

David S. Patterson

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MEETINGS: The annual meeting of the Society is held in conjunction with the yearly convocation of the American Historical Association in December. The Society also meets with the Organization of American Historians in April.

PRIZE: The Stuart L. Bernath Prize of \$500.00 is awarded each year at the spring meeting of the Society to that person whose first or second book in U. S. diplomatic history is adjudged the best for the previous year.

ROSTER: A complete listing of the members with their addresses and their current research projects is issued in even years to all members. (A supplemental list is mailed in odd years). Editor of the **Roster and Research List** is Warren F. Kimball, Department of History, Rutgers University (Newark), Newark, New Jersey 07102.

SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS

by
Robert H. Ferrell*

Most of the members of the Society have now learned that one of the founders of their subdiscipline, Samuel Flagg Bemis, died a year ago in Bridgeport, Connecticut, on September 26, 1973. Bemis was born in 1891 on a farm in Massachusetts and grew up in Worcester. He attended Clark College because it was virtually a tuition-free institution, and upon recommendation of one of his teachers went to Harvard and enrolled in Edward Channing's seminar where he took up the study of the Jay Treaty. Thenceforward his career moved into truly distinguished scholarship, resulting in perhaps a dozen books and half a hundred articles and innumerable reviews. He taught at Colorado College, Whitman, George Washington, and Yale, with summer stints around the country. He served as president of the American Historical Association.

To relate these points of his career is not, of course, to say anything about his qualities as a person and especially his importance as a teacher. Bemis was by nature unable to make much small talk. He lived by hard work and expected his students and friends to do likewise. Anyone encountering him in the formalities of the classroom was likely to consider him reserved, perhaps distant. But there was nothing stuffy about him, and if he considered the occasion proper he could indulge in wonderful Yankee humor of a sort akin to that of the late Calvin Coolidge (who never considered himself a humorist, but employed humor for some good purpose and with proper economy). Bemis's undergraduates usually saw the sterner side of him. If a Yale came in to the teaching assistants in History 32 and strongly protested a quiz grade, the assistants sometimes persuaded the unwitting undergrad to go into the other room and see Bemis. Likely as not the grade would be lowered. Afterward Bemis might smile at us and say it was all -- he loved to show off his French -- **pour encourager les autres**. As for the graduate students, if they worked hard he would do everything possible to help them. He never turned down a graduate student seeking to study with him.

A modest prize for beginning graduate students at Yale is being established in his memory.

*Dr. Ferrell, professor of history at Indiana University, is quite well qualified to do this memorial sketch. He not only did his graduate work under Dr. Bemis, but when it was decided a few years ago to revive and to continue the authoritative **American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy**, which Dr. Bemis had edited through the first ten volumes, Dr. Ferrell was chosen as his mentor's successor at this task.

ARCHIVAL MATERIAL ON UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND

by

Joseph M. Siracusa and Glen Barclay*

On the face of it, historians of United States foreign relations might expect to find little of value in the archives of two of the smallest and certainly the most remote of English-speaking countries. The fact is, however, that both Australia and New Zealand have been involved throughout most of their existence with the foreign and defence policies of two of the very greatest of world powers. The whole area of imperial defence was a predominantly Anzac concern from the middle of the nineteenth century, as was United States policy in the Pacific and the Far East from at least the beginning of the twentieth century. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that it is virtually impossible to follow comprehensively if not accurately the development of Anglo-American exchanges which culminated in the "special relationship" of World War Two and after without consulting primary sources available in the Australian and New Zealand capitals. Anybody doubting this claim is invited to study some of the recent efforts of contemporary British historians, who have attempted to deal with this area using British source material only.

Archival material in Australia and New Zealand is in general both concentrated and readily accessible to scholars. The only real problem of dispersion arises from the fact that in the case of Australia, for example, major diplomatic activity prior to Federation in 1901 took place between the various State Governors and the Colonial Office in London. Such correspondence is accordingly still held in the State Libraries of New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania, Queensland and Western Australia, along with certain collections of private papers. All material is organized essentially on the basis of **provenance**, in other words, by arrangement of the creating authority which originally used the particular series of documents. Generally speaking, records of an age greater than thirty years are available to academic researchers. No State institution requires any special clearance for access which is not equally applicable to Australian nationals and to non-Australians. The only criterion for access, if one is required, is the seriousness and depth of the research work being undertaken.

Of more obvious interest to United States researchers would be the post-Federation records of the Commonwealth Government, assembled by the Commonwealth Archives Office, in Canberra and Melbourne. Access here is a little more complicated, though hardly unreasonably so. The C.A.O. has cleared most documentation up to the end of the Second World War, and some correspondence of the Service Departments up to 1950. Once again, the same rules for clearance apply to non-nationals as well as to Australian citizens. The essential requirements are that one should be prepared to sign a formidable declaration of good intentions and provide one responsible referee prepared to attest to the seriousness of one's research.

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The official archives are supplemented by the invaluable collections of private papers in the Australian National Library, Canberra, and to a lesser extent in the various State Libraries. There are in general no restrictions on access here, except where certain files have been closed for security or other reasons or can be made available only on application to the families of the persons concerned. Given the breathtaking outspokenness of Australian statesmen and officials in their private correspondence and diaries, one can only marvel at the volume of material that has been made available rather than at the few pages which are still restricted. The location of collections of private papers which have come back into the public domain is noted in the published **Guide to Collections of Manuscripts Relating to Australia**, prepared and periodically supplemented by the Australian National Library. The National Library also publishes a catalogue of **Principal Manuscript Collections in the National Library of Australia**. Examples of collections of particular relevance to students of American foreign relations would be the papers of Sir Frederick Eggleston, Australian Minister to Chung-king; Sir George Pearce, Australian Minister of Defence in the 1920's; Sir Keith Officer, an Australian diplomat posted to Washington in the 1940's; and the amazing John Curtin Papers, consisting of incredibly uninhibited and occasionally blacked-out comments by the Australian wartime Prime Minister to his press secretary. Other collections not yet presented to any institution include the papers of Lord Casey, formerly Australian Minister to Washington, which are being published in part by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs; the papers of Lord Bruce, Australian Prime Minister and Minister to London, which will become available to the public in 1977; and the remainder of the John Curtin papers, which will probably be released by Curtin's present biographer within the next couple of years.

The documentary scene in New Zealand is naturally far smaller and of less obvious interest. It is, however, worth noting that the National Archives of New Zealand, Wellington, is probably the only office of that kind in a highly-developed country which one can walk into and inspect the resources of without any kind of clearance or authority at all. It can thus be actually quicker and easier for an Australian to make the trip to Wellington to consult material which he know to be available in the C.A.O. Organization is on the basis of **provenance** as in Australia, and material has been released on much the same principles, although New Zealand does not officially apply any kind of time limit on the release of documentary material, which appears to be entirely at the discretion of the Department of Foreign Affairs. As in the Australian case also, collections of private papers tend to be concentrated in the public libraries, such as the Alexander Turnbull Library in Wellington and the Hocken Library, Dunedin. Location of the various collections is given in the **Guide to Collections of Manuscripts in New Zealand**, published by the Alexander Turnbull Library. It is perhaps worth mentioning that these private collections can be peculiarly rewarding in both New Zealand and Australia, because of the past tradition for outgoing Ministers, after resignation or electoral defeat, to decamp with their office files, which thus became their own private property until returned to the public domain by donation to libraries, along with the ex-statesman's more obviously personal papers.

Any survey of archival material in these two countries would be incomplete without some reference to published source material. It would be fair to say that only the United States has produced official histories of the two World Wars which can compare in sheer exhaustiveness of detail, documentation and

occasional high literary merit with the official Australian histories of the two World Wars, and to a lesser extent the **New Zealand Official History of the Second World War**. In addition, both countries are engaged in producing documentary series which at least deserve to be mentioned along with the **Foreign Relations of the United States**. New Zealand began with three volumes of documents titled **New Zealand's Participation in the Second World War**. These have been followed by a volume of documents on the Australian-New Zealand Agreement of 1944, already in print; a further volume on Pacific security in the immediately postwar years, due for publication in 1975; and a projected third volume which will probably cover the period up to the Korean War. These publications will be the more useful because of a parallel project by the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, which will begin publishing a multi-volume series of documents on Australian foreign policy, commencing with the period 1937-1949 and working thereafter both back from 1937 and forwards from 1949.

THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF CONTAINMENT

Thomas J. Noer*

The crisis of America in the 1960's served as a catalyst to accelerate the traditional process of historical revision. The rediscovery of poverty as an enduring American phenomenon, the increased polarization of black and white, and the frustrations of an undeclared war in Vietnam forced historians to re-examine their commitment to traditional liberalism. In domestic policy the New Deal, previously viewed as the epitome of pragmatic liberalism, has borne the brunt of the historical attack. In foreign policy the dual targets have been the origins of the cold war and the guiding philosophy of the cold war liberals: containment.

Correctly or incorrectly, both critics and defenders of America's cold war foreign policy have linked that policy with the term "containment." Historians have viewed containment as both an attitude and the basis of specific policies. The Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have been assumed to be the "program" of containment. However, the connotative implications of the term have had as much impact on historical judgment as its specifics. Its defenders have seen in containment a new acceptance by Americans of the responsibilities of a world power and a rejection of misguided past policies. Conversely, critics identify containment with an assumption of inevitable conflict with the Soviet Union and the critical acceptance of force rather than negotiation as the guiding principle of postwar American policy.

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Those who have analyzed the concept of containment may be loosely classified into four "schools." The "intellectual realists" defend the basic statement of containment as a necessary departure from past American policies, but deplore the misguided implementation of the doctrine by American leadership. American foreign policy in the cold war was not containment but a perversion of the original concept. A second group, the "popular realists," have a greatly expanded interpretation of containment. Unlike the intellectual realists, this school accepts containment both as a concept and as the basis of the entire American cold war program. They argue that the Marshall plan, the Truman Doctrine, and NATO were all logical extensions of the original containment analysis. Opposing both these groups is the "new left" and other radical critics of the assumed "realist" base of America's cold war strategy. Skeptical of both the rationale that led to the containment doctrine and the extension of the idea into specific programs, the "new left" rejects the entire set of assumptions that resulted in the containment argument. Finally there is a smaller group of conservative critics who view containment as too moderate a policy that gave tacit approval to Soviet aggression.

The "Intellectual Realists:" Containment as a Temporary, Strategic Expediency

Both critics and proponents of the containment policy begin with George F. Kennan. Kennan's famous analysis of Soviet policy and formula for America's response, the "Mr. 'X'" article of July, 1947, has, despite Kennan's objections, continued to be used as a working definition of containment. In brief, Kennan described the ideological roots of Soviet conduct in foreign affairs as a cause of its unrelenting aggression and its irreconcilable commitment to the ultimate triumph of world communism. Achievement of this goal would be accomplished by a gradual, persistent, expansion of Soviet power. To counteract this slow, ceaseless pressure, United States' policy "must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies." The United States must "confront the Russians with unalterable counterforce at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world."¹

Kennan's brief article did not clearly define a policy. It contained no specific programs to meet the "Soviet challenge." Kennan's analysis was based upon an assumption that American policy had been floundering in the face of an unambiguous threat from the Soviet Union. A new policy was needed, but Kennan did not elaborate. However, almost without exception the Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine were defended as the practical implementations of the abstract containment doctrine.²

Containment, as conceived of by Kennan and activated by Harry Truman, George C. Marshall and Dean G. Acheson, was immediately challenged in a perceptive analysis by Walter Lippmann. Lippmann interpreted containment as essentially a military program. As such it was too expansive a policy and would give "a blank check to military spending." Furthermore, containment was based on the assumption that Russian actions stemmed primarily from ideology. Containment, perceived as an unending confrontation between two hostile ideological systems, would merely solidify the division of Europe. It would end hope of a negotiated solution and ignore "the immediate and decisive problem of

all our relations with the Soviet Union: how the Red Army could be evacuated from Europe." Lippman accepted the Marshall Plan but rejected the military and global implications of the Truman Doctrine.³

Lippmann's critique of America's policy forced realists like Kennan to bear responsibility not only for the initial statement of containment but also for the programs associated with doctrine: The Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and later NATO. The "intellectual realists" responded by making a critical distinction between the **concept** of containment, which they strongly endorsed, and the specific programs of Truman which they rejected. They lauded containment as a rejection of the "moralism" and "legalism" that had plagued American policy throughout the twentieth century. Containment marked a move towards "other criteria, sadder, more limited, more practical."⁴ However, they deplored the "idealism" of Truman in instigating the doctrine. "Realists" such as Hans J. Morgenthau, Norman A. Graebner, Henry A. Kissinger, Walter Johnson, John Lukacs, and Louis Halle, as well as neo-radical Staughton Lynd, all could applaud containment as "a significant move away from America's intoxication with moral abstractions" yet deplore the Truman Doctrine as "a transformation of a concrete interest of the United States in a geographically defined part of the world into a moral principle of worldwide validity" ⁵ The only debate among the "intellectual realists" was when the realistic doctrine of containment, as expounded by Kennan, became unrealistic global, military anti-communism.⁶

Louis Halle, a close associate of Kennan in the State Department, summed up the early realist view of containment:

In 1947, then, the U.S. finally adopted a new policy to meet the dire necessities of the twentieth century. . . . That new policy was to assume leadership in organizing and directing the power of the free world so as to balance, and thereby to check, the expanding power of the Soviet Union. . . . Initially, it led to successes of a magnitude which, being so close to these matters as we are we have hardly appreciated.⁷

However, for all the benefits of containment as a guiding policy, the doctrine was stated in too broad terms and expanded by the Truman Doctrine to make it yet another example of the moralism and legalism that it was designed to replace. "We leaped on an extreme. We assumed a sort of unlimited commitment that we would not be able to fulfill completely and liberally," bemoaned Halle.⁸

It was, not suprisingly, Hans J. Morgenthau and Kennan who offered the most systematic defence of the realist view of the containment doctrine. Morgenthau's **The Impasse of American Foreign Policy**, published in 1962, set down the basic realist argument. Containment was radical transformation of traditional American policy towards a new realization of the need for power politics to protect "basic national interests." Containment was "the foundation stone of the new American policy" developed in the spring of 1947. However, containment was conceived of as only "the first step, an indispensable step, towards a viable balance of power in Europe."⁹ It was a temporary expedient to restore the balance, a short-term goal that would precede a settlement of the cold war on terms more favorable to America. In Morgenthau's words:

The policy of containment was never conceived to mean, and has never actually meant, simply the holding of a line against the threat of Soviet power. There has always been implicit in the policy the objective of drawing the definitive line of division farther to the East than it was in 1945.¹⁰

Containment, Morgenthau concluded, was oriented solely towards Europe and designed only to restore the balance of power and give the United States equal weight in a negotiated settlement. Thus the Marshall Plan was an acceptable part of containment. However, the expansion of containment into a global policy was contrary to the goals of the doctrine and an idealistic mistake made by both Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower.¹¹

Kennan's recent explanation of containment is similar to that of Morgenthau's. In the first volume of his **Memoirs**, published in 1967, Kennan admits his irritation with defending the "containment doctrine" and sought vigorously to divorce himself from the applications of his concept. Containment, in Kennan's view, was not conceived of in military terms. It was to be "political containment of a political threat." Containment was to apply only to Western Europe and Japan. The Mr. 'X' " article was, according to its author, "unclear" and "misinterpreted." Containment was "not intended as a doctrine . . . but as a principle." Like Morgenthau, Kennan argued that containment was only a temporary strategy to alter the balance of power: "The purpose of 'containment' as then conceived was not to perpetuate the status quo . . . it was to tide us over a difficult time." Containment was to stabilize Europe for an eventual political settlement. "It was not 'containment' that failed," Kennan argued, "it was the intended follow-up that never occurred."¹²

Responding to the use of containment to justify the war in Vietnam, Kennan argued that the doctrine was never intended to apply to Asia. Kennan goes even further and argues that whatever value the concept contained ended with the death of Stalin and the beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The end of monolithic communism should also have marked the end of the containment doctrine.¹³

Recently John Lewis Gaddis has offered a slightly different realist interpretation of containment. Gaddis rejects the basic assumption of Kennan and Morgenthau that containment was a great departure from previous U.S. policy. Gaddis argued that the containment concept, as represented in the Truman Doctrine, was neither revolutionary nor global:

. . . the Truman Doctrine, far from representing a revolution in American foreign policy, was very much in line with previously established precedents for dealing with shifts in the European balance-of-power . . . --the real commitment to contain communism everywhere originated in the events surrounding the Korean War¹⁴

Despite this crucial disagreement with the "intellectual realists," Gaddis accepts the basic distinction between containment as conceived and as implemented. Containment was a limited and realistic strategy: "Neither Kennan nor [Charles] Bohlen had conceived of containment as a permanent policy: the objective in their view was to demonstrate to the Russians. . . that their own best interests lay in peaceful resolution of differences with the West." Gaddis also accepts the argument that the basic containment strategy would have led to negotiated settlement except for the later escalation into rigid global anti-communism:

. . . it does seem possible that the policies of Truman, Marshall and Acheson, had they been allowed to run their course, might have resulted in the evolution of a multi-polar world operating on

balance-of-power principles: a world closely resembling the nineteenth-century international order which Acheson remembered so fondly.

In Gaddis' interpretation it was the invasion of South Korea and the commitment of U.S. troops that transformed a policy of negotiation into a policy of force--the change that the "intellectual realists" deplore.

The "intellectual realists" thus view containment as a dual-level policy: A careful, realistic principle designed to maintain the status quo in Europe, to be followed by negotiation with the USSR for a permanent territorial settlement. However, under Truman this limited strategic concept was expanded into a legalistic, global, military doctrine. The realists, except for Gaddis, defend containment as a "great departure" from traditional American moralism. Unfortunately, those who implemented the strategy viewed containment as an end in itself. They never moved towards the settlement of the conflict: they only perpetuated it by making the doctrine military and global.

The "Popular Realists:" The Sanctity of Containment

If Truman and Eisenhower "misunderstood" the doctrine of containment, as Kennan and others charge, the same might also be said of "popular realists" such as Eric F. Goldman, John W. Spanier, Henry L. Roberts and others. Ignoring or dismissing the Kennan-Morgenthau interpretation of containment, the "popular realists" have interpreted containment as a fixed, world-wide doctrine expressed in the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, and NATO. Containment was both a military and economic policy designed simply to "contain" the onrush of communism. As such it was a pragmatic acceptance of an awesome challenge. America refused to repeat her fatal withdrawal from world politics and realistically rose to meet the Soviet threat.

Eric F. Goldman's immensely popular **The Crucial Decade**, first published in 1956, stated in dramatic fashion the "popular realist" interpretation. Containment, according to Goldman, was an example of America's response to a grave threat with a pragmatic program to counteract the menace of communism. America was in desperate need of a policy to meet "the pressure of the onrushing chaos in Europe." The Marshall Plan and the Truman Doctrine, both extensions of the containment doctrine, were crisis programs. America had only three choices in 1947, argued Goldman, "world war, appeasement, or containment." Containment of communism through economic pressure and military force was a long-term policy that would not produce spectacular results. However, it would prove successful in the end. The prevention of the expansion of communism would weaken the Soviet Union by denying its basic ideology.¹⁵

Like the Kennan-Morgenthau school, Goldman and other "popular realists" saw containment as a radical departure from previous American policy. However, Goldman and others make no distinction between containment as a specific political and economic policy towards Europe and as a global military preservation of the status quo. They accepted containment as an end in itself rather than a preliminary step towards negotiation.

Goldman's interpretation rapidly became the popular standard. The "crucial decade" became "the critical year" in Desmond Donnelley's analysis of 1947 and in John W. Spanier's highly-acclaimed account of America's cold war policy.¹⁶ Containment proved that "the days of Chamberlain appeasement were gone," according to Herbert Druks.¹⁷ What Kennan contends was "political containment of a political threat" rapidly became interpreted essentially in military terms.¹⁸

To many of the "popular realists", containment came to symbolize all that was correct in American foreign policy. Critics were dismissed as uninformed, idealistic, or even treasonous.¹⁹ Henry L. Roberts, **Russia and America: Dangers and Prospects** is a prime example of the sanctity bestowed upon containment. Communist expansion is inevitable unless met by military force, argued Roberts. It is crucial to the national interests of America that the status quo be preserved throughout the world: "In general each time a piece of territory and its inhabitants are brought into the Soviet orbit the free world suffers a loss of strength and the communists enjoy a corresponding gain." Containment was the only policy short of war to meet this grave threat with "forward pressure." Containment must hold the line while the United States promoted "agitation throughout Eastern Europe" to keep the communists occupied within their own countries and prevent further expansion.²⁰

If Kennan and Morgenthau are correct, this popular interpretation of containment is basically a distorted view. Regardless, the "popular realist" interpretation has perpetuated an analysis of containment as a global, military policy of maintaining the exact borders between communism and the "free world." Containment became identified not only with the Marshall Plan, but also with the Truman Doctrine and regional military pacts such as NATO and SEATO. Whether or not this is what Kennan and others in the State Department intended by the containment doctrine, it became the prevailing view of the consensus liberals of the 1950's and early 1960's.

"New Left" Critics of Realism: Containment as Ideology

Despite the differences between the "intellectual" and "popular" realists, they share many basic assumptions and commitments. Both groups generally assume that containment and the policies of 1947 represented a radical departure from the traditional American "moralistic-legalistic" approach to foreign affairs. Neither group would deny the gravity of the Soviet challenge in Europe. American policy had floundered in the twenty months between the end of the war in Europe and the announcement of the Marshall Plan. U.S. policy was essentially inaction until a rather sudden realization of Soviet hostility forced America to accept the great departure of containment. It is precisely these assumptions that are denied by the "new left".²¹

The "new left" attacks on containment are merely part of their larger revisionist analysis of the origins of the cold war and the entire realist interpretation of American foreign policy. In general, the "new left" denies the basic realist contention that containment was a rejection of idealism and an acceptance of a new policy based on clear national interests. What has been dubbed realism was, in effect, ideological anti-communism and economic

self-interest. Despite the rhetoric about national interests and non-idealistic power politics, the realists viewed communism in moralistic terms. Because the architects of containment assumed communism was naturally expansive they incorrectly dismissed any possibility of negotiated settlement and cooperation with the Soviet Union.²² The realists' "blanket denial that the Soviets had even considered that they could work with the U.S." was a moral judgment that was contrary to the avowed realist method of analysis. America held the preponderance of power at the end of the War and initiated the cold war by attempting to force Russian compliance with America's economic and political objectives.²³

Containment, according to this argument, was neither new nor realistic. It was a continuation of traditional American policy. Containment was not, as the realists contend, a first step towards a negotiated settlement with the Soviet Union. It solidified the division of Europe and perpetuated an unnecessary conflict between Washington and Moscow.

Although most of the "new left" agree that containment was a misguided doctrine, they differ as to its true intentions. William A. Williams interprets containment as a continuation of the traditional American policy of a "world-wide Open Door" for trade and investment. The U.S. needed to continue her exports to avoid a postwar slump. Western Europe had failed to recover from the war to "take its place in the American scheme of things." The goal of American diplomacy was, argues Williams, to "coerce the Russians, to help Western Europe, and thereby establish the reality of an Open Door system throughout the world." Containment was an economic policy cloaked in ideological rhetoric. Kennan "had so internalized the assumptions and principles of the Open Door Policy that he thought he was proposing a radically different program. This indeed is the final act in the transformation of a utopia into an ideology."²⁴

A slightly different interpretation is offered by David Horowitz and Denna F. Fleming. Neither deny the economic goals of containment, but both emphasize the inherent political basis of the doctrine. Containment was a retreat from the "liberation" policy of 1945-6 based on the threat of nuclear war. Containment was an abandonment of diplomacy and negotiation resting on the fundamental assumption that the Soviets respected only force. Yet the policy retained its "liberation" objectives. Containment was designed to "strangle communism." Containment was not simply traditional adherence to an economic open door, but an attempt to destroy the one remaining viable challenge to America's corporate capitalism. The doctrine was more ideological anti-communism than a pragmatic defence of an open door for American exports.²⁵

Neither Horowitz nor Fleming quote directly from the realist defenders of containment; however the writings of Morgentau and Kennan illustrate the "liberation" side of containment. Morgenthau admitted that:

Containment . . . always carried within itself the implication 'roll back' of Russian power, of the 'liberation' of the satellite nations . . . 'Liberation', in contrast to the recognition of a Russian sphere of influence, has always been an objective implicit in the policy of containment.²⁶

Similarly, Kennan asserted in his **American Diplomacy** that containment would force "fundamental domestic changes" within the Soviet Union. In **Realities of**

American Foreign Policy, in contrast to his later writings, Kennan asserted that containment and liberation "are only two sides of the same coin." Containment was merely more practical. Kennan summarized:

The retraction of Soviet power from its present bloated and unhealthy limits is essential to the stability of world relationships. To bring it about must be a cardinal aim of Western policy.²⁷

The "new left" thus sees a tragic irony in containment: Conceived of as a "liberation" policy to force major changes within the Soviet Union and a retreat from Eastern Europe, containment forced the Soviets to adopt a harder line towards the West. Containment reinforced the Marxist view of encirclement. Far from moderation the Russians, containment strengthened the influence of the hardline Marxists and extreme nationalists within the USSR.²⁸

The dispute among the "new left" whether to emphasize economic motives or traditional anti-communism as the basis of containment is partly resolved by Walter LaFeber. LaFeber accepts Williams' concept of the open door; he, however, argues that economic motives do not completely explain containment. The open door went hand-in-hand with America's ideological anti-communism and sense of mission. Thus containment, as implemented in the Marshall Plan, "served as an all-purpose weapon for Truman's foreign policy. It charmed those who feared a slump in American exports and believed . . . that American and world prosperity rested on a vigorous export tradeThe Plan also attracted a group which placed more emphasis on the containment of Communism." The Marshall Plan was, according to LaFaber, "all things to all people." The containment doctrine and the Marshall Plan were not radical departures from traditional American policy. Rather they marked the last phase of America's attempt to limit herself to economic tactics to oppose communism. But the analysis and assumptions that led to containment and the Marshall Plan led naturally to the later military orientation of the policy. Due to their fixed view of communism and the Soviet Union, the realists were forced to accept Truman's assertion that Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan were "two halves of the same walnut" and they "willingly acquiesced as the military aspects of the Doctrine developed into quite the larger part."²⁹ Thus LaFaber accepts the Kennan-Morgenthau distinction between the Marshall Plan and the later program of containment--the Truman Doctrine and NATO. He, however, sees one leading inevitably to the other.

Lloyd C. Gardner, one of the most prolific of the "new left" historians, offers a similar analysis. Gardner essentially agrees with Kennan concerning the intentions of containment. However, Gardner argues that what Kennan proposed as a preliminary step prior to negotiation rapidly expanded far beyond its initial goals. Unlike Lafeber, Gardner attributes this change to the efforts of one individual: It was Secretary of the Navy, James V. Forrestal, who elevated containment from a temporary strategy to a global military policy. Kennan, he said,

. . . had set out only to instruct American policy-makers, not to start a crusade. . . . Kennan watched with increasing dismay as the 'X' article assumed the attributes and separate life of an anonymous spokesman for American foreign policy, one whose pen sounded the call to arms in the early morning of the Cold War.³⁰

Despite differences in emphasis, the "new left" generally regards containment as well within the traditions of American foreign policy. It was neither revolutionary nor realistic. It was the result of an ideology based on a distorted perception of the Soviet Union. It was an over-reaction that led not to negotiation and settlement, but to a solidification of the cold war and a global military commitment to the status quo.

Although there remain fundamental differences between the assumptions and interpretations of the "realists" and the "new left," there does seem to be a gradual merging of their views of containment. Thus Gardner, a leader of the "new left," supports the basic "realist" distinction between the original containment goals and the later distortion of the doctrine. Similarly, Gaddis' recent interpretation agrees with the basic "new left" point that containment and the Truman Doctrine were not revolutionary departures from traditional American policy.

To properly assess containment, historians must ask some different questions about the doctrine. The question of containment as a "great departure" or the logical continuation of earlier policies can only be answered by examination of the period **prior** to the "Mr. 'X'" article. A study of containment cannot begin in late 1946 or 1947. A policy statement cannot be extracted from its historical situation and its relationship to previous policies.³¹

Similarly, historians have yet to examine adequately the domestic implications of containment. Was containment a response to domestic and ethnic group pressure as well as to external communism or did containment have to be "sold" to the American public? Was it necessary to make the doctrine military in nature to gain domestic support, or was this the intended purpose from its conception?

The "realist" complaint that containment was a political program and the "new left" assertion that it inevitably led to a military emphasis should be examined by studies of the military. What was the military establishment's view of containment? Did it perceive of the doctrine as implying global commitments? Did its members lobby to make the doctrine military? Was there a conflict between the military and the State Department concerning the meaning of containment?

To defend their argument that there was an essential difference between the concept of containment and the later programs of Truman, defenders of the "realist" position must examine the relationship between Truman and the foreign policy planners. If containment was "abandoned" for idealism and global commitments, why? What protests did those who, according to Kennan, saw the doctrine as "the first step towards negotiations" make?³² Of more importance, what were the objectives of these aborted "negotiated settlements?" Was Soviet disengagement the ultimate goal of containment, as recently stated by Kennan, or a "dictated peace" as argued by Horowitz? By arguing that their ideas were "sabotaged" or "abandoned" the "realists" avoid the difficulties of explaining what the end result of their program would have been or how others were so easily able to distort the original containment doctrine.

Much of the recent criticism of containment also rests as much on assumptions as facts. The "new left" has attempted to relate containment to the period prior to

1946 by integrating it into an interpretative framework encompassing all of American diplomatic history. However, their blanket indictment of American policy, their occasional lapses in research and their admitted lack of detachment have detracted from their interpretations.³³

Despite the weaknesses of much of the "new left" work, it is clear that they have shaken the previous uncritical acceptance of containment as a great departure from America's past moralism to meet a grave challenge to U.S. security. The "popular realist" interpretation remains the textbook account, but Kennan's disavowal of the implications of the "Mr. 'X'" article seems tacit admittance that the traditional unquestioning defense of containment no longer suffices.

NOTES

1 "Mr. 'X'" (George F. Kennan), "sources of Soviet Conduct," **Foreign Affairs**, XXV (July, 1947), 566-82.

2 See Joseph G. Whelan, "George Kennan and His Influence on American Foreign Policy," **Virginia Quarterly Review**, XXV (Spring, 1959), 196-200.

3 Walter Lippmann, **The Cold War: A Study in American Foreign Policy** (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947).

4 George F. Kennan, **Realities of American Foreign Policy** (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1954), 46-9.

5 Hans J. Morgenthau, **In Defense of the National Interests** (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951); Norman A. Graebner, "Dean Acheson," in Norman A. Graebner (ed.), **An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century** (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1961), 267-88; Henry A. Kissinger, **The Necessity of Choice** (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), 176-8; Walter Johnson, **1600 Pennsylvania Avenue: Presidents and People, 1929-1959** (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1960); John Lukacs, **A History of the Cold War** (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1961); Staughton Lynd, "How the Cold War Began," **Commentary**, XXX (November, 1960), 379-87; Louis Halle, **American Foreign Policy** (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960) and **The Cold War as History** (New York: Harper and Row, 1967).

6 Kennan, Morgenthau, Lukacs, and Harry B. Price **The Marshall Plan and its Meaning** (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1955), 365-6 all argue that it was Harry Truman who abandoned the Kennan concept of containment in favor of military commitments. In contrast, Graebner and Kissinger attribute the perversion of containment to the Eisenhower Administration and particularly to John Foster Dulles.

7 Halle, **American Foreign Policy**, 295.

8 *Ibid.*, 300.

9 Hans J. Morgenthau, **The Impasse of American Foreign Policy** (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), 12-3.

10 *Ibid.*, 40

11 *Ibid.*

12 George F. Kennan, **Memoirs 1925-1950** (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1967), 358-67.

13 George F. Kennan, "Polycentrism and Western Policy," **Foreign Affairs**, XLII (January, 1964), 171-83.

14 John Lewis Gaddis, "Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?" **Foreign Affairs**, LII (January, 1974), 386-402. See also John Lewis Gaddis, **The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947** (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

15 Eric F. Goldman, **The Crucial Decade and After** (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), 62-81.

¹⁶ Desmond Donnelley, **Struggle for the World: The Cold War, 1917-1965** (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965), 236-40; John W. Spanier, **American Foreign Policy Since World War Two** (2nd revised edition: New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), 31-7.

¹⁷ Herbert Druks, **Harry Truman and the Russians, 1945-1948** (New York: R. Speller, 1966), 115. See also McGeorge Bundy, "Appeasement, Provocation and Policy," **The Reporter**, V (January 9, 1951).

¹⁸ See, for example, H. Bradford Westerfield, **Foreign Policy and Party Politics** (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 203-26.

¹⁹ See Robert Langbaum's defense of containment from the attacks of John Paul Darte on the left and John Foster Dulles on the right, "Limited War as the Path to Peace: The Case for Containment," **Commentary**, XIII (July, 1951), 1-9.

²⁰ Henry L. Roberts, **Russia and America: Dangers and Prospects** (New York: The Council on Foreign Relations, 1956), 104, 192-4.

²¹ Many of the criticisms of containment and the "realists" made by the "new left" are echoes of those made in 1947. See, for example, Henry A. Wallace, **Towards World Peace** (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1948). Containment was also immediately attacked by the right as a "no-win" policy that acknowledged the success of Soviet expansion. See James Burnham, **Containment or Liberation?** (New York: The John Day Company 1952); Robert A. Taft, **A Foreign Policy for America** (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1951); John Foster Dulles, **War or Peace?** (New York: Macmillan, 1950).

²² A good summary of the "new left" argument is Contained in Christopher Lasch, "The Cold War Revisited and Revisioned," **New York Times Magazine** (January 14, 1968), 26-7ff. See also Donald Brandon, **American Foreign Policy: Beyond Utopianism and Realism** (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966), chapter 5, "The Realist Vogue," 84-97.

²³ William A. Williams, **The Tragedy of American Diplomacy** (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1959), 268.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Williams is supported by Carl Oglesby and Richard Shaull, **Containment and Change** (New York: Macmillan and Co., 1967), 197-8.

²⁵ David Horowitz, **The Free World Colossus: A Critique of American Foreign Policy in the Cold War** (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1965), 245-58; Denna F. Fleming, **The Cold War and its Origins, 1917-1960** (2 vols.; Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1961), II, 987-90. Both authors base much of their interpretation of America's "liberation" policy on P.M.S. Blackett, **Fear, War and the Bomb** (New York: McGraw Hill, 1949). Blackett's interpretation has been expanded by Gar Alperovitz, **Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam** (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1965).

²⁶ Morgenthau, **Impasse of American Foreign Policy**, 40.

²⁷ Kennan, **Realities of American Foreign Policy**, 76, **American Diplomacy, 1900-1950** (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 114-8.

²⁸ William A. Williams, "the Irony of Containment," **Nation**, 182 (May 5, 1956), 376-9. Horowitz, 248-55.

²⁹ Walter LaFeber, **America, Russia and the Cold War, 1945-1966** (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), 51-3.

³⁰ Lloyd C. Gardner, **Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy 1941-1949** (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), 299-300.

³¹ Recently both revisionists and counter-revisionists have begun to examine American policy in the immediate postwar period. See Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, **The Limits of Power: The World and U.S. Foreign Policy** (New York: Harper and Row, 1972) and Lisle A. Rose, **After Yalta: America and the Origins of the Cold War** (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973).

³² Dean G. Acheson's memoirs make no note of a change in the concept of containment nor a dispute between the Kennan realists and the administration. See Dean G. Acheson, **Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department** (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1969).

³³ See Robert James Maddox's criticism of the "new left's" research and objectivity in **The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War** (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973).

A NOTE ON APPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE WRITING OF DIPLOMATIC HISTORY

Salvatore Prisco III*

A significant, although virtually untapped source of information in the writing of United States diplomatic history is a National Archives file entitled "Letters of Application and Recommendation" within the General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59. The file is composed of letters of application and recommendation to federal office from 1797 to 1901, and is arranged by presidential administrations. For the most part, the applications and recommendations are for State Department and Foreign Service positions. The administrations from John Adams to Andrew Johnson are available on microfilm with applicants' files in alphabetical order. Those of succeeding administrations must be consulted at the National Archives in Washington, D.C. Eventually the entire collection up to 1901 will be on microfilm.

"Letters of Application and Recommendation" can provide important and sometimes conclusive information about the sponsorship of particular applicants, party patronage and special interests, and the role of specific regional and national economic and political influences in the appointment of personnel to diplomatic posts. The placement of diplomatic representatives by private interests was often expected to lead to expanded profits from foreign markets, and enlarged political influence. Thus historians concerned with economic aspects (as well as others) in the conduct of United States foreign relations will find the "Letters of Application and Recommendation" of genuine interest.

Although the records of many supplicants for State Department posts are not complete, the individual files of a number of applicants are a veritable treasurer-trove of information. For example, John Barrett, an American diplomat who served in Asia and Latin America, and as Director-General of the Pan American Union from 1894 to 1920, has some fifty items in his file which show definite links between his diplomatic appointments and certain economic and political interests (especially in the Pacific Northwest) including recommendations from Peter E. Studebaker, the manufacturer of carriages and farm machinery (and later automobiles), the Portland Flouring Mills (Oregon), the Oregon Pacific Railway Co., the First National Bank of Portland, Ladd and Bush Bankers of Oregon, the Missionary Society of the Methodist Church, the North Carolina Bankers' Association, the Engineer Club of New York, the Merchants Association of New York, the Southern Manufacturing Association, the United States Export Association, the Chambers of Commerce of San Francisco, Los Angeles, Dallas, Nashville, Tacoma and Seattle, and a number of other interests.¹

Another applicant was Thomas R. Jernigan of North Carolina, a consular official who served in Latin America and Asia. In 1894 he sought a diplomatic post in Japan. His file holds sixteen items including a recommendation from North Carolina's Governor, Elias Carr, who wrote that "the leading and most influential businessmen of North Carolina would be greatly pleased by Mr. Jernigan's appointment, as is testified by their endorsements."² Other recommendations came from the North Carolina Department of Agriculture, the Farmers' and

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Merchants' Bank, the Alexandria, Tyler and Northwestern Railway, the Norfolk **Virginian**, the First National Bank of Raleigh, Wake Forest College, and the Commercial and Farmers' Bank.

The records of Edwin H. Conger, U.S. minister to Brazil and China, are also significant. A combination of four flour companies recommended him for the post of minister to Brazil, saying that "Within the past three years, since the abrogation of our reciprocity treaty with the Brazilians, our flour trade has suffered, . . . To remedy this evil will require the intervention of the Department of State, aided by an able and efficient representative of this country to Brazil, and we take the liberty of suggesting the name of Mr. E.H. Conger who so faithfully and successfully laboured in the interest of American commerce during the four years of his residence there under the administration of Mr. Harrison."³ Other letters of support came from New York merchants and the Royal Union Mutual Life Insurance Co.

Records for whom "Letters of Application and Recommendation" are more limited in this period of time include those of Francis B. Loomis, Charles Denby, Sr. and Jr., E.T. Williams, Charles R. Crane, Mark Dunnell, Julian Arnold, John V.A. MacMurray, Willard D. Straight, Paul S. Reinsch, W.W. Rockhill, Lloyd C. Griscom, Willys R. Peck, Henry P. Fletcher and Francis M. Huntington-Wilson.

Although no one has made a systematic study of all available collections of "Letters of Application and Recommendation" from 1797 to 1901, the material might well lend itself to a quantitative analysis of multifaceted motivations behind diplomatic appointments in different periods. For example, a summary investigation of thousands of applications and recommendations submitted during the administrations of John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson reveals that in the period 1825 to 1837 fewer concrete ties existed between specific economic interests and diplomatic appointments than in the period beginning in the 1880's and going through 1901.⁴

While we do not have complete records for each individual applicant (and in some cases no records at all), we do have enough significant information so that diplomatic historians should be able to make use of this data to deepen our understanding of the relationship between private interests (economic or otherwise), and United States foreign policy, 1797-1901.

NOTE

1 U.S. National Archives, Letters of Application and Recommendation, John Barrett, Record Group 59, Box 12.

2 U.S.N.A., Letters, Thomas R. Jernigan, R. G. 59, Box 57.

3 U.S.N.A., Letters, Edwin H. Conger, R.G. 59, Box 24.

4 U.S.A.N., Letters of Application and Recommendation: John Quincy Adams, 1825-1829, R. G. 59, Microcopy No. M531 (8 rolls). Also Letters of Application and Recommendation: Andrew Jackson, 1829-1837, R.G. 59, Microcopy No. M639 (27 rolls).

PUBLICATIONS BY MEMBER OF SHAFR

Ronald J. Caridi (Trenton State Col., N.J.), **Twentieth Century American Foreign Policy; Security and Self-Interest**. 1974. Prentice-Hall. pb. \$5.95; cl. \$10.50.

Richard S. Kirkendall (Executive Sec'y, OAH), **The United States, 1929-1945; Years of Crisis and Change**. 1974. McGraw-Hill. Pb. \$5.95; cl. \$8.95. Modern America Series.

Lisle A. Rose (Dep't of State, Washington, D.C.), **Dubious Victory: The United States and the End of World War II**. 1974. Kent State U Press. \$10.00. Reviewed in **History**, Feb., 1974.

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., **The Imperial Presidency**. 1973. Houghton Mifflin Co. \$10.00. Reviewed in New York **Times**, Nov. 18, 1973; **Perspective**, Dec. 1973; **History**, March, 1974.

Robert W. Sellen and Thomas A Bryson, eds. **American Diplomatic History; Issues and Methods**. 1974. Dep't of Geography, West Georgia College, Carrollton, Ga. 30117. \$2.00. Checks payable to Sears Book Fund.

John Snetsinger (California State U, San Luis Obispo), **Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel**. 1974. Stanford:the Hoover Institution Press. \$6.95. Reviewed in **History**, May/June, 1974.

Ralph E. Weber (Marquette U) ed., **As Others See Us: American History in the Foreign Press**. 1972. Holt, Rinehart, and Winston. Pb. \$4.00; cl. \$7.00.

Ralph E. Weber (Marquette U) and Thomas E. Hachey, eds., **Voices of Revolution**. 1972. Dryden Press. Pb. \$4.95.

Monte D. Wright and Lawrence J. Paszek, eds., **Soldiers and Statesmen: The Proceedings of the 4th Military History Symposium, U.S. Air Force Academy, Oct. 22-23, 1970**. 1973. U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Washington, D. C. Pb. \$1.60. Participants in the symposium included the following members from SHAFR: Russell F. Weigley, Forrest C. Pogue, Gaddis Smith, and Richard D. Challener.

**ABSTRACTS OF ARTICLES PUBLISHED, OR SCHOLARLY PAPERS
DELIVERED, BY MEMBERS OR SHAFR**

(Please limit abstracts to a total of twelve (12) lines of **Newsletter** space. The overriding problem of space, plus the wish to accommodate as many contributors as possible, make this restriction necessary. Don't send lengthy summaries to the editor with the request that he cut as he sees fit. Go over abstracts carefully before mailing. If words are omitted or statements are vague, the editor in attempting to make needed changes may do violence to the meaning of the article or paper. Do not send abstracts until a paper has actually been delivered, or an article has actually appeared in print. For abstracts of articles, please supply the date, the volume, the number within the volume, and the pages. Double space all abstracts).

Justus D. Doenecke (New College, Sarasota, Fla.), "The Debate over Coercion: The Dilemma of America's Pacifists and the Manchurian Crisis." **Peace and Change**.2(Spring, 1974), 47-52. This article is an effort to modify the "conventional wisdom" which contended that the nation's pacifists were naive in responding to totalitarian aggression. The writer argues that in the 1930's the American peace movement was gaining a more realistic picture of an increasingly barbarous world than were the interventionists. The recognition of Japan's legitimate needs in the Manchurian area--as carefully distinguished from her callous slaughter of innocent Chinese civilians--does not denote mere sentimentality. Nor does the willingness to recognize America's partial responsibility for Japan's action. If both church and secular historians have continually praised the "Christian realism" of Reinhold Niebuhr, it is well to note the insight of those pacifists who demanded justice for Japan and foresaw that the United States could commit demonic acts.

Reinhold R. Doerries (Hamburg University, W. Germany), "Amerikanische Aussenpolitik im Karibischen Raum vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg", **Jahrbuch für Amerikastudien**, 18 (1973), 62-82. Originally a lecture given before the Annual Meeting of the Deutsche Gesellschaft Für Amerikastudien, the essay contends that American participation and intervention in Latin American affairs prior to World War I did not represent a major departure from U.S. foreign policy. Rather, the U.S. accepted its role as a major power in the concert of nations. While U.S. presidents such as Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson sought varied approaches to Latin American problems and crises, citizens of the involved neighboring nations merely experienced the indignities of interference. Whenever American security or the American sphere of interest appeared to be threatened, diplomatic negotiation took place under the threat of armed confrontation.

Reinhard R. Doerries (Hamburg University, W. Germany), "Imperial Berlin and Washington: New Light on America's Involvement in World War I". Paper read by invitation of the Yale University Council on West European Studies, New Haven, Conn., April, 1974. Based on the documentary evidence from the archives of the German Foreign Office, the paper maintains that the German Empire not only contributed measurably to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe but that the Imperial German Government decidedly refused to accept mediation from the American president, even though it was clearly evident that the war could not be won on the battlefield or the high seas. Waving aside all possibilities of reconciliation, the German Government deliberately provoked the United States into entry of the war on the side of the Entente.

Kenneth J. Hagan (U.S. Naval Academy), "Toward a New Definition of Isolationism; Nineteenth Century American Naval Activity in the Indian Ocean." Annual meeting of American Anthropological Ass'n, New Orleans, Nov., 1973. This paper argued that the U.S. was not isolated from the Indian Ocean during the nineteenth century insofar as naval activity indicated interest and involvement. Throughout the century the Navy Department on occasion ordered its ships to that ocean for specific purposes, such as investigation of a mutiny or murder. Moreover, warships traveling from naval bases on the east coast of the U.S. to duty with the Asiatic Squadron habitually transited the Indian Ocean at the beginning and end of their extended cruises. While in the ocean, the warships usually performed some sort of quasi-diplomatic function. Very much of that naval diplomacy was concerned with searching for markets for American agricultural and industrial products, a search only abandoned with the onset of dramatic European colonialism toward the end of the century. The intermittent but consistent use of the navy to hunt for commercial outlets indicates the dynamic impact of economic factors upon American foreign policy as well as a traditional willingness to use some kind of force to achieve desired ends.

Hugh B. Hammett (Rochester Institute of Technology), "The Jay Treaty: Crisis Diplomacy in the New Nation". **The Social Studies**. 1974, 65 (1), 10-17. An article for teachers and general readers describing the Jay mission, its implications for the survival of the young nation, the effects of the agreement, and the most recent developments in the historical literature concerning the treaty. One obvious conclusion is that, even after the passage of fifty years, Samuel F. Bemis's epochal **Jay's Treaty** still holds up well, offering an interpretation held by most American diplomatic historians.

Philip W. Kennedy (University of Portland, Oregon). "Race and the American Presence in the Philippines". "Annual meeting of Asian Studies on the Pacific Coast, Santa Barbara, June, 1974. This paper dealt with the attitude of Americans in the Philippines in the first decade of the twentieth century. Americans carried with them the belief that the Filipinos were colored and hence inferior. This attitude was intensified by the Filipino Insurrection. In a more positive view, Americans carried to the Philippines a sense of mission to civilize the Filipinos. This was to be accomplished through a program of formal education under American auspices. At some future date, the Filipinos would become responsible for the unencumbered direction of their own affairs.

Thomas Schoonover (U of Southwestern Louisiana), "El algodón mexicano y la guerra norteamericana." **Historia Mexicana**. 23 (enero-marzo, 1974), 483-506. The Civil War in the United States, for all its tragic course north and east of the Rio Grande, apparently had a beneficial effect upon the Mexican economy in several aspects. The increase in Mexican cotton production in the early 1860s served as one basis for the expansion of trade ties between two liberal governments--that of Juárez in Mexico and of the Republicans in the United States. The isolation of the textile industry in the northeastern portion of the United States from its southern sources made it an eager purchaser of Mexican cotton. The expanded Mexican-United States trade in cotton aided the economy of several Mexican areas, particularly the Pacific Coast region, which were loyal to the Juárez government and least accessible to French control. It is thus possible to suggest that the expanded Mexican cotton trade, directly or indirectly, helped keep the Liberal government of Juárez in power.

Thomas Schoonover (U of Southwestern Louisiana), "Pre-Porfirato United States Economic Penetration into Mexico--the 1860's." Annual Meeting of the Missouri Valley Historical Conference, Omaha, Nebr., March, 1974. In spite of the American Civil War and Mexico's previous fifty-year history of disorder and revolution, capped in 1861 by foreign intervention, speculators, capitalists, and promoters from the United States launched an intensive campaign to gain concessions and to seize investment opportunities in Mexico during precisely those years from 1861 to 1867. During the 1860's these businessmen succeeded in acquainting themselves with virtually every phase of Mexican economic life and obtained footholds in several areas. Most significantly, their activity was quietly encouraged by Congress and the State Department and welcomed by Mexico.

Thomas Schoonover (U of Southwest Louisiana), ed., "Documents Concerning Lemuel Dale Evans' Plan to Keep Texas in the Union in 1861." **East Texas Historical Journal**. 12 (Spring, 1974), 35-38. These letters reveal a plan for undermining the secessionist forces in Texas. It is also possible that besides the unionist factor in the Evans plans, the U.S. Secretary of State, William H. Seward, intended to use Evans's strength in Texas to extend the blockade of the Confederacy up the whole length of the Rio Grande valley, thus almost totally isolating Texas and the Confederacy from the rest of the world.

Joseph M. Siracusa (U of Queensland, Australia), "The United States, Vietnam, and the Cold War: a Reappraisal", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*. 5 (March, 1974), 82-101. American involvement in Vietnam, as set against the background of the Pentagon Papers, is seen as unintelligible considered apart from the larger foreign policy considerations of the United States during World War II, the immediate postwar period, and the Korean War. According to the thesis of this article, President F. D. Roosevelt's Indo-Chinese policy served both as a function of his overall plan to accelerate the liberation of colonial peoples throughout the world (where possible), and of his efforts to punish the French by depriving them of their Southeast Asian empire. Similarly, under President Harry S. Truman America's Vietnamese policy served at once as a function of the administration's larger policy of containing, first, Soviet imperialism in Europe and, secondly, Sino-Soviet imperialism in Korea and Southeast Asia. From the Korean experience onward successive American presidents came increasingly to believe that Vietnam had become an internationalized testing ground of rival Great Powers and ideological claims and never seriously bothered to consider the political realities of that part of the world, which were once dimly perceived, apart from larger policy considerations. When the Nixon trips to communist capitals inaugurated "a period of detente" with America's erstwhile rivals, the nation's Vietnam policy stood alone for a season and appeared generally absurd if not wicked.

PERSONALS

Upon that epochal day when Richard M. Nixon resigned the presidency and Gerald R. Ford assumed it, SHAFR watchers of events upon the NBC channel were doubtlessly delighted to see the genial face, and to listen to the learned comments, of their fellow member, Henry Graff (Columbia), who was the historical specialist for the occasion.

Reinhard R. Doerries (Hamburg University, West Germany) spent the academic year 1973-74 in the United States as a fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies. He has been awarded the same grant for a second year in order to continue his comparative study of the acculturation of German-Americans and Irish-Americans.

Kenneth P. Jones (U of Tennessee, Martin) will be teaching at the University of Mainz, Germany, during the academic year 1974-75.

Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent State), Executive Secretary-Treasurer of SHAFR, was a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center, Washington, D.C., the past summer.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

The Committee upon Nominations, chaired by Samuel F. Wells (U of North Carolina), solicits opinions and recommendations from the membership relative to prospective officers for the Society whose terms will begin at the AHA convention in December of 1975. The three positions which must be filled, and upon which advice is desired, are those of vice president, membership upon the Council, and membership upon the Nominations Committee.

This is the year (an even one) in which the **Roster and Research List** of SHAFR is revised and issued in a complete form. Consequently, the editor of the **List**, Warren F. Kimball (Rutgers U, Newark), and his associate, Mary Jo Lemaldi, are at work now preparing this compilation for publication by the end of the year, and they would like to have all relevant information from the membership as soon as possible. All members, and especially those of some years standing, should, therefore, carefully review their current entries upon the **List** and make all changes that are necessary to bring them into conformity with present conditions. This **List** is a valuable one for all those who are working in the area of U.S. diplomatic history, and its thorough revision well deserves the firm support of all members of SHAFR. (The form to be used in complying with this request will be found on the last page of this issue of the **Newsletter**).

The first independent national meeting ever of SHAFR is scheduled to be held at Georgetown U, Washington, D.C., August 15-16, 1975. All national meetings of SHAFR have thus far been held in conjunction with the two older and much larger historical organizations, the AHA and the OAH. A separate national gathering will be a milestone in the independence of the Society, indicating an advanced degree of maturity. This meeting will, hopefully, become an annual event, but the materialization of this hope will depend greatly upon the reaction of the membership to this initial convention. All members of the Society should then "lay it upon their hearts" to include this convocation among their "musts" for 1975. The assemblage will be for two days with two full-length sessions each day. A couple of luncheons and one or two dinners are also contemplated, at each of which formal papers will be presented. Individuals who have ideas concerning the sessions, or who are willing to present papers, should contact the personnel of the Program Committee at once.

The membership of the Program Committee consists of Thomas G. Paterson, chairperson (U of Connecticut); Raymond O'Connor (U of Miami, Coral Gables); Warren I. Cohen (Michigan State U); Jerald A. Combs (San Francisco State U); and Frank Merli (Queens College, CUNY).

In addition to suggestions relative to the national meeting of SHAFR outlined above, the Committee welcomes proposals of panels for possible joint sessions with the Organization of American Historians (April, 1975), Southern Historical Association (Fall, 1975), and the American Historical Association (December, 1975).

All proposals for panels should follow these guidelines:

(1) The proposals should be sent to the chairperson **and** to each member of the Program Committee.

(2) Each proposal should be as complete as possible, with the following information: statement of purpose, title of panel topic, list of participants (including commentators and chairperson), and rationale.

(3) Indicate the meeting for which the panel is proposed.

(4) The Committee will assist members who have individual papers to present in reaching scholars who have similar topics, but individuals should first attempt to make such contacts themselves in organizing complete panels.

The Committee welcomes suggestions concerning its procedures, as well as possible topics for meetings still farther in the future than those mentioned above.

One program at the annual meeting of the SHA will be of particular interest to U.S. diplomatic historians. Titled "Paradigms and Models: What Utility for Diplomatic History?" it will be held at 9:30 a.m., Thursday, November 7, in the Danish Room of the Hotel Adolphus, meeting headquarters, Commerce and Akard, Dallas, Texas 75221. Melvin Small (Wayne State U) will speak upon the topic, "The Application of Quantitative Techniques to Diplomatic History," while Ernest R. May (Harvard) will hold forth upon "Theories of Bureaucratic Politics." Comment will be offered by Wayne S. Cole (Maryland), ex-president of SHAFR, and Jamie W. Moore (The Citadel).

That same day, at 5:00-7:00 p.m., SHAFR will sponsor a cocktail party (cash bar) and smoker in the Century Room of the Adolphus.

THE ACADEMIC EXCHANGE

(Acting solely in a service capacity, the **Newsletter** will carry notices of (a) vacancies in various fields which are of interest to U.S. diplomatic historians, and (b) the vitae of members of SHAFR who desire employment. All announcements will be anonymous, unless a user specifically states otherwise. Each notice will be assigned a number, and persons who are interested must mention that number when contacting the editorial office. That office will then supply the name and address which corresponds to that number. When contacting the editor regarding an announcement, please enclose a stamped, addressed envelope for the return. Announcements should not exceed twelve (12) lines in the **Newsletter**. Unless specifically requested to do otherwise, and then subject to the limitations of space and fairness to others, a particular notice will be carried only once a year).

#E--103 Ph. D. (Princeton, 1966) in U.S. diplomatic and recent American history. Nine years experience in teaching at undergraduate level. Eight articles in print and several more accepted for publication. Author of a small bibliographical monograph. Now writing two books, one of which is under contract in a presidential series. Can teach courses of a specialized nature in recent, as well as intellectual, history of the U.S. Can also handle survey courses in U.S. history and in European history since the Renaissance.

THE STUART L. BERNATH PRIZE COMPETITION FOR 1975

The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations announces that the 1975 competition for the Stuart L. Bernath Prize upon a book dealing with any aspect of American foreign affairs is still open. The purpose of the award is to recognize and to encourage distinguished research and writing by young scholars in the field of U.S. diplomatic relations.

CONDITIONS OF THE AWARD

ELIGIBILITY: The prize competition is open to any book on any aspect of American foreign relations that is published during 1974. It must be the author's first or second book.

PROCEDURES: Books may be nominated by the author, the publisher, or by any member of SHAFR. Five (5) copies of each book must be submitted with the nomination. The books should be sent to: Dr. Theodore A. Wilson, Chairman, Stuart L. Bernath Prize Committee, Department of History, University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas 66044. The works must be received not later than December 31, 1974.

AMOUNT OF AWARD: \$500.00. If two (2) or more works are deemed winners, as in 1972, the amount will be shared. The award will be announced at the luncheon for members of SHAFR, held in conjunction with the annual meeting of the OAH which will be April, 1975, at Boston, Mass.

SHAFR ROSTER AND RESEARCH LIST

Please use this form to register your general and current research interests as well as your address. This **List** is stored upon computer tapes so that information may be quickly retrieved. In order for the system to work, though, two things are necessary from the members: (a) simple, concise, obvious titles should be used in describing projects; (b) a key word should be specified for each project. It would be quite helpful if members would send revised information to the editor whenever new data is available, since it will be much easier to keep the files up to date and avoid a rush in the fall. If a form is not available, a short memo will suffice. Changes which pertain only to addresses should be sent to the Executive Secretary, and he will pass them on to the editors of the **List** and the **Newsletter**. Unless new data is submitted, previously listed research projects will be repeated.

Name: _____ Title: _____

Address _____

State: _____ Zip Code _____ Institutional Affiliation

(if different from address) _____

General area of research interest: _____

_____ Key word _____

Current research project(s): _____

_____ Key word(s) _____

If this is pre-doctoral work, check here _____

Mail to: Dr. W. F. Kimball, editor
SHAFR R & R List
Department of History
Rutgers University, Newark
Newark, New Jersey 07102

THE SHAFR NEWSLETTER

SPONSOR: Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, Tennessee.

EDITOR: Nolan Fowler, Department of History, Tennessee Tech, Cookeville, Tennessee 38501.

ISSUES: The **Newsletter** is published on the 15th of March, June, and September, and on the 1st of December. All members receive the publication.

DEADLINES: All material must be in the office of the editor not later than six (6) weeks prior to the publication date.

ADDRESS CHANGES: Notification of address changes should be in the office of the editor at least one month prior to the date of publication. Copies of the **Newsletter** which are returned because of faulty addresses will be forwarded only upon the payment of a fee of 50¢.

BACK ISSUES: Copies of all back numbers of the **Newsletter** are available and may be obtained from the editorial office upon the payment of a service charge of 35¢ per number. If the purchaser lives abroad, the charge is 50¢ per number.

MATERIALS DESIRED: Personals (promotions, transfers, obituaries, honors, awards), announcements, abstracts of scholarly papers and articles delivered—or published—upon diplomatic subjects, bibliographical or historiographical essays dealing with diplomatic topics, lists of accessions of diplomatic materials to libraries, essays of a "how-to-do-it" nature respecting diplomatic materials in various depositories. Because of space limitations, "straight" articles and book reviews are unacceptable.