In this issue

A Tribute to Peter Hahn
A Roundtable on *A Superpower Transformed*
Two Views on *Zivotofsky v. Kerry*

And more...
Passport Editorial Office:
Andrew Johns
Department of History, Brigham Young University, 2161 JFSB, Provo, UT 84602
passport@shafr.org
801-422-8942 (phone)
801-422-0275 (fax)

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SHAFR is very pleased to announce the appointment of Amy Sayward as its new Executive Director. She is a Professor of History at Middle Tennessee State University and has a wide range of experiences in SHAFR, including service on numerous committees and two decades' worth of conference participation. Professor Sayward served on the staff of Diplomatic History while a graduate student at Ohio State University, and more recently was a member of the journal's editorial board. She brings a wealth of administrative experience to the job, including four years as department chair and stints as Faculty Assistant to the Dean and, subsequently, Interim Associate Dean, of the Graduate School at MTSU. Professor Sayward has also had a distinguished career as a teacher, adviser, and scholar, publishing The Birth of Development in 2006 with The United Nations in International History due out next year.
Roland Burke is Lecturer in History at La Trobe University. He is the author of Decolonization and the Evolution of International Human Rights (2010), and his recent research has focused on shifts in the meaning of the 1948 University Declaration of Human Rights in articles in the Journal of Global History and Humanity. At present, he is completing a monograph on competing visions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Amanda C. Demmer is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of New Hampshire. Her dissertation, “The Last Chapter of the Vietnam War: Normalization, Non-governmental Actors, and the Politics of Human Rights, 1975-1995,” examines the ways that refugee politics, especially the lobbying of Vietnamese American and human rights organizations, informed and often defined U.S. normalization policies toward the SRV. She has received numerous fellowships—including the Gerald R. Ford Scholar Award (Dissertation Award) in Honor of Robert M. Teeter—and has an article on the Jay Treaty forthcoming in the Journal of the Early Republic.


David Farber is the Roy A. Roberts Distinguished Professor at the University of Kansas. His books include Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First Encounter with Radical Islam (2004); What They Think of Us: International Perceptions of the United States since 9/11 (2007); The Age of Great Dreams: America in the 1960s (1994); and America in the Seventies (2004), with Beth Bailey.

Stephanie Freeman is a Ph.D. candidate in history at the University of Virginia. Her article, “The Making of an Accidental Crisis: The United States and the NATO Dual-Track Decision of 1979,” was published in Diplomacy and Statecraft in June 2014. She is currently working on a dissertation that examines the role that nuclear abolitionists played in the end of the Cold War.

Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht is Chair of the Department of History in the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies at the Freie Universität Berlin. She is the author of Transmission Impossible: American Journalism as Cultural Diplomacy in Postwar Germany, 1945-1955 (1999), winner of the SHAFC Stuart L. Bernath and Myrna Bernath prizes; and Sound Diplomacy: Music and Emotion in Transatlantic Relations, 1850-1920 (2009), which was named a Choice Outstanding Academic Title. She is also the editor of the series “Explorations in Culture and International History” with Berghahn Books.

William Glenn Gray is Associate Professor of History at Purdue University. His first book, Germany’s Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1949-1969 (2003), explores the global competition between East and West Germany. His recent article projects have focused on circulating systems–currencies, nuclear proliferation, and weapons exports. He is currently wrapping up a book on Germany’s international roles in the 1960s and 1970s.

Peter L. Hahn is Dean of Arts & Humanities and Professor of History at The Ohio State University. His publications include Missions Accomplished?: The United States and Iraq since World War I (2011); Historical Dictionary of U.S.–Middle East Relations (2007); Crisis and Crossfire: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (2005); and Caught in the Middle East: U.S. Policy toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1945-1961 (2004). He served as Associate Editor of Diplomatic History from 1991 to 2002, and most recently served as Executive Director of SHAFC from 2002 to 2015.

Richard H. Immerman is Edward Buthusiem Distinguished Faculty Fellow and Marvin Wachman Director of the Center for the Study of Force and Diplomacy at Temple University. His most recent book is The Hidden Hand: A Brief History of the CIA (2014), and his next book, Understanding the U.S. Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which he co-edited with Beth Bailey, will be published in fall 2015. A past president of SHAFC, he was Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Analytic Integrity from 2007-2009, has chaired the Historical Advisory Committee to the Department of States for the past five years, and since 2013 has held the Francis W. DeSerio Visiting Chair in Strategic Intelligence at the United States Army War College.

Hamza Karčić is Assistant Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Political Science, University of Sarajevo. His recent publications include articles in the Journal of Genocide Research, the Journal of Transatlantic Studies, and Indonesia and the Malay World.


Nadja Klopprogge is a doctoral candidate at the Graduate School of North American Studies at the John F. Kennedy Institute at the Freie Universität Berlin. She received her B.A. and M.A. degrees the Freie Universität in History, English, and Education. She is currently working on her dissertation, “Love, Sex, and Civil Rights: African American GIs in West Germany.”
Maurice Jr. M. Labelle is Assistant Professor of Middle East History at the University of Saskatchewan in Canada. His articles have appeared in Diplomatic History, Journal of Global History, and International Historical Review. His current book project explores how post-colonial Lebanon came to identify the United States as an imperial power in the Middle East. He has also begun working on a second manuscript that seeks to explicate the globalization of Arab perspectives.

Mark Atwood Lawrence is Associate Professor of History at the University of Texas at Austin. He earned his doctorate in history from Yale University in 1999 and is the author of Assumming the Burden: Europe and the American Commitment to War in Vietnam (2005) and The Vietnam War: A Concise International History (2008). He has also published several edited and co-edited books, as well as numerous articles and chapters, on various aspects of the history of U.S. foreign relations. He is now working on a study of U.S. policymaking toward the Third World in the 1960s.

Asa McKercher is a Social Science and Humanities Research Council Postdoctoral Fellow in the Department of History at Queen's University. His research, which focuses on 20th century international history broadly conceived and comparative reactions to the Cuban Revolution, has been published in International History Review, Cold War History, Canadian Historical Review, and Diplomatic History. He completed his Ph.D. at the University of Cambridge in 2013, and is currently Assistant Editor for the Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies.


Stephen R. Ortiz is Associate Professor of History at Binghamton University, SUNY. He is the author of Beyond the Bonus March and GI Bill: How Veteran Politics Shaped the New Deal Era (2012) and Veterans’ Policies, Veterans’ Politics: New Perspectives on Veterans in the Modern United States (2012). He is currently working on a new book titled Comrade in Arms: Veterans Organizations and the Politics of National Security in the American Century.

P. Michael Rattansengchanh is a doctoral candidate at Ohio University. His research interests are U.S. foreign relations during the Cold War and Southeast Asian history. His dissertation will focus on U.S.-Thai relations from 1957 to 1979, with an emphasis on public and cultural diplomacy.

Avshalom Rubin is a historian in the Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State in Washington, D.C. His responsibilities include historical projects pertaining to U.S. relations with Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinians. His research has been published in Middle Eastern Studies and Middle East Review of International Affairs.

Daniel J. Sargent is Assistant Professor of History at the University of California, Berkeley. He received his B.A. from Christ’s College, Cambridge in 2001 and his Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2008. He has held fellowships at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University and at International Security Studies at Yale University. He is the author of A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s (2015) and the co-editor (with Niall Ferguson, Charles Maier, and Erez Manela) of The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective (2010). He is now working on two book-length projects: a history of international economic governance in the modern era, and a study on the uses of history and historical thinking in U.S. foreign policy.

Mary Elise Sarotte is Dean’s Professor of History at the University of Southern California and Research Associate at the Center for European Studies, Harvard University. Her most recent book, The Collapse: The Accidental Opening of the Berlin Wall (2014), was selected as a “Book of the Week” by CNN and “Book of the Year” by BBC History Magazine, the Economist, and the Financial Times, among other publications.

Lauren F. Turek is Assistant Professor of History at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas. She recently completed her Ph.D. at the University of Virginia; her dissertation, “To Bring the Good News to All Nations: Evangelicals, Human Rights, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969-1994,” examined the complex and deeply significant ways in which religion and religious groups interacted with foreign policy, political culture, and the international human rights regime to shape America’s role in the modern world. Her scholarship on U.S. foreign relations, religion, and domestic politics has been published in Diplomatic History and the Journal of American Studies.

Dustin Walcher is Associate Professor and Chair of Political Science at Southern Oregon University. A specialist in international history, the history of U.S. foreign relations and inter-American affairs, his scholarship analyzes international economic policy, global capitalism, and social disruption. He is currently revising a manuscript that examines the link between the failure of U.S.-led economic initiatives and the rise of social revolution in Argentina during the 1950s and 1960s.

Mark Walker is the John Bigelow Professor of History at Union College. He studied mathematics at Washington University and received his Ph.D. in history from Princeton University with a dissertation on the German atomic bomb. He has taught modern European history, intellectual history, and the history of science and technology at Union College since 1987.

Guoqi Xu is Professor of History at Hong Kong University. He is the author of six books, including Olympic Dreams: China and Sports, 1895-2008 (2008) and Chinese and Americans: A Shared History (2014).

John Yoo is Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley and a visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. He is the author, most recently, of Point of Attack: Preventive War, International Law, and Global Welfare (2014).
Editor’s note: On Friday, June 26, SHAFR president Tim Borstelmann announced at the outset of his presidential address that long-time SHAFR executive director Peter Hahn would be resigning due to his new administrative responsibilities as Dean of Arts & Humanities at The Ohio State University. During his thirteen year tenure as executive director (2002-2015)—on which he reflects at the end of this issue—Peter was the epitome of professional, intelligent, and even-handed leadership that will remain the standard by which his successors will be measured. Every member of our organization owes Peter their profound gratitude for being instrumental in making SHAFR what it is today.

Passport salutes Peter and thanks him for his years of dedicated service to SHAFR. While it would be impossible to do justice to Peter’s wide-ranging contributions to SHAFR—as evidenced by the lengthy standing ovation he received at the presidential luncheon—the following comments from past presidents of SHAFR highlight and are representative of the admiration and esteem that scores of SHAFR members who had the good fortune to work with Peter have expressed in the wake of this announcement. AJ

Tim Borstelmann, University of Nebraska, Lincoln
2015 SHAFR president

I suspect that I am not the only SHAFR president in the past several years whose greatest fear was the prospect of losing Peter Hahn as executive director. Anyone who worked closely with Peter over a period of time knew how talented and dedicated he is—and thus how ripe he was for promotion into the upper echelons of university administration. Even as his steady hand on the tiller at SHAFR made the organization efficient, professional, and fair-minded, we knew that we could not keep him forever. What I will miss most is Peter’s deep moral integrity. His effectiveness as executive director these past thirteen years was grounded in his unstinting commitment to doing the right thing, at every step and in every situation. His honesty, courtesy, and concern for others have shaped SHAFR in subtle but profound ways as the organization has grown dramatically in size and influence since his appointment in 2002. Peter’s unfailing modesty masked a willingness to be firm when necessary, and his guidance to SHAFR officers and members has been indispensable. We will miss him dearly, even as we carry on into a future made bright by all that he has done to build SHAFR.

David Anderson, California State University, Monterey Bay
2005 SHAFR president

My memories of working with Peter Hahn during the period that I had the privilege of serving as SHAFR president are variations on the phrase “it’s already taken care of.” When I was learning how to be president under Peter’s tutelage and later performing the responsibilities of the office (which are significant in such a vibrant organization), Peter not only had immediate answers to my every question but usually had anticipated and addressed every issue before it occurred to me. In looking over the council minutes from a decade ago, I am reminded of how transformational that period was for SHAFR. The journal, website, membership directory, bibliographic guide, financial management, and annual meeting were attaining the professional quality that we now assume of SHAFR, and Peter was facilitating all of the details of these changes. Throughout his tenure, he has provided the institutional expertise and continuity that have made SHAFR’s accomplishments possible. Thank you, Peter.

Andrew Rotter, Colgate University
2010 SHAFR president

Peter Hahn called me the night he certified my election as SHAFR vice president. I had not expected to win, and while I was gratified that I had, I also found myself worrying about my ability to lead the organization. With some experience on Council and a couple of committees, I nevertheless pictured the task as unfathomable, calling to mind (oddly) Woody Allen’s lines in Love and Death: “Wheat...lots of wheat...fields of wheat...a tremendous amount of wheat.” I wasn’t sure I could manage it.

Peter was reassuring, that evening and for the rest of my tenure as vice president, then president. He knew everything: about protocol, money, procedure, deadlines, committee appointments (a big part of the job), arranging the conference—everything. SHAFR presidents used to joke, morbidly, that if Peter ever got hit by a bus, or took, say, a deanship, all was lost. That isn’t true, but it was easy to believe, so great was Peter’s attention to detail and so deep his understanding of the organization.
Peter has had an extraordinary influence on SHAFR. He has guided it to a position of unprecedented strength and given it a prominence that is remarkable for an organization its size. We are very lucky to have had his guidance for these thirteen years.

Thomas Schwartz, Vanderbilt University
2008 SHAFR president

I have a very hard time imagining SHAFR without Peter Hahn. Perhaps I shouldn’t say that, since the organization is obviously a thriving and dynamic one, larger than any one individual. But Peter has been at the center of it for so long, and he has been so instrumental in helping SHAFR grow and prosper, that it is really hard for me to think he is leaving us. Here at Vanderbilt we are particularly proud of the fact that Peter is a product of our program, a student of the legendary Mel Leffler. At this year’s conference I told him that I think that “The Ohio State University” is a very lucky institution to recruit him as its new dean. I know that SHAFR will miss him terribly.

My time as President of SHAFR would have been either a disaster or even worse without Peter, and I think my fellow Presidents will affirm something of the same feeling. But the one story I will tell gives some indication of why Peter was such a valuable person to have as Executive Secretary. For the 2008 annual conference I arranged a very controversial speaker for one of the plenary sessions. I was immediately deluged with angry emails protesting this choice, with a number of them suggesting that they would cancel their membership in the organization and demand the return of their dues. I was mortified. The last thing I wanted to do as President was to run down SHAFR’s membership and hurt its finances. But throughout the controversy, Peter Hahn was a pillar of strength and wisdom. Not only did he suggest that we invite a rival speaker and have a formal debate at the plenary, but he also encouraged me to stand up to those who protested the event.

If some people didn’t like the idea of a debate about important issues of public policy and left the organization, SHAFR was strong enough to survive it. What I remember most about Peter’s reaction was his serenity in the midst of the storm – Peter simply made you feel that everything would work out for the best. One of Franklin Roosevelt’s associates once said of FDR, after watching him give a fireside chat with such optimism and confidence in the depths of the Great Depression, that “He must have been psychoanalyzed by God.” I’ve often thought the same thing about Peter. Peter Hahn radiates integrity, and SHAFR has been extremely fortunate to have had the benefit of his good judgment and stellar character for so many years. I wish him only the best.

Mark Stoler, University of Vermont
2004 SHAFR president

Peter Hahn has been much more than simply SHAFR’s executive director for the last thirteen years. He has in effect run the organization, served as its institutional memory, and overseen its enormous expansion. As such he is largely responsible for its success.

Although Peter had assumed his position only a few years before I became SHAFR president in 2004, he had already mastered the structure, needs and intricacies of the organization in a way no incoming president could. I relied upon him for almost everything that year, and I do not believe I could have possibly fulfilled my responsibilities in a competent manner without him. His calm demeanor also calmed me emotionally when problems arose during my presidency—no mean feat given my personality! I owe him a debt that can never be repaid, as do all of us who served as SHAFR presidents or on Council during his tenure. So does the organization as a whole.

Fred Logevall, Harvard University
2014 SHAFR president

For years I suspected that Peter Hahn had an identical twin, a seldom-seen figure who toiled away in a top-secret Columbus location and enabled Peter to accomplish his astonishing array of feats—as a productive researcher and writer, as a talented and devoted teacher, as chair of one of the largest History departments in the United States, as executive director of our beloved SHAFR. But it was only in 2013, when I prepared to become president of SHAFR and saw firsthand all that Peter did for the organization, that I knew for certain: there is definitely a second Hahn (Paul? Perry?) in central Ohio, working in perfect shadowy unison with his brother. How else to explain Peter’s astonishing contributions to SHAFR, year in and year out? It’s not merely the extraordinary administrative competence, or the reassuring unflappability, or the vast knowledge of the organization’s history; it’s the unshakable sense of commitment and fundamental generosity of spirit that Peter brings to each and every task. All of which suggests the following entirely commonsensical assertion: over the past dozen-plus years, no one has done as much for SHAFR as has Peter Hahn.

It remains to commend the powers that be at Ohio State for their superb judgment in selecting Peter for a deanship—and to rest in the knowledge that, though he is leaving the executive director position, he is not leaving the Society. Mr. SHAFR he is to many of us, and Mr. SHAFR he will continue to be.
Richard Immerman, Temple University
2007 SHAFR president

Serving as SHAFR president ranks in the very top tier of career highlights for any historian of U.S. foreign relations, international historian, transnational historian, or however one self-identifies. Collaborating with wonderful colleagues and meeting new ones is a true pleasure, and the opportunities to contribute, even in a small way, to an organization that has been so central and influential to our professional development is extraordinarily rewarding.

Serving as SHAFR’s president also meant collaborating closely with Peter Hahn. That I did inestimably enhanced the pleasure and the reward. I was fortunate that my tenure coincided with the first “windfall” from the *Diplomatic History* contract. Consequently, during that time SHAFR launched such new initiatives as the Summer Institute, the dissertation completion fellowships, and the grants to defray the cost of graduate student and international member travel to our annual conference. It also started or expanded new committees, like the membership committee and committee on women. Peter deserves the bulk of the credit for this progress. By advising, by recommending, by interpreting, and by implementing, he gave real substance to the concept of “leading from behind.” In every instance, moreover, and I underscore every instance, Peter was unfailingly gracious, collegial, and friendly (lurking behind his placid expressions is an infectious sense of humor). I am richer in the best sense of that word because Peter was executive director when I was president. But SHAFR is exponentially more so. For that I, and we all, owe him more than we can ever repay.

Mark Bradley, University of Chicago
2013 SHAFR president

You just don’t really know until you have the honor to be elected president of SHAFR what Peter has done for us over the years, and how marvelously and seamlessly he gets it done. We are an amazingly well endowed organization, and with that has flowed a whole series of exciting initiatives: the Summer Institutes, book prizes, support for graduate students, an annual conference that just keeps getting better year after year and more. There are a lot of moving parts in making all that happen. Peter put the processes in place that make it so in such a careful and modest way that all of us think it just happens by itself. But it really happens because of Peter’s unsurpassed abilities as an administrator *par excellence.* SHAFR was blessed to have Peter as our Executive Director these last 13 years. He’ll be a terrific dean at OSU. And I know he will keep close to us in the years to come. Thank you Peter for all you have done to make SHAFR the vibrant organization it is today. We never would have gotten there without you!
Roundtable Introduction: A Superpower Transformed

Mary Elise Sarotte

A Superpower Transformed, a book based on Daniel Sargent's Harvard University dissertation, is a welcome addition to the literature on the conceptual history of U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century. After its simple but compelling opening sentence—"A superpower is different" (p. 1)—the roughly 300-page study skillfully explores the unique ways in which the international and transnational developments of the 1970s challenged U.S. leaders. In particular, Sargent examines how the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations sought to master a wide range of events, from oil shocks to humanitarian crises.

The author concludes that "American decision-makers experimented and faltered, under circumstances they did not fully comprehend, with consequences they could not foresee. Theirs, in the end, were stories not of great power and vast agency...but of frustration, adaptation, and constraint" (p. 310). Sargent takes a particular approach to elucidating these developments; as he emphasizes repeatedly in both the book itself and his author's response to this roundtable, his study "is not ultimately about episodes and crises in the international history of the 1970s; it is about the conceptual evolution of U.S. foreign policy." In other words, A Superpower Transformed is "concerned not with the remaking of world politics but with the remaking of U.S. foreign policy, a crucial distinction." To study this conceptual evolution, Sargent has mined the U.S. National Archives, the relevant presidential archives, and an impressive array of other English-language archival collections.

Equally impressive is the line-up of experts who generously took time to comment on Sargent's book for this roundtable: David Farber, William Gray, Mark Atwood Lawrence, and Luke Nichter, all published experts on the history of international and transnational relations in the second half of the twentieth century. They unanimously find Sargent's book worthy of extensive praise. In particular, Farber acclaims A Superpower Transformed as a "wise book" that focuses "with great success on the highest level of national policymakers." Farber especially admires Sargent's "sophisticated understanding of international economics and finance." In fact, Farber finds this aspect of the book so admirable, he wishes that there were even more of it. Farber urges Sargent to explore, in the future, the role of "currency traders, international capitalists, global business and financial leaders, and other profit-minded masters of the expanding global economy," who are only present "offstage" in this study.

Similarly, Gray praises Sargent's impressive ability to depict the "multipolar, economically diverse world" of the 1970s in a manner that is both "simple and elegant[.]" Gray focuses, however, on a different aspect of the book: Sargent's belief that the 1970s were the time when "the Cold War ceased to define world politics (if indeed it ever had done) and new challenges proliferated." (p. 9). Sargent argues that "[t]he Cold War (or postwar) order that emerged from the 1940s...collapsed in the 1970s, and a historical transformation in the superpower role of the United States ensured." Gray finds that Sargent thereby "implies that the competition with Moscow was a unilateral American construct and that the United States could have chosen to ignore Brezhnev and focus on other problems instead." Sargent responds by saying that his goal was "not to suggest...that the Cold War was mere smoke and mirrors – an artifice existing only in the minds of U.S. decision-makers" but rather that, "[a]rmed and dangerous, the Soviet Union remained an existential threat to U.S. interests into the 1970s and beyond, and this made the Cold War an enduring concern." Rather, Sargent says that he seeks to "stress that the Cold War was a 'feature' of the international system, not its essential or defining characteristic."

Like Gray, Lawrence, while praising the book as a "resounding triumph," also pushes Sargent to elucidate one of the main themes of A Superpower Transformed further. In particular, Lawrence takes issue with the title of the book, suggesting that "the United States was not so much 'transformed' at the end of the seventies as it was 'unmoored' or 'cast adrift,' its leaders buffeted by global forces and lacking a clear sense of purpose or control." Sargent responds that he "intended the title to convey...the kind of change that is achieved via the introduction of new elements and the disruption of existing arrangements."

Finally, Nichter—rounding out the universal praise...
that all reviewers provide—calls A Superpower Transformed a “sweeping study.” He finds that Sargent is to be congratulated for providing “a roadmap for the 1970s that will be on seminar reading lists for a long time—including mine.”


Luke A. Nichter

The transformation of the American superpower in the 1970s was neither foreordained nor planned. Rather, it followed a series of adoptions to unexpected and confounding circumstances,” says Daniel Sargent. He is the author of this sweeping study, which will force scholars to reassess the period even as it was just coming into focus as a result of recent records releases. This is as good as it gets for a first big book. In the narrowest sense, the work is a contribution to the burgeoning field of human rights diplomacy and foreign policy during the Carter administration. But it is much more than that. Sargent also shows how we got there—via a superpower stalemate, the end of the postwar period, Cold War lessons learned, and nascent globalization. The volume covers a period of time that up until now has not been captured by a comprehensive narrative based on original research.

The book is arranged chronologically, starting roughly at the dawn of the Cold War, though most of its attention is squarely focused on the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. Specifically, the actors whose actions and words receive the most scrutiny include national security advisors Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, “the era’s leading foreign policy thinkers.” The approach is top-down, though there probably is not any other way to craft a study of the “pinnacles of power.”

Arguably, the two greatest contributions of the work are one of research and one of method. National security records from the 1970s have only recently been declassified and made available by the National Archives. The United States does not follow a thirty-year rule as the United Kingdom does; in fact, for the most sensitive presidential records something closer to a forty-or-more-year rule has been the effective practice for some time. That time lag is a challenge for a book of this type, which sits on the edge of the archival frontier. And, of course, an even more serious challenge for historians is that by the mid-1970s, fewer and fewer sensitive decisions had a paper record in the first place. After various measures—among them the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (1974), the Presidential Records Act (1978), the Church Committee findings, and the U.S.A. v. Gray, Felt, Miller decision (1980)—brought about increased scrutiny of the executive branch, executives responded by creating fewer meaningful records. To tackle that problem, Sargent went the extra mile by interviewing Brzezinski and former President Jimmy Carter, though the reader is left wondering why no officials from the Nixon or Ford administration were interviewed.

The second major contribution of the work is the merging of a sound diplomatic history of the 1970s with the literature and research on globalization. Sargent’s advisors at Harvard—especially Niall Ferguson—must be especially proud of this achievement. It is disappointing that so many scholars resist quantitative analysis with every fiber of their being. Sargent addresses the nuances of international monetary and macroeconomics head on, examining the U.S. balance of payments, spending on the welfare state over time, refugee movements, energy production, arms exports, the Misery Index and many other issues. In doing so, he adds an additional dimension of credibility to this work that it would not otherwise have.

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A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s

Daniel Sargent generally avoids this debate other than to say that “the Nixon Doctrine aimed to sustain, not shed, the international commitments that the United States had assumed since the 1940s” (42). In other words, the Nixon Doctrine was definitely more than a simple articulation of Nixon’s policy of Vietnamization. A harbinger of the détente era, the Nixon Doctrine was indeed meant to have application beyond Southeast Asia, as the simplicity of Nixon’s language suggested. When Nixon said “we, of course, will keep the treaty commitments that we have” and “we should assist, but we should not dictate,” he foreshadowed a new phase in America’s engagement with the world, a phase in which other nations would be expected to take on more responsibility in the areas of their own defense, monetary and economic affairs, and political development. Future American commitments would be appropriated on a more realistic scale commensurate with a new era of reduced Cold War tensions.

Nixon understood that by the end of the 1960s, America’s resources were decreasing and its international stature was in decline. Nixon and Kissinger had less room to maneuver within the range of influence that remained because of a series of difficulties they inherited (and in some cases aggravated further): the Vietnam War; a resurgent Soviet Union; a decades-long estrangement from the People’s Republic of China; a volatile Middle East; and poor relations with U.S. allies in Europe. Nixon was also constrained by a decline in domestic morale, sapped during the 1960s by the difficult choices that had to be made repeatedly between guns and butter— that is, Vietnam and the Great Society—

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and by a political class that did not seem to have answers to the nation’s problems. What Nixon and Kissinger tried to do was to rescale America’s commitment to the world in the hope that reducing the scope of U.S. activity would create an opportunity for creativity within those areas that Nixon and Kissinger concluded were most essential to the nation’s strategic interests.

I also differ with Sargent on Nixon’s view of the United States in the world. Nixon “looked backward,” Sargent writes (11). He “did not seek to transform America’s world role; rather, the Nixon administration sought to bolster the sinews of American power within a conservative concept of Cold War politics. Nixon worked to stabilize the status quo, to the short-term advantage of the United States, but he failed to engage, much less master, new forces in world politics. The consequences of economic globalization, combined with the effects of Nixon’s choices, collapsed the international monetary order in the early 1970s” (10).

In my own work, based heavily although certainly not exclusively on the Nixon tapes, I see Nixon’s goal quite differently. It was not simply to stabilize the status quo. In his view, the status quo on January 20, 1969, was unacceptable. His various “Nixon shocks,” as they became known, included rapprochement with China, détente with the Soviet Union, reordering international monetary policy, and shifting the focus of American policy away from an Atlantic-centered world to one that was Pacific-centered. With the blessing of experts such as David Bruce and John Mccloy, Nixon concluded that further European integration was no longer in American interests. He downplayed relations with allies, especially in Western Europe, in favor of improving ties with adversaries. It is hard to find much preservation of the status quo in any of these areas.

Also, while a single book can do only so much, there are moments when Sargent seems to overlook the effect of domestic policy—at times a brake and at times an accelerator—on foreign policy. Nixon was exceptionally good at seeing short-term and long-term options when it came to foreign policy. But he was much less effective when this planning was affected by domestic policy or economic policy. While a single book can do only so much, there are moments when Sargent seems to overlook the effect of domestic policy—at times a brake and at times an accelerator—on foreign policy. Nixon was exceptionally good at seeing short-term and long-term options when it came to foreign policy. But he was much less effective when this planning was affected by domestic policy or economic policy.

A Well-Ordered Account of Chaos

David Farber

Daniel Sargent has written a wise book on the struggles of 1970s-era presidents and their key foreign policy advisors to craft a strategic response to America’s swirling international challenges, which included both continuing Cold War conundrums and rapid global economic transformation. Sargent clearly delineates his historical subject: “Explaining how the seventies transformed America’s world role and remade its superpower vocation, not according to coherent design but in a chaotic pattern, is the central task of this book” (9). I do him a slight injustice here in picking this sentence to lay out his objective, since throughout the text he avoids writing sentences without human agency in them. This overarching statement reveals the crux of Sargent’s analysis: in the 1970s, America’s highest-level international policymakers had to react to, not forge, the conditions they hoped to manage, and their attempts to impose a strategy—“the central focus of this book” (8)—on unfolding events mostly failed. Still, even as the United States emerged from the 1970s less able to control international developments, especially economic globalization, America was at the advent of the 1980s a superpower reborn, freed from some of the self-imposed limits that post-World War II international economic and Cold War national security strategy had placed on it and in a position of far greater strength than the rapidly decaying Soviet Union.

Like other authors who have written excellent books
on policymaking and international developments of the 1970s, such as Tim Borstelmann (The 1970s) and Judith Stein (The Pivotal Decade), Sargent considers how globalization, usually referred to in the 1970s as interdependence, forced Americans to reconsider their place in the world. However, his approach to the topic differs from that of his predecessors. Borstelmann, for example, assesses how this structural change broadly affected both American society and international policy. Sargent focuses more narrowly and with great success on the highest level of national policymakers, who pondered a strategic response to the great international challenges of their day.

Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Zbigniew Brzezinski are his prime protagonists, and all come across in his account as intelligent men devoted to the United States’ security and to its role as global superpower. More than in most other accounts, these men are presented as dispassionate policymakers with similar objectives rather than as antagonistic advocates of wildly different goals. Obviously, Kissinger is more devoted to stabilizing America’s preeminent role in a stable international order, while Jimmy Carter is more dedicated to expanding America’s commitment to a just global order based on key American values. Still, Sargent argues that what these men share is what is most important: a commitment to American power in a dangerous, economically transformative world. Kissinger, especially during his tenure in the Ford administration, is revealed as a flexible analyst and appears here to be more open—if only for tactical reasons—to a new regime of interdependence based, at least partially, on human rights (though Kissinger is quick to note privately that he doesn’t really “give a damn” about any sort of “humanitarian concerns”) (180). And Carter, who really does care about human rights and a humanitarian role for the United States, comes to accept the necessity of a more realist approach to crisis management when faced with Soviet aggression and instability in Africa, the Middle East, and the Persian Gulf.

In his careful assessment of the three presidential administrations, Sargent offers cogent re-evaluations. Nixon is portrayed as a backward-looking advocate of “conservative stability” who “failed to engage, much less master, new forces in world politics” (10). Kissinger rises to the challenge of the mid-1970s; he “managed to hold the West together, and he established a basis on which globalization might be managed in an ad hoc fashion” (11). Carter is credited with prioritizing “the management of economic interdependence among the industrialized countries and the worldwide promotion of human rights,” even as world events shredded his strategic aspirations and pushed him to revert to “foreign-policy concepts associated with the high Cold War” (11). I found Sargent’s deeply researched and analytically precise accounts of his protagonists’ attempts to craft a strategic approach to foreign policy making convincing and enlightening. Sargent rightfully brags that his findings depended on “readings of entire archival series,” and it shows. He moves surefootedly from crises in Biafra, Bangladesh and Iran to the Soviet Union and China and to most every other place American power was tested, applied, or considered.

Most significantly, I think, Sargent brings to his account of White House strategy a sophisticated understanding of international economics and finance. With great lucidity he explains how changing international currency regimes, balance of payments, and control of commodity prices (especially oil) shaped and even structured presidential administrations’ policy options. American presidents and their advisors could not, by the early 1970s, control these changing international economic factors; and so each, in quite different ways, sought begrudgingly to accommodate American power to these new realities. The United States, he hammers home, was not alone in facing these challenges. In a typically pithy set piece, for example, he explains how global economic factors created a crisis in Poland—of which Carter and Brzezinski took full advantage. Economic interdependence created opportunities as well as challenges for American policymakers.

Sargent also demonstrates that global interdependence brought new actors to the stage. Transnational human rights groups emerge as a new sort of pressure group; and, insomuch as they were able to insert themselves into high policy forums and to act as an interest group pressuring the U.S. Congress, which in turn would apply pressure to White House foreign policymaking. Sargent gives them a minor role in his story. Kept almost completely offstage but acting as a kind of deus ex machina are currency traders, international capitalists, global business and financial leaders, and other profit-minded masters of the expanding global economy. While these unnamed moneymen make almost no appearances in Sargent’s account, they often drive White House policy concerns.

Appearing in a still limited but more substantive role are the occasional non-national security-focused cabinet officers who insist on a role in international economic policy. Treasury Secretary John Connally, beloved by all historians—and their readers—for his blunt, quotable ways, has some limited success in convincing Nixon and Kissinger, neither of whom had much interest in or understanding of international economics, to prioritize American economic growth and not stability-promoting alliance policy by caring less about other nations’ needs for highly advantageous access to American markets. More radical advice comes from Connally’s successor at Treasury, the irrepressible George Schultz. Schultz is the first major White House-level apostle of a neoliberal market-based approach to globalization. He lays the groundwork for the future, even as Kissinger does everything he can in the short term to prevent the destabilizing consequences of Schultz’s market-based policy from damaging America’s relations with its major allies.

The international economic policy battles between Schultz and Kissinger, as well as other major figures, are, to my mind, the most original aspect of Sargent’s sweeping account of strategic thinking in the 1970s-era presidential administrations. Given my bias, my only complaint against Sargent’s brilliant work is that I would have liked to have better understood the power and place of powerful economic actors in influencing White House strategy both at the instrumental level and at the level of structuring options. Private financiers and bankers make no appearances, and American business leaders, who we know are organizing with alacrity in the 1970s, are similarly quiet in Sargent’s account.

Now it may be that at the highest level of strategy these sort of historical actors do, in fact, play little to no role. But Judith Stein’s detailed account of trade policy and what she calls “international Keynesianism” argues that a variety of economic actors, including internationally minded labor leaders, had a more important role in major policymaking decisions than is indicated in Sargent’s account. Stein is writing about policy choices that affected America’s international and domestic economic position, and that differs from the kind of White House grand strategy that Sargent analyzes so well. Still, at a methodological level, I wonder if strategy—whether grand or not quite grand—
best explains the large-scale changes in America's global role and the impact that changing global role had on life in the United States in the 1970s.


Mark Atwood Lawrence

By one standard, Daniel J. Sargent’s *A Superpower Transformed* might seem a stodgy, outdated book. Ours is, after all, the age of international history, when young scholars of global affairs are urged to travel the world, master multiple languages, dislodge new documents from far-flung archives, and embrace the notion that the United States may not be the center of every important story.

Rather than follow this formula, Sargent relies overwhelmingly on American sources, shows scant interest in documents written in languages other than English, and seems not to have voyaged beyond the United States and his native Britain. Most strikingly of all, he unashamedly focuses on a question about U.S. decision-making. How, Sargent asks, did Washington respond to the stark decline of America’s global power in the late 1960s and early 1970s and reconfigure America’s global role for an era of diminished capabilities? His *dramatis personae*, moreover, could hardly be more traditional. At its core, this is a book about Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Jimmy Carter and their immediate subordinates at the pinnacle of American power.

Yet *A Superpower Transformed* is a resounding triumph, one of the most conceptually bold and argumentatively rich books to appear in the fields of diplomatic and international history in some years. Though unconvincing in a couple of respects, it unquestionably sets a new bar for writing about the 1970s and the recasting of U.S. power in that most befuddling of decades.

*A Superpower Transformed* is a resounding triumph, one of the most conceptually bold and argumentatively rich books to appear in the fields of diplomatic and international history in some years. Though unconvincing in a couple of respects, it unquestionably sets a new bar for writing about the 1970s and the recasting of U.S. power in that most befuddling of decades.

None of this is terribly surprising, but Sargent breaks ground by demonstrating the ways in which these trends were connected to rapidly accelerating “globalization.” By this term, Sargent means not just the burgeoning flow of capital and goods but also the quickening spread of ideas and political practices that profoundly challenged the prerogatives of dominant nations, especially the United States. Conceptualizing the era in this way, Sargent shows that the crisis confronting U.S. leaders in the 1970s stemmed not merely from particular setbacks such as the Vietnam quagmire, the Watergate scandal, or the oil crisis, but also from nothing less than the dawn of a new era in global affairs, the age of globalization that has prevailed ever since. The book thus argues for a reevaluation of twentieth-century history, urging us to think of the 1970s as the hinge between the high Cold War and our own times.

The bulk of *A Superpower Transformed* focuses on the ways in which American leaders attempted to shore up U.S. power as the tectonic plates of history shifted beneath them. The argument proceeds in three phases, which correspond roughly to the three presidential administrations of the 1970s. The Nixon administration, Sargent contends, pursued an essentially conservative program aimed at bolstering the Pax Americana through tactical adjustments. Although the book argues that these adjustments—detente with the Soviet Union, the opening to China, and the Nixon Doctrine—revealed genuine boldness and creativity, he ultimately concludes that Nixon and his aides showed little awareness of the larger shifts in the global order and even less interest in repositioning American foreign policy to synchronize American purposes with the larger flow of history. Above all, Sargent explores the ways in which Nixon struggled to preserve the essence of the collapsing Bretton Woods system and explicitly rejected human rights as a significant factor in making foreign policy. He suggests that Nixon embodied the apotheosis of the older brand of geopolitics rooted in the unassailable autonomy and sovereignty of national governments.

Only with the growing dominance of Henry Kissinger during Nixon’s final months in office—and Kissinger’s even greater dominance during the Ford presidency, which coincides with the second phase of the argument—did Washington, Sargent suggests, shed its earlier conservatism and attempt to reorient U.S. foreign policy toward a new historical era. By this point, the full collapse of Bretton Woods and to an even greater extent the oil shock of 1973 had underscored the impossibility of maintaining the Pax Americana. In one of the most original and insightful sections of the book, Sargent shows that Kissinger gradually came to terms with new uncertainties flowing...
from floating exchange rates and rapidly expanding flows of currency, trade, and investment. Moreover, Kissinger helped inaugurate a new era of multilateral governance, epitomized by the Trilateral Commission and the G-7 summits, both of which date from the mid-1970s.

By drawing a line between Kissinger’s pre- and post-Watergate guises and giving him credit for creativity in the Ford presidency, Sargent makes a notable intervention in the voluminous scholarship on U.S. policy in the Nixon/Ford era, suggesting the need for a more complex view of Kissinger than scholars have usually offered. Sargent challenges conventional portraits by describing a thoughtful man attuned to some of the most profound transformations of his age but also lacking any fixed grand-strategic vision.

Whether readers will accept this view is another question. While Sargent offers intriguing evidence that Kissinger was more adept at economic policy and had a greater capacity for on-the-job learning than scholars have usually allowed, he does little to demonstrate similar evolution in the arenas of superpower relations, North-South interactions, or human rights. A reader more skeptical of Kissinger might view him as fighting a rearguard action against global change by making tactical concessions merely in the economic sphere. In this way, Kissinger’s behavior after Watergate may have been more continuous with his behavior during the earlier Nixon years.

In any case, Sargent argues in the third part of the book that Jimmy Carter embraced both the economic multilateralism that Kissinger had pioneered and the concern with human rights that Kissinger had rejected, thereby going well beyond his predecessors in revamping American foreign policy. Sargent argues in the third part of the book that Jimmy Carter embraced both the economic multilateralism that Kissinger had pioneered and the concern with human rights that Kissinger had rejected, thereby going well beyond his predecessors in revamping American foreign policy.

Yet A Superpower Transformed has disappointingly little to say about the early 1980s or the possibility that the end of its story lies properly in the Reagan years. To be sure, this critique may be unfair. Sargent, after all, has achieved a great deal in covering an entire decade with such skill and meticulousness, sweeping across policy areas as diverse as human rights and monetary policy in a book that is already rather large at 310 pages. To ask for more may be to ask for too much. Moreover, extending the book into the 1980s would disrupt the tidiness of analyzing a single decade.

Still, by ending his book where he does, Sargent misses a chance to carry his argument to completion and even to open up new ways of understanding the eighties. To capture this complexity, Sargent might have chosen a different central metaphor and given the book a title that better captures the indeterminacy of its endpoint. But another way to address this problem might have been to carry the story of American policymaking beyond the Carter presidency into the Reagan years. It might be that any transformation in U.S. foreign policy as a consequence of the forces unleashed in the 1970s was complete only with Reagan's reconfiguration of American global leadership for the new era. Reagan, after all, successfully exploited atavistic attachment to the Pax Americana while accepting multilateral management of the international economy, accommodating the nation to a new era of indebtedness and trade deficits, and embracing human rights (albeit the rights of Eastern Bloc dissidents rather than Third World peoples abused by right-wing governments). To put it in yet another way, the Reagan presidency achieved a new and (crucially) durable synthesis that responded to changed circumstances but also—in sharp contrast to the solutions offered up by Nixon, Ford, and Carter—garnered broad political support.

The good news is that A Superpower Transformed will surely inspire others to take up the task of extending his analysis. Indeed, Sargent describes the broad currents of the seventies with such assurance and perspicacity that he will likely provoke scholars—not just historians but also political scientists, economists, and sociologists—to reconsider a range of major topics, including the location of key breaking points in postwar history, the nature of globalization, and the relationship between globalization and U.S. power. Few books, and still fewer revised dissertations, hold such potential or deserve a space on so many bookshelves.


William Glenn Gray

In the field of twentieth-century foreign relations, shadows retreat at intervals of thirty years. Young historians often make a habit of chasing the sun, racing to cast eyes on material that hasn’t seen daylight since the time of its creation. The dawn horizon has been especially
sharp in the case of the 1970s, which (unlike the 1960s) drew little historical interest until the thirty-year threshold was crossed. Now, after a decade of rediscovery, large thematic overviews of the period are published every few months. Studies of foreign policy in the Nixon, Ford, or Carter years are no rarity either, yet the vast majority of the new work is still appearing as articles and book chapters rather than full-length monographs. Thus Daniel Sargent could scarcely have written a synthetic overview of foreign relations in the 1970s, even if he had wanted to. His recourse is to the primary sources themselves—the cables, memoranda, think-pieces, and treatises of three presidential administrations.

Sargent has sifted through a vast quantity of paper, and he commands an impressively broad thematic range. He writes comfortably about grand strategy, monetary breakdowns, Middle Eastern politics, and human rights. The tone is concise, sober, and authoritative; the narrative moves along briskly without pausing to engage in scholarly controversies. Along the way, Sargent takes pains to supply more backstory than experts in the field would need (about, say, Watergate or the Six-Day War). This is a work striving to reach a general audience, as is also indicated by the parallel release of hardcover and audio editions.

At its core, Sargent’s book offers a symmetrical reading of the 1970s. Nixon and Kissinger came into office as Cold Warriors; but by mid-decade, the latter had embraced the complexity of a multipolar, economically diverse world. For his part, Carter began his term in 1977 as the first post-Cold War president, determined to situate the United States within a cooperative global framework. Yet détente collapsed two years later, and Carter reluctantly shifted his horizons to focus on the bilateral competition with Moscow. As a thumbnail sketch of U.S. policies in the 1970s, Sargent’s model is simple and elegant, if not completely persuasive. The following discussion raises two main objections. First, could the United States have disengaged from the Cold War quite as unceremoniously as Sargent imagines? Second, was the “one-worldism” of the Carter administration as open-minded and consensual as this narrative suggests?

How Constructed Was the Cold War?

In most respects, Sargent’s account is refreshingly free of moralizing. The dominant voice is ironic, not tragic, with an emphasis on unintended consequences. For example, President Nixon and Secretary of the Treasury John Connally did not set about to introduce a “neoliberal” world financial order. They could not have foreseen that de-emphasizing the U.S.-Soviet relationship would fatally weaken the Bretton Woods system and usher in an era of floating exchange rates and loose capital controls. Sargent’s discussion of human rights is equally dispassionate. On Nigeria, he notes that “the humanitarians got things wrong” by accusing the Lagos government of genocide against the Igbos (80). Human rights activism could target the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile—or the camp system in the Soviet Union. Indeed, excessive congressional attention to Solzhenitsyn and Jewish emigration destabilized U.S.-Soviet relations and hastened the end of détente. The very stability achieved by Nixon and Kissinger in the early 1970s “catalyzed the backlash against it” half a decade later (214). Sargent neither celebrates nor laments the emergence of human rights consciousness and a global civil society; he merely documents its salience as a constraint on policy choices.

More fundamentally, Sargent finds fault in presidents espousing a “commitment to American leadership”—a tendency that Sargent traces back, somewhat arbitrarily, to Woodrow Wilson. To Sargent, such exaggerated claims to global leadership were inherently unsustainable and anachronistic. He dismisses Nixon’s entire grand strategy as a form of “reaching backward.”

There are, nevertheless, two cardinal sins in Sargent’s eyes. The first involves the use of a “Cold War lens.” Such a perspective “superimposed ideological binaries on political complexity” (92). In the case of South Asia, Cold War thinking led Nixon and Kissinger to “tilt” toward Pakistan and away from India, since the latter had signed an arms deal with the Soviet Union. When Pakistani forces began slaughtering Bengali resisters seeking freedom for East Pakistan, Kissinger ignored human rights considerations and backed Islamabad to the hilt. Later on, in October 1979, the Carter administration made a similar choice when embracing the new anti-communist military junta in El Salvador (293). Like many scholars before him, Sargent laments zero-sum Cold War perspectives, insisting that they led to poor policy choices.

More fundamentally, Sargent finds fault in presidents espousing a “commitment to American leadership”—a tendency that Sargent traces back, somewhat arbitrarily, to Woodrow Wilson (47). To Sargent, such exaggerated claims to global leadership were inherently unsustainable and anachronistic. He dismisses Nixon’s entire grand strategy as a form of “reaching backward.” On this count, Sargent paints with an exceptionally broad brush. Was Nixon’s policy of “retrenchment and international burden sharing” really as mundane as Sargent claims, simply because it functioned within the existing Cold War paradigm (54)? Was it foolish of the Ford administration to remain “committed to sustaining the postwar international order, an essentially conservative goal” (167)?

In Sargent’s account, détente in the Nixon years combined both of these flaws. First, Nixon and Kissinger—fixated as they were on the “Cold War balance of power” (61)—chose to make arms control the centerpiece of their political agenda. Instead of transcending the Cold War, the SALT and ABM treaties merely stabilized it. Even the dalliance with Beijing only served to reinforce an unhealthy obsession with high politics at a time when other global issues such as energy dependence, post-colonial aspirations, and unhappy European trading partners should have commanded attention instead (66). During the Yom Kippur War, American efforts to cast the Arab-Israeli conflict in bipolar Cold War terms triggered a serious deterioration in trans-Pacific relations. By the same token, Sargent’s critique of the “Cold War lens” implies that the competition with Moscow was a unilateral American construct and that the United States could have chosen to ignore Brezhnev and focus on other problems instead. Such a view treats Soviet behavior as irrelevant; and it suggests further that de-emphasizing the U.S.-Soviet relationship would have had much the same results as the elaborate series of summits and treaties actually negotiated by Nixon and Kissinger. In effect, Sargent is depicting the environment of the mid-1970s as the natural state of things, a world in which the thawing Cold War tundra allowed underlying issues—human rights, the “North-South” dialogue—to bubble up to the surface. This reading seems at odds with Sargent’s acknowledgment that détente was a fragile construct. It took a tremendous amount of diplomatic energy to push the Soviets to the margins of Middle Eastern affairs in 1974. Was bipolarity a more deeply rooted structural feature of the international system than Sargent wants to admit?
Could it be that the surge of Soviet adventurism in the late 1970s marked the real return to normality?

**How Cosmopolitan Was “One-Worldism”?**

Sargent makes plain his conviction that the Carter administration arrived in Washington with the right intellectual preparation, meaning a commitment to U.S.-Japanese-European trilateralism and a penchant for multilateral governance. He explores the zeitgeist of the mid-1970s quite effectively, showing the strong appeal of “interdependence” as an up-to-date way of apprehending the world. Key theorists get their due, including Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Sargent also highlights how elite political groups—the Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission—devoted seminars and publications to subjects such as “perforated sovereignty” and the “crisis of democracy” (170–2). He casts Brzezinski as an avid one-worlder; indeed, the Polish-born National Security Adviser comes across as less wedded to Cold War thinking than his State Department rival Cyrus Vance, who viewed “the sustenance of détente” as “the overarching purpose of US foreign policy” (269).

What Sargent glosses over here is the skeptical reception Jimmy Carter experienced in Europe and Japan alike. Carter’s agenda was multilateral in theory but unilateral in conception; he was trying to foist American priorities on the other G-7 members. Perhaps the cool response he received could be seen as the result of a clash between far-sighted global governance and a jealous regard for national sovereignty (242). Even so, it is telling just how little “trilateral” input went into the making of U.S. policy on nuclear energy or human rights or the demand for German and Japanese stimulus programs. In fairness, Carter was hardly the first U.S. president to want to set the international agenda for America’s allies and trading partners. Why, then, did he provoke so much bitterness overseas, arguably more even than Nixon and Connally? Was it lack of respect for a decidedly non-imperial president? The disappointing contrast with Ford’s easy-going diplomatic style?

To Sargent, Carter’s most significant weaknesses reflected “the general limitations of grand strategic thinking as a tool for apprehending—and mastering—historical complexity” (262). In other words, Carter’s “world order politics” was more consistent and coherent than its critics have appreciated (231), but for that very reason his approach necessarily floundered upon internal contradictions. Sargent wants to stress the logic (or illogic) of grand strategy here; yet his text presents ample evidence of an alternative explanation rooted in domestic politics. Congress balked at Carter’s energy policies. The resulting surge in oil imports hampered the U.S. balance of payments; the dollar plunged in 1977 and 1978, undermining U.S. efforts to coordinate economic policy with the other G-7 countries. Carter blamed the outcome on lobbyists (245). The simple fact, however, is that the U.S. president could not deliver on promises made to his international peers. Perhaps the truly distinctive feature of the 1970s zeitgeist was a reflexive, ingrained rejection of executive power and official expertise – a trend felt across the Western world. Ruling parties routinely thwarted the initiatives of their own party leaders. Was this the inexorable tidal wave of global civil society, or distinct, provincial expressions of not-in-my-backyard-ism? Could skillful political leadership at home by Carter (or Harold Wilson and James Callaghan in Britain, or Helmut Schmidt in West Germany) have yielded better outcomes for “world order politics”?

Perhaps all scholars of contemporary history want to treat the dynamics of “their” periods as harbingers of things to come. Sargent presents the 1970s as a kind of flash preview for the globalizing, post-Soviet world of the 1990s. Yet it is one thing to trace the origins of long-term trends, such as the loosening of financial regulation, and quite another to postulate the fundamental similarity of two different time periods. Yes, the world grew more complex and unmanageable in the 1970s, and it continues to do so. But “complexity,” one of Sargent’s themes, actually makes it harder to trace lines of continuity. Many of the contentious gatherings Sargent writes about with such clarity – the New International Economic Order (NIEO), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) – lost salience during or after the 1980s, when the “world transformed” once again. Activists of the 1970s may have addressed certain problems we recognize, such as environmental degradation and unaccountable multinational corporations, but they did so using different vocabulary and different conceptual frameworks. Sargent has done an excellent job of highlighting the complexity of the 1970s and outlining the ineffective American attempts to remain on top of global trends. His book is a compelling entry point. Much remains to be filled in, however, as the daylight shines ever brighter on the documentary record from four decades ago.

**A Superpower Transformed Roundtable Response**

Daniel J. Sargent

Entitled the final section of the last chapter of A Superpower Transformed “The End of the 1970s” was a declaration of hopeful intent. Having relived the decade in real time, the seventies and I were done. But the breakup has not endured. Thanks to the kindness of editors and the engagement of reviewers, my interest in the 1970s is reanimated. For this, I am grateful. As a first-time author, I find it humbling to receive engaged and supportive reviews from distinguished and well-published colleagues. Gratitude is the appropriate note on which to begin: to David Farber, William Gray, Mark Lawrence, and Luke Nichter and to Andy Johns, editor of Passport, for proposing and stewarding this roundtable.

The reviewers highlight diverse issues, but one area where they and I concur is methodology: evidence matters. That I had opportunity to write what these reviewers have adjudged a well-researched book is a testament to the generosity of others. Mentors at Harvard supported and honed the dissertation on which the book is based. Susan Ferber at Oxford University Press and my colleagues at Berkeley encouraged me to write the fullest book I could muster. Their forbearance enabled me to continue my researches through rounds of revision, even as publication and review deadlines loomed. To the extent that the book predicates its argument upon a synthesis of the primary sources, not the secondary literature, I should also mention the digital tools that I used to organize and synthesize archival documents. Databases like FileMaker and DevonThink have made a great difference to what historians can do with documents, facilitating synthesis and organization via keywords, tags, and even full-text search capacities. I have depended on these technologies, as a growing number of historians do.

The book nonetheless relies more on certain kinds of sources than on others, as reviewers note. Luke Nichter points out that Nixon’s White House tapes are barely deployed. I would have done more with these unique sources had the two volumes of transcripts that Nichter has curated been available, but I will also confess my bias for sources that convey the more reflective, pensive aspects of Richard Nixon. I thought Nixon’s presidential handwriting file especially revelatory. Much of the challenge in writing a book that traces the development of ideas in the policy arena is that concept and purpose must be extrapolated from sources in which they are often more latent than...
explicit. To a degree that surprised me, given the value that affixes to classified sources among diplomatic historians, I found that unclassified sources, including public speeches and policy papers, often yielded considerable insight into the development of core strategic assumptions.

The documents also indicate the book’s analytical scope. As Mark Lawrence notes, A Superpower Transformed might at first blush appear a “stodgy, outdated” book, given its reliance on U.S. sources, which are the starchy fodder of traditional diplomatic history. Yet here the empirical focus is, as Lawrence explains, a function of analytical purpose. The book is not a global history of the 1970s; rather, it is a study of foreign policy decision-making under circumstances of global transition. Alternative foci would have required different kinds of sources. Writing international histories of any of the key episodes that punctuate the book—from the breakdown of fixed exchange rates in 1971-73 to the energy turmoil of 1979-80—would undoubtedly have required fuller use of non-American documents. Yet A Superpower Transformed is not ultimately about episodes and crises in the international history of the 1970s; it is about the conceptual evolution of U.S. foreign policy. Its verdicts, like those of all historical interpretation, are provisional, subject to ongoing revision and correction. I join William Gray in hoping that graduate students (and others) will continue to engage the 1970s, as new documents permit new kinds of historical reconstruction. Who knows, I may even undertake some of this work myself.

Thankfully, the contributors to this roundtable for the most part question my interpretations and judgments, not my handling of the historical substance. One disagreement that does emerge involves the book’s treatment of Nixon’s objectives. Luke Nichter has done more work on Nixon than I have done, and I revisit this terrain with trepidation. Still, what is at stake seems in the end more interpretive than substantive. Was Nixon’s agenda “conservative”? I maintain so, but I take seriously Nichter’s characterization of Nixon as more of a creative figure. A Superpower Transformed acknowledges that Nixon pursued bold methods that sometimes had dramatic consequences, as when dollar devaluation capsized Bretton Woods and détente engendered ideological backlash.

Was Nixon’s agenda “conservative”? I maintain so, but I take seriously Nichter’s characterization of Nixon as more of a creative figure. A Superpower Transformed acknowledges that Nixon pursued bold methods that sometimes had dramatic consequences, as when dollar devaluation capsized Bretton Woods and détente engendered ideological backlash. Yet the ulterior rationale of Nixon’s policy, I remain convinced, was conservative, oriented to sustaining American primacy within a bipolar international order. “Our interests in the Middle East, Europe, China, require keeping the Soviet Union going,” Nixon explained in 1974.1

The issue of Nixon’s agenda leads to a broader problem, which William Gray raises: the question of whether the Cold War was by the 1970s more constructed than real. I do borrow from Matthew Connelly the metaphor of a Cold War “lens,” which conveys the reductive intellectual work that bipolar assumptions often performed, rendering technicolor reality in harsh monochrome.2 My purpose in embracing Connelly’s metaphor is not to suggest, however, that the Cold War was mere smoke and mirrors—an artifact existing only in the minds of U.S. decision-makers. Armed and dangerous, the Soviet Union remained an existential threat to U.S. interests into the 1970s and beyond, and the Soviet threat made the Cold War an enduring concern. I agree with Gray that the Cold War remained a “deeply rooted structural feature of the international system,” but I would stress that the Cold War was a “feature” of the system, not its essential or defining characteristic.

The problem with the “Cold War lens” was that it too often conflated world politics with Cold War politics, obfuscating the complexity of a world that remained “militarily bipolar,” as Henry Kissinger wrote in 1969, but manifested new and unmasterable kinds of “political ultrilolarity.”3 But I do not believe that American policymakers in the mid-1970s should have abandoned the “Cold War lens” for a holistic concept organized around globalization or interdependence. The book seeks not to adjudicate between alternative strategic concepts but to interrogate the basic utility of such concepts. The Carter chapters, after all, show how the embrace of a grand strategic concept for “world order politics” in 1976-77 led the Carter administration to squander the gains of détente. Unified strategies might be alluring, but the practical utility of what officials in 1969 called the “central organizing concept” for foreign policy is more doubtful, at least for a superpower with complex and worldwide interests. (Such strategies may be more appropriate for entities with more focused interests: businesses or even small nations.)

Brzezinski made this point well when he suggested in 1977 that a “concentrated foreign policy must give way to a complex foreign policy.”4 This is not to deny the utility of strategic thinking: strategy connects discrete issues, establishes hierarchies, and imports long-term perspective. What is problematic is the sublimation of complexity to monolithic historical assumptions, a tactic that the “Cold War lens” often encouraged. Strategic interpretation is more effective, and more realistic, when it embraces pluralism and accepts complexity and even incoherence.

Material capacities are in the end what enabled the United States to act in the world, not clever strategies. It was the mismatch between capacities and circumstances in the 1970s that compelled the rethinking of America’s leadership. For my part, I have no aversion to American primacy, even hegemony. Yet diminished circumstances in the 1970s made it necessary for the United States to collaborate with like-minded states to a greater extent than it had done in the high Cold War. Here Nixon erred, especially during the breakdown of Bretton Woods in 1971-73 and the oil crisis of 1973-74. The record of the mid-1970s proved more constructive, as Ford and Kissinger laid the foundations for a new era of intra-Western cooperation, which the G-7 exemplified. Carter and Brzezinski built upon their achievements, but obstacles to collaborative leadership endured, as the travails of 1979-80 would indicate. So, yes, I do believe, to answer Gray’s question, that there was “something particular about the 1970s that made leadership uniquely challenging.” Material capabilities were dwindling as novel challenges proliferated: financial globalization, energy interdependence, the rise of human rights, and so on.

All of this brings me to the searching question that David Farber poses: what difference does grand strategy make in the end? I find myself in agreement with Farber’s suggestion that strategy may not, in the end, be sufficient explanation for “the large-scale changes in America’s global role and the impact that changing global role had on life in the United States in the 1970s.”5 I began the research project that became A Superpower Transformed more convinced than I am now in the capacities of high-level decision-makers to fabricate historical outcomes. To the extent that the decision-makers who populate the book shaped their global circumstances, their agency was mostly ironic, manifesting itself in unintended consequences. I agree with Farber that the off-stage actors were crucial. Financial globalization, for example resulted from the ingenuity of bankers and traders, the adaptation of information technologies, the needs of multinational businesses, and the shortcomings of the Bretton Woods regime. White House decision-makers...
did not will globalization into being; they accommodated themselves to its rise. Yet the book is, in the end, concerned not with the remaking of world politics but with the remaking of U.S. foreign policy—a crucial distinction. Understanding this remaking, I argue, requires situating the history of America’s superpower career, which I engage through the men who presumed to guide it, within a broader conception of global historical change.

Transformation may nonetheless remain contentious. Here, Mark Lawrence raises perhaps the most challenging question of all: was the United States in the 1970s a “superpower transformed,” or was it something more like a superpower adrift or a superpower befuddled? Here, too, semantics matter. To the extent that transformation implies transmutation—a transition from one settled state into a new and distinctive state of affairs—the title may exaggerate the argument. What I intended the title to convey, however, was the kind of change that is achieved via the introduction of new elements and the disruption of existing arrangements. Whether such transformation was achieved in the 1970s will be for others to adjudge, but I will reiterate my core claims.

It was in the 1970s that Bretton Woods crumbled, precipitating the transformation of the United States from creditor to debtor. It was in the 1970s that the United States came to depend upon the global energy market, which it no longer dominated, as a result of its dwindling production. It was in the 1970s that American decision-makers aligned themselves with human rights, having previously favored the prerogatives of self-determination and territorial sovereignty. It was in the 1970s that the United States sided with China against the USSR, remaking the Cold War’s geopolitics. Some of this change was self-conscious; much of it was not. What ensued, however, was not the achievement of a new and sustainable international order. If the United States became a globalized superpower in the 1970s, its new status would in the end prove no more durable than the post-1945 Pax Americana. Settled equilibria are rare in international politics; stability is usually fleeting and prone to unraveling. What demarcates the 1970s as a phase of pivotal transition, I believe, was not the destination but the dramatic shifts in the rates and vectors of change. Expanding the timeframe into the 1980s would have yielded a longer book but not necessarily more settled conclusions, for the core dilemmas that the seventies exposed remain ongoing and unresolved in our own times.

Lest I conclude on an ambivalent note, I will return to my initial theme. David Farber, William Gray, Mark Lawrence, and Luke Nichter have offered four probing, insightful, and generous commentaries on A Superpower Transformed. Their engagement has enriched my own understanding of the book—and of its limits. I am most grateful for their engagement and to Passport for hosting this discussion.

Notes:
Call for Papers

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR) invites proposals for its 2016 Annual Conference, to be held June 23-25 at the University of San Diego in San Diego, CA. Proposals must be submitted via the on-line interface by December 1, 2015.

SHAFR is dedicated to the study of the history of the United States in the world, broadly conceived. This includes not only diplomacy, statecraft, and strategy but also other approaches to Americans’ relations with the wider world, including (but not limited to) global governance, transnational movements, religion, human rights, race, gender, trade and economics, immigration, borderlands, the environment, and empire. SHAFR welcomes those who study any time period from the colonial era to the present.

2016 Program

The conference program will include a Thursday afternoon plenary lecture by Mike Davis, Professor Emeritus of Creative Writing at the University of California, Riverside. Professor Davis is the author of more than 20 books, from the award-winning City of Quartz to transnational studies of neoliberalism, immigration policy, and the politics of disease.

The 2016 keynote address, held at the Saturday luncheon, will be delivered by Robin Kelley, Distinguished Professor of History and Gary B. Nash Endowed Chair in United States History at the University of California, Los Angeles, an acclaimed author of numerous books on U.S. social, political, cultural, and intellectual history and on the African diaspora. Professor Kelley will speak on the life and work of Grace Halsell, a white journalist and activist who sometimes assumed different racial and ethnic identities to highlight transnational inequities.

The 2016 program will also host SHAFR’s fourth annual Job Search Workshop to help prepare our graduate student members for the job market. Students will have the opportunity to receive individualized feedback on their cover letters and CVs from experienced faculty members. Those submitting proposals for the conference may indicate their interest in the job search workshop by checking a box on the online submission form. However, one does not have to be a panelist to participate. The Job Workshop is open to all current graduate students and newly minted PhDs. Priority will be given to first-time participants.

Proposals

SHAFR is committed to holding as inclusive and diverse a conference as possible, and we encourage proposals from women, minorities, and historians residing outside of the United States, as well as scholars working in other disciplines (such as political science, American studies, sociology, anthropology, film studies, and literary criticism).

Graduate students, international scholars, and participants who expand the diversity of SHAFR are eligible to apply for fellowships to subsidize the cost of attending the conference. Please see below and visit shafr.org for the online application form. The deadline to apply for these fellowships is December 1, 2015. The Program Committee especially welcomes panels that transcend conventional chronologies, challenge received categories, or otherwise offer innovative approaches and fresh thinking.

Panel sessions for the 2016 meeting will run one hour and forty-five minutes. A complete panel usually involves three papers plus chair and commentator (with the possibility of one person fulfilling the latter two roles) or a roundtable discussion with a chair and three or four participants. The Program Committee is open to alternative formats, which should be described briefly in the proposal. Papers should be no longer than 20 minutes, and must be shorter in situations where there are more than three paper presentations.

Applicants should note that a roundtable discussion differs from a panel session in that the former necessarily involves an expansive approach, with contributors exploring the historiographical or conceptual dimensions of a broadly defined theme, rather than delving into the details of more narrowly defined subjects.

Applicants are strongly encouraged to apply as part of a panel rather than submit individual paper proposals. Since complete panels with coherent themes will be favored over single papers, those seeking to create or fill out a panel should consult the “panelists seeking panelists” link on the SHAFR 2016 Annual Meeting web page (https://shafr.org/conferences/annual/2016-annual-meeting) or Tweet #SHAFR2016.

Policies

All proposals and funding applications should be submitted via the procedures outlined at shafr.org. Applicants requiring alternative means to submit the proposal should contact the program co-chairs via email at program-chair@shafr.org.
Proposals should list the papers in the order in which participants will present, as they will be printed in that order in the conference program and presented in that order during their session.

Each participant may serve only once in each capacity. For example, each may serve only once as a chair, once as a commentator, and once as a panelist.

AV requests, along with a brief explanation of how the equipment will be used, must be made at the time of application.

Any special scheduling requests (e.g., that a panel not take place on a particular day) must be made at the time of application.

While membership in SHAFR is not required to submit panel or paper proposals, an annual membership for 2016 will be required for those who participate in the 2016 meeting. Enrollment instructions will be included with notification of accepted proposals.

SHAFR and the media occasionally record conference sessions for use in broadcast and electronic media. Presenters who do not wish for their session to be recorded may opt out when submitting a proposal to the Program Committee. An audience member who wishes to audiotape or videotape must obtain written permission of panelists. SHAFR is not responsible for unauthorized recording. SHAFR reserves the right to revoke the registration of anyone who records sessions without appropriate permissions.

For more details about conference lodgings, the “panelists seeking panelists’” forum, travel funding opportunities, and the Job Workshop, please visit the conference website.

We look forward to seeing you next June in San Diego!

SHAFR 2016 Program Committee
Melani McAlister (George Washington University) and Salim Yaqub (University of California, Santa Barbara), co-chairs

Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants

In 2016, SHAFR will offer several Robert A. and Barbara Divine Graduate Student Travel Grants to assist graduate students who present papers at the conference. The following stipulations apply: 1) no award will exceed $300 per student; 2) priority will be given to graduate students who receive no or limited funds from their home institutions; and 3) expenses will be reimbursed by the SHAFR Business Office upon submission of receipts. The Program Committee will make the decision regarding all awards. A graduate student requesting travel funds must make a request when submitting the paper/panel proposal. Applications should consist of a concise letter from the prospective participant requesting funds and an accompanying letter from the graduate advisor confirming the unavailability of departmental funds to cover travel to the conference. These two items should be submitted via the on-line interface at the time the panel or paper proposal is submitted. Funding requests will have no bearing on the Program Committee’s decisions on panels, but funds will not be awarded unless the applicant’s panel is accepted by the committee in a separate decision. Application deadline: December 1, 2015.

SHAFR Global Scholars and Diversity Grants

SHAFR also offers as many as 25 Global Scholars and Diversity Grants to help defray travel and lodging expenses for the 2016 annual meeting. These competitive awards are intended for scholars who represent groups historically under-represented at SHAFR meetings, scholars who offer intellectual approaches that may be fruitful to SHAFR but are under-represented at annual meetings, and scholars from outside the United States. Preference will be given to persons who have not previously presented at SHAFR annual meetings. “Scholars” includes faculty, graduate students, and independent researchers. To further acquaint the winners with SHAFR, they will also be awarded a one-year membership in the organization, which includes subscriptions to Diplomatic History and Passport. Applicants should submit a copy of their individual paper proposal along with a short CV (2-page maximum) and a brief (2-3-paragraph) essay addressing the fellowship criteria (and including information on previous SHAFR meetings attended and funding received from SHAFR). Please submit your application via the on-line interface. Funding requests will have no bearing on the Program Committee’s decisions on panels, but funds will not be awarded unless the applicant’s panel is accepted by the committee in a separate decision. Application deadline: December 1, 2015.
Two Perspectives on the Zivotofsky v. Kerry Decision

Mary L. Dudziak and John Yoo

Editor’s note: On June 8, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling in Zivotofsky v. Kerry. While the case dealt specifically with provisions in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 relating to the status of Jerusalem and whether Congress could require the U.S. Department of State to indicate on passports that Jerusalem is part of Israel, the Court’s decision had broader constitutional implications for executive-legislative relations and ramifications for U.S. foreign relations. In an effort to clarify the issues at stake in the case, Passport invited two noted legal scholars, Mary Dudziak and John Yoo, to comment on the decision and its significance. 

“A Delicate Subject”: The Supreme Court, Congress, and the President’s Foreign Relations Power

Mary L. Dudziak

A delicate subject lies in the background of this case,” wrote Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy at the opening of his opinion for the Court in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, earlier this year. The case upheld the power of the executive branch to require that passports designate the city of Jerusalem, and not the nation of Israel, as the birthplace of American citizens born there. The “delicate subject” Kennedy had in mind was the status of Jerusalem, which has been deeply contested. But this case also engaged a delicate subject of an entirely different sort: the role of the Court itself in apportioning American foreign relations power.

The Supreme Court is traditionally thought to be deferential to the political branches in foreign relations cases. But when Zivotofsky was argued, Supreme Court blogger Lyle Denniston observed that the Justices all seemed to play “diplomat for a day,” offering suggestions for how to avoid diplomatic problems related to passports. “It was quite difficult...to remember that the Supreme Court has serious doubts about its own competence in the field of foreign relations.” In spite of the idea of judicial deference, however, the courts have been a persistent presence in U.S. international affairs. This essay will set the Zivotofsky case in the context of one aspect of the broader legal history of U.S. foreign relations: the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on presidential power. And the essay will explain how this year’s ruling has made the Court itself a delicate subject of an entirely different sort: the role of the Court itself in apportioning American foreign relations power.

The U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv followed State Department policy, and refused to put “Israel” on Zivotofsky’s passport. The underlying executive branch policy at stake is to maintain neutrality on the question of which country is the recognized sovereign of the city of Jerusalem, over which both Israel and the Palestinian people claim sovereignty. Since Israel declared its independence in 1948, however, the United States has declined to recognize any country’s sovereignty over the city. In the context of the Zivotofsky litigation, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice filed a statement in 2006, explaining that:

Within the framework of this highly sensitive, and potentially volatile, mix of political, juridical, and religious considerations, U.S. Presidents have consistently endeavored to maintain a strict policy of not prejudging the Jerusalem status issue and thus not engaging in official actions that would recognize, or might be perceived as constituting recognition of, Jerusalem as either the capital city of Israel, or as a city located within the sovereign territory of Israel.

The passport statute is only one example of efforts by members of Congress who support more strongly pro-Israel policies to challenge U.S. policy on Jerusalem, including efforts to move the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Sovereignty over the city has been a political point for both major parties. In 2012 the Democratic Party platform was amended, at President Barack Obama’s request, to state that “Jerusalem is and will remain the capital of Israel.”

Zivotofsky’s parents brought the courts into this conflict when they sued the secretary of state, beginning a long legal saga that would culminate in a Supreme Court ruling in the government’s favor this June. Most important for scholars of foreign relations and diplomatic history is not the outcome of the case, but the way the Court decided it, ensuring that Congress and the Court itself will have active roles in limiting executive branch authority in international affairs in the future.

Perhaps the most iconic statement by the Court about
the scope of presidential foreign affairs power comes from the 1936 case *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*. In sharp contrast to the reasoning in *Zitołofsky*, the Court emphasized that “The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”* The idea that the nation speaks with one voice in foreign relations, and that voice is the president’s, powerfully informed jurisprudence and legal scholarship during much of the twentieth century. But the constitutional dimensions of American foreign affairs power have shifted over time. This term’s ruling, and *Curtiss-Wright* itself, are best understood within a longer history that has involved sharp battles among presidents, Congress and the courts.

*Curtiss-Wright* was a challenge to the indictment of the Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. for selling machine guns to Bolivia, in violation of a proclamation by President Franklin D. Roosevelt against arms sales to parties involved in conflict in the Chaco region of that country. Congress had delegated power to the president to issue such a proclamation, in the hopes that it might support peace in the region. Although it is a case about foreign relations power, understanding *Curtiss-Wright* requires attention to the broader context of the Court and constitutional power in the 1930s.

For constitutional historians, 1936 was an important year amidst a longer constitutional crisis. The Supreme Court and the president were battling over FDR’s New Deal programs. This conflict would come to a head in 1937, after Roosevelt’s reelection in 1936 was safely behind him, when he proposed a court-packing plan that would have enabled him to appoint new, more sympathetic justices. (The plan failed, of course, but the power to reshape the Court would soon come to Roosevelt anyway through retirement and death of justices.)

What mattered for development of the foreign relations power was one element of the Court’s rulings against New Deal programs: the nondelegation doctrine. In some creative New Deal programs, Congress delegated policy-making power to the executive branch. In *A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States* in 1935, the Court struck down the National Industrial Recovery Act in part because Congress had delegated to the president the power to make legally enforceable new “codes of fair competition” that were negotiated within industries. The underlying idea was that the lawmaking power belonged to Congress under the constitution, and it was unconstitutional for Congress to give it away.

*Curtiss-Wright* came to the Court in between *Schechter Poultry* and the court packing episode. If Congress could not delegate its power to regulate interstate commerce, then surely it could not give away its lawmaking power in other areas. In upholding the indictment in *Curtiss-Wright*, the Court neither applied the nondelegation doctrine nor overturned *Schechter Poultry*. Instead, in essence, it found that the foreign affairs power was different, and not subject to the same limits as the domestic powers of Congress. To accomplish this, Justice George Sutherland, who authored the majority opinion, conceptualized the foreign relations power as different in kind than other powers, as a subject outside of the Court’s authority.

The sweeping embrace of executive power in the decision was not a timeless constitutional principle, legal historian G. Edward White shows in *The Constitution and the New Deal*. Instead, this constitutional vision was crafted within a particular context in which the Court could preserve the foreign relations power by framing it as exceptional, and therefore different than the domestic powers the Court sought to restrain. By laying through the opinion quotations from the founding generation, Sutherland also made this holding seem foundational.

There was, of course a longer history of expansive readings of U.S. foreign relations power. The Court had itself promoted what the Justices called “American empire” in cases involving overseas territories. The Court’s late nineteenth century immigration rulings suggested that American power in the world was an inherent aspect of sovereignty, preceding the Constitution itself. In these and other contexts, the courts played a role in shaping the contours of American global power.

American courts did not disappear from the world stage after *Curtiss-Wright*. Instead, the case provided a logic for the courts to resolve interbranch conflict over executive branch actions. Judicial power was never absent, however, for rulings about the authority of others are themselves exercises of power.

The era of *Curtiss-Wright* was also an era that produced what came to be called an imperial presidency. For reasons, domestic and international, that had little to do with the Supreme Court, presidential power in domestic and foreign affairs expanded. The Court was often deferential to new exercises of federal power, but along the way the Court reassessed its own role in the constitutional separation of powers.

In 1952, during the Korean War, the Supreme Court took up a case that would set the terms for future battles over presidential power. In *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer*, the Court found unconstitutional President Harry S. Truman’s order to seize steel mills to avert a strike. Justice Robert Jackson’s concurrence in *Youngstown* would become the touchstone for analysis of presidential power in future years. Jackson reasoned that presidential power must be considered in relation to the powers of Congress. He separated presidential actions into three categories. When the president acted “pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate” (category #1).

At the other end of the scale, if a president’s action was “incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb.” In that context, “he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter” (category #3). In between these two categories was what Jackson called “a zone of twilight,” where Congress and the president had concurrent authority, or the distribution of power was uncertain (category #2). Jackson interpreted the relevant statutes in *Youngstown* in a way that cast Truman’s action into the “lowest ebb” of his power, and agreed with the majority that the seizure was unconstitutional.

Truman had justified the seizure because of the importance of steel to the war effort, and Chief Justice Fred Vinson’s dissent reminded the Court of its previous statements that the president was “the Nation’s organ for foreign affairs.” Although the quote was reminiscent of *Curtiss-Wright*, Vinson was probably directing his ire at Justice Jackson, implying that he was contradicting himself. Jackson had used that phrase and cited *Curtiss-Wright* in a 1948 opinion emphasizing the importance of judicial deference to the executive in foreign relations.

In later cases, courts and litigants would analyze which of Justice Jackson’s categories fit a presidential action. If the president was acting pursuant to a statute—the highest category of power—the president’s action was presumptively constitutional. If acting against the will of congress, presidential power was at its “lowest ebb,” and hard to sustain. In the middle, the twilight zone, it was more ambiguous. *Curtiss-Wright* survived alongside
this framework, and helped to underscore the breadth of constitutional authority granted presidents—by Congress and the constitution itself—in contexts that went to the heart of foreign affairs. The outer boundaries of presidential power never had to be defined, however, because the Court never found that a foreign affairs case fell into the lowest category of authority—until Zivotofsky.20

The Zivotofsky case bounced back and forth in the federal courts for years. When Menachem Binyamin Zivotofsky’s parents first brought suit over his passport, two courts dismissed the case. The District Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia both held that the case presented a “political question” inappropriate for judicial resolution. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the power to recognize a foreign sovereign belongs to the president, and “deciding whether the Secretary of State must mark a passport...as Zivotofsky requests would necessarily draw [the court] into an area of decision-making the Constitution leaves to the Executive alone.”21 But the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit in 2012, holding that the case did not involve the recognition of sovereignty over Jerusalem, but instead simply whether the passport statute was constitutional, a question that fell within judicial competence and authority.22 On remand, the Court of Appeals again ruled in favor of the government in 2013, holding that the statute undermined the president’s exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns.23

The Zivotofsky case returned to the Supreme Court again last fall, with oral arguments on November 3, 2014. It took the Court seven months to issue a ruling, leading to speculation that the Court was divided and found the case difficult to resolve. Justice Kennedy announced the outcome on June 8, 2015. The vote was 5-4 in favor of the government. The result for Zivotofsky himself, now twelve years old, is that only Jerusalem, not Israel, will appear on his passport.24

The Court found that because the case involved a conflict between an executive branch policy and a federal statute, presidential power was at its “lowest ebb” under Youngstown. This meant that the most stringent analysis of presidential power applied. The policy could be upheld only if the president alone had the power to recognize foreign sovereigns, and if the case involved a conflict between an executive branch policy and a federal statute, presidential power was at its “lowest ebb” under Youngstown. This meant that the most stringent analysis of presidential power applied. The policy could be upheld only if the president alone had the power to recognize foreign sovereigns, and if the statute conflicted with that recognition. The Court found that because the case

affairs as in the domestic realm.” Kennedy emphasized that it was “essential the congressional role in foreign affairs be understood and respected.” The president “is not free from the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue.” The Court went on to invalidate the statute, finding that it conflicted with the president’s exclusive recognition power.27

In spite of the bare outcome of the case—the Court struck down the statute and upheld executive branch policy—Zivotofsky should not be mistaken as a case that reins in Congress. The Court explicitly narrowed its interpretation of Curtiss-Wright, and repeatedly emphasized the importance of Congress’s role in foreign relations.

Rhetorically, the presidency was transformed from the “sole organ” of foreign relations to the nation’s “one voice” on recognition. By reinscribing the vehicle of U.S. foreign policy, the Court, in essence, described the presidency as its horn. This helps us to see how the outcome (executive branch won) could distract us from the likely impact: enhancing Congress’s ability to limit presidential power.28

But there is one more result in this case. When the Supreme Court apportions power among Congress and the president, it is an active manager of the foreign relations power. Justice Breyer and the lower courts urged that the judiciary should instead stay its hand and dismiss the case. The outcome would have been similar: executive branch policy would not be invalidated. What the Court majority accomplished through its intervention was to shore up Congress, and at the same time to keep the management of the legal boundaries of foreign relations powers in the hands of the courts.

Notes:
1. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2081 (2015). A link to the initial “Slip Opinion” is at SCOTUSblog: http://www.scoutusblog.com/case-files/cases/zivotofsky-v-kerry/. Subsequent page cites in this essay will be to the Court’s slip opinion because it is accessible open access, rather to the Supreme Court Reporter. Readers should turn to U.S. Reports once the opinion is published, or to the Supreme Court Reporter in the interim, when citing to the case in publications.
In its fall 2014 term, the Supreme Court legalized gay marriage, upheld critical Obamacare subsidies, allowed states to use nonpartisan commissions to draw voting districts, and accepted the use of racial statistics in fair housing cases. In the midst of these controversial decisions, Zivotofsky v. Kerry may end up as a footnote in the law books. But it shouldn’t. Zivotofsky adds to the president’s constitutional arsenal in foreign affairs and could affect the struggle over Middle East policy, such as an Iranian nuclear deal.

At first glance, Zivotofsky appears as important as the color of TSA uniforms. It only holds that the executive branch controls the form of U.S. passports. According to the Court, the State Department, rather than Congress, decides whether to record the birthplace of a U.S. citizen as “Jerusalem,” rather than as “Israel.” According to the Obama administration, which continued the position of its Republican and Democratic predecessors, to choose “Israel” would imply American recognition of the holy city as part of Israeli territory. When Congress passed the law at stake in Zivotofsky in 2002, George W. Bush declared that Congress would be “impermissibly interfere[ing] with the President’s constitutional authority to formulate the position of the United States, speak for the Nation in international affairs, and determine the terms on which recognition is given to foreign states.” In the subtle world of Middle Eastern politics, recording a birthplace as Jerusalem, rather than in Israel, maintains neutrality on the city’s final status.

But Zivotofsky bears significance well beyond the content of U.S. passports. The Court found that the president holds a monopoly on the recognition of foreign governments, which stems from his exclusive constitutional authority to “receive Ambassadors.” Congress, however, controls immigration, the borders, and international travel. But Justice Anthony Kennedy, who wrote the majority opinion, concluded that Congress could not use these powers to contradict the president’s position on Israel’s territorial boundaries. A passport law that contradicts presidential foreign policy “would not only prevent the Nation from speaking with one voice but also prevent the Executive itself from doing so in conducting foreign relations.”

Controlling passports rises to the level of constitutional importance because the Framers did not clearly assign the foreign affairs power to either the president or Congress. The constitutional text, for example, does not declare that either branch enjoys the power to set relations with foreign nations—a startling lacuna, in light of the Constitution’s detailed prohibitions on state activities in foreign affairs. And when the Framers did look abroad, unlike the British lawyers of their time, they divided powers between the branches. They explicitly split treatymaking between the president and Senate, gave the president the role of commander-in-chief and Congress the power to declare war and raise armies, and required that the Senate approve the president’s appointment of ambassadors. Political scientist Edwin Corwin famously observed that this arrangement created “an invitation to struggle” over directing foreign policy.

Into this textual vacuum, the president’s institutional advantages and historical practice have come to the fore. This may come as no surprise to historians of American foreign relations, who toil in the archives of presidential libraries and organize diplomatic history by administration. Although the constitutional question of control of foreign policy first arose in President George Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality during the French Revolution, because of the Constitution’s silence, it reappears at regular intervals during periods of crisis—from the Civil War, to World Wars I and II, the Cold War, and most recently the response to the 9-11 attacks and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (on which, it should not go unmentioned, I worked as an official in the U.S. Department of Justice).

Such areas of constitutional ambiguity would seem tailor-made for Supreme Court intervention. But the Justices rarely step into the struggle between the president and Congress over American foreign policy. The Court doubts its own competence to assess delicate matters of diplomacy and worries that it might contradict the elected branches on a matter of great national importance. Instead of roaming through foreign policy with the same abandon that they
exhibit on domestic questions, the Justices often defer to the executive branch on foreign policy or avoid a decision altogether. In *Goldwater v. Carter* (1979), for example, the Supreme Court refused to decide whether Jimmy Carter could terminate unilaterally the U.S. treaty with Taiwan, even though the president needs two-thirds of the Senate to make a treaty. A majority of the Justices agreed that the judiciary should refuse to intervene in the dispute between the president and Congress, which effectively left the power of treaty termination with the president. “[T]he President almost always wins in foreign affairs,” one critic of presidential power, Yale professor Harold Koh, wrote in an influential law journal article.

*Zivotofsky* followed in this tradition of judicial deference to the president in foreign policy. It adopted the basic reasoning of one of the Supreme Court’s most pro-executive precedents, *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation* (1936). In *Curtiss-Wright*, the Court upheld President Franklin Roosevelt’s arms embargo on Bolivia and Paraguay, which were engaged in a war at the time, pursuant to a federal statute. For the majority, Justice Arthur Sutherland admitted that the Constitution had failed to assign many important foreign policy powers between the branches, but still concluded that they had to vest in the federal government. “The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other sovereignties,” Sutherland wrote, “if they had never been mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of nationality.”

In the face of this silence, *Curtiss-Wright* concluded, foreign affairs powers must vest in the presidency because of its institutional advantages. Wrote Sutherland: “In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.” Quoting from a Senate report, he further explained that “[t]he nature of transactions with foreign nations . . . requires caution and unity of design, and their success frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch.” Sutherland concluded that the power over foreign policy had to exist in the national government, even if it went unmentioned in the Constitution, and that because of the executive’s institutional advantages, that power would vest in the President. Quoting Chief Justice John Marshall (uttered when he was a mere member of Congress), Sutherland declared the president to be the “sole organ” of the nation in its foreign affairs. *Curtiss-Wright* and similar decisions from the 1930s bolstered FDR’s campaign to re-engage in world affairs and to prepare for the gathering storm.

*Zivotofsky* and *Curtiss-Wright* themselves are no sharp break from practice, but instead follow a tradition that stems from the earliest days of the Republic. When the French Revolution broke out, President George Washington did not immediately issue his Proclamation of Neutrality. Rather, he ordered Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson to seek the legal views of the Justices on a range of questions, such as whether the 1778 treaty with France required U.S. assistance to the new regime, whether international law recognized the revolutionaries as the true government of France, and so on. The Court refused to answer the questions because they did not arise in the context of a legal case. President Washington then took the initiative and declared neutrality, a decision famously defended by Alexander Hamilton as Pacificus and attacked by James Madison as Helvidius.

Hamilton planted the arguments that would flourish in *Curtiss-Wright* and *Zivotofsky*. According to Pacificus, Article I of the Constitution vested in Congress carefully limited powers, such as the power to regulate interstate commerce, declare war, and raise and support armies. Article II, however, vested in the president “the executive power,” without enumerating its content. Any power by nature executive, such as representing the nation in its foreign affairs, must accrue to the president, except for powers that the Constitution explicitly transferred elsewhere. “The general doctrine then of our Constitution is, that the Executive Power of the Nation is vested in the President,” Hamilton concluded, “subject only to the exceptions and qualifications which are expressed in that instrument.”

Hamilton argued that the conduct of foreign relations was fundamentally executive in nature under British constitutional practice and the theories of Locke, Blackstone, and Montesquieu. Therefore, Article II’s vesting of executive power in the president gave Washington the right to decide not to intervene in what would become the Napoleonic Wars. It should be noted that Hamilton was not a fair weather friend of executive power. During the ratification contest, as Publius he had argued in Federalist 72 that “the actual conduct of foreign negotiations,” “the arrangement of the army and navy,” and “the directions of the operations of war” should fall “peculiarly within the province of the executive department.”

Writing as Helvidius, Madison set out the case for congressional control over foreign affairs that endures to this day. He dismissed Locke and Montesquieu’s classification of foreign affairs as executive in nature because they were “evidently warped by a regard to the particular government of England.” Making treaties and declaring war were legislative powers because they had the force of law; therefore, the President could not exercise them. “The natural province of the executive magistrate is to execute laws, as that of the legislature is to make laws,” Madison wrote. “All his acts therefore, properly executive, must presuppose the existence of the laws to be executed.” To allow the president a share of the legislative power “is an absurdity—in practice a tyranny.” Madison’s deeper argument was that placing the power to conduct war and to begin war in the same hands risked tyranny. “Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things be proper or safe judges whether a war ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded,” according to Madison, “war is in fact the true nurse of executive aggrandizement.”

Madison’s arguments, however, failed. Washington proclaimed neutrality. Even Thomas Jefferson, who had urged Madison to attack Hamilton and established the Democratic Party to challenge Washington, would exercise broad executive authority once he moved into the Oval Office. Ever since the Helvidius-Pacificus debates, presidents have exercised the initiative in foreign affairs, punctuated by periods—such as the 1930s Neutrality Acts—where Congress has used its power over international commerce and military funding to push the nation in a different direction.

Because *Zivotofsky* involves Jerusalem, it cannot help but provide a window into the struggle over U.S. Middle East policy. It also comes at a time when the sitting commander-in-chief has invoked executive power against the states or to refuse to enforce federal laws on immigration, drug, and education laws.
U.S. military support and aid. He can argue against any new congressional efforts to increase sanctions on Iran or Syria or reduce support for the Palestinians because they interfere, a la Zivotofsky, with executive foreign policy in the Middle East.

This is why Justice Clarence Thomas’s concurring opinion in Zivotofsky offered the best resolution of the dispute (by the way, I served as a law clerk for Thomas twenty years ago). The majority opinion used an ambiguous balancing test to decide that the president’s power to recognize ambassadors allowed control over passports. The dissent mistakenly argued that the president did not have the privilege of recognizing foreign governments and of conducting foreign policy generally. But the majority left open the possibility that it might swing Congress’s way if the dispute were important enough. Such uncertainty may preserve the Framers’ hope that the contest between the branches of government would preserve liberty, but it also aggrandizes the judicial role beyond its traditional scope.

Thomas refused to follow either flawed approach. In an opinion rooted in American diplomatic history, he concluded that the Framers had understood the “executive power” of the president in foreign affairs to include issuing passports. The virtue of his view is that the executive power does not undermine Congress’s competing authorities. Regardless of the executive’s choice of foreign policy, Congress can always impose trade and travel sanctions on foreign countries. By mistaking the source of the foreign affairs power, both the majority and dissent transformed a small case into a constitutional conflict between the executive and legislative branches. The majority’s outcome foisted on the Constitution an unpredictable balancing test that could support an end run around the treaty power. The main conservative dissent turned its back on a once consistent defense of an energetic executive.

Perhaps the Justices could not help but decide this case with the coming constitutional conflict over Iran on the horizon. President Obama’s agreement with Iran, reached while this essay went to press, calls on Iran to halt its nuclear weapons research for ten years and to accept international inspectors. In exchange, the United States must lift the crippling economic sanctions that brought Iran to the bargaining table. In a strange upending of the normal treaty process, Congress must pass a disapproval resolution—subject to presidential veto—to stop the agreement. But even if Congress were to assemble the necessary two-thirds majority vote to override, Zivotofsky strengthens Obama’s constitutional hand to pursue his opening to Iran as a matter of foreign policy. The majority’s decision, unfortunately, pretends that such matters are open to resolution in the courts, rather than in the political process where they belong.

Indeed, Zivotofsky offers President Obama an end run around the Constitution’s treaty clause, already diluted by Congress’s law for reviewing the deal. As I argued in Taming Globalization (2012), such a significant commitment of U.S. sovereignty must undergo the Constitution’s treaty process to constitute a legally binding agreement. But President Obama could argue that he is making no deal at all; he is only setting executive foreign policy to remain friendly toward Iran as long as it remains a non-nuclear power. Any written text would only establish a “framework” for cooperation. He could refuse to send a deal with Iran to Congress because he had made no legal agreement that rose to the level of a treaty.

Republicans would respond by ramping up sanctions on the Iranian economy. Suppose they overcome an administration veto. The Supreme Court’s decision suddenly could come into play. In the last year of his term, President Obama might refuse to obey the sanctions. He could repeat his refusal to enforce the laws and claim that he is selectively prosecuting cases in the national interest, even if he chooses zero cases to bring. But Zivotofsky could give the White House an added dimension of authority. The administration could argue that sanctions, even though passed pursuant to Congress’s sole control over foreign commerce, force executive branch officers to contradict the president’s foreign policy toward Iran. While the dissenter in Zivotofsky thought the notion ridiculous, three years ago most would not have thought that the President could systematically refuse to enforce the immigration laws in millions of cases. But as Zivotofsky shows, precedents can not only define the executive power, but expand it.
Graduate students make up an important component of SHAFR’s membership base. They have a strong presence at the annual meeting as attendees as well as presenters, they are frequent and enthusiastic contributors to Diplomatic History and other U.S. foreign relations journals, and they are the future of our organization. This begs the question: how well is SHAFR serving the needs of these graduate student members as they work toward completing their degrees, finding employment, and (hopefully) becoming dedicated, lifelong members of our esteemed organization? What, if anything, could or should SHAFR do differently? Those of us who participated in the 2015 SHAFR Summer Institute (SSI), which brought advanced graduate students and early career faculty members together with several established scholars, had the opportunity to consider these questions at length.

Our discussions revealed a deep appreciation for the commitment that SHAFR has made to understanding and prioritizing the needs of its graduate student members. The SSI participants shared the consensus that SHAFR is a leader in this regard, especially compared to other professional historical societies. Indeed, the SSI itself is just one of the many commendable opportunities for professional development and intellectual growth that SHAFR provides to graduate students. The numerous funding opportunities that SHAFR offers for doctoral research as well as foreign language acquisition have enabled many graduate students to write cutting-edge dissertations and ensured that recipients finished their degrees in a timely manner. The job workshop at the annual meeting gives graduate students unparalleled insight into the academic job market and assistance in preparing application documents. On a more basic level, SHAFR is incredibly welcoming to graduate students: scholars at the annual meeting are generous with their time and advice, and the inclusion of graduate student representatives on Council and on key committees makes clear that the organization values the contributions and talents of its junior members.

Since SHAFR is a forward-looking organization, however, it should not rest on its laurels. As we all know, the academic job market remains extremely challenging for ABDs and recently-minted Ph.D.s, particularly for those laboring in fields and subfields that have fallen out of fashion. Graduate students cannot leave professional development to the last few years of their doctoral programs; they need help at all stages of their training to build a competitive dossier, and the need does not end with graduation. The academic job market remains extremely challenging for ABDs and recently-minted Ph.D.s, particularly for those laboring in fields and subfields that have fallen out of fashion. Graduate students cannot leave professional development to the last few years of their doctoral programs; they need help at all stages of their training to build a competitive dossier, and the need does not end with graduation. The benefits we are already reaping from these relationships—to say nothing of the testimonials we heard from past participants—have convinced us that fostering face-to-face connections with colleagues at similar stages and working in similar fields...
is one of the most critical and underdeveloped parts of SHAFR’s graduate student mentorship.

To be sure, much of the annual conference’s value to graduate students are the informal and serendipitous connections one makes by attending panels and talking with the presenters and other attendees. However, one way the annual meeting might serve as a catalyst for graduate student networking is to host a graduate student social. Such an event would give all of us a chance to meet others researching related themes and employing comparable methodologies in a congenial and low-pressure setting. We cannot overstate the potential value of such encounters, especially given that while some of us are fortunate to attend graduate programs with large cohorts of other graduate students who study diplomatic and international history, others of us labor mostly in solitude. This type of informal networking has the potential to foster lifelong friendships as well as productive research collaborations. In addition to a social event at the annual meeting, SHAFR might establish a digital hub through its website or existing social media accounts to nurture these connections between graduate students and to encourage ongoing interaction. Bringing junior members of the profession together in this way would build additional enthusiasm for SHAFR, leading to an enduring sense of a commitment to the organization and a desire to contribute to its ongoing success.

As the annual SHAFR meeting has grown in popularity, it has become more competitive and difficult for potential presenters to get their panels accepted. Although many doctoral students participate in the annual meeting, several SSI members expressed an interest in organizing an annual SHAFR-sponsored graduate student conference that would give students in the early stages of their doctoral programs opportunities to present papers, receive feedback from established scholars, and participate in professional development workshops geared specifically to their needs. Such a conference might rotate among several host universities in different regions of the country. This would allow graduate students from a wide range of different programs to hone their presentation skills and learn how to assemble a strong, engaging panel while also demonstrating the vibrancy of the field of U.S. foreign relations history.

Of course, any discussion of what SHAFR can do to assist graduate students would be incomplete without mention of funding. One thing we learned from meeting colleagues at other universities is just how varied institutional support for research and conference attendance remains. While some students enjoy guaranteed summer support, most do not. Graduate students conducting international research, as well as those interested in pursuing research into the domestic factors that influence U.S. foreign relations, face stiff competition for the limited funds available from their home institutes, organizations such as SHAFR, and other national funding agencies. Moreover, although some graduate students enjoy adequate funding for conference attendance, other institutions offer only a small (i.e. $200) fixed sum for conference attendance, regardless of the conference’s duration and location. When discussing alternative locations for the organization’s annual meeting, we encourage SHAFR to keep in mind the necessity of commensurate graduate student funding. In the event of an oft-discussed international conference, additional financial support for graduate students would be essential.

Finally, we would like to pass along some brief thoughts about the Summer Institute itself, with a few suggestions for making future Institutes even more rewarding for participants. Drawing on a common theme from our conversations on this topic, many of this year’s participants hoped that SHAFR might consider expanding the SSI so as to both increase the number of participants and provide a more tailored experience for attendees. This year, SSI participants ranged from graduate students just beginning their dissertations to recently-minted Ph.D.s who have been working as instructors or adjuncts over the past few years. While we all benefited from sharing our research with each other and from the workshops on publishing, the academic job market, and teaching, many participants felt that it would have been beneficial if there had been either separate workshops for those still working on their dissertations and for those who had finished, or perhaps even two separate but parallel summer institutes. For example, participants at earlier stages in their career could have a seminar on the state of the field and sources available, while simultaneously late-stage attendees could have a discussion (with a specific question and answer session) about how to turn their dissertations into a book and how to approach publishers. We would like to reiterate the point that the SSI should retain its professionalization focus for both early and late stage participants, especially given the fact that those at early stages of their careers still have the time to incorporate advice and improve their CVs. Nevertheless, sub-group meetings and/or two separate institutes would allow each participant to get even more out of the experience.

While we hope that the ideas herein will serve as starting points for future discussions, we would like to conclude with a reiteration of our sincere gratitude to SHAFR. SHAFR members can take for granted that essays like this will find a receptive audience of scholars eager to address graduate student needs—an assumption that does not apply to many other organizations. In most respects, we simply encourage SHAFR to continue what it is already doing and to think a bit more about how to expand existing programs to reach more people. With that in mind, we will close with a word to our fellow graduate students and junior faculty: join SHAFR, apply to the SHAFR Summer Institute, and come to the annual conference (even if you are not presenting). There are precious few scholarly organizations out there that are as supportive, friendly, and intellectually rigorous as SHAFR, and we encourage everyone to get involved.

2015 SHAFR Summer Institute participants relaxing in the Short North, Columbus, OH.
The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR), in partnership with the Transatlantic Studies Association (TSA), invites proposals for the SHAFR Summer Institute, to be held in the summer of 2016 in the Netherlands (precise date and location will be announced on SHAFR.org and on transatlanticstudies.com). The Institute will be timed so that participants may attend both the annual SHAFR conference in San Diego and the TSA conference at the University of Plymouth (UK). Participants are strongly encouraged (but not required) to attend one or both conferences, and the TSA conference fee will be waived for Institute participants.

The Institute will focus on the use of propaganda, intelligence, and culture as lenses through which to reconsider broader approaches to international and transnational history. Emphasizing the role of government security and information agencies, state-private networks, and non-state and transnational actors, the institute will explore the interconnectedness of public and private, domestic and international, state and non-state. Participants will work with each other and the organizers in a series of research workshops to refine and enhance the analytical framework of a significant research project, ideally (but not exclusively) oriented toward publication of a first book. In addition, the Institute will include professional development sessions and an active-learning pedagogical workshop on the theme of historical memory that will take place at a local site of historical significance.

Objectives of the Institute include: (1) enhance the analytical complexity of on-going research; (2) internationalize SHAFR by building connections between American, European, and other international scholars; (3) promote collaborative international and transnational research networks; (4) share knowledge, archival sources, and research techniques in intelligence and propaganda history.

The Institute is designed for advanced graduate students and early career faculty members in history from around the world, with roughly half the participants coming from North America. All sessions and readings will be in English. Participants will be expected to do some collaborative online work prior to the Institute, and submit a draft chapter-length portion of their research projects by March 15, 2016. Each participant will be provided free accommodation and a stipend sufficient to offset major travel expenses.

The deadline for applications is January 10, 2016. Applications should include the following as a single PDF file: one-page curriculum vitae; one-page abstract of the research project to be presented at the Institute, including a brief description of the significance of the project and its source base; and a cover page listing current contact information, institutional affiliation, title of proposed research project, and short answers to the following questions: (1) What are your publication plans for your research project, and what is a realistic timeline for completion? (2) What journal article or book chapter had the greatest impact on your research interests, methods, or ideas? Briefly explain, and provide a complete citation. Please do not cite the Institute organizers. (3) Optional: How will you combine your travel to this Institute with archival research in Europe or participation at the TSA conference? (4) Optional: applicants who can contribute their own funding to subsidize their participation in the Institute should identify the funding source and amount. Applicants should send these materials as a single PDF file to: shafr2016@gmail.com. A letter of recommendation should also be sent by the recommender (typically dissertation advisor) directly to this email address. Questions about the institute are welcome and may be directed to the email address above.

The Institute will be led by Kenneth Osgood (Colorado School of Mines), J. Simon Rofe (SOAS, University of London), Giles Scott-Smith (University of Leiden), and Hugh Wilford (California State University, Long Beach).
A View from Overseas: The Congressional Commemoration of the Bosnian Genocide

Hamza Karčić

Editor’s note: The following essay is part of the Passport series, “A View from Overseas,” which features short pieces written by someone outside of the United States, examining the views held by the people and government in their country about the United States. SHAFR members who are living abroad, even temporarily, or who have contacts abroad who might be well-positioned to write such pieces are encouraged to contact the editor at passport@shafr.org.

July 11, 2015, marked the twentieth anniversary of Srebrenica, the final and most brutal phase of the genocide committed by Bosnian Serb military and police forces against Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) from 1992 until 1995. American journalist Roy Gutman received a Pulitzer Prize in 1993 for his reporting on the death camps in Bosnia; ten years later, Samantha Power, scholar, former journalist, and now U.S. ambassador to the UN, was the recipient of a Pulitzer Prize for her work on genocide, which vividly described the Bosnian case. They were joined by an impressive array of scholars and journalists who contributed to the expanding literature on the gravest crime in Europe since the Second World War. Gutman’s reporting and Power’s study shed invaluable light on this aspect of Europe’s history at the turn of the century. Their findings were reaffirmed by two crucial resolutions adopted by the U.S. Congress in 2005. Those resolutions also confirmed what a number of U.S. legislators had testified to during the early 1990s.

The first resolution (S. Res. 134) was adopted in June 2005 to commemorate the tenth anniversary of Srebrenica. Introduced by Gordon H. Smith and co-sponsored by eight well-known senators, the resolution declared that “the massacre at Srebrenica was among the worst of the many horrible atrocities to occur in Bosnia and Herzegovina from April 1992 to November 1995, during which the policies of aggression and ethnic cleansing pursued by Bosnian Serb forces with the direct support of authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) ultimately led to the displacement of more than 2,000,000 people, an estimated 200,000 killed.” The Senate further declared that the “policies of aggression and ethnic cleansing as implemented by Serb forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995 meet the terms defining the crime of genocide in Article 2” of the Genocide Convention, which was ratified by the UN in 1951. This resolution was adopted unanimously by the Senate.

Several days later, the House of Representatives passed its own resolution (H.Res.199) on the tenth anniversary of Srebrenica. The resolution was introduced by New Jersey Republican Chris Smith and was co-sponsored by thirty-nine congressmen. Many of the clauses passed by the House were similar to clauses in the Senate resolution. A major difference was that the House resolution declared that the Bosnian Serb forces had the support of “the Serbian regime of Slobodan Milosevic and his followers.” The Senate went further in stating that the Bosnian Serb forces had the support of “authorities in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).” While the Senate resolution was passed unanimously, the House resolution passed by 370-1 (with the lone no vote cast by Rep. Ron Paul). Among the numerous co-sponsors of the House resolution was Tom Lantos, a major human rights advocate and the only Holocaust survivor ever to have served in the U.S. Congress.

The adoption of these resolutions in 2005 marked a milestone in legislative commemoration of the Bosnian genocide. Both chambers passed resolutions declaring the nature of crimes committed between 1992 and 1995 in Bosnia as genocide. In fact, individual legislators had been stating as much in the early 1990s. Foremost among them were Senator Bob Dole and Indiana congressman Frank McCloskey, but this camp included several other legislators from both sides of the aisle. Dole’s Senate papers and McCloskey’s congressional papers show that both legislators started referring to genocide in 1992 in letters to fellow members of Congress and to the executive branch. Dole’s papers contain a letter he wrote to President George H.W. Bush on December 17, 1992, in which he and twelve other senators noted that “the genocide of the people of Bosnia is continuing” and urged the president to act.

McCloskey, whose advocacy was vividly described by Samantha Power and whom Paul R. Bartrop calls “the biggest supporter of Bosnia in Congress during the genocide,” was adamant that what was happening in Bosnia constituted genocide. His congressional papers at Indiana University testify to his strong feelings. One of the earliest documents in McCloskey’s archive on Bosnia is one produced following his trip to the Balkans in late 1992. After a visit as part of a Helsinki Commission delegation to Macedonia and Croatia in November 1992, led by Arizona Senator Dennis DeConcini, McCloskey issued a statement declaring that genocide was being committed on European soil. When McCloskey called for Secretary of State Warren Christopher’s resignation in October 1993, one of the reasons he gave was that Christopher, in McCloskey’s words, “steadfastly refused to describe Serbian atrocities in Bosnia as genocide.” The McCloskey archive is replete with similar letters and statements drawing attention to Bosnia and urging an assertive intervention.

While Dole, McCloskey and others were pointing out that genocide was being committed in Bosnia and were calling for an intervention in the early 1990s, the 2005 congressional resolutions affirmed the views of the full Senate and House. Both chambers, in other words, confirmed what several individual legislators had begun saying more than a decade earlier. In passing these...
landmark resolutions, Congress laid the groundwork for legislative commemorations of the Bosnian genocide. When Australian member of parliament Michael Danby introduced a resolution commemorating Srebrenica in November 2011, he stated that “this House very bravely, very seriously, joins the Congress of the United States and parliaments in Europe in remembering these dreadful and important events.” Clearly the U.S. Congress’ resolutions of 2005 on Bosnia had an impact beyond the water’s edge.

Notes:
4. For a detailed description of Congressman Frank McCloskey’s advocacy for Bosnia see Samantha Power, “A Problem From Hell”;
5. America and the Age of Genocide (New York, 2002).
6. Letter to President George H. W. Bush, Box 124, Folder 6, “Foreign Policy – Issues to Balkan States 1990–1994 (1 of 2),” Republican Leadership Collection, Robert J. Dole Institute of Politics Archive and Special Collections, University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS.
The Entangled Histories of Human Rights and the Olympic Games

Barbara Keys, Roland Burke, and Guoqi Xu

By now we are all familiar with the human rights scrutiny that accompanies the media frenzy before every Olympic Games. We saw it before the 2008 Beijing Games, the 2014 Sochi Games, and now the 2016 Rio Games. Cuba and a few Muslim-majority countries are among the only places where the media does not routinely cover the human rights implications of sports mega-events. Human rights pressures on the Games were once mostly limited to issues that directly affected athletes; now they encompass fair employment, gender equality, LGBT rights, free speech, political imprisonment, fair trials, and much more. In the last decade, the two global human rights powerhouses, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have devoted substantial resources to Olympic campaigns, augmenting their reach by engaging with audiences transfixed by the biannual events. Measured by the publicity accruing to human rights groups, top sports bodies’ apparent preference in recent years to select host cities that are deeply problematic in human rights terms has been perversely fortuitous.

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) is feeling the pressure. Hammered by bad publicity, and with democracies deserting the bidding process due to skyrocketing costs, the IOC has made some procedural concessions. It has added an anti-discrimination clause and (appropriately, given the origin of the Olympics) delphic human rights provisions to the host city contract, beginning with the 2022 Games.

These moves are largely cosmetic. The new “human rights” language requires that a host city “take all necessary measures to ensure that development projects necessary for the organization of the games comply with local, regional and national legislation and international agreements and protocols, applicable in the host country with regard to planning, construction, protection of the environment, health and safety and labor laws.” It asks nothing more than that these laws will be obeyed. But Human Rights Watch has praised the new language—and apparently even had a role in its drafting.

The rise of universal human rights to the status of global moral lingua franca has taken place alongside the transformation of the Olympics into a gargantuan global commercial and media spectacle. Inevitably these two powerful phenomena have been drawn into a mixture of contention and competitive co-option, creating a complex relationship that has mixed synergies and antagonisms. Since the 1960s, the claims of universal human rights have chipped away at the Olympic illusion that sport can be free from politics, and a vocal segment of the human rights movement and the media have pressed the Olympics to deliver ever grander and more ambitious moral achievements. Olympic officials have responded erratically, but on the whole in ways that have expanded the moral girth of the festival’s aspirations.

In November 2014, the School of Historical and Philosophical Studies at the University of Melbourne convened a day-long symposium on “The Olympic Games and Human Rights” to explore the origins and development of this increasingly fraught relationship. This event brought together academic experts on the Olympic Games (Kristine Tooley) and human rights (Patrick Kelly), a sport executive with close ties to the IOC (Dr. Soyoung Kwon of the International Sports Relations Foundation in South Korea), a senior researcher from Human Rights Watch’s Hong Kong office (Nicholas Bequelin), and a scholar who has also worked in anti-Olympic activism (Helen Lenskyj).

Based on the presentations and discussions that the workshop fostered, we offer three suggestions for future research:

1. It is tempting to assume that human rights concerns at the Olympic Games have a long history. For example, researchers can find issues that we now categorize under the heading of “human rights” in American and European boycott campaigns against the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games. We might even find occasional uses of the term “human rights” in these campaigns. But searching for human rights in past eras can quickly lead to historical anachronism. Human rights did not become a central organizing rubric for moral concerns until the “breakthrough” years of the 1970s. The moral and political projects of earlier periods should be understood on their own terms.

2. The activities of human rights organizations have become a major field for the practice of sport-related diplomacy. The status of sports mega-events is now influenced by the global public’s views of their human rights impacts. At the same time, as human rights organizations devote more and more attention to sport, it is worth considering how these sport-related campaigns have influenced global understandings of human rights. Many people who may not be familiar with human rights issues are exposed to them through these movements. How these campaigns have shaped public perceptions of human rights, what kind of yield they bring in new audiences and easy media attention for groups with limited resources, and how they may differ from other human rights campaigns, are important questions that have yet to be studied.

3. As human rights organizations began to set their sights on the Olympic Games (and other sports mega-events), they created public-relations headaches for the IOC and other sports officials. But they may also have buttressed the moral legitimacy of the Olympics in the face of serious challenges from other quarters (perhaps most
of all on the grounds that the costs of hosting the event have reached outrageous proportions). Human rights movements of recent decades have legitimized their activities primarily by referring to international law—specifically, the corpus of international human rights law developed at the UN since the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But Olympic-related campaigns also take seriously the idealistic claims that have long served as the IOC’s moral veneer. When activists mobilized against LGBT discrimination in Russia, for example, they used the anti-discrimination clause of the Olympic Charter to press the IOC to require more of Russia. When human rights campaigns take the IOC’s own moral claims seriously, they implicitly lend support to its claims to be a force for good in the world.

The moral repercussions of sports mega-events will continue to present thorny diplomatic problems. Deaths and mistreatment of migrant workers on building sites for the 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar; questions of social and economic rights at the 2016 Summer Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro; and the fact that the remaining cities bidding for the 2022 Winter Games are Almaty and Beijing—both in repressive dictatorships—are indicative of problems that will continue to attract high levels of public attention. Sports organizations, governments, the United Nations and other intergovernmental bodies, and nongovernmental organizations such as Human Rights Watch will continue to wrestle with these issues. And foreign relations historians will surely begin to redress their neglect of the history of these developments.

Notes:
3. Wilson, “Rights Group.”
**ATTENTION SHAFR MEMBERS:**

“Elections belong to the people. It’s their decision. If they decide to turn their back on the fire and burn their behinds, then they will just have to sit on their blisters.” Abraham Lincoln

Passport would like to remind the members of SHAFR that voting for the 2015 SHAFR elections will began on August 3 and will close on October 31. Ballots will be sent electronically to members of SHAFR. If you are a member of SHAFR and do not receive a ballot by the beginning of September, please contact the chair of the SHAFR nominating committee, Kelly Shannon (kelly.j.shannon@gmail.com), as soon as possible to ensure that you are able to participate in the election.

“To vote is like the payment of a debt, a duty never to be neglected, if its performance is possible.” Rutherford B. Hayes

As noted in the April 2015 issue of Passport, on average only about 311 out of the approximately 1800 members of our organization have voted in elections over the past thirteen years, with a high of 506 in 2011 and a low of 195 in 2005. That is roughly a 17.3% participation rate. We can, and we should, be more engaged in decisions that affect the future of our organization.

“Every election is determined by the people who show up.”
Larry J. Sabato

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**2015 SHAFR Election Candidates**

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<td>David Engerman</td>
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<td>Vice President</td>
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<td>Dustin Walcher</td>
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Book Reviews


Richard H. Immerman

A political scientist by training and disposition, Henry Nau summons history to the cause of advocacy. His aim is not just to earn recognition for “conservative internationalism,” a “tradition” in U.S. foreign policy that he claims scholars have neglected but that warrants equal billing with what he identifies as the more generally accepted traditions: nationalism, realism, and liberal internationalism. More fundamentally, he singles out conservative internationalism as the foreign policy tradition that has best served America’s and global interests from the era of the Founding Fathers to the present. For support, Nau presents what he judges as the great achievements of Presidents Thomas Jefferson, James K. Polk, Harry Truman, and above all, Ronald Reagan, each of whom represents a few or many aspects of that which conservative internationalism can offer the United States and the world. Political scientists and international theorists may applaud Nau’s manifesto; the blurbs suggest as much. But historians will not. Conservative Internationalism will provoke; but, seriously flawed, it will not convince.

Challenging readers to think about conservative internationalism as a weltanschauung and grand strategy is a stimulating undertaking. Nau identifies eleven of its tenets. Each is important, but by aggregating them he generates a more manageable number of characteristics. These characteristics, he argues over and over again, exhibit the finest attributes of nationalism, realism, and liberal internationalism and thereby produce a tradition different from and superior to any of them.

Nau portrays conservative internationalists, in contrast to neoconservatives, as crusaders and pragmatists. Unwilling to accept a status quo that requires dealing with or at best refusing to recognize despots, they are fully committed to promoting democracy and expanding the sphere of liberty—the “equalizer of culture” (94). But their zeal is “disciplined” by judicious threat assessments and setting priorities based on feasibility. Conservative internationalists also champion the use of force and the threat to use force. But for them force, rather than a substitute for diplomacy, is a “counter [to] the greater force field created by despots” (5). As a consequence, it facilitates diplomacy by creating the conditions necessary for negotiations to succeed. By injecting force (in the form of defense spending, troop and weapons systems deployments, etc., as opposed to actual combat) early in the negotiating cycle, or even before it has begun, conservative internationalists increase the likelihood of achieving their goals even as they reduce the likelihood of having to resort to force because the negotiations have failed. A third major characteristic of conservative internationalism is the suspicion if not rejection of international institutions. The antidote to anarchy is not global governance but “a decentralized world of democratic civil societies.” The “conservative nirvana” that Nau and “his” presidents strive to create is the product of the many “sister republics” inspired by American exceptionalism (2–3). Finally, and perhaps most important, conservative internationalists accept the premise that public opinion in free societies is the final arbiter of America’s foreign policy choices” (59).

Thomas Jefferson formulated the concept of sister republics, and according to Nau, he pioneered conservative internationalism. Nau’s Jefferson is devoted to both liberty and limited government. What is equally salient, yet overlooked in “existing interpretations” of Jefferson’s foreign policies, is that he was “a passionate expansionist and willing to use and threaten to use force” (82). Downplaying Jefferson’s slaveholding and his flexible interpretation of the Constitution, Nau praises his management of the Barbary Pirates and the Louisiana Purchase in order to emphasize the congruence between his behavior and the tenets of conservative internationalism. For the same reason Nau even spins the 1807 Embargo, and he does so more positively than anyone I have ever read.

Nau’s analysis of Jefferson sets the stage for his assessments of his other three presidents. He absolutely gushes over Polk. Oregon was a brilliant example of “arming diplomacy with force and accepting the risks” (142). Left with no alternative, Polk, “drew the sword” against Mexico, but “the sword always served the olive branch” (129). Nau concedes that Polk was a racist and contributed to the genocidal decimation of Native Americans. But the good overshadowed the bad. During Polk’s single term in office, the United States “granted more liberty to more white people then, and went on to secure more liberty for more people of all colors later, than any other country that might have settled and governed the western territories after 1798” (114).

I need not provide details of his treatment of Truman and Reagan because by now any reader of this review will be able to draw the correct inferences. Suffice it to say, Truman’s sole misstep came early in his accidental presidency, when, still unsure of himself, he failed to overrule Eisenhower and race Stalin to Berlin. As for Reagan, he was the “quintessential conservative internationalist” (171). His strategy, which reflected the tradition’s most valued principles, was superb. More than that, his instincts were “unerring” (193). Reagan not only played a larger role than Gorbachev in ending the Cold War, but he also played a large role in bringing Gorbachev to power in the first place.

Expecting criticism, Nau seeks to deflect it. “I arrived in Washington as a graduate student and discovered quickly that the world around me . . . was almost completely liberal,” he proclaims in his acknowledgments. “Conservatism still sleeps in the academic universe,” he then adds(six-x). In the first note to the first chapter he writes that his is “not a book about academic or media bias. But the facts are indisputable. . . . [L]iberals dominate the two institutions” (247n1). Nau’s self-identification as a beleaguered minority impugns the legitimacy of his critics.

Conservative Internationalism demands serious criticism, nevertheless, from scholars and other commentators across the political spectrum. Nau does himself and his readers a
disservice by cramming “his” presidents into tight boxes (he focuses only on presidents): nationalists, realists, and liberal internationalists, to that list he adds conservative internationalists. He in fact creates more boxes by dividing nationalists into minimalists and maximalists and realists into offensive and defensive ones. However, he does not accord radical or revisionist critiques a box, he explains, because they are either subsumed within the realist or nationalist traditions or they “chastise American society and capitalism as irredeemably evil” and thus “fall outside the purview of my study” (39). Further, defining John Quincy Adams, Grover Cleveland, Herbert Hoover, or even Dwight D. Eisenhower as conservative internationalists would not be a stretch. Or maybe they require a different box.

Yet the book’s problems run much deeper. Although many readers may disagree with the ideology Nau embraces and proselytizes for, most, I predict, will respect him for boldly wearing his politics on his sleeve. And while many will take issue with his judgments—for example, his classification of Jefferson and Truman as conservatives; his tolerance for freedom-seekers who were slaveholders; his whitewashing of Polk’s deceptive maneuvering to provoke the Mexican War; his praise for the brilliance of NSC 68 (for which he credits only Truman; Dean Acheson and Paul Nitze do not appear in the chapter); his attributing to Reagan a degree of foresight comparable to what Bismarck claimed for himself in his memoir—they recognize that differing interpretations, even if they lack nuance, are the foundation of the historical enterprise. Indeed, some may even excuse Nau’s omission of inconvenient truths such as Vietnam and Iran-Contra, which reflect disdain more than respect for the will of the people.

But what historians will not be able to excuse are Nau’s methodological and evidentiary defects. I am not referring to his lack of archival research. That is still not the norm for political scientists. But it is the norm for political scientists to draw on the breadth of respected historical literature. Nau does not. How can one write about Jefferson’s foreign policies and claim that his expansionism is absent from existing interpretations, while not citing a single work by Larry Kaplan, including Westward the Course of Empire? Nau does cite Amy Greenberg’s prize-winning A Wicked War, published in 2012, along with studies by Anders Stephanson, Thomas Hietala, and a few others—but solely as examples of “negative assessments” of Polk (271n4). For the “real” Polk he relies on David Pletcher and Charles Sellers, who wrote decades ago but whom Nau nevertheless presents as representative of “most historians” (122). Mel Jeffler’s Preponderance of Power remains the “go-to” study of Truman’s foreign policy. Not for Nau; he doesn’t mention it once. I will give him a pass for his chapter on Reagan, because an authoritative history awaits the opening of more archives and evolution of a richer historiography. But I won’t do the same for his examinations of Jefferson, Polk, and Truman. Thus, if Nau can be said to have made a persuasive case for conservative internationalism, his case is limited to Reagan. And a set of one does not a tradition make.


Stephen R. Ortiz

Andrew Johnstone’s exploration of the internationalist lobbying groups in the United States during the years preceding formal American belligerency in World War II is a fine addition to a distinct revival of scholarly interest in this period of neutrality and debate.1 Johnstone here, as well as in a recent essay in *Passport,* also joins the group of scholars emphasizing the study of domestic politics and American foreign relations against the more recent trends of internationalizing and transnationalizing that have so engrossed the field.2 His book provides an admirable model for studying the institutional, non-governmental forces in the United States that promote specific foreign policy visions and that connect to the larger electoral dynamics and state bureaucratic structures central to American policy in the modern era.

In *Against Immediate Evil,* Johnstone argues that the creation of a number of internationalist interest groups committed to supporting American intervention in the Asian and European conflicts between 1937 and 1941 produced a critical nexus of support for Franklin D. Roosevelt and his administration’s efforts to guide the American people and Congress toward deepening involvement. According to Johnstone, these loosely-linked national interest groups, which had chapters of members distributed around the country, helped begin a groundswell of internationalism and, more specifically, interventionism, through their national publicity campaigns and lobbying efforts in Congress. Johnstone contends that this network, which he describes, using William Allen White’s term, as an “interlocking directorate of internationalism” (91), was a significant force in the move toward greater involvement in world conflicts during the time of American neutrality and a foundational ideological and institutional source of strength for the new sense of American internationalism that would emerge from the war years.

To support these important arguments, *Against Immediate Evil* traces the rise of a number of internationalist groups, the most prominent of which were the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies (CDAAA), the Century Group, Fight For Freedom (FFF), the American Committee for Non-Participation in Japanese Aggression (ACNPJA), and the American Union for Concerted Peace Efforts (AUCPE). By investigating the creation of these groups, their leadership (including White, Ulrich Bell, and Clark Eichelberger), their membership bases, and their ties to the Roosevelt administration, including FDR himself, Johnstone provides his reader with a valuable counterpart to the work of Wayne S. Cole and Justus D. Doenecke, which examines the isolationist and anti-interventionist opponents of Roosevelt.3 Basing his work primarily on institutional records and leaders’ correspondence, Johnstone weaves the histories of these institutions chronologically through some of the most important inflection points in the “Great Debate” period, such as the revision and subsequent repeal of the Neutrality Acts, the Selective Service Act, the Destroyers for Bases executive order, Lend-Lease, and then the “Shoot on Sight” orders of September, 1941. Throughout, he skillfully highlights the relationships of organization members to the American media, members of Congress, State Department officials, and the White House and shows how the groups sought at times to promote administration policy and at other times to get out in front of it. When discussing the strategic differences among the groups on how best to succeed in their interventionist aims, Johnstone offers many important insights on interest group pressure in policy formation and public opinion. One of the most interesting and compelling sections of his book, chapter 5, demonstrates how the legal justifications for a Destroyers for Bases executive order, published in the *New York Times* by CDAAA and Century Group members (including the young Dean Acheson), were important to the Roosevelt administration’s embrace of this policy course. Here, Johnstone successfully shows how these groups proved their worth with their promotion of internationalism.

While there is much to admire in Johnstone’s analysis, there is room for criticism in three key areas. First and most
important is the issue of internationalist effectiveness in the realm of public opinion. Johnstone seems ambivalent about whether the internationalists had a direct impact on moving public opinion first toward greater involvement and then toward war. He alludes repeatedly to the groups having an important influence on public opinion, but he admits that he cannot prove any type of causation. International events themselves seemed to have a greater bearing on the public opinion polls than these groups, and in fact public opinion occasionally moved in the opposite direction of the internationalists’ positions. Johnstone also walks back any claims of direct causation in multiple places in the text. Admittedly, causation in American public opinion is very difficult to prove under any circumstances, especially in the early years of rudimentary polling. But this slipperness of analysis does not aid the overall argument; nor, frankly, was it necessary to try to maintain the argument to prove the groups’ importance. I wish that Johnstone had instead focused more on the other aspects of the groups’ influence and amplified his brief concluding discussion of the critical people in these organizations as they moved during and after the war into key positions in the Office of War Information, the Department of State, and other locations of policymaking importance. In that way he could have assessed more systematically the ongoing impact of the groups’ members on postwar American internationalism.

Two smaller complaints merit a mention: Johnstone’s claims about the nature of the internationalist groups’ membership and his use of the “Four Freedoms” in the text and title. Johnstone makes repeated reference to the groups with a wide social base to downplay their elite membership. Yet the institutional records he relies on show only that the organizations established special women’s, youth, labor, and (occasionally) African American outreach committees, not a wider response to the initiatives by those demographic groups. Moreover, when Johnstone provides detailed lists of professions for FFF members, the least elite profession listed is “labor official,” hardly a representative of the large and diverse American working class.

Finally, while the book includes “the Four Freedoms” in the text and subtitle, it proves to be an unhelpful analytical framework. Much of the action described in the text takes place before FDR’s January 6, 1941 “Four Freedoms” speech, so Johnstone is thus anachronistically deploying the term to describe the foundations of the internationalists’ drive toward protecting American national security and economic, political, and religious freedoms. Moreover, those freedoms are so broad as to allow almost any justification for intervention to fit into one of those categories. In short, it seems a touch forced to make this specific linkage to Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms.

Nevertheless, Johnstone has accomplished a great deal in his book by laying out the institutional web of interest groups promoting further American involvement in the world—specifically, more aggressive policies of intervention against what would become the Axis powers. This network of Interventionists surely aided the Roosevelt administration in the years of the Great Debate by running publicity campaigns and pressuring Congress to side with FDR’s moves toward deeper and deeper involvement. Equally important, Johnstone adroitly shows, is the way in which these groups served as a counterweight to the America First Committee and other combative anti-interventionists who were producing hard-hitting arguments against the Roosevelt administration’s “war-mongering.”

While Johnstone is not able to prove any claims about the internationalists’ actual impact on public opinion, and while his assertion that the organizations were more than simply groups of elites is not supported by the evidence he offers, his book remains an excellent contribution to the literature on American engagement and debate in World War II prior to formal belligerency, on the rise of midcentury internationalism as an institutional as well as ideological force, and on the importance of domestic pressure groups in American foreign relations. For all of these reasons, Against Immediate Evil is a book that SHAFR members should place on their “to-read” lists.

Notes:


Nadja Klopprogge and Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht

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he history of foreign deployment of U.S. troops has recently enjoyed a renaissance, and it is not hard to see why. The presence of U.S. forces in the Middle East, the coverage of local cultural and social conflicts in the news, and the failure of U.S. cultural diplomacy to alleviate such conflicts have all stirred up memories of past occupations. Since the 1960s, scholars on both sides of the Atlantic have been investigating the significance and implications of the U.S. military presence in what became West Germany and West Berlin. While early students of the era, such as John Gielow, emphasized the “success” of the occupation, revisionist historians in the 1970s who focused on the process of denazification criticized the military’s efforts to purge German social and political structures. More recently, research has diversified, concentrating on issues of gender, race, and counterculture. Points of comparison in the literature include the U.S. army’s presence in France, Japan, and elsewhere.

GIs in Germany, edited by Thomas Maulucci and Detlev Junker, adds a twist to this literature by venturing beyond the years of occupation. As Maulucci writes in the introduction, “the essays in the volume deal with an American military that is no longer an occupier per se but instead one element in a complex relationship between two sovereign states” (4). To unravel the story of the U.S. military presence, the volume seeks to take on a perspective that is both local and global: “[W]ere the U.S. troops in the Federal Republic part of a post-1945 overseas ‘empire’” (4)? A total of fifteen chapters organized by theme engage with these questions from a wide range of perspectives and include topics such as strategy and politics, military communities, tensions between neighbors, the German armed forces and the American model, and the 1970s and 1980s.

Following a formal survey of the U.S. forces in Germany by Hans-Joachim Harder, Bruno Thoß debates debates over German rearmament and the establishment of the Bundeswehr in the early Federal Republic within the context of disputes over NATO defense strategies. Dennis Showalter examines the cooperation between the U.S.
army and the Bundeswehr in preparation for a war that was “never fought.” He stresses that German rearmament and the establishment of the Bundeswehr were key to NATO’s defense strategy. Yet for all the military and strategic success, the U.S. presence in Europe remained an anachronism from the beginning, as Hubert Zimmermann observes. He demonstrates how the issue of troop strength in Germany evolved as the subject of a political power play between the White House and Congress during the 1960s and 1970s.

Klaus Naumann and Wolfgang Schmidt then highlight the agency of German Bundeswehr officers and Luftwaffe pilots, many of whom had served in World War II, in shaping the West German postwar military structures. As Naumann argues, U.S. and German decision-makers entertained divergent views on how to reform the German military after rearmament. The new German mode of organization allowed mid-level commanders to participate in decision-making to a considerable degree, whereas U.S. military personnel admired the German military tradition and believed that the new democratic outlook of the army might compromise military professionalism. West Germans were, nevertheless, allowed to structure their army in accordance with their own aspirations.

Wolfgang Schmidt shows the enormous amount of appreciation U.S. air force commanders had for Goering’s Luftwaffe pilots, even though the latter had been trained in the age of propeller craft and were the former enemy. However, German pilots often proved reluctant to follow prescriptive rules and checklists, as during the war they had been chosen more for their ideological enthusiasm than their professionalism and had been trained to improvise rather than to follow a rigorous protocol.

Thomas Leuerer, Theodor Scharnholz, and Donna Alvah consider U.S. military communities in Germany. As Leuerer points out, the Korean War was a turning point, when the army in Europe (notably West Germany) significantly expanded and military communities became self-contained, U.S.-style suburban settlements. Providing social and moral stability for U.S. forces, they also signaled to the Cold War adversary that American soldiers were in Germany to stay. Drawing on narratives and accounts by service family members (primarily wives), Donna Alvah illustrates how they defined their roles within the Cold War context. In their daily encounters with West Germans, service wives considered themselves active agents in promoting American values and foreign policy. However, the disorderly behavior of some servicemen and their dependents endangered the image constructed by conscientious service family members.

That said, the transition from occupier to protector created serious challenges for the German-American relationship, as is shown in the third section, “Tensions between Neighbors,” and the fifth section, “The 1970s and 1980s.” The contributors to “Tensions between Neighbors,” Gerhard Fürmetz and Jennifer V. Evans, both challenge the widespread image of the “friendly GI.” Fürmetz delivers a vivid account of GI delinquency in West Germany in the 1950s. Delinquents often got away with their offenses because they were not subject to German jurisdiction. As a result, soldiers often behaved roughly towards both civilians and the new German police, and the latter had little choice but to accept the situation.

The result was a dual credibility gap that affected both U.S. military courts and the German law enforcement system. Evans’s case study of violence in Berlin confirms “that Americans, like the Soviets, committed brutal sexual assaults, perhaps not as frequently but with equal disregard for the body and soul of the victims” (213). German women, however, do not appear as passive victims in Evans’s account but “accessed the channels of retributive justice and . . . negotiated their ambiguous status as both victims and agents” (223). U.S. authorities, in turn, understood that dismissing cases of sexual violence weakened Allied legitimacy.

This lack of credibility worsened in the 1970s and 1980s when, as Alexander Vazansky, Howard DeNike, Anni Baker, and Lou Marin point out, troop morale deteriorated, while protests among soldiers and German criticism of GIs intensified. Influenced by the Vietnam War and the student habitus of U.S. soldiers increasingly mirrored that of protestors around the world. Political dissent, drug abuse, and racial problems increased; decreasing salaries and the poor conditions of army barracks exacerbated soldiers, officers and their families alike. As DeNike shows, U.S. enlisted forces now frequently took up their pens and took to the streets to voice their dissent.

Among Germans opposed to NATO and to the presence of U.S. troops, such complaints fell on fertile ground. Looking at protests in the city of Wiesbaden, Baker portrays a coalition of local and regional governmental and non-state forces that collectively fought against German chancellor Helmut Kohl’s agreement to expand the airbase nearby. While there may have been a fundamental difference between peace activists and opponents of the Erbenheim Airport, in the end, as Marin shows, it all appeared to GIs to be part and parcel of a general German desire to get rid of the troops.

The authors of this volume have made a formidable effort to draw in local voices, perceptions, interactions, complaints and conflicts. While information on Wehrmacht training may be familiar to military historians, the sociocultural interplay between Wehrmacht training and the reorganization of the West German Bundeswehr under U.S. auspices may surprise quite a few readers.

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There are a number of flaws here that are often associated with edited volumes. For example, the introduction casts a wide methodological net, encompassing discourses of “Americanization” as well as “empire,” very little of which appears in the individual chapters. Many essays deviate from the title and focus not on the GI experience but on former Luftwaffe pilots and Wehrmacht officers—their old enemies—is particularly striking. Similarly, although the section on GI delinquency and sex resonates with the gender-oriented works of Petra Goedde and Annette Brauerhoch, its call for a comparison of Red Army and U.S. sexual violence opens up a chilling new perspective on the triangular relationship without regressing to the one-dimensional portrayal of women as passive victims.

There are a number of flaws here that are often associated with edited volumes. For example, the introduction casts a wide methodological net, encompassing discourses of “Americanization” as well as “empire,” very little of which appears in the individual chapters. Many essays deviate from the title and focus not on the GI experience but on German politics or U.S. planning. Key themes such as troop recreation and daily routine, the role of ethnic minorities in the army, and the consequences of sexual relations between U.S. personnel and German citizens are missing. GIs appear as rather one-dimensional subjects; their various positions within the army and the different roles and expectations associated with them are not explored.

Edited volumes are frequently underrated. Publishers often fear that such books have a short shelf life, and academic journals increasingly shun collections as irrelevant. Yet such worries blind us to the enormous potential of a well-edited volume. In the best cases, such works can update us more quickly and effectively on the state of the art in a
given field. *GIs in Germany* does this and more. It inspires further investigation into the implications the deployment had for U.S. troops. What were the long-term ramifications of their experiences, and how did they instigate socio-cultural, economic, and political changes within the United States? Regarding Germany, future research might want to attempt a deeper understanding of the discrepancy between assessments of the de facto occupation of the 1940s and 1950s and the “perceived” occupation of the 1980s. One cannot help but be reminded constantly of more recent U.S. Army stints overseas and wonder anew whether the U.S. presence in Europe represented an exception or needs to be reexamined. After all, we have not seen anything quite like it since.

**Notes:**


P. Michael Rattanasengchanh

In his book *Before the Quagmire*, journalist and historian William J. Rust demonstrates how, between 1954 and 1961, a small backwater country became a national security priority for the Eisenhower administration. President Dwight D. Eisenhower wanted to create a strong anti-communist government in Laos but according to Rust, there were obstacles to that goal. While Washington was supporting the democratically elected Royal Laotian Government (RLG), it was simultaneously providing military aid to rightwing groups that sought to overthrow that government. Divisions among U.S. foreign policymakers in Washington and in Laos exacerbated Laotian rivalries and hindered effective policymaking. Some of the American ambassadors stationed in Laos recommended that Washington work with the RLG, but the administration ignored their advice. Most often Eisenhower chose to increase assistance to military leaders who seemed tougher on communism than the RLG’s civilian politicians.

Rust also argues that intervention in Laos prefigured the American war in Vietnam. U.S. policymakers failed to apply the lessons learned from their experiences in Laos to Vietnam. Had they done so, perhaps the United States would have settled for neutrality in Vietnam, as it had in Laos. Instead, it reluctantly went to war.

Rust does a good job of illustrating the divisions among mid- and high-level U.S. officials. Ambassadors Horace Smith and Winthrop Brown were at odds with Washington. They both rejected the idea of supporting military groups rather than the RLG. In particular, Brown felt that neutralist Prime Minister Souvanna Phoumi was a good leader to back because he was popular and he tried to promote stability. The British and French agreed with the ambassador and added that too much support for the military could lead to communist retaliation. However, Eisenhower, the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Pentagon saw Souvanna as weak and considered his neutral foreign policy a stepping-stone to a communist takeover. Notwithstanding their unified support of Souvanna, each of the U.S. intelligence agencies held different views on Laotian policy. Each organization worked independently of the others and sometimes at cross-purposes with each other. Rust convincingly shows how U.S. policies in Laos lacked unity and coordination.

In its pursuit of an anti-communist Laos, the administration inadvertently created more instability there. Souvanna sought to unify the country by reconciling with the Pathet Lao communists and forming a coalition government with them. However, Washington saw negotiating and working with the communists as unacceptable. Their alternatives were the rightist Phoum Sanamikone and, later, General Phoumi Nosavan. While giving minimal aid to Souvanna, the administration provided arms and money to Phoumi. Souvanna eventually resigned and blamed the Americans for undermining him. When Phoumi came to power, Phoumi and his Committee for the Defense of National Interests (CDNI) immediately challenged him. Ambassador Smith advised U.S. policymakers to back Phoumi and the RLG instead of the military, but he was in the minority. Many in Washington did not oppose Phoumi but doubted he could build a strong anti-communist government. Phoumi seemed to be the better option because of his position in the military. However, an unexpected coup in August 1960 brought Souvanna back to power. Like Smith, the newly appointed ambassador, Winthrop Brown, felt that Souvanna was the best person to bring stability to Laos, but Washington ignored his input. The administration’s response was to support Phoumi’s countercoup. This led neutralists to join forces with the communists and to prepare an attack on the capital. War seemed imminent.

At this point in the book with communists and neutralists on the offensive, Rust discusses how Eisenhower responded. Eisenhower believed that losing Laos would be disastrous for U.S. security. However, accounts of how the president wanted to use military action vary. Some policymakers reported that Eisenhower was against unilateral action and wanted to work with regional allies. But in a December 1960 meeting with his national security advisers, Eisenhower made it clear that all options remained open. “If war is necessary,” he said, “we will do so with our allies or unilaterally” (251). Rust interprets these differing accounts as a reflection of the president’s uncertainty about using military force. Eventually, when the communist threat appeared less grave than what U.S. intelligence reported, Eisenhower chose the familiar route of providing support to the Laotian military and making a commitment to united action.

Rust effectively captures the frustrations of those who opposed Washington’s aggressive policies in Laos and in doing so makes both Ambassadors Smith and Brown the heroes of the narrative. For example, he quotes Vientiane Embassy Telegram 1300, written in the fall of 1959, in which Ambassador Smith and Director of United States Operations Mission John Tobler give a sobering assessment of the Laotian situation and recommend preparing for the possibility of failure. The RLG was weak and there was little unity among the right-wing groups. Smith ends by saying that “unless the US government was prepared to grasp the nettle of much greater aid, we should not place US prestige further in jeopardy” (135). The administration ignored his recommendations.

Smith’s replacement, Ambassador Brown, was also willing to take unpopular stands. He was critical of Washington’s obsession with Phoumi and the CDNI and felt the United States was fighting against a popular leader in Souvanna. J. Graham Parsons (a former Ambassador to Laos) and the White House disagreed. They had their doubts
about Phoumi but continued to support him because of his anti-communist posture. The Eisenhower administration gave Phoumi the approval for his countercoup in late 1960 but never notified Brown about the decision. Washington effectively marginalized opposing opinions.

Before the Quagmire has many merits, but Rust’s argument that America’s experience in Laos was a preview of what would happen in Vietnam needs elaboration. It is clear that the United States failed to apply the lessons learned in Laos to Vietnam and would thus make some of the same mistakes in the later conflict. In addition, future presidents would indeed repeat some of Eisenhower’s Laotian policies in Vietnam. However, the reader can only make these connections if they are familiar with the literature on both countries. Rust needs to specify which lessons and policies from Laos the United States did and did not employ in Vietnam. One particular policy not replicated in Vietnam comes to mind: John F. Kennedy’s support for neutrality in Laos. The historical comparison has some limitations, but more evidence would provide a better link between events in the two countries.

One possible avenue for future research would be to use primary sources in the Laotian language to study the Laotian perspective on events. In Rust’s book, the thoughts of Laotian policymakers and their responses to Washington’s policies are only from the standpoint of U.S. officials or secondary sources. RLG or even Pathet Lao documents may provide different views or opinions on policies and situations. The use of such sources would help balance U.S. policymakers’ assessments of their Laotian counterparts and of events taking place in Laos.

Before the Quagmire adds to the literature on American intervention in Laos during the Vietnam War era. Laos became a trouble spot during Eisenhower’s presidency. The administration’s goal was to stymie the spread of communism, but the lack of unity among U.S. policymakers and poor choices in Laotian partners brought about a civil war and almost created a larger superpower conflict. America nearly went to war in Laos. Some of Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s decisions in Laos set a pattern for future policymakers as they confronted the task of nation-building and fighting communist insurgencies in Vietnam.

Before the Quagmire has many merits, but Rust’s argument that America’s experience in Laos was a preview of what would happen in Vietnam needs elaboration. It is clear that the United States failed to apply the lessons learned in Laos to Vietnam and would thus make some of the same mistakes in the later conflict.

The book is divided into four sections. In the first, the essays look at how the Johnson administration sought to move past the Cold War binary. Daniel Sargent traces how LBH[1] and his officials dealt with stirring economic globalization and with the management of the global economy. He shows the tension that existed—and still exists—between domestic economic policy and international economic issues. Patrick Cohrs shows the influence of Johnson’s ideas about domestic politics on his handling of foreign affairs. Portraying the Texan as Franklin Roosevelt’s heir not just in terms of domestic policy but in foreign policy too, he highlights LBH’s efforts both to renew U.S. liberal hegemony—undermined by Vietnam—and to deal with what Walt Rostow would later call the “diffusion of power.”

One wonders, though—and it is certainly a quibble—why no mention was made here of China, particularly given the volume’s presentist focus.

Touching on a number of themes from his excellent book, Thomas Schwartz makes the case that Johnson was invested in bridge-building and détente with Moscow so as to reduce the threat of nuclear war and also allow the United States and the USSR to meet jointly challenges like global poverty. Events intervened, however: notably, the Soviet response to the Prague Spring. Détente and arms control would await Nixon. Still, as is clear from the three chapters in the first section of the book, Johnson was able to see beyond the Cold War, which makes his decision to fight in Vietnam all the more tragic.

Beyond Vietnam, Johnson is also synonymous with the Great Society, and in the second section of the book, the authors probe what were, in effect, the international aspects of the president’s domestic programs. U.S. efforts to combat hunger and famine in India are a relatively unexplored area of study. Nick Cullather links such efforts to Johnson’s “visionary ambition” (120) to promote development abroad. Yet LBH had problems selling foreign aid domestically. As Sheyda Jahanbani points out, the 1960s saw the term “global poverty” enter our lexicon. The Johnson administration, like its predecessor, employed modernization theory in tackling the problem. This issue has been explored before—by Michael Latham, for instance—but Jahanbani makes the important point that while modernization theory has been discredited, it continues to influence aid and assistance programs through an emphasis on capitalism and growth as keys to poverty alleviation.

In a similarly critical vein, Matthew Connelly looks at the Johnson administration’s attempts to curb global population growth. Invoking the future but misunderstanding predictions of a Malthusian crisis, U.S. officials pursued population control at the expense of perhaps millions of individuals’ reproductive rights. On a far more positive note, Erez Manela points to Johnson’s support for smallpox eradication. That effort was carried out by various internationalists, the Centers for Disease Control, and the UN, and became the first and only successful global eradication campaign.
The two essays in the third section address scarcity and natural resources, with Tom Robertson providing an excellent disquisition on how Johnson addressed environmental issues, which were a growing concern in the 1960s. He credits LBJ with the Green Revolution, with the very birth control programs derided by Connelly, and with environmental programs in the Great Society. But Robertson also knocks Johnson for doing little to discourage consumption, a task left for Jimmy Carter. Next, looking to the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Chris Dietrich traces the growth in the political power of Arab oil producers, whose strength would be felt not simply during the oil embargoes of the 1970s but in more subtle ways up to the present.

In the final section, Sarah Snyder and Andrew Preston probe shifting moralities in the 1960s. Among the foremost analysts of rights and U.S. foreign policy, Snyder offers an excellent overview of growing attention to human rights in the years immediately prior to the “breakthrough” of the 1970s. Focusing on Southern Rhodesia and on the Greek coup of 1967, she shows that the Johnson White House was not as supportive of human rights abroad as it was of civil rights at home, an indication that LBJ and his officials were still wedded to the sanctity of sovereignty and influenced by alliance loyalties. Lastly, in his contribution Andrew Preston has focused much more inwardly than the other authors in offering a brilliant exegesis on the “political realignment” (263) of religious loyalties during the 1960s, a result of that decade’s upheavals at home and abroad.

Ultimately, the essays in Beyond the Cold War offer a welcome look at various persistent international issues in Johnson’s “conflicting and often mixed” legacy (8).

Notes:

Negotiating a World Without Nuclear Tests:

Stephanie Freeman

Banning the Bang or the Bomb? is an interdisciplinary collection of essays that offers valuable insight into the negotiations that produced the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), as well as practical suggestions for conducting multilateral negotiations on nuclear issues, establishing effective treaty verification regimes, and carrying out successful on-site inspections in accordance with the CTBT. The book is divided into two parts. The first nine essays analyze the four decades of test ban negotiations that culminated in the conclusion of the CTBT in 1996. The second section examines the CTBT’s verification regime, focusing particularly on the negotiations associated with on-site inspections.

As its title suggests, one of the book’s main arguments is that there was a divide among states over the purpose of a nuclear test ban. As Rebecca Johnson, I. William Zartman and Julia Lendorfer, and Ulrika Möller demonstrate, the five officially recognized nuclear-weapon states (NWS) viewed the CTBT simply as a way to end nuclear testing, thereby furthering nuclear non-proliferation and protecting their privileged positions as nuclear powers. However, the Zartman- Lendorfer essay and the Möller essay show that non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) like Egypt and Iran and nuclear-capable weapon states (NCWS) like Pakistan and India hoped that the CTBT would be a step on the path to nuclear abolition, which would eradicate an unequal world order that privileges the five NWS. In an excellent essay that demonstrates the influence of transnational civil society on the CTBT negotiations, Johnson demonstrates that activists also viewed the CTBT as a way to facilitate nuclear disarmament.

As illustrated in the Zartman-Lendorfer essay, the NWS vision of the CTBT as a non-proliferation measure prevailed in negotiations, with discussion of nuclear disarmament confined to the treaty’s preamble. While the book nicely illuminates this divide between those who viewed the CTBT as a measure to “ban the bang” and those who sought to use the treaty as a way to ultimately “ban the bomb,” it does not grapple with the larger implications of this rift. Is this divide to blame for the treaty’s failure to garner the necessary ratifications to enter into force? Will it impede the effectiveness of the treaty if and when it enters into force? What is its significance?

A number of the contributors lament that eight of the forty-four states that must ratify the CTBT for it to enter into force have failed to do so. Yet in a book that prides itself on offering practical recommendations for conducting future multilateral negotiations and on-site inspections, it is surprisingly devoid of specific suggestions for facilitating the CTBT’s entry into force. Chris McIntosh makes a provocative and compelling argument that “whether one is more of a nuclear ‘hawk’ or a nuclear ‘dove,’ U.S. ratification of the CTBT is net positive,” since ratifying a treaty that is so widely supported in the international community will garner the United States new allies in its counter-proliferation efforts (148–9). As Hein Haak notes, however, U.S. ratification of the CTBT may not necessarily convince the other seven holdouts to ratify the treaty immediately. Rather, he writes, “every state in the Annex 2 list holds the key to EIF [entry into force]” (225). That being the case, it would have been helpful if some of the book’s contributors had offered concrete proposals for precipitating the remaining eight ratifications.

The essays in the second half of the book convincingly demonstrate that verification is not merely a technical issue but also a political one. Ariel Macaspac Penetrante and Mordechai Melamud show that CTBT on-site inspections will require daily negotiations not only between the inspectors and the inspected state, but also among members of the inspection team. By comparing the CTBT’s on-site inspection regime to the inspection regimes of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the International Atomic Energy Agency, Melamud nicely illuminates the “significant differences that make this [CTBT] inspection regime more susceptible to situations that require negotiation” (297). Drawing on an analysis of treaty language concerning on-site inspections, as well as the results of multiple table-top exercises, the P. Terrence Hopmann essay and the Paul Meerts-Mordechai Melamud essay offer sound recommendations for training inspectors to handle the many negotiations in which they will participate during an on-site inspection.

With contributions by academics, participants in the CTBT negotiations, and arms control professionals, this book will have wide appeal. Historians of the nuclear age will benefit from the chapters on the four decades of nuclear test ban negotiations. Political scientists will be interested in Fen Osler Hampson’s discussion of the
multiple streams model of decision-making. Zartman and Linder’s examination of the importance of formulation in negotiations, and McIntosh’s critique of the norms-versus-interests logic. Viewing the CTBT as a case of regime-building, the contributors draw lessons from the CTBT negotiations and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization activities that can be applied by arms control professionals in future efforts to negotiate and implement treaties dealing with nuclear issues. This is a valuable volume for both scholars and practitioners.


Dustin Walcher

There was a time when it was controversial for a historian to apply the analytic lens of imperialism to the experience of the United States. Believing their country to be exceptional, most Americans recoiled at the suggestion that U.S. conduct overseas—or, for that matter, along the country’s shifting western frontier—had anything in common with European imperialism. In popular discussions of American history, that sense of American anti-imperial exceptionalism remains ingrained among a substantial portion of the population. But a gap has developed between popular sentiments and the analytical work completed by historians since the Vietnam era. Historians of the United States working in a variety of subfields have long characterized the United States as an “empire.”

In essence, James G. Morgan seeks to “describe the evolution of critiques of imperialism” (9). That is, Into New Territory: American Historians and the Concept of U.S. Imperialism endeavors to historicize the historiography. Morgan finds that the 1960s comprised “the pivotal decade” (119) when “Wisconsin scholars . . . took the study of US imperialism into new territory and demonstrated it could be an effective analytical prism through which the origins and manifestations of US foreign policy could be understood” (6). The dominance of orthodox historians who denied the imperial character of U.S. policy subsequently ended.

The “Wisconsin scholars” who are at the center of Morgan’s narrative are Fred Harvey Harrington, William Appleman Williams, and their students. Williams’s scholarship—most notably, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy, first published in 1959—was foundational to the development of a rigorous anti-imperial critique. It was, Morgan explains, grounded in the longer progressive tradition that dated to the work of Charles Beard. At the same time, he carefully explicates their deviation from Beardian orthodox.

Morgan contrasts the Wisconsin scholars with those of the New Left, who were developing their critique contemporaneously. Although the two groups are often conflated, Morgan convincingly argues that they represent fundamentally different scholarly traditions. He explains that the New Left anti-imperial critique was less sophisticated than that of the Wisconsin School. It was basically derivative of the Marxism of the Old Left. Indeed, Morgan is at his best when distinguishing between the roots and intellectual tradition of the New Left and those of progressive scholarship. Whereas the Wisconsin School analyzed American ideology and “attributed US imperialism to intellectual failures rather than the expansionist nature of capitalism” (32), New Left scholars could fairly be accused of economic determinism; the needs of the U.S. economy as perceived by policymakers were generally sufficient to explain outcomes. The analysis of the New Left thus minimized individual agency. The only way out of the imperialist trap, according to the New Left, was through revolution. It should not be a surprise, therefore, that New Left scholars and political activists were closely related, as they sought to achieve change through confrontation and direction action.

By contrast, Williams and the Wisconsin School remained grounded in a progressive tradition that demanded change through democratic processes. Those working in the progressive tradition generally assumed that when properly educated, Americans would recognize the wrongs that their country perpetrated overseas and freely choose a different path. As Morgan explains, “[w]hat separated Williams from the Marxists was the question of inevitability” (108).

As a study of the intellectual influence of the Wisconsin School generally, and Williams in particular, Into New Territory largely succeeds. But it is not without flaws. Morgan oversates the degree to which the Wisconsin School was distinct from the New Left. It is certainly true that Williams and his students were not orthodox Marxists. But the progressive tradition was indebted to Marx. Nobody understood that more than Williams, who wrote about “the central utility of Karl Marx for Americans in the middle of the twentieth century.” Similarly, Morgan is sometimes prone to overstatements with which even he does not ultimately agree. For example, in the introduction he writes that “the critical concept of US imperialism was disseminated for the very first time” in the 1960s (4). But debates about the nature of U.S. imperialism were as old as the republic. More to the point, Morgan examines at some length Charles Beard’s engagement with the concept of imperialism. Such overstatements point to a need for tighter editing.

While Into New Territory does an admirable job delineating the roots of and differences between the anti-imperial intellectual critiques of the mid-twentieth century, the book’s significance is ultimately limited by its overwhelming emphasis on intellectual developments within the scholarly literature. Most readers of Passport will be familiar with the general trends described and are likely to agree that “significant aspects of the Wisconsin critique of American empire found their way into post-revisionist interpretations of the Cold War”—a “tangible” result (10). Yet there was an opportunity here to examine with some rigor the larger social and intellectual significance of these scholarly works. To what extent did Wisconsin School and New Left authors—most of whom presented themselves as New Left intellectuals and sought to push Americans onto a different historical trajectory, albeit in somewhat different ways—exert an impact beyond the academy? Such questions are hinted at, as when Morgan traces the movement of the journal Studies on the Left from Madison to New York. But the analysis is not sustained.

Ultimately Morgan produces a useful intellectual history of the scholarly anti-imperialist critique, especially between the late 1950s and the 1970s. Although it sometimes reads as the latest salvo thrown by a Wisconsin School supporter at those post-revisionist adherents of a neo-orthodox approach to the history of U.S. foreign relations, graduate students preparing for their general examinations are likely to be quite appreciative of Morgan’s efforts to explain in detail the epistemology of progressive and New Left scholarship. The anti-imperialist scholarship that Morgan examines profoundly affected the direction of our field. Morgan charts that trek “into new territory.”

Note:
On November 28, 1984, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger took the podium at the National Press Club and set out his criteria for when and how American presidents should use force. First, he said, force should be used only when the vital national interests of the United States or its allies were at stake and then “wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning.” There had to be “clearly defined political and military objectives,” and the relationship between the objectives and the force used to achieve them had to be continually adjusted. Any decision to send Americans to fight should have “the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.” Finally, combat troops should be used only as a last resort.2 New York Times columnist William Safire derided the speech as “the doctrine of only-fun-wars.” The secretary of defense, Safire proclaimed, was gripped by a “Vietnam-traumatized” mindset; his ideas were “suitable for Switzerland, but not for a superpower.” 3

Gail Yoshitani begins Reagan at War: A Reappraisal of the Weinberger Doctrine, 1980–1984, by confessing that she too once believed “that the Weinberger Doctrine epitomized the Vietnam syndrome.” Why, she wondered, would President Ronald Reagan allow Weinberger to issue “such a renunciatory doctrine” (xi-xii)? According to Yoshitani, however, Weinberger’s philosophy of force did not depart from Reagan’s own outlook, nor was it as reckless and craven as critics like Safire alleged. Rather, the Weinberger Doctrine “codified principles” that Reagan and his advisors “had followed throughout their first term in deciding when and how to use military force.” The problem is that Yoshitani’s book makes it clear that Ronald Reagan did not so much make decisions on the use of force as allow himself to be swayed by the counsel of his more opinionated advisors. In this context, Weinberger’s address seems less like a “doctrine” and more like another salvo in the bureaucratic wars between Reagan’s cabinet officers. The fact that Reagan allowed Weinberger to give the speech says more about the president’s lackadaisical management style than anything he actually believed.

Yoshitani’s argument rests on case studies of the Reagan administration’s debates about military intervention in Central America, Grenada, and Lebanon. As she admits, “Reagan entered office in 1981 with no clearly enunciated doctrine on when and how to use military power as a tool of statecraft” (18). She attempts to show that such a “doctrine” was worked out during the four years that followed. According to Yoshitani, Reagan and his advisors developed and refined their ideas about how American power should be used through trial and error. The bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in October 1983 was when these inchoate ideas supposedly hardened into doctrine. That attack, she writes, “provided the impetus for crafting a major policy speech in which the administration would codify six principles for deciding when and how to use military power” (113).

Yet the intra-administration battles over Lebanon, to which Yoshitani devotes a third of the book, make it clear that there was no consensus on how force should be used. Rather, Reagan’s advisors fought for the president’s ear, and Reagan sided with whoever offered the more politically expedient option. The disagreements between Weinberger and Secretaries of State Alexander Haig and George Shultz (as well as the NSC staff, whom Yoshitani largely ignores) were not resolved, and the president never really developed a clear view of how force should be used. Yoshitani acknowledges the disagreements between the president’s advisors, but in order to support her thesis, she goes to great lengths to impose coherence upon the actions of a disorganized, feuding administration.

Reagan heeded the State Department’s calls to deploy U.S. Marines to Beirut as part of a multinational force (MNF) in August 1982 because doing so was politically preferable to exerting massive pressure on Israel to withdraw its forces from Lebanon (as Weinberger wanted to do, though Yoshitani does not explore this angle). Yoshitani argues that Weinberger and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Vessey initially opposed U.S. participation in the MNF, but they changed their minds “because assisting the departure of the PLO was an explicit military objective aimed at securing an important political objective” (76–77). But in fact, Weinberger and the JCS agreed to take part in the MNF because they had no other choice, and they sought to undermine it at every step. Col. Jim Sehulster, who served as the Marines’ liaison to Reagan emissary Philip Habib, was quoted as saying that “Weinberger was deliberately dragging his feet, yes. He didn’t want us committed, that’s for sure.” The Pentagon limited the deployment to thirty days, insisted that French troops enter Beirut first, and refused to let the Marines venture beyond the Beirut port. When some Palestinian forces demanded to surrender their positions to the Marines, Weinberger rejected Habib’s request to move the Marines onto the “Green Line” between East and West Beirut. Reagan’s envoy dubbed Weinberger’s behavior “an international disgrace.” Yet Yoshitani accepts Weinberger’s explanation that he was simply adhering to the original terms of the mission, and she raises no questions about the fact that his behavior could have scuttled the evacuation and that the president did not confront him about it (81).

Yoshitani’s depictions of the deployment of the “second MNF” following the September 1982 Sabra and Shatilla massacres and the intra-administration debates over its use are more problematic. Again, she downplays the extent of the infighting between Reagan’s advisors and Weinberger’s inclination to make policy on his own. She glosses over the uncomfortable fact that Weinberger chose to pull the Marines out of Lebanon on September 10, 1982, well before their deployment ended, without consulting the White House and against the wishes of Habib and Marine commander Col. James Mead.4 Yoshitani also makes it seem as though the administration’s debates over Lebanon ended with the barracks bombing (112). In reality, the October 1983–February 1984 period was the most crucial in the entire Lebanon episode. It was during these months that Reagan truly had to choose whether to escalate the fight against Syria, Iran, and their Lebanese proxies. Initially, the president sided with Shultz and NSC advisor Robert McFarlane in favor of a more aggressive policy. National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 111, which Reagan signed on October 28, called for expanded strategic cooperation with Israel and Arab allies against Syria, retaliation for the Beirut bombing, and an expansion of the rules of engagement for U.S. forces. 5 NSDD 117 of December 5 further expanded the rules of engagement, allowing U.S. forces to strike targets “organizationally associated” with militiamen who fired upon the Marines. 6 Weinberger and the JCS waged a determined campaign against these escalatory policies. According to McFarlane and former NSC staffer Howard Teicher, Weinberger deliberately disregarded a presidential order to retaliate for the bombing of the Marine barracks.7 The JCS suspended reconnaissance flights over Lebanon without notifying Shultz or presidential emissary Donald Rumsfeld.8 It is not known who leaked the findings of the Defense Department’s Long Commission report, which harshly criticized the administration’s Lebanon policy, yet it is reasonable to assume that it was someone close to Weinberger and Vessey.
The Pentagon’s actions undermined public backing for a U.S. role in Lebanon and encouraged the Syrians to order their proxies to launch an offensive against Beirut in February 1984. By this time, congressional support for the administration’s policy was fading, and Vice President George Bush and presidential advisors James Baker and Edwin Meese had joined Weinberger’s camp for fear of what Lebanon might mean for the 1984 elections. Just before the Syrian-sponsored assault on Beirut, Reagan signed NSDD 123, which called for the phased redeployment of the Marines, expanded rules of engagement for air and naval forces offshore, and the insertion of Special Operations forces into Lebanon. The United States would leave Lebanon slowly in order to preserve American credibility. However, the renewed fighting in Beirut, which erupted when both Shultz and Reagan were out of Washington, allowed Bush and Weinberger to convene several meetings in which they effectively overrode NSDD-123 and rapidly accelerated the U.S. withdrawal from Lebanon.

This last, sorry chapter in the story of the Reagan administration and Lebanon does not appear in Yoshitani’s book. Its absence distorts her portrayal of the context in which Weinberger delivered his November 1984 speech. The State Department and the NSC staff thought that the rapid withdrawal from Lebanon had been a mistake and that they had failed to convince the administration’s lack of a clear counterterrorism policy. Their frustration shaped NSDD 138 of April 1984, which called for “an active, preventive program to combat state-sponsored terrorism before the terrorists can initiate hostile acts.” Likewise, anger over Lebanon shaped George Shultz’s Park Avenue Synagogue speech of October 1984, in which the secretary of state declared that the United States could not “become the Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to respond” to terrorism. Yoshitani, however, writes as though Lebanon helped administration officials reach a shared philosophy on the use of military power. She follows her discussion of Lebanon with a look at the Grenada invasion and a comparison of Shultz and Weinberger’s views about the use of force, in which she repeatedly notes the differences between the two men but concludes that they shared “support for the executive branch’s use of military power as a tool of statecraft.”

Yoshitani has done solid research in the memoir literature, the available documentation at the Reagan Library, and contemporary press reporting. Readers will gain a good sense of how the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate political environment impinged upon the Reagan administration’s decision-making. She also deserves credit for asking an important question about how Ronald Reagan and his advisors felt about the use of military power. It is a question, however, that many more historians will need to try to answer.

Notes:
1. The views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State or the United States government. All views expressed here are based upon unclassified sources.
2. The text of Weinberger’s speech can be found online at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/shows/military/force/weinberger.html.
5. George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State (New York, 1993), 80–81.
7. National Security Decision Directive 111, “Next Steps Toward Progress in Lebanon and the Middle East,” October 28, 1983. The text of NSDD 111, along with all other Reagan-era NSDDs that have been declassified, can be found online at http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/NSDDs.html#V=V/S/SCF0P3.


Maurice Jr. M. Labelle

There are, grosso modo, two points of consensus that have emerged in the last decade or so among most scholars of the interconnected Israeli-Palestinian and Arab-Israeli conflicts: (1) from the onset, Israeli-Zionist negotiations with Palestinians and Arab neighbors were— and continue to be— inherently flawed; and (2) the so-called peace process, which reportedly aimed to establish a framework for a two-state solution via land-for-peace, is
dead. On the eve of his re-election in March 2015, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu buttressed these facts by forcefully asserting that “there will be no Palestinian state.” Despite Washington’s longstanding claim to the role of impartial, honest broker in both conflicts, historians of U.S. diplomacy have recently spilled considerable ink in unearthing the myriad ways and times in which the very concept of process tragically served as a discursive means to render peace more elusive. The “peace process,” along with its dizzying road maps, has exacerbated a grossly unequal relationship between Israelis and Palestinians, overwhelmingly benefiting the former while haunting postcolonial Arabs and turning the clock back on Palestinian decolonization.

In the audacious, thought-provoking edited volume One Land, Two States, Middle East Studies scholar Mark LeVine, retired Swedish diplomat Mathias Mossberg, and numerous contributors from varied backgrounds and nationalities (including both Israelis and Palestinians) challenge this unlawful, inhumane impasse by introducing readers to a nascent alternative to the existing one- and two-state solutions: the Parallel State Project (PSP). Initiated by the New York-based EastWest Institute and then adopted by the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at Lund University and the Swedish Foreign Ministry, this transnational movement of scholars and politically connected experts has met a handful of times since 2004 to devise constructively a new project that would better sow the seeds for a genuinely just and lasting peace between Israelis and Palestinians. The publication of this edited volume represents the fruits of their dialogue and disseminates the positions of some of its members, thereby attempting to “stimulate further new thinking” and tackling workable challenges related to their innovative, bold initiative.

The PSP’s long-term vision is simple, yet revolutionary: establish two parallel states in one land. It builds on the basic premise “that is it impossible to divide the land of Israel and impossible to divide Palestine, either physically or mentally” (250). The PSP seeks to foster peaceful relations between neighbors through the establishment of a consensual political structure that legally sanctions sharing the land of Israel/Palestine, overturning the contemporary international system’s nation-state framework in the process. All restrictions regarding the flow of peoples within the joint-territorial entity would be eliminated and every individual would choose her/his national citizenship. The Israeli and Palestinian states’ political authority would be exercised solely over their respective citizens, in conjunction with equitable bilateral agreements over mutual military, economic, social, and legislative matters pertinent to those residing within the new territorial entity. By de-territorializing Israel/Palestine, the PSP aims to create a harmonious environment that permits the “establishing of one Palestinian state on all of historic Palestine” (176), while simultaneously ensuring that Israel and its Jewish citizens are not thrown into the sea—as the first chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), Ahmed Shuqayri, reportedly proclaimed on the eve of the third Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and many Zionists across the globe have (mis)quoted ever since.

Without question, One Land, Two States’ presentation of an embryonic bi-national, shared two-state system and its ensuing discussions of the PSP’s various political, legal, economic, military, religious, and gendered facets reflect a pressing need for the world to “think outside the box” (xi). And it definitely succeeds in this regard. Yet an extensive exploration of one crucial dimension of Israeli-Palestinians relations is missing from the edited volume’s pages: imperial culture. To be fair, the parallel state’s masterminds do clearly acknowledge that Israel and the Palestinian Authority are far from being two equal states. They periodically allude to Israeli society’s general “xenophobic and chauvinistic” outlook toward Palestinians and Israeli Arabs, as well as to the prejudicial views of Palestinians and Arabs toward Israeli Jews.

Mark LeVine and Liam O’Marra IV do dedicate a chapter to “culture,” Jewish-Muslim relations, and peaceful coexistence. Unfortunately, however, this key contribution fails both to catalyze and establish a firm, foundational structure for inter-cultural dialogue concerning reconciliation over the short term, as well as the long durée. In order for the PSP to gain further momentum and realize its ambitious objective, the plan must actively integrate an extensive socio-cultural program—with the thorough consent and commitment of both states, their leaders, and their citizenry—designed to mitigate longstanding, detrimental prejudices and delegitimize the contrapuntal politics of difference that justify unlawful occupation, terrorism, and structural inequality. Perhaps the most effective means of building “confidence between the sides” (26) and thus making a permanent peace less elusive than it has been is by altering the ways in which Palestinians and Israelis see themselves, the other, and their interconnections. In other words, Palestinians and Israelis must consensually decolonize together at the same time and in the same place. Both the framework of the peace process and the mindset of the actors within it require immediate change.

This, of course, is an overwhelming, daunting task. But so is the PSP, as outlined in One Land, Two States. For it to gain further traction and reach its objective of constructively reviving the heavily tainted peace process, it must place cultural equality on the same structural level as land, politics, security, economy, and law. Universal humanity must be shared between Israelis and Palestinians. Otherwise, the PSP risks being perceived as yet another obscure imperial scheme that invokes process in a way that is antithetical to a just and lasting peace. Honest, sound reconciliation will remain elusive. And unlawful violence and dispossession will continue unabated.

Notes:
Members Present: Amanda Boczar, Tim Borstelmann (presiding), Mark Bradley, Robert Brigham, David Engerman, Petra Goedde, Rebecca Herman Weber, Kristin Hoganson, Paul Kramer, Alan McPherson, Michael Sherry, Penny Von Eschen

Others Present: Brooke Blower, Jason Colby, Nick Cullather, Anne Foster, David Hadley, Peter Hahn, Andrew Johns, Melani McAlister, Kimber Quinne, Trish Thomas, Jenn Walton

Business Items
1) Announcements

Borstelmann called the meeting to order at 8:10. He announced that Peter Hahn would be resigning from the Executive Directorship of SHAFR and expressed his great respect and gratitude for the work Hahn had done on SHAFR's behalf. Council voiced agreement with Borstelmann's remarks. Borstelmann announced that a search committee had been formed to find a successor to Hahn.

2) Recap of motions passed by e-mail since January meeting

Hahn read into the minutes a summary of the four motions passed by e-mail since the January 2015 meeting: approval of January 2015 minutes; an E-motion for clarification of the role of the Web Committee; the approval of a resolution urging the CIA and the National Archives to retain CIA records; and the allocation of $15,000 as honoraria to chapter editors of the SHAFR Guide to the Literature.

3) Mid-year budget update

Hahn provided an oral summary of a written report, circulated before the meeting, on the first half of the 2015 fiscal year budget. He reported that at the six-month mark, SHAFR's endowment and its total liquid assets were at the highest levels in the Society's history.

4) SHAFR Guide to the Literature

McPherson presented a report on a provisional contract between SHAFR and a publisher for the publication of the SHAFR Guide to the Literature. McPherson reported that he had worked with Borstelmann, Engerman, and Hahn on preparing the contract, and was satisfied with its provisions.

McPherson also reported that of thirty chapters in the guide, only two still need an editor, those chapters being Culture, Gender, and Race and U.S.-Asian relations before 1918. It was also reported that ABC-CLIO would continue to be able to provide electronic editions of the previous edition of the guide paid for on a subscription basis under the previous contract. McPherson recommended a name change for the guide to clarify SHAFR's role. McPherson then opened the floor to questions. Some discussion ensued concerning whether a deal might be reached with the publisher for legacy subscribers to the guide. It was suggested that, given the size of the subject, the chapter on Culture, Gender, and Race might be split into different chapters. Borstelmann thanked McPherson for the enormous amount of work put into the project.

5) Institutional pricing for Diplomatic History

Borstelmann opened discussion about SHAFR's relationship with Oxford University Press and the publication of Diplomatic History. Borstelmann noted that institutional pricing of DH had increased, and asked whether this might be a cause for concern. Engerman reported this raise was part of projected cost increases. Discussion ensued concerning declining institutional subscriptions to DH and declining individual SHAFR memberships. It was noted that, despite these shortfalls, DH's circulation had increased due to its packaging in consortia deals. It was hoped that SHAFR might be better informed as to how these consortia might affect SHAFR royalties. Concern was also raised with difficulties renewing membership. Hahn noted improvements have been made, and that SHAFR will remain attentive to any potential issues.

6) Summer Institutes in 2016 and 2017

Bradley reported that SHAFR had received two proposals for the SHAFR Summer Institute from outside the United States. Both were deemed to be of high quality, and Bradley proposed that both be accepted as the 2016 and 2017 Summer Institutes, with a minor increase in funding on account of the international location. Bradley also presented one of the proposal's suggestions for additional funding for research by SI participants. It was agreed that the two proposals should be selected for 2016 and 2017. Discussion ensued as to whether additional research funding would be made available. Some concern was expressed as to whether such funding would limit the geographic range of the institute. It was suggested that any additional research funds should be made available to all SHAFR members. Council voted unanimously to approve the two proposals as the Summer Institutes for 2016 and 2017, with each awarded an additional $2,000. Council decided not to fund the optional mini-research grants.
7) Compensation for the Guide editor and the conference consultant

McPherson left the room. Borstelmann reported that the question of compensation for the conference consultant would be negotiated during the search following the departure of Jenn Walton from the position. Borstelmann reported that, in regard to the Guide, more work had been necessary than expected to launch the project. Borstelmann suggested that Council could raise the Guide editor’s stipend, affirm the current compensation, or provide a “launch bonus” for the first year of heavy work. Sherry moved approval of a $1,000 launch bonus, to be applied in two installments. Bradley seconded, and the motion passed unanimously.

8) Search for a new conference consultant

Borstelmann reported that the search for a new conference consultant had been launched. Review of applications will begin on June 30 and the goal was to appoint someone soon thereafter. The committee will bring a recommendation to Council by e-mail. Borstelmann expressed great respect for the work of Jenn Walton, and Council expressed strong agreement.

9) Membership status of prize winners

Hahn reminded Council that at the January 2015 Council meeting a consensus was reached that SHAFR would require SHAFR membership for the Bernath Lecture Prize and all research grants, but not for best book prizes, and that the issue should be discussed again at this meeting. Council affirmed the consensus reached in January.

10) Global Scholars & Diversity Grant program

Hahn reported the Global Scholars and Diversity Grant program was scheduled to expire in 2016 and suggested that Council consider extending it now to enable continuity of planning and advertising. Goedde observed that the Grant program had been successful in bringing more international applicants to SHAFR and resulted in more diverse panels. Herman Weber moved, with Brigham seconding, that the program be continued through 2019, with the stipulation that money allocated to the program should not be spent if there were a lack of meritorious applicants. The motion was unanimously approved.

11) Development initiatives

Borstelmann reported that he had appointed an ad hoc committee chaired by Frank Costigliola and including Mary Dudziak, Richard Immerman, Jeanna Kinnebrew, Melvyn Leffler, Fred Logevall, Randall Woods, and Thomas Zeiler to investigate potential development initiatives. Borstelmann noted that while SHAFR is in good shape, it is important that the organization continue to build upon its strong foundation.

Borstelmann then opened the meeting to suggestions for the use of any additional funds, as he noted that responsibility for such programs belonged to Council. Discussion ensued on several programs SHAFR could pursue to improve international scholarship.

12) Venue of SHAFR conference in 2017

Borstelmann introduced the issue of venue selection for the 2017 SHAFR conference. Hahn asked if Council wished to continue the practice of holding the conference in Washington every other year, and Council affirmed that practice. Council approved the suggestion that the president and executive director would work with a hotel broker to identify possible venues for 2017 in metropolitan Washington.

13) Proposal regarding chairs & commentators at SHAFR conference panels

Sherry raised the question of whether the roles of chair and commentator on SHAFR panels should be performed by one person. After discussion, a consensus emerged that no formal change was needed, given that chairs are not currently prevented from serving as commentators.

14) History Relevance Campaign’s “Value of History” statement

Borstelmann introduced a statement from the History Relevance Campaign and asked whether SHAFR might like to endorse the statement. Von Eschen moved, with Hoganson seconding, that the statement be approved. The motion passed unanimously.

15) Discussion of controlled unclassified information

Hoganson reported that the text of a statement from the National Coalition of History, signing onto a statement from openthegoverment.org, would be forthcoming for review by Council via e-mail. The statement will concern access to documents that are not classified, but for which access is limited.

Reports

16) Passport

Johns provided a report on Passport, noting that the publication was in good health and that it had begun printing book reviews in cooperation with DH. Johns raised two issues. The first was that there had been some problems with delivery of the January issue, and he noted that he would continue to monitor the situation. The second was a suggestion that Passport
might follow the lead of the American Historical Association and publish the names of life members of SHAFR. Goedde asked whether Passport reviews were available via sites such as JSTOR. Johns reported that they were not, though Hahn noted that a broader internet search could find them since Passport is posted on the SHAFR website. Borstelmann expressed his approval of the publication of the names of life members.

17) Diplomatic History

Foster and Cullather reported that the turnaround time from acceptance of articles to publication had been reduced, and noted that they would continue working to improve it. Cullather praised the previous leadership of Tom Zeiler. Thomas reported that the editorial transition had gone well, and that DH impact factor had improved.

Thomas was questioned regarding renewal problems and the decline of institutional and individual memberships. Thomas responded that some of the decline was simply a difference in naming conventions between Oxford and the previous publisher. Thomas said that the issue of consortia would be looked into further.

18) Teaching Committee

Quinney reported that the Teaching Committee hoped to increase the number of teaching panels available at the SHAFR conference. Given that ten years had passed since the last survey of SHAFR members by the Teaching Committee, the Committee proposed to conduct a new survey and Quinney welcomed suggestions on how to shape the survey to recognize developments of the last ten years. Discussion ensued, and several suggestions concerning evaluation of the role of SHAFR members within their institutions were suggested.

19) 2015 SHAFR Conference

Walton, Colby, and Blower reported that the 2015 SHAFR conference, with 95 panels, was on track to set an attendance record. Discussion ensued on technical aspects of conference management.

20) 2016 SHAFR Conference

Johns and Statler reported that preparations for the 2016 SHAFR conference at the University of San Diego were underway. Statler elaborated on housing and transportation arrangements, and expressed enthusiasm for the program of the conference as it was developing. McAlister elaborated on the planned keynote address and other plans of the Program Committee.

21) 2015 Summer Institute

Johns presented a report on the recently completed 2015 SHAFR Summer Institute. He expressed satisfaction at the performance of institute attendees, and recommended an emphasis on professional development in future institutes. Discussion ensued on that recommendation. Borstelmann tabled the issue for future consideration.

22) Reports on recent prizes

Hahn reported the winners and honorable mentions of prizes to be awarded at the 2015 SHAFR Conference: Dissertation Completion Fellowships would be awarded to Carly Goodman and Eric Rutkow; the Betty Miller Unterberger Dissertation Prize, to Mark Seddon with Honorable Mention to Sarah Miller-Davenport; the Stuart L. Bernath Scholarly Article Prize, to Brooke Blower with Honorable Mention to Daniel J. Sargent; the Arthur S. Link-Warren F. Kuehl Prize for Documentary Editing, to Frank Costigliola; the Stuart L. Bernath Book Prize, to Adam Ewing; and the Robert H. Ferrell Book Prize, to Frank Ninkovich.

23) Concluding remarks

Borstelmann thanked Council for its service. Sherry offered a special round of thanks to Hahn, which was shared by the Council. Borstelmann called an end to the meeting at 12:20.

Respectfully submitted,
Peter L. Hahn
Executive Director

PLH/dh
1. Professional Notes

Elizabeth Cobbs has been named the Melbern G. Glasscock Chair in American History at Texas A&M University. She has also been appointed a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution.

Heather Dichter has accepted a position as Assistant Professor of Sport Management in the Department of Human Performance and Health Education at Western Michigan University.

Peter L. Hahn, outgoing SHAFR executive director, became Dean of Arts & Humanities at The Ohio State University on July 1, 2015.

Andrew Johns will be the director of the Brigham Young University Washington, D.C. Seminar for the 2015-2016 academic year.

Fredrik Logevall has been named the Laurence D. Belfer Professor at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He has also been named professor of history at Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences.

Lauren Turek has accepted a position as Assistant Professor of History at Trinity University.

Penny Von Eschen will join the Department of History at Cornell University in fall 2015.

Jennifer Walton, outgoing SHAFR conference coordinator, has accepted a full-time position providing administrative support at a public middle school in central New Hampshire beginning in August 2015.

Odd Arne Westad has been named the S.T. Lee Professor of U.S.-Asia Relations at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.

2. Announcements

Report of the Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, January 1-December 31, 2014
April 19, 2015

The Historical Advisory Committee to the Department of State (HAC) has two principal responsibilities. First, it oversees the preparation and timely publication of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series. Second, it monitors the declassification and release of Department of State records.

The Foreign Relations Statute of 1991 (Public Law 102-138 [105 Stat. 647, codified in relevant part at 22 U.S.C. § 4351 et seq.) mandates these responsibilities. It calls for a “thorough, accurate, and reliable” documentary record of United States foreign relations. Since the enactment of this law, HO has worked diligently to compile and publish FRUS volumes which meet this standard.

HAC appreciates that meeting this standard has become even more challenging and complex in view of the explosion of vital government documents pertaining to foreign relations produced by a wide spectrum of government departments and agencies during the 1960s and later decades, and in view of the parallel requirement that volumes be published no later than 30 years after the events they document. HO has struggled to meet these twin obligations, and there remains a gap between publication of the FRUS volumes and the 30-year target. HAC nonetheless is delighted that HO’s record over the past year builds on the robust progress it made over the preceding two. The projected publication in 2015 of the first volume in the Ronald Reagan administration subseries signals that HO has made significant advances in its focused effort to meet the 30-year target.
The 1991 Foreign Relations statute also mandates that HAC monitor and advise on the declassification and opening of the Department of State’s records. In this area of its responsibility, the HAC remains disappointed and concerned.

Executive Order 13526, issued in December 2009, mandates the declassification of records over 25-years-old—unless valid and compelling reasons can be specified for withholding them. With a few exceptions, State’s Office of Information Programs and Services (IPS) warrants praise for meeting this requirement, although without greater resources doing so in the future is at risk. Despite IPS’s record, however, the time required for reviews by other agencies with equities, for processing, and for transfer, State’s records may not be available to researchers for many years beyond the E.O’s requirement for review. HAC applauds the leadership of both NARA and IPS for more aggressively addressing this problem in 2014. Still, more must be done.

Publications of the Foreign Relations Series

The slow rate of declassifying records, electronic as well as paper, exacerbates the challenge of meeting the Foreign Relations of the United States series’ mandated twenty-five year deadline. Still, during 2014 the Office of the Historian published nine volumes. These are:

2. 1977–1980, Volume XXI, Cyprus; Turkey; Greece

This total, which includes the long-awaited Chile, 1969-1973 and the pioneering Public Diplomacy, World War I, amounts to two more volumes published than in 2013 and three more than in 2012. With twenty-two additional volumes compiled and submitted for declassification, HO expects to publish at least this many volumes next year. The eagerly anticipated retrospective volume on Iran 1953 is ready for publication and only awaits a State Department decision to approve its release. HO has set its sights on completing the Jimmy Carter administration subseries, will soon begin publishing the Reagan administration subseries, and has begun work on the George H. W. Bush subseries.

The management skills of the Historian, Deputy Historian, General Editor, and others in supervisory positions, coupled with innovative organizational initiatives, have generated efficiencies throughout the production chain. In addition, the maturation and commitment of the exceptional cadre of compilers, and the increase in the number of very capable editors, has dramatically reduced the time required for a volume to progress from conception to publication. The high morale throughout HO and the office’s acquisition of a more spacious and secure facility on Navy Hill which will provide on-site access to highly classified information augurs well for HO’s future productivity.

HAC commends HO for accelerating the publication cycle. It likewise commends the office for its advances in digitizing the FRUS volumes. In early 2015 HO will release twenty newly digitized versions of volumes that cover 1948 to 1951 and were published in print between 1973 and 1998. These digitized versions will be available as fully-searchable e-books on the office’s website and in a format readable on tablets and smart phones. In the near future HO intends to complete this initiative so that all FRUS volumes will be digitized. HO concurrently has improved its outreach to the public through the effective use of social media and by hosting on its website such valuable resources as a series of essays, “Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations” and an index to the diplomatic archives available around the world.

The Challenge of the 30-Year Requirement

HAC congratulates HO for its impressive progress in moving toward the 30-year target for publishing a FRUS volume. It recognizes, nevertheless, that notwithstanding the occasional exception, meeting this target will in most cases remain out of reach. In 1985, with the gap between a document’s origin and its publication in FRUS growing continually longer, Ronald Reagan established the 30-year requirement. Yet since then, the series has never averaged a 30-year lag time, and the current average exceeds 35 years. HO designed a plan that is enabling it to compile and review the volumes in the Reagan administration subseries within the 30-year time frame. The progress it has made in executing that plan, coupled with the start it has made conducting the research for the George H.W. Bush administration subseries, should facilitate the timely publication of the Bush and subsequent administrations’ subseries. HAC judges nonetheless that despite HO’s best efforts, it will not be able to publish the majority of these subseries’ volumes within 30-years of the events that they cover.

This judgment reflects the HAC’s understanding of the challenges HO confronts, specifically those that are not within its control. Ironically, the most severe challenge stems from the 1991 legislation itself. That statute mandated and facilitated research beyond the State Department and White House: in the files of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Departments of Defense and Energy, and all other Executive Office agencies involved in the conduct of U.S. foreign relations, and the incorporation of the resultant documentation in the FRUS volumes. Not only must these agencies declassify their documents for inclusion in the series, but all departments, notably the CIA and the Departments of Defense and Energy, must review documents of any origin that include their “equities.” Exacerbating the delays, the Kyl-Lott amendment to the 1999 Defense Appropriations Act requires a secondary review by the Department of Energy of every document, irrespective of its originating agency, believed to contain nuclear-related information. This tortuous process of declassification is very likely to thwart HO’s outstanding efforts to meet the 30-year requirement for publishing many FRUS volumes.
In an effort to facilitate access and review, the State Department signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the CIA, and in the late 1990s, it established a State-CIA-NSC committee, the “High-Level Panel” (HLP), to provide guidelines for declassifying and publishing documentation relating to covert actions and other sensitive intelligence activities that had a major impact on U.S. foreign policy and to adjudicate disputes. The results of these initiatives have been outstanding. In 2014 the CIA reviewed more than 3500 documents submitted by HO for declassification, and the office and agency collaborated to verify and declassify 9 volumes in manuscript. Also during 2014 the HLP process yielded approval for five cases, with another five under deliberation. The expectation is a decision will be reached on these by the spring of 2015.

Despite organizational improvements and better cooperation, this commitment to transparency extends the time between compilation and publication, often by multiple years. And the number of covert actions and other intelligence-related issues that will require HLP resolution will rise dramatically as HO compilers work through the Reagan years and beyond. HO estimates that the number of volumes in the Reagan administration subseries with HLP issues is likely to be double the number in the Carter administration subseries.

3. Recent Publications of Interest

Antunes, Catia and Jos Gommans. Exploring the Dutch Empire: Agents, Networks and Institutions, 1600-2000 (Bloomsbury, 2015).


Gaffield, Julia. *Haitian Connections in the Atlantic World: Recognition after Revolution* (South Carolina, 2015).


Heller, Joseph. *British Policy Towards the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1914* (Routledge, 2015).

Hendrickson, Ryan C. *Obama at War: Congress and the Imperial Presidency* (Kentucky, 2015).


Paget, Karen M. *Patriotic Betrayal: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Secret Campaign to Enroll American Students in the Crusade against Communism* (Yale, 2015).


Tan, Andrew T.H. *Security and Conflict in East Asia* (Routledge, 2015).


Walther, Karine V. *Sacred Interests: The United States and the Islamic World, 1821-1921* (North Carolina, 2015).


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### 4. SHAFR Updates

**SHAFFR By-Laws**  
(Revised 2014)

**Article I: Membership**

**Section 1** Any person interested in furthering the objects of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations as set forth in the Certificate of Incorporation shall become a member upon submitting an acceptable application and paying the dues herein provided.  
**Section 2** The following are the classes of membership in the Society: Regular, Student, Life, and Institutional. The specific qualifications of each class of membership shall be established by the Council.  
**Section 3** Annual dues for Regular, Student, and Institutional members shall be established by the Council.  
**Section 4**  
(a) All members in good standing, except institutional members, shall have the right to attend, participate in, and vote in all of the Society’s meetings and to vote in its elections. Each member shall be supplied without additional charge one copy of each issue of Diplomatic History and the newsletter while a member, and shall have such other privileges as may be prescribed by the Council.  
(b) Membership in good standing is defined as paid membership certified by the Executive Director at least thirty days before participating in an election or in a Membership Meeting.  
**Section 5** Any member whose dues become three months in arrears shall be automatically suspended.  
**Section 6** Dues are payable in advance of the first day of each year. New membership shall become effective at the beginning of the calendar year in which application is received and dues are paid except that dues paid after August 31 shall be applied for the following year.
Article II: Officers, Elections, and Terms of Office

Section 1 The officers of the Society shall consist of a President, a Vice President, and an Executive Director.

Section 2 The President and Vice President shall be elected for terms of one year each, beginning on January 1. The Vice President shall be an automatic nominee for the office of President the following year, although contesting nominees may be offered in accordance with provisions of the By Laws.

Section 3 The Executive Director shall be appointed by the Council to serve at the pleasure of the Council.

Section 4 In the event of the death, resignation or disability of the President, the last to be determined by a majority vote of the Council, the Vice President shall succeed to the Presidency until the following January 1. Since the office of Vice President will then be vacant, the Council by majority vote may designate one of its own members to act as chair of meetings in the President's absence. A Vice President who succeeds to the Presidency under the provisions of this section shall still be an automatic nominee for the next year's Presidency. If the Presidency, while filled by the elected Vice President under the terms of this section, shall again become vacant, the Council, by majority vote, shall designate a President ad interim to act until the office is filled by an annual election.

Section 5

(a) Elections shall be held annually by mail or electronic ballot. The candidate for each office who receives the highest number of votes is elected. When more than two nominees are slated for a particular office and no candidate receives a majority vote, a run-off election will be held between the candidates with the two highest vote totals.

(b) The Nominating Committee shall present the name of the outgoing Vice President as an automatic nominee for the office of President.

(c) The Nominating Committee shall also present a slate of two candidates for each of the following offices: Vice President, members of the Council, graduate student member of Council (in appropriate years), and member of the Nominating Committee.

(d) Additional nominees for any office shall be placed on the ballot when proposed by petition signed by twenty-five members in good standing; but such additional nominations, to be placed on the ballot, must reach the Chair of the Nominating Committee by July 1.

(e) The Chair of the Nominating Committee shall certify the names to be placed on the ballot to the Executive Director by July 15. The Executive Director shall mail the completed election ballot to the membership not later than August 15 for return by October 31. The election results, certified by the Nominating Committee, shall be announced as expeditiously as possible. In the event of a tie, the current Council, with the exception of the President, will vote to elect one of the candidates.

(f) If a SHAFR member is nominated and placed on the ballot, but fails to win election, he or she shall wait one year before being nominated again for the same or a different office.

(g) Following the expiration of their tenure, Council members must wait three years before seeking nomination again.

(h) The president and vice president shall not submit nominations while holding office. SHAFR officers should not sit in on Nominating Committee meetings or have contact with Nominating Committee members regarding nominees.

(i) The authority for administering the election rests with the Nominating Committee. In addition to soliciting nominations and constructing the ballot, the Nominating Committee shall acquire from the candidates statements and biographical data; enforce all election guidelines; respond to all questions; work with the SHAFR Business Office to circulate the ballot, reminders, and other notifications; receive from the webmaster the electronic results; and transmit the results to the SHAFR Business Office. The Nominating Committee shall refer all disputes to the Council.

(j) SHAFR endows the Nominating Committee with full responsibility and authority for constructing the ballot and both the nominating and election process.

Article III: Powers and Duties

Section 1 The President shall supervise the work of all committees, formulate policies for presentation to the Council, and execute its decisions. He or she shall appoint the members of the Program Committee and of special committees, commissions, and boards. He or she shall sign all documents requiring official certification. The President shall be ex officio a member of the Council and shall preside at all Membership and Council meetings at which he or she is present. A retiring President shall retain membership on the Council for three years after the expiration of his or her term of Office as President. The president and vice president shall be limited to one term in office.

Section 2 The Vice President shall preside at Membership and Council meetings in the absence of the President and shall perform other duties as assigned by the Council. The Vice President shall be ex officio a member of the Council.

Section 3 The Executive Director shall have charge of all Society correspondence, and shall give notice of all Council meetings. He or she shall keep accurate minutes of all such meetings, using recording devices when deemed necessary. He or she shall keep an accurate and up to date roll of the members of the Society in good standing and shall issue a notice of membership to each new member. He or she shall see that the By Laws are printed periodically in the newsletter. He or she shall submit all mail ballots to the membership and shall tabulate the results. He or she shall retain those ballots, for possible inspection, for a period of one month. He or she shall give instructions of the Council to the new members of committees when necessary. Under the direction of the Council, he or she shall manage all funds and securities in the name of the Society. He or she shall submit bills for dues to the members and deliver an itemized financial report annually to the membership. He or she shall have custody of all records and documents pertaining to the Society and be responsible for their preservation, and shall prepare an annual budget for approval by the Council. The Executive Director shall be ex officio a member of the Council, but without vote.
Article IV: The Council

Section 1 The Council of the Society shall consist of
(a) those officers or former officers of the Society who, in accordance with Article III of the By Laws, serve ex officio as members of the Council;
(b) seven members (three year terms) elected by the members of the Society; and
(c) two graduate student members (three year terms) elected by the members of the Society. In the event of a vacancy on the Council caused by death or resignation, the vacancy shall be filled at the next annual election.

Section 2 The Council shall have power to employ and pay necessary staff members; to accept and oversee funds donated to the Society for any of the objects of the Society stated in the Certificate of Incorporation; to appoint the Executive Director; to arrange for meetings of the Society; to create, in addition to committees named in the By Laws, as many standing or ad hoc committees as it deems necessary to fulfill its responsibilities; and to transact other business normally assigned to such a body.

Section 3 The Council may reach decisions either at meetings or through correspondence filed with the Executive Director, provided that such decisions have the concurrence of two thirds of the voting members of the Council.

Article V: Committees

Section 1 The Nominating Committee shall consist of three members in good standing who hold no other office in the Society and shall be elected for a term of three years, except that members of the first Nominating Committee shall be appointed by the President to terms of one, two, and three years, respectively. The Chair shall be held by the member with the longest years of service, except that when two or more members have equal length of service the President shall designate which of them shall serve as Chair. If a post on the Nominating Committee becomes vacant through death, resignation, or ineligibility through acceptance of an office in the Society, the President shall appoint a member to fill the post until the next annual election, when a replacement shall be chosen for the unexpired term.

Section 2 The Program Committee shall consist of five members in good standing appointed by the President for a term of one year. The Program Committee may include the Local Arrangements Chair (but not as chair or co-chair).

Section 3 The Ways & Means Committee shall have responsibility for (1) recommending investment management and policy to Council; (2) serving as SHAFR’s advisory board to the investment management firm approved by Council; (3) monitoring the endowment investments; (4) reporting regularly (at least twice a year) to Council on the status of the endowment investments; (5) monitoring and evaluating all ongoing programs; (6) soliciting and assessing proposals for new programs; (7) making recommendations to Council regarding funding and programs; and (8) consulting with the SHAFR accountant as necessary. The membership of the Committee will consist of the immediate past president (chair), the president, the vice president, and two members-at-large. The President shall appoint the two at-large members to reflect the breadth of the Society’s interests and membership, and they shall serve staggered, three-year terms. The Endowment Liaison and the Executive Director shall serve ex officio.

Article VI: Diplomatic History

Section 1 The Editor of Diplomatic History shall be appointed by the President with the approval of the Council for a term of at least three years and not exceeding five years.

Section 2 The Editorial Board shall consist of the Editor and nine members nominated by the Editor and appointed by the Council. Members shall serve three years except that for the purpose of establishing and maintaining a regular rotation members may be appointed for a term of shorter than three years.

Article VII: Amendment

Section 1 Amendments to the By Laws may be proposed by twenty five members in good standing or by any member of the Council.

Section 2 Once proposed, amendments must be approved by a majority vote of Council and a concurring majority vote of those participating in a mail ballot.

Article VIII: Membership Meeting

Section 1 Council shall schedule a Membership Meeting, to be held during the SHAFR annual conference, upon presentation of an appropriate petition signed by at least 25 members of SHAFR in good standing. Notice of the final time, place, and agenda of the Membership Meeting shall be mailed by the Executive Director to each member of the Society at least six months prior to that meeting.

Section 2 Resolutions tentatively approved at a Membership Meeting shall be submitted by the Executive Director directly to the full membership of the Society by mail ballot for final approval.
5. Opportunities

Diplomacy Center Foundation Desires to Employ Historian for U. S. Diplomacy Center

The Diplomacy Center Foundation (DCF) is seeking an innovative professional with a proven track record in the field of American Diplomatic History.

Organizational Profile: Located in Washington, D.C., the Diplomacy Center Foundation is a nonprofit organization, which is participating in a public-private enterprise to build and support a new American Diplomacy Center and Museum, scheduled to open to the public by 2018. It is the first institution of its kind in the world, and will be located at the U.S. Department of State in the Foggy Bottom section of Washington, D.C. near the National Mall with its museums and national memorials. The Department of State (public sector) and the DCF (private sector) are partners in building the Center.

Job Profile: We seek a Historian to research, analyze, interpret and help to present the 240-year story of American Diplomacy to the public. The Center will present American diplomacy to the public in dynamic state-of-the-art exhibits and educational outreach programs backed by a clear, concise history that provides our audiences (high schools, universities, foreign policy groups, and the public) with experiences that engage, teach and reveal information about American Diplomacy in exciting, informative ways.

We encourage freedom and creativity, to bring American diplomacy alive for a wide audience and make the Center an exciting and memorable educational experience for our visitors. The Department of State is highly respected among international diplomats for its skill in the practice of diplomacy and is considered one of the top five most interesting places to work by federal employees. It is consistently listed in the top half-dozen places to work by college graduates who are entering the federal workforce.

Position Responsibilities: The Historian will:
-- Be part of a team that will develop the historical storyline, exhibits and programs of the Center;
-- Review materials used for historical accuracy and relevance;
-- Research historical images and artifacts;
-- Work on major events in diplomatic history showing historical connections and causality;
-- Engage in extensive research and writing on historical topics for exhibits, educational outreach, and public lectures and presentations on American diplomacy;
-- Compile and organize data and work in sharable formats.

Candidate Requirements: Must have Ph.D. in American History, Diplomatic History or a related field, four years of experience teaching, and preferably some work in museums or educational outreach.

Must have excellent interpersonal, oral and written communication, organizational, and time management skills, and creative and analytical approaches to projects.

Compensation: DCF offers attractive compensation commensurate with experience, qualifications and verifiable salary history. DCF encourages men and women from diverse backgrounds and cultures to apply. DCF is an EO/EA/AA employer.

Nominations and Applications: Please email resumes, a statement of interest, a list of any publications and 3 (three) references to Robert Heath, DCF Executive Director at: Heath@DiplomacyCenterFoundation.org or heathrc@aol.com.

Background on the U.S. Diplomacy Center: The United States Diplomacy Center (USDC) will be an exciting museum and educational venue for all our citizens, and will foster a greater understanding of the critical role diplomacy plays as our first line of defense. In addition to American diplomatic history, practices, and challenges, the Center will explore American values, which underpin our diplomacy's goals of security, prosperity, peace, freedom, and democracy. Groundbreaking for the 40,000 square foot Center was celebrated on September 3, 2014.

Education is the core of the Center’s mission, reaching out across the country through modern technology to schools, colleges, universities, and to the public. Filled with interactive state-of-the-art exhibits, the USDC will present immersive educational programs and be the first museum dedicated to telling the story of American diplomacy. Using ambassadors and diplomats and their experiences, it will conduct forums, conferences, colloquia, and true-to-life simulations explaining American diplomatic practices required for America’s success in the 21st century. For details on the Center see: diplomacy.state.gov

Diplomacy Center Foundation: In April 2015, Amb. Thomas E. McNamara (ret) became President & CEO of the DCF. For more details see: DiplomacyCenterFoundation.org.
The Journal of American-East Asian Relations Frank Gibney Award

The award is given by the editors to an essay in the field of American–East Asian Relations written by a graduate student and submitted by his or her supervisor.

The author will receive a $1,000 prize and the winning article will be published in the Journal.

The award honors the life and goals of Frank Gibney (1924–2006), an early and enthusiastic supporter of the Journal. Gibney worked for more than fifty years to educate the peoples on both sides of the Pacific about each other. He began his study of Japan as a military intelligence officer during World War II and the Occupation of Japan, then became a correspondent and editor at Time, Life, and Newsweek magazines before joining Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1966. Gibney wrote or edited more than a dozen books on Japan and Asia. In 1979, Gibney co-founded the Pacific Basin Institute, now at Pomona College, Claremont California. He edited the Library of Japan series, which commissioned and translated works of Japanese fiction and nonfiction.

Deadline for submissions for the 2016 Award is February 1, 2016.

Questions and submissions to Charles W. Hayford, Immediate Past Editor: Chayford@AOL.COM.

Instructions for Authors: Submissions should follow JAEAR form and style: http://www.brill.com/sites/default/files/ftp/authors_instructions/JAER.pdf

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Report on the Spending of Funds from the 2015 Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant
by Eva-Maria Muschik

The generous support from SHAFR's Stuart L. Bernath Dissertation Research Grant allowed me to go on an essential ten day trip to California to conduct research for my dissertation entitled "Building States through International Development Assistance: The United Nations between Trusteeship and Self-Determination, 1945 to 1965." By examining the personal papers of UN employees located at UCLA's Young Research Library and Stanford's Hoover Institution Library and Archives in late February 2015, I was able to explore the role of UN employees in shaping the UN Trusteeship System. (Established in 1945, this system of colonial administration under UN oversight was based on the idea that the victorious powers of World War II would assume trusteeship of the former colonies of the defeated colonial powers to develop these territories.) The material found in the archives testifies to the fact that UN employees, given their lack of leverage, took a rather non-confrontational approach toward the colonial powers that were in charge of realizing the stated goals of political, economic, educational and social advancement in the Trust Territories. Yet the Trusteeship System proved to be much more than "a noble idea, with squalid results," as one observer at the time put it. In setting those developmental goals, the system provided a framework for UN state-building exercises, e.g. in Libya in the early 1950s and the Congo in the early 1960s. Even though Libya and the Congo were never formally incorporated into the Trusteeship System, it was the personnel of the UN Trusteeship Department who implemented policies there along the lines of the stated goals of the Trusteeship System. Another insight derived from the archival material relates to the US interest in setting up the Trusteeship System in the first place. After World War II, the US was eager to secure certain territories in the Pacific but feared being perceived as imperialistic. Declaring these islands Strategic UN Trust Territories offered a way to present de facto US annexation as a measure of collective international security rather than territorial aggrandizement. I am deeply thankful to the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations in helping me gain these and other insights and moving my dissertation forward.

Budget Summary

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Manfred Jonas was born on April 9, 1927, in Mannheim, Germany, and died aged eighty-six on August 25, 2013, in the United States. Together with his parents, Walter Jonas and Toni Dannheisser, he emigrated to New York City in 1957 in order to flee from Nazism. He graduated in 1943 from Stuyvesant High School in New York City, in 1949 received his B.A. from City College of New York, and in 1959 his Ph.D. from Harvard University with a dissertation on: "The Isolationist Viewpoint 1935-1941: An Analysis.

The next year Jonas became a visiting professor at the Free University of Berlin. The years he spent in postwar Germany had a great influence on his subsequent professional development. In 1963 he began his career at Union College, where he stayed until his retirement in 1996. Honors earned during this time include being named first the Washington Irving Professor in Modern Literature and Historical Studies, then the John Bigelow Professor of History at Union College. Jonas was also a fellow of both the Fulbright-Hays Program and the Charles Warren Center, Harvard University, as well as the Dr. Otto Salgo Visiting Professor of American Studies, University of Budapest.


Manfred Jonas defined isolationism as: “the avoidance of political and military commitments to, or alliances with, foreign powers, particularly those of Europe.” Distinguishing between different categories of 1930s isolationists, including the “foreign-oriented,” the “belligerent,” the “radical,” and the “conservative,” Jonas argued that the “neo-isolationist” designation being used in the 1960s was confusing and inaccurate. Jonas further distinguished between the liberal-radical wing isolationists who craved peace in order to carry the New Deal farther to the Left and the conservatives who feared that war would guarantee the triumph of collectivism at home. Isolationism claimed the support of Communists, Socialists, Democrats, Republicans, and Fascists who, often for very different reasons, opposed involvement in World War II. Thus Jonas’ study demonstrates how opposite interests can unite in support of a position without achieving a consensus.

Isolationism had multiple causes, was characterized by the principles of “unilateralism in foreign affairs and the avoidance of war,” and was “the considered response to foreign and domestic developments of a large, responsible and respectable segment of the American people.” The remoteness of the expanding republic from powerful enemies had allowed Americans to believe that they were permanently disengaged from European power struggles. Foreign involvements would be temporary and should be entered into only to allow Americans to defend transcendent values.

Jonas’ careful and objective analysis of the ideas expressed by the isolationists emphasized their positive approach to the world crisis, but also revealed the essential bankruptcy of their solutions. Despite their differences, most isolationists did share certain important assumptions, especially their belief that foreign wars of the 1930s lacked any clearly defined moral issues and that the United States occupied an impregnable military position in the Western Hemisphere. The isolationists failed to appreciate that these principles “did not fit the realities of the world situation and ... frequently proved incompatible with each other in practice.” Too often the United States’ war-avoiding policy of strict neutrality unintentionally helped one side in a conflict and invited retaliation from the other. “The basic tenets of isolationism had never had more than questionable validity in the twentieth century.”

The spokesmen of Isolationism failed to realize this because of their immunity to world events, something Jonas argued: “can be fully explained only in terms of the attitudes and experiences of individual isolationists.” The events of the late 1930s, especially Japan’s invasion of China, the Spanish Civil War, and Hitler’s aggression in Europe, undermined the isolationists’ contention that the American people were not affected by what took place beyond their frontiers. Jonas argues that isolationism had become little more than “an imposing facade” by the time Hitler invaded Poland, and as a consequence Roosevelt had little difficulty persuading the American people to intervene. But a small,
dedicated minority remained faithful to the isolationist creed until the Japanese assault on Pearl Harbor shattered the illusion that a unilateral policy could give the United States immunity from foreign attack.11

In contrast to his earlier work on isolationism, Manfred Jonas’ sweeping diplomatic history of American-German foreign relations focuses on an important political relationship. Beginning with American independence, Jonas quickly reaches the Civil War, when Prussia supported the Union cause.12 In turn, although the United States declared its neutrality when the Franco-Prussian War began, its policies favored Prussia.13 American-German relations evolved from support for unification in 1871 and an initial era of “good feelings”—because of an absence of imperial rivalry in Latin America and Asia as well as American misperceptions about German society—to late-nineteenth-century hostile attitudes arising from conflicts over commerce, tariffs, ports in Samoa and the Philippines, and Kaiser Wilhelm’s admonition to his troops to give no quarter during the 1899-1901 Boxer Rebellion.14 Jonas analyzes Germany’s persistent wooing of the United States during the reign of the last Kaiser, demonstrating that the eventual military conflict in 1917 was not the product of different “ways of life” but of fundamental German ignorance of American laws and traditions. From the Moroccan crises to Woodrow Wilson’s declaration of war, Wilhelm II and his government saw common interests that did not exist and had unreasonable expectations.15

When Jonas analyzes the relationship of the two countries between the wars, he shows that, once again, illusion dominated policy-making, this time on both sides. The Germans overrated the significance of the American refusal to sign the Treaty of Versailles. The United States sought to prevent Germany’s economic prostration but insisted at the same time that French claims for war damages be paid. While the Americans rejected German goals of territorial revision, they also failed to appreciate the hostility of the German public to any policy designed to fulfill the post-World War I settlement.16 It is striking that during the 1920s, the two nations could nevertheless cooperate significantly without sharing any genuine common interest.17

Jonas’ account rejects the myth about American isolationism under Woodrow Wilson’s Republican successors. It was Franklin Roosevelt’s election in 1932, and his preoccupation with the New Deal, which brought an initially thorough-going isolationist into the White House.18 The Roosevelt administration kept out of Europe’s proliferating quarrels despite growing public hostility to Nazism. The rise of Adolf Hitler did cause tension between the two countries, although until 1939 the United States did not vigorously oppose German expansion. Like many Germans it hoped that Hitler would not last or would moderate his policies. Jonas also emphasizes Franklin D. Roosevelt’s vacillation in his wartime policy toward Germany.19

By 1937 German representatives warned their government that another war with Great Britain would immediately make the United States an adversary.20 After September 1, 1939 every German victory hastened a confrontation with America. While Hitler envisioned an ultimate stand against the United States, he restrained his admirals. Jonas argues that, had it not been for the Japanese attack, Hitler might not have declared war against America in the foreseeable future.21 After Pearl Harbor, Hitler kept his word to the Japanese, now hoping that the Pacific war would prevent a repetition of 1918. As he confessed to the Japanese ambassador Oshima: “How one defeats America, [I do] not know yet.” After three generations of mostly friendly relations, Germany knew even less about the United States than the United States knew about Germany.22

In the end, the United States knew how to defeat Germany but not what to do with it afterward. The second postwar period differed substantially from the first because Germany had been defeated more thoroughly, and the Germans were more accommodating. The United States firmly imposed its political and economic systems—federalism and capitalism—on the reluctant Germans.23 United States troops remained in Europe, with West Germany essentially becoming a client state. When during the second postwar period the United States was once again forced to decide between supporting legitimate allied interests and a viable Germany, the threat posed by the Soviet Union was decisive. West Germany was rebuilt and made into one of America’s closest allies.24

Manfred Jonas was a keen observer of both Germany and the United States, and has enriched our understanding of both.

Notes:
7. Shenton, 643.
11. Divine, 120.
12. Doenecke, 601.
17. Doenecke, 601.
23. Doenecke, 601.
I have admired the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations throughout my professional career and I feel truly privileged to have served as the Executive Director since June 2002. Holding that position has provided a unique perspective on the dynamics of the Society and taught me to appreciate the hard and unrequited work that many people have contributed to the success of the collective enterprise. In my estimation, SHAFR is perhaps the most vibrant professional society in the Humanities, thanks to the devotion and care of many members.

Over the last decade and a half, SHAFR has experienced a remarkable period of growth in resources, programs, and dynamism. Annual operating budgets have increased by nearly tenfold since 2002. Much of that growth has been achieved thanks to the worldwide public and academic demand for the content of *Diplomatic History.* The journal’s esteemed reputation rests on the superb service by teams of editors (most recently, Robert D. Schulzinger and Thomas Zeiler at the University of Colorado in 2001-2014 and Nick Cullather at the Indiana University and Anne Foster at Indiana State University since 2014). It also draws upon the voluntary contributions of scores of authors who toiled in the archives and then at their keyboards to produce insightful scholarship on important topics, and the countless peer reviewers who sharpened the scholarly discourse. So valuable are the final, published articles that thousands of readers worldwide eagerly consult the pages of the journal on a routine basis, which not only has affirmed the journal’s reputation but also has generated substantial, tangible resources.

To its credit, SHAFR has wisely and generously invested these resources in several new missions that have advanced its original purpose of promoting “the study, advancement, and dissemination of a knowledge of American Foreign Relations.” Over recent years, the Council has launched several effective and popular initiatives. The generous Dissertation Completion Fellowships now enable two doctoral candidates per year to concentrate on passing the finish line of their graduate training, free of teaching and other work-related demands. The Summer Institute, launched in 2008, provides a remarkable opportunity for 15 to 20 scholars and graduate students to gather for a week of intensive study and analysis of an important theme in the field under the guidance of leaders in the field—and incidentally to build professional and personal networks that will last a lifetime. The multiplying of research fellowships for graduate students and junior scholars represents a strategic investment in our profession’s future leaders, stimulating their scholarly work and thereby pushing the field into new and interesting directions. The Global Scholars & Diversity Grants support travel to the annual meeting of those whose participation enhances the discourse by ensuring the presentation of diverse and multi-national perspectives.

SHAFR’s annual meetings have blossomed into fabulous events, where professional accomplishment, collegiality, networking, and personal friendships combine to produce remarkable experiences. The meetings have become the “happening place,” a role model for other professional societies. Much of the success of this enterprise has resulted from the hard work of our professional conference consultants, Sara Wilson (2004-2009) and Jennifer Walton (2010-2015). These two masterful organizers plus a small army of program committees, local arrangement hosts, and countless grad student volunteers have labored tirelessly behind the scenes to orchestrate the symphonies enjoyed by all. A fine testament to the success of the annual meeting is the attendance number at our last two: 524 in Lexington in 2014 (the first conference outside of metropolitan Washington, D.C. to surpass 500) and 586 in Arlington, Virginia in 2015 (an all-time record). When we reach 600 (San Diego in 2016, everyone?), we will have doubled the average turn-out of the early 2000s.

I have also been impressed by SHAFR’s elected leadership. The 14 presidents to whom I have reported since 2002 have brought to office diverse talents and passions but also a uniform commitment to achieving excellence in our research and teaching missions. I have been impressed without exception by the seriousness of purpose and the collegial and collaborative spirit among the waves of Council members who gave three years of service to the cause. Suffice it to say that the SHAFR Nominating Committee has identified candidates of superb capacity and the electorate, facing a series of “win-win” ballot selections, has chosen winners.

SHAFR’s communications have thrived under the leadership of very talented managers. The newsletter, which William Brinker built as a reliable quarterly over many years of service, was transferred to the SHAFR Business Office in 2003 and soon thereafter relaunched as *Passport.* I attribute the initial success of *Passport* to Mitch Lerner, who partnered with me to conceive of and launch it. I never hesitate to report that Mitch performed nearly all of the considerable day-to-day and week-to-week work that was invested in the early years of publication. With complete confidence—now borne out—I supported the transfer of the tasks of editing and publishing to the current editor, Andrew Johns. Under their watch, *Passport* has become a gem.

SHAFR has made its mark with other publications as well. The SHAFR *Guide* has enjoyed a storied life originating when the first edition appeared in 1983 and continuing when a two-volume, second edition appeared in print in 2003 under the editorship of Robert L. Beisner. Tom Zeiler then became the editor who took the *Guide* into the digital age by commanding an initiative to e-publish updates on an ongoing basis. Alan McPherson recently assumed direction of that operation and is working to bring the *Guide* into a new age of bytes and paper, with a new commercial press partner. On a sturdy foundation erected by Chester Pach in the 1990s, the SHAFR website has been nurtured and modernized over the last decade by the cumulative efforts of webmasters Brian Etheridge and George Fujii and our new Web Committee. The website has become a rich resource that is academically engaged, organized, accurate, and aesthetically attractive. Behind
the scenes, our webmasters built automatic communication relay systems that greatly facilitate the flow of “paperwork” and conversations among SHAFR officers, prize committee chairs, and program committees, eliminating the headaches of the paper-and-ink-and-Post-Office era and enabling these officials to focus on what really matters.

Over my years as Executive Director, I have been continuously impressed by the eager volunteerism demonstrated by scores, if not hundreds of SHAFR members. SHAFR would cease to function in the absence of the roll-up-the-sleeves-and-get-to-work spirit shown by the rank and files members who staff the program, local arrangements, prize, standing, and ad hoc committees under the direction of the elected leaders. I have found it remarkable how consistently members say YES when asked to perform service for the Society. While I have not counted precisely, I estimate that the acceptance rate is 98 percent—quite a bit higher, I daresay, than most of us find in our departments at home. The spirit of voluntarism confirms that the membership remains the heart and soul of the Society.

I also celebrate SHAFR’s long-time commitment to students. This culture of supporting students blossomed decades ago in the generous gifts made by Dr. Gerald and Mrs. Myrna Bernath to honor their late son Stuart L. Bernath, Ph.D. The family’s determination to honor Stuart by endowing several student scholarships and prizes aimed at junior scholars, I believe, ingrained our culture of supporting the next generation. Thus we subsidize student membership, conference registration, and conference meal fees. Thus we spend several tens of thousands of dollars every year on scholarships and prizes named for Bernaths and other benefactors, plus the $50,000 per year on the two Dissertation Completion Fellowships, plus the Summer Institutes that since inception in 2008 have touched nearly 200 graduate students and junior scholars, plus the Divine Graduate Student Conference Travel Grants (established through the generosity of Robert A. Divine). As the one who has been writing all of SHAFR’s checks, I have come to notice, with considerable satisfaction, a distinct pattern in the mailing addresses of scholarship and travel grant recipients: a large majority of those addresses include apartment numbers, which signal that most of the beneficiaries are in the launching phase of their careers.

For these reasons I have taken great pride in my long-term association with SHAFR. I came to appreciate the Society while a graduate student at Vanderbilt University, recruited by my esteemed adviser Melvyn P. Leffler. I became a life member in 1989, shortly after I landed my first “real job” at Penn State. My journey of discovery deepened after I joined the Ohio State faculty in 1991, inasmuch as Michael Hogan, then editing Diplomatic History on that campus, invited me to serve as an associate editor for ten years.

I was honored when the SHAFR Council asked me to become Executive Director in 2002 upon Allan Spetter’s retirement. My thirteen years of service have been one of the highlights of my career and my decision to resign the post this year has brought me some sadness. My passion for SHAFR remains strong, and I intend to remain an avid member, DH and Passport reader, and conference guest for many years to come.

Back when Mitch Lerner and I envisioned Passport, I proposed the name “Passport” and Mitch came up with the “Diplomatic Pouch” and “The Last Word.” As Executive Director, I previously have written several Last Word columns. This time, with this column serving as my “last word” as Executive Director, I guess I mean it!