

(3) The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and Merchant Marine. It is their desire that as many of these Poles as possible should return home, and they consider that the Polish Provisional Government could itself greatly assist in this regard by giving specific undertakings that those Poles who return will do so with full assurance of their personal security, freedom and livelihood.

(4) The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government is pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot, in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. It is the confident hope of the Three Powers that the elections will be so organized as to enable all sections of Polish opinion to express their views freely, and thus play their full part in the restoration of the country's political life. The Three Powers will further expect that representatives of the Allied Press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections.¹⁷

President Truman, who had been listening for sometime, expressed belief the Soviet and British had similar proposals on Poland. "I am interested," Truman continued, "in the Polish Government, particularly in free

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 1111-1112.

elections assured by the Yalta agreement."¹⁸ Both proposals were referred to the foreign ministers for study. At 6:00 P.M. the second plenary meeting adjourned. The President and the American delegation left for their quarters.¹⁹

Truman recorded his impression of this meeting in his diary:

There were three proposals and I banged them through in short order, much to the surprise of Mr. Churchill. Stalin was very much pleased. Churchill was too, after he had recovered. I'm not going to stay around this terrible place all summer just to listen to speeches. I'll go home to the Senate for that.²⁰

That night the President looked over a number of messages and documents. One was given to him by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson. Stimson had received from his aid, George Harrison, a message marked, "TOP SECRET PRIORITY CABLE." The Message dealt with the atomic bomb. In cryptic language, it indicated the first explosion of the bomb was a success. For security reasons a clear non-cryptic message would have been out of the question. Harrison used the following cryptic phrases to describe the successful test:

The light in his eyes discernible from here [Washington, D.C.] to Highold [Stimson's house on Long Island, N.Y., 250 miles away] and I could have heard his screams from here [Washington, D.C.] to my farm [at Upperville, Virginia, 40 miles away].²¹

¹⁸Ibid., p. 98.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 15.

²⁰Ferrell, Off the Record, p. 54.

²¹Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace The Potsdam Conference (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 164.

The message read:

The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee
(Harrison to the Secretary of
War (Stimson))

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 17 July [19]45.

PRIORITY

WAR--33556. TopSec Secretary of War from Harrison.
Doctor has just returned most enthusiastic and
confident that the LITTLE BOY is as husky as his big
brother. The light in his eyes discernible from here to
Highhold and I could have heard his screams from here to
my farm.²²

Berlin--Thursday, July 19, 1945

The third plenary meeting was called to order by the
President at 4:05 P.M. The foreign ministers completed
their work on the political principles for Germany and
awaited approval from the Heads of Government. This was
granted and the document would be placed in the communique
and the protocol. The first topic for discussion was the
German fleet. After some discussion it was agreed that a
portion of the fleet be used in the war against Japan.
Inspection of the fleet would be supported by the United
States, President Truman indicated, only if it were mutual.

Eden announced the next topic was Spain.²³ The
Soviets made a proposal which called upon nations to end

²²Ibid., pp. 130-131.

²³Ibid., p. 133.

diplomatic relations with Spain and "to render support to the democratic forces in Spain and to enable the Spanish people to establish such a regime as will respond to their will."²⁴

The Prime Minister expressed his opposition to the Soviet proposal. "I am against interfering in the internal affairs of a country which has not molested us," said Churchill.²⁵ Finally it was agreed to leave this issue for the time being.

The next topic was Yugoslavia. Churchill and Stalin then commenced to carry on a long, technical debate on Yugoslavia while the man from Missouri listened. Finally this was too much for Truman. He exploded. He proceeded to give them, as he would write later in his memoirs, his Police Court speech:

I am here at this conference as a representative of the United States to discuss world affairs with the Soviet and British Governments.

I am not here to hold a police court hearing on something that was already settled or which would eventually be settled by the United Nations. That is the work of San Francisco.

If we do that, we shall become involved in trying to settle every political difficulty and will have to hold hearings for a succession of representatives, including de Gaulle, Franco, and others.

I do not wish to waste time listening to grievances but wish to deal with the problems which the three heads of government had come here to settle.

If they would not do that your time was wasted. I did not come to hear Tito, de Gaulle, and Franco. If

²⁴Ibid., p. 1173.

²⁵Ibid., p. 134.

you do not get to the main issues I am going to pack up and go home. I mean just that.²⁶

Stalin let out a hearty laugh and said he would not blame the President for expressing a desire to return to the United States. He, too, would like to return to his homeland.²⁷ The next topic was on Rumanian oil property taken during the war. After a brief discussion the topic was referred to their foreign ministers, and on that note the third plenary meeting adjourned at 4:55 P.M.²⁸ That evening President Truman hosted a State Dinner for Stalin and Churchill.²⁹

Berlin--Friday, July 20, 1945

The fourth plenary meeting was called to order by President Truman at 4:05 P.M. The first topic was the procedure for peace settlements. The only remaining questions on this were the time and place of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. After some discussion the Heads of Government agreed to designate London as the permanent seat for the Council of Foreign Ministers. The President left the date of the premier meeting of the council to the foreign ministers.

²⁶Ibid., pp. 129, 135; Truman, Memoirs, I, p. 397.

²⁷Truman, Memoirs, I, p. 397.

²⁸Potsdam Papers, II, p. 130.

²⁹Ibid., p. 5.

The next topic for discussion was Italy. Truman proposed a separate peace treaty for Italy. Stalin wanted to include Rumania, Bulgaria, Finland, and Hungary in the peace treaty. Churchill then began to make a lengthy speech on the damage Italy had inflicted upon his country in the early years of the war. The matter was finally referred to the foreign ministers. At 6:40 P.M. the meeting adjourned.³⁰

Berlin--Saturday, July 21, 1945

At 11:35 A.M. a special courier delivered to Secretary of War Stimson a report. This report was from General Leslie R. Groves. At 3:00 P.M. General of the Army, George C. Marshall, was back in his quarters after attending a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Stimson went to see the General and let him read a lengthy report on the successful test of the atomic bomb, S--1. A half hour later Stimson went to see President Truman. Stimson read the Groves' report to the President and Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes. The "TOP SECRET" report read:³¹

The Commanding General, MANHATTAN DISTRICT
Project (Groves) to the Secretary
of War (Stimson)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 18 July 1945

³⁰Ibid., pp. 164-177.

³¹Ibid., p. 136ln--footnote 1 for Document No. 1305.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Subject: The Test.

1. This is not a concise, formal military report but an attempt to recite what I would have told you if you had been here on my return from New Mexico.

2. At 0530, 16 July 1945, in a remote section of the Alamogordo Air Base, New Mexico, the first full scale test was made of the implosion type atomic fission bomb. For the first time in history there was a nuclear explosion. And what an explosion! . . . The bomb was not dropped from an airplane but was exploded on a platform on top of a 100-foot high steel tower.

3. The test was successful beyond the most optimistic expectations of anyone. Based on the data which it has been possible to work up to date, I estimate the energy generated to be in excess of the equivalent of 15,000 to 20,000 tons of TNT; and this is a conservative estimate. Data based on measurements which we have not yet been able to reconcile would make the energy release several times the conservative figure. There were tremendous blast effects. For a brief period there was a lighting effect within a radius of 20 miles equal to several suns in midday; a huge ball of fire was formed which lasted for several seconds. This ball mushroomed and rose to a height of over ten thousand feet before it dimmed. The light from the explosion was seen clearly at Albuquerque, Santa Fe, Silver City, El Paso and other points generally to about 180 miles away. The sound was heard to the same distance in a few instances but generally to about 100 miles. Only a few windows were broken although one was some 125 miles away. A massive cloud was formed which surged and billowed upward with tremendous power, reaching the substratosphere at an elevation of 41,000 feet, 36,000 feet above the ground, in about five minutes, breaking without interruption through a temperature inversion at 17,000 feet which most of the scientists thought would stop it. Two supplementary explosions occurred in the cloud shortly after the main explosion. The cloud contained several thousand tons of dust picked up from the ground and a considerable amount of iron in the gaseous form. Our present thought is that this iron ignited when it mixed with the oxygen in the air to cause these supplementary explosions. Huge concentrations of highly radioactive materials resulted from the fission and were contained in this cloud.

4. A crater from which all vegetation had vanished, with a diameter of 1200 feet and a slight slope toward the center, was formed. In the center was a shallow

bowl 130 feet in diameter and 6 feet in depth. The material within the crater was deeply pulverized dirt. The material within the outer circle is greenish and can be distinctly seen from as much as 5 miles away. The steel from the tower was evaporated. 1500 feet away there was a four-inch iron pipe 16 feet high set in concrete and strongly guyed. It disappeared completely.

5. One-half mile from the explosion there was a massive steel test cylinder weighing 220 tons. The base of the cylinder was solidly encased in concrete. Surrounding the cylinder was a strong steel tower 70 feet high, firmly anchored to concrete foundations. This tower is comparable to a steel building bay that would be found in typical 15 or 20 story skyscrapers or in warehouse construction. Forty tons of steel were used to fabricate the tower which was 70 feet high, the height of a six story building. The cross bracing was much stronger than that normally used in ordinary steel construction. The absence of the solid walls of a building gave the blast a much less effective surface to push against. The blast tore the tower from its foundations, twisted it, ripped it apart and left it flat on the ground. The effects on the tower indicate that, at that distance, unshielded permanent steel and masonry buildings would have been destroyed. I no longer consider the Pentagon a safe shelter from such a bomb. Enclosed are a sketch showing the tower before the explosion and a telephotograph showing what it looked like afterwards.³² None of us had expected it to be damaged.

6. The cloud travelled to a great height first in the form of a ball, then mushroomed, then changed into a long trailing chimney-shaped column and finally was sent in several directions by the variable winds at different elevations. It deposited its dust and radioactive materials over a wide area. It was followed and monitored by medical doctors and scientists with instruments to check its radioactive effects. While here and there the activity on the ground was fairly high, at no place did it reach a concentration which required evacuation of the population. Radioactive material in small quantities was located as much as 120 miles away. The measurements are being continued in order to have adequate data with which to protect the Government's interests in case of future claims. For a few hours I was none too comfortable about the situation.

³²The editors of the Potsdam Papers point out, "Neither reproduced," Potsdam Papers, II, p. 1363n.

7. For distances as much as 200 miles away, observers were stationed to check on blast effects, property damage, radioactivity and reactions of the population. While complete reports have not yet been received, I now know that no persons were injured nor was there any real property damage outside our Government area. As soon as all the voluminous data can be checked and correlated, full technical studies will be possible.

8. Our long range weather predictions had indicated that we could expect weather favorable for our tests beginning on the morning of the 17th and continuing for four days. This was almost a certainty if we were to believe our long range forecasters. The prediction for the morning of the 16th was not so certain but there was about an 80% chance of the conditions being suitable. During the night there were thunder storms with lightning flashes all over the area. The test had been originally set for 0400 hours and all the night through, because of the bad weather, there were urgings from many of the scientists to postpone the test. Such a delay might well have had crippling results due to mechanical difficulties in our complicated test set-up. Fortunately, we disregarded the urgings. We held firm and waited the night through hoping for suitable weather. We had to delay an hour and a half, to 0530, before we could fire. This was 30 minutes before sunrise.

9. Because of bad weather, our two B-29 observation airplanes were unable to take off as scheduled from Kirtland Field at Albuquerque and when they finally did get off, they found it impossible to get over the target because of the heavy clouds and the thunder storms. Certain desired observations could not be made and while the people in the airplanes saw the explosion from a distance, they were not as close as they will be in action. We still have no reason to anticipate the loss of our plane in an actual operation although we cannot guarantee safety.

10. Just before 1100 the news stories from all over the state started to flow into the Albuquerque Associated Press. I then directed the issuance by the Commanding Officer, Alamogordo Air Base of a news release as shown on the enclosure. With the assistance of the Office of Censorship we were able to limit the news stories to the approved release supplemented in the local papers by brief stories from the many eyewitnesses not connected with our project. One of these was a blind woman who saw the light.

11. Brigadier General Thomas F. Farrell was at the control shelter located 10,000 yards south of the point of explosion. His impressions are given below:

"The scene inside the shelter was dramatic beyond words. In and around the shelter were some twenty-odd people concerned with last minute arrangements prior to firing the shot. Included were: Dr. Oppenheimer, the Director who had borne the great scientific burden of developing the weapon from the raw materials made in Tennessee and Washington and a dozen of his key assistants--Dr. Kistiakowsky, who developed the highly special explosives; Dr. Bainbridge, who supervised all the detailed arrangements for the test; Dr. Hubbard, the weather expert, and several others. Besides these, there were a handful of soldiers, two or three Army officers and one Naval officer. The shelter was cluttered with a great variety of instruments and radios.

"For some hectic two hours preceding the blast, General Groves stayed with the Director, walking with him and steadying his tense excitement. Every time the Director would be about to explode because of some untoward happening, General Groves would take him off and walk with him in the rain, counselling with him and reassuring him that everything would be all right. At twenty minutes before zero hour, General Groves left for his station at the base camp, first because it provided a better observation point and second, because of our rule that he and I must not be together in situations where there is an element of danger, which existed at both points.

"Just after General Groves left, announcements began to be broadcast of the interval remaining before the blast. They were sent by radio to the other groups participating in and observing the test. As the time interval grew smaller and changed from minutes to seconds, the tension increased by leaps and bounds. Everyone in that room knew the awful potentialities of the thing that they thought was about to happen. The scientists felt that their figuring must be right and that the bomb had to go off but there was in everyone's mind a strong measure of doubt. The feeling of many could be expressed by 'Lord, I believe; help Thou mine unbelief.' We were reaching into the unknown and we did not know what might come of it. It can be safely said that most of those present--Christian, Jew and Atheist--were praying and praying harder than they had ever prayed before. If the shot were successful, it was a justification of the several years of intensive effort of tens of thousands of people--statesmen, scientists,

engineers, manufacturers, soldiers, and many others in every walk of life.

"In that brief instant in the remote New Mexico desert the tremendous effort of the brains and brawn of all these people came suddenly and startlingly to the fullest fruition. Dr. Oppenheimer, on whom had rested a very heavy burden, grew tenser as the last seconds ticked off. He scarcely breathed. He held on to a post to steady himself. For the last few seconds, he stared directly ahead and then when the announcer shouted, 'Now!' and there came this growling roar of the explosion, his face relaxed into an expression of tremendous relief. Several of the observers standing back of the shelter to watch the lighting effects were knocked flat by the blast.

"The tension in the room let up and all started congratulating each other. Everyone sensed 'This is it!' No matter what might happen now all knew that the impossible scientific job had been done. Atomic fission would no longer be hidden in the cloisters of the theoretical physicists' dreams. It was almost full grown at birth. It was a great new force to be used for good or for evil. There was a feeling in that shelter that those concerned with its nativity should dedicate their lives to the mission that it would always be used for good and never for evil.

"Dr. Kistiakowsky, the impulsive Russian, threw his arms around Dr. Oppenheimer and embraced him with shouts of glee. Others were equally enthusiastic. All the pent-up emotions were released in those few minutes and all seemed to sense immediately that the explosion had far exceeded the most optimistic expectations and wildest hopes of the scientists. All seemed to feel that they had been present at the birth of a new age--The Age of Atomic Energy--and felt their profound responsibility to help in guiding into right channels the tremendous forces which had been unlocked for the first time in history.

"As to the present war, there was a feeling that no matter what else might happen, we now had the means to insure its speedy conclusion and save thousands of American lives. As to the future, there had been brought into being something big and something new that would prove to be immeasurably more important than the discovery of electricity or any of the other great discoveries which have so affected our existence.

"The effects could well be called unprecedented, magnificent, beautiful, stupendous and terrifying. No man-made phenomenon of such tremendous power had ever occurred before. The lighting effects beggared description. The whole country was lighted by a searing

light with the intensity many times that of the midday sun. It was golden, purple, violet, gray and blue. It lighted every peak, crevasse and ridge of the nearby mountain range with a clarity and beauty that cannot be described but must be seen to be imagined. It was that beauty the great poets dream about but describe most poorly and inadequately. Thirty seconds after the explosion came first, the air blast pressing hard against the people and things, to be followed almost immediately by the strong, sustained, awesome roar which warned of doomsday and made us feel that we puny things were blasphemous to dare tamper with the forces heretofore reserved to The Almighty. Words are inadequate tools for the job of acquainting those not present with the physical, mental and psychological effects. It had to be witnessed to be realized."

12. My impressions of the night's high points follow:

After about an hour's sleep I got up at 0100 and from that time on until about five I was with Dr. Oppenheimer constantly. Naturally he was nervous, although his mind was working at its usual extraordinary efficiency. I devoted my entire attention to shielding him from the excited and generally faulty advice of his assistants who were more than disturbed by their excitement and the uncertain weather conditions. By 0330 we decided that we could probably fire at 0530. Our decision became firmer as time went on. During most of these hours the two of us journeyed from the control house out into the darkness to look at the stars and to assure each other that the one or two visible stars were becoming brighter. At 0510 I left Dr. Oppenheimer and returned to the main observation point which was 17,000 yards from the point of explosion. In accordance with our orders I found all personnel not otherwise occupied massed on a bit of high ground.

At about two minutes of the scheduled firing time all persons lay face down with their feet pointing towards the explosion. As the remaining time was called from the loud speaker from the 10,000 yard control station there was complete silence. Dr. Conant said he had never imagined seconds could be so long. Most of the individuals in accordance with orders shielded their eyes in one way or another. There was then this burst of light of a brilliance beyond any comparison. We all rolled over and looked through dark glasses at the ball of fire. About forty seconds later came the shock wave followed by the sound, neither of which seemed startling after our complete astonishment at the extraordinary lighting intensity. Dr. Conant reached over and we

shook hands in mutual congratulations. Dr. Bush, who was on the other side of me, did likewise. The feeling of the entire assembly was similar to that described by General Farrell, with even the uninitiated feeling profound awe. Drs. Conant and Bush and myself were struck by an even stronger feeling that the faith of those who had been responsible for the initiation and the carrying on of this Herculean project had been justified. I personally thought of Blondin crossing Niagara Falls on his tight rope, only to me this tight rope had lasted for almost three years and of my repeated confident-appearing assurances that such a thing was possible and that we would do it.

13. A large group of observers were stationed at a point about 27 miles north of the point of explosion. Attached is a memorandum written shortly after the explosion by Dr. E. O. Lawrence which may be of interest.

14. While General Farrell was waiting about midnight for a commercial airplane to Washington at Albuquerque--120 miles away from the site--he overheard several airport employees discussing their reaction to the blast. One said that he was out on the parking apron; it was quite dark; then the whole southern sky was lighted as though by a bright sun; the light lasted several seconds. Another remarked that if a few exploding bombs could have such an effect, it must be terrible to have them drop on a city.

15. My liaison officer at the Alamogordo Air Base, 60 miles away, made the following report:

"There was a blinding flash of light that lighted the entire northwestern sky. In the center of the flash, there appeared to be a huge billow of smoke. The original flash lasted approximately 10 to 15 seconds. As the first flash died down, there arose in the approximate center of where the original flash had occurred an enormous ball of what appeared to be fire and closely resembled a rising sun that was three-fourths above a mountain. The ball of fire lasted approximately 15 seconds, then died down and the sky resumed an almost normal appearance.

"Almost immediately, a third, but much smaller, flash and billow of smoke of a whitish-orange color appeared in the sky, again lighting the sky for approximately 4 seconds. At the time of the original flash, the field was lighted well enough so that a newspaper could easily have been read. The second and third flashes were of much lesser intensity.

"We were in a glass-enclosed control tower some 70 feet above the ground and felt no concussion or air

compression. There was no noticeable earth tremor although reports overheard at the Field during the following 24 hours indicated that some believed that they had both heard the explosion and felt some earth tremor."

16. I have not written a separate report for General Marshall as I feel you will want to show this to him. I have informed the necessary people here of our results. Lord Halifax after discussion with Mr. Harrison and myself stated that he was not sending a full report to his government at this time. I informed him that I was sending this to you and that you might wish to show it to the proper British representatives.

17. We are all fully conscious that our real goal is still before us. The battle test is what counts in the war with Japan.

18. May I express my deep personal appreciation for your congratulatory cable to us and for the support and confidence which I have received from you ever since I have had this work under my charge.

19. I know that Colonel Kyle will guard these papers with his customary extraordinary care.

L R Groves

[Enclosure]

BULLETIN³³

Alamogordo, N.M., July 16--William O. Eareckson, commanding officer of the Alamogordo Army Air Base, made the following statement today:

"Several inquiries have been received concerning a heavy explosion which occurred on the Alamogordo Air Base reservation this morning.

"A remotely located ammunition magazine containing a considerable amount of high explosive and pyrotechnics exploded.

"There was no loss of life or injury to anyone, and the property damage outside of the explosives magazine itself was negligible.

"Weather conditions affecting the content of gas shells exploded by the blast may make it desirable for

³³The editors of the Potsdam Papers wrote that this is from the July 16, 1945, edition of the Albuquerque Tribune, Potsdam Papers, II, p. 1368n.

the Army to evacuate temporarily a few civilians from their homes."

[Enclosure]

TOP SECRET [NEAR ALAMOGORDO AIR BASE?], July 16, 1945.

THOUGHTS BY E. O. LAWRENCE³⁴

Our group assembled at a point 27 miles from the bomb site about two in the morning. We were on a plain extending all the way to the bomb and although I did not notice carefully the mountains seemed to be some miles away. We could see in the distance lights defining the position of the bomb and at about four a.m. our radio picked up conversations between the B-29s and the ground organization.

We soon learned that zero hour was 5:30 a.m. which was just break of dawn. Naturally our tenseness grew as zero hour approached. We were warned of the probable brilliance of the explosion--so bright it would blind one looking directly at it for sometime and there was even danger of sunburn!

I decided the best place to view the flame would be through the window of the car I was sitting in, which would take out ultraviolet, but at the last minute decided to get out of the car (evidence indeed I was excited!) and just as I put my foot on the ground I was enveloped with a warm brilliant yellow white light--from darkness to brilliant sunshine in an instant and as I remember I momentarily was stunned by the surprise. It took me a second thought to tell myself, "this is indeed it!!" and then through my dark sun glasses there was a gigantic ball of fire rising rapidly from the earth--at first as brilliant as the sun, growing less brilliant as it grew boiling and swirling into the heavens. Ten or fifteen thousand feet above the ground it was orange in color and I judge a mile in diameter. At higher levels it became purple and this purple afterglow persisted for what seemed a long time (possibly it was only for a minute or two) at an elevation of 20-25,000 feet. This purple glow was due to the enormous radio-activity of the gases. (The light is in large part due to nitrogen of the air and in the laboratory we occasionally produce it in miniature with the cyclotron.)

³⁴The editors of the Potsdam Papers wrote, "This memorandum, which bears an uncertified, typed signature, has the following typed notation at the end: 'This was written in an airplane and not corrected by the author,'" Potsdam Papers, II, p. 1369n.

In the earlier stages of rise of the flame the clouds above were illuminated and as the flame rose it was a grand spectacle also to see the great clouds immediately above melt away before our eyes.

The final phases was the column of hot gases smoke and dust funneling from the earth into the heavens to 40,000 feet. The column was to me surprisingly narrow until high elevations were reached when it foamed out considerably. The great funnel was visible a long time. We could still make it out as we drove away a half hour later.

But to retrace, a little over two minutes after the beginning of the flash the shock wave hit us. It was a sharp loud crack and then for about a minute thereafter there were resounding echoes from the surrounding mountains. The pressure of the shock wave was not great enough to be disturbing but the noise was very loud and sharp, indeed. The noise of the shock wave was a sharp crack like that of a giant firecracker set off a few yards away--or perhaps like the report of 37 mm artillery at a distance of about one hundred yards.

A number of observers near me were looking right at the explosion through welders goggles (or the same dark glasses) and they told me the light through these glasses was so bright as to blind them for an instant.

As I was not actively concerned with the problems of Y, I had on occasions asked my colleagues there what the event would be like and their predicted picture of the event was borne out completely. I am amazed that the whole business went off so exactly as their calculations had predicted.

The grand, indeed almost cataclysmic proportion of the explosion produced a kind of solemnity in everyone[']s behavior immediately afterwards. There was restrained applause, but more a hushed murmuring bordering on reverence in manner as the event was commented upon[.] Dr. Charles Thomas (Monsanto) spoke to me of this being the greatest single event in the history of mankind, etc. etc.

As far as all of us are concerned although we knew the fundamentals were sound and that the explosion could be produced, we share a feeling that we have this day crossed a great milestone in human progress.

ERNEST O. LAWRENCE³⁵

³⁵ Potsdam Papers, II, pp. 1361-1370.

The President seemed pleased. Stimson went on in his diary:

The President was tremendously pepped up by it and spoke to me of it again and again when I saw him. He said it gave him an entirely new feeling of confidence and he thanked me for having come to the Conference and being present to help him in this way.³⁶

The fifth plenary meeting was called to order by the President at 5:00 P.M.³⁷ The first item for discussion was the transfer of assets from the London Polish Government to the new Polish Provisional Government. Stalin finally agreed with his colleagues, after a lengthy discussion, that the new Polish Government should absorb the liabilities of the London Polish Government.³⁸

The western frontier of Poland was the next topic. As debate continued it became obvious the Heads of Government were at an impasse on this and finally President Truman adjourned the meeting.³⁹

After the American delegation returned to its quarters the members got ready for a State Dinner hosted by Stalin.⁴⁰ Later in the evening President Truman read a message from the Polish Provisional Government of National

³⁶Ibid., p. 136ln--footnote 1 for Document No. 1305.

³⁷Ibid., p. 17.

³⁸Truman, Memoirs, I, p. 404.

³⁹Potsdam Papers, II, p. 215.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 17.

Unity, Boleslaw Bierut and Prime Minister in the Polish
 Provisional Government of National Unity, Edward Boleslaw
 Osóbka-Morawski:

President Bierut and Prime Minister Osóbka-
 Morawski to President Truman

HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT TRUMAN[:] On behalf of the
 Polish Provisional Government of National Unity we
 address ourselves to Your Excellency desiring to call
 attention of Your Excellency to the problem of [the]
 Western frontier of the Polish Republic, a problem that
 is of a vital importance to the Polish Nation.

Expressing the unanimous and inflexible will of the
 whole Nation, the Polish Provisional Government of
 National Unity are convinced that only the boundary line
 that follows, beginning in the south, the former
 frontier between Czechoslovakia and Germany, then the
 Lausitzer Neisse river, then runs along the left bank of
 the Oder, and leaving Stettin for Poland reaches the sea
 west of the town of Swinemünde, can be considered a just
 frontier that guarantees successful development to the
 Polish Nation, security to Europe, and a lasting peace
 to the world.

The Polish Nation, which suffered such enormous
 losses in the war against the Germans, would consider
 any other solution of the problem of their Western
 boundary as harmful and injurious, and endangering the
 future of the Polish Nation and State.

Simultaneously we transmit identical note to
 Generalissimo Stalin, Chairman of the Council of the
 Peoples Commissars of the USSR, and to Mr. Winston
 Churchill, Prime-Minister of His Majesty's Government,
 and we are convinced that the problem of Poland's
 Western frontier will find a positive solution during
 the present debates that are of such a far reaching
 momentum.

We avail ourselves [etc.] BOLESŁAW BIERUT⁴¹
 EDWARD OSÓBKA-MORAWASKI

WARSAW, July 20, 1945.

⁴¹Ibid., pp. 1138-1139.

Berlin--Sunday, July 22, 1945

President Truman received Secretary of War Stimson at 9:20 A.M. The two messages from Harrison, which follow, were discussed. The President was pleased with the progress of the bomb.⁴² One message deals with the selection of the target, and the other with the progress of the bomb:

The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee
(Harrison) to the Secretary of
War (Stimson)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 21 July 1945.

URGENT

WAR 35987. Secretary of War EYES ONLY TopSec from Harrison.

All your local military advisors engaged in preparation definitely favor your pet city⁴³ and would like to feel free to use it as first choice if those on the ride select it out of four possible spots in the light of local conditions at the time.⁴⁴

The other message, which was shown to the President deals with the progress of the bomb:

The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee
(Harrison) to the Secretary of
War (Stimson)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 21 July 1945.

URGENT

WAR 35988. Secretary of War EYES ONLY Top Sec from Harrison.

⁴²Ibid., p. 1373n.

⁴³Editors of the Potsdam Papers wrote, "The reference is to the selection of Kyoto as a possible target for atomic attack," Potsdam Papers, II, p. 1372n--footnote 1 for Document 1307.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 1372.

Patient progressing rapidly and will be ready for final operation first good break in August. Complicated preparations for use are proceeding so fast we should know not later than July 25 if any change in plans.⁴⁵

While the President was attending church services at 10:40 A.M., Secretary of War Stimson was meeting with British Prime Minister Churchill. Churchill resumed reading the Groves' report.

Harvey H. Bundy, American Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, later wrote about the meeting:

Churchill exclaimed after learning the contents of the report of the first atomic test: "Stimson, what was gunpowder? Trivial. What was electricity? Meaningless. This atomic bomb is the Second Coming in Wrath."⁴⁶

The sixth plenary meeting was called to order by President Truman at 5:10 P.M.⁴⁷ Stalin announced that Soviet troops had withdrawn to their zones in Austria, whereupon the American and British had withdrawn to their zones of occupation in Austria.

It was agreed to allow two or three Polish representatives to testify on July 24 before the Foreign Ministers of the Three Powers.

The next topic was trusteeships. A long debate ensued. Stalin outlined what his country desired: to

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 1372.

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 225. The editors of the Potsdam Papers quoted from an article Bundy wrote, "Remembered Words," in the March, 1957, edition of The Atlantic, page 57.

⁴⁷Ibid., p. 17.

control either alone or jointly a portion of Italy's African colonies, a share in the territories formerly under the mandate of the defunct League of Nations and to exchange views on a possible trusteeship over Korea. After prolonged discussion this matter was referred to the Foreign Ministers for further study.⁴⁸

Churchill said the time was now to modify the Montreux Convention regarding the Straits of Turkey.⁴⁹ The Soviets, in a proposal, called for a renegotiation of the Convention. President Truman indicated he was unable to express an opinion. The President announced the United States would send the invitation to the members of the Polish Government in Warsaw to attend the conference. The sixth plenary meeting was then adjourned at 7:50 P.M.⁵⁰ The President immediately departed for the Little White House. He dined at his quarters at 8:30 P.M.⁵¹

The next day the American Charge d'Affaires ad interim in the Soviet Union delivered the invitation from

⁴⁸Ibid., pp. 260-261.

⁴⁹In 1936 the Montreux Conference was held. It allowed Turkey to place fortifications around the Straits. International control of the Straits was abolished. Turkey was given the right to close the Straits to warships if war seemed a possibility. Potsdam Papers, II, p. 1434.

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 259.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 18.

the Big Three to the Polish Charge d'Affaires Wladyslaw

Matwin:

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the
Polish Chargé in the Soviet Union (Matwin)

MOSCOW, July 23, 1945.

DEAR MR. MATWIN: I have just been asked by my Government to effect delivery through you of the following urgent and secret message from the President of the United States to the President of the Polish Government of National Unity:

"I have the honor, on behalf of the three heads of Government now in conference at Potsdam, to invite the Polish Government to send two or three representatives, if possible by July 24, to state to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and the Secretary of State of the United States of America their views on the question of the western frontier of Poland.

(Signed) Harry S. Truman."

I would be grateful if you would be good enough to arrange for the immediate transmission of this message to President Bierut and would advise me as soon as he is known to have received it.

Very sincerely yours,

[GEORGE F. KEENAN]⁵²

⁵²Ibid., pp. 1138-1139.

CHAPTER VII

THE SECOND WEEK AT POTSDAM, JULY 23, 1945,
TO JULY 29, 1945

Berlin--Monday, July 23, 1945

Stimson received a cable from Harrison. Later he sent one to the Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee. At 11:00 A.M. Stimson met with President Truman and showed him the cable from Harrison and a copy of one he had sent to Harrison. The President read the Harrison cable which listed the possible targets in Japan:¹

The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee
(Harrison) to the Secretary of
War (Stimson

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 23 July 1945.

URGENT

WAR 36791. Top secret Secretary of WAR EYES ONLY
from Harrison.

Reference my WAR 35987 and your VICTORY 218 Hiro-
shima, Kokura, Niigata in [is?] order of choice here.²

¹United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945, II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 1266n--footnote 3. Hereafter cited as Potsdam Papers, II.

²Ibid., p. 1374.

The President then read his Secretary of War's cable to the Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee on the possible date when the atomic device could be operational:

The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Acting
Chairman of the Interim Committee
(Harrison)

TOP SECRET

[BABELSBERG,] 23 July 1945.

URGENT

VICTORY 218. To AGWar from Stimson to Pasco for Harrison[']s EYES ONLY.

Reference your number WAR 35988. We are greatly pleased with apparent improvement in timing of patient[']s progress. We assume operation may be any time after the first of August.

Whenever it is possible to give us a more definite date please immediately advise us here where information is greatly needed. Also give name of place or alternate places, always excluding the particular place against which I have decided [Kyoto]. My decision has been confirmed by highest authority.³


The President and his group left for the seventh plenary meeting. The meeting was called to order at 5:10 P.M.⁴

The agenda for the meeting included four conventional topics: Turkish Straits; transfer to the Soviet Union the city of Kienigsberg; Syria-Lebanon; and Iran.

The first topic was the Turkish Straits. The following map indicates the importance of the Straits.

³Ibid., p. 1373.

⁴Ibid., p. 18.



Russian ships, in order to reach the Mediterrean, must pass through this area. The map shows that Turkey borders the Soviet Union in the west and Bulgaria in the east. Stalin said if Turkey desired the protection of a peace treaty she should cede the territories of Kars and Ardahan, formerly in Aremenia and Georgia, which are located in the Soviet Union

⁵ John B. Harrison and Richard E. Sullivan, A Short History of Western Civilization (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), frontpiece.

(see map on p. 98). President Truman suggested that Russia and Turkey should settle the matter of these territories themselves. This was acceptable to Stalin.⁶

The next topic was the transfer to the Soviet Union the city of Koenigsberg. It was essential for Russia, Stalin indicated, to possess an ice-free port because all ports on the Baltic were frozen during the winter. Truman replied he was ready to agree in principle. Churchill supported Stalin's request to have this city in the Soviet Union.⁷

The next topic was the Syria-Lebanon question. Both Syria and Lebanon expressed the feeling that native troops must be transferred to their command and all French troops must be removed from their respective countries before any discussion of a political settlement could begin. After much discussion, Stalin agreed to have a four-power

⁶Potsdam Papers, II, pp. 301-305.

⁷Ibid., pp. 305-306. George F. Kennan wrote in his memoirs that the Koenigsberg episode stands as an example of American ignorance. Supposedly, the reason for Soviet acquisition of the city was the need for an ice-free port, but Russia already had three ports on the Baltic that were virtually ice-free: Windau, Libau, and Baltic Port. Furthermore, Koenigsberg lies 49 kilometers from the open sea at the end of an artificial canal which is frozen several months of the year and must be kept open, if at all possible, by icebreakers. The harbor is accessible only to moderate size vessels with a draft of no more than twenty-five feet. George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), pp. 263-264.

conference composed of Russia, Britain, France, and the United States take up the matter.⁸

The last item was Iran. The British, then, submitted a proposal. It read:

Proposal by the British Delegation

SECRET
P. (TERMINAL) 16

PERSIA

MEMORANDUM BY THE UNITED KINGDOM DELEGATION

His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government are maintaining their troops in Persia by virtue of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty of the 29th June [January], 1942, under Article 5 of which these forces are to be withdrawn from Persia "not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her Satellites had been suspended." His Majesty's Government have suggested to the Soviet Government that the Allied forces should be withdrawn from Persia pari passu and in stages before the final treaty date is reached. The Soviet Government have not, however, replied.

2. In His Majesty's Government's view the time has now come for the complete joint withdrawal of Allied forces from Persia and they propose that this should take place in three stages as follows:--

(1) British and Soviet forces would be withdrawn completely from Teheran at once;

(2) After the completion of the first stage, British and Soviet troops would be withdrawn from the whole of Persia except that British troops would remain in Abadan and the southern oilfields area and Soviet troops would remain in a zone in either north-east or north-west Persia;

(3) On the completion of the second stage, British troops would be withdrawn from Abadan and the oilfields area in south Persia and Soviet troops would be withdrawn from the last area in which their troops were stationed in either north-east or north-west Persia.

⁸Ibid., pp. 306-308.

3. If this proposal is accepted the demarcation of the withdrawal zones can be worked out afterwards.

BERLIN, 21st July, 1945.⁹

President Truman said his country was ready to leave; however, he wanted to guard the supplies destined to be used against Japan. Churchill was anxious to have British troops vacate the country.

Churchill then mentioned the British elections. He informed his colleagues that it was necessary that he return for the results. The meeting was adjourned at 7:00 P.M.¹⁰ The President left for his quarters.¹¹

Berlin--Tuesday, July 24, 1945

Secretary of War Stimson called on President Truman at 10:20 A.M. Harrison had sent a cable to Stimson which arrived Monday evening, July 23, 1945. Stimson showed the President the cable which had the dates when the atomic device could be dropped on Japan. The cable read:

The Acting Chairman of the Interim Committee
(Harrison) to the Secretary of
War (Stimson)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 23 July 1945

OPERATIONAL PRIORITY

WAR 36792. Secretary of War EYES ONLY top secret from Harrison.

⁹Ibid., pp. 1391-1392.

¹⁰Ibid., pp. 304-311.

¹¹Ibid., pp. 18-19.

Operation may be possible any time from August 1 depending on state of preparation of patient and condition of atmosphere. From point of view of patient only, some chance August 1 to 3, good chance August 4 to 5 and barring unexpected relapse almost certain before August 10.¹²

The President met with the Polish Delegation. Later in the day, Harriman drew up a "TOP SECRET" memorandum of this conversation for the President. It read:

Memorandum by the Ambassador to the
Soviet Union (Harriman)

TOP SECRET

BABELSBERG, July 24, 1945.

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Subject: Poland

Mr. Bierut presented on behalf of the Polish Delegation the basis of the Polish claims to the German territory as far as the Oder-Lower Neisse line along the general lines of his presentation to the Foreign Ministers. The President explained that he had great interest in Poland and its future and would do all he could to see that they got justice; on the other hand in frankness he pointed out that he did not like the arbitrary manner in which the boundary question was being handled by the Soviet and Polish governments.

He explained that the title would not be valid unless approved at the peace settlement and that a disagreement would be a source of trouble in the future. In answer to Bierut's argument that it was German territory that was being taken, the President pointed out that under agreement there were four occupying countries responsible for the entire territory of Germany and that he did not wish to have a fifth. He further pointed out that France might wish the Ruhr and the Rhineland but that there was no question of any territory in the western part of Germany being given to France until the matter could be considered in an orderly way with full allied agreement.

Mr. Bierut said that he understood the legal point of view but that there were many homeless people who had to be settled in the new territory which all agreed

¹²Ibid., p. 1374.

Poland was to have in compensation for the loss of territory in the East. He spoke of the 4,000,000 Poles east of the Curzon Line and 3,000,000 Poles in Germany or in western Europe.

The conversation ended with a statement by the President that the boundary question must be determined at the peace settlement and that it could not be settled here. As the Poles were fifteen minutes late, having been with Prime Minister Churchill, and as the President had a meeting of the Big Three, the conversation lasted only fifteen to twenty minutes.

W A H[ARRIMAN]¹³

President Truman, after meeting with the Polish delegation, left for the eighth plenary meeting at 4:50 P.M. The American delegation arrived ten minutes later. President Truman called the meeting to order at 5:15 P.M.¹⁴

Stalin wanted the conference to recognize the governments of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania. The United Nations, Truman pointed out, admitted countries that had democratic governments. Stalin countered that Argentina held membership and her government was far less democratic.

¹³Ibid., pp. 356-357. Harriman mentioned the Curzon Line in this memorandum. "A proposal to settle the disputed frontier between Poland and Russia put to the Poles by [British Prime Minister] Lloyd George on July 10th, 1920. Subsequent correspondence about the proposed frontier was undertaken by Lord Curzon, the [British] Foreign Secretary, who thus gave his name to the line of demarcation. The line stretched from Grodno, through Brest-Litovsk and Przemysl to the Carpathians; it would have excluded from Poland lands predominantly inhabited by White Russians, Ukrainians and Lithuanians. The Poles rejected the proposal and subsequently secured territory twice as large as that suggested by Lloyd George. After the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939, the Curzon Line (with minor variations) became the boundary between the German and Russian spheres of occupation." A. W. Palmer, A Dictionary of Modern History 1789-1945 (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1978), p. 76.

¹⁴Potsdam Papers, II, p. 19.

Discussion continued and finally at the suggestion of President Truman this topic was again referred to their foreign ministers.¹⁵

The President said the conference would have to finish its work in a week to ten days and issue a communique. He proposed their foreign ministers set up a committee to draft one. This communique would be released to the public. The eighth plenary meeting adjourned at 7:30 P.M.¹⁶

Truman Informs Stalin About the Atomic Bomb

Immediately after the eighth plenary meeting, President Truman went over to Stalin and his interpreter, Vladimir Pavlov, to inform the Russian about the atomic bomb.¹⁷ Truman wrote in his memoirs: "On July 24 I

¹⁵Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions Memoirs by Harry S. Truman (New York: Signet paperback, 1965), p. 423. Hereafter cited as Truman, Memoirs, I.

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 367-368.

¹⁷There is some disagreement if the President had his interpreter, Charles Bohlen, at the meeting with Stalin and the Soviet interpreter, Vladimir Pavlov. The editors of the Potsdam Papers, II, quote from Secretary of State Byrnes' All in One Lifetime, p. 300, that Bohlen was with the President. In 1956 State Department historians had a conference with the President and he said Bohlen was with him. In a 1960 conversation with State Department historians the editors of the Potsdam Papers, II, wrote: "Bohlen stated categorically that Truman walked over to Stalin alone, in order to give the conversation a more casual flavor, and that Pavlov did the interpreting." Potsdam Papers, II, p. 378n--footnote 2 for the heading, "TRUMAN-STALIN CONVERSATION, TUESDAY, JULY 24, 1945, 7:30 P.M."

casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of unusual destructive force. The Russian Premier showed no special interest. All he said was that he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make 'good use of it against the Japanese.'¹⁸

There was no need to ask a question of President Truman about the bomb, for Stalin already knew about it. His spies at Los Alamos, New Mexico, kept him informed.¹⁹ Georgy Konstantinovich Zhukov, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Forces of Occupied Germany, wrote in his memoirs that when their delegation returned to their quarters Stalin ordered Igor N. Kurchatov to have his research group accelerate its study of the atom.²⁰

Berlin--Wednesday, July 25, 1945

President Truman called the ninth plenary meeting to order at 11:00 A.M.²¹ Transfer of populations was discussed. Prime Minister Churchill initiated discussion on the transfer of population from Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. The Poles, he said, were being taken out of an

¹⁸Truman, Memoirs, I, p. 458.

¹⁹Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York: William Morrow Company, 1973), p. 276.

²⁰G. K. Zhukov, The Memoirs of Zhukov (New York: Delacorte Press, 1971, first English edition), p. 675.

²¹Potsdam Papers, II, p. 20.

occupation zone which was part of the Russian zone. This should not occur, he pointed out, unless some consideration was given to the provision of food and other matters. Stalin found nothing wrong with the Poles extracting a measure of revenge on the Germans. President Truman expressed his opposition to this policy and believed the peace conference should decide the German-Polish frontier. Discussion continued and finally the ninth plenary meeting adjourned at 12:00 noon. The conference was in recess until the British delegation returned from London.²²

The President and his group returned to their quarters after the meeting. While the President dined, James Clement Dunn, Assistant Secretary of State, along with W. Averill Harriman, met with Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, Deputy Prime Minister in the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

The Deputy Prime Minister handed over to the Americans three memoranda. The Poles wanted, as mentioned in the memoranda, the Soviet troops and the NKVD to leave the country. The NKVD was the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Soviet Union). The memoranda read:

²²Ibid., pp. 382-388.

Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime
Minister (Mikolajczyk)

[Translation]

SECRET

[BABELSBERG,] July 24, 1945.

Poland is to be strong, free, independent and sovereign. Poland is to live in alliance with Soviet Russia, with Great Britain and France, and in friendship with the United States and the Slav countries.

This is possible on the following conditions:

(1) The Soviet forces and the NKVD should quit the territories accorded to, and delimited for, the Polish State.

(2) The Polish Army is to become a national army.

(3) The so-called Security should cease to terrorize the community.

(4) The émigrés and Polish troops should return swiftly, and elections should be held, before which the western frontiers should be settled.

(5) There should be freedom of the Press and freedom of concourse and the genuine organization of the five Parties in Poland. The P.P.R. (the Polish Labor Party or really, the Communist Party) does enjoy these freedoms, the P.P.S. (Polish Socialist Party) only enjoys them in part, whilst the Democratic party is at this moment more or less an extension of the P.P.R.

The Peasant's Party, thanks to which the Provisional Government of National Unity has been formed and the Polish Government recognized, does not have freedom of action, nor does the Labor Party.

(6) Personal freedom and the right of property should be safeguarded within the framework of the law.

(7) The elections should take place at the latest in December or February on the basis of the electoral laws resulting from the 1921 constitution. There must be found a method of ensuring the fairness of the elections. Fair elections are impossible as long as Soviet troops and the NKVD remain in Poland. Elections on the basis of the 1921 constitution are rendered impossible by interpretations relating to the electoral system. These follow the conception of the PKWN (translator's note: Polish Committee of National Liberation), which was based on the 1921 constitution, and they introduce artificial majorities by the appointment--beside the political parties--of various professional and social organizations which are adjuncts of a party already possessing its own representatives in Parliament (Sejm).

Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime
Minister (Mikolajczyk)

[Translation]

[Undated.]

(?) As to [To add to (?)] the preceding note from which it follows that at this stage of the dispute one should not limit himself by the relatively small territory which anyway with the support of Russia may by the force of facts appear to be included in Poland.

At this moment the struggle is about the independence and sovereignty of Poland, and the dispute about borders unless it is predetermined is another problem.

To save the independence of Poland the territory should be determined (established?) and the elections should take place as soon as possible.

At the recognition of territory the conditions could be put forward,
And so:

1. Elections--freedom for parties and for press, eventually the international control of elections.
2. Removal of the Soviet troops and NKVD.
3. Return and help for return of Polish army from the West in a whole and all émigrés in general.
4. Help in repatriation of Poles from the East.
5. Immediate stop of dismembering (taking to pieces) of factories and disjoining the railroad tracks on the territory given to Poland and full control by Poland of political, economic and communications administration.

The Soviet transport through Polish territory on the basis of a plan presented by Polish authorities.

Poland is to take part in the assistance to Europe by its industrial production and later by agricultural products. Therefore Poland must be completely freed and can not be hampered from inside by senseless dismembering of industrial objects, railroad tracks and by depriving it of agricultural machinery and livestock.

Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime
Minister (Mikolajczyk)

[Translation]

[BABELSBERG,] July 24, 1945.

SECRET

Poland, in order to safeguard her existence, development, and independence, must--after the loss of territories in the East, (to which loss the population cannot physically reconcile itself) acquire in the west, the frontier of the Niesse, Stettin and the Delta.

This frontier should be determined immediately for the following main reasons:

(a) The population east of the Curzon Line, if it is not to perish for ever, must be boldly encouraged to return and transfer to Western Poland.

(b) The population of the west must be repatriated with utmost speed, and the Western Territories must absorb it; the date of the elections is contingent on their swift return.

(c) If these questions had to be dependent on a tardier fixing of the frontiers, then there would be no possibility either of transfer of population from the east or the west, or of holding elections there. Soviet Armies would stand as hosts in those territories and Poland would lose the chance of directing her own national economy within the area of the entire state. The partial holding of elections, after the losses east of the Curzon Line and without the delimitation of the western frontiers would only cover a small portion of the country's territory.

(d) This state of affairs would not only overthrow the State system of economy, but it would render impossible any normalisation of conditions in the country, which might prejudice the question of the State's independence or of its system.

(e) The lack of opportunities for transfer to the west of population from the overcrowded central districts of Poland, leads to the parcellation of peasant farm holdings and estates inside Poland, however healthy the agricultural structure of the country, and it will not be possible to effect a recovery.

(f) If Poland does not take over these territories soon, then there will be no point in a later occupation of these derelict areas.²³

²³Ibid., pp. 1128-1130; 1140-1141.

Berlin--Thursday, July 26, 1945

President Truman and his group left in the morning for Frankfurt, Germany, to inspect the American facilities. The presidential party returned that evening. At 10:00 P.M. President Truman, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek issued a proclamation.²⁴ This was a warning to Japan to surrender or face the consequences.

The following documents trace the origins of this proclamation, the securing of the signature of Chiang Kai-shek and the issuance of the proclamation.

On July 2, 1945, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson sent to President Truman a cover letter with two enclosures. The President had requested, as noted in Stimson's letter, recommendations on the proposed warning to Japan. The first enclosure deals with Japan and the final enclosure is a proposed draft of the proclamation:

The Secretary of War (Stimson)
to the President

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 2, 1945.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am enclosing herewith a memorandum to you on the matter of the proposed warning to Japan, a subject which I have heretofore discussed with you. I have tried to state as succinctly as possible how the matter lies in my mind, and in the course of preparing the memorandum, I have consulted with Secretary of the Navy [James Forrestal] and the Acting Secretary of State [Joseph C. Grew], each of whom

²⁴Ibid., pp. 20-21.

has approved the tenor of the memorandum and has subscribed to the recommendations contained in it.

I have also had prepared a proposed form of proclamation which has been discussed with representatives of the State Department and the Navy Department, as well as with officers of the General Staff but which has not been placed in final form or in any sense approved as a final document by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Navy or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It has been drafted merely to put on paper something which would give us some idea of how a warning of the character we have in mind might appear. You will note that it is written without specific relation to the employment of any new weapon. Of course it would have to be revamped to conform to the efficacy of such a weapon if the warning were to be delivered, as would almost certainly be the case, in conjunction with its use.

As these papers were primarily prepared as a possible background for some of your discussions at the forthcoming conference, this added element was not included, but a suitable provision could be readily added at the appropriate time.

I shall continue to discuss this matter with the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Navy, as well as with the representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and will of course keep you currently informed of any further suggestions we may have.

Faithfully yours,

HENRY L STIMSON

[Enclosure 1]

The Secretary of War (Stimson)
to the President

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 2, 1945.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR JAPAN

1. The plans of operation up to and including the first landing have been authorized and the preparations are now actually going on. This situation was accepted by all members of your conference on Monday, June 18th.

2. There is reason to believe that the operation for the occupation of Japan following the landing may be a very long, costly and arduous struggle on our part. The terrain, much of which I have visited several times,

has left the impression on my memory of being one which would be susceptible to a last ditch defense such as has been made on Iwo Jima and Okinawa and which of course is very much larger than either of those two areas. According to my recollection it will be much more unfavorable with regard to tank maneuvering than either the Philippines or Germany.

3. If we once land on one of the main islands and begin a forceful occupation of Japan, we shall probably have cast the die of last ditch resistance. The Japanese are highly patriotic and certainly susceptible to calls for fanatical resistance to repel an invasion. Once started in actual invasion, we shall in my opinion have to go through with an even more bitter finish fight than in Germany. We shall incur the losses incident to such a war and we shall have to leave the Japanese islands even more thoroughly destroyed than was the case with Germany. This would be due both to the difference in the Japanese and German personal character and the differences in the size and character of the terrain through which the operations will take place.

4. A question then comes: Is there any alternative to such a forceful occupation of Japan which will secure for us the equivalent of an unconditional surrender of her forces and a permanent destruction of her power again to strike an aggressive blow at the "peace of the Pacific?" I am inclined to think that there is enough such chance to make it well worthwhile our giving them a warning of what is to come and a definite opportunity to capitulate. As above suggested, it should be tried before the actual forceful occupation of the homeland islands is begun and furthermore the warning should be given in ample time to permit a national reaction to set in.

We have the following enormously favorable factors on our side--factors much weightier than those we had against Germany:

Japan has no allies.

Her navy is nearly destroyed and she is vulnerable to a surface and underwater blockade which can deprive her of sufficient food and supplies for her population.

She is terribly vulnerable to our concentrated air attack upon her crowded cities, industrial and food resources.

She has against her not only the Anglo-American forces but the rising forces of China and the ominous threat of Russia.

We have great moral superiority through being the victim of her first sneak attack.

The problem is to translate these advantages into prompt and economical achievement of our objectives. I believe Japan is susceptible to reason in such a crisis to a much greater extent than is indicated by our current press and other current comment. Japan is not a nation composed wholly of mad fanatics of an entirely different mentality from ours. On the contrary, she has within the past century shown herself to possess extremely intelligent people, capable in an unprecedentedly short time of adopting not only the complicated technique of Occidental civilization but to a substantial extent their culture and their political and social ideas. Her advance in all these respects during the short period of sixty or seventy years has been one of the most astounding feats of national progress in history--a leap from the isolated feudalism of centuries into the position of one of the six or seven great powers of the world. She has not only built up powerful armies and navies. She has maintained an honest and effective national finance and respected position in many of the sciences in which we pride ourselves. Prior to the forcible seizure of power over her government by the fanatical military group in 1931, she had for ten years lived a reasonably responsible and respectable international life.

My own opinion is in her favor on the two points involved in this question.

a. I think the Japanese nation has the mental intelligence and versatile capacity in such a crisis to recognize the folly of a fight to the finish and to accept the proffer of what will amount to an unconditional surrender; and

b. I think she has within her population enough liberal leaders (although now submerged by the terrorists) to be depended upon for her reconstruction as a responsible member of the family of nations. I think she is better in this last respect than Germany was. Her liberals yielded only at the point of the pistol and, so far as I am aware, their liberal attitude has not been personally subverted in the way which was so general in Germany.

On the other hand, I think that the attempt to exterminate her armies and her population by gunfire or other means will tend to produce a fusion of race solidarity and antipathy which had no analogy in the case of Germany. We have a national interest in creating, if possible, a condition wherein the Japanese nation may live as a peaceful and useful member of the future Pacific community.

5. It is therefore my conclusion that a carefully timed warning be given to Japan by the chief representatives of the United States, Great Britain, China and, if then a belligerent, Russia, calling upon Japan to surrender and to permit the occupation of her country in order to insure its complete demilitarization for the sake of the future peace.

This warning should contain the following elements:

The varied and overwhelming character of the force we are about to bring to bear on the islands.

The inevitability and completeness of the destruction which the full application of this force will entail.

The determination of the allies to destroy permanently all authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the country into embarking on world conquest.

The determination of the allies to limit Japanese sovereignty to her main islands and to render them powerless to mount and support another war.

The disavowal of any attempt to extirpate the Japanese as a race or to destroy them as a nation.

A statement of our readiness, once her economy is purged of its militaristic influences, to permit the Japanese to maintain such industries, particularly of a light consumer character, as offer no threat of aggression against their neighbors, but which can produce a sustaining economy, and provide a reasonable standard of living. The statement should indicate our willingness, for this purpose, to give Japan trade access to external raw materials, but no longer any control over, the sources of supply outside her main islands. It should also indicate our willingness, in accordance with our now established foreign trade policy, in due course to enter into mutually advantageous trade relations with her.

The withdrawal from their country as soon as the above objectives of the allies are accomplished, and as soon as there has been established a peacefully inclined government, of a character representative of the masses of the Japanese people. I personally think that if in saying this we should add that we do not exclude a constitutional monarchy under her present dynasty, it would substantially add to the chances of acceptance.

6. Success of course will depend on the potency of the warning which we give her. She has an extremely sensitive national pride and, as we are now seeing every

day, when actually locked with the enemy will fight to the very death. For that reason the warning must be tendered before the actual invasion has occurred and while the impending destruction, though clear beyond peradventure, has not reduced her to fanatical despair. If Russia is a part of the threat, the Russian attack, if actual, must not have progressed too far. Our own bombing should be confined to military objectives as far as possible.

[Enclosure 2]

TOP SECRET

PROCLAMATION BY THE HEADS OF STATE

U.S.--U.K.--[U.S.S.R.]--CHINA

[Delete matters inside brackets if
U.S.S.R. not in war]

(1) We,--the President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, [the Generalissimo of the Soviet Union] and the President of the Republic of China, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to surrender on the terms we state herein.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west [have now been joined by the vast military might of the Soviet Union and] are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until her unconditional capitulation.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example before Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power backed by our resolve means the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) Is Japan so lacking in reason that it will continue blindly to follow the leadership of those ridiculous militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation? The time has come to decide whether to continue on to destruction or to follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. They may be accepted or not. There are no alternatives. We shall not tarry on our way.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the country into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established Japanese lands must be occupied and the exercise of our authority shall continue until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such adjacent minor islands as we determine.

(9) The Japanese military forces shall be completely disarmed and returned to their homes and peaceful and productive lives.

(10) The Japanese shall not be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice will be meted out to all war criminals including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. Democratic tendencies found among the Japanese peoples [sic] shall be supported and strengthened. Freedom of speech, of religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain only such industries as will not enable her to rearm herself for war but which can produce a sustaining economy. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as our objectives are accomplished and there has been established beyond doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible government of a character representative of the Japanese people. This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if it be shown to the complete satisfaction of the world that such a government will never again aspire to aggression.

(13) We call upon those in authority in Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces under the authority of the Japanese Government and High Command, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action.²⁵

The next day, July 3, 1945, the State Department issued a paper on the position of the Japanese Emperor. The paper was an appendix to a Briefing Book Paper on Japan. The Briefing Book Paper and the Appendix read:

Briefing Book Paper

TOP SECRET

MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND OCCUPATION OF JAPAN

ATTITUDE TOWARD THE EMPEROR

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States Government has approved the establishment of a Far Eastern Advisory Commission to make recommendations to the participating governments:

"On the instruments to carry out the terms imposed upon Japan as a result of its unconditional surrender or total defeat; and

"On the terms and provisions to be imposed on Japan, including the measures necessary to ensure the complete disarmament and subsequent effective control of Japan."

As the attitude of military government toward the Emperor is a problem directly concerned with "the instruments to carry out the terms imposed upon Japan", it is suggested that if this question is raised, discussion on the matter be referred to the Far Eastern Advisory Commission.

The attitude to be taken by military government toward the Emperor has been formulated and approved by the Department of State and is submitted in general outline in the attached appendix.

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1945.

²⁵Ibid., pp. 888-894.

[Appendix]

TOP SECRET

[THE POSITION OF THE EMPEROR IN JAPAN]

I. APPREHENSION OF THE EMPEROR

The Department of State has recommended that immediately upon the unconditional surrender or total defeat of Japan, the constitutional powers of the Emperor should be suspended. It has further recommended that if it is politically practicable and physically possible the Emperor and his immediate family should be placed under protective custody in a detached place outside Tokyo. He should be kept in seclusion, but his personal advisers should be allowed to have access to him under reasonable conditions.

II. THE EMPEROR AND INSTRUMENT OF UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER

The Department of State has also recommended, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have tentatively concurred, that:

(1) The Emperor should proclaim that Japan has surrendered unconditionally to the United Nations at war with Japan and should command the armed forces and people of Japan to cease hostilities forthwith and to comply with all requirements imposed by the designated commander for Japan.

(2) The Emperor should also command all civil and military officials to obey and enforce all orders and directives issued by the designated commander for Japan and direct them to remain at their posts and to perform their duties until specifically relieved by the designated commander.

(3) The Emperor, as well as the highest available representative of the Japanese High Command, should sign and seal the instrument of unconditional surrender.

(4) If the several requirements as to the acknowledgment of unconditional surrender by the Emperor are not fulfilled, the designated commander may receive the unconditional surrender of Japan by the highest military authorities of Japan or he may by proclamation take over supreme authority of Japan.

III. REMOVAL OF EMPEROR FROM JAPAN

The Department of State believes that the occupation forces should not threaten to remove the Emperor from Japan, but if for any reason they feel that his removal is advisable, the Department of State should be given an opportunity to express its opinion before such action is taken.

IV. IN THE ABSENCE OF THE EMPEROR

If the Emperor escapes from Japan or cannot be found, the occupation authorities should:

(a) Notify the Japanese people that, so long as these conditions obtain, the occupation authorities will consider any action of the Emperor without validity.

(b) Make no statement that the Emperor has abdicated unless the Emperor himself makes such an announcement or a regency is set up.

(c) Take no initiative in choosing a successor to the throne.

V. INSTITUTION OF THE EMPEROR

Since the Japanese at present show an almost fanatical devotion to their sovereign, an attempt from the outside to abolish the institution of the Emperor, would, so long as the present attitude of the Japanese continues, probably be ineffective. The mere dethronement of the Emperor against the will of the Japanese people would not accomplish the abolition of the emperorship nor could it probably be effectively legislated out of existence so long as the Japanese believed in it and were determined to maintain it. Under these circumstances the indefinite occupation of Japan might be necessary if the United Nations wished to prevent the revival of the institution of the Emperor.

To assure that the treatment of the Emperor by the occupation authorities does not prejudice the continuance of the institution of the Emperor against the will of the Japanese people, the occupation authorities should in all their treatment of and their contacts with the Emperor refrain from any action which would imply recognition of or support for the Japanese concept that the Japanese Emperor is different from and superior to other temporal rulers, that he is of divine origin and that he is indispensable. They should permit absolute freedom of discussion, except where there may

be incitement to breaches of the peace, of political as well as other subjects.

VI. ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EMPERORSHIP

There are indications that the Chinese may favor the abolition of the institution of the Emperor and public opinion in the United States increasingly seems to prefer this solution. On the other hand, it is questionable whether the British would support such a policy. As for the Soviet Union, their attitude on the matter is not known.

[WASHINGTON,] July 3, 1945.²⁶

On July 24 President Truman gave to the British Prime Minister Churchill a copy of the Draft Proclamation on Japan.²⁷ The paper and the reply of the British read:

Proposal by the United States Delegation

[Undated.]

DRAFT PROCLAMATION BY THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS

UNITED STATES . . . UNITED KINGDOM . . .
U.S.S.R. . . . CHINA²⁸

(1) We,--The President of the United States, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the Generalissimo of the Soviet Union, and the President of the Republic of China, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that the Japanese people shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

(2) The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west have now been joined by the vast military might of the Soviet Union, and are poised to strike the final blows

²⁶Ibid., pp. 885-887.

²⁷Truman, Memoirs, I, p. 387.

²⁸The editors of the Potsdam Papers, II, wrote: "Punctuation as in the original." Potsdam Papers, II, p. 127n--footnote 2 for Document No. 1244.

upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until her capitulation.

(3) The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

(4) The time has come for the Japanese people to decide whether they will continue blindly to follow the leadership of those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether they will follow the path of reason.

(5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

(6) There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

(7) Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, Japanese territory shall be occupied to the extent necessary to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

(8) The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

(9) The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. Democratic tendencies among Japanese people shall be supported and strengthened. Freedom of speech,

of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

(11) Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

(12) The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

(13) We call upon the Japanese people and those in authority in Japan, to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

Proposal by the British Delegation

[Undated.]

AMERICAN TEXT

Paragraph 1.
 . . . Japanese
 people . . .
 Paragraph 4.

The time has come
for the Japanese people
 to decide whether they
 will continue blindly
 to follow the leader-
 ship of those self-
 willed militaristic
 advisers whose
 unintelligent calcula-
 tions have brought the
 Empire of Japan to the
 threshold of annihila-
 tion, or whether they
 will follow the path of
 reason.

SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS

Paragraph 1.
 . . . Japan . . .
 Paragraph 4.

The time has come for
 Japan to decide whether she
 will continue to be controlled
 by those self-willed
 militaristic advisers whose
 unintelligent calculations
 have brought the Empire to the
 threshold of annihilation, or
 whether she will follow the
 path of reason.

Paragraph 7.

Until such a new order is established and there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, Japanese territory shall be occupied to the extent necessary to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

Paragraph 10: second sentence.

Democratic tendencies among the Japanese people shall be supported and strengthened.

Paragraph 13.

We call upon the Japanese people and those in authority in Japan . . .

Paragraph 7.

Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan's war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

Paragraph 10: second sentence.

The Japanese-Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people.

Paragraph 13.

We call upon the Government of Japan . . .

29

The President sent a cable to the American Ambassador in China, Joseph Hurley. The cable, marked "TOP SECRET, URGENT," contained a copy of the proclamation on Japan. Later in a cable dated July 25, 1945, Ambassador Hurley informed the President and the Secretary of State that Chiang Kai-shek would be receiving the document in due time. The cable read:

²⁹ Ibid., pp. 1275-1277.

The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the
President and the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[CHUNGKING,] 25 July 1945.

URGENT

(The following message is top secret and urgent for the eyes alone of the Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, Potsdam, Germany, for the President from Ambassador Hurley.)

Your message White House Number 311 delivered to Prime Minister Soong at his residence at 2130 hours, Chungking time, July 25th. Generalissimo out of Chungking across Yangtze River in mountains. We intend to complete translation and deliver message to him tonight.³⁰

On July 26 two cables reached the President and the Secretary of State from Ambassador Hurley. The first contained Chiang's approval of the proclamation, a request from Chiang to have his name placed ahead of British Prime Minister Churchill's because he regarded the President and himself as head of their respective countries. The cable read:

The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the
President and the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[CHUNGKING,] 26 July 1945.

URGENT

(The following message is top secret and urgent for the eyes alone of the Secretary of State James F Byrnes Potsdam, Germany for the President from Ambassador Hurley.)

The following message is from the Generalissimo, Chiang Kai Shek, for President Truman.

"I concur in the proposed proclamation to Japan, with the single alteration that paragraph (1) should be

³⁰Ibid., p. 1278.

revised to read 'We, the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen etc, etc, etc' since the proclamation is to be by the heads of the three governments concerned, Chiang Kai Shek."

Concurrence given to me by Chiang Kai Shek at Yellow Mountain, 0930 hours Chungking time July 26th. Delay in transmission due to fact I had to return to Chungking by ferry Yangtze River because lack of communications. Foregoing message handed both Army and Navy for transmission at 1105 hours Chungking time July 26th.³¹

The second cable from Hurley to the President and Secretary vividly described the lengths Hurley went in securing Chiang's signature on the proclamation. It also contains further comments from Chiang. It reads:

The Ambassador in China (Hurley) to the President and the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[CHUNGKING,] 26 July 1945.

URGENT

(The following message is top secret and urgent for the eyes alone of the Secretary of State James F. Byrnes Potsdam, Germany for the President from Ambassador Hurley.)

The following are sidelights that may be helpful to you. The translation was not finished until after midnight. We then had difficulty in procuring a ferry to cross the Yangtze. The Prime Minister [T.V. Soong] declined to go out to Yellow Mountain with me in the night. This morning, K C Wu, Assistant Minister of Foreign Relations, accompanied me to the Generalissimo's residence at Yellow Mountain. The Generalissimo was kindly and courteous throughout. After he had told me that he concurred in the proclamation Dr Wang Shih Chieh, Minister of Information, arrived at the conference. It became necessary to explain the whole situation again to Wang. Incidentally Wang is to succeed the Prime Minister as Minister of Foreign

³¹Ibid., p. 1282.

Relations. When Chiang Kai Shek had approved the message of concurrence we found the telephone was out of order. It was necessary for me to return to Chungking to contact facilities for transmission to you. The message was sent through both Army and Navy systems.

Two points which the Generalissimo wished to state in his message were omitted on my suggestion. I am stating them here for your information.

(1) The Generalissimo wished to explain that it would be helpful to his position in China if the words "President of the National Government of the Republic of China" should follow "President of the United States." He considers both you and himself as the supreme heads of nations while the Prime Minister is a secondary official.

(2) He desired me to stress in the message an expression of his desire for China to be invited to be present at all future United Nations conferences on Asia. He said he realized the difficulties of the past which prevented his attendance and was very tolerant in his attitude toward those conditions. He stated however that decisions pertaining to Asia made in conferences without China being represented puts him in an undesirable position with the people of China. Especially is this true when he is asked to concur in decisions made in the absence of China's representatives without giving him an opportunity to procure the opinions of his advisors. His concurrence and his whole attitude were constructive and without rancor. He expressed appreciation of your friendship for China.³²

Eben Ayers, White House Information Officer, sent a telegram to Charles G. Ross, Secretary to President Truman, on the issuance of the Potsdam Proclamation. The Office of War Information was to release the document. All times mentioned in the telegram were Eastern War Time. The telegram read:

³² Ibid., pp. 1282-1283.

The White House Information Officer (Ayers)
to the President's Secretary (Ross)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 27 July 1945.

256. OWI domestic and overseas directors, Niel Dalton and Thurman Barnard, request the following be sent you by message:

"Proclamation on Japan handled as follows (All times EWT):

Text received at 3:10 p.m. At 3:32 p.m. given to press through OWI Press Room, White House and State Department simultaneously.

At 4:00 p.m. (5 a.m. Tokyo time) our west coast shortwave transmitters began broadcasting text in English. Highlights broadcast in Japanese at 4:05 p.m. Full text in Japanese not broadcast until translation made by OWI's San Francisco office had been checked by telephone with State Dept language experts in Washington. First broadcast from San Francisco at 6:00 p.m. (7 a.m. Tokyo time).

Thereafter, Japanese text broadcast repeatedly on our eleven west coast shortwave transmitters, shortwave transmitter at Honolulu and on our medium wave Saipan transmitter. Carried in twenty languages from west coast. All regular programs were cancelled to permit full and repeated broadcasts of the proclamation.³³

Text transmitted in telegraphic Japanese to Pacific and China outposts so one official Japanese version would be used on outpost radio programs and in leaflets.

Urgent telegrams ordered psychological warfare outposts in Honolulu, Manila, Chungking, and Kunming to use full text without comment or speculation until further notice.

Our New York office made Proclamation highlights and text lead story for programs in 24 languages broadcast over 26 transmitters.

Current instructions to all offices and outposts are no editorial comment or other reaction to be used. This will not be modified without consultation with State. Fullest play will be continued on all Pacific

³³The editors of the Potsdam Papers, II, wrote: "No evidence has been found in Department of State files to indicate that the text of the proclamation was transmitted to the Japanese Government through neutral diplomatic channels." Potsdam Papers, II, p. 1290n--footnote 1.

transmitters through Friday. For several days thereafter the Proclamation will be repeated at regular intervals."

AYERS³⁴

The July 27, 1945, edition of the New York Times carried Raymond Daniell's account of the Potsdam Proclamation. Daniell's story, with a July 26, 1945, date-line, reported that since Russia was still at peace with Japan she was not invited to sign the proclamation.³⁵ Winston S. Churchill's Conservative Party, the New York Times noted in the same issue, failed to win a majority in Parliament. King George VI of England asked Clement Attlee to form a new government.³⁶

Berlin--Friday, July 27, 1945

There was no meeting because the British delegation had not returned to Berlin. President Truman conducted government business and stayed in his quarters.³⁷

At 6:00 P.M. American Secretary of State Byrnes conferred with Foreign Commissar Molotov. They discussed a number of issues and agreed that nothing definite could be

³⁴Ibid., p. 1290.

³⁵Raymond Daniell, "Terms Laid Down," the New York Times, July 27, 1945, p. 4.

³⁶Ibid., p. 1.

³⁷Potsdam Papers, II, p. 21.

settled until Clement Attlee returned from Britain. They also discussed the issuance of the Potsdam Proclamation. A portion of their talks on this read:

THE SECRETARY said first of all he wished to tell Mr. Molotov that his request for a two or three day postponement in the issuance of the statement on Japan had only reached him this morning when it was too late.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he had sent the word last night [by telephone] as soon as he had received the Secretary's letter.

THE SECRETARY explained that even then it would have been too late since at 7:00 o'clock the statement had gone to the press for early morning release. He explained that the President for political reasons had considered it important to issue an immediate appeal to the Japanese to surrender. Two days ago he had discussed it with the Prime Minister [Churchill] and he had received his consent to the issuance of the statement and had cabled Chiang Kai Shek. On his return yesterday from Frankfurt the President had found a telegram from Chiang Kai Shek agreeing to the issuance of the statement.

MR. MOLOTOV said that thus they had not been informed until after the release.

THE SECRETARY said that we did not consult the Soviet Government since the latter was not at war with Japan and we did not wish to embarrass them.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he was not authorized to discuss this matter further.³⁸

Berlin--Saturday, July 28, 1945

Due to the late arrival of the British delegation, the tenth plenary meeting was called to order by President Truman at 10:30 P.M. It was agreed by the Heads of Government to end this meeting at midnight. The section in the communique dealing with Italy and the satellite states received careful attention by the delegates.

³⁸Ibid., pp. 449-450.

A lengthy argument ensued over the recognition of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania. Since it was apparent that agreement would be impossible they agreed to postpone the issue. Italian reparations were taken up and President Truman announced that the United States and Britain had given over half a billion dollars for the feeding and rehabilitation of Italy. Further, he had no desire to see the Italians use this money for reparation payments. The discussion on Italy lasted until 12:04 A.M. The conferees realized that they had gone past their self-imposed deadline. It was agreed to reinstate the original time of 4:00 P.M. for the next plenary meeting. The meeting adjourned officially at five minutes past midnight.³⁹

Berlin--Sunday, July 29, 1945

After church services the President returned to the Little White House. There he was greeted by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov and his interpreter.⁴⁰ Stalin was sick, stated Molotov through his interpreter. The Premier had come down with a cold and his doctors would not let him attend the next session. President Truman expressed his regrets.⁴¹

³⁹Ibid., pp. 364-365.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 22.

⁴¹Truman, Memoirs, I, pp. 441-443.

The July 30, 1945, edition of the New York Times ran the announcement of Japanese reaction to the Proclamation on page 1:⁴²

Japan Officially Turns Down
Allied Surrender Ultimatum

The story read in part that Premier Kantaro Suzuki said his country rejects the surrender ultimatum. The New York Times quoted Suzuki: "So far as the Imperial Government of Japan is concerned it will take no notice of this proclamation."⁴³

⁴²The New York Times, July 30, 1945, p. 1.

⁴³Ibid., p. 1.

CHAPTER VIII

THE FINAL WEEK AT POTSDAM, JULY 30, 1945,
TO AUGUST 2, 1945

Berlin--Monday, July 30, 1945

Stalin was still indisposed. President Truman attended to routine business.

Berlin--Tuesday, July 31, 1945

Prior to the eleventh plenary meeting Secretary of State Byrnes met with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov. The American Secretary indicated there were three major issues not resolved: reparations, western frontier of Poland, and admission of Italy and the satellite countries into the United Nations. Byrnes then proposed a three-point deal.¹

If the Soviet Government would accept the American proposals, the United States, in turn, would accept the Soviet proposal to allow Poland to administer former German

¹United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945, II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 510. Hereafter cited as Potsdam Papers, II.

territory up to the Oder-Western Neisse. A peace conference would formalize the boundary between Poland and Germany.²

Byrnes, after presenting this collection of proposals, said to Molotov that Premier Stalin "could come to the conference that afternoon to accept or reject them."³

Byrnes, less than a month later, would give his views on the Potsdam Conference to Senator Warren R. Austin, Democrat from Vermont. The Secretary noted his July 31, 1945, meeting with Molotov and the package deal he presented to the Russian Foreign Minister in which Byrnes said to Austin: "The only way to negotiate with the Russians is to hit them hard, and then negotiate."⁴

The eleventh plenary meeting was called to order by the President at 4:00 P.M.⁵ Secretary of State Byrnes presented the American three part proposal to the conference. The first was on reparations:

²Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1979), p. 88.

³James F. Byrnes, All in One Lifetime (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 302.

⁴James F. Byrnes in a memorandum of August 20, 1945, by Senator Warren R. Austin, Democrat from Vermont, as quoted in Thomas G. Patterson, "Potsdam, the Atomic Bomb, and the Cold War: A Discussion with James F. Byrnes," The Pacific Historical Review 41 (May, 1972):228. According to Patterson, the Austin memorandum may be found in the Austin Papers, Box 21, in the Guy W. Bailey Library, University of Vermont.

⁵Potsdam Papers, II, p. 23. The Log of the President's Trip noted this meeting would be the longest so far, lasting over three hours.

As to the reparations the United States proposal was that 25 percent of the industrial capital equipment in the Ruhr which was determined to be unnecessary for a peacetime economy be delivered to the Soviets in exchange for an equivalent of food, coal, potash, timber and other articles from the Soviet zone.

It was proposed further that an additional 15 percent of such capital goods unnecessary for peacetime economy should be removed and transferred to the Soviet Union on reparation account without further consideration.⁶

The second part of the American three part proposal was on the western frontier of Poland. Byrnes read:

Proposal by the United States Delegation

[BABELSBERG,] July 30, 1945.

WESTERN FRONTIER OF POLAND

U.S. PROPOSAL

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimean Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.


The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea through Swinemünde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River⁷ and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not

⁶Ibid., p. 512. The editors of the Potsdam Papers, II, wrote that the document on German reparations presented by Secretary Byrnes has not been found.

⁷The Lausitzer Neisse or Nysa Luzycha. Potsdam Papers, II, p. 115ln.

placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.⁸

The following map indicates the Oder-Neisse territories:



⁸ Ibid., pp. 1150-1151

⁹ Alfred M. de Zayas with a forward by Robert Murphy, Nemesis at Potsdam: The Anglo-Americans and the Expulsion of the Germans Background Executions, Consequences (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., paperback, 1979), p. xxvii.

The final part of the American package was the admission of countries to the United Nations. The United States favored membership for neutral countries into the United Nation organization, conclusion of peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, and Rumania, and the opposition of Spain's application to join the United Nations.¹⁰

Byrnes finished reading the paper and expressed the hope the three proposals would be adopted. Stalin then said: "Mr. Byrnes suggests that the three questions be linked. Mr. Byrnes can use such tactics as those if he wishes, but the Russian delegation will vote on each question separately."¹¹

The Big Three discussed the American proposal on German reparations. After considerable debate the American proposal was accepted with the following changes:

The figure of 12½ percent for compensated deliveries to the Soviets was changed to 15 percent and the figure of 7½ percent for uncompensated deliveries was changed to 10 percent.

France was added to the Reparations Commission for the purpose of determining equipment available for reparations.

Six months was fixed as the final term for determination of the amount of equipment available for reparation.¹²

¹⁰Potsdam Papers, II, pp. 629-630.

¹¹Ibid., p. 530.

¹²Ibid., p. 539.

The western frontier of Poland was the next topic. After a lengthy debate among the American Secretary of State Byrnes, the British Foreign Secretary Bevin and Premier Stalin, the American proposal was accepted by the Big Three with three changes:

It was further agreed (a) that Stettin should be considered as included within the area of Polish administration; (b) that the French should be informed of the decision on the Polish frontier; and (c) that the President should notify the Poles of this decision.¹³

A brief discussion on the American proposal concerning admission of Italy and other countries into the United Nations followed and this, the final part of the American package deal, was approved by the Big Three.

The eleventh plenary meeting was adjourned at 7:15 P.M. The President and his party left for the Little White House.¹⁴

Berlin--Wednesday, August 1, 1945

At 10:00 A.M. the President conferred with the Polish delegation. No official record of their meeting has been found. However, Polish Deputy Prime Minister Mikolajczyk made notes of the meeting.¹⁵ They read:

¹³Ibid.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 528.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 541.

Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime
Minister (Mikolajczyk)

[Translation]

NOTES OF A DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT TRUMAN ON
AUGUST 1, 1945, IN BABELSBERG

Present on the American side: Truman, Byrnes, Bohlen, and Harriman. On the Polish side: Bierut, Mikolajczyk, Grabski, Modzelewski, and interpreter Zebrowski.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN opens the session. He states that on behalf of the three Great Powers he wishes to inform us of the following:

The territorial boundaries have been established in accordance with the Polish proposal, and the Polish Government is responsible for the administration within these boundaries. The Russians have agreed to withdraw their armies from these territories, and will retain only two lines of communication for transit across Poland. (In answer to my question, BOHLEN stated that one of these lines is the Kraków-Lwów line; the other one is in the north.)

We have acknowledged the fact that representative Poles from Poland and from abroad had agreed to the formation of a Provisional Government of National Unity. We had recognized that Government and therefore we were able now to hear its views. After hearing its views, we were able to make a unanimous decision which we are now communicating to you. As a result, the Arciszewski Government has ceased to exist and the two states--Great Britain and the United States--undertake to do everything in their power in order to protect Polish property abroad, to make it impossible to transfer or sell such property, and to help recover it.

All of the Three Powers promise every assistance to help Poles and the Polish Army in returning to Poland from abroad. In this connection they express their conviction that all Poles who return will be treated on the same terms as apply to all other Polish citizens.

Having heard the statement of the President and of the Government concerning obligations under the resolutions of the Crimean Conference to hold elections as soon as possible, as well as the statement that the foreign press shall have free access to Poland, we were able to make unanimous decisions.

MR. BIERUT thanks the President for both the decisions and the assistance.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN stresses the fact that he speaks on behalf of the three Great Powers and can accept thanks only in that capacity.

In parting I approached Truman and told him that only now was I free to thank him as the President of the United States.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN answered, "Thank you; we did it out of friendship toward Poland", and said that he himself was greatly interested in Poland . . . and that he hoped that Poland would be free and happy.

Then there was a brief conversation with HARRIMAN, who stressed once more the necessity of keeping secret the decision announced by President Truman until the Communiqué had been published. He then pointed out that as a result of the statements made by Mr. Bierut and of discussions between Mr. Mikolajczyk and himself, Dunn, Bohlen, and Matthews, the American Delegation had been able to propose the final text, which had been approved unanimously by the Three Powers, and the decision is now that of the three Great Powers.¹⁶

The twelfth meeting was convened by President Truman at 3:30 P.M.¹⁷ Prime Minister Attlee proposed membership for France on the Reparations Commission because the French had a zone of occupation in Germany. After some discussion the Prime Minister's request was approved by his colleagues. Attlee expressed the view that Austria was under no obligation for reparations and inquired if this were a firm decision. Stalin indicated that this was the case and that Austria would be mentioned in the protocol.¹⁸ Stalin proposed a list of war criminals be published in a

¹⁶Ibid., pp. 1540-1541.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 24.

¹⁸Ibid., pp. 569-572.

month and this was adopted by his colleagues.¹⁹ Truman mentioned his conversation with the Polish delegation. They, he indicated, would remain silent on the action taken concerning their country until the communique was released to the public. The conference decided to send messages of gratitude to former Prime Minister Churchill and former Foreign Secretary Eden for their contribution in making this meeting a success. The twelfth plenary meeting was adjourned at ten minutes to six o'clock.²⁰

President Harry S. Truman called the final plenary meeting to order at 10:30 P.M.²¹ The vast majority of this session was devoted to grammatical changes, additions, deletions, and minor amendments on the communique and protocol drafts. It was agreed, finally after making the necessary changes and the like, to have Premier Stalin sign the cover sheet for the communique and the protocol. The former would be released to the public on August 2, 1945, around 5:30 P.M., Washington, D.C., time. The latter was not released until March 24, 1947.

Finally President Truman said they were ready to adjourn. He hoped if they were to convene again it would be in the United States. To that Stalin replied, "God

¹⁹Truman, Memoirs, I, p. 450.

²⁰Potsdam Papers, II, pp. 574-578.

²¹Ibid., p. 24.

willing."²² Prime Minister Attlee thanked Stalin for the arrangements and he thanked President Truman for traveling a long distance to personally participate in this conference. Stalin thanked the President and the Prime Minister for their contribution. The Russian even thanked Secretary of State Byrnes for his tireless efforts in making the conference successful.²³ President Truman said he wished to thank the Foreign Ministers and others "who had worked to get three to agree."²⁴

The final meeting adjourned at 12:30 A.M.²⁵ The American delegation left for the Little White House.

Thursday, August 2, 1945

The President and his party left for Gatow Airport at 7:15 A.M. The President requested no special honors for his departure. Three planes left Gatow carrying the American delegation. The President's plane left at 8:15 A.M. The destination of the President and his group was St. Mawgan, England. There an official welcoming committee consisting of John G. Winant, American Ambassador to the United Kingdom, various American military officers, and

²²Ibid., p. 601.

²³Ibid.

²⁴Ibid., p. 597.

²⁵Ibid.

British civic leaders were waiting to greet the President and the delegation. However, the airfield in St. Mawgan was closed due to fog. Thus, the President and the other planes landed in Harrowbeer.

After securing transportation the Americans departed for Plymouth Harbor. The President boarded the Augusta around 11:20 A.M. The President, Secretary of State Byrnes and Admiral Leahy left the Augusta around 12:35 P.M. to lunch with King George VI, who had traveled from London to see the President. After lunch the King accompanied the American to the Augusta. The King stayed for a half hour. After King George VI left the Augusta it set sail for America at 3:49 P.M.²⁶

²⁶Ibid., pp. 24-26.

CHAPTER IX

THE POTSDAM COMMUNIQUE ISSUED

AUGUST 2, 1945

COMMUNIQUE

Truman Papers

Communiqué

[BABELSBERG,] August 2, 1945[.]

REPORT ON THE TRIPARTITE CONFERENCE OF BERLIN

I

On July 17, 1945, the President of the United States of America, Harry S. Truman, the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Generalissimo J. V. Stalin, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston S. Churchill, together with Mr. Clement R. Attlee, met in the Tripartite Conference of Berlin. They were accompanied by the foreign secretaries of the three Governments, Mr. James F. Byrnes, Mr. V. M. Molotov, and Mr. Anthony Eden, the Chiefs of Staff, and other advisers.

There were nine meetings between July 17 and July 25. The Conference was then interrupted for two days while the results of the British general election were being declared.

On July 28 Mr. Attlee returned to the Conference as Prime Minister, accompanied by the new Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ernest Bevin. Four days of further discussion then took place. During the course of the Conference there were regular meetings of the Heads of the Three Governments accompanied by the foreign secretaries, and also of the Foreign Secretaries alone. Committees appointed by the Foreign Secretaries for preliminary consideration of questions before the Conference also met daily.

The meetings of the Conference were held at the Cecilienhof near Potsdam. The Conference ended on August 2, 1945.

Important decisions and agreements were reached. Views were exchanged on a number of other questions and consideration of these matters will be continued by the Council of Foreign Ministers established by the Conference.

President Truman, Generalissimo Stalin and Prime Minister Attlee leave this Conference, which has strengthened the ties between the three governments and extended the scope of their collaboration and understanding, with renewed confidence that their governments and peoples, together with the other United Nations, will ensure the creation of a just and enduring peace.

II.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF FOREIGN MINISTERS

The Conference reached an agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers representing the five principal Powers to continue the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements and to take up other matters which from time to time may be referred to the Council by agreement of the governments participating in the Council.

The text of the agreement for the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers is as follows:

(1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United States.

(2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London, which shall be the permanent seat of the joint Secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorized to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Minister, and by a small staff of technical advisers.

(ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1st 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time.

(3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to

propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.

(ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other Members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion.

(iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the Member Governments.

(4) (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question.

(ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problem under consideration. In some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases, the Council may convoke a formal conference of the State[s] chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem.

In accordance with the decision of the Conference the three Governments have each addressed an identical invitation to the Governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join in establishing the Council.

The establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the specific purposes named in the text will be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that there should be periodic consultation among the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom.

The Conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of Germany's unconditional surrender, for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the coordination of

Allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Allied Control Council at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly, it was agreed to recommend that the European Advisory Commission be dissolved.

III

GERMANY

The Allied armies are in occupation of the whole of Germany and the German people have begun to atone for the terrible crimes committed under the leadership of those whom, in the hour of their success, they openly approved and blindly obeyed.

Agreement has been reached at this Conference on the political and economic principles of a coordinated Allied policy toward defeated Germany during the period of Allied control.

The purpose of this agreement is to carry out the Crimea declaration on Germany. German militarism and Nazism will be extirpated and the Allies will take in agreement together, now and in the future, the other measures necessary to assure that Germany never again will threaten her neighbors or the peace of the world.

It is not the intention of the Allies to destroy or enslave the German people. It is the intention of the Allies that the German people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis. If their own efforts are steadily directed to this end, it will be possible for them in due course to take their place among the free and peaceful peoples of the world.

The text of the agreement is as follows:

The Political and Economic Principles to Govern the Treatment of Germany in the Initial Control Period.

A. Political Principles.

1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council.

2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are:

(i) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:--

(a) All German land, naval and air forces, the S.S., S.A., S.D. and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers' Corps, Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organizations and all other military and quasi-military organization[s], together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism;

(b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented.

(ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.

(iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.

(iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.

4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discrimination on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.

5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving

or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.

6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.

7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.

8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion.

9. The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:

(i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation;

(ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;

(iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government;

(iv) for the time being no central German government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.

10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade nations shall be permitted.

B. Economic Principles.

11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 15. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed.

12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements.

13. In organizing the German economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.

14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in regard to:

- (a) mining and industrial production and allocation;
- (b) agriculture, forestry and fishing;
- (c) wages, prices and rationing;
- (d) import and export programs for Germany as a whole;
- (e) currency and banking, central taxation and customs;
- (f) reparation and removal of industrial war potential;
- (g) transportation and communications.

In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions.

15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent necessary:

(a) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament and demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports.

(b) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.)

(c) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports.

(d) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential tial[sic] and of achieving the other objectives named herein.

(e) to control all German public or private scientific bodies, research and experimental institutions, laboratories, et cetera, connected with economic activities.

16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any breakdown in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited.

17. Measures shall be promptly taken:

- (a) to effect essential repair of transport;
- (b) to enlarge coal production;
- (c) to maximize agricultural output; and
- (d) to effect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities.

18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German-owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany.

19. Payment of Reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports.

The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4(a) and 4(b) of the Reparations Agreement.

IV

REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY

In accordance with the Crimea decision that Germany be compelled to compensate to the greatest possible extent for the loss and suffering that she has caused to the United Nations and for which the German people cannot escape responsibility, the following agreement on reparations was reached:

1. Reparation claims of the U.S.S.R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U.S.S.R. and from appropriate German external assets.

2. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations.

3. The reparation claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German external assets.

4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U.S.S.R. from its own zone of occupation, the U.S.S.R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones:

(a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries, as is unnecessary for the Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.

(b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously.

5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest.

6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 (a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U.S.S.R. in agreed installments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparations shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed.

7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect of such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6.

8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones of occupation in Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below.

9. The Governments of the U.K. and the U.S.A. renounce their claims in respect of reparations to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern Zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria.

10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany.

[V]

DISPOSAL OF THE GERMAN NAVY AND MERCHANT MARINE

The Conference agreed in principle upon arrangements for the use and disposal of the surrendered German fleet and merchant ships. It was decided that the Three Governments would appoint experts to work out together detailed plans to give effect to the agreed principles. A further joint statement will be published simultaneously by the Three Governments in due course.

VI.

CITY OF KOENIGSBERG AND THE ADJACENT AREA

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government that pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg-Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia.

The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above subject to expert examination of the actual frontier.

The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.

VII.

WAR CRIMINALS

The Three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in London between British, United States, Soviet and French representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of those major war criminals whose crimes under the Moscow Declaration of October 1943 have no particular geographical localization. The Three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring those criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of those major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will be published before September 1.

VIII

AUSTRIA

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria.

The Three Governments agreed that they were prepared to examine this question after the entry of the British and American forces into the city of Vienna.

IX

POLAND

The Conference considered questions relating to the Polish Provisional Government and the western boundary of Poland.

On the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity they defined their attitude in the following statement:

A-- We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognized by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and the United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.

The British and United States Governments have taken measures to protect the interest of the Polish Provisional Government as the recognized government of the Polish State in the property belonging to the Polish State located in their territories and under their control, whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.

The three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return of Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish Armed Forces and the Merchant Marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens.

The three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all

democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates, and that representatives of the Allied press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections.

B-- The following agreement was reached on the western frontier of Poland:

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west of Swinemunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Niesse River and along the western Niesse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

X.

CONCLUSION OF PEACE TREATIES AND ADMISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION.

The Conference agreed upon the following statement of common policy for establishing, as soon as possible, the conditions of lasting peace after victory in Europe:

The Three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views.

For their part the Three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty for Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the reestablishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognized and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the Three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of The United Nations.

The Three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognized democratic Governments in these States will also enable the three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.

The three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

As regards the admission of other states into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:

"1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations;

"2. the admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council."

The Three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above.

The Three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded, with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.

XI

TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIPS

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government concerning trusteeship territories as defined in the decision of the Crimea Conference and in the Charter of the United Nations Organization.

After an exchange of views on this question it was decided that the disposition of any former Italian territories was one to be decided in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy and that the question of Italian territory would be considered by the September Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

XII

REVISED ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION PROCEDURE IN RUMANIA, BULGARIA, AND HUNGARY

The Three Governments took note that the Soviet Representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commission, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased.

The Three Governments agreed that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries would now be undertaken, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the Three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries, and accepting as a basis the agreed proposals.

XIII

ORDERLY TRANSFERS OF GERMAN POPULATIONS

The Conference reached the following agreement on the removal of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary:

The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognize that the transfer to Germany of German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.

Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Allied Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem with special regard to the question of equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out, having regard to the present situation in Germany.

The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above, and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending the examination by the Governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council.

XIV

MILITARY TALKS

During the Conference there were meetings between the Chiefs of Staff of the three Governments on military matters of common interest.

Approved:

J. V. STALIN
HARRY S. TRUMAN
C. R. ATTLEE

LIST OF DELEGATIONS

For the United States

The President:

Harry S. Truman

The Secretary of State:

James F. Byrnes

Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N., Chief of Staff to the President

Joseph E. Davies, Special Ambassador
 Edwin Pauley, Special Ambassador
 W. Averell Harriman[,] Ambassador to the U.S.S.R.
 General of the Army, George C. Marshall, Chief of
 Staff, United States Army
 Fleet Admiral, Ernest J. King, U.S.N., Chief of
 Naval Operations and Commander in Chief, U.S.
 Fleet
 General of the Army, H. H. Arnold, U.S. Army Air
 Forces
 Lieutenant General! [sic] Brehon B. Somervell,
 Commanding General, Army Service Forces
 Vice Admiral Emory S. Land, War Shipping
 Administrator
 William L. Clayton[,] Assistant Secretary of State
 James C. Dunn[,] Assistant Secretary of State
 Ben Cohen, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
 State
 H. Freeman Matthews, Director of European Affairs,
 Department of State
 Charles E. Bohlen[,] Assistant to the Secretary,
 (together with political, military and technical
 advisers).

For the United Kingdom

The Prime Minister:
 Mr. Winston S. Churchill, M.P.
 Mr. C. R. Attlee, M.P.
 The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs:
 Mr. Anthony Eden, M.P.
 Mr. Ernest Bevin, M.P.
 Lord Leathers[,] Minister of War Transport
 Sir Alexander Cadogan, Permanent Under Secretary of
 State for Foreign Affairs
 Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, H.M. Ambassador at Moscow
 Sir Walter Monckton, Head of the U.K. Delegation to
 Moscow Reparations Commission.
 Sir William Strang, Political Adviser to the
 Commander-in-Chief, British Zone in Germany.
 Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial
 General Staff.
 Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Sir Charles Portal,
 Chief of the Air Staff.
 Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, First
 Sea Lord.
 General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief of Staff to the
 Minister of Defence.
 Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander, Supreme Allied
 Commander, Mediterranean Theatre.

Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, Head of the
British Joint Staff Mission at Washington.
and other advisers

[For the Soviet Union]

[The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars:
J. V. Stalin
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs:
V. M. Molotov
Fleet Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov, People's Commissar,
the Naval Fleet of the U.S.S.R.
A. I. Antonov, Chief of Staff of the Red Army
A. Ya Vyshinski, Deputy People's Commissar for
Foreign Affairs
S. I. Kavtaradze, Assistant People's Commissar for
Foreign Affairs
I. M. Maisky, Assistant People's Commissar for
Foreign Affairs
Admiral S. G. Kucherov, Chief of Staff of the Naval
Fleet
F. T. Gusev, Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Great
Britain
A. A. Gromyko, Ambassador of the Soviet Union in the
United States of America
K. V. Novikov, Member of the Collegium of the
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Director of the
Second European Division
S. K. Tsarapkin, Member of the Collegium of the
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, Director of the
United States Division
S. P. Kozyrev, Director of the First European
Division of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
A. A. Lavrishchev, Director of the Division of
Balkan Countries, Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
A. A. Sobolev, Chief of the Political Section of the
Soviet Military Administration in Germany
I. [M.] Z. Saburov, Assistant to the Chief of the
Soviet Military Administration in Germany
A. [S.] A. Golunsky, Expert consultant of the
Commissariat for Foreign Affairs
and also political, military, and technical
assistants.]¹

¹United States Department of State, Foreign
Relations of the United States The Conference of Berlin (The
Potsdam Conference) 1945, II (Washington: United States
Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 1499-1514.

CHAPTER X

POST-CONFERENCE DEVELOPMENTS

The New York Times ran a story by the Associated Press in the August 4, 1945, edition that no secret arrangements were made at the conference. Part of the story read:

ABOARD THE UNITED STATES CRUISER AUGUSTA, With President Truman, Aug. 3--President Truman told reporters today that he had made "no secret agreements of any kind" in his conference with Premier Stalin and Prime Minister Attlee at Potsdam.¹

The Associated Press account went on to report the President was working on a report of the conference to be delivered on nation-wide radio when he returned to Washington, D.C.² On page three of the same issue the New York Times carried excerpts from editorial comments of various newspapers across the country on the conference. Some of these comments read:

CLEVELAND

"Justifiably Harsh Measures"

The Plain Dealer

"In adopting justifiably harsh measures 'to assure that Germany never again will threaten her neighbors or

¹The New York Times, August 4, 1945, p. 1.

²Ibid., p. 1.

the peace of the world,' the leaders of the Big Three at Potsdam achieved a greater degree of Allied political unity than was discernible after either the Teheran or Yalta conferences.

"The language of the statement is language that the Germans can understand. They will not have a third opportunity to start on the road of world conquest--an opportunity in which they might succeed."

NASHVILLE

"Germany Without Claws"

The Tennessean

"Potsdam appears to have been mainly a post-mortem on the last war in Europe. * * *

"All in all the communique reveals that Potsdam attempted to dispose of the body of the conquered and to plan for the resuscitation of a part of it. A Germany without claws, with a new spirit and a much smaller girth is contemplated."

SALT LAKE CITY

Gadsden Deal Recalled

The Tribune

"Isolationists are complaining because the Polish boundary issue was not settled according to plans more acceptable to Americans. But unity and peace could not be jeopardized by becoming involved in a European border controversy. What would our American statesmen have said if any European power had interfered with the Gadsden deal by which our Mexican boundary was established in 1853?"³

On the South Pacific island of Tinian, part of the Marianas Island chain, an American B-29 had taken off around 2:45 A.M. on August 6, 1945--destination: Hiroshima,

³Ibid., p. 3.

Japan.⁴ Half way around the world the Augusta was still on course for the United States. On board the watch officer for the White House Map Room was Captain Frank Graham. The White House Map Room, as found in Washington, D.C., had been set up on the Augusta.⁵

This room was covered with a map of the world and other maps of Europe and Asia, which outlined all troop locations of the Allied forces. It was here the war was conducted in Europe and Asia. The only conflict was in the South Pacific. Captain Graham, a few minutes before noon, went to the dining room where President Truman was having lunch with the ship's crew. He handed a message from the Navy Department to the President. It read:⁶

TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR

Big bomb dropped on Hiroshima August 5 at 7:15 P.M. Washington time. First reports indicate complete success which was even more conspicuous than earlier test.⁷

⁴Joseph Laurance Marx, Nagasaki The Necessary Bomb (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), p. 1.

⁵Harry S. Truman, Year of Decisions Memoirs by Harry S. Truman, I (New York: Signet paperback, 1965), pp. 65-66. Hereafter cited as Truman, Memoirs, I.

⁶United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference 1945, II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 27.

⁷Truman, Memoirs, I, p. 464.

The President, after reading the message, got up and said to the crew: "Please keep your seats and listen for a moment. I have an announcement to make. We have just dropped a new bomb on Japan which has more power than 20,000 tons of TNT. It has been an overwhelming success."⁸

The headlines on page one for the August 7, 1945, edition of the New York Times read:⁹

FIRST ATOMIC BOMB DROPPED ON JAPAN;
MISSILE IS EQUAL TO 20,000 TONS OF TNT;
TRUMAN WARNS FOE OF A "RAIN OF RUIN"

The New York Times ran on August 8, 1945, the following headline:¹⁰

ATOMIC BOMB WIPED OUT 60% OF HIROSHIMA

An American B-29 took off, on August 9, 1945, from the island of Tinian. Its destination was Kokura, Japan.¹¹ However, due to poor visibility the destination was changed to Nagasaki, Japan.¹² Also, on that day, Japanese radio operators had picked up a message from Russia. The Soviet Union had declared war on Japan.¹³ The New York Times

⁸Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1973), p. 282.

⁹The New York Times, August 7, 1945, p. 1.

¹⁰The New York Times, August 8, 1945, p. 1.

¹¹Marx, Nagasaki The Necessary Bomb, p. 1.

¹²Ibid., p. 69.

¹³John Toland, The Rising Sun The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945 (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 806.

would inform its readers of the double blow Japan had received:¹⁴

SOVIET DECLARES WAR ON JAPAN;
ATTACKS MANCHURIA, TOKYO SAYS;
ATOM BOMB LOOSED ON NAGASAKI

That evening President Truman made his previously announced address on Potsdam. He said:

My Fellow Americans:

I have just returned from Berlin, the city from which the Germans intended to rule the world. It is a ghost city. The buildings are in ruins, its economy and its people are in ruins.

The German people are beginning to atone for the crimes of the gangsters whom they placed in power and whom they wholeheartedly approved and obediently followed.

We also saw some of the terrible destruction which the war had brought to the occupied countries of Western Europe and to England.

How glad I am to be home again! And how grateful to Almighty God that this land of ours has been spared!¹⁵

The President continued to discuss the various items that were contained in the communique.¹⁶ The American radio monitors heard a report from Japan around 7:30 in the morning on August 10, 1945. The Japanese were ready to surrender. They were embracing the July 26, 1945, Potsdam Proclamation.¹⁷

¹⁴The New York Times, August 9, 1945, p. 1.

¹⁵The New York Times, August 10, 1945, p. 12.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Truman, Memoirs, I, p. 471.

CHAPTER XI

PROTOCOL OF PROCEEDINGS

EDITOR'S NOTE.--The text of the Protocol, as released to the public by the Department of State on March 24, 1947, was developed in three distinct stages, as follows:

Stage 1. From the preparation of a draft Protocol by the Protocol Subcommittee of the Conference to the end of the Conference. According to the minutes of the Thirteenth Plenary Meeting, August 1, 1945 (ante, page 596), the Three Heads of Government merely signed "top copies" to which the perfected texts of the Protocol were to be attached, and appointed a committee, consisting of a representative of each of the three Delegations, to "compare texts". The United States original of the Protocol as it left the Conference (i.e., the text as it stood at the end of Stage 1) consists of a one-sentence "top document", dated August 1, 1945, and signed by Stalin, Truman, and Attlee, to which there is fastened by a wire staple the "Protocol of the Proceedings of the Berlin Conference", part of which is typewritten and part of which is in mimeographed form, and on the face of which a number of manuscript changes and corrections had been made. The text printed below is the text as it stood at the end of Stage 1.

Stage 2. After the United States original of the Protocol reached Washington, but before its text was publicly released, it became apparent that certain editorial corrections had not been made and that certain decisions of the Heads of Government with respect to the Protocol and the Communiqué had not been reflected in changes in the Protocol. A number of changes falling within these categories were then made on the United States original of the Protocol.

Stage 3. Immediately before the publication of the Protocol in a Department of State Press release, the United States text of the Protocol was checked against a British text of the same document, and further changes were introduced to bring the United States text into

harmony with the British text. These changes, however, were not entered on the face of the United States original.

The text printed below (the text as it stood at the end of Stage 1) is annotated to show (a) manuscript changes made on the signed original during Stage 1 and (b) changes introduced in Stages 2 and 3.

L/T Files

Protocol of the Proceedings of the
Berlin Conference

BERLIN, August 1, 1945.

There is attached hereto the agreed protocol of the Berlin Conference.

H. CTAJIHH
HARRY S TRUMAN
C. R. ATTLEE

[Attachment]

PROTOCOL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
BERLIN CONFERENCE

The Berlin Conference of the Three Heads of Government of the U.S.S.R., U.S.A., and U.K., which took place from July 17 to August 1, 1945, came to the following conclusions:

I. ESTABLISHMENT OF A COUNCIL OF
FOREIGN MINISTERS.

The Conference reached the following agreement for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers to do the necessary preparatory work for the peace settlements:

"(1) There shall be established a Council composed of the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, France and the United States.

(2) (i) The Council shall normally meet in London, which shall be the permanent seat of the joint Secretariat which the Council will form. Each of the Foreign Ministers will be accompanied by a high-ranking Deputy, duly authorized to carry on the work of the Council in the absence of his Foreign Minister, and by a small staff of technical advi[s]ers.

(ii) The first meeting of the Council shall be held in London not later than September 1st 1945. Meetings may be held by common agreement in other capitals as may be agreed from time to time.

(3) (i) As its immediate important task, the Council shall be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.

(ii) For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy. Other Members will be invited to participate when matters directly concerning them are under discussion.

(iii) Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the Member Governments.

(4) (i) Whenever the Council is considering a question of direct interest to a State not represented thereon, such State should be invited to send representatives to participate in the discussion and study of that question.

(ii) The Council may adapt its procedure to the particular problem under consideration. In some cases it may hold its own preliminary discussions prior to the participation of other interested States. In other cases, the Council may convoke a formal conference of the State[s] chiefly interested in seeking a solution of the particular problem."

It was agreed that the three Governments should each address an identical invitation to the Governments of China and France to adopt this text and to join in establishing the Council. The text of the approved invitation was as follows:

Council of Foreign Ministers.

Draft for identical invitation to be sent separately by each of the Three Governments to the Governments of China and France.

"The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the U.S.S.R. consider it necessary to begin without delay the essential preparatory work upon the peace settlements in Europe. To this end they are agreed that there should be established a Council of the Foreign Ministers of the Five Great Powers to prepare treaties of peace with the European enemy States, for submission to the United Nations. The Council would also be empowered to propose settlements of outstanding territorial questions in Europe and to consider such other matters as member Governments might agree to refer to it.

The text adopted by the Three Governments is as follows:

(Here insert final agreed text of the Proposal).

In agreement with the Governments of the United States and U.S.S.R., His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and U.S.S.R., the United States Government, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Government extend a cordial invitation to the Government of China (France) to adopt the text quoted above and to join in setting up the Council. His Majesty's Government, The United States Government, The Soviet Government attach much importance to the participation of the Chinese Government (French Government) in the proposed arrangements and they hope to receive an early and favorable reply to this invitation."

It was understood that the establishment of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the specific purposes named in the text would be without prejudice to the agreement of the Crimea Conference that there should be periodical consultation between the Foreign Secretaries of the United States, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom.

The Conference also considered the position of the European Advisory Commission in the light of the Agreement to establish the Council of Foreign Ministers. It was noted with satisfaction that the Commission had ably discharged its principal tasks by the recommendations that it had furnished for the terms of surrender for Germany, for the zones of occupation in Germany and Austria and for the inter-Allied control machinery in those countries. It was felt that further work of a detailed character for the coordination of Allied policy for the control of Germany and Austria would in future fall within the competence of the Allied Control Commission at Berlin and the Allied Commission at Vienna. Accordingly the Conference agreed to recommend to the Member Governments of the European Advisory Commission that the Commission might now be dissolved.

II. THE PRINCIPLES TO GOVERN THE TREATMENT OF GERMANY IN THE INITIAL CONTROL PERIOD

A. Political Principles.

1. In accordance with the Agreement on Control Machinery in Germany, supreme authority in Germany is exercised, on instructions from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the French Republic, each in his own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the Control Council.

2. So far as is practicable, there shall be uniformity of treatment of the German population throughout Germany.

3. The purposes of the occupation of Germany by which the Control Council shall be guided are:

(1) The complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production. To these ends:--

(a) All German land, naval and air forces, the S.S., S.A., S.D. and Gestapo, with all their organizations, staffs and institutions, including the General Staff, the Officers' Corps Reserve Corps, military schools, war veterans' organizations and all other military and quasi-military organizations, together with all clubs and associations which serve to keep alive the military tradition in Germany, shall be completely and finally abolished in such manner as permanently to prevent the revival or reorganization of German militarism and Nazism;

(b) All arms, ammunition and implements of war and all specialized facilities for their production shall be held at the disposal of the Allies or destroyed. The maintenance and production of all aircraft and all arms, ammunition and implements of war shall be prevented.

(ii) To convince the German people that they have suffered a total military defeat and that they cannot escape responsibility for what they have brought upon themselves, since their own ruthless warfare and the fanatical Nazi resistance have destroyed German economy and made chaos and suffering inevitable.

(iii) To destroy the National Socialist Party and its affiliated and supervised organizations, to dissolve

all Nazi institutions, to ensure that they are not revived in any form, and to prevent all Nazi and militarist activity or propaganda.

(iv) To prepare for the eventual reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis and for eventual peaceful cooperation in international life by Germany.

4. All Nazi laws which provided the basis of the Hitler regime or established discrimination on grounds of race, creed, or political opinion shall be abolished. No such discriminations, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.

5. War criminals and those who have participated in planning or carrying out Nazi enterprises involving or resulting in atrocities or war crimes shall be arrested and brought to judgment. Nazi leaders, influential Nazi supporters and high officials of Nazi organizations and institutions and any other persons dangerous to the occupation or its objectives shall be arrested and interned.

6. All members of the Nazi Party who have been more than nominal participants in its activities and all other persons hostile to Allied purposes shall be removed from public and semi-public office, and from positions of responsibility in important private undertakings. Such persons shall be replaced by persons who, by their political and moral qualities, are deemed capable of assisting in developing genuine democratic institutions in Germany.

7. German education shall be so controlled as completely to eliminate Nazi and militarist doctrines and to make possible the successful development of democratic ideas.

8. The judicial system will be reorganized in accordance with the principles of democracy, of justice under law, and of equal rights for all citizens without distinction of race, nationality or religion.

9. The administration of affairs in Germany should be directed towards the decentralization of the political structure and the development of local responsibility. To this end:--

(i) local self-government shall be restored throughout Germany on democratic principles and in particular through elective councils as rapidly as is consistent with military security and the purposes of military occupation;

(ii) all democratic political parties with rights of assembly and of public discussion shall be allowed and encouraged throughout Germany;

(iii) representative and elective principles shall be introduced into regional, provincial and state (Land) administration as rapidly as may be justified by the successful application of these principles in local self-government;

(iv) for the time being, no central German Government shall be established. Notwithstanding this, however, certain essential central German administrative departments, headed by State Secretaries, shall be established, particularly in the fields of finance, transport, communications, foreign trade and industry. Such departments will act under the direction of the Control Council.

10. Subject to the necessity for maintaining military security, freedom of speech, press and religion shall be permitted, and religious institutions shall be respected. Subject likewise to the maintenance of military security, the formation of free trade unions shall be permitted.

Economic Principles

11. In order to eliminate Germany's war potential, the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war as well as all types of aircraft and sea-going ships shall be prohibited and prevented. Production of metals, chemicals, machinery and other items that are directly necessary to a war economy shall be rigidly controlled and restricted to Germany's approved post-war peacetime needs to meet the objectives stated in Paragraph 15. Productive capacity not needed for permitted production shall be removed in accordance with the reparations plan recommended by the Allied Commission on Reparations and approved by the Governments concerned or if not removed shall be destroyed.

12. At the earliest practicable date, the German economy shall be decentralized for the purpose of eliminating the present excessive concentration of economic power as exemplified in particular by cartels, syndicates, trusts and other monopolistic arrangements. Notwithstanding this, however, and for the purpose of achieving the objectives set forth herein, certain forms of central administrative machinery, particularly in the fields of Finance, Transportation and Communication, shall be maintained or restored.

13. In organizing the German Economy, primary emphasis shall be given to the development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.

14. During the period of occupation Germany shall be treated as a single economic unit. To this end common policies shall be established in regard to:

- (a) mining and industrial production and allocation;
- (b) agriculture, forestry and fishing;
- (c) wages, prices and rationing;
- (d) import and export programs for Germany as a whole;
- (e) currency and banking, central taxation and customs;
- (f) reparation and removal of industrial war potential;
- (g) transportation and communications.

In applying these policies account shall be taken, where appropriate, of varying local conditions.

15. Allied controls shall be imposed upon the German economy but only to the extent necessary:

(a) to carry out programs of industrial disarmament and demilitarization, of reparations, and of approved exports and imports.

(b) to assure the production and maintenance of goods and services required to meet the needs of the occupying forces and displaced persons in Germany and essential to maintain in Germany average living standards not exceeding the average of the standards of living of European countries. (European countries means all European countries excluding U.K. and U.S.S.R.)

(c) to ensure in the manner determined by the Control Council the equitable distribution of essential commodities between the several zones so as to produce a balanced economy throughout Germany and reduce the need for imports.

(d) to control German industry and all economic and financial international transactions, including exports and imports, with the aim of preventing Germany from developing a war potential and of achieving the other objectives named herein.

(e) to control all German public or private scientific bodies, research and experimental institutions, laboratories, et cetera, connected with economic activities.

16. In the imposition and maintenance of economic controls established by the Control Council, German administrative machinery shall be created and the German authorities shall be required to the fullest extent practicable to proclaim and assume administration of

such controls. Thus it should be brought home to the German people that the responsibility for the administration of such controls and any breakdown in these controls will rest with themselves. Any German controls which may run counter to the objectives of occupation will be prohibited.

17. Measures shall be promptly taken:

- (a) to effect essential repair of transport;
- (b) to enlarge coal production;
- (c) to maximize agricultural output; and
- (d) to effect emergency repair of housing and essential utilities.

18. Appropriate steps shall be taken by the Control Council to exercise control and the power of disposition over German owned external assets not already under the control of United Nations which have taken part in the war against Germany.

19. Payment of Reparations should leave enough resources to enable the German people to subsist without external assistance. In working out the economic balance of Germany the necessary means must be provided to pay for imports approved by the Control Council in Germany. The proceeds of exports from current production and stocks shall be available in the first place for payment for such imports.

The above clause will not apply to the equipment and products referred to in paragraphs 4 (a) and 4 (b) of the Reparations Agreement.

III. GERMAN REPARATION

1. Reparation claims of U.S.S.R. shall be met by removals from the zone of Germany occupied by the U.S.S.R., and from appropriate German external assets.

2. The U.S.S.R. undertakes to settle the reparation claims of Poland from its own share of reparations.

3. The reparations claims of the United States, the United Kingdom and other countries entitled to reparations shall be met from the Western Zones and from appropriate German external assets.

4. In addition to the reparations to be taken by the U.S.S.R. from its own zone of occupation, the U.S.S.R. shall receive additionally from the Western Zones:

- (a) 15 per cent of such usable and complete industrial capital equipment, in the first place from the metallurgical, chemical and machine manufacturing industries as is unnecessary for the German peace

economy and should be removed from the Western Zones of Germany, in exchange for an equivalent value of food, coal, potash, zinc, timber, clay products, petroleum products, and such other commodities as may be agreed upon.

(b) 10 per cent of such industrial capital equipment as is unnecessary for the German peace economy and should be removed from the Western Zones, to be transferred to the Soviet Government on reparations account without payment or exchange of any kind in return.

Removals of equipment as provided in (a) and (b) above shall be made simultaneously.

5. The amount of equipment to be removed from the Western Zones on account of reparations must be determined within six months from now at the latest.

6. Removals of industrial capital equipment shall begin as soon as possible and shall be completed within two years from the determination specified in paragraph 5. The delivery of products covered by 4 (a) above shall begin as soon as possible and shall be made by the U.S.S.R. in agreed installments within five years of the date hereof. The determination of the amount and character of the industrial capital equipment unnecessary for the German peace economy and therefore available for reparation shall be made by the Control Council under policies fixed by the Allied Commission on Reparations, with the participation of France, subject to the final approval of the Zone Commander in the Zone from which the equipment is to be removed.

7. Prior to the fixing of the total amount of equipment subject to removal, advance deliveries shall be made in respect to such equipment as will be determined to be eligible for delivery in accordance with the procedure set forth in the last sentence of paragraph 6.

8. The Soviet Government renounces all claims to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Western Zones of Germany as well as to German foreign assets in all countries except those specified in paragraph 9 below.

9. The Governments of the U.K. and U.S.A. renounce their claims to shares of German enterprises which are located in the Eastern Zone of occupation in Germany, as well as to German foreign assets in Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Austria.

10. The Soviet Government makes no claims to gold captured by the Allied troops in Germany.

IV. DISPOSAL OF THE GERMAN NAVY AND MERCHANT MARINE.

A.

The following principles for the distribution of the German Navy were agreed:

(1) The total strength of the German surface navy, excluding ships sunk and those taken over from Allied Nations, but including ships under construction or repair, shall be divided equally among the U.S.S.R., U.K., and U.S.

(2) Ships under construction or repair mean those ships whose construction or repair may be completed within three to six months, according to the type of ship. Whether such ships under construction or repair shall be completed or repaired shall be determined by the technical commission appointed by the Three Powers and referred to below, subject to the principle that their completion or repair must be achieved within the time limits above provided, without any increase of skilled employment in the German shipyards and without permitting the reopening of any German ship building or connected industries. Completion date means the date when a ship is able to go out on its first trip, or, under peacetime standards, would refer to the customary date of delivery by shipyard to the Government.

(3) The larger part of the German submarine fleet shall be sunk. Not more than thirty submarines shall be preserved and divided equally between the U.S.S.R., U.K. and U.S. for experimental and technical purposes.

(4) All stocks of armament, ammunition and supplies of the German Navy appertaining to the vessels transferred pursuant to paragraphs (1) and (3) hereof shall be handed over to the respective powers receiving such ships.

(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite naval commission comprising two representatives for each Government accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German warships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German fleet. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than 15th August, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each Delegation on the Commission will have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect German warships wherever they may be located.

(6) The Three Governments agreed that transfers, including those of ships under construction and repair, shall be completed as soon as possible, but not later than 15th February, 1946. The Commission will submit fortnightly reports, including proposals for the progressive allocation of the vessels when agreed by the Commission.

B.

The following principles for the distribution of the German Merchant Marine were agreed:--

(1) The German Merchant Marine, surrendered to the Three Powers and wherever located, shall be divided equally among the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and the U.S. The actual transfers of the ships to the respective countries shall take place as soon as practicable after the end of the war against Japan. The United Kingdom and the United States will provide out of their shares of the surrendered German merchant ships appropriate amounts for other Allied States whose merchant marines have suffered heavy losses in the common cause against Germany, except that the Soviet Union shall provide out of its share for Poland.

(2) The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships during the Japanese War period shall fall under the cognizance and authority of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime Authority.

(3) While actual transfer of the ships shall be delayed until after the end of the war with Japan, a Tripartite Shipping Commission shall inventory and value all available ships and recommend a specific distribution in accordance with paragraph (1).

(4) German inland and coastal ships determined to be necessary to the maintenance of the basic German peace economy by the Allied Control Council of Germany shall not be included in the shipping pool thus divided among the Three Powers.

(5) The Three Governments agree to constitute a tripartite merchant marine commission comprising two representatives for each Government, accompanied by the requisite staff, to submit agreed recommendations to the Three Governments for the allocation of specific German merchant ships and to handle other detailed matters arising out of the agreement between the Three Governments regarding the German merchant ships. The Commission will hold its first meeting not later than September 1st, 1945, in Berlin, which shall be its headquarters. Each delegation on the Commission will

have the right on the basis of reciprocity to inspect the German merchant ships wherever they may be located.

VI

CITY OF KOENIGSBERG AND THE ADJACENT AREA

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government to the effect that pending the final determination of territorial questions at the peace settlement, the section of the western frontier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which is adjacent to the Baltic Sea should pass from a point on the eastern shore of the Bay of Danzig to the east, north of Braunsberg--Goldap, to the meeting point of the frontiers of Lithuania, the Polish Republic and East Prussia.

The Conference has agreed in principle to the proposal of the Soviet Government concerning the ultimate transfer to the Soviet Union of the City of Koenigsberg and the area adjacent to it as described above subject to expert examination of the actual frontier.

The President of the United States and the British Prime Minister have declared that they will support the proposal of the Conference at the forthcoming peace settlement.

VII

WAR CRIMES

The Three Governments have taken note of the discussions which have been proceeding in recent weeks in London between British, United States, Soviet and French representatives with a view to reaching agreement on the methods of trial of those major war criminals whose crimes under the Moscow Declaration of October, 1943 have no particular geographical localisation. The Three Governments reaffirm their intention to bring these criminals to swift and sure justice. They hope that the negotiations in London will result in speedy agreement being reached for this purpose, and they regard it as a matter of great importance that the trial of these major criminals should begin at the earliest possible date. The first list of defendants will be published before 1st September.

VIII.

AUSTRIA

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the extension of the authority of the Austrian Provisional Government to all of Austria.

The three Governments agreed that they were prepared to examine this question after the entry of the British and American forces into the city of Vienna.

It was agreed that reparations should not be exacted from Austria.

IX.

POLAND

A. Declaration

We have taken note with pleasure of the agreement reached among representative Poles from Poland and abroad which has made possible the formation, in accordance with the decisions reached at the Crimea Conference, of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity recognised by the Three Powers. The establishment by the British and United States Governments of diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government has resulted in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London, which no longer exists.

The British and U.S. Governments have taken measures to protect the interests of the Polish Provisional Government, as the recognised Government of the Polish State, in the property belonging to the Polish State located in their territories and under their control whatever the form of this property may be. They have further taken measures to prevent alienation to third parties of such property. All proper facilities will be given to the Polish Provisional Government for the exercise of the ordinary legal remedies for the recovery of any property belonging to the Polish State which may have been wrongfully alienated.

The Three Powers are anxious to assist the Polish Provisional Government in facilitating the return to Poland as soon as practicable of all Poles abroad who wish to go, including members of the Polish armed forces and the merchant marine. They expect that those Poles who return home shall be accorded personal rights and property rights on the same basis as all Polish citizens.

The Three Powers note that the Polish Provisional Government in accordance with the decisions of the Crimea Conference has agreed to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot in which all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates; and that representatives of the Allied Press shall enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Poland before and during the elections.

B. Western Frontier of Poland.

In conformity with the agreement on Poland reached at the Crimea Conference the three Heads of Government have sought the opinion of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity in regard to the accession of territory in the north and west which Poland should receive. The President of the National Council of Poland and members of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity have been received at the Conference and have fully presented their views. The three Heads of Government reaffirm their opinion that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should await the peace settlement.

The three Heads of Government agree that, pending the final determination of Poland's western frontier, the former German territories east of a line running from the Baltic Sea immediately west [of] Swinemunde, and thence along the Oder River to the confluence of the western Neisse River and along the western Neisse to the Czechoslovak frontier, including that portion of East Prussia not placed under the administration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in accordance with the understanding reached at this conference and including the area of the former free city of Danzig, shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purposes should not be considered as part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany.

X.

CONCLUSION OF PEACE TREATIES AND ADMISSION TO
THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION.

The Three Governments consider it desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Roumania should be terminated by the conclusion of Peace Treaties. They trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share these views.

For their part the Three Governments have included the preparation of a Peace Treaty with Italy as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, who [to] whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards reestablishment of a democratic government and institutions. The conclusion of such a Peace Treaty with a recognised and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the Three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations.

The Three Governments have also charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing Peace Treaties for Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Roumania. The conclusion of Peace Treaties with recognised democratic Governments in these States will also enable the Three Governments to support applications from them for membership of the United Nations. The Three Governments agree to examine each separately in the near future, in the light of the conditions then prevailing, the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Roumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary to the extent possible prior to the conclusion of peace treaties with those countries.

The Three Governments have no doubt that in view of the changed conditions resulting from the termination of the war in Europe, representatives of the Allied Press will enjoy full freedom to report to the world upon developments in Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.

As regards the admission of other states into the United Nations Organization, Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations declared that:

1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations;

2. The admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.

The Three Governments, so far as they are concerned, will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above.

The Three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favour any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.

XI.

TERRITORIAL TRUSTEESHIP

The Conference examined a proposal by the Soviet Government on the question of trusteeship territories envisaging those categories of territories as defined in the decision of the Crimea Conference and in the Charter of the United Nations Organisation.

After an exchange of views on this question it was decided that the disposition of any former Italian territories was one to be decided in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty with Italy and that the question of Italian territory would be considered by the September Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

XII.

REVISED ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION PROCEDURE IN ROUMANIA, BULGARIA AND HUNGARY.

The Three Governments have taken note that the Soviet Representatives on the Allied Control Commissions in Roumania, Bulgaria and Hungary, have communicated to their United Kingdom and United States colleagues proposals for improving the work of the Control Commissions, now that hostilities in Europe have ceased.

The Three Governments agree that the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commissions in these countries will now be undertaken, taking into account the interests and responsibilities of the Three Governments which together presented the terms of armistice to the respective countries, and accepting as a basis, in respect of all three countries, the Soviet Government's proposals for Hungary as annexed hereto.

ANNEX

TEXT OF A LETTER TRANSMITTED ON JULY 12 TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE U.S. AND U.K. GOVERNMENTS ON THE ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION IN HUNGARY.

In view of the changed situation in connection with the termination of the war against Germany, the Soviet Government finds it necessary to establish the following order of work for the Allied Control Commission in Hungary.

1. During the period up to the conclusion of peace with Hungary the President (or Vice-President) of the ACC will regularly call conferences with the British and American representatives for the purpose of discussing the most important questions relating to the work of the ACC. The conferences will be called once in 10 days, or more frequently in case of need.

Directives of the ACC on questions of principle will be issued to the Hungarian authorities by the President of the Allied Control Commission after agreement on these directives with the English and American representatives.

2. The British and American representatives in the ACC will take part in general conferences of heads of divisions and delegates of the ACC, convoked by the President of the ACC, which meetings will be regular in nature. The British and American representatives will also participate personally or through their representatives in appropriate instances in mixed commissions created by the President of the ACC for questions connected with the execution by the ACC of its functions.

3. Free movement by the American and British representatives in the country will be permitted provided that the ACC is previously informed of the time and route of the journeys.

4. All questions connected with permission for the entrance and exit of members of the staff of the British and American representatives in Hungary will be decided on the spot by the President of the ACC within a time limit of not more than one week.

5. The bringing in and sending out by plane of mail, cargoes and diplomatic couriers will be carried out by the British and American representatives on the ACC under arrangements and within time limits established by the ACC, or in special cases by previous coordination with the President of the ACC.

I consider it necessary to add to the above that in all other points the existing Statutes regarding the ACC in Hungary, which was confirmed on January, 20 [sic], 1945, shall remain in force in the future.

XIII

ORDERLY TRANSFER OF GERMAN POPULATIONS

The Three Governments, having considered the question in all its aspects, recognise that the transfer of Germany to German populations, or elements thereof, remaining in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, will have to be undertaken. They agree that any transfers that take place should be effected in an orderly and humane manner.

Since the influx of a large number of Germans into Germany would increase the burden already resting on the occupying authorities, they consider that the Allied Control Council in Germany should in the first instance examine the problem, with special regard to the question of the equitable distribution of these Germans among the several zones of occupation. They are accordingly instructing their respective representatives on the Control Council to report to their Governments as soon as possible the extent to which such persons have already entered Germany from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and to submit an estimate of the time and rate at which further transfers could be carried out having regard to the present situation in Germany.

The Czechoslovak Government, the Polish Provisional Government and the Control Council in Hungary are at the same time being informed of the above and are being requested meanwhile to suspend further expulsions pending an examination by the Governments concerned of the report from their representatives on the Control Council.

XIV

OIL EQUIPMENT IN RUMANIA

The Conference agreed to set up two bilateral commissions of experts, one to be composed of United Kingdom and Soviet Members, and one to be composed of United States and Soviet members, to investigate the facts and examine the documents, as a basis for the settlement of questions arising from the removal of equipment from Rumania. It was further agreed that these experts shall begin their work within ten days, on the spot.

XV

IRAN

It was agreed that Allied troops should be withdrawn immediately from Tehran, and that further stages of the withdrawal of troops from Iran should be considered at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers to be held in London in September, 1945.

XVI

THE INTERNA[T]IONAL ZONE OF TANGIER

A proposal by the Soviet Government was examined and the following decisions were reached.

Having examined the question of the Zone of Tangier, the three Go[v]ernments have agreed that this Zone, which includes the city of Tangier and the area adjacent to it, in view of its special strategic importance shall remain international.

The question of Tangier will be discussed in the near future at a meeting in Paris of representatives of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kin[g]dom and France.

XVII

THE BLACK SEA STRAITS

The three Governments recognised the need for revision of the Convention on the Straits concluded at Montreux as failing to meet present-day conditions.

It was agreed that as the next step the matter should be the subject of direct conversations between each of the three Governments and the Turkish Government.

XVIII

INTERNATIONAL INLAND WATERWAYS.

The Conference considered a proposal of the U.S. Delegation on this subject and agreed to refer it for consideration to the forthcoming meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

XIX

EUROPEAN INLAND TRANSPORT CONFERENCE.

The British and U.S. Delegations to the Conference informed the Soviet Delegation of the desire of the British and U.S. Governments to reconvene the European Inland Transport Conference and stated that they would welcome assurance that the Soviet Government would participate in the work of the reconvened conference. The Soviet Government agreed that it would participate in this conference.

XX

DIRECTIVES TO MILITARY COMMANDERS ON ALLIED
CONTROL COUNCIL FOR GERMANY.

The three Governments agreed that each would send a directive to its representative on the Control Council for Germany informing him of all decisions of the Conference affecting matters within the scope of his duties.

XXI

USE OF ALLIED PROPERTY FOR SATELLITE
REPARATIONS OR "WAR TROPHIES"

The proposal presented by the U.S. Delegation was accepted in principle by the Conference, but the drafting of an agreement on the matter was left to be worked out through diplomatic channels.¹

¹United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference 1945, II (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 1477-1498.

CHAPTER XII

TESTING RESULTS

Having read the 186-page document on the origins of the Potsdam Conference, the proceedings of the Conference; the Potsdam Proclamation, calling upon Japan to surrender; the Communique immediately after the Conference; and the Protocol, issued two years later, the students participating in this dissertation were asked to complete four exercises. First they had one week to complete a take-home essay. Then they participated in an in-class exercise which included a multiple-choice test, an identification test, and the completion of a questionnaire.

The take-home essay covered five major subjects discussed at the conference: the fate of Germany, Poland's future, Japan at the Conference, President Truman's views of the Conference, and a comparison of the Communique to the Protocol. The purpose of this exercise was to give the students an opportunity to develop their observation and writing skills. The essay was a take-home assignment to avoid any undue pressure on the students in developing their

essays. The students were allowed to either type or in their best penmanship write out in longhand the essays. The author included a number of subheadings with page numbers to assist the students in their essays. This also helped the author to grade the essays as objectively as possible. If a student failed to cover a sub-point, he or she lost points. The vast majority (56.5%) of the sixty-two students who wrote the take-home essays chose President Truman's views of the conference.

On the same day they handed in their take-home essays, the students took a multiple-choice test. The purpose of the multiple-choice test was to see if the students read the material in lieu of merely "checking it over to write their essays." From the test results, which are included in this chapter, the students read the material thoroughly. The test is reproduced in its entirety with the number of responses and percentages.

Following the multiple-choice test the students took an identification test. The material for the test came from pages twenty-two through twenty-three of the Potsdam document the students read. The material covered was the code symbols used in the diplomatic cables. The students were informed beforehand that they should read these pages, for this is where the identification items would originate. The students were to do four out of seven identification items. Each item was worth one and one-quarter points for a

total value of five points. Part of the aim of the dissertation was to give the students a flavor of a diplomatic conference. Consequently, the coding symbols were left on the diplomatic cables. The reader of the Potsdam document would need to learn them or continuously turn back to pages twenty-two and twenty-three. In general, the students learned some of the symbols but not all and did somewhat more poorly on this than on either the essay or the multiple-choice test.

The final in-class exercise was a questionnaire. The questions were numbered following the multiple-choice test in order to allow the computer to grade and record the students' responses. Questions twenty-three and twenty-four asked if the student would have either looked up the appendix to read the primary material or would have gone to the library to read the material. The responses indicated the students would neither have turned to the appendix nor gone to the library. Questions twenty-five through twenty-seven dealt with the atomic bomb and Japan. The remaining questions (twenty-eight through thirty) inquired into the student's college status.

Take-Home Essay

Each student wrote a take-home essay which counted sixty-five percent of their grade. They had five topics from which to choose and were to write on one of them. The

topics dealt with items covered at the conference. There were a number of sub-points provided by the author with page numbers to assist the students in developing their essay. They had one week to write the essays.

There were sixty-five students who responded to the in-class exercises, the multiple-choice test, questionnaire, and identification test. Three students, for reasons unknown, chose not to write an essay. The explanatory sheet given to the students explaining the essay follows with the number of those who responded and the percentage based on sixty-two students (see Table 1).

TABLE 1

ESSAY TEST

ESSAY (65 points). Do 1 (one). Use 4-8 pages. Note to student: the page numbers of the Potsdam Conference paper you have are included in the sub-headings of your essay, which you are to do ONE. These pages are in (). Example: (80-81) means pages 80-81 in the Potsdam Conference paper.

1. DISCUSS THE FATE OF GERMANY 16 responded for 25.8%

Include the following in your essay: the geographical definition of Germany (80-81); a brief summary of the Political Principles of Germany (155-158); a brief summary of the Economic Principles of Germany (158-160); a brief summary of the reparations of Germany (160-161); a brief summary of the Disposal of the German Navy and Merchant Marine (161); discuss the fate of War Criminals (162); is there any difference in the material contained in the Communiqué on Germany (155-161) and the material contained in the Protocol (179-187)? If so, briefly indicate the areas of difference.

TABLE 1--Continued

2. DISCUSS POLAND AT THE CONFERENCE 4 responded for 6.5%

Include the following in your essay: a brief summary of the Soviet Proposal on Poland (81-82); a brief summary of the British Proposal on Poland (82-83); summarize the diplomatic telegram from the Polish President Bierut and Polish Prime Minister Osobka-Morawski to American President Harry S. Truman (100); summarize the diplomatic note to the Polish Government on National Unity (104); summarize the July 24, 1945, memorandum of a conversation with President Truman and the Polish delegation (111-112); briefly discuss the Curzon line (112, footnote 13); W. Averell Harriman and James Clement Dunn met with the Polish Delegation. The Poles gave the Americans three memoranda. Briefly discuss these documents (115-118); briefly discuss what the Communique mentioned on Poland (163-164); is there any difference between the Communique (163-164) and the Protocol (188-189) on Poland? If so, briefly indicate.

3. DISCUSS JAPAN AT THE CONFERENCE 4 responded for 6.5%

Include the following in your essay: briefly summarize the July 2, 1945, memorandum from Stimson entitled, "PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR JAPAN" (120-122); briefly summarize the United States State Department's July 3, 1945, Briefing Book Paper entitled, "ATTITUDE TOWARD EMPEROR" (126) and "THE POSITION OF THE EMPEROR" (127-129); briefly summarize the DRAFT PROCLAMATION OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENTS AND BRITISH PROPOSALS (131-132); discuss the efforts to obtain China's signature on the Proclamation, include Hurley's cables (132-135); briefly summarize Ayers' telegram to Ross on releasing the Proclamation and the New York Times coverage (135-137); briefly discuss Russian reaction to the Proclamation (137-138), include Japan's reaction to the Proclamation (140); was Japan covered in the Communique (152-167) and Protocol (176-195)?

4. DISCUSS PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S VIEWS DURING THE CONFERENCE
35 responded for 56.5%

Include in your essay the following: briefly summarize the President's views of his living quarters (70, footnote 7); briefly summarize his meeting with British

TABLE 1--Continued

Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill (74, footnote 14); briefly summarize his view on Berlin (74-75, footnote 15 which is carried on the bottom of p. 75); briefly summarize his meeting with Stalin (77); briefly summarize his views on the translation during the conference (78); briefly summarize his views on the second plenary meeting (84); summarize his "Police Court" speech (86-87); discuss his view of the atomic bomb test as noted in Stimson's diary (99); summarize his radio speech (174).

5. COMPARE AND CONTRAST THE COMMUNIQUE AND THE PROTOCOL
3 responded for 4.8%

In your essay: define Communique and Protocol; list all major topics in the Communique (152-167); and all major topics in the Protocol (176-195); after listing these topics discuss those not released to the world on August 2, 1945.

Providing the various sub-points and the pages seems to have assisted the students in developing their essays. A sample of each of the essays can be found in Appendix A. The students' names have been removed as well as the name of their instructor.

Results of the Essay

The following tables deal with the take-home essay. Table 2 is the grading scale for the essay. The sub-headings for each topic were counted up and divided into the allotted sixty-five points.

TABLE 2
GRADING SCALE FOR ESSAY

Essay	Sub-Headings	Avg. Points	Total Points
1. Discuss the Fate of Germany	7	9.28	65
2. Discuss Poland at the Conference	9	7.22	65
3. Discuss Japan at the Conference	7	9.28	65
4. Discuss President Truman's Views During the Conference	9	9.28	65
5. Compare and Contrast the Communique and the Protocol	4	16.25	65

The sub-headings enabled the grader to see if the students covered the allotted material contained in the sub-headings, and allowed him to take off points with as little subjectivity as possible. For example, in the essay on Germany the student was asked if there were any differences in the material contained in the Communique on Germany and the material contained in the Protocol; and, if so, the student was to indicate the areas of difference. Four students, as Table 3 indicates, responded there was no difference in the Communique and Protocol on Germany. This is incorrect, for the Communique did not mention the disposal of the German Naval and Merchant Marine fleet, while the Protocol has this material. As Table 3 indicates,

most students were able to follow the instructions and produced an essay which covered the sub-topics adequately. Only five students failed to include the required materials out of sixty-two who did the essay. Three students (4.6%) failed to write the essay at all out of the sixty-five who participated in the other parts of the exercise.

TABLE 3

GRADE DISTRIBUTION FOR THE ESSAY

Essay	Total Students	65 Points	60 Points	56 Points	Mean	Percentage
1	16	11	1	4	62.437	96.057
2	4	4	0	0	65.000	100.000
3	4	4	0	0	65.000	100.000
4	35	35	0	0	65.000	100.000
5	3	3	0	0	65.000	100.000
	(62)	(57)	(1)	(4)	64.338	98.981

It is quite likely that, if this type of exercise were required in a class taught by the instructor himself, the percentage failing to participate would be lower; however, the success rate for those who did participate in this essay exercise was very high, indicating that the students had read the primary documents at a much higher proficiency level than if they were required to obtain the information from the library or in another format.

The final table on the take-home essay covers those who responded to the various essay questions. As Table 4 indicates, the largest percentage was for essay four, the one dealing with President Truman's views during the conference. This is followed by essay one that dealt with the fate of Germany at Potsdam. Essay five, compare and contrast the Communique and Protocol, was administered to give the students an opportunity, if they so desired, to write a literary analysis rather than a more objective historical analysis. Obviously, the students expressed little interest in this question.

TABLE 4

TOTAL RESPONDENTS AND PERCENTAGES
FOR THE ESSAY

Essay	Total Respondents	Percentage Based on 62 Students
1. Discuss the Fate of Germany	16	25.8
2. Discuss Poland at the Conference	4	6.5
3. Discuss Japan at the Conference	4	6.5
4. Discuss President Truman's Views During the Conference	35	56.6
5. Compare and Contrast the Communique and the Protocol	3	4.8

Multiple-Choice Test Results

On the day the students returned their essays they were administered a multiple-choice test, an identification test, and a questionnaire. The multiple-choice test consisted of twenty questions worth 1.5 points. The test, number of responses to each question and their percentages are shown in Table 5. An asterisk (*) denotes the correct response.

TABLE 5

MULTIPLE-CHOICE TEST

Name _____ Instructor _____

Multiple-Choice (1.5 points/30 points total)

1. President Roosevelt attended in February, 1945, a conference at Yalta. A number of historians refer to this conference as:

A. the Crimea Conference	61*	94.0%
B. the Stalin Conference	0	0.0%
C. The Big Three Conference	3	5.0%
D. The Last War Conference	1	1.0%

2. The French did not attend the Potsdam Conference. This was because:

A. De Gaulle was too busy forming a new government	0	0.0%
B. The French expressed no desire to attend the conference	6	9.2%

TABLE 5--Continued

C.	Russia opposed the French at Potsdam	7	10.8%
D.	Of a number of serious diplomatic and military incidents with the United States during World War II	52*	80.0%
3.	President Truman sent two diplomats to London and Moscow to prepare for the Potsdam Conference. These diplomats were:		
A.	Charles E. Bohlen-- W. Averell Harriman	27	41.5%
B.	Harry Hopkins-- Joseph E. Davies	32*	49.0%
C.	Robert D. Murphy-- Edward R. Stettinius	5	8.0%
D.	W. W. Norton-- Alfred A. Knopf	1	1.5%
4.	President Truman and the American delegation traveled on an American cruiser named the:		
A.	U.S.S. <u>South Dakota</u>	2	3.1%
B.	U.S.S. <u>Tennessee</u>	1	1.5%
C.	U.S.S. <u>Augusta</u>	59*	90.8%
D.	U.S.S. <u>Missouri</u>	3	4.6%
5.	Potsdam is located in Berlin. Which sector is Potsdam located in:		
A.	American	1	1.5%
B.	French	1	1.5%
C.	British	5	8.0%
D.	Soviet Union	58*	89.0%

TABLE 5--Continued

6. The quarters of President Truman were nicknamed by the American delegates as:		
A. The Little House in the Suburbs	4	6.2%
B. The Little White House	56*	86.1%
C. The Little Mansion	4	6.2%
D. The Little Yellow House	1	1.5%
7. The opening of the conference was delayed because:		
A. Churchill's plane was delayed	1	1.5%
B. Stalin suffered a heart attack	62*	95.4%
C. President Truman fell and injured his head	0	0.0%
D. at the last minute France was invited to the conference	2	3.1%
8. Harry S. Truman was made chairman because:		
A. he was the only Chief of State at the conference	61*	93.8%
B. It was customary to rotate the chairmanship of diplomatic conferences	2	3.1%
C. the United States had given financial and military assistance to Britain and Russia	2	3.1%
D. President Truman asked to be made chairman	0	0.0%

TABLE 5--Continued

9. The news media at the conference:		
A. had complete access to the heads of Government for interviews	4	6.2%
B. had access only to the foreign secretaries	12	18.4%
C. had complete transcripts of the plenary meetings	4	6.2%
D. were given very little useful information	45*	69.2%
10. The constant quarreling between Churchill and Stalin at the third plenary meeting finally got to President and he exploded. Truman delivered what he called in his Memoirs his:		
A. "police court speech"	58*	89.2%
B. "Missouri speech"	4	6.2%
C. "One, two, punch speech"	1	1.5%
D. "Give em Hell Harry speech"	2	3.1%
11. After the Eighth Plenary Meeting, President informed Stalin about the atomic bomb. Stalin's reaction was:		
A. of great joy and excitement	4	6.2%
B. glad to hear it and hoped the United States would make "good use of it against the Japanese"	35*	53.8%
C. one of mild surprise and asked why his country was not informed about its development	15	23.1%
D. one of emotion	11	16.9%

TABLE 5--Continued

12. Winston Churchill informed his colleagues that he was leaving for England because:		
A. of pressing legislative business	1	1.5%
B. his son died	3	5.0%
C. he was up for reelection	60*	92.0%
D. he had enough and was going home	1	1.5%
13. On July 26, 1945, the Potsdam Proclamation was issued. It:		
A. called upon Japan to surrender	56*	86.2%
B. asked the world to pray for peace	1	1.5%
C. said Prime Minister Churchill did an outstanding job at the conference	0	0.0%
D. announced the admittance of France in the United Nations Organization	8	12.3%
14. Which country did not sign the Potsdam Proclamation:		
A. China	42	64.6%
B. Great Britain	1	1.5%
C. Russia	20*	30.8%
D. United States	2	3.1%

TABLE 5--Continued

15.	At the Eleventh Plenary meeting (July 31, 1945), the American delegation presented a "package deal" on three issues:		
A.	Iran, Syria-Lebanon, and the Turkish Straits	11	16.9%
B.	Western frontier of Poland, admission of Italy along with other states to the United Nations, and reparations from Germany	40*	61.5%
C.	War criminals, city of Kienigsburg, and Turkey	10	15.4%
D.	division of Germany, Iran, and war criminals	4	6.2%
16.	The final plenary meeting was held on August 1, 1945. President Truman hoped they would meet again, to which Stalin replied:		
A.	"God willing"	38*	58.5%
B.	"Never!"	2	3.1%
C.	"Soon"	16	24.6%
D.	"We'll see"	9	13.8%
17.	After the conference the Heads of Government:		
A.	released a protocol	21	32.3%
B.	released no formal statement	5	7.7%
C.	released a communique	33*	50.8%
D.	merely went home and said nothing	6	9.2%

TABLE 5--Continued

18.	On August 6, 1945, the Americans dropped an atom bomb on:		
	A. Tokyo	3	5.0%
	B. Kokura	1	1.0%
	C. Nigata	0	0.0%
	D. Hiroshima	61*	94.0%
19.	After the atomic bomb was dropped on Japan, Russia:		
	A. announced she was sending medical supplies to Japan	0	0.0%
	B. declared war on Japan	40*	61.5%
	C. criticized the U.S. for dropping the atomic bomb on Japan	15	23.1%
	D. said nothing	10	15.4%
20.	On August 9, 1945, another Japanese city was the recipient of an atomic bomb. That was:		
	A. Tokyo	1	1.5%
	B. Kokura	1	1.5%
	C. Nagasaki	63*	97.0%
	D. Formosa	0	0.0%

The first seven questions in the multiple-choice test dealt with items prior to the opening of the Potsdam Conference. The first question inquired into the other name historians use in identifying the Yalta Conference and

94% correctly chose the Crimea Conference. The second question asked why the French were excluded from the conference and 80% correctly responded because "of a number of serious diplomatic and military incidents with the United States during World War II." The third question asked the students to identify the two American diplomats sent by President Truman to London and Moscow to prepare for the conference. The students had difficulty with this question because only 49% correctly chose Harry Hopkins and Joseph E. Davies. Charles E. Bohlen and W. Averell Harriman were incorrectly identified by 41½% of the students.

The students, in question four, were asked to identify the ship that carried the American delegation and President Truman to Europe. The students had little difficulty in choosing the answer for 90% indicated it was the U.S.S. Augusta. After the administration of the multiple-choice test one student informed the author that battleships are named for states and cruisers are named for cities. Since the only city named was the correct answer, perhaps that explains why some students had little difficulty with question four. The students were informed in the paper that Berlin was in the hands of the Soviets. The city was to be divided into sectors under the jurisdiction of the United States, Britain and later France along with the Soviet Union. The students, in question five, were

to identify the country that had authority over Potsdam. This posed no difficulty to the students as 89% said the Soviet Union. The quarters of President Truman were nicknamed by the American delegation, and in question six the students were asked to name the President's quarters. The Little White House was correctly chosen by 86% of the students. The final pre-conference question, number seven, asked the students why the opening of the conference was delayed and 95% correctly indicated that it was delayed because Joseph Stalin, the Russian Premier, had suffered a heart attack.

The next set of questions, eight through seventeen, dealt with events at the Potsdam Conference. The students were asked in question eight why President Truman was made chairman of the conference and over 90% correctly said he was the only Chief of State at the conference. Question nine dealt with the media coverage of the conference. The students seemed to have difficulty with this question because only 69% correctly indicated the media was given little useful information during the conference. At the third plenary meeting President Truman gave a speech to Churchill and Stalin. In question ten 80% of the students correctly labeled the President's talk the "police court speech." Premier Stalin was informed of the atomic bomb, and the students were asked in question eleven to choose the Russian's response. This question posed some difficulty to

to the students for only 53% correctly indicated that Stalin said he was "glad to hear it and hoped the United States would make good use of it against the Japanese." British Prime Minister Churchill left the conference and question twelve inquired why the Prime Minister left the conference. This question posed no problem for over 90% said Churchill was returning to England because he was up for reelection.

On July 26, 1945, the Potsdam Proclamation was issued and in question thirteen the students were asked to indicate the purpose of the proclamation. Over 86% of the students correctly indicated the proclamation was issued to ask the Japanese to surrender. Question fourteen did pose a serious problem to the students. The question read, "Which country did not sign the Potsdam Proclamation?" Only 30% said Russia. A majority, over 60%, incorrectly said China. This is curious for there was a good deal of material informing the students of the efforts to obtain the signature of Chiang Kai-shek. American Ambassador to China Patrick Hurley's diplomatic cables were included in the paper. However, perhaps the students were convinced that the Soviet Union participated in all activities at the conference, thus they did not perceive the lack of Soviet involvement with the Japanese question.

There were a number of issues unresolved on July 31, 1945. United States Secretary of State James F. Byrnes presented a "package deal" to the Soviets. The students,

in question fifteen, were asked to identify the three issues contained in this proposal. Apparently they had some difficulty for only 61% correctly said the "package deal" covered the western frontier of Poland, admission of Italy along with other states to the United Nations, and reparations to Germany.

At the final plenary meeting, August 1, 1945, President Truman expressed the desire they would meet again. The students, in question sixteen, were asked for Stalin's response to President Truman's remark. The students had some difficulty because only approximately 58% correctly indicated Stalin replied, "God willing." The Heads of Government issued a document after the conference; in question seventeen the students were asked to identify this document. Again they had difficulty with this question for only 50% correctly said the Heads of Government released a Communique.

The remaining three questions on the multiple-choice test dealt with events after the conference. Question eighteen said on August 6, 1945, the Americans dropped an atomic bomb on a Japanese city. The students had no difficulty with this because over 90% indicated Hiroshima was the city bombed by the United States. The students were asked in question nineteen to choose the reaction of the Russians after the atomic bomb was dropped on Japan. This question posed some difficulty for only 61% said the

Russians declared war on Japan. The final question asked the students to name the second Japanese city to be bombed by the United States. The students had no difficulty with this question for over 90% said Nagasaki. (See Table 6)

TABLE 6

MULTIPLE-CHOICE TEST RESPONSES AND PERCENTAGES
OF THE THREE CATEGORIES: PRE-CONFERENCE,
CONFERENCE, AND POST-CONFERENCE

Category: Pre-Conference									
Question	A		B		C		D		
	R	%	R	%	R	%	R	%	
1	61*	94.0	0	0.0	3	5.0	1	1.0	
2	0	0.0	6	9.2	7	10.8	52*	80.0	
3	27	41.5	32*	49.0	5	8.0	1	1.5	
4	2	3.1	1	1.5	59*	90.8	3	4.6	
5	1	1.5	1	1.5	5	8.0	58*	89.0	
6	4	6.2	56*	86.1	4	6.2	1	1.5	
7	1	1.5	62*	95.4	0	0.0	2	3.1	
Category: Conference									
8	61*	93.8	2	3.1	2	3.1	0	0.0	
9	4	6.2	12	18.4	4	6.2	45*	69.2	
10	58*	89.2	4	6.2	1	1.5	2	3.1	
11	4	6.2	35*	53.8	15	23.1	11	16.9	
12	1	1.5	3	5.0	60*	92.0	1	1.5	
13	56*	86.2	1	1.5	0	0.0	8	12.3	
14	42	64.6	1	1.5	20*	30.8	2	3.1	

TABLE 6--Continued

Category: Conference (Continued)									
Question	A		B		C		D		
	R	%	R	%	R	%	R	%	
15	11	16.9	40*	61.5	10	15.4	4	6.2	
16	38*	58.5	2	3.1	16	24.6	4	13.8	
17	21	32.3	5	7.7	33*	50.8	6	9.2	
Category: Post-Conference									
18	3	5.0	1	1.0	0	0.0	61*	94.0	
19	0	0.0	40*	61.5	15	23.1	10	15.4	
20	1	1.5	1	1.5	63*	97.0	0	0.0	

Table 7 deals with the correct response, percentage, and the three categories: pre-conference, conference, and post-conference.

TABLE 7

MULTIPLE-CHOICE TEST CORRECT RESPONSE AND
PERCENTAGE PRE-CONFERENCE, CONFERENCE,
AND POST-CONFERENCE

Category: Pre-Conference		
Question	Number of Responses	Percentage
1	61	94.0
2	52	80.0
3	32	49.0
4	59	90.8
5	58	89.0

TABLE 7--Continued

Category: Pre-Conference (Continued)		
Question	Number of Responses	Percentage
6	56	86.1
7	<u>62</u>	<u>95.4</u>
Total	380	83.5
Category: Conference		
8	61	93.8
9	45	69.2
10	58	89.2
11	35	53.8
12	60	92.0
13	56	86.2
14	20	30.8
15	40	61.5
16	38	58.5
17	<u>33</u>	<u>50.8</u>
Total	446	68.6
Category: Post-Conference		
18	61	94.0
19	40	61.5
20	<u>63</u>	<u>97.0</u>
Total	164	84.1

Table 8 is a breakdown of the test results from the multiple-choice test. The table includes the mean, standard deviation, and percentage. The table has a breakdown by class and sex.

TABLE 8

MULTIPLE-CHOICE TEST RESULTS BY
CLASS AND SEX

Classification	Number of Students	Mean	Standard Deviation	Percentage
Class				
Freshman	2	16.000	1.000	86.666
Sophomore	19	15.421	2.232	77.105
Junior	18	15.056	1.772	83.520
Senior	25	14.960	2.615	74.800
Special	1	18.000	0.000	93.333
Sex				
Male	26	15.600	1.720	78.000
Female	39	14.897	2.544	74.485
Class and Sex				
Class: Freshman				
Sex				
Male	1	15.000	0.000	83.333
Female	1	17.000	0.000	90.000
Class: Sophomore				
Sex				
Male	6	15.500	1.258	77.500
Female	13	14.385	2.554	71.925

TABLE 8--Continued

Classification	Number of Students	Mean	Standard Deviation	Percentage
<u>Class: Junior</u>				
<u>Sex</u>				
Male	6	15.500	1.118	77.500
Female	12	14.833	1.997	82.776
<u>Class: Senior</u>				
<u>Sex</u>				
Male	12	14.667	2.091	73.335
Female	13	14.308	2.863	71.540
<u>Class: Special</u>				
<u>Sex</u>				
Male	1	18.000	0.000	93.333
Female	0	0.000	0.000	00.000

Table 9, the final table on the multiple-choice test, shows the number of students giving a particular number of correct responses on the test.

TABLE 9

CORRECT RESPONSES TO THE MULTIPLE-CHOICE TEST
NUMBER OF STUDENTS WHO MADE CORRECT
RESPONSES AND PERCENTAGE
(Highest Possible Score: 20 Correct)

Correct Responses	Number of Students (out of 65 Students)	Percentage
20	1	1.5
19	4	6.2

TABLE 9--Continued

Correct Responses	Number of Students	Percentage (out of 65 Students)
18	6	9.2
17	8	12.3
16	7	10.8
15	17	26.2
14	9	13.9
13	7	10.8
12	2	3.1
11	1	1.5
10	2	3.1
9	1	1.5
1-8	0	0.0

In general, this test indicates that the students read the testing document fairly assiduously. A correct percentage of 76.365 for the total student population seems reasonable for a multiple-choice test. In fact, if a teacher used the common grading scale of 90's for A's, 80's for B's, and so forth, there were 11 A's, 15 B's, 26 C's, 9 D's, and 4 F's in this section of the test.

The percentage of correct for the three sub-sections indicates that the student read this material on the pre-conference (83.5%) and post-conference (84.1%) more

carefully than the conference itself (66.8%). However, only two questions had a success rate lower than 50%. Question fourteen asked what country did not sign the Potsdam Proclamation and had a success rate of 30.8%. The correct answer, Russia, was indicated many times in the primary documents. But the students were so accustomed to Russia participating in most of the conference events that they normally (64.6%) chose China. The other question answered poorly was three, which asked what two American diplomats went to London and Moscow to prepare for the conference. The correct answer, Hopkins and Davies, had a success rate of 49.0%.

One result which is surprising but indicated the universal applicability of this document, and by implication of similar documents, to college classrooms is the small percentage difference between classes and sexes on the multiple-choice section of the test. One might expect seniors to do best and freshmen much more poorly, especially in a summer class; but this was not so. In fact, seniors finished lowest, but there is no difference between classes or sexes that is significant at the 10% level on the Chi Square Test.

In general, the students performed adequately on this but not as well as on the essays. Thus, it distinguished rather accurately those who read the whole document from those who merely read to write the essay.

Identification Test

At the same time of the multiple-choice test, the students were given an identification test in which they were to briefly answer four out of seven items. Each question was worth 1.25 points. The author read the students' identification answers and assigned a grade of either 1.25, 1.00, 0.75, 0.50, 0.25, or 0.00 points. Thus, a student's grade could range from 0 to 1.25 per identification answer. For example, many students in identification question one, "FAT MAN," failed to mention the atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. By not mentioning Nagasaki the author took off .25 points. Thus, the students, assuming they answered everything else correctly, received 1.00 point for identification question one. The material for the identification questions came from pages twenty-two through twenty-three. This material consisted of the code symbols found in the various documents. The purpose of this test was to make sure the student paid some attention to the code symbols in the document in order to perceive more of the flavor of a diplomatic conference.

The identification test, with the correct answer as it appeared in the Potsdam Papers, follows along with the number of students who responded to that question whether correctly or incorrectly. (See Table 10)

TABLE 10

IDENTIFICATION TEST

IDENTIFICATION (5 points). Do 4 out of 7.

Briefly define the following code names as noted in this paper.

1. FAT MAN 61 out of 65 students responded for a percentage of 93.8.

[An atomic bomb of the implosion type (the type dropped on Nagasaki; previously tested as an experimental device in New Mexico on July 16, 1945)]
2. NKVD 41 out of 65 students responded for a percentage of 63.1.

[People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (Soviet Union)]
3. SA 25 out of 65 students responded for a percentage of 38.5.

[National Socialist Storm Troops (Germany)]
4. SHAEF 33 out of 65 students responded for a percentage of 50.8.

[Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force]
5. SS 28 out of 65 students responded for a percentage of 41.1.

[National Socialist Elite Guard (Germany)]
6. TERMINAL 27 out of 65 students responded for a percentage of 41.5.

[Code name for the Berlin Conference, July 16-August 2, 1945]

TABLE 10--Continued

7. S-1	30 out of 65 students responded for a percentage of 46.2.
	[Code name for the atomic bomb]

Five students answered less than the required number of items. This represents 7.7% of those who took the test. Table 11 summarizes the number of responses and percentages.

TABLE 11

IDENTIFICATION TEST: NUMBER OF THOSE WHO RESPONDED AND THE PERCENTAGE*

Identification	Responded	Percentage
1. FAT MAN	61	93.8
2. NKVD	41	63.1
3. SA	25	38.5
4. SHAEF	33	50.8
5. SS	28	43.1
6. TERMINAL	27	41.5
7. S-1	30	46.2
**	5	7.7

*based on 65 students.

**those who answered less than the required number of identification question which was four.

Table 12 gives the results from the identification test. Possible scores ranged from a high of five points to a low of zero points. The percentage is based on sixty-five students.

TABLE 12

IDENTIFICATION TEST RESULTS, SCORES, NUMBER
OF STUDENTS, AND PERCENTAGE
(Highest Score: 5 Points)

Score	Number of Students	Percentage*
5.00	5	7.7
4.75	12	18.5
4.50	3	4.6
4.25	0	0.0
4.00	8	12.3
3.75	4	6.2
3.50	6	9.2
3.25	1	1.5
3.00	2	3.1
2.75	4	6.2
2.50	2	3.1
2.25	9	13.9
2.00	0	0.0
1.75	1	1.5
1.50	0	0.0
1.25	1	1.5

TABLE 12--Continued

Score	Number of Students	Percentage*
1.00	1	1.5
.75	1	1.5
.50	1	1.5
.25	1	1.5
.00	3	4.6

*based on 65 students.

The mean score on the identification of the test was 3.3 or 66%. The standard deviation was 1.413, indicating a rather wide variation in scores as is seen in the preceding table. In fact, the students tended to do either very well or rather poorly. Again, if the teacher used a standard 90 for A, 80 for B, and so forth breakdown, there were 20 A's, 8 B's, 10 C's, 3 D's, and 24 F's.

In summary, the students either read and learned these coding symbols or they did not. On the average they did much more poorly than on the essay and somewhat more poorly (76.365%-66.0%) than on the multiple-choice test. This was the most difficult portion of the test. However, the identification section counted only five percent of the total grade and thus did not severely harm the final grade of any of the students.

Questionnaire

As a final part of this exercise, the students were asked to fill out a questionnaire based on the material they had read. In order to tabulate their responses the questions followed the number order of the multiple-choice test. Thus, questionnaire question was numbered twenty-one. The students were asked in question twenty-one if the documents in the main text did hinder their reading or did not hinder their reading. The majority, over 75%, indicated having the documents did not hinder their reading (see Table 13). This indicates the majority of the students were not bothered by having primary source material in the main body of the text and were able to read and adequately understand the narrative of the conference.

The author left in the diplomatic cables various code names such as "TOP SECRET," or "MOST SECRET." In question twenty-two the students were given three responses from which to choose. Over 50% indicated the terms, "TOP SECRET," or others made no difference in their reading. Over 40% indicated having these terms heightened their reading of the diplomatic cables, and 1% said the terms hindered their reading of the diplomatic cables.

Question twenty-three asked the students if the documents were not in the main text and were in the appendix would they have taken the time to turn to the appendix and

TABLE 13
QUESTIONNAIRE

21. Did having the documents in the main text hinder your reading?

A. hindered my reading	13	20.0%
B. did not hinder my reading	50	76.9%

Two students did not respond to this question or 3.1% of the students who answered the questionnaire.

22. Did the terms, "MOST SECRET," "TOP SECRET," among others:

A. heighten your reading of the document	28	43.1%
B. made no difference	34	52.3%
C. hinder your reading of the cables	1	1.5%

Two students did not respond to this question or 3.1% of the students who answered the questionnaire.

23. If the documents were not in the main text and were in the appendix, would you have stopped reading and turned to the appendix to read the document?

A. Yes	8	12.3%
B. No	55	84.6%

Two students did not respond to this question or 3.1% of the students who answered the questionnaire.

24. Would you have gone to the Potsdam Papers, located in the library, and looked up the text of the documents mentioned in the paper?

A. Yes	1	1.5%
B. No	62	95.4%

TABLE 13--Continued

Two students did not respond to this question or 3.1% of the students who answered the questionnaire.

25. Based on what you have read on the atomic bomb would you

A. have dropped the bomb	40	61.5%
B. have not dropped the bomb	23	35.4%

Two students did not respond to this question or 3.1% of the students who answered the questionnaire.

26. Some believe the United States should have arranged for another test of the bomb on a deserted island and invited the Japanese to witness the test. These individuals believed the Japanese might have surrendered. Do you?

A. believe the Japanese would have surrendered after seeing the test	24	36.9%
B. believe the test would have had no impact on the Japanese	39	60.0%

Two students did not respond to this question or 3.1% of the students who answered the questionnaire.

27. Do you believe President Truman made the correct decision in dropping the bomb?

A. made the correct decision	53	81.5%
B. made the wrong decision	10	15.4%

Two students did not respond to this question or 3.1% of the students who answered the questionnaire.

TABLE 13--Continued

28. Are you a history major?

A. Yes	2	3.1%
B. No	61	93.8%

Two students did not respond to this question or 3.1% of the students who answered the questionnaire.

29. Are you a history minor?

A. Yes	4	6.2%
B. No	59	90.7%

Two students did not respond to this question or 3.1% of the students who answered the questionnaire.

30. Are you neither a history major or minor?

A. Yes	54	83.1%
--------	----	-------

Eleven students did not respond to this question or 16.9% of the students who answered the questionnaire.

read the document. The majority who responded, 84%, said they would not have turned to the appendix and have read the document. This supports the contention of the author that, given a choice, students would rather have the primary source material in the main text and not in the back as is found in many scholarly works. Only 12% indicated they would have turned to the appendix and have read the documents.

In question twenty-four, the students were asked if they would have gone to the library and looked up these documents and read their contents. The vast majority of those who responded to the question, 95%, indicated they would not have taken the time to go to the library, look up these documents, and read their contents. This upholds the contention of the author that students, especially underclassmen who are not history majors, would not take the time to seek out primary source material in the library. In general, for students in required history courses the documents must be placed in the text material or they will not use them.

Questions twenty-five through twenty-seven dealt with the atomic bomb and Japan. The students were asked in question twenty-five if they would have dropped the atomic bomb based on what they have read in the paper. Based on what they read, 61.5% responded they would have dropped the atomic bomb; 35.4% said they would not have dropped the atomic bomb on Japan.

In question twenty-six, the students were asked a question concerning the contention of some that the United States should have arranged for another test of the bomb on a deserted island and invited the Japanese to witness the test. Then the Japanese might have surrendered. A vast majority, 60%, indicated they believed the test would have had no impact on the Japanese, while 36% believed the

Japanese would have surrendered after seeing the test of the atomic bomb.

The final question on the atomic bomb and Japan inquired if President made the correct decision to have the atomic bomb dropped on Japan. Over 80% responded that President Harry S. Truman made the correct decision to have the atomic bomb dropped on Japan, while 15% indicated the President made the wrong decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan.

Questions twenty-eight through thirty inquired as to the major and minor status of the students. Results indicated the following: there were two history majors, four history minors, and fifty-four who said they were neither. Actually the responses to questions twenty-eight and twenty-nine indicate that there were probably fifty-nine who were neither. The sampling was too small for any significant distinction to be made between history majors, history minors, and non-history majors.

In summary, the answers to the questionnaire indicate at least three important matters. First, questions twenty-one through twenty-three show that these students much prefer primary documents located in the text of the outside reading books if they are to use them at all. Although some would turn to an appendix, few at all would go to the library.

Second, questions twenty-four through twenty-seven indicate that students will read such materials and form an opinion on a controversial question affecting their own lives. Not only were they able to respond to the questions, but their answers indicate a possible shift of opinion towards the American view indicating some thought.

Finally, questions twenty-eight through thirty help validate the other results of this study. Only six at most (four at least) of the sixty-five students were either history majors or minors. More than 90% of these students were taking only a required general education course. Thus, their answers are not skewed toward preference for anything historical. It is the opinion of this author that the time of administration of this instrument also is indicative of this. The three courses were taught by other instructors during a five-week term in the summer. Usually during such a term students are not taking courses that are their favorites. They leave those for the regular year.

CHAPTER XIII

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

The idea to place primary material in the text of the narrative came to the author when he was doing research for his Master's thesis on the Potsdam Conference. It occurred to the author that the diplomatic telegrams, cables, and proposals merited a better treatment rather than a mere synopsis. This idea was reinforced in the Van Nostrand Anvil paperback books. The editors of these books place the primary material in the back of the books and in the narrative use the phrase, "See Document No. 1, 2, etc." to refer the reader to the primary source material.¹ This makes reading a time-consuming process by requiring the student to stop and turn to the back of the book to read the primary material.

During the author's doctoral teaching internship the students in his History 202 section were requested to participate in a reading exercise involving two books on

¹Norman Graebner, Cold War Diplomacy 1945-1960 (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, an Anvil Original under the general editorship of Louis L. Snyder, 1962), p. 14.

Potsdam: Herbert Feis, Between War and Peace The Potsdam Conference and Charles Mee, Meeting at Potsdam. The students were to read these books and write a one- to four-page essay comparing the two works. The author inquired if the primary documents were in the main text of the narrative if that would have helped them in their reading. The results were mixed. Neither book implements primary source material in the main text. The students indicated in their essays that they preferred the Mee book over the Feis work. They found the latter boring (see Appendix B for a sample student essay).

The author was determined to prove his theory that given an option the students would not look in the back of the book to read the primary source material. Thus, the author opted for the Doctor of Arts dissertation. The author then created a narrative of the Potsdam Conference, from the origin to conclusion, with primary documents included in the main text. In this 186-page document there was careful avoidance of the phrase, "see Appendix for main text of the material." The primary source of the document was the United States Department of State Foreign Relations of the United States series volumes which included the Potsdam Conference.²

²United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers The Conference at Malta and Yalta 1945; United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: European

The author then constructed an essay test giving the student an option to write one essay from five major topics: the fate of Germany; the fate of Poland; Japan and the origins of the Potsdam Proclamation; President Truman's views during the conference; or a comparison and contrast of the Protocol and Communique. The student was given sub-points and page numbers in order to give some guidance in developing the essay. The author designed a multiple-choice and identification test to see if the student had read the material in general. There was also a questionnaire for the students to fill out in class to determine a number of factors including their view on having primary source material in the main text of the narrative.

Each student was given a printed copy of the paper. This paper was field tested in three American History survey courses in the summer of 1982 on the campus of Middle Tennessee State University. The professors varied in credit for doing this exercise. They either gave a percentage towards the final grade or indicated this exercise satisfied a portion of the Middle Tennessee State University History Department's eight-hundred page outside reading assignment.

Advisory Commission, Austria, Germany, 1945, Vol. III; United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Europe 1945, Vol. IV; United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Europe 1945, Vol. V; United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945, Vols. I and II.

From the results this document is suitable for all age groups and all grade levels. The students' performance in the essay portion was excellent. It appears the sub-points and page number were of tremendous assistance to the students. The students, according to the results from the multiple-choice test and the identification test read the paper. They indicated in the questionnaire that having the primary documents in the main text did not hinder their reading and, further, they would not have looked in the back or in appendixes to read them if they were located there.

Conclusions

The purpose of this dissertation was to present primary source material in the main text of a testing document to undergraduate students in an American History survey course. The most difficult and time-consuming portion of the dissertation was creating the 186-page document presenting the principle primary documents of the Potsdam Conference. This was particularly true since no such similar document existed for Potsdam. Also, it was necessary to include enough introductory and transitory materials to guide the student through the conference with comprehension. However, extensive inclusion on explanatory materials was avoided because one of the most important skills being taught in the exercise was interpretation of primary documents.

The most important conclusion reached from this dissertation was that such a document can be successfully implemented in the classroom. The results of the essay were extremely good. The students were able to produce quite adequate essays following the author's suggested sub-points. The students were able to read the primary documents, comprehend their meaning, organize the material, and present it in an orderly form. All of these are important techniques of historical research whether applied to a diplomatic conference or to another area. Seemingly totally unrelated, for example, is the decision by a business man for the location of a new store.

The multiple-choice test results and, to a lesser extent, the identification test results indicate that the students were willing to read the entire document. The grades, 76% on the multiple-choice test and 66% on the identification test, indicate they comprehended the material fairly well. The major problem the author noted in this exercise was the identification test. The grades ranged from zero points to a maximum of five points. The author feels the identification test was perhaps too technical. If an instructor uses this paper as a teaching tool, in lieu of the code names a list of individuals who attended the conference might be more useful. Possible names for an identification test are: James F. Byrnes, American Secretary of State; W. M. Molotov, Russian Foreign Minister;

Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary; Henry L. Stimson, American Secretary of War; Patrick Hurley, American Ambassador to China; and Charles E. Bohlen, American interpreter, to name a few individuals.

An effort was made to produce a document that was universally applicable to all general education students. This was successful because the number of history majors and minors were too small to give any accurate measurement.

The author deliberately left the diplomatic codes and symbols in the document to give the reader the feeling he or she was reading a diplomatic cable and not some cold, lifeless paragraph. From the results of the essay, multiple-choice test, identification test, and questionnaire, one may draw the conclusion that having the primary source material in the main text with the various codes and symbols posed no problem to the students in understanding the material at hand. As indicated above, the students were given no historical views of the subject and as little editorial comment from the author as possible. This was done to give the students an unbiased view of a diplomatic conference. Part of the value of such an exercise is the student's ability to form his or her own conclusions. The essay test indicates that this was successfully accomplished.

The author included a number of newspaper accounts that described the meeting area and conditions under which the participants met. Far too often works on diplomacy do

not adequately describe the meeting place. Thus, the reader is left wondering about the setting of the conference itself. The newspaper accounts remedied this and gave the students a sense they were present at the conference. By combining the documents and newspaper coverage this dissertation demonstrated to the students that what they read in the newspaper may be, and is in many cases, entirely different from the official primary documents. One example was the inclusion of the Atomic Bomb Test report which had a bulletin from the Albuquerque Tribune giving an "official" version of the atomic bomb test (see page 96). The bulletin said an army ammunition dump exploded that night and there was nothing to cause worry. This explanation seemed to satisfy the public and for awhile they had no idea an atomic device had been successfully tested. The author, while going through the New York Times, found nothing concerning an explosion of an ammunition dump in New Mexico. This paper also gave the students a behind-the-scenes view of the preparation of a diplomatic conference and steps that were taken in preparing an agenda of topics for the Heads of Government, which is an insight frequently overlooked in diplomatic history.

In the dissertation, the students were presented with material concerning the development of the atomic bomb, the origins of the Potsdam Proclamation which called upon Japan to surrender, the rejection of that Proclamation by Japan,

and the dropping of the atomic bombs. In the non-graded questionnaire portion of the testing exercise, three questions inquired into their reading of the material. The answers indicated they had read it and had probably been influenced towards a more pro-nuclear attitude.

Finally, these questions in the questionnaire inquired about the format of the Potsdam Document itself. In general, the students much preferred the format of this dissertation. They found the placing of the primary documents in the main text of the paper quite useful. Few students indicated they would have turned to the appendix of the paper for the documents and virtually none would have gone to the library for them. This upholds the author's contention that the best format for such documents is in the main body of a work.

In summary, this dissertation allowed the instructor to give the students an in-depth look into the interworkings of diplomacy without taking up valuable lecture time in the classroom. The instructor does not have the time to devote a great deal of attention to any particular topic. This dissertation gave sixty-five undergraduate students exposure to primary source material. They were able to use this material and learn from it.

Recommendations

The students were tested in the summer and given one week to read the Potsdam document and write their essays. If this dissertation or a similar document were tested in the fall or spring semesters, perhaps two weeks would be better. More than approximately two weeks would probably lead to procrastination. The author feels, however, that if this exercise were treated as part of the reading assignment and the exercise of a take-home essay were handed in about the same time the other reading assignments were due the student would lose the meaning of the paper. While students may resent this exercise as they resent any extra class work, they can still obtain the true flavor of the conference and perform adequately the material. The author employed sub-points in the instructions for the take-home essay. This seemed to work very well in focusing on the student's writing and should be retained. One of the essays and its sub-points was designed to make sure the student read the Communique and Protocol. The normal tendency for the student would be to omit reading them and believe the instructor would not "bother to ask any questions about them." This device of having sub-points designed to make sure the student reads these two sections should be retained. Otherwise the student would lose some of the meaning of the conference. The Communique was what the

world read in 1945 and the Protocol was subsequently released two years later, when it was obvious most of the items covered had been implemented.

The teacher should inform the student that the main purpose of the multiple-choice test and identification test is to see if he or she read the material. While students may feel some of the questions are too technical, they are designed to make sure the paper was adequately covered. The instructor may want to implement questionnaire questions twenty-five through twenty-seven concerning the dropping of the atomic bomb. In this day of nuclear freezes and atomic controversy, it would be interesting to ascertain the reaction of students on the dropping of the bomb on Japan.

As for course credit, the instructor may want to give the students credit for approximately half of their reading assignment. If the "reward" to the student for reading this paper is substantial, then he or she may have less hostility in reading the paper if the academic credit were a few quality points.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

STUDENT ESSAYS

STUDENT ESSAYS

The following student essays are included just as the students wrote them, with their punctuation and spelling.

Student Essay I

THE FATE OF GERMANY

The geographical definition of Germany was settled at the second plenary meeting at the Potsdam Conference which occurred on July 18, 1945, at 4:00 p.m. The year 1937 was agreed upon as the basis of Germany and the lands it possessed at that time. It included present day Germany as well as parts of Poland and Lithuania.

The political principles of Germany stated the authority in Germany was to be controlled jointly by the governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, and the French Republic, through the heads of their armed forces in Germany. Each country had their own sphere of control but in matters concerning the country on a whole, such as treatment of its populace, was to be jointly decided.

The entire Germany military system including the industries which supported them were to be eliminated to prevent a revival of German militarism or stockpiles of

military arms. This was done to convince the German people that they were responsible for supporting the Nazi's while it caused the ruin of their country's military and industry.

The four country's also wanted to destroy the National Socialist Party and all other affiliated Nazi organizations. This was to be done in preparation for returning Germany to a peaceful people with a democratic basis on which all its people would be free from discrimination of the Nazi's.

The Nazi leaders responsible for atrocities would be brought to judgement for their war crimes. All active participants in the Nazi movement were to be removed from any political office and replaced by democratic interested individuals.

Presently there would be no Central Government but local governments based on democratic principles would be formed. Except for military security in some places, the German people would have freedom of speech, press, religion, and to a point freedom to form free trade with other nations.

The Economic Principles were designed to eliminate Germany's war industry while reestablishing its economy. The primary concern was to enhance the development of agricultural and domestic industry not relating to war production.

A common policy was issued covering wages, transportation, industrial, agricultural, and most all other production in Germany. This was done to insure goods and services were sufficient to meet the needs of the German people and the occupying forces. Also, all German external assets were under the control of the United Nations. The payment of Reparation should not exceed the resources needed by the German people to be self-sufficient.

The reparations of Germany were such that the U.S.S.R. would remove its part of the claim from its sector and from external assets and would settle Poland's claim from its share. Additionally, it would receive 15 per cent of the metallurgical, chemical, and machine industries in Germany in exchange for food, timber, and other commodities to be agreed upon later. The Soviet Government was also to receive 10 per cent of such industrial equipment not vital to the German economy from the western sector free.

The Soviets would then renounce their claims against the German industries in the Western sphere of influence. The countries in the western sphere would also renounce their claims in the eastern sphere.

The Potsdam Conference decided to appoint experts from the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. to work out a plan to dispose of the German ships. Their report was to be released at a later date.

There has been a meeting going on in London for several weeks which will be the basis for the prosecution of war criminals that has been comprised of American, English, French, and Russian diplomats. The crimes were detailed under the Moscow Declaration of 1943. The three governments of the Potsdam Conference have vowed to find these criminals wherever they are and bring them to justice.

The only difference is in how the German Navy and the Merchant Marine is disposed of. In the Communiqué it stated that a commission would look into the matter.

The Protocol stated that the entire German Navy excluding submarines was to be equally divided between the U.S., The U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom. All but 30 of the submarines were to be sunk with the remainder split between the three countries. These countries agreed to form a commission for the allocation of specific warships to individual countries. This commission would meet in Berlin, its homebase. Also each delegate of the commission would have the right to inspect any individual ship in the German Navy.

The German Merchant Marine was to be similarly disposed. These ships would be divided after the conclusion of the war against Japan. The Allied countries would receive reimbursement for the merchant marine damage done by German Naval forces through the share of the U.S. and the U.K. The U.S.S.R. would take care of Poland's claim from

its share. Also, each member of the delegation would have the right to inspect any German Merchant Marine vessel anywhere in the world it may be located.

Student Essay II

POLAND AT THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE

Sergy Goulinsky, expert consultant, read the draft submitted by the Soviet delegation on July 18, 1945. The Soviets wanted the United States and Great Britain as well as governments of other United Nations, to sever all all relationships with the Polish Government of Arciszewski. This included any diplomatic relations as well, which the Soviets claimed already existed between Poland and the Soviet Union. The Provisional Government of National Unity would be given assistance with the immediate transmission of all assets and property belonging to Poland, which was still at the disposal of the government of Arciszyweski. Also the Polish Armed Forces would be transferred from from the Arciszewski to the Provisional Polish Government of National Unity.

After some discussion, the Birtish presented their proposal on the Polish problem. The British draft begins with an overwhelming response to the agreement reached among Polish representatives which made possible the formation of a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, recognized by the three major powers. The establishment of

diplomatic relations by Great Britian and the United States with the Polish Provisional Government would result in the withdrawal of their recognition from the former Polish Government in London.

Great Britian and the United States expressed willingness to help and support the orderly transfer of Polish State Property, including Embassies to the new Government and discussed liabilities and debts advanced to the late Polish Government and the significance of such advances. Also proposed was the return of Poles abroad who wished to return, and the assurance by the new government that their personal security, freedom and livelihood would be protected. Free elections by secret ballot and that Polish opinion be used to freely express their views and thus help restore the country's political life and prestige. President Truman displayed great interest in these proposals. Stalin was very pleased and although Churchill had some reservations, he agreed.

The telegram sent to President Truman, detailed the boundry line stressing that this be considered a just frontier, guaranteeing successful development of the Polish nation, security to Europe and a lasting peace for the world. It was recognized however, that any problems or disabreements on this western boundary would be harmful, endangering the future of the Polish nation.

A secret message was sent to the President of the Polish Government of National Unity by President Truman, requesting that two or three representatives be allowed to state their views on the question of the western frontier, to the Big Three Leaders.

The memorandum by Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Mr. Harriman was of interest and excerpts follow; Mr. Harriman points out that Mr. Bierut presented the basis of the Polish claims to German territory to the Foreign Ministers. Mr. Bierut believed in the future of Poland and he wanted to do all he could to see that justice prevailed, but did not like the arbitrary manner in which the boundary question was being handled by the Soviet and Polish governments. He wanted the title approved at the peace settlement in that a disagreement would be a source of trouble in the future. He also pointed out that France might want to take over some of the Rhineland area of Germany, but no action on this matter could be accomplished until a full allied agreement could be reached. He spoke of the homeless that needed territory and compensation for loss of territory in the East. The boundary question had to be determined at a peace settlement also. Harriman also mentioned the Curzon line which was the disputed frontier between Poland and Russia. This line of demarcation would have excluded from Poland, territory predominately inhabited by White Russians, Ukranians and Lithuanians. The Poles objected and claimed

territories twice as large as that proposed by Lloyd George in 1920. The Curzon line became the boundary between the German and Russian spheres of occupation.

The deputy Prime Minister handed over to the Americans, three memoranda. The Poles wanted the Soviet troops and the Peoples Commissariat for internal affairs to leave the country. The Polish Deputy Prime Minister stated that Poland would be strong, free, independant and soveriegn. Poland wanted to live in alliance with Soviet Russia, Great Britian and France and in friendship with the United States and the low countries. He then listed conditions under which this could be accomplished. Personal freedom, elections, freedom of the press, a national army and security were needed in order to safeguard her existance. Also a memorandum concerning the frontier and conditions that were needed to control boundary population. And a recognition of territories and industrial production and agricultural products could not be tampered with.

The Communique mentioned the relationship of Poland and her Polish Provisional Government and her western boundaries. In summary, the recognition of the Polish Provisional Government and the diplomatic relations and measures by the United States and Britian were to protect the interests of the Polish Government. It also provided the desired access to to properties and the return of Poles abroad and free elections and the freedom to report to the

world concerning developments in Poland before and during elections. It also took into account the disputed territory in the North and West which Poland should receive pending final disposition at the peace settlement meeting.

Student Essay III

JAPAN

The following is a summary of this student's essay on Japan: Japan was a subject of grave concern for the Allies and particularly for the United States. With a huge military force of fanatical devotion Japan had established itself as a fierce enemy who could be expected to fight to the death rather than surrender.

Secretary of War, Stimson suggested to the President that the alternative of offering the Japanese the opportunity to surrender unconditionally in the face of the impending destruction would be vastly preferable to mounting an invasion operation. Stimson also pointed out several factors very favorable to the prospect of unconditional Japanese surrender: lack of Allies, Japanese Navy almost destroyed, and the threat of war with Russia. It was Stimson's opinion that we had a "national interest" in seeing Japan evolve into a useful and responsible member of the "Pacific Community."

The Secretary of War suggested that a carefully timed warning be issued to Japan citing her ultimate destruction and the resolve of the Allied forces and calling for unconditional surrender and occupation of Japan. Essential elements of the warning proposed by Stimson included the following:

1. The overwhelming force of Allies.
2. Inevitable destruction of Japan by this force.
3. Determination of Allies to destroy current Japanese leadership.
4. Determination of Allies to limit Japanese sovereignty to main islands.
5. Disavowal of attempt to extirpate Japanese race or destruction of Japanese nation.
6. Readiness to permit non-threatening industries and prospect of eventual trade relations.
7. The ultimate withdrawal of occupying forces upon reaching objectives.

The student continued that President Truman gave Churchill a copy of the draft proclamation calling upon Japan to surrender. This document was returned with some revisions. This document, according to this student, made clear the futility of armed resistance on the part of Japan in the light of the result of Nazi resistance. The student would indicate how American Ambassador to China, Patrick Hurly, obtained the signature of Chiang Kai-shek.

White House Secretary Eben Ayers then sent a message to Charles T. Ross, White House Press Secretary telling him how to release this Proclamation to the Japanese and the world. The New York Times printed the entire contents of the document in their newspaper. The Russians, who were at peace with Japan, did not sign the Proclamation and were unhappy for being left out of any discussion relating to the Proclamation. This view was conveyed to American Secretary of State James F. Byrnes by Russian Foreign Minister Molotov.

The Japanese simply ignored the Proclamation. The student indicated there wasn't anything in the Communique or Protocol on the Japanese and the surrender.

Student Essay IV

PRESIDENT HARRY TRUMAN'S VIEW DURING THE POTSDAM CONFERENCE

The following is a summary of a student's essay on Harry Truman's views during the Conference:

President Truman's view of his living quarters are quoted in his diary as being stripped of everything by the Russians. The President and other Americans recovered enough furniture to make the place livable, even though nothing seemed to match. These living quarters seemed comfortable enough for the President. President Truman's meeting with Prime Minister Churchill went very well on July

17, 1945. Truman recorded in his diary that Churchill is charming and clever. Churchill told Truman how he loved him and the United States.

He has his thoughts about Berlin. He thought it was a sorrowful sight, because Hitler over reached himself by taking in too much territory. The most sorrowful part was the way Russia had taken everything out of homes and took the able bodied men to work for them. Hitler had done the same to the Russians.

President Truman met with Premier Stalin on July 17, 1945, in Berlin on Tuesday around noon. President Truman told Stalin that he wasn't a diplomat, but answered yes or no to questions after the arguments, which pleased Stalin. They had lunch, talked socially, and toasted a drink to everyone. Pictures were made in the back yard of the house where Truman stayed.

Premier Stalin brought along his interpretor, Mr. Pavlov, to translate for him. President Truman was impressed. Charles E. Bohlen, assistant to the Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, would correct Pavlov each time he mispronounced a word. Stalin was pleased with Bohlen on helping Pavlov.

President Truman seemed to regard the second plenary meeting as useless. He wrote in his diary that there were three proposals and he banged them through in short order. Churchill was surprised. Stalin was pleased. President

Truman felt different about the meeting. He wasn't going to stay around here (at Potsdam) to hear speeches. He could go home to the Senate for that.

President Truman was at the conference representing the United States, while discussing world affairs with the Soviet and British governments. He didn't want to talk about things that would be eventually settled by the United Nations. President Truman wanted to deal with the problems which the three heads of government had come to discuss, not listening to grievances. President Truman wanted to get to the main issues or go back home.

The President seemed pepped up by this test [of the atomic bomb]. It gave him a whole new feeling of confidence. He thanked Stimson for coming to the conference with this news of the successful atomic bomb test in New Mexico.

On the evening of August 9, 1945, President Harry S. Truman gave a speech over the radio. He told the American people that he had just returned from Berlin, Germany. The Germans are beginning to atone for the crime of gangsters, whom they placed in power and followed obediently. He also saw the destruction of countries in Western Europe and England. He was glad to be home and grateful that this land of ours has been spared.

Student Essay V

COMPARE AND CONTRAST THE COMMUNIQUE
AND THE PROTOCOL

The following is a summary of a student's essay on comparing and contrasting the Communique and Protocol:

After the Potsdam Conference a communique was issued. A communique is the official record of their talks. A Protocol is a signed document containing a record of the points in which agreement has been reached by negotiating parties preliminary to a finished treaty.

There were several major topics listed in the Potsdam Communique which are as follows: the establishment of a council of foreign ministers consisting of five principal powers to continue peace settlements and handle future disputes; the principles, both economic and political, which would govern Germany in the future; the amount and type of reparations Germany would pay to each particular country; disposal of the German navy and land forces; the transfer to Soviet Union the city of Koenigsberg; the method of trial of major war criminals; the future governing of Austria; the formation of Poland's government and determination of its western boundary; the conclusion of peace treaties and admission of countries to the United Nations organization; territorial trusteeships; a revised allied control commission procedure covering Rumania,

Bulgaria, and Hungary; the orderly transfer of German population; and the military talks.

The topics released in the Communique differed from those listed in the Protocol as follows:

1. The establishment of a council of foreign ministers.
2. The establishment of economic and political principles to initially govern Germany.
3. An outline of the war reparations Germany must make to the Allies.
4. The distribution and disbanding of German naval and marine forces.
5. The transfer of the city of Koenigsberg and its adjacent area to control of the Soviet Union.
6. The punishment and trial of major war criminals.
7. The future government of Austria and war reparations.
8. The government of Poland and determination of its boundaries.
9. The conclusion of any peace treaties and admission of countries to the United States, Great Britain and Soviet Union concept of a United Nations Organization.
10. The settlement of any questions over territorial trusteeships.

11. The revised Allied control commission procedure in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.
12. The orderly transfer of German Populations.
13. Removal of oil equipment in Rumania.
14. Withdrawal of troops from Iran.
15. Creation of the international zone of Tangier.
16. Settlement of the question of the Black Sea Straits.
17. Settlement of the question of international inland waterways.
18. Directives to Military commanders on the Allied control council for Germany.
19. The use of Allied property for satellite reparations.

The topics of the Protocol that were not reported to the public until 1947 included: oil equipment in Rumania; international zone of Tangier; the Black Sea Straits; international inland waterways; Iran; European inland transport conference; directives to military commanders on allied control council for Germany; and use of allied property for satellite reparations or war trophies.

To settle the question about the removal of oil equipment from Rumania, the conference agreed to set up two bilateral commissions of experts, one to be composed of the United Kingdom and Soviet members and one to be composed of United States and Soviet members. The commission would

investigate the facts and examine the documents within ten days of the adjournment of the Potsdam conference.

Concerning Iran, the conference agreed all Allied troops would be withdrawn immediately from Teheran. Further stages of troop withdrawal from Iran would be discussed in a meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in September, 1945.

The Soviet government made a proposal to create an international zone of Tangier. The three governments agreed that, due to its strategic importance, the city of Tangier and the adjacent area would remain international. Further discussion would take place at a future meeting in Paris attended by France, United States, Soviet Union and Great Britain.

The conference realized a need of a revision concerning policies in the Black Sea Straits. The matter was deferred until a meeting between each of the three governments and the Turkish government.

The United States had proposed international inland waterways for purpose of further trade between countries. It was referred to the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in London.

Great Britain and the United States decided to reconvene the European Inland Transport Conference. The Soviet Union gave assurance that it would participate in such a conference.

Each of the three governments would send a directive to the representative on the Control Council for Germany to acquaint him on all decisions reached on matters concerning his duties.

The United States delegation had proposed the use of allied property for satellite reparations. While this was agreed on in principle by the Conference, the actual details and commitments were to be worked out through diplomatic channels.

The Potsdam Conference settled many questions and established a fraemwork for the future of Europe and the rest of the world. The decisions reached by the three delegations were sound ones and for a short while, there was cooperation between the East and the West.

APPENDIX B

SAMPLE STUDENT ESSAY

SAMPLE STUDENT ESSAY

The following essay is shown in its original form including grammatical, punctuation, and spelling errors.

A Comparison of
Meeting at Potsdam by Charles L. Mee Jr.
and
Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference by Herbert
Feis

It seems to me that simply reporting on each of these books separately would be insignificant since they both contain essentially the same material. Thus, I chose to compare the differences -- the author's style, personality, and method of presentation. There are many differences between Feis and Mee, some are obvious and some are not so obvious. I have a definite preference for one of these authors. This preference will be clear by the end of this paper.

To begin with, something as simple as the titles of the several of the chapters shows the areas that each author feels are important. Mee seems to feel that the people involved were of utmost importance. For example, a few of his chapters were entitled: "Churchill Departs," "The Bit Two," and "Atlee and Bevin." On the other hand, Feis seems to feel that the countries in question and the relating problems were more significant. Some titles he chose are: "Spain," "Poland," and "Germany: The Crucial Questions."

This difference in the titles of chapters demonstrates the basic contrast between Mee and Feis. More so than Feis, Mee felt that the people involved had a great influence on the decisions made.

Furthermore, Mee made me feel like I was right there at the meetings of the Potsdam Conference. I feel this was due to his descriptions of the people involved -- their personalities, peculiarities, apparel, and varying reactions and attitudes. Thanks to Mee, I'll always have a mental picture of Churchill, Truman, and Stalin, and an impression of their personalities. In particular, Mee made the contrasts between Churchill and Truman memorable. For example, Truman liked pianos and violins, and had these instruments play pieces such as Chopin, his favorite, at his party during the conference. In contrast, Churchill had a loud, spirited band for entertainment. These differences continued into the meetings. Truman was rather reserved and calm, but Churchill was boisterous and easily excited. These same adjectives can describe the wardrobe of these two great leaders.

Another thing that these personality differences showed me was a brand new idea. I had previously supposed that Truman and Churchill sided together against Stalin due to diplomatic differences. But, now I feel that Truman and Stalin tended to exclude Churchill at meetings, public and private. This impression is due to the compatibility

between Truman and Stalin as persons, rather than leaders. This compatability was shown in their preference for simple and forthright conversations, classical music, and reserved mannerisms and clothes. In meetings, this compatability proved its importance because Truman and Stalin seemed to put up with Churchill's childish arguments and speeches rather than to respect his opinion. Anyway, as I said, this was an original concept for me, and probably is not portrayed by many historians, certainly not by Feis.

In fact, because of their similar diplomatic opinions, Feis tended to group Churchill and Truman together, which in my opinion was improper and biased. Technically, Feis presented each leader's opinion separately. More specifically, Feis repeatedly began each section or issue with a concise report of the opinions of each of the leaders at the conference. He even tended to follow a line up which usually was Stalin or Truman first, then Churchill, followed by Molotov and Byrnes. This became, to say the least, more dull and boring with each additional chapter. Also, it caused the various problems to seem to blur together into one big controversial issue. Due to his monotonous presentation, Feis failed to make any conversations, problems, or deals memorable to the reader.

In contrast, Mee's chapters varied, just as the meetings and attitudes probably varied. Mee emphasized things such as the effect of Churchill's anxiety about the

upcoming election, various letters to home, the impressions of the press, the skirmish attitude shared by most about the Polish leaders coming to the meeting, and he took the trouble to add photographs. Surprisingly enough, I can easily remember that Poland was a major issue at the Potsdam Conference due to Mee's chapter entitled "The Dreaded People." Mee also clarified Churchill's rather pitiful feelings when he was not re-elected, and the impact of his absence on the remaining meetings at Potsdam. I can remember this by Mee's chapter entitled "The Big Two." Not only were his titles effective, his entire presentation was interesting, and considering his subject, he made it more exciting than I could have ever imagined. It was nice, also, to learn about the misinterpretation of the Japanese word "Mokusatsu" by the American press -- a fine bit of historical trivia that I can always treasure! The examples cited are few, but are representative of Mee's entire presentation. By stressing feelings, Mee succeeded in making an uninterested reader interested -- he made me feel like I was getting the inside story rather than the straight facts (like Feis did).

However, Herbert Feis does have a few assets. One of the most successful areas in Feis' book was concerned with the first atomic bomb test. He presented this material quite efficiently. It was very interesting to learn the immediate impressions of several involved eye witnesses.

However, this information consisted almost entirely of quoted material. Thus, being one of his most interesting sections, this does not say much for Feis' writing abilities. But, if I needed to do a research paper on the Potsdam Conference, I would rely more heavily on this presentation. It would be easier to find a certain fact in his book, due to his sequence of information and the titles of his chapters. He more often than not took each problem separately to a chapter, and then dealt with that problem in full. This is an effective method for the provision of information, but not as effective for reading straight through the book (as I was forced to do).

In the same pattern of contrast as discussed earlier, Feis and Mee differed in their opinions on the changeover from Roosevelt at Yalta to Truman at Potsdam. Feis felt that any difference in the two conferences was due to the fact that at Yalta there was a bond of military dependence between the 'Big Three', and that this forced the leaders to get along with each other. Mee felt that any differences between the conferences was due to the change from Roosevelt to Truman. Mee was partial to the fact that the personality of the two Presidents differed, thus, logically, there was a change in the interpersonal relationships between the 'Big Three'. As Mee emphasized, though, Truman handled the situation well, and established his own relationship with Stalin and Churchill.

Overall, Mee taught me a lot more about the Potsdam Conference than Feis. I kept falling asleep as I attempted to read the presentation by Feis! Also, the temptation to skim over the words was too great to resist as I read Between War and Peace: The Potsdam Conference. On the contrary, as I have repeatedly stated, Mee's Meeting at Potsdam was much more enjoyable, and just as packed with information. Maybe enjoyable and interesting are not the greatest compliments to an author, but in my opinion those qualities are extremely important components of a successful writer.

note: please excuse my typewriter's urge to type in red ink--its un contolable! also please forgive my unfilled page, but I was as dumb as usual and put some of this project of until the last minute and it's dawn and I have already drained my mind of any logical thinking... period. Thank you,
JLR

Author's note: In the student's typed copy of the essay, all underlining was done in red ink. This explains the student's reference to the "typewriter's urge to type in red ink. . . ."

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