



The Society for Historians of American
Foreign Relations

NEWSLETTER

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SOCIETY FOR HISTORIANS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS

Founded in 1967. Chartered in 1972.

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MEMBERSHIP: Anyone interested in U.S. diplomatic history is invited to become a member. Annual dues are \$5.00 per year, payable at the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer. Student memberships are \$3.00 per year, while institutional affiliations are \$10.00. Life memberships are \$75.00.

MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in conjunction with the yearly convocation of the American Historical Association in December. The Society also meets with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZE: The Stuart L. Bernath Prize of \$500.00 is awarded each year at the December meeting of the Society to that person whose first or second book in U.S. diplomatic history is adjudged the best for the previous year.

ROSTER: A complete listing of the members with their addresses and their current research projects is issued once a year to all members. Editor of the *Roster and Research List* is Dr. Warren A. Kimball, Department of History, Rutgers University, Newark, N. J. 07102.

SPANISH FOREIGN OFFICE ARCHIVES

James W. Cortada*

One of the last major unused sources in Europe for American diplomatic history is the archive of the Spanish foreign office (*Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores*). Created in the 1830s, the archive contains the diplomatic correspondence of Spain with the United States with the earliest papers dating from about 1833. Some files for other countries, however, run back into the 1790s. Older diplomatic materials dealing with the United States prior to 1833 are still kept at the National Historical Archives (*Archivo Histórico Nacional*) also in Madrid.

The Foreign Office materials on the United States are divided into several major collections. The first is *política* which contains the general dispatches received from ministers in Washington. This group also has many of the Foreign Minister's replies to these reports; it includes numerous American newspaper clippings, pamphlets, posters, letters from the Captain General of Cuba and other correspondence addressed to the legation. The file conveniently contains the majority of manuscripts from many diverse governmental sources dealing with a specific American issue, although not all. For example, the mid-nineteenth century dispatches from Latin America, Cuba, and European legations dealing with annexationist plans for the Spanish possessions in the Caribbean may be found in this file. The records are also in a rough chronological order within each bundle of manuscripts.

The second major group of records are the *correspondencias* which contain much information on internal developments in the United States, more legation files, and miscellaneous letters. Although less important than the first collection, both complement each other. A third source is the *consulado* or consular series. These are almost the same as the American consular records. Some important consular dispatches dealing with a major issue, however, are often located in the *política* file. Two smaller collections are the embassy and personnel records which go back into the nineteenth century.

Because the papers are stored by country topic rather than by origin, the Foreign Office may have placed documents dealing with the United States in another file. For example, a great deal of correspondence between the two governments over the Mexican problems of the 1860s will not be found in the United States' file but rather in Mexico's.

Other files dealing with the United States are catalogued under obvious headings such as Cuba, 1850-1931 and the Dominican Republic, 1796-1931 within each of the three major categories. Since the archivists

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have a general card index on the country files, it is easy enough to determine what major collections would need to be examined.

The papers are loosely bundled together in about two feet high stacks called *legajos*, neatly held together with red cord. In dealing with the manuscripts for citation purposes, one refers to the country file, major collection (e. g., *política*) and then *legajo* number.

Manuscripts may officially be read up to 1931 but, unofficially, permission might be obtained for the examination of papers up to the late 1940s. The delay resulting in gaining permission for the inspection of manuscripts after 1931 along with the restrictions that would be imposed on their use by the Minister of Foreign Affairs himself, preclude the practicability of reading them at this time, although it has been done. There are no restrictions on the earlier papers. To gain admission to the archives one must go to the American Embassy (room 205) with a letter of introduction from a college, university, or other research institute and obtain a note of introduction to the Spanish government. This is taken to the archives located in the annex of the Foreign Office behind the Plaza de la Provincia on Calle de El Salvador. Usually two days after submitting this letter and a form obtained at the Foreign Office one may begin to do research.

Typewriters may be used. The excellent library of the Foreign Office may also be consulted. Photocopying may be done only on a limited basis since the photocopying center is also used by the entire Ministry. In practice, it is often easier and quicker to take notes on a document than to have it duplicated. Copies cost five pesetas (8.5 cents) each. Microfilming facilities do not exist, but at this writing workmen were remodeling a room for such equipment. The archivists have expressed the view, however, that it will be a long time before they can hope to offer microfilming services to scholars since the Ministry plans to film many of its current records.

The Foreign Office has not published any catalogues of its American manuscript holdings although plans call for an all-inclusive list of the archives to be published. Some treaties have been issued along with a few "red books" but there is no Spanish equivalent to the *U. S. Foreign Relations* volumes nor are there intentions of publishing such a series at this time.

Because so few researchers use the archive, there are no designated reading rooms. One works in a large library room in the basement where comfortable chairs and several large tables are provided. Hours are from ten in the morning until two in the afternoon, six days a week. The Ministry closes on all official holidays of which there seem to be too many for the American researcher. When using the facilities, enter the building by the El Salvador entrance, walk the length of the hall on the right hand side and enter the second to the last door on the right to let the archivists know you want to use the basement. They will call an attendant on the telephone to open the library door. The basement is

reached by a staircase almost opposite the archivist's office and also by an elevator.

The small library staff is efficient but none of them speak English. The archivists on the main floor know their holdings very well and the attendants in the basement obtain the desired *legajos* in a matter of one or two minutes. Never ask for more than one at a time because the officials fear papers from one might accidentally be returned to another. No forms for ordering *legajos* are used. Indeed, the system remains informal in the basement and the attendants are cooperative.

A nine volume bibliography of the library is available in the archivist's office. Since the hours are short, one would do better to use the bibliography to find titles and then spend the afternoons and evenings reading the books at the *Biblioteca Nacional*, located at Calvo Sotelo, 20.

The Foreign Office is conveniently located in downtown Madrid near many hotels, restaurants, and bookstores. All buses and subways start and end at the nearby Puerta del Sol. Walk from this plaza to the immediate right of the Security Police headquarters on the backside of the Puerta del Sol. This is Calle de Correo. After two blocks make a right turn; one block further is the Plaza de la Provincia and the Foreign Office. Go around to the right hand side of the building to the entrance. The walk should only take five minutes from the Puerta del Sol.

Texts and Teachings: A Profile of Historians of American Foreign Relations in 1972

Sandra Caruthers Thomson*

and

Clayton A. Coppin, Jr.*

How do teachers of the history of American foreign relations see themselves and their discipline? What teaching methods do they use, what strengths and weaknesses do they identify in the field, and how have recent events affected their outlook? Probably every diplomatic historian has his own opinions on these matters, gathered as our own were from informal talks with colleagues, ideas exchanged at professional meetings, and from the media. For more than idle speculation, however, some concrete data were required. After some thought, the authors of this paper decided to compose a questionnaire, to acquire factual data about age, training and the like, some personal opinions about approaches

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to the subject, and to look at the effect of certain events on one's outlook. In order to obtain a sample which would include most of those teaching diplomatic history in colleges and universities in the United States, we mailed the questions to those on the current membership list of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. Of the 450 we mailed out, 197 were returned and of those, 182 were usable, a relatively large response. Our tacit assumption (unfortunately untested), was that the great majority of the SHAFR membership were historians trained in, and teaching, American diplomatic history.

The areas of interest we addressed ourselves to were several. First, we sought some data on those who are teaching courses on the history of American diplomacy or American foreign relations. (See the Appendix for the questionnaire). We wished to learn the ages of the recipients, where they had been educated, and how they taught the subject -- what texts, problems, and documentary collections and monographs were used. We were also curious as to their particular interpretations of the subject matter. Did the "labels" applied in problems books correspond to the self-perceptions of those teaching the subject?

In addition to data on age and training and methodology of instruction, our third concern was with the effect of current and controversial events on the respondents, issues that have disrupted not only the discipline of history, but most other scholarly organizations in the past few years as well as the American people as a whole. Few events in American history have provoked such agonizing and soul-searching as the American involvement in Vietnam. Since 1968 when President Lyndon Baines Johnson chose not to seek reelection rather than to risk his reputation for his war policies, Americans in all walks of life have sought answers to the many problems posed by our continuing involvement in the war. Several years ago, Daniel Ellsberg, reached his private verdict against further implication in a policy he could no longer support, and began the unauthorized publication of the famed *Pentagon Papers*.

The popular debate over the war, of course, has helped stimulate the revision of American history being undertaken by the scholars generally termed the "New Left." It was apparent that some American diplomatic historians, concerned about the war itself, were perceiving implications from their conclusions about Vietnam and the Cold War for earlier periods of American foreign policy. Judging from the endless variety of problems books and readers that are pouring from the presses, diplomatic historians were as disturbed as the general public by the Vietnam debate, and questions asked about the war were leading some to a re-examination of long-held assumptions about the wisdom of formerly-unchallenged decisions in foreign affairs.

How many in the field of American foreign relations were so moved? Was the "New Left" just a strident and vocal minority among the con-

servative or moderate majority? We sought to quantify the data about the effect of the war, the publication of the *Pentagon Papers*, and political preferences and, utilizing a computer, to compare this data to reach some conclusions. The results of the study have been gratifying, enlightening, and frustrating, as we discovered some of the limitations of the questionnaire approach and the difficulties in analyzing the information we had obtained.

Before explaining the outcome of the subject we must identify some of the problems encountered. One respondent remarked, "You will learn less than you think," which was, thanks to the computer, quite untrue. We learned much more than can be presented in this brief paper. However, composing a questionnaire is in the same league with wording a true-false test. The gap between what the questioner seeks to learn and the way in which the respondent reacts to the words used is hard to perceive in advance, and thus poses problems very difficult to overcome. A few, perhaps a half-dozen of the recipients, were so offended by the questions that they not only refused to answer but also sent us hostile communications heaping opprobrium upon our heads, damning and distrusting our motives, and even suspecting our source of funds (which came largely from our own pockets). Others raised quite legitimate complaints about our use of a 1-7 rating scale (which, for purposes of computerizing the results, was far too broad, allowing too many choices). They also castigated our use of such undefined terms as "traditional" and "radical". A number objected to our limiting their response to the Vietnam War to a simplistic continuum from "immediate withdrawal" to "indefinite presence." Some felt that, despite our guarantees of their anonymity, questions about their political behavior were, to quote, "none of your damned business." Some of these complaints we had anticipated but had decided to ignore because of another consideration: The desire to make the questionnaire short enough to tempt more people to take the time to answer it. In this day of the deluge of paper, brevity and simplicity are sometimes greater virtues than absolute accuracy of detail. And, after all, we are all called upon to make choices between less-than-optimal alternatives and denied the opportunity to make our feelings "perfectly clear" by means of a position paper. Since we wished to computerize the results, we had also to keep the questions simple so the results could be transferred to punch cards. Having perused the responses rather thoroughly, I can now make some further criticisms of the approach. The wording did lead to ambiguity, although for some questions that was probably unavoidable. The profession itself cannot agree on whether to call those interpretations of American foreign policy that are generally supportive of past administrative decisions as nationalist, "Establishment," traditional, consensus, or by the more obviously offensive label, "court historians." The term traditional seemed to us to be a fairly neutral one. An item we had not expected to be so controversial was the phrase "diplomatic history." A number of respondents felt the subject

matter should properly be designated foreign relations, and from some of their criticisms it was apparent that the Association's membership is split among historians, some of whom took the opportunity to castigate the "social scientists" for infringing on their "turf," and political scientists and international relations specialists, some of whom felt that any association with the word "history" was contaminating; others wished in addition to avoid the narrowness implied by the original phrase. It was obvious that we should have asked the respondents to identify the specific area of their own training.

The nature of the sample also can be open to some criticism. From the data on age groups, it will be seen that the respondents covered the spectrum well. However, it was impossible to determine, since the questionnaire specified anonymity, just who answered; did we hear primarily from the younger or less-well-known members of the group? We can state only that the respondents were all members of SHAFR; not all of them are currently teaching diplomatic history, although most are. About a dozen recipients returned unanswered questionnaires because they were not now teaching the subject. However, we did use responses from teachers trained in foreign relations who were not currently teaching it, including a few from graduate teaching assistants, and historians working in research positions for the federal government. And, of course, we did not solicit responses from the many teachers of diplomatic history who are not members -- yet -- of SHAFR.

A further limitation in the usefulness of this project is the necessarily "dated" nature of the response. Political questions were exciting and very relevant in October of 1972, but are perhaps less so now. With the end of the Vietnam War, the highly emotional effect it had on the study and teaching of American foreign relations will perhaps be lessened. The publication of the *Pentagon Papers* has been replaced as an emotional issue by the Ellsberg-Russo trial, but the larger issue surrounding the extensive classification of government documents still remains. One respondent urged us to "applaud Nixon (if he wins) for dropping the majority of the restrictions on World War II documents and encourage him to drop the ban on material up through 1960. Hell, it might even make him look good." On this sensitive issue the views of the SHAFR membership can still be of considerable utility.

Since my colleague and I were previously inexperienced in the use of the computer, we neglected to ask as many questions of it as we might have. We also found ourselves with far more data than we had imagined, and further analysis seems to be merited along several lines. The project was itself a "learning experience," and the results have, in our minds, only confirmed the need for continuing self-evaluation of this branch of the academic profession.

II

A Description of the Data

The average age of the respondents was 40.85 years. Those who answered the questionnaire ranged in age from 22 to 75. The regional location of the institutions where the respondents obtained their terminal degrees can be seen from Table 1. The midwest produced 34.1% of the highest degrees (overwhelmingly Ph.D.'s). It was further apparent that no one school dominates in the production of doctorates in the history of American foreign relations. The U of C at Berkeley, Wisconsin, and Harvard led with 10, 9, and 8, respectively, followed by Yale, Stanford, and the University of Virginia, but 130 were graduates of schools other than those. 79.7% said that U. S. diplomatic history was their primary area of interest, and they were apparently historians by and large.

The average enrollment of the institutions where the respondents taught was between 7,500 and 10,000; however, 59% taught in schools with enrollments less than 5,000. 79% of the institutions were secular. 25.5% teach in the Midwest, which, however, produced more Ph.D.'s than are employed there. (See table 2 for regional location of teaching institutions.) 125 of the respondents taught in universities, as opposed to colleges (47) and junior colleges (5), but the universities were small (indicating that the more well-known of the diplomatic historians from the major state and private universities probably did not reply.) 65.1% of the institutions were urban. There were an average of two classes in diplomatic history per department, and class size ranged as large as 500 students, with the average 41.6. Over one-half the classes were smaller than 29 students.

Of the respondents, 70.9% indicated that they usually used a textbook. Table 3 shows the preferences named. Some did indicate that they switched materials yearly in an attempt to "keep up to date." The heavy preference for the text by Thomas A. Bailey would seem to indicate that a sizable number prefer to stick with this well-known and established work. 10% favored Wayne Cole's work, which does represent a different approach, an "interpretative" history. 20% selected the texts by Daniel Smith and Alexander DeConde, indicating aside from stylistic and content preference, perhaps a desire to use works available in paper and thus cheaper for the student, enabling the instructor to combine them more readily with other materials.

57 of the 182 respondents reported using a problems book, while 41 used a documents collection. The most-used titles can be seen in Tables 4 and 5. Great variation emerged when we attempted to assess the combination of materials used. While figures were not fully analyzed, a study of the questionnaires indicated that about 36 respondents used both text and problems, about 15 used text, problems and documents as well, while

about 25 used text and documents. A smaller number, less than 20, indicated they used problems or documents without a text. 88.6% reported using monographs, either entirely or in combination with a text or other materials. This no doubt reflects the success of the "paperback revolution," as well as the diligence of the book salesmen.

The question as to which monographs have had the greatest influence on the respondent's teaching (see #11, Appendix) lent itself to several interpretations. Younger scholars and graduate students often named works that had influenced their own development as teachers, while older historians also saw the question in terms of the works that were most effective as teaching devices, even if they themselves did not agree with the interpretation. Many did not answer the question, and one irritated (or irritable) respondent replied sharply, "How the hell should I know?" Of the works mentioned, however, those by the radical historians led the field. 38 respondents mentioned William Appleman Williams, usually his *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, occasionally his *Roots of the Modern American Empire*. Walter LaFeber's *The New Empire* was mentioned by 29, and works by Gabriel Kolko by 12. It should be noted that a number of those who named works by radicals specifically disclaimed agreement with the viewpoint presented, however. Other influential authors were also named: George F. Kennan by 19, and the following scholars by 5 to 13 respondents each: Samuel F. Bemis, T. A. Bailey, Hans Morgenthau, Norman Graebner, Robert Osgood, and Albert Weinberg.

The item concerning the interpretations of foreign policy stressed by the academician in his courses produced some interesting data as well as many complaints (see Table 7.) Since the great majority of respondents checked more than one interpretation, and the interpretations listed were not perceived by most as mutually exclusive, it is not possible to separate out economic determinists on an absolute basis. A rough calculation of the number that chose only one or two interpretations showed, for example, that only six selected economic motivation by itself; about 20 chose it in combination with special interests, an intellectual approach, or politics. About 12 chose intellectual alone, while national security was selected by itself by 15 (several wrote in national interest as well.) The great majority of historians stressed their attempt to follow a multi-causal approach, or at least to present various interpretations in contrast to each other. Many other ideas were written in, such as psychological, social, ideological, balance of power or "realpolitik," options, and alternatives, peace studies, public opinion, and realist. Only two respondents condemned the question itself as "silly;" most seemed to understand what we were interested in. Our aim was to determine if historians did attach ideological labels to their approach to foreign relations, especially since so many of the problems books do so identify them. We found, however, that most teachers try to avoid this.

As to the method of presentation, approximately 54.2% favored a topical over a chronological approach, although some expressed preference for a combination of the two. The average time spent lecturing was 62.14%. 55% spent between 50-75% of their class time in lectures, which would tend to confirm the rather prevalent view of history as an essentially conservative discipline in terms of teaching technique. Several respondents did, however, mention elsewhere on the questionnaire their interest in the use of audio-visual, media materials, and oral history or outside lecturers in an attempt to be innovative, and some decried the large classes that made the lecture format obligatory.

How much have historians changed their interpretation of American foreign policy in the last five years? On a scale of 1 to 7, the mean score was 3.7 (1 corresponded to a significant change.) The data would appear to confirm that in the last five years there has been, on the average, a moderate change in approach. However, we might have had more conclusive data if we had asked how long the respondent had been teaching. The results of the next question asked, as to how much the Vietnam War had affected interpretation, showed that the war had had a moderate overall effect. However, because this question was subjected to a more thorough computer analysis, I will save further comment on it for later in the paper.

The item on classification of government documents produced a more dramatic tabulation. 72.7% felt that classification procedures are too strict, while some 3.9% of the respondents indicated that they believed classification policies are not strict enough. This response was in line with the next item, the publication of the *Pentagon Papers*. 57.5% agreed with the way in which the *Papers* were released to the press; 36.3% thought they should have been published, but in a different manner; while 6.1% denied that they should have been published at all (see Table 8 for the data.)

III

Vietnam, Teaching Objectivity, and Changing Interpretations in Diplomatic History

On the interrelated questions of the effects of the Vietnam War on interpretation, political preferences, teaching objectivity, and changing approaches to diplomatic history, computer analysis provided us with the most interesting results of the study. The data is shown in Table 9, which lists first the attitudes on the Vietnam War and then political preference. It will be observed that a majority of the respondents favored withdrawal from the war over a so-called "neutral" position, while very few favored maintaining an indefinite presence in that country. This would appear to be highly related to their political persuasions in past

presidential elections. In 1964, when the country was presumably offered a clear choice on the war in the candidacies of Lyndon B. Johnson and Barry Goldwater, diplomatic historians favored the Democratic candidate by an overwhelming margin - 87.8%. They still remained with the Democrats, though by a less impressive (69.4%) margin, in the 1968 Humphrey-Nixon contest. However, the 1972 election showed them somewhat more split, with a 66.5% margin for McGovern, (with many written comments indicating much soul-searching over the choices offered.) However, since the academicians were still 2 to 1 for McGovern, what is more striking is how different their preferences were from the nation's as a whole.

An additional comparison was made of the respondents' personal interpretations of American foreign relations with their self-evaluations of political persuasion. The results, which are not surprising, appear in Table 10. By a large margin they preferred to avoid ideological extremes. This would be further confirmed by their reluctance to identify themselves with only one or two overall interpretations of America's foreign relations (question 12).

The age of the respondents showed a predictable relationship to their feelings about the war. Of those most affected by the Indochina conflict (checking item 1 on question 16,) the average age was 32.6. Those who indicated a moderate effect (checking 3-5 on the scale) averaged 40.5 years of age, while those unaffected (checking 7) were an average of 45.5. The age relationship was even more pronounced on the question involving classification of government documents; those favoring a more liberal policy were 39.5, while those taking the most opposed stance averaged 60. Likewise, the age of the respondents seemed to affect their personal political evaluation in a predictable fashion: the radicals (1-2) were 35 years old, the moderates (3-5) were 41.8, while the conservatives (6-7) averaged 44.8.

A variety of further relationships were examined in the data involving Vietnam. Those who felt that the conflict had had a pronounced effect on their interpretation of foreign policy reported a marked change in their approach in the last five years, while those who denied any effect on their views professed a moderate to negligible change in their classroom interpretation. Age may well have had a bearing here too. The great number favoring immediate withdrawal from Vietnam (checking 1-2 on the scale,) who numbered 112 of the 163 replying to that question (#21,) reported a moderate amount of change in their approach to foreign policy. The mean response was 3.5. Interesting is the picture that emerges as one considers how much change in interpretation has been made by those who see themselves as radicals or traditionalists in interpretation. The traditionalists had changed very little in outlook in the last five years, while the radicals professed a great deal. A similar picture emerged in comparing personal political identification (radical vs. conservatives)

with the amount of change. The degree of change also showed a high parallel to the effect of the Vietnam War; those who reported pronounced change in approach were also those who indicated the greatest effect of the war on their perspective, while the reverse was also true.

A further analysis revealed that those who thought the classification of government documents was too strict (124 of 173 responses on that item) were at least rather strongly affected by Vietnam (3.8 on the 1-7 scale). Those few who felt classification was not strict enough were virtually unaffected by the war.

The item on teaching objectivity did not lend itself to easy analysis; those who admitted to mixing personal political beliefs into their classroom presentation are to be found across the spectrum of viewpoints. One's response to this question is probably more likely related to one's philosophy of teaching and conceptions about the possibility or desirability of injecting or omitting bias from presentation than to the other factors studied. Many of the radicals admitted that they did not separate their own opinions from their classroom analyses, although they often claimed to label them as such. The conservatives, on the other hand, usually claimed to separate totally their beliefs from classroom presentation, although they generally identified their interpretation as moderate or traditional in approach. The basic data is presented in Table II. The question does, in effect, involve a value judgment as well as a self-evaluation, and thus it would not seem to relate strictly along lines of political persuasion. Perhaps there is a better relationship to be drawn along age lines; younger scholars, having been more exposed to newer ideas in educational and social psychology, are perhaps more able to recognize that racial and ethnic biases are implicit in virtually all standard teaching materials as well as in personal attitudes, thus making total objectivity impossible. Further study on this item would seem desirable.

One further comment on the issue of objectivity. Those who said that they totally separated their personal beliefs from their classroom interpretations were far less affected by the Vietnam War than those who admitted that their beliefs emerged in their teaching. The parallel here seems logical to anyone who became emotionally involved in the war issue; it was very hard to keep one's own feelings from entering into the discussion. In fact, here the reverse would not follow; "no comment" or criticism of the war was itself a strong statement about it. In further comparisons it was seen that the "traditionalists" were less moved to change their interpretation of past foreign policies by the war than were the radicals.

Those who approved the manner of publication of the *Pentagon Papers* agreed that the classification of government documents is too strict,

while those who disagreed on the first count also strongly disputed the the second. Radicals agreed, as one might expect, that classification of documents is overly extensive and rigid, but they were joined in that assessment by the vast majority who could be termed moderates. Only the four self-proclaimed conservatives disagreed sharply, indicating a preference for even stricter classification. A similar trend was evident in comparing those who felt classification was too strict with those favoring immediate withdrawal from Vietnam; only a similar handful disagreed with both propositions.

Attitudes about the war and its effect on interpretation of diplomatic history seemed to have less bearing on the way the respondents voted. This may have resulted from the heavy preference of these academicians for the Democratic candidates anyway, presumably often for reasons unrelated to the war issue, on which there was no simple choice. The data did indicate that those who reported that the war had profoundly affected their interpretation of diplomatic history tended much more to see themselves as radical politically (5.67 on the 7-point scale.) Those who reported little effect from Vietnam were generally moderates (3.6.) This also makes sense; the war has, to most observers, been responsible for radicalizing the political beliefs of a significant segment of the academic world. (See Table 12 for data) However, there was no such dichotomy on the issue of classification of government documents; the vast majority of respondents agreed that classification was too strict, regardless of their political persuasions.

Those who termed themselves radicals differed from the moderates and conservatives in several other particulars. Radicals reported a much stronger degree of change in their classroom interpretations in the last five years; other data indicated that the war had affected them much more than the moderates. Conservatives were more critical of the publication of the *Pentagon Papers*, while moderates preferred the "yes, but." choice. Again, on the sticky issue of the separation of personal belief from classroom interpretation, it was much more difficult to separate out the ideologues.

The way in which the respondents intended to vote in November, 1972, likewise was seemingly little affected by their attitudes on the war and the documents. Some academicians in the field of foreign relations may well have had the same problems with the McGovern candidacy as the public at large; they were troubled about his domestic policy and often grudgingly praise-worthy of Nixon's policy toward China and the Soviet Union. Others tended to vote Democratic anyway, probably through long preference for the party. Those who favored an indefinite presence in Vietnam were voting Republican; the radicals favored the candidacy of Benjamin Spock or McGovern, while traditionalists and moderates

were more split between Nixon and McGovern. Despite the great preference for the Democratic party, the McGovern candidacy clearly did not command as great a hold over diplomatic historians as had Lyndon Johnson's.

The Vietnam War was closely related to the amount of interpretation change which these teachers reported for the last five years. The data indicated that the more one was affected by the war, the greater the amount of change in interpretation of the history of America's foreign relations. Those who were least affected by the protracted conflict were least likely to have changed their approach to the subject. Those showing the greatest change were also likely to be those who also favored withdrawal from Vietnam. On that question, 85 of 163 respondents favored immediate withdrawal from the war. In a cross-tabulation of those 85 it was clear that the more affected by the war, the more likely the respondent was to have changed his interpretation of American foreign relations. Among those 85, the war had had a predictably strong effect. However, there was a great spread in response to the question about changes in interpretation, probably because some of the younger and more radical scholars had always been radical in their approach to American foreign policy and thus did not modify their interpretation because of Vietnam.

Although much further work remains to be done with this data some conclusions are already apparent. Among historians of American foreign relations there is a perceptible difference in opinion and outlook which is in part attributable to age - the "generation gap." On the issues of Vietnam and the publication of government documents relating to our involvement in that conflict, their reactions are mixed, but substantially in favor of an end to the conflict and greater access to the evidence concerning policy decisions about it. They showed a very strong preference for the Democratic party, although support for its presidential candidate has been declining since the Johnson landslide of 1964. However, most placed themselves as moderates politically, and that general attitude seemed to carry over to their approaches to the history of American foreign relations. Most favored a multi-causal approach and hesitated to identify with any single "label." They try to be objective in their portrayal of their subject matter, but a strong minority admitted that some of their own beliefs filtered in, whether identified as such or not. The overall picture that emerged from this study, then, is of a group, (perhaps better described as a subgroup of the larger discipline of history) basically moderate in approach but strongly moved by the controversies of the last decade.

IV

Miscellaneous Comments

One of the most informative areas of this questionnaire was not subject to computer analysis; these were the personal comments about

the field of history of American foreign relations. There was a wide variation of opinion on the "state of the discipline." Thirty-five replied that they saw nothing wrong with the teaching of diplomatic history today, or that they couldn't comment without more knowledge of what others were doing. However, many did have complaints. A narrow, parochial approach was criticized by 35, who felt the subject was presented with too ethnocentric a view. A similar number condemned what they called a polemical, "true believer" approach, which they often linked to the New Left. About 20 criticized the so-called "Establishment," the "old boys" whom they saw as having too great a tendency to "snuggle up to the national government." A dozen or more condemned what they felt was an excessively presentist attitude, while others noted the tendency toward outmoded approaches -- excessive lecturing, narrative history, an obsession with names and dates, and dull writing, which filled the journals with masses of unread articles. Most of those complaining tended to mention several of these themes.

While many did find areas to praise, such as the generally high quality of textbooks, monographs and journal articles, and the wide variety and diversity of viewpoints debated, there were many suggestions for improvement. About ten noted the historians' general lack of training in social science methodology and asked that these techniques be made more available. An equal number specifically requested a journal for articles dealing with the history of American foreign relations. There were several suggestions for more general get-togethers, especially for informal sessions dealing with new approaches in teaching diplomatic history. There were very few specific suggestions as to what new methods might be tried, though some suggested a broader approach, placing more emphasis on the domestic influences on foreign policy, and a multi-national way of looking at the topic. Others urged narrowing topics for study so that the student could become more aware of the difficulties of choice among the various options open on a problem. Some suggested the use of outside speakers who could explain the way in which policy is actually formulated by the government.

In sum, the questionnaire indicated a wide interest in a continuing self-analysis, an awareness of some general problems in the field such as is indicated by those loaded words, "lack of relevance." They noted declining numbers of students as well as a lack of jobs and an oversupply of applicants. They seemed to be aware of the tendency toward a narrow, parochial approach to overcome this. The continuing exchange of ideas about the field itself as well as its content seemed to many to be one of the most encouraging prospects of all.

TABLE 1

Regional Location of Terminal Degrees

<u>Region</u>	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent of Responses</u>
Northeast	31	17.0
Mid Atlantic	27	14.8
Southeast	17	9.3
Midwest	62	34.1
South	12	6.6
Rocky Mt. West	3	1.6
Pacific West	24	13.2
Other	5	2.7
No Response	1	.5
Total	<u>182</u>	<u>100.0</u>

TABLE 2

Regional Location of Teaching Institutions

<u>Region</u>	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent of Responses</u>	*
Northeast	38	20.9	+
Mid Atlantic	22	12.1	-
Southeast	16	8.8	-
Midwest	41	22.5	-
South	16	8.8	+
Rocky Mt. West	5	2.7	+
Southwest	12	6.6	+
Pacific West	24	13.2	same
Other	5	2.7	
No Response	3	1.6	
Total	<u>182</u>	<u>100.6</u>	

*In the percentage column, regions marked + employ more than they educate, while those regions marked - educate more than they employ.

TABLE 3

Textbooks used in Courses in History of American Foreign Relations

<u>Author</u>	<u>Number of Respondents</u>	<u>Percent of Replies</u>
Bailey	36	34.6
Bemis	2	1.9
Ferrell	16	15.4
DeConde	15	14.4
Leopold	3	2.9
Smith	6	5.8
Cole	11	10.6
Pratt	4	3.8
Other	11	10.6
No Response	78	42.9
Total	<u>182</u>	<u>100.0</u>

TABLE 4

Usage of Textbooks, Problems Books, and Documents

	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>No</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Using Textbook	124	70.9	51	29.1
Using Problems	69	40.6	101	59.4
Using Documents	63	47.0	71	53.0

TABLE 5

Most Used Problems Books

<u>Editor</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Williams	12	21.1
Rappaport	18	31.6
Gelfand	1	1.8
Heath Series	2	3.5
Combs	7	12.3
Graebner	4	7.0
Peterson	2	3.5
Smith	5	8.8
Other	6	10.5
Total	<u>57</u>	<u>100.0</u>

TABLE 6

Most-Used Documents Collections

<u>Editor</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Williams	13	31.7
Smith	1	2.4
Graebner	7	17.1
Bartlett	6	14.6
Rappaport	1	2.4
Total	<u>41</u>	<u>100.0</u>

TABLE 7

Interpretations of American Foreign Relations

<u>Item</u>	<u>Total Number Checking that Item</u>	<u>Number Choosing that Item alone</u>
National security	83	15
Economic	79	6
Polit. leaders, politics	74	6
Special interests	32	2
Intellectual	68	12
Other	50	

TABLE 8

Opinion on Classification of Government Documents

<u>Number checked on scale</u>	<u>No. Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1 - 2 (Much too strict)	130	72.7
3 - 4 (somewhat strict)	41	22.9
5 - 7 (Not strict enough classification)	8	3.9
Total	179	99.6

Opinion on Publication of Pentagon Papers

Number approving of publication	103	56.6
Favoring a different method of publication	65	35.7
Opposed to any publication at all	11	6.0
No Opinion	3	1.6
Total	182	100.0

TABLE 9

Opinion on Vietnam

	<u>No. of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Favoring immediate withdrawal (1-2)*	119	68.4
No strong response (3-5)*	38	25.8
Favored prolonged presence there (6-7)*	10	5.7
Total	<u>167</u>	

* Indicates number checked on 1-7 scale.

Voting Patterns

	<u>1964</u>		<u>1968</u>		<u>1972</u>	
	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Republican	17	11.5	25	13.9	33	18.9
Democratic	130	87.8	125	69.4	109	66.5
Other	1	.7	1	1.1	21	12.8

TABLE 10

Political Persuasion and Classroom Interpretation

	<u>Personal Interpretation of American For. Relations</u>	<u>Personal Political Evaluation</u>
Radical (1-2 on scale)	15.6%	24.5%
Moderate (3-5)	69.3%	66.9%
Conservative/traditional (6-7 on scale)	15.0%	8.6%

TABLE 11

Classroom Objectivity

	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Percent</u>
Total separation of own political beliefs from classroom interpretation (1-2 on scale)	72	40.7
Moderate separation of own beliefs (3-5 on scale)	80	45.2
Little or no separation of own beliefs (6-7 on scale)	25	14.1
Total	<u>177</u>	<u> </u>

TABLE 12

Effects of Vietnam on Personal Interpretation

<u>Item checked on 1-7 scale</u> (One - very strong effect of war. seven - war had minimal effect)	<u>Number of Responses</u>	<u>Average response</u> (One - conservat. seven - radical)
One	9	5.67
Two	34	4.35
Three	28	4.00
Four	31	4.38
Five	17	3.41
Six	25	3.68
Seven	23	3.61
Total	<u>177</u>	

APPENDIX
QUESTIONNAIRE

All responses are confidential

1. Age _____.
2. Where did you receive your academic training _____.
3. Is U.S. Diplomatic your primary area? Yes _____. No _____.
4. Enrollment of institution where you teach _____.
5. Regional location _____.
6. Secular ____; Protestant ____; Catholic ____; Other _____;
7. Junior college ____; College ____; University _____;
8. Rural ____; Urban _____.
9. Do you usually use a textbook? Yes ____ No _____. Author _____.
10. Do you usually use a problems book? Yes ____ No _____. Editor _____;
Selected documents Yes ____ No ____ Editor ____; Monographs Yes ____ No _____.
11. What monographs do you feel have had the greatest influence on your teaching?
a) _____; b) _____; c) _____.
12. Which of the following interpretations do you usually use: a) National security
____, b) Economic ____, c) political leaders and partisan politics ____,
d) special interests, e) intellectual ____, f) other _____.
13. Do you prefer a topical approach? Yes ____ No _____.
14. What per cent of time do you lecture in your teaching? _____.
15. How much have you changed your classroom interpretation in the last five years?
Significantly _____.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 not at all
16. How much has the Vietnam War affected your interpretation?
Significantly _____.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 not at all
17. Do you feel that the government classification of documents is
Too strict _____.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 not strict enough
18. Do you believe the Pentagon Papers should have been published? Yes _____,
Yes, but in a different manner _____, No _____.
19. What is your average enrollment in diplomatic history courses? _____.
20. How many different courses does your department offer in U.S. Diplomatic
history? _____.
21. How do you feel about U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War?
Immediate withdrawal _____.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Indefinite presence

22. How much do you separate your personal political beliefs from your classroom interpretations? Significantly _____ not at all
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
23. How did you vote in: 1964 _____; 1968 _____.
24. How do you see your personal diplomatic history interpretations?
Traditional _____ Radical.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
25. How do you see yourself politically?
Radical _____ Conservative.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
26. What do you feel is "wrong" with the teaching of diplomatic history today?
27. What do you feel is wrong with the profession of diplomatic history today?
28. What do you feel is done best in the field of U.S. diplomatic history today?
29. What changes would you like to see in the way graduates and undergraduates are taught U.S. diplomatic history?
30. What are the most challenging new areas or subjects in diplomatic history today?
31. What is your political preference in the 1972 presidential election?

Abstracts of Articles Published, or Scholarly Papers
Delivered, by Members of SHAFR

David J. Alvarez. (St. Mary's College, California), "The United States, the Vatican, and World War II." *Research Studies*. 1972. 40(4), 239-250. In the period 1940-1945, the United States engaged in extensive diplomatic activity at the Holy See. American policy sought to isolate the Pope from Axis influence, discourage papal initiatives for a negotiated peace, and secure Vatican support for the Allied effort. By emphasizing the moral issues of the war as well as the political advantages

of cooperation with the Allies, the United States successfully tied the Vatican to the Allied cause.

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Leon E. Boothe (George Mason U, Virginia), "The Brussels Conference and Conflict with Japan." *World Affairs*. 1972. 135 (3), 240-259. The call for the Brussels Conference was issued by the League of Nations in late 1937 (in the wake of the Marco Polo bridge incident at Peiping) to the nine signatory powers to the Washington treaty of 1922, plus other interested nations. The article contended that America's role in the Conference ought to be looked at in terms of world foreign policy, rather than domestic internal politics. America's indecisiveness at the Brussels Conference was a clear, green light to the aggressor nations that they could act relatively freely without worrying immediately about the reactions of that power.

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Leon E. Boothe (George Mason U, Virginia), "Woodrow Wilson and Egyptian Nationalism, 1919." 6th Annual Duquesne History Forum, Pittsburgh, Pa. Nov., 1972. The paper stressed that President Wilson's decision to recognize the British protectorate over Egypt was a crushing blow to Egyptian nationalists in their desire to present their people's case before the Paris Peace Conference.

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Justus D. Doenecke (New College, Sarasota, Fla.), "Verne Marshall's Leadership of the No Foreign War Committee." *Annals of Iowa*. 1973. 41 (7), 1153-1172. Marshall, a crusading, right-wing editor of the Cedar Rapids (Iowa) *Gazette*, established an isolationist lobby and pressure group which he hoped would rival the America First Committee. Although Marshall carried on a brief political flirtation with such people as Col. Charles A. Lindbergh, he lacked the judgment and stability to sustain a mass movement. His effort to promote the "secret Hitler peace plan," supposedly advanced by Wm. Rhodes Davis, an independent oil magnate, was simply the final straw. The group died four months after it was born, leaving the America First Committee supreme in the field.

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Justus D. Doenecke (New College, Sarasota, Fla.), "Lawrence Dennis: Revisionist of the Cold War." *Wisconsin Magazine of History*. 1972. 45 (summer), 275-286. The article demonstrates that Dennis, who has gone down in textbook stereotype as a "Harvard fascist," to be a strong opponent of all aspects of the Cold War, including McCarthyism and the hero worship of Douglas McArthur. At least twenty years before

the "Wisconsin school" of diplomatic history was born, Dennis's *Appeal to Reason* caught the relationship between frontiers and markets. Refusing to enlist in any crusade except the one for absolute neutrality, his isolationism remained pure.

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Justus D. Doenecke (New College, Sarasota, Fla.), "Iran's Role in Cold War Revisionism," *Iranian Studies*. 1972. 5 (spring-summer). Coverage of the standard and revisionist interpretations of American-Iranian relations from 1945 to 1954, with an effort to show where both sides of the controversy are weak.

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Justus D. Doenecke (New College, Sarasota, Fla.), "Myths, Machines, and Markets: The Columbian Exposition of 1893." *Journal of Popular Culture*. 1972. 6 (winter). A look at the World's Fair of 1893 in light of the general economic distress of the period in the U. S., and the efforts that were made to alleviate it by seeking overseas markets.

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Mark T. Gilderhus (Colorado State U), "Henry P. Fletcher in Mexico, 1917-1920: An Ambassador's Response to Revolutionary Nationalism." Annual meeting of SHA, Miami, Fla., Nov., 1972. The paper examined Fletcher's perceptions of the Mexican Revolution, particularly with reference to Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917, and sought to explore his role in the formulation of U. S. policy in Mexico.

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Mark T. Gilderhus (Colorado State U), "The United States and Carranza, 1917: The Question of *De Jure* Recognition." *The Americas*. 1972. 29 (Oct.), 214-231. The article explored the Wilson administration's use of the policy of recognition in response to the Mexican Constitution of 1917, and also in efforts to combat the alleged German threat. One portion of the article sought to determine Carranza's response to the Zimmerman telegram.

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Kenneth J. Grieb (U of Wisconsin--Oshkosh), "Resources for Mexican History in the United States National Archives," in Richard E. Greenleaf and Michael C. Meyer, eds., *Research in Mexican History. Topics, Methodology, Sources, and a Practical Guide to Field Research*. (Lincoln, Nebr.: U of Nebraska Press. 1973), 105-109. A brief description of the types of materials which are available in the United States National

Archives that would be useful to researchers dealing with Mexican history, or relations of the United States with Mexico. The various record categories are described, the types of materials are indicated, and the procedures for obtaining access are explained.

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Kenneth J. Grieb (U of Wisconsin--Oshkosh), "Negotiating a Reciprocal Trade Agreement with an Underdeveloped Country: Guatemala as a Case Study." *Prologue: The Journal of the National Archives*. 1973. 5 (1), 23-29. This study discussed the negotiation of a reciprocal trade agreement with Guatemala under Franklin D. Roosevelt's presidency during the 1930's. It noted that trade with Guatemala did not fit the theoretical framework of the planners, and that due to consumer patterns in the United States the principal Guatemalan exports were already admitted duty free. This situation precluded significant concessions to Guatemala. Guatemalan dependence upon import and export taxes for governmental revenues, on the other hand, prevented significant concessions to the United States. The result was a fiasco during the negotiations, leading to a situation in which conclusion of an agreement became an end in itself. An accord was duly signed, because of the friendship between the two nations, but it did not fit the original projections of the theorists, and had scant effect upon trade between the two countries.

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Philip W. Kennedy (U of Portland--Oregon), "General Tasker H. Bliss on the Responsibilities of American Civilization." 16th Annual Missouri Valley History Conference, Omaha, Nebr., March, 1973. Gen. Tasker Howard Bliss compiled a solid record of service as a soldier-diplomat. He imbibed the ideas of evolutionary and reform Darwinism, and he spoke at times in terms of racial concepts. From the study of history, Bliss devised a theory which, although not complete in all particulars, depicted the "Latin and Anglo-Saxon Civilization" of western Europe as representing the highest development of modern man. Bliss regarded World War I as a weakening of the barriers against semi-civilized and barbarous peoples, especially the Bolsheviks, who might further endanger the civilization of western Europe, particularly Great Britain, and the United States. In short, Bliss reflected the views of an America seeking to adjust itself to the requirements of responsibility in the early twentieth century.

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Jamie W. Moore (The Citadel), "Bargaining for Security between the Wars: American Tactics." Peace Science Society (International) -- West-Region meeting. State U of California at San Francisco, Feb., 1973. In the discussion over naval arms limitation (1934-1936) the United States

steadfastly denied Japanese claims to the right of parity, thus making inevitably the breakup of the Washington Treaty system. Perceived by American policy makers as the best of the available alternatives, this outcome rested upon several assumptions, some of them new to American diplomatic thinking. Among the most important: a belief that treaty modification would effectively close off the possibly desirable future choice of outbuilding Japan, a desire to separate matters affecting the Pacific Ocean from those affecting the mainland of Asia, a determination that regarding the Pacific the United States had to be the controlling force in Anglo-American diplomacy, and a presumption that the reaction of the American public to forgive a failure to negotiate a disarmament agreement could be counted upon.

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Jamie W. Moore (The Citadel), "East Asia, the Historian, and the Burden of A. Whitney Griswold." 6th Annual Duquesne History Forum, Pittsburgh, Pa., Nov., 1972. This paper was composed of two main parts. The first demonstrated that all of the major conclusions reached by Griswold in his *Far Eastern Policy of the United States* may be found in various outlines and proposals for the study, written before any detailed research was undertaken. From a close reading of his work one may conclude that Griswold wrote to persuade readers of the correctness of alternatives to American policy that he recommended. His device for doing this was to construct a model of American policy. Because of its compact argument and literary excellence, Griswold's work has survived to become the basic cognitive map through which most Americans perceive their Far Eastern history. But Griswold's model is as faulty as it is persuasive, and needs to be replaced. Recent advances in analysis and presentation of diplomatic history make construction of a more accurate model quite possible. The second part of the paper gave a brief description of one form that such a model might take.

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Thomas Schoonover (U of Southwest Louisiana), "Black Colonization as an Expansionist Policy for the Lincoln Administration." Annual meeting of AHA, New Orleans, La., Dec., 1972. Using detailed information of a heretofore unknown effort of the Lincoln Administration to colonize freed blacks in Mexico, this paper argued for a new look at the motivation behind colonization. Historians have traditionally cited Northern racial ideology and fears, and Republican political strategy, to explain the Lincoln administration's very serious efforts to colonize blacks outside the United States. But this paper argued that discussions relative to colonizing blacks in Mexico or in Central America produced, on the part of the Latin American government, a fear of Yankee territorial expansionism.

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Thomas Schoonover (U of Southwest Louisiana), "Foreign Affairs and the Impeachment of President Andrew Johnson." Annual meeting of OAH, Chicago, Ill., April, 1973. This paper contended that foreign policy played a significant role in the first effort to impeach Johnson which lasted from December, 1866, until March, 1867. The Radicals not only objected to the President's domestic policy, but they were at odds with his Mexican strategy which they believed was not sufficiently active to terminate the French violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Moreover, based upon his reaction to conversations with Congressional leaders, the Mexican minister to the United States, Matias Romero, believed that the Secretary of State, Wm. H. Seward, was as much the target of these early impeachment plans as was President Johnson.

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Ronald Spector (Office of Chief of Military History, Dep't of the Army), "The American Image of Southeast Asia, 1790-1865: A Preliminary Assessment." *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*. Sept., 1972. 3 (2). Although American interests and activities in Southeast Asia are at least as old as those in China, scholars have tended to neglect this aspect of American foreign relations. Between 1790 and 1865 American merchants, missionaries, travelers, diplomats, and naval officers acquired a rich and varied experience in Southeast Asia. Through lectures, books, articles and official reports they transmitted the image of the area which they had acquired to their countrymen at home. With few exceptions, Americans portrayed the countries of Southeast Asia as much alike in their poverty, backwardness and superstition and in the venal and arbitrary character of their governments. They confidently predicted great results from the contact between the benighted peoples of the area and the progressive, democratic and Christian United States.

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Ronald Spector (Office of Chief of Military History, Dep't of the Army), "Roosevelt, the Navy, and the Venezuela Controversy: 1902-1903." *American Neptune*. 1972. 32 (4). The records of the Navy Department, as Howard K. Beale and Seward W. Livermore have pointed out, tend to support Roosevelt's famous and much-debated story of his actions during the Venezuelan controversy. What is not generally known is that, based on the studies and war games at the Naval War College, the estimates of the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the deliberations of the General Board, the Navy expected to lose a conflict with Germany, should one ensue. This condition seems to support the conclusion, also suggested by the research of Paul S. Holbo ("Perilous Obscurity: Public Diplomacy and the Press in the Venezuelan Crisis, 1902-1903," *The Historian*, 32 (3), 428-448. 1970) that if the Rough Rider did deliver his famous ultimatum, he was probably bluffing.

 ANNOUNCEMENTS

Dr. Richard H. Heindel, Professor of International Relations at Pennsylvania State U (the Capitol Campus, Middletown, Pa. 17057), is interested in, and doing research on, the tentatively-labeled topic, "The American Impact Abroad." The topic obviously includes diplomatic history in the usually-accepted sense, but other disciplines are involved, too. Dr. Heindel wishes, therefore, to exchange views and suggestions from a wide spectrum of scholars upon this little-emphasized area of history. Those interested in this field may wish to consult Dr. Heindel's work, *American Impact on Great Britain* (1940; rep. 1968), to ascertain his thinking upon the subject.

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Members of SHAFR who may wish to complete their files respecting back issues of the *Newsletter* may do so by applying to the office of the editor. Send twenty-four cents (24¢) in stamps for each number desired. Allow two weeks for delivery, since they will be mailed third class. The numbers available are as follows:

Volume I, #1 (December, 1969)	Volume III, #1 (December, 1971)
I, #2 (May, 1970)	III, #2 (May, 1972)
II, #1 (December, 1970)	IV, #1 (March, 1973)
II, #2 (May, 1971)	IV, #2 (June, 1973)

* * * * *

At the meeting of Council in Chicago in April it was announced that the mailing list of SHAFR would henceforth be maintained by the editor of the *Newsletter*. This means, in short, that all changes of address, as well as the addresses of new members, should be sent directly to the office of the editor. He will then transmit copies of the same to the Executive Secretary-Treasurer and to the editor of the *SHAFR Roster*.

It is important that the above procedure be followed since the *Newsletter* is now published upon a quarterly basis. Unreported changes of address, or changes sent to the wrong office, often mean undeliverable copies which then imposes upon the editorial office the needless expenditure of valuable time and monetary resources. Not to be neglected either in such a situation, is the inconvenience to the member, caused by the delay (sometimes months) in receiving his copy of the *Newsletter*.

* * * * *

An announcement was made in the June number of the *Newsletter* to the effect that the September issue would be largely devoted to the publication of abstracts of articles published, or papers delivered, by the members of SHAFR in the field of U. S. diplomatic history over the previous year. The editor had intended to make this project an annual feature with the September number of each year serving as the vehicle. The response to this announcement was on the minimal side, for whatever the reasons. The editor, therefore, wishes to change the *modus operandi* of this project. The publication of abstracts will be a feature of each issue from now on. Members are henceforth invited to send abstracts to the editor's office just as soon as an article is published, or a paper has been delivered, and while the material is still fresh in the mind. Please refer to the June issue for the metes and bounds concerning the submission of abstracts. Include all significant publication data in connection with articles. For those unsure of how to perform this task, they might well consult that well-known purveyor of historical abstracts, *America: History and Life*.

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The Center for the Study of Armament and Disarmament, California State U, 5151 State University Drive, Los Angeles, California 90032, invites correspondence with respect to the Center's objectives, its services, its publications, and the availability of some free materials.

THE ACADEMIC EXCHANGE

(Acting solely in a service capacity, the *Newsletter* will henceforward carry notices of (a) vacancies in various fields which are of interest to U. S. diplomatic historians, and (b) the vitae of members of SHAFR who desire employment. All announcements will be anonymous, unless a user specifically states otherwise. Each notice will be assigned a number, and persons who are interested must mention that number when contacting the editorial office. That office will then supply the name and address which corresponds to that number. When contacting the editor regarding an announcement, please enclose a stamped, addressed envelope for the return. Announcements should not exceed twelve (12) lines in the *Newsletter*. Unless specifically requested to do so, and then subject to the limitations of space and fairness to others, a particular notice will be carried only once a year.)

#E-101 Ph.D. (1972) in American and modern Chinese history. Prefers a teaching position, but has had editorial and archival experience,

and has demonstrated administrative ability. Experienced teacher. Familiar with multi-disciplinary approaches. Prepared to teach survey courses. Especially strong in U. S. diplomatic and modern Chinese history. Danforth and AHA fellow. Has done research in the Far East. Reads five languages and speaks two, in addition to his mother tongue, English. Revised version of dissertation under consideration by a publisher.

MEETINGS

SHAFR will hold one session in conjunction with the annual convocation of the Southern Historical Association. The latter will meet in Atlanta, Ga., November 7-10, with headquarters at the Sheraton-Biltmore Hotel. The session, titled "The Monroe Doctrine -- 150 Years Later," will be held at the Stouffer's Inn (590 West Peachtree St.), 2:30 P. M., Thursday, November 8. Dr. Armin Rappaport (U of California at San Diego) will chair the meeting. Dexter Perkins (professor emeritus, Rochester, N. Y.) and Prof. Mario Ojeda Gómez (El Colegio de Mexico) will read papers, while Prof. Robert F. Smith (U of Toledo) will deliver a commentary.

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Plans are well advanced for the joint meeting of SHAFR and the AHA at the latter's annual convention which will take place in San Francisco, December 27-29, with the San Francisco Hilton Hotel (Mason and O'Farrell Sts.) serving as headquarters. The Council for SHAFR will convene at 7:00 P. M., Thursday, December 27, in the Tamalpais Room of the Hilton. The luncheon will be in the Cypress Room of the Hilton at 12:15 on Friday, December 28. Vice president Bradford Perkins will preside, and Prof. Wayne S. Cole will deliver his presidential address, "A Tale of Two Isolationists -- Told Three Wars Later." The winner of the second Annual Stuart L. Bernath Prize will be announced at this meeting. Tickets for the luncheon will cost \$7.50, and forms for ordering the same will be sent from the office of the Executive Secretary-Treasurer in October. There will be accommodations for about eighty persons at the luncheon.

At 2:30 of the same day a joint session with the AHA, titled "The Significance of American Naval Diplomacy, 1838-1917," will get under way. Participants and place of meeting will be supplied in the December *Newsletter*. A reception for members of SHAFR will follow in Continental Parlor #3 of the Hilton from 5:00 until 7:00.

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Plans for the meeting in conjunction with the OAH, to be held in Denver, Colorado, April 17-20, 1974, with headquarters at the Denver Hilton (1550 Court Place) are as yet incomplete. Prof. Richard Van Alstyne has, however, agreed to speak at the luncheon.

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The first independent national meeting ever of SHAFR will be at Washington, D. C., in August of 1975. Members who have suggestions for a session (at least three, and possibly four, will be held) are asked to contact Dr. Armin Rappaport, Chairman for the Program Committee of SHAFR, in the near future. All national meetings of SHAFR have hitherto been "piggybacks" to the two older and much larger historical organizations, the AHA and the OAH. A separate national gathering will be a milestone in the independence of the Society, signifying an advanced degree of maturity. This convocation, therefore, well merits the wholehearted support of the entire membership of SHAFR.

PERSONALS

Dr. Richard S. Kirkendall, formerly a member of the Department of History at the University of Missouri, became the Executive Secretary of the Organization of American Historians on July 1, succeeding Dr. Thomas D. Clark who has retired. Among his many responsibilities in this position will be editorship of a recently-established newsletter which will supplement the *Journal of American History*. The publication will be issued in July and December. Dr. Kirkendall's address is 112 North Bryan Street, Bloomington, Indiana 47401.

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Dr. E. Berkeley Tompkins, who formerly headed the Historical and Cultural Affairs Division for the State of Delaware, has been elevated to the position of Executive Director of the National Historical Publications Commission. His new address is the National Archives Building, Washington, D. C. 20408.

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Dr. Forrest C. Pogue, Executive Director, George C. Marshall Research Foundation, is one of sixteen scholars who have been selected by

the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research to present a distinguished lecture series in commemoration of the nation's bicentennial. Dr. Pogue's topic will be "The Revolutionary Transformation of the Art of War."

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Dr. Paul S. Holbo of the History Department at the University of Oregon has been appointed Acting Dean of the College of Liberal Arts at that institution. He has also been appointed to the Board of Editors of the *Pacific Historical Review*.

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Dr. Joseph M. Siracusa was recently appointed lecturer in American diplomatic history at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia.

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Dr. Kenneth J. Hagan, formerly of Kansas State University, has recently become a member of the Department of History at the U. S. Naval Academy.

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Dr. Mark T. Gilderhus of Colorado State University was promoted to the post of associate professor of history as of July 1.

Publications by Members of SHAFR

Russell D. Buhite (U of Oklahoma), *Patrick J. Hurley and American Foreign Policy, 1941-1947* (1973, Cornell U Press. \$14.50. Reviewed in *History*, May/June, 1973.

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John L. Gaddis's (Ohio U) *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (1972, Columbia U Press. Cloth, \$12.50; paperback, \$3.95) has been awarded the Bancroft Prize for 1973.

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Bruce Kuklick (U of Pennsylvania), *American Policy and the Division of Germany: the Clash with Russia over Reparations*. 1972. Cornell U Press. \$9.50. Reviewed in *Journal of American History*, March, 1973.

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Richard C. Lukas (Tennessee Technological U), editor, *From Metternich to the Beatles; Readings in Modern European History*. 1973. Mentor Book (New American Library). \$1.95.

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Robert J. Maddox (Pennsylvania State U), *The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War*. 1973. Princeton U Press. \$7.95. Reviewed in *History*, July, 1973.

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Walter V. Scholes (U of Missouri), editor, *United States Diplomatic History: Vol. II: Readings for the Twentieth Century*. 1973. Houghton Mifflin. Paperback, \$4.50. Reviewed in *History*, March, 1973.

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Joseph M. Siracusa (U of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia), *New Left Diplomatic Histories and Historians*. 1973. Kennikat Press. \$6.95.

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Gaddis Smith (Yale U), *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy: Vol. XVI: Dean Acheson*. 1972. Cooper Square. \$11.50. Reviewed in *Journal of American History*, June, 1973, by Norman A. Graebner.

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Wm. E. Leuchtenburg, editor, *The Unfinished Century: America since 1900*. 1973. Little, Brown and Co. Paperback. c. 976pp. \$8.95. Three members of SHAFR are among the seven contributors: Robert H. Ferrell (U of Indiana), David F. Trask (Suny at Stony Brook), and Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (U of North Carolina). Wells handles the era of American diplomacy from 1900 to 1921, Ferrell from 1921 to 1945, and Trask from 1945 to the present.

Recent News Releases - U. S. Government Offices

August 16, 1973: Effective today, the Department of State has declassified almost all of its foreign policy records for the year 1947. This action has been taken by special administrative decision and does not void the Department's standing regulation which provides, on a continuing basis, for the opening of records 30 years old. Many of the most important papers in the Department's files for 1947 have already been declassified and published in the eight volumes for that year in the Department's continuing series, "Foreign Relations of the United States".

The bulk of the Department's records for 1947 are in the custody of the National Archives and Records Service, and most of them are physically housed in the National Archives building in Washington, D. C. They may now be consulted by all researchers in accordance with the standard procedures of the National Archives.

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The National Archives recently began to microfilm the Numerical File of the Department of State, 1906-10. These records, which comprise the central foreign policy file of the Department, include documentation relating to all aspects of American diplomacy and State Department business for those years. This microfilm publication will complement similar publications of pre-1906 State Department correspondence and major segments of the Decimal File (1910-29) which already are available for purchase.

The Numerical File is a subject file, consisting of 25,982 separate case files bound in 1172 volumes. Although it will take several years to complete the project, only those volumes being filmed at any one time will not be available for research at the National Archives. Upon request, it will be possible to provide positive microfilm copies of specific volumes at regular microfilm publication prices, about one-tenth the cost of negative microfilm. Until the publication is completed, inquiries may be addressed to the Diplomatic Branch.

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The Joint Chiefs of Staff recently transferred their records for 1946-48 to the National Archives. The records (60 cu. ft.) document the planning and operations of both the Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff in the early post-war period. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed a security

review of the records, and the majority of the documents have been declassified and are now open for research.

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A small number of "lot" files, received at the National Archives from the State Department, have also recently been declassified. These include the personal files of Philip Mosely, political advisor to the European Advisory Commission (11 cu. ft.); the files used in the preparation of the "Blue Book" on Argentina in 1946 (12 cu. ft.); and the personal files of Harley Notter relating to post-war international financial arrangements (1 cu. ft.).

THE STUART L. BERNATH PRIZE COMPETITION FOR 1974

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations announces the opening of the 1974 competition for the Stuart L. Bernath Prize on a book dealing with any aspect of American foreign relations. (The 1973 competition closed on May 31 with the prize winner to be announced at the annual luncheon of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the AHR in December, 1973). The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of America's foreign relations.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that was published during 1973. It must be the author's first or second book.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. Robert Beisner, Chairman, Stuart L. Bernath Prize Committee, Department of History, American University, Washington, D. C. 20016. The volumes must be received by December 31, 1973.

AMOUNT: \$500.00. If two (2) or more works are deemed winners, as in 1972, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be in April, 1974, at Denver, Colo.

SHAFR ROSTER & RESEARCH LIST

Please use this form to register your general and current research interests as well as your current address. The complete Roster & Research List will be revised and issued on Dec. 15 of even years. (Supplemental lists will be published in uneven years). In addition to an alphabetical membership roster, names will be grouped according to the subject matter of their current research (or according to their area of general research interest if no specific research project is listed), so please use descriptive titles in registering a project. Unless new data is submitted, previously listed research projects will be repeated in each issue. Submit the form at any time during the year, but before July 15 to be included in that year's listing.

Name: _____ Title: _____

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_____ Code Word: _____

Current research project: _____

Code Word: _____ EST. COMPL. DATE: _____

Check here _____ if this is pre-doctoral research.

Mail to: W. F. Kimball, Editor, SHAFR Roster
 Department of History, Rutgers University
 175 University Avenue
 Newark, New Jersey 07102

SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: Nolan Fowler, Department of History, Tennessee Tech,
Cookeville, Tennessee 38501

ISSUES: March, June, September, and December. All members receive the publication.

DEADLINES: All material must be in the hands of the editor not later than the 1st of the month preceding each issue.

MATERIAL DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, awards), announcements, synopses of scholarly papers delivered upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, lists of accessions of diplomatic materials to libraries, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting diplomatic materials in various depositories. Because of space limitations articles and book reviews are unacceptable.

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